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"A substantial and compendious report of a case rightly adjudged doth produce

OF THI!

three notable effects; first. It openeth the understanding of the reader and hearer;

secondly, it breaketh through difficulties; and thirdly, it bringeth home to the hand

of the studious, variety of pleasure and profit; I say It doth open the window of

LAW OF

the laws, to let in that gladsome light, whereby the right reason of the rule (the

beauty of the law) may be clearly discerned; it breaketh the thick and hard shell,

whereby with pleasure and ease, the sweetness of the kernel may be sensibly

tasted, and adorneth with variety of fruits, both pleasant and profitable, the store-
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houses of those by whom they were never planted nor watered."
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PREFACE.

Mr. Justice Swayne said the Common Law is "Reason dealing

by the light of experience with human affairs"; and Mr. Justice

Holmes says '' The life of the law has not been logic; it has been

experience." This work is designed to furnish those interested in

the study of Corporation Law,—whether practitioner, teacher or stu-

dent,—such material from the original sources, and in such order, as

will show how reason and experience have dealt with the subject.

Effort has been made in the selection to secure the best expression of

the underlying reason or theory; to place these in such order as to

develop, in a natural way, the general theory of Corporation Law,

set forth in the table of contents; to insert such notes as will present

a more comprehensive view of some of the topics; and to furnish, in

PREFACE.

chronological order, such a list of cases bearing upon the principles

as will enable the investigator to make a reasonably complete study

of the same.

The editor has had no special theories to advance, but some effort

has been made to bring back into light, and put in their proper places,

Ma.

the "personal" and "franchise" theories of corporate existence, so

The Law of Corporations cuts across nearly the whole body of the
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said the Common Law is "Reason dealing

Holmes says " The life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience." This work is designed to furnish those interested in
the study of Corporation Law,-whether practitioner, teacher or student,-such material from the original sources, and in such order, as
will show how reason and experience have dealt with the subject.
Effort has been made in the selection to secure the best expression of
the underlying reason or theory; to place these in such order as to
develop, in a natural way, the general theory of Corporation Law,
set forth in the table of contents; to insert such notes as will present
a more comprehensive view of some of the topics; and to furnish, in
c hronological order, such a list of cases bearing upon the principles
as will enable the investigator to make a reasonably complete study
of the same.
The editor has had no special theories to advance, but some effort
has been made to bring back into light, and put in their proper places,
the "personal" and "franchise" theories of corporate existence, so
much obscured by the "collection of individuals" theory in the excellent works of Mr. Morawetz and Mr. Taylor.
The Law of Corporations cuts across nearly the whole body of the
L aw. In addition, intricate and peculiar relations arise between a
corporation and the State, the Promoters, the Members, the Officers,
the Creditors, or others, as well as amongst themselves. R ecently
the volume of corporate litigation has been enormous, resulting in
numerous discordant decisions of inordinate length. All these mak,,.
the choice of illustrative cases on the subject especially difficult.
During the four years of prepara.tion, many thousand cases have bet·n
examined and compared in order to make this selection. Som e topics are not here worked out in such detail as in other collections; b·,~

lent works of Mr. Morawetz and Mr. Taylor.

Law. In addition, intricate and peculiar relations arise between a

corporation and the State, the Promoters, the Members, the Officers,

the Creditors, or others, as well as amongst themselves. Recently

the volume of corporate litigation has been enormous, resulting in

numerous discordant decisions of inordinate length. All these make

the choice of illustrative cases on the subject especially difficult.

During the four years of preparation, many thousand cases have bet n

examined and compared in order to make this selection. Some top-

ics are not here worked out in such detail as in other collections; b«»t

(v)

JusTICE SWAYNE

by the light of experience with human affairs"; and Mr. Justice

much obscured by the "collection of individuals" theory in the excel-
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VI

PREFACE.

PREFACE.

VI

many others, such as, the Corporation as a Franchise, Constitutional

Limitations on the Power to Create, Functions of Promoters, Subscrip-

many others, such as, the Corporation as a Franchise, Constitutional
Limitations on the Power to Create, Functions of Promoters, Subscriptions, Incorporation, Organization, Corporations De Facto and By
Estoppel, Name, Power to Sue and Be Sued, Taxation, Visitation,
National Corporations, the National Government and State Corporations, etc., etc., not found, or merely touched upon, in other works,
are here given due prominence. An appendix of forms is also added.
By continual cross references, many cases have been used to do double service, and thereby add to the completeness of the view.
It is believed that a constant reference by the student to the outline given in the table of contents will be of material service in helping him to understand and appreciate the bearing and relation of the
cases to one another and to the general theory of corporation law.
Acknowledgments are due to Oscar Bader, Esq., R. G. Schulder,
Esq. and Mr. H. F. Jacobs, for help in reading proof and verifying
citations.
The work is submitted to the judgment of those who have occasion
to use it, with the hope that it may be found of service.

tions, Incorporation, Organization, Corporations De Facto and By

Estoppel, Name, Power to Sue and Be Sued, Taxation, Visitation,

National Corporations, the National Government and State Corpora-

tions, etc., etc., not found, or merely touched upon, in other works,

are here given due prominence. An appendix of forms is also added.

By continual cross references, many cases have been used to do dou-

ble service, and thereby add to the completeness of the view.

It is believed that a constant reference by the student to the out-

line given in the table of contents will be of material service in help-

ing him to understand and appreciate the bearing and relation of the

cases to one another and to the general theory of corporation law.

Acknowledgments are due to Oscar Bader, Esq., R. G. Schulder,

Esq. and Mr. H. F. Jacobs, for help in reading proof and verifying

citations.

The work is submitted to the judgment of those who have occasion

to use it, with the hope that it may be found of service.

H. L. W.
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ILLUSTRATING

CASES

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES

OP THE

j

Law of Private Corporations

ILLUSTRATING

PART I.

THE IDEA OF A CORPORATION.

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES

CHAPTER 1.

DESCRIPTION AND CLASSES.

ARTICLE I. DEFINITIONS AND TESTS.

OF TBK

Sec. 1. Definitions.1 A Person": "A corporation is an artifi-

cial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contem-

plation of law.''

1819. Chief Justice Marshall, in Trustees of Dartmouth College

LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, on 636.

A Collection of Individuals': "The word 'corporation'

is but a collective name for the corporators or members who

compose an incorporated association; and where it is said

that a corporation is itself a person, or being, or creature,

PART I.

this must be understood in a figurative sense only."

et seg.
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1886. Victor Morawetz, Law of Private Corporations, 2d ed., § 1,

THE IDEA OF A CORPORATION.

A Franchise': "A corporation is a franchise created by the

king."

c. 1745. Comyn's Digest, Franchise (F) F. 1.

'Angell A A. Corp., §§ 1-65; Beach, § 1; 1 Bl. Com., *467; Boone, ch. 1;

CHAPTER 1.

Clark, ch. 1; Cook, ch. 1; Elliott, §§ 1-20; Field, ch. 1; Grant, p. *l-*9; 2

Kent Com., p. *267; 1 Kyd Corp., Int.; Taylor, ch. 1-5; 1 Thomp., ch. 1.

•See §§6-16 infra, and note, p. 72.

DESCRIPTION AND CLASSES.

* See §§ 16-21 infra, and note, p. 109.

'See §§ 22-29 infra, and note, p. 157.

(1)

ARTICLE I.

DEFINITIONS AND TESTS.

Sec. 1. Definitions.1 A

PERSON! : "A corporation is an artificial being; invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law."

1819. Chief Justice Marshall, in Trustees of Dartmouth College
v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 618, on 636.

A COLLECTION OF INDIVIDUALS': "The word 'corporation'
is but a collective name for the corporators or members who
compose an incorporated association; and where it is said
that a corporation is itself a person, or being, or creature,
this must be understood in a figurative sense only.''
1886. Victor Morawetz, Law of Private Corporations, 2d ed., §I,
et seq.
A FRANCHISE4 : ''A corporation is a franchise created by the

king . ''
c. 1745. Comyn's Digest,

~nchise

(F) F. 1.

1

Angell & A. Corp., §§ 1-66 ; Beach, § 1; 1 Bl. Com., •467; Boone, ch. 1;
\.,"'lark, ch. 1; Cook, ch. 1; Elliott, §§ 1-20; Field, ch.1; Grant, p. •1-•9; 2
Kent Com., p. •267; 1 Kyd Corp., Int.; Taylor, ch. 1-6; 1 Thomp., ch. 1.
1 See §§ 6-16 infra, and note, p. 72.
• See §§ 16-21 infra, and note, p. 109.
•See §§ 22-29 infra, and note, p. 167.

(1)
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2 WARNER AND RAY V. BEERS—BOLANDER V. STEVENS. § 2

Sec. 2. Tests. As to whether a particular institution is a corpora-

tion or not the tests are:

(1) "The merging of the individuals composing the aggre-

gate body into one distinct, artificial existence."

WARNER and RAY v. BEERS.1

BOLANDER v. STEVENS.

1840. In the Court for the Correction of Errors. 23

Wendell (N. Y.) Reports, pp. 103-190.

[In the first above entitled cause, the declaration commenced in the

name of "Joseph D. Beers," described as "President of the North

American Trust and Banking Company, an association doing busi-

ness in the city of New York, under and by virtue of an act of the

legislature of the state of New York, entitled 'an act to authorize

the business of banking,' passed April 18th, 1838, who prosecutes

for and on behalf of the said association;" and then was set forth in the

usual form a count on a promissory note by the third endorsee against

Warner and Ray, as endorsers. The declaration also contained the

common money counts, and the insimul compufassenf, alleging the

debts to have arisen, and the promises to have been made to "the

said association," and concluded with the words "to the damage of
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the said association of five hundred dollars; and therefore the said

plaintiff, as president as aforesaid, brings suit," etc.

The declaration in the second suit was like the preceding, except

that it contained only the common money counts, and the count on

the insimul computassent. To these declarations, demurrers were

put in by the defendants respectively. In the first suit, the following

cause, among others, of demurrer was assigned, viz.:

V. The institutions or associations authorized and intended to be

created by the act entitled "An act to authorize the business of bank-

ing" are corporations or bodies politic, and the act expressly allows

the creation of an indefinite and unlimited number of such corpora-

tions, at the pleasure of any persons who may associate for that pur-

pose. The act is, therefore, a violation of the ninth section of the

seventh article of the constitution of this state, and is absolutely void.

The defendant in the second cause also interposed a demurrer assign-

ing special causes similar to the special causes in the first count; the

fourth special cause being in these words: "For that the act in

the declaration mentioned, entitled 'An act to authorize the busi-

1 Statement of facte partly omitted. Arguments omitted. Opinions by

Bradiah, president of the senate, Walworth, chancellor, and Root, senator,

omitted; also, part of the opinion of Senator Verplanck. A brief analysis of

each of the opinions given in this case is given in a note by the reporter on

pp. 103-105.

TESTS: MERGER INTO ARTIFICIAL BODY.

s

ness of banking,' so far as the same proposes to authorize this suit,

TESTS:

is a violation of the provisions of the constitution of this state re-

MERGER INTO ARTIFICIAL BODY.

3

specting the creations of incorporations, and is void; and also that

the said act is void, because the same did not receive the assent of

two-thirds of all the members elected to the legislature of this state,

by which legislature the said act purports to have been passed."1

The two demurrers were brought to argument before the supreme

court, at the January term, 1840, and judgment given in both cases

for the plaintiffs. The court referred, for the reasons of the judg-

ment, to the opinions delivered by Chief Justice Nelson, Mr. Justice

Bronson and Mr. Justice Cowen, in the case of Thomas v. Dakin, 22

Wendell 9 et scg. 2 Both causes were removed by writs of error to the

court for the correction of errors, and were brought on to argument on

the iSth February, 1840.]

By Senator Verplanck. The decision of these causes seems to

me to depend wholly upon that of the question, whether or no asso-

ciations with constitutions, powers and incidents, similar to those

authorized under the general banking law, are bodies corporate and

politic; or, in other words, whether the general banking law of 1838

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:13 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

is void, because it was not passed with the express assent of two-thirds

of all the members of the legislature.

The supreme court think that they "must, on these records, presume

the general banking law to have been passed by two-thirds of all the

members of the legislature." Judge Cowen adds: "We must clearly

do so until the fact is denied by plea. The requisite constitutional

solemnities must always be presumed to have taken place until the

contrary shall be clearly shown. Should the defendant withdraw his

demurrer, and plead specially that the law in question did not receive

the assent of two-thirds as required by the constitution, it will then be

in order to pass upon the validity of such an objection." Judge

Bronson concurs more briefly to the same effect.

Now, it appears to me that this point was rightly presented on the

demurrers in these cases, so as to authorize and demand the decision

of the court. * * *

From our official knowledge of the facts of the law—from those facts

being spread out on our journals—from the actual inspection of the

record by some of us, we all well know that the act was not passed

by the vote of two-thirds of each house of the legislature. We must

then meet directly, and settle the question whether the associations

formed under the general banking laws are, or are not, "bodies politic

and corporate."'

[Definition—Artificial personality.]—What, then, is the strict defini-

tion of the phrase bodies politic and corporate?

Definitions differ in their character according to the nature of the

thing to be defined. * * *

1 See infra, p. 373.

! Infra, p. 19.

1 For statement of provisions of the general banking law of 1838, see

Thomas v. Dakin, infra, p. 21.

nei;.~

of banking,' so far as the same proposes to authorize this suit,
is a violation of the provisions of the constitution of this state respecting the creations of incorporations , and is void; and also that
the said act is void, because the same did not receive the assent of
two-thirds of all the members elected to the legislature of this sfate,
by which legislature the said act purports to have been passed." 1
The two demurrers were brought to argument before the supreme
court, at the January term, 1840, and judgment given in both cases
for the plaintiffs. The court referred, for the reasons of the judgment, to the opinions delivered by Chief Justice Nelson, Mr. Justice
Bronson and Mr. Justice Cowen, in the case of Thomas v. Dakin , 22
Wendell 9 et seq.1 Both causes were removed by writs of error to the
court for the correction of errors, and were brought on to argument on
the 18th February, 1840.]
By SENATOR VERPLANCK. The decision of these causes seems to
me to depend wholly upon that of the question, whether or no associations with constitutions, powers and incidents, similar to those
authorized under the general banking law, are bodies corporate and
politic; or, in other words, whether the general banking law of 1838
is void, because it was not passed with the express assent of two-thirds
of all the members of the legislature.
The supreme court think that they "must, on these records, presume
the general banking law to have been passed by two-thirds of all the
members of the legislature." Judge Cowen adds: "We must clearly
do so until the fact is denied by plea. The requisite constitutional
solemnities must always be presumed to have taken place until the
contrary shall be clearly shown. Should the defendant withdraw his
demurrer, and plead specially that the law in question did not receive
the assent of two-thirds as required by the constitution, it will then be
in order to pass upon the validity of such an objection." Judge
Bronson concurs more briefly to the same effect.
Now, it appears to me that this point was rightly presented on the
demurrers in these cases, so as to authorize and demand the decision
of the court.
•
•
•
From our official knowledge of the facts of the law-from those facts
being spread out on our journals-from the actual inspection of the
record by some of us, we all well know that the act was not passed
by the vote of two-thirds of each house of the legislature. We must
then meet directly, and settle the question whether the associations
formed under the general banking laws are, or are not, "bodies politic
and corporate."'
[Deftnition- Arti1leia.l personality.]-What, then, is the strict definition of the phrase bodies politic and corporateP
Definitions differ in their character according to the nature of the
thing to be defined.
•
•
•
1

See infra, p. 373.
Infra, p. 19.
1
For statement of provisions of the general banking law of 1838, see
Thomas .v. Dakin, infra, p. 21.
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Strict and essential definitions can generally be given of the terms

of positive jurisprudence, and particularly so in the extremely techni-

cal and artificial system of the ancient English law. This is remark-

ably the case, for instance, in regard to our common law terms of real

estate, as fee, lease, warranty, grant, covenant, reversion, remainder,

etc.; all of which are defined precisely and essentially, not explained

by mere attributes. Bodies corporate belong to that system, and

thence do we immediately derive them. What, then, is a body cor-

porate? What is its necessary and essential meaning? "It is called

a body corporate," says Lord Coke, "because the persons composing

it are made into one body." "It is only in abstracto, and rests only

in contemplation of law." 10 R. 50. So again, he says, 1 Inst. 202,

250, "Persons capable of purchasing are of two sorts—persons natural

created of God, and persons created by the policy of man, as persons

incorporated into a body politic." If, leaving the quaint scholastic

teaching of the father of English law, we come to the clearer and di-

recter sense of our own Marshall, we find the same prevailing idea.

"A body corporate is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, exist-

ing only in contemplation of law. Being the creature of law, it pos-

sesses only the properties conferred upon it by its charter. Among
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the most important of these are immortality, and, if the expression

may be allowed, individuality." 4 Wh. R.636; 1 Peters' R. 46.

Again; "It is precisely what the act of incorporation makes it; de-

rives all its powers from that act, and is capable of exerting its facul-

ties only in the manner which that act authorizes." "Within the

limits of the properties conferred by its charter, it can," says Black-

stone, "do all acts as natural persons may." "In corporations,"

says Prof. Woodeson, "individuals are invested by the law with a

political character and personality, wholly distinct from their natural

capacity." "A corporation," says Kyd on Corporations, 13, "is not

a mere capacity, but a political person in which many capacities re-

side." Thus, then, the essential legal definition that covers the whole

ground, and expresses the very essence of the being of a body corpo-

rate, is this: '■'■It is an artificial legal person, a succession of indi-

viduals, or an aggregate body considered by the law as a single

continuous person, limited to one peculiar mode of action, and having

the power only of the kind and degree prescribed by the law which

confers them." Such is the established notion of our common law.

Such, too, as far as I can trace it, is the doctrine of the modern civil

law, as modified by the jurisprudence of the European continent.

"Communities that are lawfully established (»'. e., corporations)," says

Doinat, one of the great teachei-s of the ante-revolutionary French

civil law, "are in the place of persons, and their union, which renders

common all their interest, makes them to be considered as one single

person." Domat, Civil Law, Lib. 1, tit. 15. To the same effect a

somewhat older Italian civilian speaks, Oldradus De Ponte, as quoted

by Sir Robert Sawyer, in his very able and learned argument in the

case of the city of London, 8 St. Tr. 1175. "Licet non habent

veram personam, habent personam fictione juris." So the older

TESTS: MERGER INTO ARTIFICIAL BODY.

s

German jurisprudence, as founded on the Roman law, also held the

TESTS:

idea of personality as essential to corporations. Heineccius, one of the

MERGER INTO ARTIFICIAL 'BODY.
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most distinguished civilians of that school in the last century, in his

instructive essay on the legal history of the corporate guilds or socie-

ties of trade so common in Germany, speaks of this personality as an

attribute of all corporations. "Universitates et contrahere ■possunt et

delinquere, quippe quae moraliter unam representant personam." De

Collegiis Opificum, in Germania, cap. 77, § 19. This doctrine of the

modern civilians of France, Italy and Germany, may be traced up

even to the jurists of the Code and Pandects. '•'■Persona vice fungitur

municipium et decuria." Pan. 1, 22, de Jide juss. I do not cite

these civilians as direct authorities, but mainly to show how deeply and

generally this pervading idea of legal personality and artificial individu-

ality entered into and formed the characteristic of all corporate bodies,

in those systems of law which might indirectly affect or govern our

own, or tend to influence even the popular use of our legal terms.

.So far was this principle of corporate personality carried in our old

common law that reasons were expressly assigned why a corporation

could not be excommunicated or punished for crime. "Because it
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has no soul," said Lord Coke, which, however ludicrously it may now

sound, was but saying quaintly, and in the style of that day, what in

modern times would be expressed by saying that a corporation, being

an artificial and not a moral person, must be incapable of guilt. The

very able argument in the celebrated historical case of the charter of

London, in 1682, went a good deal into these refinements, and it was

held on one side that a political person had a mind and reason, ac-

cording to Lord Chief Justice Hobart, and that its reason was ex-

pressed by its by-laws, whilst the attorney-general (whom Bishop

Burnet has egregiously wronged in calling him "a hot, dull man"),

argued most acutely, as well as very learnedly, in support of the ca-

pacity of a corporation to incur political, if not moral, guilt and pun-

ishment.

All these, it is true, are refinements of technical reasoning, in a

taste and fashion of thought which have passed away; but they prove

conclusively how strong and undoubted was that legal principle of

personality upon which these mere inferences and nice distinctions

were founded.

In order to continue the existence of such an artificial person, per-

petual succession is ordinarily necessary, though it was not strictly

essential, for it may be confined to any given number of lives in

being, holding in a sort of corporate joint tenancy, of which I think

examples may be found. As a legal person, it has only the powers

and properties specifically conferred upon it; and can possess and ex-

ercise no others, except such as are absolutely necessary to the exer-

cise of the powers expressly given. This is the enactment of our re-

vised statutes, which, as our revisers rightly said in their report on

that title of the law, is "declaratory of a principle of law frequently

recognized by our courts, and which it was deemed useful to confirm

by legislative authority." To these are added certain legal incidents

German jurisprudence, as founded on the Roman law, also held the
idea of personality as essential to corporations. Reineccius, one of the
mo t distinguished civilians of that school in the last century, in his
instructive essay on the legal history of the corporate guilds or societies of trade so common in Germany, speaks of this personality as an
attribute of all corporations. "Universitates et contrahere possunt et
delinquere, quippe quae moraliter unam representant personanz." De
Collegiis Opificum, in Germania, cap. 77, § 19. This doctrine of the
modern civilians of France, Italy and Germany, may be traced up
even to the jurists of the Code and Pandects. '' Persona! vice fungitur
municipium et decuria." Pan. I, 22, de fide juss. I do not cite
these civilians as direct authorities, but mainly to show how deeply and
generally this pervading idea of legal personality and artificial individuality entered into and formed the characteristic of all corporate bodies,
in those systems of law which might indirectly affect or govern our
own, or tend to influence even the popular us<; of our legal terms.
So far was this principle of corporate personality carried in our old
common law that reasons were expressly assigned why a corporation
could not be excommunicated or punished for crime. "Because it
has no soul," said Lord Coke, which, however ludicrously it may now
sound, was but saying quaintly, and in the style of that day, what in
modem times would be expressed by saying that a corporation, being
:m artificial and. not a moral person, must be incapable of guilt. The
rery able argument in the celebrated historical case of the charter of
London, in 1682, went a good deal into these refinements, and it was
held on one side that a political person had a mind and reason, according to Lord Chief Justice Hobart, and that its r eason was expres ed by its by-laws, whilst the attorney-general (whom Bishop
Burnet has egregiously wronged in calling him "a hot, dull m a n"),
argued most acutely, as well as very learnedly, in support of the capacity of a corporation to incur political, i.f not moral, guilt and punishment.
All these, it is true, are refinements of technical reasoning, in a
taste and fashion of thought which have passed away; but they prove
conclus ively how strong and undoubted was that legal principle of
personality upon which these mere inferences and nice distinctions
were founded.
In order to continue the existence of such an artificial person, perpetual succession is ordinarily necessary, though it was not strictly
e.sential, for it may be confined to any given number of lives in
being, holding in a sort of corporate joint tenancy, of which I think
examples may be found. As a legal person, it has only the powers
and properties specifically confeITed upon it; and can possess and exercise no others, except such as are absolutely necessary to the exercise of the powers expressly given. This is the enactment of our rerisecl statutes, which, as our revisers rightly said in their report on
that title of the law, is "declaratory of a principle of law frequently
recognized by our courts, and which it was deemed useful to confirm
hy legislative authority." To these are added certain legal incidents
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by the common law, also declared in our statute, and common to all

corporations, as to sue and be sued, hold and convey real and pei>

sonal property, to appoint officers for its services, and to make by-

laws for the management of its affairs. To these more important

rights, the law adds the external evidence of a name and a common

seal. This last, though apparently a matter of form, is not without

effect any more than the legal consequences of seals to instruments in

England and this state, so widely different from those of other legal

systems, where the distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments

is unknown. It is only through a common seal and name that any

grant of lands or covenant touching them can be made by a corpora-

tion.

[Powers incidental to corporate existence.]—There are several very

useful and beneficial accessary powers or attributes, very often

accompanying corporate privileges, especially in moneyed cor-

porations, which, in the existing state of our law, as modified by

statutes, are more prominent in the public eye, and perhaps some-

times in the view of our courts and legislatures, than those which are

essential to the being of a corporation. Such added powers, however

valuable, are merely accessary. They do not in themselves alone
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confer a corporate character, and may be enjoyed by unincorporated

individuals.

Such a power is the transferability of shares, whereby investments

may be made, without the owner losing the future control of his funds

under changes of circumstances. Such, too, is the limited responsi-

bility by which the stockholder, having once fairly paid up his share

of the capital, is exempted from further personal liability. So, too,

the convenience of holding real estate for the common purposes, exempt

from the legal inconveniences of joint tenancy or tenancy in common.

Again, there is the continuance of the joint property for the benefit

and preservation of the common fund, indissoluble by the death or

legal disability of any partner. Every one of these attributes or

powers, though commonly falling within our notions of a moneyed

corporation, is quite unessential to the legality of a corporation, may

be found where there is no pretense of a body corporate, nor will they

make one if all were combined, without the presence of the essential

quality of legal individuality. This distinction has been observed and

marked by Mr. Kyd, Kyd on Corporations, 13, with logical acuteness

and precision: "A corporation is a political person, capable, like a

natural person, of enjoying a variety of franchises. It is to a franchise

as the substance to its attribute. It is something to which many at-

tributes belong, but it is itself something distinct from those attri-

butes:'

Thus, the transferability of shares is not essential to a corporation.

For instance, it does not enter into the constitution of our chartered

colleges, academies, hospitals and other corporate institutions founded

by public endowment, or private beneficence. It does not enter into the

charters ot incorporated scientific and literary societies for mutual ben-

efit or charity, in the funds of which the members have a beneficial in-

§2 TESTS: MERGER INTO ARTIFICIAL BODY. 7

terest. On the other hand, such a right of transfer may be incorporated

TESTS:

into partnership articles, and become a fundamental condition of them.

MERGER INTO ARTIFICIAL BODY.
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The general rule, in absence of any express stipulation, is indeed the

reverse of this, and in practice it is comparatively rare amongst us.

Hence it has become common to consider such transferability as a

clear indication of a corporate character. "We have seen," says

Collyer on Partnership, 647, "that in common cases a partner is pre-

cluded from assigning his interest to a stranger, so as to make that

stranger a partner. To prevent this rule from affecting the stock-

holder of a trading company, there must be provision in the deed of

settlement enabling each stockholder to assign or transfer his share."

He then adds the limitations rendered necessary in England by the

Bubble act, which has no corresponding statute here, and the con-

clusion of the English decisions is that, by the common law, shares

may be made transferable absolutely. King v. Webb, 14 East 406;

Pratt v. Hutchinson, 15 East 515; Nichols v. Crosby, 2 Barn. & Cres.

814. See also other cases collected by Wordsworth on Joint Stock

Companies. Again, the joint stock companies authorized by statutes

in England are avowedly and confessedly not corporations; and,

there, says Wordsworth on Joint Stock Companies, 183, "It is the
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object of all companies to render their shares as negotiable as pos-

sible, so that in fact the restrictions imposed by the deed of settlement

upon the transfer of shares are generally very few, and seldom extend

beyond requiring the transferer's name, etc., being registered in the

books of the company. The language of two or three of the later

acts of parliament is specially worthy of attention on this subject.

Thev declare, as strongly as words can declare legislative intention,

that transferability of shares, and the consequent succession, can be

authorized in common law copartnerships, without giving to such

companies any corporate existence, or rendering them less copartner-

ships in the strict legal sense of the term. In the statute of 6 Geo. IV,

ch. 42, it is enacted, "that it shall be lawful for any member of any

such society or copartnership, their respective executors, adminis-

trators or assigns, to sell and transfer any share or shares, or portion

or portions of, or the entire stock or interest which any such member

may possess in such society or copartnership, and the property or

funds thereof, subjected to such regulations and restrictions as may

be required by the constitution of such society or copartnership."

This statute is entitled "An act for the better regulation of copartner-

ships of certain bankers in Ireland." The preamble and recitals, and

all the sections speak of these banking firms as mere copartnerships.

This strongly marked and repeated recognition of them as such, in

the very sections authorizing that transferability and its consequent

succession, which have been insisted on as infallible marks of cor-

porate character, leave no doubt in my mind as to the intention and

understanding of the British parliament, that in authorizing associa-

tions with these and other powers similar to those granted by our

banking law, they were not creating bodies politic or corporate

But this is not all; parliament has not left this meaning and inten-

terest. On the other hand, such a right of transfer may be incorporated
into partnership articles, and become a fundamental condition of them.
The general rule, in absence-of any express stipulation, is indeed the
reverse of this, and in practice it is comparatively rare amongst us.
Hence it has become common to consider such transferability as a
clear indication of a corporate character. "We have seen," says
Collyer on Partnership, 647, "that £n common cases a partner is precluded from assigning his interest to a stranger, so as to make that
stranger a partner. To prevent this rule from affecting the stockholder of a trading company, there must be provision in the deed of
settlement enabling each stockholder to assign or transfer his share."
He then adds the limitations rendered necessary in England by the
Bubble act, which has no corresponding statute here, and the conclusion of the English decisions is that, by the common law, shares
may be made transferable absolutely. King v. Webb, 14 East 406;
Pratt v. Hutchinson, I 5 East 515; Nichols v. Crosby, 2 Barn. & Cres.
814. See also other cases collected by Wordsworth on Joint Stock
Companies. Again, the joint stock companies authorized by statutes
in England are avowedly and confessedly not corporations; and,
there, says Wordsworth on Joint Stock Companies, 183, "It is the
object of all companies to render their shares as negotiable as possible, so that in fact the restrictions imposed by the deed of settlement
upon the transfer of shares are generally very few, and seldom extend
beyond requiring the transferer's name, etc., being registered in the
books of the company. The language of two or three of the later
acts of parliament is specially worthy of attention on this subject.
They declare , as strongly as words can declare legislative intention,
tbat transferabz"lt"ty of shares, and the consequent succession, can be
authorized in common law copartnerships, without giving to such
companies any corporate existence, or rendering them less copartncrhips in the strict legal sense of the term. In the statute of 6 Geo. IV,
ch. 42, it is enacted, "that it shall be lawful for any member of any
such society or copartnershi'p, their respective executors, administrators or assigns, to sell and transfer any share or shares, or portion
or portions of, or the entire stock or interest which any such member
may possess in such society or copartnershi'p, and the property or
funds thereof, subjected to such regulations and restrictions as may
be required by the constitution of such society or copartnership."
Thi statute is entitled ''An act for the better regulation of copartnerslzips of certain bankers in Ireland." The preamble and recitals, and
all the sections speak of these banking firms as mere copartnerships.
Thi strongly marked and repeated recognition of them as such, in
the very sec6ons authorizing that transferability and its consequent
succession, which have been insisted on as infallible marks of corporate character, leave no doubt in my mind as to the intention and
understanding of the British parliament, that in authorizing associations \Yith tl:ese and other powers similar to those granted by our
banking law, they were not creating bodies politic or corporate
But this is not all; parliament has not left this meaning and inten-
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tion to be a matter of inference. In 1838, another act was passed

amendatory of the one just cited, and of another in relation to bank-

ers in England, which gave similar powers. That amendatory stat-

ute, after reciting and referring to the titles of these prior acts, adds

in the preamble, "and whereas, it is expedient that the said act should

be amended, so far as relates to the powers enabling any such copart-

nership, not being a body corporate, to sue any of its own members,

and the powers enabling any member of any such copartnership, not

being a body corporate, to sue the said copartnership. Be it therefore

enacted, etc., that any person now being, or who hereafter may be, a

member of any copartnership carrying on the business of banking

under the provisions of the said recited acts may commence and

prosecute any action," etc.

There can then be no reasonable doubt, that in these most deliber-

ately considered and very technically drawn acts of parliament, recog-

nizing copartnerships as having transferable stock, and giving them

the authority of suing in the name of their officers and other persons,

similar to those of the associations formed under our act, no bodies

corporate were intended or supposed to be created.

But, on this head of transferability we need not rely upon English
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authority alone. We have as strong authority in our own usages and

decisions.

In the articles of the Merchants' Bank Association, before our re-

straining act, a similar transferability of shares was provided, and

these articles have the authority of Alexander Hamilton for their

validity. I shall have occasion to refer to them more fully here-

after.

So again, in the case of the Albany Exchange, before it received

its present charter, the validity of the partnership or joint stock com-

pany for a public enterprise, with transferable shares, was expressly

recognized. By the court—Cowen, J.—"The objection taken on the

argument, that this association was illegal, as being in the nature of

a corporation, issuing scrip and providing for a transfer of stock, is

not well founded. The act of association in this way is, we think,

properly characterized by the exception taken at the trial. It consti-

tutes a partnership valid, as being formed for the purposes of a law-

ful, honest enterprise." Townsend v. Goewey, 19 Wendell 427.

The learned judge then refers to, and adopts, the authority of Collyer

on Partnerships, p. 624, and the cases he cites.

Again, this transferability may be found in many sorts of trusts.

A well-known instance of this may be seen in the Tontine of New

York, originally built for the purposes of a merchants' exchange. It

is a trust of real estate, with transferable shares as personal property;

it was originally settled by the most eminent counsel of this state, and

its validity has been attested by nearly fifty years' experience, during

which, above two hundred shares have passed through courts, assign-

ments, insolvencies, bankrupt commissions, distribution of estates,

etc.. without their legal transferability having ever been impeached.

See printed articles of the Tontine, N. Y., 1793.

§ 2 TESTS: MERGER INTO ARTIFICIAL BODY. 9

In both of these last examples, as in other instances of trusts and

partnerships, lands were held exempt by operation of law from the legal

TESTS:

incidents of joint tenancy or tenancy in common, and the estate contin-
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ued for the common purposes. This has been noted as a mark of cor-

porate character; yet most corporations are limited in the extent of its

exercise, some are expressly excluded from the privilege, and very

many exist legally without its actual exercise or enjoyment.

The non dissolution by death or by legal disability is also noted in

the opinion of the supreme court in these cases as a mark of a corpo-

rate body. But that also may be found in the trusts just mentioned,

and others of a similar nature, and it may be adopted as an article of

ordinary partnership. It is the settled law of England that it may be

stipulated that death shall not dissolve the partnership, and further,

that the executors of the deceased shall become partners. Collyer on

Partnership, p. 5,648; Pease v. Chamberlain, 2 Vesey Rep. 33;

Haggerman v. Spears, 7 Pick. Rep. 235; Wrexham v. Huddleton, 1

Swanst. 514.

Again, a common name has been regarded as a corporate criterion.

To this Lord Ellenborough gives a full answer in Rex v. Webb.

"As to the fourth point, that the subscribers have presumed to act as
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if they were a body corporate—how is this made out? It was urged

that they assumed a common name, that they have a committee, etc.

But are these the unequivocal evidence and characteristics of a corpo-

ration? How many unincorporated assurance companies and other

descriptions of persons are there that use a common name, and have

their committees, general meetings and by-laws? Are these all ille-

gal? Or which of these particulars can be stated as being of itself

the distinctive and peculiar criterion of a corporation?" Thence he

infers that "these subscribers have not acted peculiarly as a body

corporate." Rex v. Webb, 14 East's Rep. 406.

But. perhaps, in the general and popular understanding, the most

familiar distinction between corporate bodies and common partner-

ships, or other joint undertakings, is the exemption of the associates

from personal liability beyond the actual amount of their respective

proportions of the capital. The regarding this very frequent and

important incident of a corporation as an essential characteristic

seems not to be confined to popular opinion. Judge Cowen says, in

the decision of the cases now before us: "Among other peculiar

privileges conferred on these associations, and not enjoyed by natural

persons, I allude to that of the exemption of members from personal

liability for debt. This is mentioned by Angell & Ames, in their

treatise, as peculiar to a private corporation; they notice it as a strik-

ing characteristic between a corporation and a partnership." Yet our

own statute of limited partnerships affords sufficient evidence that an

alteration of the existing law may be made by statute, so as to exempt

from personal liability beyond the stipulated share in the joint funds,

for the debts of a firm, without the remotest thought of converting

>.uch firms into bodies corporate.' Besides, the right of making a con-

tract, whereby those who tender it stipulate not to be bound beyond

In both of these last examples, as in other instances of trusts and
partnerships, lands were held exempt by operation of law from the legal
incidents of joint tenancy or tenancy in common, and the estate continued for the common purposes. This has been noted as a mark of corporate character; yet most corporations are limited in the extent of its
exercise, some are expressly excluded from the privilege, and very
many exist legally without its actual exercise or enjoyment.
The non dissolution by death or by legal disability is also noted in
the opinion of the supreme court in these cases as a mark of a corporate body. But that also may be found in the trusts just mentioned,
and others of a similar nature, and it may be adopted as an article of
ordinary partnership. It is the settled law of England that it may be
stipulated that death shall not dissolve the partnership, and further,
that the executors of the deceased shall become partners . Collyer on
Partnership, p. 5, 648; Pease v. Chamberlain, 2 Vesey Rep. 33;
Haggerman v. Spears, 7 Pick. Rep. 235; Wrexham v. Huddleton, I
Swanst. 5 14.
Again, a common name has been regarded as a corporate criterion.
To this Lord Ellenborough gives a full answ er in Rex v . Webb.
" As to the fourth point, that the subscribers have presumed to a ct as
if they were a body corporate-how is this made out? It was urged
that they assumed a common name, that they have a committee, etc.
But are these the unequ.ivocal evi-dence and characteristics of a corporation? How many unincorporated assurance companies and other
descriptions of persons are there that use a common na me, and have
their committees, general meetings and by-laws ? Are these all ill egal? Or which of these particulars can be stated as being of itse lf
the distinctive and peculiar criterion of a corporation?" Thence he
infers that "these subscribers have not acted peculiarly as a body
corporate." Rex v. Webb, 14 East's Rep. 406.
But. perhaps, in the general and popular understanding, the most
familiar distinction between corporate bodies and common partnerships, or other joint undertakings, is the exemption of the associates
from personal liabi'lity beyond the actual amount of the ir respective
proportions of the capital. The regarding this very frequent and
important incident of a corporation as an essential characteristic
seems not to be confined to popular opinion. Judge Cowen say s, in
the decision of the cases now before us: "Among other peculiar
privileges conferred on these associations, and not enjoyed by natural
persons, I allude to that of the exemption of members from personal
liability for debt. This is mentioned by Angell & Ames, in their
treatise, as peculiar to a private corporation; they notice it as a striking characteristic between a corporation and a partnership.'' Yet our
o wn statute of limited partnerships affords sufficient evidence that an
alteration of the existing law may be made by statute, so as to exempt
from personal liability beyond the stipulated share in the joint fund s,
for the dchts of a firm, without the re motest thou ght of converting
o;uch firm s into bodies corporate: B esides, th e right of making a contract, whereby those who tender it stipulate not to be bound beyond
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the amount of some specific pledged fund, must be a natural right

growing out of the very nature of contracts. If a company, or asso-

ciation, or an individual, offers to contract to make certain payments

only to the amount of certain specific funds, and others choose to ac-

cept that contract on those conditions, there can be nothing to prevent

the validity of such a contract, except some positive rule of law founded

on policy or an arbitrary enactment. In the absence of such a restric-

tion, it is and must be good. Such a limitation, then, must be bind-

ing on all who accept the conditions. The policy of our law and the

usages of business have, indeed, rightly fixed the presumption the

other way, so that the stipulation and the burden of proof of the

limited indebtedness are thrown upon those who expect to be bene-

fited by them. This right has been substantially admitted by the

highest tribunals in Great Britain, in the case of Minnett v. Whin-

nery, 3 Brown's Pari. Cas. 333, and it was held to be good by Lord

Ellenborough, in Alderson v. Clay, 1 Camp. 404. The doctrine has

been received as settled law by one of the best elementary writers of

the day, often cited by our own supreme court. "When a creditor,"

says Collver on Partnership, 214, "has notice, that by an arrangement

between partners, one of them, though appearing to the world as a
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partner, shall not participate in the loss, and shall not be liable for it,

the creditor will be bound by the arrangement."

The original articles of the Merchants' Bank, in the city of New

York, as an unincorporated association, with limited liability, as well

as transferable shares, which were read in argument by Mr. Kent,

have the great professional authority of Alexander Hamilton, who

prepared them, and of the many eminent men who joined in them, and

whose professional distinction gives to their approbation the character

of a sort of judicial sanction; whilst the restraining act passed soon

after proves, as was unanswerably argued, that the legislature and

its legal advisers considered such a voluntary association, thus re-

straining its own liability, not as a violation of common law, but

merely as contradicting the financial policy of the state.

A similar analysis of such of the customary accessary powers of

specially chartered moneyed corporations, as from being most con-

ducive to ends of profit or convenience are ordinarily considered as

the essential qualities constituting corporations, will show, that all

such powers or incidents are merely convenient and desirable authori-

ties or modes of action, added to and engrafted upon the creation of

a body politic; not the legal attributes absolutely essential to a cor-

poration, and denoting its existence as such.

Amongst us, as in England, bodies politic or corporate may exist

where the ultimate personal liability is still retained. The personal

liability is indeed suspended in such cases, and for a time merged in

that of the artificial corporate person; but there may be an ulterior

recourse to the corporators when the former fails. Many corporate

banks in other states are so constituted, and with us some chartered

companies for insurance, etc., some for an indefinite, others to a lim-

ited extent beyond the capital. Corporate bodies may exist also

TESTS: MERGER INTO ARTIFICIAL BODY.
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without transferability of the rights of the corporators; for a large

TESTS:

majority of our literary and charitable, as well as all our municipal

MERGER INTO ARTIFICIAL BODY.

II

corporations, are so. On the other hand, by our own common law

as it would exist now, independently of statutory restrictions, associa-

tions might be formed and trusts created, having every one of the above

enumerated characteristics, which have been insisted upon as essential

to a corporation, except that personality which I before stated as form-

ing its strict and necessary essential legal definition. The present

joint stock companies of England afford pregnant examples, showing

how many of these attributes may be embodied in voluntary associa-

tions which are confessedly not corporations.

In fact the line may be very faint, and depending wholly upon the

purely legal and technical character conferred, whether a joint stock

association or a trust, freed by law from certain positive restraints im-

posed by our modern statutes, be a cprporation or not. The Tontine

trust, before mentioned, is managed by directors annually elected by

stockholders; its real estate is held by trustees, continuing their trust

from hand to hand, during the lives of the original nominees and the

survivors of them, with transferable shares, and wholly without per-
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sonal liability. For the reasons already stated, the eminence of the

counsel (the late R. Harrison) who prepared the trust, and the fre-

quency with which its legal character must have passed in review be-

fore lawyers and courts, and always without objection, it may well be

regarded as sanctioned judicially. It is a valid trust. Add to it a

legislative charter, making the associates a body corporate and no

more, what then is the effect? Simply to give a different technical

character, an artificial individuality in Chief Justice Marshall's phrase,

a different mode of standing in courts.

Such was the actual history of the Albany Exchange. It was a

joint stock company, formally decided to be valid. 19 Wendell's

Rep. 427. A year or two after (1837), it appears by our statute

book to have been incorporated, but there is probably but little differ-

ence, besides the greater convenience of the corporate body, between

the former organization and the present.

The trusts specially permitted by an act of last year, Statutes of

1839, ch. 174, for the benefit of that singular people called Shakers,

were nothing more than exemptions from the recent restrictions of

trusts. They were authorized to continue, enlarge and manage their

property, by trusts, as they had done before the change in that title of

our law effected bv the revised statutes. Had the law, in addition to

this, made every Shakers' United Society a body corporate, without

otherwise varying the original trust, the only change would have been

the conversion of a trust into an artificial legal person, with the same

effect substantially as to the interests of those beneficially interested.

Our act for general religious incorporations regulates the incor-

poration of churches of all religious denominations (other than those

provided for in the first and second sections) by trustees, who are to

be a body corporate.

Those who have had occasion to look into the mode in which dis-

without transferability of the rights of the corporators j for a large
majority of our literary and charitable, as well as all our municipal
corporations, are so. On the other hand, by our own common law
as it would exist now, independently of statutory restrictions, associations might be formed and trusts created, having every one of the above
enumerated characteristics, which have been insisted upon as essential
to a corporation, except that personality which I before stated as forming its strict and necessary essential legal definition. The present
joint stock companies of England afford pregnant examples, showing
how many of these attributes may be embodied in voluntary associations which are confessedly not corporations.
In fact the line may be very faint, and depending wholly upon the
purely legal and technical character conferred, whether a joint stock
association or a trust, freed by law from certain positive restraints imposed by our modern statutes, be a cprporation or not. The Tontine
trust, before mentioned, is managed by directors annually elected by
tockholders; its real estate is held by trustees, continuing their trust
from hand to band, during the lives of the original nominees and the
urvivors of them, with transferable shares, and wholly without p ersonal liability. For the reasons already stated, the eminence of the
coun el (the late R. Harrison) who prepared the trust, and the frequency with which its legal character must have passed in review before lawyers and courts, and always without objection, it may well be
regarded as sanctioned judicially. It is a valid trust. Add to it a
legi lative charter, making the associates a body corporate and no
more, what then is the effect? Simply to give a different technical
character, an artificial individualt'ty in Chief Justice Marsha11' s phrase,
a different mode of standing in courts.
Such was the actual history of the Albany Exchange. It was a
joint stock company, formally decided to be valid. 19 Wendell's
Rep. 427. A year or two after ( 1837), it appears by our statute
book to have been incorporated, but there is probably but little difference, besides the greater convenience of the corporate body, between
the former organization and the present.
The trusts specially permitted by an act of last year, Statutes of
t 39, ch. r74, for the benefit of that singular people called Shakers,
were nothing more than exemptions from the recent restrictions of
tru ts . They were authorized to continue, enlarge and manage their
property, by trusts, as they had done before the change in that title of
our law effected bv the revised statutes. Had the law, in addition to
this. made every Shakers' United Society a body corporate, without
otherwise varying the original trust, the only change would have been
the conversion of a trust into an artificial legal person , with the same
effect substantially as to the interests of those beneficially interested.
Our act for general religiou s incorporations regulates the incorporation of churches of all religious denominations (other than those
provided for in the first and second sections) by trustees, who are to
be a body corporate.
Those who have had occasion to look into the mode in which dis-
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senting religious trusts are held in England, as I presume they were,

in the same manner, in New York when a colony, will, I think, per-

12

ceive that our statute adds little more than a convenient corporate
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character to powers elsewhere, and formerly here, exercised under

senting religious tmsts are hela in England, as I presume they were,
in the same manner, in New York wh1en a colony, will, I think, perceive that our statute adds little more: than a convenient corporate
character to powers elsewhere, and fr>rmerly here, exercised under
trusts.
All these considerations lead me to the conviction that, for the purpose of constitutional interpretation, we must look to the strict legal
meaning of the phrase body politic or corporate, and not to those circumstances or adjuncts, which amount only to the descriptions of the
manner in which such bodies are very frequently constituted when
used for purposes of profit. If this be regarded as a very strict rule
of interpretation, let it also be remembered, that it is applied where
such strictness is most appropriate, in the interpretation of a provision.
restraining the general sovereign power of the state expressing the
public will through a majority C?f the people's representatives.
There is yet another rule of interpretation, which it is proper to
state before proceeding to examine wh1ether the associations organized
under the banking law are or are not corporations.
Corporate rights are well defined by Chancellor Kent and others to
be "franchises or peculiar privileged grants," of the nature of incorporeal property. Such franchises, when they are granted for pecuniary or other purposes valuable to private interests, are of the nature
of monopolies, and are always granted exclusively by the sovereign
power, directly or indirectly. It is a well-known fact, admitted on all
sides, that it was part of the policy andt intent of our amended constitution, to prevent, by a constitutional and fixed limitation of the legislative authority, the influence of cormption or interest upon the legislature, as well as the abuse of political favoritism, and the dangerous union of political with pecuniary power. The clause so designed ,
though so general in its terms as to indu<le even academies and village corporations, it is not doubted, rieferred in its policy wholly to
the monopoly privileges of chartered capital, and especially to banks.
Here, then, in my view, arises another branch of inquiry; and the
two distinct objects of examination arie these: ( 1) Do these banking associations fall within the right legal definition of the word
"bodies politic or corporate," as before explained and established?
( 2) Do they come within the policy ai nd intent of the framers of the
constitution or of the people who ratifited it?
[Test of corporate existence.]-The most peculiar, and the strictly
essential characteristfr of a corporate body, whfrh makes# to be such,
and not some other thing in legal contemplation, is the merging
of the indivt'duals compost'ng the aggregate body into one d£stinct, artijidal indivt'dual existence. Now this is not found in the
associations under the act. A corpora•ti'on can sue and be sued only
by its corporate name. It can act only according to the letter of the
law creating it. "It derives all its powers from that act," says Chief
Justice Marshall, "and is capable of exercising its faculties only in
the manner which that act authorizes.'' It has no natural powers

trusts.

All these considerations lead me to the conviction that, for the pur-

pose of constitutional interpretation, we must look to the strict legal

meaning of the phrase body politic or corporate, and not to those cir-

cumstances or adjuncts, which amount only to the descriptions of the

manner in which such bodies are very frequently constituted when

used for purposes of profit. If this be regarded as a very strict rule

of interpretation, let it also be remembered, that it is applied where

such strictness is most appropriate, in the interpretation of a provision,

restraining the general sovereign power of the state expressing the

public will through a majority of the people's representatives.

There is yet another rule of interpretation, which it is proper to

state before proceeding to examine whether the associations organized

under the banking law are or are not corporations.

Corporate rights are well defined by Chancellor Kent and others to

be "franchises or peculiar privileged grants," of the nature of incor-
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poreal property. Such franchises, when they are granted for pecu-

niary or other purposes valuable to private interests, are of the nature

of monopolies, and are always granted exclusively by the sovereign

power, directly or indirectly. It is a well-known fact, admitted on all

sides, that it was part of the policy and intent of our amended consti-

tution, to prevent, by a constitutional and fixed limitation of the leg-

islative authority, the influence of corruption or interest upon the leg-

islature, as well as the abuse of political favoritism, and the danger-

ous union of political with pecuniary power. The clause so designed,

though so general in its terms as to include even academies and vil-

lage corporations, it is not doubted, referred in its policy wholly to

the monopoly privileges of chartered capital, and especially to banks.

Here, then, in my view, arises another branch of inquiry; and the

two distinct objects of examination are these: (1) Do these bank-

ing associations fall within the right legal definition of the word

"bodies politic or corporate," as before explained and established?

(2) Do they come within the policy and intent of the framers of the

constitution or of the people who ratified it?

[Test of corporate existence.]—The most peculiar, and the strictly

essential characteristic of a corporate body, -which makes it to be such,

and not some other thing in legal contemplation, is the merging

of the individuals composing the aggregate body into one dis-

tinct, artificial individual existence. Now this is not found in the

associations under the act. A corporation can sue and be sued only

by its corporate name. It can act only according to the letter of the

law creating it. "It derives all its powers from that act," says Chief

Justice Marshall, "and is capable of exercising its faculties only in

the manner which that act authorizes." It has no natural powers
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which, in its discretion, it may exercise or not. It can exercise none
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of those other powers, and possesses none of those other rights which

13

the individuals composing it could possess and exercise, were it a

mere society or partnership. Not so as to these associations. By

this act, suits on behalf of such associations may be brought in the

name of the president. Persons having claims against the company

may maintain their actions against the president. But there is no

reason, except that of mere convenience, why the association may not

also sue and be sued under their several real names, as other partners

may. This reason of convenience, it is obvious, would not apply

where the company was composed of a few persons, as if, for exam-

ple, one of our great banking firms were to come under the law.

It was indeed argued that the technical construction, which gives to

may the meaning of must or shall, applies here. But that construc-

tion holds only when there is a previous duty, to which the statute

adds some new power or authority, as in the case of a public officer;

or where from other reasons it is manifest that (to use Judge Story's

words) "the legislature meant to impose an absolute duty, not to give

a discretionary power;" otherwise, as he says, "the ordinary use of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:13 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

language must be presumed to be intended, unless it would defeat the

provisions of the act." 1 Peters' Rep. 64.. The ordinary popular

discretionary sense of the word may is also the ordinary legal one.

The other is the exception. In our revised statutes, the words may

and shall are so used and distinguished. So they are in our annual

legislation, as when it is said of a company that it may hold real

estate, may take a certain rate of tolls, may borrow money.

Moreover, here the right to sue and be sued as other partners is a

common law right, and can not be taken away by mere implication.

"A statute made in the affirmative, without negative words," say the

highest authorities, "does not take away the common law." 2 Inst.

200. See also Dwarris on Statutes 637, and the authorities there re-

ferred to. * * *

Again, these associations do not act by a corporate name and seal,

but by another mode familiar to our law. They can contract through

their president, as a limited partnership must through its general

partner. They are authorized to sue and be sued through him; as

Judge Cowen observes: "The power of the legislature to give a right

of action to one man in his own name for a debt due to another, has

always been exercised from our earliest legal history, and it is

now too late to call it in question." I refer to the several legislative

and judicial authorities which he has collected in his opinion on these

cases. They can not hold real estate as a corporation does, or con-

tract concerning it by their own name and common seal; but, like

partnerships, they can have an equitable and beneficial interest in land.

Collyer, 70, 76. Their president takes as a trustee, and the associates

are but beneficiaries.

How then are these associations to be regarded in legal contempla-

tion?

I assent fully to the conclusive reasoning of the counsel, who

which, in its discretion, it may exercise or not. It can exercise none
of those other powers, and possesses none of those other rights which
the individuals composing it could possess and exercise, were it a
mere society or partnership. Not so as to these associations. By
this act, suits on behalf of such associations may be brought in the
name of the president. Persons having claims against the company
may maintain their actions against the president. But there is no
reason, except that of mere convenience, why the association may not
also sue and be sued under their several real names, as other partners
may. This reason of convenience, it is obvious, would not apply
where the company was composed of a few persons, as if, for example , one of our great banking firms were to come under the law.
It was indeed argued that the technical construction, which gives to
may the meaning of must or shall, applies here. But that construction holds only when there is a previous duty, to which the statute
adds some new power or authority, as in the case of a public officer;
or where from other reasons it is manifest that (to use Judge Story's
words) "the legislature meant to impose an absolute duty, not to give
a discretionary power;" otherwise, as he says, "the ordinary use of
language must be presumed to be intended, unless it would defeat the
provisions of the act." I Peters' Rep. 64. The ordinary popular
discretionary sense of the word may is also the ordinary legal one.
The other is the exception. In our revised statutes, the words may
and shall are so used and distinguished. So they are in our annual
legislation, as when it is said of a company that it may hold real
estate, may take a certain rate of tolls, may borrow money.
Moreover, here the right to sue and be sued as other partners is a
common law right, and can not be taken away by mere implication.
"A statute made in the affirmative, without negative words," say the
highest authorities, "does not take away the common law." z Inst.
zoo. See also Dwarris on Statutes 637, and the authorities there referred to.
•
•
•
Again, these associations do not act by a corporate name and seal,
but by another mode familiar to our law. They can contract through
their president, as a limited partnership must through its general
partner. They are authorized to sue and be sued through him; as
Judge Cowen observes: "The power of the legislature to give a right
of action to one man in his own name for a debt due to another, has
always been exercised from our earliest legal history, and it is
now too late to caJJ it in question." I refer to the several legislative
and judicial authorities which he has collected in his opinion on these
cases. They can not hold real estate as a corporation does, or contract concerning it by their own name and common seal; but, like
partnerships, they can have an equitable and beneficial interest in land.
Collyer, 70, 76. Their president takes as a trustee, and the associates
are but beneficiaries.
How then are these associations to be regarded in legal contemplation?
I assent fully to the conclusive reasoning of the counsel, who
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chiefly pressed this part of the argument (Mr. Kent), that they are

copartnerships relieved from the inhibitions of the restraining act,

and thus allowed to carry on banking business under certain condi-

tions. The policy of the state has prohibited its citizens from issuing

paper for circulation as money, or from associating together for cer-

tain banking purposes. I R. S. 711. It reserved those privileges

for corporate banks. The act to authorize the business of banking

repealed that prohibition pro tanto, as to all individuals or companies

who would comply with its conditions. The associations in question

are partnerships complying with those conditions, and thus exempted,

as any other citizens may be on the same terms, from the operation

of a statutory restraint of general right, which is still binding on all

who will not comply with the conditions. This is so far in close an-

alogy to the law of special partnership, where exemption from the

general liability imposed by the law is tendered to all who comply

strictly with the provisions of the statute. The articles and certificate

in this act correspond to the certificate setting forth the names of

partners, amount of capital, time of termination and nature of busi-

ness, required by the title of "Limited Partnerships," 1 R. S. 764,

and with the articles which every such copartnership must have. The
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general partner there is authorized to transact business and contract

for the rest; so, though with less authority, is the president here.

The mode of suing and being sued is precisely the same in both

cases. * * *

On the question being put, shall these judgments be reversed? all

the members of the court, with but a single exception (twenty-three

being present), voted in the negative. Whereupon the judgments of

the supreme court were affirmed. The court thereupon adopted the

following resolutions:

1. "Resolved, That the law entitled'An act to authorize the busi-

ness of banking,' passed 18th April, 1838, is valid, and was constitu-

tionally enacted, although it may not have received the assent of two-

thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature."

This resolution was adopted by a vote of 23 to 1.

2. "Resolved, That the associations organized in conformity with

the provisions of the act entitled 'An act to authorize the business of

banking,' passed April 1, 1838, are not bodies politic or corporate,

within the spirit and meaning of the constitution." This resolution

was adopted by a vote of 22 to 3.
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THE PEOPLE, Ex Rel. WINCHESTER, Etc., Respondent, v. COLEMAN

Et Al., Commissioners of Taxes, Etc., Appellants.1

1892. Court of Appeals, New York. 133 N. Y. 279-287, 37

Sec. 3. Telrts. ( 2) The legislative intent.

Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. i, 31 N. E. 96.

Appeal from order of the general term of the supreme court, in

THE PEOPLE, Ex
ET

the first judicial department, made February 13, 1891, which affirmed

REL. WINCHESTER, ETc., RESPONDENT, v. COLEMAN
AL., CoMMISSIONERS OF TAXES, ETc., APPELLANTS. 1

a judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered upon a decision of the court

on trial at special term, vacating an assessment.

This was a proceeding by certiorari to review the action of the

1892.

commissioners of taxes and assessments of the city of New York, in

COURT OF APPEALS, NEW YORK. 133 N. Y. 27<)-287, 37
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 1, 31 N. E. 96.

imposing an assessment upon the capital stock of the National Ex-

press Company, a joint-stock company, of which the relator is treas-

urer, for the year 1888.

The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.

Finch, J. The relator was taxed upon its capital on the ground

that it had become a corporation within the meaning of the provision

of the Revised Statutes, which enacts that "all moneyed or stock
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corporations deriving an income or profit from their capital or other-

wise, shall be liable to taxation on their capital in the manner herein-

after prescribed." (1 R. S., title 4, ch. 13, part 1.) The company

was formed as a joint-stock company or association in 1853 by a

written agreement of eight individuals with each other, the whole

force and effect of which, in constituting and creating the organiza-

tion, rested upon the common law rights of the individuals and their

power to contract with each other. The relation they assumed was

wholly the product of their mutual agreement and dependent in no

respect upon the grant or authority of the state. It was entered into

under no statutory license or permission, neither accepting nor de-

signed to accept any franchise from the sovereign, but founded wholly

upon the individual rights of the associates to join their capital and

enterprise in a relation similar to that of a partnership. A few years

earlier the legislature had explicitly recognized the existence and va-

lidity of such organizations, founded upon contract and evolved from

the common law rights of the citizens. (Laws of 1849, ch. 258.)

That act provided that any joint-stock company or association, which

consisted of seven or more members, might sue or be sued in the

name of its president or treasurer, and with the same force and effect,

so far as the joint property and rights were concerned, as if the suit

should be prosecuted in the names of the associates. But the act

explicitly disclaimed any purpose of converting the joint-stock asso-

ciations recognized as existing into corporations by a section prohibit-

ing any such construction. (§ 5.) In 1851 the act was amended in

1 Arguments omitted.

Appeal from order of the general term of the supreme court, in
the first judicial department, made February 13, 1891, which affirmed
a judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered upon a decision of the court
on trial at special term, vacating an assessment.
This was a proceeding by certiorari to review the action of the
commissioners of taxes and assessments of the city of New York, in
imposing an assessment upon the capital stock of the National Express Company, a joint-stock company, of which the relator is treasurer, for the year 1888.
The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.
F1NCH, J.
The relator was taxed upon its capital on the ground
that it had become a corporation within the meaning of the provision
of the Revised Statutes, which enacts that "ail moneyed or stock
corporations deriving an income or profit from their capital or otherwise, shall be liable to taxation on their capital in the manner hereinafter prescribed." (1 R. S. , title 4, ch. 13, part 1.) The company
was formed as a joint-stock company or association in 1853 by a
written agreement of eight individuals with each other, the whole
force and effect of which, in constituting and creating the organization, J;"ested upon the common law rights of the individuals and their
power to contract with each other. The relation they assumed was
wholly the product of their mutual agreement and dependent in no
respect upon the grant or authority of the state. It was entered into
under no statutory license or permission, neither accepting nor designed to accept any franchise from the sovereign, but founded wholly
upon the individual rights of the associates to join their capital and
enterprise in a relation simi lar to that of a partnership. A few years
earlier the legislature had explicitly recognized the existence and validity of such organizations, founded upon contract and evolved from
the common law rights of the citizens. (Laws of 1849, ch. 258.)
That act provided that any joint-stock company or association, which
consisted of seven or more members, might sue or be sued in the
name of its president or treasurer, and with the same force and effect,
so far as the joint property and rights were concerned, as if the suit
should be prosecuted in the names of the associates. But the act
explicitly disclaimed any purpose of converting the joint-stock associations recognized as existing into corporations by a section prohibiting any such construction. ( § 5.) In 1851 the act was amended in
1

Arguments omitted.
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its form and application, but in no respect material to the present in-

quiry. There is no doubt, therefore, that when the company was

its form and application, but in no respect material to the present inquiry. There is no doubt, therefore, that when the company \'\'as
formed and went into operation the law recognized a distinction and
substantial difference between joint-stock companies and corporations,
and never confused one with the other, and that the existing statute
which taxed the capital of corporations had no reference to or operation upon joint-stock companies or associations.
But two things have since occurred. The legislature, while steadily
preserving the distinction of names, has with equal persistence confused the things by obliterating substantial and characteristic marks
of diff~rence, until it is now claimed that the joint-stock associations
have grown into and become corporations by force of the continued
bestowal upon them of corporate attributes. It is said , and very
probably correctly said, that the legislature may create a corporation,
without explicitly d eclaring it to be such, by the bestowal of a corporate franchise or corporate attributes, and the cases of banking associations are referred to as instances of actual occmTence. (Thomas
v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 9; 1 Bank of Watertown v. Watertown, 25 Wend.
686; People v. Niagara, 4 Hill 20.) It is added that such result
may happen even without the legislative intent, and because the gift
of corporate powers and attributes is tantamount to a corporate creation. It is then asserted that a series of statutes. beginning with the
act of 1849, has ended in the gift to joint-stock associations of every
essential attribute possessed by and characteristic of corporations
(Laws of 1853, ch. 153; Laws of 1854, ch. 245; Laws of 1867, ch.
289); that the lines of distinction between the two, however far apart
in the beginning, have steadily converged until they have melted into
each other and become identical; that every distinguishing mark and
characteristic has been obliterated, and no reason remains why joint
stock associations should not be in all respects treated and regarded
as corporations.
Some of this contention is true. The case of People , ex rel. Platt,
v. Wemple (117 N. Y. 136) , shows very forcibly how almost the
full measure of corporate attributes has, by legislative enactment,
been bestowed upon joint-stock associations, until the difference, if
there be one, is obscure, elusive and . difficult to see and describe.
And yet the truth remains that all along the line of legislation the distinctive names have been retained as indicative and representative of
a difference in the organizations them selves. As recently as the acts
of 1880 and 1881 , which formed the subject of consideration in the
Wemple case, the legislature, dealing with the subject of taxation and
desiring to tax business and franchises , imposed the liability upon
"every corporation , joint-stock company or association whatever now
or hereafter incorporated or organized under any law of this state."
It is significant that the words "or organized" were inserted by
amendment, and evidently for the understood reason that joint-stock

formed and went into operation the law recognized a distinction and

substantial difference between joint-stock companies and corporations,

and never confused one with the other, and that the existing statute

which taxed the capital of corporations had no reference to or opera-

tion upon joint-stock companies or associations.

But two things have since occurred. The legislature, while steadily-

preserving the distinction of names, has with equal persistence con-

fused the things by obliterating substantial and characteristic marks

of difference, until it is now claimed that the joint-stock associations

have grown into and become corporations by force of the continued

bestowal upon them of corporate attributes. It is said, and very

probably correctly said, that the legislature may create a corporation,

without explicitly declaring it to be such, by the bestowal of a corpo-

rate franchise or corporate attributes, and the cases of banking asso-

ciations are referred to as instances of actual occurrence. (Thomas

v. Dakin, 22 Wend, o;1 Bank of Watcrtown v. Watertown, 25 Wend.
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686; People v. Niagara. 4 Hill 20.) It is added that such result

may happen even without the legislative intent, and because the gift

of corporate powers and attributes is tantamount to a corporate crea-

tion. It is then asserted that a series of statutes, beginning with the

act of 1849, has ended in the gift to joint-stock associations of every

essential attribute possessed by and characteristic of corporations

(Laws of 1853, ch. 153; Laws of 1854, ch. 245; Laws of 1867, ch.

289); that the lines of distinction between the two, however far apart

in the beginning, have steadily converged until they have melted into

each other and become identical; that every distinguishing mark and

characteristic has been obliterated, and no reason remains why joint

stock associations should not be in all respects treated and regarded

as corporations.

Some of this contention is true. The case of People, ex rel. Piatt,

v. Wemple (117 N. Y. 136), shows very forcibly how almost the

full measure of corporate attributes has, by legislative enactment,

been bestowed upon joint-stock associations, until the difference, if

there be one, is obscure, elusive and difficult to see and describe.

And yet the truth remains that all along the line of legislation the dis-

tinctive names have been retained as indicative and representative of

a difference in the organizations themselves. As recently as the acts

of 1880 and 1881, which formed the subject of consideration in the

Wemple case, the legislature, dealing with the subject of taxation and

desiring to tax business and franchises, imposed the liability upon

"every corporation, joint-stock company or association whatever now

or hereafter incorporated or organized under any law of this state."

It is significant that the words "or organized" were inserted by

amendment, and evidently for the understood reason that joint-stock

'Infra, p. 19.
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companies could not properly be said to be '• incorporated," but

might be correctly described as "organized" under the laws of the
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state. This persistent distinction in the language of the statutes I
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should not be inclined to disregard or treat as of no practical conse-

quence, when seeking to arrive at the true intent and proper con-

struction of the statute, even if I were unable to discover any practi-

cal or substantial difference between the two classes of organizations

upon which it could rest, or out of which it grew, for the distinction

so sedulously and persistently observed would strongly indicate the

legislative intent, and so the correct construction.

But I think there was an original and inherent difference between

the corporate and joint-stock companies known to our law which leg-

islation has somewhat obscured, but has not destroyed, and that dif-

ference is the one pointed out by the learned counsel for the respon-

dent, and which impresses me as logical and well supported by

authority. is that the creation of the corporation merges in the

artificial body and drowns in it the individual rights and liabilities

of the members, while the organization of a joint-stock company leaves

the individual rights and liabilities unimpaired and in full force.

The idea was expressed in .Supervisors of Niagara v. People, 7 Hill
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512, and in Gifford v. Livingston, 2 Den. 380, by the statement that the

corporators lost their individuality and merged their individual char-

acters into one artificial existence: and upon these authorities a cor-

poration is defined on behalf of the respondents to be '■'•an artificial

ferson created by the sovereign from natural persons and in which

artificial person the natural persons of which it is composed become

merged and non-existent." I am conscious that legal definitions in-

vite and provoke criticism, because the instances are rare in which

they prove to be perfectly accurate; and yet this one offered to us

may be accepted if it successfully bears some sufficient test. In put-

ting it on trial we may take the nature of the individual liability of

the corporators on the one hand and of the associates on the other,

for the debts contracted by their respective organizations, as a suffi-

cient test of the difference between them, and contrast their nature

and character.

It is an essential and inherent characteristic of a corporation that it

alone is primarily liable for its debts, because it alone contracts them,

except as that natural and necessary consequence of its creation is

modified in the act of its creation by some explicit command

of the statute which either imposes an express liability upon the

corporators in the nature of a penalty, or affirmatively retains and

preserves what would have been the common-law liability of the

members from the destruction involved in the corporate creation.

In other words, the individual liability of the members, as it would

have existed at common law, is lost by their creation into a corpo-

ration, and exists thereafter only by force of the statute, upon some

new and modifying conditions, to some partial or changed ex-

tent, and so far preventing, by the intervention of an express com-

2—Wil. Cases.

companies could not properly be said to be ' ·incorporated , " but
might be correctly described as "organized" under the laws of the
state. Thi s persistent distinction in the languag e of the statutes I
bould not be inclined to di sregard or treat as of no practical consequence , when seeking to arrive at the true intent and proper contruction of the statute, even if I were unable to discover any practical or substantial difference between the two classes of organiza tions
upon which it could rest, or out of which it grew, for the distinctio n
so sedulously and persistently observed would strongly indicate the
legislative intent, and so the correct construction.
But I think there w as an orig inal and inherent difference between
the corporate and joint-stock companies known to our law which legi. lation has somewhat obscured, but has not destroved, and that differe nce is the one pointed out by the learned couns~l for the respondent, and which impresses me as logical and well supported by
authority. It i s that the creation of the corporat£on m erges in the
arlijicial body and d rowns in it the indiv £dual rig hts and 1£abt'l£t£es
of the members, while the organt'zation of a jot'nt-stock company l eaves
the individual rt'g hts and Habilitt'es unimpaired and t'n full force.
The idea was expressed in Supervisors of Niag ara v. People, 7 Hill
512, and in Gifford v. Livingston , 2 D en. 380, by the statement th at the
corporator s lost their individuality and m erged their individual characters into one artificial existence: and upon ·these authorities a corporation is de fined on behalf of the respondents to be "an artifict'a!
person created by the sovereign from natural p ersons and t'n w hich
arlijirial p erson the natural p ersons of w hich t't is composed become
merged and non-existent." I am conscious that legal de finitions inYite and provoke criticism, because the instances are rare in which
they prove to be perfectly accurate; and yet this one offered to us
may be accepted if it successfully bears some sufficient test. In putting it on trial we may take the nature of the indiv idu al liability of
the corporators on the one hand and of the associates on the other,
for the debts contracted by their respective organizations, a s a sufficient test of the difference between them, and contrast their nature
and character.
It is an essential and inherent characteristic of a corporation 'that it
alone is primarily liable for its debts, because it alone contracts them ,
except as that natural and necessary consequence of its creation is
modified in the act of its creation by some explicit command
of the statute which either imposes an express liability upon the
corporators in the nature of a penalty, or affirmatively retains and
preserves what would have been the common-law liability of the
members from the destruction involved in the corporate creation.
In other words, the individual liability of the members, as it would
have existed a t · common law, is lost by their creation into a corporation, and exists thereafter only by force of the statute, upon some
new and modifying conditions, to some partial or changed extent, and so far preventing, by the intervention of an express com2- WTL. CASES.

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

18

§3

18

PEOPLE V. COLEMAN

PEOPLE V.

<:ul..~MAN

mand, the total destruction of Individual liabilities which otherwise

mand , the total destruction of individual liab11itJes which othern•ise
woul<l flow from the inherent effect of the corporate creation. The
penalties sometimes imposed are, of course, new statutory liabilities
which never at common law rested upon the individual members.
The retained liability occasionally estaiblished is in the nature and a
parcel of such original liability, as we ]bad occasion to show in Rogers
v. Decker, 131 N. Y. 490, but is retained by force of the express
command of the statute, and in that manner saved from the destruction which otherwise would follow the simple creation of the
corporation.
Ordinarily, these individual liabilities exist upon
other than common-law conditions, and make the corporators rather
sureties or guarantors of the corporation than original debtors, since
in general their liability arises after tlhe usual remedies against the
corporation have been exhausted. But where that is not so, the
invariable truth is that the creation of the corporation necessarily
destroys the common-law liability of the individual members for its
debts, and requires at the bands of the creating power an affirmative
imposition of new personal liabilities or a specific retention of old
ones from the destruction which would otherwise follow. Exactly
the opposite is true of joint-stock companies. Their formation destroys no part or portion of their common law liability for the debts
contracted. Those debts are their debts, for which they must answer.
Permission to sue their president or treasurer is only a convenient
mode of enforcing that liability, but in no manner creates or saves it.
The statute of 1853 did interfere with it. That act required, in the
first instance, a suit against the president or treasurer, and so a preliminary exhaustion of the joint property. But that act was modal,
and determined the procedure. It suspended the common-law right,
but recognized its existence. We so held in Witherhead v. Allen,
4 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 628, and at the same time said that the associations were not corporations, but me1re partnership concerns. Even
that mode of procedure has been modified by the Code, §§ -1922, 1923,
so that the creditor, at his option, may sue the associates without
hringing his action against the president or treasurer. These last and
quite recent enactments show that the legislative intent is still to preserve and not destroy the original difference between the two classes
of organizations; to maintain in full force the common-law liability
of associates, and not to substitute for it that of corporators , and preserving in continued operation that normal and distinctive difference,
to evince a plain purpose not to merge the two organizations in one or
destroy the boundaries which separate them. That intent, once clearly
ascertained, determt"nes the construct£on to be adopted, and may be the
only reUable test t"n v£ew of the powe:r of the state to clothe one organ£zatt"on wt"th all the attrt"butes of t)~e other. The drift of legislation has been to lessen and obscure the original and characteristic
difference. On the one hand, corporations have been created with
positive provisions retaining more or less the individual liability of the
members, and on the other the joint-stock companies have been
clothed with most of the corporate attributes, hut enough of the

would flow from the inherent effect of the corporate creation. The

penalties sometimes imposed are, of course, new statutory liabilities

which never at common law rested upon the individual members.

The retained liability occasionally established is in the nature and a

parcel of such original liability, as we had occasion to show in Rogers

v. Decker, 131 N. Y. 490, but is retained by force of the express

command of the statute, and in that manner saved from the de-

struction which otherwise would follow the simple creation of the

corporation. Ordinarily, these individual liabilities exist upon

other than common-law conditions, and make the corporators rather

sureties or guarantors of the corporation than original debtors, since

in general their liability arises after the usual remedies against the

corporation have been exhausted. But where that is not so, the

invariable truth is that the creation of the corporation necessarily

destroys the common-law liability of the individual members for its

debts, and requires at the hands of the creating power an affirmative

imposition of new personal liabilities or a specific retention of old
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ones from the destruction which would otherwise follow. Exactly

the opposite is true of joint-stock companies. Their formation de-

stroys no part or portion of their common law liability for the debts

contracted. Those debts are their debts, for which they must answer.

Permission to sue their president or treasurer is only a convenient

mode of enforcing that liability, but in no manner creates or saves it.

The statute of 1853 did interfere with it. That act required, in the

first instance, a suit against the president or treasurer, and so a pre-

liminary exhaustion of the joint property. But that act was modal,

and determined the procedure. It suspended the common-law right,

but recognized its existence. We so held in Witherhead v. Allen,

4 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 628, and at the same time said that the asso-

ciations were not corporations, but mere partnership concerns. Even

that mode of procedure has been modified by the Code, §§ 1922, 1923,

so that the creditor, at his option, may sue the associates without

bringing his action against the president or treasurer. These last and

quite recent enactments show that the legislative intent is still to pre-

serve and not destroy the original difference between the two classes

of organizations; to maintain in full force the common-law liability

of associates, and not to substitute for it that of corporators, and pre-

serving in continued operation that normal and distinctive difference,

to evince a plain purpose not to merge the two organizations in one or

destroy the boundaries which separate them. That intent, once clearly

ascertained, determines the construction to be adopted, and may be the

only reliable test in view of the power of the state to clothe one or-

ganization -with all the attributes of the other. The drift of legisla-

tion has been to lessen and obscure the original and characteristic

difference. On the one hand, corporations have been created with

positive provisions retaining more or less the individual liability of the

members, and on the other the joint-stock companies have been

clothed with most of the corporate attributes, but enough of the
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original difference remains to show that our legislation not only care-

fully preserves the distinction of names, but sufficient, also, of the

original difference of character and quality to disclose a clear intent

not to merge the two.

We may thus see upon what the legislative intent to preserve them

as separate and distinct is founded and what distinguishing character-

istics remain. The formation of the one involves the merging and

destruction of the common law liability of the members for the debts,

and requires the substitution of a new or retention of the old liability

by an affirmative enactment which avoids the inherent effect of the

corporate creation; in the other, the common law liability remains

unchanged and unimpaired and needing no statutory intervention to

preserve or restore it; the debt of the corporation is its debt and not

that of its members, the debt of the joint-stock company is the debt

of the associates however enforced; the creation of the corporation

merges and drowns the liability of its corporators, the creation of the

stock company leaves unharmed and unchanged the liability of the

associates; the one derives its existence from the contract of individ-
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uals, the other from the sovereignty of the state. The two are alike

but not the same. More or less, they crowd upon and overlap each

other, but without losing their identity, and so, while we can not say

that the joint-stock company is a corporation, we can say, as we did

say in Van Aernam v. Bleistein, 102 N. Y. 360, that a joint-stock

company is a partnership with some of the powers of a corporation.

Beyond that we do not think it is our duty to go.

The order should be affirmed, with costs.

All concur.

Order affirmed.

See. 4. Tests. (3) The powers conferred.

THOMAS v. DAKIN.'

1839. *N THK Supreme Court of New York. 22 Wendell

(N. Y.) 9-112.

Chief Justice Nelson: This is an action brought by the plaintiff,

original difference remains to show that our legislation not only carefully preserves the distinction of names, but sufficient, also, of the
original difference of character and quality to disclose a clear intent
not to merge the two.
We may thus see upon what the legislative intent to preserve them
as separate and distinct is founded and what distinguishing characteristics remain. The formation of the one involves the merging and
destruction of the common law liability of the members for the debts,
and requires the substitution of a new or retention of the old liability
by an affirmative enactment which avoids the inherent effect of the
corporate creation; in the other, the common law liability remains
unchanged and unimpaired and needing no statutory intervention to
preserve or restore it; the debt of the corporation is its debt and not
that of its members, the debt of the joint-stock company is the debt
o f the associates however enforced ; the ·creation of the corporation
merges and drowns the liability of its corporators, the creation of the
stock company leaves unharmed and unchanged the liability of the
associates; the one derives its existence from the contract of individuals, the other from the sovereignty of the state. The two are alike
but not the same. More or less, they crowd upon and overlap each
other, but without losing their identity, and so, while we can not s ay
that the joint-stock company is a corporation, we can say, as we did
say in Van Aernam v. Bleistein, 102 N. Y. 360, that a joint-stock
company is a partnership with some of the powers of a corporation.
Beyond that we do not think it is our duty to go.
The order should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur.
Order affirmed.

as president of the Bank of Central New York, an association formed

under what is familiarly known as the general banking law, passed
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cle of the constitution. On the part of the plaintiffs, it is urged in

reply: (i) That the associations are not corporations; (2) That if

cle of the constitution. On the part of the plaintiffs, it is urged in
reply: ( 1) That the associations are not corporations; ( 2) That if
they be, the act authorizing them may be passed by a majority bill;
and (3) If within the ninth section, still the law may be passed by
two-thirds of the members elected.
[Test of Corporate Ex.istence.]-Are these assocz'at£ons corporations .P
In order to determz'ne this question, we must first ascertat'n the
properties essential to const£tute a corporate body, and compare them
with those conferrcd upon the associatt'ons, for tf they ext'st £n common, or substantially correspond, the answer wz'll be t'n the ajfirmatt've. A corporate body is known to the law by the powers and
faculties bestowed upon it, expressly or impliedly, by the charter; the
use of the term corporation in its creation is of itself unimportant, except as it will imply the possession of these. They may be expressly
conferred, and then they denote this legal being as unerringly as if
created in general terms. It has been well said by l~arned expounders, that a corporation aggregate is an artificial body of men, composed of divers individuals, the lt'gaments of which body are the
francht'ses and libertt'es bestowed upon it, which bind and unite all
into one, and in which consists the whole frame and essence of the
corporation.
[Powers Incidental to Corporate Existence.J-The '' franchises and liberties," or, in more modern language, and as more strictly applicable
to private corporations, the p<r.vers and facul#es, which are usually
specified as creating corporate existence, are: 1. The capacity of
perpetual succession; 2. The power to sue and be sued, and to grant
and receive in its corporate name ; 3. To purchase and hold real and
personal estate; 4. To have a common seal, and 5. To make bylaws. These indicia were given by judges and elementary writers
at a very early day, since which time the institutions have greatly
multiplied, their practical operation and use have been thoroughly
tested, and their peculiar and essential properties much better understood. Any one comprehending the scope and purpose of them, at
this day, will not fail to perceive that some of the powers above specified are of trifling importance, while others are wholly unessential.
For instance, the power to purchase and hold real estate is no otherwise essential than to afford a place of business; and the right to use
a common seal, or to make by-laws, may be dispensed with altogether.
For as to the one, it is now well settled that corporations may contract by resolution, or through agents, without seal; and as to the
other, the power is unnecessary in all cases where the charter sufficiently provides for the government of the body. The distinguishing
feature, far above all others, is the capacity conferred, by which a
perpetual success£on of dijferent persons shall be regarded i'n the
law as one and the same body, and may at all t£mes act t'n f u!jillment
of the objects of the assoda#on as a st'ngle t'ndt'vt'dual.
In this way, a legal existence, a body corporate, an artificial being,
is constituted; the creation of which enables any number of persons
to be concerned in accomplishing a particular object, as one man.

they be, the act authorizing them may be passed by a majority bill;

and (3) If within the ninth section, still the law may be passed by

two-thirds of the members elected.

[Test of Corporate Existence.]—Arc these associations corporations?

In order to determine this question, we must first ascertain the

properties essential to constitute a corporate body, and compare them

with those conferred upon the associations, for if they exist in com-

mon, or substantially correspond, the answer will be in the affirma-

tive. A corporate body is known to the law by the powers and

facidtiesbestowed upon it, expressly or impliedly, by the charter; the

use of the term corporation in its creation is of itself unimportant, ex-

cept as it will imply the possession of these. They may be expressly

conferred, and then they denote this legal being as unerringly as if

created in general terms. It has been well said by learned expound-

ers, that a corporation aggregate is an artificial body of men, com-
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franchises and liberties bestowed upon it, which bind and unite all

into one, and in which consists the whole frame and essence of the

corporation.

[Powers Incidental to Corporate Existence.]—The '' franchises and lib-

erties," or, in more modern language, and as more strictly applicable

to private corporations, the powers and faculties, which are usually

specified as creating corporate existence, are: 1. The capacity of

perpetual succession; 2. The power to sue and be sued, and to grant

and receive in its corporate name; 3. To purchase and hold real and

personal estate; 4. To have a common seal, and 5. To make by-

laws. These indicia were given by judges and elementary writers

at a very early day, since which time the institutions have greatly

multiplied, their practical operation and use have been thoroughly

tested, and their peculiar and essential properties much better under-

stood. Any one comprehending the scope and purpose of them, at

this day, will not fail to perceive that some of the powers above speci-

fied arc of trifling importance, while others are wholly unessential.

For instance, the power to purchase and hold real estate is no other-

wise essential than to afford a place of business; and the right to use

a common seal, or to make by-laws, may be dispensed with altogether.

For as to the one, it is now well settled that corporations may con-

tract by resolution, or through agents, without seal; and as to the

other, the power is unnecessary in all cases where the charter suffi-

ciently provides for the government of the body. The distinguishing

feature, far above all others, is the capacity conferred, by which a

perpetual succession of different persons shall be regarded in the

law as one and the same body, and may at all times act in fulfillment

of the objects of the association as a single individual.

In this way, a legal existence, a body corporate, an artificial being,

is constituted; the creation of which enables any number of persons

to be concerned in accomplishing a particular object, as one man.
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of a natural person. In this consists the essence and great value of

these institutions. Hence it is apparent that the only properties that

can be regarded strictly as essential, are those which are indispensable

to mold the different persons into this artificial being, and thereby

enable it to act in the way above stated. When once constituted,

this legal being created, the powers and faculties that may be con-

ferred are various—limited or enlarged, at the discretion of the legis-

lature, and will depend upon the nature and object of the institution,

which is as competent as a natural person to receive and enjoy them.

We may, in short, conclude by saying, with the most approved au-

thorities at this day, that the essence of a corporation consists in a ca-

pacity: ( i) To have a perpetual succession under a special name,

and in an artificial form; (2) to take and grant property, contract

obligations, sue and be sued by its corporate name as an individual;

and (3) to receive and enjoy in common, grants of privileges and

immunities.

We will now endeavor to ascertain with exactness the powers and
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attributes conferred upon these associations by virtue of the statute.

The first fourteen sections (1 to 14) prescribe the duties of the comp-

troller in furnishing notes for circulation, taking the required securi-

ties, etc. The fifteenth provides that any number of persons may

associate to establish offices of discount, deposit and circulation. The

sixteenth, that they shall make and file a certificate, specifying: 1.

The name to be used in the business. 2. The place where the busi-

ness shall be carried on. 3. The amount of capital stock and num-

ber of shares into which divided. 4. The names of the shareholders.

5. The duration of the association. The eighteenth confers upon

the persons thus associating the most ample powers for carrying on

banking operations, together with the right "to exercise such inciden-

tal powers as shall be necessary to carry on such business;" also to

choose a president, vice-president, cashier and such other officers and

agents as may be necessary. By the twenty-first and twenty-second

sections, contracts, notes, bills, etc., shall be signed by the president

and cashier; and all suits, actions, etc., are to be brought in the

name of, and also against, the president for the time being; and not

to abate by his death, resignation or removal, but to be continued in

the name of the successor. Twenty-fourth section: The association

may purchase and hold real estate, etc., the conveyance to be made

to the president, or such other officer as shall be designated, who may

sell and convey the same free from any claim against shareholders.

Nineteenth section: The shares of capital stock to be deemed per-

sonal property, transferable on the books of the association; and

every person becoming a shareholder by such transfer shall succeed

to all the rights and liabilities of the prior holder. Twenty-third

section: No shareholder to be personally liable; and the association

is not to be dissolved by the death or insanity of any shareholder.

1. Upon a perusal of these provisions, it will appear that the asso-

While the aggregate means and influence of all are wielded in effecting it, the operation is conducted with the simplicity and individuality
of a natural person. In this consists the essence and great value of
these institutions. Hence it is apparent that the only properties that
can be regarded strictly as essential, are those which are indispensable
to mold the different persons into this artificial being, and thereby
enable it to act in the way above stated. When once constituted,
thi legal being created, the powers and facultie:s that may be conferred are various-limited or enlarged, at the discretion of the legislature, and will depend upon the nature and object of the institution,
which is as competent as a natural person to receiive and enjoy them.
W e may, in short, conclude by saying, with the most approved authorities at this day, that the essence of a corporalt"on consists in a capac£ty: ( r) To have a perpetual successi"on under a special 11ame,
and in an artificial form; (2) to take and grant property, contract
obligations, sue and be sued by its corporate nam1~ as an indivt'dual;
and (3) to receive and enjoy in common, grants of pri"vileges and
£mmuniti"es.
\Ve will now endeavor to ascertain with exactness the powers and
attributes conferred upon these associations by virtue of the statute.
The first fourteen sections (I to 14) prescribe the duties of the comptroller in furnishing notes for circulation, taking the required securities, etc. The fifteenth provides that any number of p~rsons may
as ociate to establish offices of discount, deposit and circulation. The
. ixteenth, that they shall make and file a certificate, specifying : I.
The name to be used in the business. 2. The place where the businc
hall be carried on. 3. The amount of capital stock and number of shares into which divided. 4 . The names of the shareholders.
5. The duration of the association. The eighteenth confers upon
the persons thus associating the most ample powers for carrying on
banking operations, together with the right "to exercise such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on such business;" also to
choo e a president, vice-president, cashier and such other officers and
agents as may be necessary. By the twenty-firslt and twenty-second
. ections, contracts, notes, bills, etc., sha ll be signed by the president
and cashier; and all suits, actions, etc., are to be brought in the
name of, and also against, the president for the time being; and not
to abate by his death, resignation or removal, btlit to be continued in
the name of the successor. Twenty-fourth section: The association
may purchase and hold real estate, etc., the conveyance to be made
to the president, or such other officer as shall be designated, who may
. e ll and convey the same free from any claim against shareholders.
~ineteenth section: The shares of capital stock to be deemed personal property, transferable on the books of the association: and
every person becoming a shareholder by such transfer shall succeed
to all the rights an<l liabilities of the prior hander. Twenty-third
section: No shareholder to be personally liable ; and the association
i not to be dissolved by the death or insanity of any shareholder.
1. Upon a perusal of these provisions, it will appear that the asso-
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amount of capital stock for banking purposes, which, when subscribed,

ciation acquires the power to raise and hold for common use any given
amount of capital stock for banking purposes, which, when subscribed,
is made personal property, and the several shares transferable the
same and with like effect as in case of co.rporate stock; to assume a
common name under which to manage all the affairs of the association; to choose all officers and agents that may be necessary for the
purpose, and remove and appoint them at pleasure. It will, hence,
be seen, that although the association may be composed of a number
of different persons, holding an interest in the capital stock, its operations are so arranged that they do not appear in conducting its
affairs; all are so bound together, so molded into one, as to constitute but a single body, represented by a common name, or names
(the knot of the combination), and in which all the business of the
institution is conducted by common agents. In this way it purchases
and holds real and personal property, contracts obligations, discounts
bills, notes and other evidences of debt, receives deposits, buys gold
and silver bullion, bills of exchange, etc., Joans money, sues and is
sued, etc. It is true some portion of the business is conducted in
the assumed name, and some in the name of the president for the
time being; but this in no manner changes the character of the body.
A corporation may have more than one name; it may have one in
which to contract, grant, etc., and another in which to sue and be
sued; so it may be known by two different names, and may sue :md
he sued in either; and the name of the president, his official name, or
any other, will answer every purpose. 2 Bacon's Ahr. 5; 2 Salk.
451; 2 Salk. 237; Ld. Raym. 153, 680. The only material circumstance is, a name, or names, of some kind, in which all the affairs of
the company may be conducted. So much, and no more, is essential
to give simplicity and effect to the operation. An artificial being is
thus plainly created, capable of receiving all the ample powers and
privileges conferred upon the associations, and of managing their diversified concerns in an individual capacity. All business is to he
conducted in a common or proper name.
2. This artificial being possesses the powers of perpetual succession. Neither sale of shares or death of shareholders affect it; if one
should sell his interest, or die, the purchaser or representative, by
operation of law, immediately takes his place. § 19. Nor can the
insanity of a member work a dissolution. Id. Officers and agents
for conducting the business of the association are secured. In case
of vacancy, by death or otherwise, the place may at once be filled.
§ 18. For the entire duration, therefore, of the association, and which
may be without limit, § 16, sub. 5, the whole body of shareholders,
though perpetually shifting, constitute the same uniform, artificial
being w hich is to be engaged through the instrumentality of officers
and agents in conducting the business of the concern, and no member
is personally liable. § 23. Then, as to the powers confened, without again specially recurring to them, it will be seen at once that the
associations possess all that are deemed essential, according to the
most approved authorities, to constitute a corporate body. They

is made personal property, and the several shares transferable the

same and with like effect as in case of corporate stock; to assume a

common name under which to manage all the affairs of the associa-
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the assumed name, and some in the name of the president for the

time being; but this in no manner changes the character of the body.

A corporation may have more than one name; it may have one in

which to contract, grant, etc., and another in which to sue and be

sued; so it may be known by two different names, and may sue and

be sued in either; and the name of the president, his official name, or

any other, will answer every purpose. 2 Bacon's Abr. 5; 2 Salk.

451; 2 Salk. 237; Ld. Raym. 153, 680. The only material circum-

stance is, a name, or names, of some kind, in which all the affairs of

the company may be conducted. So much, and no more, is essential

to give simplicity and effect to the operation. An artificial being is

thus plainly created, capable of receiving all the ample powers and

privileges conferred upon the associations, and of managing their di-

versified concerns in an individual capacity. All business is to be

conducted in a common or proper name.

2. This artificial being possesses the powers of perpetual succes-

sion. Neither sale of shares or death of shareholders affect it; if one

should sell his interest, or die, the purchaser or representative, by

operation of law, immediately takes his place. § 19. Nor can the

insanity of a member work a dissolution. Id. Officers and agents

for conducting the business of the association are secured. In case

of vacancy, by death or otherwise, the place may at once be filled.

§ 18. For the entire duration, therefore, of the association, and which

may be without limit, § 16, sub. 5, the whole body of shareholders,

though perpetually shifting, constitute the same uniform, artificial

being which is to be engaged through the instrumentality of officers

and agents in conducting the business of the concern, and no member

is personally liable. § 23. Then, as to the powers conferred, with-

out again specially recurring to them, it will be seen at once that the

associations possess all that are deemed essential, according to the

most approved authorities, to constitute a corporate body. They
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name, and in an artificial form. 2. To take and grant property, con-

tract obligations, to sue and be sued by its corporate name in the

same manner as an individual. 3. To receive grants of privileges and

immunities, and to enjoy them in common. All these are expressly

granted, and many more, besides the general sweeping clause, '••to

exercise suck incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on stick

business" (meaning the business of banking), under which even the

seal and right to make by-laws are clearly embraced, if essential in

conducting the affairs of the institution. * * *

By Cowen, J. Independent of authority and general reasoning,

I have had very great difficulty, on a simple reading, to avoid see-

ing plain, direct and express enactments in the general banking law,

conferring all the requisites demanded by counsel. 1. I read of a

collective existence, i. e., a body of men associated under a name

conferred mediately, i. e., through the certificate of association, by the

sovereign power, which is the legislature. 2. As such collective ex-

istence, I read that the association has a standing in court, perhaps in
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its own name, or at least in the name of its president. It recovers

judgments for debts due to it, and execution is levied on its property,

upon a recovery against it. 3-1 read of power to take and convey

title to property, acquire and give rights; all this to be done, as it

must be in every corporation, by its agents, but certainly in its collec-

tive name and designation; for the statute demands that the name

which it assumes shall be used in all its dealings. 4. I shall have

occasion to show that under a general provision of the act, there can

be no doubt of its power to make by-laws. There are various con-

siderations connected with this short view of the question, which may

perhaps tend to the illustration, distinctness and strength of that

view.

[Difference Between a Partnership and a Corporation1]—The associa-

tions formed under the act may, like our ordinary banks, elect their

president, cashier and directors, confer on the latter as I have as-

sumed and intend to show, the power to make and repeal by-laws,

to regulate elections, and through their proper agents in the name

of the association, to exercise all the other functions of our or-

dinary incorporated banking institutions. The latter are well known

as aggregate moneyed corporations.

It can not be denied that a voluntary association or partnership

might, temporarily, also elect the like officers and agents, confer upon

them nearly the same powers, and perform about the same functions,

without any charter or act of incorporation whatever. Collyer on

Partnership, 621, Am. ed. 1834. There is, however, much difference

between the power, duration and legal effect; a corporation aggre-

gate is in law an individual entirely distinct from its members, each

of whom may hold shares or interests in the corporation, legally

transferable in virtue of its charter; whereas a voluntary association

is made up of individuals not distinct from, but belonging in their

own names and rights to the company. Their shares or interests are

1 See p. 170, infra.

have a capacity: I. To have perpetual succession under a common
name, and in an artificial form. 2. To take and grant property, contract obligations, to sue and be sued by its corporate name in the
ame manner as an individual. 3. To receive grants of privileges and
immunities, and to enjoy them in common. All these are expressly
granted, and many more, besides the general sweeping clause, ' ·to
exercise such inddental powers as shall be necessary to carry on such
ousiness" (meaning the business of banking), under which even the
seal and right to make by-laws are clearly embraced, if essential in
conducting the affairs of the institution. • • •
By CowEN, J. Independent of authority and general reasoning,
I have had very great difficulty, on a simple reading, to avoid seeing plain, direct and express enactments in the general banking law ;
conferring all the requisites demanded by" counsel. 1. I read of a
collective existence, z". e., a body of men associated under a name
conferred medz"ate!y, £. e., through the certificate of association, by the
sovereign power, which is the legislature. 2. As such collective existence, I read that the association has a standing in court, perhaps in
its own name, or at least in the name of its president. It recovers
judgments for debts due to it, and execution is levied on its property,
upon a recovery against it. 3. I read of power to take and convey
title to property, acquire and give rights; all this to be done, as it
must be in every corporation, by its agents, but certainly in its collective name and designation; for the statute demands that the name
which it assumes shall be used in all its dealings. 4. I shall have
occasion to show that under a general provision of the act, there can
be no doubt of its power to make by-laws. There are various considerations connected with this short view of the question, which may
~rhaps tend to the illustration, distinctness and strength of that
\'ICW.

[Difference Between a Partnership ancl a Corporation1 ]-The associations formed under the act may, like our ordinary banks, elect their
pre ident, cashier and directors, confer on the latter as I have assumed and intend to show, the power to make and repeal by-laws,
to regulate elections, and through their proper agents in the name
of the association, to exercise all the other functions of our ordinary incorporated banking institutions. The latter are well known
a aggregate moneyed corporations.
It can not be denied that a voluntary association or partnership
might, temporarily, also elect the like officers and agents, confer upon
them nearly the same powers, and perform about the same functions,
without any charter or act of incorporation whatever. Collyer on
Partner hip, 621, Am. ed. 1834. There is, however, much difference
between the power, duration and legal effect; a corporation aggregate is in law an individual entirely distinct from its members, each
of whom may hold shares or interests in the corporation, legally
transferable in virtue of its charter; whereas a voluntary association
i made up of individuals not distinct from , but belonging in their
own names and rights to the company. Their shares or interests are
' See p. 170, infra.
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common to all; and, except so far as these may be made up of prop-

common to all; and, except so far as these may be made up of property in possession, they can not be transferred so as to create anything
more than an equitable right in the assignee. Hence a voluntary
company, asserting that it is possessed of stock transferable at the
option of the holder, has been said to be punishable for pretending to
act as a corporation. Collyer on Partnership, 624.
The members of a copartnership are joint tenants in the stock and
all the effects of the company, and, on the death of each, his interest
in the common choses in action, at law, survives to the other members, while his interest in the common land and choses in possession
passes, as an undivided share, to his heirs or personal representatives.
Collyer on Partnership, 4, 5, 68. The nature of these interests and
the course of succession are, in some respects, modified by the court
of chancery. Collyer on Partnership, 70, 71. All the members
must, as we have in part before seen, be named in suits by or against
the company, the right or liability to which, on the death of one, survives to all the others. Collyer on Partnership, 386, 395, 420, 427.
Each is individually liable for the whole debts due from the company,
Collyer on Partnership, 2 12, and may release and discharge all the
debts due to them. Collyer on Partnership, 239. One may enter
upon, use or otherwise control all the common property, real or personal; indeed, be may, in general, convert it to his own use, subject
to an account. Collyer on Partnershipr 2 JI. All the remedies t"nter
se, with few exceptions, are by action of account or hill in equity.
Collyer on Partnership, 143. The firm can not, in general, sue or
be sued by any one of its members, for this would involve the absurdity of a man being both plaintiff and defendant on the same record.
Collyer on Partnership, 143, 644-5. Partnerships are dissoluble, not
only by death or insanity, but by the bankruptcy of a member; a
general sale of his partnership effects by execution; his attainder of
felony, if it result in his civil death; an assignment by himself of all
his interest, and the marriage of a partner who is a feme sole. Indeed,
the better opinion is, that, however strong the provisions against a
dissolution may be in the articles of copartnership, the whole concern
may be dissolved at any time, by the act of a single partner, at his
own mere pleasure. Even during the continuance of the partnership,
he may interrupt its proceedings, by interdicting any single measure,
though agreed on by a majority of the firm. At least this is generally
so at law, and the power, it is apprehended, can be but partially qualified by a court of chancery. Collyer on Partnership, 58, § 2. 3
Kent's Comm., 53-4, 3d ed. It would seem clearly to follow, if it
has ever been disputed, that any powers, though jointly conferred on
others, as to act in the direction of affairs, or use a common seal, may
be revoked at the pleasure of either partner.
Most of these incidents it is impossible for the partners to avoid by
any stipulations in their articles of connection; and in proportion as any
body of men is authorized by statute to hold property and sue and be
sued without such incidents, they approach the character of a corporation. While they continue partners they are considered as natural

erty in possession, they can not be transferred so as to create anything

more than an equitable right in the assignee. Hence a voluntary

company, asserting that it is possessed of stock transferable at the

option of the holder, has been said to be punishable for pretending to

act as a corporation. Collyer on Partnership, 624.

The members of a copartnership are joint tenants in the stock and

all the effects of the company, and, on the death of each, his interest

in the common choses in action, at law, survives to the other mem-

bers, while his interest in the common land and choses in possession

passes, as an undivided share, to his heirs or personal representatives.

Collyer on Partnership, 4, 5, 68. The nature of these interests and

the course of succession are, in some respects, modified by the court

of chancery. Collyer on Partnership, 70, 71. All the members

must, as we have in part before seen, be named in suits by or against

the company, the right or liability to which, on the death of one, sur-

vives to all the others. Collyer on Partnership, 386, 395, 420, 427.

Each is individually liable for the whole debts due from the company,
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Collyer on Partnership, 212, and may release and discharge all the

debts due to them. Collyer on Partnership, 239. One may enter

upon, use or otherwise control all the common property, real or per-

sonal; indeed, he may, in general, convert it to his own use, subject

to an account. Collyer on Partnership, 211. All the remedies inter

se, with few exceptions, are by action of account or bill in equity.

Collyer on Partnership, 143. The firm can not, in general, sue or

be sued by any one of its members, for this would involve the absur-

dity of a man being both plaintiff and defendant on the same record.

Collyer on Partnership, 143, 644-5. Partnerships are dissoluble, not

only by death or insanity, but by the bankruptcy of a member; a

general sale of his partnership effects by execution; his attainder of

felony, if it result in his civil death; an assignment by himself of all

his interest, and the marriage of a partner who is a feme sole. Indeed,

the better opinion is, that, however strong the provisions against a

dissolution may be in the articles of copartnership, the whole concern

may be dissolved at any time, by the act of a single partner, at his

own mere pleasure. Even during the continuance of the partnership,

he may interrupt its proceedings, by interdicting any single measure,

though agreed on by a majority of the firm. At least this is generally

so at law, and the power, it is apprehended, can be but partially quali-

fied by a court of chancery. Collyer on Partnership, 58, § 2. 3

Kent's Comm., 53—4, 3d ed. It would seem clearly to follow, if it

has ever been disputed, that any powers, though jointly conferred on

others, as to act in the direction of affairs, or use a common seal, may

be revoked at the pleasure of either partner.

Most of these incidents it is impossible for the partners to avoid by

any stipulations in their articles of connection; and in proportion as any

body of men is authorized by statute to hold property and sue and be

sued without such incidents, they approach the character of a corpo-

ration. While they continue partners they are considered as natural
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persons merely, as so many joint tenants or tenants in common, of all

their property. In proportion as, by statute, they cease to be so they

become an artificial person. These two are the only persons known

to the law, according to the language of the great commentator,

i Black. Comm. 123. "Persons," says he, "are divided by the law

into either natural persons or artificial. Natural persons are such as

the God of nature formed us. Artificial are such as are created and

devised by human laws for the purposes of society and government,

which are called corporations or bodies politic." In another part of

his work, 1 Black. Comm. 467, he shows the advantages of corpora-

tions over partnerships or voluntary companies. He says: "Corpo-

rations are formed in order to preserve entire and forever those rights

and immunities which, if they were granted only to those individuals

of which the body is composed, would, upon their death, be utterly

lost and extinct." In a mere voluntary assembly he admits the indi-

viduals that compose it might act up to the purposes for which they

associated so long as they could agree to do so; "but they could
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neither frame nor receive any laws or rules of their conduct; none, at

least, which would have any binding force, for want of coercive power

to create a sufficient obligation; and when they are dispersed by death

or otherwise, how shall they transfer their advantages to others

equally unconnected with themselves?

"So, also, with regard to holding estates or other property, if land

be granted for the common purpose to twenty individuals not incor-

porated, there is no legal way of continuing the property to any other

persons for the same purpose, but by endless conveyances from one to

another, as often as the hands are changed. But when they are con-

solidated and united into a corporation, they and their successors are

then considered as one person in law; as one person, they have one

will, which is collected from the sense of the majority of the individ-

uals; this one will may establish rules and orders for the regulation

of the whole, which are a sort of municipal laws of this little republic;

or rules and statutes may be prescribed to it at its creation, which are

then in the place of natural laws; the privileges and immunities, the

estates and possessions of the corporation, when once vested in'them,

will be forever vested, without any new conveyance or new succes-

sions; for all the individual members that have existed from the

foundation to the present time, or that shall ever hereafter exist, are

but one person in law, a person that never dies; in like manner as

the river Thames is still the same river, though the parts which com-

pose it are changing every instant." In this quotation, I have taken

the words of Blackstone as he applied them, by way of example, to

the case of a college in one of the English universities; and without

quoting him literally throughout, have confined myself to such things

as the learned author considers peculiar, to every aggregate corpora-

tion. These are, in short, the receiving of peculiar laws and the

making of bv-laws for itself; perpetual succession, both as to its

privileges and property; the having one will, as collected from the

power of the majority to make by-laws; and the being but one per-

persons merely, as so many joint tenants or tenants in common, ?f all
their property. In proportion as, by statute, they cease to be so they
become an artificial person. These two are the only persons known
to the law, according to the language of the great commentator,
1 Black. Comm. 123.
"Persons," says he, "are divided by the law
into either natural persons or artificial. Natural persons are such as
the God of nature formed us. Artificial are such as are created and
devised by human laws for the purposes of society and government,
which are called corporations or bodies politic." In another part of
his work, 1 Black. Comm. 467, he shows the advantages of corporations over partnerships or voluntary companies. He says: " Corporations are formed in order to preserve entire and forever those rights
and immunities which, if they were granted only to those individuals
of which the body is composed, would, upon their death, be utterly
lot and extinct." In a mere voluntary assembly he admits the individuals that compose it might act up to the purposes for which they
a sociated so long as they could agree to do so; "hut they could
neither frame nor receive any laws or rules of their conduct; none, at
least, which would have any binding force, for want of coercive power
to create a sufficient obligation; and when they are dispersed by death
or otherwise, how shall they transfer their advantages to others
equally unconnected with themselves?
" So, also, with regard to holding estates or other property, if land
be granted for the common purpose to twenty individuals not incorporated, there is no legal way of continuing the property to any other
persons for the same purpose, but by endless conveyances from one to
another, as often as the hands are changed. But when they arc conolidated and united into a corporation, they and their successors are
then considered as one person in law; as one person , they have one
will, which is collected from the sense of the majority of the individuals; this one will may establish rules and orders for the regulation
of the whole, which are a sort of municipal laws of this little republic;
or rules and statutes may be prescribed to it at its creation, which are
then in the place of natural laws; the privileges and immunities, the
e tates and possessions of the corporation, when once vested in 'them,
will be forever vested, without any new conveyance or new successions; for all the individual members that have existed from the
foundation to the present time, or that shall ever hereafter exist, are
but one person in law, a person that never dies; in like manner as
the river Thames is still the same river, though the parts which compose it are changing every instant." In this -quotation , I have taken
the words of Blackstone as he applied them, by way of example, to
the case of a college in one of the English universities; and without
quoting him literally throughout, have confined myself to such things
as the learned author considers peculiar. to every aggregate corporation. These are , in short, the receiving of peculiar laws and the
m:iking of by-laws for itself; perpetual succession, both as to its
pri1 ileges and property; the having one will, as collected from the
power of the majority to make by-laws; and the being but one per-
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son in law, a person that dies not, but continues the same individual,

THOMAS V. DAKIN.

though its parts may change. See, also, Ang. & Ames on Corp.,

son in law, a person that dies not, but continues· the same individual.
though its parts may change. See, also, Ang. & Ames on Corp.,

2 j_ « » »

[The Idea of Perpetual Succession.]—The great and essential object to

:?3. • • •
[The Idea of Perpetual Snccession.]-The great and essential object to

be attained by the creation of a corporation, is continuity (sometimes

called immortality) and individuality; '"properties," says Ch. J.

Marshall, "by which a perpetual succession of many persons are con-

be attained by the creation of a corporation , is continu£ty (sometime .,
called immortality) and ind£v£dual£ty; " properties," says Ch. J.
Marshall, "by which a perpetual successt"on of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as the single £nd£v£dual. They
enable a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold property
without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless nece ·sity of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from
hand to hand." Dartmouth College v. Wood ward, 4 Wheat. 636;
Angel & Ames on Corp., 2. A peculiar sort of £nd£viduality, and a
peculiar mode of success£on, for a particular purpose, and not allowed
by the general law to natural persons, enter into every definition of a
corporation that I ha,·e seen. 1 Kyd on Corp., 2-3. With us there
can be no recent creation of such an artificia l person except by statute. 2 Kent's Comm., 276, 3d ed. No agreement of individuals
can so far alter the nature of things; and, as we have seen of p erso11s,
there can be only two kinds, natural and artificial, so there can be but
two mod es in which property is transmitted by succession. The o ne
takes place between natural persons, of which we have an example in
descent on the death of the ancestor; the other is between predecessors and s uccessors in a corporation aggregate or sole. The one may
be called a natural, and the other an artificial succession; and it is
evident that the latter can not exist independent of a corporation , any
more than the former without natural persons. 1 Kyd on Corp. 2-3.
In the associations created by the banking law great care has been
taken to introduce and maintain corporate succession m every part of
the system. I have already endeavored to show that the beneficial
interest in all it · real and personal property belongs to any association formed under that law as an individual. If I have succeeded, it
fo llows that such association is a corporation. The principle of succession is equally maintained in respect to the president for the purpose of receiving co1weyances of real estate and selling it; and so
when he acts a the organ of maintaining actions in right of the association and defending actions brought. All these rights, powers and
duties pass in perpetual succession from president to president during
the existence of the company. The president and his successors thus
come to enjoy, in the nature of a sole corporation, a perpetual trusteeship in the real estate, and a perpetual power or control over it, together with the suits of the company. "From their having p erpetual
succession, and suing and being sued in their political character, single
per ons of both these descriptions have (without much propriety, as
Mr ..K yd thinks) bee n uniformly, in the books of English law, called
corporations." Kyd on Corporations, 19, 20. "A sole corporation,
as its name implies, consists only of one person, to whom and his
successors belongs that legal perpetuity, the enjoyment of which is
denied to all natural persons." Angell & Ames on Corporations, 18,

sidered as the same, and may act as the single individual. Thev

enable a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold property

without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless neces-

sity of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from

hand to hand." Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 636;

Angel & Ames on Corp., 2. A peculiar sort of individuality, and a

peculiar mode of succession, for a particular purpose, and not allowed

by the general law to natural persons, enter into every definition of a

corporation that I have seen. 1 Kyd on Corp., 2—3. With us there

can be no recent creation of such an artificial person except by stat-

ute. 2 Kent's Comm., 276, 3d ed. No agreement of individuals
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can so far alter the nature of things; and, as we have seen of persons.

there can be only two kinds, natural and artificial, so there can be but

two modes in which property is transmitted by succession. The one

takes place between natural persons, of which we have an example in

descent on the death of the ancestor; the other is between predeces-

sors and successors in a corporation aggregate or sole. The one may

be called a natural, and the other an artificial succession; and it is

evident that the latter can not exist independent of a corporation, any-

more than the former without natural persons. 1 Kyd on Corp. 2—3.

In the associations created by the banking law great care has been

taken to introduce and maintain corporate succession in every part of

the system. I have already endeavored to show that the beneficial

interest in all its real and personal property belongs to any associa-

tion formed under that law as an individual. If I have succeeded, it

follows that such association is a corporation. The principle of suc-

cession is equally maintained in respect to the president for the pur-

pose of receiving conveyances of real estate and selling it; and so

when he acts as the organ of maintaining actions in right of the asso-

ciation and defending actions brought. All these rights, powers and

duties pass in perpetual succession from president to president during

the existence of the company. The president and his successors thus

come to enjoy, in the nature of a sole corporation, a perpetual trustee-

ship in the real estate, and a perpetual power or control over it, to-

gether with the suits of the company. "From their having perpetual

succession, and suing and being sued in their political character, single

persons of both these descriptions have (without much propriety, as

Mr. Kyd thinks) been uniformly, in the books of English law, called

corporations." Kyd on Corporations, 19, 20. "A sole corporation,

as its name implies, consists only of one person, to whom and his

successors belongs that legal perpetuity, the enjoyment of which is

denied to all natural persons." Angell & Ames on Corporations, 18,
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19; I Black. Comm., 469. It need scarcely be remarked that the

president cf the banking associations in question comes fully within

TESTS:

the general definition.

-

POWERS CONFERRED.

In England, sole corporations are mostly employed to hold in suc-

cession the rights and property of the ecclesiastical establishment; and

it is said they can not take personal property in succession, but only

real. Sole corporations are not common in the United States. Angell

& Ames on Corp., 19, 20. But it is not perceived why an officer, or

other person authorized to hold property, real or -personal, to him and

his. successors, be not a sole corporation within the plain meaning of

the definition. The chamberlain of London, who may take a recog-

nizance to him and his successors, in his political capacity, in trust for

orphans, was said to be a sole corporation in trust. Byrd v. Wilford,

Cro. Eliz. 464. It was there said by Gawdy and Fenner, Js., that the

chamberlain was a special corporation for that purpose; and an obli-

gation may as well go in succession as land. So of the comptroller

who takes an assignment of stocks, bonds and mortgages, to hold

under the general banking law. Surely these would not, on his death,

go to his executors. They are holdcn by him in trust, to pay the

debts of the association; and would pass to his successors. He is
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equally a corporation sole, for this special purpose, according to the

English definition. The supervisor of a town may sue or be sued.

2 R. S. 387, 8, §§ 96 and 100, 2d ed. Suppose he were authorized

to hold lands and chattels to him and his successors, in trust for his

town, would he not be a sole corporation, as the board of supervisors

or loan officers are an aggregate corporation in respect to lands which

they hold for the county? Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. R. 325.

The grand test of a corporation is the mode in which property suc-

ceeds from one to another. When it does not go to the heirs of the

holder as a natural person, it passes to the successor or successors,

because it is holden in a corporate capacity. The holders are there-

fore said to be a person or body politic and corporate, in opposition

to their natural capacity. Thus, all property must be holden by

natural persons or corporations. If the property of an association

under the general banking law be not holden in the natural capacity

of the different members as partners, the only alternative remaining

is a holding by corporations aggregate or sole. No third description

of person is known to our law. None was known to the Roman law.

See 1 Browne's Civil and Adm. Law, 141. None to any system of

laws with which we are acquainted.

There are two cases in 1 Rolle's Abr., 515, which show still more dis-

tinctly that the president of an association and the state comptroller

must be considered each as sole corporations. One is where a presi-

dent of a college of physicians recovers, in that character, a penalty

against a party for practicing without license. Another is where

the master of an hospital recovers, in that character, the arrears of

the annuity due to the hospital. On the death of either the interest

iruthe judgment recovered passes to his successor, and not to his ex-

ecutor; and simply because the debt thus goes in succession, and

19; 1 Black. Comm., 469. It need scarcely be remarked that the
president cf the banking associations in question comes fully within
the general definition.
.
In England, sole corporations are mostly employed to hold in succession the rights and property of the ecclesiastical establishment; and
it is said they can not take personal property in succession, but only
- real. Sole corporations are not common in the Unite<l States. Angell
& Ames on Corp., 19, 20. But it is not perceived why an officer, or
other person authorized to hold property, real or p ersonal, to him an<l
his. successors, be not a sole corporation within the plain meaning of
the definition. The chamberlain of London, who may take a recognizance to him and his successors, in his political capacity, in trust for
orphans, was said to be a sole corporation in trust. Byrd Y. Wilford,
Cro. Eliz. 464. It was there said by Gawdy and Fenner, Js., that the
chamberlain was a special corporation for that purpose; and an obligation may as well go in succession as land. So of the comptroll er
who takes an assignment of stocks, bonds and mortgages, to hold
under the general banking law. Surely these would not, on his death,
go to his executors. They are holden by him in trust, to pay the
debts of the association; and would pass to his successors. He is
equally a corporation sole, for this special purpose, according to the
English definition. The supervisor of a town may sue or be sucrl.
2 R. S. 387, 8, §§ 96 and 100, 2d ed.
Suppose he were authonzerl
to hold lands and chattels to him and his successors, in tru st for his
town, would he not be a sole corporation, as the board of supervisors
or loan officers are an aggregate corporation in respect to lands whi ch
they hold for the county? Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. R. 325.
The grand test of a corporation is the mode in which property succeeds from one to another. vVhen it does not go to the heirs of the
holder as a natural person, it passes to the successor or successors,
because it is holden in a corporate capacity. The holclcrs are therefore said to be a person or body politic and corporate, in opposition
to their natural capacity. Thus, all property must be holden by
natural persons or corporations. If the property of an association
under the general banking law be not holden in the natural capacity
of the different members as partners, the only alternative remaining
is a holding by corporations aggregate or sole. No third description
of person is known to our law. None was known to the Roman law.
See 1 Browne's Civil and Adm. Law, 141. None to any system of
laws with which we are acquainted.
There are two cases in 1 Rolle's Ahr., 515, which show still more distinctly that the president of an association and the state comptroller
mu t be c~nsidered each as sole corporations. One is where a president of a college of physicians recovers, in that character, a penalty
again t a party for practicing without license. Another is where
the ma ter of an hospital recovers, in that character, the arrears of
the annuity due to the hospital. On the death of either the interest
in.the judgment recovered passes to his successor, and not to hi executor; and simply hecau<Je the debt thus goes in successio!l, and
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Toller says they are each a special or sole corporation like the cham-

berlain of London before mentioned. Toll, on Ex., ch. 4, § 3, p.

Toller says they are each a special or sole corporation like the chamberlain of London before mentioned. Toll. on Ex., ch. 4 1 § 3 1 p.
136, ed. of 1803. See also I Wms. Ex. 546, ed. of 1832. Atkins v.
Gardener, Cro. Jae. 159. This matter is very fully illustrated in 2
Black. Comm., 431, 2. • • •
By BRONSON, J.: I concur fully in the opinions expressed by my
brclhren, that associations formed under the general banking law are
corporations, and that the assent of two-thirds of all the members
elected to each branch of the legislature was necessary to the passing
of the act. But, as at present advised, I can not concur in the
opinion that the legi. lature has the constitutional power, although
two-thirds may assent, to provide by a general law for the creation of
an indefinite number of corporations at the pleasure of any persons
who may associate for that purpose.
It was conceded on the argument, that the demurrer does not reach
the objection that the act was not passed by a two-thirds vote; and I
have not, therefore, considered the question whether we can look heyond the statute book. A plea may render it necessary for us to pass
upon that question.
Judgment for plaintiff.

136, ed. of 1803. See also 1 Wms. Ex. 546, ed. of 1832. Atkins v.

Gardener, Cro. Jac. 159. This matter is very fully illustrated in 2

Black. Comm., 431, 2. * * *

By Bronson, J.: I concur fully in the opinions expressed by my

brethren, that associations formed under the general banking law are

corporations, and that the assent of two-thirds of all the members

elected to each branch of the legislature was necessary to the passing

of the act. But, as at present advised, I can not concur in the

opinion that the legislature has the constitutional power, although

two-thirds may assent, to provide by a general law for the creation of

an indefinite number of corporations at the pleasure of any persons

who may associate for that purpose.

It was conceded on the argument, that the demurrer does not reach

the objection that the act was not passed by a two-thirds vote; and I

have not, therefore, considered the question whether we can look be-

yond the statute book. A plea may render it necessary for us to pass
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upon that question.

Judgment for plaintiff.

Sec. 5. Tests. (4) But in foreign jurisdictions the powers con-

ferred, rather than the legislative declaration, will control.1

EDGEWORTH v. WOOD, Treasurer of the United States Express

Company.

1896. In the Supreme Court of New Jersey. 58 New Jer-

sey Law (29 Vroom) 463-469, 3 Am. & Eng.

Corp. Cas. (N. S.) 299, 33 Atl. 940.

Sec. 5. Tests.

( 4) But in foreign jurisdictions the powers conferred, rather than the legislative declaration, will control. 1

On rule to show cause.

Argued at November term, 1S95, before Beasley, chief justice,

and Justices Magie and Ludlow.

EDGEWORTH v. WOOD, TREASURER

The opinion of the court was delivered by Magie, J. This is an

action in tort in which plaintiff seeks to recover damages for injuries

OF THE UNITED STATES

EXPRESS

COMPANY .

suffered by him by reason of his being run over, in a public street in

1896.

Jersey City, by a wagon of the United States Express Company, neg-

ligently driven by a driver in the employ of that company. The jury

having rendered a verdict for plaintiff, this rule to show cause whv the

verdict should not be set aside was allowed. Several reasons were

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF NEw JERSRY. 58 New Jersey Law (29 Vroom) 463-469, 3 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. (N. S.) 299, 33 Atl. 940.

filed in support of the rule, but only three have been urged in the

On rule to show cause.
Argued at November term, 1895, before BEASLEY, chief justice,
and Justices MAGIE and LUDLOW.
The opinion of the court was delivered by MAGIE, J. This is an
action in tort in which plaintiff seeks to recover damages for injuries
suffered by him by reason of his being run over, in a public street in
Jersey City, by a wagon of the United States Express Company, negligently driven by a driver in the employ of that company. The jury
having rendered a verdict for plaintiff, this rule to show cause why the
verdict should not be set aside was allowed. Several reasons were
filed in support of the rule, but only three have been urged in the
argument. These only will he considered.
·
It is first contended that neither plaintiff's declaration nor the evidence produced by him discloses any liability on the part of Theodore
F. Wood, treasurer of the United States Express Company, to answer for plaintiff's injuries, if inflicted as he claimed.

argument. These only will be considered.

It is first contended that neither plaintiff's declaration nor the evi-

dence produced by him discloses any liability on the part of Theodore

F. Wood, treasurer of the United States Express Company, to an-

swer for plaintiff's injuries, if inflicted as he claimed.

1 See note (5) at end of Article I, infra, p. 32.

1
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Plaintiff claims to have made out his case, in this respect, in the
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following manner: He produced proof that the United States Ex-

press Company was an association organized April 22, 1854, under

the laws of New York, and having a principal place of business in

the city of New York, and that Thomas C. Piatt was its president

and Theodore F. Wood its treasurer. He put in evidence chapter

238 of the laws of New York for the year 1849, and sections 1919,

1924 of the New York code of civil procedure, whereby it appeared

that any association thus organized was expressly authorized to sue

and to be sued in the name either of its president or its treasurer for

the time being. Upon this he contends that he is entitled to an ac-

tion against Wood, as treasurer, and as Wood is a resident of New

Jersey, and was served with process here, that our courts, by comity,

will recognize the liability to suit imposed by the laws of New York.

In opposition to this, it is contended on the part of defendant

that if it be conceded that our courts will, by comity, adopt and en-

force remedies against such associations, in the mode prescribed by

the law of the state under which they came into existence, yet if the
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law of this state has furnished a mode of procedure by which reme-

dies against such associations may be enforced, the rule of comity

ceases and the mode of procedure provided by our laws must be pur-

sued. The supplement to the Practice act, approved May 23, 1890

(Pamph. L., p. 353; Gen. Stat., p. 2592, § 342), is conceived by

counsel to have furnished a mode of procedure under which this ac-

tion could have been maintained against the United States Express

Company.

By that act it is enacted that any "unincorporated company, stock

company or association," consisting of two or more persons united

for business purposes and having a recognized name, may be sued by

that name in any action affecting the common property or the joint

rights and liabilities of such company or association. Provision is

made for the service of process and for the issue of an execution upon

judgment in the same manner as upon judgments against corporations.

If the United States Express Company is an unincorporated associa-

tion, within the meaning of the act, it would seem that plaintiff could

have brought his action under that act.

Questions concerning the nature of associations formed under the

laws of New York, such as the United States Express Company,

have been frequently considered in the courts of that state. The act

of 1849 speaks of them as joint-stock companies or associations. By

its certificate, this company calls itself a joint-stock company.

In the earliest case to which my attention has been directed, the

question requiring solution was as to the relation between a share-

holder and such a company. After an exhaustive review of the New

York statutes on the subject, Judge Barnard declared that such com-

panies had all the qualities of corporations, except that of having a

common seal. His conclusion was that in a controversy between a

shareholder and the company, he was not to be considered as a part-

ner in a partnership, but the courts must deal with his relation follow-

Plaintiff claims to have made out his case, in this respect, in the
following manner: He produced proof that the United States Express Company was an association organized April 22, 1854, under
the laws of New York, and having a principal place of business in
the city of New York, and that Thomas C. Platt was its president
and Theodore F. Wood its treasurer. He put in evidence chapter
238 of the laws of New York for the year 1849, and sections 1919,
1924 of the New York code of civil procedure, whereby it appeared
that any association thus organized was expressly authorized to sue
and to be sued in the name either of its president or its treasurer for
the time being. Upon this he contends that he is entitled to an action against Wood, as treasurer, and as Wood is a resident of New
Jersey, and was served with process here, that our courts, by comity,
will recognize the liability to suit imposed by the laws of New York.
In opposition to this, it is contended on the part of defendant
that if it be conceded that our courts will, by comity, adopt and enforce remedies against such associations, in the mode prescribed by
the law of the state under which they came into existence, yet if the
law of this state has furnished a mode of procedure by which remedies against such associations may be enforced, the rule of comity
ceases and the .mode of procedure provided by our laws must be pursued. The supplement to the Practice act, approved May 23, 1890
(Pamph. L., p. 353; Gen. Stat., p. 2592, § 342), is conceived by
counsel to have furnished a mode of procedure under which this action could have been maintained against the United States Express
Company.
By that act it is enacted that any "unincorporated company, stock
company or association," consisting of
or more persons united
for business purposes and h aving a recognized name, may be sued by
that name in any action affecting the common property or the joint
rights and liabilities of such company or association. Prc;>Vision is
made for the service of process and for the issue of an execution upon
judgment in the same manner as upon judgments against corporations .
If the United States Express Company is an unincorporated association, within the meaning of the act, it would seem that plaintiff could
have brought his action under that act.
Questions concerning the nature of associations formed under the
Jaws of New York, such as the United States Express Company,
have been frequently considered in the courts of that state. The act
of 1849 speaks of them as joint-stock companies or associations. By
its certificate, this company calls itself a joint-st~ck company.
In the earliest case to which my attention has been directed, the
question requiring solution was as to the relation between a shareholder and such a company. After an exhaustive review of the New
York statutes on the subject, Judge Barnard declared that suc11 companies had all the qualities of corporations, except that of having a
common seal. His conclusion was that in a controversy between a
shareholder and the company, he was not to be considered as a partner in a partnership , but the courts must deal with his relation follow-
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ing the analogy of the law of corporations. Waterbury v. Merchants'
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Union Express Co., 50 Barb. 157.

EDGEWORTH V. WOOD.

In a later case, an action was brought by a shareholder in the same

company against Fargo, its president, to recover for the loss of articles

ing the analogy of the law of corporations. Waterbury v. Merchants'
U nion Express Co.,
Barb. 157·
In a later case, an action was brought by a shareholder in the same
company against F argo, its president, to recoyer for the loss of articles
entrusted to it for transportation. The defense was that the owner of
an interest in the company could not maintain such an action against
it, which it was claimed was like an action by a partner against the
partnership. The action was sustained by the court below.· Westcott v. Fargo, President , 6 Lans. 319. Upon appeal, the opinion was
<lelivered by Dwight, one of the commissioners of appeal. Upon a
review of the statutes, he declared that the president or treasurer of
one of these joint-stock companies or associations was to be regarded,
for the purpo es of an action against the company, substantially as a
corporation sole; that such companies possessed some powers and
privileges o f corporations not possessed by individual s or partnerships,
a nd that a n action upon a liability of the company might be maintained by one of its members. vV estcott v. Fargo, 61 N. Y. s4z.
Later the United States Express Company, the very company whose
officer is here sued, objected to the imposition of a tax upon its corporate franchises and business computable upon its capital stock under an act taxing corporations, joint-stock companies and associations
incorporated or organized under any law of the state. Its contention
was that it was ne ither so incorporated nor organized. The right to
impose the tax was sustained, Judge Danforth say ing: "The agreement which brought many persons into one artificial body was so
framed as to accomplish that end, an<l in proposing to conduct its affairs by the power given to it in the mode prescribed by the legislature, they must be deemed, for the purposes of the act in question,
to be incorporated-that is, formed or united under the law of the
state, whether the artificial body be termed a corporation , a joint-stock
company or association.'' People, ex rel. Platt, v. Wemple, 11 7
N. Y. 136.
Question s have also arisen respecting the right to remove to the
federal courts actions between the president or treasurer of such companies and other persons.
In ~cw York, it was held , in a suit by Fargo as president of such
a company organized in New York, that the company was to be considered like a corporation, a citizen of New York, and the action was
removable to the United States court, if the other party was a citizen
of another state. Fargo v. McVicker, SS Barb. 437.
In the United States Circuit Court for the District of Michigan,
Judge Brown (now justice of the supreme court) held that such a
company formed in New York was to be d eemed a citizen of New
York without regard to the citizenship of its members. Maltz v.
American Express Co. , 1 Flip. 611.
Tn another case in the federal courts; the action was brought by
Fargo as president of such a company against a citizen of a western
state, and Judge Gresham held that such a company was a citizen of
!'Jew York and could maintain an action in those courts, notwithstand-

so

entrusted to it for transportation. The defense was that the owner of

an interest in the company could not maintain such an action against

it, which it was claimed was like an action by a partner against the

partnership. The action was sustained by the court below. West-

cott v. Fargo, President, 6 Lans. 319. Upon appeal, the opinion was

delivered by Dwight, one of the commissioners of appeal. Upon a

review of the statutes, he declared that the president or treasurer of

one of these joint-stock companies or associations was to be regarded,

for the purposes of an action against the company, substantially as a

corporation sole; that such companies possessed some powers and

privileges of corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships,

and that an action upon a liability of the company might be main-

tained by one of its members. Westcott v. Fargo, 61 N. Y. 542.

Later the United States Express Company, the very company whose

officer is here sued, objected to the imposition of a tax upon its cor-

porate franchises and business computable upon its capital stock, un-
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der an act taxing corporations, joint-stock companies and associations

incorporated or organized under any law of the state. Its contention

was that it was neither so incorporated nor organized. The right to

impose the tax was sustained, Judge Danforth saying: "The agree-

ment which brought many persons into one artificial body was so

framed as to accomplish that end, and in proposing to conduct its af-

fairs by the power given to it in the mode prescribed by the legisla-

ture, they must be deemed, for the purposes of the act in question,

to be incorporated—that is, formed or united under the law of the

state, whether the artificial body be termed a corporation, a joint-stock

company or association." People, ex rel. Piatt, v. Wemple, 117

X. Y. 136.

Questions have also arisen respecting the right to remove to the

federal courts actions between the president or treasurer of such com-

panies and other persons.

In New York, it was held, in a suit by Fargo as president of such

a company organized in New York, that the company was to be con-

sidered like a corporation, a citizen of New York, and the action was

removable to the United States court, if the other party was a citizen

of another state. Fargo v. McVicker, 55 Barb. 437.

In the United States Circuit Court for the District of Michigan,

Judge Brown (now justice of the supreme court) held that such a

company formed in New York was to be deemed a citizen of New

York without regard to the citizenship of its members. Maltz v.

American Express Co., 1 Flip. 611.

In another case in the federal courts; the action was brought by

Fargo as president of such a company against a citizen of a western

state, and Judge Gresham held that such a company was a citizen of

New York and could maintain an action in those courts, notwithstand-
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ing the fact that some of its shareholders were residents of the state
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in which the defendant resided. Fargo v. L., N. A. & C. Ry. Co.,

6 Fed. Rep. 787.

In the case last cited and in some of the other cases, the conclusion

reached has not been deemed invalidated by the fact that some of the

New York statutes speak of such companies and associations as unin-

corporated.

In Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566, the supreme

court of the United States held that an Bnglish joint stock associa-

tion, which was endowed with certain corporate powers, must be con-

sidered by our courts to be a corporation, notwithstanding the acts of

parliament declared that such associations should not be held to be

corporations.

[Test of Corporate Existence.]—Whether an aggregation of indi-

viduals united in an artificial body is a corporation or not is to be

determined rather by the faculties and powers conferred upon the

body than by the name or description given to it.

Upon this review, I have reached the conclusion that the United

States Express Company is a corporate entity, empowered to sue and
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be sued, not, as is usual, in a corporate name, but in the name of

designated officers. To such a corporation the act of 1890 does not

apply, and this action was therefore properly brought against Wood

as treasurer, whose status in the suit is not that of an individual but

of a representative of the company.

This reason can not, therefore, prevail.

[Points of opinion relating to sufficiency of evidence are omitted.]

The rule to show cause should be discharged.

NOTES TO ABTICXK I.

1. Definitions: For the authorities favoring one or the other of the defini-

tions given above, see notes to Articles II, III and IV, infra, pp. 72, 109, 157.

Definitions of corporations will be found in the following cases: 1804, Head v.

Providence Ins. Co., 2 Cranch (U. S.) 127, on 167; 1809, Hank of United

States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch (U. S.) 61; 1819, Trustees Dartmouth Col. v.

ing the fact that some of its shareholders were residents of the state
in which the defendant resided. Fargo v. L., N. A. & C. Ry. Co.,
6 Fed. Rep. 787.
In the case last cited and in some of the other cases, the conclusion
reached has not been deemed invalidated by the fact that some of the
New York statutes speak of such companies and associations as unincorporated.
In Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566, the supreme
court of the United States held that an Bnglish joint stock association, which was endowed with certain corporate powers, must be cons idered by our courts to be a corporation, notwithstanding the acts of
parliament declared that such associations should not be held to be
corporations.
[Test of Corporate Existence.]- Whether an aggregati'on of indi'vi'duals uni'ted t'n an artificial body t's a corporation or not i's to be
d et crmt'ned rather by the facult£es and powers conferred upon the
body than by the name or descrtpti'on gt'ven to it.
Upon this review, I have reached the conclusion that the United
States Express Company is a corporate entity, empowered to sue and
be sued, not, as is usual, in a corporate name, but in the name of
designated officers. To such a corp.o ration the act of 1890 does not
apply, and this action was therefore properly brought against Wood
as treasurer, whose status in the suit is not that of an individual but
of a representative of the company.
This reason can not, therefore, prevail.
[Points of opinion relating to sufficiency of evidence are omitted. J
The rule to show cause should be discharged.

Woodward, 4 Wlieaton 518, on 636, 667; 1839, Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wendell

(N. Y.) 9, 70, 104, supra, p. 19; 1840, Warner v. Beers, 23 Wendell (N. Y.)

NOTES TO ABTIOLB I.

103, 123,124, supra, p. 2; 1841, People, ex rel. Bank of Watertown, v. Asses-

sors, etc., 1 Hill (N. Y.) 616, 620; 1844, Louisville C, etc., R. Co. v. Let-

son, 2 Howard fIT. S.) 497, 552; 1860, The Ohio Ins. Co. v. Nunemacher,

15 Ind. 295; 1861, Ohio and Mississippi R. Co. v. Wheeler, 66 IT. S. (1

Black! 286, 295; 1872, Railroad Commissioners v. P. & O. C. R. Co., 63

Maine 269, 277; 1872, Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich. 214, 223; 1875, Board

of Commrs. Tipo. Co. v. L. M. & B. R., 50 Ind. 85, 108; 1878, State v. M.

L. S. & W. R. Co., 45 Wis. 579, 592; 1882, Bait. & P. R. Co. v. Fifth Bap-

tist Church, 108 U. S. 317, 330; 1890, United States v. Trinidad Coal & C. Co.,

137 U. S. 160; 1898, Andrews Bros. v. Youngstown Coke Co., 86 Fed. R. 585.

2. The New York Bank Cases: The second resolution adopted by a vote

of 22 to 3, in the case of Warner v. Beers, supra, p. 14, that the associations

organized under the banking act of 1838, "are not bodies politic or corporate,

within the spirit and meaning of the constitution," did not settle the law that

l. Definitions: For the authorities favoring one or the other of the definitions given above, see notes to Articles II, III anrl IV, infra, pp. 72, 109, 157.
Definitions of corporations will be found in th e following r.ases: 1804, H ead v.
Providence Ins. Co., 2 Crancb (U . S. l 127, on 167; 1809, Hunk of United
States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch (U. S.) 61; 1819, Trustees Dartmouth Col. v.
Woodward, 4 Wlieaton 518, on 636, 667; 1839, Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wendell
(N. Y . ) 9, 70, 104, supra, p. 19; 1840, Warner v. Beers, 23 Wenrlell (N. Y.)
10.3, 123, 124, s11p1·a, p. 2; 1841, People, ex rel. Bank of Vvatertown, v. Asf!essors, etc., I Bill rN. Y.) 616, 620; 1844, Louisvi11e C., etc., R. Co. v. Letson, 2 Boward (U. S. ) 497, 552; 1860, The Ohio Ins. Co. v. Nunemacber,
15 Ind. 295; 1861, Ohio and Mississippi R. Co. v. Wheeler, 66 U. S. (l
Black ! 286, 295; 1872, Railroad Commissioners v. P. & 0 . C. R. Co., 63
Maine 269, 27!; 1872, Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich. 214, 223; 1875, Board
of Commrs. Tipp. Co. v . L . M. & B. R., 50 Ind. 85, 108; 1878, State v. M.
L. S. & W. R. Co., 45 Wis. 579, 592; 1882, Balt. & P. R. Co. v. Fifth Bnp 7
tist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 330; 1890, United States v. Trinidad Coal & C. Co.,
137 U.S. 160; 1898, Andrews Bros. v. Youngstown Coke Co., 86 Fed. R. 585.
2. The New York Bank Cases: The second resolution adopted by a vote
of 22 to 3, in the case of Warner v. Beers, s11pra, p. 14, that the associations
OrJ?anize<l under the banking act of 1838, "are not bodies politic or corporate,
within the spirit and meaning of the constitution," did not settle the law that
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such associations were not corporations for anv purpose, but only that they

NOTES TO ARTICJ,E I.

were not so "within the spirit and meaning" of the constitution. See particu-

such associations were not corporations for any purpose, but only that they
were not so "ioithin the spirit and merming" of the constitution. See part.icnlarly 1841, People v. Assessors oi Watertown, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 616, 618; 1845,
De Bow v. People, 1 Denio (N. Y.l 9, 14; 1845, Gifford v. Livingston, 2Denio(N. Y.) 380, 382; 1850, l1illet v. Moody, 3 N. Y. 485. The rlecisions, generally,
after Warne r v. Beers, treated these institution s for most purposes as corporations. The cases are: 1840 Parmly v. Tenth Ward Bank, 3 Edw. Cb. 395;
1840, Delafield v. Kinney, 24 Wend. 345; 1841, People v. Assessors of Watert own, 1 Hill 616; Bank of Watertown v. Assessors of Watertown, 25 Wend .
686; 1842, Willoughby v. Comstock, 3 Hill 389; 1842, People v. Supervisors
of Niagara. 4 Hill 20; 1843, Leavitt v. Ty leet..1 Sandf. Ch. 207; 1844, Supervisors of Niagara v. People, 7 Hill 504; 1844,Hois~erard v. New York Bankin ~ Co. , 2 Sandf. Ch. 23; 18H, Mutter of Bank of Dansville, 6 Hill 370; 184fl,
fTifford v. Livingston, 2 Denio 380 (Conrt for Correction of Errors, overruling 18-!5, De Bow v. People, 1 Denio 9 (Supreme Court); 1848, Leavitt v.
Yates, 4 Edw. Ch. 134; 1846, Sagory v. Dubois, 3 Sandf. Ch. 466, 485; 1848,
Leavitt v. Blatchford, 5 Barb. 9; 1850, Cuyler v. Ranford , 8 Barb. 225; 1850,
Gill et v. )[oody, 3 N. Y. (Comst. ) 479; 1851, Palmer v. Lawrence, 5 ?\. Y.
(1 Re id.) 389; J&i2, Talmage v. P ell, 7 N. Y. t3 Seid .) 328; Tracy v. Talmage,
18 Barb. 456; 1855, Gill_et v. P~illips, 13 N. Y. (3 Kern .) 114 ; }8.58, Leavitt
v. Blatchford, 17 N. Y. t>2 1; 18t>9, Codd v . Rathbone, 19 N. Y. 31.

larly 1841, People v. Assessors of Watertown, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 616, 618; 1845,

De Bow v. People, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 9,14; 184.">, Gifford v. Livingston, 2 Denio

(N. Y. ) 380, 382; 1850, Gillet v. Moody, 3 N. Y. iSo. The decisions, generally,

after Warner v. Beers, treated these institutions for most purposes as corpo-

rations. The cases are: 1840, Parmly v.Tenth Ward Bank, 3 Edw. Ch. 395;

1840, Delafield v. Kinney, 24 Wend. 345; 1841, People v. Assessors of Water-

town, 1 Hill 616; Bank of Watertown v. Assessors of Watertown, 25 Wend.

686; 1842, Willoughby v. Comstoek, 3 Hill 389; 1842, People v. Supervisors

of Niagara, 4 Hill 20"; 1843, Leavitt v. Tylee 1 Sandf. Ch. 20"; 1844, Super-

visors of Niagara v. People. 7 Hill 504; 1844,Boisegerard v. New York Bank-

ing Co., 2 Sandf. Ch. 23; 1844, Matterof Bank of Dansville, 6 Hill 370; 1845,

Gifford v. Livingston, 2 Denio 380 (Court for Correction of Errors, overrul-

ing 1845, De Bow v. People, 1 Denio 9 (Supreme Court); 1848. Leavitt v.

Yates, 4 Edw. Ch. 134; 1846, Sagory v. Dubois, 3 Sandf. Ch. 466, 485; 1848,

Leavitt v. Blatchford, 5 Barb. 9; 1850, Cuyler v. Sanford. 8 Barb. 225; 1850,

Gillet v. Moody, 3 N. Y. (Comst.) 479; 18.51, Palmer v. Lawrence, 5 N. Y.

(1 Seld.) 389; 1852, Talmage v. Pell, 7 N. Y. 13 Seld.) 328; Tracv v. Talmage,
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18 Barb. 456; 1855, Gillet v. Phillips, 13 N. Y. (3 Kern.) 114; 1858, Leavitt

v. Blatchford, 17 N. Y. 521; 1859, Codd v. Rathbone, 19 N. Y. 37.

3. The Michigan Discussion: Sec. 2, art. 12, of the constitution of Michi-

3. The ~Iichiga.n Discussion: Sec. 2, art. 12, of the constitution of Michigan, 1835, provided, "The legislature shall pass no act of incorporation, unless
with the assent of at least two-thirds of each house." In 1837 (Sess. L. 1837,
p. 76), a n "Act to organize and regulate banking associations" was passed.
The constitutionality of this act came before the United States circuit court
for :\Iichigan for adjudication in 1840, in tbe case of Falconer v. Campbell, 2
McLeun C. C. (7th Circuit), 195; Federal Cases, 4620; 10 Myers' Fed. Dec.,
18, infra p. 287; the question as to whether the act had received the required
majority was arguect, but it was beld not properly raised by the demurrer_
Th e c0urt held the law constitutional; that the associations were corporations,
and tbat an indefi nite number might be crented , or provi<led for, by one genernl act. In 1844, in the case of Green, receiver of bunk of Niles v. Graves,
1 Douglass (Mich.) 351, th e same points were 11rgued before the suprem e
court of Michigan, and the law was h eld un constitutional, because it attempted
to rreate c01·poralions, and an indefinite number of them nt one time; this, it
was heh!, could not be .done, because the constitution meant to require a twothirds rnte in the creation of ench and every corporation. This holding has
been followed since, in regard to the banking a1•t of 183i, but not extended to
other general corporRtion laws. See 2 Doug. (M ich.) 160, 195; 1 Mich. 119,
120, 121, 482, 512; 2 :Mich. 287; 5 ::VIich. 259; 13 Mich. 151 ; 16 Mich. 258, and
45 Mich. 510. Also 1849, Nesmith v. Sheldon, 48 U.S. r7 How. ) 812.

gan, 1835, provided, "The legislature shall pass no act of incorporation, unless

with the assent of at least two-thirds of each house." In 1837 (Sess. L. 1837,

p. 76), an "Act to organize and regulate banking associations" was passed.

The constitutionality of this act came before the United States circuit court

for Michigan for adjudication in 1840, in the case of Falconer v. Campbell, 2

McLean C. C. (7th Circuit), 195; Federal Cases, 4620; 10 Myers' Fed. Dec,

18, infra p. 287; the question as to whether the act had received the required

majority was argued, but it was held not properly raised by the demurrer.

The court held the law constitutional; that the associations were corporations,

and that an indefinite number might be created, or provided for, by one gen-

eral act. In 1844, in the case of Green, receiver of bank of Niles v. Graves,

1 Douglass (Mich.) 35], the same points were argued before the supreme

courtof Michigan, and thelaw was held unconstitutional, because it attempted

to create corporations, and an indefinite number of them at one time; this, it

was held, could not be.done, because the constitution meant to require a two-

thirds vote in the creation of each and every corporation. This holding has

been followed since, in regard to the banking act of 1837. but not extended to

other general corporation laws. See 2 Doug. (Mich.) 160, 195; 1 Mich. 119

120. 121, 482, 512; 2 Mich. 287; 5 Mich. 259; 13 Mich. 151; 16 Mich. 258. and

4. Later holdin!?'S: Many of the same points h ave hePn discusE>ed in the New
York courts as to the nature of their joint-sto1·k associations, as were in the
bank cases. People v. Coleman, 133 N. Y. 279, supra, p. 15, is the best
case. Others are : 18fi7, \:Vaterbury v. Merchants' Union Express Co., 5(}
Barb. (N . Y.) 157 ; 1869, Fargo v . McVicker, 5Fl Barb. 437: 1875, Westcott v.
Fargo, 61 N. Y . .542; 1886, Van Aernam v. Bleistein, etc. , 102 N. Y. 355, 16
American and Eng. Corp. Cas. 103; 1889, P eople, ex rel. Platt, v. Wemple,
117 N. Y. 136, 29 American and Eng. Corp. Cas. 610; 1892, McCabe v. Goodfellow, 133 N. Y. 89, 37 American and Eng. Corp. Cas. 73.

45 Mich. 510. Also 1849, Nesmith v. Sheldon, 48 U. S. (7 How.) 812.

4. Later holding's: Many of the same points have been discussed in the New

York courts as to the nature of their joint-stock associations, as were in the

bank cases. People v. Coleman, 133 N. Y. 279, supra, p. 15, is the best

case. Others are: 18U7, Waterbury v. Merchants' Union Express Co 50

Barb. (N. Y.) 157; 1869, Fargo v. McVicker, 55 Barb. 437; 1875, Westcott v

Fargo, 61 N. Y. 542; 1886, Van Aernam v. Bleistein, etc., 102 N. Y. 355, 16

American and Eng. Corp. Cas. 103; 1889, People, ex rel. Piatt, v. Wemple

117 N. Y. 136, 29 American and Eng. Corp. Cas. 610; 1892, McCabe v. Good-

5. Note a.s to the fourth te.s~ above ~iven: This is qualified in many of the
states by the rule that the dec1s10ns of the courts of the state creatin~ the instituti on in question , as to whether it is a corporation or not, will be deemed
controlling. See 1871, Taft v. Ward, 106 Mass. 518; 1880, Railroad Co. v. Peareon, 128 Mass. 445; 188.q, Gleason v. McKay, 134 Mass. 419,infra,p.167; 1895,
Gregg v. Sanrlf<_>rd, 12 C. C. A. 525, 65 Feel. Rep. 151 , 48 Am. and "Eng. Corp.
Cas. 292. In Liverpool_ Insurance~- v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. (U. 8.) 566,
the supreme court applied the rule given as the fourth test above, and held an

fellow, 133 N. Y. 89, 37 American and Eng. Corp. Cas. 73.

5. Note as to the fourth test above given: This is qualified in many of the

states by the rule that the decisions of the courts of the state creating the insti-

tution in question, as to whether it is a corporation or not, will be deemed

controlling. See 1871, Taft v. Ward, 106 Mass. 518; 1880, Railroad Co. v. Pear-

son, 128 Mass. 445; 1883, Gleason v. McKay. 134 Mass. 419, infra, p. 167: 1895

Gregg v. Sandford, 12 C. C. A. 525, 65 Fed'. Rep. 151, 48 Am. and T?ng. Corp'

Cas. 292. In Liverpool Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. (U. k.) 566

the supreme court applied the rule given as the fourth test above, and held an
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English insurance company to be a corporation, notwithstanding the act of

parliament under which it was created expressly provided it should not be

so considered. This holding, however, was not necessary to the decision of
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the case. But in 1889, Chapman v. Barney, 129 U. S. 677, the same court

held it would follow the decisions or the statutes of the states in which the

institution was organized as to its nature. For further upon this point, see

note to Article V, infra, p. 175; 1900, Great Southern F. Hotel Co. v. Jones,

177 U. S. 449.

ARTICLE II. THE CORPORATION AS A PERSON.

Sec 6. For most purposes a corporation is considered as a per-

son having, as such, rights, duties and liabilities.

English insurance r.ompany to be a corporation, notwithstanding the act of
parl iament under which it was created expressly provided it should not be
so considered. This holcling, however, was not necessary to the decision of
the case. But in 1889, Chapman v. Barney, 129 U. S. 677, the same court
held it would follow the decisions or the statutes of the states in which the
institution was organized as to it.a nature. For further upon this point, see
note to .Article V, infra, p. 175; 1900, Great Southern F. Hotel Co. v. Jones,
177 u.

s. 449.

"For by incorporation it acquires jus persona, and becomes per-

sona politico., and is capable of all civil rights kabendi et agendi."

Per Attorney-General, Quo Warranto, v. London, 3-8 as given in

ARTICLE I I.

THE CORPORATION AS A PERSON.

Comyn's Digest, Corporation, under Franchises (F) F. 1. Also,

8 Howell's State Trials, p. 1039, on 1156.

(i) And particularly, having rights: (a) Under the com-

mon law.

Sec. 6. · For most purposes a corporation is considered as a person having, as such, rights, duties and liabilities.

TRUSTEES of thb UNIVERSITY op NORTH CAROLINA v. FOY

and BISHOP.1
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1805. In the Court of Conference of North Carolina. 1

Murphy (N. C.) Reports 58-92, 3 American Dec. 672.

"For by incorporation it acquires jus personat, and becomes persona politica, and is capable of all civil rights habendi et agendi. ''

Locke, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The legislature of

Per Attorney-General, Quo Warranto, v. London,~ as given in
Comyn's Digest, Corporation, under Franchises (F) F. 1. Also,
8 Howell's State Trials, p. 1039, on 1155.

North Carolina, in the year 1789, granted to the trustees of the uni-

versity "all the property that has heretofore or shall hereafter escheat

tothe state." And by another act, passed in the year 1794, they

also granted, "the confiscated property then unsold." By an act

passed in the year 1800, they declared, "that from and after the pass-

ing of this act, all acts and clauses of acts, which have heretofore

( 1) And partirnlarly, Jiaving rights: (a) Under the common law.

granted power to the trustees of the University, to seize and possess

any escheated or confiscated property, real or personal, shall be and

the same is hereby repealed and made void.

TRUSTEES

"And be it further enacted, That all escheated or confiscated prop-

OF THB

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA v. FOY
AND BISHOP. 1

erty which the said trustees, their agents or attorneys, have not legally

sold by virtue of the said laws, shall from hence revert to the state,

and henceforth be considered as the property of the same, as though

IN

I8o5.

THE COURT OF CONFERENCE OF NORTH CAROLINA.

Murphy (N. C.) Reports

5~2,

I

3 American Dec. 672.

such laws had never been passed."

'Statement of facts (except aa given in opinion), arguments and dissent-

ing opinion of Hall, J., omitted. Also parts of the opinion of the court by

Locke, J.

3—Wil. Casks.

LocKE, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The legislature of
North Carolina, in the year 1789, granted to the trustees of the university " all the property that has heretofore or shall hereafter escheat
to the state." And by another act, passed in the year 1794, they
also granted, "the confiscated property then unsold." By an act
passed in the year 18oo, they declared, "that from and after the passing of this act, all acts and clauses of acts, which have heretofore
granted power to the trustees of the University, to seize and possess
any escheated or confiscated property, real or personal, shall be and
the same is hereby repealed and made void.
llAnd be it further enacted, That all escheated or confiscated property which the said trustees, their agents or attorneys, have not legally
sold by virtue of the said laws, shall from hence revert to the state,
and .henceforth be considered as the property of the same, as though
such laws had never been passed.''
1
• Statement of facts (except as given in opinion), arguments and dissentmg opinion of HALL, J ., omitted. Also parts of the opinion of the court by
LOCu, J.
3-WIL. CABE8.
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TRUSTEES V. FOY & BISHOP.

The trustees of the university, in pursuance of the powers vested

34

in them by the act of 1789, have brought this suit to recover the pos-

TRUSTEES V. FOY & BISHOP.

§ 6

session of a tract of land escheated to the state before the passing of

The trustees of the university, in pursuance of the powers vested
in them by the act of 1789, have brought this suit to recover the possession of a tract of land escheated to the state befcre the passing of
the repealing act in the year 1800. The defendants have pleaded
this repealing act in bar, by which they allege the power of the trustees to support this action is entirely destroyed. It is therefore now
to be considered how far the trustees have title under the act of l 789,
and in the next place~ how far they are divested of that title by the
repealing act of 1800.

the repealing act in the year 1800. The defendants have pleaded

this repealing act in bar, by which they allege the power of the trus-

tees to support this action is entirely destroyed. It is therefore now

to be considered how far the trustees have title under the act of 1789,

and in the next place, how far they are divested of that title by the

repealing act of 1800.

[After holding the act of 1789 passed the title to the.trustees, and some re-

marks as to the general constitutional provisions, proceeds:]

Some light will be thrown upon this subject by examining the na-

ture of corporations, how property can be taken from them, and how

[After holding the act of 1789 passed the title to the.trustees, and some remarks as to the general constitutional provisions, proceeds:]

they can be dissolved. Corporations are formed for the advancement

of religion, learning, commerce or other beneficial purposes. They

are either aggregate or sole, and created by grant or by law.

Some light will be thrown upon this subject by examining the nature of corporations, how property can be taken from them, and how
they can be dissolved. Corporations are formed for the advancement
of religion, learning, commerce or other beneficial purposes. They
are either aggregate or sole, and created by grant or by law.
[Rights.]-When they are once erected, they acquire many rights,
powers, capacities and some incapacities, 1 Black. 475, as ( l) to
have perpetual succession; and therefore all aggregate corporations
have necessarily the power of electing members in the room of those
who die, to sue and be sued and to do .all other acts as natural persons; ( 2) to purchase lands and to hold them for the benefit of
themselves and successors; (4) to have a common seal; (S) to •
make by-laws for the better government of the corporation. These
corporations can not commit crimes, although their members may in
their individual capacity. The dutt'cs of those bodies consist in acting up to the design for which they were instituted. Let us next inquire how their corporate property can be taken from them and how
they may be dissolved. A member may be disfranchised or lose his
place by his own improper conduct, or he may resign. A corporation may be dissolved by act of parliament, which is boundless in its
operation; by the natural death of all its members, in case of an aggregate corporation ; by surrender of its franchises into the hands of
the king, which is a kind of suicide; by forfeiture of its charter
through negligence or abuse of its franchises, in which case the law
judges the body politic to have broken the condition on which it was
incorporated, and therefore the incorporation to be void; and the regular course is to bring an information in the nature of a quo warranto,
to inquire by what authority the members now exercise their corporate power, having forfeited it by such and such proceedings. 1
Black. 485; 3 Black. 263. None of these prerequisites have been
done in the present case.
We are then led to inquire into the soundness of an argument
greatly relied on by the defendant's counsel, that those who create
can destroy. The legislature have not pretended to dissolve the corporation, but to deprive them of a part of the funds that were deemed
to be vested in them, and to transfer those funds to the state. In
England the king's consent to the creation of any corporation is absolutely necessary, either given expressly by charter or by act of par-

[Rights.]—When they are once erected, they acquire many rights,

powers, capacities and some incapacities, 1 Black. 475,8s (1) to

have perpetual succession; and therefore all aggregate corporations
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have necessarily the power of electing members in the room of those

who die, to sue and be sued and to do all other acts as natural per-

sons; (2) to purchase lands and to hold them for the benefit of

themselves and successors; (4) to have a common seal; (5) to'

make by-laws for the better government of the corporation. These

corporations can not commit crimes, although their members may in

their individual capacity. The duties of those bodies consist in act-

ing up to the design for which they were instituted. Let us next in-

quire how their corporate property can be taken from them and how

they may be dissolved. A member may be disfranchised or lose his

place by his own improper conduct, or he may resign. A corpora-

tion may be dissolved by act of parliament, which is boundless in its

operation; by the natural death of all its members, in case of an ag-

gregate corporation; by surrender of its franchises into the hands of

the king, which is a kind of suicide; by forfeiture of its charter

through negligence or abuse of its franchises, in which case the law

judges the body politic to have broken the condition on which it was

incorporated, and therefore the incorporation to be void; and the reg-

ular course is to bring an information in the nature of a quo warranto,

to inquire by what authority the members now exercise their corpo-

rate power, having forfeited it by such and such proceedings. 1

Black. 485; 3 Black. 263. None of these prerequisites have been

done in the present case.

We are then led to inquire into the soundness of an argument

greatly relied on by the defendant's counsel, that those who create

can destroy. The legislature have not pretended to dissolve the cor-

poration, but to deprive them of a part of the funds that were deemed

to be vested in them, and to transfer those funds to the state. In

England the king's consent to the creation of any corporation is ab-

solutely necessary, either given expressly by charter or by act of par-
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liament, where his assent is a necessary ingredient or implied by
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prescription, I Black. 472, 473. The king may grant to a subject

the power of erecting a corporation; and yet it is the king that erects,

the subject is but the instrument. 1 Black. 474. Where there is an

endowment of lands, the law distinguishes and makes two species of

foundation; the first, foundatio incipiens, or the corporation, in

which sense the king is the founder of all colleges and hospitals; the

other, fundatio •perficiens, or the dotation of it, in which sense the

first gift of the revenues is the foundation, and who gives them is the

founder. 1 Black. 481. The constitution directed the general as-

sembly to establish this institution and endow it; then it would seem,

from the principle upon which all this doctrine is predicated, that the

constitution and not the legislature had erected this corporation, the

legislature being only the agent or instrument whose acts are valid

and binding when they do not contravene any of the provisions of the

constitution. • • •

But one great and important reason which influences us in deciding

this question is the 10th section of the bill of rights, which declares
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••that no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned or disseized of his

freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any

manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by

the law of the land." It has been yielded on the part of the defend-

ants that if the legislature had vested an individual with the property

in question, this section of the bill of rights would restrain them from

depriving him of such right; but it is denied that this section has any

operation on corporations whose members are mere naked trustees,

and have no interest in the donation, and especially on a corporation

erected for a public purpose. It is also insisted that the term, "Law

of the Land," does not impose any restrictions on the legislature,

who are capable of making the law of the land, and was only in-

tended to prevent abuses in the other branches of government. That

this clause was intended to secure to corporations as well as to individ-

uals the rights therein enumerated, seems clear from the word

erties," which peculiarly signifies those privileges and rights which

corporations have by virtue of the instruments which incorporate them,

and is certainly used in this clause in contradistinction to the word

••liberty," which refers to the personal liberty of the citizen. We

therefore infer that by this clause the legislature are as much restrained

from affecting the property of corporations, as they are that of a private

individual, unless the expression, "Law of the Land," should re-

ceive the construction contended for on the part of the defendant. It is

evident the framers of the constitution intended the provision as a re-

straint upon some branch of the government, either the executive,

legislative or judicial. To suppose it applicable to the executive

would be absurd on account of the limited powers conferred on that

officer; and from the subjects enumerated in that clause no danger

could be apprehended from the executive department, that being en-

trusted with the exercise of no powers by which the principles thereby

intended to be secured could be affected. To apply it to the judi-

liament, where his assent is a necessary ingredient or implied by
prescription. 1 Black. 472, 473. The king may grant to a subject
the power of erecting a corporation; and yet it is the king that erects,
the subject is but the instrument. 1 Black. 474. Where there is an
endowment of lands, the law distinguishes and makes two species of
foundation; the first, foundatio incipiens, or the corporation, in
which sense the king is the founder of all colleges and hospitals; the
other, fundatio "perfidens, or the dotation of it, in which sense the
first gift of the revenues is the foundation, and who gives them is the
founder. 1 Black. 481. The constitution directed the general as~mbly to establish this institution and endow it; then it would seem,
from the principle upon which all this doctrine is predicated, that the
constitution and not the legislature had erected this corporation, the
legislature being only the agent or instrument whose acts are valid
and binding when they do not contravene any of the provisions of the
constitution. • • •
But one great and important reason which influences us in deciding
this question is the 10th section of the bill of rights, which declares
· ·that no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned or disseized of his
freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any
manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by
the law of the land." It has been yielded on the part of the defendants that if the legislature had vested an individual with the property
in question, this section of the bill of rights would restrain them from
depriving him of such right; but it is denied that this section has any
operation on corporations whose members are mere naked trustees,
and have no interest in the donation, and especially on a corporation
erected for a public purpose. It is also insisted that the term, "Law
of the Land," does not impose any restrictions on the legislature,
who are capable of making the law of the land, and was only intended to prevent abuses in the other branches of government. That
this clause was intended to secure to corporations as well as to individuals the rights therein enumerated, seems clear from the word "liberties," which peculiarly signifies those privileges and rights which
corporations have by virtue of the instruments which incorporate them,
and is certainly used in this clause in contradistinction to the word
"liberty," which refers to the personal liberty of the citizen. We
therefore infer that by this clause the legislature are as much restrained
from affecting the property of corporations, as they are that of a private
individual. unless the expression, "Law of the Land," should receive the construction contended for on the part of the defendant. It is
evident the framers of the constitution intended the provision as a restraint upon some branch of the government, either the executive,
legislative or judicial. To suppose it applicable to the executive
would be absurd on account of the limited powers conferred on that
officer; and from the subjects enumerated in that clause no danger
could be apprehended from the executive department, that being entrusted with the exercise of no powers by which the principles thereby
intended to be secured could be affected. To apply it to the judi-
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ciary would, if possible, be still more idle, if the legislature can make

36

the "Zaw of the Land.''' For the judiciary are only to expound and

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO V. SOl' THERN. PACIFIC R. CO.
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enforce the law and have no discretionary powers enabling them to

judge of the propriety or impropriety of laws. They are bound,

ciary would, if possible, be still more idle, if the legislature can make
the "Law of the Land." For the judiciary are only to expound and
enforce the law and have no discretionary powers enabling them to
judge of the propriety or impropriety of laws. They are bound,
~hether agreeable to their ideas of justice or not, to carry into effect
the acts of the legislature as far as they are binding or do not contravene the constitution. If then this clause is applicable to the legislature alone, and was intended as a restraint on their acts (and to presume otherwise is to render this article a dead letter), let us next inquire, what will be the operation which this clause will or ought
to have on the present question? It seems to us to warrant a
belief that members of a corporation, as well as individuals, shall not
be so deprived of their liberties or property, unless by a trial by jury
in a court of justice, according to the known and established rules of
decision, derived from the common law, and such acts of the legislature as are consistent with the constitution-and although the trustees
are a corporation established for public purposes, yet their property is
as completely beyond the control of the legislature as the property of
individuals or that of any other corporation. Indeed, it seems difficult to conceive of a corporation established for merely private purposes. In every institution of that kind, the ground of the establishment is some public good or purpose intended to be promoted; but in
many, the members thereof have a private interest, coupled with the
public object. In this case the trustees have no private interest beyond the general good; yet we conceive that circumstance will not
make the property of the trustees subject to the arbitrary will of the
legislature. The property vested in the trustees must remain for the
uses intended for the university, until the judiciary of the country, in
the usual and common form, pronounce them guilty of su~h acts, as
will, in law, amount to a forfeiture of their rights or a dissolution of
their body. The demurrer must therefore be allowed, and the plea
in bar overruled.
[Note. It should be remembered this case was decided before the case of
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood ward, 4 Wheat. (U. S .) 518, tnfra, p. 708. J

whether agreeable to their ideas of justice or not, to carry into effect

the acts of the legislature as far as they are binding or do not contra-

vene the constitution. If then this clause is applicable to the legisla-

ture alone, and was intended as a restraint on their acts (and to pre-

sume otherwise is to render this article a dead letter), let us next in-

quire, what will be the operation which this clause will or ought

to have on the present question? It seems to us to warrant a

belief that members of a corporation, as well as individuals, shall not

be so deprived of their liberties or property, unless by a trial by jury

in a court of justice, according to the known and established rules of

decision, derived from the common law, and such acts of the legisla-

ture as are consistent with the constitution—and although the trustees

are a corporation established for public purposes, yet their property is

as completely beyond the control of the legislature as the property of

individuals or that of any other corporation. Indeed, it seems diffi-

cult to conceive of a corporation established for merely private pur-
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poses. In every institution of that kind, the ground of the establish-

ment is some public good or purpose intended to be promoted; but in

many, the members thereof have a private interest, coupled with the

public object. In this case the trustees have no private interest be-

yond the general good; yet we conceive that circumstance will not

make the property of the trustees subject to the arbitrary will of the

legislature. The property vested in the trustees must remain for the

uses intended for the university, until the judiciary of the country, in

the usual and common form, pronounce them guilty of such acts, as

will, in law, amount to a forfeiture of their rights or a dissolution of

their body. The demurrer must therefore be allowed, and the plea

in bar overruled.

[Note. It should be remembered this case was decided before the case of

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518, infra, p. 708. ]

Note. The rights of corporations is the subject of chapter 12, infra, p. 914.

Sec. 7. Same. (£) Under the United States constitution.

THE RAILROAD TAX CASES.

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC R. CO.1

1882. In United States Circuit Court, District of California.

13 Federal Reporter 722-782, with note 782-789.

[Action to recover taxes and penalty of the Southern Pacific Rail-

road Company, a corporation formed under the laws of California.

Note.

1 Case taken to supreme court of the United States; settled and disposed of,

The rights of corporations is the subject of chapter 12, infra, p. 914.

116 U. S. 138. See, also, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118

Sec. 7. Same. ( b) Under the United States constitution.

U. S. 394, on 396. Statement of facts condensed. Only so much of the opin-

ions as bears directly on the rights of corporations under the 14th amendment

THE RAILROAD TAX CASES.
COUNTY OF SAN MATEO v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC R. C0.1

of the United States constitution is given.

1882.

IN UNITED STATES CmcuIT CouRT, District of California.
13 Federal Reporter 722-782, with note 782-789.
[Action to recover taxes and penalty of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation formed under the laws of California.
1
Caae taken to supreme court of the United States; sett1ed and disposed of,

116 U. S. 138. See, also, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., llS
U. 8. 394, on 396. Statement of facts condensed . Only so much of the opinions as bears directly on the rights of corporations under the 14th amendment
of the United States constitutio11 is given.
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By the California constitution all property, with certain exceptions, is
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to be taxed according to its value; but in ascertaining the value of

property owned by individuals the amount unpaid of any mortgage

upon it is to be deducted from the assessed value, and the tax levied

on the balance, as against the owner. "The franchise, roadway, road-

bed, rails and rolling stock of all railroads operated in more than one

county," are to be assessed at their actual value and apportioned to

the various municipal subdivisions in proportion to mileage, without

any deductions for any mortgages on the property. Also, the statutes

provide for notice and hearing by the parties affected before the as-

sessment is complete, in all cases except railroads operated in more

than one county.

The railroal company contended: (i) That the assessment, because

no deductions for mortgages were allowed, as in other cases, had the

effect of denying it the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the

14th amendment of the United States constitution. (2) Also, that

the fact that no notice was provided for, deprived it of its property

without due process of law, contrary to the same amendment.
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The county contended: (1) That the state's authority to tax is un-

limited except by the United States constitution. (2) That the United

States constitution did not forbid the classification of property for tax-

ation. (3) That the 14th amendment did not apply. (4) That cor-

porations were not persons within the meaning of the amendment.

(5) That the statute requiring a statement of property by the railroad

company was sufficient notice; and (6), that the provisions relative

to taxation of railroads are to be treated as conditions upon the con-

tinued existence of the corporations.]

Field, J. * * * The fourteenth amendment of the constitu-

tion, in declaring that no state shall deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, imposes a limitation upon

the exercise of all the powers of the state which can touch the indi-

vidual or his property, including among them that of taxation. What

ever the state may do, it can not deprive any one within its jurisdic-

tion of the equal protection of the laws. And by equal protection of

the laws is meant equal security under them to every one on similar

terms—in his life, his liberty, his property, and in the pursuit of

happiness. It not only implies the right of each to resort, on the same

terms with others, to the courts of the country for the security of his

person and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs and the

enforcement of contracts, but also his exemption from any greater

burdens or charges than such as are equally imposed upon all others

under like circumstances.

Unequal exactions in every form, or under any pretense, are abso-

lutely forbidden; and, of course, unequal taxation, for it is in that

form that oppressive burdens are usually laid. It is not possible to

conceive equal protection under any system of laws where arbitrary

and unequal taxation is permissible; where different persons may be

taxed on their property of the same kind, similarly situated, at differ-

ent rates; where, for instance, one may be taxed at 1 per cent, on the

value of his property, another at 2 or 5 per cent., or where one may be

thus taxed according to his color, because he is white, or black, or

By the California constitution all property, with certain exceptions, is
to be taxed according to its value; ~ut in ascertaining the value of
property owned by individuals the amount unpaid of any mortgage
upon it is to be deducted from the assessed value, and the tax levied
<m the balance, as against the owner. "The franchise, roadway, roadbed. rail and rolling stock of all railroads operated in more than one
county, " are to be assessed at their actual value and apportioned to
the various municipal subdivisions in proportion to mileage, without
any deductions for any mortgages on the property. Also, the statutes
provide for notice and hearing by the parties affected before the asessment is complete, in all cases except railroads operated in more
than one county.
The railroal company contended: (I) That the assessment, because
no deductions for mortgages were allowed, as in other cases, had the
effect of denying it the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
14th amendment of the United States constitution. (2) Also, that
the fact that no notice was provided for, deprived it of its property
without due process of law, contrary to the same amendment.
The county contended: ( 1) That the state's authority to tax is unlimited except by the United States constitution. ( 2) That the United
States constitution did not forbid the classification of property for tax:ition. (3) That the 14th amendment did not apply. (4) That corporations were not persons within the meaning of the amendment.
(S) That the statute requiring a statement of property by the railroad
company was sufficient notice; and (6), that the provisions relative
to taxation of railroads are to be treated as conditions upon the continued existence of the corporations. J
F1RLD, J.
• • • T.he fourteenth amendment of the constitution, in declaring that no state shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, imposes a limitation upon
the exercise of all the powers of the state which can touch the individual or his property, including among them that of taxation. What
ever the state may do, it can not deprive any one within its jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws. And by equal protection of
the laws is meant equal security under them to every one on similar
terms-in his life, his liberty, his property, and in the pursuit of
happiness. It not only implies the right of each to resort, on the same
terms with others, to the courts of the country for the security of his
person and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs and the
enforcement of contracts, but also his exemption from any greater
burdens or charges than such as are equally imposed upon all others
under like circumstances.
Unequal exactions in every form, or under any pretense, are absolutely forbidden; and, of course, unequal taxation, for it is in that
form that oppressive burdens are usually laid. It is not possible to
conceive equal protection under any system of laws where arbitrary
and unequal taxation is permissible; where different persons may be
taxed on their property of the same kind, similarly situated, at different r::ites; where, for instance, one may be taxed at r per cent. on the
value of his property, another at 2 or 5 per cent., or where one may be
thus taxed according to his color, because he is white, or black, or
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brown, or yellow, or according to any other rule than that of a fixed

rate proportionate to the value of his property. * * *
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constitution of California for the property of railroad companies, we

brown, or yellow, or according to any other rule than that of a fixed
rate proportionate to the value of his property. • • •
If we may now look at the scheme of taxation prescribed by the
constitution of California for the property of railroad companies, we
shall perceive a flagrant departure from the rule of equality and uniformity so essential to equality in the distribution of the burdens of
government. Whenever an individual holds property incumbered
with a mortgage he is assessed at its value, after deducting from it
the amount of the mortgage. If a railroad company holds properly
subject to a mortgage, it is assessed at its full value, without any
deduction for the mortgage; that is, as though the property were unincumbered. The inequality and discriminating character of the procedure will be apparent by an illustration given by counsel. Suppose
a private person owns a farm which is valued at $100,000, and is incumbered with a mo1tgage amounting to $80,000; he is, in that case,
assessed at $zo,ooo; if the rate of taxation be 2 per cent., he "Yould
pay $400 taxes. If a railroad corporation owns an adjoining tract
worth $100,000, which is also incumbered by a m01tgage for $80,000,
it would be assessed for $100,000, and be required to pay $z,ooo
taxes, or five times as much as the private person. There is here a
discrimination too palpable and gross to be questioned, and such is
the nature of the discrimination made against the Southern Pacific
Railroad Company in the taxation of its property. Nothing can be
clearer than that the rule of equality and uniformity is thus entirely
disregarded. • • •
Is the defendant, being a corporation, a person within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment, so as to be entitled, with respect to its
property, to the equal protection of the la';VS? The learned counsel
of the plaintiff and the attorney-general of the state take the negative
of this question, and assert with much earnestness that the amendment
applies, and was intended to apply, only to the newly-made citizens
of the African race, and should be limited to their protection. • • •
In the Dartmouth College case it was urged that the charter of the
college was not a contract contemplated by the constitution, because
no valuable consideration passed to the king as an equivalent for the
grant, and that contracts merely voluntary were not within the prohibition. But Chief Justice Marshall, after showing that the charter was
a contract upon a valuable consideration, said:
"It is more than possible that the preservation of rights of this description was not particularly in view of the framers of the constitution when the clause under consideration was introduced into that instrument. It is probable that interferences of more frequent recurrence, to which the temptation was stronger and of which the mischief
was more extensive, constituted the great motive for imposing this restriction on the state legislatures. But although a particular and a
rare case may not, in itself, be of sufficient magnitude to induce a rule,
yet it must be governed by the rule when est.a blished, unless some
plain and strong reason for excluding it can be g iven." And again,
"the case being within the words of the rul e must be within its operation likewise, unless there he someth ing in the literal construction so
obviously absurd or mischiernus , or r e pugnant to the general spirit of

shall perceive a flagrant departure from the rule of equality and uni-

formity so essential to equality in the distribution of the burdens of

government. Whenever an individual holds property incumbered

with a mortgage he is assessed at its value, after deducting from it

the amount of the mortgage. If a railroad company holds property

subject to a mortgage, it is assessed at its full value, without any

deduction for the mortgage; that is, as though the property were un-

incumbered. The inequality and discriminating character of the pro-

cedure will be apparent by an illustration given by counsel. Suppose

a private person owns a farm which is valued at $100,000, and is in-

cumbered with a mortgage amounting to $80,000; he is, in that case,

assessed at $20,000; if the rate of taxation be 2 per cent., he would

pay $400 taxes. If a railroad corporation owns an adjoining tract

worth $100,000, which is also incumbered by a mortgage for $80,000,

it would be assessed for $100,000, and be required to pay $2,000

taxes, or five times as much as the private person. There is here a
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discrimination too palpable and gross to be questioned, and such is

the nature of the discrimination made against the Southern Pacific

Railroad Company in the taxation of its property. Nothing can be

clearer than that the rule of equality and uniformity is thus entirely

disregarded. * * *

Is the defendant, being a corporation, a person within the meaning

of the fourteenth amendment, so as to be entitled, with respect to its

property, to the equal protection of the laws? The learned counsel

of the plaintiff and the attorney-general of the state take the negative

of this question, and assert with much earnestness that the amendment

applies, and was intended to apply, only to the newly-made citizens

of the African race, and should be limited to their protection. * * *

In the Dartmouth College case it was urged that the charter of the

college was not a contract contemplated by the constitution, because

no valuable consideration passed to the king as an equivalent for the

grant, and that contracts merely voluntary were not within the prohi-

bition. But Chief Justice Marshall, after showing that the charter was

a contract upon a valuable consideration, said:

"It is more than possible that the preservation of rights of this de-

scription was not particularly in view of the framers of the constitu-

tion when the clause under consideration was introduced into that in-

strument. It is probable that interferences of more frequent recur-

rence, to which the temptation was stronger and of which the mischief

was more extensive, constituted the great motive for imposing this re-

striction on the state legislatures. But although a particular and a

rare case may not, in itself, be of sufficient magnitude to induce a rule,

yet it must be governed by the rule when established, unless some

plain and strong reason for excluding it can be given." And again,

"the case being within the words of the rule must be within its opera-

tion likewise, unless there be something in the literal construction so

obviously absurd or mischievous, or repugnant to the general spirit of
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the instrument, as to justify those who expound the constitution in

making it an exception." 4 Wheat. 644.

Following that authority, we can not adopt the narrow view for

which counsel contend, and limit the application of the prohibition

of the fourteenth amendment to legislation touching members of the

enfranchised race. It has a much broader operation. It does not,

indeed, place any limit upon the subjects, in reference to which the

states may legislate. It does not interfere with their police power.

Upon every matter upon which previously to its adoption they could

act, they may still act. They can legislate now, as they always could,

to promote the health, good order and peace of the community; to

develop their resources, increase their industries and advance their

prosperity; but it does require that in all such legislation hostile and

partial discrimination against any class or person shall be avoided;

that the state shall impose no greater burdens upon anyone than upon

others of the community under like circumstances, nor deprive any-

one of rights which others similarly situated are allowed to enjoy. It

forbids the state to lay its hand more heavily upon one than upon an-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:13 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

other, under like conditions. It stands in the constitution as a per-

petual shield against all unequal and partial legislation by the states,

and the injustice which follows from it, whether directed against the

most humble or the most powerful; against the despised laborer from

China, or the envied master of millions. • * •

Private corporations are, it is true, artificial persons, but, with the

exception of a sole corporation, with which we are not concerned,

they consist of aggregations of individuals united for some legitimate

business. In this state they are formed under the general laws; and

the civil code provides that they "may be formed for any purpose for

which individuals may lawfully associate themselves." Any five or

more persons may by voluntary association form themselves into a cor-

poration. And, as a matter of fact, nearly all enterprises in this state

requiring for their execution an expenditure of large capital are un-

dertaken by corporations. They engage in commerce; they build

and sail ships; they cover our navigable streams with steamers; they

construct houses; they bring the products of earth and sea to market;

they light our streets and buildings; they open and work mines; they

carry water into our cities; they build railroads, and cross mountains

and deserts with them; they erect churches, colleges, lyceums and

theaters; they set up manufactories, and keep the spindle and shuttle

in motion; they establish banks for savings; they insure against acci-

dents on land and sea; they give policies on life; they make money

exchanges with all parts of the world; they publish newspapers and

books, and send news by lightning across the continent and under the

ocean. Indeed, there is nothing which is lawful to be done to feed

and clothe our people, to beautify and adorn their dwellings, to re-

lieve the sick, to help the needy and to enrich and ennoble humanity,

which is not to a great extent done through the instrumentalities of

corporations. There are over 500 corporations in this state; there

the instrument, as to justify those who expound the constitution m
making it an exception." 4 Wheat. 644.
Following that authority, we can not adopt the narrow view for
which counsel contend, and limit the application of the prohibition
of the fourteenth amendment to legislation touching members of the
enfranchised race. It has a much broader operation. It does not,
indeed, place any limit upon the subjects, in reference to which the
states may legislate. It does not interfere with their police power.
Upon every matter upon which previously to its adoption they could
act, they may still act.' They can legislate now, as they always could,
to promote the health, good order and peace of the community; to
develop their resources, increase their industries and advance their
prosperity; but it does require that in all such legislation hostile and
partial discrimination against any class or person shall be avoided;
that the state shall impose no greater burdens upon anyone than upon
others of the community under like circumstances, nor deprive anyone of rights which others similarly situated are allowed to enjoy. It
forbids the state to lay its hand more heavily upon one than upon another, under like conditions. It stands in the constitution as a perpetual shield against all unequal and partial legislation by the states,
and the injustice which follows from it, whether directed against the
most humble or the most powerful; against the despised laborer from
China, or the envied master of millions. • • •
Private corporations are, it is true, artificial persons, but, with the
exception of a sole corporation, with which we are not concerned,
they consist of aggregations of individuals united for some legitimate
business. In this state they are formed under the general laws; and
the civil code provides that they "may be formed for any purpose for
which individuals may lawfully associate themselves." Any five or
more persons may by voluntary association form themselves into a corporation. And, as a matter of fact, nearly all enterprises in this state
requiring for their execution an expenditure of large capital are undertaken by corporations. They engage in commerce ; they build
and sail ships; they cover our navigable streams with steamers; they
construct houses; they bring the products of earth and sea to market;
they light our streets and buildings; they open and work mines; they
carry water into our cities; they build railroads, and cross mountains
and deserts with them; they erect churches, colleges, lyceums and
theaters; they set up manufactories, and keep the spindle and shuttle
in motion ; they establish banks for savings ; they insure against accidents on land and sea; they give policies on life; they make money
exchanges with all parts of the world ; they publish newspapers and
books, and send news by lightning across the continent and under the
ocean. Indeed, there is nothing which is lawful to be done to feed
and clothe our people, to beautify and adorn their dwellings, to re1ieve the sick, to help the needy and to enrich and ennoble humanity,
which is not to a great extent done through the instrumentalities of
corporations. There are over 500 corporations in this state ; there
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It would be a most singular result if a constitutional provision, in-

tended for the protection of every person against partial and discrimi-

are 30,000 in the United States, and the aggregate value of their property is several thousand millions. 1
It would be a most singular result if a constitutional provision, intended for the protection of every person against partial and discriminating legislation by the states, should cease to exert such protection
the moment the person becomes a member of a corporation. We
can not accept such a conclusion. On the contrary, we think that it
is well established by numerous adjudications of the supreme court of
the United States and of the several states, that whenever a prov ision
of the constitut£on , or of a law, guarantees to p er sons the enjoyment of
property, or a,ff'ords to them means for its protection, or prohibt"ts
legislation in;uriously affecting t"t, the benefits of the prov ision extend to corporatt"ons, and that the courts will always look beyond the
name of the artificial being to the indt"v t"duals whom t"t r epresents.
The case of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Pa1ts v. Town of New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, furnishes an apt
illustration of this doctrine. The sixth article of the treaty of peace
with Great Britain of 1783, provided that there should be "no future
confiscations made, nor any prosecutions commenced, against any person or persons for or by reason of the part which he or they may have
taken in the present war, and that no person shall on that account
suffer any future loss or damage, either in his person, liberty or prope1ty." An English corporation claimed the benefit of this article
with reference to certain lands in Vermont granted to it before the
revolution, which tht! legislature of that state had undertaken to give
to the town where they were situated. It was contended that the
treaty only applied to natural persons; that it did not embrace corporations, because they were not persons who could take part in the war,
or could be considered British subjects ; but the position was held to
be untenable. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Washington ,
said that the argument proceeded upon an incorrect view of the subject, and refeITed to the case of United States v. De,·e aux, 5 Cranch
86, to show that the court, when necessary, will look beyond the
name of a corporation to reach and protect those whom it represe nts.
The constitution, in defining the judicial power of the United
States, declares that it shall e xtend to "controversies between citizens
of different states;" and in the case referred to by Mr. Justice Washington, the question arose whether a corporation composed of citizens
of one state could sue, in the circuit court of the United States, a citizen of another state, and it was held that it cot.Id. In deciding the
question, the court, speaking through Chief-Justice Marshall, said:
"However true the fact may be that the tribunals of the state will
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation to parties of
every description, it is not less true that the constitution itself either
entertains apprehension on this subject, or views with such indulgence
the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established
national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and
1
The number of corporations here stated is much lees than the number
actually existing. There are oyer 5,000 corporations in California alone.

nating legislation by the states, should cease to exert such protection

the moment the person becomes a member of a corporation. We

can not accept such a conclusion. On the contrary, we think that it

is well established by numerous adjudications of the supreme court of

the United States and of the several states, that -whenever a provision

of the constitution, or of a law, guarantees to -persons the enjoyment of

property, or affords to them means for its protection, or prohibits

legislation injuriously affecting it, the benefits of the provision ex-

tend to corporations, and that the courts will always look beyond the

name of the artificial being to the individuals whom it represents.

The case of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in For-

eign Parts v. Town of New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, furnishes an apt

illustration of this doctrine. The sixth article of the treaty of peace

with Great Britain of 1783, provided that there should be "no future

confiscations made, nor any prosecutions commenced, against any per-

son or persons for or by reason of the part which he or they may have
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taken in the present war, and that no person shall on that account

suffer any future loss or damage, either in his person, liberty or prop-

erty." An English corporation claimed the benefit of this article

with reference to certain lands in Vermont granted to it before the

revolution, which the legislature of that state had undertaken to give

to the town where they were situated. It was contended that the

treaty only applied to natural persons; that it did not embrace corpo-

rations, because they were not persons who could take part in the war,

or could be considered British subjects; but the position was held to

be untenable. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Washington,

said that the argument proceeded upon an incorrect view of the sub-

ject, and referred to the case of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch

86, to show that the court, when necessary, will look beyond the

name of a corporation to reach and protect those whom it represents.

The constitution, in defining the judicial power of the United

States, declares that it shall extend to "controversies between citizens

of different states;" and in the case referred to by Mr. Justice Wash-

ington, the question arose whether a corporation composed of citizens

of one state could sue, in the circuit court of the United States, a citi-

zen of another state, and it was held that it could. In deciding the

question, the court, speaking through Chief-Justice Marshall, said:

"However true the fact may be that the tribunals of the state will

administer justice as impartially as those of the nation to parties of

every description, it is not less true that the constitution itself either

entertains apprehension on this subject, or views with such indulgence

the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established

national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and

'The number of corporations here stated is much less than the number

actually existing. There are over 5,000 corporations in California alone.
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citizens, or between citizens of different states. Aliens or citizens of

4r

different states are not less susceptible of these apprehensions, nor

can they be supposed to be less the objects of constitutional provision

because they were allowed to sue by a corporate name. That name,

indeed, can not be an alien or a citizen, but the persons whom it rep-

resents may be the one or the other, and the controversy is, in fact

and in law, between those persons suing in their corporate character,

bv their corporate names, for a corporate right, and the individual

against whom the suit may be instituted. Substantially and essentially

the parties in such a case, where the members of the corporation are

aliens or citizens of a different state from the opposite party, come

within the spirit and terms of the jurisdiction conferred by the con-

stitution of the national tribunals. Such has been the universal un-

derstanding on the subject. Repeatedly has this court decided causes

between a corporation and an individual without feeling a doubt re-

specting its jurisdiction."

The same point was presented in another form in the case of Mar-

shall v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 16 How. 326. There the question
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was whether a citizen of one state could sue in the circuit court of the

United States a corporation of another state, and a similar conclusion

was reached. After referring to the clause of the constitution extend-

ing the judicial power of the United States to controversies between

citizens of different states, the court proceeded to consider the objec-

tions urged to treating a corporation as a citizen, so far as it might be

necessary to protect the corporators.

"A corporation," observed Mr. Justice Grier, speaking for the

court, "it is said is an artificial person, a mere legal entity, invisible

and intangible. This is no doubt metaphysically true in a certain

sense. The inference, also, that such an artificial entity 'can not be a

citizen' is a logical conclusion from the premises, which can not be

denied. But a citizen who has made a contract and has a contro-

versy with a corporation may also say, with equal truth, that he did

not deal with a mere metaphysical abstraction, but with natural per-

sons; that his writ has not been served on an imaginary entity, but on

men and citizens, and that his contract was made with them as the

legal representatives of numerous unknown associates, or secret and

dormant partners.

"The necessities and conveniences of trade and business require

that such numerous associates and stockholders should act by repre-

sentation, and have the faculty of contracting, suing and being sued

in a fictitious or collective name. But these important faculties, con-

ferred on them by state legislation, for their own convenience, can

not be wielded to deprive others of acknowledged rights. It is not

reasonable that those who deal with such persons should be deprived

of a valuable privilege by a syllogism, or rather sophism, which deals

subtly with words and names, without regard to the things or persons

they are used to represent."

The fifth amendment to the constitution declares that—

'•No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infa-

citizens, or between citizens of different states. Aliens or citizens of
different states are not less susceptible of these apprehensions, nor
can they be supposed to be less the objects of constitutional provision
because they were allowed to sue by a corporate name. That name,
indeed, can not be an alien or a citizen, but the persons whom it represents may be the one or the other, and the controversy is, in fact
and in law, between those persons suing in their corporate character,
by their corporate names, for a corporate right, and the indh·idual
against whom the suit may be instituted. Substantially and essentially
the parties in such a case, where the members of the corporation are
aliens or citizens of a different state from the opposite party, come
withln the spirit and terms of the jurisdiction conferred by the constitution of the national tribunals. Such has been the universal understanding on the subject. Repeatedly has this court decided causes
between a corporation and an individual without feeling a doubt respecting its jurisdidion."
The same point was presented in another form in the case of Marhall v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 16 How. 326. There the question
was whether a citizen of one state could sue in the circuit court of the
United States a corporation of another state, and a similar conclusion
was reached. After referring to the clause of the constitution extending the judicial power of the United States to controversies between
citizens of different states, the court proceeded to consider the objections urged to treating a corporation as a citizen, so far as it might be
necessary to protect the corporators.
" A corporation," observed Mr. Justice Grier, speaking for the
court, "it is said is an artificial person, a mere legal entity, invisible
and intangible. This is no doubt metaphysically trne in a certain
ense. The inference, also, that such an artificial entity 'can not be a
citizen' is a logical conclusion from the premises, which can not be
denied. But a citizen who has made a contract and has a controversy with a corporation may also say, with equal truth, that he did
not deal with a mere metaphysical abstraction, but with natural persons ; that his writ has not been served on an imag inary entity, but on
men and citizens, and that his contract was made with them as the
legal representatives of numerous unknown associates, or secret and
dormant partners.
" The necessities and conveniences of trade and business require
that such numerous associates and stockholders should act by representation, and have the faculty of contracting, suing and being sued
in a fictitious or collective name. But these important faculties, conferred on them by state legislation, for their own convenience, can
not be wielded to deprive others of acknowledged rights. It is not
reasonable that those who deal with such persons should be deprived
of a valuable privilege by a syllogism, or rather sophism, which deals
subtly with words and names, without regard to the things or persons
they are ui::ed to represent."
The fifth amendment to the constitution declares th at ":'llo person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infa-
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when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any

person be subject for the same offense to be put twice in jeopardy of

mous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a gran<l jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia,
when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be put twice in jeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without clue process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation.''
From the nature of the prohibitions in this amendment it would
seem, with the exception of the last one, as though they could apply
only to natural persons. No others can be witnesses; no others can
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, or be compelled to be witnesses against themselves; and, therefore, it might be said with much
force, that the word "person" there used in connection with the prohibition against the deprivation of life, liberty and property without
due process or law, is in like manner limited to a natural person. But
such has not been the construction of the courts. A similar provision
is found in nearly all of the state constitutions; and everywhere, at all
times and in all courts , it has been held, either by tacit assent or express adjudication, to extend, so far as their property is concerned, to
corporaticns. And this has been because the property of a corporation is in fact the property of the corporators. To deprive the corporation of its property, or to burden it, is in fact to deprive the
corporators of their property or to lessen its value. Their interest,
undivide<l though it he, and constituting only a right during the continuance of the corporation to participate in its dividends, and on its
dissolution to receive a proportionate share of its assets, has an appreciable value, and is property in a commercial sense, and whatever
affects the property of the corporation necessarily affects the commercial value of their interests. If, for example, to take the illustration given by counsel, a corporation created for banking purposes
acquires land, notes, stocks, bonds and money, no stockholder can
claim that he owns any particular item of this property, but be owns
an interest in the whole of it, which the courts will protect against unlawful seizure or appropriation by others, and on the dissolution of
the company he will receive a proportionate share of its assets. Now,
if a statute of the state takes the entire property, who suffers loss by
the legislation? Whose property is taken? Certainly, the corporation is deprived of its property; but at the same time, in every just
sense of the constitutional guaranty, corporators are also deprived of
their property.
.
The prohibition against the deprivation of life and liberty in the
same clause of the fifth amendment does not apply to corporations ,
because, as stated by counsel, the lives and liberties of the individual corporators are not the life and liberty of the corporation.
Nor do all the privileges and immunities of citizenship attach to
corporations; These bodies have never been considered citizens for
any other purpose than the protection of the property rights of the
corpora tors. The status of citizenship, entitling the citizen to cert:t in

life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-

ness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property with-

out due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public

use without just compensation."

From the nature of the prohibitions in this amendment it would

seem, with the exception of the last one, as though they could apply

only to natural persons. No others can be witnesses; no others can

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, or be compelled to be wit-

nesses against themselves; and, therefore, it might be said with much

force, that the word "person" there used in connection with the pro-

hibition against the deprivation of life, liberty and property without

due process or law, is in like manner limited to a natural person. But

such has not been the construction of the courts. A similar provision

is found in nearly all of the state constitutions; and everywhere, at all

times and in all courts, it has been held, either by tacit assent or ex-

press adjudication, to extend, so far as their property is concerned, to
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corporations. And this has been because the property of a corpora-

tion is in fact the property of the corporators. To deprive the cor-

poration of its property, or to burden it, is in fact to deprive the

corporators of their property or to lessen its value. Their interest,

undivided though it be, and constituting only a right during the con-

tinuance of the corporation to participate in its dividends, and on its

dissolution to receive a proportionate share of its assets, has an ap-

preciable value, and is property in a commercial sense, and whatever

affects the property of the corporation necessarily affects the com-

mercial value of their interests. If, for example, to take the illustra-

tion given by counsel, a corporation created for banking purposes

acquires land, notes, stocks, bonds and money, no stockbolder can

claim that he owns any particular item of this property, but he owns

an interest in the whole of it, which the courts will protect against un-

lawful seizure or appropriation by others, and on the dissolution of

the company he will receive a proportionate share of its assets. Now,

if a statute of the state takes the entire property, who suffers loss by

the legislation? Whose property is taken? Certainly, the corpora-

tion is deprived of its property; but at the same time, in every just

sense of the constitutional guaranty, corporators are also deprived of

their property.

The prohibition against the deprivation of life and liberty in the

same clause of the fifth amendment does not apply to corporations,

because, as stated by counsel, the lives and liberties of the indi-

vidual corporators are not the life and liberty of the corporation.

Nor do all the privileges and immunities of citizenship attach to

corporations; These bodies have never been considered citizens for

any other purpose than the protection of the property rights of the

corporators. The status of citizenship, entitling the citizen to certain
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privileges and immunities in the several states, does not belong to cor-

43

porations. The special privileges which citizens acquire by becom-

ing incorporated in one state can not, therefore, be exercised in an-

other state without the latter's consent, as was held in Paul v. Vir-

ginia, 8 Wall. 168, although such consent will generally be presumed

in the absence of positive prohibition.

Decisions of state courts, in harmony with the views we have ex-

pressed, exist in great numbers. But it is unnecessary to cite them.

It is sufficient to add that in all text writers, in all codes, and in all

revised statutes, it is laid down that the term "person" includes, or

may include, corporations; which amounts to what we have already

said, that whenever it is necessary for the protection of contract or

property rights, the courts will look through the ideal entity and name

of the corporation to the persons who compose it, and protect them,

though the process be in its name. All the guaranties and safe-

guards of the constitution for the protection of the property possessed

by individuals may, therefore, be invoked for the protection of the

property of corporations. And as no discriminating and partial
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legislation, imposi?ig unequal burdens upon the property of indi-

viduals, -Mould be valid under the fourteenth amendment, so no leg-

islation imposing such unequal burdens upon the property of corpo-

rations can be maintained. The taxation, therefore, of the property

of the defendant upon an assessment of its value, without a deduction

of the mortage thereon, is to that extent invalid.

[The remainder of the opinion of Justice Field, holding that notice was ab-

solutely essential, and that the constitutional provisions relating to taxation

were not conditions as to the continued existence of the corporations, is

omitted.]

We are satisfied that the assessment upon which they were levied

is invalid and void, and judgment must be accordingly entered on the

demurrer for the defendant, and, by stipulation of parties, the judg-

ment must be made final.

Sawyer, C. J., concurring. The facts of this case are fully

stated by Mr. Justice Field, and need not be repeated here. The

questions presented are of the gravest character, and of the utmost

importance to the people of California. While I concur, generally,

in the conclusions and in the line of argument adopted by my associ-

ate, I shall also state as briefly as I reasonably can, considering the

gravity of the questions discussed, my conclusions upon the points in-

volved.

i. In my judgment, the word "person" in the clause of the four-

teenth amendment to the national constitution, "No state shall * * *

deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of

law, nor deny to any person the equal protection of the law," includes

a private corporation. It must, at least, through the corporation, in-

clude the natural persons who compose the corporation, and who are

the beneficial owners of all the property, the technical and legal title

to which is in the corporation in trust for the corporators. The fact

that the corporators are united into an ideal legal entity, called a cor-

privileges and immunities in the several states, does not belong to corporations. The special privileges which citizens acquire by becoming incorporated in one state can not, therefore, be exercised in another state without the latter's consent, as was held in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, although such consent will generally be presumed
in the absence of positi\'e prohibition.
Decisions of state courts, in harmony with the views we have expressed, exist in great numbers. But it is unnecessary to cite them.
It is sufficient to add that in all text writers, in all codes, and in all
revised statutes, it is laid down that the term "person" includes, or
may include, corporations; which amounts to what we have already
said, that whenever it is necessary for the protection of contract or
property rights, the courts will look through the ideal entity and name
of the corporation to the persons who compose it, and protect them,
though the process be in its name. All the guaranti'es and safeguards of the constituti'on for the protectz'on of tlze property possessed
by individuals may, therefore, be invoked f or the protectt'on of the
property of corporatt'ons. And as no dt'scriminating and partt'al
legislatt'on, imposing 1tneq1tal burdens upon the property of indi;;iduals, would be val£d under the fourteenth amendment, so no legislation t'mposing such unequal burdens upon the property of corpora/ions can be maintat'ned. The taxation , therefore, of the property
of the defendant upon an assessment of its value, without a deduction
of the mortage thereon, is to that extent invalid.
[The remainder of the opinion of Justice Field, holding that notice was absolutely essential, and that the constitutional provisions relating to taxation
were not conditions as to the continued existence of the corporations, is

omitt.ed.)
We are satisfied that the assessment upon which they were levied
i invalid and void, and judgment must be accordingly entered on the
demurrer for the defendant, and, by stipulation of parties, the judgment must be made final.
SAWYER, C. J., concurring.
The facts of this case are fully
stated by Mr. Justice Field, and need not be repeated here. The
questions presented are of the gravest character, and of the utmost
importance to the people of California. While I concur, generally,
in the conclusions and in the line of argument adopted by my associate. I shall also state as briefly as I reasonably can, considering the
gravity of the questions discussed, my corn;:lusions upon the points involved.
I. In my judgment, the word "person" in the clause of the fourteenth amendment to the national constitution, "No state shall • ., •
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor deny to any person the equal protection 6£ the law," includes
a private corporation. It must, at least, through the corporation, include the natural persons who compose the corporation, and who are
the beneficial owners of all the property, the technical and legal title
to which is in the corporation in trust for the corporators. The fact
that the corporators are united into an ideal legal entity, called a cor-
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poration, does not prevent them from having a right of property in

the assets of the corporation which is entitled to the protection of this
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clause of the constitution. Nor does the intervention of this artificial

§8

being between the real beneficial owners and the state, for the simple

p oration, does not prevent them from having a right of property in
the assets of the corporation which is entitled to the protection of this
clause of the constitution. Nor does the intervention of this artificial
being between the real beneficial owners and the state, for the simple
purpose of convenient management of the business, enable the state,
by acting directly upon the legal entity, to deprive the real parties
beneficially interested, of the protection of these important provisions.
In the language of Mr. Pomeroy, one of the counsel, which I adopt:
"Whatever be the legal nature of a corporation as an artificial,
metaphysical being, separate and distinct from the individual members, and whatever distinctions the common law makes in carrying out
the technical legal conception between property of the corporation
and that of the individual members, still, in applying the fundamental
guaranties of the constitution, and in thus protecting the rights of
property, these metaphysical and technical notions must give way to
the r~ality. The truth can not be evaded that, for the purpose of
protecting rights, the property of all business and trading corporations
is the property of the individual corporators. A state act depriving a
business corporation of its property without due process of law does,
in fact, deprive the individual corporators of their property. In this
sense, and within the scope of these grand safeguards of private rights,
there is no real distinction between artificial persons, or corporations,
and natural persons.''

purpose of convenient management of the business, enable the state,

by acting directly upon the legal entity, to deprive the real parties

beneficially interested, of the protection of these important provisions.

In the language of Mr. Pomeroy, one of the counsel, which I adopt:

"Whatever be the legal nature of a corporation as an artificial,

metaphysical being, separate and distinct from the individual mem-

bers, and whatever distinctions the common law makes in carrying out

the technical legal conception between property of the corporation

and that of the individual members, still, in applying the fundamental

guaranties of the constitution, and in thus protecting the rights of

property, these metaphysical and technical notions must give way to

the reality. The truth can not be evaded that, for the purpose of

protecting rights, the property of all business and trading corporations

is the property of the individual corporators. A state act depriving a

business corporation of its property without due process of law does,

in fact, deprive the individual corporators of their property. In this
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sense, and within the scope of these grand safeguards of private rights,

there is no real distinction between artificial persons, or corporations,

and natural persons."

[Remainder of opinion of Sawyer, J., omitted.]

Note. The rights of corporations is the subject of chapter 12, infra, p. 914.

See also numbers 10, IS and 21, in note to Crafford v. Board of Supervis-

ors, etc., 87 Va. 110, infra, pp. 56-57, § 10.

Sec. 8. Same. (2) And subject to duties: (a) Of a public nature.

THE STATE, Ex Rhl. BLAKE Et Al., v. THE N. E. RAILROAD CO.'

1S56. In the Court of Appeals of South Carolina. 9 Rich-

ardson (S. C.) Law 247-254, 67 American Dec. 551.

[Remainder of opinion of Sawyer, J., omitted.]
Note. The rights of corporations is the subject of chapter 12, infra, p . 914.
See also numbers 10, 18 and 21, in note to Crafford v. Board of Supervisors, etc., 87 Va. 110, infra, pp. 06--07, § 10.

[Rule against the railroad company to show cause why mandamus

should not issue commanding the removal of obstructions placed in

New Market and Vardell creeks, alleged to be navigable, and pro-

vide proper viaducts or use steamboats for crossing water-courses, so

as not to obstruct navigation, as required by the charter of the com-

pany.]

Report by Glover, J. [who, after holding the streams were navi-

Sec. 8. Same. ( 2) And subject to duties: (a) Of a public nature.

gable, proceeded]:

The last inquiry suggested by the answer of the respondents is,

THE STATE, Ex RxL. BLAKE ET AL., v. THEN. E. RAILROAD C0. 1

1 Part of report of Glover, J., and arguments, omitted.

IN

THR CouRT oF APPEALS OF SouTH CAROLINA.

9 Rich-

ardson (S. C.) Law 247-254, 67 American Dec. 551.
[Rule against the railroad company to show cause why mandamus
should not issue commanding the removal of obstructions placed in
New Market and Vardell creeks, alleged to be navigable, and provide proper viaducts or use steamboats for crossing water-courses, so
as not to obstruct navigation, as required by the charter of the company.]
R eport by GLOVER, J. (who, after holding the streams were navi·
gable, proceeded]:
The last inquiry suggested by the answer of the respondents is,
1
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whether a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy. The removal

and abatement of a public nuisance is generally effected by indict-

45

ment, which affords, in most cases, an ample and a satisfactory rem-

edy; but it does not follow that a mandamus will not be issued where

an indictment may be sustained. The cases referred to in the argu-

ment show that the remedy by mandamus has been adopted to compel

a corporation to do its duty to the public and to individuals. In its

form, the writ commands the performance of some act or duty therein

specified, the execution of which is consonant to right and justice.

(3 Steph. Com. 681.) Although railways have become important

for public travel and transportation, yet they are private corporations,

enjoying large privileges, and should strictly comply with the pro-

visions of their charters. The public is interested in their successful

operation, and their usefulness should not be impaired by any unneces-

sary restraints; but they must not be permitted to abuse the powers

granted, and should be held to a strict performance of the duties en-

joined. If the nuisance be abated by a removal of the track of the

road or the piles which sustain it, the public would suffer in the tem-

porary delay in destroying the connection. Whereas, the remedy by

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:13 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

mandamus does not destroy the road or delay its operations, but com-

mands the company to fulfill its duty to the public by pursuing the

directions prescribed by their charter for crossing rivers and water-

courses.

The remedy by mandamus has been often used in England, in

cases not unlike the present. The Eastern Counties Railway Com-

pany obtained an act of Parliament for making a railway from Lon-

don to Norwich and Yarmouth, and it appearing doubtful if the com-

pany intended to extend their road to the points indicated, a manda-

mus was issued calling upon them to complete the whole line of road

pursuant to the provisions of the act. (Reg. v. Eastern Counties

Railway Company, 1 vol. Railway and Canal Cases.) Lord Den-

man, C. J., delivering the judgment of the court, says: "This inter-

ference is occasioned by inferior courts or persons refusing to proceed

in some course prescribed by law, and not in consequence of any mis-

apprehension or error in their course, provided they have entered

upon it. And accordingly, if it had appeared that the company were

substantially complying with the terms of their undertaking, there would

have been at once a satisfactory answer to that application." The

writ, in this case, was issued at the instance of stockholders; but it

has also been granted to command a railway company to increase the

height of a bridge erected by them over a public carriage road, accord-

ing to the provisions of their act of Parliament. (Tapp. on Man.

243.) The remedy by mandamus will embarrass the company less in

the progress, completion or use of their road than an indictment to

abate and remove the obstructions complained of. The result of an

indictment would be the punishment of the company by fine, and this

might not afford to the public the relief which is sought, to which

they are entitled, and which the railroad company are required by the

provisions of their charter to afford. It is no objection to this mode

whether a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy. The removal
and abatement of a public nuisance is generally effected by indictment, which affords, in most cases, an ample and a satisfactory remedy; but it does not follow that a mandamus will not be issued where
an indictment may be sustained. The .cases referred to in the argument show tliat the remedy by mandamus has been adopted to compel
a corporation to do its duty to the pub/i'c and to indi"viduals. In its
form, the writ commands the performance of some act or duty therein
specified, the execution of which is consonant to right and justice.
(3 Steph. Com. 68r.) Although railways have become important
for public travel and transportation, yet they are private corporations,
enjoying large privileges, and should strictly comply with the provisions of their charters. The public is interested in their successful
operation, and their usefulness should not be impaired by any unnecessary restraints; but they must not be permitted to abuse the powers
granted, and should be held to a strict performance of the duties enjoined. If the nuisance be abated by a removal of the track of the
road or the piles which sustain it, the public would suffer in the temporary delay in destroying the connection. Whereas, the remedy by
mandamus does not destroy the road or delay its operations, but commands the company to fulfill its duty to the public by pursuing the
directions prescribed by their charter for crossing rivers and watercourses.
The remedy by mandamus has been often used in England, in
cases not unlike the present. The Eastern Counties Railway Company obtained an act of ~arliament for making a railway from London to Norwich and Yarmouth, and it appearing doubtful if the company intended to extend their road to the points indicated, a mandamus was issued calling upon them to complete the whole line of road
pursuant to the provisions of the act. (Reg. v . Eastern Counties
Railway Company, I vol. Railway and Canal Cases.) Lord Denman, C. J., delivering the judgment of the court, says: "This interference is occasioned by inferior courts or persons refusing to proceed
in some course prescribed by law, and not in consequence of any misapprehension or error in their course, provided they have entered
upon it. And accordingly, if it had appeared that the company were
substantially complying with the terms of their undertaking; there would
have been at once a satisfactory answer to that application.'' The
writ, in this case, was issued at the instance of stockholders; but it
has also been granted to command a railway company to increase the
height of a bridge erected by them over a public carriage road, according to the provisions of their act of Parliament. (T~pp. on Man.
243.) The remedy by mandamus will embarrass the company less in
the progress, completion or use of their road than an indictment to
abate and remove the obstructions complained of. The result of an
indictment would be the punishment of the company by fine, and this
might not afford to the public the relief which is sought, to which
they are entitled, and which the railroad company are required by the
provisions of their charter to afford. It is no ohjection to this mode
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of relief, that the relators have another remedy, especially when that
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remedy is not so convenient, complete and beneficial. (Tapp. on

of relief, that the relators have another remedy, especially when that
remedy is not so convenient, complete and beneficial. (Tapp. on
Man. 24.)
"It is, therefore, ordered that a writ of mandamus issue." • •
•
The defendants appealed, -and moved this court to set aside the
order granting the mandamus, on the ground, i'nter alia.
3. That if the respondents have committed a nuisance, mandamus
is not the proper remedy. • • •
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GLOVER, J.
The appellants have abandoned all the grounds in
support of their motion, except the third, which submits that if they
have committed a nuisance mandamus is not the proper remedy.
It is not necessary for the decision of this question to trace the writ
of mandamus from its first institution to the present time, and to inquire how far it has been enlarged as a remedial process to advance
justice and right. Its earliest application seems to have been suggested in aid of that clause of Magna Charta, which declares that
"Null£ negabt'mus aut differemus just£dam vel rectum" ( 10 Mod.
48). There never has been any disposition to abridge the use of the
writ of mandamus in cases where it is applicable as a remedy either
by the action of the courts or by the legislature.
The general doctrine so earnestly insisted on by the appellant's
counsel, that where there is a specific legal remedy the writ will not
be granted, or, if granted, will be quashed, is fully sustained by reason, and by the authorities to which the court has been referred. But
this general rule has been restricted to cases where the specific legal
remedy is equally convenient, complete and beneficial.
The writ of mandamus has always been regarded as an appropriate
remedy to enforce the performance of duties by artificial bodies. In
the case of the King v. The Bishop of Chester ( r T. R. 396), Buller, J., says: "It is peculiarly the duty of this court to see that the
powers created by the king's charter are properly exercised." How
far an indictment is a specific remedy, was considered in the case of
The King v. The Commissioners of Dean Inclosure, 2 M. & Sel. 80.
The commissioners had neglected to obey an order of the sessions directing them to set out a road as a public road, and it was held that
indictment would not be a specific remedy, that is, such as the case
demands, for it was a proceeding in pxnam for the past, and not a
remedy for the future. It is admitted that if indictment be equally
convenient, beneficial and effectual, and such as the particular case
demands, the court will not grant the mandamus. King v. Severn
and Wye Railway Company, 2 Barn. & Al. 646. This is not the ordinary case of an obstruction placed in a highway which may be abated
as a nuisance by indictment; but the obstruction of a highway by a
railway, and in the free use of both, the public interest is involved.
It is therefore important that in the application of a remedy, public
travel and transportation should not be stopped or checked, either on the
highway or railway. "It ought to be the concern of a court of justice
to take care that whilst they are granting a remedy to one, they do not at

Man. 24.)

"It is, therefore, ordered that a writ of mandamus issue." * • •

The defendants appealed, -and moved this court to set aside the

order granting the mandamus, on the ground, inter alia.

3. That if the respondents have committed a nuisance, mandamus

is not the proper remedy. * * *

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Glover, J. The appellants have abandoned all the grounds in

support of their motion, except the third, which submits that if they

have committed a nuisance mandamus is not the proper remedy.

It is not necessary for the decision of this question to trace the writ

of mandamus from its first institution to the present time, and to in-

quire how far it has been enlarged as a remedial process to advance

justice and right. Its earliest application seems to have been sug-

gested in aid of that clause of Magna Charta, which declares that

ilJVu//i negabimus aut differ emus justiciam vel rectum" (10 Mod.
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48). There never has been any disposition to abridge the use of the

writ of mandamus in cases where it is applicable as a remedy either

by the action of the courts or by the legislature.

The general doctrine so earnestly insisted on by the appellant's

counsel, that where there is a specific legal remedy the writ will not

be granted, or, if granted, will be quashed, is fully sustained by rea-

son, and by the authorities to which the court has been referred. But

this general rule has been restricted to cases where the specific legal

remedy is equally convenient, complete and beneficial.

The writ of mandamus has always been regarded as an appropriate

remedy to enforce the performance of duties by artificial bodies. In

the case of the King v. The Bishop of Chester (1 T. R. 396), Bul-

ler, J., says: "It is peculiarly the duty of this court to see that the

powers created by the king's charter are properly exercised." How-

far an indictment is a specific remedy, was considered in the case of

The King v. The Commissioners of Dean Inclosure, 2 M. & Sel. So.

The commissioners had neglected to obey an order of the sessions di-

recting them to set out a road as a public road, and it was held that

indictment would not be a specific remedy, that is, such as the case

demands, for it was a proceeding in pecnam for the past, and not a

remedy for the future. It is admitted that if indictment be equally

convenient, beneficial and effectual, and such as the particular case

demands, the court will not grant the mandamus. King v. Severn

and Wye Railway Company, 2 Barn. & Al. 646. This is not the or-

dinary case of an obstruction placed in a highway which maybe abated

as a nuisance by indictment; but the obstruction of a highway by a

railway, and in the free use of both, the public interest is involved.

It is therefore important that in the application of a remedy, public

travel and transportation should not be stopped or checked, either on the

highway or railway. "It ought to be the concern of a court of justice

to take care that whilst they are granting a remedy to one, they do not at
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the remedy be such as may prove effectual." (10 Mod. 48.) The

relators do not require that the railway shall be destroyed, but that

the corporation shall exercise the powers granted in the manner pre-

scribed by their charter—not that they shall be punished by fine or

otherwise, but that they shall do their duty to the public. This is a

reasonable request, and can not be enforced by indictment without

exposing the railway company to great inconvenience, and in the end

it would not prove such a remedy as the case demands. Corporate

bodies must be compelled in the performance of their duties to dis-

charge their public obligations.

This court is of opinion that a writ of mandamus is an appropriate

remedy to compel the defendants in crossing "rivers or other water-

courses," to pursue the mode prescribed by their charter. The other

grounds having been abandoned, the court has not considered the

questions which they suggest. Since the writ of mandamus was

granted an act has been passed by tbe general assembly, and has been

brought to the notice of the court, which declares, "that the existing
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structure of said railway at the points of intersection of said road with

the creeks known as New Market and Vardell's creeks, is hereby de-

clared to be lawful, and the said company is hereby authorized to cross

said creeks without drawbridges or other provision for the navigation

of the same." This enactment necessarily supersedes the writ. It is

therefore ordered, that the motion be dismissed, and that all further

proceedings on the writ be restrained.

O'Neall, Wardlaw, Withers, Whitner and Munroe, JJ., con-

curred.

Motion dismissed.

[See note, p. 55.

Hole. The duties and liabilities of corporations will be the subject of later

chapters. See infra, chs. 13-17, pp. 914-1766.

Sec. 9. Same, (b) And of a private nature.

RIDDLE v.THE PROPRIETORS, Etc., ON MERRIMAC RIVER.'

the same time expose others to great inconvenieinces, and likewise that
the remedy be such as may prove effectual." ( ro Mod. 48.) The
relators do not require that the railway shall be destroyed, but that
the corporation shall exercise the powers grant1ed in the manner prescribed by their charter-not that they shall be punished by fine or
otherwise, but that they shall do their duty to the public. This is a
reasonable request, and can not be enforced by indictment without
exposing the railway company to great inconvenience, and in the end
it would not prove such a remedy as the case demands. Corporate
bodies must be compelled in the performance of their duties to discharge their public obligations.
This court is of opinion that a writ of mandamus is an appropriate
remedy to compel the defendants in crossing "rivers or other watercourses," to pursue the mode prescribed by their charter. The other
grounds having been abandoned, the court has not considered the
questions which they suggest. Since the writ of mandamus was
granted an act has been passed by the general assembly, and has been
brought to the notice of the court, which declares, "that the existing
structure of said railway at the points of intersection of said road with
the creeks known as New Market and Vardell's creeks, is hereby declared to be lawful, and the said company is her1eby authorized to cross
aid creeks without drawbridges or other provision for the navigation
of the same." This enactment necessarily supersedes the writ. It is
therefore ordered, that the motion be dismissed, and that all further
proceedings on the writ be restrained.
O'Neall, Wardlaw, Withers, Whitner and Munroe, JJ., concurred.
Motion dismissed.

1810. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 7

Mass. Reports 169, 5 American Dec. 35.

[Action on the case against the proprietors of a canal who were

bound by their incorporation to construct their canal deep and wide

[See note, p. 55.
Note. The duties and liabilities of corporations wiill be the subject of later
chapters. See infra, chs. 13-17, pp. 914-1766.

enough for rafts of a specific size to pass through when the river be-

low was navigable for craft of the same size. The proprietors neg-

Sec. 9. Same. ( b) And of a private

natun~.

ligently permitted the canal to become out of repair to such an extent

RIDDLE v. THE PROPRIETORS, ETc., ON M:ERRIMAC RIVER. 1

that the plaintiff in attempting to transport a raft of the proper size,

after paying the toll exacted, was unable to do so, and after his raft

grounded he returned home for the purpose of waiting until there

18 IO.

IN THE SUPREME Juo1c1AL CouRT OF' MASSACHUSETTS.

Mass. Reports 169, ·5 American Dec. 35.

1 Statement of facts condensed. Arguments and parts of the opinion omitted.

7

[Action on the case against the proprietors of a canal who were
bound by their incorporation to construct their canal deep and wide
enough for rafts of a specific size to pass through when the river be- '
low was navigable for craft of the same size. The proprietors negligently permitte<l the canal to become out of repair to such an extent
that the plaintiff in attempting to transport a raft of the proper size,
after paying the toll exacted, was unable to do so, and after his raft
grounded he returned home for the purpose IDf waiting until there
1

St.atementof facts condensed. Arguments and parlts of the opinion omitted.
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should be enough water to move the raft; while he was away a storm

occurred, which occasioned the loss of a quantity of wood, a part of

should be enough water to move the raft; while he was away a storm
occurred, which occasioned the loss of a quantity of wood, a part of
the raft, and the value of which the jury was directed to include in
the damages.]
PARSONS, C. J.
[After a brief recital of the declaration.] The
cause was tried on the general issue, and a verdict was found for the
plaintiff agreeably to the judge's direction.
The defendants have moved for a new trial for the misdirection of
the judge in a matter of law, and they have also moved in arrest of
judgment for the insufficiency of the declaration.

the raft, and the value of which the jury was directed to include in

the damages. ]

Parsons, C. J. [After a brief recital of the declaration.] The

cause was tried on the general issue, and a verdict was found for the

plaintiff agreeably to the judge's direction.

The defendants have moved for a new trial for the misdirection of

the judge in a matter of law, and they have also moved in arrest of

judgment for the insufficiency of the declaration.

[After holding that none of the objections to the verdict conld prevail, the

judge proceeded]:

We now come to the motion in arrest of judgment, which has been

rAfter holding that none of the objections to the verdict could prevail, the
judge proceeded]:

made on two grounds.

The first is, that it is not the duty of the defendants to keep the

canal in repair, sufficient for the passage of rafts and boats of the de-

We now come to the motion in arrest of judgment, which has been
made on two grounds.
The first is, that it is not the duty of the defendants to keep the
canal in repair, sufficient for the passage of rafts and boats of the description mentioned in the declaration. This ground is endeavored to
be maintained on the supposition that the powers granted to the corporation were a privilege, which might be waived or exercised at its
discretion. But we think this supposition is not correct. When the
act of incorporation first passed, it was optional with the proprietors
whether they would or would not take the benefit of it, but after they
had made their election by executing the powers granted, and claiming the toll, then the duties imposed by the tenth section, to make the
canals, etc., attached, from which they can not be discharged, but by
a seizure of the franchise into the hands of the government, or by a
repeal of the act with their assent.
But further to maintain this ground, the · defendants have argued
that, from the plaintiff's own showing, it is not the duty of the corporation to keep this canal in repair. By the statutes relating to this
subject, if the corporation did not open this canal in seven years, for
the passage of rafts and boats, then their powers as to this canal
ceased. Now the plaintiff alleges, say the defendants, that when the
injury complained of happened, which was more than seven years
from the passing of the statutes, the proprietors had then, and for a
long time before, neglected to open and dig this canal.
If we were obliged to adopt the construction of the plaintiff's allegation, on which the defendants insist, the objection ought to prevail.
But attending to other parts of the declaration, we find it averred that
,this canal belonged to the proprietors, and that they, unmindful of their duty, neglected to open and dig the same of a sufficient depth, and permitted it to remain in a decayed state, and out
of repair, and the passage to become and remain chok~d and filled
up. We are now considering the declaration after a verdict, and the
fair construction of this allegation is not that they never opened and
dug the canal sufficiently, but that they neglected to open it by digging and removing the collection of matters which choked it and ob-

scription mentioned in the declaration. This ground is endeavored to

be maintained on the supposition that the powers granted to the cor-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:13 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

poration were a privilege, which might be waived or exercised at its

discretion. But we think this supposition is not correct. When the

act of incorporation first passed, it was optional with the proprietors

whether they would or would not take the benefit of it, but after they

had made their election by executing the powers granted, and claim-

ing the toll, then the duties imposed by the tenth section, to make the

canals, etc., attached, from which they can not be discharged, but by

a seizure of the franchise into the hands of the government, or by a

repeal of the act with their assent.

But further to maintain this ground, the defendants have argued

that, from the plaintiff's own showing, it is not the duty of the corpo-

ration to keep this canal in repair. By the statutes relating to this

subject, if the corporation did not open this canal in seven years, for

the passage of rafts and boats, then their powers as to this canal

ceased. Now the plaintiff alleges, say the defendants, that when the

injury complained of happened, which was more than seven years

from the passing of the statutes, the proprietors had then, and for a

long time before, neglected to open and dig this canal.

If we were obliged to adopt the construction of the plaintiff's alle-

gation, on which the defendants insist, the objection ought to prevail.

But attending to other parts of the declaration, we find it averred that

'this canal belonged to the proprietors, and that they, unmind-

ful of their duty, neglected to Open and dig the same of a suf-

ficient depth, and permitted it to remain in a decayed state, and out

of repair, and the passage to become and remain choked and filled

up. We are now considering the declaration after a verdict, and the

fair construction of this allegation is not that they never opened and

dug the canal sufficiently, but that they neglected to open it by dig-

ging and removing the collection of matters which choked it and ob-
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structed the passage. We are, therefore, satisfied that the motion in
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arrest can not prevail on the ground we have been considering.

49

The other ground is that no action lies against a corporation for a

breach of its duty by any person specially injured by the breach, and

that the only remedy is by information or indictment. This point has

been argued by the defendant's counsel with much ability, and has

had all the attention we could give it in the short time the constitution

of this court has allowed us.

The argument, when compressed, is that corporations, having only

a legal and not a natural body, no capiatur lies against them; that in

all actions of trespass and trespass on the case, where the general

issue is not guilty, if judgment be against the defendant, a part of the

judgment at common law is an entry of a capiatur; that, therefore,

no such actions lie against a corporation at common law; and the

statute, taking away the necessity of the entry of a capiatur, does not

authorize an action which did not lie before.

That a process to take the body of a corporation does not lie is

certainly true, but the defendants must show that in all actions of
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trespass a capiatur against the defendant may, from the nature of the

action, be entered. In 21 Edw. 4, 7, 12, 27, 67, it is holden that a

corporation can not be beaten, nor beat, nor commit treason or felony,

nor be imprisoned for a disseizin with force, nor be outlawed, nor a

capias in debt be awarded against them. These principles result from

the nature of an aggregate corporation.

But the defendants have relied on an opinion of Thorp, J., in 22

Ass. pi. 67. He there says that trespass does not lie against a corpo-

ration aggregate by its corporate name, for a capias and exigent do

not lie against it. That a capias and exigent do not lie against a cor-

poration is evident; but that no action of trespass lies is questionable.

For it is agreed that a corporation may be fined on indictment, and

the fine levied by distress; and why may not a corporation be amerced,

and the amercement collected in the same manner? This has led us

to look into the ancient law on this subject and we find Thorp's opin-

ion overruled as to certain trespassess. In 31 Ass. pi. 19 a corpora-

tion is holden answerable in assize as a disseizor with force. In 8

H. 6, 1, 14, 6, an aggregate corporation was holden answerable in

trespass for distraining the plaintiff's cattle until he paid a toll, which

he was not bound to pay. Several other cases are mentioned in The-

loal's Dig. lib. 4, c. 13, as trespass against a corporation for disturb-

ing the plaintiff in the profits of his liberties; or for disturbing him

in holding a leet. It is therefore very clear, from the examination of

the old books, that some actions of trespass might, at common law,

be maintained against aggregate corporations. And, as in these

actions no capiatur could be entered, the omission of this entry can

be no objection to actions of trespass on the case. The foundation of

the defendants' argument seems to fail them.

Let us now leave the ancient cases and resort to the maxims of the

common law, which are founded in good sense and substantial justice.

4—Wil. Cases.

structed the passage. We are, therefore, satisfied that the motion in
arrest can not prevail on the ground we have been considering.
The other ground is that no action lies against a corporation for a
breach of its duty by any person specially in1ured by the breach, and
that the only remedy is by information or indictment. This point has
been argued by the defendant's counsel with much ability, and has
had all the attention we could give it in the short time the constitution
of this court has allowed us.
The argument, when compressed, is that corporations, having only
a legal and not a natural body, no capiatur lies against them; that in
all actions of trespass and trespass on the case, where the general
issue is not guilty, if judgment be against the defendant, a part of the
judgment at common law is an entry of a capiatur; that, therefore,
no such actions lie against a corporation at common law; and the
statute, taking away the necessity of the entry of a capiatur, does not
authorize an action which did not lie before.
That a process to take the body of a corporation does not lie is
certainly true, but the defendants must show that in all actions of
trespass a capiatur against the defendant may, from the nature of the
action, be entered. In 21 Edw. 4, 7, 12, 27, 67, it is holden that a
corporation can not be beaten, nor beat, nor commit treason or felony,
nor be imprisoned for a disseizin with force, nor be outlawed, nor a
capias in debt be awarded against them. These principles result from
the nature of an aggregate corporation.
But the defendants have relied on an opinion of Thorp, J., in 22
Ass. pl. 67. He there says that trespass does not lie against a corporation aggregate by its corporate name, for a capias and ext"gent do
not lie against it. That a capias and ext"gent do not lie against a corporation is evident; but that no action of trespass lies is questionable.
For it is agreed that a corporation may be fined on indictment, and
the fine levied by distress; and why may not a corporation be amerced,
and the amercement collected in the same manner? This has led us
to look into the ancient law on this subject and we find Thorp's opinion overruled as to certain trespassess. In 31 Ass. pl. 19 a corporation is holden answerable in assize as a disseizor with force. In 8
H. 6 , 1, 14, 6, an aggregate corporation was holden answerable in
trespass for distraining the plaintiff's cattle until he paid a toll, which
be was not bound to pay. Several other cases are mentioned in Theloal's Dig. Jib. 4, c. 13, as trespass against a corporation for disturbing the plaintiff in the profits of his liberties; or for disturbing him
in holding a leet. It is therefore very clear, from the examination of
the old books, that some actions of trespass might, at common law,
he maintained against aggregate corporations. And, as in these
actions no capiatur could be entered, the omission of this entry can
be no objection to actions of trespass on the case. The foundation of
the defendants' argument seems to fail them.
Let us now leave the ancient cases and resort to the maxims of the
common law, which are founded in good sense and substantial justice.
4-WIL. CASBS.
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It is one of these maxims that a ma?i specially injured by the breach

of duty in another shall have his remedy by action. If the breach
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of duty be by an individual, there is no question; and why should a
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corporation, receiving its corporate powers and obliged by its corpo-

It is one of these maxims that a man spedally injured by the breach
of duty in another shall have his remedy by action. If the breaclt
of duty be by an ind£vidual, there is no question; and why should a
corporation, receiving £ts corporate powers and obl£ged by its corporate duties with its own consent, be an excepti'on, when it has, or
must be supposed to have, an equivalent for its conscnt.P
We distinguish between proper aggregate corporations, and the inhabitants of any district, who are by statute invested with particular
powers without their consent. These are in the books sometimes
called quasi-corporations. Of this description are counties and hundreds in England, and counties, towns, etc., in this state. Although
quasi-corporations are liable to information or indictment for a neglect of a public duty imposed on them by law, yet it is settled in the
case of Russel et al. v. Inhabitants of the County of Devon, 1 that no
private action can be maintained against them for a breach of their
corporate duty, unless such action be given by statute, and the sound
reason is, that having no corporate fund, and no legal means of obtaining one, each corporator is liable to satisfy any judgment rendered
against the corporation. This burden the common law will not impose, but in cases where the statute is an authority, to which every man
must be considered as assenting. But in regular corporations, which
have, or are supposed to have, a corporate fund, this reason does not
apply.
Among the modern cases there is one which seems in its principles
to apply directly to the case before us. It is the case of The Mayor
of Lynn, in error, v. Turner. 2 Turner sued the corporation of
Lynn Regis for not repairing and cleansing a certain creek, in which
the tide ebbed and flowed, as from time immemorial they had been used,
by which he lost the use of his navigation. The declaration contained
a number of counts, in one of which the special damage alleged was
that the plaintiff was obliged to carry his com round about. At the
common pleas judgment on nil dt'cit was rendered on all the counts.
For the plaintiff in error it was argued that the creek as described was
an highway, and as in one of the counts no special damage was alleged, the action did not lie. But Lord Mansfield and the court said
that a creek, in which the tide ebbed and flowed, was not necessarily
a highway; .that the corporation were bound by prescription, and it
might be the very condition or terms of their charter. And the judgment was affirmed. By this decision it is settled that case will lay
against a corporation for neglect of a corporate duty by which the
plaintiff suffers. How far a special damage must be alleged we need
not now decide.
For the proprietors, in support of their motion, a reference was
made to the several statutes creating our turnpike corporations, in
which an action is given to any person specially injured by a neglect
in repairing the road. This provision was cumulative, and introduced ex majori cautela by the framers of the bills; and is no objection
to our present construction of the law.

rate duties with its own consent, be an exception, when it has, or

must be supposed to have, an equivalent for its consent?

We distinguish between proper aggregate corporations, and the in-

habitants of any district, who are by statute invested with particular

powers without their consent. These are in the books sometimes

called ywaw'-corporations. Of this description are counties and hun-

dreds in England, and counties, towns, etc., in this state. Although

^z^m'-corporations are liable to information or indictment for a neg-

lect of a public duty imposed on them by law, yet it is settled in the

case of Russel et al. v. Inhabitants of the County of Devon,1 that no

private action can be maintained against them for a breach of their

corporate duty, unless such action be given by statute, and the sound

reason is, that having no corporate fund, and no legal means of ob-

taining one, each corporator is liable to satisfy any judgment rendered

against the corporation. This burden the common law will not im-

pose, but in cases where the statute is an authority, to which every man
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must be considered as assenting. But in regular corporations, which

have, or are supposed to have, a corporate fund, this reason does not

apply.

Among the modern cases there is one which seems in its principles

to apply directly to the case before us. It is the case of The Mayor

of Lynn, in error, v. Turner.2 Turner sued the corporation of

Lynn Regis for not repairing and cleansing a certain creek, in which

the tide ebbed and flowed, as from time immemorial they had been used,

by which he lost the use of his navigation. The declaration contained

a number of counts, in one of which the special damage alleged was

that the plaintiff was obliged to carry his corn round about. At the

common pleas judgment on nil dicit was rendered on all the counts.

For the plaintiff in error it was argued that the creek as described was

an highway, and as in one of the counts no special damage was al-

leged, the action did not lie. But Lord Mansfield and the court said

that a creek, in which the tide ebbed and flowed, was not necessarily

a highway; that the corporation were bound by prescription, and it

might be the very condition or terms of their charter. And the judg-

ment was affirmed. By this decision it is settled that case will lay

against a corporation for neglect of a corporate duty by which the

plaintiff suffers. How far a special damage must be alleged we need

not now decide.

For the proprietors, in support of their motion, a reference was

made to the several statutes creating our turnpike corporations, in

which an action is given to any person specially injured by a neglect

in repairing the road. This provision was cumulative, and intro-

duced ex majori cautela by the framers of the bills; and is no objection

to our present construction of the law.

12 D & E. 667. • Cowp. 86.
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There appears to us, upon the whole, no sufficient ground to stay
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THE CORPORATION AS A PERSON.

judgment, and, as the exceptions to the verdict can not prevail, the

Judgment on the verdict.

Note. The duties and liabilities of corporations will be the subject ot later

chapters. See infra, chs. 13-17, pp. 914-1766.

Sec 10. Same. This artificial personality is recognised par-

ticularly, (i) In statutes. The word "person" includes

private corporations, unless the legislative intention or the rea-

son of the law is clearly otherwise.

There appears to us, upon the whole, no sufficient ground to stay
judgment, and, as the exceptions to the verdict can not prevail, the
plaintiff must have judgment.
Judgment on the verdict.
Note. The duties and liabilities of corporations will be the subject of later
chapters. See infra, · chs. 13-17, pp. 914-1766.

CRAFFORD v. SUPERVISORS OF WARWICK COUNTY.1

1890. In the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 87 Vir-

ginia 110-118, 10 L. R. A. 129.

[In 1888 the general assembly of Virginia enacted: "That it shall

See. 10. Same.

This artificial personality is recognized particularly, ( I ) In statutes. The word ''person'' includes
private corporations, unless the legislative intention or the rea-

be the duty of the judge of the county court upon the application of

persons paying one-third of the taxes upon real estate in said county,"

to order the election officers to hold an election "for the purpose of

son of the law is clearly otherwise.

ascertaining the sense of the qualified voters of said county" concern-

ing the removal of the court-house, etc. Application was accord-

CRAFFORD v. SUPERVISORS OF W .ARWICK COUNTY.1
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ingly made by various parries (including many corporations), who

paid more than one-third of the taxes on real estate in the county,

whereupon the court ordered the holding of an election; this was

1890.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA.

ginia

done, and a majority of the qualified electors voted for removal; and

110-118, 10

L. R. A.

87 Vir-

129.

in pursuance of such vote the supervisors, as provided by the statute,

commenced to remove the court-house. The appellants, Crafford

and others, obtained an injunction from the corporation court, re-

straining the supervisors from proceeding with the removal; this in-

junction was dissolved by the circuit court, and appeal from that court

was taken to the supreme court of appeals.]

Fauntleroy, J., delivered the opinion of the court. * * «

The question raised by the pleadings in this cause is, whether or

not corporations are included or signified in the term "persons," as

expressed in the first section of the said act of assembly of March 2,

1SS8, under which the sense of the qualified voters of Warwick county

was ordered to be taken, and was so taken, by the election aforesaid.

The appellants contend that the word '1persons'' in the said act does

not embrace or include corporations, and that the said word "per-

sons" should be construed to mean "voters paying taxes on real estate

in the county of Warwick," and that the corporations, owning real

estate in the said county and paying taxes on the same amounting to

very nearly two-thirds of the whole taxes on real estate in the county,

were not competent signers to the written petition or application to

plaintiff must have judgment.

1 Statement of facts condensed. Part of opinion omitted.

[In 1888 the general assembly of Virginia enacted: "That it shall
be the duty of the judge of the county court upon the application of
persons paying one-thfrd of the taxes upon real estate in said county,"
to order the election officers to hold an election "for the pmpose of
ascertai'ning the sense of the qualified voters·of said county" concerning the removal of the court-house, etc. Application was accorJlingly made by various parties (including many corporations), who
paid more than one-third of the taxes on real estate in the county,
whereupon the court ordered the holding of an election; this was
done, and a majority of the qualified electors voted for removal; and
in pursuance of such vote the supervisors, as provided by the statute,
commenced to remove the court-house. The appellants, Crafford
and others, obtained an injunction from the corporation court, restraining the supervisors from proceeding with the removal; this injunction was dissolved by the circuit court, and appeal from that court
was taken to the supreme court of appeals. J
FAUNTLEROY, ]. , delivered the opinion of the court.
• • •
The question raised by the pleadings in this cause is, whether or
not corporations are included or signified in the term "persons," as
expressed in the first section of the said act of assembly of March 2,
1888, under which the sense of the qualified voters of Warwick county
was ordered to be taken, and was so taken, by the election aforesaid.
The appellants contend that the word ''persons'' in the said act does
not embrace or include corporations, and that the said word "persons" should be construed to mean "voters paying taxes on real estate
in the county of Warwick," and that the corporations, owning real
estate in the said county and paying taxes on the same amounting to
very nearly two-thirds of the whole taxes on real estate in the county,
were not competent signers to the written petition or application to
1

Statement of facts condensed. .Part of opinion omitted.
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the judge of the county court, upon which he based the order for the
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election to take or test the sense of the qualified voters of the county

CRAFFORD V. SUPERVISORS.
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of Warwick, as to the removal of the site of the court-house of the

said county, under the provisions of the said act. The language of

the judge of the county court, upon which he based the order for the
election to take or test the sense of the qualified voters of the county
of Warwick, as to the removal of the site of the court-house of the
said county, under the provisions of the said act. The language of
the first section of the act under consideration is plain, explicit, positive and unambiguous, and neither calls for nor admits of construction. If the legislature had intended that the words (which it did
use) "upon the application of persons paying one-third of the taxes
upon real estate in said county" should mean "qualified voters paying taxes on real estate in the county of Warwick (which it did not
use ), it would presumably have said so; and few, simple and unambiguous as the words are, contained in the said first section, the
'' officers conducting elections in the county of Warwick, on the
fourth Thursday in May, 1888, are ordered to open a poll for the purpose of ascertaining the sense of the qualified voters of the said
county," etc., in the same sentence in which it is said "that it shall
_be the duty of the judge of the county court, upon the application of
persons paying one-third of the taxes upon real estate in said county~
to order the election to be held," etc. It is thus unmistakably and
undebatably manifest upon the face of the short and plain first section itself, that in the same sentence the legislature discriminated
the phrase ''persons paying one-third of the taxes upon real estate in
said county" from the phrase "the sense of the qualified voters of said
county," making the one the condition precedent to warrant the judge
to t>rder the election, and the other to define and confine the election,
when held, to the "qualified voters of said county."
The legislature, like every other oracle, must be held to £ntend to
say, what it h as explicitly and imperatively said; and where, by the
use of clear and unequivocal language, anything is enacted by the
legislature, effect must be given to it, and it can not be construed
away. The whole amount of the taxes upon real estate in the county
of Warwick, for the fiscal years of 1887-1888, was $10,009.76, of
which $6,451.8o was paid by corporations owning real estate in the
said county; and the first section of the act devised a mode by which
these heavy tax-paying corporations could, to a certain extent, and in
the preliminary action prescribed to the election, protect their large
interests from the expense and burden of the cost of the election, and
of the reqioval of the court-house from its present location to Newport
News. The design of the statute was to protect the tax-payers and a
designated class of tax-payers-those who paid taxes upon real estate
in the county-from the imposition of additional taxation upon their
real estate. The tax-payer on personality could not petition the county
judge to order the election. Why, nobody knows or can conjecture;
but so it was enacted. Corporations paid taxes on real estate in the
county, lik'e as individuals, and had the same interest to protect and a
like burden to bear should the expense be incurred and the tax imposed to pay it. Why are they not in equal protection of the law?
They belong to the designated · class, and they are equally within the
reason, the justice and the intent of the law. They could not vote~

the first section of the act under consideration is plain, explicit, posi-

tive and unambiguous, and neither calls for nor admits of construc-

tion. If the legislature had intended that the words (which it did

use) "upon the application of persons paying one-third of the taxes

upon real estate in said county" should mean "qualified voters pay-

ing taxes on real estate in the county of Warwick (which it did not

use), it would presumably have said so; and few, simple and unam-

biguous as the words are, contained in the said first section, the

"officers conducting elections in the county of Warwick, on the

fourth Thursday in May, 1888, are ordered to open a poll for the pur-

pose of ascertaining the sense of the qualified voters of the said

county," etc., in the same sentence in which it is said "that it shall

be the duty of the judge of the county court, upon the application of

persons paying one-third of the taxes upon real estate in said county,

to order the election to be held," etc. It is thus unmistakably and
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undebatably manifest upon the face of the short and plain first sec-

tion itself, that in the same sentence the legislature discriminated

the phrase "persons paying one-third of the taxes upon real estate in

said county" from the phrase "the sense of the qualified voters of said

county," making the one the condition precedent to warrant the judge

to t>rder the election, and the other to define and confine the election,

when held, to the "qualified voters of said county."

The legislature, like every other oracle, must be held to intend to

say, what it has explicitly and imperatively said; and where, by the

use of clear and unequivocal language, anything is enacted by the

legislature, effect must be given to it, and it can not be construed

away. The whole amount of the taxes upon real estate in the county

of Warwick, for the fiscal years of 18S7-1S88, was $10,009.76, of

which $6,451.80 was paid by corporations owning real estate in the

said county; and the first section of the act devised a mode by which

these heavy tax-paying corporations could, to a certain extent, and in

the preliminary action prescribed to the election, protect their large

interests from the expense and burden of the cost of the election, and

of the removal of the court-house from its present location to Newport

News. The design of the statute was to protect the tax-payers and a

designated class of tax-payers—those who paid taxes upon real estate

in the county—from the imposition of additional taxation upon their

real estate. The tax-payer on personality could not petition the county

judge to order the election. Why, nobody knows or can conjecture;

but so it was enacted. Corporations paid taxes on real estate in the

county, like as individuals, and had the same interest to protect and a

like burden to bear should the expense be incurred and the tax im-

posed to pay it. Why are they not in equal protection of the law?

They belong to the designated class, and they are equally within the

reason, the justice and the intent of the law. They could not vote,
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but they were, designedly and expressly, given a voice in the question
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as to whether or not the election should be ordered, and thereby have

an additional burden of taxation imposed upon them.

53

An intent to do what is unjust, and to discriminate, unjustly

and without reason, between different cases of a like kind, is not to

be ascribed to the legislature.' Arthur v. Blight, 2 Cranch 390; 24

Pickering 370.1 The real estate of both the individual and the corpo-

ration are alike subject to the taxation which may be imposed. Can

any reason be given why there should be a discrimination against cor-

porations owning real estate, and paying nearly two-thirds of all the

taxes on real estate in the county, under this statute, to determine the

question of whether additional taxation should be made necessary?

Would not this be an unjust and unreasonable discrimination between

classes of tax-payers in similar cases? Wherever the governing

principle is taxation, the term persons in a statute has been held to

include corporations; and, under the assessment and tax laws, corpo-

rations are assessed and taxed, although the word persons is used

therein, and corporation is not mentioned.

In the case of Beaston v. Farmers' Bank of Delaware, 12 Peters
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134-5, tne supreme court of the United States said: "Corporations

are to be deemed and considered as '■■persons,' when the circumstances

in which they are placed are identical with those of natural persons

expressly included in such statutes."

In Stribbling v. The Bank of the Valley, 5 Rand., on p. 180, Judge

Cabell said: "The term 'person,' used in the law, is unquestionably

sufficiently comprehensive to embrace corporations; and it must be

held to embrace them unless there is something in the law showing

the legislative intention to restrict its application."

In United States Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 1 Robinson 589, Judge

Allen said, "For civil purposes, corporations are, in law, deemed

persons." United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheaton 393, and quoting,

with approval, Beaston v. Farmers' Bank of Delaware, 12 Peters

134. and Stribbling v. Valley Bank, 5 Rand. 132, goes on to say the

"only doubt has been whether the word (person) would embrace

(corporations) within penal statutes," etc.

In Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Gallahue's Adm'r, 12 Gratt. 663,

"When the word persons is used in a statute, corporations, as well as

natural persons, are included for civil purposes." 2 Inst. 697, 703,

736.

In the Code of 1873, ch. 16, § 17, p. 101, it is provided that the

word persons, in a statute, "may extend to and be applied to bodies

politic and corporate as well as to individuals, unless it would be in-

consistent with the manifest intention of the legislature," and the

same provision is in the Code of 1887. The -word persons does cer-

tainly include corporations unless the intention of the legislature is

manifest that corporations were intended to be excluded from its op-

tration. Corporations are not, in terms, excluded from its operation.

The omission of the word corporations does not exclude them, for

'Commissioners v. Kimball.

but they were, designedly and expressly, given a voice in the question
as to whether or not the election should be ordered, and thereby have
an additional burden of taxation imposed upon them.
An intent to do what is unjust, and to discriminate, unjustly
and without reason, between different cases of a like kind, is not to
be ascribed to the legislature: Arthur v. Blight, 2 Cranch 390; 24
Pickering 370. 1 The real estate of both the individual and the corporation.are alike subject to the taxation which may be imposed. Can
any reason be given why there should be a discrimination against corporations owning real estate, and paying nearly two-thirds of all the
taxes on real estate in the county, under this statute, to determine the
question of whether additional taxation should be made necessary?
Would not this be an unjust and unreasonable discrimination between
classes of tax-payers in similar cases? Wherever the governing
principle is taxation, the term persons in a statute has been held to
include corporations; and, under the assessment and tax laws, corporations are assessed and taxed, although the word persqns is used
therein, and corporation is not mentioned.
In the case of Beaston v. Farmers' Bank of Delaware, 12 Peters
134-5, the supreme court of the United States said: "Corporations
are to be deemed and considered as •persons,' when the circumstances
in which they are placed are identical with those of natural persons
expressly included in such statutes."
In Stribbling v. The Bank of the Valley, 5 Rand., on p. 18o, Judge
Cabell said: " The term 'person,' used in the law, is unquestionably
sufficiently comprehensive to embrace corporations; and it must be
held to embrace them unless the.re is something in the law showing
the legislative intention to restrict its application."
In United States Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 1 Robinson 589, Judge
Allen said, "For civil purposes, corporations are, in law, deemed
persons." United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheaton 393, and quoting,
with approval, Beaston v. Farmers' Bank of Delaware, 12 Peters
134, and Stribbling v. Valley Bank, 5 Rand. 132, goes on to say the
"only doubt has been whether the word (person) would embrace
(corporations) within penal statutes," etc.
In Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Gallahue's Adm'r, 12 Gratt. 663,
"When the word persons is used in a statute, corporations, as well as
natural persons, are included for civil purposes." 2 Inst. 697, 703,

736.
In the Code of 1873, ch. 16, § 17, p. 101, it is provided that the
word persons, in a statute, "may extend to and be applied to bodies
politic and corporate as well as to individuals, unless it would be inconsistent with the manifest intention of the legislature," and the
same provision is in the Code of 1887. The word persons does certainly include corporations unless the intention of the legislature is
manifest that corporati"ons were intended to be excluded from it-s operation. Corporations are not, in terms, excluded from its operation.
The omission of the word corporations does not exclude them, for
1
Commissioners v. Kimball.
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must include them, unless it was the manifest intention of the legisla-
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ture to exclude them from the operation of the act. Nor is there any-

thing in the nature of the act to exclude corporations from its opera-

this act uses a word "persons," which may include them, and which
must include them, unless it was the manifest intention of the legislature to exclude them from the operation of the act. Nor is there anything in the nature of the act to exclude corporations from its operation. Miller's Ex. v. The Commonwealth, 27 Gratt. 115. See,
also, Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 4
Rawle 9; Field v. New York Central R. Co., 29 Barb. 176; Wright
v. Tame, 28 Barb. So; Johnson v. Mcintosh, 31 Barb. 267; Wallace
v. Mayor of New York, 2 Hilton 440; La Forge v. Exchange Fire Ins.
Co., 22 N. Y. 334; The People v. Utica Ins. Co. , 8 Am. Dec. 251;
Pembina Manf'g Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. Rep. 181; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Peters 504.
To hold, as i ~ the contention of the appellants, that the legislature
intended, by the use of the word -"persons" paying one-third of the
taxes, etc., to restrict it to voters paying one-third of the taxes, etc.,
would not only exclude corporations, but non-residents, and even resjdents who had not resided long enough to become voters-women,
minors, aiiens--none of whom could be a voter, yet many of whom,
if not, indeed, all, are tax-payers upon real estate in Warwick
county.
If we give the other construction contended for by the appellants,
that "persons" meant natural persons, and that natural persons signing the application should represent one-third of the taxes paid upon
real estate, it would have put it in the power of two persons paying
one-forty-fifth part of the whole real estate tax in the county to have
denied the wishes and defeated the will of all the other real estate
owners, and the whole population of the county united in the application to the judge to order the election. It is not to be imputed to the
legislature that they had any such an absurdity of intention, and it is
not con istent with the obiect and context of the act.
If corporations paying taxes upon real estate in Warwick county are
not within the intent of the word "persons" in the act, then they must
be excluded; and, if excluded, the individuals paying taxes upon real
estate in the county, who signed the petition or application to the
judge to order the election, did pay more than one-third of the taxes
paid by individuals on real estate in the county of Warwick. The
amount of taxes upon real estate in the county of Warwick paid by
corporations was $6,451.80, of which sum the Chesapeake and Ohio
Railroad Company paid $3, 130.47. It is objected by the appellants that Williams C. Wickham, who signed the application to the
judge to order the election , did so as receiver, and without authority.
It is not necessary to decide this question, inasmuch as those corporations who did sign, other than the C. & 0. R. R. Co., by W. C.
Wickham, receiver, paid $2,271.33, which, added to the taxes on
real estate paid by individuals . who signed the application, $1 ,395.46,
amounts to $3,666.79, which is more than one-third of the whole
amount of the taxes on real estate paid in Warwick county by $333· 53.
We are of opinion that the election was properly ordered by the
judge of the county comt of Warwick, and that the election was duly

tion. Miller's Ex. v. The Commonwealth, 27 Gratt. 115. See,

also, Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 4

Rawle 9; Field v. New York Central R. Co., 29 Barb. 176; Wright

v. Tame, 28 Barb. 80; Johnson v. Mcintosh, 31 Barb. 267; Wallace

v. Mayor of New York, 2 Hilton 440; La Forge v. Exchange Fire Ins.

Co., 22 N. Y. 334; The People v. Utica Ins. Co., 8 Am. Dec. 251;

Pembina Manf'g Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. Rep. 181; Provi-

dence Bank v. Billings, 4 Peters 504.

To hold, as is the contention of the appellants, that the legislature

intended, by the use of the word "persons" paying one-third of the

taxes, etc., to restrict it to voters paying one-third of the taxes, etc.,

would not only exclude corporations, but non-residents, and even res-

idents who had not resided long enough to become voters—women,

minors, aliens—none of whom could be a voter, yet many of whom,

if not, indeed, all, are tax-payers upon real estate in Warwick
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county.

If we give the other construction contended for by the appellants,

that "persons" meant natural persons, and that natural persons sign-

ing the application should represent one-third of the taxes paid upon

real estate, it would have put it in the power of two persons paying

one-forty-fifth part of the whole real estate tax in the county to have

denied the wishes and defeated the will of all the other real estate

owners, and the whole population of the county united in the applica-

tion to the judge to order the election. It is not to be imputed to the

legislature that they had any such an absurdity of intention, and it is

not consistent with the object and context of the act.

If corporations paying taxes upon real estate in Warwick county are

not within the intent of the word "persons" in the act, then they must

be excluded; and, if excluded, the individuals paying taxes upon real

estate in the county, who signed the petition or application to the

judge to order the election, did pay more than one-third of the taxes

paid by individuals on real estate in the county of Warwick. The

amount of taxes upon real estate in the county of Warwick paid by

corporations was $6,451.80, of which sum the Chesapeake and Ohio

Railroad Company paid $3,130.47. It is objected by the appel-

lants that Williams C. Wickham, who signed the application to the

judge to order the election, did so as receiver, and without authority.

It is not necessary to decide this question, inasmuch as those corpora-

tions who did sign, other than the C. & O. R. R. Co., by W. C.

Wickham, receiver, paid $2,271.33, which, added to the taxes on

real estate paid by individuals who signed the application, $1,395.46,

amounts to $3,666.79, which is more than one-third of the whole

amount of the taxes on real estate paid in Warwick county bv $333-53-

We are of opinion that the election was properly ordered by the

judge of the county court of Warwick, and that the election was duly
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and properly conducted, and that the circuit court rightfully dissolved

the injunction which had been granted in the cause, September 4,
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1888, by the judge of the corporation court of the city of Manchester,

and the decree appealed from is without error, and the same is af-

firmed.

Decree affirmed.

.Vote. The rule given in this case seems to be the one that now has the

weight of authority; but in Betts v. Menard, 1 Breese's Appeal (111.), p. 395

(1831/, the rule was announced that "persons" would not include "corporations"

unless it was absolutely necessary to carry out the objects of incorporation. This

rale seems to have been followed in State v. Fertilizer Co., 24 Ohio St. 611

(1874), in interpreting a criminal statute relating to a nuisance. The later

Ohio cases seem to have laid down a rule in accordance with the one given

above in the CraSord case. See Springfield v. Walker, 42 Ohio St. 643, and

Cincinnati Gas Light and Coke Co. v. Avondale, 43 Ohio St. 257.

Some of the earlier cases followed a rule similar to that in Betts v. Menard,

supra. See Blair v. Worley, 1 Scam. (III.) 178 (1835); School Directors v.

Carlisle Bank, 8 Watts (Pa.) 291. And in Fox's Appeal, 112 Pa. St. 337, 14

Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 356 (1886), the rule is stated that unless something in
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the context indicates that "person" shall include "corporation," it will not

be so held. In the leading English case, Pharmaceutical Society v. London,

etc., Assn., 5 App. Cas. 857, it was allowed that in an act of Parliament, re-

lating to persons, corporations were presumptively included, but that the pre-

sumption was not strong, and the context of the act should determine.

Sta, particularly, Elliott Corp., § 8; Morawetz Corporations, § 1091; Grant

on Corp., p. 4, note 5; 8 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 626 (franchise); 18 Am.

& Eng. Ency. of Law 405 (person); Cook Stock and Stockholders, § 700;

note 19 Lawyer's Reports Annotated, p. 222, where the cases are classified.

ILLUSTRATIONS.

1. In general.—See Ricker v. Am. L., etc., Co., 140 Mass. 346; Turnbull

and properly conducted, an<l that the circuit court rightfully dissolved
the injunction which had been granted in the cause, September 4,
1888, by the judge of the corporation court of the city of Manchester,
and the decree appealed from is without error, and the same is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
Hou. The rule given in this case seems to be the one that now has the
weigbt of autbority; but in Betts v. Menard, 1 Breese's Appeal (Ill.), p. 395
(1831), the rule was announced that "persons" would not include " corporations"
unJus il was absolutely necessary to· carry out the objects of incorporation. Tbis
role seems to have been followed in State v. Fertilizer Co., 24 Ohio St. 611
(1874), in interpreting a criminal statute relating to a nuisance. The later
Ohio cases seem to have laid down a rule in accordance with ·the one given
above in the Crafford case. See Springfield v. Walker, 4.2 Ohio St. 543, and
Cincinnati Gas Light and Coke Co. v. Avondale, 43 Ohio St. 257.
Some of tbe earlier cases followed a rule similar to that in Betts v. Menard,
supra. See Blair v. Worley, 1 Scam. (Ill.) 178 (1835); School Directors v.
Carlisle Bank, 8 Watts (Pa.) 291. And in Fox's Appeal, 112 Pa. St. 337, 14
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 356 (1886), the rule is stated that unless something in
the context indicates that "person" shall include "corporation," it will not
be so held. In the leading English case, Pharmaceutical Society v . London,
etc., Assn., 5 App. Cas. 857, it was allowed that in an act of Parliament, relating to person8, corporations were presumptively included, but that the preaunption was not stron~, and the context of the act should determine.
&d, particularly, Elhott Corp., § 8; Morawetz Corporations, § 1091; Grant
on Corp., p. 4, note 5; 8 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 626 (franchise) ; 18 Am.
& Eng. Ency. of Law 405 (person); Cook Stock and Stockholders, § 700;
uote 19 Lawyer's Reports Annotated, p. 222, where the cases are classified.

v. Prentiss Lumber Co., 55 Mich. 387; Billings v. State, 107 Ind. 54; Stewart

ILLUSTRATIONS .

v. Waterloo Turn Verein, 71 Iowa 226,60 Am. Rep. 786; Springfield v. Walker,

42 Ohio St. 543; Forrest v. Henry, 33 Minn. 434; Fagan v. Boyle Ice Mach.

Co., 60 Tex. 331; Chippeway Vallev, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,

75 Wis. 224; Union Steamship Co. v. Milburne H. Co., 9 App. Cas. 366; Fox's

App., 112 Pa. St. 337, 14 A. & E. Corp. Cas. 356.

2. Attachment laws relating to persons, apply also to private corporations.—

See Planters' Bank v. Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404; Libby v. Hodgdon, 9 N.

H. 394; Knox v. Protection Ins. Co., 9 Conn. 430, 25 Am. Dec. 33; Bray v.

Wallingford, 20 Conn. 416; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Gallahue, 12 Gratt.

(Va.) 655, 65 Am. Dec. 254; Mineral Point R. Co. v. Keep, 22 111. 9, 74 Am.

D. 124; Bushel v. Com. Ins. Co., 15 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 173; South Carolina R.

Co. v. McDonald, 5 Ga. 531; Union Bank v. United States Bank, 4 Humph.

(Tenn.) 369; Martin v. Branch Bank, 14 La. 415. But compare McQueen v.

Middleton Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 5; and Mayor of Baltimore v. Root, 8

Md. 95. In Dollman v. Moore, 70 Miss. 267, 19 L. R. A. 222, it was held that

a board of school trustees was not a person within the meaning of attachment

laws.

3. Appeals.—Statutes allowing appeals by persons apply to corporations:

People v. May, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 238.

i. Banking'.—Statutes prohibiting persons from banking apply to corpora-

tions: People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 358, 8 Am. Dec. 243.

5. Citizens.—(a) Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of section

2, article 4 of theU. S. constitution, saying, "The citizens of each state shall be

entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states."

See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 168; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mayer,

28 0. S. 521; Norfolk & West. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114, 10 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 958; Pembina Con. Silver Min., etc., Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S.

1. In genera.1.-See Ricker v. Am. L., etc., Co., 140 Mass. 346; Turnbull
v. Prentiss Lumber Co., 55 Mich. 387; Billings v. State, 107 Ind. 54; Stewart
v. Waterloo Turn Verein, 71Iowa226, 60 Am. Rep. 786; Springfield v. Walker,
420hio St. 543; Forrest v. Henry, 33 Minn. 434; Fagan v . Boyle Ice Mach.
Co., 65 Tex. 331; Chippeway Valley, etc., R . R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,
75 Wis. 224; Union Steamship Co. v. Milburne H. Co., 9 App. Cas. 365; Fox's
App., 112 Pa. St. 337, 14 A. & E. Corp. Cas. 356.
2. Attachment Ia.ws relating to persons, apply also to private corporations.See Planters' Bank v. Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404; Libby v. Hodgdon, 9 N.
H . 394; Knox v. Protection Ins. Co. 1 9 Conn. 430, 25 Am. Dec. 33; Bray v.
Wallingford, 20 Conn. 416; ~altimore1 etc., R. Co. v. Gallahue, 12 Gratt.
(Va.) 655 1 65 Am. Dec. 254; Mmeral Point R. Co. v. Keep, 22 Ill. 9, 74 Am.
D.124; Bushel v. Com. Ins. Co., 15 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 173; South Carolina R.
Co. v. McDonald, 5 Ga. 531; Union Bank v. United States Bank, 4 Humph.
(Tenn. } 369; Martin v. Branch Bank, 14 La. 415. But compare McQueen v.
Middleton Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 5; and Mayor of Baltimore v. Root, 8
Md. 95. Jn Dollman v. Moore, 70 Miss. 267, 19 L. R. A. 222, it was held that
a board of school trustees was not a person within the meaning of attachment
laws.
3. Appea.ls.-Statutes allowing appeals by persons apply to corporations:
People v. May, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 238.
·
. 4. Ba.nking.-Sta~tes prohibiting persons from banking apply to corpora·
t1ons: People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 358, 8 Am. Dec: 243.
5. Citizens.-( a) Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of section
2, article 4 of the U. S. constitution, saying, "The citizens of each state shall be
enLitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states."
" e Paul v. Virgima, 8 Wall. (U.S.> 168; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mayer,
28 0. S. 521; Norfol~ & W est. ~-Co.". · Pennsylvania. 136 U . S. ~14, 10 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 958; Pembma Con. Silver Mm., etc., Co. v. Pennsylvama, 125 U .S.
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181; Railroad v. Barntaill, 91 Tenn. 395, 30 Am. St. 889; Horn S. M. Co. v.

§ IO

ILLUSTRATIONS.

56

New York, 143 U. S. 305; People v. Wemple, 131 N. Y. 64; note to State v.

Goodwill in 25 Am. St. Rep. 873; Daggs v. Orient, etc., Co., 136 Mo. 382, 58

181; Railroad v. Barnhill!....91 Tenn. 395, 30 Am. St. 889; Hom S. M. Co. v.
New York, 143 U.S. 305; .t'eople v. Wemple, 131 N. Y. 64; note to State v.
Goodwill in 25 Am. St. Rep. 873; Daggs v. Orient, etc., Co., 136 Mo. 382, 58
Am. St. 638; Commonwealth v. New York, etc., R. Co., 129 Pa. St. 463, 15
Am. St. R. 724. Compare St. Louis Iron M. T. R. Co. v. Paul, 64 Ark. 83,
62 Am. St. R. 154, and note p. 167.
(b \ But corporations are citizens of the state creating them within the meaning of section 2, article 3, of the constitution, that "the judicial power shall
extend to all cases between citizens of different states." See 1809, Hope Ins.
Co. v. Boardman, 5 Cran ch (9 U. S.) 57; 1809, Bank of U. S. v. Deveaux, 5
Cranch (9U. S.)61; 1840, Commercial, etc., Bank v. Slocomb, 14 Pet. (U.S.)
60, all of which held that the court "would look beyond the mere legal being, and consider the citizenship of the individuals of whom the company is
composed ." In 1844, Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. (43 U.S. )
497, 558, the court, after an elaborate review, overruled the former cases and
announced the rule above given. The later cases are: 1853, Marshall v. B.
& 0. R. Co., 16 How. (57 U.S .) 314; 1861, Ohio & Miss. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1
Black. (66 U.S.) 286; 1866, County of Allegheny v. Cleveland & P.R. Co., 51
Pa. St. 228, 88 Am. D . 579; 1870, Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65; 1871,
Chicago & M. V. R. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. (SOU. S.) 27:0; 1876, Muller v.
Dows, 94 U.S. 444; 1881, C. & W. I. R. Co. v. L., S. & M. S. R. Co., 5 Fed. R.
19;._1882, Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Alabama, 107 U. S. 581; 1885, Pennsylvama Co. v. St. L., A. & T. R. Co., 118 U.S. 290; 1890, Nashua & L . R. Co.
v. Boston & L. R. Co., 136 U . S. 356; 1890, Paul v. B. & 0. R. Co., 44 Fed.
Rep. 513; 1892, Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444; 1892, Southern
Pac. R. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202; 1893, In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653;
1895, Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Meek, 69 Fed. Rep. 753, 30 L . R. A. 250; 1896,
St. Louis. & San Francisco R. Co. v. Jam es, 161 U. S. 545, infra, p. 1099; 1896,
Louisville Trust Co. v. L., N. A. & C. R. Co., 75 Fed. Rep. 433.
(c) As to fourteenth amendment, Ree infra, No. 10.
6. Contracts.- Statutes relating to contracts of persons apply to corporations also: Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 513; State v. Nashville Univ.,
4 Humph. (Tenn.) 157; Commercial Bank v. Nolan, 8 Miss. (7 How.) 608;
Cincinnati Gas Co. v. Avondale, 43 Ohio St. 257.
7. Death by wrong1nl act.-Statutes making persons liable for such include corporations: Chase v. Steamboat Co., 10 R. I. 79.
'
8. Eminent domain statutes apply to corporations, though persons only are
named: Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal Co., 4 Rawle (Pa.) 9, 26 Am.
Dec. lll.
9. Evidenee.-A corporation is a "living person" within the meaning of a
statute giving a party the right to testify when the adverse party is a living
person; La Farge v. Exchange F. Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 352.
10. Fourteenth amendment.-The provisions of section I, saying "No
state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws," protects the rights of the corporations, when in the state, tbe same
as persons: Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S.181; Santa Clara
Co. v. ~outh Pacific R. Co., 118. U.S. 394, 24 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 523; Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26; Charlotte, etc., R. Co. v. Gill,
142 'U. S. 386; Co~nty of San Mateo v. South Pacific R. Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 722,
1upra, p. 36; Covrngton, etc., R. Co. v. Sanford, 164 U. S. 578; Smrthe v.
Ames, 169 U. S. 522, 171 U. S. 361. But contrary to the holding in Umversity
v. Foy, supra, p. 34, the 14th chapter of Magna Charta, that "no freeman shall
be amerced," etc., was held not to apply to corporations aggregate but only
to corporations sole. 2 Inst. 169, 170, 8 Rep. 39.
'
11. Foreign corporations are not persons within a constitutional provision
"t~at no person shal_l be deJ?rived o_f the natural rights to life, liberty and tbe
en1oyment of the game of ~1s own mdustry ." Daggs v. Orient Ins. Co., 136
Mo. 382, 58 Am. St. 638. 8ee, also, Bla~ e. v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, infra,
p. 2036; Hammond, etc., Co. v. Best, 91 Maine 431, 42 L. R. A. 528.
12. lncorporatiou. - Statutes providing that a certain number of persons may

Am. St. 638; Commonwealth v. New York, etc., R. Co., 129 Pa. St. 463, 15

Am. St. R. 724. Compare St. Louis Iron M. T. R. Co. v. Paul, 64 Ark. 83,

62 Am. St. R. 154, and note p. 167.

(6) But corporations are citizens of the state creating them within the mean-

ing of section 2, article 3, of the constitution, that "the judicial power shall

extend to all cases between citizens of different states." See 1809, Hope Ins.

Co. v. Boardman, 5 Cranch (9 U. S.) 57; 1809, Bank of U. S. v. Deveaux, 5

Cranch (9U. S.)61; 1840, Commercial, etc., Bank v. Slocomb, 14 Pet. (U. S.)

60, all of which held that the court "would look beyond the mere legal be-

ing, and consider the citizenship of the individuals of whom the company is

composed." In 1844, Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. (43 U. S.)

497, 558, the court, after an elaborate review, overruled the former cases and

announced the rule above given. The later cases are: 1853, Marshall v. B.

& O. R. Co., 16 How. (57 U. S.) 314; 1861, Ohio & Miss. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1

Black. (66 TJ. S.) 286; 1865, County of Allegheny v. Cleveland & P. R. Co., 51

Pa. St. 228, 88 Am. D. 579; 1870, Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65; 1871,
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Chicago & M. V. R. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. (80 U. S.) 270; 1876, Muller v.

Dows, 94 U. S. 444; 1881, C. & W.I. R. Co. v. L., S. & M. S. R. Co., 5 Fed. R.

19;-1882, Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Alabama, 107 U. S. 581; 1885, Pennsyl-

vania Co. v. St. L., A. & T. R. Co., 118 U. S. 290; 1890, Nashua & L. R. Co.

v. Boston & L. R. Co., 136 U. S. 356; 1890, Paul v. B. & O. R. Co., 44 Fed.

Rep. 513; 1892, Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444; 1892, Southern

Pac. R. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202; 1893, In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653;

1895, Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Meek, 69 Fed. Rep. 753, 30 L. R. A. 250; 1896,

St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545, infra, p. 1099; 1896,

Louisville Trust Co. v. L., N. A. & C. R. Co., 75 Fed. Rep. 433.

(c) As to fourteenth amendment, see infra, No. 10.

6. Contracts.—Statutes relating to contracts of persons apply to corpora-

tions also: Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 513; State v. Nashville Univ.,

4 Humph. (Tenn.) 157; Commercial Bank v. Nolan, 8 Miss. (7 How.) 508;

Cincinnati Gas Co. v. Avondale, 43 Ohio St. 257.

7. Death by wrongful act.—Statutes making persons liable for such, in-

clude corporations: Chase v. Steamboat Co., 10 R. I. 79.

8. Eminent domain statutes applj; to corporations, though persons only are

named: Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal Co., 4 Rawle (Pa.) 9, 26 Am.

Dec. 111.

9. Evidence.—A corporation is a "living person" within the meaning of a

statute giving a party the right to testify when the adverse party is a living

person: La Farge v". Exchange F. Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 352.

10. Fourteenth amendment.—The provisions of section 1, saying "No

state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process

of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of

the laws," protects the rights of the corporations, when in the state, the same

as persons: Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181; Santa Clara

Co. v. South Pacific R. Co., 118 U. S. 394, 24 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 523; Min-

neapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26; Charlotte, etc., R. Co. v. Gill,

142 U. S. 386; County of San Mateo v. South Pacific R. Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 722,

supra, p. 36; Covington, etc., R. Co. v. Sanford, 164 U. S. 578; Smythe v.

Ames, 169 U. S. 522, 171 U. S. 361. But contrary to the holding in University

v. Foy, supra, p. 34, the 14th chapter of Magna Charta, that "no freeman shall

be amerced," etc., was held not to apply to corporations aggregate, but only

to corporations sole. 2 Inst. 169, 170, 8 Rep. 39.

11. Foreign corporations are not persons within a constitutional provision

"that no person shall be deprived of the natural rights to life, liberty and the

enjoyment of the gains of his own industry." Daggs v. Orient Ins Co 136

Mo. 382, 58 Am. St. 638. See, also, Blake v. McClung, 172 TJ. S. 239, infra,

p. 2036; Hammond, etc., Co. v. Best, 91 Maine 431, 42 L. R. A. 528.

12. Incorporation. Statutes providing that a certain numberof persons may
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incorporate do not include corporations as such persons. Factors, etc., Ins.

Co. v. New Harbor P. Co., 37 La. Ann. 233; Humphrey v. Mooney, 5 Colo. 282;
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Central R. Co. v. Pa. R. Co., 31 N. J. Eq. 475. See infra, pp. 553, 889.
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13. Jurisdiction of courts.—For this purpose a corporation is a person, in-

habitant or citizen of the state creating it. See cases cited in this note No. 5.

(6) above. See, also, Brown v. Mayor, etc., 66 N. Y. 385; Chicago, etc., R.

v. Bank of North America, 82 111. 493; Eslava v. Ames, etc., 47 Ala. 384.

14. Limitation of actions.—Statutes of limitation apply to corporations in

the same way as to persons. People v. Trinity Church, 22 N. Y. 44; North

Missouri R. Co. v. Akers, 4 Kan. 453.

15. Misdemeanors.—Statutes making persons liable for, include corpora-

tions. White v. State, 69 Ind. 273.

16. Penalties.—Statutes providing penalties for certain acts of persons, per-

haps do not include corporations unless the context very clearly shows they

are meant to be so included. This is on account of the strict construction of such

statutes. See Coats v. People, 22N. Y. 245; United States v. Kan. P. R., 4 C.

L. J. 174; Androscoggin Water Power Co. v. Bethel S. M. Co., 64 Maine 441;

Benson v. Monson, etc.,9 Mete. (Mass.) 562; Ohio v. Cincinnati Fertilizer Co.,

24 Ohio St. 611; Guardians of St. Leonard v. Franklin, 3 C. P. Div. 377.
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17. Promissory notes.—The Statute of Anne providing for the negotiability

of notes made payable' to the order of any person applies to notes by or to

corporations or to the order of corporations. Indiana v. Woram, 6 Hill.

(N. Y.)33; Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 513.

18. Property, protection of.—See below, Trespass, No. 23, and No. 10,

above. United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. (U. S.) 392.

19. Practice and procedure.-People v. May, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 238. See

also Appeals, No. 3, above, and Jurisdiction, No. 13, above.

20. Registry laws.—.Statutes providing for the registration of vessels or

other things by persons include corporations. Regina v. Arnaud, 9 Q. B. 806,

infra, p. 58; Durant v. Kennett L. R., 5 C. P. 262.

21. Real estate.—Statutes relating to real estate of persons apply to that of

corporations. Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal Co., 4 Rawle (Pa.) 9; Blair

v. Worlev, 1 Scam. (111.) 178; Cortes v. Kent Water Works Co., 7 B. & O.

(K. B. Eng.) 314.

22. Taxation.—Statutes relating to the taxation of the property of persons,

inhabitants, residents, etc., include that of corporations also. See Rex v. Gard-

ner, Cowp. 79, but see 3 Q. B. 233; Royal Exchange Assurance Co. v.

Vaughan, 1 Burr. 155; Reg. v. Birmingham, etc., Ry. Co., 3 Q. B. 233; Peo-

ple v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 358, 382, 8 Am. Dec. 243; Mayor of

Mobile v. Rowland, 26 Ala. 498; Trenton Bank v. Haverstick, 6 Halst. (N.

J.) 171; Citv of St. Louis v. Rogers, 7 Mo. 19; Bushel v. Can. Ins. Co., 15 S.

& R. (Pa.) 173; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bank of N. A., 82 111. 493; People v.

McLean, 80 N. Y. 254; Otis Co. v. Inhabitants of Ware, 8 Gray (Mass.) 509;

Baldwin Inhabitants v. Trustees, 37 Maine 369; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v.

Com., 1 Bush (Ky.) 250; Compare Fox's Appeal, 112 Pa. St. 337, 14 A. & E.

C. C. 356; Cherokee Ins. Co. v. Justices, 28 Ga. 121; Hartford Ins. Co. v.

Hartford, 3 Conn. 15.

23. Trespasses, protection from.—Statutes protecting the property of per-

sons apply to corporations also. White v. State, 69 Ind. 273; State v. Nashville

Univ., 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 157; Bartee v. Houston, etc., R. Co., 36 Texas 648.

24. Usury.—Statutes forbidding usury by persons apply to corporations

also. Thornton v. Bank of Wash., 3 Pet. (U. S.) 36; Grand Gulf Bank v.

Archer, 8 S. & M. (Miss.) 151.

25. Voting-.—The English Public Health Act (11 and 12 Vict., sec. 20)

authorized corporations aggregate to vote by proxy under their common seal

incorporate do not include corporations as such persons. Factors, etc., Ins.
Co. v. New Harbor P. Co ..!.37 La. Ann. 233; Humphrey v. Mooney, 5 Colo. 282;
Cent ral R. Co . v. Pa. R. vo., 31 N. J. Eq. 475. See infra, pp. 553, 889.
13. Jurisdiction of courts.-For this purpose a corporation is a person, inhabitant or citizen of the state creating it. See cases cited in this note No. 5,
(b) above. See, also, Brown v. Mayor, etc., 66 N. Y. 385; Chicago, etc., R.
v. Bank of North America, 82 Ill. 498; E slava v. Ames, etc., 47 Ala. 384.
14. Limitation of aetions.-Statutes of limitation apply to corporations in
the same way as to persons. People v. Trinity Church, 22 N. Y. 44; North
Missouri R. Co. v. Akers, 4 Kan. 453.
15. Misdemeanors.-Statutes making persons liable for, include corporations. White v. State, 69 Ind. 273.
16. Penalties.-Statutes providing penalties for certain acts of persons, perhaps do not include corporations unless the context very clearly shows they
are meant to be so included. This is on account of the strict construction of such
statutes. See Coats v. People, 22 N. Y. 245; United States v. Kan. P.R., 4 C.
L. J. 174; Androscoggin Water Power Co. v. Bethel S. M. Co., 64 Maine 441;
Benson v. Monson, etc., 9 Mete. (Mass .) 562; Ohio v. Cincinnati Fertilizer Co.,
24 Ohio St. 6ll; Guardians of St. Leonard v. Franklin, 3 C. P. Div. 377.
17. Promissory notes.-The Statute of Anne providing for the negotiability
of notes made payable· to the order of any p erson applies to notes by or to
corporations or to the order of corporations. Indiana v. Woram, 6 Hill.
(N. Y.) 33; Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. (N. Y. l 513.
18. Property, protection of.-See below, Trespass, No. 23, and No. 10,
above. United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. (U.S . ) 392.
19. Practice and procednre.- People v. May, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 238. See
also A ppeals, No. 3, above, and Jurisdiction, No. 13, above.
20. Registry laws.-Statutes providing for the registration of vessels or
?ther things by persons include corpor~tions. Regina v. Arnaud, 9 Q. B. 806,
infra, p. 58; Durant v. Kennett L. R., o C. P. 262.
21. Real estate.-Statutes relating to real estate of persons apply to that of
corporations. Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal Co., 4 Ra wle (Pa.) 9 ; Blair
v. Worley, 1 Scam. (Ill.) 178; Cortes v. Kent Water Works Co., 7 B. & C.
(K. B. Eng. ) 314.
22. Taxation.-Statutes relating to the taxation of the property of persons,
inhabil<mts, residents, etc., include that of corporations also. See Rex v . Gardner, Cowp. 79, but see 3 Q. B. 233; Royal Exchange Assurance Co. v.
Vaughan , I Burr. 155; Reg. v. Birmingham, etc., Ry . Co. , 3 Q. B. 233; People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 358, 382, 8 Am . Dec. 243; Mayor of
Mobile v. R-0wland, 26 Ala. 498; Trenton Bank v. Haverstick, 6 Halat. (N.
J .) 171 ; City of St. Louis v. Rogers, 7 Mo. 19; Bushel v. Can. Ins. Co., 15 S.
& R. ( Pa.) 173 ; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bank of N. A., 82 Ill. 493; P eople v.
McLean , 80 N. Y. 254; Otis Co. v. Inhabitants of W are, 8 Gray (Mass.) 509;
Bald win Inhabitants v. Trustees, 37 Maine 369; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v.
Com ., 1 Bush (Ky.) 250; Compare Fox's Appeal, 112 Pa. St. 337, 14 A. & E.
C. C . 356; Cherokee Ins. Co. v. Justices, 28 Ga. 121; Hartford Ins. Co. v.
Hartford, 3 Conn. 15.
23. Trespasses, pl'otection fl'om.-Statutes protecting the property of perso~ apply to corporations also. White v. State, 69 Ind. 273; State v. Nashville
Umv., 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 157; Bartee v. Houston, etc., R. Co., 36 Texas &,lS.
24. Usnry.-Statutes forbidding usury bY.: persons apply to corporations
also. Thornton v. Bank of Wash., 3 Pet. (U. 8.) 36; Grand Gulf Bank v.
Archer, 8 S. & M. (Miss.) 151.
25. Voting.-The English Public Health Act (11 and 12 Viet., sec. 20)
authorized corporations aggregate to vote by proxy under their common seal
at the election of local boards of health. Grant on Corp., p. *4, n. s. Of
course, where corporations m ay be owners of the stock of other corporations,
statutes relating to voting by persons would apply to the corporations as well.

at the election of local boards of health. Grant on Corp., p. *4, n. s. Of

course, where corporations may be owners of the stock of other corporations,

statutes relating to voting by persons would apply to the corporations as well.
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See. 11. Same. (2) As to the ownership of its property.
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THE QUEEN ON THE PROSECUTION, Etc., v. ARNAUD Et Ax.1

THE QUEEN, ETC., V. ARNAUD.

§

I I

1846. In the Court of Queen's Bench. 25 Law Journal Re-

ports {New Series, Vol. 16), for the year 1847, part II,

Cases at Common Law, pp. 50—55.

Sec. 11.

The judgment of the court was delivered by—

Same.

( 2)

As to tlte owners/tip of £ts property.

Lord Denman, C. J. The object of the present mandamus is to

THE QUEEN ON THE PROSECUTION,. ETC., v. ARNAUD ET A.L.1

compel the custom-house officers to register a vessel, the property of

the Pacific Steam Navigation Company. The company is a corpo-

ration by charter of her present Majesty, for the purpose of providing

1846.

vessels, and employing them in the Pacific ocean. It is admitted by

the defendants that the company, as a British corporation, might be

owners of British-built vessels, and prima facie would be, as such

IN THE CouRT OF QuEEN's BENCH. 25 Law Journal Reports (New Series, Vol. I6), for the year 1847, part II,
Cases at Common Law, pp. 50-55.

corporation, entitled to register them, under the provisions of the

The judgment of the court was delivered byLoRD DENMAN, C. J. The object of the present mandamus is to
compel the custom-house officers to register a vessel, the property of
the Pacific Steam Navigation Company. The company is a corporation by charter of her present Majesty, for the purpose of providing
vessels, and employing them in the Pacific ocean. It is admitted by
the defen<lants that the company, as a British ~orporation, might be
owners of British-built vessels, and pr£ma facie would be, as such
corporation, entitled to register them, under the provisions of the
8 and 9 Viet., c. 89, applicable to the registry of vessels by corporations. 2
But it is. said that some of the members of the corporation are not
British subjects, but foreigners; and, consequently, that the vessel
does not wholly belong to her Majesty's subjects, as required by the
5th section of the act, and is within the prohibition contained in the
12th section of the act, against foreigners being entitled to be owners,
in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, of any vessel requiring to
be registered. Now, it appears to us that the British corporation is,
as such, the sole owner of the ship, and a British subject within the
meaning of the 5th section, as far as such a term can be applicable to
a corporation, notwithstanding some foreigners may individually have
shares in the company, and that such individual members of the corporation are not entitled, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, to
be owners of the vessel. The individual members of the corporation, no doubt, are interested £n one sense £n the property of the corporatz"on, as they may der£ve ind£v£dual benefit from £ts £ncrease, or
loss from its destruction; but £n no legal sense are the individual

8 and 9 Vict., c. 89, applicable to the registry of vessels by corpora-

tions.2

But it is said that some of the members of the corporation are not

British subjects, but foreigners; and, consequently, that the vessel

does not wholly belong to her Majesty's subjects, as required by the
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5th section of the act, and is within the prohibition contained in the

13th section of the act, against foreigners being entitled to be owners,

in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, of any vessel requiring to

be registered. Now, it appears to us that the British corporation is,

as such, the sole owner of the ship, and a British subject within the

meaning of the 5th section, as far as such a term can be applicable to

a corporation, notwithstanding some foreigners may individually have

shares in the company, and that such individual members of the cor-

poration are not entitled, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, to

be owners of the vessel. The individual members of the corpora-

tion, no doubt, are interested in one sense in the property of the cor-

poration, as they may derive individual benefit from its increase, or

loss from its destruction; but in no legal sense are the individual

1 Statement of facts, except as given in the opinion and notes, and argu-

ments omitted.

2 This act provided, section 5, * * * "That no vessel shall be registered

* * * except such as are wholly of the build of the United Kingdom,

* * * and which shall wholly belong or continue to belong to her

Majesty's subjects * * *" Sec. 12. » * * "That no person who has

taken the oath of allegiance to any foreign state, * * * nor any person

usually residing in any country not under the dominion of her Majesty

* * * shall be entitled to be the owner in whole or in part, directly or in-

directly, of any ship or vessel required to be registered, etc." Sec. 13. * * *

"That if it shall become necessary to register any vessel belonging to any

corporate body in the United Kingdom, the following declaration shall be

taken and subscribed by the secretary, etc., 'I, A. B., Secretary,' etc., 'do

1 Statement of facts, except as given in the opinion and notes, and arguments omitted.
2
This act provided, section 5, • • • "That no vessel shall be registered
• • • except such as are wholly of the build of the United Kingdom,
• • • and which shall wholly belong or continue to belong to her
Majesty's subjects • • *" Sec. 12. • • • "That no person who has
taken the oath of al legiance to any foreign state, • • • nor any person
usually residing in any country not under the dominion of her Majesty
• • • shall be entitled to be the owner in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, of any ship or vessel required to be registered, etc." Sec. 13. • • •
"That if it shall become necessary to reg-ister any vessel belonging to any
corporate body in the United Kingdom, the following declaration shall be
tnken and subscribed by tlle secretary, etc., 'I, A. B., Secretary,' etc., 'do
hereby declare.' etc., • • • 'tl1at the same (ship) doth wholly and truly
belong to [n~me of company or corpuratiun].'"

hereby declare,' etc., * * » 'that the same (ship) doth wholly and truly

belong to [name of company or corporation].'"
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THE CORPORATION AS A PERSON.

members the owners. If all the individuals of the corporation were

§I

I

THE CORPORATION AS A PERSON.

duly qualified British subjects, they could not register the vessel in

59

their individual names as owners; but must register it as belonging

wholly to the corporation as owner. The terms of the 23d section,

with respect to the condition of the bond to be given upon obtaining

the registry, as to foreigners purchasing or becoming entitled to any

part or share of or interest in any ship or vessel, would appear to be

applicable to a case of purchase or transfer of property in the vessel

itself, as it provides that the certificate shall be delivered up, "within

seven days after such purchase or transfer of property in such ship,"

and does not, as it seems to us, bear materially on the present ques-

tion. It was contended that the effect might be to defeat the object

and policy of the navigation laws in this respect, inasmuch as the in-

dividual members of the British corporation might, either originally

or by transfer, be all foreigners. Such does not appear to be contem-

plated or provided for by the act in question. If it be casus omissus,

and evil consequences arise, they may be remedied by the interfer-

ence of the legislature, or, possibly (though we do not wish to be
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understood as giving any opinion upon this point), by repealing the

letters patent, as improvidently giving powers operating to defeat the

law and public policy, and, in future patents, by providing against

the objection. But, as the case stands, it seems to us that the British

corporation is, to all intents, the legal owner of the vessel, and entitled

to the registry, and that we can not notice any disqualification of an

individual member, which might disable him, if owner, from register-

ing the vessel in his own name. There will, therefore, be judgment

for the prosecutors, and a peremptory mandamus.

Judgment for the Crown.

Note. See also, Russell v. Temple, 3 Dane's Abr. (Mass.) 108; Bundy v.

Iron Co., 38 Ohio St. 300; Button v. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 20, 50 Am. R. 131;

Baldwin v. Canfleld, 26 Minn. 43; Tomlinson v. Bricklayers'Union, 87 Ind.

308; Wbeelock v. Moulton, 15 Vt. 519; Atchison, etc., R*. Co. v. Cochran, 43

Kan. 225, 23 Pac. 151; Central T. Co. v. Kneeland, 138 U. S. 414; Louisville

Bank Co. v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 42 Am. St. 335; Humphreys v. McKissock,

members the <>wners. If all the individuals of the corporation were
duly qualified British subjects, they could not register the vessel in
their individual names as owners; but must register it as belonging
wholly to the corporation as owner. The terms of the 23d section,
with respect to the condition of the bond to be given upon obtaining
the registry, as to foreigners purchasing or becoming entitled to any
part or share of or interest in any ship or vessel, would appear to be
applicable to a case of purchase or transfer of property in the vessel
itself, as it provides that the certificate shall be delivered up, "within
seven days after such purchase or transfer of property in such ship,"
and does not, as it seems to us, bear materially on the present question. It was contended that the effect might be to defeat the object
and policy of the navigation laws in this respect, inasmuch as the individual members of the British corporation might, either originally
or by transfer, be all foreigners. Such does not appear to be contemplated or provided for by the act in question. If it be casus omt'ssus,
and evil consequences arise, they may be remedied by the interference of the legislature, or, possibly (though we do not wish to be
understood as giving any opinion upon this point), by repealing the
letters patent, as improvidently giving powers operating to defeat the
law and public policy, and, in future patents, by providing against
the objection. But, as the case stands, it seems to us that the British
corporation is, to all intents, the legal owner of the vessel, and entitled
to the registry, and that we can not notice any disqualification of an
indiv1dual member, which might disable him, if owner, from registering the vessel in his own name. There will, therefore, be judgment
for the prosecutors, and a peremptory mandamus.
Judgment for the Crown.

140 U.S. 304; Parker v. Hotel Co., 96 Tenn. 252,34 S. W. 209; Pott v. Schmucker,

84Md.535, 57 Am. St. 415; Gallagher v. Germania Brewing Co , 53 Minn. 214;

Barrick v. GiSord, 47 O. S. 180, 21 Am. St. R. 798; England v. Dearborn, 141

Mass. 590; Rough v. Breitung, 117 Mich. 48, 75 N. W. Rep. 147; Warren v.

Davenport Fire Ins. Co., 31 Iowa 464, holding a stockholder has an insurable

interest in the corporation.

Not.e. See also, Russell v. Temple, 3 Dane's Ahr. (Mass.) 108; Bundy v.
Iron Co., 38 Ohio St. 300; Button v. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 20, 50 Am. R. 131;
Baldwin v. Can.field, 26 Minn. 43; Tomlinson v. Bricklayers' Union, 87 Ind.
308; Wheelock v. Moulton, 15 Vt. 519; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Cochran, 43
Kan. 22.5, 23 Pac. 151; Central T. Co. -. . Kneeland, 138 U.S. 414; Louisville
Bank Co. v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 42 Am. St. 335; Humphreys v. McKissock,
140U.S. 304; Parker v. Hotel Co., 96 Tenn. 25Z, 34 S. W. 209; Pott v. Schmucker,
84 Md. 535, 57 Am. St. 415; Gallagher v. Germania Brewing Co., 53 Minn. 214;
Barrick v. Gifford, 47 0. S. 180, 21 Am. St. R. 798; Engiand v. Dearborn, 141
Mass. 590; Rough v. Breitung, 117 Mich. 48, 75 N. W. Rep. 147; Warren v.
Davenport Fire Ins. Co., 31 Iowa 464, holding a stockholder bas an insurable
interest in the corporation.
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Sec. 12. Same. (3) As to contracts between it and its members.

FOSTER & SONS, LIMITED, v. THE COMMISSIONERS OF INLAND

REVENUE.1

1893. In the Court of Appeals. Law Reports (1894), 1 Q. B.

Div. 516-532.

[Case stated by the commissioners of inland revenue under the

stamp act of 1891, 54 and 55 Vict., ch. 39, § 13. In 1891, eight

persons named Foster, then partners, extensively engaged' in mercan-

tile, manufacturing, mining and banking business, agreed among

themselves to form a corporation under the English Limited Compa-

nies Act, to carry on their business; they took the proper steps to form,

and did form, a corporation known as John Foster & Sons, Limited.

These same eight persons, acting as parties of the first eight parts, by

indenture duly executed, conveyed all the partnership property to the

corporation, John Foster & Sons, Limited (composed of the same

eight persons) acting as the party of the ninth part. The considera-

tion for the conveyance was nothing except the preferred, ordinary

and debenture stock in the corporation, which was apportioned to

each one of the first eight parties in proportion to his former interest
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in the partnership property. Under the English Stamp Act (requiring

all conveyances to be duly stamped) the commissioners of Inland

Revenue levied a duty of jQ'joo 10s. This act provided, Sec. 70.

"The term 'conveyance on sale' includes every instrument * * »

whereby any property upon the sale thereof is legally or equitably

transfered to or vested in the purchaser or any other person on his be-

half." * * * Sec. 71. "Where the consideration » * »

consists of stock * * * such conveyance is to be charged with

ad valorem duty in respect of the value of such stock * * *."

Sec. 78 imposed a duty on conveyances "not otherwise charged."

The question in this case was, was there any real conveyance upon

which a stamp duty was chargeable? Wright, J., of the divisional court,

held there was, but Cave, J., of the same court, held the partners had

not sold their property, but -there had been a mere rearrangement of

ownership among the same persons, the parties, property, shares and

consideration had remained the same. Wright withdrew his judg-

ment and allowed the commissioners to appeal.]

Lindley, L. J.: I confess that, with great deference to Cave,

J., I can not see the difficulty in this case.

The material sections of the act of 1870 must first be considered.

[The lord justice then read sections 70 and 71 of the stamp act of 1870, and

continued.]

The importance of section 71, to my mind, is this: It shows

that there may be a conveyance on sale, although the considera-

tion for it is not cash or money, but may include or consist of stock

or marketable securities. The definition of "stock" and "marketable

1 Statement of facts condensed. Opinions of Cave and Wright, JJ., of the

Jivisional court, and arguments omitted.
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§ 12

THE CORPORATION AS A PERSON.

61

duty on conveyances not otherwise charged, and the schedule shows what

the stamps are that are imposed upon conveyances that are charged.

First, we have "conveyance or transfer, whether on sale or other-

wise," of certain stocks and dividends. The present case does not

come within that head. Then we have "conveyance or transfer on

sale, of any property" * * * "where the amount or value of

the consideration for the sale does not exceed 5/." That fits in with

sections 70 and 71. Thenwecometo: "Conveyance or transfer by way

of security of any property or of any security;" and then we have

''conveyance or transfer of any kind not hereinbefore described."

We must accordingly consider under which of these heads the par-

ticular deed in this case comes. It certainly does not come under the

first, nor under "conveyance or transfer byway of security of any

property," and the alternative is between "conveyance or transfer on

sale" and "conveyance or transfer of any kind not hereinbefore de-

scribed."

Now, the document in this case is an indenture made between eight
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gentlemen of the first eight parts and "John Foster & Sons, Limited

(hereinafter called 'the company'), of the ninth part." Pausing there

for a moment, although the persons of the first eight parts may be

and were members, and the only members, of John Foster & Co.,

Limited, John Foster & Co., Limited, is not those eight individuals;

John Foster & Co., Limited, is a corporation. We have accordingly

tco parties, one party consisting of several individuals, and the

other party consisting of a corporation. Whether they are or are

not the members, or the only members of the corporation, is wholly

immaterial. The corporation is a totally different person from them

in any capacity you choose to assign to them, except a corporate one.

[The lord justice then stated the recitals in the operative part of the con-

veyances, and continued]:

Then the parties of the first eight parts put their seals to the instru-

ment, and the company puts it seal to it. Now, what is that instru-

ment? It is certainly a conveyance of property—that is obvious. In

order to amount to a conveyance of property there must be a person

conveying and a person taking, and you have them both here. The

persons conveying are the persons named in the first eight parts,

securities" will be found in section 2. Then section 78 imposes a stamp
duty on conveyances not otherwise charged, and the schedule shows what
the stamps are that are imposed upon conveyances that are charged.
First, we have ''conveyance or transfer, whether on sale or otherwise," of certain stocks and dividends. The present case does not
come within that head. Then we have "conveyance or transfer on
sale, of any property" • • • "where the amount or value of
the consideration for the sale does not exceed 51." That fits in with
sections 70 and 71. Then we come to: ''Conveyanceor transfer by way
of security of any property or of any security;" and then we have
"conveyance or transfer of any kind not. herein before described."
We must accordingly consider under which of these heads the particular deed in this case comes. It certainly does not come under the
fir t, nor under ''conveyance or transfer by way of security of any
property," and the alternative is between "conveyance or transfer on
sale" and "conveyance or transfer of any kind not hereinbefore described.''
Now, the document in this case is an indenture made between eight
gentlemen of the first eight parts and "John Foster & Sons, Limited
(hereinafter called 'the company'), of the ninth part." Pausing there
for a moment, although the persons of the first eight parts may be
and were members, and the only members, of John Foster & Co.,
Limited, John Foster & Co., Limited, is not those eight individuals;
John Foster & Co., Limited, is a corporation. We have accordingly
two parti'es, one party consistt"ng of several individuals, and the
other party consi'sting of a corporation. Whether they are or qre
not the members, or the only members of th e corporatt'on, is wholly
immaterial. The corporation is a totally different person from them
i11 any capacity yo1' choose to assi'gn to them, except a corporate one.
[The lord justice then stated the recitals in the operative part of the conveyances, and continued]:

and the persons taking are the corporation named in the ninth part.

Now, what is the consideration? The consideration for the trans-

fer for this property is, I agree, not money, but it is stocks and secu-

rities, which for this purpose are to be regarded as equivalent to

money by reason of section 71 of the act to which I have already alluded.

Then what have we got? To sum it up shortly, it is a conveyance of

property from one person to another for money, or what is, according

to the provisions of the statute, equivalent to money. What is that

except a conveyance on sale? What else can you call it? It is cer-

tainly not a gift; it is not an exchange; it is not a partition; it is not

a mortgage. I do not know what it is unless it is a conveyance on

Then the parties of the first eight parts put their seals to the instrument, and the company puts it seal to it. Now, what is that instrument? It is certainly a conveyance of property-that is obvious. In
order to amount to a conveyance of property there must be a person
conveying and a person taking, and you have them both here. The
persons conveying are the persons named in the first eight parts,
and the persons taking are the corporation named in the ninth part.
Now, what is the consideration? The consideration for the transfer for this property is, I agree, not money, but it is stocks and securities, which for this purpose are to 'b e regarded as equivalent to
money by reason of section 71 of the act to which I have already alluded.
Then what have we got? To sum it up shortly, it is a conveyance of
property from one person to another for money, or what is, according
to the provisions of the statute, equivalent to money. What is that
except a conveyance on sale? What else can you call it? It is certainly not a gift; it is not an exchange ; it is not a partition ; it is not
a mortgage. I do not know what it is unless it is a conveyance on
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purposes of the stamp act, for stock or marketable securities.

sale. I do not know what is necessary to constitute a sale, except a
transfer of property from one person to another for money, or for the
purposes of the stamp act, for stock or marketable securities.
But then it is argued that it is only a redistribution of property. I
do not consider it a redistribution at all. It is an entire transfer 'of
property from one set of people to another person altogether, and
whether there are, as there may well be hereafter, additional persons
taking shares in this company, is perfectly immaterial.
Again it is argued on behalf of the appellants that this instrument
is in substance nothing more than a conveyance to a trustee to carry
-on the business in trust for the grantor. Just try that. Supposing there is a conveyance by half a dozen people, transferring their
property to a trustee on trust to carry on the business for them, can
you in any sense of the word, legal or business-like, or otherwise, call
that trustee a buyer? There is no buying; there is no sale to him at
all, nor is there any money, or stock, or securities, or anything else
parted with by him. Then it was urged that these shares can derive
no value unless the company gets this property transferred to them.
That is possible enough. That is to say, in other words, that the
shares in the company would be valueless unless the company had
assets. Of course they would be, but that does not affect the question whether there is a sale or a conveyance or not. I think myself
that Cave, J., has attached too little importance to the fact that you
have here a distinct seller and a distinct buyer, and that in point of
law it is immaterial that in the present case the buyer is a corporation_, which consists of the eight persons who formed and who are the
partners. The appeal must be allowed.
KAY, L. J. I am of the same opinion. With deference to Cave,
J., it seems to me impossible to hold that this transaction was anything else than a conveyance on sale. As pointed out on the face of
the statute, the consideration may be money or money's worth.
1'-foney's worth certainly is sufficiently expressed by a number of shares
and debentures of an existing corporation, which, in effect, constituted the consideration for the particular transfer in this case. Now,
that there was a conveyance is beyond all question. The persons who
are named as vendors in the deed have divested themselves of their
property in the subject of that conveyance, and all that property is
vested in an entirely independent and separate body; namely, a corporation. Suppose that corporation had consisted of altogether different persons, no one for a moment would doubt that this was a conveyance on sale. Suppose there had been one person in it different,
there is nothing that I have heard in the argument which induces me
to suppose that even in that case it could have been doubted that this
was a conveyance on sale. But the argument, as I understand it, is
this: that the individual corpora tors who composed that corporation
were, in fact, the very identical persons who were conveying this
property to the corporation, and the corporation had no other property
except this which it took under its conveyance; and that, as the only
value of the shares and debentures was derived from this very property

But then it is argued that it is only a redistribution of property. I

do not consider it a redistribution at all. It is an entire transfer of

property from one set of people to another person altogether, and

whether there are, as there may well be hereafter, additional persons

taking shares in this company, is perfectly immaterial.

Again it is argued on behalf of the appellants that this instrument

is in substance nothing more than a conveyance to a trustee to carry

on the business in trust for the grantor. Just try that. Suppos-

ing there is a conveyance by half a dozen people, transferring their

property to a trustee on trust to carry on the business for them, can

you in any sense of the word, legal or business-like, or otherwise, call

that trustee a buyer? There is no buying; there is no sale to him at

all, nor is there any money, or stock, or securities, or anything else

parted with by him. Then it was urged that these shares can derive

no value unless the company gets this property transferred to them.

That is possible enough. That is to say, in other words, that the
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shares in the company would be valueless unless the company had

assets. Of course they would be, but that does not affect the ques-

tion whether there is a sale or a conveyance or not. I think myself

that Cave, J., has attached too little importance to the fact that you

have here a distinct seller and a distinct buyer, and that in point of

law it is immaterial that in the present case the buyer is a corpora-

tion, which consists of the eight persons who formed and who are the

partners. The appeal must be allowed.

Kay, L. J. I am of the same opinion. With deference to Cave,

J., it seems to me impossible to hold that this transaction was any-

thing else than a conveyance on sale. As pointed out on the face of

the statute, the consideration may be money or money's worth.

Money's worth certainly is sufficiently expressed by a number of shares

and debentures of an existing corporation, which, in effect, consti-

tuted the consideration for the particular transfer in this case. Now,

that there was a conveyance is beyond all question. The persons who

are named as vendors in the deed have divested themselves of their

property in the subject of that conveyance, and all that property is

vested in an entirely independent and separate body: namely, a cor-

poration. Suppose that corporation had consisted of altogether dif-

ferent persons, no one for a moment would doubt that this was a con-

veyance on sale. Suppose there had been one person in it different,

there is nothing that I have heard in the argument which induces me

to suppose that even in that case it could have been doubted that this

was a conveyance on sale. But the argument, as I understand it, is

this: that the individual corporators who composed that corporation

were, in fact, the very identical persons who were conveying this

property to the corporation, and the corporation had no other property

except this which it took under its conveyance; and that, as the only

value of the shares and debentures was derived from this very property
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the conveying partners either got no consideration for that which they
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conveyed other than part of the property actually conveyed, or they

got no consideration at all. Now, I do not follow that argument in

the least. I think it is a fallacy from beginning to end. In the first

place, a corporation is a different thing from the individuals who

compose it; and, secondly, the shares and debentures of a corpora-

tion are not the same thing as the property which that corporation

owns.

You may say, in one sense, that the property is a security for the

value of those shares. The value of those shares in the market,

which, observe, are immediately transferable, may depend upon the

solvency of the company, the amount of property it possesses, and its

chance of carrying on a profitable business. To say that the shares

and debentures are part of that property seems to me to be a com-

plete confusion of terms. Suppose the case, which I put during the

argument of a sale of real estate, and the whole of the purchase-

money not to be paid at once in cash, but to be secured on mortgage

on that real estate; and, if you like, in order to make the analogy
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perfect, suppose the purchaser had no other property than that prop-

erty, would the transaction be the less a sale for that reason? Still the

consideration given would be a certain amount of cash which would

be left on the security of the estate; but I have never yet heard that

because the whole of the purchase-money upon a sale of real estate

was left on mortgage of the real estate that for that reason the trans-

action ceased to be, or was prevented from being, a sale. Yet, really,

that is what the argument in this case comes to. I confess I am not

able to agree with it. Nothing else was suggested which should pre-

vent this transaction from being a sale, and it seems to me clearly to

be. under the words of this statute, "a conveyance on sale" for a con-

sideration which, if not money, at least is money's worth. I, there-

fore, with all deference to Cave, J., think that his decision must be

reversed and the appeal allowed.

A. L. Smith, L. J. The question in this case is whether the in-

strument of November 27, 1891, is a conveyance or transfer on sale

of any of the property mentioned under the second head—"convey-

ance or transfer"—in the schedule to the stamp act of 1870.

Now, in order to find out what is, or is not, a conveyance or trans-

fer on sale of any property in that second head of the schedule, I

must refer to sections 70 and 71 of the act. And, reading both these sec-

tions together, it seems to me that the term "conveyance on sale" in-

cludes every instrument whereby any property, upon the sale thereof,

is transferred to or vested in the purchaser in consideration of any

stock or marketable security. That is the definition.

First of all, then, is this an instrument whereby any property is

transferred to or vested in the purchaser? I beg to say yes. It is an

instrument upon the face of which the actual land of the vendors,

and the trade-marks which are their property, are transferred to a

limited company. I do not think that this is disputed, and it does not

which the individual corporators were conveying to the corporation,
the conveying partners either got no consideration for that which they
conveyed other than part of the property actually conveyed; or they
got no consideration at all. Now, I do not follow that argument in
the least. I think it is a fallacy from beginning to end. In the first'
place, a corporation is a different thing from the indivi'duals who
compose it; and, secondly, the shares and debentures of a corporaiirm are not the same thi"ng as the property which that corporation
owns.
You may say, in one sense, that the property is a security for the
value of those shares. The value of those shares in the market,
which, observe, are immediately transferable, may depend upon the
solvency of the company, the amount of property it possesses, and its
chance of carrying on a profitable business. To say that the shares
and debentures are part of that property seems to me to be a complete confusion of terms. Suppose the case, which I put during the
argument of a sale of real estate, and the whole of the purchasemoney not to be paid at once in cash, but to be secured on mortgage
on that real estate; and, if you like, in order to make the analogy
perfect, suppose the purchaser had no other property than that property, would the transaction be the less a sale for that reason? Still the
consideration given would be a certain amount of cash which would
be left on the security of the estate; but I have never yet heard that
because the whole of the purchase-money upon a sale of real estate
was left on mortgage of the real estate that for that reason the transaction ceased to be, or was prevented from being, a sale. Yet, really,
that is what the argument in this case comes to. I confess I am not
able to agree with it. Nothing else was suggested which should prevent this transaction from being a sale, and it seems to me clearly to
be, under the words of this statute, ''a conveyance on sale" for a consideration which, if not money, at least is money's worth. I, therefore, with all deference to Cave, J., think that his decision must be
reversed and the appeal allowed.
A. L. SMITH, L. J. The question in this case is whether the instrument of November 27, 1891, is a conveyance or transfer on sale
of any of the property mentioned under the second head-"conveyance or transfer"-in the schedule to the stamp act of 1870.
Now, in order to find out what is, or is not, a conveyance or transfer on sale of any property in that second head of the schedule, I
must refer to sections 70 and 71 of the act. And , reading both these sections together, it seems to me that the term "conveyance on sale" includes every instrument whereby any property, upon the sale thereof,
is transferred to or vested in the purchaser in consideration of any
stock or marketable security. That is the definition.
First of all, then, is this an instrument whereby any property is
transferred to or vested in the purchaser? I beg to say yes. It is an
instrument upon the face of which the actual land of the vendors,
and the trade-marks which are their property, are transferred to a
limited company. I do not think that this is disputed, and it does not

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

64

FOSTER & SONS V. THE COMMISSIONERS.

appear to me to be disputed so far, in the judgment of my brother

FUSTER & SONS V. THE COMMISSIONERS.

Cave: but what he says is that this is not an instrument whereby any

§
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property, upon the sale thereof, is transferred. The real pith of his

appear to me to be disputed so far, in the judgment of my brother
Cave: but what he says is that this is not an instrument whereby any
property, upon the sale thereof, is transferred. The real pith of his
judgment is that the vendors and vendees are the same persons--that
the agreement as regards the sale was carried out by the members of
the old firm before any·company limited came into existence, and that
inasmuch as they are the same persons now as then, there is no sale at
all; and, therefore, there is no instrument whereby any property upon
the sale thereof is transferred. I must here respectfully differ with
m y brother Cave. It seems to m e that the company limited are not
the same persons as the eight members of the old jinn-they are diff erent altogether. It was admitted by Mr. Finlay in argument,
though he entirely took away the ground from under my brother
Cave's feet when he said so, that the company lt'm£ted could ma£nta£n a sut't for specific performance agat'nst the old partners. If
that is so, how can they be the same persons. This really shows that
they are not the same persons. It is here that I disagree with my
brother Cave.
The respondents also contend that there was no consideration. We
must read the two sections together. Section 70 enacts that: "The
term •conveyance on sale' includes every instrument whereby any
property, upon the sale thereof, is transferred to or vested in the purchaser." Then section 71 implies that it may be in consideration of any
stock or marketable security. The land and the trade-marks are
transferred by this instrument from the eight partners who were the
old firm to the new company limited. The land and trade-marks
are transferred by this instrument in consideration of what? In consideration of stock or marketable securities, which undoubtedlv are
not the same things as the land and trade-marks themselves, though
they may be charges upon the land and trade-marks which are conveyed. It seems to me that it is untrue to say that in this transaction
there has been no consideration passing from the vendee to the vendor.
Although charges upon the land and the trade-marks, the consideration comes within the very terms of section 71 itself-"any stock or
marketable security."
For these reasons I prefer the judgment of my brother Wright to
that of my brother Cave.
Appeal allowed.

judgment is that the vendors and vendees are the same persons—that

the agreement as regards the sale was carried out by the members of

the old firm before anycompany limited came into existence, and that

inasmuch as they are the same persons now as then, there is no sale at

all; and, therefore, there is no instrument whereby any property upon

the sale thereof is transferred. I must here respectfully differ with

my brother Cave. It seems to me that the company limited are not

the same persons as the eight members of the old Jirm—they are dif-

ferent altogether. It was admitted by Mr. Finlay in argument,

though he entirely took away the ground from under my brother

Cave's feet when he said so, that the company limited could main-

tain a suit for specific performance against the old partners. If

that is so, how can they be the same persons. This really shows that

they are not the same persons. It is here that I disagree with my

brother Cave.

The respondents also contend that there was no consideration. We
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must read the two sections together. Section 70 enacts that: "The

term 'conveyance on sale' includes every instrument whereby any

property, upon the sale thereof, is transferred to or vested in the pur-

chaser." Then section 71 implies that it may be in consideration of any

stock or marketable security. The land and the trade-marks are

transferred by this instrument from the eight partners who were the

old firm to the new company limited. The land and trade-marks

are transferred by this instrument in consideration of what? In con-

sideration of stock or marketable securities, which undoubtedly are

not the same things as the land and trade-marks themselves, though

they may be charges upon the land and trade-marks which are con-

veyed. It seems to me that it is untrue to say that in this transaction

there has been no consideration passing from the vendee to the vendor.

Although charges upon the land and the trade-marks, the considera-

tion comes within the very terms of section 71 itself—"any stock or

marketable security."

For these reasons I prefer the judgment of my brother Wright to

that of my brother Cave.

Appeal allowed.

Note. See also Gordon v. Preston, 1 Watts (Pa.) 385; Polleys v. Insurance

Co., 14 Maine 141; Pope v. Brandon, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 401; Lexington Life, F. &

M. Ins. Co. v. Page, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 412; Moore & Handler Hardware Co.

v. Towers, 87 Ala. 206, 13 Am. St. 23; Davis v. Creamery Co., 48 Neb. 471,

67 N. W. 436; 1900, Andres v. Morgan, 62 O. 8. 236, 78 Am. St. R. 712.

Note. See also Gordon v. Preston, 1 Watts (Pa.) 385; Polleys v. Insurance
Co., 14Maine141; Pope v. Brandon, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 401; Lexington Life, F. &
M. Ins. Co. v. Page, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 412; ~foore & Handley Hardware Co.
v. Towers, 87 Ala. 206, 13 Am. St. 23; Davis v. Creamery Co., 48 Neb. 471,
67 N. W. 436; 1900, Andres v. Morgan, 62 0. 8. 236, 78 Am. St. R. 712.

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

THE CORPORATION AS A PERSON.

65

Sec 13. Same. (4) Or to contracts between the members them-

THE CORPORATION AS A PERSON.

selves.

MORRIS SELLERS v. HOWARD GREER.1 *

1898. In the Supreme Court of Illinois. 172 11110018549-558.

Appeal from the appellate court for the first district, heard in that

Sec. 13. Same. ( 4) Or to contracts between the members them-

court on appeal from the superior court of Cook county, the Hon.

Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding.

selves.

This was a bill for specific performance, brought by Howard Greer

MORRIS SELLERS v. HOW ARD GREER. 1

against Morris Sellers, in the superior court of Cook county. The

cause proceeded to a hearing on the pleadings and evidence, and the

court entered a decree dismissing the bill. To reverse the decree,

1898.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT

OF ILLINOIS.

172

Illinois 549-558.

Greer appealed to the appellate court, where the decree was reversed

and the cause remanded for the purpose of allowing Greer to recover

such damages as he may have sustained on account of the failure of

Sellers to perform the contract. To reverse the judgment of the ap-

pellate court, Sellers appealed to this court.

Upon looking into the record it appears that Morris Sellers and

Howard Greer had been associated together in the business of manu-

facturing railroad supplies for several years prior to 1891. In June,
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1S91, they formed a corporation under the laws of this state, and

adopted the name of Morris Sellers & Co., incorporated. The capi-

tal stock of the corporation was fixed at $100,000, each share being

of the par value of $100, and 499 shares were subscribed for and

owned by Morris Sellers and Howard Greer, respectively, each own-

ing that number of shares from the formation of the corporation to

the time of filing the bill. The remaining two shares were owned by

John M. Sellers and Paul E. Greer, who were sons of said principal

stockholders, each owning one share. No money was paid by any of

the stockholders for their stock. The 500 shares belonging to Sellers

and his son were paid for by turning over the plant and their interest

in certain patents to the corporation; and the 500 shares issued to the

Greers were paid for by turning over their interest in certain patents

controlled by them. .All four of the above named parties were stock-

holders and directors. Morris Sellers acted as president and treas-

urer and had charge of the office and financial department of the con-

cern. Howard Greer was secretary and manager or superintendent,

and had charge of the factory and manufacturing department of the

business.

After the organization of the corporation it did a fair business, and

its management and success seemed to have been satisfactory to the

'Part of the opinion relating to specific performance of the contract is

omitted.

5—Wil. Casks.

Appeal from the appellate court for the first district, heard in that
court on appeal from the superior court of Cook county, the Hon.
Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding.
·
This was a bill for specific performance, brought by Howard Greer
against Morris Sellers, in the superior court of Cook county. The
cause procet!ded to a hearing on the pleadings and evidence, and the
court entered a decree dismissing the bill. To reverse the decree,
Greer appealed to the appellate court, where the decree was reversed
and the cause remanded for the purpose of allowing Greer to recover
such damages as he may have sustained on account of the failure of
Sellers to perform the contract. To reverse the judgment of the appellate court, Sellers appealed to this court.
Upon looking into the record it appears that Morris Sellers and
Howard Greer had been associated together in the business of manufacturing railroad supplies for several years prior to 1891. In June,
1891 , they formed a corporation under the laws of this state, and
adopted the name of Morris Sellers & Co., incorporated. The capital stock of the corporation was fixed at $100,000, each share being
of the par value of $100, and 499 shares were subscribed for and
owned by Morris Sellers and Howard Greer, respectively, each owning that number of shares from the formation of the corporation to
the time of filing the bill. The remaining two shares were owned by
John M. Sellers and Paul E. Greer, who were sons of said principal
stockholders, each owning one share. No money was paid by any of
the stockholders for their stock. The 500 shares belonging to Sellers
and bis son were paid for by turning over the plant and their interest
in certain patents to the corporation ; and the 500 shares issued to the
Greers were paid for by turning over their interest in certain patents
controlled by them. ,.All four of the above named parties were stockholders and directors. Morris Sellers acted as president and treasurer and had charge of the office and financial department of the
cern. Howard Greer was secretary and manager or superintendent,
and had charge of the factory and manufacturing department of the
business.
After the organization of the corporation it did a fair business, and
i~ management and success seemed to have been satisfactory to the

con-

1
Part of the opinion relating to specific performance of the contract is
omitted.

6-W1L. CABBB.
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parties interested until the latter part of 1894, when trouble arose be-

tween the two principal stockholders in regard to the management of
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the business. Greer made an offer to purchase the Sellers interest,
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but the offer was not accepted. Negotiations continued, however,

parties interested until the latter part of 1894, when trouble arose between the two principal stockholders in regard to the management of
the business. Greer made an offer to purchase the Sellers interest,
but the offer was not accepted. Negotiations continued, however,
between
parties until September 4 1 1894, when Morris Sellers
made a written proposition to buy out Greer. The proposition was
written and executed by Morris Sellers and by him delivered to Greer.
It was as follows: ·
" Outline of proposition between Howard Greer and Morris Sellers:
Greer to take aH of the Greer patents and all of the special machinery
attached to punching machines; all other appliances belonging to the
making of spikes, he surrendering all of his stock in M. S. & Co.,
and to furnish M. S. & Co. a complete set of templates for splices;
M. S. & Co. to loan ma~hine No. 4 for six mo. and pay Howard
Greer $ r ,800 toward a new machine for cutting spikes ; Howard Greer
to fill all of the present orders so far as the material now on hand will
complete. This agreement to be put in proper form at as early a date
as possible, pending the return of the company's attorney to draw up
the necessary releases.
MORRIS SELLERS.
"Tuesday, September 4, I894."
The bill alleged and the evidence tended to prove that the Greer
mentioned in the proposition was appellee, and the letters 11 M. S. &
Co.'' meant and referred to the corporation known as Morris Sellers & Co.
Mr. JusTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the court.
The two following grounds are relied upon by counsel for appellant in the argument to reverse the judgment of the appellate court:
"We claim, firstly, that the proposition is not a contract binding upon
appellee or upon appellant; that it lacks mutuality; that the subjectmatter was the property of a corporation, and not of either of the parties named in the proposition; that appellee is in nowise bound, and so
acted as not to legally bind himself in terms to said proposition; that
it was made under such circumstances that it was not, and was not
intended to be, a complete or binding contract or agreement upon
either appellant or appellee; hence, its specific enforcement was not
only impossible, but if attempted by way of assessment of damages upon appellant, as the appellate court seeks to do, would contravene equitable principles. Secondly, that if all these points are
negatived, appellee has yet barred himself of all relief in equity by
his own inequitable conduct."
It will be observed that appellee did not sign the contract, and
hence it is contended that the contract is not mutual. It appears,
however, that the contract was delivered by Morris Sellers, appellant,
to appellee, on the day it was executed, and appellee accepted the
contract and agreed to its terms and conditions. The acceptance of
the contract by appellee assenting to its terms , holding it and acting
upon it as a valid instrument, may be regarded as equivalent to its
formal execution on his part, as held by this court in Johnson v.
Dodge, 17 Ill. 433, and Vogel v. Pekoe, 157 Ill. 339.

between tne parties until September 4, 1894, when Morris Sellers

made a written proposition to buy out Greer. The proposition was

written and executed by Morris Sellers and by him delivered to Greer.

It was as follows: ■

me

"Outline of proposition between Howard Greer and Morris Sellers:

Greer to take all of the Greer patents and all of the special machinery

attached to punching machines; all other appliances belonging to the

making of spikes, he surrendering all of his stock in M. S. & Co.,

and to furnish M. S. & Co. a complete set of templates for splices;

M. S. & Co. to loan machine No. 4 for six mo. and pay Howard

Greer $1,800 toward a new machine for cutting spikes; Howard Greer

to fill all of the present orders so far as the material now on hand will

complete. This agreement to be put in proper form at as early a date

as possible, pending the return of the company's attorney to draw up

the necessary releases. Morris Sellers.

"Tuesday, September 4, 18Q4."
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The bill alleged and the evidence tended to prove that the Greer

mentioned in the proposition was appellee, and the letters "M. S. &

Co." meant and referred to the corporation known as Morris Sel-

lers & Co.

Mr. Justice Craig delivered the opinion of the court.

The two following grounds are relied upon by counsel for appel-

lant in the argument to reverse the judgment of the appellate court:

"We claim, firstly, that the proposition is not a contract binding upon

appellee or upon appellant; that it lacks mutuality; that the subject-

matter was the property of a corporation, and not of either of the par-

ties named in the proposition; that appellee is in nowise bound, and so

acted as not to legally bind himself in terms to said proposition; that

it was made under such circumstances that it was not, and was not

intended to be, a complete or binding contract or agreement upon

either appellant or appellee; hence, its specific enforcement was not

only impossible, but if attempted by way of assessment of dam-

ages upon appellant, as the appellate court seeks to do, would con-

travene equitable principles. Secondly, that if all these points are

negatived, appellee has yet barred himself of all relief in equity by

his own inequitable conduct."

It will be observed that appellee did not sign the contract, and

hence it is contended that the contract is not mutual. It appears,

however, that the contract was delivered by Morris Sellers, appellant,

to appellee, on the day it was executed, and appellee accepted the

contract and agreed to its terms and conditions. The acceptance of

the contract by appellee assenting to its terms, holding it and acting

upon it as a valid instrument, may be regarded as equivalent to its

formal execution on his part, as held by this court in Johnson v.

Dodge, 17 111. 433, and Vogel v. Pekoe, 157 111. 339.
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But it is said the subject-matter of the contract was the property of
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a corporation, and not of either of the parties named therein, and as

the corporation never executed or ratified the contract it can not be

enforced in a court of equity. Of the 1,000 shares of capital stock

of the corporation Greer and Sellers owned equally the entire amount

except two shares, which were held in the names of the respective

sons of the two parties. These sons never paid anything for the stock

placed in their names, and were mere nominal shareholders, and the

only inference to be drawn from all the evidence is, that the two

shares were placed in their names in order that the concern might

have a sufficient number of stockholders to make up a board of di-

rectors. In the management of the affairs of the concern, whatever

was done by Greer was assented to by his son, and whatever action

was taken by Sellers was approved by his son. As between appellant

and appellee they may be regarded as owners of the property named

in the contract, and any contract which they may have made in re-

gard to the property may, as between them, be enforced in a court of

equity.

But it is said the proposition was not intended to be a complete and
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binding contract. There is nothing appearing on the face of the con-

tract, nor is there anything in the evidence introduced on the hearing,

which will sustain that position. The contract is definite and specific

in regard to what was to be done by each of the parties. By the con-

tract Greer was to do three things: First, he was to surrender all of

his stock in the Morris Sellers & Co. establishment; second, he was

to furnish a complete set of templates for splices; third, he was to fill

all of the present orders, so far as the material then on hand would

permit. From the terms of the contract there could be no uncertainty

or doubt in regard to what Greer was required to do in order to com-

ply with the contract. As to Sellers, he was required by the contract

to deliver over to Greer all of the Greer patents, and what was meant

by Greer patents was well understand by both parties.

It is true that Morris Sellers and Howard Greer owned all of the

stock of the corporation, except two shares, which belonged to their

sons. But did this fact confer upon them, or either of them, the

power to sell the corporate property? It is conceded that the patents

and all the other property named in the contract in question belonged

to the corporation Morris Sellers & Co., and the question presented

is whether Morris Sellers and Howard Greer, two of the stockhold-

ers, without the consent or authority of the corporation Morris Sellers

& Co., had the right to divide the corporate property between them-

selves, or to sell it, as was attempted to be done by the contract in

question. A corporation is an artificial being created by law. clothed

with certain powers. It acts through its board of directors and

officers. Its property is not subject to the control or disposition of

its members or stockholders. They have no power to sell or encum-

ber the corporate property. A reference to a few authorities will

fully sustain what has been said.

In Cook on Stockholders (3d ed., § 709), it is said: "The

But it is said the subject-matter of the contract was the property of
a corporation, and not of either of the parties named therein, and as
the corporation never executed or ratified the contract it can not be
enforced in a court of equity. Of the 1 ,000 shares of capital stock
of the corporation Greer and Sellers owned equally the entire amount
except two shares, which were held in the names of the respectiYe
sons of the two parties. These sons never paid anything for the stock
placed in their names, and were mere nominal shareholders, and the
only inference to be drawn from all the evidence is, that the two
shares were placed in their names in order that the concern might
have a sufficient number of stockholders to make up a board of directors. In the management of the affairs of the concern, whatever
was done by Greer was assented to by his son, and whatever action
was taken by Sellers was approved by his son. As between appellant
and appellee they may be regarded as owners of the property named
in the contract, and any contract which they may have made in regard to the property may, as between them, be enforced in a court of
equity.
But it is said the proposition was not intended to be a complete and
binding contract. There is nothing appearin g on the face of the contract, n or is there anything in the evidence introduced on the hearing,
which will sustain that position. The contract is definite and specific
in regard to what was to be done by each of the parties. By the contract Greer was to do three things: First, he was to surrender all of
his tock in the Morris Sellers & Co. establishment; second, he was
to furnish a complete set of templates for splices; third , he was to fill
all of the present orders, so far as the material then on hand would
permit. From the terms of the contract there could be no uncertainty
or doubt in regard to what Greer was required to do in order to comply with the contract. As to Sellers, he was required by the contract
to deliver over to Greer all of the Greer patents, and what was meant
by Greer patents was well understand by both parties.
It is true that Morris Sellers and Howard Greer owned all of the
~tock of the corporation, except two shares, which belonged to their
sons. But did this fact confer upon them, or either of them, the
power to sell the corporate property? It is conceded that the patents
and all the other property named in the contract in question belonged
to the corporation Morris Sellers & Co., and the question presented
is whether Morris Sellers and Howard Greer, two of the stockholders. without the consent or authority of the corporation Morris Sellers
& Co., had the right to divide the corporate property between themselves, or to sell it, as was attempted to be done by the contract in
question. A corporat£on is an artificial being created by law, clothed
with cerlai'n powers. It acts through i'ts board of dt'reclors a11d
officers. Its property i's not subject to the control or disposition of
its members or stockholders. They have no power to sell or encumber the corporate property. A reference to a few authorities will
fully sustain what has been said .
. In Cook on Stockholders (3d ed., § 709), it is said: "The
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stockholders can not enter into contracts with third persons. Con-
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tracts between the corporation and third persons must be entered into
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by the directors and not by the stockholders. The corporation, in

stockholders can not enter into contracts with third persons. Contracts between the corporation and third persons must be entered int<>
by the directors and not by the stockholders. The corporation, in
such matters, is represented by the former and not by the latter. Such
is one of the main objects of corporate existence. To the directors
is given the management and formation of corporate contracts. The
stockholders can not, in meeting assembled, bind the corporation by
their contracts in its behalf. Although one person owns a majority of
the stock, or all of it, or all but two shares, he does not, in consequence thereof, acquire the right to act for the corporation, or as the
corporation, independently of the directors. One person may own
all the stock, and yet the existence, relations and business methods of
the corporation continue. A single stockholder can not make a contract for and in the name of the corporation which shall have any
binding force or validity, except by subsequent ratification or adoption
in the regular manner."
In Allemong v. Simmons, 124 Ind. 199, it was attempted to hold
a corporation liable on a contract made by one <:;:rawford, who was a
director and owner of five-sixths of the stock of the corporation. In
disposing of the question the court said: "It is true, Crawford was
one of the directors of the company and held a majority of the stock;
but the existence of these facts confers upon him no power to make
contract for the corporation. It could only be bound by the action of
its board of directors. The board could have conferred upon Crawford this power, but there is no evidence that it had done so. Crawford, as one of the directors, had no more authority or power than
any other director. The board consisted of five members, and three
constituted a quorum. Less than three could make no binding contract for the corporation. • • • The contract which Simmons
and Aleshire executed with Crawford was the mere personal engagement of Crawford with the said parties."
In Humphrey v. McKissock, 140 U. S. 304, the validity of the
action of all the stockholders of a corporation in transferring its property without corporate action arose, and in disposing of the case the
court said: "Both the commissioner and the court in confirming
his report and entering the decree mentioned, seem ·to have confounded the ownership of stock in a corporation with ownership of
its property. But nothing is more distinct than the two rights. The
ownership of one confers no ownership of the other. The property
of a corporatt'on is not subject to the control of individual members,
whether acting separately or jointly They can net'ther encumber or
transfer that property, nor authorize others to do so. The corporation-the artificial being created-holds the property, and alone can
mortgage or transfer t't; and the corporation acts only through ·i ts
officers subject to the conditt'ons prescribed by law.
In Smith v. Hurd, 12 Mete. 385, the relations of stockholders to
the rights and property of a banking corporation are stated with his
usual clearness and precision by Chief Justice Shaw, speaking for
the supreme court of Massachusetts, and the same doctrine applies to.

such matters, is represented by the former and not by the latter. Such

is one of the main objects of corporate existence. To the directors

is given the management and formation of corporate contracts. The

stockholders can not, in meeting assembled, bind the corporation by

their contracts in its behalf. Although one person owns a majority of

the stock, or all of it, or all but two shares, he does not, in conse-

quence thereof, acquire the right to act for the corporation, or as the

corporation, independently of the directors. One person may own

all the stock, and yet the existence, relations and business methods of

the corporation continue. A single stockholder can not make a con-

tract for and in the name of the corporation which shall have any

binding force or validity, except by subsequent ratification or adoption

in the regular manner."

In Allemong v. Simmons, 124 Ind. 199, it was attempted to hold

a corporation liable on a contract made by one Crawford, who was a

director and owner of five-sixths of the stock of the corporation. In
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disposing of the question the court said: "It is true, Crawford was

one of the directors of the company and held a majority of the stock;

but the existence of these facts confers upon him no power to make

contract for the corporation. It could only be bound by the action of

its board of directors. The board could have conferred upon Craw-

ford this power, but there is no evidence that it had done so. Craw-

ford, as one of the directors, had no more authority or power than

any other director. The board consisted of five members, and three

constituted a quorum. Less than three could make no binding con-

tract for the corporation. * * * The contract which Simmons

and Aleshire executed with Crawford was the mere personal engage-

ment of Crawford with the said parties."

In Humphrey v. McKissock, 140 U. S. 304, the validity of the

action of all the stockholders of a corporation in transferring its prop-

erty without corporate action arose, and in disposing of the case the

court said: "Both the commissioner and the court in confirming

his report and entering the decree mentioned, seem to have con-

founded the ownership of stock in a corporation with ownership of

its property. But nothing is more distinct than the two rights. The

ownership of one confers no ownership of the other. The property

of a corporation is not subject to the control of individual members,

whether acting separately or jointly They can neither encumber or

transfer that property, nor authorize others to do so. The corpora-

tion—the artificial being created—holds the property, and alone can

mortgage or transfer it; and the corporation acts only through its

officers subject to the conditions prescribed by law.

In Smith v. Hurd, 12 Mete. 385, the relations of stockholders to

the rights and property of a banking corporation are stated with his

usual clearness and precision by Chief Justice Shaw, speaking for

the supreme court of Massachusetts, and the same doctrine applies to.
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the relations of stockholders in all business corporations. Said the

chief justice; 'The individual members of a corporation, whether

they shall all join or each act severally, have no right or power to inter-

meddle with the property or concerns of the bank, or call any officer,

aijent or servant to account or discharge them from any liability.

Should all of the stockholders join in a power of attorney to any one,

he could not take possession of any real or personal estate, any se-

curity or chose of action, could not collect any debt, or discharge a

claim, or release damage arising from any default, simply because

they are not the legal owners of the property, and damage done to

such property is not an injury to them. Their rights and their

powers are limited and well defined.'"

In this court, in Hopkins v. Roseclare Lead Co., 72 111. 373, the

right of a stockholder of a corporation to transfer certain leases be-

longing to the corporation arose, and in disposing of the question the

court said (p. 379): "It is insisted that La Grave had no power to

make trie sale of the leases, to transfer the control of the suit or to sell

the twenty acres of land, as they were all owned by the company. He
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was but a stockholder, and as such had no power to make the sale.

He. although owning the majority of the stock, could not act for the

company unless specially authorized. He could, no doubt, control

the action of the company by the election of its officers, but still the

company could only act through its officers or by expressly delegating

power to others, whether a stockholder or other persons." See, also,

England v. Dearborn, 141 Mass. 590; Newton Manf. Co. v. White,

42 Ga. 148; Russell v. McLellan, 14 Pick. 63.

From what has been said it is apparent that Morris Sellers, al-

though he owned one-half of the capital stock of the corporation, had

no right to sell the corporate property, and any contract he may have

made would not be obligatory on the corporation. The corporation,

Morris Sellers & Co., the owner of the letters-patent and other prop-

erty described in the contract, was not made a party to the bill, and

no decree could have been obtained against it if it had been made a

party, for the reason it never executed the contract, nor did it ratify

the contract after it was made, but, on the other hand, expressly re-

fused to do so on application of Greer to its board of directors. The

hill prayed that Sellers might be compelled to convey the letters-pat-

ent named in the contract to Greer. He had no title, and hence could

not make a conveyance, and any decree that might have been ren-

dered would have been nugatory. In a bill for specific performance

the contract must be of such a character that the court is able to make

an efficient decree and enforce it when made. 3 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur.,

I 1405. • » •

Appellee not being entitled to a decree for a specific performance,

the next question presented is, did the court err in refusing to retain

the bill for the purpose of allowing appellee to recover damages for

the failure of Sellers to perform the contract? * * *

In Kennedy v. Hazleton, 128 U. S. 667, it was held that specific

performance can not be decreed of an agreement to convey property

the relations of slockholders in all business corporations. Said the
chief justice; 'The individual members of a corporation, whether
tbey shall all join or each act severally, have no right or power to intermcddle with the property or concerns of the bank, or call any qfficer,
agent or servant to account or discharge them from any liability.
Should all of the stockholders join in a power of attorney to any one,
he could not take possession of any real or personal estate, any security or chose of action, could not collect any debt, or discharge a
claim, or release damage arising from any default, simply because
they are not the legal owners of the property, and damage done to
suck property is not an injury to them. Their rights and thei'r
puwcrs are limited and well de.fined.' "
In this court, in Hopkins v. Roseclare Lead Co., 72 Ill. 373, the
right of a stockholder of a corporation to transfer certain leases belonging to the corporation arose, and in disposing of the question the
court said (p. 379): " It is insisted that La Grave had no power to
make toe sale of the leases, to transfer the control of the suit or to sell
the twenty acres of land, as they were all owned by the company. He
was but a stockholder, and as such had no power to m ake the sale.
He, although owning the majority of the stock, could not act for the
company unless specially authorized. He could, no doubt, control
the action of the company by the election of its officers, but still the
company could only act through its officers or by expressly delegating
power to othe rs, whether a stockholder or other persons." See, also,
England v. Dearborn, r4r Mass. 590; Newton Man£. Co. v. White,
4z Ga. r+S; Russell v. McLellan, 14 Pick. 63.
From what has been said it is apparent that Morris Sellers, although he owned one-half of the capital stock of the corporation, had
no right to sell the corporate property, and any contract he may have
made would not be obligatory on the corporation. The corporation,
Morris Sellers & Co., the owner of the letters-patent and other property described in the contract, was not made a party to the bill, and
no decree could have been obtain~d against it if it had been made a
party, for the reason it never executed the contract, nor did it ratify
the contract after it was made, but, on the other 1rnnd, expressly refu ed to do so on application of Greer to its boanl of directors. The
bill prayed that Sellers might be compelled to convey the letters-patent named in the contract to Greer. He had no title, and hence could
not make a conveyance, and any decree that might have been rendered would have been nugatory. In a bill for specific performance
the contract must be of such a character that the court is able to make
an efficient decree and enforce it when made. 3 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur.,
§ 1405.

•

•

•

Appellee not being entitled to a decree for a specific performance,
the next question presented is, did the court err in refusing to retain
the bill for the purpose of allowing appellee to recover damages for
the failure of Sellers to perform the contract? • • •
In Kennedy v. Hazleton, 128 U. S. 667, it was held that specific
performance can not be decreed of an agreement to convey property
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which has no existence or to which the defendant has no title, and if

§ 14

WILLIAMSON V. SMOOT.

the want of title was known to the plaintiff at the time of beginning

which has no existence or to which the defendant has no title, and if
the want of title was known to the plaintiff at the time of beginning
suit, the bill would not be retained for the assessment of damages.
The same doctrine is declared in Hurlbut v. Kantzler, l l 2 Ill. 482.
Here, Greer, the appellee, knew when he accepted the contract from
Sellers that the property named in the contract was owned by Morris
Sellers & Co., a corporation. He also knew that Sellers had no
authority to sell the property, and, knowing these facts, he could not
maintain a bill for specific performance, nor would the bill be retained
for an assessment of damages for a breach of the contract.
The judgment of the appellate court will be reversed and the decree
of the superior court of Cook county will be affirmed.
~udgment reversed.

suit, the bill would not be retained for the assessment of damages.

The same doctrine is declared in Hurlbut v. Kantzler, 112 111. 482.

Here, Greer, the appellee, knew when he accepted the contract from

Sellers that the property named in the contract was owned by Morris

Sellers & Co., a corporation. He also knew that Sellers had no

authority to sell the property, and, knowing these facts, he could not

maintain a bill for specific performance, nor would the bill be retained

for an assessment of damages for a breach of the contract.

The judgment of the appellate court will be reversed and the decree

of the superior court of Cook county will be affirmed.

Judgment reversed.

Sec. 14. Same. (5) Also as to suits by or against third per-

sons.

WILLIAMSON Et Al., Syndics, v. SMOOT Et Al.1

1819. In the Supreme Court of Louisiana. 7 Martin (La.)

31-33, or vol. 7 of Louisiana Term Reports.

Sec. 14. Same. ( S) Also as to suits
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Appeal from the court of the first district.

Matthews, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The plaintiffs

by or against third per-

sons.

having caused an attachment to be levied on the steamboat Alabama,

the St. Stephens Steamboat Company intervened in their corporate

WILLIAMSON ET AL., SYNDICS, v. SMOOT ET AL.1

capacity, and claimed her as their property. The intervening party

are a body politic, created by an act of the legislature of the territory

of Alabama, the capital stock of which is divided into shares of a cer-

1819.

tain amount, and Smoot, the defendant, owns ten of them, subscribed

for by him.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF Lou1s1ANA. 7 Martin (La.)
31-33, or vol. 7 of Louisiana Term Reports.

[The questions to be decided are » * « 2. Can the shares or

Appeal from the court of the first district.
MATTHEWS, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The plaintiffs
having caused an attachment to be levied on the steamboat Alabama,
the St. Stephens Steamboat Company intervened in their corporate
capacity, and claimed her as their property. The intervening party
are a body politic, created by an act of the legislature of the territory
of Alabama, the capital stock of which is divided into shares of a certain amount, and Smoot, the defendant, owns ten of them, subscribed
for by him.
·
[The questions to be decided are · • • •
2. Can the shares or
stock of any individual stockholder be legally attached?] • • •
II. The existence of the claimants being recognized as a body corporate, and it being admitted that the boat attached belongs to them
as a part of their common stock, it is clear that Smoot does not possess such certain and distinct individual property in it as to make his
interest attachable. The estate and rt'ghts of a corporatt'on belong so
completely to the body that none of the t'ndt'vt'duals who compose t't
has any rt'ght of ownership i'n them, nor can dispose of any part of
them. Ct'v. Code, 88, art. II.
The court is of opinion that the district court erred in disallowing
the claim of the company.
It is, therefore. ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment
be annulled, avoided and reversed. and that the attachment of the

stock of any individual stockholder be legally attached ?] * * *

II. The existence of the claimants being recognized as a body cor-

porate, and it being admitted that the boat attached belongs to them

as a part of their common stock, it is clear that Smoot does not pos-

sess such certain and distinct individual property in it as to make his

interest attachable. The estate and rights of a corporation belong so

completely to the body that none of the individuals who compose it

has any right of ownership in them, nor can dispose of any part of

them. Civ. Code, 88, art. 11.

The court is of opinion that the district court erred in disallowing

the claim of the company.

It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment

be annulled, avoided and reversed, and that the attachment of the

1 Part of the opinion relating to the recognition of a foreign corporation by a

state is omitted.

1
Pa.rt of the opinion relating to the recognition of a foreign corporation by a
state is omitted.
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plaintiff and appellant be quashed, so far as it relates to the said

steamboat, the Alabama, and that she be released therefrom.

\ote. 1. Evidence.—Admissions of shareholders are not admissions of

the corporation. Fairfield County Turnpike Co. v. Thorp, 13 Conn. 173; Pol-

plaintiff and appellant be quashed, so far as it relates to the said
steamboat, the Alabama, and that she be released therefrom.

levs v. Ocean Ins. Co., 2 Shep. (Maine) 141; Osgood v. Manhattan Bank, 3

Cow. (N. Y.) 612; Hartford Bank v. Hart, 3 Day (Conn.) 493; Mayor of Lon-

don v. Long, 1 Campb. 22.

2. Judge, by holding stock, is disqualified to try a case in which the

corporation is a party. Bonham's Case, 8 Rep. 226: Day v. Savadge, Hob.

85, 87; Washington Ins. Co. v. Price, 1 Hop. Ch. (N. Y.) 1; Gregory v. Cleve-

land, etc., R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 675; Northampton v. Smith, 11 Met. (Mass.)

390; Newcome v. Light, 58 Texas 141; Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal, 3 H.

L. Cas. 759; State v. Young, 31 Fla. 594, 34 Am. St. 41. But see Stewart v.

Mech. & F. Bank, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 501; Searsburgh Turnpike Co. v. Cutter,

6 Vt. 315.

3. Juror, who holds stock can not try a case in which the corporation

is a partv. Page v. Contoocook V. R. Co., 1 Fost. (21 N. H.) 438; Peninsular

R. Co. v. Howard, 20 Mich. 18; Michigan Air Line R. Co. v. Barnes, 40 Mich.

383; Georgia A. Co. v. Hart, 60 Ga. 550; Butler v. Glens, etc., R. Co., 121 N.
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Y. 112; McLaughlin v. Louisville Elec. L. Co., 100 Ky. 173.

4. Witness.—At common law a shareholder was disqualified, because of

interest, to be a witness for the corporation. Porter v. Bank, etc., 19 Vt. 410;

McAuley v. The York, etc., 6Cal. 80; Mokelumne, etc., Co. v. Woodbury, 14

C'al.265.

5. Sheriff, though a stockholder, is not disqualified to serve process on

the corporation. Merchants' Bank v. Cook, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 405; Adams v.

Wiscasset Bank, 1 Greenleaf (Maine) 361, 10 Am. Dec. 88; Barker v. Rem-

ick, 43 N. H. 235.

Note. 1. Evidence.-Admissions of shareholders are not admissions of
the corporation. !<'airfield County Turnpike Co. v. Thorp, 13 Conn. 173; Polleys v. Ocean Ins. Co., 2 Shaj:>. (Maine) 141; Osgood v. Manhattan Bank, 3
Cow. (5. Y.l 612; Hartford Bank v. Hart, 3 Day (Conn.) 493; Mayor of London v. Long, 1 Campb. 22.
2. Judge, by holdinir stock, is disqualified to try a case in which the
corporation is a party. Bonham's Case, 8 Rep. 2::!6; Day v. Savadge, Hob.
85, 7; Washington Ins. Co. v. Price, l Hop. Ch . (N. Y.) I; Gregory v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 675; Northampton v. Smith, 11 Met. (Mass. )
390; Newcome v. Light, 58 Texas 141; Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal, 3 H.
L. Cas. 759; State v. Young, 31 Fla. 594, 34 Am. St. 41. But see Stewart v.
Yecb. & F. Bank, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 501; Searsburgh Turnpike Co. v. Cutter,
6 rt. 315.
3. Juror, who holds stock can not try a case in which the corporation
is a party. Page v. Contoocook V. R. Co., 1 Fost. (21 N . H.) 438; Peninsular
R. Co. v. Howard, 20 Mich. 18; Michigan Air Line R. Co. v. Barnes, 40 Mich.
383; Georgia A. Co. v. Hart, 60 Ga. 550; Butler v. Glens, etc., R. Co-., 121 N.
Y.112; McLaughlin v. Louisville Elec. L Co., 100 Ky. 173.
4. Witness.-At common law a shareholder was disqualified, because of
interest, to be a witness for the corporation. Porter v. Bank, etc., 19 Vt. 410;
llcAuley v. The York, etc., 6Cal. 80; Mokelumne, etc., Co. v. Woodbury, 14
Cal. 265.
.
5. Sheriff, though a stockholder, is not disqualified to serve process on
the corporation. Merchants' Bank v. Cook, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 405; Adams v.
Wiscasset Bank, 1 Greenleaf (Maine) 361, 10 Am. Dec. 88; Ba.r ker v. Remick, 43 N. H. 235.

Sec. 15. Same. (6) Or as to suits between it and its members.

1430. "If mayor and commonalty disseise one of the commonalty

he shall have assise against them, for they are as several persons, viz.,

body politic and body natural. Per Paston, Br. Corporations, pi. 24,

Sec. 15. Same.

( 6) Or as to suits between it and its members.

cites 8 H. VI, 1, 14," as given in 6 Viner's Abr., Corporations, § 2,

P- 3<H-

WARING v. CATAWBA COMPANY.1

1797. In the Superior Courts of South Carolina. 2 Bay

(South Carolina) 109-111.

1430. "If mayor and commonalty disseise one of the commonalty
be shall have assise against them, for they are as several persons, viz.,
body politic and body natural. Per Paston, Br. Corporations, pl. 24,
cites 8 H. VI, 1, 14,' ' as given in 6 Viner's Ahr., Corporations, § 2,

Assumpsit for goods sold, and for work and labor, etc.

Plea in abatement.

p. 304·
WARING v. CATAWBA COMPANY.1

This case came before the court upon a plea in abatement, which

pleaded that plaintiff was himself a member of the company, and,

therefore, could not maintain any action against it in his individual

1797. IN

THE

SUPERIOR

CouRTS

OF SouTH CAROLINA.

(South Carolina)

capacity.

2

Bay

109-111.

Mr. Trezevant, for the plaintiff, argued that there was a wide dif-

ference between a copartnership in trade and a corporation. Copart-

ners, he admitted, must sue and be sued jointly; that they were jointly

and severally liable, etc. But a corporation (as in the present case)

1 Part of arguments omitted.

Assumpsit for goods sold, and for work and labor, etc.
Plea in abatement.
This case came before the court upon a plea in abatement, which
pleaded that plaintiff was himself a member of the company, and,
therefore, could not maintain any action against it in his individual
capacity.
Mr. Trezevant, for the plaintiff, argued that there was a wide <liffcrence between a copartnership in trade and a corporation. Copartners he admitted, must sue and be sued jointly; that they were jointly
and severally liable , etc. But a corporation (as in the present case)
1

Part of arguments omitted.
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must be sued in its corporate name; that the private property of its

§

I

5

members were not liable, only the corporate property, so that there

must be sued in its corporate name; that the private property of its
members were not liable, only the corporate property, so that there
was a wide difference between a corporation and a copartnership,
both as to the mode of bringing an action and as to the effect of any
judgment or decree against them. • • "
The attorney-general, contra, said this company ought to be considered as an association for gain, or the emolument of its members,
and therefore in law should only be considered as a kind of copartnership, and not as a public corporation. • • •
The court, after hearing the arguments, overruled the plea in abatement, as containing principles subversive of justice; but they observed
that the two cases of Bourdeaux and Drayton against The Santee Canal
Company had settled this point, as they had both been allowed by this
court to maintain their actions for their salaries, etc., against the company, as well as the cases respecting the other public societies, mentioned in the argument.
The plaintiff was then allowed to go on and prove his debt to a
jury.
Present, Burke, Grimke and Bay; but as Judge Grimke was a
member of the company, he declined giving an opinion.

was a wide difference between a corporation and a copartnership,

both as to the mode of bringing an action and as to the effect of any

judgment or decree against them. * * *

The attorney-general, contra, said this company ought to be con-

sidered as an association for gain, or the emolument of its members,

and therefore in law should only be considered as a kind of copartner-

ship, and not as a public corporation. * * *

The court, after hearing the arguments, overruled the plea in abate-

ment, as containing principles subversive of justice; but they observed

that the two cases of Bourdeaux and Drayton against The Santee Canal

Company had settled this point, as they had both been allowed by this

court to maintain their actions for their salaries, etc., against the com-

pany, as well as the cases respecting the other public societies, men-

tioned in the argument.

The plaintiff was then allowed to go on and prove his debt to a

jury-

Present, Burke, Grimke and Bay; but as Judge Grimke was a
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member of the company, he declined giving an opinion.

Note. See Culbertson v. Navigation Co., Fed. Cas. 3464; Rogers v. Society,

19 Vt. 187.

NOTES TO ARTICLE II.

1. Ancient ideas.—The idea of an artificial person seems as old as our race.

In fact the underlying idea of a person is not that it is an individual human

being, but rather that part or character which one sustains in the world. The

Note. See Culbertson v. Navigation Co., Fed. Cas. 3464; Rogers v. Society,
19 Vt. 187.
·

word comes from the Latin, meaning "a mask for actors," or "the character

represented by such mask." See Century Dictionary, Austin's Jurisprudence

(Campbell's edition), § 438; Holland's Jurisprudence, p. 65 (edition of 1880).

NOTES TO ARTICLE II.

This Wing the primary meaning of the word, it was immaterial whether this

1. Ancient ide88.-The idea of an art(ficial person seems as old as our race.
In fact the underlying idea of a person is not that it is an individual human
being, but rather that part or character which one sustains in the world. The
word comes from the Latin, meaning "a mask for actors," or "the character
represented by such mask.'' See Century Dictionary, Austin's Jurisprudence
(Campbell's edition),§ 438; Holland's Jurisprudence, p. 65 (edition of 1880).
This being the primary meaning of the word, it was immaterial whether true
person was composed of a single human being, or many, or not even a human
being at all, but only a thing or group of things, provided they or it had the
same stattts, or was entitled to the same rights or subject to the same duties
as any single human being was. So, too, the whole hierarchy of gods and
goddesses that peopled the "heavens and earth" of the ancient world was
nothing but personi.ftcations of the forces of nature. Morawetz (Private Corporations, § 1, p. 2), says: "The conception of a number of individuals as a
corporate or collective entity occurs in the earliest stages of human development, and is essential to many of the most ordinary processes of thought. Thus
the existence of tribes, village communities, families , clans and nations implies a conception of these several bodies of individuals as entities having
corporate rights and attributes.'' The oldest corporate body or artificial person seems to have been the family. Hearn, in "The Aryan Household," pp.
64, 5, 6, thus characterizes the ancient family: "It formed an organized permanent body, distinct from its individual members, owning property, and
having other rights and duties of its own. • • • It was a permanent association. It was not intended to pass away and be reformed like the generations of men. It was constructed and meant to endure forever. It was, in
our technical language, a corporation. It had perpetual succession. It included in its members bot.h the living and the dead. These members had
various degrees of rank; but the whole number, taken collectively, formed
one well defined and distinct individuality. Of this corporate entity, the house
father for the time being was the head, or, as we might say, the managing di-

person was composed of a single human being, or many, or not even a human

being at all, but only a thing or group of things, provided they or it had the

same status, or was entitled to the same rights or subject to the same duties

as any single human being was. So, too, the whole hierarchy of gods and

goddesses that peopled the "heavens and earth" of the ancient world was

nothing but personifications of the forces of nature. Morawetz (Private Cor-

porations, § 1, p. 2), says: "The conception of a number of individuals as a

corporate or collective entity occurs in the earliest stages of human develop-

ment, and is essential to many of the most ordinary processes of thought. Thus

the existence of tribes, village communities, families, clans and nations im-

plies a conception of these several bodies of individuals as entities having

corporate rights and attributes." The oldest corporate body or artificial per-

son seems to have been the family. Hearn, in "The Aryan Household," pp.

64, 5, 6, thus characterizes the ancient family: "It formed an organized per-

manent body, distinct from its individual members, owning property, and

having other rights and duties of its own. * * * It was a permanent as-

sociation. It was not intended to pass away and be reformed like the genera-

tions of men. It was constructed and meant to endure forever. It was, in

our technical language, a corporation. It had perpetual succession. It in-

cluded in its members both the living and the dead. These members had

various degrees of rank; but the whole number, taken collectively, formed

one well denned and distinct individuality. Of this corporate entity, the house

father for the time being was the head, or, as we might say, the managing di-
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rector." Mr. Hearn cites the following authorities: Maine's Early History

THE CORPORATION AS A PERSON.

of Institutions, p. 78 (the Hindu family); K. O. Miiller's Dorians, vol. 2,

73

p. 240 (the Greek family); M. Ortolan, History of Roman Law, p. 677 (the

Roman family); M. de Laveleve, De la Propriety, p. 23 (the Slav family);

the Editor of Ancient Laws of Ireland, Int., p. 79 (the Irish family); Maine's

Ancient Law, p. 143 (the German family).

2. In the Roman civil law.—Although corporations do not seem to be

mentioned in the Institutes of Gaius (c. i80 A. D.) they are in the Institutes

of Justinian and there are many provisions in the digests (A. D. 533) relat-

ing to them; the ideas above expressed were embodied in the Roman law.

"Every being capable of having and being subject to rights was called in Ro-

man law a persona. Thus, not only was the individual citizen when looked

at as having this capacity, a persona, but also corporations and public bodies.

* * * The word personal has also another sense. It was used not only for

the being who had the capacity of enjoying rights and fulfilling duties, but

also for the different characters or parts in which this capacity showed itself;

or to borrow the metaphor suggested by the etymology of the word, for the

different masks or faces which the actor wore in playing hiB part in the

drama of civic and social life. Tims, for instance, the same man might have
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the persona patris, or tutoris, or mariti; that is, might be regarded in his char-

acter of father, tutor, or husband. » * * Status (legal standing) is the cor-

relative of persona. Status is the legal capacity of a persona; persona is that

which has status." Note of T. C. Sandars in Hammond's Edition of ban-

dars' Justinian's Institutes. De Jure Personarum, p. 76. See, also, Mack-

eldev, Handbook of Roman Law (Dropsie's Translation, 1883, sections 128,

129, '155.)

"A universitas, or corporate body, exists when a number of persons are so

united that the law takes no notice of their separate existence, Dut recognizes

them only under a common name, which is not the name of any one of them.

(Dittest 3, 4, 2; 3, 4, 7, 1). All the members are considered in law as a sin-

gle unit or being. (Digest 46, 1, 22.) Such units are sometimes called ficti-

tious persons, because the corporate body, as such, may sue and be pued, re-

ceive or part with property, bind itself or bind others, through some agent or

syndic (Digest 3, 4, 1, 1), who acts in the name of the whole, just as any in-

dividual may act for himself. (Digest 3, 4, 7, 1.) The chief characteristic of

snch a body is that it does not necessarily die. (Digest 5, 1, 76.) * * *

There were many such corporations in Rome, chiefly connected with trades,

snch as the guild of bakers, and shipowners, 'companies of tax-gatherers,

companies for working mines of gold, silver, salt, etc. The internal govern-

ment of the corporate bodies was in the hands of the members (sodales).—

Hunter's Roman Law, 2d ed., pp. 314-5.

Sheldon Amos, in his " History and Principles of the Civil Law of Rome,"

p. 118, says: "Such a conception (as that of legal persons) had thoroughly

penetrated the fabric of Roman law and society long before the time of Jus-

tinian, and the appropriate legal consequences had worked themselves out

with considerable exactness. The conception, indeed, was extended for pur-

poses of legal convenience, even beyond the original sense of an assemblage

of persons, determinate or indeterminate, treated as integral unity. The

same hypothesis of a legal personality was made in certain cases where no

human beings were directly concerned at all, but where it was desired to as-

sume, provisionally, a fixed center, to which a group of rights and duties

might for some purposes be referred. Thus, in the case of an inheritance on

which the heir had not yet entered, it was convenient for the moment to call

it a person, and to estimate the rights and duties that would attach to a person

so situated than to be making constant references to all the innumerable

human beings who might be actually interested in the succession." Taylor,

in his work on Corporations, ch. ], takes a slightly different view, and holds

that at least in the early period of the Roman law the idea of the artificial

rector." Mr. Heam cites the following authorities: Maine's Early History
of Institutions, p. 78 (the Hindu family ) ; K. 0. Muller's Doriane, vol. 2,
p. 240 (the Greek family); M. Ortolan, History of Romain Law, p. 577 (the
Roman family ) ; M. de Laveleye, De la Propriete, p. 23 (the Slav family);
the Edito r of .Ancient Laws of Ireland, Int., p. 79 (the Iriuh family ) ; Maine's
Ancient Law, p. 143 {the German family).
2. In the Roman civil law .- Although corporations do not seem to be
mentioner!. in the Institutes of Gains (c. 180 A. D.) they are in the Institutes
of Justinian and there are many provisions in the dip;este1 (A. D. 53a) relating to them; the ideas above expressed were embodied in the Roman Jaw.
" Every being capable of having and being subject to rights was called in Roman law a persona. Thus, not only was t.he individual citizen when looked
at as having this capacity, a persona, but also corporations and public bodies.
• • • The word persona: has also another sense. It was used not only for
the being who bad the- capacity of enjoying rights and fulfilling duties, but
also for the different characters or parts in which this caparity showed itself;
or to borrow the metaphor suggested by the etymology o:f the word, for the
different masks or faces which the actor wore in playing bis part in the
drama of civic and social life. Thus, for instance, the "rtme man might have
the ptrscma patris, or ttttoris, or mariti; that is, might be regarded in bis character of f ather, tit tor, or husband. • • • Status (legal standing) is the correlative of p ersona. Status is the legal capacity of a pers.o na; pt>rsona is that
-which has status." Note of T. C. Sandars in Hammond ' s Edition of Sandars' Justinian' s Institutes. De Jure Personarum, p. 76. See, also, Mackeldey, Handbook of Roman Law (Dropsie's Translation, 1883, sections 128,
129, 155. )

"A universitas, or corporate body, exists when a number of persons are so
united that the law takes no notice of their separate existence, but recognizes
them only under a common name, which is not the name of any one of them.
(Digest 3, 4, 2; 3, 4, 7, 1). All the members are considered in law as a single unit or being. (Digest 46, 1, 22.) Such units are sometimes called fictitious persons, because the corporate body, as such , may sue and be sued, rerei\'e or part with property, bind itself or bind others, through some agent or
syndic I Digest 3, 4, 1, 1), who acts in the uame of the whole, just as any individual may act for himself. (Digest 3, 4 , 7, 1.) The chief characteristic of
snch a body is that it does not necessarily die. (Digest 5, I, 76.) • • •
There we re many such corporations in Rome, chiefly connected with trades,
such as the guild of bakers, and shipowners, 'companie13 of tax-gatherers,
companie.s for working mines of gold, silver, salt, etc. The internal government of the corporate bodies was in the bands of the me mbers (sodales).-Hanter's Roman Law, 2d ed., pp. 314-5.
Sheldon Amos, in his "History and Principles of the Ci·vil Law of Rome,"
p. 118, says : "Such a conception (as that of legal pel'8o:ns) had thorough Jy
penetrated the fabric of Roman law and society long before the time of Justinian, and the appropriate legal consequences had wor'ked themselves out
with considerable exactness. The conception, indeed, waB extended for purposes of legal convenience, even beyond the original sense of an assemblRge
of persons, determinate or indeterminate, treated as integral unity . The
same hypothesis of a legal personality was made in certain cases where no
buma.n beinizs were directly concerned at all, bu t where it was desired to afleume, provisionally, a fixed center, to which a group of rights and dutiN1
might for some pnrposes be referred. Thus , in the case olf an inheritance on
which the heir had not yet entered, it was convenient for the moment to call
it a person, and to estimate the rights and duties that would attach to a person
80 situated than to be making constant references to all the innumerable
human beings who might be actually interested in the succession ." Taylor,
in bis work on Corporations, ch. 1, takes a slightly different view, and bolds
that at lea.lit in the early period of the Roman law the idea of the artificial
peT'f'<l n ali t~· of a corporation, if it existed at all, was in a very rudimentary
shape, thoug h he admits it was present in the late r periods, as evidenced by
such provisions as, "If anything is owed to a corporation, it is not owed to

personality of a corporation, if it existed at all, was in a very rudimentary

shape, though he admits it was present in the later periods, as evidenced by

such provisions as, "If anything is owed to a corporation, it is not owed to
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any single [member]; nor what a corporation owes do the single [mem-

NOTES TO ARTICLE II.

bers] owe." ["Si quid unirersitati debettir, singulis nun debetur; nec quod

any single (member]; n or what a corporation owes do the single (members] owe." ["6'i quid 1mit1ersitati debetur, singulis non debetur; nee quod
debet 1mitJersitas 11i11g11li. debe11t." Digest iii, 4, lex 7, § 1.) And in tbe
n otes (p. 31 he cites Ihring, to the effect that the members of a corporation were the true subjects of corporate rights and liabilities, at least among
themselvet1, and the corporation was only the form assumed toward outsiders.
Gheist, etc., iii, Theil., pp. 219. :t20, 343-4. So, too, Pollock and Maitland
say: "It would be a great mistake to suppose that what we are wont to consider the true theory of w1irersitates lay so plainly written on the face of the
Roman law books that no one could read t.hem attentively without grasping
it. The glossators did not grasp it. Bracton's master, Azo, had not grasped
it." History of English Law, vol. 1, p. 477.
3. In the Canon law.-The personification of an institution, such as The
Church, was one of the earliest and most persistent ideas of the early Christian world; so, too, the blending of many members into one body was an early
Christian conception. "The Church of God." Acts xx, 28; 1 Cor. i, 1 and 2;
R ev. ii. 7. "He is the head of the body, the church." Colos. i, 18; Eph. i. 22,
23. "For as the body is one and hath many members, and all the members
of that one body, being many are one body; so, also, is Christ • • • Now
ye are the body of Christ, and members in particular." 1 Cor. xii, 12, 27.
Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, vol. 1, p. 489, thus summarises the history on this point : "Within the ecclesiastical sphere there have
been 'juristic persons' from an extremely remote time. Confining our view
to England, we may say that they have existed ever since £thelberht sanctioned God's vroperty with a twelve-fold bot, and gave lands to St. Andrew.
God and the saints, it is needless to say, were not re~arded as imaginary persons; still their property hlld to be administered for them by 'the church,' and
the personality of the church is more purely juristic. A p ersonified buildi ug
gives way to a personified institution or a personified purpose. Tben the
worldly business of the church is often conducted for it, not by a single man,
but by a group of men acting in common; still these men are not the e cclesill; no, not though they be all taken together. Thus, <.'anonist.s have obtained
a foundation of fact and practical law for their theories. They see and
proclaim that the universitas is personajicta, not found in the world of sense,
but created by Jaw, that it is invisible, immortal, a body that has no body and
no soul. It can not sin, it can not be excommnnicated, it can not commit a
crime, it can not be punished; very probably it can not commit a delid.
These theories are very generally worked out in the thirteenth anti the
following centuries; they bear abundant fruit in our latest Year Books. To
'the church,' modern law owes its conception of a juristic person, ancl the
clear line that it draws between 'the corporation aggregate,' and the sum of
its members." In fact it hns been said that Pope Innocent IV (A. D. 12431255) was the father of the modern learning of corporations. lb., p. 477.
4. In the early common law.-The personification of the chttrch, as having
rights, was a common idea in tbe Saxon laws. "The property of God and
the church twelve-fold. " Laws of £tbelberht, 1 (c. 600 A. D. ). "If any
carry off a nun from a minstflr • • • let him pay 120 shillings, half to
the king and half to the bishop and to the ch11rch·ltlaford," which Steams
(Germs and Developme nts of Laws of England, n. 1, p. 781, translates
"church corporation," though the word is more frequently rendered t1-ib11te.
See Laws of Alfred, 8 (c. 890 A. D. ). Under the Laws of Edward the Confessor
( c. 104.3-10fl6 l, there was a peace of the ch.u rch as there was of the king (1 , 6) ;
lands were held of the church; it had fiefs, and it was entitled to tithes (3,

debet universitas sinyuli debent." Digest iii, 4, lex 7, § 1.] And in the

notes (p. 31 he cites Hiring, to the eSect that the members of a corpora-

tion were the true subjects of corporate rights and liabilities, at least among

themselves, and the corporation was only the form assumed toward outsiders.

Gheist, etc., iii, Theil., pp. 219. 220, 343-1. So, too, Pollock and Maitland

say: "It would be a great mistake to suppose that what we are wont to con-

sider the true theory of unirersitates lay so plainly written on the face of the

Roman law books that no one could read them attentively without grasping

it. The glossators did not grasp it. Bracton's master, Azo, had not grasped

it." History of English Law, vol. 1, p. 477.

3. In the Canon law.—The personification of an institution, such as The

Church, was one of the earliest and most persistent ideas of the early Chris-

tian world; so, too, the blending of many members into onebodv was an early

Christian conception. "The Church of God." Acts xx, 28; 1 Cor. i,l and 2;

Rev. ii. 7. "He is the head of the body, the church." Colos. i, 18; Eph. i. 22,

23. "For as the body is one and hath many members, and all the members

of that one body, being many are one body ; so, also, is Christ * * * Now
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ve are the body of Christ, "and members in particular." 1 Cor. xii, 12, 27.

Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, vol. 1, p. 489, thus summa-

rises the history on this point: "Within the ecclesiastical sphere there have

been 'juristic persons' from an extremely remote time. Confining our view

to England, we may say that they have existed ever since ^Ethelberht sanc-

tioned God's property with a twelve-fold bot, and gave lands to St. Andrew.

God and the saints, it is needless to say, were not regarded as imaginary per-

sons; still their property had to be administered for them by 'the church,' and

the personality of the church is more purely juristic. A personified building

gives way to a personified institution or a personified purpose. Then the

worldly business of the church is often conducted for it, not by a single man,

but by a group of men acting in common; still these men are not the eecfe-

sia; no, not though they be all taken together. Thus, canonists have obtained

a foundation of fact and practical law for their theories. They see and

proclaim that the universitas is persona ficta, not found in the world of sense,

out created by law, that it is invisible, immortal, a body that has no body and

no soul. It can not sin, it can not be excommunicated, it can not commit a

crime, it can not be punished; very probably it can not commit a delict.

These theories are very generally worked out in the thirteenth mid the

following centuries; they bear abundant fruit in our latest Year Books. To

'the church,' modern law owes its conception of a juristic person, and the

clear line that it draws between 'the corporation aggregate,' and the sum of

its members." In fact it has been said that Pope Innocent IV (A. D. 1243-

1255) was the father of the modern learning of corporations. Ib., p. 477.

4. In the early common law.—The personification of the church, as having

rights, was a common idea in the Saxon laws. "The property of God and

the church twelve-fold." Laws of vEthelberht , 1 (c. 600 A. D.l. "If any

carry off a nun from a minster * * * let him pay 120 shillings, half to

the king and half to the bishop and to the chnrch-hlaford,1' which Stearns

(Germs and Developments of Laws of England, n. 1, p. 78), translates

"church corporation," though the word is more frequently rendered tribute.

4, 7).

See Laws of Alfred, 8 (c. 890 A. D.). Under the Laws of Edward the Confessor

These provisions of the laws of Edward were also in the confirmation of
them by William the Conqueror. London traced some of its liberties to a
charter granted by the Conqueror, sealed with his seal, "bitten with his tooth
in token of sooth." Coke says h e had seen a "charter made by Heney I
(1100-1135), by which he ~ranted them (lildam mPre<itorttm. and a confirmation by H enry II 0154-1189), by which charters they were incorporate d."
10 Rep. 30. Though corporations seem to have been in existence fr0111 the

(c. 1043-1066), there was a peace of the church as there was of the kimr (1,6);

lands were held of the church; it had fiefs, and it was entitled to tithes (3,

4, 7).

These provisions of the laws of Edward were also in the confirmation of

them by William the Conqueror. London traced some of its liberties to a

charter granted by the Conqueror, sealed with his seal, "bitten with his tooth

in token of sooth." Coke says he had seen a "charter made by Henry I

(1100-1135), by which he granted them ffildam mercatorum, and a confirma-

tion by Henry II (1154--1189), by which charters they were incorporated."

10 Rep. 30. Though corporations seem to have been in existence from the
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time of the Conqueror, Braeton's ideas (c. 1263) were not clear, and were

THE CORPORATION AS A PERSON.

taken almost wholly from the Roman law. He says: "Things belong to

75

corporate bodies, and not to individuals, which are in cities, such as theaters,

stadia, etc., • * * sllch as lands and serfs, which are said to belong to

cities because they so belong to all the citizens as not to belong to any one

person by himself." F. 8, 1 Twiss's Translation 59. This is substantially

taken from Justinian's Institutes, Bk. 2, T. 1, § 6. In f. 1716, he speaks

of the "body corporate of the realm." [ Universitas regni.] 3 Twiss 93. In

f. 180*. (3 Twiss 151), he adds race grounds, walls and gates of cities, to

corporate property. From what he says, f. 102 (2 Twiss 133), f. 2286, (3

Twiss5351, it seems "all may complain or one (only) under the name of the

corporation (Unicersitatis). On f. 374 (5 Twiss, pp. 447-449), he says: "If

an abbot, or prior, or other collegiate men claim land, etc., in the name of

their church upon the seysine of their predecessors, * * » the declara-

tion should not be from abbot to abbot, or from prior to prior, nor should

there be mention of the intermediate abbots or priors, because in colleges and

in chapters the same corporation always remains, although they all die suc-

cessively and others are substituted in their place, as may be said of flocks of

«heep, where there is always the same flock, although all the sheep or heads
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successively depart, nor does any individual of them succeed to another by

right of succession, in such manner that the right descends by inheritance

from one to another, because the right always pertains to the church, and

remains with the church, according to what may be seen in the charters of

feoffment of religious orders, * * » and accordingly if the abbot or the

prior, the monks or the canons successively die, the house remains to eter-

nity." This comes very near to the modern idea of the existence of the cor-

poration separate and distinct from its members.

By 1311 a borough is called a "corps." Y. B., 4 Ed. II 103, Gross's Gild

Merchant I, 94, note. But "It was really about the reign of Edward III

il327-1377) that the idea of the lay corporation, the lay persona flcta as now

understood, was painfully elaborated. The doctrine that there could not be a

writ of capias against a "commonalty" was definitely expressed at least as

early as 22 Edward III (1349), 22 Ass. 67, and the practice had been in ac-

cordance with this doctrine considerably earlier. There is a very curious

case at the end of this reign, which shows not only that the lawyers had come

to the notion of a "body," afterwards called a "body politic," but also by

what road they traveled. They had often been troubled by the question

whether something in dispute was appendant or appurtenant to something

else, or was a thing by itself and independent, which they called a gross (un

jrou). It was, for instance, a common subject of argument whether an

advowson was a gross (according to modern phraseology "in gross"), or ap-

pendant. By a curious psychological process they realized that what we now

call a corporation was "a gross," or something which had an existence per

»<: and this something they called alternatively "un corps." Thus they came to

the idea of an individuality composed of the members of a corporation, or, as

we might now say, to the idea of a persona ficta. At the same time it was

held that the commonalty of a guild which had not been affirmed by a royal

charter could not be adjudged to be a body (un corps), capable of purchasing

an estate of freehold." See 49 Li. Ass. 8. Introduction t»y L. O. Pike to Y.

B., 16 Ed. Ill, part 1, p. xlvi. Many points turning on or recognizing the

artificial personality of a corporation were determined during this reign. In

1335 it was held the head of the corporation could be sued by the corpora-

tion, as the dean by the chapter of the same church. Y. B., 9 Ed. Ill 456.

In 1341 it was held that if a corporation disposes of all its property the cor-

poration yet remains. 15 Ass. 10. In 1349, as indicated above, it was said:

"The corporation is invisible, incorporeal; it can not be assaulted, or be

beaten or imprisoned; trespass does not lie against it, for capias nor exigent

time of the Conqueror, Brncton's ideas (c. 1263) were not clear, and were
ta.ken almost wholly from the Roman law. He says: "Things belong to
corporate bodies, and not to individuals, which are in cities, such as theate1·s,
nadia, etc., • • • such as lands and serfs, which are said to belong to
cities because they so belong to all the citizens as not to belong to any oue
per.>-00 by himself."
F. 8, 1 Twiss's Translation 59. This is substantially
taken from Justinian's Institutes, Bk. 2, T. l, § 6. In f. 17.lb, he speaks
of the "body corporate of the realm." [ Universitas regni.] 3 Twiss 93. In
f. 180b. (3 Twiss 151) , he adds race grouuds, walls and gates of cities, to
corporate property. From what be says, f. 102 (2 Twiss 133), f. 228b, (3
Twi 5351, it seems "all may complain or one (only) under the name of the
corporation (Uiiiliersitatis). On f. 374 (5 Twiss, pp. 447-449), be says: "If
an abbot, or prior, or other collegiate men claim land, etc., in the name of
their church upon the seysine of their predecessors, • • • the declaration should not be from abbot to abbot, or from prior to prior, nor should
there be mention of the intermediate abbots or priors, becat1se in colleges and
in chapters the same corporation always remains, although they all die succesffively and others are substituted in their place, as mar be said of flocks of
sheep. where there is always the same flock, although al the sheep or h eads
surcessively depart, nor does any individual of them succeed to another by
right of succeasion, in such manner that the right descends by inheritance
from one to another, because the right. always pertains to the church, and
remai ns with the church, accordin~ to what may be seen in the charters of
feofiment of religious orders, •
• and accordingly if the abbot or the
prior, the monks or the cnnons successively die, the house remains to eternitv." This comes verv near to the modern idea of the existence of the corporation separate and distinct from its members.
By 1311 a borough is called a "corps." Y. B. , 4 Ed. II 103, Gross's Gild
lierchant I, 94., note. But "It was really about the reign of Edward III
113t7-1377) that the idea of the lay corporation, the lay perso11a jicta as now
on<lerstood, wa.s painfully elaborated. The doctrine that there could not be a
writ of capias against a "commonalty" was definitely expressed at least as
early as 22 Edward III (1349), 22 Ass. 67, and the practice bad been in accordance with this doctrine considerably earlier. There is a very curious
case at the e nd of this reign, which shows not only that the lawyers had <'Ome
lo the notion of a "bodv," afterwards called a ''body politic," but also by
what road they traveled. They had oft.en been troubled by the question
whether something in dispute wns appendant or appurtenant to something
else, or was a thing by itself and independent, which they called a gross ( tm
!lTOU ). It was, for mstance, a common subject of argument whether an
advowson was a gross (according to modern phraseology ''in gross"), or appendant. By a carious psycholo~ical process they realized that what we now
Cl.II a corporation was ''a groBB,' or something which hacl nu existence per
u : and this something they called alternatively "tm co1-ps." Thus they came to
the idea of an individuality composed of the members of a corporation, or, as
we might now say, to the idea of a p ersona jicta. At the same time it was
helcl that the commonalty of a gu(ld which had not been uffirmed by a royal
charter could not be adjudged to be a body lttn corps), capable of purchasing
an estate of free hold." See 49 Li . Ass. 8. Introduction by L. 0. Pike to Y.
B., 16 Ed. III, part 1, p. xlvi. Many points turning on or recognizing the
Rrtificial personality of a corporation were determined during rhis reign. Jn
1_3ao it was held the bead of the corporation could be sued by the <'Orporallon, as the dean by the chapter of the same church. Y. B.. 9 Ed. III 45b.
In 1341 it waa held that if a corporation disposes of all its property th e corporation yet remains. 15 Ass. 10. In 1349, ns indicated above, it was said:
"The corporation is invisible, incorporeal; it can not be assaulted , or be
~ten or imprisoned; trespass does not lie against it, for capias nor n:igent
lies not against a commonalty." 22 Ass. 100, pl. 67. In ta56, "Nor can tbey
commit treason. or be outlawed, or excommunicated, for they have no souls,
nor can they 1tppear in person, but by attorney ." In 1372, however, it was
held "a corporation can commit a trespaas." 45 Ed. III 2.

lies not against a commonalty." 22 Ass. 100, pi. 67. In 1356, "Nor can they

commit treason, or be outlawed, or excommunicated, for they have no souls,

nor can they appear in person, but by attorney." In 1372, however, it was

held "a corporation can commit a trespass." 45 Ed. Ill 2.
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In 1375, the taking by the servant of a corporation is a taking by the cor-
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poration. 48 Ed. Ill 17. In 1876, none but the king can make a corpora-

tion. 49 Ed. Ill 4. In 1377, one corporation can be united to another

(consolidation?), so as to succeed to the rights of the latter. 50 Ed. Ill 27.

Pollock and Maitland (History of English Law, vol. 1, p. 473) place the birth

of the corporate idea a little later than indicated above. They say: "If for

a moment we take our stand in Edward IV's reign (1461-1483) * * * we

can say that the idea of a corporation is already in the minds of our common

lawyers; it may trouble them, this is shown by their frequent discussions

about its nature, but still it is there. First we notice that they already have

a term for it, namely, 'corporation' for which 'corps corporal,' and 'corps

politik,' are equivalents." Kent says (2 Comm., § 270, note e), "the terms

corporation and body corporate first appeared in the reign of Henry IV

(1399-1413), in any public document." In 1429, it was unsuccessfully

contended that when a member and the corporation were sued together, the

member was twice sued. Y. B.,8 Hen. VI, f. 1. In 1437, "if a man recovers

a debt or damages against a commonalty he shall have execution only against

the goods they have in common." Y. B., 16 Hen. VI, Fitz. Ahr., Execution

pi. 128. In 1441, "a release by all the members of a corporation is not the
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release of the corporation." Y. B., 19 Hen. VI 64. So too "if all the

members of a corporation appear in person to answer a suit against the cor-

poration it is not sufficient." Y. B. 19 Hen. VI 80. In 1442, "if all the

members, as abbots and monks,die, the corporation is dissolved." Y. B., 20

Hen. VI 7, 8. In 1454, "when a city or village is incorporated as bailiff

and commonalty of , they are by this name a person corporate, an entire

body." Y. B., 32 Hen. VI 9. In 1461, "a corporation aggregate of sev-

eral is invisible, immortal and rests only in intendment and consideration of

law, and therefore dean and chapter can not have predecessor nor successor."

Y. B., 39 Hen. VI 136, 14. In 1470, generally they must act by deed only.

Y. B., 9 Ed. IV 59, but in 1479, thev can appoint ordinary servants and

agents without a seal. Y. B.( 18 Ed. IV 8.

In 1481 corporate bodies are contrasted with unincorporated bodies. Y. B..

20 Ed. IV 2. So, too, in this year or the next, a juror was challenged be-

cause he was a brother to one of the members of the corporation; it was

answered that the juror was ''a stranger to the chapter, for it is a body of such

nature that it can have neitherbrother nor cousin," but conceded that it would

have been otherwise if the juror had been brother to the Dean, Y. B., 21 Ed.

IV, f. 28, 1 Pollock and Maitland 474. In this year, too, a corporation is called

a mere name. Y. B., 21 Ed. IV 13. Perhaps the most interesting case of the

time is the one of this year summarized by Pollock and Maitland thus: "Ab-

bot, of Hulme, sued mayor, sheriff and commonalty of Norwich, on a bond,

and they pleaded that when the bond was made the then abbot had got the

then mayor in prison and extorted the bond by duress. The lawyers admit-

ted that the corporation itself can not be in prison or suffer duress, and

that it would be no defense to urge that when the bond was made some few

of the citizens of Norwich were in prison. Counsel said: 'Every body politic

,,

is made up of natural men. And as regards what has been said touching its

inseverability, I do not admit that, for they allowed that mayor, sheriffs and

commonalty make up a single body; here, then, are members, namely the

mayor is one member * * * the sheriff another member * * * the

third is the commonalty. In this case there is an alleged imprisonment of

one of the distinct members named in the title of the corporation, to wit, the

mayor, who is the head and (as in the body natural) the principal member

* * * and if one member of the body natural be restrained or beaten, that

is a restraint or batterv of the whole body.'" Vol. 1, p. 475. Y. B., 21 Ed.

IV, f. 7, 12, 27, 67. In 1483, it was held that "if the king makes a general

corporation by a certain name, all the incidental powers, as to sue, be sued,

In 1375, the taking by the servant of a corporation is a taking by the corporation. 48 Ed. III 17. In 1376, none but the king can make a corporation. 49 Ed. III 4. In 1377, one corporation can be united to another
(consolidation? ), so as to succeed to the rights of the latter. 50 Ed. III 27.
Pollock and Maitland (History of English Law, vol. 1, p. 473) place the birth
of the corporate idea a little later than indicated above. They say: "If for
a moment we t.ake our stand in Edward IV's rei~n (1461-1483) • • • we
can say that the idea of a corporation is already rn the minds of our common
lawyers; it may trouble them, this is shown by their frequent discussions
about its nature, but still it is there. First we notice that they already ha'l'e
a term for it, namely, 'corpo1·acion' for which 'corps cm·porat,' and 'corps
politik,' are equivalents." Kent says (2 Comm.,§ 270, note e ), "the terms
corporation and body corporate first appeared in the reign of Henry IV
(liH:IH-1413), in any public document." In 1429, it was unsuccessfully
contended that when a member and the corporation were sued together, the
member was twice sued. Y. B ., 8 H en. VI, f. 1. In 1437, "if a man recovers
a debt or damages against a commonalty he shall have execution only against
the goods they have in common." Y. B ., 16 Hen. VI, Fitz. A.hr., Execution
pl. 128. In 14U, "a release by all ti.le members of a corporation is not the
release of the corporation." Y. B., 19 Hen. VI 64. So too "if all the
members of a corporation appear in person to answer a snit against the corporation it is not sufficient." Y. B . 19 Hen. VI 80. In 1442, "if all the
members, as abbots and monks, die, the corporation is dissolved ." Y. B., 20
Hen. VI 7, 8. In 1454, "when a city or village is incorporated as bailiff
and commonalty of--, they are by this name a person corporate, an entire
body." Y. B ., 32 Hen . VI 9. In 1461, "a corporation aggregate of several is invisible, immortal and rests only in intendment and consideration of
law, and therefore dean and chapter can not have predecessor nor successor."
Y. B., 39 Hen. VI 13b, 14. In 1470, generally they must act by deed only.
Y. H., 9 Ed. IV 59, but in 1479, they can appoint ordinary servants and
agents without a seal. Y. B., 18 Ed. IV 8.
In 1481 corpornte bodies are contrasted with unincorporated bodies. Y. B ..
20 Ed. IV 2. So, too, in this year or the next, a juror was challenged because be was a brother to one of the members of the corporation; it was
answered that the juror was "a stranger to the chapter, for it is a body of such
nature that it can have neitherbrot.her nor cousin," bnt conceded that it would
have bee n otherwise if the juror had been brother to the Dean, Y. B., 21 Ed.
IV, f. 28, 1 Pollock and Maitland 474. In this year, too, a corporation is called
a mere name. Y. B., 21 Ed. IV 13. Perhaps the most interesting case of tbe
time is the one of tbis year summarized by Pollock and Maitland thus: "Abbot, of Hulme, sued mayor, sheriff and commonalty of Norwich, on a bond,
and they pleaded that when tbe bond was made the then abbot had got tbe
then mayor in prison and extorted the bond by duress. The lawyers admitted that the corporation itself can not be in prison or suffer duress, and
that it would be no defense to urge that when the bond was made some few
of the citizens of Norwich were in prison. Counsel said: 'Every body politic
is made up of natural men. And as regaros what has been said touching its
inseverability, I do not admit that, for they allowed that mayor, sheriffs and
commonalty make up a sinfle body; here, then, are members, namely the
mayor is one member •
• the sheriff another member • • • the
third is the commonalty. In this case there is an alleged imprisonment of
one of the distinct members named in the title of the corporation, to wit, the
mayor, who is the head and (as in the body natural) the principal member
• • • and if one member of the body natural be restrained or beaten, that
is a restraint or battery of the whole body.'" Vol. 1, p. 475. Y. B., 21 Ed.
IV, f. 7, 12, 27, 67. In 1483, it was held that "if th e king makes a general
corporation by a certain name, all the incidental powers, as to sue, be sued ,
purchase and bold land and other property, cont.met, have a seal, make
by-laws, etc., are included." Y . B., 22 Ed. IV, cited in 10 Coke's Rep. 30.
Littleton, in his Tenures, written about 14.81, does not have much to sa.y of
corporations, but enough to make it certain that their nature and presence

pnrchase and hold land and other propertv, contract, have a seal, make

by-laws, etc., are included." Y. B., 22 Ed. IV, cited in 10 Coke's Rep. 30.

Littleton, in his Tenures, written about 1481, does not have much to say of

corporations, but enough to make it certain that their nature and presence
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were pretty well known, and the distinctions between sole and aggregate

THE CORPORATION AS A PERSON.

pretty well recognized. He speaks particularly of "prelates, abbots, priors,

77

deans, or of the parson of a church, or of other bodies politike." Section

413. See, also, §§ 133 and 134. And his statements accord with the holdings

such as: "Where a bond is made to the Dean of P. and his successors, and it

is not said dean and chapter, and his successors, this is good to the executors,

and void to the successors. Contra, if it had been to the dean and chapter and

his successors; for he has two capacities, viz., "To him and his heirs, and an-

other with the corporation." 20 Ed. IV 2 (1481). So, "If land be granted to

a mayor and commonalty, saying to their successors, they have a fee-simple. 11

Hen. VII 12 (14.96). In 1501, where a corporation has a head (as a mayor)

he may command a thing in person; but a corporation aggregate, which has

no head, must give their authority, under theseal of the corporation." Y. B.,

16 Hen. VIII 2. In 1523, all acts of a corporation must be by their name of

corporation, and by writing, otherwise it is not the corporate act. As do a tort

make a feoffment, enter into an agreement; yet they may elect a dean, mas-

ter or attorney, which are of record. Y. B., 14 Hen. VIII 2, 29. In 1542,

corporations aggregate can not do fealty; for a body invisible can not be in

person, nor can swear. 33 Hen. VIII, Br., Fealty pi. 15. "A bodv politick
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is ml contained in the word person." Plowden, f. 177 (1550-1580). In 1585,

a corporation consisting of confreres and sisters is dissolved by the death of

all the sisters. In 158/, "A corporation is a body politick, consisting of ma-

terial bodies, which, joined together, must have a name to do things that con-

cern their corporation, or otherwise it is no corporation. Ch. B., in Mariot

v. Mascall, And. 206 pi. 238, 29 Eliz. In the argument in this case it was said:

"All the natural persons are not the corporation, but are persons of which

the corporation consist, but not wholly; for the name is part also, without

which the corporation can not be." And. 210. In 1596, it was contended

that an annuity charged against a corporation was gone when the corporation

was dissolved, for it is the person charged. 38 Eliz. Viner, Corp. (4, 3) 8.

Rochester (Bishop's i Case.

Coke's idea of a corporation was that of an artificial personality. "The

corporation itself is only in abstracto, and rests only in intendment and con-

sideration of law." Sutton's Hospital, 10 Rep. 1, on p. 32. (1613). "Per-

sons capable of purchase are of two sorts, persons natural, created of God, and

persons incorporate, or politique, created by the policy of man (and, there-

fore, they are called bodies politique)." 1 Institutes 2 a. (1628). "It is

also called a corporation, or body incorporate, because the persons are made

into a body, and are of a capacity to take and grant." Ib. 250 a. Lord Chief

Justice Hale classed corporations among persons. The 22d section of

Analysis of the Law (c. 1676) is entitled "Concerning persons or bodies politic,

i. e., corporations. I have done with the jura personanim natitralinm * * *

and I now come to persons politic, or corporations, that is, bodies created by

operation of law."

•5. In the modern law.—There can be no doubt as to the influence of the

definitions of Blackstone upon our legal ideas, and there can be scarcely less

doubt as to the influence of Hale's classification upon that of Blackstone." The

latter says: "Persons are divided by the law into either natural or artificial.

* * • Artificial are such as are created and devised by human laws for the

purposes of society and government, which are called corporations or bodies

politic." 1 Comm. »123 (A. D. 1765). On p. *467 he says: "It has been

found necessary, when it is for the advantage of the public to have any par-

ticular rights on foot and continued, to constitute artificial persons, who may

maintain a perpetual succession and enjoy a kind of legal immortality. These

artificial persons are called bodies politic, bodies corporate (corpora corporata),

or corporations, of which there is a great variety subsisting, for the advance-

ment of religion, of learning and of commerce."" Hammond shows that parts

were pretty well known, and the distinctions between sole and aggregate
pretty well recognized. He speaks particularly of " prelates, abbots, priors,
deans, or of the parson of a church, or of other bodies politike." Section
4l3. See, also, §§ 133 and 134. And his statements accord with the holdings
snch as: "Where a bond is made to the Dean of P. and his successors, and it
i.s Hot said dean and chapter, and bis successors, this is good to the executors,
aod void to the successors. Contra, ii it bad been to the dean and chapter and
hiJJ ruccusors; for he has two capacities, viz., ''To him and his heirs, and anoLber with the corporation." 20 Ed. IV 2 (1481). So, "If land be granted to
s mayor and commonalty, saying to their successors, they have a fee-simple. 11
Heo. VII 12 (1496). In loOl, where a corporation bas a head (as a mayor)
he may command a thing in person; but a corporation aggregate, which has
no head, must give their authority, under the seal of the co1·poration." Y. B.,
16 Hen. VIU 2. In 1523, all acts of a corporation must be by their name of
oorporation, and by writing, otherwise it is not the corporate act. As do a to1·t
make a feoffment, enter into an agreement; yet t.laey mav elect a denn, master or attorney, which are of reco1·d. Y. B., 14 Hen. ViII 2, 29. In 154.2,
oorporations aggregate can not <lo fealty; for a body invisible can not be in
person, nor can swear. 33 Hen. VIII, Br., Fealty pl. 15. "A body politick
lS Mt co11eai1ied in the word person." Plowden, f. 177 ( 1550-1580).
In 1585,
a corporation consisting of confreres and sisters is dissolved by the death of
aJI the sisters. In 1587, "A corporation is a body politick, consisting of material bodies, which, joined together, must have a name to do things that concern their corporation, or otherwise it is no corporation. Ch. B., in Ma riot
v. Mascall, And. 206 pl. 238, 29 Eliz. In the argument in this case it was said:
"All the natural persons are not the corporation, but are persons of which
the corporation consist, but not wholly; for the name is part also, without
which the corporation can not be." And . 210. In 1596, it was contended
tba~ an annuity chnrged against a corporation was gone when the corporation
waP dissolvPd, for it is the person charged. 38 Eliz. Viner, Corp. (4, 3) 8.
Rochester {Bishop's 1 Case.
·
<Joke's idea of a corporation was that of an artificial persona1ity. "The
ct>rp-Oration itself is only in abstracto, and rests only in i ntendment and consirleration of law." Sutton's Hospital, 10 Rep. 1, on p. 32. (1613). "Per101U capable of purchase are of two sorts, persons natural, created of God, and
pmoM incorporate, or politique, created by the policy of man (and, therefore, they are called bodies politique )." 1 Institutes 2 a. 11628). "It is
also called a corporation, or bocly inco'rporate, because the persons are made
into a body, and are of a capacity to take an<l grant." lb. 250 a. Lord Chief
Jastit..-e Hale classed corporations among persons. The 22d section of
Analysis of the Law (c. 1676 ) is entitled "Concerning persons or bodies politic,
i.e., corporations. I have done with the jura personarum natt1rali11m • • •
and I now come to persons politic, or co rporations, that is, bodies created by
operation of law ."
5. In the modern law.-There can be no doubt as to the influence of the
definitions of Blackstone upon our legal ideas, and there can be sciircely less
donbt as to the influence of Hale's classification upon that of Blackstone. The
latter says: "Persons are divided by the law into either natural or artificial.
• • • Artificial are such as are created and devised by human laws for the
porposes of society and government, which are called corporations or bodies
politic." 1 Comm. •123 (A. D. 1765). On p. •467 he says: "It has been
foond necessary, when it is for the advantage of the public to have any particular rights on foot and continued, to constitute artificial persons, who may
maintain a perpetual succession and enjoy a kind of legal immortality. These
artificial persons are called bodies politic, bodies corporate {corpora corporata),
or corporations, of which there is a great variety subsiilting, for the advancement of religion, of learning and of commerce." Hammond shows that parts
of this 18th chapter, Book I (containi ng eighteen small pages), have been
qooted, cited or criticised nearly 150 times in reports of cases in the United
States.
Marshall's definition in the Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. (U. 8.), p.

of this 18th chapter, Book I (containing eighteen small pages), have been

quoted, cited or criticised nearly 150 times in reports of cases in the United

States.

Marshall's definition in the Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. (TJ. S.), p.
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NOTES TO ARTICLE II.

518 (A. D. 1819), seems to have come from Coke and the Year Books. He

.NOTES TO ARTICLE II.
says: "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing

only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of the law, it possesses

618 (A. D. 1819), seems to have come from Coke and the Year Beoks. He
says: "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of the Jaw, it possesses
only those properties whfoh the charter of its creation confen! upon it, either
express ly, or as incident~) to its very existence. The..c:e are each as are supposed \:>e;!L to effect the object for which it was created. .Among the moet
1mportant are immortality, and if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties hy which a perpetual succe~on of many persons are cons idered as the P..ame and may act a a sinJ?le individUBI." Although in this
case Judge Story seemed to favor the n ew that a corporation was essentially
a c·ollection of indi vid uals (see infra , p. 727), yet b e summed up his d efinition
thna: "It is, in short, an artificial person, existing in contemplation of law,
and endowed with certain powers and fra1chises, which, though thP.y must
be exercised through the medium of its oat ·raJ members, are yet considered
as subsisting in the corporation as distinctly as if it were a N'a/ personage."
4 Wheat. (U. S.) 667. Justice \Y'.'Sl)ington_ _qootes Blackstone, and looke
upon a corporatio n as afra11<:hise, 4 Wheat. (lJ. S.) 657; isee infrn, p . 723).
The Louisiana civil cooe of 1824 defined a corporation as "an intellectnal
bod;, created by Jaw, composed of individuals united under a common name
•
• and for certain purposes, considered a natural person." Tit. 10, ch.
l, art. 418, 427. This is approved and substantially adoptPd by An~ell and
Ames Corporation!.', p. 1 (1831 ). Walker, American Law, §90 (1837), says:
"Persons are either natural or artificial," the latter consisting "of natural
persons clothed hy law with an artificial character and capacity." So, too,
1n 1839 (22 Wend. 70, Thomas v. Dakin, st1pra, p. 19), and 1841 (1 Bill
(X. Y. ) 620), corporations are defined to bepersons. Granton Corporations,
p . •4 ( 1850), says: "The ideal being called a corporation we may thus defin e to be a continuous identity, endowed at its <'reation with capacity for endless dur~tion; residing in the grantees of it and their successors, its acts being
determined by the will of a majority of.the existing body of its grantees or their
successors at any given time • • • having a name, and unrle r such name
a capacity for taking, holding and enjoying all kinds of property, a qualified
right of disposing of its possessions, and also a capacity for takinf?, h olding and
enjoying but inalienably, liberties, franchi!.'es, exemptions and privileges,
• • • of suing and being sued." In 19 N. Y. 39 (1859), a corporation is
treated as a person. Sir Nathaniel Lindley, in bis Treatise on the Law of
Partnerships, p. 66 (1860), says: "A .corporation is a fictitious person, created by special aatho1;ty, and endowed by that authority with a capacity to
acquire rights and incur obligations, as a means to the end for the attainment
of which the corporation is created. A corporation, it is true, consists of a
number of individuals, but the rights and obligations of these individuals are
not the rights and obligations of the body corporate exercisable by or enforcible against the individual members thereof, either jointly or separately,
but only collectively as one fictitious whole."
The California code of 1872 calls it "a creature of the law having cert-ain
powers and duties of a natural person." Se<'tion 283. This is repeated in the
codes of . 'outh Dakota (1883 l, § 373; and Oklahoma, § 944. The Georgia code
of 1882 says: "A corporation is an artificial person created by law for spedfi.:
purpost>s." Section 1670. Lowell,TransferofStock,§§l , 2(1884),says: "A
corporation is an imaginary person, who, by a fiction of law, possesses certain
rights, and is made subject to certain duties. • • • The corporation is
something distinct from its members. Its life is independent of theirs. Its
will may, at times, be different from that of any member, or of anv given
proportion of its members, anrl it may be bound by conduct·which binds no
one of its members as an individual. Of course, there are, in reality, no rights
or duties but those of batural persons; but the rights and duties of natural
persons who deal with a corporation arise from a fiction, ancl their nature
and extent are determined by that fiction. A person , therefore. who confounds a corporation with its stockholders, who says that they are the corporation, or that it consists uf its members, not only misstates the legal view
of the matter, but is in danger of falling into endless confusion and error. A

only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either

expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are sup-

posed best to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most

important are immortality, and if the expression may be allowed, individual-

ity; properties by which a perpetual succession of many persons are con-

sidered as the same and may act as a single individual." Although in this

case Judge Story seemed to favor the view that a corporation was essentially

a collection of individuals (see infra, p. 727), yet he summed up his definition

thus: "It is, in short, an artificial person, existing in contemplation of law,

and endowed with certain powers and franchises, which, though they must

be exercised through the medium of its nat ral members, are yet considered

as subsisting in the corporation as distinctly as if it were a real personage."

4 Wheat. (U. S.) 667. Justice Washington quotes Blackstone, and looks

upon a corporation as a franchise, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 657; isee infra, p. 723).

The Louisiana civil code of 1824 defined a corporation as "an intellectual

body, created by law, composed of individuals united under a common name
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• * * and for certain purposes, considered a natural person." Tit. 10, ch.

1, art. 418, 427. This is approved and substantially adopted by Angell and

Ames Corporations, p. 1 (1831). Walker, American Law, §90 "(1837), says:

"Persons are either natural or artificial," the latter consisting "of natural

persons clothed hv law with an artificial character and capacitv." So, too,

in 1839 (22 Wend. 70, Thomas v. Dakin, supra, p. 19), and 1841 (1 Hill

(X. Y.) 620), corporations aredefined to be persons. Grant on Corporations,

p. *4 (1850), says: "The ideal being called a corporation we may thus de-

fine to be a continuous identity, endowed at its creation with capacity for end-

less duration; residing in the grantees of it and their successors, its acts being

determi ned by the will of a majority of.the existing body of its grantees or their

successors at any given time * * * having a name, and under such name

a capacity for taking, holding and enjoying all kinds of property, a qualified

right of disposing of its possessions, and also a capacity for taking, holding and

enjoying but inalienably, liberties, franchises, exemptions and privileges,

• •" » of suing and being sued." In 19 N. Y. 39 (1859), a corporation is

treated as a person. Sir Nathaniel Lindley, in his Treatise on the Law of

Partnerships, p. 66 (1860), says: "A corporation is a fictitious person, cre-

ated by special authority, and endowed by that authority with a capacity to

acquire rights and incur obligations, as a means to the end forthe attainment

of which the corporation is created. A corporation, it is true, consists of a

number of individuals, but the rights and obligations of these individuals are

not the rights and obligations of the body corporate exercisable by or en-

forcible against the individual members thereof, either jointly or separately,

but only collectively as one fictitious whole."

The California code of 1872 calls it "a creature of the law having certain

powers and duties of a natural person." Section 283. This is repeated in the

codes of South Dakota (1883), § 373; and Oklahoma, § 944. The Georgia code

of 1882 savs: "A corporation is an artificial person created bvlaw for specific

purposes." Section 1670. Lowell, Transfer of Stock, §§ 1, 2 (1884), says: "A

corporation is an imaginary person, who, by a fiction of law, possesses certain

rights, and is made subject to certain duties. » • * The corporation is

something distinct from its members. Its life is independent of theirs. _ Its

will may, at times, be different from that of any member, or of any given

proportion of its members, and it may be bound by conduct-which binds no

one of its members as an individual. Of course, there are, in reality, no rights

or duties but those of natural persons; but the rights and duties of natural

persons who deal with a corporation arise from a fiction, and their nature

and extent are determined by that fiction. A person, therefore, who con-

founds a corporation with its stockholders, who says that they are the cor-

poration, or that it consists of its members, not only misstates the legal view

of the matter, but is in danger of falling into endless confusion and error. A
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corporation is distinct from its members in the same sense that a state is dis-

tinct from its citizens."

Austin Abbott, in the Century Dictionary (1889) defines a corporation as

"An artificial person, created by law, or under authority of law, from a group

or succession of natural persons, and having a continuous existence irrespec-

tive of that of its members, and powers and liabilities different from those of

its members." Cook, Stock and Stockholders (3ded., 1894), § 1, says: "A

corporation is an artificial person like the state. It is a distinct existence —

an existence separate from that of its stockholders and directors." This is

repeated in the 4th ed., 1898. Reese, The True Doctrine of Ultra Vires, 1897,

says, § 2: "It will be assumed in the examination of the doctrine to be

hereafter discussed, that a corporation both under the common law and as

now organized and created under our state laws, is-a legal entity, separate and

distinct from the members who compose it; that in the corporation, the creature

of the law, is vested all the property and powers of the company; that it can

only be affected by such acts and agreements as are done or executed in its

behalf by the corporate agencies, acting within the legitimate scope of its char-

tered powers; and that no acts or contracts by the officers or agents of the

company beyond the scope of the powers as prescribed and designated in the

charter or articles of association, can be ascribed to the corporation, though
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done and concurred in by each and all of the stockholders." Elliott Cor-

porations, 1899.§2, gives and approves the definitions of Abbott, supra, and

Kyd, infra, p. 109.

The nature of the corporate personality has been the subject of much

speculation. At present, in the United States, the theory is generally held

that the personality is artificial, or fictitious, has no existence in fact. On the

other hand, in Germany, the theory is the reverse of this—that the person-

ality of a corporation is organic—a real person, with a will and capacityto act,

and that this is different from, but just as real, as the individual personality

of each of its members. Recently Dr. Freund, of Chicago University, has

put forth a view that seems to be between these—thnt the personality is a

representative one, limited to a special purpose, hut within that purpose ex-

hibiting a real capacity of acting and willing that has substantially all the

legal elements of responsibility that pertain to an individual. Like the state,

it is a real legal existence, that expresses the will of its members through

representatives selected in a definite way, and is as near a reality as the

state is.

ARTICLE HI. THE CORPORATION AS A COLLECTION OF INDIVIDUALS.1

Sec. 16. The corporation is considered as a collection of individ-

uals,

(I) In the management of corporate affairs:1

"Where an act is to be done by a corporation, all of the members

ought to be assembled together to consent, but this can not be separately

and apart by them at several times, for then it is a factum singulorum.

Case of the Dean and Chapter of Femes, 5 Jac. B. R. (1608)." 6

Viner's Abr. Corporations (G. 3), 6. "In a trial * » * where

there are twelve canons besides the dean, which in all make thirteen

of the corporation, it was held: 1st. That -prima facie, in all acts

done by the corporation, the major number must bind the lesser, or

else differences could never be determined. 2d. That acts done by

the corporation ought to be done by the consent of the major number,

1 See note at the end of this article.

* The management of corporations is treated in ch. 10, infra, p. 833, et seq.

SO CHATER V. SAN FRANCISCO SUGAR REFINING CO. § 17

or else they are not valid, and therefore, -where the corporation con-

80

sists of thirteen, there ought to be seven to make a chapter; but the

CHATER V. SAN FRANCISCO SUGAR REFINING CO.

§ 17

act of the major number of these seven is binding to the corporation.

But if the ancient usage hath been that acts have been done from

or else they are not valid, and therefore, where the corporation consists of thirteen, there ought to be seven to make a chapter; but the
act of the major number of these seven is binding to the corporation.
But if the ancient usage hath been that acts have been done from
time to time by the major part of those that are present, although
they are but three or four, it shall be then intended that that was part
of their constitution at the beginning, and so what is done by them is
b.inding to the rest." 6 Viner's Abr. Corporations (G. 3), 7, citing
Haschard v. Somany, Freem. Rep. 504 (1693). "If an act to be
done be referred to the constituent members of a corporation, nothing
can be done but by those who are the constituent part of the corporation; but where a thing is referred to be done by the commonalty,
there the majority of those who are present (all being summoned)
will determine and bind the rest, but in the other case the majority of
those who are present will not do." 6. Viner's Abr. Corporations
(G. 3), 8, citing The Queen v. Lock, 6 Ann. B. R. (1708).

time to time by the major part of those that are present, although

they are but three or four, it shall be then intended that that was part

of their constitution at the beginning, and so what is done by them is

binding to the rest." 6 Viner's Abr. Corporations (G. 3), 7, citing

Haschard v. Somany, Freem. Rep. 504 (1693). "If an act to be

done be referred to the constituent members of a corporation, nothing

can be done but by those who are the constituent part of the corpora-

tion; but where a thing is referred to be done by the commonalty,

there the majority of those who are present (all being summoned)

will determine and bind the rest, but in the other case the majority of

those who are present will not do." 6. Viner's Abr. Corporations

(G. 3), 8, citing The Queen v. Lock, 6 Ann. B. R. (1708).

Sec. 17. (2) When, by agreement or otherwise, reason, policy, or

justice requires, the artificial personality of the corporation will

be ignored, and the rights and duties of those composing it

alone considered.
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CHATER v. THE' SAN FRANCISCO SUGAR REFINING CO., Et Al.1

1861. In the Supreme Court of California. 19 Cal. 219-248.

[This was a bill filed by the plaintiff for the specific performance of

an agreement between plaintiff and Gordon and Bond, for the forma-

Sec. 17. ( 2) When, by agreement or otherwise, reason, policy, or

tion of a company to be called the "San Francisco Sugar Refining

justice requires, tlte artificial personality of the corporation will
be ignored, and the rights and duties of those composing it
alone considered.

Company," to consist of 1,000 shares, of $100 per share, providing

that one-third of the stock was to be issued to J. B. Bond or his

assigns, upon him or them paying $12,500, Bond to convey back to

the company 83^ shares, into the common stock of the company. A

like provision is made in reference to Gordon. And also "one-third

CRATER v. THE" SAN FRANCISCO SUGAR REFINING CO., ET AL.1

[of the shares] are to be issued to Nathaniel Chater or his assigns,

1861.

upon him or them executing two notes—one of $6,250 to J. B Bond,

IN

THE SUPREME CouRT OF CALIFORNlA. ·

19

Cal. 21~248.

collaterally secured by 125 shares of stock, having two years to run,

[This was a bill filed by the plaintiff for the specific performance of
an agreement between plaintiff and Gordon and Bond, for the forma·
tion of a company to be called the " San Francisco Sugar Refining
Company," to consist of 1 ,ooo shares, of $ 100 per share, providing
that one-third of the stock was to be issued to J. B. Bond or his
assigns, upon him or them paying $12 ,500, Bond to convey back to
the company 83}'3 shares, into the common stock of the company. A
like provi sion is made in reference to Gordon. And also "one-third
[of the shares J are to be issued to Nathaniel Chater or his assigns,
upon him or them executing two notes-one of $6,250 to J. B Bond,
collaterally secured by 125 shares of stock, having two years to run,
bearing 2 per cent. per month interest; and another note of $6.250 to
George Gordon, collaterally secured by 125 shares of stock, having
same time to run, and bearing the same interest, and said Chater is
also to transfer back to the company 83}'3 shares of stock into the
common stock of the company."
"It is agreed that the two hundred and fifty shares of stock thus
given back to the company shall be sold only by a majority vote of
the company, and J. B. Bond guarantees to the extent of the note of

bearing 2 per cent, per month interest; and another note of $6,250 to

George Gordon, collaterally secured by 125 shares of stock, having

same time to run, and bearing the same interest, and said Chater is

also to transfer back to the company 83^ shares of stock into the

common stock of the company."

"It is agreed that the two hundred and fifty shares of stock thus

given back to the company shall be sold only by a majority vote of

the company, and J. B. Bond guarantees to the extent of the note of

1 Statement of facts condensed, arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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said Chater held by him ($6,250), that from one hundred and twenty-

five of the shares he will raise the sum of $12,500, as needed, and

George Gordon guarantees to the extent of the note of said Chater

held by him, that he will, on one hundred and twenty-five shares', also
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raise the sum of $12,500.

"And it is further agreed, that the shares not sold belonging to the

common stock of the company, as above recited, shall, if it be not

found necessary to sell them, be divided equally among the three par-

ties hereto, but not until the company's works have been in operation

for at least twelve months.

"It is agreed that George Gordon shall organize the company in

San Francisco by taking out articles of incorporation according to law,

and that the first trustees shall be Charles W. Bond, Nathaniel Chater

and George Gordon.

"That upon the organization of the company and on the enactment

of its by-laws, the trustees shall issue stock as herein set forth, to the

said Chater held by him ($6,250), that from one hundred and twentyfive of the shares he will raise the sum of $12,500, as needed, and
George Gordon guarantees to the extent of the note of said Chater
held by him, that he will, on one hundred and twenty-five shares~ also
raise the sum of $12,500.
"And it is further agreed, that the shares not sold belonging to the
common stock of the company, as above recited, shall, if it be not
found necessary to sell them, be divided equally among the three parties hereto, but not until the company's works have been in operation
for at least twelve months.
"It is agreed that George Gordon shall organize the company in
San Francisco by taking out articles of incorporation according to law,
and that the first trustees shall be Charles W. Bond, Nathaniel Chater
and George Gordon.
"That upon the organization of the company and on the enactment
of its by-laws, the trustees shall issue stock as herein set forth, to the
parties, upon their furnishing the respective amounts they herein agree
to furnish, or in proportion as they furnish said amount.
"Each certificate of stock to be signed by two trustees and countersigned by the secretary.
"The stock of N. Chater to be issued to him, as herein provided,
on the execution of the agreement to manage the works, a memorandum of which agreement is made simultaneous with this.
"The said Gordon and Chater agree that, to the extent of the interest which they may control, they will vote for the said Bond to act
as agent of the company in San Francisco, attending to the commercial affairs of said company there, for which service he shall receive
a salary of $I ,8oo per annum."
Afterwards, another agreement was made, of the same date, as follow:
"Whereas, N. Chater has induced the said Bond and Gordon to
enter into the organization of a company in San Francisco for the purpose of sugar refining and its collateral branches; and the said Bond
and Gordon do so on the representation of said Chater and on his
promise to manage the same for five years, and to retain his interest
therein during that time, and upon his further representation that he
can skillfully manage a sugar refinery; with a view of engaging the
services of said Chater, the said Bond and Gordon, by an agreement
of even date herewith, have agreed to set apart to said Chater two
hundred and fifty shares of the capital stock of the company, at the
rate of fifty cents on the dollar of the par value of the shares, and to
take therefor the notes of said Chater (two, and $6,250 each), having two years to run, collaterally secured by the two hundred and fifty
shares, and also to give the said Chater one-third of the reserved or
paid back shares which may not be sold, as provided for in agreement
of thls date made between the present contracting parties.
"Now, the said Chater agrees with and to the said Gordon and
Bond (which agreement they make for the company they propose to
0

parties, upon their furnishing the respective amounts they herein agree

to furnish, or in proportion as they furnish said amount.

"Each certificate of stock to be signed by two trustees and counter-

signed by the secretary.
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"The stock of N. Chater to be issued to him, as herein provided,

on the execution of the agreement to manage the works, a memoran-

dum of which agreement is made simultaneous with this.

"The said Gordon and Chater agree that, to the extent of the in-

terest which they may control, they will vote for the said Bond to act

as agent of the company in San Francisco, attending to the commer-

cial affairs of said company there, for which service he shall receive

a salary of $1,800 per annum."

Afterwards, another agreement was made, of the same date, as fol-

low:

"Whereas, N. Chater has induced the said Bond and Gordon to

enter into the organization of a company in San Francisco for the pur-

pose of sugar refining and its collateral branches; and the said Bond

and Gordon do so on the representation of said Chater and on his

promise to manage the same for five years, and to retain his interest

therein during that time, and upon his further representation that he

can skillfully manage a sugar refinery; with a view of engaging the

services of said Chater, the said Bond and Gordon, by an agreement

of even date herewith, have agreed to set apart to said Chater two

hundred and fifty shares of the capital stock of the company, at the

rate of fifty cents on the dollar of the par value of the shares, and to

take therefor the notes of said Chater (two, and $6,250 each), hav-

ing two years to run, collaterally secured by the two hundred and fifty

shares, and also to give the said Chater one-third of the reserved or

paid back shares which may not be sold, as provided for in agreement

of this date made between the present contracting parties.

"Now, the said Chater agrees with and to the said Gordon and

Bond (which agreement they make for the company they propose to

6—Wil. Cases.
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form, and with the understanding that they shall be at liberty to trans-

fer the said agreement to the company when it shall be formed) that

82

he, the said Chater, will proceed to San Francisco and there superin-
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tend the erection of the sugar refinery and construct the same as he

form, and with the understanding that they shall be at liberty to transfer the said agreement to the company when it shall be formed) that
he, the said Chater, will proceed to San Francisco and there superintend the erection of the sugar refinery and construct the same as he
may be directed by the company, with regard to location, cost and
extent, and get the same into working order, and that after the same
is in order, he shall superintend the business of sugar refining for the
said company for the · period of five years from the date of first of
May, 1856 (eighteen hundred and fifty-six).
"That he shall engage in no other business during the period of
his engagement with this company, but devote his entire time to the
business of the company during the time he is manager.
"And the more effectually to secure the performance by him, the
said Chater, of this agreement, he hereby agrees that during the
period of his engagement above named, of five years, he will not dispose of such of his shares of stock in the company (or sell or transfer
them) as he may have been enabled to pay for out of the dividends
made upon the stock issued to him, and the said Chater agrees that
the stock shall be issued to him with such restrictions as shall prevent
him selling it during the above named period.
"He, the said Chater, also agrees with the said Bond and Gordon
that the dividends declared from time to time upon the stock issued
to him shall go to the payment of the notes hereinbefore referred to.
"The said Bond and Gordon undertake that the proposed company
shall, in consideration of the premises, agree to pay the said Cbater
the yearly salary of $3,ooo, in monthly sums of $250 per month, to
commence at the time the works go into operation, and shall also pay
him the monthly sum of $I 50 during the time his services may be required in erecting the works prior to commencing operations, and up
to the time of commencing operations.
·
"That said Chater also agrees, that if at any time the company
become dissatisfied with his management, they may remove him without prejudice to this agreement, in which event his yearly salary of
$3,000 shall cease and determine, but he, the said Chater, shall not
be at liberty to engage in California in the business of sugar refining
either for himself or for others.
"Interest on the notes given by said Chater to commence on the
first day of September of this present year.
"~t is agreed that said Bond and the said George Gordon shall procure for the said Chater, within sixty days of being notified by him
of his readiness to pay the notes herein specified, the said notes and
collaterals, though the notes shall not have matured, and that in the
event of the said Gordon and Bond respectively failing to procure the
said notes, the interest upon same shall, from such date, be reduced
to one- per cent. per month.
"It is further agreed , until dividends shall have been declared by the
company of sufficient amount so that those due on the stock of said
Chater, hypothecated to secure said notes, shall be sufficient to pay
the interest due and accruing monthly on those notes, that the company

may be directed by the company, with regard to location, cost and

extent, and get the same into working order, and that after the same

is in order, he shall superintend the business of sugar refining for the

said company for the period of five years from the date of first of

May, 1856 (eighteen hundred and fifty-six).

"That he shall engage in no other business during the period of

his engagement with this company, but devote his entire time to the

business of the company during the time he is manager.

"And the more effectually to secure the performance by him, the

said Chater, of this agreement, he hereby agrees that during the

period of his engagement above named, of five years, he will not dis-

pose of such of his shares of stock in the company (or sell or transfer

them) as he may have been enabled to pay for out of the dividends

made upon the stock issued to him, and the said Chater agrees that

the stock shall be issued to him with such restrictions as shall prevent

him selling it during the above named period.
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"He, the said Chater, also agrees with the said Bond and Gordon

that the dividends declared from time to time upon the stock issued

to him shall go to the payment of the notes hereinbefore referred to.

"The said Bond and Gordon undertake that the proposed company

shall, in consideration of the premises, agree to pay the said Chater

the yearly salary of $3,000, in monthly sums of $250 per month, to

commence at the time the works go into operation, and shall also pay

him the monthly sum of $150 during the time his services may be re-

quired in erecting the works prior to commencing operations, and up

to the time of commencing operations.

"That said Chater also agrees, that if at any time the company

become dissatisfied with his management, they may remove him with-

out prejudice to this agreement, in which event his yearly salary of

$3,000 shall cease and determine, but he, the said Chater, shall not

be at liberty to engage in California in the business of sugar refining

either for himself or for others.

"Interest on the notes given by said Chater to commence on the

first day of September of this present year.

"It is agreed that said Bond and the said George Gordon shall pro-

cure for the said Chater, within sixty days of being notified by him

of his readiness to pay the notes herein specified, the said notes and

collaterals, though the notes shall not have matured, and that in the

event of the said Gordon and Bond respectively failing to procure the

said notes, the interest upon same shall, from such date, be reduced

to one per cent, per month.

"It is further agreed, until dividends shall have been declared by the

company of sufficient amount so that those due on the stock of said

Chater, hypothecated to secure said notes, shall be sufficient to pay

the interest due and accruing monthly on those notes, that the company
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shall advance to said Chater the interest so upon due until the ma-

turity of the notes as a loan to him." * * *

Chater, afterwards, on the 17th of October, 1856, was seized with
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paralysis, and was rendered incapable of attending to the business.

The notes mentioned in the agreement as those to be made by the

plaintiff were never given, nor, so far as appears, demanded.

The defense seems to rest principally upon the point that these

notes were not made as contemplated by the agreement, that the

plaintiff, therefore, did not comply with the contract on his part, and

consequently has no right to insist on performance by defendants,

that one of the principal, if not the leading, inducements to the con-

tract was the rendition of the services of the plaintiff, and that the

failure to render these, though caused by his sickness, was a failure

of the consideration of the agreement; and that the agreement was

that of the individual members or stockholders, Gordon and Bond,

and not of the corporation.] • * »

Baldwin, J., delivered the opinion of the court, Field, C. J., and

Cope, J., concurring.

The whole case in this view of it may be thus summed up: Three

men enter into an agreement to form a corporation for commercial
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purposes. By this agreement, and the corporate act, each corporator

is entitled to an equal proportion of the stock; two contribute to the

capital in money—the third has no money; he proposes and is allowed

to give his note in lieu of money, pledging his stock as security; the

other two agree that on this stock they will raise him the money. It

is agreed that the stock due him shall be issued on a given event; the

event happens. The note is not made nor the stock issued to him,

but the company, controlled by the other two corporators, goes on recog-

nizing the third as a corporator; no demand is made for his note or

the stock issued to him. The corporation makes profit enough to pay

the debts, and the share coming to the third partner pays his contribu-

tion. No stock is issued to him, and he now claims it. If the two

who were to raise the amount to be contributed by the third, having

by the agreement the right to demand his note and stock, do not de-

mand them or issue the stock to him, but without this form of

security advance the money which was to be raised, they are to be

considered as waiving this formal right, and are not at liberty to plead

the want of a mere literal compliance as a forfeiture—for such it

would be—of the interest of the third partner in the common enter-

prise. In equity the substance of the whole transaction is fulfilled;

the object of the security answered, and the original right of the

plaintiff here to his stock is not lost by a mere failure on his part to

give a particular form of security, upon which those beneficially in-

terested in demanding it did not insist. What, in such a state of

things, was not insisted upon was waived; and equity, not regarding

mere modes or forms, but looking at the very substance of the trans-

action, is satisfied when the substantial purpose is effected, though

not effected in the precise way contemplated by the parties: and this

is the more especially true if this failure to follow the prescribed mode

shall advance to said Chater the interest so upon due until the maturity of the notes as a loan to him." • • •
Chater, afterwards, on the 17th of October, 1856, was seized with
paralysis, and was rendered incapable of attending to the business.
The notes mentioned in the agreement as those to be made by the
plaintiff were never given, nor, so far as appears, demanded.
The defense seems to rest principally upon the point that these
notes were not made as contemplated by the agreement, that the
plaintiff, therefore, did not comply with the contract on his part, and
consequently has no right to insist on performance by defendants,
that one of the principal, if not the leading, inducements to the contract was the rendition of the services of the plaintiff, and that the
failure to render these, though caused by his sickness, was a failure
of the consideration of the agreement; and that the agreement was
that of the individual members or stockholders, Gordon and Bond,
and not of the corporation.] • • •
BALDWIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, FIELD, C. J., and
COPE, J., concurring.
The whole case in this view of it may be thus summed up: Three
men enter into an agreement to form a corporation for commercial
purposes. By this agreement, and the corporate act, each corporator
i entitled to an equal proportion of the stock; two contribute to the
capital in money-the third has no money; he proposes and is allowed
to give his note in lieu of money, pledging his stock as security; the
other two agree that on this stock they will raise him the money. It
is agreed that the stock due him shall be issued on a given event; the
event happens. The note is not made nor the stock issued to him,
but the company, controlled by the other two corporators, goes on recognizing the third as a corporator; no demand is ma<le for his note or
the stock issued to him. The corporation makes profit enough to pay
the debts, and the share coming to the third partner pays his contribution. No stock is issued to him, and he now claims it. If the two
who were to raise the amount to be contributed by the third, having
by the agreement the right to demand his note and stock, do not demand them or issue the stock to him, but without this form of
security advance the money which was to be raised, they are to be
considered as waiving this formal right, and are not at liberty to plead
the want of a mere literal compliance as a forfeiture-for such it
would be--of the interest of the third partner in the common enterprise. In equity the substance of the whole transaction is fulfilled ;
the object of the security answered, and the original right of the
plaintiff here to his stock is not lost by a mere failure on his part to
giv'e a particular form of security, upon which those beneficially interested in demanding it did not insist. What, in such a state of
things, was not insisted upon was wai:ved ; and equity, not regarding
mere modes or forms, but looking at the very substance of the transaction, is satisfied when the substantial purpose is effected, though
not effected in the precise· way contemplated by the parties: and this
is the more especially true if this failure to follow the prescribed mode
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be owing to the laches, or be by the waiver or acquiesence of the

party entitled in strict right to insist upon it.
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The notes of Chater were merely to represent his debt, and the
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money to pay this debt Bond and Gordon were to raise on the secu-

be owing to the lacbes, or be by the waiver or acquiesence of the
party entitled in strict right to insist upon it.
The notes of Chater were merely to represent bis debt, and the
money to pay this debt Bond and Gordon were to raise on the security of his stock, they being interested in using it; and whether the
stock was issued in the form of a certificate or not, it was bound by
the agreement; and if they chose, they could as safely advance the
money without the note, and the substance of the whole atTangement
be attained. It is not necessary for us, therefore, to consider the other
points urged, to say the least, with plausibility, in avoidance of the
ground taken by the appellants to sustain the proposition just discussed.
This view distinguishes this case from mere executory agreement,
through a performance of the terms of which a party becomes entitled
to property, of which class Green v. Covillaud (10 Cal. 317) 1 and the
other cases cited by appellants, are examples. Here Chater was entitled, as of original right, to his stock, and the conditions annexed to
the issuance of the certificates to him, even if not waived, at most
were mere qualifications in favor of his associates of that right, and
in the nature of security to them, the substance of which security they
enjoyed, and a failure of the precise process prescribed, neither by the
general principles of law applicable to such contracts, nor by the express terms of the agreement, worked a forfeiture of his interest in the
stock, nor in the business of the corporation.
We think there is nothing in the point that the rendering of plaintiff's services for the five years was a condition precedent to the vesting
of the plaintiff's title to the stock. Nothing in the agreement so declares. The provision for the employment of plaintiff as superintendent 'seems to be an independent tenn of the agreement. • • •
BALDWIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court upon the petition
for rehearing, FIELD, C. J., and CoPE, J., concurring. • • •
It is next insisted that we erred in holding that this agreement bound
the corporation. That point was barely suggested on the oral argument, and in the learned and able briefs of the counsel no great
stress seemed to be laid on it. We gave it no very elaborate consideration, for we really supposed-erroneously, perhaps-that the counsel placed but little reliance upon it. The argument now on this point
is very full and very ingenious, but as applied to the facts of this record is not sound.
Every opinion, as Chief Justice Marshall well observes, must be
considered with reference to the particular facts upon which it is
made ; for it is impossible so to use language as that general expressions apply in every instance with the same meaning to every condition of facts. We asserted no such doctrine as that, by force of a
secret agreement between the original corporators in a commercial
corporation, whether made before or after the act of incorporation,
the stock issued by the corporation to innocent parties without notice
of the agreement could be charged or affected by it. There was no
. case before us for the application of such a principle. But the right

rity of his stock, they being interested in using it; and whether the

stock was issued in the form of a certificate or not, it was bound by

the agreement; and if they chose, they could as safely advance the

money without the note, and the substance of the whole arrangement

be attained. It is not necessary for us, therefore, to consider the other

points urged, to say the least, with plausibility, in avoidance of the

ground taken by the appellants to sustain the proposition just dis-

cussed.

This view distinguishes this case from mere executory agreement,

through a performance of the terms of which a party becomes entitled

to property, of which class Green v. Covillaud (10 Cal. 317), and the

other cases cited by appellants, are examples. Here Chater was en-

titled, as of original right, to his stock, and the conditions annexed to

the issuance of the certificates to him, even if not waived, at most

were mere qualifications in favor of his associates of that right, and

in the nature of security to them, the substance of which security they
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enjoyed, and a failure of the precise process prescribed, neither by the

general principles of law applicable to such contracts, nor by the ex-

press terms of the agreement, worked a forfeiture of his interest in the

stock, nor in the business of the corporation.

We think there is nothing in the point that the rendering of plaint-

iff's services for the five years was a condition precedent to the vesting

of the plaintiff's title to the stock. Nothing in the agreement so de-

clares. The provision for the employment of plaintiff as superintend-

ent seems to be an independent term of the agreement. * * *

Baldwin, J., delivered the opinion of the court upon the petition

for rehearing, Field, C. J., and Cope, J., concurring. • * •

It is next insisted that we erred in holding that this agreement bound

the corporation. That point was barely suggested on the oral argu-

ment, and in the learned and able briefs of the counsel no great

stress seemed to be laid on it. We gave it no very elaborate consid-

eration, for we really supposed—erroneously, perhaps—that the coun-

sel placed but little reliance upon it. The argument now on this point

is very full and very ingenious, but as applied to the facts of this rec-

ord is not sound.

Every opinion, as Chief Justice Marshall well observes, must be

considered with reference to the particular facts upon which it is

made; for it is impossible so to use language as that general expres-

sions apply in every instance with the same meaning to every condi-

tion of facts. We asserted no such doctrine as that, by force of a

secret agreement between the original corporators in a commercial

corporation, whether made before or after the act of incorporation,

the stock issued by the corporation to innocent parties without notice

of the agreement could be charged or affected by it. There was no

case before us for the application of such a principle. But the right
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to incorporate for such a purpose as that here is a statutory right,

which is free to everybody. The rights in the corporation can be

adjusted by contract, and the terms fixed by contract. The cor-
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poration is little more, under our laws, than a joint stock company

under the English laws, indeed, in its true nature more nearly resem-

bling a limited partnership under special articles than a corporation

at common law. This corporation was organized under an agree-

ment, whieh was in itself legal and binding. The original corpora-

tors were really the men (except one—if, indeed, he were not the

issignee of one) who made the agreement, and were bound to execute

it. They had the power to execute it; for they had on the organiza-

tion the power, subject to restrictions which we do not apply here, to

control their own business in their own way. A man may as well

make an agreement with another for certain stock in a corporation to

be organized hereafter, as an agreement for stock in a presently ex-

isting corporation. If A, B and C agree to form a corporation for a

railroad with a capital of so much, to be represented by so many

shares of stock, why may not they contract that each is to have so

many shares on such and such terms? What rule of law forbids? Is

there anything immoral in the contract, or opposed to public policy?
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Can not a man as well subscribe one time as another for stock, if all

interested consent? Indeed, asunder this particular agreement they

organized, so far as the then members are concerned, the agreement

becomes as effectual as if a part of the corporate act.

As there is in this respect no restriction upon the terms on which

they associate or do business, or to the time of making them, why not

find those terms in an antecedent agreement as well as a present adop-

tion, if the preceding agreement is connected by clear proof with the

act of incorporation and its affairs? Suppose A, B and C agree to

form a corporation for running stages, and put in, each, $10,000, but

there are to be no certificates of stock issued and no debts incurred.

This agreement precedes, of course, the incorporation; and suppose

the money is paid before the corporate act is consummated. The cor-

poration is formed and proceeds to do business. Will it be contended

that these men are not entitled to their respective shares of the profits,

etc., from the mere fact that all this occurred before the technical

ideal thing—the corporation—was called into existence? The truth is,

the corporation, under our system, following such an agreement, would

be the mere agency of the associates created for the sake of conve-

nience in carrying out the agreement, as bet-jveen those who made the

bwgain—the different characters or forms in which or by which the

bargain was made, and the order in which the several parts of it were

executed, makes no substantial difference in the obligation. But if

it did, and this ideal thing, the corporation, be something essential, dis-

tinct and exclusive, making the men inside of it and controlling it

wholly different from the same men just before they went into it; yet

these shares are interests and property in esse or posse. This interest,

or those shares, entitle the holder to certain privileges of value, and

may entitle him to profits. Whether, therefore, the corporation is

to incorporate f.or . such a purpose as that here is a statutory right,
which is free to everybody. The rights in the corporation can be
adjusted by contract, and the terms fixed by contract. The corporation little more, under our laws, than a joint stock company
under the English laws, indeed, in its true nature more nearly resembling a limited partnership under special articles than a corporation
at common law. This corporation was organized under an agreement, whieh was in itself legal and binding. The original corporators were really the men (except one-if, indeed, he were not the
1ssignee of one) who made the agreement, and were bound to execute
it. They had the power to execute it; for they had on the organization the power, subject to restrictions which we do not apply here, to
control their own business in t~eir own way. A man may as well
make an agreement with another for certain stock in a corporation to
be organized hereafter, as an agreement for stock in a presently exi ting corporation. If A, B and C agree to form a corporation for a
railroad with a capital of so much, to be represented by so many
hares of stock, why may not they contract that each is to have so
many shares on such and such terms? What rule of law forbids? Is
there anything immoral in the contract, or opposed to public policy?
Can not a man as well subscribe one time as another for stock, if all
interested consent? Indeed, as under this particular agreement they
organized, so far as the then members are concerned, the agreement
becomes as effectual as if a part of the corporate act.
As there is in this respect no restriction upon the terms on which
they associate or do business, or to the time of making them, why not
find those terms in an antecedent agreement as well as a present adoption, if the preceding agreement is connected by clear proof with the
act of incorporation and its affairs? Suppose A, B and C agree to
fonn a corporation for running stages, and put in, each, $10,000, but
there are to be no certificates of stock issued and no debts incurred.
This agreement precedes, of course, the incorporation; and suppose
the money is paid before the corporate act is consummated. The corporation is formed and proceeds to do business. Will it be contended
that these men are not entitled to their respective shares of the profits,
etc., from the mere fact that all this occurred before the technical
ideal thing-the corporation-was called into existence? The truth is,
the corporation, under our system, following such an agreement, would
be the mere agency of the associates created for the sake of convenience in carrying out the agreement, as between those who made the
bargain-the different characters or forms in which or by which the
bargain was made, and the order in which the several parts of it were
executed, makes no substantial difference in the obligation. But if
it did, and this ideal thing, the corporation, be something essential, distinct and exclusive, making the men inside of it and controlling it
wholly different from the same men just before they went into it; yet
these shares are interests and property in esse or posse. This interest,
or those shares, entitle the holder to certain privileges of value, and
may entitle him to profits. \Vhether, therefore, the corporation is

is

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

86 CHATER V. SAN FRANCISCO SUGAR REFINING CO. § 17

bound of itself, and as a separate entity, to recognize a right in a

claimant to this interest, a private person holding these shares or

86

interests would be bound to such claimant for them.
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But apart from all this, when the corporation became such, it or-

bound of itself, and as a separate entity, to recognize a right in a
claimant to this interest, a private person holding these shares or
interests would be bound to such claimant for them.
But apart from all this, when the corporation became such, it organized with Chater, Bond and Gordon as trustees, and these were
really the sole corporators also ; and they organized with full knowledge of this agreement, which not only contemplated the formation
of the company or corporation, but prescribed the terms and rights of
the members in the corporation and corporate business. Chater was
not only superintendent under this agreement, but tmstee, too; and
the corporate business was commenced and for a long time prosecuted
with reference to this agreement, which recited these terms and affirmed
these rights. If anything could be, this was an adoption by the corporation of these terms. It is not necessary to inquire whether an innocent purchaser of the stock, buying subsequently without notice,
would be affected by any such acts-for no such question is before us
now. If the corporation be bound by this agreement, and the comt,
proceeding to enforce it by ordering the issuance of stock, should affect injuriously any innocent holder of stock, it will be time enough
to consider bis rights, legal or equitable, when the facts and proper
parties are before the court.
If, on taking the account, it should appear that Chater is not entitled to anything, but that the corporation is so indebted as to make
it inequitable for him to receive his shares, the court below, on the
final hearing, can make the proper decree, unaffected by anything in
the decree under review.
With these modifications, the decree is affirmed and the cause remanded.

ganized with Chater, Bond and Gordon as trustees, and these were

really the sole corporators also; and they organized with full knowl-

edge of this agreement, which not only contemplated the formation

of the company or corporation, but prescribed the terms and rights of

the members in the corporation and corporate business. Chater was

not only superintendent under this agreement, but trustee, too; and

the corporate business was commenced and for a longtime prosecuted

with reference to this agreement, which recited these terms and affirmed

these rights. If anything could be, this was an adoption by the cor-

poration of these terms. It is not necessary to inquire whether an in-

nocent purchaser of the stock, buying subsequently without notice,

would be affected by any such acts—for no such question is before us

now. If the corporation be bound by this agreement, and the court,

proceeding to enforce it by ordering the issuance of stock, should af-

fect injuriously any innocent holder of stock, it will be time enough

to consider his rights, legal or equitable, when the facts and proper
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parties are before the court.

If, on taking the account, it should appear that Chater is not en-

titled to anything, but that the corporation is so indebted as to make

it inequitable for him to receive his shares, the court below, on the

final hearing, can make the proper decree, unaffected by anything in

the decree under review.

With these modifications, the decree is affirmed and the cause re-

manded.

Note. (1) Specific performance of stock agreements may be had when

damages woula be inadequate. See: 1746, Buxton v. Lister, 3 Atkyns, Ch.

383; 1804, Lady Arundell v. Phipps, 10 Vesey 148; The Mechanics', etc.,

Bank v. Seton, 1 Peters (U. S. Sup. C.) 299; 1828, Cowles v. Whitman, 10

Conn. 121; 1839, Clark v. Flint, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 231; 1863, Treasurer v. Com-

mercial Mining Co., 23 Cal. 390; 1879, Cushman v. Thaver Mfg. I. Co., 76

N. Y. 365, 32 Am. Rep. 315; 1886, Eckstein v. Downing, 64 N. H. 248,10 Am.

St. Rep. 404; 1888, Goodwin Gas S. & M. Co.'s Appeal, 117 Pa. St. 514; 1891,

Note. (1) Speclftc performance of stock agreement.a may be bad when
damages would be inadequate. See: 1746, Buxton v. Lister, 3 Atkyns, Ch.
383; 1804, Lady Arundell v. Phipps, 10 Vesey 148; The Mechanics', etc.,
Bank v. Seton, 1 Peters (U. S. Sup. C.) 299; 1828, Cowles v. Whitman, 10
Conn. 121; 1839, Clark v. Flint, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 231; 1863, Treasurer v. Commercial M'1010g Co., 23 Cal. 390; 1879, Cushman v. Thayer Mfg. I. Co., 76
N. Y. 365, 32 Am . Rep. 315; 1886, Eckstein v. Downing, 64 N. H. 248, 10 Am.
St. Rep. 404; 1888, Goodwin Gas S. & M. Co.'s Appeal, 117 Pa. St. 514; 1891,
Bumgardner v. Leavitt, 35 W. Va. 194, 12 Law. Rep. Ann. 776; 1894, New
England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 27 Law. Rep. Ann. 271.
(2) Waiver of statutory liability, by creditors, may be made by express
agreement: 1839, Kerridge v. Hesse, 9 Carr. & Payne 200; 1863, Robinson v.
Bidwell, 22 Cal. 3i9; 1872, Bassbor v. Forbes, 36 Md. 154; 1883, Brown v.
Eastern Slate Co., 134 Mass. 590.
(3) Generally '.in informal agreement among members of a corporation,
without corporate aclfon in the prescribed mode, does not bind the corporation:
1891, Independent Order of Foresters v. Zak, 136 Ill. 185, 29 Am. St. Rep.
318; 1896, Dennis v. Joslin Mfg. Co., 19 R. I. 666, 61 Am. Rt. Rep. 805.
(4) Provisions in articles of association contrary to law or public policy
are void: 1889, People v. Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 17 Am. St. Rep. 319; yet
they mRy be consirle red as surplu.sage, and not vitiate the organization: 1896,
Shick v. Citizens' Enterprise Co., 15 Ind. App. 329, 57 Am. St. Rep. 280; unless there is no sanction in Jaw at all for the purposes proposed: 1894, State
v. Inter-National lnve!"tmPnt Co., 88 Wis. 512, 43 Am. St. 920.

Bumgardner v. Leavitt, 35 W. Va. 194, 12 Law. Rep. Ann. 776; 1894, New

England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 27 Law. Rep. Ann. 271.

(2) Waiver of statutory liability, by creditors, may be made by express

agreement: 1839, Kerridge v. Hesse, 9 Carr. & Payne 200; 1863, Robinson v.

Bid well, 22 Cal. 379; 1872, Basshor v. Forbes, 36 Md. 154; 1883, Brown v.

Eastern Slate Co., 134 Mass. 590.

(3) Generally an informal agreement among members of a corporation,

without corporate action in the. prescribed mode, does not bind the corporation:

1891, Independent Order of Foresters v. Zak, 136 111. 185, 29 Am. St. Rep.

318; 1896, Dennis v. Joslin Mfg. Co., 19 R. I. 666, 61 Am. St. Rep. 805.

(4) Provisions in articles of association contrary to law or public policy

are void: 1889, People v. Gas Trust Co., 130 111. 268, 17 Am. St. Rep. 319; yet

they may be considered as surplusage, and not vitiate the organization: 1896,

Shi'ck v. Citizens' Enterprise Co., 15 Ind. App. 329, 57 Am. St. Rep. 230; un-

less there is no sanction in law at all for the purposes proposed: 1894, State

v. Inter-National Investment Co., 88 Wis. 512, 43 Am. St. 920.
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Sec. 18. Same. Particularly, (a) In matters relating to the

constitution of the corporation itself, or changes therein.

ASHTON v. BURBANK Et Al.1

1873. In the United States Circuit Court, Eighth Circuit, Dis-

trict of Minnesota. 2 Dillon (U. S. Cir. Ct.)

435-441, Fed. Cas. No. 582.

[This is an action on a promissory note, dated August 19, 1867, for

$3,000, made by the defendants to the Provident Life Insurance and

Investment Company. The defendants were subscribers of that com-

pany, and the note in suit was given for an assessment upon their

stock. The original charter of said company authorized it to transact

a "life and accident insurance" business. After the defendants' sub-

scription to the stock, the charter was amended, and the name of the

company changed to the Eagle Insurance Company, and it was also

authorized, by the amended charter, to transact the business of "fire,

marine and inland insurance." The amended charter was accepted,

but, in point of fact, the company took no risks during the short period

it afterwards did business, except such as were authorized by its orig-

inal charter. Subsequently, the company, being then in possession

of the note in suit, forfeited, under authority given in its charter, the
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stock of the defendants therein. The note in suit, when long past

due, was transferred by the company to the plaintiff. * * *

The defendants neither procured nor assented to said last men-

tioned act [amending the charter], nor did they know of it until after

its passage, and thereupon they protesed against it, and refused to

pay the note in suit on this ground. Subsequently the said Eagle

Insurance Company ceased to do business, and this note, among

other assets, was sold to the plaintiff in the year 1871, in payment of

a debt due from the Eagle Insurance Company to him. After the

said amendment of the charter of March 3, 1869, the Eagle Insurance

Company did not, in fact, transact any fire, marine or inland insur-

ance business, or do any other business than such as was authorized

by the original charter.]

Dillon, C. J. We hold the following propositions: * * *

The change in the charter, by which a life and accident company

was authorized to transact fire, marine and inland insurance, is an

organic change of such a radical character as to discharge previous

subscribers to the stock of the company from any obligation to pay

their subscription, unless the change is expressly or impliedly assented

to by them. Here there was no such assent, and no acquiescence in

the structural change made in the charter of the company. The com-

pany could not, against such a subscriber, maintain a suit to collect

his subscription, and take the money and use it as capital for the

transaction of business under the charter as altered. We think, in

1 Statement of facts condensed. Part of opinion omitted.
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such a case, the subscriber is not bound to enjoin action under the
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amended charter, but may, if he elects, defend against an action to

recover on his subscription to the stock.

such a case, tht: subscriber is not bound to enjoin action under the
amended charter, but may, if he elects, defend against an action to
recover on his subscription to the stock.
If the company accepted the amended charter, as it did, by adopting the new name, it is not essential to such a defense to show that at
the time of the trial the corporation had actually exercised the enlarged powers conferred upon it. The defendants are not bound,
on their subscription, to pay to the company money which, if paid,
may be used as capital to carry on the business authorized by the
amended charter.
Judgment for the defendants.
NELSON, J., concurs.

If the company accepted the amended charter, as it did, by adopt-

ing the new name, it is not essential to such a defense to show that at

the time of the trial the corporation had actually exercised the en-

larged powers conferred upon it. The defendants are not bound,

on their subscription, to pay to the company money which, if paid,

may be used as capital to carry on the business authorized by the

amended charter.

Judgment for the defendants.

Nelson, J., concurs.

Note. The power of the majority to modify the constitution of a corpora-

tion is discussed in ch. 16, see p. 1447, infra. See, particularly: 1820, Livings-

ton v. Lynch, 4 Johns. Ch. 573; 1824, Natusch v. Irving, 2 Cooper's Ch. 358,

appendix to Gow on Partnership, p. 398; 1862, Durfee v. Old Colony & F. R.

R. Co., 5 Allen (Mass.) 230; 1867, Zabriskie v. H. & N. Y. R. Co., 18N. J.Eq.

Note. The power of the majority to modify the constitution of a. corporation is discussed in ch. 16, seep. 1447, infra. See, particularly: 1820, Livingston v. Lynch, 4 Johns. Ch. 573; 1824, Natusch v. Irving, 2 Cooper's Ch . 358,
appendix: to Gow on Partnership, p. 398; 1862, Durfee v. Old Colony & F. R.
R. Co., 5 Allen (Mass.) 230; 1867, Zabriskie v. R. & N. Y. R. Co., 18N.J.Eq.
(3 C. E . Green), 178, 90Am. Dec. 617; 1887, Dow v. Northern R. Co., 67 N.
H. 1, 36 Atl. 510.

(3 C. E. Green), 178, 90 Am. Dec. 617; 1887, Dow v. Northern R. Co., 67 N.

H. 1, 36 Atl. 510.
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Sec. 19. Same. (#) In determining the rights of members

among themselves in equity.

DODGE, Appellant, v. WOOLSEY.1

1855. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 18 How-

ard (59 U. S) 331-380.

[Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district

of Ohio.

Sec. 19. Same.

( b) In determining the rights of members
among themselves in equity.

Suit in chancery by Woolsey, a citizen of Connecticut, and holder

of thirty shares in the Commercial Bank of Cleveland (an Ohio cor-

poration, and branch of the State Bank of Ohio) against the tax col-

DODGE,

lector (Dodge), the bank directors and the.bank itself (all citizens of

APPELLANT,

v. WOOLSEY.1

Ohio) to enjoin the collection of the tax assessed by the state of Ohio

IN

against the bank. The bank's charter of 1S45 provided that semi-

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

annually it should pay six per cent, of its net profits for the preceding

18 How-

ard (59 U. S) 331-380.

six months to the state of Ohio "in lieu of all taxes to which said com-

pany or the stockholders, on account of stock owned therein, would

[Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district
of Ohio.
Suit in chancery by Woolsey, a citizen of Connecticut, and holder
of thirty shares in the Commercial Bank of Cleveland (an Ohio corporation, and branch of the State Bank of Ohio) against the tax collector (Dodge), the bank directors and the-bank itself (all citizens of
Ohio) to enjoin the collection ot the tax assessed by the state of Ohio
against the bank. The bank's charter of 1845 provided that semiannually it should pay six per cent. of its net profits for the preceding
six months to the state of Ohio " in lieu of all taxes to which said company or the stockholders, on account of stock owned therein, would
otherwise be subject.'' In 185 1 the new state constitution was adopted,
and this provided that laws should be p assed taxing "the notes and
bills discounted or purchased, money loaned and all other property,
effects or dues whatever, without deduction, of all banks now existing
or hereafter created, and of all bankers, so that all property employed
in banking shall always bear a burden of taxation equal to that imposed on the property of individuals." In 1852 the legislature of
Ohio, in accordance with this constitutional provision, made it the duty

otherwise be subject." In 1851 the new state constitution was adopted,

and this provided that laws should be passed taxing "the notes and

bills discounted or purchased, money loaned and all other property,

effects or dues whatever, without deduction, of all banks now existing

or hereafter created, and of all bankers, so that all property employed

in banking shall always bear a burden of taxation equal to that im-

posed on the property of individuals." In 1852 the legislature of

Ohio, in accordance with this constitutional provision, made it the duty

1 Statement of facts condensed. Arguments and parts of opinions omitted.

1 Statement of
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of the president and cashier of every bank (under a severe penalty) to

make report of the various items indicated to the county auditors, who

were to place the same upon the tax duplicate, to be taxed as other

§ 19 THE CORPORATION AS A COLLECTION OF INDIVIDUALS.

89

property. In 1852, the president and cashier of the Commercial Bank

of Cleveland, did this, under protest, the tax assessed and collected

by distress being over $10,000, and more than $7,500 more than it

would have been under the charter plan. Like proceedings were had

in 1853, when the tax assessed was nearly $12,000 more than the

charter plan would have made. Woolsey alleged that "if the taxes

are permitted to be assessed and collected * * * it will virtually

destroy and annul the contract between the state and the bank, in re-

spect to the tax which the state imposed upon it by the charter * * *

in lieu of all other taxes, the stock will be thereby lessened in value,

dividends diminished, and the bank be compelled to suspend business;

that, as a stockholder, he had requested the directors of the bank to

take measures to prevent the collection of the tax."

The material allegations, except the unconstitutionality of the law,

and the application to the directors to prevent the collection of the

tax, were admitted. Upon the latter point it was agreed that Woolsey

had by his attorney addressed a letter to the bank requesting it to take
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proper proceeding to prevent the collection of the tax, the answer to

which was: "Resolved, that we fully concur in the views named,

and believe it to be in no way binding upon the bank; but in consid-

eration of the many obstacles in the way of testing the law in the

courts of the state, we can not consent to take the action which we

are called upon to take, but must leave the said (Woolsey) to pursue

such measures as he may deem best in the premises." Upon the

foregoing, the circuit court granted the injunction with costs against

Dodge, who appealed, his counsel relying upon the following points:

"1. The complainant does not show himself to be entitled to relief

in a court of chancery, because the charter of the bank provides that

its affairs shall be managed by a board of directors, and that they

are not amenable to the stockholders for an error of judgment merely.

And that in order to make them so, it should have been averred that

they were in collusion with the tax collector in their refusal to take

legal steps to test the validity of the tax."]

[2 and 3, relating to the jurisdiction of the court, and the constitutionality

of the tax, omitted.]

Mr. Justice Waynb (after stating the facts) delivered the opinion

of the court. * * *

We will consider the points in their order. The first comprehends

two propositions, namely; that courts of equity have no jurisdiction

over corporations, as such, at the suit of a stockholder for violations

of charters, and none for the errors of judgment of those who manage

of the president and cashier of every bank (under a severe penalty) to
make report of the various items indicated to the county auditors, who
were to place the same upon the tax duplicate, to be taxed as other
property. In 1852, the president and cashier of the Commercial Bank
of Cleveland, did this, under protest, the tax assessed and collected
by distress being over $10,000, and more than $1,500 more than it
would have been under the charter plan. Like proceedings were had
in 1853, when the tax assessed was nearly $12,000 more than the
charter plan would have made. Woolsey alleged that "if the taxes
are permitted to be assessed and collected • • • it will virtually
de troy and annul the contract between the state and the bank, in respect to the tax which the state imposed upon it by the charter • • •
in lieu of all other taxes, the stock will be thereby lessened in value,
dividends diminished, and the bank be compelled to suspend business;
that, as a stockholder, he had requested the directors of the bank to
take measures to prevent the collection of the tax."
The material allegations, except the unconstitutionality of the law,
and the application to the directors to prevent the collection of the
tax, were admitted. Upon the latter point it was agreed that Woolsey
had by his attorney addressed a letter to the bank requesting it to take
proper proceeding to prevent the collection of the tax, the answer to
which was: "Resolved, that we fully concur in the views named,
and believe it to be in no way binding upon the bank; but in consideration of the many obstacles in the way of testing the law in the
courts of the state, we can not consent to take the action which we
are called upon to take, but must leave the said (Woolsey) to pursue
such measures as he may deem best in the premises.'' Upon the
foregoing, the circuit court granted the injunction with costs against
Dodge, who appealed, his counsel relying upon the following points:
"r. The complainant does not show himself to be entitled to relief
in a court of chancery, because the charter of the bank provides that
its affairs shall be managed by a board of directors, and that they
are not amenable to the stockholders for an error of judgment merely.
And that in order to make them so, it should have been averred that
they were in collusion with the tax collector in their refusal to take
legal steps to test the validity of the tax."]

their business ordinarily.

There has been a conflict of judicial authority in both. Still, it has

been found necessary, for prevention of injuries for which common-

law courts were inadequate, to entertain in equity such a jurisdiction

(2 and 3, relating to the jurisdiction of the court, and the constitutionality
of the tax, omitted.]

Mr. Justice W AYNR (after stating the facts) delivered the opinion
of the court. • • •
We will consider the points in their order. The first comprehends
two propositions, namely ; that courts of equity have no jurisdiction
over corporations, as such, at the suit of a stockholder for violations
of charters, and none for the errors of judgment of those who manage
the ir business ordinarily.
Th ere ha. heen a conflict of judicial authority in both. Still, it has
bee n fo und necessary, for prevention of injuries for which commonlaw courts were inadequate, to entertain in equity such a jurisdiction
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in the progressive development of the powers and effects of private

90

corporations upon all the business and interests of society.

DODGE V. WOOLSEY.

It is now no longer doubted, either in England or the United

in the progressive development of the powers and effects' of private
corporations upon all the business and interests of society.
It is now no longer doubted, either £n En(land or the United
States, that courts of equity, in both, have a JUrisdiction over corporations; at the instance of one or n~ore of their members, to apply
preventive remedies by injunction, to restrain those who administer
them from doing acts whi'ch would amount to a violatt'on of charters,
or to prevent any misapplt'cation of their capitals or profits wlzicll
might result in lessening the dividends of stockholders or the value
of thet'r shares~ as either may be protected by the franchises of a
corporation. if the acts intended to be done create what is in the law
denominated a breach of trust. And the jurisdiction extends to inquire
into, and to enjoin, as the case may require that to be done, any proceedings by individuals, in whatever character they may prefess to act,
if the subject of complaint is an imputed violation of a corporate franchise, or the denial of a right growing out of it, for which there is not
an adequate remedy at law. 2 Russ. & Mylne Ch. Rep., Cunliffe
v. Manchester and Bolton Canal Company, 480, n.; Ware v. Grand
Junction Water Company, 2 Russ. & Mylne 470; Bagshaw v. Eastern Counties Railway Company, 7 Hare Ch. Rep. 114; Angell &
Ames, 4th ed., 424, and the other cases there cited.
It was ruled in the case of Cunliffe v. The Manchester and Bolton
Canal Company, 2 Russ. & Mylne Ch. R. 481, that where the legal
remedy against a corporation is inadequate, a court of equity will interfere, and there were cases in which a bill in equity will lie again t
a corporation by one of its members. ''It t's a breach oftrust t0"..va1'd
a shareholder in a joint-stock incorporated company, establz'shed for
certain definite purposes prescribed by its charter, if the funds or
credit of the company are, without his consent, diverted from such
purpose, though the misappli'cation be sanctioned by the votes of a
majority; and, therefore, he may file a bill in equity against the company in his own behalf, to restrain the company by injunction from
any such diversion or misapplication." In the case of Ware v. Grand
Junction Water Company, 2 Russ. & Mylne, a bill filed by a member
of the company against it, Lord Brougham said: "It is said this is
an attempt on the part of the company to do acts which they are not
impowered to do by the acts of parliament, meaning the charter of the
company; 'so far I restrain them by injunction.' Indeed, an investment in the stock of a corporation must, by every one, be considered a wild speculation, if it exposed the owners of the stock to all
sorts of risk in support of plausible projects not set forth and authorized by the act of incorporation, and which may possibly lead to extraordinary losses. The same jurisdiction was invoked and implied
in the case of Bagshaw v. The Eastern Counties R. Co. ; so, also, i.n
Coleman v. The Eastern Counties R. Co., rn Beavan's Ch. Rep. 1.
It appeared in that case that the directors of the company, for the purpose of increasing their traffic, proposed to guarantee certain profits,
and to secure the capital of an intended steam-packet company, which
was to act in connection with the raihvay. It was held, such a trans-

States, that courts of equity, in both, have a jurisdiction over cor-

porations; at the instance of one or more of their members, to apply

preventive remedies by injunction, to restrain those -who administer

them from doing acts which would amount to a violation of charters,

or to -prevent any misapplication of their capitals or profits which

might result in lessening the dividends of stockholders or the value

of their shares, as either may be protected by the franchises of a

corporation, if the acts intended to be done create what is in the law

denominated a breach of trust. And the jurisdiction extends to inquire

into, and to enjoin, as the case may require that to be done, any pro-

ceedings by individuals, in whatever character they may prefess to act,

if the subject of complaint is an imputed violation of a corporate fran-

chise, or the denial of a right growing out of it, for which there is not

an adequate remedy at law. 2 Russ. & Mylne Ch. Rep., Cunliffe

v. Manchester and Bolton Canal Company, 480, n.; Ware v. Grand

Junction Water Company, 2 Russ. & Mylne 470; Bagshaw v. East-
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ern Counties Railway Company, 7 Hare Ch. Rep. 114; Angell &

Ames, 4th ed., 424, and the other cases there cited.

It was ruled in the case of Cunliffe v. The Manchester and Bolton

Canal Company, 2 Russ. & Mylne Ch. R. 481, that where the legal

remedy against a corporation is inadequate, a court of equity will in-

terfere, and there were cases in which a bill in equity will lie against

a corporation by one of its members. "72 is a breach of trust toward

a shareholder in a joint-stock incorporated company, established for

certain definite purposes prescribed by its charter, if the funds or

credit of the company are, without his consent, diverted from such

purpose, though the misapplication be sanctioned by the votes of a

majority; and, therefore, he may file a bill in equity against the com-

pany in his own behalf, to restrain the company by injunction from

any such diversion or misapplication." In the case of Ware v. Grand

Junction Water Company, 2 Russ. & Mylne, a bill filed by a member

of the company against it, Lord Brougham said: "It is said this is

an attempt on the part of the company to do acts which they are not

impowered to do by the acts of parliament, meaning the charter of the

company; 'so far I restrain them by injunction.' Indeed, an in-

vestment in the stock of a corporation must, by every one, be consid-

ered a wild speculation, if it exposed the owners of the stock to all

sorts of risk in support of plausible projects not set forth and author-

ized by the act of incorporation, and which may possibly lead to ex-

traordinary losses. The same jurisdiction was invoked and implied

in the case of Bagshaw v. The Eastern Counties R. Co.; so, also, ip

Coleman v. The Eastern Counties R. Co., 10 Beavan's Ch. Rep. 1.

It appeared in that case that the directors of the company, for the pur-

pose of increasing their traffic, proposed to guarantee certain profits,

and to secure the capital of an intended steam-packet company, which

was to act in connection with the railway. It was held, such a trans-
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action was not within the scope of their powers, and they were re-

strained by injunction. And in the second place, that in such a case

one of the shareholders in the railway company was entitled to sue in
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behalf of himself and all the other shareholders, except the directors,

who were defendants, although some of the shareholders had taken

shares in the steam-packet company. It was contended in this case

that the corporation might pledge, w-ithout limit, the funds of the com-

pany for the encouragement of other transactions, however various

and extensive, provided the object of that liability was to increase the

traffic upon the railway and thereby increase the traffic to the share-

holders. But the master of the rolls, Lord Langdale, said, "there

was no authority for anything of that kind."

But further, it is not only illegal for a corporation to apply its

capital to objects not contemplated by its charter, but also to apply

its profits. And therefore a shareholder may maintain a bill in equity

against the directors and compel the company to refund any of the

profits thus improperly applied. It is an improper application for a

railway company to invest the profits of the company in the purchase

of shares in another company. The dividend (says Lord Langdale,

in Solamons v. Laing, 14 Jurist for December, 1S50), which belongs
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to the shareholders, and is divisible among them, may be applied

severally as their own property; but the company itself or the direct-

ors, or any number of shareholders, at a meeting or otherwise, have

110 right to dispose of his shares of the general dividends, which belong

to the particular shareholder, in any manner contrary to the will, or

without the consent or authority of, that particular shareholder.

We do not mean to say that the jurisdiction in equity over corpora-

tions at the suit of a shareholder has not been contested. The cases

cited in this argument show it to have been otherwise, but when the

case of Hodges v. The New England Screw Company et al. was

cited against it (we may say the best argued and judicially considered

case which we know upon the point, both upon the original hearing

and rehearing of that cause), the counsel could not have been aware

of the fact that, upon the rehearing of it, the learned court, which had

decided that courts of equity have no jurisdiction over corporations as

such at the suit of a stockholder for violations of charter, reviewed and

recalled that conclusion. The language of the court is: "We have

thought it our duty to review in this general form this new and unset-

tled jurisdiction, and to say, in view of the novelty and importance

of the subject and the additional light which has been thrown upon it

since the trial, we consider the jurisdiction of this court over corpora-

tions for breaches of charter at the suit of shareholders, and how far

it shall be extended, and subject to what limits, is still an open ques-

tion in this court. 1 Rhode Island Reports 312—rehearing of the

case September term, 1853."

The result of the cases is well stated in Angell & Ames, paragraphs

391. 393. "/« cases where the legal remedy against a corporation

is inadequate, a court of equity will interfere, is well settled, and

there are cases in which a bill in equity will lie agaist a corporation

action was not within the scope of their powers, and they were restrained by injunction. And in the second place, that in such a case
one of the shareholders in the railway company was entitled to sue in
behalf of himself and all the other shareholders, except the directors,
who were defendants, although some of the shareholders had taken
shares in the steam-packet company. It was contended in this case
that the corporation might pledge, without limit, the funds of the company for the encouragement of other transactions, however various
and extensive, provided the object of that liability was to increase the
traffic upon the railway and thereby increase the traffic to the shareholders. But the master of the rolls, Lord Langdale, said, "there
was no authority for anything of that kind."
But further , it is not only illegal for a corporation to apply its
capital lo objects not contemplated by t'ts charter, but also to apply
its profits. And therefore a shareholder may maintain a bill in equity
again t the directors and compel the company to refund any of the
profits thus improperly applied. It is an improper application for a
railway company to invest the profits of the company in the purchase
of . hares in another company. The dividend (says Lord Langdale,
in Solamons v. Laing, 14 Jurist for December, 1850), which belongs
to the bareholders, and is divisible among them, may be applied
se,·erally as their own property; but the company itself or the director. , or any number of shareholders, at a meeting or otherwise, have
no right to dispose of his shares of the general dividends, which belong
to the particular shareholder, in any manner contrary to the will , or
without the consent or authority of, that particular shareholder.
We do not mean to say that tne jurisdiction in equity over corporations at the suit of a shareholder has not been contested. The cases
cited in this argument show it to have been otherwise, but when the
case of Hodges v. The New Eng)and Screw Company et al. was
cited against it (we may say the best argued and judicially considered
ca!ie which we know upon the point, both upon the original hearing
and rehearing of that cause), the counsel could not have been aware
of the fact that, upon the rehearing of it, the learned court, which had
decided that courts of equity have no jurisdiction over corporations as
uch at the suit of a stockholder for violations of charter, reviewed and
recalled that conclusion. The language of the court is: "We have
thought it our duty to review in this general form this new and unsettled jurisdiction, and to say, in view of the novelty and importance
of the subject and the additional light which has been thrown upon it
ince the trial, we consider the jurisdiction of this court over corporations for breaches of charter at the suit of shareholders, an<l how far
it shall be extended, and subject to what limits, is still an open question in this court. 1 Rhode Island Reports 3 12-rehearing of the
case September term, 1853."
The result of the cases is well stated in Angell & Ames, paragraphs
391. 393. "In cases where the legal remedy against a corporat£on
i.s inadequate, a court of equity will interfere, is well settled, and
there are cases in wMch a bill in equt'ty will lie agaist a corporation
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and in obedience to the provisions of its constitution, the will of

by one of £ts members." "Though the result of the authorities
clearly i"s, that in a corpora#on, when act£ng w£thin the scope of
and in obedience to the prov£sions of its cons#tution, the will of
the majority, duly £mpressed at a legally constituted meeti"ng, must
govern; yet beyond the lim£ts of the act of £ncorporation, the will
of the majority can not make an ad valid; and the powers of a
court of equity may be put in motion at the instance of a single shareholder, if he can show that the corporation are employing their statutory powers for the accomplishment of purposes not within the scope
of their institution. Yet it is to be observed that there is an important
distinction between this class of cases and those in which there is no
breach of trust, but only error and misapprehension, or simple negligence on the part of the directors.'' 1
We have then the rule and its limitation. It is contended that thi
case is within the limitation; or that the directors of the Commercial Bank
of Cleveland, in their action in respect: to the tax assessed upon it, under
the act of April 18, 1852, and in their refusal to take proper measures for
testing its validity, have committed an "error of judgment merely."
It is obvious, from the rule, that the circumstances of each case
must determine the jurisdiction of a court of equity to give the relief
sought. That the pleadings must be relied upon to collect what they
are, to ascertain in what character, and to what end a shareholder invokes the interposition of a court of equity, on account of the mi management of a board of directors. Whether such acts are out of
or beyond the limits of the act of incorporation, either of commission
contrary thereto, or of negligence in not doing what it may be their
cha1tered duty to do.

the majority, duly impressed at a legally constituted meeting, must

govern; yet beyond the limits of the act of incorporation, the will

of the majority can not make an act valid; and the powers of a

court of equity may be put in motion at the instance of a single share-

holder, if he can show that the corporation are employing their stat-

utory powers for the accomplishment of purposes not within the scope

of their institution. Yet it is to be observ ed that there is an important

distinction between this class of cases and those in which there is no

breach of trust, but only error and misapprehension, or simple negli-

gence on the part of the directors."1

We have then the rule and its limitation. It is contended that this

case is within the limitation ; or that the directors of the Commercial Bank

of Cleveland, in their action in respect to the tax assessed upon it, under

the actof April 18, iS52,and in their refusal to take proper measures for

testing its validity, have committed an "error of judgment merely."

It is obvious, from the rule, that the circumstances of each case
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must determine the jurisdiction of a court of equity to give the relief

sought. That the pleadings must be relied upon to collect what thev

are, to ascertain in what character, and to what end a shareholder in-

vokes the interposition of a court of equity, on account of the mis-

management of a board of directors. Whether such acts are out of

or beyond the limits of the act of incorporation, either of commission

contrary thereto, or of negligence in not doing what it may be their

chartered duty to do.

1 So it has been repeatedly decided that a private corporation may be sued

at law by one of its own members. The text upon this subject is so well

expressed, with authorities to support it, that we will extract the paragraph

390 from Angell and Ames entire. "A private corporation may be sued by one

of its own members. This point came directly before the court, in the state

of South Carolina in an action of assumpsit against the Catawba Company.

The plea in abatement was, that the plaintiff himself was a member of that

1 So it has been repeatedly decided that a private corporation may be sued
at law by one of its own members. The text upon this subject is so well
expressed, with authorities to support it, that we will extract the paragraph
390 from Angell and Ames entire. "A private corporation may be sued by one
of its own members. This point came directly before the court, in the state
of South Carolina in an action of assumpsit against the Catawba Company.
The plea in abatement was, that the plaintiff himself was a member of that
company, and therefore could maintain no action against it in his individual
capacity. The court, after hearing argument, overruled the plea as containing
principles subversive of justice; and they moreover said, that the point bad
been settled by two former cases, wherein certain officers were allowed to
maintain actions for their salaries due by the company. In this respect, the
cases of incorporated companies are entirely dissimilar from those of ordinary
co-partnerships, or unincorporated joint-stock companies. In the former, the
individual members of the company are entirely distinct from the artificial
body endowed with corporate powers. A member of a corporation who is a
creditor has the same right as any other creditor to secure the payment of
his demands, by attachment or by levy upon the property of the corporation,
although he may be personally liable by statute to satisfy other judgments
against the corporation. An action was maintained against a corporation on
a bond securin~ a certain sum to the plai ntiff, a member of the corporation,
the member berng deemed by the court a stranger. Pierce v. Partridge, 3
Met. (Mass .) 44; so of notes and bonde1, accounts and rights to dividends.
Hill v. Manchester and Salford Water-':\i'orks, 5 Adol. & Ellis 866 ; Dunston
v. Imperial Glass Company, 3 B. & Adol. 125; Geer v. School District, 6 Vt.
76; Methodist Episcopal Society, 18 Vt. 405; Rogers v. Danby Universalist
Society, 19 Vt. 187."

company, and therefore could maintain no action against it in his individual

capacity. The court, after hearing argument, overruled the plea as containing

principles subversive of justice; and they moreover said, that the point had

been settled by two former cases, wherein certain officers were allowed to

maintain actions for their salaries due by the company. In this respect, the

cases of incorporated companies are entirely dissimilar from those of ordinary

co-partnerships, or unincorporated joint-stock companies. In the former, the

individual members of the company are entirely distinct from the artificial

body endowed with corporate powers. A member of a corporation who is a

creditor has the same right as any other creditor to secure the payment of

his demands, by attachment or by levy upon the property of the corporation,

although he may be personally liable by statute to satisfy other judgments

against the corporation. An action was maintained against a corporation on

a bond securing a certain sum to the plaintiff, a member of the corporation,

the member being deemed by the court a stranger. Pierce v. Partridge, 3

Met. (Mass.) 44; so of notes and bonds, accounts and rights to dividends.

Hill v. Manchester and Salford Water-Works, 5 Adol. & Ellis 866; Dunston

v. Imperial Glass Company, 3 B. & Adol. 125; Geer v. School District, 6 Vt.

76; Methodist Episcopal Society, 18 Vt. 405; Rogers v. Danby Universalist

Society, 19 Vt. 187."
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This brings us to the inquiry, as to what the directors have done in

this case, and what they refused to do upon the application of their

co-corporator, John M. Woolsey. After a full statement of his case,
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comprehending all of his rights and theirs also, alleging in his bill

that his object was to test the validity of a tax upon the ground that

it was unconstitutional, because it impaired the obligation of a con-

tract made by the state of Ohio with the Commercial Bank of Cleve-

land, and the stockholders thereof; he represents in his own behalf,

as a stockholder, that he had applied to the directors, requesting them

to take measures, by suit or otherwise, to prevent the collection of

the tax by the treasurer, and that they refused to do so, accompanying,

however, their refusal with the declaration that they fully concurred

with Woolsey in his views as to the illegality of the tax; that they

believed it no way binding upon the bank, but that, in consideration

of the many obstacles in the way of resisting the collection of the tax

in the courts of the state, they could not consent to take legal meas-

ures for testing it. Besides this refusal, the papers in the case dis-

close the fact that the directors had previously made two protests

against the constitutionality of the tax, because it was repugnant to

the constitution of the United States, and to that of Ohio also, both
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concluding with a resolution that they would not, as then advised,

pay the tax, unless compelled by law to do so, and that they were

determined to rely upon the constitutional and legal rights of the bank

under its charter.

Now, in our view, the refusal upon the part of the directors, by

their own showing, partakes more of disregard of duty than of an

error of judgment. It was a non-performance of a confessed official

obligation, amounting to what the law considers a breach of trust,

though it may not involve intentional moral delinquency. It was a

mistake, it is true, of what their duty required from them, according to

their own sense of it, but, being a duty by their own confession, their

refusal was an act outside of the obligation which the charter imposed

upon them to protect what they conscientiously believed to be the

franchises of the bank. A sense of duty and conduct contrary to it is

not "an error of judgment merely," and can not be so called in any

case. It amounted to an illegal application of the profits due to the

stockholders of the bank, into which a court of equity will inquire to

prevent its being made.

Thinking, as we do, that the action of the board of directors was

not "an error of judgment merely" but a breach of duty, it is our

opinion that they were properly made parties to the bill, and that the

jurisdiction of a court of equity reaches such a case to give such a

remedy as its circumstances may require. This conclusion makes it

unnecessary for us to notice further the point made by the counsel that

the suit should have been brought in the name of the corporation, in

support of which they cited the case of the Bank of the United States

v. Osborn. The obvious difference between this case and that is,

that the Bank of the United States brought a bill in the circuit court

of the United States for the district of Ohio, to resist a tax assessed

This brings us to the inquiry, as to what the directors have done in
this case, and what they refused to do upon the application of their
co-corporator, John M. Woolsey. After a full statement of his case,
comprehending all of his rights and theirs also, alleging in his bill
that his object was to test the validity of a tax upon the ground that
it was unconstitutional, because it impaired the obligation of a contract made by the state of Ohio with the Commercial Bank of Cleveland, and the stockholders thereof; he represents in his own behalf,
as a stockholder, that he had applied to the directors, requesting them
to take measures, by suit or otherwise, to prevent the collection of
the ta..x by the treasurer, and that they refused to do so, accompanying,
however, their refusal with the declaration that they fully concurred
with Woolsey in his views as to the illegality of the tax; that they
believed it no way binding upon the bank, but that, in consideration
of the many obstacles in the way of resisting the collection of the tax
rn the courts of the state, they could not consent to take legal measures for testing it. Besides this refusal, the papers in the case disclose the fact that the directors bad previously made two protests
against the constitutionality of the tax, because it was repugnant to
the constitution of the United States, and to that of Ohio also, both
concluding with a resolution that they would not, as then advised,
pay the tax, unless compelled by law to do so, and that they were
detennined to rely upon the constitutional and legal rights of the bank
under its charter.
Now, in our view, the refusal upon the part of the directors, by
their own showing, partakes more of disregard of duty than of an
error of judgment. It was a non-performance of a confessed official
obligation, amounting to what the law considers a breach of trust,
though it may not involve intentional moral delinquency. It was a
mistake, it is true, of what their duty required from them , according to
their own sense of it, but, being a duty by their own confession, their
refusal was an act outside of the obligation which the charter imposed
upon them to protect what they conscientiously believed to be the
franchises of the bank. A sense of duty and conduct contrary to it is
not "an error of judgment merely," and can not be so called in any
case. It amounted to an illegal application of the profits due to the
stockholders of the bank, into which a court of equity will inquire to
prevent its being made.
Thjnking, as we do, that the action of the board of directors was
not "an error of judgment merely" but a breach of duty, it is our
opinion that they were properly made parties to the bill, and that the
jurisdiction of a court of equity reaches such a case to give such a
remedy as its circumstances may require. This conclusion makes it
unnecessary for us to notice further the point made by the counsel that
the suit should have been brought in the name of the corporation, in
support of which they cited the case of the Bank of the United States
v. Osborn. The obvious difference between this case and that is,
that the Bank of the United States brought a bill in the circuit court
of the United States for the di.&,!rict of Ohio, to resist a tax assessed
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what they had declared it to be their duty to do, have forced one of

under an act of that state, and executed by its auditor, and here the
directors of the Commercial Bank of Cleveland, by refusing to do
what they had declared it to be their duty to do, have forced one of
its corporators, in self-defense, to sue. If the directors had done so
in a state court of Ohio, and put their case upon the unconstitutionality of the tax act, because it impaired the obligation of a contract,
and had the decision been against such claim, the judgment of the
state court could have been re-examined, in that particular, in the supreme court of the United States, under, the same authority or jurisdiction by which it reversed the judgment of the supreme court of
Ohio, in the case of the Piqua Branch of the State Bank of Ohio v.
Jacob Knoop, treasurer of Miami County, 16 How. 369. • • •
Mn. Justice CAMPBELL (with whom concurred Justices DANIEL
and CATRON), dissenting. • • •
The court has assumed this jurisdiction, and I am therefore called
to inquire whether a court of chancery can take cognizance of the
bill? The· act of incorporation of the bank charges the board of directors with the care of the corporate affairs, subject to an annual responsibility to the stockholders. The principle of a court of chancery
is, to decline any interference with the discretion of such directors, or
to regulate their conduct or management in respect to the duties committed to them.
The business of that court is to redress grievances illegally inflicted
or threatened, not to supply the prudence, knowledge or forecast requisite to successful corporate management. The facts of this case
involve, in my opinion, merely a question of discretion in the performance of an official duty. In 1852, the taxes were withdrawn from
the treasurer of Cuyahoga county, by an assignee of the bank, and
were never passed into the state treasury. The supreme court of Ohio,
subsequently to this, pronounced the taxes to be legally assessed upon
these banks, and that there was no contract between the state and the
banks, and there was no exemption from the tax by anything apparent
in the act of 1845. Some of these judgments were pending in this
court upon writs of error then undecided, no judgment having been
given contrary to that of the authorities, legislative, executive and judicial, as well as by the people of Ohio. It was under these conditions that this stockholder, who purchased stock after the controversy
had arisen in Ohio, some five days before the taxes were payable, addressed the directors of the Commercial Bank to take preventive
measures-that is, I suppose, to file a bill for an injunction instantly
-and, upon their suggestion of difficulties, proceeds to take charge
of the corporate rights of the bank by this suit, in the circuit court of
the United States. The directors were elected annually; they were,
collectively, owners of one-tenth of the stock of the bank, and no evidence is shown that any other stockholder supposed that "preventive
measures," under the circumstances, could be sustained. There is
no charge of fraud, collusioo, neglect of duty or of indifference by the
directors, save this omissiul to take some undefined "preventive
measures," which the plaintiff affected to suppose might be proper.

its corporators, in self-defense, to sue. If the directors had done so

in a state court of Ohio, and put their case upon the unconstitution-

ality of the tax act, because it impaired the obligation of a contract,

and had the decision been against such claim, the judgment of the

state court could have been re-examined, in that particular, in the su-

preme court of the United States, under, the same authority or juris-

diction by which it reversed the judgment of the supreme court of

Ohio, in the case of the Piqua Branch of the State Bank of Ohio v.

Jacob Knoop, treasurer of Miami County, 16 How. 369. * * *

Mr. Justice Campbell (with whom concurred Justices Daniel

and Catron), dissenting. * * *

The court has assumed this jurisdiction, and I am therefore called

to inquire whether a court of chancery can take cognizance of the

bill? The act of incorporation of the bank charges the board of di-

rectors with the care of the corporate affairs, subject to an annual re-

sponsibility to the stockholders. The principle of a court of chancery
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is, to decline any interference with the discretion of such directors, or

to regulate their conduct or management in respect to the duties com-

mitted to them.

The business of that court is to redress grievances illegally inflicted

or threatened, not to supply the prudence, knowledge or forecast re-

quisite to successful corporate management. The facts of this case

involve, in my opinion, merely a question of discretion in the per-

formance of an official duty. In 1852, the taxes were withdrawn from

the treasurer of Cuyahoga county, by an assignee of the bank, and

were never passed into the state treasury. The supreme court of Ohio,

subsequently to this, pronounced the taxes to be legally assessed upon

these banks, and that there was no contract between the state and the

banks, and there was no exemption from the tax by anything apparent

in the act of 1845. Some of these judgments were pending in this

court upon writs of error then undecided, no judgment having been

given contrary to that of the authorities, legislative, executive and ju-

dicial, as well as by the people of Ohio. It was under these condi-

tions that this stockholder, who purchased stock after the controversy

had arisen in Ohio, some five days before the taxes were payable, ad-

dressed the directors of the Commercial Bank to take preventive

measures—that is, I suppose, to file a bill for an injunction instantly

—and, upon their suggestion of difficulties, proceeds to take charge

of the corporate rights of the bank by this suit, in the circuit court of

the United States. The directors were elected annually; they were,

collectively, owners of one-tenth of the stock of the bank, and no evi-

dence is shown that any other stockholder supposed that "preventive

measures," under the circumstances, could be sustained. There is

no charge of fraud, collusion, neglect of duty or of indifference by the

directors, save this omission to take some undefined "preventive

measures," which the plaintiff affected to suppose might be proper.
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I understand the rule of chancery in reference to such a case to be

that no suit can be maintained by an individual stockholder for a

wrong done, or threatened, to such a corporation, unless it appears
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that the plaintiff has no means of procuring a suit to be instituted in

the name of the corporation; and that the rule is universal, applicable

as well to the cases where the acts which afford the ground for com-

plaint were either such as a majority might sanction, or whether it be-

longed to the category of those acts by which no stockholder could be

bound, except by his own consent. This principle has the highest sanc-

tion in the decisions of that court. (Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461—af-

firmed 1 Phil. 790; 2 Phil. 740; 7 Hare 130.) The principle is an ob-

vious consequence from the relations between the officers and members of

a chartered corporation and the corporation itself. These are explained

in Smith v. Hurd, 12 Met. 371. The court says: "There is no legal

privity, relation or immediate connection between the holders of shares

in a bank in their individual capacity on the one side and the directors

of the bank on the other. The directors are not the bailees, the fac-

tors, agents or trustees of such individual stockholders. The bank is

a corporation and body politic, having a separate existence as a dis-

tinct person in law, in whom the whole stock and property of the
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bank are vested, and to whom all agents, debtors, officers and servants

are responsible for all contracts, express or implied, made in reference

to such capital, and for all torts and injuries diminishing or impairing

it." The corporation, therefore, must vindicate its own wrongs and

assert its own rights, in the modes pointed out by law.

I do not say that a court of chancery will never permit an individual

stockholder to come before it to assert a right of the corporation in

which he is a shareholder, where there is an obstacle of such a nature

that the name of the corporation can not be employed before legitimate

tribunals in their regular modes of proceeding, but the burden is

thrown upon the plaintiff to establish the existence of an urgent neces-

sity for such a suit.

The consideration of analogous cases will strengthen this conclusion;

cases where courts of chancery are more free to intervene, from the

fiduciary relations between the parties and the extent of its general

jurisdiction over them. Such are cases of danger to the interests of a

creditor of an estate from the collusion of an executor with the debtor

of the estate, or the insolvency of the executor; or where an executor

wrongfully fails to make a settlement with a surviving partner, and a

residuary legatee seeks one entire settlement of the estate against the

executor and partner; or where a decedent in his life has fraudulently

conveyed assets, and his executor is estopped to impute fraud, and

there are creditors; or where the managers of a joint stock company

have been guilty of fraud, illegality, waste, and their stockholders

desire relief. In all these cases the court of chancery will suffer a

party remotely interested to institute the suit which his trustee, or

other representative, should have brought, and will grant the relief on

that suit which would have been appropriate to the case of him who

I understand the rule of chancery in reference to such a case to be
that no suit can be maintained by an individual stockholder for a
wrong done, or threatened, to such a corporation, unless it appears
that the plaintiff has no means of procuring a suit to be instituted in
the name of the corporation; and that the rule is universal, applicable
as well to the cases where the acts which afford the ground for complaint were either such as a majority might sanction, or whether it belonged to the category of those acts by which no stockholder could be
bound , except by his own consent. This principle has the highest sanction in the decisions of that court. (Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461-affirmed r Phil. 790; 2 Phil. 740; 7 Hare 130.) The principle is an obvious consequence from the relations between the officers and members of
a chartered corporation and the corporation itself. These are explained
in Smith v. Hurd, 12 Met. 371. The court says: "There is no legal
privity, relation or immediate connection between the holders of shares
in a bank in their individual capacity on the one side and the directors
of the bank on the other. The directors are not the bailees, the factors , agents or trustees of such individual stockholders. The bank is
a corporation and body politic, having a separate existence as a distinct person in law, in whom the whole stock and property of the
bank are vested, and to whom all agents, debtors, officers and servants
are responsible for all contracts, express or implied, made in reference
to such capital, and for all torts and injuries diminishing or impairing
it." The corporation, therefore, must vindicate its own wrongs and
assert its own rights, in the modes pointed out by law.
I do not say that a court of chancery will never permit an individual
stockholder to come before it to assert a right of the corporation in
which he is a shareholder, where there is an obstacle of such a nature
that the name of the corporation can not be employed before legitimate
tribunals in their regular modes of proceeding, but the burden is
thrown upon the plaintiff to establish the existence of an urgent necessity for such a suit.
The consideration of analogous cases will strengthen this conclusion;
cases where courts of chancery are more fr~e to intervene, from the
fiduciary relations between the parties and the extent of its general
jurisdiction over them. Such are cases of danger to the interests of a
creditor of an estate from the collusion of an executor with the debtor
of the estate, or the insolvency of the executor; or where an executor
wrongfully fails to make a settlement with a surviving partner, and a
residuary legatee seeks one entire settlement of the estate against the
executor and partner; or where a decedent in his life has fraudulently
conveyed assets, and his executor is estopped to impute fraud , and
there are creditors; or where the managers of a joint stock company
have been guilty of fraud, illegality, waste, and their stockholders
desire relief. In all these cases the court of chancery will suffer a
party remotely interested to institute the suit which his trustee, or
other representative, should have brought, and will grant the relief on
that suit which would have been appropriate to the case of him who
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ing to one of these categories, says:
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"To support such a bill as this it is not sufficient to prove that it

may be an unpleasant duty to the executors and trustees to take the

should have commenced it. Sir John Romilly, in a late case belonging to one of these categories, says:
"To support such a bill as this it is not sufficient to prove that it
may be an unpleasant duty to the executors and trustees to take the
necessary steps for protecting the property intrusted to them. It is
not sufficient to show that it will be for their interests not to take such
steps. It is necessary to show that they prefer their own interests to
their duty, and that they intend to neglect the performance of the obligation incidental to the office imposed upon them, and which they assumed to perform; or, as said in Travis v. Mylne, that a substantial
impediment to the prosecution by the executors of the rights of the
parties interested in the estate against the surviving partner exists."
Stainton v. Carron Co., 23 L. & Eq. 315; Travis v. Mylne, 9 Hare
141; Hersey v. Veazie, I 1 Shep. 1; Colquitt v. Howard, I 1 Geo.
556.
These cases afford no support to this suit. The Cleveland Bank
has betrayed no purpose to abandon its corporate duty. The interests
and obligations of the directors coincide to support its pretensions.
There is no supineness in their past conduct, nor indifference to the
existing peril. The evidence, at the most, convicts them only of a
present disinc.Jination to commence suits, which were likely to be unproductive, at the request of a single shareholder. The answer shows
that the taxes for 1852 had not been recovered by the state, but had
been retaken by an assignee of the bank. Nor does the correspondence show that the directors had decided to abandon the contest. The
case here does not at all fulfill the conditions on which the interposition of a shareholder is allowable. Elmslie v. McAulay, 3 Bro.
C. C. 224, 1 Phil. 790; Law v. Law, 2 Coll. 41; Walker v. Trott,
4 Ed. Ch. Rep. 38.
But the evidence does not allow me to conclude that any impediment whatever existed to a suit in the name of the corporation, from
any disposition of the directors to resist the claims of the state. Their
protest appears at every successive stage of the action of the fiscal
officers. . This suit is evidently maintained with their consent; there
has been no appearance either by the directors or the corporation,
but they abide the case of the stockholder. The decree is for the
benefit of the corporation. The question then is, can a corporation
belonging to a state, and whose officers are citizens, upon some hope
or assurance that the opinions of the courts of the United States are
more favorable to their pretensions, by any combination, contrivance
or agreement with a non-resident shareholder, devolve upon him the
right to seek for the redress of corporate grievances, which are the
subjects of equitable cognizance in the courts of the United States, by
a suit in his own name? In my opinion, there should be but one
answer to the question. • • •
Decree of circuit court affirmed.

necessary steps for protecting the property intrusted to them. It is

not sufficient to show that it will be for their interests not to take such

steps. It is necessary to show that they prefer their own interests to

their duty, and that they intend to neglect the performance of the obli-

gation incidental to the office imposed upon them, and which they as-

sumed to perform: or, as said in Travis v. Mylne, that a substantial

impediment to the prosecution by the executors of the rights of the

parties interested in the estate against the surviving partner exists."

Stainton v. Carron Co., 23 L. & Eq. 315; Travis v. Mylne, 9 Hare

141; Hersey v. Veazie, 11 Shep. 1; Colquitt v. Howard, 11 Geo.

556.

These cases afford no support to this suit. The Cleveland Bank

has betrayed no purpose to abandon its corporate duty. The interests

and obligations of the directors coincide to support its pretensions.

There is no supineness in their past conduct, nor indifference to the
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existing peril. The evidence, at the most, convicts them only of a

present disinclination to commence suits, which were likely to be un-

productive, at the request of a single shareholder. The answer shows

that the taxes for 1852 had not been recovered by the state, but had

been retaken by an assignee of the bank. Nor does the correspond-

ence show that the directors had decided to abandon the contest. The

case here does not at all fulfill the conditions on which the interposi-

tion of a shareholder is allowable. Elmslie v. McAulay, 3 Bro.

C. C. 224, 1 Phil. 790; Law v. Law, 2 Coll. 41; Walker v. Trott,

4 Ed. Ch. Rep. 38.

But the evidence does not allow me to conclude that any impedi-

ment whatever existed to a suit in the name of the corporation, from

any disposition of the directors to resist the claims of the state. Their

protest appears at every successive stage of the action of the fiscal

officers. . This suit is evidently maintained with their consent; there

has been no appearance either by the directors or the corporation,

but they abide the case of the stockholder. The decree is for the

benefit of the corporation. The question then is, can a corporation

belonging to a state, and whose officers are citizens, upon some hope

or assurance that the opinions of the courts of the United States are

more favorable to their pretensions, by any combination, contrivance

or agreement with a non-resident shareholder, devolve upon him the

right to seek for the redress of corporate grievances, which are the

subjects of equitable cognizance in the courts of the United States, by

a suit in his own name? In my opinion, there should be but one

answer to the question. * * *

Decree of circuit court affirmed.

Note. The rights of members of a corporation is the subject of chapter 17,

infra. See page 1706, et seq., where this topic is further discussed. A few refer-

ences are here given: 1843, Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare (English Vice Chancel-

Note. The righte of membere of a corporation ie the eubject of chapter 17,
infra. See page 1706, et seq., wherethie topic is further diecuesed. A few refer·
encee are here given: 1843, Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare (English Vice Chancel·
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lor's Court) 461; 1844, Hersey v. Veazie, 24 Maine 9, 41 Am. Dec. 364; 1847,

Smith v. Hard, 12 Met. (Mass.) 371; 1867, Seaton v. Grant, L. R. 2 Chan.

App. 459; 1881, Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450, infra, p. 1716; 1890, Esdi-
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weflerv. Stowell, 78 Wis. 316, 23 Am. St. Rep. 411; 1896, Decatur M. L. Co.

v. Palm, 113 Ala. 531, 59 Am. St. 140.

Pltading, see Quincy v. Steel Co., 120 U. S. 241.

Sec. 20. Same, (c) When the corporate organization is used as

a cloak to aid in the commission of frauds.

METCALF v. ARNOLD.1

!or's Court) 461; 1844, Hersey v. Veazie, 24 Maine 9, 41 Am. Dec. 364 ; 1847,
Smith v. Hurd, 12 Met. (Mass.) 371; 1867, Seaton v. Grant, L. R. 2 Chan.
App. 459 ; 1881, Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, infra, p. 1716; 1890, Eschweiler v. Stowell, 78 Wis. 316, 23 Am. St. Rep. 411; 1896, Decatur M. L. Co.
v. Palm, 113 Ala. 531, 59 Am. St. 140.
Pttading, see Quincy v. Steel Co., 120 U . S. 241.

1895. In the Supreme Court of Alabama, no Ala. 180-185;

55 Am. St. Rep. 24.

Sec. 20. Same.

( c) When the corporate organization is used as
a cloak to aid in the commission of frauds.

Appeal from the chancery court of Montgomery.

Heard before the Hon. Jere N. Williams.

The bill in this case was filed by the appellees, who were judgment-

MET{{ALF v. ARNOLD. 1

creditors, for the benefit of themselves and all other creditors of the

Metcalf Drug Company who might desire to come in and make them-

selves parties.

1895. IN

THE SUPREME CouRT OF ALABAMA.

I

10 Ala. 18o-185;

55 Am .. St. Rep. 24.

The bill avers that complainants recovered a judgment against H.

B. Metcalf and F. G. Weatherly, who were doing business under the

firm name of H. B. Metcalf, and that executions on each of said judg-
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ments were issued and returned no property found. It was further

averred in the bill that after the debts which were the basis of the judg-

ment in favor of each of the complainants were contracted, and while

said H. B. Metcalf and F. G. Weatherly were indebted to complain-

ants and other creditors, the said H. B. Metcalf and F. G. Weatherly

were conducting a drug business in the city of Montgomery, Alabama,

and had a large stock of goods and assets in said business, none of

which were exempt to them, or either of them; that after the creation

of the indebtedness to the complainants, but prior to the rendition of

the judgment in their favor, "the said H. B. Metcalf and F. G.

Weatherly, with the intention to hinder, delay and defraud complain-

ants and others of their creditors, attempted to form a corporation,

with a capital stock of $8,000," and put into the said corporation

as its only capital stock, the stock of goods, wares and merchandise

and notes and accounts, which were the assets of the firm of H. B.

Metcalf; that "said H. B. Metcalf and F. G. Weatherly, carrying

out their hitherto formed intention of hindering, delaying and defraud-

ing complainants and their other creditors, had the stock of said cor-

poration, consisting of eighty shares, of the par value of $100 each,

issued as follows: thirty-six shares of par value of $3,600, to A. P.

Metcalf, the wife of H. B. Metcalf; eighteen shares of par value of

$1,800, to H. B. Metcalf; seventeen shares of the par value of $1,700,

to M. M. Weatherly, the wife of F. G. Weatherly; and nine shares

of the par value $900, to F. G. Weatherly."

1 Arguments omitted.

7—Wil. Cases.

Appeal from the chancery court of Montgomery.
Heard before the Hon. Jere N. Williams.
The bill in this case was filed by the appellees, who were judgmentcreditors, for the benefit of themselves and all other creditors of the
Metcalf Drug Company who might desire to come in and make themseh·es parties.
The bill avers that complainants recovered a judgment against H.
B. Metcalf and F. G. Weatherly, who were doing business under the
finn name of H. B. Metcalf, and that executions on each of said judgments were issued and returned no property found . It was further
averred in the bill that after the debts which were the basis of the judgment in favor of each of the complainants were contracted, and while
said H.B. Metcalf and F. G. Weatherly were indebted to complainants and other creditors, the said H. B. Metcalf an.<l F. G. Weatherly
were conducting a drug business in the city of Montgomery, Alabama,
and had a large stock of goods and assets in said business, none of
which were exempt to them, or either of them; that after the creation
of the indebtefiness to the complainants, but prior to the rendition of
the judgment in their favor, " the said H. B. Metcalf and F. G.
Weatherly, with the intention to hinder, delay and defraud complainants and other5 of their creditors, attempted to form a corporation,
with a capital stock of $8,ooo," and put into the said corporation
a its only capital stock, the stock of goods, wares and merchandise
and notes and accounts, which were the assets of the firm of H. B.
Metcalf: that "said H. B. Metcalf and F. G. Weatherly, canying
out their hitherto formed intention of hingering, delaying and defrauding complainants and their other creditors, had the stock of said corporation, consisting of eighty shares, of the par value of $100 each,
issued as follows: thirty-six shares of par value of $3,6oo, to A. P.
Metcalf, the wife of H. B. Metcalf; eighteen shares of par value of
$1 8oo, to l:I. B. Metcalf; seventeen shares of the par value of $ r , 700 1
to M. M. Weatherly, the wife of F. G. \ Veatherly; and nine shares
of the par value $9<>0, to F. G. Weatherly."
1

Arguments omitted.
7-WIL. CASES.
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It was further averred that the corporation so attempted to be formed

§
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20

was known and called the "Metcalf Drug Company," but that the

said A. P. Metcalf and M. M. Weatherly had no interest whatever in

It was further averred that the corporation so attempted to be formed
was known and called the "Metcalf Drug Company," but that the
said A. P. Metcalf and M. M. Weatherly had no interest whatever in
the effects put into the formation of the capital stock of said corporation : that all of said property put into the said corporation belonged
to H. B. Metcalf and F. G. Weatherly, doing business in the firm
name of H. B. Metcalf; and that the property so put into the corporation constituted all, or substantially all, of the property belonging to
said firm and to each member thereof, upon which property the complainants had an equitable lien for the payment of their debts.
It was further averred "that on, to wit, April 18, 1894, by a collusion between H.B. Metcalf and F. G. vVeatherly and a small creditor
of theirs, a judgment was allowed to be taken against the said defendants, H. B. Metcalf and F. G. Weatherly, in a justice court, for an
amount less than one hundred dollars, upon which judgment execution
was issued and levied upon seventeen shares of stock in the name of
H. B. Metcalf and eight shares in the name of F. G. Weatherly, and
t!1e said H. B. Metcalf and F. G. Weatherly, with the still further
fraudulent intent of placing all their property beyond the reach of
their creditors, allowed all of said shares to be sold at public outcry,
and they pretended that said shares were bought in by their respective
wives, but your orators allege that in tnith and in fact the amount so
bid at such sale for said stock was paid by the said H. B. Metcalf and
F. G. Weatherly.
The bill further ave1Ted "that according to the stock-books of the
Metcalf Drug Company, the said H.B. Metcalf now owns one share of
stock and the said F. G. Weatherly owns one share of stock, but upon
said stock-books, notice is given that the one share of H. B. Metcalf
is transferred as collateral security to his wife for a pretended debt,
and the one share of F. G. Weatherly is transferred to his wife as
collateral security for a pretended debt."
•
The prayer of the bill was for the issuance of an injunction restraining the defendants and each of them from disposing of, transfen-ing
or incumbering any of the prope1ty refeJTed to in the bill, and for the
appointment of a receiver of the goods, wares, merchandise and the
notes, accounts and books of the Metcalf Drug Co., and "that on a
final hearing of this cau se , your honor will decree that the formation
of said corporation was fraudulent and void as to your orators, and
that the issue of stock and pretended interest therein of A. P. Metcalf and M . M . Weatherly is illegal and void as to your orators, and that
your orators have a lien upon said property to the extent of debts due
them, and that your honor will order a reference to ascertain the
amount of debts due your orators and any other creditors who may
come in and make themselves parties hereto; and will order the receiYer to sell and di pose of said stock of goods, and to collect the
notes and accounts , and pay your orators out of the proceed thereof."
The respondents clemuned to the bill, and assigned many grounds,
the sl!hstance of whi ch were the following: ( 1) The said bill seeks to
forfeit the charter of the .Metcalf Drug Company, and fails to show

the effects put into the formation of the capital stock of said corpora-

tion; that all of said property put into the said corporation belonged

to H. B. Metcalf and F. G. Weatherly, doing business in the firm

name of H. B. Metcalf; and that the property so put into the corpo-

ration constituted all, or substantially all, of the property belonging to

said firm and to each member thereof, upon which property the com-

plainants had an equitable lien for the payment of their debts.

It was further averred "that on, to wit, April 18, 1894, by a collu-

sion between H. B. Metcalf and F. G. Weatherly and a small creditor

of theirs, a judgment was allowed to be taken against the said defend-

ants, H. B. Metcalf and F. G. Weatherly, in a justice court, for an

amount less than one hundred dollars, upon which judgment execution

was issued and levied upon seventeen shares of stock in the name of

H. B. Metcalf and eight shares in the name of F. G. Weatherly, and

the said H. B. Metcalf and F. G. Weatherly, with the still further

fraudulent intent of placing all their property beyond the reach of
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their creditors, allowed all of said shares to be sold at public outcry,

and they pretended that said shares were bought in by their respective

wives, but your orators allege that in truth and in fact the amount so

bid at such sale for said stock was paid by the said H. B. Metcalf and

F. G. Weatherly.

The bill further averred "that according to the stock-books of the

Metcalf Drug Company, the said H. B. Metcalf now owns one share of

stock and the said F. G. Weatherly owns one share of stock, but upon

said stock-books, notice is given that the one share of H. B. Metcalf

is transferred as collateral security to his wife for a pretended debt,

and the one share of F. G. Weatherly is transferred to his wife as

collateral security for a pretended debt." ,

• The prayer of the bill was for the issuance of an injunction restrain-

ing the defendants and each of them from disposing of, transferring

or incumbering any of the property referred to in the bill, and for the

appointment of a receiver of the goods, wares, merchandise and the

notes, accounts and books of the Metcalf Ding Co., and "that on a

final hearing of this cause, your honor will decree that the formation

of said corporation was fraudulent and void as to your orators, and

that the issue of stock and pretended interest therein of A. P. Met-

calf and M. M. Weatherly is illegal and void as to your orators, and that

your orators have a lien upon said property to the extent of debts due

them, and that your honor will order a reference to ascertain the

amount of debts due your orators and any other creditors who may

come in and make themselves parties hereto; and will order the re-

ceiver to sell and dispose of said stock of goods, and to collect the

notes and accounts, and pay your orators out of the proceed thereof."

The respondents demurred to the bill, and assigned manv grounds,

the substance of which were the following: (1) The said bill seeks to

forfeit the charter of the Metcalf Drug Company, and fails to show
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that it was not duly organized according to law. (2) The bill seeks

to forfeit the charter of the Metcalf Drug Company, and fails to set
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forth any grounds for the forfeiture of said charter. (3) The bill

seeks to condemn the assets of the Metcalf Drug Company to the pay-

ment of debts for which it is not liable. (4) The bill shows on its

face that the debts which are sought to be collected in this suit are due

from H. B. Metcalf and F. G. Weatherly, as partners, under the firm

name of H. B. Metcalf, and are not due from the Metcalf Drug Com-

pany, and yet the bill seeks to condemn the property of the Metcalf

Drug Company, and not the property of said debtors. (5) The bill

seeks to fasten a specific lien on the goods, wares, merchandise, notes

and accounts delivered in payment of the corporate stock in the Met-

calf Drug Company, but fails to state that all, or any part, or what

part of said assets were in the possession of the defendants, or anyone

of them, at the time of the filing of the bill in this cause.

On the submission of the cause on the demurrer, the chancellor

overruled the said demurrer. The defendants appeal from this decree,

and assign the same as error.

Brickell, C. J. The demurrer was properly overruled. The bill

is not, as is supposed by several of the causes of demurrer, a bill as-
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sailing collaterally the incorporation of the Metcalf Drug Company

and seeking a forfeiture of its charter. It is a bill by judgment cred-

itors, seeking the aid of a court of equity to remove obstacles and

hindrances to the enforcement of their judgments, which the judgment

debtors have fraudulently interposed. Whatever maybe the character

of the obstacle or hindrance; whatever may be the scheme or device

to which the debtor resorts, it lies within the province of a court of

equity to remove it. The formation of a corporation, investing it with

the legal title to all the property and rights of property of the judg-.

ment-debtors, and parcelling out the stock of the corporation to the

debtors and their wives, may be a new device for hindering, delaying

and defrauding creditors. The novelty of the device is not of conse-

quence; the fraud of its conception and consummation vitiates it, as

fraud vitiates all transactions tainted with it. The bill does pray that

the formation of the corporation be deemed fraudulent and void as to

the complainants. Such a decree would be proper in granting to the

complainants the full measure of relief to which they are entitled if

the allegations of the bill be true. But it would not work a forfeiture

of the charter, or a dissolution of the corporation; it would simply be

ancillary to the divestiture of the title to the property, liable to the

debts of the complainants, with which it had been invested by the

judgment-debtors.

Let the decree of the chancellor be affirmed.

Xnte. See also: 1865, Booth v. Bunce, 33 N. Y. 139, 88 Am. Dec. 372;

187S. Des Moines Gas Co. v. West, 50 Iowa 16; 1882, Hibernia Insurance Co. v.

St. Louis-, etc., Trans. Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 516; 1886, Slatterly v. St. Louis, etc.,

T. Co., 91 Mo. 217, 60 Am. Rep. 245; 1890, Montgomery Web Co. v. Dienelt,

133 Pa. St. 5*5; 1891, Breman, etc., Bank v. Branch, etc., Co., 104 Mo. 425,

18 S. W. 209: 1892, Vance v. McNabb, 92 Tenn. 47; 1892, Miner v. Belle Isle

Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N. W. 2-18; 1896, Austin v.Tecumseh Natl. Bank, 49

that it was not duly organized according to law. ( 2) The bill seeks
to forfeit the charter of the Metcalf Drug Company, and fails to set
forth any grounds for the forfeiture of said charter. (3) The bill
seeks to condemn the assets of the Metcalf Drug Company to the payment of debts for which it is not liable. ( 4) The bill shows on its
face that the debts which are sought to be collected in this suit are due
from H. B. Metcalf and F. G. Weatherly, as partners, under the firm
name of H.B. Metcalf, and are not due fromthe Metcalf Drug Company, and yet the 'bill seeks to condemn the property of the Metcalf
Drug Company, and not the property of said debtors. (S) The bill
seeks to fasten a specific lien on the goods, wares, merchandise, notes
and accounts delivered in payment of the corporate stock in the Metcalf Dmg Company, but fails to state that all, or any part, or what
part of said assets were in the possession of the defendants, or any one
of them, at the time of the filing of the bill in this cause.
On the submission of the cause on the demurrer, the chancellor
overruled the said demurrer. The defendants appeal from this decree,
and assign the same as error.
BRICKELL, C. J.
The demurrer was properly overruled. The bill
i not, as is supposed by several of the causes of demurrer, a bill assailing collaterally the incorporation of the Metcalf Drug Company
and seeking a forfeiture of its charter. It is a bill by judgment creditors, seeking the aid of a court of equity to remove obstacles and
hindrances to the enforcement of their judgments, which the judgment
debtors have fraudulently interposed. Whatever may be the character
of the obstacle or hindrance; whatever may be the scheme or device
to which the debtor resorts, it lies within the province of a court of
equity to remove it. The formation of a corporation, investing it with
the legal title to all the property and rights of property of the judg- .
mcnt-debtors, and parcelling out the stock of the corporation to the
dehtors and their wives, may be a new device for hindering, delaying
and defrauding creditors. The novelty of the device is not of consequence; the fraud of its conception and consummation vitiates it, as
fraud ,;tiates all transactions tainted with it. The bill does pray that
the formation of the corporo<1tion be deemed fraudulent and void as to
the complainants. Such a decree would be proper in granting to the
complainants the full measure of relief to which they are entitled if
the allegations of the bit! be true. But it would not work a forfeiture
of the charter, or a dissolution of the corporation; it would simply be
ancillary to the divestiture of the title to the property, liable to the
debts of the complainants, with which it had been invested by the
judgment-debtors.
Let the decree of the chancellor be affirmed .
.Vote. See also: 1865, Booth v. Bunce, 33 N. Y. 139, 88 Am. Dec. 372;
1878. Des Moines Gas Co. v. West, 50 Iowa 16; 1882, Hibernia Insurance Co. v.
St. Louis., etc., Trans. Co., 13 Fed . Rep. 516 ;.. 1886, Slatterly v. St. Louis, etc.,
T. Co., 91 Mo. 217, 60 Am. Rep. 24·5; 1890, Montgome ry Web Co. v. Dienelt,
133 Pa. St. 58.5; 1891, Breman , etc., Bank v. Branch, etc., Co .. 104 Mo . 425,
16 S. W. 209; 1892, Vance v. McNabb, 92 Tenn. 47; 1892, Miner v. Belle Isle
lee Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N. W. 2-18; 1896, Austin v. Tecumseh Natl. Bank, 49
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Stone Co., 57 O. S. 60, 48 N. E. Rep. 285, 7 A. & E. Corp. Cas. N. S. 431.

Sec. 21. Same, (d) When corporate sins result from the con-

Neb. 412, 68 N. W. 628, 5 A. & E. Corp. Cas. N. S. 382, 35 L. R. A. 444;
1897, Ewing v. Composite, etc., Co., 169 Mass. 72; 1897, Gates v. Tippecanoe
Stone Co., 57 0. S. 60, 48 N. E. Rep. ~85, 7 A. & E. Corp. Cas. N. S. 431.

certed, but apparently individual, actions of the corporation

members.

THE PEOPLE, Etc., Respondent, v. THE NORTH RIVER SUGAR

REFINING COMPANY, Appellant.1

1890. In the Court of Appeals of New York. 121 N. Y.

Sec. 21. Same. ( d) When corporate sins

re~ult from the concerted, but apparently individual, actions of the corporation
members.

582-626, 18 Am. St. Rep. 843, 32 Am. & E. Corp. Cas. 149,

24 North Eastern Rep. S34; also in the lower court, 54 Hun

354, 7 N. Y. Supp. 406, 22 A. & E. Corp. Cases 511, 5 Ry. &

Corp. L. J. 56, 6 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 442.

Appeal from judgment of the general term of the supreme court in

THE PEOPLE, ETC., RESPONDENT, v. THE NORTH RIVER SUGAR
REFINING COMPANY, APPELLANT. 1

the first judicial department, entered upon an order made November

7, 18S9, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon

a verdict directed by the trial court, and affirmed an order denying a

motion for a new trial.

'

This action was brought by the attorney-general to have the defend-

ant "dissolved, its charter vacated and its corporate existence an-
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nulled." This complaint alleged, and it was found that defendant is

a corporation organized under the general manufacturing act; that it,

1890. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. 121 N. Y.
582-626, 18 Am. St. Rep. 843, 32 Am. & E. Corp. Cas. 149,
24 North Eastern Rep. 834; also in the lower court, 54 Hun
354, 7 N. Y. Supp. 4o6, 22 A. & E. Corp. Cases 511 1 5 Ry. &
Corp. L.]. 56, 6 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 442 .

together with other corporations and firms, in violation of law and in

abuse of its powers, became a party to and carried out an agreement

Appeal from judgment of the general term of the supreme court in
the first judicial department, entered upon an order made November
7, 1889, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon
a verdict directed by the trial court, and affirmed an order denying a
motion for a new trial.
This action was brought by the attorney-general to have the defendant "dissolved, its charter vacated and its corporate existence annulled." This complaint alleged, and it was found that defendant is
a corporation organized under the general manufacturing act; that it,
together with other corporations and finns, in violation of law and in
. abuse of its powers, became a party to and carried out an agreement
which among other things provided in substance as follows:

which among other things provided in substance as follows:

Deed: The undersigned, namely, Havemeyers & Elder [and fourteen

other sugar refining partnerships "and corporations named, including the

North River Sugar Refining Co.], for the purpose of forming the hoard, here-

inafter provided for, and the other purposes hereinafter set forth, enter into

the following agreement: Name, the board shall be designated the Sugar

Refineries Company. Objects: (1) To promote economy of administration,

reduce the cost of refining, and keep the price of sugar as low as is consistent

with reasonable profit. (2) To give each refining company benefit of all

appliances and processes known or used by the others, useful to improve qual-

ity, and diminish cost of sugar. (3) To protect against unlawful combinations

of labor. (4) To prevent the lowering of the standard of refined sugars, and

(5) Generally to promote the interests of the parties hereto in all lawful and

suitable ways. Board: All parties hereto not corporations, to become such

Deed: 'The undersigned, namely, H avemeyers & Elder [and fourte1•u
other sugar refining partnerships -and corporations named, including the
North River Sugar Refining Co.], for the purpose of forming the boat·d, hereinaner provided for, and the other purposes h ereinafter set forth, enter into
the following agreement: Name, th e boai·d shall be designated the Sugar
Refineries Company. Objects: (1) To promote economy of administration,
reduce the cost of refining, and keep the price of sugar as low as is consistent
with reasonable profit. (2) To give each refining company benefit of all
appliances and processes known or used by the others, useful to improve quality, and diminish cost of sugar. (31 'fo protect ai,.rainstunlawful combinations
of labor. (4) To prevent the lowering of the standard of refined sugars, and
(51 Generally to promote the interests of the parties hereto in all lnwfnl Rl)d
suitable ways. Board: All parties hereto not corporations, to become such
before deed goes into effect; all shares of stock of each corporation to be transferred to a bom·d, consisting of eleven persons, any member to be removable
by two-thirds of the entire board for incapacity or refusal to serve, vacancies
in term to be fillerl by vote of board, at end of terms by election of certificate
holders, at an annual meeting in New York City. Board to make by-Jaws
for themselves, act by proxy if they choose, majority to be a quorum , nnd
majority of quorum to control , except in appropriating money, a majority of
all, required; members of hoard to he members of boardfl of directors of the

before deed goes into effect; all shares of stock of each corporation to be trans-

ferred to a board, consisting of eleven persons, any member to be removable

by two-thirds of the entire board for incapacity or refusal to serve, vacancies

in term to be filled by vote of board, at end of terms by election of certificate

holders, at an annual meeting in New York City. Board to make by-laws

for themselves, act by proxy if they choose, majority to be a quorum, and

majority of quorum to control, except in appropriating money, a majority of

all, required; members of board to be members of boards of directors of the

1 Statement of facts condensed. Arguments and parts of the opinion omitted.
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several companies; shares in such companies to be transferred to them in

order to qualify them, if necessary; members of board to be divided into three

classes, first to serve seven years teach being named), second, five yeare

(each named), and third, three years (naming them). Officers: Board to

appoint a president, vice-president and treasurer from the members of the

board, and a secretary (not necessarily a member of the board), and such

other officers as necessary, fixing their duties. Plans: The several parties

hereto to maintain their separate organizations, and carry on and conduct their

own business. Capital stock of each corporation to be transferred to the

board, and certificates not exceeding $50,000,000 ( 500,000 shares of $100 each)

to be issued by the board to each refinery in proportion to the value of its

plant as fixed by appraisers to be selected, and each stockholder in each

refinery to have such proportion of the certificates issued to each refinery as

his stock bore to the stock of that refinery, except 15 per cent, of the shares

allotted to each refinery to be left with the board to be disposed of for the

purchase of other refineries or increasing the refining capacity of the parties

hereto.

The certificate, provided that the holder was entitled to shares in the

sugar refineries company, subject to the provisions of the deed, transfera-

ble on the books of the board upon surrender, subject to right to increase the
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total stock, or change this deed, and the assignee, by accepting the certificate

to be held to agree to the terms of the deed, or changes made therein. The

title to the Stock of the corporations to be in the members of the board as

trustees, strictly as joint tenants and having all the rights and powers inci-

dent to stockholders in the several corporations, subject to the provisions of

this deed. Profits of each corporation to be paid to the board, and dividends

distributed by the board to certificate holders. Changes in the deed to be

maile by a majority of certificate holders. Other refineries to be added upon

terms provided by the board. Custody of the deed to be in the president of

the board, with sole and independent control, and not to be shown to any cor-

poration, firm or person whatsoever except by express direction of the board.

The stockholders of the North River Sugar Refining Company in April,

1SS7, at a meeting when all the trustees were present, appointed a committee

to make arrangements to consolidate the sugar refineries of New York, and

directed the president and secretary to sign such contract as the committee

should make for that purpose. The secretary, on behalf of the company, in

September signed the foregoing deed to go into effect in October. In Novem-

ber, at a stockholders' meeting, the powers of the committee and the presi-

dent and secretary were revoked, but it was recited that one John Searles,

Jr., had offered to purchase all of the stock for $325,000, and it was unani-

mously resolved that a committee be appointed to deliver it to him, the pro-

ceeds to be divided in proportion to the ownership of shares by the stock-

holders. Accordingly, the members individually, transferred their shares,

indorsed in blank, to Searles, who was a member and the secretary and treas-

urer of the board created by the deed above set forth; the stock was by

Searles transferred to the board, and it issued certificates to the shareholders

to the amount of $700,000, less 15 percent., as provided by the deed; new

directors were chosen by the board, Searles became president, and shortly

afterward the works of the North River Sugar Refineries Company were

closed, and never ran thereafter, though it was allotted its share of dividends

for its certificate holders.

Finch, J. The judgment sought against the defendant is one of

corporate death. The state, which created, asks us to destroy; and

the penalty invoked represents the extreme rigor of the law. Its in-

fliction must rest upon grave cause, and be warranted by material mis-

conduct. The life of a corporation is indeed less than that of the hum-

West citizen, and yet it envelopes great accumulations of property,

moves and carries in large volume the business and enterprise of the

102 PEOPLE V. NORTH RIVER SUGAR REFINING CO. § 21

people, and may not be destroyed without clear and abundant reason.

That would be true, even if the legislature should debate the destruc-
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beyond dispute where the state summons the offender before its judi-

people, and may not be destroyed without clear and abundant reason.
That would be true, even if the legislature should debate the destruction of the corporate life by a repeal of the corporate charter; but is
beyond dispute where the state summons the offender before its judicial tribunals, and submits its complaint to their judgment and review.
By that process it assumes the burden of establishing the charges which
it has made, and must show us warrant in the facts for the relief which
it seeks. • • •
Two questions, therefore, open before us, first, has the defendant
corporation exceeded or abused its powers; and second, does that excess or abuse threaten or harm the public welfare.
The first question requires us to ascertain what the defendant corporation has done in violation of its duty, or omitted to do in performance of its duty. We find disclosed by the proof that it has become
an integral part and constituent element of a combination which
possesses over it an absolute control, which has absorbed most of its
corporate functions, and dictates the extent and manner and terms of
its entire business activity. Into that combination, which drew into
its control sixteen other corporations engaged in the refining of sugar,
the defendant has gone, in some manner and by some process, for, as
an unquestionable truth, we find it there. All its stock has been transferred to the central association of eleven individuals denominated a
"Board ; " in exchange it has taken and distributed to its own stockholders certificates of the board catTying a proportionate interest in
what it describes as its capital stock; the new directors of the defendant corporation have been chosen by the board, made eligible by its
gift of single shares, and liable to removal under the terms of their
appointment at any moment of independent action. It has lost the
power to make a dividend, and is compelled to pay over its net earnings to the master whose servant it has become. Under the orders of
that master it has ceased to refine sugar, and, by so much, has lessened
the supply upon the market. It can not stir unless the master approves,
and yet is entitled to receive from the earnings of the other refineries,
massed as profits in the treasury of the board, its proportionate share
for division among its own stockholders holding the substituted certificates. In return for this advantage it has become liable to be mortgaged, not for its own corporate benefit alone, but to supply with funds
the controlling board when reaching out for other and coveted r efineries.
No one can look these facts fairly in the face without being compelled
to say that the defendant is in the combination and in to stay. Indeed, so much is with great frankness admitted on the pait of the appellant. Its counsel concedes that the stock was transferred "to the
board mentioned in the agreement and on the terms and for the purposes mentioned in the agreement; and that this action effectually
lodged the control of the defendant company, so far as such contol
can be secured by the voting power in that board."
But that truth does not afone solve the problem presented. \Ve
are yet to ascertain \.vhether the corporation became the subordinate
and servant of the board by its own voluntary action, or the will and

cial tribunals, and submits its complaint to their judgment and review.

By that process it assumes the burden of establishing the charges which

it has made, and must show us warrant in the facts for the relief which

it seeks. * * *

Two questions, therefore, open before us, first, has the defendant

corporation exceeded or abused its powers; and second, does that ex-

cess or abuse threaten or harm the public welfare.

The first question requires us to ascertain what the defendant cor-

poration has done in violation of its duty, or omitted to do in perfor-

mance of its duty. We find disclosed by the proof that it has become

an integral part and constituent element of a combination which

possesses over it an absolute control, which has absorbed most of its

corporate functions, and dictates the extent and manner and terms of

its entire business activity. Into that combination, which drew into

its control sixteen other corporations engaged in the refining of sugar,

the defendant has gone, in some manner and by some process, for, as
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an unquestionable truth, we find it there. All its stock has been trans-

ferred to the central association of eleven individuals denominated a

"Board;" in exchange it has taken and distributed to its own stock-

holders certificates of the board carrying a proportionate interest in

what it describes as its capital stock; the new directors of the defen-

dant corporation have been chosen by the board, made eligible by its

gift of single shares, and liable to removal under the terms of their

appointment at any moment of independent action. It has lost the

power to make a dividend, and is compelled to pay over its net earn-

ings to the master whose servant it has become. Under the orders of

that master it has ceased to refine sugar, and, by so much, has lessened

the supply upon the market. It can not stir unless the master approves,

and yet is entitled to receive from the earnings of the other refineries,

massed as profits in the treasury of the board, its proportionate share

for division among its own stockholders holding the substituted certifi-

cates. In return for this advantage it has become liable to be mort-

gaged, not for its own corporate benefit alone, but to supply with funds

the controlling board when reaching out for other and coveted refineries.

No one can look these facts fairly in the face without being compelled

to say that the defendant is in the combination and in to stay. In-

deed, so much is with great frankness admitted on the part of the ap-

pellant. Its counsel concedes that the stock was transferred "to the

board mentioned in the agreement and on the terms and for the pur-

poses mentioned in the agreement; and that this action effectually

lodged the control of the defendant company, so far as such contol

can be secured by the voting power in that board."

But that truth does not alone solve the problem presented. We

are yet to ascertain whether the corporation became the subordinate

and servant of the board by its own voluntary action, or the will and
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power of others than itself; by force of a contract to which it was in

reality a party, or as the simple consequence of a change of owners;

by its fault or its misfortune; by a sale or by a trust. For, if it has

§ 21
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done nothing, if what has happened, and all that has happened, is as-

certained to be that the stockholders of the defendant, one or many,

sold absolutely to the eleven men who constituted the board their

entire stock, and the latter, by force of their proprietorship and as

owners, have merely chosen directors, in their own interest, and are

only managing their property in their own way as any absolute own-

ers may; if that is the truth, and the entire and exact truth, it is dif-

ficult to see wherein the corporation has sinned, or what it has done

beyond merely omitting for a time to carry on its business. That is

the theory upon which the appellant stands, and which it submits to

our examination.

On the other hand it is contended that there never was a sale, but a

trust constituted by mutual agreement; that they who agreed were

the whole body of stockholders in each corporation necessarily repre-

senting and binding the corporation itself; that they transferred their

shares to the board upon the trusts declared in the deed; that the cer-

tificates issued by the board were the formal declaration of the trust;
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that the corporate stockholders parted with the legal title of their stock

to the chosen trustees with the power to vote upon it, but retained,

nevertheless, its beneficial ownership through the operation of the cer-

tificates; and so the corporations entered into a partnership with each

other, vesting the partnership power in a board of control.

I have brought these two theories face to face, where they may con-

front each other, because, when a choice is made between them, we

have gone a long distance towards the end of the controversy.

[After reviewing the provisions of the deed and indicating that a sale im-

plies existing vendors and vendees, a negotiation between them, signing of

the formal contract by both, a vesting of the entire dominion in the vendee,

with the accompanying rights of ownership, in all of which points the deed

was peculiarly deficient; and on the other band that the board was expressly

made trustees, with managing powers of stockholders only by the express

terms of the deed, and not as an incident of real ownership ;"that the right to

power of others than itself; by force of a contract to which it was in
reality a party, or as the simple consequence of a change of owners;
by its fault or its misfortune; by a sale or by a trust. For, if it has
done nothing, if what has happened, and all that has happened, is ascrrtained to be that the stockholders of the defendant, one or many,
sold absolutely to the eleven men who constituted the board their
entire stock, and the latter, by force of their proprietorship and as
owners, have merely chosen directors, in their own interest, an<l are
only managing their property in their own way as any absolute owners may; if that is the truth, and the entire and exact truth, it is difficult to see wherein the corporation has sinned, or what it has done
beyond merely omitting for a time to carry on its business. That is
the theory upon which the appellant stands, and which it submits to
our examination.
On the other hand it is contended that there never was a sale, but a
tru t constituted by mutual agreement; that they who agreed were
the whole body of stockholders in each corporation necessarily representing and binding the corporation itself; that they transferred their
shares to the board upon the trnsts declared in the deed; that the certificates issued by the board were the formal declaration of the trust;
that the corporate stockholders parted with the legal title of their stock
to the chosen trustees with the power to vote upon it, but retained,
ne,·ertheless, its beneficial ownership through the operation of the certificates ; and so the corporations entered into a partnership with each
ether, vesting the partnership power in a hoard of control.
I have brought these two theories face to face, where they may confront each other, because, when a choice is made between them, ·we
ha,·e gone a long distance towards the end of the controversy.

mortgage was derived from the deed alone, and not as owner; that payment

was to be made not by money but by certificates of the board created by the

deed, who were not to create any liability either as a whole, or by its mem-

bers, all of which indicated a trust and nothing more, the opinion proceeds:]

The combination, therefore, framed by the deed was a trust; and,

if created by the corporations, or in any respect the consequence or

product of their action, some inevitable results would be certain to

follow. But here we encounter the stronghold of the appellant's argu-

ment which is, that if the corporations are in some manner in the com-

bination, they are there solely as the result of a contract other than

[After reviewing the provisions of the deed and indicating that a sale implies existing vendors and vendees,. a negotiation between them, signing of
the formal contract by both, a vesting of the entire dominion in the vendee,
with the accompanying rights of ownership, in all of which points the deed
was peculiarly deficient; and on the other hand that the board was expressly
made trustees, with managing powers of stockholders only by the express
terms of the deed, and not as an incident of real ownership; that the right to
mortgage was derived from the deed alone, and not as owner; that payment
was to be made not by money but by certificates of the board created by the
deed, who were not to create any liability either as a whole, or by its members, all of which indicated a trust and nothing more, the opinion proceeds:]

their own; are there without corporate action on their part; and so

are sufferers and not sinners. The reasoning leading to that result is

so severely technical as to have suggested a justification almost remind-

ing one of an apology. We are called upon to sever the corporation,

the abstract legal entity, from the living and acting corporators; as it

The combination, therefore, framed by the deed was a trust; and,
if created by the corporations, or in any respect the consequence or
product of their action, some inevitable results would be certain to
follow. But here we encounter the stronghold of the appellant's argument which is, that if the corporations are in some manner in the combination, they are there solely as the result of a contract other than
their own; are there without corporate action on their part; and so
are sufferers and not sinners. The reasoning leading to that result is
so severely technical as to have suggested a justification almost reminding one of an apology. We are called upon to sever the corporation,
the abstract legal entity, from the living and acting corporators; as it
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were, to separate in our thought the soul from the body, and admit-
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ting the sins of the latter to adjudge that the -former remains pure.
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21

Let us first recall the facts in the order of their occurrence.

[After stating the facts in relation to the surrender to the board, substan-

were, to separate in our thought the soul from the body, and admitting the sins of the latter to adjudge that the ·former remains pure.
Let us first recall the facts in the order of their occurrence.

tially as above set forth, p. 101, the opinion proceeds:]

And yet it is argued that the corporation, the legal entity, has done

nothing; that Searles was guilty, but the corporate robe that enveloped

[After stating the facts in relation to the surrender to the boa.rd, substantially as above setfortb, p. 101, the opinion proceeds :]

him was innocent, and so he must be left to wear it undisturbed; that

while all that was human and could act had sinned, yet the impalpa-

ble entity had not acted at all and must go free. I believe that the

And yet it is argued that the corporation, the legal entity, has done
nothing; that Searles was guilty, but the corporate robe that enveloped
him was innocent, and so he mu st be left to wear it undisturbed; that
while all that was human and could act had sinned, yet the impalpable entity had not acted at all and must go free. I believe that the
history of what occurred, as I have already described it, furnishes a
sufficient answer, assuming that stockholders and trustees acting together can do a corporate act at all. There was corporate action in
making the combination agreement which bound the defendant. The
revocation of an executed authority left the contract standing. The
corporation thus helped to make the trust and became an element of
it. If there was anything imperfect in its action, the new stockholder
and his associates waived the imperfection by acting upon the agreement of the corporation, and so confirming it in all particulars.
But the assumption underlying the view I have expressed is itself
contested, and a proposition asserted which denies the possibility of
any corporate action, except by the trustees or directors acting formally as such; a proposition which, if sound, dominates the whole
field of controversy, and, establishing that there bas been no corporate action at all, effectually shuts out every question of illegality or
public injury. I can not admit that proposition. I tliink there may be

history of what occurred, as I have already described it, furnishes a

sufficient answer, assuming that stockholders and trustees acting to-

gether can do a corporate act at all. There was corporate action in

making the combination agreement which bound the defendant. The

revocation of an executed authority left the contract standing. The

corporation thus helped to make the trust and became an element of

it. If there was anything imperfect in its action, the new stockholder

and his associates waived the imperfection by acting upon the agree-

ment of the corporation, and so confirming it in all particulars.

But the assumption underlying the view I have expressed is itself
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contested, and a proposition asserted which denies the possibility of

any corporate action, except by the trustees or directors acting for-

mally as such; a proposition which, if sound, dominates the whole

field of controversy, and, establishing that there has been no corpo-

rate action at all, effectually shuts out every question of illegality or

public injury. lean not admit that proposition. I think there may be

actual corporate conduct which is not formal corporate action; and where

that conduct is directed or produced by the whole body, both of officers

and stockholders, by every living instrume?itality which can possess and

wield the corporate franchise, that conduct is of a corporate character,

and if illegal and injurious may deserve and receive the penalty of dis-

solution.

There always is, and there always must be, corporate conduct with-

actual corporate condud whiclz is not formal corporate action; and where
that conduct is directed or produced by the whole body, both of offiu1'8
and stockholders, by every livt'ng instrumentality whiclz can possess and
wield the corporate franchise, that conduct i's ef a corporate clzaracter,
and if illegal and injurious may deserve and receive the penalty of dissolution.

out formal corporate action where the thing challenged is an omission

to act at all. A corporation organized in the public interest, with a

view to the public welfare, and in the expectation of benefit to the

community, which is the motive of the state's grant, may accept the

franchise and hold it in sullen silence, doing nothing, resolving noth-

ing, furnishing no formal corporate action upon which the state can

put its finger and say, this the corporation has done by the agency

There always is , and there always must be, corporate conduct without formal corporate action ·where the thing challenged is an omission
to act at all. A corporation organized in the public interest, with a
view to the public welfare, and in the expectation of benefit to the
community, which is the motive of the state's grant, may accept the
franchise and bold it in sullen silence, doing nothing, resolving nothing, furnishing no formal corporate action upon which the state can
put its finger and say, this the corporation has done by the agency
through which it is authorized to act. That is corporate conduct
which the state may question and punish without searching for a formal corporate act. The directors of a corporation , its authorized and
active agency, may see the stockholders perverting its normal purposes
by handing it over, bound and helpless, to an irresponsible and foreign authority, and omit all action which they ought to take , offer no
resistance, make no protest, but silently acquiesce as directors in the
wrong which, as stockholders, they have themselves helped to com-

through which it is authorized to act. That is corporate conduct

which the state may question and punish without searching for a for-

mal corporate act. The directors of a corporation, its authorized and

active agency, may seethe stockholders perverting its normal purposes

by handing it over, bound and helpless, to an irresponsible and for-

eign authority, and omit all action which they ought to take, offer no

resistance, make no protest, but silently acquiesce as directors in the

wrong which, as stockholders, they have themselves helped to com-
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mit. That again is corporate conduct, though there be an utter ab-

sence of directors' resolutions.

Is it asked what they could have done to prevent the organization
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of the trus.t, how they were negligent and unfaithful as corporate of-

ficers by their omission to act; what good a mere protest or objection

would have accomplished; what effective form their resistance could

have assumed? The answer is that they could have refused to recog-

nize the illegal trust transfer of the stock; they could have declined to

register the new ownership upon their stock books; they could have

said, and acted upon their words, that the original stockholders re-

mained not only the beneficial, but the legal owners of the stock;

and, if the board of trustees appealed to the law, the resisting directors

could challenge the legality of the transfer as molded by the combina-

tion agreement, and might have defeated the trust and shattered it at

the outset of its career. So much they could have done as corporate

officers; so much it was their duty to have done as representatives of

the corporation, and when beyond that corporate neglect they recog-

nized the validity of the stock transfers in trust, put the new and un-

lawful ownership upon their books, and accepted its votes in the

choice of new directors, who were to throttle the independence of the
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corporation and chain it to the will of the trust, I think we must shut

our eyes in willful blindness if we fail to see both corporate neglect

and corporate action.

It is true, as we are reminded, that the statute confers upon trustees

and directors general authority to manage the stock, property and con-

cerns of manufacturing corporations; and equally true that, as a gen-

eral rule and as between the companies and those with whom they

deal, the corporate action must be manifested through and by the di-

rectors; but other statutes indicate with equal plainness that there are

corporate acts which the trustees can not perform, and which affect

and bind the corporation only upon the condition that they proceed

from the stockholders, or from them and the trustees acting together.

In increasing or diminishing the capital stock, the corporate act is

wholly that of the corporators, and in consolidating two or more com-

panies into one, there must be the joint action of both trustees and

stockholders. The trust of the refineries, in substance and effect, ap-

proached very near to these two corporate acts, so far as the resultant

consequences affected the corporators acting. The trust stipulations

practically doubled their corporate stock through the agency of the

certificates issued, and the combination in its result is largely the equiv-

alent of a substantial consolidation. If these things had been done

lawfully, they would have been accomplished by the united action of

trustees and corporators, and beyond any question would have been

corporate acts. Having been done unlawfully, but by the same united

agency aiming at similar results, they must still constitute corporate

conduct, unless the bare fact of their illegality takes away their corpo-

rate character. To say that would disarm the state in every case of

misuse or abuse of chartered powers.

The abstract idea of a corporation, the legal entity, the impalpable

mit. That again is corporate conduct, though there be an utter absence of directors' resolutions.
ls it asked what they could have done to prevent the organization
of the tm t, how they were negligent and unfaithful as corporate officers by their omission to act; what good a mere protest or objection
would ba,·e accomplished; what effective form their resistance could
ba\"e assumed? The answer is that they could have refused to recognize the illegal trust transfer of the stock; they could have declined to
regi ter the new ownership upon their stock books; they could have
said, and acted upon their words, that the original stockholders remained not only the beneficial, but the legal owners of the stock;
and, if the board of trustees appealed to the law, the resisting directors
could challenge the legality of the transfer as molded by the combination agreement, and might ha,·e defeated the tmst and shattered it at
the out et of its career. So much they could have done as corporate
officers; so much it was their duty to have done as representatives of
the corporation, and when beyond that corporate neglect they recognized the validity of the stock transfers in trust, put the new and unlawful owner hip upon their books, and accepted its votes in the
choice of new directors, who were to throttle the independence of the
corporation and chain it to the will of the trust, I think we must shut
our eyes in willful blindness if we fail to see both corporate neglect
and corporate action.
It is true, as we are reminded, that the statute confers upon trustees
and directors general authority to manage the stock, prope1ty and concerns of manufacturing corporations; and equally true that, as a general rule and as between the companies and those with whom they
deal, the corporate action must be manifested through and by the directors; but other statutes indicate with equal plainness that there are
corporate acts which the trustees can not perform, and \vhich affect
and bind the corporation only upon the condition that they proceed
from the stockholders, or from them and the trustees acting together.
In increasing or diminishing the capital stock, the corporate act is
wholly that of the corporators, and in consolidating two or more companies into one, there must be the joint action of both trustees and
stockholders. The trust of the refineries, in substance and effect, approached very near to these two corporate acts, so far as the resultant
consequences affected the corporators acting. The trust stipulations
practically doubled their coq)orate stock through the agency of the
certificates issued, and the combination in its result is largely the equivalent of a substantial consolidation. If these things had been done
lawfully, they would have been accomplished by the united action of
tru tees and corporators, and beyond any question would have been
corporate acts. Having been done unlawfully, but by the same united
agency aiming at similar results, they mu st still constitute corporate
conduct, unless the bare fact of their illegality takes away their corporate character. To say that would disarm the state in every case of
misuse or abuse of chartered powers.
The abstrad idea of a corporaU:on, the legal entity, the impalpable
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and intangible creatio?i of human thought is itself a fiction, and has been

appropriately described as a figure of speech. It serves very well to
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designate in our minds the collective action and agency of many indi-
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viduals as permitted by the law; and the substa?itial inquiry always is

and intangible creation of human thought is itself a .fiction, and lzas been
appropriately described as a figure of speech. It serves very well to
designate in our minds tlte collective action and agency of many individuals as permitted by !lie law,- and !lie substantial inquiry always is
wlzat in a given case has been that collective action and agency. As
between the corporation and tltose with whom it deals the manner of its
exercise usually is material, but as between it and the state, the substantial inquiry is only what that collective action and agency has done,
wliat it has, in fact, accomplz'slied, what is seen to be t'ts effective work,
wllat has been its conduct. It ought not to be otlzerwise. The state
gave the franchise, the charter, not to the impalpable, intangible and
almost nebulous .fiction of our thought, but to the corpora/ors, the individuals, the acting and living men to be used by them, to redound to
their benefit, to strengthen tlzeir hands and add energy to their capital.
If it is taken away, it is taken from tlzem as individuals and corporators, and the legal .fiction disappears. The benefit is theirs, the punisll1nent is theirs, and both must attend and depend upon their conduct;
and when they all act collectively, as an aggregate body, without the
least exceplion, and so acting, reach results and accomplish purposes
clearly corporate in their character, and affecHng the vitalif.y, the independence, the utility of tlze corporaHon itself, we can not hesitate to conclude that there has been corporate conduct which the state may review,
and not be defeated by the assumed innocence of a convenient .fiction.
As was said in People, ex rel., v. K. & M. T. R. Co. (23 Wend.

what in a given case has been that collective action and agency. As

between the corporation and those with whom it deals the manner of its

exercise usually is material, but as between it and the state, the sub-

stantial inquiry is only what that collective action and agency has done,

7vhat it has, i?i fact, accomplished, what is seen to be its effective work,

-what has been its conduct. It ought not to be otherwise. The state

gave the franchise, the charter, not to the impalpable, intangible and

almost nebulous fiction of our thought, but to the corporators, the indi-

viduals, the acting a?id living men to be used by them, to redound to

their benefit, to strengthen their hands and add energy to their capital.

If it is taken away, it is taken from them as individuals and corpora-

tors, and the legal fiction disappears. The benefit is theirs, the pun-

ishment is theirs, and both must attend and depend upon their conduct;

and when they all act collectively, as an aggregate body, without the

least exception, and so acting, reach results and accomplish purposes

clearly corporate in their character, and affecting the vitality, the inde-
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pendence, the utility of the corporation itself, we can not hesitate to con-

clude that there has been corporate conduct which the state may review,

and not be defeated by the assumed innocence of a convenient fiction.

As was said in People, ex rel., v. K. & M. T. R. Co. (23 Wend.

193), "though the proceeding by information be against the corpo-

rate body, it is the .acts or omissions of the individual corporators that

are the subject of the judgment of the court."

It remains to determine whether the conduct of the defendant in

participating in the creation of the trust, and becoming an element of

it was illegal and tended to the public injury and we may consider the

two questions together and without formal separation.

193), "though the proceeding by information be against the corporate body, it is the .acts or omissions of the individual corpora tors that
are the subject of the judgment of the court."
It remains to ·determine whether the conduct of the defendant in
participating in the creation of the trust, and becoming an element of
it was illegal and tended to the public injury and we may consider the
two questions together and without formal separation.
It is quite clear that the effect of the defendant's action was to divest
itself of the essential and vital elements of its franchise by placing
them in trust; to accept from the state the gift of corporate life only
to disregard the conditions upon which it was given; to receive its
powers and privileges merely to put them in pawn; and to give away
to an irresponsible board its entire independence and self-control.
When it had passed into the hands of the tmst, only a shell of a corporation was left standing, as a seeming obedience to the law, but
with its internal structure destroyed or removed. Its stockholders,
retaining their beneficial interest, have separated from 'it in their voting
power, and so parted with the control which the charter gave them
and the state required them to exercise. It has a board of directors
nominally and formally in office, but qualified by shares which they
do not own, and owing their official life to the board which can end
their pov,rer at any moment of disobedience. It can make no dividends
whatever may be its net earnings, and mu st encumber its property at
the command of its master, and for purposes wholly foreign to its own
corporate interests and duties. At the command of that master it has

It is quite clear that the effect of the defendant's action was to divest

itself of the essential and vital elements of its franchise by placing

them in trust; to accept from the state the gift of corporate life only

to disregard the conditions upon which it was given; to receive its

powers and privileges merely to put them in pawn; and to give away

to an irresponsible board its entire independence and self-control.

When it had passed into the hands of the trust, only a shell of a cor-

poration was left standing, as a seeming obedience to the law, but

with its internal structure destroyed or removed. Its stockholders,

retaining their beneficial interest, have separated from it in their voting

power, and so parted with the control which the charter gave them

and the state required them to exercise. It has a board of directors

nominally and formally in office, but qualified by shares which they

do not own, and owing their official life to the board which can end

their power at any moment of disobedience. It can make no dividends

whatever may be its net earnings, and must encumber its property at

the command of its master, and for purposes wholly foreign to its own

corporate interests and duties. At the command of that master it has
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ceased to refine sugar, and without any doubt for the purpose of so

far lessening the market supply as to prevent what is termed "over-

production." In all these respects it has wasted and perverted the

privileges conferred by the charter, abused its powers, and proved

unfaithful to its duties. But graver still is the illegal action substituted

for the conduct which the state had a right to expect and require. It

has helped to create an anomalous tmst which is, in substance and

effect, a partnership of twenty separate corporations.

The state permits in many ways an aggregation of capital, but mind-

ful of the possible dangers to the people overbalancing the benefits,

keeps upon it a restraining hand, and maintains over it a prudent

supervision, where such aggregation depends upon its permission and

grows out of its corporate grants. It is a violation of law for corpo-

rations to enter into a partnership. N. Y. & S. C. Co. v. F. Bank,

7 Wend. 412; Clearwater v. Meredith, 1 Wall. 29; Whittcnton

Mills v. Upton, 10 Gray 596. The case last cited furnishes the rea-

sons with precision and at length. It shows the utter inconsistency

of a double allegiance by those who act for the corporation to two dif-

ferent principals, and demonstrates that the vital characteristics of the

corporation are of necessity drowned in the paramount authority of
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the partnership. That the combination of the refineries partakes of

the nature of a partnership is not denied. Indeed, in one of the papers

added to the appellant's brief, it is not only admitted, but asserted

and defended. That paper shows quite clearly that by force of the

arrangement there was a community of interest in the fund created by

the corporate earnings before division, and that each member of the

trust shared in the profit and loss of all. It is said, however, that a

consolidation of manufacturing corporations is permitted by the law,

and that the trust, or combination, or partnership, however it may be

described, amounts only to a practical consolidation, which public

policy does not forbid, because the statute permits it. Laws of 1867,

ch. 960: Laws of 1S84, ch. 367. The refineries did not avail them-

selves of that statute. They chose to disregard it, and to reach its

practical results without subjection to the prudential restraints with

which the state accompanied its permission.

If there had been a consolidation under the statute, one single cor-

poration would have taken the place of the others dissolved. They

would have disappeared utterly, and not, as under the trust, remained

in apparent existence to threaten and menace other organizations

and occupy the ground which otherwise would be left free. Under

the statute the resultant combination would itself be a corporation de-

riving its existence from the state, owing duties and obligations to the

state, and subject to the control and supervision of the state, and not,

as here, an unincorporated board, a colossal and gigantic partnership,

having no corporate functions and owing no corporate allegiance.

Under the statute the consolidated company taking the place of the

separate corporations could have as capital stock only an amount equal

to the fair aggregate value of the rights and franchises of the compa-

nies absorbed; and not as here a capital stock double that value at the

108 PEOPLE V. NORTH RIVER SUGAR REFINING CO. § 21

outset and capable of an elastic and irresponsible increase. The dif-

ference is very great and serves further to indicate the inherent ille-
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And here, I think, we gain a definite view of the injurious tenden-

out.set and capable of an elastic and irresponsible increase. The difference is very great and serves further to indicate the inherent illegality of the trust combination.
And here, I think, we gain a definite view of the injurious tendencies developed by its organization and operation, and of the public
interests which are menaced by its action. As corporate grants are
always assumed to have been made f or the publ£c benefit, any condud
wh£ch destroys their normal functz'ons, and mat'ms and cripples their
separate act£vz'ty, and takes away the£r free and £ndependent action,
must so far disappo£nt the purpose of their creation as to affect unfavorably the public interest ; and that to a much greater extent w /1c11
beyond their o·wn several aggregatt'ons of capital they compact them
all into one combination wh£ch stands outside of the ward of th e state,
which dominates tlte range of an entire £ndustry, and puts upon the
market a capital stock proudly defiant of actual values , and capable
of an unl£mited expansion. It is not a sufficient answer to say that
similar results may be lawfully accomplished; that an individual having the necessary wealth might have bought all these refineries, manned
them with his own chosen agents, and managed the m as a group at
his sovereign will; for it is one thing for the state to respect the right
of ownership and protect them out of regard to the business freedom
of the citizen, and quite another thing to add to that possibi lity a fu rther extension of those consequences by creating artificial · persons to
aid in producing such aggregations.
The individuals are few who hold in possession such enormous
wealth, and fewer still who peril it all in a m anufacturing enterprL e i
but if corporations can combine, and mass their forces in a solid tru t
or partnership, with little added risk to the capital already embarked,
without limit to the magnitude of the aggregation, a tempting and
easy road is opened to enormous combinations, vastly exceeding in
number and in strength and in their power over industry any pos. ibilities of individual ownership; and the state by the creation of the
artificial persons constituting the elements of the combination , and
failing to limit and restrain their powers, becomes itself the responsible creator, the voluntary cause of an nggregation of capital which it
imply endures in the individual as the product of his free agency.
What it may bear is one thing, what it should cause and create is quite
another.
And so we have reached our conclusion, and it appears to us to
have been established, that the defendant corporation has violated its
charter and failed in the performance of its corporate duties, and that
in respects so material and important as to justify a judg ment of dis olution. Having reached that result, it becomes needless to advance
into the wider discussion over monopolies and competition and retraint of trade and the problems of political economy. Our duty is
to leave them until some proper emergency compels their consideration. Without either approval o r disapproval of the views expressed
upon that branch of the case by the courts below, we are enabled to
decide that in this state there can be no paitnersbips of separate and

cies developed by its organization and operation, and of the public

interests which are menaced by its action. As corporate grants arc

always assumed to have been made for the -public benefit, any conduct

which destroys their normal functions, and maims and cripples their

separate activity, and takes away their free and independent action,

must so far disappoint the purpose of their creation as to affect un-

favorably the public interest; and that to a much greater extent when

beyond their own several aggregations of capital they compact them

all into one combination which stands outside of the ward of the state,

which dominates the range of an entire industry, and puts upon the

market a capital stock proudly defiant of actual values, and capable

of an unlimited expansion. It is not a sufficient answer to say that

similar results may be lawfully accomplished; that an individual hav-

ing the necessary wealth might have bought all these refineries, manned

them with his own chosen agents, and managed them as a group at

his sovereign will; for it is one thing for the state to respect the rights
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of ownership and protect them out of regard to the business freedom

of the citizen, and quite another thing to add to that possibility a fur-

ther extension of those consequences by creating artificial persons to

aid in producing such aggregations.

The individuals are few who hold in possession such enormous

wealth, and fewer still who peril it all in a manufacturing enterprise;

but if corporations can combine, and mass their forces in a solid trust

or partnership, with little added risk to the capital already embarked,

without limit to the magnitude of the aggregation, a tempting and

easy road is opened to enormous combinations, vastly exceeding in

number and in strength and in their power over industry any possibili-

ties of individual ownership; and the state by the creation of the

artificial persons constituting the elements of the combination, and

failing to limit and restrain their powers, becomes itself the responsi-

ble creator, the voluntary cause of an aggregation of capital which it

simply endures in the individual as the product of his free agency.

What it may bear is one thing, what it should cause and create is quite

another.

And so we have reached our conclusion, and it appears to us to

have been established, that the defendant corporation has violated its

charter and failed in the performance of its corporate duties, and that

in respects so material and important as to justify a judgment of disso-

lution. Having reached that result, it becomes needless to advance

into the wider discussion over monopolies and competition and re-

straint of trade and the problems of political economy. Our duty is

to leave them until some proper emergency compels their considera-

tion. Without either approval or disapproval of the views expressed

upon that branch of the case by the courts below, we are enabled to

decide that in this state there can be no partnerships of separate and
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independent corporations, whether directly, or indirectly through the

medium of a trust; no substantial consolidations which avoid and dis-

regard the statutory permissions and restraints, but that manufactur-
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ing corporations must be and remain several as they were created, or

one under the statute.

The judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs.

All concur.

Judgment affirmed.

Sou. (1) The right of the state to forfeit the charter of a corporation for a

violation of it injuriously affecting the public, is treated in ch. 16, infra, p.

1294, etneg.

(2) Also the power of a corporation to become a member of a partneHr 1

is treated in ch. 13, infra, p. 957.

(3) As to the "fiction of the legal entity of the corporation" see particularly,

1892, State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. R. 137, 34 Am. St. R. 541, and

the quotations from Morawetz and Taylor, in the note to this article, infra,

p. 110. Also 1895, Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers' Association, 155 111. 166;

1895, Belden v. Burke, 147 N. Y. 542; 1888, Wood v. Trust Co., 128 U. S. 416.

<4) As to validity of trusts or combinations in restraint of trade. See 1889,

Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632, 27 Am. & E. C. C. 256; 1889, People v.
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Chicago (ias Trust, 130 111. 2(58, 17 Am. St. R. 319, 29 Am. & E. C. C. 257;

1889, Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co.. 130 U. S. 896,25 Am. & E. C. C. 369; 1890,

Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., 47 Ohio St. 320, 32 Am. & E. C. C. 165; 1890, State

1. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700, 29 Am. & E. C. C. &56; 1891, Huston

v.Rentlinger,91 Kv.333,34 Am. St. R. 225; 1893, People v. Sheldon, 139 N.Y.

151,36 Am. St. R. 690; 1894, Nester v. Continental Brewing Co., 161 Pa. St.

473, 41 Am. St. R. 894; 1895, Distilling & Cattle F. Co. v. People, 156 111. 448,

47 Am. St. R. 200; 1895, People v. Milk Exchange, 145 N. Y. 267, 45 Am. St.

R. 609; 1897, People v. Chicago Live Stock Exchange, 170 111. 556, 62 Am. St.

R. 404; 1897. LTnited States v. Joint Traffic Association, 76 Fed. R. 895, s. c.

in 171 U. S. 505.

NOTES TO ARTICLE III.

The corporation as a collection of individuals, history and definitions:

Mr. Kyd iCorporations, vol. 1, p. 13, 1793) says: A corporation, or body

independent corporations, whether directly, or indirectly through the
medium of a trust; no substantial consolidations which avoid and disregard the statutory permissions and restraints, but that manufacturing corporations must be an<l remain several as they were created, or
one under the statute.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.

You. (1) The right of the state to forfeit the charter of a corporation for a
violation of it injuriously affecting the public, is treated in ch. 16, infra , p.
1294. t't

!lt q.

(2) Also the power of a corporation to become a member of a part 11 P• 'i ,. ·

is treaterl iu ch . 13, infra, p. 957.
(3) As to the "fiction of the legal entity of the corporation" see particularly,
1892, State v. Standaru Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. R. 137, 34 Am. St. R. 541, and
Uie quotations from Morawetz and Taylor, in the note to this article, infra,
p. lJO. Also 1895, Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers' Association, 155 Ill. 166;
I 5, Belden v. Burke, 147 N. Y. 542; 1888, Wood v. Trust Co., 128 U.S. 416.
•4) Ai; t-0 validity of trusts or combinations in restraint of trade. See 1889,
Ri-:hsrdso!1 v. Buhl, 77 Mich; 632, 27 Am. & E . C. C. 256 ; 1889, People v.
Clucago Gas Trust, 130 Ill. 268, 17 Am . St. R. 319, 29 Am. & E . C. C. 257;
1889, Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co .. J30U. S. 396, 25 Am . & F.. C. C. 369; 1890,
Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., 47 Ohio St. 320, 32 Am. & E. C. C. 165; 1890 State
v. ~ebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700, 29 Am. & E. C. C. 656; 1891, Huston
v. Rentlinger, 91Ky.333, 34 Am. St. R. 225; 1893, Peoplev. Sheldon, 139 N. Y.
?.51, 36 Am. St. R. 690; 1894, JS ester v. Continental Brewing Co., 161 Pa. St.
4i3, 41 Am. St. R. 894; 1895, Distilling & Cattle F. Co. v. People, 156 Ill. 448,
41 Am. St. R. 200; 1895, People v. Milk Exchange, 145 N. Y. 267, 45 Am. St.
R. 609 : 1897, People v. Chicago Live Sto<'k Exchange, 170 rn. 556 62 Am. St.
R. 404 ; 1897. United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 76 Fed. R. 8951 s. c.
in 171 U. S. 505.

politic, or body incorporate is a collection of many individuals united in one

body, under a special denomination, having perpetual succession under an
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artificial form, and vested by the policy of the law with the capacity of act-

ing in several respects as an individual, particularly of taking and granting

property, of contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued, of enjoying

privileges and immunities in common, and of exercising a variety of political

righto, more or less extensive, according to the design of its institution, or

the powers conferred upon it, either at the time of its creation or at any sub-

sequent period of its existence."

In Hope Insurance Co. v. Boardman, 5 Cranch (9 U. S.) 57, 1809, and in

Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch (9 U. S.) 61, same year, it was

held, in regard to the citizenship of corporations for the purpose of jurisdic-

tion, that the court "would look beyond the mere legal being which the

charter created, and consider the character as to citizenship, of the individ-

ual? of whom the company is composed." This, of course, ignored the cor-

porate personality, and continued to be the law till 1844, when the case of

Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 Howard (43 U. S.) 497, 558, announced

that a corporation "is to be deemed to all intents and purposes as a person,

although anartifieinl person,"and a citizen of thestate creatingit. In the later

case of Ohio and Mississippi R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black (fill U. fi.) 286, 1861,

the Deveanx and Letson cases were attempted to be reconciled, by inventing

another strange fiction that the members of any corporation were to be conj

The eorpora.tion as a collection of individuals, history and definitions:

~Ir. Kyd (Corporations, vol. 1, p. 13, 1793 >says:
A corporation, or body
politic, or body incorforate is a collection of many individuals united in one
bodv, under a specia denomination, having perpetual succession under an
arti~cial form, and vested by the policy of the law with the capacity of acting in l!everal respects as an individual, particularly of taking and granting
property, of contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued, of enjoying
pril'ileges and immunities in common, and of exercising a variety of political
righU!, more or less extensi\'e, nccording to the design of its institution, or
the powers conferred upon it, either at the time of its creation or at any sub·
sequenL period of its existence."
In Hope Insurance Co. v. Boardman, 5 Cranch (9 U.S.) 57, 1809, and in
Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch (9 U. S.) 61, same year, it was
held, iu regard to the citizenship of corporations for the purpose of jurisdiction, that the court "would look beyond the mere legal being which the
charter created, and consider the character as to citizenship, of the individoa.1! of whom the company is composed." This, of course, ignored the corporate personality, and continued to be the law till 1844, when the case of
Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. "·Letson, 2 Howard (43 U.S.) 497, 558. announced
that a corporation "is to be deemed to all intents and purposes a.~ a person ,
alth ou~h an artificial person." and a citizen of the state l'rentmg it. In the later
case of Ohio and Mississippi R. Co. v. Wheeler. 1 Bhwk (fi6 U. S. ) 286, 1861,
the Deveanx and Letson cases were attemptt>d t.o be reconcil ed, by invent.in~
another strange fiction t.hut the members of any corporation were to be con~
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clusively presumed to be citizens of the state creating the corporation, and
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"no averment or evidence to the contrary is admissible," though the truth is

elusively presumed to be citizens of the state creating the corporation, and
"no averment or evidence to the contrary is admissible," though the truth is
otherwise, and though the suit of a corporation "is to be considered as a so.it
by the individuals who compose it." This seems to be the theory yet.
In :Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 4-H, 1876, it is said: "A suit may be brought
in the fe<leral court8 by or against a corporation, but in such a case it is regarded as a suit brought by or against the stockholders of the corporation,"
all of whom are conclusively presumed to be citizens of the state creating the
corporation.
(See further on this point, Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444, infra,
p. 10f"16, and St. Louis & S. F. R. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, infra, p. 1099. )
Judge Story, in the Dartmouth College case, 1819 (4 Wheat. 667, infrri,
p. 727 1, while recognizing the artificial personality of the corporation, yet
seemed to emphasize the collective or associate character more particularly.
He says: "A corporation aggregate is a collection of individuals united into
one collective body, under a special name, and possessing certain immunities,
privileges and capacities in its collective character, which do not belong to the
natural persons composing it."
Chief Justice Shaw, of Massachusetts, in Overseers of the Poor v. Sears, 22
Pick. (Mass.) 122 on 128, infrn, p. 193, 1839, says; "A corporation aggregate
consists of many persons united together into one soci~ty, and kept up by a
perpetual succession of members so as to continue forever."
Lumpkin, J., in Hightower v. Thornton, 8 Ga. 492, 1850, says: "Corpora·
tions are but associatioris of individuals." So Baldwin, J., in Chater v. Sa.a
Francisco, etc., Co., 19 Cal. 219, 1861 (supra, p. 80), says: "A corporation
organized under general laws is scarcely more than a partnership, or an association of individuals." Similarly Law, .J .. in Gelpcke v. Blake. 19 Iowa 263,
on 268, 1865i asks: ''Who in law constitutes the company, if it be not the
stockholders?"
Mr. l\:Iorawetz, in the preface to the second edition of his Treatise on the
Law of Private Corporations, 1886, says the first edition (which appeared in
1882) was prepared according to a plan differing from that followed in any
previous treatise on the same subject, and specifies particularly: "The author
was of the opinion that the law relating to private business corporations could
not be clearly understood, unless the fact were recognized that snch a corpo·
ration is really mi association formed b!f the agreement of its stockholders, and
that the existence of a corporation as an entity, independently of it.a members, is a fiction; and that while the fiction of a corporate entity bas important uses and can not be dispensed with, it is nevertheless essential to
bear in mind distinctly that the rights and duties of an incorporated associa·
tion are, in reality, the rights and duti es of the persons who compose it, aud
not of an imnginary being." He retains the same view throughout th e second edition. In section 227 he save: "A corporation is really au association
of persons, and no judicial dictum or legislative enactment can alter this fact."
And "In equity the conception of a corporate entity is used merely as a
formula for working out the rights and equities of the real parties in int ere~,
while at law this figurative conception takM the shape of a dogma, and 1s
often applied rigorously withont r egard to its true purpose and meaning. In
equity the relationship between the shareholders is recognized whene\•er this
becomes necessary to the attainment of justice; at law this relationship is not
recognized at all." H e particularly enumerates that the unanimous actions
of the members, wit.hi11 corporate powers, are the actions of the corporat~on;
notice to all members is notice to the corporation; property of associations
subject to debts can be followe<i, when vested in a corporation org1rnized ·by
th Pir members; also in the questions relating to const.itut.ionality of laws
affecting corporations, and laws of consolidations and dissolutions of corpora·
tions, the rig-ht.s of creditors an<l the rights of members as against the corpo·
rat.inn. f'tml in simila r cases thP fi ction is necessarilv overlooked or ignorPd.
Sefl sections 22R, 229. 230 11n<l 231.
\fr. Taylo r, Treati Ps on the Law of Priv11te Corporations, in the preface to
his first edition in 188-t, says: "It is the opinion of the write r that the fie·

otherwise, and though the suit of a corporation "is to be considered as a suit

by the individuals who compose it." This seems to be the theory yet.

In Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444, 1876, it is said: "A suit may be brought

in the federal courts by or against a corporation, but in such a case it is re-

garded as a suit brought by or against the stockholders of the corporation,"

all of whom are conclusively presumed to be citizens of the state creating the

corporation.

(See further on this point, Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444, infra,

p. 1060, and St. Louis & S. F. R. v. James, 161 U. S. 545, infra, p. 1099.)

Judge Story, in the Dartmouth College case, 1819 (4 Wheat. 667, infra,

p. 727), while recognizing the artilicial personality of the corporation, yet

seemed to emphasize the collective or associate character more particularly.

He says: "A corporation aggregate is a collection of individuals united into

one collective body, under a special name, and possessing certain immunities,

privileges and capacities in its collective character, which do not belong to the

natural persons composing it."

Chief Justice Shaw, of Massachusetts, in Overseers of the Poor v. Sears, 22
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Pick. (Mass.) 122on 128, infra, p. 193, 1839, says; "A corporation aggregate

consists of many persons united together into one society, and kept up by a

perpetual succession of members so as to continue forever."

Lumpkin, J., in Hightower v. Thornton, 8 Ga. 492, 1850, says: "Corpora-

tions are but associations of individuals." So Baldwin, J., in Chater v. San

Francisco, etc., Co., 19 Cal. 219, 1861 {supra, p. 80), says: "A corporation

organized under general laws is scarcely more than a partnership, or an asso-

ciation of individuals." Similarly Law, J., in Gelpcke v. Blake. 19 Iowa 263,

on 268, 1865, asks: "Who in law constitutes the company, if it be not the

stockholders?"

Mr. Morawetz, in the preface to the second edition of his Treatise on the

Law of Private Corporations, 1886, says the first edition (which appeared in

1882) was prepared according to a plan differing from that followed in any

previous treatise on the same subject, and specifies particularly: "The author

was of the opinion that the law relating to private business corporations could

not be clearly understood, unless the fact were recognized that such a corpo-

ration is really an association formed by the agreement of its stockholders, ami

that the existence of a corporation as an entity, independently of its mem-

bers, is a fiction; and that while the fiction of a corporate entity has im-

portant uses and can not be dispensed with, it is nevertheless essential to

bear in mind distinctly that the rights and duties of an incorporated associa-

tion are, in reality, the rights and duties of the persons who compose it, and

not of an imaginary being." He retains the same view throughout the sec-

ond edition. In section 227 he says: "A corporation is really an association

of persons, and no judicial dictum or legislative enactment can alter this fart."

And "In equity the conception of a corporate entity is used merely as a

formula for working out the rights and equities of the real parties in interest,

while at law this figurative conception takes the shape of a dogma, and is

often applied rigorously without regard to its true purpose and meaning. In

equity the relationship between the shareholders is recognized whenever tliis

becomes necessary to the attainment of justice; at law this relationship is not

recognized at all." He particularly enumerates that the unanimous actions

of the members, within corporate powers, are the actions of the corporation;

notice to all members is notice to the corporation; property of associations

subject to debts can be followed, when vested in a corporation organizedby

their members; also in the questions relating to constitutionality of laws

affecting corporations, and laws of consolidations and dissolutions of corpora-

tions, the rights of creditors and the rights of members as against the corpo-

ration, and in similar cases the fiction is necessarilv overlooked or ignorcil.

See sections 22S, 229. 230 and 231.

Mr. Taylor, Treaties on the Law of Private Corporations, in the preface to

his first edition in 1884, says: "It is the opinion of the writer that the fic-

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

THE CORPORATION AS A COLLECTION OF INDIVIDUALS. I I I

tion of the 'legal person' has outlived its usefulness, and is no longer adequate

for the purposes of an accurate treatment of the legal relations arising through

THE CORPORATION AS A COLLECTION OF INDIVIDUALS. I I I

the prosecution of a corporate enterprise. By dismissing this fiction aclearer

view may be had of the actual human beings interested, whose rights may

then be determined without unnecessary mystification." In the preface to

his third edition, 1894. he says: "When special rules cease to accord with

the general rule once back of them,—if no further convenient rules can be

drawn from the general rule,—it drops from the body of the law. * * *

Thus it is at present with the rule or fiction that a corporation is a lega,l per-

son; it still represents a convenient phrase, nay, a convenient point of view;

but it is dead as a principle because legal propositions are no longer deduced

from it, nor is it in logical connection with the great mass of legal rules which

have been called forth by controversies relating to railroad and other busi-

ness corporations," citing People v. North Riv. S. R. Co. [supra, p. 100), and

State v.Standard Oil Co.,490.S. 137. In the text, section 36, he says: "A corpo-

ration, considered as a legal institution, is the sum of the legal relations re-

sulting from the operation of rules of law, in its constitution upon the various

persons, who, by fulfilling the prerequisite conditions, bring themselves within

the operation of these rules." In section 48 he adds: "It is now necessary

to determine who are the individuals composing the corporation regarded not
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as a mass of legal relations, but as a body of men. Can it be said that the

corporation, or body corporate, is composed of all the persons between whom

these legal relations subsist? This conception would embrace all persons in

any way interested in the corporate enterprise, * * * the state * * *

the shareholders and directors, » * * and creditors." But, he says, sec-

tion 49, "It is more in accordance with the ordinary use of terms, and a

clearer and more serviceable conception, to regard the corporation as consist-

ing of the shareholders, who may, with propriety, be said to constitute the

body corporate, as it is through their acts, or the acts of their predecessors,

that incorporation is caused." Section 50: "The shareholders, then, vested

with the corporate powers, are the body corporate, corporation or company."

Section 51: "Such, then, are the two meanings of the term corporation; the

one. the sum of legal relations subsisting in respect to the corporate enter-

prise; the other, the organic body of shareholders, whose acts cause the

operation of the rules of law in the constitution. These two concep-

tions include all that is really connoted by the term in whatever sense

used. And, if so, what has become of the venerable 'legal person?' Is he

still somewhere, as he has always been imagined? Or is he nowhere

a? he has always actually been? * * * Shall we say he is the combination,

the mystic unification of our two conceptions? Better not; better forget him.

For he is a conception, which, if it amounts to anything, is but a stumbling-

Hook in the advance of corporation law towards the discrimination of the

real rights of actual men and women. And then, after all, what has he ever

been but an abstraction materialized in a name?" He says, also, note 1, § 51:

"It is in respect of the doctrine of ultra vires, that the fiction of a legal per-

son is most pernicious, as this fiction involves regarding a corporation as a

unit, and retards the proper discrimination of the rights of different persons

in regard to ultra vires acts." Compare the definition of Reese, supra, p. 70.

Prof. Pomerov, in reviewing Mr. Tavlor's work, under the title, "Legal

Idea of a Corporation," 19 Am. Law Rev., pp. 114-116 (1885), says: "The

common law conception of the 'legal personality' of the metaphysical entity

constituting the corporation entirely distinct from its individual members

arose at a time when corporations were all created by special charters, gen-

erally granted by the crown; when very few * * * were'stock'corpora-

tions, * • » and were necessarily monopolies. * * * In the United

States » » * almost all private corporations * * * are formed under

eeneral laws * * • for almost any business purpose. » * * The asso-

ciation? thus formed * * * differ very little in their essential attributes

tion of the 'legal person' has outlived its usefulness, and is no longer adequate
for the purposes of an accurate treatment of the legal relations arising through

the prosecution of a corporate enterprise. By dismissing this fiction a clearer
view may be bad of the actnal human beings interested, whose rights may
then be determined without unnecessary mystification." In the preface to
hi third edition, 1894, be say!!: "When special rules cease to accord with
the general rule once back of tbem,-if no further convenient rules can be
drawn from the general rule,-it drops from the body of the law. • • •
Thus it is at present with the rule or fiction that a corporation is a leg~l person; it still represents a convenient phrase, nay, a convenient point of view;
but it is dead as a principle because legal propositions are no longer deduced
from it, nor is it in logical connection with the great mass of legal rules which
ha\'e been called forth by controversies relating to railroad and other business corporations," citing People v. North Riv. S. R. Co. (supra, p. 100 ), and
tatev.Standard Oil Co., 49 0. S. 137. In the text, section36, he says:" A corporation, considered as a legal institution, is the sum of the legal relations resulting from the operation of rules·of law, in its constitution upon the various
persons, who, by fulfilling the prerequisite conditions, bring themselves within
the operation of these rules." In section 48 he adds: "It is now necessary
to determine who are the individuals composing the corporation regarded not
as a mass of legal relations, but as a body of men. Can it be said that the
corporation, or body corporate, is composed of all the persons between whom
these legal relations subsist? This conception would embrace all persons in
any way interested in the corporate enterprise, • • • the state • • •
the shareholders and directors, • • • and creditors." But, he says, section 49, " It is more in accordance with the ordinary use of terms, and a
dearer and more serviceable conception, to regard the corporation as consistini? of the shareholders, who may, with propriety, be said to constitute the
body corporate, as it is through their acts, or the acts of their predecessors,
that incorporation is caused." Section 50: "The shareholders, then, vested
11ith the corporate powers, are the body corporate, corporation or company."
Section 51: "Such, then, are the two meanings of the term corporation; the
one, the sum of legal relations subsisting in respect to the corporate enterprise ; the other, the organic body of shareholders, whose acts cause the
operation of the rules of law in the constitution. Tbese two conreptions include all that is really connoted by the term in whatever sense
osed. And, if so, what has become of the venerable 'legal person?' Is he
still somewhere, as he llas always been imagined? Or is he nowhere
ae he has always actually been? • • • Shall we say he is the combination,
the mystic unification of our two conceptions? Better not; better forget him.
For he is a conceptinn, which, i"f it amounts to anything, is but a stumblingblock in the advance of corporation law towards the discrimination of the
real rights of actual men and women. And then, after all, what has he ever
been bat an abstraction materialized in a name?" He says, also, note 1, § 51:
" It is in respect of the doctrine of ultra vires, that the fiction of a legal person is most pernicious, as this fiction involves regarding a corporation as a
artlt, and retards the proper discrimination of the rights of different persons
in regard to ultra 11fres acts." Compare the definition of Reese, suprn, p. 'iO.
Prof. Pomeroy, in reviewing Mr. Taylor's work, under the title, "Legal
Men of a Corporation," 19 .Am. L aw Rev., pp. 114-116 (1885), says: "The
rommon law conception of the 'legal personality' of the metaphysical entity
con titating the corporation entirely distinct from its individual members
arose at n time when corporations were all cre1tted by special charters, gene.raUy granted by the crown; when very few • • • were 'stock' corporations, • • • and were necessarily monopolies. • • • In the United
States • • • almost all private corporations • • • are formed under
~era! laws • • • for almost any 1msiness purpose. • • • The assor1ati1Jn~ thus formed • • • differ verv little in their essential attributes
t:om r artnerships. • • • Of late yea"rs parliament has enacted stHtutes
l'lmilar in their scope and effect to on r gen e ral laws for the formation of private corporations. The English courts have never treated the joint-stock

from partnerships. * * * Of late years parliament has enacted statutes

similar in their scope and effect to our general laws for the formation of pri-

vate corporations. The English courts have never treated the joint-stock
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companies with limited liability, formed under these statutes, as being identi-

NOTES TO ARTICLE III .

cal with common law corporations, but have always carefully distinguished

between them. In our opinion, the American courts must, in time, recognize

companies with limited liability, formed under these statutes, as being identi·
cal with common law corporations, but have always carefully distinguished
between them. In our opinion, tbe American courts must, in time, recognize
and enforce the same distinction."
In Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U . S. 181, on 189 ( 1888), Field,
J., says : "A private corporation is merely an association of individuals united
for a special purpose and permitted to do business under a particular name,
anri have a succession of members without dissolution." He said the same
in Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U. S. 317, 330 (18831.
The Am. & .Eng. Ency. (4 vol. 185) (1888), says: " A corporation is a body
co1111i.9ting of one or more persons, established by law for certain specific J?UT·
poses, with the capacity of succession (either perpetual or for a limited
period) and other special privileges not possessed by individuals, yet acting
m many respects as an individual."
Mr. Beach, Commentaries on tbe Law of Private Corporations, vol. 1, §I,
1891, after noting the conflicts in definitions given, says: "Although a cor·
poration is, in a certain sense, something distinct from its. members, having a
life independent of theirs, the truth would seem to lie between these conflicting views of its nature. • • • The effort of practical jurisdiction should
be to regard it as a unit or as a collection of persons according to the relation
in which it acts in a given instance. As has been aptly said to this point
(quoting Professor Pomeroy, 19 Am. Law Rev. 114) 'the shield will be either
white or red accordingly as it is viewed from the one side or the other.'"
Mr. Thompson, Commentaries on Corporations, 1895, § 1, says: "The
most usual conception of a corporation is that it is a collection of natural persons, joined together by their voluntary action or by legal compulsion, by or
under the authority of an act of the legislature, to accomplish some purpose,
pecuniary, ideal, or governmental, authorized by the legislature, under a
scheme of organization and by methods thereby prescribed or permitted:
with the faculty of having a continuous succession during the period presr.ribed by the legislature for its existence, of having an individual na1.11e by
which it may make and take contracts and sue and be sued, and of acting as
a unit in re'spect of all matters within the scope of the purposes for which it
was created."
Mr. Clark, Handbook of the Law of Private Corporations, 1897, §§ 1, 2, 3,
says: "A corporation aggregate is a collection of individuals united, by author·
ity of law, into one body, under a special denomination, with the capacity of
perpetual succession . Every corporation aggregate consists of, (a) A collec·
tion of individuals. ( b) A legal entity, which is, for many purposes, in contemplation of law, separate and distinct from the members who compose it.
For the purpose of acquiring, holding, and conveying property , contracting
obligations, incurring liabilities, suing and being sued, a corpon1tion is
regarded in law as a legal entity separate and distinct from the members who
compose it. • • • That a corporation is thus a legal entity, separate and
distinct from the members who compose it, is a mere legal fietion rntrodaced
for the convenience of the corporation in transacting business, and of those
who do business with it; and when urged to an intent nnd purpose not within
its reason and policy, it will be disregarded, and the fact thnt the corporation
is really a collection of individuals will be recognizerl, e,·en at law. Courts
of equity, in numerous instances, look behind the corporate entity, and recog·
nize the individual members and will do so whenever iustice requires."
It seems from the foregoing, and still more from the further treatment of
the subject by Mr. Beach, Mr. Thompson and Mr. Clark, that "the collection
of individuals" is emphasized only by being placed first in their definitions
as Mr. Kyd dirl, nnd is not marle especially prominent as a principle from
which to deduce theories of corp0rate rights and liabilities, as is the case with
Mr. Morawetz and Mr. Taylor.
·
Mr. Trapnell in "The Logical Conception of a Corporation ,"-a paper
rearl before the West Virginia Bar Association in 11Hl6, defines a corporation
as "an association of individuals formed under the sanction of the state, for
a distinct and rlefinite purpose." He specifies particularly that tlie associa·

and enforce the same distinction."

In Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 TJ. S. 181,on 189 (1888), Field,

J., says: "A private corporation is merely an association of individuals united

for a special purpose and permitted to do business under a particular name,

and have a succession of members without dissolution." He said the same

in Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U. S. 317, 330 (18831.

The Am. & Eng. Ency. (4 vol. 185; (1888), says: "A corporation is a body

consisting of one or more persons, established by law for certain specific par-

poses, with the capacity of succession (either perpetual or for a limited

period) and other special privileges not possessed by individuals, yet acting

in many respects as an individual."

Mr. Beach, Commentaries on the Law of Private Corporations, vol. 1, §1,

1891, after noting the conflicts in definitions given, says: "Although a cor-

poration is, in a certain sense, something distinct from its members, having a

life independent of theirs, the truth would seem to lie between these conflict-

ing views of its nature. » » » The effort of practical jurisdiction should
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be to regard it as a unit or as a collection of persons according to the relation

in which it acts in a given instance. As has been aptly said to this point

(quoting Professor Pomeroy, 19 Am. Law Rev. 114) 'the shield will be either

white or red accordingly as it is viewed from the one side or the other.'"

Mr. Thompson, Commentaries on Corporations, 1895, §1, says: "The

most usual conception of a corporation is that it is a collection of natural per-

sons, joined together by their voluntary action or by legal compulsion, by or

under the authority of an act of the legislature, to accomplish some purpose,

pecuniary, ideal, or governmental, authorized by the legislature, under a

scheme of organization and by methods thereby prescribed or permitted:

with the faculty of having a continuous succession during the period pre-

scribed by the legislature for its existence, of having an individual name by

which it may make and take contracts and sue and be sued, and of acting as

a unit in respect of all matters within the scope of the purposes for which it

was created."

Mr. Clark, Handbook of the Law of Private Corporations, 1897, §§ 1, 2, 3,

says: "A corporation aggregate is a collection of individuals united, by author-

ity of law, into one body, under a special denomination, with the capacity of

perpetual succession. Ever}' corporation aggregate consists of, (a) A collec-

tion of individuals. {!>) A legal entity, which is, for many purposes, in con-

templation of law, separate and distinct from the members who compose it.

For the purpose of acquiring, holding, and conveying property, contracting

obligations, incurring liabilities, suing and being sued, a corporation is

regarded in law as a legal entity separate and distinct from the members who

compose it. * * * That a corporation is thus a legal entity, separate and

distinct from the members who compose it, is a mere legal fiction introduced

for the convenience of the corporation in transacting business, and of those

who do business with it; and when urged to an intent and purpose not within

its reason and policy, it will be disregarded, and the fact that the corporation

is really a collection of individuals will be recognized, even at law. Courts

of equity, in numerous instances, look behind the corporate entity, and recog-

nize the individual members and will do so whenever justice requires."

It seems from the foregoing, and still more from the further treatment of

the subject bv Mr. Beach, Mr. Thompson and Mr. Clark, that "the collection

of individuals" is emphasized only by being placed first in their definitions

as Mr. Kyd did, and is not made especially prominent as a principle from

which to deduce theories of corporate rights and liabilities, as is the case with

Mr. Morawetz and Mr. Taylor.

Mr. Trapnell in "The Logical Conception of a Corporation."—a paper

read before the West Virginia Bar Association in 189ft, defines a corporation

as "an association of individuals formed under the sanction of the state, for

a distinct and definite purpose." He specifies particularly that tlie associa-
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tion originates in an agreement between individuals, which becomes effective

§ 22
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13

only through a special charter or general enabling act, the provisions of

which are accepted by the execution of the agreement; the peculiar mode of

existence is perpetual, actual or potential; the distinct feature of its termina-

tion is the state's power to dissolve for violation of the law; the distinctive

features as to membership are the effect of assignment of stock, and the confin-

ing of rights and liabilities strictly to the proper purposes of the corporation;

as to the state's sanction, it must be an express legislative one, which operates

both as a grunt of poicers forming a contract with the state, and as a law, pre-

scribing certain forms and modes of action, and, as to the purpose, it must be

a definite one, and no corporate power is to be exercised outside of this ex-

press or necessarily implied purpose, under penalty of forfeiture, and no

corporate liability will arise therefrom except by way of estoppel; the cor-

porate actions must be through the forms and by the parties or officers pre-

scribed, and the funds must be applied only to the purposes indicated, with-

out diversion or dissipation to the prejudice of members or creditors. The

foregoing is the substance of what he submits "as a logical statement of all

the elements essential to a modern business corporation, with such analysis

of each as is necessary to differentiate a corporation from all other associa-
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tions known to law, as regards that particular," in other words "to exhibit the

anatomy of a healthy corporation." He says further: "It seems worth while

to attempt to embody a clear conception of a corporation—immortality,

'corporate identity,' 'perpetual succession,' and all—without any aid from

the 'artificial' person whom Coke and Blackstone regarded so lovingly, and

who is such a bugbear to, at least, one modern text writer."

tion originates in an agreement be.tween individuals, which becomes effective
only through a special charter or general enabling act, the provisions of
which a.re accepted by the execution of the agreement; the peculiar mode of
existence is perpetual, actual or potential; the distinct feature of its termination is the state's power to dissolve for violation or the law; the distinctive
features as to membership are the effect of assignment of stock, and the confining of rights and liabilities strictly to the proper purposes of the corporation;
as to the state's sanction, it must be nn express legislative one, which operates
both as a grant of powers forming a contract with the state, and as a law, preecribing certain forms and modes of action, and, as to the purpose, it must be
a definite one, and no corporate power is to be exercised outside of this express or necessarily implied purpose, under penalty of forfeiture, and no
corporate liability will arise therefrom except by way of estoppel; the corporate actions must be through the forms and by the parties or officers prescribed, and the funds must be applied only to the purposes indicated, without diversion or dissipation to the prejudice of members or creditors. The
foregoing is the substance of what he submits "as a logical statement of all
the elements essential to a modern business corporation, with such analysis
of each as is necessary to differentiate a corporation from all other associations known to law, as regards that particular," in other words "to exhibit the
a11awmy of a healthy corporation." He says further: "It seems worth while
to attempt to embody a clear conception of a corporation-immortality,
'corporate identity,' 'perpetual succession,' and all-without any aid from
the 'artificial' person whom Coke and Blackstone regarded so lovingly, and
who is such a bugbear to, at least, one modern text writer."

ARTICLE IV. THE CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE.1

Sec. 22. In its relation to the state a corporation is considered

as a primary franchise held by the members in their individual

ARTICLE IV.

capacity, enabling them in their collective or corporate capac-

THE CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE. 1

ity to have and exercise other or secondary franchises, rights

or privileges.

(1) General nature of a franchise.

Sec. 22. In

its relation to the state a corporation is considered

as a primary franchise held by the members in their individual

THE PEOPLE, Etc., Ex Rel. The Attorney-General, v. THE UTICA

capacity, enabling them in their collective or corporate capacity to have and exercise other or secondary franchises, rights
or privileges.
( 1) General nature of a franchise.

INSURANCE COMPANY.1

1S18. In the Supreme Court of New York. 15 Johnson (N.

Y-) *358-*395-

[Information in the nature of quo warranto against the Utica In-

surance Company,—a company authorized to do all kinds of insur-

ance business, and "in general of doing and performing, in these op-

erations, all the business generally performed by insurance companies,

excepting therefrom that this corporation shall not engage in loaning

THE PEOPLE, ETC., Ex REL. THE AT'l'ORNEv-GENERAL, v. THE UTICA
INSURANCE COMPANY. 1

any money upon bottomry and respondentia nor in making any in-

IN

1818.

surance upon any life or lives,"—for using without any warrant,

THE

SuPREME CouRT OF

NEw

YoRK.

15 Johnson (N.

Y.) •358-•395.

1 See note at end of this article, p 157.

'Statement of facts condensed, parts of arguments, and parts of opinion

omitted.

8—Wil. Casks.

(Information in the nature of quo warranto against the Utica Insurance Company,-a company authorized to do all kinds of insurance business, and "in general of doing and performing, in these operations, all the business generally performed by insurance companies,
excepting therefrom that this corporation shall not engage in loaning
any money upon bottomry and respondentia nor in making any insurance upon any life or lives,"-for using without any warrant,
1

See note at end of this article, p 157.
Stat.ement of facts condensed, parts of arguments, and parts of opinion
omitted.
1

8-WIL. CASES.
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charter or grant the following liberties, privileges and franchises to

I

wit, that of becoming proprietors of a bank or fund for the purpose of

14

PEOPLE V. UTICA INSURANCE COMPANY.

issuing notes, receiving deposits, making discounts, and transacting

charter or grant the following liberties, privileges and franchises to
wit, that of becoming proprietors of a bank or fund for the purpose of
issuing notes, receiving deposits, making discounts, and transacting
other business which incorporated banks may and do transact by virtue of their respective acts of recorporation, all of which libertie ,
privileges and franchi ses the said company have usurped and still do
usurp upon the people of the state. The bank pleaded authority
under their act of incorporation and the people demurred.]
Attorneys [Harri.son and T. A. Emmet] for the insurance company maintained: 1. The acts charged against the defendants a.c:
not the exercise of fran.chises; and therefore an information in the
nature of a writ of quo warranto will not lie against them. Franchise or not is a question of law and is not admitted by the demurrer. A franchise is a royal privilege, or branch of the royal prerogative, subsisting in the bands of the subject, by grant from the
crown. A writ of quo warranto is the king's writ of right and
and issues where a franchise is usurped, or forfeited by misuser. (2
Bl. Com. 37, Finch's Law 38, 164, 166; 3 Cruises' Dig. 278, tit. 27,
§ r.) The word "franchises" is often used, in common parlance, in
a very broad sense, for all liberties, but its legal or technical signification is more confined. A franchise was, always, in England, a
gem in the royal diadem. It was inherent in the crown from the first
institution of monarchy. But the right of banking was never a franchise or branch of the royal prerogative. The bank of England was
established in 1694, pursuant to an act of parliament (SW. & M.,
cap. 20), which authorized their majesties, William and Mary, to
grant a commission to take subscriptions from individuals, and to incorporate them. Had the power of banking been a royal franchise ,
this special authority from parliament would not have been necessary.
In 1697 (8 & 9 W. & M., ch. 20, § 28) it was enacted that during
the continuance of the bank of England, no other bank, or any other
corporation, society, fellowship, company or constitution, in the nature of a bank, should be erected or established, etc., by act of parliament.
This still left individuals and ancient corporations free to bank. But
in 1708 (7 Anne, ch. 7, § 61), it was enacted, that during the continuance of the bank of England, it should not be lawful fer any corporation erected, or to be erected (other than said bank), or for any other
persons in partnership, exceeding the number of six persons, to take
up money on their bills or notes, etc. It is clear, then, that if parliament had not interfered, all corporations might lawfully have carried
on banking business; the act of 7 Anne, restraining them, does not
declare it unlawful, but merely prohibits the exercise of the power
while the bank of England continued. It is manifest, therefore, that
in England, banking was not considered as a royal franchise; and
private banking is now carried on in that country by associations of
partnership of not more than six persons.
If we look to the acts of our legislature, we shall find that they

other business which incorporated banks may and do transact by vir-

tue of their respective acts of recorporation, all of which liberties,

privileges and franchises the said company have usurped and still do

usurp upon the people of the state. The bank pleaded authority

under their act of incorporation and the people demurred.]

Attorneys \_Harriso?i and T. A. Emmet] for the insurance com-

pany maintained: I. The acts charged against the defendants a.e

not the exercise of franchises; and therefore an information in the

nature of a writ of quo -warranto will not lie against them. Fran-

chise or not is a question of law and is not admitted by the de-

murrer. A franchise is a royal privilege, or branch of the royal pre-

rogative, subsisting in the hands of the subject, by grant from the

crown. A writ of quo warranto is the king's writ of right and

and issues where a franchise is usurped, or forfeited by misuser. (2

Bl. Com. 37, Finch's Law 38, 164, 166; 3 Cruises' Dig. 278, tit. 27,

§ 1.) The word "franchises" is often used, in common parlance, in

a very broad sense, for all liberties, but its legal or technical signifi-
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cation is more confined. A franchise was, always, in England, a

gem in the royal diadem. It was inherent in the crown from the first

institution of monarchy. But the right of banking was never a fran-

chise or branch of the royal prerogative. The bank of England was

established in 1694, pursuant to an act of parliament (5 W. & M.,

cap. 20), which authorized their majesties, William and Mary, to

grant a commission to take subscriptions from individuals, and to in-

corporate them. Had the power of banking been a royal franchise,

this special authority from parliament would not have been necessary.

In 1697 (8 & 9 W. & M., ch. 20, § 28) it was enacted that during

the continuance of the bank of England, no other bank, or any other

corporation, society, fellowship, company or constitution, in the na-

ture of a bank, should be erected or established, etc., by act of parlia-

ment.

This still left individuals and ancient corporations free to bank. But

in 1708 (7 Anne, ch. 7, § 61), it was enacted, that during the continu-

ance of the bank of England, it should not be lawful fcr any corpora-

tion erected, or to be erected (other than said bank), or for any other

persons in partnership, exceeding the number of six persons, to take

up money on their bills or notes, etc. It is clear, then, that if parlia-

ment had not interfered, all corporations might lawfully have carried

on banking business; the act of 7 Anne, restraining them, does not

declare it unlawful, but merely prohibits the exercise of the power

while the bank of England continued. It is manifest, therefore, that

in England, banking was not considered as a royal franchise; and

private banking is now carried on in that country by associations of

partnership of not more than six persons.

If we look to the acts of our legislature, we shall find that they
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speak the same doctrine. Numerous acts of incorporation have been

passed since the restraining act of April 11, 1804, each of which con-

§

22
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tains a special clause to restrain the corporation from banking.

u 5

[Here the counsel enumerated more than fifty acts passed since 1804, which,

he said, contained a special restraining clause.]

It is remarkable, also, that in the same session in which the restrain-

ing act was passed there was an act of incorporation passed containing

speak the same doctrine. Numerous acts of incorporation have been
passed since the restraining act of Apri'l I 1, 1804, each of which contains a special clause to restrain the corporation from banking.

a special prohibition against banking. What stronger evidence can

be wanted of the sense of the legislature that the right of banking is

[Here the counsel enumerated more than.fifty acts passed since 1804, which,
he said, contained a special restraining clause.]

not a franchise, but exists at large in every citizen, and may be freely

exercised, unless expressly restrained by the legislature?

The right was open to every individual, and the defendants, being

created a corporation, have, as its inseperable incidents, a perpetual

succession, a capacity to sue and be sued, a right to purchase and hold

land, to have a common seal, and to make by-laws, etc. (Kyd on

Corp., 69, 70.) They might therefore, as well as any individual,

carry on banking business, unless expressly prohibited. If, then,

this is not a royal franchise, no information in the nature of a writ of

quo warranto lies; for these informations have been substituted in the

place of that ancient prerogative writ. (2 Co. Inst. 496, 1 Bulst. 55,
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56; Rex v. Marsden, 3 Burr. 1817, per Wilmot, J.)

Not a case can be found in which a writ of quo warranto has been

brought, or an information in the nature of one filed for exercising the

right of banking.

In The King v. Shepherd (4 Term Rep. 381), Lord Kenyon said,

that the old writ of quo warranto lay only where there was a usurpa-

tion on the rights and prerogatives of the crown; and that an infor-

mation in the nature of a quo warranto could be only granted in such

cases. So, in The King v. The Corporation of Bedford Level (6

East 359), Lawrence, J., says it has been always understood that a

quo warranto only lay for encroachments on franchises created by the

crown.

Again, for the exercise of any power incidental to a corporation or

association, a writ of quo warranto does not lie. As well might it lie

to ascertain by what authority individuals assembled for political pur-

poses. A person entitled to a manor need not show by what title he

holds a court baron, for that is incident to a manor. (Rex v. Stan-

ton, Cro. Jac. 259, 260.)

But it is said the restraining act has made banking a franchise, and

that no person can now exercise the right, without showing a legisla-

tive grant. Suppose in England, after the restraining act, more than

six persons had associated as bankers, would an information, in nature

of a quo warranto, have been filed against them? No. Their acts

would have been illegal and void. How have the legislature assumed

this prerogative and franchise? How have they taken to themselves

what was before the common right of every citizen? By prohibiting

all unincorporated banking associations. Is everything which is made

the subject of exclusive right or grant a franchise, and to be tried by

It is remarkable, also, that in the same session in which the restraining act was passed there was an act of incorporation passed containing
a special prohibition against banking. vVhat stronger evidence can
be wanted of the sense of the legislature that the right of banking is
not a franchise, but exists at large in every citizen, and may be freely
exercised, unless expressly restrained by the legislature?
The right was opeq to every individual, and the defendants, being
created a corporation, have, as its inseperable incidents, a perpetual
~uccession, a capacity to sue and be sued, a right to purchase and hold
land , to have a common seal, and to make by-laws, etc. (Kyd on
C o rp., 69, 70.) They might therefore, as well as any individual,
carry on banking business, unless expressly prohibited. If, then,
this is not a royal franchise, no information in the nature of a writ of
91to warranto lies; for these informations have been substituted in the
place of that ancient prerogative writ. (2 Co. Inst. 496, I Buist. 55,
56; Rex v. Marsden, 3 Burr. 1817 1 per Wilmot, J.)
~ ot a case can be found in which a writ of quo warranto has been
brought, or an information in the nature of one filed for exercising the
right of banking.
In The King v. Shepherd (4 Term Rep. 381), Lord Kenyon said,
that the old writ of quo warranto lay only where there was a usurpation on the rights and prerogatives of the crown ; and that an information in the nature of a quo warranto could be only granted in such
cases . So, in The King v. The Corporation of Bedford Level (6
Ea t 359), Lawrence, J., says it has been always understood that a
9uo warranto only lay for encroachments on franchises created by the
crown.
Again, for the exercise of any power incidental to a corporation or
a ociation, a writ of quo warranto does not lie. As well might it lie
to ascertain by what authority individuals assembled for political purposes. A person entitled to a manor need not show by what title he
holds a court baron, for that is i"nci'dent to a manor. (Rex v. Stanton, Cro. Jae. 259, 260.)
But it is said the restraining act has made banking a franchise, and
that no person can now exercise the right, without showing a legislative grant. Suppose in England, after the restraining act, more than
six persons ha<l associated as bankers, would an information, in nature
of a quo warranto, have been filed against them? No. Their acts
would have been illegal and void. How have the legislature assumed
this prerogative and franchise? How have they taken to themselves
what was before the common right of every citizen? By prohibiting
all unincorporated hanking associations. ls everything which is made
the subject of exclusive right or grant a franchise, and to be tried by
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a quo warranto! Ferries, running of stages, and steamboats are made
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exclusive rights, yet it has never been supposed that an information

PEOPLE V. UTICA INS URANCE COMPANY.
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in nature of quo warranto would lie in case of any invasion of these

rights.

a quo warranto? Ferries, running of stages, and steamboats are made
exclusive rights, yet it has never been supposed that an information
in nature of quo warranto would lie in case of any invasion of these
rights.
Again, the restraining act is not in conjunctive; it declares that "no
person unauthorized by law shall subscribe to, or become a member
of, any association, institution or company, or proprietor of any
bank or fund for the purpose of issuing notes, receiving deposits, making discounts, or transacting any other business which incorporated
banks may or do transact, by virtue of their respective acts of incorporation." By this act the legislature assume the rights specified.
They do not resume a franchise. If the legislature can thus assume
all rights common to the citizen, there is no commercial business whatever which they may not prohibit; and so the chamber of commerce
apprehended. And on their petition the sections to the act, 27th
session, chapter 110, sections 8 and 9, were passed in explanation of
the restraining act. It was, in effect, an act to restrain commercial
partnerships or companies, but the explanatory sections do virtually
repeal the restraining act.
It may be said that banking is qttasi a franchise or branch of prerogative. But when every individual has a right to bank, how can it be,
in any degree or shape, a franchise? The act merely restrains associations. Every citizen, or inhabitant, may, if he pleases, be a banker.
Can it be possible that the legislature may assume to itself the rights
of every citizen? Such is not the law of England. If it is the law of
any country, it is that of Turkey, where, alone it can be imagined that
the common rights of man should be doled out for the purposes of
gain. The mind revolts at the idea of a legislature bargaining out
the common rights of the citizen for money. If the exercise of the
right be injurious, prohibit it. What is granted should be given
freely. A contrary doctrine would be attended with the most pernicious effects. • • •
Van Buren in reply. • • • The gerleral demurrer admits, that
the power exercised by the defendants is a franchise; and it follows,
that this is the proper remedy. But is it not a franchise? The
chancellor had no doubt on the question. He says, that "the right
of banking was formerly, a common law right belonging to individuals, and to be exercised at their pleasure.
But the legislature thought proper, by the restraining act of 1804,
which has since been re-enacted, to take away that right from all persons not specially authorized by law. Banking has now become a franchise derived from the grant of the legislature, and subsisting in tho. e
only who can produce the grant; if exercised by other persons, it is
the usurpation of a privilege for which a competent remedy can be
had by the public prosecutor in the supreme court." This ought,
perhaps, to be a sufficient authority on this question. But to pursue
it further: A franchise is a liberty or privilege. There is a distindion
between royal and common franchises-between those of the sovereign and those of the people, as the right of trial by jury. Whtin

Again, the restraining act is not in conjunctive; it declares that "no

person unauthorized by law shall subscribe to, or become a member

of, any association, institution or company, or proprietor of any

bank or fund for the purpose of issuing notes, receiving deposits, mak-

ing discounts, or transacting any other business which incorporated

banks may or do transact, by virtue of their respective acts of incor-

poration." By this act the legislature assume the rights specified.

They do not resume a franchise. If the legislature can thus assume

all rights common to the citizen, there is no commercial business what-

ever which they may not prohibit; and so the chamber of commerce

apprehended. And on their petition the sections to the act, 27th

session, chapter 110, sections 8 and 9, were passed in explanation of

the restraining act. It was, in effect, an act to restrain commercial

partnerships or companies, but the explanatory sections do virtually

repeal the restraining act.

It may be said that banking is quasi a franchise or branch of preroga-
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tive. But when every individual has a right to bank, how can it be,

in any degree or shape, a franchise? The act merely restrains asso-

ciations. Every citizen, or inhabitant, may, if he pleases, be a banker.

Can it be possible that the legislature may assume to itself the rights

of every citizen? Such is not the law of England. If it is the law of

any country, it is that of Turkey, where, alone it can be imagined that

the common rights of man should be doled out for the purposes of

gain. The mind revolts at the idea of a legislature bargaining out

the common rights of the citizen for money. If the exercise of the

right be injurious, prohibit it. What is granted should be given

freely. A contrary doctrine would be attended with the most per-

nicious effects. * * *

Van Buren in reply. * * * The gerieral demurrer admits, that

the power exercised by the defendants is a franchise; and it follows,

that this is the proper remedy. But is it not a franchise? The

chancellor had no doubt on the question. He says, that "the right

of banking was formerly, a common law right belonging to indi-

viduals, and to be exercised at their pleasure.

But the legislature thought proper, by the restraining act of 1804,

which has since been re-enacted, to take away that right from all per-

sons not specially authorized by law. Banking has now become a fran-

chise derived from the grant of the legislature, and subsisting in those

only who can produce the grant; if exercised by other persons, it is

the usurpation of a privilege for which a competent remedy can be

had by the public prosecutor in the supreme court." This ought,

perhaps, to be a sufficient authority on this question. But to pursue

it further: A franchise is a liberty or privilege. There is a distinction

between royal and common franchises—between those of the sov-

ereign and those of the people, as the right of trial by jury. When
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the colony became a sovereign and independent state the people suc-

ceeded to all the rights and privileges of English subjects, and more,

they succeeded to all the rights and privileges of the crown or sov-

~ 22

THE CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE.

I 17

ereign. The legislature have, accordingly, from time to time granted

various exclusive liberties and privileges, or franchises, to citizens.

Bv the restraining act of the nth of April, 1804, the legislature did

take to itself the right or liberty of banking. What was before com-

mon to all ceased to be so, and became a franchise or privilege in the

government, not to be exercised by citizens, unless by grant. Whether

this was a franchise in England or not, it is made a franchise here,

and the legislature were competent to make it so. It is true that pri-

vate individuals may bank, but the defendants are an association ear-

ning on banking business in violation of the act of the 1 ith of April,

1S04, passed expressly to prevent any unauthorized or unincorporated

association from banking. Being a privilege, then, which the defend-

ants could not lawfully exercise without a grant from the legislature,

it comes within the very definition which has been given of a franchise.

We could not proceed by indictment, for the act gives a penalty, and

not to the people, but to the informer. If this remedy does not lie,

there is no remedy, civil or criminal. It is, at least, a liberty in the
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nature of a franchise; and this is the only and proper remedy. • * *

Thompson", Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court. * * * It may

safely be admitted, that formerly the right of banking was a common

law right belonging to individuals and to be exercised at their pleasure.

It can not, however, admit of a doubt that the legislature had author-

ity to regulate, modify or restrain this right. This they have done by

the restraining act of 1804 (sess. 27, ch. 117), and which has since

been re-enacted and continued in full force (2 N. R. L. 234).1 The

construction which has been given by this court to the act is, that

it extends only to associations or companies formed for banking pur-

poses, and not an individual who carries on banking operations alone,

and on his own credit and account (14 Johns. Rep. 205). The right

of banking, therefore, by a?iy company or association, has, since the

restraining act, become a franchise, or privilege, derived from the grant

of the legislature, and subsisting only in such companies or associations

as can show such grant. The defendants have, accordingly, set up,

as their authority or charter, for the exercise of this privilege, an act

passed the 29th of April, 1816, entitled "an act to incorporate the

Utica Insurance Company." The real inquiry is whether this act

contains any such grant of banking privileges. * * *

Many powers and capacities are tacitly annexed to a corporation duly

created; but they are such only as are necessary to carry into effect

the purposes for which it was established. The specification of certain

powers operates as a restraint to such objects only, and is an implied

prohibition of the exercise of other and distinct powers. A contrary

doctrine would be productive of mischievous consequences, especially

with us, where charter privileges have been so alarmingly multiplied.

* * * I am, accordingly, of opinion that the defendants are un- >

'1 R. 8. 712.

the colony became a sovereign and independent state the people succeeded to all the rights and privileges of English subjects, and more,
they succeeded to all the rights and privileges of the crown or sovereign. The legislature have, accordingly, from time to time granted
various exclusive liberties and privileges, or franchises, to citizens.
By the restraining act of the r rth of April, r804 , the legislature did
take to itself the right or liberty of banking. What was before common to all ceased to be so, and became a franchise or privilege in the
government, not to be exercised by citizens, unless by grant. Whether
this was a franchise in England or not, it is made a franchise here,
and the legislature were competent to make it so. It is true that private individuals may bank, but the defendants are an assodation carryi ng on banking business in violation of the act of the r rth of April,
1~, passed expressly to prevent any unauthorized or unincorporated
association from banking. Being a privilege, then, which the defendants could not lawfully exercise without a grant from the legislature,
it comes within the very definition which has been given of a franchise.
We could not proceed by indictment, for the act gives a penalty, and
not to the people, but to the informer. If this remedy does not lie,
there is no remedy, civil or crimina l. It is, at least , a liberty in the
nature of a franchise; and this is the only and proper remedy. • • •
THOM PSOK, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court. • • • It may
safely be admitted, that formerly the right of banking was a common
law right belonging to individuals and to be exercised at their pleasure.
It can not , however, admit of a doubt that the legislature h ad authority to regulate, modify or restrain this right. This they have done by
the restraining act of r804 ( sess. 27, ch. l 17) , and which has since
been re-enacted and continued in full force (2 N. R. L. 234). 1 The
construction which has been given by this court to the act is, that
it extends only to associations or companies formed for banking purposes, and not an individual who carries on banking operations alone ,
and on his own credit and account (14 Johns. Rep. 205). Tiu right
of banking, llzerefore, by any company or assodalion , has, since the

restraining ad, become a franchise, or privilege, derived from the grant

of the legislature, and subsisting only in such compan£es or assodations
as can sktnp such grant.

The defendants have , accordingly, set up,
a· their authority or charter, for the exercise of this privilege , an act
passed the 29th of April, 1816, entitled "an act to incorporate the
Utica Insurance Company." The real inquiry is whether this act
contains any such grant of banking 'privileges . • • •
Many powers and capacities are tacitly annexed to a corporation duly
created; but they are such only as are necessary to carry into effect
the purposes for which it was established. The specification of certain
powers operates as a restraint to such objects only, and ii; an implied
prohibition of the exercise of other and distinct po.,.vers. A contrary
doctrine would be productive of mischievous consequences, especially
with us, where charter privileges have been so alarmingly rrwltiplied.
• • • I am, accordingly, of opinion that the defendants are un11 R. S. 712.
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authorized, by law, to enter into such business, and that judgment of

ouster ought to be rendered against them.

118

Spencer, J. Two questions have been brought forward in the ar-
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gument: (i) Whether an information in the nature of quo warranto

authorized, by law, to enter into such business, and that judgment of
ouster ought to be rendered against them.
· SPENCER, ].
Two questions have been brought forward in the argument: (I ) Whether an information in the nature of quo warranto
will lie in this case. ( 2) Whether the defendants have authority,
under the act incorporating the Utica Insurance Company, to carry on
banking operations in the manner set forth in their plea.
The statute (1 N. R. L. 108) ( 2 R. S. 581) gives this writ against
any person who shall usurp, intrude into or unlawfully hold and execute
any office or franchise within this state; and if the right set up by the
defendants is a franchi e, and the act under which they claim to exercise
it does not confer it, then the defendants are subject to this prosecution.
A franchise is a species of incorporeal hereditament; it is defir.ed
by Finch ( 164) to be a royal privilege, or a branch of the king's prerogative subsisting in the hands of a subject; and he says that franchises being derived from the crown, they must arise from the king's
grant, or, in some cases, may be held by prescription, which presupposes a grant; that the kinds are various, and almost infinite, and
they may be vested in natural persons or in bodies p olitic.
All the elementary writers agree in adopting Finch's definition of a
franchise, that it is a royal privilege or branch of the king's prerogative , subsisting in the hands of a subject.
An information, in the nature of a writ of quo warranto, is a substitute for that ancient writ, which has fa llen into disuse; and the
information which has superseded the old writ is defined to be a
criminal method of prosecution, as well to punish the usurper by a
fine for the usurpation of the franchise, as to oust him, and seize it for
the crown. It has, for a long time, been applied to the mere purpose
of trying the civil right, seizing the franchi se or ousting the wrongful
possessor, the fine being nominal only. (2 Inst. 281, pl. 12; 3 Burr.
1817, 4 Term Rep. 381 , I Buist. 55.)
If there are certain immunities and privileges in which the public
have an interest, as contra-di stinguished from private rights, and
which can not be exercised without authority derived from the sovereign power, it would seem to me that such immunities and privileges
must be franchi ses; and the act for rendering the proceedings upon
writs of mandamus, and informations in the nature of quo warranto,
more speedy and effectual, presupposes that there are franchises, other
than offices, which may be u surped and intruded into.
If in England, a privilege in the lands of a subject, which the king
alone can grant, would be a franchi se, with us a privilege, or immunity of a public nature, which can not legally be exercised without
legislative grant, would be a franchise. The act commonly called the
restraining law ( sess. 27, ch. 114) , (1 R. S. 712) enacts, that no person, unauthorized by law, shall subscribe to, or become a member of,
any association, or proprietor of any bank or fund, for the purpose
of issuing notes, receiving deposits, making discounts or transacting
any other business which incorporated banks do, or may transact, by
virtue of their re, pectiYe acts of incorporations.

will lie in this case. (2) Whether the defendants have authority,

under the act incorporating the Utica Insurance Company, to carry on

banking operations in the manner set forth in their plea.

The statute (1 N. R. L. 108) (2 R. S. 581) gives this writ against

any person who shall usurp, intrude into or unlawfully hold and execute

any office or franchise within this state; and if the right set up by the

defendants is a franchise, and the act under which they claim to exercise

it does not confer it, then the defendants arc subject to this prosecution.

A franchise is a species of incorporeal hereditament; it is defined

by Finch (164) to be a royal privilege, or a branch of the king's pre-

rogative subsisting in the hands of a subject; and he says that fran-

chises being derived from the crown, they must arise from the king's

grant, or, in some cases, may be held by prescription, which presup-

poses a grant; that the kinds are various, and almost infinite, and

they may be vested in natural persons or in bodies politic.

All the elementary writers agree in adopting Finch's definition of a
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franchise, that it is a royal privilege or branch of the king's preroga-

tive, subsisting in the hands of a subject.

An information, in the nature of a writ of quo warranto, is a sub-

stitute for that ancient writ, which has fallen into disuse; and the

information which has superseded the old writ is defined to be a

criminal method of prosecution, as well to punish the usurper by a

fine for the usurpation of the franchise, as to oust him. and seize it for

the crown. It has, for a long time, been applied to the mere purpose

of trying the civil right, seizing the franchise or ousting the wrongful

possessor, the fine being nominal only. (2 Inst. 2S1, pi. 12; 3 Burr.

iS 17, 4 Term Rep. 381, 1 Bulst. 55.)

If there are certain immunities and privileges in which the public

have an interest, as contra-distinguished from private rights, and

which can not be exercised without authority derived from the sover-

eign power, it would seem to me that such immunities and privileges

must be franchises; and the act for rendering the proceedings upon

writs of mandamus, and informations in the nature of quo warranto,

more speedy and effectual, presupposes that there are franchises, other

than offices, which may be usurped and intruded into.

If in England, a privilege in the lands of a subject, which the king

alone can grant, would be a franchise, with us a privilege, or immun-

ity of a public nature, which can not legally be exercised without

legislative grant, would be a franchise. The act commonly called the

restraining law (sess. 27, ch. 114), (1 R. S. 712) enacts, that no per-

son, unauthorized by law, shall subscribe to, or become a member of,

any association, or proprietor of any bank or fund, for the purpose

of issuing notes, receiving deposits, making discounts or transacting

any other business which incorporated banks do, or may transact, by

virtue of their respective acts of incoqiorations.
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Taking it for granted, at present, for the purpose of considering

119

whether the remedy adopted is appropriate, that the defendants have

exercised the right of banking, without authority, and against the

provisions of the restraining act, they have usurped a right which the

legislature have enacted should only be enjoyed and exercised by

authority derived from them. The right of banking, since the re-

straining act, is a privilege or immunity subsisting in the hands of

citizens, by grant of the legislature. The exercise of the right of

banking, then, with us, is the assertion of a grant from the legisla-

ture to exercise that privilege, and consequently it is the usurpation

of a franchise, unless it can be shown that the privilege has been

granted by the legislature. An information, in the nature of a writ

of quo warranto, need not show a title in the people to have the par-

ticular franchise exercised, but calls on the intruder to show by what

authority he claims it, and if the title set up be incomplete, the peo-

ple are entitled to judgment. (2 Kyd on Corp., 399; 4 Burr. 2146—7.)

This position is illustrated by the nature and form of the informa-

tion ; the title of the king is never set forth ; but after stating the fran-
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chise usurped, the defendant is called upon to show his warrant for

exercising it.

This consideration answers the argument urged by the defendant's

counsel, that banking was not a royal franchise in England., and that

it is not a franchise here which the people, in their political capacity,

can enjoy; for if their title to enjoy it need not be set out in the infor-

mation, it is not necessary that it should exist in them at all. In the case

of The King v. Nicholson and Others (1 Str. 303), it appeared that

by a private act of parliament for enlarging and regulating the port of

Whitehaven, several persons were appointed trustees, and a power

was given to them to elect others upon vacancies by death or other-

wise. The defendants took upon them to act as trustees without such

an election; and upon motion for an information in the nature of a

quo warranto against them, it was objected, by the counsel for the de-

fendants, that the court never grants these informations but in cases

where there is usurpation upon some franchise of the crown; whereas,

in that case the king alone could not grant such powers as are exer-

cised by the trustees, the consequence of which was, that this author-

ity was no prior franchise of the crown. To this it was answered,

and resolved by the court, that the rule laid down was too general, for

that informations had been constantly granted when any new jurisdic-

tion or public trust was exercised without authority; and leave to file

an information was, accordingly, granted. This case is a strong au-

thority in favor of this proceeding.

Many cases might be cited, in which informations, in the nature of

quo warranto, have been refused, where the right exercised was one

of a private nature to the injury only of some individual. In the

present case, the right claimed by the defendants is in the nature of a

public trust; they claim, as a corporation, the rights of issuing notes,

ibscounting notes and receiving deposits. The notes they issue, if

their claim be well founded, are not obligatory on the individuals who

Taking it for granted, at present, for the purpose of considering
whether the remedy adopted is appropriate, that the defendants have
exercised the right of banking, without authority, and against the
provisions of the restraining act, they have usurped a right which the
legislature have enacted should only be enjoyed and exercised by
authority derived from them. The right of banking, since the retraining act, is a privilege or immunity subsisting in the hands of
citizens, by grant of the legislature. The exercise of the right of .
banking, then, with us, is the assertion of a grant from the legislature to exercise that privilege, and consequently it is the usurpation
of a franchise, unless it can be shown that the privilege has been
!!ranted by the legislature. An information, in the nature of a writ
of <JU{) warranto, need not show a title in the people to have the particular franchise exercised, but calls on the intruder to show by what
authority he claims it, and if . the title set up be incomplete, the people are entitled to judgment. (2 Kyd on Corp., 399; 4 Burr. 2146-7.)
This position is illustrated by the nature and form of the information ; the title of the king is never set forth ; but after stating the franchise usurped, the defendant is called upon to show his warrant for
exercising it.
This consideration answers the argument urged by the defendant's
counsel, that banking was not a royal franchise in England, and that
it is not a franchise here which the people, in their political capacity,
can enjoy; for if their title to enjoy it need not be set out in the information, it is not necessary that it should exist in them at all. In the case
of The King v. Nicholson and Others (1 Str. 303), it appeared that
by a private act of parliament for enlarging and regulating the port of
Wkiieltaven, several persons were appointed trustees, and a power
was given to them to elect others upon vacancies by death or otherwise. The defendants took upon them to act as trustees without such
an election; and upon motion for an information in the nature of a
quo warranto again st them, it was objected, by the counsel for the defendants, that the court never grants these informations but in cases
where there is usurpation upon some franchise of the crown; whereas,
in that case the king al"one could not grant such powers as are exercised by the trustees, the consequence of which was, that this authority was no prior franchise of the crown. To this it was answered ,
and resolved by the court, that the rule laid down was too general, for
that informations had been constantly granted when any new jurisdiction or public trust was exercised without authority; and leave t-0 file
an information was, accordingly, granted. This case is a strong authority in favor of this proceeding.
Many cases might be cited, in which informations, in the nature of
quo warranto, have been refused, where the right exercised was one
of a private nature to the injury only of some individual. In the
present case, the right claimed by the defendants is in the nature of a
public tru t; they claim, as a corporation, the rights of issuing notes,
di'>counting notes and receiving deposits. The notes they issue, if
their claim be well founded , arc not obligatory on the individuals who
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compose the direction or are proprietors of the stock of the corpora-

tion. These notes pass currently, on the ground that the corporation

SPRING VALLEY WATER-WORKS V. SCHOTTLER.

120

have authority to issue them, and that they are obligatory on all their

funds; the right claimed is one, therefore, of a public nature, and, as

compose the direction or are proprietors of the stock of the corporation. These notes pass currently, on the ground that the corporation
have authority to issue them, and that they are obligatory on all their
funds; the right claimed is one, therefore, of a public nature, and, as
I conceive, deeply interesting to the community; and if the defendants
can not exercise these rights without a grant from the legislature; if
they do exercise them as though they had a grant, they are, in my
. judgment, usurping an authority and privilege of a public kind ; and
we perceive that it is not necessary that the right assumed should be a
prior franchise of the crown, oc of the people of the state.
Had the defendants claimed and exercised the right of banking as
private individuals, I agree that an information would not lie against
them; they would have been subject only to the penalties inflicted by
the act; but they claim the privilege as a corporation, and under a
grant from the legislature. If they have not that grant, they have
exercised and usurped a franchise, and the remedy pursued is well
adapted to the case. • • •
Judgment of ouster.

I conceive, deeply interesting to the community; and if the defendants

can not exercise these rights without a grant from the legislature; if

they do exercise them as though they had a grant, they are, in my

judgment, usurping an authority and privilege of a public kind; and

we perceive that it is not necessary that the right assumed should be a

prior franchise of the crown, or of the people of the state.

Had the defendants claimed and exercised the right of banking as

private individuals, I agree that an information would not lie against

them; they would have been subject only to the penalties inflicted by

the act; but they claim the privilege as a corporation, and under a

grant from the legislature. If they have not that grant, they have

exercised and usurped a franchise, and the remedy pursued is well

adapted to the case. * * *

Judgment of ouster.

Note. See 1896, Meadowcroft v. People, 163 111. 56, 54 Am. St. 447; State v.

Woodmansee, 1 N. Dak. 246. But see 1892, State v. Scougal, 3 S. Dak. 55, 44
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Am. St. R. 756, holding that "Banking was not a franchise at common law,

and except as to the privilege of issuing notes to circulate as money, can not

be made such by the legislature. See also 1885, In Matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y.

98, 50 Am. Rep. 636 (act forbidding manufacture of cigars in certain ways and

Note. See 1896, Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56, 54 Am. St. 447; State v.
Woodmansee, 1 N. Dak. 246. But see 1892, State v. Scougal, 3 S. Dak. 55, 44
Am. St. R. 756, holding that "Banking was not a franchise at common law,
and except as to the privilege of issuing notes to circulate as money, can not
be made such by the legislature. See also 1885, In Matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y.
98, 50 Am. Rep. 636 (act forbidding manufacture of cigars in certain ways and
places held unconstitutional); 1885, People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep.
34 (prohibiting sale of oleomargarine}. Also 1893, Braceville Coal Co. v.
People, 147 Ill. 66, 37 Am. S. R. 206, as to the constitutional restrictions upon
the police power of the legislature. As to corporate franchis es particularly see
cases in addition to those given in text: 1838, Regents v. Williams, 9 Gill &
.J. (Md.) 365, 31 Am. D. 72; 1886, Appeal of Pittsburgh, etc., R . R. Co., 122
Pa. St. 511, 9 Am . St. 128 ; infra, p. 1342; 1846, Enfield Toll Bri<lge Co. v. Hart
ford, etc., R. R. 0o., 17 Conn. 4-54, 44 Am. Dec. 556; 1892, Mayor, etc., v.
Houston, etc., Ry. Co .• 83 Tex. 548, 29 Arn. St. R. 679; 1890, Macon, etc., R.
R. Co. v. Gibson, 85 Ga. 1, 21 Am. St. R. 135; 1846, Miners' Bank v. United
States, Morris (Iowa.) 482, 43 Am. D. 115.

places held unconstitutional); 1885, People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep.

34 (prohibiting sale of oleomargarine). Also 1893, Braceville Coal Co. v.

People, 147 111. 66, 37 Am. S. R. 206, as to the constitutional restrictions upon

the police power of the legislature. As to corporate franchises particularly see

oases in addition to those given in text: 1838, Regents v. Williams, 9 Gill &

.1. (Md.) 365, 31 Am. D. 72; 1886, Appeal of Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 122

Pa. St. 511, 9 Am. St. 128; infra, p. 1342; 1846, Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hart

ford, etc., R. R. Co., 17 Conn. 454, 44 Am. Dec. 556; 1892, Mayor, etc., v.

Houston, etc., Rv. Co., 83 Tex. 548, 29 Am. St. R. 679; 1890, Macon, etc., R.

R. Co. v. Gibson, 85 Ga. 1, 21 Am. St. R. 135; 1846, Miners' Bank v. United

States, Morris (Iowa) 482, 43 Am. D. 115.

Sec. 23. Same.

SPRING VALLEY WATER-WORKS v. SCHOTTLER Et Al.1

1882. In the Supreme Court of California. 62 Cal. 69-119.'

[Appeal by plaintiff from judgment of the superior court of the city

and county of San Francisco, denying a writ of review, and confirm-

ing the action of the board of equalization of that city and county, in

Sec. 23. Same.

raising the assessment of the franchise of the water-works company

from $5,000 to $5,000,000. The state constitution (art. 13, § 1)

SPRING VALLEY WATER-WORKS v. SCHOTTLER ET AL. 1

provided: "All property in the state * * * shall be taxed in pro-

portion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. The word

1882.

'property,' as used in this article and section, is hereby declared to in-

IN

THE SUPREME CouRT OF CALIFORNIA.

6z

Cal.

69-119. 1

1 Statement of factB condensed. Parts of arguments and opinion omitted.

[Appeal by plaintiff from judgment of the superior court of the city
and county of San Francisco, denying a writ of review, and confirming the action of the board of equalization of that city and county, in
raising the assessment of the franchise of the water-works company
from $s,ooo to $s,ooo,ooo. The state constitution (art. 13, § r)
provided: ''All prope1ty in the state • • • shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. The word
'prope1ty,' as used in this article and section, is hereby declared to in-

« Affirmed by U. S. Sup. Ct., Spring Valley W. W. v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347.

1
2
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Affirmed by U . S. Sup. Ct., Spring Valley W.W. v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347.
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dude moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, dues, franchises and all other

THE CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE.

matters and things, real, personal and mixed, capable of private own-

121

ership." The water-works company was organized under general

acts of 1S50, 1853, 1858, etc., giving it the power of perpetual suc-

cession for fifty years, to sue and be sued, to make and use a seal,

hold, purchase and convey necessary real and personal property, ap-

point necessary officers and agents, divide its stock into shares, make

by-laws to regulate its management and regulate the transfer of stock;

to exercise power of eminent domain, to use streets, alleys, ways, etc.,

necessary for laying its pipes, to furnish water to the inhabitants at

rates fixed in a prescribed way, and the further right to "all the privi-

leges, immunities and franchises that might be thereafter granted to

any individual or corporation relating to the introduction of fresh

water into any city or town of the state for the use of the inhabitants

thereof." The state constitution also provided (art. xi, § 19): "In

cities where there are no public works owned by the municipality * * *

any individual or company duly incorporated for that purpose shall

(subject to certain provisions as to damages) have the privilege of

using the streets for laying down pipes, etc."]
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Fox & Kellogg, for appellant, argued:

* * * In making up the assessment, the revenue officers seem to

have taken it for granted that because franchises may be property, they

are ex necessitate liable to assessment; and to have overlooked the pro-

vision of the constitution and the statute, that they can only be prop-

erty and subject to taxation when "capable of private ownership."

According to their theory, the elective franchise, the freedom of speech,

the freedom of the press, the most valuable of all franchises, are liable

to assessment and subject to taxation. But these and a hundred other

franchises are not "capable of private ownership," and therefore not

••property," and, not being property, are not subject to taxation.

We submit that nothing but "property" is subject to assessment and

taxation, in the form now under consideration, under the constitution

or laws of this state. Only those "franchises" can be classed as

'■property • * » capable of private ownership," which are de-

fined by the supreme court of the United States, in Bank of Augusta

v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, as being "special privileges conferred by gov-

ernment on individuals, which do not belong to the citizens of the

country generally, or by common right." Wherever we find a fran-

chise held to be property, we find it to be of the class thus clearly

defined by the highest tribunal in the land. Of these are street rail-

roads, turnpike roads, bridges, ferries, wharves and the like.

But the appellant in this case possesses no such franchise. There

is no right or privilege which it can name, or upon which it can place

its hand and say, "This is mine;" none that is or can be held by

it in "private ownership." It owns no franchise; it simply enjoys

the privileges conferred by law. Its privileges are these and these

only: (1) The right of corporate existence. This is a privilege

granted by the legislature to all the people of the state, and any five

of its inhabitants may enjoy that franchise at any time, when they see

elude moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, dues, franchises and all other
matters and things, real, personal and mixed, capable of private ownership." The water-works company was organized under general
acts of 1850, 1853, 1858, etc., giving it the power of perpetual succession for fifty years, to sue and be sued, to make and use a seal,
bold, purchase and convey necessary real and personal pro,perty, appoint necessary officers and agents, divide its stock into shares, make
by-laws to regulate its management and regulate the transfer of stock;
to exercise power of eminent domain, to use streets, alleys, ways, etc.,
necessary for laying its pipes, to furnish water to the inhabitants at
rate fixed in a prescribed way, and the further right to "all the privileges, immunities and franchises that might be thereafter granted to
any individual or corporation relating to the introduction of fresh
water into any city or town of the state for the use of the inhabitants
thereof." The state constitution also provided (art. xi, § 19): "In
citie'i where there are no public works owned by the municipality * * *
any individual or company duly incorporated for that purpose shall
( ubject to certain provisions as to damages) have the privilege of
u ing the streets for laying down pipes, etc."]
Fox & Kellogg, for appellant, argued:
• • • In making up the assessment, the revenue officers seem to
have taken it for granted that because franchises may be property, they
are ex necessitate liable to assessment; and to have overlooked the provi ion of the constitution and the statute, that they can only be property and subject to ta.xation when "capable of private ownership."
According to their theory, the elective franchise, the freedom of speech,
the freedom of the press, the most valuable of all franchises, are liable
to assessment and subject to taxation. But these and a hundred other
fra nchises are not "capable of private ownership," and therefore not
"property," and, not being property, are not subject to taxation.
We submit that nothing but "property" is subject to assessment and
taxation, in the form now under consideration, under the constitution
or laws of this state. Only those "franchises" can be classed as
" property • • • capable of private ownership," which are defined by the supreme court of the United States, in Bank of Augusta
v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, as being "special privileges conferred by government on individuals, which do not belong to the citizens of the
country generally, or by common right." Wherever we find a franchise held to be property, we find it to be of the class thus clearly
defined by the highest tribunal in the land. Of these are street railroads, turnpike roads, bridges, ferries, wharves and the like.
But the appellant in this case possesses no such franchise. There
is no right or privilege which it can name, or upon which it can place
its hand and. say, "This is mine;" none that is or can be held by
it in "private ownership." It owns no franchise; it simply enjoys
the privileges conferred by law. Its privileges are these and these
only: ( 1) The right of corporate existence. This is a privilege
granted by the legislature to all the people of the state, and any five
of its inhabitants may enjoy that franchise at any time, when they see
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fit to incorporate for any purpose for which men may contract or asso-

ciate themselves together. (Civil Code, § 2S6.) (2) The right to

fit to incorporate for any purpose for which men may contract or associate themselves together. (Civil Code, § 286.) (2) The right t~l
acquire property, when it is absolutely necessary, and can not otherwise be acquired for certain of its corporate uses, by condemnation.
This is a right which can never be exercised without enormous co t.
proportion,ed to the value of the thing acquired, and which is not, and
can not be held in private ownership.
It is a right held in common by all corporations organized for the
purpose of supplying cities and towns with water as well as many
others, and there is no limit to the number of corporations which
may organize and actually engage in the business of supplying the
same city or town. (See Statute, 1858, p. 2r8; Code of Civil Procedure, § r 237.) (3) The right to lay and maintain pipes in the streets
and to collect water rates. Like the two preceding, so of this. It
is not a right which is or can be held "in private ownership." By
the statute of 1858, above cited, and under which the appellant i
organized, it is a right guaranteed to every corporation organized
for the purpose of supplying water in cities and towns, with no limitation upon the number that may engage in the same business in the
same city or town. By the codes the same right is also guaranteed to
any corporation organized for such purpose; but under the m it could
only be exercised when thereunto authorized by ordinance of the city.
But by the same section of the code, the city authorities were prohibited from granting any exclusive privilege of the kind. (See Ci,·il
Code , §§ 548, 549.) But since the passage of both the statute and
the code, the p eople , in the majesty of their power, have taken away
even the limitations of those laws, by which the right to exercise the
privilege was limited to corporations, and now it is a right common
to every person in the state whether incorporated or not.

acquire property, when it is absolutely necessary, and can not other-

wise be acquired for certain of its corporate uses, by condemnation.

This is a right which can never be exercised without enormous cost,

proportioned to the value of the thing acquired, and which is not, and

can not be held in private ownership.

It is a right held in common by all corporations organized for the

purpose of supplying cities and towns with water as well as many

others, and there is no limit to the number of corporations which

may organize and actually engage in the business of supplying the

same city or town. (See Statute, 1858, p. 218; Code of Civil Pro-

cedure, §1237.) (3) The right to lay and maintain pipes in the streets

and to collect water rates. Like the two preceding, so of this. It

is not a right which is or can be held "in private ownership." By

the statute of 1858, above cited, and under which the appellant is

organized, it is a right guaranteed to eveiy corporation organized

for the purpose of supplying water in cities and towns, with no limi-
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tation upon the number that may engage in the same business in the

same city or town. By the codes the same right is also guaranteed to

any corporation organized for such purpose; but under them it could

only be exercised when thereunto authorized by ordinance of the city.

But by the same section of the code, the city authorities were pro-

hibited from granting any exclusive privilege of the kind. (See Civil

Code, §§ 548, 549.) But since the passage of both the statute and

the code, the people, in the majesty of their power, have taken away

even the limitations of those laws, by which the right to exercise the

privilege was limited to corporations, and now it is a right common

to every person in the state whether incorporated or not.

[After quoting provisions of art. xi, § 19, of the constitution above given:]

Thus it will be seen that under the constitution of the state it is im-

possible that there should be a franchise of this kind—that is "capable

of private ownership." It is one which belongs to everybody, and

whoever sees fit to use it need not even say to the municipal author-

ities, "by your leave." All they have to do is to be subject to gen-

[After quoting provisions of art. xi,§ 19, of the constitution above given:]

eral regulations for damages and indemnity for damages, and to

supervision of the street superintendent, as to the mode and manner

Thus it will be seen that under the constitution of the state it is impossible that there should be a franchise of this kind-that is "capable
of private ownership." It is one which belongs to everybody, and
whoever sees fit to use it need n ot even say to the municipa l authorities, " by your leave." All they have to do is to be subject to general regulations for damages and indemnity for damages, and to
supervision of the street superintendent, as to the mode and manner
of using the street. It is tme that article xiv of the constitution
declares the right to collect water rates to be a franchise which can
only be exercised by authority and in the manner prescribed by law.
But that does not militate against the proposition that it is a privilege
common to all, and not "capable of private ·ownership." It is
declared to be a franchise solely for the purpose of making it subject
to regulation by law, and without giving it the character of property
or private ownership. These are all the franchises, if they can be
called such, enjoyed by the appellant. They are all franchises which are
enjoyed by every inhabitant of the state, which are not ' 'capable of private
ownership," and therefore not liable to assessment under the law.

of using the street. It is true that article xiv of the constitution

declares the right to collect water rates to be a franchise which can

only be exercised by authority and in the manner prescribed by law.

But that does not militate against the proposition that it is a privilege

common to all, and not "capable of private -ownership." It is

declared to be a franchise solely for the purpose of making it subject

to regulation by law, and without giving it the character of property

or private ownership. These are all the franchises, if they can be

called such, enjoyed by the appellant. They are all franchises which are

enjoyed by every inhabitant of the state, which are not''capable of private

ownership," and therefore not liable to assessment under the law.
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F. G. Newland, for appellant, argued:

THE CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE.

The term "franchise," in its broad sense, means "exemption from

123

constraint or oppression, liberty, freedom." ( Webster.) In this sense

the right to vote is termed a "franchise;" so also the right of trial by

jury, freedom of speech and freedom of the press are termed''franchises.''

The declaration of the constitution that the word "property" includes

'franchises,'' certainly was not intended to apply to those general privi-

leges and rights which society has guaranteed and secured to individuals.

The '■•franchises" declared by the constitution to be property, must be

those special privileges, exclusive in their nature, conferred by the gov-

ernment on individuals, and having the incidents and attributes of

properly; that is to say, they must be capable of private ownership, of

assignment and of being inherited. In this sense fhey are included in

that division of property called '■'incorporeal hereditaments" they are

things without body, capable of being inherited, such as the right of

"ferry," or the right of "fishery," or the right to maintain a "toll"

road, conferred upon the grantee, his heirs or assigns. It is evidently

in this sense that the word is used in the constitution, for in it the word

"property" is declared to include "moneys, credits, • • « fran-
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chises and all other matters and things real, personal and mixed,

capable of private ownership." The last words attach to and qualify

all the taxable things referred to in the above quotation.

[After quoting the provisions of the constitution and general laws relating

to the formation of the corporations:]

Under these acts the petitioner has the following rights and privileges:

1. The right to be a corporation—that is to say, the right as an arti-

ficial being, to act under an artificial name, and to exercise certain

powers and duties of a natural person, among others, to sue and be

sued, and to purchase, hold, sell and convey real and personal prop-

erty. Under the act of 1853, any three or more persons could asso-

ciate themselves together and form a water-company, by signing and

filing the proper certificate. This was a privilege made by the laws

of'common right and general enjoyment. All persons could exercise

it. Under the civil code, section 286, "Private corporations may be

formed for any purpose for which individuals may lawfully associate

themselves." and any five persons may associate themselves together

and form such corporation.

It appears, then, that the right to be a corporation is simply a

privilege conferred by the general law upon any. number of persons, not

less than three in the one case or five in the other, whoever they may

be, who may wish to associate themselves together, to exercise, as an

associated body, under an artificial name, certain powers and perform

certain duties of a natural person. In other words, a corporation is a

bundle of faculties. Could the faculty of a natural person to sue and

be sued, or his faculty to acquire and possess property, be assessed as

property? The right to the things sued for, which constitute choses

in action, or the property acquired and possessed could be assessed

both to natural and artificial beings, but not mere faculties or pow-

ers. The right to be a corporation is simply the right to exist at the

F. G. 1Vewla11d, for appellant, argued:
The term "franchise," in its broad sense, means "exemption from
constraint or oppression, liberty, freedom." (Webster.) In this sense
the rigltt to vote is termed a "franchise;" so also tlie right of trial by
jury, freedom ofspeech and freedom of the press are termed ''franchises. ''
Tlte dedaration of the constitution th.at the word '•property'' includes
''jranchises, '' certainly was not intended to apply to those general privileges and rig/its which society lzas guaranteed and secured to individuals.
The '' frandtises'' declared by the constitution to be property, must be
those special privileges, exclusive in their nature, conferred by the government on individuals, and having llte incidents and altn'butes of
property; that is to say, they must be capable of private ownersliip, of
assignment and of being inlten'ted. In tlzis sense /llzey are included in
that division of property called "incorporeal lzereditaments;" tlzey are
things witliotd body, capable of being inherited, such as the n'gllt of
''ferrJ1," or the rigltt of. "fishery," or the n'glit to maintain a "toll"
road, conferred upon tlze grantee, his heirs or assigns. It is evidently
in this sense that the word is used in the constitution, for in it the word
"property" is declared to include "moneys, credits, • • • fnmchi es and all other matters and things real, personal and mixed,
capable of private ownership." The last words attach to and qualify
all the taxable things referred to in the above quotation.
[After quoting the provisions of the constitution and general laws relating
to the formation of the corporations:]
Under these acts the petitioner has the following rights an<l privileges:
1. The right to be a COJ'l>Ol'ation-that is to say, the right as an a1tificial being, to act under an artificial name, and to exercise certain
powers and duties of a natural person, among others, to sue and be
ued, and to purchase, hold, sell and convey real and personal property. Under the act of 1853, any three or more persons could associate themselves together and form a water-company, by signing and
filing the proper certificate. This was a privilege made by the laws
of'common right and general enjoyment. All persons could exercise
it. Under the civil code, section 286, "Private corporations may be
formed for any purpose for which individuals may lawfully associate
themselves," and any five persons may associate themselves together
and form such corporation.
It appears, then, that the right to be a corporation is simply a
privilege conferred by the general law upon any. number of persons. not
less than three in the one case or fh·e in the other, whoever they may
_ he, who may wish to associate themselves together, to exercise, as an
associated body, under an artificial name, certain powers and perform
certain duties of a natural person. In other words, a corporation is a
bundle of faculties. Could the faculty of a natural person to sue and
he sued, or hi faculty to acquire and possess property. be assessed as
property? The right to the things sued for, which constitute choses
in action, or the property acquired and possessed could be assessed
both to natural and artificial beings, but not mere faculties or powers. The right to be a corporation is simply the right to exist at the
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will of the creator. Can the right to exist either as a natural or arti-

ficial being be valued as property?

will of the creator. Can the right to exist either as a natural or artificial being be valued as property?
2. Under the act of 1858 water companies are granted the privilege
of exercising the power of eminent domain; but they exercise this pri\"i·
lege simply as the agents of the state, for the purpose of serving a
public use, to which their powers and property are delegated. This
agency may be revoked at any time. It is a naked power-not n
power coupled with an interest. Can the agency of the agent, whether
natural or artificial, be assessed as property? • • •
3. The only other right or privilege conferred by the general law of
1858, upon water companies, is the right of laying down pipes in the
street.s of the city, and supplying the inhabitants with water at rate
fixed by law; but this right is not only common to all water companies, but is also conferred by art. xi, § 19, and art. xiv, of the new
constitution, on all individuals, so that this right which, if granted
absolutely and exclusively to a single individual or a single corporation, and his or its a signs, might be regarded as property, has been
hy the fundamental law of the state made a matter of common right
and general enjoyment. It is true that everybody does not exerci e
this right or privilege, just as everybody does not exercise the right to
vote, but everybody has the right to exercise it, and it is even more
unlimited and general than the right to vote, for the latter right i
conferred only upon native-born inhabitants over twenty-one yerw
of age, and upon naturalized citizens, whilst the former right can
he exercised by anybody, whether adult or minor, citizen or alien.
This right or privilege has none of the incidents of ownership; no one
can sell it, for every body has it, and no person can gain by the acce sion of the right of another.
We have thus classified all the rights and piivileges of water com·
panies under the general law, and the constitution of the state, and we
find that they are all subject to alteration and entire revocation by the
state; they are privileges enjoyed, not property owned. Webster defines property to be: "4· The exclusive right of possessing, enjoy·
ing and disposing of a thing, ownership. 6. An estate, whether in
lands, goods or money." Blackstone, book 1, page 1 38, speaks of
property as an absolute right "which consists in the free use, enjoyment and disposal of all his acquisitions without any control or
diminution save only by the laws of the land," and in another place,
book 2, page 2, speaks of the right of property as "that sole and despotic dominion which- one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe." Bouvier, in his Law Dictionary, in defining the word property, says: "It is the right to enjoy and to dispose of certain things in the most absolute manner, • • • so
that property, considered as an exclusive right to things contains not
only a right to use those things, but a right to dispose of them, either
by exchanging them for other things, or by giving them away to any
other person without any consideration, or even throwing them away."
Can it be said that any of the rights or privileges confen-e<l on the

2. Under the act of 1858 water companies are granted the privilege

of exercising the power of eminent domain; but they exercise this privi-

lege simply as the agents of the state, for the purpose of serving a

public use, to which their powers and property are delegated. This

agency may be revoked at any time. It is a naked power—not a

power coupled with an interest. Can the agency of the agent, whether

natural or artificial, be assessed as property? * * *

3. The only other right or privilege conferred by the general law of

1S58, upon water companies, is the right of laying down pipes in the

streets of the city, and supplying the inhabitants with water at rates

fixed by law; but this right is not only common to all water com-

panies, but is also conferred by art. xi, § 19, and art. xiv, of the new-

constitution, on all individuals, so that this right which, if granted

absolutely and exclusively to a single individual or a single corpora-

tion, and his or its assigns, might be regarded as property, has been

by the fundamental law of the state made a matter of common right
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and general enjoyment. It is true that everybody does not exercise

this right or privilege, just as everybody does not exercise the right to

vote, but everybody has the right to exercise it, and it is even more

unlimited and general than the right to vote, for the latter right is

conferred only upon native-born inhabitants over twenty-one years

of age, and upon naturalized citizens, whilst the former right can

be exercised by anybody, whether adult or minor, citizen or alien.

This right or privilege has none of the incidents of ownership; no one

can sell it, for every body has it, and no person can gain by the acces-

sion of the right of another.

We have thus classified all the rights and privileges of water com-

panies under the general law, and the constitution of the state, and we

find that they are all subject to alteration and entire revocation by the

state; they are privileges enjoyed, not property owned. Webster de-

fines property to be: "4. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoy-

ing and disposing of a thing, ownership. 6. An estate, whether in

lands, goods or money." Blackstone, book 1, page 138, speaks of

property as an absolute right "which consists in the free use, enjoy-

ment and disposal of all his acquisitions without any control or

diminution save only by the laws of the land," and in another place,

book 2, page 2, speaks of the right of property as "that sole and de-

spotic dominion whiclrone man claims and exercises over the exter-

nal things of the world in total exclusion of the right of any other

individual in the universe." Bouvier, in his Law Dictionary, in de-

fining the word property, says: "It is the right to enjoy and to dis-

pose of certain things in the most absolute manner, * * * so

that property, considered as an exclusive right to things contains not

only a right to use those things, but a right to dispose of them, either

by exchanging them for other things, or by giving them away to any

other person without any consideration, or even throwing them away."

Can it be said that any of the rights or privileges conferred on the
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petitioner by general laws, subject to alteration, amendment or repeal,

come within the definition of the term "property"? * * * Under

the new constitution it is impossible to grant a franchise, in the property

sense of that term, to either natural or artificial persons, for it declares

(art. 1, § 21); "No special privileges or immunities shall be granted

which may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the legislature.

Nor shall any class of citizens be granted privileges or immunities

which upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens." And,

again (art. 4, § 25): "The legislature shall not pass local or special

laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: Grant-

ing to any corporation, association or individual any exclusive right,

privilege or immunity in all cases where a general law may be made

applicable."

It is evident, therefore, that the day of "franchises" as property is

over. The whole tendency of the civilized government, is to do away

with special or exclusive privileges, and wherever a right is extended by

the government to make it common to all. Equality of right, equality of

privilege, and equality of burden, are now the crowning franchises of
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all persons, natural and artificial, in this state. The great difficulty

in construing a word like "franchise," which has figured extensively

in the evolution of government, is that the attributes of a by-gone age

are likely to be given to it notwithstanding the modifications that may

have taken place in its character, and scope.

As already stated the power of society over the individual is abso-

lute. It is called the power of government, or the police power.

Every privilege which the individual, either specially or as a member

of a class or in common with all other individuals enjoys, may be

regarded in one sense as a grant from the government.

The despot who rules with the consent or by the sufferance of society

has absolute power over the vocation of life. He can grant to a cer-

tain individual the right to pursue a special trade exclusively, or he can

throw open such trade or occupation to all. When such a grant is

made to an individual, his heirs and assigns, it may be regarded as

his property, and when such a grant is made to all individuals it is no

less a franchise; it is a freedom, a liberty, but not "property." If

we look back to the times of Elizabeth, James I and Charles I, we

will find many examples of special grants which partook of the nature

of property. Hallam, in his Constitutional History of England, vol.

1, ch. v, speaking of the reign of Elizabeth, says: "The crown either

possessed or assumed the prerogative of regulating almost all matters

of commerce at its discretion."

"Patents to deal exclusively in particular articles, generally of for-

eign growth, but reaching in some instances to such important neces-

saries of life as salt, leather and coal, had been lavishly granted to the

courtiers, with little direct advantage to the revenue. They sold them

to companies of merchants, who, of course, enhanced the price to the

utmost ability of the purchaser."

"In 1601 parliament made a bolder and more successful attack on

the administration than this reign had witnessed. The grievance of

petitioner by general laws, subject to alteration, amendment or repeal,
come within the definition of the term "property"? • • • Under
the new constitution it is impossible to grant a franchise, in the prope1ty
ense of that term, to either natural or a1tificial persons, for it declares
(art. 1, § 21); "No special privilegesor immunities shall be granted
which may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the legislature.
!\or shall any class of citizens be granted privileges or immunities
which upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens." And,
again (art. 4, § 25): "The legislature shall n0tpass local or special
law in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: Granting to any corporation, association or individual any exclusive right,
privilege or immunity in all cases where a general law may be made
applicable."
It is evident, therefore, that the day of "franchises" as property is
over. The whole tendency of the civilized government, is to do away
\\;th special or exclusive privileges, and wherever a right is extended by
the government to make it common to all. Equality of right, equality of
privilege, and equality of burden, are now the crowning franchises of
all persons, natural and artificial, in this state. The great difficulty
in construing a word like "franchise," which has figured extensively
in the evolution of government, is that the attributes of a by-gone age
are likely to be given to it notwithstanding the modifications that may
have taken place in its character, and scope.
As already stated the power of society over the individual is absolute. It is called the power of government, or the police power.
E\'ery privilege which the individual, either specially or as a member
of a class or in common with all other individuals enjoys, may be
regarded in one sense as a grant from the government.
The despot who rules with the consent or by the sufferance of society
has absolute power O\'er the vocation of life. He can grant to a certain individual the right to pursue a special trade exclusively, or he can
throw open such trade or occupation to all. When such a grant is
made to an individual, his heirs and assigns, it may be regarded as
his property, and when such a grant is made to all indi\·iduals it is no
less a franchise; it is a freedom, a liberty, but not "prope1ty." If
we look back to -the times of Elizabeth, James I and Charles I, we
will find many examples of special grants which partook of the nature
of property. Hallam , in his Constitutional History of England, vol.
1, 'ch. v, speaking of the reign of Elizabeth, says: "The crown either
possessed or assumed the prerogative of regulating almost all matters
of commerce at its discretion.''
"Patents to deal exclusively in particular articles, generally of foreign growth, but reaching in some instances to such important necessaries of life as salt, leather and coal, had been lavishly granted to the
courtiers, with little direct advantage to the revenue. They sold them
to companies of merchants, who, of course, enhanced the price to the
utmost ability of the purchaser."
"ln 16o1 parliament made a bolder and more successful attack on
the administration than this reign had witnessed. The grievance of
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monopolies had gone on continually increasing; scarce any article
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was exempt from these oppressive patents. When the list of them
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was read over in the house a member exclaimed: 'Is not bread among

the number?' The house seemed amazed. 'Nay,' said he, 'if no

monopolies had gone on continually increasing; scarce any article
was exempt from these oppressive patents. When the list of them
was read over in the house a member exclaimed: 'Is not bread among
the number?' The house seemed amazed. 'Nay,' said he, •if no
remedy is found for these, bread will be there before the next parliament.'''
It was in those times that the East India Company was organized
under letters patent from the crown, and vested with the exclusive
right to trade in India. Monopolies were granted by letters patent,
conferring the exclusive right to deal in necessaries of life , such as
coal, iron, soap, salt, leather, tobacco, beer, hops, linen, etc. (Bright's
English Hist., vol. 1 I, p. 629.) Rights of ferry, rights of wharfage.
rights of fishing, rights of chase and of toll-roads, etc., were also
granted. All these grants, as a rule, were made by letters patent,
running to an individual, his heirs or assigns, and exclusive in their
nature. They were protected by the courts as property, and it was
held by the courts that no grant could be made by the sovereign
which would interfere with or impair the exercise of the previous
grant. They were therefore termed incorporeal hereditaments, and,
Kent, in speaking of such franchises, says (Kent's Com., vol. 3, page
458) : " Another class of incorporeal hereditaments are franchises,
being certain privileges conferred by grant from government, and
vested in individuals. In England they are very numerous and are
understood to be royal privileges in the hands of a subject. They
contain an implied covenant on the part of the government not to
invade the rights vested. • • • The government can not resume
them at pleasure or do any act to impair the grant without a breach of
contract. • • • An estate in such a franchise and an estate in
law rest upon the same principle, being equally grants of a right or
privilege for an adequate consideration. If the creation of a franchise
be not declared to be exclusive, yet it is necessarily implied in the
grnnt, as in the case of the grant of the ferry, bridge, or turnpike, or
railroad, that the government will not, either directly or indirectly.
interfere with it, so as to destroy or materially impair its value.
Every such interference, whether it be by the creation of a rival franchise or otherwise, would be in violation or in fraud ·of the grant."
Such was the nature of franchises in England, and also in this
country at the time Chancellor Kent wrote. In the celebrated case
of Dartmouth College v. \Voodward, 4 Wheaton 519, it ' was decided
that the charter granted by the British Crown to Dartmouth Colleg-e
was a contract, and that an act of the legislature of New Hampshire
altering the charter was an act impairing the obligation of a contract,
and was unconstitutional and void. Justice Washington said (page
657): "To this grant or this franchise the parties are the king, and
the person for whose benefit it is created or trustees for them. The
assent of both is necessary. The subjects of the grant are not only
privileges and immunities, but property. • • • Certain obligations are created, binding both on the granter and grantee. On the
part of the former, it amounts to an extiDgUishment of the king's pre-

remedy is found for these, bread will be there before the next parlia-

ment.'""

It was in those times that the East India Company was organized

under letters patent from the crown, and vested with the exclusive

right to trade in India. Monopolies were granted by letters patent,

conferring the exclusive right to deal in necessaries of life, such as

coal, iron, soap, salt, leather, tobacco, beer, hops, linen, etc. (Bright's

English Hist., vol. 11, p. 629.) Rights of ferry, rights of wharfage,

rights of fishing, rights of chase and of toll-roads, etc., were also

granted. All these grants, as a rule, were made by letters patent,

running to an individual, his heirs or assigns, and exclusive in their

nature. They were protected by the courts as property, and it was

held by the courts that no grant could be made by the sovereign

which would interfere with or impair the exercise of the previous

grant. They were therefore termed incorporeal hereditaments, and,

Kent, in speaking of such franchises, says (Kent's Com., vol. 3, page

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:14 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

45S): "Another class of incorporeal hereditaments are franchises,

being certain privileges conferred by grant from government, and

vested in individuals. In England they are very numerous and arc

understood to be royal privileges in the hands of a subject. They

contain an implied covenant on the part of the government not to

invade the rights vested. * * * The government can not resume

them at pleasure or do any act to impair the grant without a breach of

contract. * * * An estate in such a franchise and an estate in

law rest upon the same principle, being equally grants of a right or

privilege for an adequate consideration. If the creation of a franchise

be not declared to be exclusive, yet it is necessarily implied in the

grant, as in the case of the grant of the ferry, bridge, or turnpike, or

railroad, that the government will not, either directly or indirectly,

interfere with it, so as to destroy or materially impair its value.

Every such interference, whether it be by the creation of a rival fran-

chise or otherwise, would be in violation or in fraud of the grant."

Such was the nature of franchises in England, and also in this

country at the time Chancellor Kent wrote. In the celebrated case

of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 519, it was decided

that the charter granted by the British Crown to Dartmouth College

was a contract, and that an act of the legislature of New Hampshire

altering the charter was an act impairing the obligation of a contract,

and was unconstitutional and void. Justice Washington said (page

657): "To this grant or this franchise the parties are the king, and

the person for whose benefit it is created or trustees for them. The

assent of both is necessary. The subjects of the grant are not only

privileges and immunities, but property. « » * Certain obliga-

tions are created, binding both on the grantor and grantee. On the

part of the former, it amounts to an extinguishment of the king's pre-
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rogative to bestow the same identical franchise on another corporate

body, because it would prejudice his prior grant. It implies, there-

fore, a contract not to reassert the right to grant the franchise to an-

other, or to impair it."

Justice Story says (p. 700): "In respect to corporate franchises

they are, properly speaking, legal estates vested in the corporation it-

self as soon as it is in esse. They are not mere naked powers granted

to the corporation, but powers coupled with an interest."

Mr. Webster, in his memorable argument in that case said: "Hume

gives the reason: It is that such franchises were regarded in a most

emphatic sense as private property. If it could be made to appear

that the trustees and the president and professors held their offices and

franchises during the pleasure of the legislature and that the property

holden belonged to the state, then indeed the legislature have done no

more than they had a right to do. But this is not so. The charter is

a charter of privileges and immunities, and these are holden by the

trustees expressly against the state forever."

The decision of this case attracted great attention. Its effect was
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feared; it placed the creature beyond the power of the creator, and as

a result of it the various states adopted constitutional amendments,

providing for the formation of corporations under general laws, which

should be subject to alteration, amendment or repeal. The courts

themselves in a measure shrank back from the doctrine of that case,

and in a subsequent case, argued in the supreme court of the United

States, entitled Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge et al. (n

Peters 420), they modified the doctrine which had previously existed

as to the exclusiveness of franchises, and declared "that a franchise

conferred by the government was not exclusive unless so expressed in

the grant." This remained the settled doctrine of the American

courts since that decision.

It will be observed, therefore, that the tendency of the people, act-

ing through constitutional conventions and representative legislatures

and of the courts, has been to modify the doctrine of the Dartmouth

College case, and to make powers conferred by the government upon

persons, natural or artificial, mere privileges enjoyed, not property

owned. This tendency has reached its highest development in our

state, where the legislature is not permitted to grant any special privi-

lege to any person, natural or artificial, and where all privileges con-

ferred by the sovereign power are made of common right and general

enjoyment. • » •

The only case which has been called to our attention in which a

tax has been imposed upon the franchise of a corporation as property,

separate and apart from the property in connection with which it is

exercised is the case of Exchange Bank of Columbus v. Hines, 3

Ohio St. 7, in which the court declared the tax invalid, in the follow-

ing language: * * *

Does a corporate franchise, in sober truth and reality, possess the

essential qualities of property? It is said that the corporate franchise

of a bank, conferring a peculiar legal capacity, and the high function

rogative to bestow the same identical franchise on another corporate
It implies, therefore, a contract not to reassert the right to grant the franchise to another, or to impair it.''
Justice Story says (p. 700): "In respect to corporate franchises
they are, properly speaking, legal estates vested in the corporation it~elf as soon as it is in esse.
They are not mere nake<l powers granted
to the corporation, but powers coupled with an interest."
~ir. Webster, in his memorable argument in that case said: "Hume
J!ires the reason: It is that such franchises were regarded in a most
~mphatic sense as private property.
If it could be made to appear
that the trustees and the president and professors held their offices and
franchises during the pleasure of the legislature and that the property
holden belonged to the state, then indeed the legislature have done no
more than they had a right to do. But this is not so. The charter is
a charter of privileges and immunities, and these are holden by the
tru tees expressly against the state forever."
The decision of this case attracted great attention. Its effect was
feared ; it placed the creature beyond the power of the creator, and as
:1 result of it the various states adopted constitutional amendments,
providing for the formation of corporations under general laws, which
should be subject to alteration, amendment or repeal. The courts
themselves in a measure shrank back from the doctrine of that case,
and in a subsequent case, argued in the supreme court of the United
.:tates, entitled Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge et al. ( 11
Peters 420), they modified the doctrine which had previously existed
as to the exc1usiveness of franchises, and dec1ared "that a franchise
conferred by the government was not exc1usive unless so expressed in
the grant.'' This remained the settled doctrine of the American
courts since that decision . .
It will be observed, therefore, that the tendency of the people, acting through constitutional conventions and representative legislatures
and of the courts, has been to modify the doctrine of the Dartmouth
CoUege case, and to make powers conferred by the government upon
persons, natural or artificial, mere privileges enjoyed, not property
owned. This tepdency has reached its highest development in our
tate, where the legislature is not permitted to grant any special privilege to any person, natural or artificial, and where all p1;vileges conferred by the sovereign power are made of common right and general
enjoyment. • • •
The only case which has been called to our attention in which a
tax has been imposed upon the franchise of a corporation as property,
separate and apart from the property in connection with which it is
exercised is the case of Exchange Bank of Columbus v. Hines, 3
Ohio St. 7, in which the court dec1ared the tax invalid, in the following language: • • •
Does a corporate franchise, in ·sober truth and reality, possess the
essential qualities of property? It is said that the corporate franchise
of a bank, conferring a peculiar legal capacity, and the high function

body, because it would prejudice his prior grant.
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of great value. But value is not the distinguishing attribute of prop-
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erty. The right of suffrage is esteemed valuable; a public office,

of making and circulating paper money, is valuable-indeed, a thing
of great value. But value is not the distinguishing attribute of property. The right of suffrage is esteemed valuable; a public office,
with its emoluments, is valuable; a license to keep a tavern, as
formerly granted in this state, or a license to carry on any special
business which is prohibited without a special grant of authority from
the government, may be valuable, and a right to either of these things
may be asserted and maintained in a court of justice, yet neither of
them possesses the essential qualities which constitute property. Our
right to the free use and enjoyment of things which are in common,
such as air, light, water, etc., is valuable; and our right to the free
use of the public highways, and to many of the privileges and advantages derived from the government may be valuable, and may be
maintained by legal process. Yet none of these things come within
the denomination of property. Those things which constitute the suhject-matter of private property are such as the owner may exercise
exclusive dominion over, in the use, enjoyment and disposal of them,
without any control or diminution save only by the laws of the land.
( 1 Wend. Blackstone, 138.)
It is a fundamental principle that property considered as an exclusive right to things contains not only a right
to use those things, but a right to dispose of them, either by exchanging them for other things, or by giving them away to any other person.
without any valuable consideration in return, or even of throwing
them away, which is usually called relinquishing them." (Rutherford's Institutes 20; Puffendorff, c. 9, b. 7.)
"lt is said that capability of alienation, or disposal, either by sale,
devise, or abandonment, is an essential incident to property." (2
Kent's Com. 317.) "A corporate franchise, therefore, being a mere
prt'vt"lege, or grant of authort"ty by the government, i's not proper~y
of any descrt"ptt'on, and consequently not •subject to taxation under
the above provision of the constitution.'' ~ • •
The constitution not only provides that "all property shall be taxed
in proportion to its value," but that such value is "to be ascertained
as provided by law." The only rule laid down in the Political Code
for the assessment of property is that contained in section 3637, to wit:
"All taxable property must be assessed at its full cash value," which
latter term is defined (§ 3617, subd. 5) as follows: "The term
value and cash value mean the amount at which the property would
be taken in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor." • •
The rule applied was one which it was declared had the approval
of the supreme court, in the case of San Jose Gas Co. v. January,
viz., by ascertaining, first, the market value of the stock of the
corporation; and secondly, the assessed value of the property thereof,
and deducting the latter from the former, the difference was declared
to be the value of the franchise. • • •
The rule applied does not operate equally and uniformly upon all
franchises, for in the case of a franchise enjoyed by an individual ,
there would be no stock from the aggregate market value of which
could be deducted the value of the tangible property in order to

with its emoluments, is valuable; a license to keep a tavern, as

formerly granted in this state, or a license to carry on any special

business which is prohibited without a special grant of authority from

the government, may be valuable, and a right to either of these things

may be asserted and maintained in a court of justice, yet neither of

them possesses the essential qualities which constitute property. Our

right to the free use and enjoyment of things which are in common,

such as air, light, water, etc., is valuable; and our right to the free

use of the public highways, and to many of the privileges and ad-

vantages derived from the government may be valuable, and may he

maintained by legal process. Yet none of these things come within

the denomination of property. Those things which constitute the sub-

ject-matter of private property are such as the owner may exercise

exclusive dominion over, in the use, enjoyment and disposal of them,

without any control or diminution save only by the laws of the land,

(i Wend. Blackstone, 138.) It is a fundamental principle that prop-

erty considered as an exclusive right to things contains not only a right
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to use those things, but a right to dispose of them, either by exchang-

ing them for other things, or by giving them away to any other person,

without any valuable consideration in return, or even of throwing

them away, which is usually called relinquishing them." (Ruther-

ford's Institutes 20; Puffendorff, c. 9, b. 7.)

"It is said that capability of alienation, or disposal, either by sale,

devise, or abandonment, is an essential incident to property." (2

Kent's Com. 317.) "A corporate franchise, therefore, being a mere

privilege, or grant of authority by the government, is not property

of any description, and consequently not subject to taxation under

the above provision of the constitution." * » *

The constitution not only provides that "all property shall be taxed

in proportion to its value," but that such value is "to be ascertained

as provided by law." The only rule laid down in the Political Code

for the assessment of property is that contained in section 3637, to wit:

"All taxable property must be assessed at its full cash value," which

latter term is defined (§ 3617, subd. 5) as follows: "The terms

value and cash value mean the amount at which the property would

be taken in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor." * *

The rule applied was one which it was declared had the approval

of the supreme court, in the case of San Jose Gas Co. v. January,

viz., by ascertaining, first, the market value of the stock of the

corporation; and secondly, the assessed value of the property thereof,

and deducting the latter from the former, the difference was declared

to be the value of the franchise. * * *

The rule applied does not operate equally and uniformly upon all

franchises, for in the case of a franchise enjoyed by an individual,

there would be no stock from the aggregate inarket value of which

could be deducted the value of the tangible property in order to
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ascertain the value of the franchise, nor is it an equal or uniform

129

rule in any sense, for it applies only to corporations, whereas the

business of private individuals and firms should be subjected to

the same mode of assessment. A mercantile firm may have a stock

of goods on hand worth $100,000, and yet its business, the good will,

so called, with the advantages which years of skillful and honorable at-

tention to business united with fortunate circumstances may have given,

may be worth five times as much as the stock, and yet the assessor asses-

ses only the tangible property, and lets the good-will go free. The law

provides that "private corporations may be formed for any purpose

for which individuals may lawfully associate themselves." (C. C,

§ 286.) Such a mercantile firm could, if it chose, form itself into a

mercantile corporation. With a stock of goods on hand never ex-

ceeding $100,000 it might earn, with a skill and ability of its mem-

bers through the large custom acquired, a liberal rate of interest

on $500,000, and the stock would sell in the market for that sum. In

such cases, the assessor, pursuing the rule contended for here, would

determine the value of the franchise to be $400,000; whereas, as a
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matter of fact, the right to be a corporation would be utterly valueless

to a firm, and the difference between the market value of the stock

and the value of the tangible property would simply be the good-will

of the business; this would exist whether the concern was incorpo-

rated or not; and yet the difference is assessed only to corporations

and not to individuals.

A more glaring instance of the absurdity of the rule applied is

that of a newspaper whose value is almost entirely made up of skill,

ability, enterprise and good-will. Take the case of the two leading

newspapers of this city, the Chronicle and Call, owned by private pro-

prietors. Each is valued at about $300,000, and probably yields its

proprietors a liberal interest upon that amount. Probably the only

property connected with either of these papers which the assessor would

assess are the printing presses and fixtures, worth, say, $30,000; but

if either paper should be incorporated into a joint-stock company,

with a capital stock of $300,000, its stock would probably sell for

that amount, as the value of the stock in the market is largely de-

termined by the rate of interest paid as dividends upon it. The as-

sessor then, in that case, would assess the franchise, that is, the privi-

lege of conducting the same business in the name of an artificial being,

at the difference between the value of the printing press and fixtures,

and the market value of the stock, namely: $270,000. So the mere

change in the conduct of the business of such a newspaper, from the

hands of a natural person to those of an artificial person, would result

in an assessment upon the latter ten times greater than upon the for-

mer, and yet this artificial person is a purely business corporation; it

does not have the power of eminent domain, or exercise the royal

prerogative of collecting tolls; the only franchise it possesses is the

right to be a corporation. • » *

Thornton, J. * * * Blackstone says, in relation to franchises:

9—Wil. Casks.

a certain the value of the franchise, nor is it an equal or uniform
rule in any sense, for it applies only to corporations, whereas the
business of private individuals and firms should be subjected to
the same mode of assessment. A mercantile firm may have a stock
of goods on hand worth $100,000, and yet its business, the good will,
so called, with the advantages which years of skillful and honorable attention to business united with fortunate circumstances may have given,
may be worth five times as much as the stock, and yet the assessor assesses only the tangible property, and lets the good-will go free. The law
prorides that "private corporations may be formed for any purpose
for which individuals may lawfully associate themselves." (C. C.,
§ 286.) Such a mercantile firm could, if it chose, form itself into a
mercantile corporation. With a stock of goods on hand never exceeding $100,000 it might earn, with a skill and ability of its members through the large custom acquired, a liberal rate of interest
on $300,000, and the stock would sell in the market for that sum. In
such cases, the assessor, pursuing the rule contended for here, would
determine the value of the franchise to be $400,000; whereas, as a
matter of fact, the right to be a corporation would be utterly valueless
to a firm, and the difference between the market value of the stock
and the value of the tangible property would simply be the good-will
of the business; this would exist whether the concern was incorporated or not; and yet the difference is assessed only to corporations
and not to individuals.
A more glaring instance of the absurdity of the rule applied is
that of a newspaper whose value is almost entirely made up of skill,
ability, enterprise and good-will. Take the case of the two leading
newspapers of thi s city, the Chronicle and Call, owned by private proprietors. Each is valued at about $300,000, and probably yields its
proprietors a liberal interest upon that amount. Probably the only
property connected with either of these papers which the assessor would
assess are the printing presses and fixtures, worth, say, $30,000; but
if either pa pet" shou 1d be incorporated into a joint-stock company,
with a capital stock of $300,000, its stock would probably sell for
that amount, as the value of the stock in the market is largely determined by the rate of interest paid as dividends upon it. The assessor then, in that case, would assess the franchise, that is, the privilege of conducting the same business in the name of an artificial being,
at the difference between the value of the printing press and fixtures ,
and the market value of the stock, namely: $z70,ooo. So the mere
change in the conduct of the business of such a newspaper, from the
hands of a natural person to those of an artificial person, would result
in an assessment upon the latter ten times greater than upon the former, and yet this artificial person is a purely business corporation; it
does not have the power of eminent domain, or exercise the royal
prerogative of collecting tolls; the only franchise it possesses is the
right to be a corporation. • • •
THORNTON, J.
• • • Blackstone says, in relation to franchise s :
9-WIL. CASES.
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"Franchises and liberty are used as synonymous terms, and their defini-

tion is a royal privilege, or branch of the king's prerogative, subsisting
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in the hands of a subject. Being, therefore, derived from the crown,

SPRING VALLEY WATER-WORKS V. SCHOTTLER.

they must arise from the king's grant, or in some cases may be held

'' Franchises and liberty are used as synonymous terms , and their definition is a royal privilege, or branch of the king's prerogative, subsisting
in the hands of a subject. Being, therefore, derived from the crown,
they must arise from the king's grant, or in some cases may be held
by prescription, which, as has been frequently said, presupposes a
grant. The kinds of them are various and almost infinite,'' and adds
"that they may be vested in either natural persons or bodies politic,
in one man or in many." And again on this subject he says: "To be
a county palatine is a franchise, vested in a number of persons. It
is likewise a franchise for a number of persons to be incorporated,
and subsist as a body polt"tic, with a power to maintain perpetual
s1,ccession, and do other corporate acts .: each individual member of
s1,ch corporation is also said to have a franchise or fr eedom." (2 Bl.
Com. 37.)
Kent defines franchises as "privileges conferred by grant from government, and vested in individuals." (3 Kent's Com. 458.) He
also says: "Corporations or bodies politic are the most usual franchises known in our law." (Id . 459.)
In Pierce v. Emery, 32 N. H. 507, Perley, C. J. , speaking for the
court, remarks: "A corporation t"s itself a franchise belonging to
the members of the corporatt"on; and a corporation, being itself a
franchi"se, may hold other francht"ses as rt"ghts and franchises of the
corporatt"on." And furth er : "A corporation, being itself a franchise, consists and is made up of its rt'ghts and franchi'ses."
In City of Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co., 36 Conn. 266,
Butler, J., speaking for the court, uses this language in regard to a
railroad corporation: "The term •franchise' has several significations,
and there is some confusion in its use. The better opinion deduced
from the authorities seems to be that it consists of the entire privileges
embraced in and constituting the grant." (See title "Franchise" in
Abbott's Law Diet., and cases there cited.)
It is true that the privileges so granted by the government do not
pertain to the citizens of the state by common right. But what is the
"common right" here referred to? Is it not a right which pertains to
the citizens by the common law, the investiture of which is not to be
looked for in any special law, whether established by a constitution
or an act of the legislature? Coke says : "De commun droit-of
common right-this is by the common law, because the common law
ii the best and most common birthright that the subject hath for the
safeguard and defense not only of his goods, lands and revenues, but
of his wife and children. • • • This common law of England is
sometimes called right, sometimes common right, and sometimes com·
muni's justi'ti'a." (Coke's Inst. 142a.) The definition of franchises
as special privileges conferred by government upon individuals, and
which do not belong to the citizens of the country generally of common right, had its origin in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 575.
A very learned and accurate writer, Mr. Emory \Vashbum , in his
work on Real Property (2d vol. 267), adopts this definition, and cites
as authority the case above referred to from 13 Peters. The same

by prescription, which, as has been frequently said, presupposes a

grant. The kinds of them are various and almost infinite," and adds

"that they may be vested in either natural persons or bodies politic,

in one man or in many." And again on this subject he says: "To be

a county palatine is a franchise, vested in a number of persons. //

is likewise a franchise for a number of persons to be incorporated,

and subsist as a body politic, with a power to maintain perpetual

sticcession, and do other corporate acts; each individual member of

such corporation is also said to have a franchise or freedom." (2 Bl.

Com. 37.)

Kent defines franchises as "privileges conferred by grant from gov-

ernment, and vested in individuals." (3 Kent's Com. 458.) He

also says: "Corporations or bodies politic are the most usual fran-

chises known in our law." (Id. 459.)

In Pierce v. Emery, 32 N. H. 507, Perley, C. J., speaking for the

court, remarks: "^4 corporation is itself a franchise, belonging to
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the members of the corporation; and a corporation, being itself a

franchise, may hold other franchises as rights and franchises of the

corporation." And further: "A corporation, being itself a fran-

chise, consists and is made up of its rights and franchises."

In City of Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co., 36 Conn. 266,

Butler, J., speaking for the court, uses this language in regard to a

railroad corporation: "The term 'franchise' has several significations,

and there is some confusion in its use. The better opinion deduced

from the authorities seems to be that it consists of the entire privileges

embraced in and constituting the grant." (See title "Franchise" in

Abbott's Law Diet., and cases there cited.)

It is true that the privileges so granted by the government do not

pertain to the citizens of the state by common right. But what is the

"common right" here referred to? Is it not a right which pertains to

the citizens by the common law, the investiture of which is not to be

looked for in any special law, whether established by a constitution

or an act of the legislature? Coke says: llDe commun droit—of

common right—this is by the common law, because the common law

is the best and most common birthright that the subject hath for the

safeguard and defense not only of his goods, lands and revenues, but

of his wife and children. * * * This common law of England is

sometimes called right, sometimes common right, and sometimes com-

munis justitia." (Coke's Inst. 142a.) The definition of franchises

as special privileges conferred by government upon individuals, and

which do not belong to the citizens of the country generally of com-

mon right, had its origin in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 57_v

A very learned and accurate writer, Mr. Emory Washburn, in his

work on Real Property (2d vol. 267), adopts this definition, and cites

as authority the case above referred to from 13 Peters. The same

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

THE CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE.

definition is quoted by Angell & Ames, in their work on Corporations,

from the case referred to. (See Ang. & Ames on Corp., § 4.)

THE CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE.

In the case in 13 Peters it was contended that under the laws and

131

constitution of Alabama the right of banking was a franchise. The

court refused to so hold, on the ground that the right of banking, at

common law. belonged to every citizen. (See, also, Curtis v. Leavitt,

15 N. Y. 170, opinion of Shanklin, J.) The discussion on the point

in the opinion shows clearly that "common right" is used with the

signification of common law."

We are of opinion that the common right refers to the right of citi-

zens, generally at common law. Such rights of citizens, though

frequently spoken of as franchises, are not the franchises here

meant; and it maybe conceded that where such rights are granted

to corporations, they are not franchises. But independent of the right

to exist as a corporation, and to exercise powers in its corporate ca-

pacity, there are privileges granted to the water-works, which do

not.by the common law, belong to citizens generally; such as the

right to lay down pipes in the streets, ways and alleys of a city, and

to collect rates for water furnished, which was held to be a franchise

in San Francisco v. Spring Valley Water-Works, 48 Cal. 493, and in
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San Jose Gas Co. v. January, 57 Cal. 616. Conceding for the argu-

ment that the constitution, by section 19 of article xi, grants this right

to every person, it does not follow that it is not a franchise. They

are vested by a grant of the sovereign power, and not by the common

law; and the generality of the grant does not deprive them of the

character of franchises.

The right to collect rates for use of water supplied to the city and

county of San Francisco, or the inhabitants thereof, which the appel-

lant has possessed at least ever since the act of 1858 went into effect,

is expressly declared to be a franchise by the constitution of the state

in the second section of article xiv, thereof. As has been said above,

the very existence of a corporation as such is a franchise, and it exer-

cises its franchise in every act which it performs as a corporation. In

the Bank of Augusta v. Earle, above cited, the supreme court of the

United States, speaking through Taney, C. J., in relation to the

making of contracts by corporations, which, by common right, indi-

viduals could make, said: "In making such contracts, a corporation,

m doubt, exercises its corporate franchise. But it must do this

whenever it acts as a corporation, for its existence is a franchise."

A corporation, whose existence is a franchise, may possess powers

and privileges, which, in themselves, are not franchises (such as the

right to bank, discussed in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, above cited, or

the right to buy and sell property, real and personal), but it usually

owns, along with such privileges, some that are franchises; but

whether the powers be entirely of the kind which are franchises or

not. its existence and right to employ its corporate powers is a fran-

chise. This we think abundantly established by the cases above cited.

We have no doubt that it was the intention of those who framed

and ratified the constitution to place such franchises in the category of

definition is quoted by Angell & Ames, in their work on Corporations,
from the case referred to. (See Ang. & Ames on Corp., § 4.)
In the case in 1 3 Peters it was contended that under the laws and
constitution of Alabama the right of banking was a franchise. The
court refused to so hold, on the ground that the right of banking, at
common law, belonged to every citizen. (See, also, Curtis v. Leavitt,
15 ~. Y. 170, opinion of Shanklin, J.) The discussion on the point
in tbc opinion shows clearly that "common right" is used with the
ignification of common law."
We are of opinion that the common right refers to the right of citizen, generally at common law. Such rights of citizens, though
frequently spoken of as franchises, are not the franchises here
meant; and it may be conceded that where such rights are granted
to corporations, they are not franchises. But independent ot the right
to exist as a corporation, and to exercise powers in its corporate capacity, there are privileges granted to the water-works, which do
not. by the common law, belong to citizens generally; such as the
ri~bt to lay down pipes in the streets, ways and alleys of a city, and
to collect rates for water furnished, which was held to be a franchise
in San Francisco v. Spring Valley Water-Works, 48 Cal. 493, and in
. an Jose Gas Co. v. January, 57 Cal. 616. Conceding for the argument that the constitution, by section 19 of article xi, grants this right
to every person, it does not follow that it is not a franchise. They
are vested by a grant of the sovereign power, and not by the common
law ; and the generality of the grant does not deprive them of the
character of franchises.
The right to collect rates for use. of water supplied to the city and
county of San Francisco, or the inhabitants thereof, which the appellant has possessed at least ever since the act of 1858 went into effect,
· expressly declared to be a franchise by the constitution of the state
in the second section of article xiv, thereof. As has been said above,
the very existence of a corporation as such is a franchise, and it exerci~es it franchise in every act which it performs as a corporation. In
the Bank of Augusta v. Earle , above cited, the supreme court of the
United States, speaking through Taney, C. ]. , in relation to the
~akiog of contracts by corporations, which, by common right, .individuals could make, said: "In mak£ng such contracts, a corporation,
RO doubt, exercises t"ts corporate f ranch£se.
But t't must do tht's
whenever it acts as a corporation, for its existence is a f rancht'se."
A corporation, whose existence is a franchise, may possess powers
and privileges, which, in themselves, are not franchises (such as the
right to bank, discussed in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, above cited, or
the right to buy and sell property, real and personal), but it usually
OV.'lls, along with such privileges, some that are franchises ; but
whether the powers· be entirely of the kind which are franchises or
not, its existence and right to employ its corporate powers is a franchi e. This we think abundantly established by the cases above cited.
We have no doubt that it was the intention of those who framed
and ratified the constitution to place such franchises in the category of
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property to be taxed. The word "franchises,"as used in the first

section of article 13, is used generally without any qualifying words,
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• and is intended to embrace all franchises of the character above re-
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ferred to, whether vested in individuals or bodies politic. A fran-

property to be taxed. The word "franchises, "as used in the first
section of article 13, is used generally without any qualifying words,
· and is intended to embrace all franchises of the character above referred to, whether vested in individuals or bodies politic. A franchise conferred on an individual to lay down pipes in the streets of a
city and to collect rates for water furnished a city or its inhabitants is
to be taxed in the same way as when vested in corporations. The law
in this respect is the same in regard to all persons, whether natural or
artificial.
It is contended that the clause, "and all other matters and things
real , personal and mixed, capable of private ownership," in section r
of article 13, qualifies the word "franchises" which precedes it. We
do not thipk so. The structure of the sentence forbids any such construction. What is said before the employment of these words is
complete of itself, and needs nothing to show what was signified.
The words used show clearly that they were intended to add something to what preceded them, to refer to kinds of property not previously mentioned, net to qualify anything. They were doubtless inserted out of abundant caution to show that all kinds of property,
whether specifically enumerated or not, were intended to be included
in the property to be taxed, though not embraced in the specific
classes previously mentioned. They constitute a declaration that in
enumerating the property to be taxed it was not intended to confine
the enumeration to "moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, dues, franchises,"
but to include all other kinds of property, and that by no construction
of the word property, as used in the section, were any kinds of property to be left out.
But it is immaterial whether these words qualified "franchises" or
not, for the reason that the franchises so referred to are capable of
private ownership. To hold that a private corporation does not own
its franchise right, power and privileges would be both novel and untenable. Admitting that under the law of the state there may be legislation which might impair their value, it does not follow that it is
not owned as property, with all the rights which attach thereto. All
these rights exist until the legislative authority has acted so as to impair them or take them away; and until such legislation is enacted
the rights of property remain unimpaired. There has been no legislation yet of the character as regards the appellant that has been.called
to our attention, or that we have been able to discover.

chise conferred on an individual to lay down pipes in the streets of a

city and to collect rates for water furnished a city or its inhabitants is

to be taxed in the same way as when vested in corporations. The law

in this respect is the same in regard to all persons, whether natural or

artificial.

It is contended that the clause, "and all other matters and things

real, personal and mixed, capable of private ownership," in section 1

of article 13, qualifies the word "franchises" which precedes it. We

do not think so. The structure of the sentence forbids any such con-

struction. What is said before the employment of these words is

complete of itself, and needs nothing to show what was signified.

The words used show clearly that they were intended to add some-

thing to what preceded them, to refer to kinds of property not pre-

viously mentioned, net to qualify anything. They were doubtless in-

serted out of abundant caution to show that all kinds of property,

whether specifically enumerated or not, were intended to be included
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in the property to be taxed, though not embraced in the specific

classes previously mentioned. They constitute a declaration that in

enumerating the property to be taxed it was not intended to confine

the enumeration to "moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, dues, franchises,"

but to include all other kinds of property, and that by no construction

of the word property, as used in the section, were any kinds of prop-

erty to be left out.

But it is immaterial whether these words qualified "franchises" or

not, for the reason that the franchises so referred to are capable of

private ownership. To hold that a private corporation does not own

its franchise right, power and privileges would be both novel and un-

tenable. Admitting that under the law of the state there may be leg-

islation which might impair their value, it does not follow that it is

not owned as property, with all the rights which attach thereto. All

these rights exist until the legislative authority has acted so as to im-

pair them or take them away; and until such legislation is enacted

the rights of property remain unimpaired. There has been no legis-

lation yet of the character as regards the appellant that has been called

to our attention, or that we have been able to discover.

This franchise of a corporation is sometimes classed as real estate—

of that kind styled incorporeal hereditaments. (Enfield Toll Bridge Co.

v. Hartford and New Haven R. Co., 17 Conn. 40; s. c, 17 Conn.

462; Price v. Price's Heirs, 6 Dana 107; 1 Blackstone's Com., 20—

22, 37, 38.) In the case cited from 17 Conn. 40, this was said of a

bridge corporation. The shares of stock of the water-works are by

statute made personal estate. (See act of 1853.) But whether real

or personal estate, they are property. Such franchises, as long as

they exist, are protected as property by the guarantee universal in the

Tkis franchise of a corporation is sometimes classed as real estate-of tkat kind styled incorporeal hereditaments. (Enfield Toll Bridge Co.

states of the Union, which forbids their being taken except for public

v. Hartford and New Haven R. Co., 17 Conn. 40; s. c., 17 Conn.
462; Price v. Price's Heirs, 6 Dana 107; I Blackstone's Com., 2022, 37, 38.) In the case cited from 17 Conn. 40, this was said of a
bridge corporation. The shares of stock of the ·water-works are by
statute made personal estate. (See act of 1853.) But whether real
or personal estate, they are property. Such franchises, as long as
they exist, are protected as property by the guarantee universal in the
states of the Union, which forhids their being taken except for public
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purposes and on compensation being made. (1 Cooley's Con. Lim.,
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4th ed., 655, and cases cited in note 4.) During their existence they
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are as fully protected by law as any other species of property. On

this subject see Wilmington R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 268; 3 Kent's

Com. 458; Hamilton County v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 633; People

v. Selfridge, 52 Cal. 331; T. & T. R. Co. v. Campbell, 44 Cal. 89;

O. R. Co. v. O. B. & F. V. R. Co., 45 Cal. 365. (See cases just

above cited from 17 Connecticut, and Norwich Gas-light Co. v. Nor-

wich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 36.)

The franchise of a corporation is and can be well defined to be the

right of the corporation to exist and exercise the powers and privi-

leges vested in it by its charter. (Burr, on Tax., § 83.) The fran-

chise is the faculty of the corporation. As said by Redfield in his

work on railways: '■'■The faculty of a corporation is its organic

life; its corporate existence by which it is enabled to carry on busi-

ness; that which it derives from its charter of incorporation its cor-

porate franchise." (2 Redf. on Railways, 3d ed., 452.) In this

state, the charter is the statute or statutes granting and defining the

powers of the corporation, under which it is constituted and exists,
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together with the instruments required to be executed by the provis-

ions of such statute or statutes. These are sometimes called the constat-

ing instruments. (Field on Corp., § 34, n. 3.) Such franchises are

legal estates, not me re naked powers, and are powers coupled with an in-

terest, which vest in the corporation by virtue of its charter or constat-

ing instruments. (Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 606; Provi-

dent Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 622 ; Hamilton Co. v. Massa-

chusetts, 6 Wall. 638; Porter v. R. R. I. & St. L. R. Co., 76 111.

561.) That the state has full power to tax them, see same cases,

and State R. R. Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 603. In the case from 76

Illinois, above cited, it is said: "It is clear upon authority that the

franchise of a corporation is property, and as such it may be a proper

object of taxation." (P. 573.) In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall.

547, Chase, C. J., used this language: "Franchises are property,

often very valuable and productive property, and seem to be as

properly objects of taxation as any other property." Daniel, J., de-

livering the opinion of the court in West River Bridge Co. v. Dix et

al., 6 How. 529, said: "We are aware of nothing peculiar to a

franchise which can class it higher, or render it more sacred than

other property. A franchise is property, and nothing more." (See

also Wilmington R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264, and Monroe Savings

Bank v. The City of Rochester, 37 N. Y. 367.) In this last case

Fullerton, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said, in regard to a

statute declaring the privileges and franchises granted by the legisla-

ture to savings banks or institutions for savings, personal property,

and liable to taxation as such: "In declaring the privileges and

franchises of a bank to be personal property, the legislature has

adopted no novel principle of taxation. The powers and privileges

which constitute the franchise of a corporation are in a just sense

property, and quite distinct and separate from the property, which,

purposes and on compensation being made. (1 Cooley's Con. Lim.,
4th ed., 655, and cases cited in note 4.) During their existence they
are as fully protected by law as any other species of property. On
this subject see Wilmington R. Co. v. Reid, · 13 Wall. 268; 3 Kent's
Com. 458; Hamilton County v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 633; People
v. Selfridge, 52 Cal. 331; T. & T. R. Co. v. Campbell, 44 Cal. 89;
O. R. Co. v. 0. B. & F. V. R. Co., 45 Cal. 365. (See cases just
above cited from 17 Connecticut, and Norwich Gas-light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 36.)
The franchise of a corporation is and can be well defined to be the
right of the corporatt'on to exist and exerct'se the powers and prt'vileges vested in t't by t'ts charter. (Burr. on Tax., § 83.) The franchise is tile faculty of the corporation. As said by Redfield £n his
work on railways: "The faculty of a corporation i's t'ts organic
life; its corporate ext'stence by which t't is enabled to carry on busi'ness; that wht'cli i't derives from its charter of i'ncorporation £ts corporate francht'se." (2 Red£. on Railways, 3d ed., 452.) In this
state, the charter is the statute or statutes granti'ng and dejint'ng the
powers of the corporation, under which it is constt'tuted and ext'sts,
together with the £nstruments requfred to be executed by the provist'ons of such statute or statutes. These are someti'mes called the constat£ng t'nstruments. (Field on Corp., § 34, n. 3.) Such franchises are
legal estates, not me1•e naked powers, and are powers coupled with an interest, which vest in the corporation by virtue of its charter or constating instruments. (Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 6o6; Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 v.,r all. 622; Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 638; Porter v. R.R. I. & St. L. R. Co., 76 Ill.
561.) That the state has full power to tax them, see same cases,
and State R. R. Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 6o3. In the case from 76
Illinois, above cited, it is said: "It is clear upon authority that the
franchise of a corporation is property, and as such it may be a proper
object of taxation." (P. 573.) In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall.
547, Chase, C. J., used this language: "Franchises are property,
often very valuable and productive property, and seem to be as
properly objects of taxation as any other property." Daniel, J., delivering the opinion of the court in "\;Vest River Bridge Co. v. Dix et
al., 6 How. 529, said: ''We are aware of nothing peculiar to a
franchise which can class it higher, or render it more sacred than
other property. A franchise is property, and nothing more." (See
al o Wilmington R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264, and Monroe Savi':lgs
Bank v. The City of Rochester, 37 N. Y. 367.) In this last case
Fullerton, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said, in regard to a
statute declaring the privileges and franchises granted by the legislature to savings banks or institutions for savings, per'sonal property,
and liable to taxation as such: "In declaring the pri"ileges and
franchises of a bank to be personal property, the legislature has
adopted no novel principle of taxation. The powers and privi'leges
which constt'tute the franchise of a corporation are t'n a just sense
property, and qut'te distinct and separate from the property, which,
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by the use of such franchise, the corporation may acquire. They arc
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so regarded by the law, and so regarded by common acceptation."

That such franchises can be taxed according to the valuation arrived

at through an assessment is recognized in the case of the Freight Tax,

15 Wall. 282, and in the case of the State Tax on Railway Gross

Receipts, 15 Wall. 296. In the case of the State Railroad Tax Cases,

above cited from 92 U. S. Reports, a tax on the assessed value of

franchise and capital stock by the state of Illinois was sustained,

approving the decision to that effect in Porter v. R. R. I. & St. L.

R. R. Co., above cited from 76 Illinois. (See also Gordon v. Appeal

Tax Court, 3 How. (U. S.) 133, and Judge Redfield's comment on

this case in 2 Redf. on Railways, 453.) As to the extent of the power

of the state to tax, see Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 562, and

Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 639. In the case in 4 Pet-

ers, Marshall, C. J., said: "All powers * * * over which the

sovereign power of a state extends are subjects of taxation. The

sovereignty of a state extends to everything which exists by its author-

ity, or is introduced by its permission." (4 Pot. 563.) The same

doctrine was declared in Osborne v. Bank of the United States, 9
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Wheat. 738. From the foregoing cases, it would seem that there

can be no doubt of the power of a state to tax the franchise at its

assessed value. There may be more difficulty in arriving at its value

than that of a parcel of land or personal chattels, but still its value may

be estimated. When it is condemned for public use, the compen-

sation to be paid can be fixed. As is justly said in Porter v. R. R. I.

& St. L. R. R. Co., 76 111. 578: "We have never known it to be as-

serted that the value of a franchise is so indefinite and uncertain that

it can not be made the measure of a recovery when it is wrongfully

invaded; or that when it is taken and condemned for pubic use, it can

not be ascertained what compensation shall be made to its owner. It

is recognized in those respects as being capable of a definite valuation.

* * * If its value may be ascertained for those purposes, it mav as

readily be ascertained for the purposes of taxation." As to value of

franchises, and that they possess a value beyond that belonging to the

tangible property of the corporation, see cases just above cited.

(Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 12 Allen 29S, and Com-

monwealth v. Cary Improvement Co., 98 Mass. 23.)

In this state, the constitution having declared that franchises are

property, and that all property in the state not exempt from taxation

shall be assessed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as pro-

vided by law (Const., ..rt. xiii, § 1), it would seem to follow that the

tax must be according to the valuation made by the officer appointed

for that purpose. If the state can impose a tax on the franchise of a

corporation in the nature of an excise or duty, it does not exclude the

taxation by a valuation made by an assessor.

That such a franchise as that held by the appellant was taxable in

this state, we think has been held by this court in two cases: Burke

v. Badlam, 57 Cal. 594; and San Jose Gas Company v. January, 57

Cal. 614. * * *

1
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15 Wall. 282, and in the case of the State Tax on Railway Gross
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of the state to tax, see Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 562, and
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corporation in the nature of an excise or duty, it does not exclude the
taxation by a valuation made by an assessor.
That such a franchise as that held by the appellant was taxable in
this state, we think has been held by this court in two cases: Burke
v. Badlam, 57 Cal. 594; and San Jose Gas Company v. January, 57
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When the matters in controversy in Burke v. Badlam originated,

135

the legislature had acted in regard to the assessments of property, and

enacted as follows:

"Shares of stock in corporations possess no intrinsic value over and

above the actual value of the property of the corporation which they

stand for and represent, and the assessment and taxation of such

shares and also of the corporate property would be double taxation.

Therefore all property belonging to corporations shall be assessed and

taxed, but no assessment shall be made of shares of stock; nor shall

any holder thereof be taxed therefor." (Pol. Code, § 3608.) (It

may be remarked here that the constitutional validity of this section

was affirmed in Burke v. Badlam. (See 57 Cal. 602.) * * •

■•The terms 'value' and 'full cash value' mean the amount at which

the property would be taken in payment of a just debt due from a

solvent debtor;" and "the term 'personal property' includes every-

thing which is the subject of ownership not included within the mean-

ing of the term real estate."

[Each person (including corporations) also must furnish a state-

ment of all property (including franchises) to the assessor, who is to
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enter the franchise and its value separate from the other property; the

assessor is to turn this statement over to the board of supervisors, who

is to equalize all assessments.] * * *

It appears from the record in this case that the board of supervisors,

in the exercise of its power of equalization, assessed the franchise of

the water-works by taking the aggregate of the market value of the

shares of stock in the company on the 7th of March, 1881, and de-

ducting therefrom the value of the real and personal property of the

company, and held the difference to be the value of the franchise.

The market value of the shares was shown to the board by the testi-

mony of witnesses. Such a mode of arriving at the value of the fran-

chise appears to have been adopted by the assessor in San Joa6 Gas

Co. v. January, 57 Cal. 614, and this mode was held to be within the

powers vested in the assessor. It was also impliedly approved as a

correct mode in Burke v. Badlam, above cited. (See Commonwealth

v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 12 Allen 306.) * * *

There is a further point which we think it proper to notice. It is

contended that good-will enters into and forms an element in the

value of the shares of stock. No case has been produced to us, nor

have we been able to find any holding or even intimating that this is

so. We find no such element of value in the least hinted at, by any

one who has written on the subject, nor has any such been called to

our attention. We can not recognize any such element as giving value

to shares in a trading corporation. It would be strange to predicate good-,

will as pertaining to or extending to an abstraction, to an "artificial

being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law."

Our conclusion is that the board of supervisors, in its capacity of a

board of equalization, had jurisdiction of the person and subject-mat-

ter in the matters involved in this cause, and the judgment of the court

below is affirmed.

· \¥hen the matters in controversy in Burke v. Badlam originated,
the legislature had acted in regard to the assessments of property, and
enacted as follows :
"Shares of stock in corporations possess no intrinsic value over and
above the actual value of the property of the corporation which they
stand for and represent, and the assessment and taxation of such
shares and also of the corporate property would be double taxation.
Therefore all property belonging to corporations shall be assessed and
ta..xed, but no assessment shall be made of shares of stock; nor shall
any holder thereof be taxed therefor." (Pol. Code, § 36o8.) (It
may be remarked here that the constitutional validity of this section
was affirmed in Burke v. Badlam. (See 57 Cal. 6o2.) • • •
··The terms 'value' and 'full cash value' mean the amount at which
the property would be taken in payment of a just debt due from a
solvent debtor;" and "the term 'personal property' includes everything which is the subject of ownership not included within the meaning of the term real estate."
[Each person (including corporations) also must furnish a statement of all property (including franchises) to the assessor, who is to
enter the franchise and its value separate from the other property; the
assessor is to turn this statement over to the board of supervisors, who
is to equalize all assessments. J • • •
It appears from the record in this case that the board of supervisors,
in the exercise of its power of equalization, assessed the franchise of
the water-works by taking the aggregate of the market value of the
shares of stock in the company on the 7th of March, 1881 , and deducting therefrom the value of the real and personal property of the
company, and held the difference to be the value of the franchi se.
The market value of the shares was shown to the board by the testimony of witnesses. Such a mode of arriving at the value of the francbi e appears to have been adopted by the assessor in San Jose Gas
Co. v. January, 57 Cal. 614, and this mode was held to be within the
powers vested in the assessor. It was also impliedly approved as a
correct mode in Burke v. Badlam, above cited. (See Commonwealth
\'.Hamilton Mfg. Co., 12 Allen 3o6.) • • •
There is a further point which we think it proper to notice. It is
contended that good-will enters into and forms an element in the
value of the shares of stock. No case has been produced to us, nor
have we been able to find any holding or even intimating that this is
so. We find no such element of value in the least hinted at, by any
one who has written on the subject, nor has any such been called to
our attention. We can not recognize any such element as giving value
to shares in a trading corporation. It would be strange to predicate good-,
will as pertaining to or extending to an abstraction, to an "artificial
being, invisible, intangihle, and existing only in contemplation of law."
Our conclusion is that the board of supervisors, i11 its capacity of a
board of equalization, had jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter in the matters involved in this cause, and the judgment of the court
below i affirmed.
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Ross, Myrick, McKinstry, McKee and Sharpstein, JJm con-

THE STATE V. THE GEORGIA MEDICAL SOCIETY.

curred.

Morrison, C. J., took no part is this decision.

Ross, MYRICK, McK1NSTRY, McKEE and SHARPSTEIN,
curred.
MoRRISON, C. J., took no part is this decision.

Note. See South Pacific R. Co. v. Orton, 82 Fed. Rep. 457, infra, p. 854,

and §§441-3, 680-1, infra.

Sec. 24. (2) And particularly: This primary franchise belongs

to the members in their individual capacity rather than to the

JJ., con-

Nntr. See South Pacific R. Co. v. Orton, 3:? FP-d. Rep . 457, infra, p. 354,
Hll• I *§ ·Hl-3, ti80-1, infm .

corporation itself, and is inalienable except by consent of the

state.

THE STATE, Ex Rel. J. WARING, Plaintiff in Error, v. THE GEOR-

GIA MEDICAL SOCIETY, Defendant in Error.1

1869. In the Supreme Court of Georgia. 38 Ga. 608-631; 95

Sec. 24.

( 2) And particularly: This primary franchise belongs
to the members in their individual capacity rather than to the
corporation itself, and is inalienable except by consent of the
state.

Am. Dec. 408.

[Waring filed a petition for writ of mandamus, to restore him to

membership in the Georgia Medical Society, upon the ground that

the action of the society "in expelling him from membership and de-

priving him of his right and franchise as a corporator in said corpo-

ration is unconstitutional and contrary to law." The society had

THE STATE, Ex REL. J. w ARING, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. THE GEORGIA MEDICAL SOCIETY, DEFENDANT IN ERROR.1

authority to make such a constitution and by-laws not repugnant to the

laws of the state or the United States, and these provide (among other
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things) that members "shall be gentlemen of respectable social posi-

1869.

tion;" and "any member who shall be guilty of ungentlemanly con-

IN THE SUPREME CouRT

OF

GEORGIA.

38 Ga. 6o8-631; 95

Am. Dec. 408.

duct during the session of the society, or who shall conduct himself,

out of the society, in such a manner as would render him ineligible

[Waring filed a petition for writ of mandamus, to restore him to
membership in the Georgia Medical Society, upon the ground that
the action of the society "in expelling him from membership and depriving him of his right and franchise as a corporator in said corporation is unconstitutional and contrary to la\\'." The society had
authority to make such a constitution and by-laws not repugnant to the
laws of the state or the United States, and these provide (among other
things) that members "shall be gentlemen of respectable social position;" and "any member who shall be guilty of ungentlemanly conduct during the session of the society, or who shall conduct himself,
out of the society, in such a manner as would render him ineligible
to membership, shall be expelled from the society according to the
wishes of two-thirds of the members of the society present, proYided
that in every instance specific charges be set forth and handed to the
individual at least one month before the society takes action thereon."
The charges made were that Waring had become surety for Richard
White, a person of color, under indictment for larceny, who had been
elected clerk of the court, in opposition to the wishes of the entire respectable community; and that he had also become surety for certain
other persons of color, who were charged with riot, in such manner
as ·w ould render him ineligible to membership; also for charging for
a dispensary prescription, which was allowed gratis by the city; also
consulting with a physician not a member of the society, contrary to
one of the rules forbidding this. Dr. Waring was given proper qotice
and expelled by the proper vote. The society answered, claiming the
court had no jurisdiction, and also setting forth the facts as to the
charges, notice and expulsion, as above given. Waring moved to
quash this answer as being insufficient; the lower court overruled the
motion, and Waring sued out his hill of exceptions to this court.]

to membership, shall be expelled from the society according to the

wishes of two-thirds of the members of the society present, provided

that in every instance specific charges be set forth and handed to the

individual at least one month before the society takes action thereon."

The charges made were that Waring had become surety for Richard

White, a person of color, under indictment for larceny, who had been

elected clerk of the court, in opposition to the wishes of the entire re-

spectable community; and that he had also become surety for certain

other persons of color, who were charged with riot, in such manner

as would render him ineligible to membership; also for charging for

a dispensary prescription, which was allowed gratis by the city; also

consulting with a physician not a member of the society, contrary to

one of the rules forbidding this. Dr. Waring was given proper notice

and expelled by the proper vote. The society answered, claiming the

court had no jurisdiction, and also setting forth the facts as to the

charges, notice and expulsion, as above given. Waring moved to

quash this answer as being insufficient; the lower court overruled the

motion, and Waring sued out his bill of exceptions to this court.]

1 Statement of facts condensed; arguments omitted.
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Brown, C. J. 1. It was insisted, in this case, that the Georgia

THE CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE.
Medical Society was in existence long before it was incorporated,

and that its objects were in no way changed by its application for and

acceptance of its present charter from the state. This may be very

true, but its legal responsibilities were changed by the acceptance of

the charter. While it remained a voluntary society, the courts had no

jurisdiction over it, if it violated no law of the state, and its members

had no property in their membership which the law could protect.

But its acceptance of the charter subjected it to the supervision of the

proper legal authorities having jurisdiction in such cases: 4 Wheat.

674-5, 6 Conn. 544-5.

2. When the voluntary society accepted the charter, it became a

private, civil corporation, and the corporators, then in being, ac-

quired a property in the franchise, and every person who has since

become a corporator has acquired a like property. The property

which the corporator acquires is not visible, tangible property; but it

is none the less property, because it is invisible and intangible. It is

not a corporeal hereditament; but it is incorporeal. Blackstone, in his

Commentaries, volume 2, page 21, says: That incorporeal heredita-
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ments are divided into ten sorts; one of these consists of franchises.

Bouvier, in his Law Dictionary, volume 1, page 593, says the word

franchise has several meanings, one of which he gives as follows:

is a certain privilege conferred by grant from the government

and vested in individuals. Corporations or bodies politic are the

most usual franchise known to our law." The law books are full of

the doctrine that persons may have a property in incorporeal heredita-

ments, franchises, etc. Property, says Bouvier, volume 2, page 381,

is divided into corporeal and incorporeal. The former comprehends

such property as is perceptible to the senses, as lands, houses, goods,

merchandise and the like; the latter consists in legal rights as choses

in action, easements and the like. Blackstone says, volume 2, page 37,

it is likewise a franchise for a number of persons to be incorporated

and subsist as a body politic, with power to maintain perpetual suc-

cession, and to do other corporate acts, and each individual member

of such corporation is also said to have a franchise of freedom. We

Ikink it well settled by these and other authorities, that a corporator

in a private, civil corporation. has a property in the franchise, of.

which he can not be deprived without due process of law.

3. It was insisted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error,

that the ninth by-law of this corporation is unauthorized by the char-

ter, and that the corporation is not justifiable in expelling a member

for its violation; that to deprive a corporator of his property in the

franchise under it is to deprive him of his property without due pro-

cess of law. We think the ninth by-law a proper one in view of the

objects of the society, and we hold that the charter conferred upon the

corporation the power to ordain and establish it, and that they have

the power to expel a member when a proper case arises under it.

But we hold that the society has not an uncontrollable discretion in

its construction and enforcement. They can not, under pretext of
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BROWN, C. J. x. It was insisted, in this case, that the Georgia
Medical Society was in existence long before it was incorporated,
and that its objects were in no way changed by its application for and
acceptance of its present charter from the state. This may be very
true, but its legal responsibilities were changed by the acceptance of
the charter. While it remained a voluntary society, the courts had no
jurisdiction over it, if it violated no law of the state, and its members
had no property in their membership which the law could protect.
But its acceptance of the charter subjected it to the supervision of the
proper legal authorities having jurisdiction in such cases: 4 Wheat.
674-5, 6 Conn. 544-~.
z. \\Then the voluntary society accepted the charter, it became a
private, civil corporation, and the corporators, then in being, acquired a property in the franchise, and every person who has since
become a corporator has acquired a like property. The property
which the corporator acquires is not visible, tangible property; but it
is none the less property, because it is invisible and intangible. It is
not a corporeal hereditament; but it is incorporeal. Blackstone, in his
Commentaries, volume 2, page 21, says: That incorporeal hereditaments are divided into ten sorts; one of these consists of francht'ses.
Bouvier, in his Law Dictionary, volume 1, page 593, says the word
franchise has several meanings, one of which he gives as follows:
"It is a certain privt'lege conferred by grant from the g·overnment
and vested in indivt'duals. Corporations or bodies pol£t£c are the
most usual franchise known to our law." The law books are full of
the doctrine that persons may have a property in incorporeal hereditaments, franchises, etc. Property, says Bouvier, volume 2, page 381,
i divided into corporeal and incorporeal. The former comprehends
such property as is perceptible to the senses, as lands, houses, goods,
merchandise and the like; the latter consists in legal rights as choses
in action, easements and the lt'ke. Blackstone says, volume 2, page 37,
it is likewise a franchise for a number of persons to be incorporated
and subsist as a body politic, with power to maintain perpetual succession, and to do other corporate acts, and each indt'vt'dual member
of such corporation is also said to have a franchise of freedom. We.
jhink it well settled by these an.d other authoriti'es, that a corporator
in a private, ct'vil corporation , has a property t'n the fmncht'se, of- ·
which he can not be deprived wt'thout due process of law.
3. It was insisted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error,
that the ninth by-law of this corporation is unauthorized by the charter, and that the corporation is not justifiable in expelling a member
for its violation; that to deprive a corporator of his property in the
franchise under it is to deprive him of his property without due process of law. We think the ninth by-law a proper one in view of the
objects of the society, and we hold that the charter conferred upon the
corporation the power to ordain and establish it, and that they have
the power to expel a member when a proper case arises under it.
But we ho ld that the society has not an uncontrollable discretion in
its construction and enforcen1ent. They can not, under pretext of
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enforcing this rule, take personal or private revenge, or make it the

THE STATE V . THE GEORGIA MEDICAL SOCIETY.

instrument of religious intolerance, or political proscription. When

a member feels that he is aggrieved or injured by the illegal or op-

pressive action of the body, it is his right to appeal to the courts for

enforcing this rule , take p ersonal or private revenge, or make it the
instrument of religious intolerance, or political proscription. When
a member feels that he is aggrieved or injured by the illegal or oppressive action of the body, it is his right to appeal to the courts for
redress and protection; and it is the right and duty of the court to investigate such charges, when properly before it, and to judge of the
legality of the action of the society in expelling a member or depriring him of any other leg al right.
4. The rule of law on this subject is thus stated by Judge Blackstone , volume I, page 381. The king being thu s con stituted by law,
visitor of all civil corporations, the law has also appointed the place
where he shall exercise this jurisdiction, which is the court of king·s
bench, where, and where only, all misbehaviors of this kind of corporations are inquired into and redressed, and all their controversies
decided. In this state the same visitorial power of correcting the misbehaviors of these corporations, and deciding their controversies, is
vested in the superior courts of the counties where they are located,
which in England belongs to the king' s bench. See 5 John. Ch. R.

redress and protection; and it is the right and duty of the court to in-

vestigate such charges, when properly before it, and to judge of the

legality of the action of the society in expelling a member or depriv-

ing him of any other legal right.

4. The rule of law on this subject is thus stated by Judge Black-

stone, volume 1, page 381. The king being thus constituted by law,

visitor of all civil corporations., the law has also appointed the place

where he shall exercise this jurisdiction, which is the court of king's

bench, where, and where only, all misbehaviors of this kind of corpo-

rations are inquired into and redressed, and all their controversies

decided. In this state the same visitorial power of correcting the mis-

behaviors of these corporations, and deciding their controversies, is

vested in the superior courts of the counties where they are located,

which in England belongs to the king's bench. See 5 John. Ch. R.
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It was contended, with much zeal and ability, by the able counsel
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for the defendant in error, that mandamus is not the proper remedy,

even if we admit that the rights of Dr. Waring have been infringed, or

that he has been deprived of them by the illegal action of the society.

The rule, as laid down by this court in a number of cases is that a

335·

person having a clear legal right, under the laws of this state, is en-

it. 4 Ga. 26 and 116, 12 Ga. 170, 26 Ga. 665.

But it is insisted that the code, section 3143, has changed this rule,

and that mandamus does not now lie as a private remedy between in-

dividuals to enforce private rights. We do not think this section of the

code was intended to deny the writ to the corporator, who is deprived

of his rights by the corporation, when he has no other adequate remedy

for their enforcement. A corporation having been created, invested

with certain powers, and charged with certain duties to be performed

.for the benefit of the public, is not a private individual in the sense

of the word as used in said section of the code, and a corporatot

whose rights arc withheld or violated by the corporation, who is with-

out other remedy, is entitled to the writ.

In the Commonwealth, ex rel., etc., v. The Mayor of Lancaster,

5 Watts 152, Gibson, C. J., says: "An action to enforce the right

could not be maintained against the corporation because performance

of a corporate function is not a duty to be demanded by action, and

unless recourse could be had to the functionary in the first instance,

the relator might have a cause for redress without a remedy." See

4 Ga. 44.

Here the discharge of a corporate duty is treated as an office or

function, and the corporation as a functionary. In this sense, no

doubt, the legislature, in the adoption of the Code, intended to treat

them.

.

It was contended, with much zeal and ability, by the able counsel
for the defendant in error, that mandamus is not the proper remedy.
even if we admit that the rights of Dr. Waring have been infringed, or
that he has been deprived of them by the illegal action of the society.
The rule, as laid d own by this court in a number of cases is that a
p erson having a clear leg al rig ht, under the laws of this state, is entitled to the writ of mandamus, if he has no other remedy to enforce
it. 4 Ga. 26 an<l I 16, 12 Ga. 170, 26 Ga. 665.
But it is insisted that the code, section 3 143, has changed this rule,
and that mandamus does not now lie as a pri vate remedy between individuals to enforce private rights. vVe do not think this section of the
code was intended to deny the writ to the corporator, who is deprived
of his rights by the corporation, when he has no other adequate remedy
for their enforce ment. A corporation hav ing been created, invested
w£th certain powers, and charged w ith certain duties to be p erformed
for the benefit of the publt'c, is not a private t'ndiv idual in the sense
of the word as used in said section of the code, and a corporator.
whose rights are w t'thheld or violated by the corpora#on, who is wit/lout other rem edy, is entitled to the w rit.
In the Commonwealth, ex rel., etc. , v. The Mayor of Lancaster,
5 Watts 152, Gibson , C. J. , says : " An action to enforce the right
could not be maintained against the corporation because performance
of a corpor ate function is not a duty to be d em anded by action , and
unless recourse could be had to the f unctionary in the first instance,
the relator mig ht have a cause for redress without a remedy." See
4 Ga. 44·
Here the discharge of a corporate duty is treated as an office or
function , and the corporation as a function ary. In this sense, no
doubt, the legislature, in the adoption of the Code, intended to treat
them.

titled to the writ of mandamus, if he has no other remedy to enforce
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The object of this society, as cited in their charter, was "for the

THE CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE.

purpose of lessening the fatality induced by climate and incidental

139

causes, and improving the science of medicine." The whole com-

munity have an interest in the success of this laudable undertaking;

and if the functions conferred by the charter, for the benefit of the

public, are not faithfully performed, and one of the corporators, who

has no other adequate redress, is injured by the conduct of the cor-

poration (the functionary), the courts will grant him relief by manda-

mus.

6. The record in this case shows no sufficient cause to justify the

society in expelling Dr. Waring from his rights and privileges as a

corporator. He was expelled for doing that which the law of this

state not only authorizes but encourages. His offending consists in

the fact that he became one of the sureties on the official bond of a

colored citizen of his county, who had been elected clerk of the superior

court of the county, by a majority of the legal votes cast at the elec-

tion for that office, and in the further fact that he became surety on

the bonds of certain other colored citizens who were charged with the

offence of riot, for their appearance at court to answer the charge as
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the law directs. The very fact that the law requires the clerk of the

superior court to give bond and security for the faithful discharge of

his duties, is sufficient to justify any citizen of the county in becoming

one of his sureties, and to protect him, in contemplation of law, from

the imputation of having forfeited his position as a gentleman by so

doing.

Again, it is not the object of law to punish citizens of this state,

whether white or black, by imprisonment, for offenses of which they

have never been convicted. When they are charged with violations

of the penal code, the requirement of the law is, that they appear at

the proper time and place, and answer the charge; and to secure such

appearance, they are required to give bond and security, and it is only

on failure to give the bond that they can be imprisoned. As inno-

cent persons are often confined in prison under charges, because of

their inability to give bond, the law favors bail whenever the offense

is. by law, bailable. And the law favors this even in the case of the

guilty, till the trial. This is not only best for the public, as it saves

the tax-payers the expense of keeping them in jail, but is just to the

accused, who receive the legal punishment for their crimes, if guilty,

under the sentence of the court after legal conviction. How, then,

does a citizen forfeit his corporate rights as a member of a civil corpo-

ration, or his position as a gentleman, by doing an act that is not only

encouraged by the laws of his state, but is a positive public benefit?

But it is said Dr. Waring was not expelled from becoming surety

on the bonds above mentioned, but for ungentlemanly conduct in the

presence of the society. What ungentlemanly conduct? The ninth

by-law requires that "specific charges" be set forth and handed to the

accused at least one month before the society takes action thereon.

What specific charges of ungentlemanly conduct in presence of the

society, were ever handed to Dr. Waring? What did he say or do in

The object of this society, as cited in their charter, was "for the
purpose of lessening the fatality induced by climate and incidental
cause , an<l improving the science of medicine." The whole community have an interest in the success of this laudable undertaking;
and if the functions conferred by the charter, for the benefit of the
public, are not faithfully performed, and one of the corporators, who
has no other adequate redress, is injured by the conduct of the corporation (the functionary), the courts will grant him relief by mandamus.
6. The record in this case shows no sufficient cause to justify the
society in expelling Dr. \tVaring from his rights and privileges as a
corporator. He was expelled for doing that which the law of this
tatc not only authorizes but encourages. His offending consists in
the fact that he became one of the sureties on the official bond of a
colored citizen of his county, who had been elected clerk of the superior
court of the county, by a majority of the legal votes cast at the election for that office, and in the further fact that he became surety on
the bonds of certain other colored citizens who were charged with the
offence of riot, for their appearance at court to answer the charge as
the law directs. The very fact that the law requires the clerk of the
superior court to give bond and security for the faithful discharge of
hL duties, is sufficient to justify any citizen of the county in becoming
one of his sureties, and to protect him, in contemplation of law, from
the imputation of having forfeited his position as a gentleman by so
doing.
Again, it is not the object of law to punish citizens of this state,
whether white or black, by imprisonment, for offenses of which they
have never been convicted. When they are charged with violations
of the penal code, the requirement of the law is, that they appear at
the proper time and place, and answer the charge; and to secure such
appearance, they are required to give bond and security, and it is only
on failure to give the bond that they c:an be imprisoned. As innocent persons are often confined in prison under charges, because of
their inability to give bond, the law favors bail whenever the offense
i . by law, bailable. And the law favors this even in the case of the
guilty, till the trial. This is not only best for the public, as it saves
the tax-payers the expense of keeping them in jail, but is just to the
accused, who receive the legal punishment for their crimes, if guilty,
under tbe sentence of the court after legal conviction. How , then,
does a citizen forfeit his corporate rights as a member of a ch·il corporation, or his position as a gentleman, by doing an act that j g not o nly
encouraged by the laws of his state, but is a positive public benefit?
But it is said Dr. Waring was not expelled from becoming surety
on the bonds above mentioned, hut for ungentlemanly conduct in the
presence of the society. What ungentlemanly conduct? The ninth
by-law requires that ''specific charges" be set forth and handed to the
accu. cd at least one month hefore the society takes action thereon.
What specific charges of ungentlemanly conduct in presence of the
society, were ever handed to Dr. Waring? What did he say or do in
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the presence of the society, to forfeit his position as a gentleman?

The record is silent. That silence is significant. That which is ma-

THE STATE V. THE GEORGIA MEDICAL SOCIETY.

terial and is not averred by the society in their answer is presumed

not to exist. No ungentlemanly conduct in presence of the society is

the presence of_ the society, to forfeit his position as a gentleman?
The record is silent. That silence is significant. That which is material and is not averred by the society in their answer is presumed
not to exist. No ungentlemanly conduct in presence of the society is
set forth in their response, and this court must presume none existed.
Dr. Waring was convicted of the charges first mentioned in reference to the suretyship, and brought formally before the society and
censured. To this illegal and unauthorized proceeding he submitted.
But, not satisfied with this, at the next meeting of the society he was
again brought up, and his resignation demanded, and he was given
till the succeeding meeting to comply with the imperious and unauthorized demand. This he declined to do. And a preamble and
resolutions were then passed, setting a future day when the society
would vote on his expulsion for refusing to resign, and for discourteous
behavior towards the society at two former meetings. In what the
discourteous behavior consisted we are not informed by the record.
In the meantime, however, the gracious privilege of avoiding expulsion by resignation was still held out to Dr. \Varing. When the
time came for the much-cherished object by the infliction of the extreme penalty of expulsion, Dr. Waring was at home sick, and unable
to attend, but he wrote the society, disclaiming all intentional discourtesy to it or its members, and protested against the irregularity
and illegality of the course resoh-ed upon, as set forth in said preamble and resolutions. But all to no effect. His expulsion was pre·
determined, and that determination was executed. A more illegal
or unjustifiable proceeding has seldom been brought before a court.
After argument had, and a thorough examination of this case, it is
the unanimous judgment of this cpurt that the judgment of the court
below be re,·ersed, and the judge of the superior courts of said county
is hereby instructed and ordered to grant a peremptory mandamus,
commanding and compelling the said "The Georgia Medical Society"
to restore the said Dr. James J. Waring to all his rights and privi·
leges as a corporator in said society.

set forth in their response, and this court must presume none existed.

Dr. Waring was convicted of the charges first mentioned in refer-

ence to the suretyship, and brought formally before the society and

censured. To this illegal and unauthorized proceeding he submitted.

But, not satisfied with this, at the next meeting of the society he was

again brought up, and his resignation demanded, and he was given

till the succeeding meeting to comply with the imperious and unau-

thorized demand. This he declined to do. And a preamble and

resolutions were then passed, setting a future day when the society

would vote on his expulsion for refusing to resign, and for discourteous

behavior towards the society at two former meetings. In what the

discourteous behavior consisted we are not informed by the record.

In the meantime, however, the gracious privilege of avoiding ex-

pulsion by resignation was still held out to Dr. Waring. When the

time came for the much-cherished object by the infliction of the ex-

treme penalty of expulsion, Dr. Waring was at home sick, and unable
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to attend, but he wrote the society, disclaiming all intentional dis-

courtesy to it or its members, and protested against the irregularity

and illegality of the course resolved upon, as set forth in said pre-

amble and resolutions. But all to no effect. His expulsion was pre-

determined, and that determination was executed. A more illegal

or unjustifiable proceeding has seldom been brought before a court.

After argument had, and a thorough examination of this case, it is

the unanimous judgment of this court that the judgment of the court

below be reversed, and the judge of the superior courts of said county

is hereby instructed and ordered to grant a peremptory mandamus,

commanding and compelling the said "The Georgia Medical Society"

to restore the said Dr. James J. Waring to all his rights and privi-

leges as a corporator in said society.

Note. See, infra, p. 1171; Evans v. Philadelphia Club, 50 Pa. St. 107-127, and

cases cited; and Belton v. Hatch, 109 N. Y. 593, 4 Am. St. 495, infra, p. 178.

Also 1896, Board of Trade of Chicago v. Nelson,' 162 111. 431, 44 N. E." 743;

1892, Spilman v. Supreme Council- of Home Circle, 157 Mass. 128; 1887,

Pitcher v. Board of Trade, 121 111. 412; 1844, Commonwealth, ex pel., v. Pike

Beneficial Soc, 8 W. & S. (Pa.) 247; 1883, Medical & Surg. Soc. of Mont. Co.

v, Weatherlv, 75 Ala. 248, 253; 1875, Meyer v. Johnson, 53 Ala. 237, 325;

1878, Board of Trade v. People, 91 111. 80; 1863, Savre v. Louisville, etc., As-

Note. See, illfra, p. 1171; Evans v. Philaclelphia Clnb, 50 Pa. St. lOi-127, :111<1
cases cited; and Belton v. Hatch, 109 N. Y. 593, 4 Am. St. 495, illfra , p. li8.
Also 1896, Board of Trade of Chicago v. Nelson; 162 Ill. 431, 44 N-. :E:i43;
1892, Spilman v. Supreme Council· of Horne Circle, 157 Mass. 128; 1887,
Pitcher v. Board of Trade, 121 III. 412; 1844, Commonwealth, ex rel., v. Pike
Beneficial Soc., 8 W. & S. (Pa. ) 24i; 1883, Medical & Snrg. Soc. of 1\lont. Co.
v.- Weatherly, 75 Ala. 248, 253; 1875, Meyer v. Johnson, 53 Ala. 237, 325 ;
1878, Board of Trade v. People, 91 Ill. 80; 1863, Sayre v. Louisville, etc., As·
sociation, 1 Duval (Ky. ) 143, 85 Am. Dec. 613; 1864, National M. F. Ins. Co.
v. Yeomans, 8 R. I. 25, 86 Am'. Dec. 610; 1855, Hiss v. Bartlett, 3 Gray 468,
63 Am. Dec. 768; note 7i3; 1857, Austin v. Searing, 16 N. Y. 112, 69 Am. Dec.
665, note 677; 1866, Society v. Commonwealth, ex rel., 52 Pa. St. 125, 91 Am.
Dec. 139; 1866, Dane v. Derby, 54 Maine 95, 89 Am. Dec. 722, note 736.

sociation, 1 Duval (Kv.) 143, 85 Am. Dec. 613; 1864," National M. F. Ins. Co.

v. Yeomans, 8 R. I. 25, 86 Am. Dec. 610; 1855, Hiss v. Bartlett, 3 Gray 468,

63 Am. Dec. 768, note 773; 1857, Austin v. Searing, 16 N. Y. 112, 69 Am. Dec.

665, note 677; 1866, Society v. Commonwealth, ex rel., 52 Pa. St. 125, 91 Am.

Dec. 139; 1866, Dane v. Derby, 54 Maine 95, 89 Am. Dec. 722, note 736.
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FIETSAM v. HAY Et Al.'

1887. In the Supreme Court of Illinois. 122 111. 293-297, 3

Sec. 25. Same.

Am. St. R. 492.

Appeal from the circuit court of St. Clair county.

FIETSAM v. HAY ET AL. 1

Mr. Justice Mulkey delivered the opinion of the court:

The People's Bank of Belleville, incorporated under a special act

of legislature, approved and in force March 27, 1869, having become

1887.

insolvent on the 17th of April, 1878, made a general assignment of

IN THE SUPREME CounT OF ILLINOIS.
Am. St. R. 492.

122 Ill. 293-297, 3

all its property and effects for the benefit of creditors. The assignee

presented a petition to the county court of St. Clair county, at its

March term, 1887, for leave to sell "all the rights, privileges, powers

and immunities which were granted by the said act incorporating

said bank." The judge of the county court being interested in the

result of the proceeding, the venue was changed to the circuit court

of St. Clair county, where, upon due consideration of the petition,

that court entered an order dismissing the same. The present appeal

is from the order of dismissal.
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The correctness of the decision of the circuit court depends entirely

upon whether the title to the franchise created and conferred by the

bank charter passed as an asset of the bank, to the assignee, under

the assignment. That its language is sufficiently comprehensive, and

adequate to pass the franchise to the assignee, if, as matter of law,

the bank could transfer it at all, we have no doubt. This is not ques-

tioned. The question, therefore, is whether a corporate franchise,

in the absence of statutory authority, is in law capable of being as-

signed or transferred. Differently put, the question, as formulated

by the parties themselves, is, "did the franchise of the said bank pass

with the deed of assignment to the assignee as a salable asset of the

said bank?"

The word "franchise" is often used in the sense of privileges gen-

erally, but in its more appropriate and legal sense the term is con-

fined to such rights and privileges as are conferred upon corporate

bodies by legislative grant. It is in the latter sense, alone, the word

is now to be considered.

The franchise proposed to be sold is a corporate franchise, and the

artificial body or political entity to which it pertains is what is known

to the law as an aggregate corporation. Such a corporation has been

well defined to be "an artificial being created by law, and composed

of individuals who subsist as a body politic under a special denomina-

tion, with the capacity of perpetual succession, and of acting, within

the scope of its charter, as a natural person." Now, a franchise is

nothing more than the right or privilege of being a corporation, and

of doing such things, and such things only, as are authorized by the

1 Arguments omitted.

Appeal from the circuit court of St. Clair county.
Mr. Justice MULKEY delivered the opinion of the court:
The People's Bank of Belleville, incorporated under a special act
of legislature, approved and in force March 27, 1869, having become
insolvent on the 17th of April, 1878, made a general assignment of·
all its property and effects for the benefit of creditors. The assignee
presented a petition to the county court of St. Clair county, at its
March term, 1887, for leave to sell "all the rights, privileges, powers
and immunities which were granted by the said act incorporating
s:iid bank." The judge of the county court being interested in the
resu lt of the proceeding, the venue was changed to the circuit court
of St. Clair county, where, upon due consideration of the petition,
that court entered an order dismissing the same. The present appeal
is from the order of dismissal.
The correctness of the decision of the circuit court depends entirely
upon whether the title to the franchise created and conferred by the
bank charter passed as an asset of the bank, to the assignee, under
the assignment. That its language is sufficiently comprehensive, and
adequate to pass the franchise to the assignee, if., as matter of law,
the bank could transfer it at all, we have no doubt. This is not questioned. The question, therefore, is whether a corporate franchise,
in the absence of statutory authority, is in law capable of being assigned or transferred. Differently put, the question, as formulated
by the parties themselves, is, "did the franchise of the said bank pass
with the deed of assignment to the assignee as a salable asset of the
said bank?"
The word "franchise" i's often used t'n the sense of prt'vt'leges gcuerally, but in its more approprt'atc and legal sense the term i's confined to such rights and privt'leges as are conferred upon corporate
bodies by leg£slative grant. It is in the latter sense, alone, th e word
is now to be considered.
The franchise proposed to be sold is a corporate franchise. and the
artificial body or political entity to which it pettains is what is known
to the law as an aggregate corporation. Such a corporation has been
well defined to be "an artificial being created by law, and composed
of individuals who subsist as a body politic under a special denomination, with the capacity of perpetual succession , and of acting, within
the scope of its charter, as a natural person." Now, a francliise i's

n1Jtlz.£ng more than the right or pn'vilege of being a corporation, and
of doi'ng suck tMngs, and s'ltC!z tilings only, as are autliorized by the
1

Arguments omitted.
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corporation's charter. This right of a body of men to be and act as

§ 25

FIETSAM V. HAY.
an artificial person, without, as a general rule, incurring: individual

responsibility, is declared by Blackstone to be "a royal privilege, or

corporation's charier. This right of a body of men to be and act as
an artificial person, without, as a general rule, incurring individual
responsibility, is declared by Blackstone to be "a royal privilege, or
branch of the king's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject."
( 2 Blackstone, 37.)
Such right or franchise is defined by Bouvier
to be "a certain privilege conferred by grant from government, and
vested in individuals." ( r Bouvier, 545.) Now, it is clear from
these definitions, and from the very nature of a corporation, 'hat a
franchise or the r£ght to be and act as an artijicial body, vests £n the i'ndivi'duals who compose the corporation ,and not i'n the corporation itself.
This fact, we think, is not without significance in reaching a conclusion upon the main question to be determined,. outside of the numer. ous authorities bearing directly on the subject.
It will be kept in mind that the corporate body, for purposes of
ownership, and, indeed, for most purposes, has a distinct identity from that of the individual corporators. The latter may be
wealthy, when at the same time the former is insolvent, and vice versa.
The corporation has no right to appropriate, sell or otherwi'se dispose
ofany ofthe property or effects ofa corporator. The relation of debtor
and creditor may subsist between them in the same manner as between the company and other persons. The company's entire property may be swept away from it by sequestration, or other means, and
yet its franchises will remain vested in the corporators, until they are
either abandoned or forfeited to the state. All these propositions are
familiar to the courts and the profession, and are all well sustained
by authority.
If, then, the franchi se is vested in and belongs to the corporators,
and not to the corporation itself, how could the latter transfer or assign it to another? On the plainest of principles this could not be
done without legislative authority for that purpose, and we find nothing, either in the statute or the company's charter, conferring such
authority. While it is conceded the legislature might confer on the
artificial body the power to sell or assign the franchise to strangers,
yet this would be, in effP.ct, to authorize it tq commit a species of suicide, for it is manifest the corporation could not exi st a moment after
the franchise conferred upon its members had been transferred to
others. Indeed, when we consider the attributes and essential elements of corporate existence, resulting from the grant of the franchise, and without which the artificial body could not accomplish the
objects of its creation or perform the duties imposed upon it by law,
the sale or assignment of the franchise without special legislative authority would seem to be wholly inadmissible. It is proposed here,
it will be noted, to sell simply the franchise of the bank. Assuming
this can be done, the question arises what would be the effect of such
a sale? It clearly could not have the effect of making the purchasers,
if more than one, an aggregate corporation, with the general banking
powers conferred by the bank charter. To assert such a proposition
would be simply startling; and yet, i£ in such case the purchasers
would take anything at all, they certainly could not take less than the

branch of the king's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject."

(2 Blackstone, 37.) Such right or franchise is defined by Bouvier

to be "a certain privilege conferred by grant from government, and

vested in individuals." (1 Bouvier, 545.) Now, it is clear from

these definitions, and from the very nature of a corporation, 'hat a

franchise or the right to be and act as an artificial body, vests in the in-

dividuals who compose the corporation,and not in the corporation itself

This fact, we think, is not without significance in reaching a conclu-

sion upon the main question to be determined, outside of the numer-

ous authorities bearing directly on the subject.

It will be kept in mind that the corporate body, for purposes of

ownership, and, indeed, for most purposes, has a distinct iden-

tity from that of the individual corporators. The latter may be

wealthy, when at the same time the former is insolvent, and vice versa.

The corporation has no right to appropriate, sell or otherwise dispose

of any of the property or effects of a corporator. The relation of debtor
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and creditor may subsist between them in the same manner as be-

tween the company and other persons. The company's entire prop-

erty may be swept away from it by sequestration, or other means, and

yet its franchises will remain vested in the corporators, until they are

either abandoned or forfeited to the state. All these propositions are

familiar to the courts and the profession, and are all well sustained

by authority.

If, then, the franchise is vested in and belongs to the corporators,

and not to the corporation itself, how could the latter transfer or as-

sign it to another? On the plainest of principles this could not be

done without legislative authority for that purpose, and we find noth-

ing, either in the statute or the company's charter, conferring such

authority. While it is conceded the legislature might confer on the

artificial body the power to sell or assign the franchise to strangers,

yet this would be, in effect, to authorize it to commit a species of sui-

cide, for it is manifest the corporation could not exist a moment after

the franchise conferred upon its members had been transferred to

others. Indeed, when we consider the attributes and essential ele-

ments of corporate existence, resulting from the grant of the fran-

chise, and without which the artificial body could not accomplish the

objects of its creation or perform the duties imposed upon it by law,

the sale or assignment of the franchise without special legislative au-

thority would seem to be wholly inadmissible. It is proposed here,

it will be noted, to sell simply the franchise of the bank. Assuming

this can be done, the question arises what would be the effect of such

a sale? It clearly could not have the effect of making the purchasers,

if more than one, an aggregate corporation, with the general banking

powers conferred by the bank charter. To assert such a proposition

would be simply startling; and yet, if in such case the purchasers

would take anything at all, they certainly could not take less than the
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right to be a banking corporation, with all the powers and privileges
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conferred by the charter, for these rights are of the very essence of

the franchise; and consequently the one could not be thus acquired

without, by the same act, securing the others—a view which, as already

indicated, has no sanction in reason or authority.

While statements are to be found on this subject in some of the text-

books, as well as in some of the decided cases, which can not be recon-

ciled with the conclusion we have reached, yet we are clearly of

opinion that a corporation, in the absence of statutory authority, has

no right to sell or transfer its franchise or any property essential to its

exercise, which it has acquired under the law of eminent domain.

This proposition, in our judgment, is sustained both by reason and

the decided weight of authority. Black et al. v. Delaware and Rari-

tan Canal Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 455; Freeman on Executions, §§ 179,

180; Pearce on Railroads, 496-1 ; Jones on Mortgages, § 161; Rorer

on Judicial Sales (2d ed.), 222; Archer v. Terre Haute and Indian-

apolis R. Co., 102 111. 493; Bruffett v. Great Western R. Co., 25

111. 353; Chicago and Rock Island R. Co. v. Whipple, 22 111. 105;

Ottawa, Oswego and Fox River Valley R. Co. v. Black, 79 111. 262.
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The circuit court having reached this conclusion, its order and judg-

ment will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Note. 1867, Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. St. 325, 94 Am. Dec.

84; 1869, Miner's Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 543, 99 Am. Dec. 300; 1887,

Chicago Gas Light Co. v. People's Gas L. Co., 121 111.530, 2 Am. St. 124;

1864, Caldwell v. Alton, 33 111. 416, 85 Am. Dec. 282; 1863. Storv v. Plank

Road Co., 16 N. J. Eq. 13, 84 Am. Dec. 134; 1862, People v. Railroad Co., 24

N. Y. 261, 82 Am. Dec. 295; 1859, Coe v. Railroad Co., 10 Ohio St. 372, 75

Am. Dec. 518; 1825, Ammant v. Turnpike Road, 13 S. & R. (Pa.) 210, 15 Am.

Dec. 593; 1877, Hudson v. Cuero Land, etc., Co., 47 Tex. 56, 26 Am. Rep.

289; 1865, Commonwealth v. Smith, 10 Allen (Mass.) 448, 87 Am. Dec. 672,

infra, p. 1070; 1862, Bardstown & L. R. Co. v. Metcalfe, 4 Met. (Ky.) 199, 81

Am. Dec. 54i, infra, p. 1074; 1893, Brunswick G. L. & Co. v. United Gas, etc.,

Co., 85 Me. 532, 35 Am. St. R. 385, note, p. 390; Jones v. Guarantee Co., 101

U. S. 622, infra, p. 1078; 1872, State of Ohio, exrel., etc., v. Sherman, 22 Ohio

St. 411, infra, p. 1082; 1892, Overton Bridge Co. v. Means, 33 Neb. 857, 29 Am.

tit. R. 514.

Sec. 26. (3) The secondary franchises and privileges as well as

all other rights except the primary franchise, belong to the

corporation, or artificial being, rather than to the individual

members.

right to be a banking corporation, with all the powers and privileges
conferred by the charter, for these rights are of the very essence of
the franchise; and consequently the one could not be thus acquired
without, by the same act, securing the others--a view which, as already
indicated, has no sanction in reason or authority.
\iVhile statements are to be found on this subject in some of the textbooks, as well as in some of the decided cases, which can not be reconciled with the conclusion we have reached, yet we are clearly of
opinion that a corporation, in the absence of statutory authority, has
no right to sell or transfer its franchise or any property essential to its
exercise, which it has acquired under the law of eminent domain.
This proposition, in our judgment, is sustained both by reason and
the decided weight of authority. Black et al. v. Delaware and Raritan Canal Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 455; Freeman on Executions, §§ 179,
18o; Pearce on Railroads, 496-1; Jones on Mortgages, § 161; Rorer
on Judicial Sales (2d ed.), 222; Archer v. Terre Haute and Indianapolis R. Co., 102 Ill. 493; Bruffett v. Great Western R. Co., 25
Ul. 353; Chicago and Rock Island R. Co. v. Whipple, 22 Ill. 105;
Ottawa, Oswego and Fox River Valley R. Co. v. Black, 79 Ill. 262.
The circuit court having reached this conclusion, its order and judgment will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Note. 1867, Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. St. 325, 94 Am. ·Dec.
84; 1869, Miner's Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 543, 99 Am. Dec. 300; 1887,
Chicago Gas Light Co. v. People's Gas L. Co., 121 Ill. 530, 2 Am. St. 124;
1864, Caldwell v. Alton, 33 Ill. 416, 85 Am. Dec. 282; 1863. Story v. Plank
Road Co ., 16 N. J. Eq. 13, 84 Am. Dec. 134; 18?2, People v. Rai.lroad Co., 24
N. Y. 261, 82 Am. Dec. 295; 1859, Coe v. Railroad Co., 10 Ohio St. 372, 75
Am. Dec. 518; 1825, Ammant v. Turnpike Road, 13 S. & R. (Pa.) 210, 15 Am.
Dec. 593; 1877, Hudson v. Cuero Land, etc., Co., 47 Tex. 56, 26 Am. Rep.
289; 1865, Commonwealth v. Smith, 10 Allen (Mass. ) 448, 87 Am. Dec. 672,
i11fra, p. 1070; 1862, Bardstown & L. R. Co. v. Metcalfe, 4 Met. (Ky . ) 199, 81
Am . Dec. 54 1, infra, p.1074; 1893, ..Bmnswick G. L. & Co. v. United Gas, etc.,
Co., 85 Me. 5a2, 35 Am. St. R. 385, note, p. 390; Jones v. Guarantee Co., 101
U. S. 6~. infra, p. 1078; 1872, State of Ohio, ex rel., etc., v. Sherman, 22 Ohio
St. 411, infra, p. 1082; 1892, Overton Bridge Co. v. Means, 33 Neb. 857, 29 Am.
8t. R. 514.

MEMPHIS AND LITTLE ROCK RAILROAD COMPANY v. RAILROAD

COMMISSIONERS."

1884. In the Supreme Court of the United States, i 12 U. S.

Sec. 26. ( 3) The secondary franchises and privileges as well as
all other rights except the primary franchise, belong to the
corporation, or artificial being, rather than to the individual
members.

609-623.

[This was a bill in equity filed in the chancery court of Pulaski

county, Arkansas, seeking to enjoin the board of railroad commis-

1 Statement of facts condensed, arguments omitted.

MEMPHIS AND tITTLE ROCK RAILROAD COMPANY v. RAILROAD
COMMISSIONERS. 1

1884.

IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

I IZ

u. s.

609-623.
(This was a bill in equity filed in the chancery court of Pulaski
county, Arkansas, seeking to enjoin the board of railroad commis1

Stat.ement of facts condensed, arguments omitted.
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sioners of the state from appraising, for the purposes of taxation, any

part of the property of the plaintiff in error, on the ground that it is
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exempted from taxation by a contract with the state contained in its

§ 26

charter of incorporation. The supreme court of the state, on appeal,

sioners of the state from appraising, for the purposes of taxation , any
part of the property of the plaintiff in error, on the groun<l that it is
exempted from taxation by a contract with the state contained in its
charter of incorporation. The supreme court of the state, on appeal ,
affirmed the decree of the chancery court dismissing the bill. That
decree of the supreme' court was brought here by writ of error, for
review, on the allegation that it enforced a law of the state impairing
the obligation of a contract in violation of the rights of the plaintiff
in error under the constitution of the United States.
The Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company was incorporated
in 1853 , with power to borrow "money on the credit of the company,
and on the mortgage of its charter and works" (§ 9); and its capital
stock was to be exempt from taxation until its road paid a dividend of
6 per cent. , and its road, fixtures, etc., were to be exempt from taxes
until twenty years after it was completed. (Sec. 28.) At the time
of its incorporation the constitution of Arkansas permitted corporations to be created by special acts, and there was no restriction as to
the power to exempt such corporations from taxation. The supreme
court of the state, in Oliverv. Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company, 30 Ark. I 28, h ad held that the exemption from taxation in the
charter of this road was a contract between it and the state, that was
not to be impaired. The railroad company in 1860 issued its bonds,
secured by mortgage covering " the charter by which said company
was incorporated and under which it was organized, and all the rights
and privileges and franchises thereof," and also all lands, etc., belonging to said company. October 13, 1874 , a new constitution of
the state went into effect providing that corporations should be formed
only under genen.~l laws, and no special act should be passed conferring corporate powers; that all property should be taxed according to
its true value; th at all laws exempting from taxation (except churches,
etc., especially named and not including railroad companies) should
be void; that the power so to tax corporations should never be surrendered or suspended by any contract on the part of the state, and
that the legislature shall not pass any general or special law for the
benefit of any corporation then existing, except upon condition that
such corporation should thereafter hold its charter subject to the provisions of the constitution.
December 9, 1874, the legislature passed a law "whereby the purchasers of a railroad of any corporation of the state, and their asso·
ciates, acquiring title thereto by virtue of a judicial sale, or of a sale
under a power contained in a mortgage or deed of trust, were authorized to organize themselves into a body corporate, vested with all the
corporate rights, liberties, privileges, immunities and franchises of
and concerning the railroad so sold, not in conflict with the constitution of the state, as fully as the same were held, exercised and enjoyed by the corporation before such sale." A certificate of such
organization was to he filed with the secretary of state. The road
was not completed till November, 1874. In 1876, a bill to foreclose
the mortgage was brought by the trustees under the same, and a de-

affirmed the decree of the chancery court dismissing the bill. That

decree of the supreme' court was brought here by writ of error, for

review, on the allegation that it enforced a law of the state impairing

the obligation of a contract in violation of the rights of the plaintiff

in error under the constitution of the United States.

The Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company was incorporated

in 1853, with power to borrow "money on the credit of the companv,

and on the mortgage of its charter and works" (§ 9); and its capital

stock was to be exempt from taxation until its road paid a dividend of

6 per cent., and its road, fixtures, etc., were to be exempt from taxes

until twenty years after it was completed. (Sec. 28.) At the time

of its incorporation the constitution of Arkansas permitted corpora-

tions to be created by special acts, and there was no restriction as to

the power to exempt such corporations from taxation. The supreme

court of the state, in Oliver v. Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Com-

pany, 30 Ark. 128, had held that the exemption from taxation in the
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charter of this road was a contract between it and the state, that was

not to be impaired. The railroad company in i860 issued its bonds,

secured by mortgage covering "the charter by which said company

was incorporated and under which it was organized, and all the rights

and privileges and franchises thereof," and also all lands, etc., be-

longing to said company. October 13, 1S74, a new constitution of

the state went into effect providing that corporations should be formed

only under general laws, and no special act should be passed confer-

ring corporate powers; that all property should be taxed according to

its true value; that all laws exempting from taxation (except churches,

etc., especially named and not including railroad companies) should

be void; that the power so to tax corporations should never be sur-

rendered or suspended by any contract on the part of the state, and

that the legislature shall not pass any general or special law for the

benefit of any corporation then existing, except upon condition that

such corporation should thereafter hold its charter subject to the pro-

visions of the constitution.

December 9, 1874, the legislature passed a law "whereby the pur-

chasers of a railroad of any corporation of the state, and their asso-

ciates, acquiring title thereto by virtue of a judicial sale, or of a sale

under a power contained in a mortgage or deed of trust, were author-

ized to organize themselves into a body corporate, vested with all the

corporate rights, liberties, privileges, immunities and franchises of

and concerning the railroad so sold, not in conflict with the constitu-

tion of the state, as fully as the same were held, exercised and en-

joyed by the corporation before such sale." A certificate of such

organization was to be filed with the secretary of state. The road

was not completed till November, 1874. In 1876, a bill to foreclose

the mortgage was brought by the trustees under the same, and a de-
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and charter of said Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company,
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and a sale was so made to certain trustees for the bondholders. In

April, 1877, these bondholders organized themselves into a company

under the name of "The Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Com-

pany as reorganized," and a few days later, the trustees named in

the sale, conveyed to said reorganized company "the property and

franchises, including the charter of 1853," and under this it claims

exemption from caxation in any way different from the provisions of

the charter of 1853.]

Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court. [After

reciting the facts substantially as above stated, he continued:]

The case of the plaintiff in error rests entirely upon the words of

the ninth section of the act of incorporation of the Memphis and Little

Rock Railroad Company of January 11, 1853, by which it was em-

powered to borrow money "on the credit of the company and on the

mortgage of its charter and works." It is argued that these words

confer power upon the company to convey to its bondholders, by way

of mortgage and on foreclosure, to purchasers absolutely, all the prop-
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erty of the company, and all its franchises, including the franchise of

becoming and being a corporation, in the sense of acquiring the right

to organize as such under the act as successor to, and substitute for,

the original company, precisely as if the act had named them as cor-

porators and endowed them with the corporate faculty. And this

being assumed, it is thence inferred that the exemption contained in

section 28 of the act applies to the substituted corporation as though

no change of corporate existence had taken place; and thus, it is in-

sisted, the case is taken out of rule of decision established in Morgan

V.Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217; Wilson v. Gains, 103 U. S. 417, and

Louisville and Nashville R. Co. v. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244. Accord-

ing to the principle of those decisions, the exemption from taxation

must be construed to have been the personal privilege of the very cor-

poration specifically referred to, and to have perished with that,-unless

the express and clear intention of the law requires the exemption to

pass as a continuing franchise to a successor. This salutary rule of in-

terpretation is founded upon an obvious public policy, which regards

such exemptions as in derogation of the sovereign authority and of

common right, and, therefore, not to be extended beyond the exact

and express requirement of the grants, construed stridissimi juris.

It is not claimed that the assignment of the charter, by way of mort-

gage and subsequent judicial sale, constituted the purchasers to be the

identical corporation that the mortgager had been; for that would in-

volve an assumption of its obligations and debts as well as an acqui-

sition of its privileges and exemptions; but, it is insisted, that it re-

sulted in another corporation in lieu of the original one, entitled to

all the provisions of the charter, by relation to its date, as though it

had been originally organized under it.

But such a construction of the words, authorizing a mortgage of the

10— Wil. Cases.

cree rendered, ordering a sale embracing the property. franchises
and charter of said Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company,
and a sale was so made to certain trustees for the bondholders. In
April, 1877, these bondholders organized themselves into a company
under the name of " The Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company as reorganized," and a few <lays later, the trustees named in
the sale , conveyed to said reorganized company "the property and
fra nchises, including the charter of 1853,'' and under this it claims
exemption from caxation in any way different from the provisions of
the charter of 1853.J
Mr. Justice M ATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the court. [After
reciting the facts substantially as above stated, he continued:]
T he case of the plaintiff in error rests entirely upon the words of
the ninth section of the act of incorporation of the Memphis and Little
Rock Railroad Company of January 11, 1853, by which it was empowered to borrow money "on the credit of the company and on the
mortgage of its charter and works." It is argued that these words
confer power upon the company to convey to its bondholders, by way
of mortgage and on foreclosure, to purchasers absolutely, all the property of the company , and all its franchises, including the franchise of
becoming and being a corporation, in the sense of acquiring the right
to organize a s such under the act as successor to , and substitute for,
the original company, precisely as if the act had named them as corporators and endowed them with the corporate faculty. And this
being assumed, it is thence inferred that the exemption contained in
section 28 of the act applies to the substituted corporation as though
no change of corporate existence had taken place; and thus, it is inisted, the case is taken out of rule of decision established in Morgan
v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217; Wilson v. Gains, 103 U. S. 417, and
Louisville and Nashville R. Co. v. Palmes, 109 U.S. 244. According to the principle of those decisions, the exemption from taxation
must be construed to have been the personal privilege of the very corporation specifically referred to, and to have perished with that,.unless
the express and clear intention of the law requires the exemption to
pass as a continuing franchise to a successor. This salutary rule of interpretation is founded upon an obvious public policy, which regards
such exemptions as in derogation of the sovereign authority and of
common right, and, therefore, not to be extended beyond the exact
and express requirement of the grants, construed strictissimi furis.
It is not claimed that the assignment of the charter, by way of mortgage and subsequent judicial sale, constituted the purchasers to be the
identical corporation that the mortgager had been; for that would involve an assumption of its obligations and debts as well as an acquisition of its privileges and exemptions; but, it is insisted, that it resulted in another corporation in lieu of the original one, entitled to
all the provisions of the charter, by relation to its date, as though it
had been originally organized under it.
But such a construction of the words, authorizing a mortgage of the
l{}-WJL.
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charter and works of the company, is, in our opinion, beyond the

intention of the law and altogether inadmissible.
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At the time when this charter was granted, in 1853, there was no

charter and works of the company, is, in our opinion, bey ond the
intention of the law and altogether i.n admissible.
There is no express grant of corporate existence to any new body.
At the time when this charter was granted, in 1853, there was no
general law in existence in Arkansas authorizing the formation of
corpor~tions.
All such grants were by special act. Neither was
there any law authorizing the purchasers of railroads at judicial sale
under mortgages of the property and franchises of the company, to
organize themselves into corporate bodies, such as was first passed in
1874. There is not in the act of January 11 ! 1853, for the incorporation of the Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company, any refer·
ence to such a right as vested in the mortgage bondholders or other
purchasers at a sale under a foreclosure of the mortgage, nor is there
any mode or machinery prescribed in the act for such an organization.
The desired conclusion rests entirely on the inference deduced from
the mortgage of the charter, and is an attempt to create a corporation by a judicial implication. But, as was said by this court in Central Railroad and Banking Co. v. Georgia, 92 U. S. 665 , 670, " it is
an unbending rule that a grant of corporate existence is never implied.
In the construction of a statute every presumption is against it. "
The application of this rule is not avoided by the claim that the
present is not the case of an original creation of a corporate body, but
the transfer, by assignment of a previously existing charter and of the
right to exist as a corporation under it. The difference is one of
words merely. The franchise of becoming and being a corporation,
in its nature, is incommunicable by the act of the parties and incapable of passing by assignment. "The franchise to be a corporation,"
said Hoar, J., in Commonwealth v. Smith, IO Allen 448, 455,
"clearly can not be transferred by any corporate body of its own will.
Such a franchise is not, in its own nature, transmissible." In Hall
· v. Sullivan Railroad Co., 21 Law Reporter 138 (2 Redfield's Am.
Railway Cases 621; l Brunner's Collected Cases 613), Mr. Justice
Cu1tis said: "The franchise, to be a corporation, is, therefore, not a
subject of sale and transfer, unless the law, by some positive provis·
ion, has made · it so, and pointed out the modes in which such sale
and transfer may be effected." No such positive provision is contained in the act under consideration, and no mode for effecting the
organization of a series of corporations under it is pointed out, either in
the act itself or in any other statute prior to that of December 9, 1874.
The franchise of being a corporation need not be implied as necessary to secure to the mortgage bondholders, or the purchasers at a
foreclosure sale, the substantial rights intended to be secured. They
acquire the ownership of the railroad, and the property incident to it,
and the franchise of maintaining and operating it as such; and the
corporate existence is not essential to its use and enjoyment. All
the franchises necessary or important to the beneficial use of the mil·
road could as well be exercised by natural persons. The essential
properties of corporate existence are quite distinct from the franchises of the corporation. The franchise of being a corporation be-

general law in existence in Arkansas authorizing the formation of

corporations. All such grants were by special act. Neither was

there any law authorizing the purchasers of railroads at judicial sale

under mortgages of the property and franchises of the company, to

organize themselves into corporate bodies, such as was first passed in

1874. There is not in the act of January 11, 1853, for the incorpo-

ration of the Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company, any refer-

ence to such a right as vested in the mortgage bondholders or other

purchasers at a sale under a foreclosure of the mortgage, nor is there

any mode or machinery prescribed in the act for such an organization.

The desired conclusion rests entirely on the inference deduced from

the mortgage of the charter, and is an attempt to create a corpora-

tion by a judicial implication. But, as was said by this court in Cen-

tral Railroad and Banking Co. v. Georgia, 92 U. S. 665, 670, "it is

an unbending rule that a grant of corporate existence is never implied.

In the construction of a statute every presumption is against it."
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The application of this rule is not avoided by the claim that the

present is not the case of an original creation of a corporate body, but

the transfer, by assignment of a previously existing charter and of the

right to exist as a corporation under it. The difference is one of

words merely. The franchise of becoming and being a corporation,

in its nature, is incommunicable by the act of the parties and incapa-

ble of passing by assignment. "The franchise to be a corporation,"

said Hoar, J., in Commonwealth v. Smith, 10 Allen 448, 455,

"clearly can not be transferred by any corporate body of its own will.

Such a franchise is not, in its own nature, transmissible." In Hall

v. Sullivan Railroad Co., 21 Law Reporter 138 (2 Redfield's Am.

Railway Cases 621; 1 Brunner's Collected Cases 613), Mr. Justice

Curtis said: "The franchise, to be a corporation, is, therefore, not a

subject of sale and transfer, unless the law, by some positive provis-

ion, has made it so, and pointed out the modes in which such sale

and transfer may be effected." No such positive provision is con-

tained in the act under consideration, and no mode for effecting the

organization of a series of corporations under it is pointed out, either in

the act itself or in any other statute prior to that of December 9, 1874.

The franchise of being a corporation need not be implied as neces-

sary to secure to the mortgage bondholders, or the purchasers at a

foreclosure sale, the substantial rights intended to be secured. They

acquire the ownership of the railroad, and the property incident to it,

and the franchise of maintaining and operating it as such; and the

corporate existence is not essential to its use and enjoyment. All

the franchises necessary or important to the beneficial use of the rail-

road could as well be exercised by natural persons. The essential

■properties of corporate existence are quite distinct from the fran-

chises of the corporation. The franchise of being a corporation be-
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and to be exercised by the corporate body as such, are the franchises
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of the corporation. The latter has no power to dispose of the fran-

chise of its members, which may survive in the mere fact of corpo-

rate existence, after the corporation has parted with all its property

and all its franchises. If, in the present instance, we suppose that a

mortgage and sale of the charter of the railroad company created a new

corporation, what becomes of the old one? If it abides for the pur-

pose of responding to obligations not satisfied by the sale, or of own-

ing property not covered by the mortgage nor embraced in the sale,

as it may well do, and as it must if such debts or property exist, then

there will be two corporations coexisting under the same charter.

For, "after an act of disposition which separates the franchise to

maintain a railroad and make profit from its use, from ,the franchise

of being a corporation, though a judgment of dissolution may be

authorized, yet, until there be such judgment, the rights of the cor-

porators and of third persons may require that the corporation be

considered as still existing." Coe v. Columbus, Piqua and Indiana
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Railroad Co., 10 Ohio St. 372, 386, per Gholson, J.

If, as required by the argument for the plaintiff in error, we regard

and treat the franchise of being a corporation as an incorporeal hered-

itament, and an estate capable of passing between parties by deed,

or of being charged by way of mortgage and of being sold under a

power or by virtue of judicial process, the logical consequences will

be found to involve insuperable difficulties and contradictions. In

the present case, for example, after the execution of the first mort-

gage, we should have the railroad company continuing as a corpora-

tion in esse, and the trustees for the bondholders, or their beneficiaries,

or assigns, a corporation in posse; and, after condition broken, the

company would hold the title to its own existence as a mere equity of

redemption. That equity it makes the subject of a second mortgage,

and, in default, the beneficiaries under the power of sale became pur-

chasers of the franchise, and organize themselves, by virtue of it, into

the Memphis and Little Rock Railway Company. The latter can

hardly claim the status of a corporation at law, as the legal title to

the franchise of being a corporation had never passed to it, on the

supposition that it might pass by a private grant; and, if a corpora-

tion at all, it could only be regarded as the creature of equity, accord-

ing to the analogy of equitable estates, a nondescript class hitherto

unknown in any system of law relating to the subject.

It finally was displaced by the judicial sale, under which the plaint-

iff in error organized as successor to both. In the meantime, the

original corporation has never been dissolved, and, for all purposes

not covered by the mortgage, still maintains an existence as a corporate

body, capable of contracting, and of suing and being sued. A concep-

tion which leads to such incongruities must be essentially erroneous.

If we concede to the argument for the plaintiff in error the position,

that the language used, which authorizes the mortgage of the charter,

maybe taken in a literal sense, still the assignment would transfer it,

longs to the corpora/ors, while the powers and pri'vileges, vested in
and to be exerct'sed by the corporate body as such, are the franchises
of the corporati'on. The latter has no power to dispose of the franchise of t'ts members, which may survt've in the mere fact of corporate existence, after the corporatt'on has parted wt'th all z'ts property
and all its franchises. 1£, in the present instance, we suppose that a
mortgage and sale of the charter of the railroad company created a new
corporation, what becomes of the old one? If it abides for the purpose of responding to obligations not satisfied by the sale, or of owning property not covered by the mortgage nor embraced in the sale,
as it may well do, and as it must if such debts or property exist, then
there will be two corporations coexisting under the same charter.
For, "after an act of disposition which separates the franchise to
maintain a railroad and make profit from its use, from ,the franchise
of being a corporation, though a judgment of dissolution may be
authorized, yet, until there be such judgment,· the rights of the corporators and of third persons may require that the corporation be
considered as still existing." Coe v. Columbus, Piqua and Indiana
Railroad Co., 10 Ohio St. 372, 386, per Gholson, ] .
If, as required by the argument for the plaintiff in error, w·e regard
and treat the franchise of being a corporation as an incorporeal hereditament, and an estate capable of passing between parties by deed,
or of being charged by way of mortgage and of being sold under a
power or by virtue of judicial process, the logical consequences will
be found to involve insuperable · difficulties and contradictions. In
the present case, for example, after the execution of the first mortgage, we should have the railroad company continuing as a corporation t"n esse, and the trustees for the bondholders, or their beneficiaries,
or assigns, a corporation in posse; and, after condition broken, the
company would hold the title to its own existence as a mere equity of
redemption. That equity it makes the subject of a second mortgage,
and, in default, the beneficiaries under the power of sale became purchasers of the franchise, and organize themselves, by virtue of it, into
the Memphis and Little Rock Railway Company. The latter can
hardly claim the status of a corporation at law, as the legal title to
the franchise of being a corporation had never passed to it, on the
supposition that it might pass by a private grant; and, if a corporation at all, it could only be regarded as the creature of equity, according to the analogy of equitable estates, a nondescript class hitherto
unknown in any system of law relating to the subject.
It finally was displaced by the judicial sale, under which the plaintiff in error organized as successor to both. In the meantime, the
original corporation has never been dissolved, and, for all purposes
not covered by the mortgage, still maintains an existence as a corporate
body , capable of contracting, and of suing and being sued. A conception which leads to such incongruities must be essentially erroneous.
If we concede to the argument for the plaintiff in error the position,
that the language used, which authorizes the mortgage of the charter,
may be taken in a literal sense, still the assignment would transfer it,
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in the very state in which it might be at the date of the transfer. But

at that date the only corporation which the charter provided for had
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already been organized. The only powers conferred upon corpora-
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tors to that end had already been exercised and exhausted. The bond-

in the very state in which it might be at the date of the transfer. But
at that date the only corporation which the charter provided for had
already been organized. The only powers conferred upon corporators to that end had already been exercised and exhausted. The bondholders, under the mortgage, and their assignees, the purchasers at
the sale, therefore took, and could take, nothing else than the charter,
so far as it remained unexecutcd, with such franchises and powers as
were capable of future enjoyment and activity, and not such as, having already spent their force by having been fully exerted, could not
be revived by a conveyance. This would include, by the necessity of the
case, the franchise to organize a corporation, which can only be exerted
once for all; for the simple act of organization exhausts the authority,
and, having once been effected, is legally incapable of repetition.
It is a mistake, however, to suppose that the mortgage and sale of
a charter by a corporation, in any proper sense which can be legally
imputed to the words, necessarily conveys every power and authority
conferred by it, so far, at least, as to vest a title in them, as franchises,
irrevocable by reason of the obligation of a contract. In many, if
not in most, acts of incorporation, however special in their nature,
there are various provisions which are matters of general law and not
of contract, and are, therefore, subject to modification or repeal.
Such, in our opinion, would be the character of the right in the
mortgage bondholders, or the purchasers at the sale under the mmtgage, to organize as a corporation, after acquiring title to the mortgaged property, by sale under the mortgage, if, in the charter under
consideration, it had been conferred in express terms, and particular
provision had been made as to the mode of procedure to effect the
purpose. It would be matter of law, and not of contract. At least,
it would be construed as conferring only a right to organize as a corporation, according to such laws as might be in force at the time when
the actual org:mization should take place, and subject to such limitations as they might impose. It can not, we think, be admitted that a
statutory provision for becoming a corporation in futuro can become
a contract, in the sense of that clause of the constitution of the United
States which prohibits state legislation impairing its obligation, until
it has become vested as a right by an actual organization under it,
and then it takes effect as of thut date, and subject to such laws as
may then be in force. Such a contract, so far as it seems to assume
that form, is a provision merely that, at the time, or on the happening of the event specified, the parties designated may become a corporation according to the laws that may then be actually in force.
The stipulation, whatever be its form, must be construed as subject
and subordinate to the paramount policy of the state, and to the sovereign prerogative of deciding, in the meantime, what shall constitute
the essential characteristics of corporate existence. The state does
not part with the franchise until it passes to the organized corporation; and, when it is thus imparted, it must be what the govern meat
is then authorized to grant and does actually confer.
It is immaterial that the form of the transaction is that of a mort-

holders, under the mortgage, and their assignees, the purchasers at

the sale, therefore took, and could take, nothing else than the charter,

so far as it remained unexecuted, with such franchises and powers as

were capable of future enjoyment and activity, and not such as, hav-

ing already spent their force by having been fully exerted, could not

be revived by a conveyance. This would include, by the necessity of the

case, the franchise to organize a corporation, which can only be exerted

once for all; for the simple act of organization exhausts the authority,

and, having once been effected, is legally incapable of repetition.

It is a mistake, however, to suppose that the mortgage and sale of

a charter by a corporation, in any proper sense which can be legally

imputed to the words, necessarily conveys every power and authority

conferred by it, so far, at least, as to vest a title in them, as franchises,

irrevocable by reason of the obligation of a contract. In many, if

not in most, acts of incorporation, however special in their nature,

there are various provisions which are matters of general law and not
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of contract, and are, therefore, subject to modification or repeal.

Such, in our opinion, would be the character of the right in the

mortgage bondholders, or the purchasers at the sale under the mort-

gage, to organize as a corporation, after acquiring title to the mort-

gaged property, by sale under the mortgage, if, in the charter under

consideration, it had been conferred in express terms, and particular

provision had been made as to the mode of procedure to effect the

purpose. It would be matter of law, and not of contract. At least,

it would be construed as conferring only a right to organize as a cor-

poration, according to such laws as might be in force at the time when

the actual organization should take place, and subject to such limita-

tions as they might impose. It can not, we think, be admitted that a

statutory provision for becoming a corporation in futuro can become

a contract, in the sense of that clause of the constitution of the United

States which prohibits state legislation impairing its obligation, until

it has become vested as a right by an actual organization under it,

and then it takes effect as of that date, and subject to such laws as

may then be in force. Such a contract, so far as it seems to assume

that form, is a provision merely that, at the time, or on the happen-

ing of the event specified, the parties designated may become a cor-

poration according to the laws that may then be actually in force.

The stipulation, whatever be its form, must be construed as subject

and subordinate to the paramount policy of the state, and to the sov-

ereign prerogative of deciding, in the meantime, what shall constitute

the essential characteristics of corporate existence. The state does

not part with the franchise until it passes to the organized corpora-

tion; and, when it is thus imparted, it must be what the government

is then authorized to grant and does actually confer.

It is immaterial that the form of the transaction is that of a mort-
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poration. "The real transaction, in all such cases of transfer, sale

or conveyance," as was said by the supreme court of Ohio in the case

of The State v. Sherman, 22 Ohio St. 411, 428, "in legal effect, is

nothing more or less, and nothing other, than a surrender or aban-

donment of the old charter by the corporators, and a grant de novo of

a similar charter to the so-called transferees or purchasers. To look

upon it in any other light, and to regard the transaction as a literal

transfer or sale of the charter, is to be deceived, we think, by a mere

figure or form of speech. The vital part of the transaction, and that

without which it would be a nullity, is the law under which the trans-

fer is made. The statute authorizing the transfer and declaring its

effect is the grant of a new charter couched in a few words, and to

take effect upon condition of the surrender or abandonment of the old

charter; and the deed of transfer is to be regarded as mere evidence

of the surrender or abandonment."

It is, of course, the law in force at the time the transaction is con-

summated and made effectual that must be looked to as determining
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its validity and effect. This is the principle on which this court pro-

ceeded in deciding the case of Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S.

359. The franchise to be a corporation remained in, and was exer-

cised by, the old corporation, notwithstanding the mortgage of its

charter, until the new corporation was formed and organized; it was

then surrendered to the state, and by a new grant then made passed to

the corporators of the new corporation, and was held and exercised by

them under the constitutional restrictions then existing.

Our conclusions, then, are that the exemption from taxation con-

tained in the 28th section of the act of January 11, 1853, was intended

to apply only to the Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company as

the original corporation organized under it; that it did not pass by

the mortgage of its charter and works, as included in the transfer of

the franchise to be a corporation, to the mortgagees or purchasers at

the judicial sale; that the franchises embraced in that conveyance were

limited to those which had been granted as appropriate to the con-

struction, maintenance, operation and use of the railroad as a public

highway and the right to make profit therefrom; and that the appellant,

not having become a corporate body until after the restrictions in the

constitution of 1874 took effect, was thereby incapable in law of having

or enjoying the privilege of holding its property exempt from taxation.

The decree of the supreme court of Arkansas is accordingly affirmed.

Note. Power to mortgage franchises must be expressly given, or it does not ex-

ist. 1856, Pierce v. Emerv, 32 N. H. 484; 1859, Coe v. C, C, etc., R. Co., 10

0.8.372; 1858, Lauraan v. Lebanon Val. R., 30 Pa. St. 42; infra, p. 1081;

Daniels v. Hart, 118 Mass. 543; 1888, People v. Cook, 110 N. Y. 443;

1890, Snell v. City, 133 111. 413, 8 L. R. A. 858, 24 N. E. 532; contra, 1857,

Hall v. Sullivan R., 11 Fed. Cas. 257 (No. 5,948); 1863, Miller v. Rutland, etc.,

R. Co., 36 Vt. 452; 1862, Bardstown, etc., R. Co. v. Metcalfe, 4 Met. (Ky.)

gage, sale or other transfer i'nter partes of the franchise to be a corporation. "The real transaction, in all such cases of transfer, sale
or conveyance,'' as was said by the supreme court of Ohio in the case
of The State v. Sherman, 22 Ohio St. 411, 428, "in legal effect, is
nothing more or less, and nothing other, than a surrender or abandonment of the old charter l;>y the corporators, and a grant de novo of
a similar charter to the so-called transferees or purchasers. To look
upon it in any other light, and to regard the transaction as a literal
transfer or sale of the charter, is to be deceived, we think, by a mere
figure or form of speech. The vital part oft.he transaction, and that
without which it would be a nullity, is the law under which the transfer is made. The statute authorizing the transfer and declaring its
effect is the grant of a new charter couched in a few words, and to
take effect upon condition of the surrender or abandonment of the old
charter; and the deed of transfer is to be regarded as mere evidence
of the surrender or abandonment."
It is, of course, the law in force at the time the transaction is consummated and made effectual that must be looked to as determining
it validity and effect. This is the principle on which this court proceeded in deciding the case of Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S.
359. The franchise to be a corporation remained in, and was exercised by, the old corporation, notwithstanding the mortgage of its
charter, until the new corporation was formed and organized; it was
then surrendered to the state, and by a new grant then made passed to
the corporators of the new corporation, and was held and exercised by
them under the constitutional restrictions then existing.
Our conclusions, then, are that the exemption from taxation contained in the 28th section of the act of January 11, 1853, was intended
to apply only to the Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company as
the original corporation organized under it; that it did not pass by
the mortgage of its charter and works, as included in the transfer of
the franchise to be a corporation, to the mortgagees or purchasers at
the judicial sale; that the franchises embraced in that conveyance were
limited to those which had been granted as appropriate to the construction, maintenance, operation and use of the railroad as a public
highway and the right to make profit therefrom; and that the appellant,
not having become a corporate body until after the restrictions in the
constitution of 1874 took effect, was thereby incapable in law of having
or enjoying the privilege of holding its property exempt from taxation.
The decree of the supreme court of Arkansas is accordingly affirmed.

199, infra, p. 1074.

The legislature may expressli/ authorize the mortgage of the franchise. 1864,

Atkinson v. Marietta, etc., R". Co., 15 O. S. 21; 1866, East Boston, etc., R.

Co. v. East. R. Co., 13 Allen (Mass.) 422.

Noe,,. Po1oer to mortgage frmirhisP-s must be exprfssly given, or it does not exi8t. 1856, Pierce v. Emery, 32 N. H . 484; 1859, Coe v. C., C., etc., R. Co., 10
0. 8. 372; 1858, Lauman v. Lebanon Val. R., 30 Pa. St. 42; infm, p. 1081;
I 75, Daniels v. Hart, 118 Mass. 543; 1888, People v. Cook, 110 N. Y. 443;
1890, Snell v. City, 133 Ill. 413, 8 L. R. A. 858, 24 N. E. 532; contra, 1857,
Hall v. Sullivan R., 11 Fed. Cas. 257 (No. 5,948); 1863, Miller v. Rutland, etc.,
R. Co. , 36 Vt. 452; 1862, Bardstown, etc., R. Co. v. Metcalfe, 4 Met. (Ky.)
199, infra, p. 1074.
The legislature may expressly authorizP- the mortgage of the franchise. 1864,
Atkinson v. Marietta, etc., R. Co., 15 O . 8. 21; 1866, East Boston, etc., R.
Co. v. East. R. Co., 13 Allen (Mass.) 422.
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road Company v.Commw.,87 Ky.661; 1884, Railroad Co. v. Berry,44 Ark. 17.

Sec. 27. (4) When a franchise is offered by the state and ac-

Exemption from taxatio1', effect of transfer. l8!J6, Pearsall v. R. Co., 161 U.S.
646; infra, p.1413; 1894, Keokuk R. Co. v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 301; 1888, Railroad Company v. Commw., 87 Ky. 661; 1884, Railroad Co. v. Berry, 44 Ark. li.

cepted by those to whom it is offered, it is in the nature of a

grant or executed contract.

1789, Buller, J., in King v. Passmore, 3 T. R. 246. "And I

do not know how to reason on this point better than in the manner

Sec. 27. ( 4) When a franchise is offered by the state and ac-

urged by one of the relator's counsel, who considered the grant of

cepted by those to whom it is offered, it is in the nature of a
grant or executed contract.

incorporation to be a compact between the crown and a certain num-

ber of subjects, the latter of whom undertake, in consideration of the

privileges which are bestowed, to exert themselves for the good gov-

1 789, BULLER, J., in King v. Passmore, 3 T. R. 246.
"And I
do not know how to reason on this point better than in the manner
urged by one of the relator's counsel, who considered the grant of
incorporation to be a compact between the crown and a certain number of subjects, the latter of whom undertake, in consideration of the
privileges which are bestowed, to exert themselves for the good government of the place. Now, if those persons have so far violated their
trust by negligence or misconduct that they are no longer capable of
governing the place, there is an end of the compact. The ground of
the charter was the government of the place, and when that can not
be carried on, I see no reason why the crown can not grant another
charter to a different set of persons."

ernment of the place. Now, if those persons have so far violated their

trust by negligence or misconduct that they are no longer capable of

governing the place, there is an end of the compact. The ground of

the charter was the government of the place, and when that can not

be carried on, I see no reason why the crown can not grant another

charter to a different set of persons."

Note. See also: 1694, Philips v. Bury, 1 Ld. Eaym. 5, s. c. 2 T. R. 346; 1815.

Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch (U. S.) 43.
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Sec. 28. Same.

WALES, Treasurer, Etc., v. STETSON.1

1806. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 2

Mass. 143-146, 3 Am. Dec. 39.

The declaration was in trespass and contained two counts. The

first was for passing the turnpike gate without payment of the legal

Note. See also: 1694, Pqilips v. Bury, 1 Ld. Raym. 5, s. c. 2 T. R. 346; 1815.
Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch (U. S.) 43.

toll; and the second was for cutting clown the gate.

The parties submitted the cause to the court on a statement of facts,

in substance as follows:

Sec. 28. Same.

That the corporation was duly authorized by law to make the road,

WALES,

and, when made and approved by the court of sessions for the county

of Norfolk, to erect a gate thereon, near the dwelling-house of Joseph

1806.

Hunt; that the road was so made and approved; that by the act of

IN

TREASURER,

ETC., v. STETSON. 1

THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

3

Mass. 143-146, 3 Am. Dec. 39.

incorporation, "If any person shall cut, break down, or otherwise in-

The declaration was in trespass and contained two counts. The
first was for passing the turnpike gate without payment of the legal
toll; and the second was for cutting down the gate.
The parties submitted the cause to the court on a statement of facts,
in substance as follows:
That the corporation was duly authorized by law to make the road,
and, when made and approved by the court of sessions for the county
of Norfolk, to erect a gate thereon, near the dwelling-house of Joseph
Hunt; that the road was so made and approved; that by the act of
incorporation, "If any person shall cut, break down, or otherwise injure or destroy the said turnpike gate, or shall forcibly pass, or attempt
to pass, by force without first paying the legal toll at such gate, such
person shall forfeit and pay a fine not exceeding $50, nor less than
$5, to be recovered by the treasurer of said corporation, to their use
in an action of trespass."
That the gate was erected on a part of the turnpike road where was
before an ancient public highway; that it was near the house of
Joseph Hunt, but that it might have been placed nearer to the said
house, and in a part of the turnpike road which was not before a
public highway.
That said Stetson did, on the twenty-ninth day of March, 18o6,

jure or destroy the said turnpike gate, or shall forcibly pass, or attempt

to pass, by force without first paying the legal toll at such gate, such

person shall forfeit and pay a fine not exceeding $50, nor less than

$5, to be recovered by the treasurer of said corporation, to their use

in an action of trespass."

That the gate was erected on a part of the turnpike road where was

before an ancient public highway; that it was near the house of

Joseph Hunt, but that it might have been placed nearer to the said

house, and in a part of the turnpike road which was not before a

public highway.

That said Stetson did, on the twenty-ninth day of March, 1806,

1 Arguments omitted.

1
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forcibly pass the said gate without payment of toll, and in the even-

THE CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE.

ing of said day did cut down said gate.

151

If, upon these facts, the court are of opinion that the corpora-

tion had a right by law to erect said gate at the place where it was

erected, then the defendant agrees to be defaulted; if otherwise the

plaintiff is to become nonsuit.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Parsons, C. J. After

considering the several points made in this cause by the counsel, we are

satisfied that the question submitted must be decided according to the

legal construction of the act incorporating the proprietors of this turn-

pike. We are not prepared to deny a right in the general court to

discontinue by statute a public highway. It is an easement common

to all the citizens, who are represented in the legislature. The au-

thorizing of the erection of bridges over navigable waters is, in fact, an

exercise of a similar right. We are also satisfied that the rights le-

gally vested in this, or in any corporation, can not be controlled or

destroyed by any subsequent statute, unless a power for that purpose

be reserved to the legislature in the act of incorporation.

In the consideration of the provisions of any statute, they ought to
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receive such a reasonable construction, if the words and subject-mat-

ter will admit of it, as that the existing rights of the public, or of in-

dividuals, be not infringed. And we are of opinion that this act of

incorporation reasonably admits such construction. The corporation

had a right to make the turnpike over such parts of the old road as lay

in their way. This affects no existing rights, as the easement re-

mains. But before we construe the statute as giving an authority to ob-

struct a former highway by erecting a gate thereon, it should appear

that such construction is necessary to give a reasonable effect to the

statute. In this case no such necessity appears; but from the case

as stated it appears that the corporation might have exercised their

right to erect a gate, and to receive the toll, as empowered by the

statute, without impeding the travel on the old highway. The stat-

ute authorizes the corporation to erect a gate on the turnpike road

near the dwelling-house of Joseph Hunt; and it is agreed in the case

that a gate might have been erected on the turnpike, and near the

dwelling-house of J. Hunt, and not upon any part of the old highway.

This gate being on the old highway is a public nuisance, and the de-

fendant had a right to abate it. Let the plaintiff be called.

-Vote. 1853, State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. (TJ. S.) 369; 1864,

Thorpe v. Rutland & Bur. R. Co., 27 Vt. 140; 1819, Dartmouth College v.

Woodward, 4 Wheat. (TJ. 8.) 518, infra, p. 708; 1857, Nichols v. Somerset,

etc., R. Co., 43 Me. 356; 1805, Trustees v. Foy, 1 Murphy (N. C.) 58, 3 Am.

Deo. 672, supra, p. 34; 1855, Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. (TJ. S.) 331, supra,

p.88; 1867, Zabriskie v. Hackensack, etc., R. Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 178, 90 Am. Dec.

K17, infra, p. 1466; 1850, Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13 Pa. St. 133, 53 Am. Dec.

4-50, infra, p. 417; 1862, Durfee v. Old Colony R. Co., 5 Allen (Mass. I 230, in-

fra, p. 1462; 1872, Yeaton v. Bank of Old Dominion, 21 Grattan (Va.) 593,

"tfrn, p. 750; 1872, Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wallace (TJ. S.) 464,infra, p. 754;

1M64, Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wallace (TJ. S.) 10, infra, p. 752; 1856, White

Mountain R. Co. v. Eastman, 34 N. H. 124, infra, p. 758. Compare, 1809, Cur-

ne v. Mut. Ass. Soc, 4 Henning & Munf. (Va.) 315.

forcibly pass the said gate without payment of toll, and in the evening of said day did cut down said gate.
If, upon these facts, the court are of opinion that the corporation had a right by law to erect said gate at the place where it was
erected, then the defendant agrees to be defaulted; if otherwise the
plaintiff is to become nonsuit.
The opinion of the court was delivered by PARSONS, C. J. After
considering the several points made in this cause by the counsel, we are
satisfied that the question submitted must be decided according to the
legal construction of the act incorporating the proprietors of this turnpike. We are not prepared to deny a right in the general court to
discontinue by statute a public highway. It is an easement common
to all the citizens, who are represented in the legislature. The authorizing of the erection of bridges over navigable waters is, in fact, an
exercise of a similar right. We are also sati"sjied that the rights legally vested in this, or in any corporatt'on, can not be controlled or
destroyed by any subsequent statute, unless a power for that purpose
be reserved to the legislature i'n the act of incorporatt'on.
In the consideration of the proYisions of any statute, they ought to
receive such a reasonable construction, if the words and subject-matter will admit of it, as that the existing rights of the public, or of individuals, be not infringed. And we are of opinion that this act of
incorporation reasonably admits such construction. The corporation
had a right to make the turnpike over such parts of the old road as lay
in their way. This affects no existing rights, as the easement remains. But before we construe the statute as giving an authority to obstruct a former highway by erecting a gate thereon, it should appear
that such construction is necessary to give a reasonable effect to the
statute. In this case no such necessity appears; but from the case
as stated it appears that the corporation might have exercised their
right to erect a gate, and to receive the toll, as empowered by the
statute, without impeding the travel on the old highway. The statute authorizes the corporation to erect a gate on the turnpike road
near the dwelling-house of Joseph Hunt; and it is agreed in the case
that a gate might have been erected on the turnpike, and near the
dwelling-house of J. Hunt, and not upon any part of the old highway.
This gate being on the old highway is a public nuisance, and the defendant had a right to abate it. Let the plaintiff be called.
Note. 1853, State Rank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. (U. S.) 369; 1854,
Thorpe v. Rutland & Bur. R. Co., 'Z'l Vt. 140; 1819, Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. 8.) 518, infra, p. 708'; 1857, Nichols v. Somerset,
et;c., R. Co., 43 Me. 356; 1805, Trustees v. Foy, 1 Murphy IN. C.) 58, 3 Am.
Dec. 672, supra, p. 34; 1855, Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. (U.S.) 331, sttpra,
p.88; 1867, Zabriskie v. Hackensack, etc., R. Co., 18 N. J. Eq.178, 90 Am. Dec.
617, infra, p. 1466; 1850, Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13 Pa. St. 133, 53 Am. Dec.
450, infra, p. 417; 1862, Durfee v. Old Colony R. Co., 5 Allen (Mass. l 230, infra, p. 1462 ; 1872, Yeaton v. Bank of Old Dominion, 21 Grattan (Va.) 593,
wfrri, p. 750; 1872, Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wallace (U.S.) 454, inf1·a, p. 754;
1864, H.awthorne v. Calef, 2 Wallace (U. 8.) 10, infra, p. 752; 1856, White
~~ouutam R. Co. v. Eastman, 34 N. H. 124, infra, p. 758. Compare, 1809, Curm v. ~ Cu t . Ass. Soc., 4 Henning & Munf. (Va.) 315.
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Sec. 29. (5 ) These franchises are property, and can not be taken

without cause, but may be forfeited for misuser or nonuser.

HIGGINS V. DOWNWARD.

152

1691. Holt, J., in King v. Mayor of London, Show. 280. "I

am of the opinion that a corporation may be forfeited, if the trust be

broken, and the end for which it is instituted be perverted."

Sec. 29. ( 5 )

HIGGINS Et Al. v. DOWNWARD.1

These franchises are property, and can not be taken
without cause, but may be forfeited for misuser or nonuser.

1888. In the Court of Errors and Appeals of Delaware. 8

Hous. (Del.) 227-257, 40 Am. St. Rep. 141.

Saulsbury, Chancellor. "A corporation is an artificial being, in-

1691. HoLT, J., in King v. Mayor of London, Show. 28o. "I
am of the opinion that a corporation may be forfeited, if the trust be
broken, and the end for which it is instituted be perverted."

visible, intangible and existing only in contemplation of law. Being

the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the

charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as inciden-

tal to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calcu-

HIGGINS ET AL. v. DOWNWARD.1

lated to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most

important are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed,

1888.

individuality; properties by which a perpetual succession of many

persons are considered as the same, and may act as the single indi-

vidual. They enable a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to

IN THE COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF DELAWARE.
Hous. (Del.) 227-257, 40 Am. St. Rep. 141.

8

hold property without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and

SAULSBURY, Chancellor. "A corporaition is an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in contemplation of law. Being
the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the
charter of its creation confers upon it, eiither expressly or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most
important are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed,
individuality; properties by which a perpetual succession of many
persons are considered as the same, and may act as the single individual. They enable a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to
hold property without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and
endless necessity of perpetual conveyance for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand. It is chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men in succession with these qualities and capacities
that corporations were invented and are iin use." Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in the case of College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 626.
A franchise is a certain privilege conferred by grant from the government, and vested in individuals. Corp4orations or bodies politic are
the most usual franchises known to our law. Bouv. Law Diet., 545.
By section 17, article z, of the constitution of this state, it is declared
that "no act of incorporation, except for the renewal of existing corporations, shall be hereafter enacted without the concurrence of twothirds of each branch of the legislature, and without a reserved power
of revocation by the legislature; and no act of incorporation which
may be hereafter enacted shall continue in force for a longer period
than twenty years without the re-enactment of the legislature, unless
it be an incorporation for public improvt~ment.''
The Wilmington and Reading Railiroad Company was a private
corporation for public improvement, and therefore its existence was
not limited to the period of twenty years under this provision of the
constitution. There was no time fixed by positive provision in the
charter of the Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company when the
corporation should cease to exist. Had there been, the corporation,
in the absence of a renewal of its charter before that period, would
1
Facts sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court. Arguments, and opinion of Comegys, J ., concurring, omitted.

endless necessity of perpetual conveyance for the purpose of trans-
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mitting it from hand to hand. It is chiefly for the purpose of cloth-

ing bodies of men in succession with these qualities and capacities

that corporations were invented and are in use." Chief Justice Mar-

shall's opinion in the case of College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 626.

A franchise is a certain privilege conferred by grant from the govern-

ment, and vested in individuals. Corporations or bodies politic are

the most usual franchises known to our law. Bouv. Law Diet., 545.

By section 17, article 2, of the constitution of this state, it is declared

that "no act of incorporation, except for the renewal of existing cor-

porations, shall be hereafter enacted without the concurrence of two-

thirds of each branch of the legislature, and without a reserved power

of revocation by the legislature; and no act of incorporation which

may be hereafter enacted shall continue in force for a longer period

than twenty years without the re-enactment of the legislature, unless

it be an incorporation for public improvement."

The Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company was a private

corporation for public improvement, and therefore its existence was

not limited to the period of twenty years under this provision of the

constitution. There was no time fixed by positive provision in the

charter of the Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company when the

corporation should cease to exist. Had there been, the corporation,

in the absence of a renewal of its charter before that period, would

1 Facts sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court. Arguments, and opin-

ion of Coinegys, J., concurring, omitted.
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have become dissolved without either a representative or the possibil-

THE CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE.

ity of one, as no provision is made by our laws for a representative in

153

such a case; and at the instance of its dissolution the debts due to it

would have become extinguished, not the right to or the remedy for

the debts suspended, merely, but the debt itself annihilated. Bank

v. Lockwood's Adm'r, 2 Har. (Del.) 14. A judgment, being No. 181

to the November term, 1869, was recovered by the Wilmington and

Reading Railroad Company, a corporation then existing under the

laws of Delaware and Pennsylvania, against the defendants. A Ji.fa.

was issued, being No. 224 to the November term, 1870, on this judg-

ment, and levy made on goods and chattels. Subsequent executions

were issued on this judgment, the last being an alias vend, exp.,

No. 92, to September term, 1887. On May 29, 1886, the judgment

was marked for the use of the Wilmington and Northern Railroad

Company, by the direction of the attorney of the plaintiff, and the

judgment was afterwards, on June 12, 1886, marked for the use of

John C. Higgins by direction of the president of the Wilmington and

Northern Railroad Company. The defendants allege that at or about
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the year 1877 the Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company had

ceased to have any legal existence as a corporation, or any right to

perform or do any act whatever, and that the said judgment which

had been recovered by it became void and of no effect.

The sixth reason assigned for setting aside the sheriff's sale is that

the transfers or assignments alleged to have been made by indorse-

ments on the record, and by and through which the said John C. Hig-

gins claims title thereto, were illegal, unauthorized and void, and

ineffectual to vest in said John C. Higgins any right or title what-

ever. This reason, so far as it relates to the authority of the attorney

directing the judgment to be marked to the use of the Wilmington

and Northern Railroad Company is not before us, exceptions thereto

having, for the sake of expediting the hearing of the questions re-

served, been abandoned, so that the real and only question before us

is. was the Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company dissolved by

the act in relation thereto passed February 22, 1877? Or, in other

words, did the legislature, by passing that act, revoke the charter of

the Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company? On the 3d of

March, 1868, the Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company exe-

cuted a mortgage upon its road, etc., for the payment of money. A

suit was afterward instituted in the United States Circuit Court for the

foreclosure of this mortgage. The final decree in the case was made

April 25, 1876, directing the sale by the trustees of the railroad and

property. The sale was made under the decree November 4, 1876.

The deed made by the trustees to the purchasers conveyed "the rail-

road of the Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company, extending

from a point on the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad at or near

Birdsboro, in the county of Berks, state of Pennsylvania, to the city

of Wilmington, in the state of Delaware, with all the rights, privi-

leges, immunities and franchises of the said Wilmington and Reading

Railroad Company, under any and all grants of the state of Pennsvl-

ha>e become dissolved without either a representative or the pos~ibil·
ity of one, as no provision is made by our laws for a representative in
such a case; and at the instance of its dissolution the debts due to it
would have become extinguished, not the right to or the remedy for
the debts suspended, merely, but the debt itself annihila~ed. Bank
v. Lockwood's Adm'r, 2 Har. (Del.) 14. A judgment, being No. 181
to the November term, 1869, was recovered by the Wilmington and
Reading Railroad Company, a corporation then existing under the
laws of Delaware and Pennsylvania, against the defendants. A .ft. fa.
was issued, being No. 224 to the November term, 1870, on this judgment, and levy made on goods and chattels. Subsequent executions
were issued on this judgment, the last being an ali"as vend. exp.,
No. 92, to September term, 1887. On May 29, 1886, the judgment
was marked for the use of the \Vilmington and Northern Railroad
Company, by the direction of the attorney of the plaintiff, and the
judgment was afterwards, on June 12, 1886, marked for the use of
John C. Higgins by direction of the president of the Wilmington and
Xorthern Railroad Company. The defendants allege that at or about
the year 1877 the Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company had
ceased to have any legal existence as a corporation, or any right to
perform or do any act whatever, and that the said judgment which
had been recovered by it became void and of no effect.
The sixth reason assigned for setting aside the sheriff's sale is that
the transfers or assignments alleged to have been made by indorsements on the record, and by and through which the said John C. Higgins claims title thereto, were illegal, unauthorized and void, and
ineffectual to vest in said John C. Higgins any right or title whatever. This reason, so far as it relates to the authority of the attorney
directing the judgment to be marked to the use of the Wilmington
and Northern Railroad Company is not before us, exceptions thereto
having, for the sake of expediting the hearing of the questions reserved, been abandoned, so that the real and only question before us
is, was the Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company dissolved by
the act in relation thereto passed February 22, 1877? Or, in other
words, did the legislature, by passing that act, revoke the charter of
the Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company? On the 3d of
March, 1868, the Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company executed a mortgage upon its road, etc., for the payment of money. A
suit was afterward instituted in the United States Circuit Court for the
foreclosure of this mortgage. The final decree in the case was made
April 25, 1876, directing the sale by the trustees of the railroad and
property. The sale was made under the decree November 4, 1876.
The deed made by the trustees to the purchasers conveyed "the railroad of the Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company, extending
from a point on the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad at or near
Birdsboro, in the county of Berks, state of Pennsylvania, to the city
of Wilmington, in the state of Delaware, with all the rights, privilege , immunities and franchises of the said Wilmington and Reading
Railroad Company, under any and all grants of the state of Pennsyl-
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included in the mortgage for which foreclosure was decreed, and, of

vania, but exclusive of the franchises granted by the state of Delaware." These franchises granted by the state of Delaware were not
included in the mortgage for which foreclosure was decreed, and, of
course, were not included, but excluded, by the decree of foreclosure.
They were not sold by the trustees to the purchasers of said road. 0£
course, therefore, the purchasers of said Wilmington and Reading
Railroad did not by such sale become entitled to said franchises granted
by the state of Delaware.
On the 22d of February, 1877, the legislature of Delaware passed
an act to incorporate the purchasers of the Wilmington and Reading
Railroad. This act, after reciting in its preamble that the railroad of
the Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company, with its appurtenances, was sold in pursuance of a mortgage executed by said company under authority of laws of this state, and that it was necessary
to the proper enjoyment of the rights acquired by said sale that the
purchaser should be incorporated with authority to consolidate with any
company organized or to be organized under the laws of the state of
Pennsylvania, operating such portion of the road so sold as is situated
within the state of Pennsylvania, incorporated the persons purchasing
the said Wilmington and Reading Railroad, under a decree of the circuit
court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, a body
politic and corporate, by the name of the "Wilmington and Northern
Railroad Company." By this act the company were vested with all
the right, title, interest, property, possession, claim and demand at
law or in equity of, in and to such railroad, to wit, the railroad of the
Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company, with its appurtenances,
and with all the rights, powers, immunities, privileges and franchises
of the corporation as whose property the same was sold, and which
may have been granted thereto or conferred thereupon by any act or
acts of assembly whatsoever in force at time of such sale. These
franchises, granted by the state of Delaware, not being included in
the mortgage executed by the Wilmington and Reading Railroad
Company, and consequently not sold under the d ecree of foreclosure
thereof made by the circuit court of the United States for the eastern
district of Pennsylvania, the purchasers at such sale acquired no title
thereto, and no property therein. If they acquired any such title or
property it could only have been under and by virtue of the act to incorporate the purchasers of the Wilmington and Reading Railroad
before referred to. This act purported to vest such purchasers, among
other things, with the privileges and franchises of the corporation as
whose property the same was sold, and which may have beengranted
thereto or conferred thereupon by any act or acts of assembly whatever in force at time of such sale.
The condition of a corporation whose charter has expired is not
the same as that of a corporation which has failed to elect its officers,
and, as the consequence of that failure, is rendered inactive. The
life of the one is out of it by its own constitution, and not from a failure to do what its charter enabled them to do, to give them active
being; the other was entitled by its charter to a continued active life.

course, were not included, but excluded, by the decree of foreclosure.

They were not sold by the trustees to the purchasers of said road. Of

course, therefore, the purchasers of said Wilmington and Reading
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Railroad. This act, after reciting in its preamble that the railroad of
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the said Wilmington and Reading Railroad, under a decree of the circuit

court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, a body

politic and corporate, by the name of the "Wilmington and Northern

Railroad Company." By this act the company were vested with all

the right, title, interest, property, possession, claim and demand at

law or in equity of, in and to such railroad, to wit, the railroad of the

Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company, with its appurtenances,

and with all the rights, powers, immunities, privileges and franchises

of the corporation as whose property the same was sold, and which

may have been granted thereto or conferred thereupon by any act or

acts of assembly whatsoever in force at time of such sale. These

franchises, granted by the state of Delaware, not being included in

the mortgage executed by the Wilmington and Reading Railroad

Company, and consequently not sold under the decree of foreclosure

thereof made by the circuit court of the United States for the eastern

district of Pennsylvania, the purchasers at such sale acquired no title

thereto, and no property therein. If they acquired any such title or

property it could only have been under and by virtue of the act to in-

corporate the purchasers of the Wilmington and Reading Railroad

before referred to. This act purported to vest such purchasers, among

other things, with the privileges and franchises of the corporation as

whose property the same was sold, and which may have been granted

thereto or conferred thereupon by any act or acts of assembly what-

ever in force at time of such sale.

The condition of a corporation whose charter has expired is not

the same as that of a corporation which has failed to elect its officers,

and, as the consequence of that failure, is rendered inactive. The

life of the one is out of it by its own constitution, and not from a fail-

ure to do what its charter enabled them to do, to give them active

being; the other was entitled by its charter to a continued active life,
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but it has failed to continue that activity by the election of its neces-
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sary officers. Its active powers, but not its being, are gone. The one

is dead; the other is dormant. The principles of law which apply

to the rights of a corporation thus dormant or disabled are not the

same as those which are applicable to the rights of a corporation

which is dissolved, or civilly dead. In the former case debts due

are extinguished; not so in the latter case. No judgment of ouster

or other similar judgment, or judgment of like effect, has ever been

judicially declared against the Wilmington and Reading Railroad.

The act to incorporate the purchasers of the Wilmington and Reading

Railroad did not in express terms revoke the charter of the Wilming-

ton and Reading Railroad, nor necessarily deprive the latter of its

franchises granted by the acts of assembly of the state of Delaware.

The Wilmington and Reading Railroad had never forfeited its char-

ter as judicially ascertained by any judgment of a court of law; and

even the former act did not so declare. A franchise is property',

and it can not wantonly or of whim be taken away by a legislative

act and transferred to another.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:14 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

The act of February 22, 1877, must receive a reasonable interpre-

tation. It must be interpreted to mean that which the legislature of

the state of Delaware had a right to do, and not that which the legisla-

ture had not a right to do. The rights, powers, immunities, privi-

leges and franchises conferred by the legislature on the purchasers of

the Wilmington and Reading Railroad must be interpreted to be such

rights, powers, immunities, privileges, and franchises as those con-

ferred by the legislature on the Wilmington and Reading Railroad by

any act or acts of the general assembly which the Delaware legislature

had the right to confer, and to vest the same in said purchasers,

because the legislature had the right to make such a grant; but the

legislature had no authority to take from the Wilmington and Read-

ing Railroad rights, powers, immunities, privileges and franchises,

Ihc same never having been judicially declared forfeited, nor revoked

constitutionally by legislative authority. If the legislature had re-

voked the charter of the Wilmington and Reading Railroad, it could

have granted rights, powers, immunities, privileges and franchises

of the same nature and kind as those which the Wilmington and

Heading Railroad had theretofore possessed, but not the same iden-

tical rights, powers, immunities, privileges and franchises, be-

cause the charter being revoked, it would follow that the rights, powers,

immunities, privileges and franchises ceased and determined. and

'£ere not the subject of transference to another company by legislative

grant. The words, "of the corporation as whose property the same

was sold, and which may have been granted thereto or conferred

thereupon by any act or acts of assembly whatsoever in force at the

time of such sale," must be interpreted as having relation to what

was sold, and not to that which was not sold, and could not have been

legally sold under the said decree of foreclosure. According to this

interpretation, the words used would have force and effect. A con-

but it bas failed to continue that activity by the election of its necessary officers. Its active powers, but not its being, are gone. The one
is dead; the other is dormant. The principles of law which apply
to the rights of a corporation thus dormant or disabled are not the
same as those which are applicable to the rights of a corporation
which is dissolved, or civilly dead. In the former case debts due
are extinguished; not so in the latter case. No judgment of ouster
or other similar judgment, or judgment of like effect, has ever been
judicially declared against the Wilmington and Reading Railroad.
The act to incorporate the purchasers of the Wilmington and Reading
Railroad did not in express terms revoke the charter of the Wilmington and Reading Railroad, nor necessarily deprive the latter of its
franchises granted by the acts of assembly of the state of Delaware.
The Wilmington and Reading Railroad had never forfeited its charter as judicially ascertained by any judgment of a court of law; and
even the former act did not so declare. A franchise is property,
and it can not wantonly or of whim be taken away by a legislatz've
ad artd transferred to another.
The act of February 22, 1877, must receive a reasonable interpretation. It must be interpreted to mean that which the legislature of
the state of Delaware had a right to do, and not that which the legislature had not a right to do. The rights, powers, immunities, privileges and franchises conferred by the legislature on the purchasers of
Lbe Wilmington and Reading Railroad must be interpreted to be such
rights, powers, immunities, privileges, and franchises as those conferred by the legislature on the Wilmington and Reading Railroad by
any act or acts of the general assembly which the Delaware legislature
had the right to confer, and to vest the same in said purchasers,
because the legislature had the right to make such a grant; but the
legislature had no 11,ufhority to take from the Wilmington and Reading Railroad rights, powers, immunities, privileges and franchi'ses,
the same never having been judicially declared forfeited, no1· revoked
cons/£tutionally by legislative authority. If the legislature had re7Joked the charter of the Wilmington and Reading Railroad, # could
htrDe granted rights, powers, £111111un£ties , privt'leges and franchises
of the same nature and k£nd as those wh£ch the Wilmt'ngton and
Reading Rat'lroad had theretofore possessed, but not the same t'dentica/ rights, powers, t'mmunitt'es, pr£v t'lcges and francht"ses , berause the charter be£ng revoked, it would follow that the r£ghts , powers,
im1mmitt'es, prt'v£leges and franchises ceased and d etermined, and
were not the subject of transference to another company by leg£slat£ve
grallt. The words, "of the corporation as whose property the same
wa sold, and which may have been granted thereto or conferred
thereupon by any act or acts of assembly v;hatsoever in force at the
time of such sale," must be interpreted as having relation to what
was sold, and not to that which was not sold, and could not have been
legally sold under the said decree of foreclosure. According to this
interpretation, the words used would have force and effect. A con-
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It appears from the case stated that the judgment in respect to

which controversy exists in this case was on May 29, 1886, marked

trary interpretation, would render the words of the act of assembly
inoperative and void.
It appears from the case stated that the judgment in respect to
which controversy exists in this case was on May 29 1 1886, marked
for the use of the Wilmington and Northern Railroad Company by
Victor Du Pont, attorney for plaintiff, and on June 12, 1886, for the
use of John C. Higgins, by direction of H. A. Du Pont, president of
the Wilmington and Northern Railroad Company. It also appears
in like manner that there had been no meeting of the stockholders of
the Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company after the sale
thereof under the decrees of foreclosure aforesaid. If these facts be
so, the Wilmington and Reading Railroad as a corporation was not
dead, nor the debts due it extinguished, so far, at least, as it existed
under the laws of the state of Delaware. In this respect it was only
dormant; capable of being revived, but incapable of action without
such revival. Its life or death rested with the legislature. The
views above expressed in reference to extinct and dormant corporations are in accordance to the opinion of the court in the case of Bank
v. Lockwood's Adm'r. "There is," says Morawetz (Priv. Corp.,
§§ 1002, 1003), "a broad and fundamental distinction between the
dissolution of the corporation and the loss of its franchise or legal
right to exist. Much confusion may be avoided," he says, "by bearing in mind this distinction." Again, he says: "If the charter of a
corporation limits its existence to a definite period of time, the franchise or right to exist would expire at the time limited." Again:
'' The franchise to exist and carry on business as a corporation continues indefinitely unless Ike time. of its duration is expressly limited in
llte grant.'' If the corporation should be guilty of any wrongful act,
or neglect of duty, wh£ck would give the stale a right to declare the
franchise forfeited, tke franchise would nevertheless conti'nue until the
forfeiture has been claimed and enforced by the state tlzrough the proper
legal proceedings. The commissz'on of a wrongful act or neglect of duty
by a corporation would evidently not per se put an end to tlze achtal existence of the corporate association. After a long-continued non-user
z't may be presumed that a corporation lzas surrendered its francMses to
tke state; but tke mere fact tkat a corporation /ias been without officers
or organization, and has performed no corporate acts during a number
ofyears, does not put an end to £ts franchises, alt/iough this may be a
good ground for declaring them forfeited by judicial proceedings.''
The charter of a corporation does not expire by reason of the omission or commission of acts on the part of the company for declaring
a forfeiture, but the franchises continue in full force until the penalty
of forfeiture is claimed by the state granting the franchise, and this
can be done only through a legal proceeding by which the cause of
forfeiture is judicially ascertained, and not in a purely collateral proceeding. Says Pierce (R. R. 11): "The non-use or misuse of its
franchises by a corporation, or its breach of the conditions on which
its duration is by the law of its creation made to depend, is a cause of
forfeiture. Such defaults, however, do not of themselves work a

for the use of the Wilmington and Northern Railroad Company by
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dissolution of the corporation and the loss of its franchise or legal

right to exist. Much confusion may be avoided," he says, "by bear-

ing in mind this distinction." Again, he says: "If the charter of a

corporation limits its existence to a definite period of time, the fran-

chise or right to exist would expire at the time limited." Again:

'' The franchise to exist and carry on business as a corporation con-

tinues indefinitely unless the time of its duration is expressly limited in
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or neglect of duty, which would give the state a right to declare the
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forfeiture has been claimed and enforced by the state through the proper

legal proceedings. The commission of a wrongful act or neglect of duty

by a corporation would evidently not per se put an end to the actual ex-

istence of the corporate association. After a long-continued non-user

it may be presumed that a corporation has surrendered its franchises to

the state; but the mere fact that a corporation has been without officers

or organization, and has performed no corporate acts during a number

of years, does not put an end to its franchises, although this may be a

good ground for declaring them forfeited by judicial proceedings."

The charter of a corporation does not expire by reason of the omis-

sion or commission of acts on the part of the company for declaring

a forfeiture, but the franchises continue in full force until the penalty

of forfeiture is claimed by the state granting the franchise, and this

can be done only through a legal proceeding by which the cause of

forfeiture is judicially ascertained, and not in a purely collateral pro-

ceeding. Says Pierce (R. R. 11): "The non-use or misuse of its
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forfeiture, but they take effect only when judicially determined in a
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direct proceeding instituted for the purpose. A non-user or mis-

user is a ground of forfeiture, although not expressly declared to be

such by statute.'' The same writer says: "A cause of forfeiture which

has not been judicially declared in a direct proceeding can not be

taken advantage of collaterally." The legal modes of proceeding

against a corporation for usurpation—non-user or misuser of a fran-

chise—is scire facias, or an information in the nature of a quo war-

ranto, each prosecuted at the instance and on behalf of the state.

What becomes of the corporate property of a corporation in the

event of its dissolution? The court in the case of Bank v. Lockwood's

Admr's, before referred to, say that on the dissolution of a corpora-

tion as by the expiration of the period of its charter, its real estate re-

verts to the grantor, its personal estate to the people, and the debts

due to it are extinguished. This is doubtless so at the common law,

and in a proceeding at law as a scire facias on a judgment; but the

more modern doctrine upon this subject seems to be that the capital

of a corporation becomes upon its dissolution a fund to be adminis-
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tered in equity for the payment of its creditors, and afterwards for

distribution among its stockholders. The creditors have a lien on the

assets, and may follow them into the hands of stockholders and per-

sons who are indebted to the corporation. The rights of stockholders

in the assets are subordinate to those of creditors. See Pierce R. R.

13, and authorities cited. In my opinion, when the constitution of

this state speaks of the reserved power of revocation of a corporation

by the legislature, it means an express revocation by the legislature,

and not otherwise.

It will be seen from what I have already said that the judgment set

forth in the case stated, being No. 181 to the November term, 1869,

of the superior court, whether it be a valid and subsisting judgment or

not, did not pass to the Wilmington and Northern Railroad Company

by virtue of the acts of assembly, mortgage foreclosure proceeding,

sale and conveyance recited in the case stated, so as to give the said

Wilmington and Northern Railroad Company the right to enforce said

judgment by execution issued against the defendants, and that John

C. Higgins, who claims to be the assignee of said company to said

judgment, has not the right to enforce said judgment against the de-

fendants. • » •

you. See 1886, Appeal of Pittsburgh R. Co., 122 Pa. St. 511. 9 Am. St.

R. 128; infra, p. 1342; 1887, Fietsam v. Hay, 122 111. 293; 3 Am. St. R. 492,

mpra, p. 141; 1844, State v. Real Estate Bank, 5 Ark. 595, 41 Am. Dec. 109;

infra, p. 1298; 1890, People v. North Riv. Sug. Ref. Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 18 Am.

St. R. 843, supra, p. 100; 1889, State v. Minnesota Thresher Co., 40 Minn. 213,

27 Am. & E. C. Cas. 286; 1892, People v. Buffalo, etc., Co., 131 N. Y. 140;

1888, State v. Madison, etc., R., 72 Wis. 612, 40 N. W. 487; 1891, People v.

Broadway R., 125 N. Y. 29; 1884, State v. Railway Co., 40 O. S. 504 .
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forfeiture, but they take effect only when judicially determined in a
direct proceeding instituted for the purpose. A non-user or misuser is a gTOund of forfeiture, although not expressly declared to be
such by statute.'' The same writer says: ''A cause of forfeiture which
has not been judicially declared in a direct proceeding can not be
taken advantage of collaterally." The legal modes of proceeding
against a corporatlon for usurpation-non-user or misuser of a franchi e-is scire faci'as, or an information in the nature of a quo warranto, each prosecuted at the instance and on behalf of the state.
What becomes of the corporate property of a corporation in the
e\·eot of its dissolution? The court in the case of Bank v. Lockwood's
Admr's, before referred to, say that on the dissolution of a corporation as by the expiration of the period of its charter, its real estate re\·erts to the grantor, its personal estate to the people, and the debts
due to it are extinguished. This is doubtless so at the common law,
and in a proceeding at law as a scire faci'as on a judgment; but the
more modern doctrine upon this subject seems to be that the capital
of a corporation becomes upon its dissolution a fund to be administered in equity for the payment of its creditors, and afterwards for
distribution among its stockholders. The creditors have a lien on the
assets, and may follow them into the hands of stockholders and per~ons who are indebted to the corporation.
The rights of stockholders
in the assets are subordinate to those of creditors. See Pierce R. R.
13, and authorities cited. In my opinion, when the constitution of
this state speaks of the reserved power of revocation of a corporation
by the legislature, it means an express revocation by the legislature,
and not otherwise.
It will be seen from what I have already said that th e judgment set
forth in tbe case stated, being No. 181 to the November term, 1869 1
of tbe superior court, whether it be a valid and subsisting judgment or
not, did not pass to the Wilmington and Northern Railroad Company
by virtue of the acts of assembly, mortgage foreclosure proceeding,
sale and conveyance recited in the case stated, so as to give the said
Wilmington and Northern Rnilroacl Company the right to enforce said
judgment by execution issued against the defendants, and that John
C. Higgins, who claims to be the assignee of said company to said
judgment, has not the right to en force said judgment against the defendants. • • •
Not~. See 1886, Appeal of Pittsburgh R. Co., 122 Pa. St. 511, 9 Am. St.
R. 128; infra, p. 1342; 1887, Fietsam v. Hay, 122 111. 293; 3 Am. St. R. 492,
tvpra, p. 141; 1844, State v. Real Estate Bank, 5 Ark. 595, 41 Am. Dec. 109;

Corporation as a franchise.—Pollock and Maitland, History of English

ilfra, p. 1298; 1890, People v. North Riv. Bug. Ref. Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 18 Am.
t. R. 843, sttpra, p. 100; 1889, State v. Minnesota Thresher Co., 40 Minn. 213,
'!i Am. & E. C. Oas. 286; 1892, People v. Buffalo, etc., Co., 131 N. Y. 140;
1888, State v. Madison, etc., R., 72 Wis. 612, 40 N. W. 487; 1891, People v.
Broadway R., 125 N. Y. 29; 1884, State v. Railway Co., 40 0. S. 604.
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any great degree an owner of lands or of goods; on the other hand it was

a holder of franchises. * * * The English temporal corporations, when

there was just this likeness: neither the borough nor the university was t.o
any great degree an owner of lands or of goods; on the other hand it was
a bolder of franchises. • • • The English temporal corporations, when
they first appear as ideal persons, appear not in the c,baracter of mere privare
persons, but in the character-we may almost say it-of governmental officers
and magistrates who hold property in right of their offices. Their lands, their
goods are few; what they own is jurisdiction, governmental powers and
fiscal immunities. This is a characteristic feature of our temporal corporations in the first stage of their existence; the artificial person comes into being
in order that he may govern and do justice. • • • This is well marked
in the history of Oxford. • • • This is so also with the merchant gild8.
They look to a modern eye now like voluntary aasociations of traders, and
now like organs of municipal government. • • • We may well suppose
that the juristic person made its appearance at a comparatively early time in
the gild ball of the brethren. Not that the gild was a trading corporation in
the modern sense. In mercantile transactions with outsiders it appea1'8 rather
as a societas than a tmiversitas. It had no property engaged in trade. • • •
Butt.be main property of the gild, as of the university, consists not of lands
and goods, but of fmnchises, jurisdictional powers and fiscal immunities."
In argument, Serjeant P emberton, in King v. London, 1Show.275, 6, 1692,
said: "A corporation is an artificial body, consisting of particular persons,
as members constituent th ereof, and like unto a natural body t.o many/arposes; that which doth unite them is the liberties and privileges grante for
that purpose. It is but n fra11chise granted originally to them by king or parliament. In all concessions of liberties and franchises, there is a tacit condi·
tion annexed to them, that th ey use them well; which upon doing otherwise
determines them; an abuse forfeits them all. 20 Ed. 4, pl. 5, pl. 6, 2 Inst.
222. The way for the king to take an advantage of such an abuser is a quo
warranto, or information in nuture of it, that is the king's writ of right; here
these abusers are examined, and then judgment is either given for acquittal
or for the king." "But here [after judgment of seizure ] it is otherwise, and
therefore I conclude that the franchise by which they claim to be a corpora·
tion was out of them, and in the king, as extinct ; for it is such a fran cbiee
as the king can not have by way of user1 and therefore it must be gone, and
determined, and if so, tlie corporation 1s dissolved; that which ties them
together is their franchise; take away that, and they are so many single
persons; for the franchise not only unites them, but distinguishes them, one
as mayor, and another as aii alderman, and the like; then that being gone,
none of them are such." 20 Ed. 4, 1;>1. 5, pl. 6, 2 Inst. 222.
In Carth. 217, this same argument JS said to have stated these views as fol·
lows: "A corporation is an artificial body, composed of divers constituent
members, ad instar corporis humani, and the ligaments of this body politic or
artificial body are the franchises and liberties thereof, which bind and unite
all its memhers together; and the wllole essence and frame of the corporation con·
sist therein."
Blackstone says: "It is likewise a franchise for a number of persons to be
incorporated and subsist as a body politic; with power to maintain perpetual
succession, and do other corporate acts; and each individual member of such
corporation is also said to have a franchise or freedom ." Commentaries,
Book II , p. *37, 1766. Judge Cooley, in his note to this statement, in hisedi·
tion of Blackstone's Commentaries, 1870, p. •40 note, says: "Among the
most important of modern franchises are the franchise to be a corpora·
tion. * * * And not only is the right to be a corporation a franchise, bat
so is every particular right or privilege possessed by a corporation under its
charter, which could only be exercised by legislative permission." Blacksk>ne
says further, citing Finch 164 (1613) : "Franchises and liberty are used as
synonymous terms; and their definition is, a royal privilege or branch of the
king's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of the subject * * • they may
be vested in either natural persons or bodies politic; in one man, or in manv ;
but the same identical franchise that bas before been granted to one can n"ot

they first appear as ideal persons, appear not in the character of mere private

persons, but in the character—we may almost say it—of governmental officers

and magistrates who hold property in right of their offices. Their lands, their

goods are few; what they own is jurisdiction, governmental powers and

fiscal immunities. This is a characteristic feature of our temporal corpora-

tions in the first stage of their existence; the artificial person conies into being

in order that he may govern and do justice. » * » This is well marked

in the history of Oxford. * * * This is so also with the merchant gilds.

They look to a modern eye now like voluntary associations of traders, and

now like organs of municipal government. * » » We may well suppose

that the juristic person made its appearance at a comparatively early time in

the gild hall of the brethren. Not that the gild was a trading corporation in

the modern sense. In mercantile transactions with outsiders it appears rather

as a societal than a universitas. It had no property engaged in trade. » ♦ •

But the main property of the gild, as of the university, consists not of lands

and goods, but of franchises, jurisdictional powers and fiscal immunities."
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In argument, Serjeant Petnberton, in King v. London, 1 Show. 275, 6, 1692,

said: "A corporation is an artificial body, consisting of particular persons,

as members constituent thereof, and like unto a natural body to many pur-

poses; that which doth unite them is the liberties and privileges granted for

that purpose. It is but n franchise granted originally to them by king or par-

liament. In all concessions of liberties and franchises, there is a tacit condi-

tion annexed to them, that they use them well; which upon doing otherwise

determines them; an abuse forfeits them all. 20 Ed. 4, pi. 5, pi. 6, 2 Inst.

222. The way for the king to take an advantage of such an abuser is a qvo

warranto, or information in nature of it, that is the king's writ of right; here

these abusers are examined, and then judgment is either given for acquittal

or for the king." "But here [after judgment of seizure] it is otherwise, and

therefore I conclude that the franchise by which they claim to be a corpora-

tion was out of them, and in the king, as extinct; for it is such a franchise

as the king can not have by way of user; and therefore it must be gone, and

determined, and if so, the corporation is dissolved; that which ties them

together is their franchise; take away that, and they are so many single

persons; for the franchise not only unites them, but distinguishes them, one

as mayor, and another as an alderman, and the like; then that being gone,

none of them are such." 20 Ed. 4, pi. 5, pi. 6, 2 Inst. 222.

In Carth. 217, this same argument is said to have stated these views as fol-

lows: "A corporation is an artificial body, composed of divers constituent

members, ad instar corporis humani, and the ligaments of this body politic or

artificial body are the franchises and liberties thereof, which bind and unite

all its members together; and the whole essence and frame of the corporation con-

sist therein."

Blackstone says: "It is likewise a franchise for a number of persons to be

incorporated and subsist as a body politic; with power to maintain perpetual

succession, and do other corporate acts; and each individual member of such

corporation is also said to have a franchise or freedom." Commentaries,

Book II, p. *37, 1766. Judge Cooley, in his note to this statement, in his edi-

tion of Blackstone's Commentaries, 1870, p. *40 note, says: "Among the

most important of modern franchises are the franchise to be a corpora-

tion. * * * And not only is the right to be a corporation a franchise, bat

so is every particular right or privilege possessed by a corporation under its

charter, which could only be exercised by legislative permission." Blackstone

says further, citing Finch 164 (1613): "Franchises and liberty are used as

synonymous terms; and their definition is, a royal privilege or branch of the

king's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of the subject * * * they may

be vested in either natural persons or bodies politic; in one man, or in many;

but the same identical franchise that has before been granted to one can not
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be bestowed on another, for that would prejudice the former grant." (But as

to this, see, Piscataqua Bridge v. N. H. Bridge, 7 N. H. 36, infra, p. 309, contra.)

THE CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE.

Mr. Kyd, Law of Corporations, p. 14 (1793), says: "A corporation has also

I59

been called a franchise; the propriety of this appellation depends on the

more or less extensive meaning in which the word franchise' is used; in its

most extensive sense it expresses every political right which can be enjoyed

or exercised by a freeman; in this sense the right of being tried by a jury,

the right a man may have to an office, the right of voting at elections, may,

with propriety, be called franchises; and in this sense the right of acting, as a

corporation, may be called a franchise, existing collectively in all the individuals

of whom the corporation is composed; in this sense, and in this sense alone,

'the franchise of being a corporation' can have any precise meaning.

"In a less general and more appropriate sense, the word 'franchise' means

a royal privilege in the hands of a subject, by which he either receives some

profit or has the exclusive exercise of some right; of the first kind are the goods

of felons, waifs, eatrays, wrecks or the like; of the second are courts, gaols, re-

turn of writs, fairs, markets and many others. They are estates and inheritances,

which may be granted and conveyed from one to another, as other estates,

which is not the case with a corporation; in this sense a corporation can not

be called a franchise; the latter is a privilege, or liberty, which can have no
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existence without reference to some person to whom it may belong; the

former is a political person, capable, like a natural person, of enjoying a

variety of franchises; it is to a franchise as the substance to its attribute; it

is something to which many attributes belong, but is itself something dis-

tinct from those attributes."

Justice Washington, in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.)

•ill 1819, on p. 657, says: "A corporation is defined by Mr. Justice Black-

stone, 2 Bl. Com. 37, to be a franchise. It is, says he, "a franchise for a

number of persons to be incorporated and to exist as a body politic, with a

power to maintain perpetual succession and to do corporate acta, and each

individual of such corporation is also said to have a franchise, or freedom."

This franchise like other franchises is an incorporeal hereditament issuing

oat of something real or personal, or concerning or annexed to, or exercisable

within a thing corporate. To this grant or this franchise, the parties are the

king, and the persons for whose benefit it is created, or trustees for them.

The assent of both is necessary." (See Skelly v. The Jefferson Bank, 9 Ohio

St. 606, on 623, where the court shows how this definition of a franchise was

used in the decision of the Dartmouth College case.)

In People v. Tibbets, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 358, 380 (1825), it is said: "To be a

corporation is a franchise (2 Bl. Com. 37), for the usurpation of which an in-

formation always lies (citing People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 386,

389,supra, p. 113; R. v. Nicholson et al., 1 Str. 299). And the question is

whether the intrusion into offices created for the government or exercise of

the franchise is equally within the act as an usurpation of the franchise

itself?" Held, it was, and that quo warranto would be allowed against persons

who intrude themselves into the office of directors of an insurance company.

(To same effect see: 1833, State v. Buchanan, Wright (Ohio) 233; State v.

Harris, 3 Ark. 570; 1862, Smith v. State Bank, 18 Ind. 327; 1837, Common-

wealth v. Gill, 3 Whart. (Pa.) 228; 1881, Creek v. State, 77 Ind. 180; 1887,

State v. Mayor, etc., 10 Atl. (N. J.) 377.

Kent, Commentaries, vol. ii, p. 267, 182 7, says: "A corporation is a fran-

chise possessed by one or more individuals, who subsist, as a body politic,

under a special denomination, and are vested by the policy of the law, with

the capacity of perpetual succession, and of acting in several respects, how-

ever numerous the association may be, as a single individual." He says,

alw, vol. iii, p. 458, "Another class of incorporeal hereditaments are fran-

chises, being certain privileges conferred by grant from government, and

vest»d in individuals. In England they are very numerous, and are under-

be bestowed on another, for that would prejudice the former grant." (But as
to this, see, Piscataqua Bridge v. N. H. Bridge, 7 N. H. 35, infra, p. 309,contra.)

~r. Kyd, Law of Corporations, p. 14 ( 1793), says: "A corporation has also
been called a franchise; the propriety of this apr,ellation depends on the
more or less extensive meaning in which the word franchise' is used; in its
most extensive sense it expresses every political right which can be enjoyed
or exercised by a freeman; in this sense the right of being tried by a jury,
the right a man may have to an office, the right of voting at elections, may,
with propriety, be called franchises; and in this sense the right of acting, as a
eorporatio1', may be called a franchise, existfag collectivelu in all the individuals
of whom the corporation is composed; in this sense, and in this sense alone,
'I.he fTanchise of being a corporation' can have any precise meaning.
"In a less general and more appropriate sense, the word 'franchise' means
a roval privilege in the bands of a subject, by which he either receives some
profit or bas the exclusive exercise of some right; of the first kind are the goods
of felons, waifs, estrays, wrecks or the like; of the second are courts, gnols, return of writs, fairs, markets and many others. They are estates and inheritances,
which may be granted and cqnveyed from one to another, as other estates,
which is not the case with a corporation; in this sense a corporation can not
be called a franchise; the latter is a privilege, or liberty, which can have no
existence without reference to 1mme person to whom it may belong; the
former is a political person, capable, like a natural person, of enioying a
variety of franchises; it is to a franchise as the substance to its attribute; it is something to which many attributes belong, but is itself something distinct from those attributes."
Justice Wa"8hinirton, in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.)
518. 1819, on p. 657, says: "A corporation is defined by Mr. Justice Blackstone, 2 Bl. Com. 37, to be a franchise. It is, says he, "a franchise for a
nnmber of persona to be incorporated and to exist as a body politic, with a
power to maintain perpetual succession and to do corporate acts, and each
inrlividaal of such corporation is also said to hnve a franchise, or freedom ."
This franchise like other franchises is an incorporeal hereditament issuing
oa.t of something real or personal, or concerning or annexed to, or exercisable
within a thing corporate. To this grant or this franchise, the parties are the
king, and the persons for whose benefit it is created, or trustees for thE>m.
The as ent of both is necessary." (See Skelly v. The Jefferson Bank, 9 Ohio
St. 606, on 623, where the court shows how this definition of a franchise was
1l3ed in the deci!!ion of the Dartmouth College case.)
In People v. Tibbets, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 358, 380 '1825), it is said: "To be a
corporation is a franchise 12 Bl. Com. 37), for the usurpation of which an inform;ttion always lies (citing People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 386,
389, ~11pra, p. 113; R. v. Nicholson et al., 1 Str. 299). And the question is
whether the intrusion into offices created for the government or exercise of
~be franchise is equally within the act as an usurpation of the franchise
itself?" Held, it was, and that quo ioarranto would be allowed against persons
who intrude themselves into the office of directors of an im~urance company .
tTo same effect see: 1833, State v. Buchanan, Wright (Ohio) 233; State v.
Harris, 3 Ark. 570; 1862, Smith v. State Bank, 18 Ind. 327; 1837, Commonwealth v. Gill, 3 Whart. (Pa.) 228; 1881, Creek v. State, 77 Ind. 180; 1887,
State v. Mayor, etc., 10 At!. (N. J.) 377.
Kent, Commentaries, vol. ii, p. 267, 1827, says: "A corporation is a franchise possessed by one or more individuals, who subsist, as a body politic,
a.oder a special denomination, and are vested by the policy of the law, with
the capacity of perpetual succession, and of acting in several respects, however nnmerons the association may be, as a single individual." He says,
also, vol. iii, p. 458, "Another class of incorporeal hereditaments are franchises, being certain privileges conferred by grant from government, and
vesttd in individuals. In England they are very numerous, and are understood to be royal privileges in the hands of a subject. They contain an implied covenant on the part of the government not to invade the rights vested,
and on the part of the grantees to execute the conditions and duties prescribed

stood to be royal privileges in the hands of a subject. They contain an im-

plied covenant on the part of the government not to invade the rights vested,

and on the part of the grantees to execute the conditions and duties prescribed
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in the grant, * * and they are necessarily exclusive in their nature. Tne
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government can not resume them at pleasure, or do any act to impair the

NOTES TO ARTICLE IV.

grant, without a breach of contract." (But as to this, see i"n/ra,p.309, contra.)

in the grant, • • and they are necessarily exclusive in their nature. T.ae
government can not resume them at pleasure, or do any act to impair the
grant, without a breach of contract." (But as to thjs, see infra, p. 309, contra.)
The exclusive nature of corporate franchises (in these cases to build and
maintain a bridge ) was the snbject of much discussion in the cases of Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 344, on 520 (1829 !, where the
nature of franchises are discussed. The supreme court of the United States
in the same case, 11 Peters (U.S.) 420 ( 1837 ), determined that the mere grant
of a franchise did not make it exclusive. In Enfield Bridge Company v. The
Connecticut River Company, 7 Conn. 28, it was held the l'tate could not grant
to another company the right to erert a bridge in the exact location previously
granted to another company. In the Americant Jurist, vol. 6, p. 87 et seq.
(1831 l, there is an article discussing these two cases, and going into the nature
of franchises somewhat in detail. In Trustees of Maysville v. Boon, etc., 2
J. J. Marsh. (Ky-.) 225, on 228, it is said: "A ferry is a franchise 1·eal, and may
be forfeited for 1101M1ser." See, also, Trustees of New Gloucester ~chool Fund
v . Bradbury, 11 Maine 118, on 124, 26 Am. Der. 515, on 518 (1834), where
Justice Washington's statement in Dartmouth College Case (sup1·a) is given
and relied on.
In Price v. Price's Heirs, 6 Dana (Ky.) 107, it is said: "The right conferred
upon each shareholder [in a railroad company] is unquestionably an incorporeal hereditament. It is a right of perpetual duration; and though it.
springs out of personalty, as well as lands and houses', this matters not. It
is a franchise which has ever been classed in that class of real estate denominated an incorporeal bereditament." "It will descend as realty, and is subiert to dower as such." Citing 2 Bl. 20, 1, 2, 37-8; Co. Litt. 19, 20. Com.
Digest, Frimchise.
In Montpelier Academy v. George, 14 La. 395, 33 Am. Dec. 585, on 59()
(184.0), Carleton, J., says, as to the franchise, after quoting Blackstone:
"There is a grantor and grantee whose assent is necessary; the king parts
from his prerogat.ive under an implied promise not to bestow the same franchise on another corporate body. It, therefore, involves a contract not to reassert the right, grant it to another, or impair it." Citing King v. PaBSmore,
3 T. R. 246; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (CJ. S.) 87; Philips v. Bury, 1 Ld.
Raym. 5, s. c. 2 T. R. 346, 1 Kyd Corp. 25. To the same effect substantially is
Regents of Univ. of Md. v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 365, on 407, 31 Am.
Dec. 95 (1838).
In Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v . Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 17 Conn. 454, 44 Am.
Dec. 556 (1846l, the bridge company had the exclusive right to build and
maintain a bri<lge over the Connect.icut river at Enfield, and collect the tolls.
After the brid~e had been taken by the railroad company under the power of
eminent domam, the bridge company claimed that, though this could be done,
there still existed "something beyond the bridge franchise which bad been
invaded,-a contract has been impaired." The court, by Church, J ., replied:
"The contract constitutes the franchise. All franchises emanating from the
government are the results of contracts between the state nnd indh•iduals.
To say, therefore, that although such franchises may be taken for public use
upon compensation, and at the same time to insist that the contract or covenant ,by which they a.re created is unconstitutionally impaired, is an absurdity.
That a contract may as well exist between the state and corporate bodies
as be.tween indivi<lnals, which are beyond their franchises, and beyond legislative control, is true; but the contract creating the corporation and de.tining ita
powr.rs and privileges , is not of this character. This is ·identical with the franchise
it.~elf, and subject to the same laws."
In Yarmouth v. North Yarmouth, 34 Maine 411, on 418, 56 Am. Dec. 666, on
670 (1862). it seemed funds derived from the sale of a school farm were
vested in trustees who were incorporated, in trust for school purposes in
North Yarmontb. Aft.erwar<l the legislnture divided this town into two, Yarmouth and North Yarmouth. the former of which claimed part of the fnnds,
under the act of the legislature which directed the funds to be so divided.

The exclusive nature of corporate franchises (in these cases to build and

maintain a bridge) was the subject of much discussion in the cases of Charles

River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 344, on 520 (1829>, where the

nature of franchises are discussed. The supreme court of the United States

in the same case, 11 Peters (17. S.) 420 (1837), determined that the mere grant

of a franchise did not make it exclusive. In Enfield Bridge Company v. The

Connecticut River Company, 7 Conn. 28, it was held the state could not grant

to another company the right to erect a bridge in the exact location previously

granted to another company. In the Americant Jurist, vol. 6, p. 87 et seq.

(1831), there is an article discussing these two cases, and going into the nature

of franchises somewhat in detail. In Trustees of Maysville v. Boon, etc., 2

J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 225, on 228, it is said: "A ferry is a"franchise real, and may

be forfeited for non-user." See, also, Trustees of New Gloucester School Fund

v. Bradbury, 11 Maine 118, on 124, 26 Am. Dec. 515, on 518 (1834), where

Justice Washington's statement in Dartmouth College Case {supra) is given

and relied on.
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In Price v. Price's Heirs, 6 Dana (Ky.) 107, it is said: "Theright conferred

upon each shareholder [in a railroad company] is unquestionably an incor-

poreal hereditament. It is a right of perpetual duration; and' though it

springs out of personalty, as well as lands and houses', this matters not. It

is a franchise which has ever been classed in that class of real estate denom-

inated an incorporeal hereditament." "It will descend as realty, and is sub-

ject to dower as such." Citing 2 Bl. 20, 1, 2, 37-S; Co. Litt. 19, 20. Com.

In Montpelier Academy v. George, 14 La. 395, 33 Am. Dec. 585, on 590

(184.0), Carleton, J., says, as to the franchise, after quoting Blackstone:

"There is a grantor and grantee whose assent is necessary; the king parts

from his prerogative under an implied promise not to bestow the same fran-

chise on another corporate body. It, therefore, involves a contract not to re-

assert the right, grant it to another, orimpair it." Citing King v. Passmore,

3T. R. 246; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Craneh (IT. S.) 87; Philips v. Burv, 1 Ld.

Ravm. 5, s. c. 2 T. R. 346, 1 Kyd Corp. 25. To the same effect substantially is

Regents of Univ. of Md. v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 365, on 407, 31 Am.

Dec. 95 (1838).

In Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 17 Conn. 454,44 Am.

Dec. 556 (18461, the bridge company had the exclusive right to build and

maintain a bridge over the Connecticut river at Enfield, and collect the tolls.

After the bridge had been taken by the railroad company under the power of

eminent domain, the bridge company claimed that, though this could be done,

there still existed "something beyond the bridge franchise which had been

invaded,—a contract has been impaired." The court, by Church, J., replied:

"The contract constitutes the franchise. All franchises emanating from the

government are the results of contracts between the state and individuals.

To say, therefore, that although such franchises may be taken for public use

upon compensation, and at the same time to insist that the contract or cove-

nant by which thev are created is unconstitutionally impaired, is an absur-

dity.

That a contract may as well exipt between the state and corporate bodies

as between individuals, which are beyond their franchises, and beyond legis-

lative control, is true; but the contract creating the corporation and defining its

powers and privileges, is not of this character. This is identical tcith the franchise

itself, and subject to the same laws."

In Yarmouth v. North Yarmouth, 34 Maine 411, on 418, 56 Am. Dec. 666, on

670 (1852). it seemed funds derived from the sale of a school farm were

vested in trustees who were incorporated, in trust for school purposes in

North Yarmouth. Afterward the legislature divided this town into two, Yar-

mouth and North Yarmouth, the former of which claimed part of the funds,

under the act of the legislature which directed the funds to be so divided.
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The trustees resisted and it was held, Howard, J.: "This fond was never in

THE CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE.

the town, but was vested by the act, in the trustees as a corporation for the

161

use mentioned, forever. They did not constitute a municipal, or public cor-

poration, although the object of its creation might have been a public benefit.

Their charter was a grant from the state, partaking of the nature of- a contract,

which they accepted, and in which the government had nointerest. This was

a franchise, which involved the right to possess and control properly, and the right

to perpetuate a corporate immortality. 2 Bl. Com. 37. Though springing

from the grant, the franchise and the rights flowing from it were no more

subject to the control or interference of the legislature than were private

riehts of property, unless on default of the corporation judicially determined."

Cites: Co. Lit*., §413; Viner's Abr. Corp. A. 2; Philips v. Bury, 2 T. R. 34D;

Allen v. McKean, 1 Sunm. 276; Dartmouth Col. v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518

infra, p. 708; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325 (infra, p. 229); Penobscot Boom,

etc., v. Lamson, 16 Maine 224 (infra, p. 283).'

In Toledo Bank v. Bond, 1 O. S. 623 (1853), Bartley, J., says: "The franchise

of a private corporation is a trust of civil authority, which, under our system

of government, must remain at all times subservient to the public welfare, the

chief end and object of the delegation of all civil power by the people, and is,
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therefore, not the legitimate subject-matter of contract or sale."

See also State, ex rel., etc., v. Medical Society, 38 Ga. 608, 95 Am. Dec. 408

(1869), supra, p. 136, where the nature of the members' right in a corpora-

tion is called a franchise. Compare with Board of Trade v. People, 91 III. 80,

below.

In Morgan v. Louisville, 93 TJ. S. 217, on 223 (1876), Justice Field says:

'Much confusion of thought has arisen in this case and in similar cases from

attaching a vague and undefined meaning to the term franchises. It is often

used as synonymous with rights, privileges, and immunities, though of a per-

sonal and temporay character; so that, if any one of these exists, it is loosely

termed a "franchise," and is supposed to pass upon a transfer of the fran-

chises of the company. But the term must always be considered in connec-

tion with the corporation or property to which it is alleged to appertain. The

franchises of a railroad corporation are rights or privileges which are essential

to the operations of the corporation, and without which its road and works

would be of little value; such as the franchise to run cars, to take tolls, to ap-

propriate earth and gravel for the bed of its road, or water for its engines,

and the like. They are positive rights or privileges, without the possession

of which the road of the company could not be successfully worked. Im-

munity from taxation is not one of them. The former may be conveyed to a

purchaser of the road as a part of the property of the company; the latter is

personal, and incapable of transfer without express statutory direction." To

the same effect are Wilson v. Gaines, 103 U. S. 417; Louisville & N. R. Co. v.

Palmes, 109 U. S. 244; Memphis R. Co. v. Commissioners, 112 TJ. S. 609 (supra,

p. 143).

In Smith v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 68 N. Y. 552, on 555 (1877), the

court, in distinguishing a franchise from property held under a franchise, said:

'Tnder the laws of our state a mere franchise or incorporeal hereditament of

any kind is not taxable, except by special statute. The plaintiff has a fran-

chise to construct and maintain this pier, and take wharfage for its use. The

pier itself is a structure built under his franchise. It is tangible, bulky prop-

erty, and in no sense incorporeal. It is not like a mere right or privilege,

which has no physical existence. A person may have a franchise to build and

maintain a bridge, and take toll for its use. The bridge, as a structure, is not

a franchise. He may not be taxed on bis franchise, but he can be taxed upon

the structure or real "estate."

See, also, Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 62 Cal. 69, 106 (supra,

p. 120).

1878, The Board of Trade of Chicago v. The People, 91 111. 80. Relator

The trustees resist.ed and it was held, HOWARD, J.: "This funrl was n ever in
the town, but was vested by the act, in the trustees as a corporation fo r the
n..-e mentioned, forever. They <lid not constitute a municipal, or public corporation, although the object of its creation might have been a public benefit.
Their charter was a grant from the state, partaking of the nature of· a contract,
which they accepted, and in which the government bad no interest. This was
afranehi11e, which involved the rigltt to possess and control property, and the right
to perpetuate a corporate immortality. 2 Bl. Com. 37. Though springing
from the grant, the franchise and the rights flowing from it were no more
subject t-0 the control or interference of the legislature than were private
rights of property, unless on default of the corporation judicially determined. "
Cites: Co. Litt., §413; Viner's Abr. Corp. A. 2; Philips v. Bury, 2 T . R . 34G;
Allen v. McKean, 1 Sumn. 276; Dartmouth Col. v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518
infra, p. 7U8; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325 (infra, p. 229); Penobscot Boom,
etc., v. Lamson, 16 Maine 224 (infra, p. 283):
In Toledo Bank v. Bond, 1 0. S. 623 (1853 ), Bartley, J., says: "The franchise
ofa private corporation is a trust of civil authority, which, under our system
oi government, must remain at all times subservient to the public welfare, the
rhief end and object of the delegation of all civil power by the people, and is,
therefore, not the legitimate subject-matter of contract or sale."
See also State, ex rel., etc., v. Medical Society, 38 Ga. 608, 95 Am. Dec. 408
(1869), 3Upra, p. 136, where the nature of the members' right in a corporation is called a franchise. Compare with Board of Trade v. People, 91 lll. 80,
below.
In Morgan v. Louisville, 93 U.S. 217, on 223 (1876), Justice Field says:
" ~och confusion of thought bas arisen in this case and in similar cases from
a~taching a vague and undefined meaning to the term franchises. It is often
a..<ed as synonymous with rights, privileges, and immunities, though of a personal and temporay character; so that, if any one of these exists, it is loosely
termed a "franchise," and is supposed to pass upon a transfer of the franchises of the company. But the term must always be considered in connection with the corporation or property to which it is alleged to appertain. The
franchises of a railroad corporation are rights or privileges which are essential
to the operations of the corporation, and without which its road and works
would be of little value; such as the franchise to run cars, to take tolls, to appropriate earth and gravel for the bed of its road, or water for its engines,
aad the Hite. They are positive rights or privileges, without lhe possession
of which the road of the company could not be successfully worked. Immunity from taxation is not one of them . The former may be conveyed to a
purchaser of the road as a part of the property of the company; the latter. is
personal, and incapable of transfer without express statutory direction." To
the same effect are Wilson v. Gaines, 103 U.S. 417; Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Palmea, 109 U. S. 244; Memphis R. Co. v. CommissioneM, 112 U. 8. 609 (supra,
p. 143).

In Smith v. Mayor, etc., of New. York, 68 N. Y. 552, on 555 0877), the
rourt., in distinguishing a franchise from property held under a franchise, said:
"Under the laws of our state a mere franchise or incorporeal hereditament of
anr kiud is not taxable, except by special statute. The plaintiff bas a fran chise to constmct and maintain this pier, and take wbarfage for its use. The
pier itself is a structure built under his franchise. It is tangible, bulky property, and in no sense incorporeal. It is not like a mere right or privilege,
v.-hich has no physical existence. A person may have a franchise to build and
maintain a bridge, and take toll for its use. The bridge, as a structure, is not
a franchise. He may not be taxed on his franchise, but he can be taxed upon
the structure or real estate."
See, also, Spring Valley Water Works v. Scbottler, 62 Cal. 69, 106 (supra,
p. 120).
1878, The Board of Tr11de of Chicago v. The People, 91 Ill. 80. Relator
was expelled from the board of trade and brought mandamus to compel that.
body to restore him to membership; a peremptory mandamus was issuerl , and
11-WIL. UASES.

was expelled from the board of trade and brought mandamus to compel that

body to restore him to membership; a peremptory mandamus was issued, and

11—Wil. Cases.
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the respondent brings the suit directly to the supreme court, under a statu-

tory provision that "Appeals and writs of error shall lie from final orders of
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the circuit court to the supreme court in cases involving a franchise or a free-

hold." Relator moved to dismiss as no franchise was involved. The court,

the respondent brings the suit directly to the supreme court, under a statutory provision that" Appeals and writs of error shall lie from final orders of
the circuit court to the supreme court in cases involving a fra.ncliise or a freehold." Relator moved to dismiss as no frailchi.se was involved. The court,
by Mr. Justice Scott, says: "The inquiry, then, must be, does the membership of the relator come within the definition of a franchise as that term is
used in the statute? Our conclusion is, it does not." After quoting Blackstone's definition, which was adopted in 73 Ill. 541, and several other cases
cited, to the effect that "corporate franchises in the American states emanate
from the government o r sovereign power, owe their existence to a grant, or,
as at common law, to prescription, which presupposes a grant, and are
vested in individuals or a body politic," the court continues: "It must have
been in this restricted sense the term "franchise" was used by the general
assembly in the statute we are considering, and not iu that broad sense contended for. No doubt the word "franchise" is sometimes used as synonymous with privileges and immunities of a personal character; but in law its
appropriate meanmg is understood to be something which the citizen can not
enjoy without legislative grant. Many of our religious, benevolent, literary
and scientific societies and associations are incorporated under general or
special laws, but it was never understood that members of such societieaorassociations possessed or exercised any franchise. What they obtain is what is
most appropriately termed "membership," which means freedom of the privilege it confers, and nothing more. That is precisely the case at bar. Relator bad membership in this corporation and the freedom of its privileges,
whatever they were, but in no just sense did he exercise any franchise granted
to him or the corporation by the general assembly. It is lawful for any person or association of persons to transact commercial business without legisla·
tive grant for that purpose. A corporation for such purposes is a mere convenience and nothing more. A member of such corporation exercises no
other rigJ:it in the buying or selling of commodities than what any citizen of
common right may do, except as in the present instance, by virtue of his
membership be may transact such business in a room belonging to the corporation, which is a mere privilege and not a franchise, in the sense that term is
used in the statute. One test that mi~bt well be applied is that in case of the
non-user or misuser by the party ownmg membership in such a corporation
an information would n ot lie against him at the suit of the people."
In Memphis & L. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609, on 619 (1884 l , 81tpra, p. 143,
Mr. Justice Matthews gives a description of corporate franchises, and shows
that "the franchise of becoming and being a corporation, in its nature, is in·
communicable by the act of the parties, and incapable of passing by assignment," citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 10 Allen 448, 455; Hall v. Sullivan
R. Co., 2 Re<lfield's Am. Ry. Cases 621, and Coe v. Columbus, P. & I. R. Co.,
10 0. s. 372, 386.
In New Orleans, S. F . & L. Co. v. Delamore, 114 U.S. 501 (1885), it is said :
"A franchise to use and occupy the streets of a municipality by a railroad
corporation, granted by the municipality, Is such a franchise as may be mortgaged and pass to the purchaser at a sale under foreclosure of the mortgage."
So, too, in State v. East Fifth St. R. Co., 140 Mo. 539, 62 Am. St. R. 742, 38
L. R. A. 218, infm, p. 706 (1897), quo warranto was brought in the lower court
to oust the street railway company of its privilege of operating its railway
upon certain streets in Kansas City, because of non-user, the city having an·
der authority of the state granted the privilege to said compnny. The defense was no franchise of the state, if any franchise at all, had been violated
by the non-user. The court of review says: "It may be said that corpornte
existence is as much a franchise as the franchises of the corporation. Tbe
former is not property in the ordinary acceptation of the term, can not be
transferred by ordinary conveyance or sale under execution, unless the statutes of the state so provide; while corporate franchises are property, can be
transferred bT voluntary conveyance or by sale, under execution against the
corporation .' rJPld, suit was prorerly brought by the state, and ouster was
declared. Compare People, ex re. Jackson, v. Suburban R. Co., 178 Tll . 594

by Mr. Justice Scott, says: "The inquiry, then, must be, does the member-

ship of the relator come within the definition of a franchise as that term is

used in the statute? Our conclusion is, it does not." After quoting Black-

stone's definition, which was adopted in 73 111. 541, and several other cases

cited, to the effect that "corporate franchises in the American states emanate

from the government or sovereign power, owe their existence to a grant, or,

as at common law, to prescription, which presupposes a grant, and are

vested in individuals or a body politic," the court continues: "It must have

been in this restricted sense the term "franchise" was used by the general

assembly in the statute we are considering, and not in that broad sense con-

tended for. No doubt the word "franchise" is sometimes used as synony-

mous with privileges and immunities of a personal character; but in law its

appropriate meaning is understood to be something which the citizen can not

enjoy without legislative grant. Many of our religious, benevolent, literary

and scientific societies and associations are incorporated under general or

special laws, but it was never understood that members of such societies or as-
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sociations possessed or exercised any franchise. What they obtain is what is

most appropriately termed "membership," which means freedom of the priv-

ilege it confers, and nothing more. That is precisely the case at bar. Rela-

tor had membership in this corporation and the freedom of its privileges,

whatever they were, but in no just sense did he exercise any franchise granted

to him or the corporation by the general assembly. It is lawful for any per-

son or association of persons to transact commercial business without legisla-

tive grant for that purpose. A corporation for such purposes is a mere con-

venience and nothing more. A member of such corporation exercises no

other right in the buying or selling of commodities than what any citizen of

common right may do, except as in the present instance, by virtue of his

membership he may transact such business in a room belonging to the corpo-

ration, which is a mere privilege and not a franchise, in the sense that term is

used in the statute. One test that might well be applied is that in case of the

non-user or misuser by the party owning membership in such a corporation

an information would not lie against him at the suit of the people."

In Memphis & L. R.Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S.609, on 619 (18841, supra, p. 143,

Mr. Justice Matthews gives a description of corporate franchises, and shows

that "the franchise of becoming and being a corporation, in its nature, is in-

communicable by the act of the parties, and incapable of passing by assign-

ment," citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 10 Allen 448, 455; Hall v. Sullivan

R. Co., 2 Redfield's Am. Ry. Cases 621, and Coe v. Columbus, P. & I. R. Co.,

10 O. S. 372, 386.

In New Orleans, S. F. & L. Co. v. Delamore, 114 IT. S. 501 (1885), it is said:

"A franchise to use and occupy the streets of a municipality by a railroad

corporation, granted by the municipality, is such a franchise as may be mort-

gaged and pass to the purchaser at a sale under foreclosure of the mortgage."

So. too, in State v. East Fifth St. R. Co., 140 Mo. 639, 62 Am. St. R. 742, 3S

L. R. A. 218, infra, p. 706 (1897), quo warranto was brought in the lon er court

to oust the street railway company of its privilege of operating its railway

upon certain streets in Kansas City, because of non-user, the city having un-

der authority of the state granted the privilege to said company. The de-

fense was no franchise of the state, if any franchise at all, had been violated

by the non-user. The court of review says: "It may be said that corporate

existence is as much a franchise as the franchises of the corporation. The

former is not property in the ordinary acceptation of the term, can not be

transferred by ordinary conveyance or sale under execution, unless the stat-

utes of the state so provide; while corporate franchises are property, can be

transferred by voluntary conveyance or by sale, under execution against the

corporation. Held, suit was properly brought by the state, and ouster was

declared. Compare People, ex ret. Jackson, v. Suburban R. Co., 178 111. 594
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THE CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE.

(1899); Tower v. Tower & S. S. R. Co., 68 Minn. 500, 64 Am. St. R. 493

i 1897); Wright v. Milwaukee Elec. R., etc., Co., 95 Wis. 29, 60 Am. St. R.

THE CORPORATION

74 (1897); Milwaukee Electric R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 39, 60 Am. St.

A~

A FRANCHISE.

R-81 (1897); Belleville v. Citizens' Home R. Co., 152 111. 171,26 L. R. A. 681

1894), and People v. Mutual Gas L. Co., 38 Mich. 154 (1878).

In New Orleans Water-Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674 (1885), the court

eays: "An exclusive franchise granted by the legislature to supply water to

the inhabitants of a municipality by means of pipes and mains laid through

the public streets is violated by a grant to an individual in the municipality

nf the right to supply his premises with water by means of a pipe or pipes so

laid, and is a contract protected by the United States constitution." To the

.same effect in regard to gas pipes for lighting, etc., are Louisville Gas Co. v.

Citizens' Gas L. Co., 115 U. S. 683, and New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana

Light Co., 115 U. S. 650.

Perhaps the best definition of franchises is that given by Bradley, J., in

California v. Central Pacific R. Co., 127 U. S. 1, on 40 (1887), as follows:

"What is a franchise? Under the English law, Blackstone defines it'as a

royal privilege, or branch of the king's prerogative subsisting in the hands of

a subject,' 2 Bl. Com. 37. Generalized and divested of the special form which

it ussnmes under a monarchical government based on feudal traditions, a
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franchise is a right, privilege, or power of public concern, which ought not to

he exercised by private individuals at their mere will and pleasure, but should

lie reserved for public control and administration, either by the government

directly, or by public agents, acting under such conditions and regulations as

the government may impose in the public interest, and for the public security.

Such rights and powers must exist under every form of society. They are

always educed by the laws and customs of the community. Under our system,

their existence and disposal are under the control of the legislative depart-

ment of the government, and they can not be assumed or exercised without

legislative authority. No private person can establish a public highway, or a

public ferry, or railroad, or charge tolls for the use of the same, without

authority from the legislature, direct or derived. These are franchises. No

private person can take another's property, even for a public use, without

such authority; which is the same as to say that the right of eminent domain

can only be exercised by virtue of legislative grant. This is a franchise. No

ixrsons can make themselves a body corporate and politic without legislative author-

ity. Corporate capacity is a franchise."

Mr. E. R. A. Seligman, in his Essays on Taxation, ch. vii, p. 180, criticises

this definition as being too narrow, since, in bis judgment, it unduly em-

phasizes the element of public control and public interest. He defines a fran-

chise as "simply a right conferred by government of conducting an occupation

either in a particular way or accompanied with particular privileges. We

prefer the definition of the supreme court, as given by Justice Bradley, and

believe it is desirable to emphasize the element of public control.

A verv short but clear definition is given by Justice Field in Home Ins. Co.

v. New York, 134 U. S. 594 on 599 (1889V as follows: By the term corporate

franchise, we understand is meant the right or privilege given by the state to

two or more persons of being a corporation, that is, of doing business in a

corporate capacity, and not the privilege or franchise which, when incorpo-

rated, the company may exercise. The right orprivilege to be a corporation,

or to do business as such body, is one generally deemed of value to the corpo-

rators, or it would not be sought in such numbers as at present."

In Macon, etc., R. Co. v. Gibson, 85 Ga. 1, 21 Am. St. R. 135 (1890), under

the Georgia Code providing that, "In all cases of private charters hereafter

srranted, the state reserves the right to withdraw the franchise, unless such

right was expressly negatived in the charter," the court said: "It is quite

too narrow a definition of the word 'franchise' used in this statute to hold it

as meaning only the right to be a corporation. The word is generic, covering

(1899); Tower v. Tower & 8. S. R. Co., 68 Minn. 500, 64 Am. St. R. 493
(1897); Wright v. Milwaukee Elec. R., etc., Co., 95 Wis. 29, 60 Am. St. R.
i4 ( 1897 ) ; Milwaukee Electric R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 39, 60 Am. St.
R.81 (1897); B elleville v. Citizens' Home R. Co., 152 Ill. 171, 26 L. R . A. 681
11894.), and People v. Mutual Gas L. Co., 38 Mich. 154 (1878 ).
In New Orleans Water-Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674 11885), the court
eays: "An exclusive franchise granted by the legislature to suppl y water to
the inhabitants of a municipality by llleans of pipes and mains laid through
the public streets is violated by a grant to an individual in the municipality
of the right to supply his premises with water by means of a pipe or pipes so
laid, and is a contract protected by the United States constitution." To the
same effect in regard to gas pipes for lighting, etc., are Louisville Gas Co. v.
Citizens' Gas L. Co., 115 U.S. 683, and New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana
Li~ht Co., 115 U. S. 650.
Perhaps the best definition of franchises is that given by Bradley, J., in
California v. Central Pacific R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, on 40 (1887), as follows:
·'What is a franchise? Under the English law, Blackstone defin es it' as a
royal privilege, or hranch of the king's prerogative subsisting in the hands of
asubject,' 2 Bl. C-0m. 37. Generalized and divested of the special form which
it assumes under a monarchical government based on feudal traditions, a.
franchise is a right, privilege, or power of public concern, which ought not to
be exercised by private individuals at their mere will and pleasure, but should.
be reserved for public control and administration, either by the government
direr.tly, or by public agents, acting nnder such conrlitions and re{?ulations as
the government may impose in the public inte rest, and for the public recurity.
Such rights anti powers must exist under every form of society. Tbey are
always educed by the Jaws and customs of the community. Under our system,
their existence and disposal are under the control of the legislative department of the government, and they can not be assumed or exercised without
legislative authority. No private person can establish a public highway, or a
poblic ferry, or railroad, or charge tolls for the use of the same, without
authority from the le{?i slature, direct or derived. These are franchises. No
prirate person can take another's property, even for a public use, without
such anthority; which is the same as to say that the ri{?ht of eminent domain
can only be exercised by virtue of legislative grant. This is a franchise. No
f)fnon.~ can make themselves a body corporate and politic without legislative authori111. Corporate capacity i.s a franchise."
~r. E. R. A. Seligman, in his Essays on Taxation, ch. vii, p. 180, criticises
this definition as being too narrow, since, in his judgment, it unduly emphasizes the element of public control and public inte rest. He defines a franchi e as "simply a right conferred by government of conducting an occupation
either in a particular way or accompanied with particular privileges." We
prefer the definition of the supreme court, as given by Justice Bradley, and
believe it is desirable to emphasize the element of public control.
! very short but clear definition is given by Justice Field in Home Ins. Co.
v. 'Sew York, 134 U.S. 594 on 599 (1889l. as follows: Br the term corporate
frandlise, we understand is meant the right or privilege given by the state to
two or more persons of being a corporation, that is. of doing business in a
corporate capacity, and not the privilege or franchise which, when incorporated, the company may exercise. The right or privilege to be a corporation,
or to do business as such body, is one generally deemed of value to the ·corporators, or it would not be sought in such numbers as at present."
In Macon, etc., R . Co. v. Gibson, 85 Ga. l, 21 Am. St. R.135 11890), under
the Georgia Code providing that, "In all cases of private charters hereafter
granted, the state reserves the right to withdrnw the franchise, unless such
right was expressly negatived in the charter,'' the court said: "It is quite
too narrow a definition of the word 'franchise' used in th is statute to bold it
as meaning only the right to be a corporation. The word is generic, covering
1Jil the rights granted by the legislature."
~.too, in State v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 25 Vt. 442, it is said: "All the
functions of a corporation are in one sense franchises. The right to hold

i" the rights granted by the legislature."

So, too, in State v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 25 Vt. 442, it is said: "All the

functions of a corporation are in one sense franchises. The right to hold
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property in the corporate name, to sue and be sued in that capacity, to have

NOTES TO ARTICLE IV.

and use a corporate seal, and by that to contract, and some others, perhaps,

are franchises, which constitute the very definition of a corporation. Simi-

property in the corporate name, to sue and be sued in that capacity, to have
and use a corporate seal, and by that to contract, and some others, p,erhaps,
are franchises, which constitute the very definition of a corporation. ' Similarly in Pierce v. Emery, 32 N. H. 507, it is said: "The different powers of a
private corporation, like the right to hold and dispose of JJroperty, are its
franchises." Compare State v. Minnesota T. M. Co., 4-0 l\Iinn. 213 (188!1 ..
For other definitions and statements describing franchises, see State, Kan"?r; v. C~rriga n Con. St. R ., 85 . Mo. 263, 55 Am. R . 361.~ H~mestead 8L ~~·
Lo. v. Pittsburgh & H. E. St. R . Co., 166 Pa. St. 16-, 21 L. R. A. 38:
Detroit Citizens' St. R . v. Detroit, 22 U. S. App. 570, 64 Fed. R. 628, 26 L. R.
A. 6ti7; People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 2 L . R. A. 255; Wilmington Water
Power Co. v. Evans, 166 111. 5-18; M. & S. Society of :Montgomery County
v. Weatherly, 75 Ala. 248, 253; Port of Mobile v. Louisville & N. R.
Co.,84 Ala. 119; Williams v. Citizens' R.Co., 130 Ind. 71,15L.R.A.64;
Baltimore Trust G. Co. v. Baltimore, 64 Fed. R. 153; Wheat v. Alexandria,
88 Va. 743; Bank of Augusta v.Earle,l3Pet. (U.S.) 519, 595; Huff v. Winona,
etc., R. Co., 1 l Minn. 180, 192; Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co. v. B. & 0. R. Co.,
4 Gill & J. (1\fd.) 1, 191; Society for Sav. v. Coite, 6 Wall. (U. S. l 594, 606;
Adams v. Yazoo & '1\L V. R. Co., 24 So. (Miss., 1898) 200. Also particularly
Justice Story's and Justice Washington's opinions in Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, infra, j:>p. 723-741.
Mr. Morawetz, Treatise on Law of Private Corps., 2d Ed., 1886, says, § 8:
"Under the common law of England aud the United States, a corporation
can not be formed like a partnership, m erely by a contract between the individuals composing it. Tbe right of forming a corporation and of acting in a
corporate capacity must be treated as a franchise, or special privilege, which
may not be assumed without a grant of authority from some governing
power." In§ 922, he says: "The word ' franchise' is generally used to designate a right or privilege conferred by law. Thus, when the legislat1Jre
grants a charter of incorporation, it confers upon t.he grantees of the charter
the right or privilege of forming a corporate association, and of acting within
certain limits in a corporate capacity, and tLis right or privilege is called the
corporatefra11cltise." In§ 923: "What is called the franchise of formin g a
corporntion is really but an exemption from a general rule of common law
prohibiting the formation of corporations. In former times, this exemption
was granted only in exceptional cases, by a special charter in each instanC'e.
It was, tberefore, looked upon as something valuable-as a gift of a special
privilege to the grantees of the charter-and was called a franchise. At the
present day, however, the prohibition of the common law has been in a great
measure repealed by the general incorporation laws. What was formerly
the exception bas now become the general rule. All persons have now the
right of forming corporate associat.ions, upon complying with the simple
formalit:ies prescribed by statute. The right of forming a corporation and of
acting in a corporate capacity, unde r the general incorporation laws, can 1)1'
called a franchi.~e. only m the sense in which the right of forming a limited
partnership or of executing a conveyance of land by deed is a franchiRe." In
note 3, § 922, he says: "The corporate franchises are sometimes said to belong to the cm11oration; but this is not accurate. They belong to the shareholders." See also §§ 648, 649, 650, 651, f>52, 653. These views of Morawetz
are cited approvingly in State v. W estern Irrigating Canal Co., 40 Kan . 00,
10 Am . .St. R. 166 (1888), holding that the sale of the francbiee of being a
corporation is inoperative to invest the purchaser with corporate power.
Judge Thompson, Commentaries on Corporations, sertion 5353 (189i>1,
says: "In respect to the Ifower of a corporation to alien its franchises, a diF·
tinction bas been taken by the courts bet.ween what may be regarded as pri·
mary and what as secondary franchises. The franchise of being a corporation
-of havin~ a corporate existence- is a franchiaeof th e former character ; and
the franchuie of carrying on a particular business or holding particular property is of the latter character. * * * No one but the sovereign can create
a corporation; and hence one corporation can not create another, by selling
to the latte r its own privilege of having a corporate existenre; though. RS al-

larly in Pierce v. Emery, 32 N. H. 507, it is said: "The different powers of a

private corporation, like the right to hold and dispose of property, are its

franchises." Compare State v. Minnesota T. M. Co., 40 Minn. 213 (18!i!l .

For other definitions and statements describing franchises, see State, Kan-

sas v. Corrigan Con. St. R., 85 Mo. 263. 55 Am. R. 361; Homestead St. K.

Co. v. Pittsburgh & H. E. St. R. Co., 166 Pa. St. 162, 27 L. R. A. 383:

Detroit Citizens' St. R. v. Detroit, 22 U. S. App. 570, 64 Fed. R. 628, 26 L. R.

A. 667; People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 2 L. R. A. 255; Wilmington Water

0 :

Power Co. v. Evans, 166 111. 548; M. & S. Society of Montgomery County

v. Weatherly, 75 Ala. 248, 253; Port of Mobile v. Louisville & N. R.

Co., 84 Ala. 119; Williams v. Citizens' R. Co., 130 Ind. 71,15 L. R. A. 64;

Baltimore Trust G. Co. v. Baltimore, 64 Fed. R. 153; Wheat v. Alexandria,

88 Va. 743; Bank of Augusta v. Earle,13 Pet. (U. S.) 519,595; Huff v. Winona,

etc., R. Co., 11 Minn. 180, 192; Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co. v. B.& O. R. Co.,

4 Gill & J. (Md.) 1, 191; Society for Sav. v. Coke, 6 Wall. (IT. S.) 594, 60K;

Adams v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 24 So. (Miss., 1898) 200. Also particularly

Justice Storv's and Justice Washington's opinions in Dartmouth College v.
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Woodward,"4 Wheat. 518, infra, pp. 723-741.

Mr. Morawetz, Treatise on Law of Private Corps., 2d Ed., 1886, says, §8:

"Under the common law of England and the United States, a corporation

can not he formed like a partnership, merely by a contract between the in-

dividuals composing it. The right of forming a corporation and of acting in a

corporate capacity must be treated as a franchise, or special privilege, which

may not be assumed without a grant of authority from some governing

power." In § 922, he says: "The word 'franchise' is generally used to des-

ignate a right or privilege conferred by law. Thus, when the legislature

grants a charter of incorporation, it confers upon the grantees of the charter

the right or privilege of forming a corporate association, and of acting within

certain limits in a corporate capacity, and this right or privilege is called the

corporate franchise." In § 923: "What is called the franchise of forming a

corporation is really but an exemption from a general rule of common law

prohibiting the formation of corporations. In former times, this exemption

was granted only in exceptional cases, by a special charter in each instance.

It was, therefore, looked upon as something valuable—as a gift of a special

privilege to the grantees of the charter—and was called a franchise. At the

present day, however, the prohibition of the common law has been in a gre;it

measure repealed by the general incorporation laws. What was formerly

the exception has now become the general rule. All persons have now the

right of forming corporate associations, upon complying with the simple

formalities prescribed by statute. The right of forming a corporation and of

acting in a corporate capacity, under the general incorporation laws, can he

called a franchise, only in the sense in which the right of forming a limited

partnership or of executing a conveyance of land by deed is afranchise." In

note 3, § 922, he says: "The corporate franchises are sometimes said to be-

long to the corporation; but this is not accurate. Thev belong to the share-

holders." See also §§ 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653. These view's of Morawetz

are cited approvinglv in State v. Western Irrigating Canal Co., 40 Kan. 98,

10 Am. St. R. 166 (1888), holding that the sale of the franchise of beinga

corporation is inoperative to invest the purchaser with corporate power.

Judge Thompson, Commentaries on Corporations, section 5353 (1895!,

says: "In respect to the p*ower of a corporation to alien its franchises, a dis-

tinction has been taken by the courts between what may be regarded as pri-

mary and what as secondary franchises. The franchise of being a corporation

—of having a corporate existence—is a franehiseof the former character; and

the franchise of carrying on a particular business or holding particular prop-

erty is of the latter character. * * * No one but the sovereign can create

a corporation; and hence one corporation can not create another, by selling

to the latter its own privilege of having a corporate existence; though, as al-

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

THE CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE.

165

ready seen, the members who compose the corporation mav, after it has been

THE CORPOR(\TION AS A FRANCHISE.

organized and its shares have been issued, by transferring their shares to

others, introduce a totally new membership into the corporate body and re-

tire therefrom themselves. * * * The rule had a very substantial value

when the franchise to be a corporation was generally granted by the king in

his council * * * when such grants could not be obtained except in con-

sideration of the rendition of important services to the king or to the state.

But under our American constitutions, under which a body of co-adventurers

may freely organize themselves into a corporation by complying with certain

statutory forms and paying a moderate tax, the franchise of being a corpora-

tion is scarcely more valuable than the franchise,—if there could be such a

thing,—of being a partnership. It is a myth; and the rule under considera-

tion would be the silliest casuistry except for its value as a rule of interpre-

tation of railway and other corporate mortgages."

Judge Elliott in his Law of Private Corporations (1900), devotes one

chapter (51 to "Franchises and privileges," giving an excellent condensed

view of the subject.

It is submitted that the above statements of Judge Thompson and Mr.

Morawetz in regard to the corporate franchise are very much overdrawn, if
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not entirely incorrect. It might be pertinent to inquire, why is it, if the right

to be a corporation is of no value, that so many corporations are formed? Why

is it that four-fifths of the wealth of the United States is held under corporate

organization? Why is no great enterprise undertaken except under a cor-

porate form of organization? The franchise of being a corporation is valuable;

the fact that the state makes it easy to obtain this franchise does not take

from its value, any more than the fact that every male over twenty-one can

vote makes the right to vote of no value. The corporate form of organiza-

tion is the most efficient form of business organization yet discovered by the

business world, and is consequently considered the most valuable by busi-

nessmen. It furnishes the greatest possibility of concentration of means, the

cnmpletest unity of management, and the least individual personal responsi-

bility both financially and morally of any business machine yet invented, to

say nothing of the possibility of fraud, speculation, and exploitation that lax

corporation laws, both now and heretofore, have made possible if not actually

invited.

But, after all, are our general incorporation laws a mere repeal of the com-

mon law—a mere exemption from the common law prohibition of forming

'•"rnorations without consent of the king or state? Or was a special charter

itself a mere repeal of or exemption from such rule of the common law? The

h'/'il theory—the doctrine of the legislature, or the doctrine of the courts, is

not so, and never has been so, and it is hoped never will be so. The common

law prohibition is not repealed, or in fact modified in any essential particular,

but is the same as it was in Blackstone's time or before. A franchise at com-

mon law was something more-than a license—it could not be revoked by the

king after granting it, except for a justifiable cause judicially determined. It

w:i8 something more than a law, also; it was an estate or interest like an estate

in land; a repeal of the law granting it did not take it away in any other way

than the repeal of a law granting land, by the transcendent power of parlia-

ment, took away the estate in the land—that is, by a forfeiture or bill of at-

tainder, or something of that kind. A franchise to be. a corporation was of the •

same character—a grant of a privilege—might be many, or only one, but at

least one, that is, the right to do the designated business under the corporate

iorm of organization. But it was still more than this: it was a grant upon a

condition, a kind of condition subsequent—the condition being the faithful

performance of the business to be conducted under the corporate form of or-

ganization—in other words, that there be no "non-user, misuser or abuser" of

the privilege. It was very much the same as the condition always annexed to

the erantof a freehold estate in land—it was in the theory of the common law

-ready seen, the members who compose the corporation may, after it bas been
organized and its shares ha\re beeu issued, by transferrrng their shares to
others, introduce a totally new membership into the corporate body and retire therefrom themselves. * * * The rule had a very substantial value
when the franchise to be a corporation was generally granted by the king in
hill council * * * when such grants could not be obtained except in coneideration of the rendition of important services to the king or to the state.
But under our American constitutions, under which a body of co-adventurers
may freely organize themselves into a corporation by complying with certain
~tatutory forms and paying a moderate tax, the franchise of beiug a corporation is scarcely more valuable than the franchise,-if there con Id be such a
thing,-of being a partnership. It is a myth; and the rule under consideration would be the silliest casuistry except for its value as a rule of inte1pretation of railwa!J and other corporate mortgages."
Jodge Elliott in bis Law of Private Corporations (1900), devotes one
chapter (5 l to "Franchises and privileges," giving an excellent condensed
view of the subject.
It is submitted that the above statements of Judge Thompson and Mr.
)lorawetz in regard to the corporate franchise are very much overdrawn, if
not entirely incorrect. It might be pertinent to inquire, why is it, if the right
tr• be a corporation is of no value, that so many corporations are formed? Why
i it that four-fifths of the wealth of the United States is held under corporate
organization? Why is no great enterprise undertaken except under a corporate fonn of organization? The frandiise of being a cnrporation is valuable;
tbe fact that the state makes it easv to obtain this franchise does not take
from its value, any more than the fact that every male over twenty-one can
roi.e makes the right to vote of no value. The corporate form of organization is the most efficient form of business organization yet discovered by the
bn iness world, and is consequently considered the most valuable by bnsine$ men. It furnishes the greatest possibility of concentration of means, the
<.'1J1nplete.'i!t unity of management, and the least individual personal responsibility both financially and morally of any bnsiness machine yet invented, to
~ay nothing of the possibility of fraud, speculation, and exploitation that lax
corporation laws, bot,b now and heretofore, have made possible if not actually
invited.
Bat, after all, are our general incorporation laws a mere repeal of the comm1Jn law-a mere exemption from the common law prohibition of forming
corporations without consent of the king or state? Or was a special rbnrter
ilself a mere repeal of or exemption from such rule of the common law? The
le91il theo111-the doctrine of the legislature, or the doctrine of the courts, is
not so, and never has been so, and it is hoped never will be so. The common
law prohibition is not repealed, or in fact modified in any essential particular,
but is tlle same as it was in Blackstone's time or before. A franchise at common law was something more-than a license- it coullt not be revoked by tbe
king after granting it, except for a justifiable cause judicially determined. It
was something more than a law, also; it was an estate or interest like an estate
in laml; a repeal of the law granting it did not take it away in any other way
than tbt> repeal of a law granting land, by the transcendent power of parliament, took away the estate in the la nd-that is, by a forfeiture or bill of attainder, or something of that kind. A franchise to be a corporatio1i was of the
same character-a grant of a privilege-might be many, or only one, but at
lea.~ one, that is, the right to <io the designated bnsiness under the corporate
form of organization. Bnt it was still more than this: it was a grant upon a
condition, a kind of condition subsequent-the condition being the faithful
performance of the business to be conducted under the corporate form of organization-in other worrls, that there be no "non-user, misnser or abuser" of
the privilege. It was very much the same as the condition always annexed to
tbe grant of a freehold estate in land-it was in the theory of the common law
always held from the kin~ npon the condition that the holder do not commit
treason or felony; if be did, the hmd would then be forfeited upon conviction
art"r indictment and 'rial in the king's bench. So, too, the corporate franchiRe

always held from the king upon the condition that the holder do not commit

treason or felony; if be did, the land would then be forfeited upon conviction

after indictment and trial in the king's bench. So, too, the corporate franchise
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theory of a franchise yet remains with us, and is in no way repealed. Under

NOTES TO ARTICLE IV.

our United States constitution, and the decisions of the supreme court, the

was held upon a like condition-non-user or misuser led to forfeiture upon judgment in scire facias or qtto warranto proceedings in the king's bench. This
the01·y of a franchis e yet remains wit.h us, and is in no way repealed. Under
our United States constitution, and the decisions of the supreme court, the
transcendent power of parliament to declare forfeitures of either land or franchises, is taken from our legislative bodies-of the states at least (Fletcher v.
Peck, 6 Cranch 87, and Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518). But
the right to forfeit franchises for misuser or non-user, in the proper judicial
proceedings, yet remains. It perhaps matters but little to tbe state whether
A., B. and C., either separately, jointly, or in a partnership, refine sugar or
petroleum. If they engage in this business they muy do so when and whe re
they please, stop when they please, or agree not to make any more-the
latter contract, under some circumstances being simpl y unenforcible, but not
a cause of forfeiture or punishment. But if A., B., C., D., etc., form a corporation for making or refining sugar or oil, the case is different; the business
is not different-it is neither more nor less public, nor more nor less a franchise than it was before; the privilege is not in making sugar or oil, but
bringing into existence and using in this business the valuable, efficient, impersonal and in many ways morally less responsible, agency or organization
known as the corporation; this is the privilege, a privilege of ''public concern,''
a franchise always having as an inseparable incident, always granted upon
the implied condition that it will not be misused or abused. For not making
oil, or sugar, or even agreeing not to do so, the charter, the franchise of being
a corporation for such purpose, can be taken away by the state. (See People v .
North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 18 Am. St. R. 843, supra, 100; State
v. Standard Oil Co., 49 0. S. 131.) Herein lies the essential differeuce between
a corporation and a partnership or joint stock company. ' See Gleason v.
McKay, 134 Mass. 419, infra, p. 167.
The franchise to co11dttct any business as a corporation, or through a corporate organization, is now, and has always been since the time of the Romans,
"a matter or p1i.vill'ge of public concern," given by the state only on condition
that it be not abused. Kent says: "Rolon permitted private companies
to institute themselves at pleasure, provided they did no£hing contrary to
the public law. Bnt th e Romans were not so indulgent as the Greeks.
They were very jealous of such combinations of individuals, and they restrainecl those that were not especially authorized, and every corporation was
illicit that was not ordained by a decree of the senate or emperor. Collegia
licita, iu the Roman law were, like our inco rporated companies, sorieties
of men united for some useful business or purpose with power to act like . a
single individual , and if th ey abused their right, 01· a.~sembled for any other
purpose than that expressed in their charte1-, they were deemed illicita, and many
laws from the time of the Twelve Tables down to the times of the emperors
were passed against all illicit or unauthorized companies. In the age of
Augustus, certain corporations had become nurseries of faction and di8order;
and that emperor interposed, as Julius Cresar had done before him , nnd
dissolved all but the ancient and legal corporations. * * • And the Emperor Trajan, in refusing to incorporate a fire company, said, 'that societies of
that sort had greatly disturbed th e peace of the cities; and whatever name he
gave them, or for whatever purpose they might be instituted , they would not
fail to be mischievous,'" citing Taylor's Elements of Civil Law, 567--570;
Suetonius, Ad. Aug. 32, and J . Cresar 42, vol. 2, pp. 268-9.
Does not this experience of the old Romans, the experience of England in
tbe early part of the last century, with John Law's schemes and the South Sea
Bubble,"and the experience of our own <lay attest the wisdom of the c.ommon
law rule that the "right to be a corporation is a franchise of public concern,
held upon the implied condition that it will uot be abused, under penalty of
forfeiture,'' and that it is well to bold fast to such rule? It, of course, has been
the policy of corporations and corporation counsel to miuimize the franchise
as much as possible, under n early every circumstance. exrept where they
have had to fight for their existence; nnd the above expressions of the Jea<ling text write rs of the day have helped (perhaps unwittingly) to make ob-

transcendent power of parliament to declare forfeitures of either land or fran-

chises, in taken from our legislative bodies—of the states at least (Fletcher v.

Peck, 6 Oranch 87, and Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518). But

the right to forfeit franchises for misuser or non-user, in the proper judicial

proceedings, yet remains. It perhaps matters but little to the state whether

A., B. and C., either separately, jointly, or in a partnership, refine sugar or

petroleum. If they engage in this business they may do so when and where

they please, stop when they please, or agree not to make any more—the

latter contract, under some circumstances being simply unenforcible, but not

a cause of forfeiture or punishment. But if A., B., C., D., etc., form a corpo-

ration for making or refining sugar or oil, the case is different; the business

is not different—it is neither more nor less public, nor more nor less a fran-

chise than it was before; the privilege is not in making sugar or oil, but

bringing into existence and using in this business the valuable, efficient, im-

personal and in many ways morally less responsible, agency or organization

known as the corporation; this is the privilege, a privilege of "public concern,"
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a franchise, always having as an inseparable incident, always granted upon

the implied condition that it will not be misused or abused. For not making

oil, or sugar, or even agreeing not to do so, the charter, the franchise of being

a corporation for such purpose, can be taken away by the state. (See People v.

North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 18 Am. St. R. 843, supra, 100; State

v. Standard Oil Co., 4!) O. S. 137.) Herein lies the essential difference between

a corporation and a partnership or joint stock company. (See Gleason v.

McKay, 134 Mass. 419, infra, p. 167.

The franchise to conduct any business as a corporation, or through a corpo-

rate organization, is now, and has always been since the time of the Romans,

"a matter or privilege of public concern," given by the state only on condition

that it be not abused. Kent says: "Solon permitted private companies

to institute themselves at pleasure, provided they did nothing contrary to

the public law. But the Romans were not so indulgent as the Greeks.

They were very jealous of such combinations of individuals, and they re-

strained those that were not especially authorized, and every corporation was

illicit that was not ordained by a decree of the senate or emperor. Collegia

licita, in the Roman law were, like our incorporated companies, societies

of men united for some useful business or purpose with power to act like , a

single individual, and if they abzised their right, or assembled for any other

purpose than that expressed in their charter, they were deemed illicila, and many

laws from the time of the Twelve Tables down to the times of the emperors

were passed against all illicit or unauthorized companies. In the age of

Augustus, certain corporations had become nurseries of faction and disorder;

and that emperor interposed, as Julius Caesar had done before him, and

dissolved all but the ancient and legal corporations. » * • And the Em-

peror Trajan, in refusing to incorporate a fire company, said, 'that societies of

that sort had greatly disturbed the peace of the cities; and whatever name he

gave them, or for whatever purpose they might be instituted, they would not

fail to be mischievous,'" citing Taylor's Elements of Civil Law, 567-570;

Suetonius, Ad. Aug. 32, and J. Caesar 42, vol. 2, pp. 268-9.

Does not this experience of the old Romans, the experience of England in

the early partof the last century, with John Law's schemes and the South Sea

Bubble, and the experience of our own day attest the wisdom of the common

law rule that the "right to be a corporation is a franchise of public concern,

held upon the implied condition that it will not be abused, under penalty of

forfeiture," and that it is well to hold fast to such rule? It, of course, has been

the policy of corporations and corporation counsel to minimize the franchise

as much as possible, under nearly every circumstance, except where they

have had to fight for their existence; and the above expressions of the lead-

ing text writers of the day have helped (perhaps unwittingly) to make ob-
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CORPORATION AND PARTNERSHIP.

scure this wholesome doctrine, both in the minds of the people and of many

judges as well. The legislatures, too, of several states have substantially abdi-

cated the power of the state to retain control over the creatures of its bounty

by authorizing the formation of joint-stock companies with nearly all the

powers of corporations, without the liability to render an account at the hands

of the state in quo warranto proceedings. The older writers—Blackstone, Kyd,

Kent, Angell & Ames and Grant—all hold fast to these old and tried doctrines,

and are, therefore, better guides in these matters than later writers.

ARTICLE V. CORPORATIONS AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER INSTI-

TUTIONS.

Sec. 30. (1) From partnerships.

GLEASON v. McKAY.1

1883. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

134 Mass. 419-426.

[In 1866 McKay was the owner of certain letters-patent for improve-

ments in machinery used in the manufacture of shoes; from the pro-

ceeds of the business he had built a machine shop for the manufacture

of these machines. He was the legal owner, but others were

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:14 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

equitably interested in various amounts. He executed an instrument

of trust, declaring himself to hold the business in trust for all who

were, or might become, interested therein, upon condition that those

so interested who accepted the declaration of trust and had a certain

certificate evidencing their interest, should constitute and be an associa-

tion, to be known as the McKay Machine Association, but no member

shall have any right or authority to make any contract or bargain, or

transact any business whatever for the association, without special

authoritv; it was to continue thirty years; death of members was not

to dissolve or have any effect on the association, except that those

who succeeded to ownership of shares should succeed to the rights of

the decedent; that the association should be the equitable owner of

the business, which was to be divided into 50,000 shares, to be dis-

tributed among the members in proportion to their interests, which

were to be evidenced by certificates indicating the number of shares,

the same to be transferable, by assignment in writing and surrender

to the trustee, who was to issue a new certificate, keeping record of

the same; the general management was to be in an executive committee

of three or five, to be chosen by the whole body of shareholders; and

this committee was to divide proceeds from time to time in proportion

to the respective interests; provision was also made whereby the

business might be transferred to a corporation, when a majority should

so determine, and thereafter no member was to have or claim any

right to the property or business, and the declaration of trust was to

cease; provision was also made for choosing a new trustee in case of

death or resignation of McKay. McKay was taxed, as trustee of said

'Statement of facts condensed, and compiled partly from Hoadley v. County

Commissioners of Essex, 105 Mass. 519; arguments omitted.
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property. The commonwealth, in addition to the foregoing taxes,

association, upon its real estate, machinery, tools and all personal
property. The commonwealth, in addition to the foregoing taxes,
sought to collect a tax upon the aggregate value of the shares of the
association. This was resisted.]
MORTON, C. J. The principal question in this case is whether the
statute of 1878, chapter 2.7 5, as applied to the defendant, is constitutional. The first section of the statute provides that "chapter 283 of
the acts of the year 1865, and the acts in amendment thereof, are
hereby extended to apply, so far as applicable to companies, copartnership and other associations having a location or place of bus iness
within this commonwealth, in which the beneficial interest is held in
shares which are assignable without consent of the other associates
specifically authorizing such transfer. And the tax provided for in
said chapter 283 shall be paid by such company, copartnership or association upon the aggregate value of the shares of said capital stock ,
in the manner provided in said chapter for taxes upon corporations."
The power of taxation, using the word in its generic sense as including all rates and impositions laid or levied upon the people, is
conferred upon the legislature by the constitution, and i5 to be held
and exercised subject to the limitations imposed by the constitution.
Oliver v. Washington Mills, I I Allen 268. The legislature is given
the power "to impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates and taxes upon all the inhabitants of, and persons resident,
and estates lying within the said commonwealth," and also power "to
impose and levy reasonable duties and excises upon any produce,
goods, wares, merchandise and commodities whatsoever, brought
into, produced, manufactured or being within the same." Const. of
Mass., chap. 1, art. 4.
It is clear that the statute in question was not intended to lay a tax
upon property within the first of these clauses. It does not purport
to do this. It merely extends to certain copartnerships and associations the provisions of the St. of 1865 , c. 283, which chapter has been
held to levy an excise upon corporate franchises, and not to lay a
tax on property, and which chapter can be sustained as constitutional
only upon the ground that it levies an excise. Murray v. Berkshire
Ins. Co., 104 Mass. 586. Commonwealth v. Hamilton Manfg. Co.,
12 Allen 298. Regarded as a tax on property, the tax we are considering would be invalid because not proportional; it would be an
imposition upon certain property at a rate different from that to which
other property in the commonwealth is subject. But, as we have
said, it does not purport to be a tax on property. In levying an imposition under this statute, no inquiry is made as to what property
liable to taxation any copartnership, or other association which comes
within its terms, has. Such property remains liable to taxation under
the general laws. This imposition is hased 4 4 upon the aggregate
value of the shares of said capital stock." Such shares, if they can be
said to be property, are not the property of the copartnership or association which is taxed, but of the individual partners or shareholderi'.
It is very clear that this was intended as an excise upon f-Ome

sought to collect a tax upon the aggregate value of the shares of the

association. This was resisted.]

Morton, C. J. The principal question in this case is whether the

statute of 1878, chapter 275, as applied to the defendant, is constitu-

tional. The first section of the statute provides that "chapter 283 of

the acts of the year 1865, and the acts in amendment thereof, are

hereby extended to apply, so far as applicable to companies, copart-

nership and other associations having a location or place of business

within this commonwealth, in which the beneficial interest is held in

shares which are assignable without consent of the other associates

specifically authorizing such transfer. And the tax provided for in

said chapter 283 shall be paid by such company, copartnership or as-

sociation upon the aggregate value of the shares of said capital stock,

in the manner provided in said chapter for taxes upon corporations."

The power of taxation, using the word in its generic sense as in-

cluding all rates and impositions laid or levied upon the people, is

conferred upon the legislature by the constitution, and is to be held
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and exercised subject to the limitations imposed by the constitution.

Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen 268. The legislature is given

the power "to impose and levy proportional and reasonable assess-

ments, rates and taxes upon all the inhabitants of, and persons resident,

and estates lying within the said commonwealth," and also power "to

impose and levy reasonable duties and excises upon any produce,

goods, wares, merchandise and commodities whatsoever, brought

into, produced, manufactured or being within the same." Const, of

Mass., chap. 1, art. 4.

It is clear that the statute in question was not intended to lay a tax

upon property within the first of these clauses. It does not purport

to do this. It merely extends to certain copartnerships and associa-

tions the provisions of the St. of 1865, c. 283, which chapter has been

held to levy an excise upon corporate franchises, and not to lay a

tax on property, and which chapter can be sustained as constitutional

only upon the ground that it levies an excise. Murray v. Berkshire

Ins. Co., 104 Mass. 586. Commonwealth v. Hamilton Manfg. Co.,

12 Allen 298. Regarded as a tax on property, the tax we are con-

sidering would be invalid because not proportional; it would be an

imposition upon certain property at a rate different from that to which

other property in the commonwealth is subject. But, as we have

said, it does not purport to be a tax on property. In levying an im-

position under this statute, no inquiry is made as to what property

liable to taxation any copartnership, or other association which comes

within its terms, has. Such property remains liable to taxation under

the general laws. This imposition is based "upon the aggregate

value of the shares of said capital stock." Such shares, if they can be

said to be property, are not the property of the copartnership or asso-

ciation which is taxed, but of the individual partners or shareholders.

It is very clear that this was intended as an excise upon some
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"franchises or privileges sought to be held by the copartnerships or

associations in supposed analogy to the franchises of corporations.

And the question is whether this imposition can be upheld as such

§ 30
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excise within the second clause of the constitution, cited above. In

this clause, there are two limitations upon the power of the legislature

in imposing excises. They must be reasonable, and they must be

excises upon some produce, goods, wares, merchandise or commodi-

ties, brought into, produced, manufactured or being within the com-

monwealth.

It will not be seriously contended that the privileges or rights which

are taxed by this statute can be properly described as either pro-

duce, goods, wares or merchandise. Do they fairly come within

the term "commodities," in the sense in which it is used in the con-

stitution? Ever since the adoption of the constitution, the legisla-

ture in its practice, and this court in its adjudications, have given a

very broad and extensive meaning to this term. It lias been repeat-

edly held that corporate franchises enjoyed by grant from the govern-

ment are commodities, and subject to an excise. So with corporate

franchises granted by a foreign government, which by comity are

permitted to be exercised within this commonwealth. So where the
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legislature has thought, upon considerations of public policy, that

certain occupations or callings, of a public or quasi public character,

should be carried on under governmental regulation it has been usual

to impose a reasonable fee for a license. Portland Bank v. Apthorp,

12 Mass. 252; Commonwealth v. People's Five Cents Saving Bank,

5 Allen 428; Commonwealth v. Hamilton Manuf. Co., ubi supra;

Commonwealth v. Cary Improvement Co., 98 Mass. 19; Connecti-

cut Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 133 Mass. 161.

This imposition is clearly not in the nature of a license fee, but is

an excise upon a franchise or privilege. The right to levy excises

upon franchises has never been extended further than to corporate

franchises specially granted by the government, or enjoyed and ex-

ercised by its permission.

The defendant in this case is not a corporation. It is merely a

partnership, with all the incidents and responsibilities of a partnership.

The firm property is taxable at its business domicile. Hoadley v.

County Commissioners, 105 Mass. 519. It enjoys no franchises con-

ferred upon it by the legislature. It docs not ask for or enjoy any

corporate or special privileges. It has constituted its partnership

under its common law rights and such legal agreements as it chooses

to make. The peculiar feature that the interest of each member may

be transferred without the special assent of the other members, is cre-

ated by agreement of the partners under their natural rights at com-

mon law. We do not see how this peculiar feature can be called a

commodity, subject to a special excise, any more than the agreement

of copartnership itself, or any clause or part of it, or any other agree-

ment, right or mode of transacting any business, can be called a com-

modity, and so liable to taxation at the will of the legislature.

If this tax can be upheld, it seems to us that the necessary result

franchises or privileges sought to be held by the copartnerships or
associations in supposed analogy to the franchises of corporations.
And the question is whether this imposition can be upheld as such
excise within the second clause of the constitution, cited above. In
this clause, there are two limitations upon the power of the legislature
in imposing excises. They must be reasonable, and they must be
excises upon some produce, goods, wares, merchandise or commodities, brought into, produced, manufactured or being within the commonwealth.
It will not be seriously contended that the privileges or rights which
a re truced by this statute can be properly described as either prod uce, goods, wares or merchandise. Do they fairly come within
the term "commodities," in the sense in which it is used in the contitution? Ever since the adoption of the constitution, the legislature in its practice, and this court in its adjudications, have given a
v ery broad and extensive meaning to this term. It has been repeated ly held that corporate franchises enjoyed by grant from the government are commodities, and subject to an excise. So with corporate
franchises granted by a foreign government, which by comity are
permitted to be exercised within this commonwealth. So where the
l egislature has thought, upon considerations of public policy, that
certain occupations or callings, of a public or quasi public character,
should be carried on under governmental regulation it has been usual
to impose a reasonable fee for a license. Portland Bank v. Apthorp,
12 Mass. 252; Commonwealth v. People's Five Cents Saving Bank,
5 Allen 428; Commonwealth v. Hamilton Manuf. Co., ubi supra;
C o mmonwealth v. Cary Improvement Co., 98 Mass. 19; Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 133 Mass. 161.
This imposition is clearly not in the nature of a license fee, but is
an excise upon a franchise or privilege. The right to levy excises
upon franchises has never been extended further than to corporate
franchises specially granted by the government, or enjoyed and exercised by its permission.
The defendant in this case is not a corporation. It is merely a
p artnership, with all the incidents and responsibilities of a partnership.
The firm property is taxable at its business domicile. Hoadley v.
County Commissioners, 105 Mass. 519. It enjoys no franchises conf erred upon it by the legislature. It does not ask for or enjoy any
corporate or special privileges. It has constt'tuted its partnership
u nder its common law rights and such l egal agreements as it chooses
to make. The peculz'ar f eature that th e interest of each member may
be transferred without the spect'al assent of the other members, is crea t ed by agreement of the partners under th et'r natural rights at common law. We do not see how this peculz'ar f eature can be called a
commod1:ty, subject to a special excise, any more than the agreem ent
of copartnership itself, or any clause or part of it, or any other ag reem ent. rz'g ht or mode of transacting any bust'ness , can be called a comm odity . and so liable to taxation at the w ill of the le,g-islature. .
If this tax ca n be upheld, it seems to us that the necessary result
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will be that the legislature has the power to select any business, occu-

§ 30

GLEASON V. M'KAY.

pation or calling carried on, or any natural right enjoyed, under the

protection of our laws, and impose upon it at its will a special tax or

excise. This would be extending the meaning of the word "com-

will be that the legislature has the power to select any business, occupation or calling carried on, or any natural right enjoyed, under the
protection of our laws, and impose upon it at its will a special tax or
excise. This would be extending the meaning of the word "commodities" beyond any reasonable limits. Its effect would be to break
down the limitations which the constitution intended to impose upon
the power of the legislature, for the purpose of securing the end thnt
all sum$ necessary for the defense and suppo1t of the government
should, as far as practicable, be raised by the equal taxation of the
people.
We are therefore of opinion that the statute of r 878, chapter 275,
so far as it applies to the defendant, is unconstitutional.
Judgment for the defendant.

modities" beyond any reasonable limits. Its effect would be to break

down the limitations which the constitution intended to impose upon

the power of the legislature, for the purpose of securing the end that

all sums necessary for the defense and support of the government

should, as far as practicable, be raised by the equal taxation of the

people.

We are therefore of opinion that the statute of 1878, chapter 275,

so far as it applies to the defendant, is unconstitutional.

Judgment for the defendant.

Note. See 1830, Pratt v. Bacon, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 123; 1833, Russell v. Mc-

Lellan, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 63; 1888, Pittsburg Melting Co. v. Reese, 118 Pa.

St. 355; and see Warner v. Beers; People v. Coleman, Thomas v. Dakin;

Edgeworth v. Wood, supra, pp. 2, 15, 19, 28.

The word partner is a contracted form of partitioner, and this indicates

somethingof its meaning. Partnerships were known to the Roman law under the

Note. See 1830, Pratt v. Bacon, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 123; 1833, RuBBell v. McLellan, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 63; 1888, Pittsburg Melting Co. v. Reese, 118 Pa.
St. 355; and see 'Varner v. Beers; People v. Coleman, Thomas v. Dakin;
Edgeworth v. Wood, supra, pp. 2, 15, 19, 28.
The word partner is a contracted form of partitioner, and this indicates
somethingofits meaning. Partnerships were known totbe Roman Jawunderthe
name of Societas, which was a contract based on the law which "natural reason establishes between all men," i.e., the jus gentium. Most of the Roman
Jaw of the subject is found in Dig. xvii, tit. 2, Pro Socio. Title 25, Book iii
of Justinian's Institutes relates to partnerships, and part of that is found in
Gaius iii, 148-1.54. The trade or commercial partnerships were the most common, though other kinds were recognized. The Roman laws of partnership,
so far as trade is conducted now as then, are still applicable . In England
the p artnership law was introduced by the merchants as a p!lrt of the law or
custom of merchants, being one of the particulai· customs of the realm, somewhat in derogation of the common law, and consequently allowed, where the
rights of others were involved , only upon strict proof of the existenl'e and
knowledge of the custom. In this way, many of the rules of the common
law were made applicable to partnerships. But the peculiar doctrines of no
survivorship; of the partners' act being th at of all, if in reference to partnership matter; and of dissolution by death of a partner, were from the law merchant, and through it from the Roman Jaw, and were contrary to the common
law rules of joint tenancy, and tenancy in common. The same difference between a partnership and a corporation, i. e., that the latter is a distinct entity
having rights and owing duties as sud1, as now recognized, was made in the
Roman law, and continued throughout the development of the common law
of England.
These differences perhaps can be classified as follows:

name of Societas, which was a contract based on the law which "natural rea-
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son establishes between all men," i. e., the jus gentium. Most of the Roman

law of the subject is found in Dig. xvii, tit. 2, Pro Socio. Title 25, Book iii

of Justinian's Institutes relates to partnerships, and part of that is found in

Gaius iii, 148-154. The trade or commercial partnerships were the most com-

mon, though other kinds were recognized. The Roman laws of partnership,

bo far as trade is conducted now as then, are still applicable. In England

the partnership law was introduced by the merchants as a part of the laic or

custom of merchants, being one of the particular customs of the realm, some-

what in derogation of the common law, and consequently allowed, where the

rights of others were involved, only upon strict proof of the existence and

knowledge of the custom. In this way, many of the rules of the common

law were made applicable to partnerships. But the peculiar doctrines of no

survivorship; of the partners' act being that of all, if in reference to partner-

ship matter; and of dissolution by death of a partner, were from the law mer-

chant, and through it from the Roman law, and were contrary to the common

law rules of joint tenancy, and tenancy in common. The same difference be-

tween a partnership and a corporation, i. e., that the latter is a distinct entity

having rights and owing duties as such, as now recognized, was made in the

Roman law, and continued throughout the development of the common law

of England.

These differences perhaps can be classified as follows:

As to creation:

As to franchise:

As to management:

As to powers:

Corporation.

Corporation.

Partftership.

Only under special au-

Ae to creation :

thority of the state.

Has a franchise.

As to franchise:
As to management:

Only in the way indicated

by law of its creation,

and by the agents there

provided for.

As to powflrs:

Has none, except neces-

sary to carry out purpose

indicated in charter, and

this can not be changed

except by consent of the

state.

Only under special authority of the state.
Has a franchise.
Only int.be way indicated
by Jaw of its creation,
and by the agents there
provided for .
Has none, except necessary to carry out purpose
indicated in charter, and
this can n ot be changed
except by consent of the
state.

By contract alone.
Has no franchise.
Each member bas authority to bind within the limits of the
purpose.
May be enlarged, or diminished , at anytime, or extended to
any other business,
by consent of all ('()ncerned.

Partnership.

By contract alone.

Has no franchise.

Each member has au-

thority to bind with-

in the limits of the

purpose.

May be enlarged, or di-

minished, at any-

time, or extended to
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Corporation.

Has no effect on corpo-

CORPORATION AND JOINT STOCK COMPANY.

rate existence.

As to succession of mem-

bership, death, with-

drawal, or insolvency:

As to property, owner- In the corporation

ship:

As to conveyance:

As to suits, by or against

As to shares:

As to liability of mem-

bers:

As to termination:

Corporation.
Partnership.
As to succession of mem- Has no effect on corpo- Dissolves.

bership, death, withrate existence.
drawal, or insolvency:
As to property, owner- In the corporation.
ship:
As to conveyance:
By the corporation only.
As to suits, by or against: In name of corporation
only.
AB to shares :
Transferable without consent of corporation.

By the corporation only.

In name of corporation

Transferable without con-

sent of corporation.

consent of the state, loss
of integral part, or for
non use or misuse of
franchise on ·complaint
of the state.

Limited.

Only upon surrender by

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:14 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

By the members only.
In name of members
only.
Not transferable without consent of others,
or if so, dissolves
partnership.
Unlimited.

to liability of mem- Limited.
hers:
As to termination :
Only upon surrender by At the option of all the
As

only.

In the members.

consent of the state, loss

of integral part, or for

parties 1 or by the
death or withdrawal
of any member,-not
by the state except
for illegal acts.

non use or misuse of

franchise on complaint

See. 31.

( 2) From joint-stock companies.

of the state.

Partnership.

EDWARDS v. WARREN LINOLINE AND GASOLINE WORKS.

Dissolves.

In the members.

1897.

By the members only.

IN THE SuPREMR Jumc1AL CouRT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Mass. Rep. 564-569, 38 Lawyer's Rep. Ann. 791.

168

In name of members

only.

Not transferable with-

out consent of others,

or if so, dissolves

partnership.

Unlimited.

At the option of all the

parties i or by the

death or withdrawal

of any member,—not

by the state except

for illegal acts.

Sec. 31. (2) From joint-stock companies.

EDWARDS v. WARREN LINOLINE AND GASOLINE WORKS.

1897. ^N THE Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 168

Mass. Rep. 564-569, 38 Lawyer's Rep. Ann. 791.

Trustee Process. The principal defendant was described in the

writ as "a joint-stock company organized under the laws of Pennsyl-

vania." The trustee, which was a Massachusetts corporation, filed

an answer setting forth reasons why it should not be charged, and, on

interrogatories propounded by the plaintiff, made answers, the nature of

which appears in the opinion. The trustee moved that it be discharged.

The superior court allowed the motion, discharged the trustee with

costs, and dismissed the action; and the plaintiff appealed to this court.

The case was argued at the bar in November, 1896, and afterwards

was submitted on briefs to all the justices.

Lathrop, J. It is conceded by the plaintiff that, as the jurisdic-

tion of the court depends upon charging the Walworth Manufacturing

TRUSTEE PROCESS. The principal defendant was described in the
writ as "a joint-stock company organized under the laws of Pennsylvania." The trustee, which was a Massachusetts corporation, filed
an answer setting forth reasons why it should not be charged, and, on
interrogatories propounded by the plaintiff, made answers, the nature of
which appears in the opinion. The trustee moved that it be discharged.
The superior court allowed the motion, discharged the trustee with
costs, and dismissed the action; and the plaintiff appealed to this court.
The case was argued at the bar in November, 1896, and afterwards
was submitted on briefs to all the justices.
LATHROP, J. It is conceded by the plaintiff that, as the jurisdiction of the court depends upon charging the Walwo1th Manufacturing
Company as trustee, inasmuch as there was no service upon the
principal defendant, the action was properly dismissed upon discharging the trustee.
The question then is whether the tmstee was properly discharged,
and this depends upon whether the principal defendant, an association
formed under the Jaws of the state of Pennsylvania, is a partnership
or a corporation.
The trustee's answers to interrogatories refer to Brightly's Purdon's .
Digest (12th ed), 1o86-1088, and to the cases of Eliot v. Himrod,
108 Pa. St. 569, and Sheble v. Strong, 128 Pa. St. 315, as containing
tbe law relative to the statement in the answer, that the principal defendant was a partnership and not a corporation.
From the digest it appears that such an association is styled a "part-

Company as trustee, inasmuch as there was no service upon the

principal defendant, the action was properly dismissed upon discharg-

ing the trustee.

The question then is whether the trustee was properly discharged,

and this depends upon whether the principal defendant, an association

formed under the laws of the state of Pennsylvania, is a partnership

or a corporation.

The trustee's answers to interrogatories refer to Brightly's Purdon's

Digest (12th ed), 1086-1088, and to the cases of Eliot v. Himrod,

108 Pa. St. 569, and Sheble v. Strong, 128 Pa. St. 315, as containing
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nership association," and not a corporation. By the terms of the various

acts which have been passed upon the subject, such an association

EDWARDS V. WARREN LINOLINE, ETC., WORKS.

§ 31

may be formed by three or more persons. The capital is alone to be

liable for the debts. There is no personal liability of the members,

nership association," and not a corporation. By the terms of the various
acts which have been passed upon the subject, such an association
may be formed by three or more persons. The capital is alone to be
liable for the debts. There is no personal liability of the members,
except to the extent.of any unpaid subscription, if certain provisions
of the act are complied with. "Interests in such partnership associations" are declared to be personal estate and are transferable, under
such rules and regulations as shall from time to time be prescribed;
but if there are no such rules and regulations, the transferee of any
interest in any such association is not entitled to any participation in
the subsequent business of the· association, unless elected to membership therein by a vote of a majority of the members in number and
value of their interests. The business is to be conducted by a board
of managers. The duration of the association may be fixed by the
articles of association , but is' not to exceed twenty years.
Power to adopt and use a common seal is given in case the association bas occasion to execute a deed of conveyance or bonds and mortgages. Land sold to the association, or by it, is required to be
conveyed in the name of the association. It js further provided:
11
Said association shall sue and be sued in their association name;
and when suit is brought against any such association, service thereof
shall be made upon the chairman, secretary or treasurer thereof, which
service shall be as complete and effective as i £ made upon each and
every member of such association." In Eliot v. Himrod, ro8 Pa. St.
569, 580, it is said by Mr. Justice Trunkey, in delivering the opinion
of the court: "The formation of a limited partnership association is
materially different from the creation of a corporation. Such association
is treated in the statute as a partnership which. upon the performance
of certain acts, shall possess specified rights and immunities. In contemplation that the association may consist of many members, for
convenience it is clothed with many of the features and powers of a
corporation, such as the right to sue and be sued , grant and receive
in the association name. But no man can purchase the interest of a
member and participate in the subsequent business, unless hy a vote
of a majority of the members in number and value of their interests.
No charter is granted to the persons who record their statement."
Sheble v. Strong, 128 Pa. St. 315, 318, is to the same effect.
If the question presented were an open one in this commonwealth.
it might well be held that such association could be considered to havt'
so many of the characteristics of a corporation that it might be treated
as one.
At common law, a joint-stock .company formed for business pur·
poses is considered in this commonwealth merely as a partnership.
Tappan v. Bailey, 4 Met. 529; Tyrrell v. Washburne, 6 Allen 466.
The same rule has been applied to joint-stock associations formed
under the laws of the state of N ew York, which do not differ, in am
essential respect, from the laws of Pennsylvania. Taft v. \Ii/ ard, 106
Mass. 518, and 111 Mass. 518; Bodwell v. Eastman, 106 Mass. 525,
526; Gott v. Dinsmore, 11 I Mass. 45, 51 ;, Boston and Albany R ail-

except to the extent of any unpaid subscription, if certain provisions

of the act are complied with. "Interests in such partnership associa-

tions" are declared to be personal estate and are transferable, under

such rules and regulations as shall from time to time be prescribed;

but if there are no such rules and regulations, the transferee of any

interest in any such association is not entitled to any participation in

the subsequent business of the - association, unless elected to member-

ship therein by a vote of a majority of the members in number and

value of their interests. The business is to be conducted by a board

of managers. The duration of the association may be fixed by the

articles of association, but is not to exceed twenty years.

Power to adopt and use a common seal is given in case the associa-

tion has occasion to execute a deed of conveyance or bonds and mort-

gages. Land sold to the association, or by it, is required to be

conveyed in the name of the association. It is further provided:

"Said association shall sue and be sued in their association name;
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and when suit is brought against any such association, service thereof

shall be made upon the chairman, secretary or treasurer thereof, which

service shall be as complete and effective as if made upon each and

every member of such association." In Eliot v. Himrod, 108 Pa. St.

569, 580, it is said by Mr. Justice Trunkey, in delivering the opinion

of the court: "The formation of a limited partnership association is

materially different from the creation of a corporation. Such association

is treated in the statute as a partnership which, upon the performance

of certain acts, shall possess specified rights and immunities. In con-

templation that the association may consist of many members, for

convenience it is clothed with many of the features and powers of a

corporation, such as the right to sue and be sued, grant and receive

in the association name. But no man can purchase the interest of a

member and participate in the subsequent business, unless by a vote

of a majority of the members in number and value of their interests.

No charter is granted to the persons who record their statement."

Sheble v. Strong, 128 Pa. St. 315, 318, is to the same effect.

If the question presented were an open one in this commonwealth,

it might well be held that such association could be considered to have

so many of the characteristics of a corporation that it might be treateil

as one.

At common law, a joint-stock company formed for business pur-

poses is considered in this commonwealth merely as a partnership.

Tappan v. Bailey, 4 Met. 529; Tyrrell v. Washburne, 6 Allen 466.

The same rule has been applied to joint-stock associations formed

under the laws of the state of New York, which do not differ, in am

essential respect, from the laws of Pennsylvania. Taft v. Ward, 106

Mass. 518, and 111 Mass. 518; Bodwell v. Eastman, 106 Mass. 525,

526; Gott v. Dinsmore, n 1 Mass. 45, 51; Boston and Albany Rail-
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road v. Pearson, 12S Mass. 445. See, also, Frost v. Walker, 60

173

Maine 468; Dinsmore v. Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, 32 Leg.

Int. 38S, and 11 Phila. 4S3.

In Taft v. Ward, 106 Mass. 518, 524, speaking of the New York

statutes, it was said by Chief Justice Chapman:

"These statutes provide, in substance, that any association, con-

sisting of seven or more shareholders or associates, may sue and be

sued in the name of the president or treasurer; that in such suit a

judgment may be rendered against the company; and until an execu-

tion is issued against the company and returned unsatisfied, no action

shall be maintained against individuals. These statutes seem to apply

to all copartnerships consisting of seven or more members. The

members of such companies are authorized to hold their interests in

shares, which are assignable like shares of stock in a corporation, and

the action against the members is regarded as supplementary to the

action against the company. Waterbury v. Merchants' Union Ex-

press Co., 50 Barb. 157; Robbins v. Wells, 1 Robertson 666.

"So far as these statutes relate to the procedure in courts for the

recorery of debts, they are limited to the state of New York; for
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each state adopts its own forms of remedy. Story Confl. Laws,

sections 556-558. The plaintiff could not in this commonwealth

bring an action against the president or secretary, and obtain a

judgment against the company by its name; nor could he bring an

action against the members, or any of them, as a supplement to such

an action. In order to do so, we must hold that the statutes of New

York prescribing forms of action are in force here. In this common-

wealth, such a company is a mere copartnership."

There is nothing inconsistent with an association being a partner-

ship that it has shares, or that the shares are transferable, or that the

death of a member shall not work a dissolution of the partnership.

Phillips v. Blatchford, 137 Mass. 510. See, also, Hoadley v. County

Comms., 105 Mass. 519; Gleason v. McKay, 134 Mass. 419.

The case mostly relied upon by the plaintiff is Liverpool Ins. Co.

v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566, which was taken to the supreme

court of the United States on a writ of error from this court. See

Oliver v. Liverpool and London Ins. Co., 100 Mass. 531. It was a

bill in equity, filed by the treasurer of the commonwealth under the

statute of 1862, c. 224, section 11, to restrain the defendant from

prosecuting its business until the tax assessed upon it by section 2

of the statute had been paid. This section provided that "each fire,

marine, and fire and marine insurance company incorporated or as-

sociated under the laws of any government or state other than one of

the United States," should annually pay a certain tax. The defend-

ant was an English company formed for the business of insurance,

and organized under a deed of settlement. Its property was divided

into transferable shares. It had power to sue and be sued by the name

of its chairman, and a suit did not abate by reason of the death of

such officer. The company could sue its own members, and be sued

by them. Execution on any judgment recovered against the com-

road v. P earson, 128 Mass. 445. See, also, Frost v. Walker, 6o
Maine 468; Din more v. Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, 32 Leg.
Int. 388, an<l 1 l Phila. 483.
In Taft v. \.Yard, 106 Mass. 518, 524, speaking of the New York
statutes, it was said by Chief Justice Chapman:
"These statutes provide, in substance, that any association, consisting of even or more shareholders or associates, may sue and be
sued in the name of the president or treasurer; that in such suit a
judgment may be rendered against the company; and until an execution is issued against the company and returned unsatisfied, no action
hall be maintained against individuals. These statutes seem to apply
to all copartnerships consisting of seven or more members. The
members of such companies are authorized to hold thdr interests in
hares, which are assignable like shares of stock in a corporation, and
the action against the members is regarded as supplementary to the
action against the company. Waterbury v. Merchants' Union Express Co., 50 Barb. 157; Robbins v. Wells, l Robertson 666.
"So far as these statutes relate to the procedure in courts for the
recoTery of debts, they are limited to the state of New York; for
each state adopts its own forms of remedy. Story Confl. Laws,
sections 556-558. The plaintiff could not in this commonwealth
bring an action against the president or secretary, and obtain a
judgment against the company by its name; nor could he bring an
action against the members, or any of them, as a supplement to such
an action . In order to do so, we must hold that the statutes of New
York prescribing forms of action are in force here. In this commonwealth, such a company is a mere copartnership."
There is nothi~g inconsistent with an association being a partnerhip that it has share . or that the shares are tnmsferable. or that the
death of a member shall not work a dissolution of the partnership.
Phillips v. Blatchford, 137 Mass. 510. Sec, also, Hoadley v. County
Comms., IOS Mass. 519; Gleason v. McKay, 134 Ma s. 419.
The case mostly relied upon by the plaintiff is Liverpool Ins. Co.
v. Massachu etts, 10 Wall. 566, which was taken to the supreme
court of the United States on a writ of error from this court. See
Oliver v. Liverpool and London Ins. Co., 100 Mass. 53 r. It was a
bill in equity, filed by the treasurer of the commonwealth under the
statute of 1862, c. 22-t, section 1 I, to restrain the defendant from
prosecuting its busine · until the tax assessed upon it by section 2
of the statute had been paid. This section provided that "each fire,
marine, and fire and marine insurance company incorporated or asociated under the laws of any government or state other than one of
the United States," should annually pay a certain tax. The defendant was an English company formed for the business of insurance,
and organized under a d'eed of settlement. Its property was diYided
into transferable shares. It had power to sue and be sued by the name
of its chairman, and a suit did not abate by reason of the death of
such officer. The company could sue its own members, and be sued
by them. Execution on any judgment recovered against the com-
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pany could be issued against any proprietor. The statute under which

it was formed, and subsequent statutes declared that it should not be

174

deemed to be incorporated. The company was composed in part of

EDWARDS V . WARREN LINOLINE, ETC., WORKS.

British subjects and in part of citizens of the state of New York.

pany could be issued against any proprietor. The statute under which
it was formed, and subsequent statutes dedared that it should not be
deemed to be incorporated. The company was composed in part of
British subjects and in part of citizens of the state of New York.
This court, after stating that it was not a pure corporation nor a
pure partnership, but was an association intermediate between corporations known to the common law and ordinary partnerships, and was
so far clothed with corporate powers that it might be treated, for the
purposes of taxation, as an artificial body, proceeded to say: "We
think the defendants are an association of the kind to which the statute
of 1862 was expressly intended to apply, as well as to bodies wholly
corporate in their character, and that, being permitted by the comity
of our laws to exercise their functions within this commonwealth, they
can claim no exemption from regulations appropriate to their collective
action on account of the citizenship or nationality of their individual
members."
In the supreme court of the United States the decree of this court
w as affirmed on the ground that the company was a foreign corporation, but Mr. Justice Bradley, while agreeing in the result, differed
on the question whether the company was a corporation. He was of
opinion that it was one of those special partner:ships called joint-stock
companies, and that it could not sue or be sued in this country without legislative aid.
This view of Mr. Justice Bradley is in accord with the view of thi s
court, and we are not aware that the view taken by the supreme court
of the United States has been followed in this commonwealth. The
decisions which we have already cited show that a foreign joint-stock
company is considered as an association or partnership, and not as a
corporation.
An examination of the statutes further shows that the legislature
has clearly recognized the distinction between foreign corporations
and associations; and th at where it has deemed it best that an act
should apply to an association as well as to a corporation, it has sa id
so in plain language. Thus, the statute of 1882, c. 106, relating to the
taxation of foreign mining, quarrying, and oil companies, and requiring
the appointment of an agent here upon whom process may be served,
u ses the language , "every corporation, company, or association."
The statute of 1887, c. 2r4, in section r, provides: "When consistent with the context, and not obviously used in a different sense,
the term 'company' or 1 insurance company' as used herein includes
all corporations, associations, partnership, or indivicluals engaged as
principals in the business of insurance." The language is the same
in the statute of 1894 , c. 522, section 1.
By the statute of 1888, c. 429, section 11, " fraternal beneficiary
corporations, associations, or societies,'' organized under the laws of
another state and then doing business here, were allowed to continue
business without incorporation under the act. But by the statute of
r892, c. 40, section 1, this was amended by striking out the words
'' associations or societies.''

This court, after stating that it was not a pure corporation nor a

pure partnership, but was an association intermediate between corpo-

rations known to the common law and ordinary partnerships, and was

so far clothed with corporate powers that it might be treated, for the

purposes of taxation, as an artificial body, proceeded to say: "We

think the defendants are an association of the kind to which the statute

of 1862 was expressly intended to apply, as well as to bodies wholly

corporate in their character, and that, being permitted by the comity

of our laws to exercise their functions within this commonwealth, they

can claim no exemption from regulations appropriate to their collective

action on account of the citizenship or nationality of their individual

members."

In the supreme court of the United States the decree of this court

was affirmed on the ground that the company was a foreign corpora-

tion, but Mr. Justice Bradley, while agreeing in the result, differed

on the question whether the company was a corporation. He was of
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opinion that it was one of those special partnerships called joint-stock

companies, and that it could not sue or be sued in this country with-

out legislative aid.

This view of Mr. Justice Bradley is in accord with the view of this

court, and we are not aware that the view taken by the supreme court

of the United States has been followed in this commonwealth. The

decisions which we have already cited show that a foreign joint-stock

company is considered as an association or partnership, and not as a

corporation.

An examination of the statutes further shows that the legislature

has clearly recognized the distinction between foreign corporations

and associations; and that where it has deemed it best that an act

should apply to an association as well as to a corporation, it has said

so in plain language. Thus, the statute of 1882, c. 106, relating to the

taxation of foreign mining, quarrying, and oil companies, and requiring

the appointment of an agent here upon whom process may be served,

uses the language, "every corporation, company, or association."

The statute of 1887, c. 214, in section 1, provides: "When con-

sistent with the context, and not obviously used in a different sense,

the term 'company' or ' insurance company' as used herein includes

all corporations, associations, partnership, or individuals engaged as

principals in the business of insurance." The language is the same

in the statute of 1894, c. 522, section 1.

By the statute of 1888, c. 429, section 11, "fraternal beneficiary

corporations, associations, or societies," organized under the laws of

another state and then doing business here, were allowed to continue

business without incorporation under the act. But by the statute of

1892, c. 40, section 1, this was amended by striking out the words

"associations or societies."
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The statute of 1884, c. 330, requires " Every corporation established

under the laws of any other state or foreign country," and hereafter
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having a usual place of business here, before doing business, to appoint
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in writing the commissioner of corporations, or his successor in office,

to be its true and lawful attorney, upon whom process might be served.

The statute of 1888, c. 321, allows "Manufacturing corporations

established under the laws of other states," which have complied with

the provisions of the statute of 1884, c. 330, to purchase and hold

such real estate here as may be necessary for conducting their busi-

ness.

By the statute of 1895, c. 311: "Foreign corporations engaged in

the business of selling or negotiating bonds, mortgages, notes or other

choses in action," are made subject to the provisions of the statute

of 1884, c. 330.

The statute of 1896, c. 391, section 1, contains a provision relating

to the personal liability, under certain circumstances, of "the officers

and members or stockholders in any corporation established under the

laws of any other state or foreign country." See also St. 1895, c. 157.

Many other instances of legislation might be given where the dis-

tinction between a corporation proper and a mere association or
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organization is shown to be clearly in mind.

Unless the principal defendant can be considered a corporation,

it can not be sued here under the name -which the laws of Pennsyl-

vania authorize it to use. Such laws have no extra-territorial force

or effect. The trustee, therefore, was properly discharged.

In the opinion of a majority of the court, the order discharging the

trustee and dismissing the action must be affirmed.

-Vote. Joint stock companies with transferable shares perhaps could be

formed at common law, or under the law merchant, without special authority.

(See Harrison v. Heathorn, 6 M. & G. 79; Mexican & S. A. Co., 5 Jur. N. S.

615, 27 Beav. 480.) But it has been said that acting as a corporation, without

authority, was an indictable offense at common law. (Kinder v. Taylor, 3 L.

J. 68; Duvergier v. Fellows, 5 Bing. 248, 5 M. & P. 403, 4 Am. & E. Enc. 185,

note 2.) But acting as a corporation also included the idea of a limited lia-

bility of members, and so far as innocent third parties were affected, this could

not be done without authority. By the Bubble actof 1719 16 Geo. 1, c. 18),

joint stock companies were declared to be common nuisances, members were

subjected to penalties, and it was an offense for brokers to deal in their shares.

This act was repealed in 1825 (6 Geo. IV, ch. 91), though perhaps not often, if

ever, enforced for a long period before. In 1826, banking companies were

allowed to sue in the name of a certain officer, after complying with certain

rules, and in 1834, the crown was permitted to extend this privilege generally

to joint-stock companies. In 1844 (7 & 8 Vict., c. 110) all companies were

allowed to be incorporated, but the partnership liability was continued, but in

1855, they were permitted to organize with a limited liability (18 & 19 Vict.,

and 19 & 20 Vict., c. 47). In 1862, all former acts relating to companies were

consolidated into one act forthe incorporation of companies, which, with some

modifications, is still the law in England. In the United States, most of the

states have provided for joint stock companies, with transferable shares, and

in some cases with limited liability, but the rules of partnership are applied

so far as possible where the statutes under which thev are formed are silen..

1. As to suits—1896, State v. AdamB Express Co.", 66 Minn. 271, 38 L. R.

A. 225, (Service of summons may be made on local agent of such foreign

The statute of 1884, c. 330, requires "Every corporation established
under the laws of any other state or foreign country," and hereafter
having a usual place of business here, before doing business, to appoint
in writing the commissioner of corporations, or bis successor in office,
to be its true and lawful attorney, upon whom process might be served.
The statute of 1888, c. 32 1, allows " Manufacturing corporations
established under the laws of other states," which have complied with
the provisions of the statute of 1884, c. 330, to purchase and hold
such real estate here as may be necessary for conducting their business.
By the statute of 1895, c. 311: "Foreign corporations engaged in
the business of selling or negotiating bonds, mortgages, notes or other
choses in action," are made subject to the provisions of the statute
of 1884, c. 330.
The statute of 1896, c. 391, section 1, contains a provision relating
to the personal liability, under certain circumstances, of "the officers
and members or stockholders in any corporation established under the
laws of any other state or foreign country." See also St. 1895, c. 157.
Many other instances of legislation might be given whe re the distinction between a corporation proper and a mere association or
organization is shown to be clearly in mind.
Unless the principal defendant can be considered a corporati'on,
ii can not be sued here under the name which the laws of P ennsylvania authorize it to use. Such laws have no extra-territorial force
qr effect.
The trustee, therefore, was properly discharged.
In the opinion of a majority of the court, the order discharging the
trustee and dismissing the action must be affirmed .
•Voce. Joint stock companies with transferable shares perhaps could be
at _common law, or under the Jaw merch~nt, without special authority.
(o.;;ee Harnson v. Heathorn, 6 M. & G. 79; Mexican & S. A. Co., 5 Jur. N. S.
615, 27 Beav. 480. ) But it has been said that acting as a corporation, without
authority, was an indictable offense at common Jaw. (Kinder v. Taylor, 3 L.
J. 68; Duvergier v. Fellows, 5 Bing. 248, 5 M. & P. 403, 4 Am. & E . Enc. 185,
note 2. ) But acting as a corporation also included th e idea of a limited liability of members, and so far as innocent third parties were affected, this could
not be done without authority. By the Bubble act of 1719 (6 Geo. 1, c. 18 ),
j oi11t st1Jck companies were declared to be common nuisances, members were
snbjected to penalties. and it was an offense for brokers to deal in their s hares .
This act was repealed in 1825 (6 Geo. IV, ch . 91), though perhaps not often , if
ever, enforced for a long period before. In 1826, banking companies were
allowed to sue in the narne of a certain officer, after complying with certain
rules, and in 1834, the crown was permitted to extend this privilege generally
to joint-stock companies. In 1844 (7 & 8 Viet., c. 110) all companies were
allowed to be facorporated, but the partnership liability was continued: but in
IS.5-5, they were permitted to organize with a limited liability (18 & 19 Viet.,
and 19 & 20 Viet., c. 47). In 1862, all former acts relating tocompanies were
consolidated into one act for the incorporation of companies, which, with some
modifications, is still the law in England. In the United States, most of the
states have provided for joint stock companies, with transferable shares, and
in some ca.'!es with limited liability, but the mies of partnership are applied
so far as possible where the statutes under which they are formed are si l en~ .
1. As to snits-1896, State v. Adams Express Co., 66 l\linn. 271, 38 L. R.
.\ . 225, (Service of summo ns may be made on local agent of such foreign
f~nned
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joint stock company) ? 1889, Imperial Ref. Co. v. Wyman, 38 Fed. Rep. 574, 3

§

LEWIS V. ·nLTON .

L. R. A. 503 (limited partnership created in Pennsylvania can not sue in

~?

J-

the United States courts, as a "citizen" of that state, citizens of other states);

joint stock company); 1889, Imperial Ref. Co. v. Wyman, 38 Fed. Rep. 574, 3
L. R. A. 503 (limited partners hip created in Pennsylvania can not sue in
the United States courts, as a "citizen" of that state, citizens of other states) ;
1881, Fargo v. L ., N. A. & C.R. Co., 6 Fed. R. 787 (is a citizen of state creating for purpose of suing and being sued in Un ited States courl$ l ; 1876, Maltz
v. American Ex. Co., 1 Flip. (U. S.) 611, Fed. Cas. 9002, 3 C. L. J. 784 (isa
citizen of creating state for purpose of being sued in United States courts);
1875, W escott v. Fargo, etc., Co., 61 N. Y. 542 (president of such an institution is a corporation sole for purpose of suits.)
2. As to failm·e to comply strictly with statute-1896, Staver , et.c. , A .
Mfg. Co. v. Blake, lll Mich. 282, 38 L . R. A. 798 (technical non-compliance
wit h la w does not make m embers liable as general pa1tners, but see next
case); 1889, Vanhorn v. Co rcoran, 127 Pa. St. 255, 4 L. R. A. 386 (failure to
comply makes members liable as general partners).
3. A8 to taxation-18&5, State v. State Board of Assessors, 47 N. J. L . 36.
27 L. R. A. 684, 13 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 403, 31 A ti. 220 (Pennsylvania
partnership association may be taxed in New Jersey as foreign corporation ) ;
1892, P eople, etc., v. Coleman, 133 N. Y. 279, 16 L . R. A. 183, 37 Am. & En)!.
Corp. Cas. 1, 81.tpra, p. 15 (joint-stock companies in New York, are not C'orporations for purposes of taxation ); 1889, P eople, etc., v. Wemple, 117 N . Y .
136, 6 L. R. A. 303, 29 Am. & Eng. C. C. 610 (the lJnited States Expre8s
Company, a joint stock company, may be taxed in New York as an incorporated company.)
4. As to status generally-1896, Rouse, Hazard & Co. v. Detroit C. C. Co .,
111 Mich. 251, 38 L. R. A. 7~4; 1891 , Allen v. L ong, 80 Texas 261, 26 Am . Rt.
Rep. 735, 38 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 68 (joint stock companies are governed
by general principles of partnership); 1890, Oliver's Estate, 136 Pa. St. 43, 20
Am. St. R e p. 894 (partnership association is an artificial person, members do
not own th e property, and death of member does not dissolve). See also, 1890,
Fifth Avenue Bank v. Colgate, 120 N. Y. 381, 8 L. R. A. 712; 1889, Abbott v.
Hapgood, 1.50 Mass. 248, 5 L. R . A.586, 22 N. E . Re p . 907; 1889, Tilge v. Brooks,
124 Pa. St. 178, 2 L. R. A. 796; 1888, Jennings' Appeal, 2 Monaghan 184 (Pa.),
2 L. R. A. 43.

1881, Fargo v. L., N. A. & C. R. Co., 6 Fed. R. 787 (is a citizen of state cre-

ating for purpose of suing and being sued in United States courts); 1876, Maltz

v. American Ex. Co., 1 Flip. (U. S.) 611, Fed. Cas. 9002, 3 C. L. J. 784 (is a

citizen of creating state for purpose of being sued in United States courts);

1875, Wescott v. Fargo, etc., Co., 61 N. Y. 542 (president of such an institu-

tion is a corporation sole for purpose of suits.)

2. As to failure to comply strictly with statute—1896, Staver, etc., A.

Mfg. Co. v. Blake, 111 Mich. 282, 38 L. R. A. 798 (technical non-compliance

with law does not make members liable as general partners, but see next

case); 1889, Vanhoru v. Corcoran, 127 Pa. St. 255, 4 L. R. A. 386 (failure to

comply makes members liable as general partners).

3. As to taxation—1885, State v. State Board of Assessors, 47 N. J. L. 36,

27 L. R. A. 684, 13 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 403, 31 Atl. 220 (Pennsylvania

partnership association may be taxed in New Jersey as foreign corporation);

1892, People, etc., v. Coleman, 131! N. Y. 279, 16 L. R. A. 183, 37 Am. & Eng.

Corp. Cas. 1, supra, p. 15 (joint-stock companies in New York, are not cor-
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porations for purposes of taxation); 1889, People, etc., v. Wemple, 117 N. Y.

136, 6 L. R. A. 303, 29 Am. & Eng. C. C. 610 (the United States Express

Company, a joint stock company, may be taxed in New York as an incorpo-

rated company.)

4. As to status generally—1896, Rouse, Hazard & Co. v. Detroit C. C. Co.,

Ill Mich. 251, 38 L. R. A. 794; 1891, Allen v. Long, 80 Texas 261, 26 Am. St.

Rep. 735, 38 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 68 (joint stock companies are governed

by general principles of partnership); 1890, Oliver's Estate, 136 Pa. St. 43, 20

Am. St. Rep. 894 (partnership association is an artificial person, members do

not own the property, and death of member does not dissolve). See also, 1890,

Fifth Avenue Bank v. Colgate, 120 N. Y. 381, 8 L. R. A. 712; 1889, Abbott v.

Hapgood, 150Mass. 248,5 L. R. A.586, 22N.E. Rep. 907; 1889,Tilgev. Brooks,

124 Pa. St. 178, 2 L. R. A. 796; 1888, Jennings' Appeal, 2 Monaghan 184 (Pa.),

2 L. R. A. 43.

Sec: 32. (3) From fraternity or society.

Sec: 32.

LEWIS v. TILTON Et Al.

1884. In the Supreme Court of Iowa. 64 Iowa 220-223, 52 Am.

(3) From fraternity or society.
LEWIS v. TILTON ET AL.

Rep. 436.

The petition, as amended, states that the defendants and others

1884.

formed a benevolent society for the prevention and suppression of in-

low A.
Rep. 436.

· IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF

temperance, known and designated as the Ottumwa Temperance Re-

64 Iowa

220-223, 52

Am .

form Club, and that they were chosen to represent such society as its

The petition, as amended, states that the defendants and other
formed a benevolent society for the prevention and suppression of intemperance, known and designated as the Ottumwa Temperance R eform Club, and that th ey were chosen to represent such society as it!'
executive committee: th at in March, 1878, the defendants entered into
a written contract of lease with plaintiff, by th e terms of which said
Ottumwa Temperance R eform Club was to and did occupy the premises described in said lease, at the yearly rental of fifteen hundred dollars (a copy of said lease is attached to the p etition) ; that by virtue
of said lease the defendants, and the society of which they were m embers, occupied said premises from March 1 , 1878, to July r , 1879,
and enjoyed all the benefits resulting from such occupancy; that these
defendants verbally contracted with the Ottumwa Gas Light Company
to furni sh said Ottumwa T emperance Reform Club the gas required

executive committee; that in March, 1S7S. the defendants entered into

a written contract of lease with plaintiff, by the terms of which said

Ottumwa Temperance Reform Club was to and did occupy the prem-

ises described in said lease, at the yearly rental of fifteen hundred dol-

lars (a copy of said lease is attached to the petition) ; that by virtue

of said lease the defendants, and the society of which they were mem-

bers, occupied said premises from March 1. 187S, to July 1, 1879.

and enjoyed all the benefits resulting from such occupancy; that these

defendants verbally contracted with the Ottumwa Gas Light Company

to furnish said Ottumwa Temperance Reform Club the gas required
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to light said opera house and rooms thereunder; that by virtue of said

§ 32
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177

verbal understanding the gas company did from time to time, and as

required, furnish said club a large amount of gas; that said club was

not incorporated at the time the above contracts were made, and is

not now; and that said account for gas has been assigned to plaintiff.

Upon the grounds above stated, the plaintiff sought to make the

defendants individually liable. To the petition there was a demurrer,

which was sustained, and the plaintiff filed an amended petition,

stating various acts and things done, and reaffirming all the allega-

tions of the petition, and thereupon asked judgment against the

defendants individually. To the amended petition the defendants de-

murred. The demurrer was sustained, and the plaintiff excepted,

and, electing to stand thereon, appealed.

Seevers, J. i. As we understand the petition, the verbal contract

entered into with the gas company is an original undertaking on the

part of the defendants. At their request the gas was furnished the

club, and, of course, it seems to us the defendants are bound to pay

for the gas so furnished. It matters not to whom it was furnished.

The gas company had the right to expect that the defendants would
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pay for whatever was furnished at their request. There is no allega-

tion that credit was extended to the club, and the only presumption

which can be indulged in is that the credit was extended to the de-

fendants. As they contracted, they must pay.

2. The more serious question is whether the defendants are indi-

vidually liable under the lease, which, on its face, shows that it was

entered into between the plaintiff, as party of the first part, and the

Ottumwa Temperance Reform Club, party of the second part, and is

signed by the plaintiff, and by the defendants as follows:

{R. L. Tilton,

S. B. Thrall,

David Eaton,

Joseph Sloan."

It is insisted that the lease shows that credit was extended to the

club, and that the contract was made with it; that the principal was

named, and therefore the defendants can not be made individually

liable. This line of argument possibly would be conclusive if there

was a principal. • But there is none. The club is a myth. It has

no legal existence, and never had. It can not sue or be sued. The

defendants contracted in the name of a supposed principal; that is,

they claimed there was a principal for whom they were acting, but

it now appears that there was no principal known to the law. But,

under the allegations of an amended petition, it should be assumed,

we think, that there was, as a matter of fact, a body of men associated

together for a benevolent purpose, who had assumed the name above

stated, for the avowed purpose, by their united efforts, of suppressing

intemperance. There is, however, some doubt in our minds whether

it can be said that the plaintiff extended credit to an organization that

had no legal existence. As the law does not recognize such an organ-

12— Wil. Casks.

to light said opera house and rooms thereunder; that by vittue of said
verbal understanding the gas company did from time to time, and as
required, furnish said club a large amount of gas; that said club was
not incorporated at the time the above contracts were made, and is
not now; and that said account for gas has been assigned to plaintiff.
Upon the grounds above stated, the plaintiff sought to make the
defendants individually liable. To the petition there was a demurrer,
which was sustained, and the plaintiff filed an amended petition,
stating various acts and things done, and reaffirming all the allegations of the petition, and thereupon asked judgment against the
defendants individually. To the amended petition the defendants demurred. The demurrer was sustained, and the plaintiff excepted,
and, electing to stand thereon, appealed.
SEEVERS, J.
1. As we understand the petition, the verbal contract
entered into with the gas company is an original undertaking on the
part of the defendants. At their request the gas was furnished the
club, and, of course, it seems to us the defendants are bound to pay
for the gas so furnished. It matters not to whom it was furnished.
The gas company had the right to expect that the defendants would
pay for whatever was furnished at their request. There is no allegation that credit was extended to the club, and the only presumption
which can be indulged in is that the credit was extended to the defendants. As they contracted, they must pay.
2. The more serious question is whether the defendants are individually liable under the lease, which, on its face, shows that it was
entered into between the plaintiff, as party of the first part, and the
Ottumwa Temperance Reform Club, party of the second part, and is
signed by the plaintiff, and by the defendants as follows:
R. L. Tilton,
"Executive Committee of the Ottumwa
S. B. Thrall,
Temperance Reform Club, { David Eaton,
Joseph Sloan."
It is insisted that 'the lease shows that credit was extended to the
club, and that the contract was made with it; that the principal was
named, and therefore the defendants can not be made individually
liable. This line of argument possibly would be conclusive if there
was a principal. · But there is none. The club is a myth. It has
no legal existence, and never had. It can not sue or be sued. The
defendants contracted in the name of a supposed principal; that is,
they claimed there was a principal for whom they were ac#ng, but
it now appears that there was no prt'ncipal known to the law. But,
under the allegations of an amended petition, it should be assumed,
we think, that there was, as a matter of fact, a body of men associated
together for a benevolent purpose, who had assumed the name above
stated, for the avowed purpose, by their united efforts, of suppressing
intemperance. There is , however, some doubt in our minds whether
it can be said that the plaintiff extended credit to an organization that
had no legal existence. As the law does not recognize such an organI2-W1L. CASES.
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ization, we are at a loss to know how or why it can be said as a mat-

ter of law that the plaintiff contracted with and extended credit to a

ization, we are at a loss to know how or why it can be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff contracted with and extended credit to a
mere myth. In legal parlance, the organization can not be named.
It has no habitation or place of abode.
It is also insisted that a fund was provided for the payment of debts,
and hence it must be presumed that the plaintiff contracted in reliance
upon such fund, and therefore the defendants can not be made individually liable. What the fact may be we are not advised, but certainly this does not appear on the face of the petition, and we have
looked into the lease, and there is no provision in it from which such
an inference can be drawn.
It is also t'nsisted that there i's no known legal prt'ndple or rule under wltich the defendants can be made lt'able. It i's sat'd that they are
not partt'es. Tht's is true; that t's to say, these defendants could not
bt'nd any other members of the organt'z·ation as a partner t'n a jot'nt
enterprt'se, or a contract as to wht'ch he had no knowledge, and to
which he did not assent. But we think "those who engaged in the
enterprise (that is, became members of the organization) are liable
for the debts. They contracted, and all are included in such liability
who assented to the undertaking or subsequently ratified it." It was
so held in Ash v. Guie, 97 Pa. St. 493; Fredendall v. Taylor et al.,
26 Wis. 286; and this mle is supported to some extent by what was
said by this court in Keller v. Tracy, 1 I Iowa 530, and Drake v. The
Board of Trustees, 11 Iowa 54.
But, it is said, these defendants did not contract. They certainly
represented that they had a principal for whom they had authority to
contract. They, for or on behalf of an alleged principal, contracted
that such principal would do and perform certain things. As we have
said, there is no principal, and t't seems to us that the defendants should
be held lt'able, and that t't i's t'mmaterlal whether they be so held because they held themselves out as agents for a prt'nct'pal that had no
existence, or on the ground that they must, under the contract, be regarded as prt'nct'pals, for the st'mple reason that there is no other
prindpal t'n existence. We think the demurrer should have been
overruled.
Reversed.
Note . See cases cited under White v. Brownell, infra, p. 187.

mere myth. In legal parlance, the organization can not be named.

It has no habitation or place of abode.

It is also insisted that a fund was provided for the payment of debts,

and hence it must be presumed that the plaintiff contracted in reliance

upon such fund, and therefore the defendants can not be made indi-

vidually liable. What the fact may be we are not advised, but cer-

tainly this does not appear on the face of the petition, and we have

looked into the lease, and there is no provision in it from which such

an inference can be drawn.

It is also insisted that there is no known legal principle or rule un-

der which the defendants can be made liable. It is said that they are

not parties. This is true; that is to say, these defendants could not

bind any other members of the organization as a partner in a joint

enterprise, or a contract as to which he had no knowledge, and to

which he did not assent. But we think "those who engaged in the

enterprise (that is, became members of the organization) are liable
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for the debts. They contracted, and all are included in such liability

who assented to the undertaking or subsequently ratified it." It was

so held in Ash v. Guie, 97 Pa. St. 493; Fredendall v. Taylor et al.,

26 Wis. 286; and this rule is supported to some extent by what was

said by this court in Keller v. Tracy, 11 Iowa 530, and Drake v. The

Board of Trustees, 11 Iowa 54.

But, it is said, these defendants did not contract. They certainly

represented that they had a principal for whom they had authority to

contract. They, for or on behalf of an alleged principal, contracted

that such principal would do and perform certain things. As we have

said, there is no principal, and it seems to us that the defendants should

be held liable, and that it is immaterial whether they be so held be-

cause they held themselves out as agents for a principal that had no

existence, or on the ground that they must, under the contract, be re-

garded as principals, for the simple reason that there is no other

principal in existence. We think the demurrer should have been

overruled.

Reversed.

Note. See cases cited under White v. Brownell, infra, p. 187.
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1888. In the Court of Appeals of New York. 109 New York

593-594> 4 Am. St. R. 495.

Appeal from judgment of the general term of the supreme court in

the first judicial department, entered upon an order made May 29,

1885, which affirmed a judgment in favor of defendant, entered upon

an order overruling a demurrer to certain portions of the answer.
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593-594, 4 Am. St. R. 495·

109 New York

Appeal from judgment of the general term of the supreme court in
the first judicial dep~rtment , entered upon an order made May 29,
1885, which affirmed a judgment in favor of defendant, entered upon
an order overruling a demurrer to certain portions of the answer.
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Gray, J. Plaintiff, as the assignee of one Des Marets, formerly a

member of the New York Stock Exchange, sues to recover the pro-
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ceeds received by that organization from a sale of the membership,

or. as it is sometimes technically termed, the seat of said Des Marets.

It is alleged by plaintiff in his complaint that Des Marets, for many

years a member of the New York Stock Exchange, in October, 1883,

became insolvent, and, under the laws governing that body, was sus-

pended; that subsequently its governing committee determined that

the failure was caused by doing business in a reckless and unbusiness-

like manner, and resolved that Des Marets was ineligible for re-

admission, and in December following the failure the stock exchange,

pursuant to its constitution and by-laws, disposed of his membership

and seat for the sum of $25,000, which sum it retained and refused

to pay over to plaintiff, who demanded It as Des Marets' assignee.

The complaint also alleges ';hat ihe New York Stock Exchange is an

unincorporated association, organized and located in New York city;

that its members have voluntarily established certain rules, conditions

and articles of association or copartnership, which are designated as

their constitution and by-laws, which are signed and consented to by
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the members and which govern them, their officers and committees,

and which control in the conduct of the transactions and concerns of

the association and are binding and obligatory upon the members.

The answer of the defendant, after admitting the allegations of the

complaint which I have mentioned, sets forth much of the constitu-

tion and by-laws of the exchange, and alleges the distribution of the

proceeds of the sale of Des Marets' membership to have been made

among his creditors in the exchange, pursuant to their provisions.

The plaintiff demurred to this portion of the answer on the ground

that it was insufficient in law upon its face. Although this matter

was not stated as a separate defense, totidem verbis, yet as it was

affirmative in its nature and constituted the defense and justification of

the association in disposing of Des Marets' membership and in retain-

ing the proceeds arising from such disposition, we shall not consider

the demurrer as improperly interposed and will dispose of the ques-

tions raised by these pleadings.

Their decision involves the legal relations to each other of the mem-

bers composing the association of the New York Stock Exchange, and

the extent and validity of the powers reserved by its constitution and

by-laws, and conferred upon its officers and committees in the man-

agement of its affairs and in the control over a member. The New

York Stock Exchange is a voluntary association of individuals,

united, without a charter, in* an organization for the purpose of afford-

ing to the members thereof certain facilities for the transaction of their

business as brokers in stocks and securities, and a convenient exchange

or sales-room for the conduct of such transactions. It can not be

said to be strictly a copartnership, for its objects do not come within

the definition of one. A copartnership results from a contract be-

tween the parties by which they agree to combine their property or

labor, or both, in some common enterprise and for a common profit,

GRAY, J. Plaintiff, as the assignee of one Des Marets, formerly a
member of the New York Stock Exchange, sues to recover the proceeds received by that organization from a sale of the membership,
or, as it is sometimes technically termed, the seat of said Des Marets.
It is alleged by plaintiff in his complaint that Des Marets, for many
years a member of the New York Stock Exchange, in October, x883,
became insolvent, and, under the laws governin'g that body, was suspended; that subsequently its governing committee determined that
the failure was caused by doing business in a reckless and unbusinesslike manner, and resolved that Des Marets was ineligible for readmission, and in December following the failure the stock exchange,
pursuant to its constitution and by-laws, disposed of his membership
and seat for the sum of $z5,ooo, which EU'.11 it r etained and refused
to pay over to plaintiff, who den::mtle~ :t as Dts Marets' assignee.
The complaint also alleges ·cha~ ~he New York Stock Exchange is an
unincorporated association, organized and located in New York city ;
that its member~ !Jave voluntarily established certain rules, conditions
and art!::::es of association or copartncrship, which are designated as
their constitution and by-laws, which are signed an<l consented to by
the members and which govern them, their officers and committees,
and which control in the conduct of the transactions and concerns of
the association and are binding and obligatory upon the members.
The answer of the defendant, after admitting the allegations of the
complaint which I have mentioned, sets forth much of the constitution and by-laws of the exchange, and alleges the distribution of the
proceeds of the s~le of Des Marets' membership to have been made
among his creditors in the exchange, pursuant to their provisions.
The plaintiff demurred to this portion of the answer on the ground
that it was insufficient in law upon its face. Although this matter
was not stated as a separate defense, totidem verbis, yet as it was
affirmative in its nature and constituted the defense and justification of
the association in disposing of Des Marets' membership and in retaining the proceeds arising from such disposition, we shall not consider
the demurrer as improperly interposed and will dispose of the questions raised by these pleadings.
Their decision involves the legal relations to each other of the members composing the association of the New York Stock Exchange, and
the extent and validity of the powers reserved by its constitution and
by-laws, and conferred upon its officers and committees in the management of its affahs and in .the control over a member. The New
York Stock Exchange is a voluntary association of individuals,
united, without a charter, in° an organization for the purpose of affording to the members thereof certain facilities for the transaction of their
business as brokers in stocks and securities, and a convenient exchange
or sales-room for the conduct of such transactions. It can not be
said to be strictly a copartnership, for its objects do not come within
the definition of one. A copartnership results from a contract between the parties by which they agree to combz"ne their propcr~y or
labor, or both , in some common enterprise and for a common pro.fit,
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to be shared in the proportion stated in their agreement. The objects

of a voluntary association of brokers do not. however, involve any such
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combination, or any communion of profits from the business trans-
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acted by the members. Like a business club, its principal object is the

to 6c shared in the proportion stated in thci"r agreement. The objects
ofa voluntary association of brokers do not, however, involve any sucll
combination, or any communion of pr~ts from the business transacted by the members. Like a business club, its principal object is the
promotion of the convenience of its members by furnishing facilities
which aid them in doing their business, and are, therefore, of benefit
to them. It may be said, however, that the rights of the associates
are not substantially different from those of partners, so far as their
rights in the property of the association are concerned. The interest
of each member in the property of the association is equal, but it is
subject to the constitution and by-laws, which are the basis on which
is founded the association. They express the contract by which each
member has consented to be bound, and which measures his duties,
rights and privileges as such.
It seems most clear to me that this constitution and the by-laws derive a binding force from the fact that they are signed by all the members, and that they are conclusive upon each of them in respect of the
regulations of the mode of transaction of his business, and of his
right to continue to be a member. Whatever are the rights acquired
by a member and created by his admission to membership, the rules
by which the membership is created or dissolved, and which control
the affairs of the organization and the relation of members, entered
into those rights when created and remained a part of them. In this
proposition there is nothing against puhlic policy, for the reason that
whatever a member acquires is subject to the self-imposed condition
that his thle and the rights which accrue from his . membership are
regulated by, and are dependent upon, the laws adopted by the as. ociation, and expressly consented to by him when he joined. When
Des Marcts, plaintiff's assignor, joined the exchange, it may be perfectly true that he acquired property; but it was property given by
the act of those who, in giving it, accompanied the gift with conditions
which were incident to and a part of the property; and it was in no
sense property created by the individual's act. I consider that there
is an obvious distinction between property of the individual's own
creation, to which he attaches conditions, or in the disposal of which
he exerts a direction, whereby the claims of others are affected, and
property which comes to him subject to conditions which may dep1;ve
him of its use or enjoyment. And so here, if the constitution, which
forms the basis of this association, appropriates to his creditors in the
association, or to any of its corporate objects, the peculiar property of
the member, who, by force of constitutional provisions, has ·Joi;t his
membership, that was an incident entering into his title to it. When
membership and the rights belong£ng to that status were conferred
upon him, the gift was accompant"cd by a co11d£tion that the rights. of
whatever nature, should revert to the associati"on upon the happeni"ng
of certain events, and he can not be hea1·d to complain; nor can tht'rd
persons, claim£ng to der£ve under him. He should be held to his
contract, which was reasonable, and wh1en entered into prejudiced no
rights of others, nor conflicted with any statutory or common-law

promotion of the convenience of its members by furnishing facilities

which aid them in doing their business, and are, therefore, of benefit

to them. It may be said, however, that the rights of the associates

are not substantially different from those of partners, so far as their

rights in the property of the association are concerned. The interest

of each member in the property of the association is equal, but it is

subject to the constitution and by-laws, which are the basis on which

is founded the association. They express the contract by which each

member has consented to be bound, and which measures his duties,

rights and privileges as such.

It seems most clear to me that this constitution and the by-laws de-

rive a binding force from the fact that they are signed by all the mem-

bers, and that they are conclusive upon each of them in respect of the

regulations of the mode of transaction of his business, and of his

right to continue to be a member. Whatever are the rights acquired

by a member and created by his admission to membership, the rules
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by which the membership is created or dissolved, and which control

the affairs of the organization and the relations of members, entered

into those rights when created and remained a part of them. In this

proposition there is nothing against public policy, for the reason that

whatever a member acquires is subject to the self-imposed condition

that his title and the rights which accrue from his. membership are

regulated by, and are dependent upon, the laws adopted by the asso-

ciation, and expressly consented to by him when he joined. When

Des Marets, plaintiff's assignor, joined the exchange, it may be per-

fectly true that he acquired property; but it was property given by

the act of those who, in giving it, accompanied the gift with conditions

which were incident to and a part of the property; and it was in no

sense property created by the individual's act. I consider that there

is an obvious distinction between property of the individual's own

creation, to which he attaches conditions, or in the disposal of which

he exerts a direction, whereby the claims of others are affected, and

property which comes to him subject to conditions which may deprive

him of its use or enjoyment. And so here, if the constitution, which

forms the basis of this association, appropriates to his creditors in the

association, or to any of its corporate objects, the peculiar property of

the member, who, by force of constitutional provisions, has lost his

membership, that was an incident entering into his title to it. When

membership and the rights belonging to that status were conferred

upon him, the gift was accompanied by a condition that the rights, of

whatever nature, should revert to the association upon the happening

of certain events, and he can not be heard to complain; nor can third

persons, claiming to derive under him. He should be held to his

contract, which was reasonable, and when entered into prejudiced no

rights of others, nor conflicted with any statutory or common-law
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right. A person acquires by his admission to membership only such

rights as the constitution and by-laws of the association give him;

and upon ceasing to be a member, by the competent judgment of the
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governing committee, he ceases to have any further concern or interest

in the association, except it is given by its laws.

The New York Stock Exchange, by the accumulation of a great fund

from a large membership, by the wise and successful management of

the members, and by the acquisition of valuable facilities for the

transaction of business, has given to membership an important pecun-

iary value. It is fair to presume that this prosperity and success were,

in an important degree, due to the regulations adopted looking to the

conduct by a member of his business, and the restraints imposed upon

reckless or dishonest methods. Membership may be property; but it

is not property in every sense. If it is property, it is incumbered

with conditions when purchased, without which it could not be

obtained. (Hyde v. Woods, 94 U. S. 523.)

By the constitution of this association, the powers of government

are vested in a governing committee, whose decision, after the trial

of a member for offenses under its laws, is final. Standing committees

are appointed by them, and the committee on insolvencies is charged
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with the duty of immediately investigating every case of insolvency

and of reporting whether the same was occasioned by reckless dealing

or by doing business for improper parties. Should the governing

committee, upon this report, determine that a member's failure was

caused by doing business in a reckless and unbusinesslike manner,

he may be declared ineligible for readmission by a majority vote of

the entire governing committee. By section 2 of article 13 of the

constitution, it is provided that "in every case where a member is

deprived of his membership, or declared ineligible for readmission by

the governing committee by reason of any offense against or under

the laws of the exchange, his membership may be disposed of forth-

with by the committee on admissions."

The plaintiff, appellant, contends that in such a case as this of Des

Marets' severance from membership, there was no power under the

constitution to distribute the proceeds arising from the sale of his

membership, and that, in the absence of some express reservation of

the right to dispose of those proceeds, they are the property of the

member. The vice in plaintiff's argument is in the assumption that

a member has any absolute property of his own in such a case. As

we have before seen, the rules of the association were an incident to

the rights acquired by a person upon admission; and one-of those

rules was that for conviction of an offense against or under the laws

of the exchange, a suspended member might be deprived of right to

readmission to membership. When expelled he ceases to have any

interest in the association. His privilege to transact his business at

that place has been lost. The association may fill the vacancy caused

by his expulsion, or not, as they please. They can not be compelled

to do so; but if they elect to admit a new member, and can derive,

from so doing, any profit, that is their unquestionable right, with the

right. A person acqufres by his admission to members/up only such
riglzts as the constitution and by-laws of the assodation give him;
and upon ceasing to be a member, by the competent judgment of the
governing committee, he ceases lo have any further concern or interest
t'n the associatt'on, except t't is giv'en by t'ts laws.
The New York Stock Exchange, by the accumulation of a great fund
from a large membership, by the wise and successful management of
the members, and by the acquisition of valuable facilities for the
transaction of business, has given to membership an important pecuniary value. It is fair to presume that this prosperity and success were,
in an important degree, dut to the regulations adopted looking to the
conduct by a member of his business, and the restraints imposed upon
reckless or dishonest methods. Membership may be property; but it
is not property in every sense. If it is property, it is incumbered
with conditions when purchased, without which it could not be
obtained. (Hyde v. Woods, 94 U. S. 523.)
By the constitution of this association, the powers of government
are vested in a governing committee, whose decision, after the trial
of a member for offenses under its laws, is final. Standing committees
are appoint~d by them, and the committee on insolvencies is charged
with the duty of immediately investigating every case of insolvency
and of reporting whether the same was occasioned by reckless dealing
or by doing business for improper parties. Should the governing
c ommittee, upon this report, determine that a member's failure was
caused by doing business in a reckless and unbusinesslike manner,
he may be dc!clarcd ineligible for readmission by a majority vote of
the entire governing committee. By section 2 of article 13 of the
constitution, it is provided that "in every case where a member is
deprived of his membership, or declared ineligible for readmission by
the governing committee by reason of any offense against or under
the laws of the exchange, his membership may be disposed of forth" ' ith by the committee on admissions."
The plaintiff, appellant, contends th<1t in such a case as this of Des
Marets' severance from membership, there was no power under the
constitution to distribute the proceeds arising from the sale of his
membership, and that, in the absence of some express reservation of
the right to dispose of those proceeds, they are the property of the
member. The vice in plaintiff's argument is in the assumption that
a member has any absolute property of his own in such a case. As
we have before seen, the rules of the association were an incident to
the rights acquired by a person upon admission; and one. of those
rules was that for conviction of an offense against or under the laws
of the exchange, a suspended m ember might be deprived of right to
readmission to membership. When expelled he ceases to have any
interest in the association. His privilege to transact his business at
that place has been lost. The association may fill the vacancy caused
hy his expulsion, or not, as they please. They can not be compelled
to do so; but if they elect to admit a new member , and can derive,
from so doing, any profit. that is their unquestionable right , with the
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exercise of which others are not concerned. They may do with their

own as they like. As I construe section 2 of article 13, above cited,

its effect is that of an express reservation of the right to deprive a

exercise of which others are not concerned. They may do with their
own as they like. As I construe section 2 of article 13, above cited,
its effect is that of an express reservation of the right to deprive a
member, found guilty of an offense under its provisions, of all rights,
interest and claim whatever.
The right is given to a member in good standing to propose for admission in his stead some one acceptable to the committee on admissions, and any profit he derives from his negotiations with the candidate is his. So if a member becomes honestly insolvent and fails to
qualify under the rules for readmission, or if he dies, after the claims
of the association are discharged, the proceeds may be paid to him or
his legal representatives, as the case may be. But in the case of a
member who, by misconduct cognizable by the laws of the association,
forfeits his right to continue to remain a member, there is reserved
by the constitution the right to dispose of his membership. These
rules are reasonable, and do not contravene any rule of public policy,
and having been consented to by the plaintiff's assignor, deprived him
of any interest or rights in the association, of which he had ceased . to
be a member. These views lead to an affirmance of the judgment
appealed from.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.

member, found guilty of an offense under its provisions, of all rights,

interest and claim whatever.

The right is given to a member in good standing to propose for ad-

mission in his stead some one acceptable to the committee on admis-

sions, and any profit he derives from his negotiations with the candi-

date is his. So if a member becomes honestly insolvent and fails to

qualify under the rules for readmission, or if he dies, after the claims

of the association are discharged, the proceeds may be paid to him or

his legal representatives, as the case may be. But in the case of a

member who, by misconduct cognizable by the laws of the association,

forfeits his right to continue to remain a member, there is reserved

by the constitution the right to dispose of his membership. These

rules are reasonable, and do not contravene any rule of public policy,

and having been consented to by the plaintiff's assignor, deprived him

of any interest or rights in the association, of which he had ceased - to

be a member. These views lead to an affirmance of the judgment
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appealed from.

All concur.

Judgment affirmed.

Note. See Board of Trade of Chicago v. Nelson, 162 III. 431, 53 Am. St. 312;

American Live Stock Co. v. Chicago Live Stock Exchange, 143 111. 210, 32 N.

E. Rep. 274; Green v. Board, etc., 174 111. 586, 51 N. E. Rep. 599 (and see

Evans v. Phil. Club, infra, p. 1165, and note).

Sec. 34. (5) From cost book mining companies.

Note. See Board of Trade of Chicago v. Nelson, 162 111. .J31, 53 Am. St. 312;
American Live Stock Co. v. Chicago Live Stock Exchange, 143 Ill. 210, 32 N.
E. Rep. 274; Green v. Board, etc., 174 Ill. 685, 51 N. E. Rep. 599 (and see
Evans v. Phil. Club, infra, p. 1165, and note).
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Appeal from the county court, Nevada county.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Crocker, J., delivered the opinion of the court—Norton, J., con-

Sec. 34. ( 5) From cost book mining companies.

curring, and Cope, C. J., concurring specially.

This is an action upon a promissory note for $102, with interest at

SKILLMAN v. LACHMAN ET AL. 1

3 per cent, per month, against the defendants, as members of the

"Gold Hill Company," originally brought before a justice of the

peace, where a judgment was rendered against the defendants, from

1863.

which they appealed to the county court, where judgment was again
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rendered against them for $260.46 cents, besides costs, that sum being

SUPREME CounT OF CALIFORNIA.
198-2o8.

23 California

the principal and interest of the note, and from which they appeal to

Appeal from the county court, Nevada county.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

this court. * * *

1 Arguments and opinion of the court on question of jurisdiction omitted.

CnocKER, J., delivered the opinion of the court-NORTON, J., concurring, and COPE, C. ]., concurring specially.
This is an action upon a promissory note for $102, with interest at
3 per cent. per month, against the defendants, as members of the
"Gold Hill Company," originally brought before a justice of the
peace, where a judgment was rendered against the defendants, from
which they appealed to the county court, where judgment was again
rendered against them for $z6o.46 cents, besides costs, that sum being
the principal and interest of the note , and from which they appeal to
this court. • • •
1
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The principal point raised by the appellant is that the owners of the

claim are tenants in common and not partners; that Sprout was one

of the owners, and that one co-tenant can not bind his co-tenants by

a note given in the name of the company. This question of the re-

lation which exists between persons owning several interests in a mine,

and engaged in working the same, is a very important one. What-

ever may be the rights and liabilities of tenants in common of a mine

not being worked, it is clear that where the several owners unite and

co-operate in working the mine, then a new relation exists between

them, and, to a certain extent, they are governed by the rules relating

to partnerships. They form what is termed a mining partnership,

which is governed by many of the rules relating to ordinary partnerships,

but which has also some rules peculiar to itself—one of which is that

one person may convey his interest in the mine and business, without

dissolving the partnership. (Ferreday v. Wightwick, 1 Russ. & Mylne

49.) Still, there may be a partnership in the working of the mine,

subject to the rules relating to an ordinary partnership in trade. (Story

on Part., § 82.) And this relation of partnership may be constituted
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either by express stipulation or by implication deduced from the acts

of the parties. (Rockw. on Mines, 575-) But in the case of an ordi-

nary mining partnership, something more will be required to raise the

presumption of liability arising from persons holding themselves out

to the world as partners than would be necessary in the case of an or-

dinary partnership. Such persons, in the absence of other circum-

stances, can not fairly be presumed to have intended to render them-

selves liable to all consequences of a commercial partnership. (Rockw.

on Mines, 575.) The same author concludes his examination of this

question as follows: "If the works are carried on by persons as mere

owners of land, concurring in a general system of management for

their common benefit, the shares of each person will only be liable for

his individual engagement, and to the payment of debts contracted by

himself, or his authorized agent, without interfering with the shares

of the other tenants in common." (Rockw. on Mines, 579.)

There have been several decisions relative to the rights and liabilities

of shareholders in mining companies to the public and among them-

selves, which it may be well to examine. In the case of Vice v. Lady

Anson (7 B. & C. 409), which was an action for goods sold and

materials furnished for working a mine, in which the defendant held

one share, evidenced only by a certificate issued by the secretary of

the company, the plaintiff, at the time he furnished the goods, had no

knowledge that she was a shareholder. She had paid the deposit on

some shares, and had spoken and written of herself (in private letters)

as a shareholder of the company. The judge held that the plaintiff

did not actually give credit to the defendant, and was not misled by

her, and that she never held herself out to the world as a partner, and

therefore she could only be chargeable on the ground of being really

interested. The fact that she thought she had an interest did not

make her interested; and he held that the certificate conveyed no

interest in the mine, and therefore she was not liable. The correct-

The principal point raised by the appellant is that the owners of the
claim are tenants in common and not partners; that Sprout was one
of the owners , and that one co-tenant can not bind his co-tenants by
a note given in the name of the company. This question of the re·
lation which exists between persons owning several interests in a mine,
and engaged in working the same, is a very important one. What·
ever may be the rights and liabilities of tenants in common of a mine
not being worked, it is clear that where the several owners unite and
co-operate in working the mine, then a new relation exists between
them, and, to a certain extent, they are governed by the rules relating
to partnerships. They form what is termed a mining partnership,
which is governed by many of the rules relating to ordinary partnerships,
but which has also some rules peculiar to itself-one of which is that
one person may convey his interest in the mine and business, without
dissolving the partnership. (Ferreday v. Wighhivick, r Russ. & Mylne
49.) Still, there may be a partnership in the working of the mine,
subject to the rules relating to an ordinary partnership in trade. (Story
on Part., § 82.) And this relation of partnership may be constituted
either by express stipulation or by implication deduced from the acts
of the parties. (Rockw. on Mines, 575.) But in the case of an ordinary mining partnership, something more will be required to raise the
presumption of liability arising from persons holding themselves out
to the world as partners than would be necessary in the case of an ordinary partnership. Such persons, in the absence of other circumstances, can not fairly be presumed to have intended to render themselves liable to all consequences of a commercial partnership. ( Rockw.
on Mines, 575.) The same author concludes his examination of this
question as follows : " If the works are carried on by persons as mere
owners of land, concurring in a general system of management for
the ir common benefit, the shart!S of each person will only be liable for
his individual .engagement, and to the payment of debts contra cted by
himself, or his authorized agent, without interfering with the shares
of the other tenants in common." (Rockw. on Mines, 579.)
There have been several decisions relative to the rights and liabilities
of shareholders in mining companies to the public and among themselves, which it may be well to examine. In the case of Vice v. Lady
Anson (7 B. & C. 409), which was an action for goods sold and
materials furnished for working a mine, in which the defendant held
one share, evidenced only by a certificate issued by the secretary of
the company, the plaintiff, at the time he furnished the goods, had no
knowledge that she was a shareholder. She had paid the deposit on
ome shares, and had spoken and written of herself (in private letter")
as a shareholder of the company. The judge held that the pla inti ff.
d id not actually give credit to the defendant, and was not misled b_v
h e r , and that she never held herself out to the world as a partner, and
t herefore she could only be chargeable on the ground of being really
inte rested. The fact that she thoug ht she had an interest did not
m ake her interested; and he held that the certificate conveyed no
interest in the mine, and therefore she was not liable. The correct-
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ness of this decision, that it was necessary to prove a conveyance of
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an interest in the mine, has been doubted.

The case of Dickinson v. Valpy (10 B. & C. 128) was an action

by an indorsee of a bill of exchange, drawn and accepted by a mining

ness of this decision, that it was necessary to prove a conveyance of
an interest in the mine, has been doubted.
The case of Dickinson v. Valpy (10 B. & C. 128) was an action
by an indorsee of a bill of exchange, drawn and accepted by a mining
company, against the defendant as a member of the company. The
defendant had applied for and obtained shares in the company, on
which he had paid several installments. The business of the company
was transacted by a board of directors, and the bill had been drawn
and accepted in pursuance of a resolution passed by them. It was
held necessary for the plaintiff to show that the directors had power
to bind the shareholders by drawing bills of exchange; and for that
purpose, evidence should have been given of the nature and character
of the business of the company, to show that in order to carry into
effect the purposes for which it was instituted the drawing and accepting of bills was necessary, or to show from the practice of similar
companies that it was usual to draw such bills. It was also held,
that although -in ordinary trading partnerships the la-.v i"mplied that
one partuer had power to bind another by drawi'ng and accepting
bills, yet that rule did not apply to mt"ni11g partnersht"ps, wt"thout
showing that it was necessary to carry on its bust"ness.
In Judson v. Boume (6 M. & W. 461), it was held that the members of a mining company have authority by law (in the absence of
any proof of a more limited authority) to bind each other by dealings
on credit for the purpose of working the mines, if that appears to be
necessary or usual in the management of the mines. In Hawtayne v.
Bourne (7 M. & W. 595), the managing agent of the mining company
had borrowed money from a bank to pay debts due to laborers who
had levied distress warrants upon the materials of the mine, and it
was held that there was no rule of law that such an agent could, eyen
in case of an emergency suddenly arising, raise money and pledge the
credit of his principals for its repayment; that the authority of the
agent was only that he should conduct and carry on the affairs of the
mine in the usual manner, and there was no proof of express authority
to borrow money, or that it was necessary in the ordinary course of the
undertaking.
A joint-stock company was formed to work a mine, in which the
defendant became a shareholder and took part in its proceedings. The
prospectus, issued on the formation of the company, stated that all
supplies for the mine were to be purchased at cash prices, and no debt
was to be incurred, and the scrip certificates also bore an indorsement
to the same effect. The plaintiff supplied goods for the necessary
working of the mine on the order of a resident agent appointed hy the
directors to manage the mine, which was the customary course in such
concerns. Held, that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for the
price of such goods, notwithstanding the statements in the prospectus
and certificates, unless it were shown that the agent had, in fact , no
authority from the defendant, and that the plaintiff had notice thereof.
(Hawkin v. Bourne, 8 M. & W. 703.)
Where a defendant is charged with a debt in an action for work and

company, against the defendant as a member of the company. The

defendant had applied for and obtained shares in the company, on

which he had paid several installments. The business of the company

was transacted by a board of directors, and the bill had been drawn

and accepted in pursuance of a resolution passed by them. It was

held necessary for the plaintiff to show that the directors had power

to bind the shareholders by drawing bills of exchange; and for that

purpose, evidence should have been given of the nature and character

of the business of the company, to show that in order to carry into

effect the purposes for which it was instituted the drawing and accept-

ing of bills was necessary, or to show from the practice of similar

companies that it was usual to draw such bills. It was also held,

that although in ordinary trading partnerships the law implied that

one partuer had power to bind another by drawing and accepting

bills, yet that rule did not apply to mining partnerships, without

showing that it was necessary to carry on its business.
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In Judson v. Bourne (6 M. & W. 461), it was held that the mem-

bers of a mining company have authority by law (in the absence of

any proof of a more limited authority) to bind each other by dealings

on credit for the purpose of working the mines, if that appears to be

necessary or usual in the management of the mines. In Hawtayne v.

Bourne (7 M. & W. 595), the managing agent of the mining company

had borrowed money from a bank to pay debts due to laborers who

had levied distress warrants upon the materials of the mine, and it

was held that there was no rule of law that such an agent could, even

in case of an emergency suddenly arising, raise money and pledge the

credit of his principals for its repayment; that the authority of the

agent was only that he should conduct and carry on the affairs of the

mine in the usual manner, and there was no proof of express authority

to borrow money, or that it was necessary in the ordinary course of the

undertaking.

A joint-stock company was formed to work a mine, in which the

defendant became a shareholder and took part in its proceedings. The

prospectus, issued on the formation of the company, stated that all

supplies for the mine were to be purchased at cash prices, and no debt

was to be incurred, and the scrip certificates also bore an indorsement

to the same effect. The plaintiff supplied goods for the necessary

working of the mine on the order of a resident agent appointed by the

directors to manage the mine, which was the customary course in such

concerns. Held, that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for the

price of such goods, notwithstanding the statements in the prospectus

and certificates, unless it were shown that the agent had, in fact, no

authority from the defendant, and that the plaintiff had notice thereof.

(Hawkin v. Bourne, 8 M. & W. 703.)

Where a defendant is charged with a debt in an action for work and
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labor as a partner in a mining company, but is not shown to have

either contracted such debt personally or represented himself to the
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plaintiff as a partner, the fact of his having been partner may never-

theless be shown by evidence short of strict proof that he had executed

a deed of copartnership, or was legally interested in the mine. The

fact may be proved by his admission made before or after the debt

was incurred. (Ralph v. Harvey, 1 Q. B. 845.) One of several co-

adventurers in a mine has not, as such, any authority to pledge the

credit of the general body for the money borrowed for the purposes

of the concern. And the fact of his having the general management

of the mine makes no difference, in the absence of circumstances from

which an implied authority for that purpose can be inferred. (Ricketts

v. Burnett, 4 Q. B. 686.)

Such is the uncertainty of mining operations that few are willing

to risk all their means in such undertakings; and it is therefore cus-

tomary for a number of persons to unite in the enterprise; and often

the interests owned by each differ greatly in amount, according as

each is able to furnish means, or is willing to take the risk. As a

general rule, it is impracticable for each proprietor to work his in-
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terest in the mine separate from the others, hence arises the necessity

for an organization of some kind to -work the mines, such as a corpo-

ration, joint stock company, or mining partnership. The company in

the present case is one of the latter class. As each owner has a right

to sell and convey his interest at any time, and as in ordinary part-

nerships such sale would dissolve the partnership, and compel a

binding up and settlement of the business, which would be most dis-

astrous to the mining enterprise, it has become an established princi-

ple that such sale does not dissolve a mining partnership, but it con-

tinues on as before. Such a radical change in the law of partner-

ship necessitates other changes. One result is, that new members

are thus introduced into the company without the consent, and often

against the wishes, of the other members; and it would be most unjust

to subject each proprietor to personal liabilities, which might sweep

away all his property, created against his consent, by those who be-

came members against his wishes. Hence arises the necessity of

establishing new rules for such partnerships, differing from those

regulating ordinary partnerships, especially those relating to the

power of any one member, or a majority of the members, or of the

superintendent or managing agent, to make contracts binding upon

the company or its members, and also regulating the extent and na-

ture of the liability of each proprietor for the company debts, as be-

tween themselves and third persons. The rules regulating ordinary

partnerships, will, to some extent, form a proper guide, but do not

necessarily determine these questions. It is impossible to lay down a

perfect code of rules upon this subject; but, like other legal rules,

they must be settled as they arise in cases requiring their determina-

tion. Such rules must be governed by the peculiar condition and

circumstances of the country, and must be founded upon sound prin-

ciples of justice, and such as will protect the rights of individual pro-

labor as a partner in a mining company, but is not shown to have
either contracted such debt personally or represented himself to the
plaintiff as a partner, the fact of his having been partner may nevertheless be shown by evidence short of strict proof that he had executed
a deed of copartnership, or was legally interested in the mine. The
fact may be proved by his admission made before or after the debt
was incurred. (Ralph v. Harvey, 1 Q. B. 845.) One of several coadventurers in a mine has not, as such, any authority to pledge the
credit of the general body for the money borrowed for the purposes
of the concern. And the fact of his having the general management
of the mine makes no difference, in the absence of circumstances from
which an implied authority for that purpose can be inferred. (Ricketts
v. Burnett, 4 Q. B. 686.)
Such is the uncertainty of mining operations that few are willing
to risk all their means in such undertakings; and it is therefore custo1nary for a number of persons to unite in the enterprise; and often
the interests owned by each differ greatly in amount, according as
each is able to furnish means, or is willing to take the risk. As a
general rule, it is impracticable for each proprietor to work his interest in the mine separate from the others, hence arises the necessity
for an organt'zation of some kind to work the mines, such as a corporation, joint stock comp~ny, ormt'ningpartnersh~p. The companJ in
the present case is one of the latter c7ass. As each owner has a right
to sell and convey his interest at any time, and as in ordinary partnerships such sale would dt'ssolve the partnership, and compel a
-rvi'nding up and settlement of the business, which would be most disastrous to the mt'nt'ng enterprt'se, t't has become an estab!t'shed prt'nciple that such sale does not dt'ssolve a mt'nt'ng partnersh ip, but it continues on as before. Such a radt'cal change t'n the law ofpartnership necesst'tates other changes. One result is, that new members
are thus t'ntroduced t'nto the company wt'thout the consent, and often
against the wt'shes, of the other members; and z't would be most unjust
to subject each propri"ctor to personal !t'abi!t'ties, which mt'ght sweep
away all his property, created agat'nst ht's consent, by those who became members agat'nst his wishes. Hence arise~ the necessity of
establishing new rules for such partnenihips, differing from those
regulating ordinary partnerships, especially those relating to the
power of any one member, or a majority of the members, or of the
s uperintendent or managing agent, to make contracts binding upon
the company or its members, and also regulating the extent and nature of the liability of each proprietor for the company debts, as behveen themselves and third persons. The rules regulating ordinary
partnerships, will, to some extent, form a proper guide, but do not
necessarily determine these questions. It is impossible to lay down a
perfect code of rules upon this subject; but, like other legl\l rules,
they must be settled as they arise in cases re'l.uiring their determination. Such rules must be governed by the peculiar condition and
circumstances of the country, and must be founded upon sound principles of justice, and such as will protect the rights of individual pro-
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prietors against the unauthorized acts of others, and at the same time

186

properly secure the claims of creditors and insure the successful work-

SKILLMAN V. LACHMAN.

§ 34

ing of the mine.

In the present case it appears that the defendant Lachman, for a

prietors against the unauthorized acts of others, and at the same time
properly secure the claims of creditors and insure the successful working of the mine.
In the present case it appears that the defendant Lachman, for a
long time prior and up to June 25, 1858, held a mortgage on the interest in the mine of one Prior; that on that day he took a conveyance
'Jf that interest in satisfaction 9f the mortgage, and conveyed the same
interest to one of the defendants, Sprout, on the twenty-eighth day of
June, and received a mortgage on Sprout's interest in the mine to secure payment of the purchase-money. This appears to be, in fact, all
the interest he had; but it was proved that both prior to and after the
date of the note, which was dated June 20, he admitted to two persons, one of whom was a brother of the plaintiff, and who delivered
most of the lumber, that he owned an interest in the mine. It does
not ap.pear that any of these statements of Lachman were the means
of inducing the plaintiff to sell or deliver the lumber. These statements of the defendant Lachman do not operate as an estoppel upon
him,~nless it appears that the plaintiff was induced thereby to sell and
deliver the lumber to the company. Neither the evidence nor the
findings of the court contain any facts or evidence establishing this
point.
But there is still a more important objection to the findings and
judgment in this case. There was no evidence of any authority having been given by the company, or Lachman , to Sprout, a member of
the company and the managing agent, or foreman, to execute a promila;ory note in the name of and binding the company for the indebtedness due the plaintiff, or any general authority to that effect. In fact ,
several members, including Lachman, testified that they never gave
him any such authority. It is clear that the law does not, in the case
of mining partnerships, imply any such authority either to a member
of such partnership or to its managing agent. In this respect the rule
of law is different from that of ordinary commercial partner~hips. It
was clearly the duty of the plaintiff to prove that the person executing
the note in the name of the company had power and authority to do
so. He might have had power to purchase the lumber for the use of
the mine, but that is very different from authorizing him to execute a
note in the name of the company, bearing interest at the rate of 3 p er
cent. per month. In this case the county court failed to draw the
proper distinction between the liability of members of a mining partnership and ordinary trading partnerships, and in this it erred.
The judgment is, therefore, rev.e rsed and the cause remanded.
CoPE, C. J. I think the conclusion arrived a( • ./ Justice Crocker
is correct, and I, therefore, concur in the judgment.

long time prior and up to June 25, 1858, held a mortgage on the in-

terest in the mine of one Prior; that on that day he took a conveyance

of that interest in satisfaction of the mortgage, and conveyed the same

interest to one of the defendants, Sprout, on the twenty-eighth day of

June, and received a mortgage on Sprout's interest in the mine to se-

cure payment of the purchase-money. This appears to be, in fact, all

the interest he had; but it was proved that both prior to and after the

date of the note, which was dated June 20, he admitted to two per-

sons, one of whom was a brother of the plaintiff, and who delivered

most of the lumber, that he owned an interest in the mine. It does

not appear that any of these statements of Lachman were the means

of inducing the plaintiff to sell or deliver the lumber. These state-

ments of the defendant Lachman do not operate as an estoppel upon

him,*unless it appears that the plaintiff was induced thereby to sell and

deliver the lumber to the company. Neither the evidence nor the

findings of the court contain any facts or evidence establishing this
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point.

But there is still a more important objection to the findings and

judgment in this case. There was no evidence of any authority hav-

ing been given by the company, or Lachman, to Sprout, a member of

the company and the managing agent, or foreman, to execute a prom-

issory note in the name of and binding the company for the indebted-

ness due the plaintiff, or any general authority to that effect. In fact,

several members, including Lachman, testified that they never gave

him any such authority. It is clear that the law does not, in the case

of mining partnerships, imply any such authority either to a member

of such partnership or to its managing agent. In this respect the rule

of law is different from that of ordinary commercial partnerships. It

was clearly the duty of the plaintiff to prove that the person executing

the note in the name of the company had power and authority to do

so. He might have had power to purchase the lumber for the use of

the mine, but that is very different from authorizing him to execute a

note in the name of the company, bearing interest at the rate of 3 per

cent, per month. In this case the county court failed to draw the

proper distinction between the liability of members of a mining part-

nership and ordinary trading partnerships, and in this it erred.

The judgment is, therefore, reversed and the cause remanded.

Cope, C. J. I think the conclusion arrived at t / Justice Crocker

is correct, and I, therefore, concur in the judgment.

Note. 1884, Bissell v. Foss, 114 V. S. 252 on 261; 1880, Kahn v. Smelting

Co.. 102 U. S. 641; 1871, Jones v. Clark, 42 Cal. 180

Note. 1884, Bissell v. Foss, 114 U.S. 252 on 261; 1880, Kahn v. Smelting
Co.• 102 U. S. 641; 1871, Jones v. Clark, 42 Cal. 180I
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Sec. 35. (6) From unincorporated associations.

WHITE v. BROWNELL, President, Etc., Et Al.1

- 1868. In the Court of Common Pleas, City and County of New

York. General Term. 2 Daly (New York Common Pleas)

329-366.

Appeal to general term from an order dissolving an injunction to

restrain the Open Board of Brokers from interfering with plaintiff's

privileges as a member of that board.

By the court, Daly, F. J. The organization known as the Open

Board of Stock Brokers, which the plaintiff asks this court to restrain

from depriving him of his rights and privileges as a member of it, is

not a partnership, and the plaintiff is not entitled, as has been argued,

to the equitable remedies which courts afford for the protection pf the

rights of a copartner. It is not a union of persons joining together

property, labor or skill for their common benefit, in any pursuit or

business having a communion of profit and loss, and distinguishable

by the feature that, if earned, there is to be a division of gains. It

may be described as an association of persons engaged in the same

kind of business, who have organized together for the purpose of es-

tablishing certain rules, by which each agrees to be governed in the
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conduct and management of his separate transactions or business;

which is not a partnership.

The objects of the organization are set forth in the articles of asso-

ciation, which declare that greater facilities are requisite for the ex-

change and negotiation of commercial securities, a business which can

be successfully transacted only where there is the utmost confidence;

that, as such confidence is begotten only by public, open, fair and up-

right transactions, so that each party interested can know not only

where, but how such business is done, the spirit of the age demands

for such transactions a great public mart, open to all; and that, for

the purpose of supplying these requirements, the persons signing their

names associate themselves together, and adopt a constitution for an

association to be known as the Open Board of Stock Brokers, each

pledging himself to abide by the constitution, and by all .by-laws,

rules and resolutions which may be passed by the board. To carry

out this object, the constitution provides that there shall be a room

where the members of the board shall have seats and desks, conveni-

ently inclosed within a railing, and that outside the railing, and in a

gallery, seats shall be provided for the public; certain officers are

designated who are to call stocks at the board, and a standing com-

mittee to arrange the order in which such securities are called. A

record is to be kept by the secretary of all sales and purchases made

1 Statement of facts except as given in opinion omitted. Arguments omitted

ind only a part of the opinion given.
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the newspapers, and no fictitious sales are to be allowed. It is, in fact,

the creation of a public mart for the sale of stocks or other commercial

at the board. He is required to prepare an account of the same for
the newspapers, and no fictitious sales are to be allowed. It is, in fact,
the creation of a public mart for the sale of stocks or other commercial
securities, each purchase or safe of which is not for the joint benefit of
the body, but is, as it would be in any other place, an individual transaction between the parties making it. It is analogous to what, in
other branches of commerce, has long been familiarly known by the
word "change," a fixed place, where merchants meet at certain hours
for the transaction of business with each other, subject to such general
mies or understanding as they think proper to be governed by. There
may be property belonging to this body, derived from the payment of
dues or fines, or consisting of the furniture of the room where the
board meets; but the possession of it is a mere incident, and not the
main purpose or object of the association. A member has no severable proprietary interest in it, or a right to any proportionable part
of it upon withdrawing. He has merely the enjoyment and use of it
while he is a member, but the property remains with and belongs to
the body while it continues to exist, like a pew, the ultimate and dominant property in which is in the congregation, and not in the pewholder; and when the body ceases to exist, those who may then be
members become entitled to their proportionate share of its assets.
(In re The St. James Club, 13 Eng. Law and Eq. Rep. 592; Fassett
v. The First Parish in Boylston, 19 Pick. 361.) This board of stock
brokers is, in fact, analogous to the organization which came under
consideration in Caldicott v. Griffith (8 Exchq. Rep. 898), called The
Midland Counties Guardian Society for the Protection of Trade,
which was decided not to be a partnership.
So far, therefore, as the plaintiff claims the equitable interference
of this court upon the assumption that this association is a co-partnership, or upon the ground that the rules which regulate the action of
courts of equity in cases of partnership are to be applied to it, the
cla im can not be supported.
It is not an incorporated body, and as a number of cases have been
cited upon the argument in which courts of equity have interfered and
restored a member of a corporation who had been expelled or obstructed in the exercise of his franchise by the acts of the corporation,
which arc relied upon by the plaintiff as authorities applicable to the
present case, it will be necessary to inquire into the reasons why corporations can not expel members except in certain extreme cases, and
to show that these reasons do not apply to a voluntary unincorporated
body, which comes into existence by the mutual agreement of the persons forming it, and i ~ thereafter carried on under rules which the body
adopts for its government. A m ember of a corporation , w hether i't
be muni'c.i pal, eleemosynary or prt'vate, i's i'n th e enjo-yment of a franchi'se, the right to w hich £s not der£ved from the body, but i's created
by statute, or ext'sts by prcscrt'pti'on, and therefor e can not be taken
away by the act of th e corporation, except, as I have sai'd, i'n certain
extrem e cases. As t't i's a right conferred by statute, or deri·ved from
immemort'al custom, w hi'ch i'mpli'cs the ext'stence of a grant , ii ca11

securities, each purchase or sale of which is not for the joint benefit of

the body, but is, as it would be in any other place, an individual trans-

action between the parties making it. It is analogous to what, in

other branches of commerce, has long been familiarly known by the

word "change," a fixed place, where merchants meet at certain hours

for the transaction of business with each other, subject to such general

rides or understanding as they think proper to be governed by. There

may be property belonging to this body, derived from the payment of

dues or fines, or consisting of the furniture of the room where the

board meets; but the possession of it is a mere incident, and not the

main purpose or object of the association. A member has no sev-

erable proprietary interest in it, or a right to any proportionable part

of it upon withdrawing. He has merely the enjoyment and use of it

while he is a member, but the property remains with and belongs to

the body while it continues to exist, like a pew, the ultimate and dom-

inant property in which is in the congregation, and not in the pew-
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holder; and when the body ceases to exist, those who may then be

members become entitled to their proportionate share of its assets.

(In re The St. James Club, 13 Eng. Law and Eq. Rep. 592; Fassett

v. The First Parish in Boylston, 19 Pick. 361.) This board of stock

brokers is, in fact, analogous to the organization which came under

consideration in Caldicott v. Griffith (8 Exchq. Rep. 89S), called The

Midland Counties Guardian Society for the Protection of Trade,

which was decided not to be a partnership.

So far, therefore, as the plaintiff claims the equitable interference

of this court upon the assumption that this association is a co-partner-

ship, or upon the ground that the rules which regulate the action of

courts of equity in cases of partnership are to be applied to it, the

claim can not be supported.

It is not an incorporated body, and as a number of cases have been

cited upon the argument in which courts of equity have interfered and

restored a member of a corporation who had been expelled or ob-

structed in the exercise of his franchise by the acts of the corporation,

which are relied upon by the plaintiff as authorities applicable to the

present case, it will be necessary to inquire into the reasons why cor-

porations can not expel members except in certain extreme cases, and

to show that these reasons do not apply to a voluntary unincorporated

body, which comes into existence by the mutual agreement of the per-

sons forming it, and is thereafter carried on under rides which the body

adopts for its government. A member of a corporation, whether it

be municipal, eleemosynary or private, is in the enjoyment of a fran-

chise, the right to which is not derived from the body, but is created

by statute, or exists by prescription, and therefore can not be taken

away by the act of the corporation, except, as I have said, in certain

extreme cases. As it is a right conferred by statute, or derived from

immemorial custom, which implies the existence of a grant, it can
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neither be taken away by the act of the corporation or withheld by the

act of the corf oration, from any one eligible to the enjoyment of it.

Thus, in The People v. The Medical Society of the County of Erie

(32 N. Y. R. 187), an incorporated medical society was compelled

by mandamus to admit a licensed physician to membership, who was

excluded under a by-law which had been adopted by the corporation.

In a corporation, there is a distinction between what is called amo-

tion, or the right to remove an officer, which is a power inherent in

every corporation, and disfranchisement. The former may be exer-

cised without interfering with the franchise, as the officer, when re-

moved, still continues a member; but disfranchisement is an absolute

expulsion of the member from the body, and the taking away of his

franchise, which can not be done unless the power is given by the

charter creating the corporation, or the member has been guilty of

crime, a conviction of which would work a forfeiture of all civil rights,

including the corporate franchise, or has committed acts which tend to

the destruction of the corporation, such as the defacing of its charter,

the obliteration or alteration of its records, or other acts tending to im-

pair or destroy its title to its rights or privileges; in which case, the

expulsion of the member is but the exercise of a power incident to the
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right of self-preservation. Evans v. The Philadelphia Club, 50 Pa.

St. R. 107Bagg's Case, n Coke R. 93'; Earle's Case, Carthew's

R. 173; Commonwealth v. St. Patrick's Benevolent Society, 2 Bin-

ney R. 441; Fuller v. The Trustees of Plainfield Academy, 6 Conn.

532; People v. The Medical Society of Erie, 24 Barb. 570; Willcock

on Municipal Corporations, 270; Grant on Corporations, pp.263,

264, 265, 266).

But in an unincorporated voluntary association, like the one now

under consideration, the privilege of membership is not given by

statute or derived through prescription, as in a corporation, but is

created by and conferred by the organization itself. It is not a

franchise—a franchise being a particular privilege vested in in-

dividuals, which is conferred by grant from a sovereign or gov-

ernment (Finch's Law, 164; 3 Kent's Com., 45S) ; while on the con-

trary, the privilege of membership in a voluntary association is de-

rived exclusively from the body that bestows it, and may be conferred

or withheld at its pleasure. The law can not compel such an organ-

ization to admit an individual to membership, as may be done in the

case of a corporation, nor can it interfere to restore a member who

has been deprived of the privilege for not complying with the condi-

tions upon which the enjoyment of it was made to depend. A mem-

ber of a body of this description has, as such, undoubtedly, rights which

the law will protect, but they do not rest upon the same ground, and

are by no means coextensive with the franchise enjoyed by a mem-

ber of a corporation. They depend upon the nature of the organiza-

tion, upon the object for which it was formed, and upon the rules,

regulations, constitution or by-laws which are explanatory of its pur-

pose, and which the body has adopted for its government.

'Infra, p. 1165.
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Individuals who form themselves together into a voluntary associa-

tion for a common object may agree to be governed by such rules as

Individuals who form themselves together into a voluntary association for a common object may agree to he governed by such mies as
they think proper to adopt, if there is nothing in them in conflict with
the law of the land; and those who become members of the body are
presumed to know them, to have assented to them, _a nd they are bound
by them (Innes v. Wylie, 1 Car. & Kir. R. 262; Brancker v. Roberts,
7 Jur. N. S. 1185; Hopkinson v. The Marquis of Exeter, London
Times, Dec. 31st, 1867, Law R., 5 Eq. Ca. 63).
Such an organization may prescribe the conditions upon which persons will be admitted to membership, as well as the conditions upon
which the continuance of membership will depend; and whtre they
have no regulation upon the subject, they may expel a member by a
vote of the majority, if he has been notified ofthe charge against him,
and afforded an opportunity of being heard in his defense (Innes v.
Wylie, 1 Car. & Kir. R. 262 ). Voluntary bodies of this kind will be
held to the fair and honest administration of the rules which are in
force when any proceeding is instituted against a member; but where
a member is expelled in conformity with the mies, and the proceedings are regular and in good faith, it is final, and no judicial tribunal can interfere. (The Commonwealth v. The Pike Beneficial Society, 8 Watts & Serg. 250). The only question, therefore, that can
arise in the present case is whether the plaintiff was suspended from
th e privileges of a member of this Open Board of Stock Brokers in
accordance with the constitution and by-laws which that body has
adopted for its government; for if he was, he has no ground of complaint.
[The court held that plaintiff was expelled in accordance with the
by-laws, and so affirmed the decree dissolving the injunction. J

they think proper to adopt, if there is nothing in them in conflict with

the law of the land; and those who become members of the body are

presumed to know them, to have assented to them, and they are bound

by them (Innes v. Wylie, i Car. & Kir. R. 262 ; Brancker v. Roberts,

7 Jur. N. S. 1185; Hopkinson v. The Marquis of Exeter, London

Times, Dec. 31st, 1867, Law R., 5 Eq. Ca. 63).

Such an organization may prescribe the conditions upon which per-

sons will be admitted to membership, as well as the conditions upon

which the continuance of membership will depend; and where they

have no regulation upon the subject, they may expel a member by a

vote of the majority, if he has been notified of the charge against him,

and afforded an opportunity of being heard in his defense (Innes v.

Wylie, 1 Car. & Kir. R. 262). Voluntary bodies of this kind will be

held to the fair and honest administration of the rules which are in

force when any proceeding is instituted against a member; but where

a member is expelled in conformity with the rules, and the proceed-
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ings are regular and in good faith, it is final, and no judicial tribu-

nal can interfere. (The Commonwealth v. The Pike Beneficial So-

ciety, S Watts & Serg. 250). The only question, therefore, that can

arise in the present case is whether the plaintiff was suspended from

the privileges of a member of this Open Board of Stock Brokers in

accordance with the constitution and by-laws which that body has

adopted for its government; for if he was, he has no ground of com-

plaint.

[The court held that plaintiff was expelled in accordance with the

by-laws, and so affirmed the decree dissolving the injunction.]

Note. 1887, Davison v. Holden, 55 Conn. 103, 10 Atl. Rep. 515; 1881, Ash

v. Guie, 97 Pa. St. 493, 39 Am. Rep. 818; 1855, Pipe v. Bateman, 1 Iowa (1

Clarke) 369; 1893, Burt v. Oneida Community, 137 N. Y. 346, 33 N. E. Rep.

307, 19 L. R. A. 297; 1893, McDowell v. Joice, 149 III. 124; 1888, Liggett v.

Ladd, 17 Ore. 89, 21 Pac. Rep. 133; 1891, Crawford v. Gross, 140 Pa. St. 297,

Note.

21 Atl. Rep. 356; 1891, Wicks v. Monihan, 130 N. Y. 232, 14 L. R. A. 243, 29

1887, Davison v. Hol<len, 55 Conn . 103, 10 At!. Rep. 515; 1881, Ash

v . Guie, 97 Pa. St. 493, 39 Am. Rep. 818; 1855, Pipe v. Bateman, 1 Iowa (1

N. E. Rep. 139; 1889, Lawler v. Murphy. 58 Conn. 294, 8 L. R. A. 113, 20 Atl.

Clarke) 369; 1893, Burt v. Oneida Community, 137 N. Y. 346, 33 N. E. Rep.
307, 19L. R. A. 297; 1893, McDowell v. Joice, 149 Ill. 124; 1888, Liggett v.
Ladd, 17 Ore. 89, 21 Pac. Rep. 133; 1891, Crawford v. GroBS, 140 Pa. St. 297,
21 Atl. Rep. 356; 1891, Wicks v. Monihan, 130 N. Y. 232, 14 L. R. A. 243, 29
N. E. Rep. 139; 1889, Lawler v. Murphy1.§8 Conn. 294, 8 L. R. A. 113, 20 Atl.
Rep. 457; 1896, Cheney v. Goodwin, 88 Maine 563, 34 Atl . Rep. 420; 1895,
Society of Shakers v. Watson, 68 Fed . Rep. 730, 15 C. C. A.632, 37 U.S. App.
141; 1893, Grand Rapids Guard v. Bulkley, 97 Mich. 610, 57 N . W. Rep. 188;
1883, Ray v. Powers, 134 Maas. 22; 1883, Burt v. Lathrop, 52 Mich . 106; 1883,
Heath v. Goslin, 80 Mo. 310, 50 Am. Rep. 505; 1843, Eichbaum v. Irons, 6
Watts & S. (Pa.) 67, 40 Am. Dec. 540; 1841, Todd v. Emly, 7 M. & W. 427, s.
~. 8 M. & W. 505.

Rep. 457; 1896, Cheney v. Goodwin, 88 Maine 563, 34 Atl. Rep. 420; 1895,

Society of Shakers v. Watson, 68 Fed. Rep. 730, 15 C. C. A.632, 37 U.S. App.

141; 1893, Grand Rapids Guard v. Bulklev, 97 Mich. 610, 57 N. W. Rep. 188;

1883, Ray v. Powers, 134 Mass. 22; 1883, Burt v. Lathron, 52 Mich. 106; 1883,

Heath v. Goslin, 80 Mo. 310, 50 Am. Rep. 505; 1843, Eichbaum v. Irons, 6

Watts & S. (Pa.) 67, 40 Am. Dec. 540; 1841, Todd v. Emly, 7 M. & W. 427. e.

8 M. & W. 605.
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CORPORATION AND STATE INSTITUTIONS.

NEIL v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE 0. A. & M. COLLEGE.1

191

1876. In the Supreme Court of Ohio. 31 Ohio State, 15-23.

Motion for leave to file a petition in error to reverse the judgment

of the district court of Franklin county.

[Action in lower court by the college board of trustees to collect

See. 36.

(7) From state institutions.

subscription made by Rudisill and others and guaranteed by Neil, to

contribute to a fund to be raised in order to secure the location of

NEIL v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE 0. A. & M. COLLEGE.1

the college in Franklin county, the sums subscribed to be paid to the

treasurer of the college at the times indicated. The college was lo-

1876.

cated in Franklin county, as proposed, and the board sued for the

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF Omo.

31 Ohio State, 15-23.

sums so subscribed. Neil demurred to the petition on the ground

(among others) that the board of trustees had not the legal capacity

to sue. ]

Boytnton, J. * * * It is claimed by the plaintiff that the board of

trustees of the college has not legal capacity to sue, and, therefore, that

the judgment was improperly rendered in its favor. It is not, however,

denied that the fourth section of the act establishing the college (67

Ohio L. 20) expressly confers upon the board the "right of suing and

being sued, of contracting and being contracted with;" but it is con-
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tended that such act, "in so far as it attempts to constitute the defend-

ant in error the board of trustees of said college, and clothe it with

the power therein mentioned," is in conflict with the first section of the

thirteenth article of the constitution, which declares that the "general

assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers," the

claim being that the board is, to all intents and purposes, created a

corporation and clothed with corporate functions and privileges. We

are not able to yield our assent to this construction of the statute. The

act is entitled "An act to establish and maintain an agricultural and

mechanical college in Ohio." It creates a board of trustees, to be ap-

pointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the

senate, and commits to such board the government, control and gen-

eral management of the affairs of the institution; and while the

statute authorizes the board to make contracts for the benefit of the

college, and to maintain actions, if necessary, to enforce them, and to

exercise other powers similar to those conferred on bodies corporate,

it does not assume to, nor does it in fact, create or constitute such

board of trustees a corporation, and hence does not clothe it with

corporate functions or powers. The State, ex rel. the Attorney-Gen-

eral, v. Davis, 23 Ohio St. 434. The college is a state institution,

designed and well calculated to promote public educational interests,

1 Arguments of counsel and opinion of court on other points omitted. State-

ment of facts condensed.

Motion for leave to file a petition in error to reverse the judgment
of the district court of Franklin county.
[Action in lower coutt by the college board of trustees to collect
subscription made by Rudisill and others and guaranteed by Neil, to
contribute to a fund to be raised in order to secure the location of
the college in Franklin county, the sums subscribed to be paid to the
treasurer of the college at the times indicated. The college was located in Franklin county, as proposed, and the board sued for the
sums so subscribed. Neil demurred to the petition on the ground
(among others) that the board of trustees had not the legal capacity
to sue.]
BoYNTON, J. • • • It is claimed by the plaintiff that the board of
trus'"ees of the college has not legal capacity to sue, and, therefore, that
the judgment was improperly rendered in its favor. It is not, however,
denied that the fourth section of the act establishing the college (67
Ohio L. 20) expressly confers upon the board the "right of suing and
being sued, of contracting and being contracted with;" but it is contended that such act, "in so far ask attempts to constitute the defendant in error the board of trustees of said college, and clothe it with
the power therein mentioned," is in conflict with the first section of the
thirteenth article of the constitution, which declares that the ''general
assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers," the
claim being that the board is, to all intents and purposes, created a
corporation and clothed with corporate functions and privileges. ~re
are not able to yield our assent to this construction of the statute. The
act is entitled "An act to establish and maintain an ag ricultural and
mechanical college in Ohio.'' It creates a board of trustees , to be appoinled by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the
senate, and commits to such board the government, control a nd general management of the affairs of the institution; and while the
statute authorizes the board to make contracts for the benefit of the
college, and to maintain actions, if necessary, to enforce them, and to
exercise other powers similar to those conferred on bodies corporate,
it does not assume to, nor does it in fact , create or constitute such
board of trustees a corporation, and hence does not clothe it with
corporate functions or powers. The State, ex rel. the Attorney-General, v. Davis, 23 Ohio St. 434. The college is a state institution,
designed and well calculated to promote public educational interests,
•

1
Arguments of counsel and opinion of court on other points omitted. Statement of facts condensed.
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established for the people of the whole state, to be managed and con-

trolled by such agencies as the legislature in its wisdom may provide.

established for the people of the whole state, to be managed and controlled by such agencies as the legislature in its wisdom may proYide .
Similar powers, but perhaps less extensive, because less required, a re
conferred. on the trustees of the various hospitals for the insane (73
Ohio L. 80), and on the board of managers of the Ohio Soldiers' and
Sailors' Orphans' Homes (67 Ohio L. 53), and other institutions of
the state. The powers thus conferred are essentially necessary to accomplish the objects for which these institutions were established.
The power to establish them is found clearly granted in the seventh
article of the constitution.
Leave refused.

Similar powers, but perhaps less extensive, because less required, are

conferred, on the trustees of the various hospitals for the insane (73

Ohio L. 80), and on the board of managers of the Ohio Soldiers' and

Sailors' Orphans' Homes (67 Ohio L. 53), and other institutions of

the state. The powers thus conferred are essentially necessary to ac-

complish the objects for which these institutions were established.

The power to establish them is found clearly granted in the seventh

article of the constitution.

Leave refused.

Note. There is considerable difficulty in determining the character of these

institutions, whether they are corporations or not. Several cases hold they

are, and several hold they are not. Perhaps, it is not improper to call them

public corporations, but they are obviously not the same as municipal cor-

Note. There is considerable difficulty in determining the character of these
institutions, whether they are corporations or not. Several cases hold the y
are, and several hold they are not. Perhaps, it is not improper to call the m
public corporations, but they are obviously not the same as municipal corporations, or public qu.asi corporations such as counties, townships, school
boards, etc. (See 'infra, pp. 214, 221, 222, 229.) They have, in the case of
banks, at least in one state, been held to be private corporations. (See infra ,
p. 221.) The fullest information to be had on the character of these institutions is to be found in a note to State v. Regents of Univ. of Kan., 55 Kan.
389 (1895), in 29 Lawyer's R ep. Ann., p. 378. Here information is given under the heads Banks, Educational Institutions, Other State lnstitutions--Liabilities of Such, and Directors, Trustees and Officers of Such.
.
1. Universities, etc. Regents of University of Maryland v. Williams, 9
Gill & J. (Md.) 365, 31 Am. Dec. 72; Oklahoma Agr. & M. Coll. v. Willis
(Minn.), 40 L. R. A. 677; State v. Carr, 111 Ind. 335 (University of Indiana
is not a public corporation); State v. White, 82 Ind. 278, 42 Am . Rep . 4H6
(Purdue University is subject to mandamus) ; State v. Regents of Uni\•ersity,
55 Kan, 389 (subject to quo warranto) ;' Weary v. State University, 42 Iowa
335 (University is not a corporation); University of Alabama v. Winston, 5
Stew. & P. (Ala.) 17 (University of Alabama is a public corporation ) ; Lewis
v. Whittle, 77 Va. 415 (Medical College of Virginia is a public corporation );
Tulane Ed. Fund v. Board of Assessors, 38 La. Ann. 292 (University of Louisiana is a corporation); Regents of University of Michigan v. Det. Bd. of E<l.,
4 Mich. il3 (University is a public corporation); to same effect, Regents of
University of Michigan v. Y. M. Society, 12 Mich. 138; Sterling v. Regents
of University of Michigan, 110 Mich. 369, 34 L . R. A. 150; Regents of University of Nebraska v. McConnell, 5 Neb. 423 (University of Nebraska is a
public corporation); University of Kortb Carolina v. l\laultsby, 43 N. C. (8 Ir.
Eq.) 257 (Universi~y of North Carolina is a public corporation); State v.
Knowles, 16 Fla. 577 (Florida Agri cultural College is a public corporntion ) ;
Dunn v. University of Oregon, 9 Ore. 357 (Directors of University of Oregon
are a corporation); State v. Lindsley, 3 Wash. 125 (U niversity of Washington
is a state institution); Butler v. Regents of University of Wisconsin , 32 Wis.
124 (University is a state institution); State Institutions, 9 Colo. 626 ( Agricultural College and School of Mines are state institutions by the conRtitutiou
and can not be moved); Lundy v. Delmas, 104 Cal. 655, 26 L . R. A. 651 (Re gents not individually liable for damages).
2. Banks, sta,te. See Bank of Tennessee v. Woodson, 5 Coldw. (Tenn. )
176; Bank of Kentucky v . Wister, 27 U . S. (2 Pet. ) 318; Briscoe v. Bank o f
Commonwealth of Kentucky , 36 U.S. ( 11 P et .) 257; Woodruff v. Trnpnall, 51
U.S. (10 How.) 190; Darrington v. Branch Bank of Alabama, 54 U. S. (13
H ow. ) 12; Curran v. Arkansas , 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304; Barings v. Dabney,
86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 1; Jones v. Bank of Tennessee, 8 B. Mon. 122, 46 Am .
Dec. 540; McFarland v. State Bank, 4 Ark. 44, 37 Am. Dec. 761; Linn v. •
State, 2 Ill. 87, 25 Am . Dec. 71.
3. Other institutions. Cleaveland T. Stewart, 3 Ga. 283; Illinois Board ot

porations, or public quasi corporations such as counties, townships, school

boards, etc. (See infra, pp. 214, 221, 222, 229.) They have, in the case of

banks, at least in one state, been held to be private corporations. (See infra,
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p. 221.) The fullest information to be had on the character of these institu-

tions is to be found in a note to State v. Regents of Univ. of Kan., 55 Kan.

38© (1895), in 29 Lawyer's Rep. Ann., p. 378. Here information is given un-

der the heads Banks, Educational Institutions, Other State Institutions—Lia-

bilities of Such, and Directors, Trustees and Officers of Such.

1. Universities, etc. Regents of University of Maryland v. Williams, 9

Gill & J. (Md.) 365, 31 Am. Dec. 72; Oklahoma Agr.*& M. Coll. v. Willis

(Minn.), 40 L. R. A. 677; State v. Carr, 111 Ind. 335 (University of Indiana

is not a public corporation); State v. White, 82 Ind. 278, 42 Am. Rep. 4!i6

(Purdue University is subject to mandamus); State v. Regents of University,

55 Kan. 389 (subject to quo warranto); Weary v. State University, 42 Iowa

335 (University is not a corporation); University of Alabama v. Winston, 5

Stew. & P. (Ala.) 17 (University of Alabama is a public corporation); Lewis

v. Whittle, 77 Va. 415 (Medical College of Virginia is a public corporation);

Tulane Ed. Fund v. Board of Assessors, 38 La. Ann. 292 (University of Louisi-

ana is a corporation); Regents of University of Michigan v. Det. Bd. of Ed..

4 Mich. 213 (University is a public corporation); to same effect, Regents of

University of Michigan v. Y. M. Society, 12 Mich. 138; Sterling v. Regents

of University of Michigan, 110 Mich. 369, 34 L. R. A. 150; Regents of Uni-

versity of Nebraska v. McConnell, 5 Neb. 423 (University of Nebraska is a

public corporation); University of North Carolina v. Maultsby, 43 N. C. (8 Ir.

Eq.) 257 (University of North Carolina is a public corporation); State v.

Knowles, 16 Fla. 577 (Florida Agricultural College is a public corporation);

Dunn v. University of Oregon, 9 Ore. 357 (Directors of University of Oregon

are a corporation); State v. Lindsley, 3 Wash. 125 (University of Washington

is a state institution); Butler v. Regents of University of Wisconsin, 32 Wis.

124 (University is a state institution); State Institutions, 9 Colo. 626 (Agri-

cultural College and School of Mines are state institutions by the constitution

and can not be moved); Lundy v. Delrnas, 104 Cal. 655, 26 L. R. A. 651 (Re-

gents not individually liable for damages).

2. Banks, state. See Bank of Tennessee v. Woodson, 5 Coldw. (Tenn. I

176; Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 318; Briscoe v. Bank of

Commonwealth of Kentucky, 36 U. S. (11 Pet.) 257; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 51

U. S. (10 How.) 190; Darrington v. Branch Bank of Alabama, 54 U. S. (13

How.) 12; Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U. S. (15 How.) 304; Barings v. Dabney,

86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 1; Jones v. Bank of Tennessee, 8 B. Mon. 122, 46 Am.

Dec. 540; McFarland v. State Bank, 4 Ark. 44, 37 Am. Dec. 761; Linn v. 1

State, 2 111. 87, 25 Am. Dec. 71.

3. Other institutions. Cleaveland v. Stewart, 3 Ga. 283; Illinois Board ot

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§37

193

SOLE AND AGGREGATE CORPORATIONS.

§ 37

193 .

SOLE AND AGGREGATE CORPORATiONS.

Education v. Greenebaum, 39 111. 610; Downing v. State Board of Agriculture,

129 Ind. 443, 12 L. R. A. 664; Liggett v. Ladd, 23 Ore. 26 (Ag. 80c.); Selinas

v. Vermont Agricultural Society, 60 Vt. 249; Hern v. Iowa State Agricul-

tural Society, 91 Iowa 97, 24 L. R. A. 655. See, especially, the full notes upon

the subject of state institutions generally, in 29 L. R. A. 378, and 40 L. R. A.

677.

ARTICLE VI. CLASSES OF CORPORATIONS.

Education v. Greenebaum, 39 Ill. 610; Downing v. State Board of Agriculture,
129 Ind. 443, 12 L. R. A. 664; Liggett v. Ladd, 23 Ore. 26 (Ag. Soc.); Selinae
v. Vermont Agricultural Society, 60 Vt. 249; Bern v. Iowa State Agricultnrsl Society, 91 Iowa 97, 24 L. R. A. 655. See, especially, the full notes upon
the subject of state i1istitutioiis generally, in 29 L. R. A. 378, and 40 L. R. A.
677.

Sec. 37. Every body politike, or corporate, is either ecclesiastical

or lay; ecclesiastical, either regular, as abbots, priors, etc.,

or secular, as bishops, deans, archdeacons, parsons, vicars,

ARTICLE VI,

etc.; lay, as maior or communaltie, baylifes and burgesses,

CLASSES OF CORPORATIONS.

etc. * * * And againe it is either sole, or aggregate of

many. * * * And this body politike, or corporate,

aggregate of many, is by the civilians called collegeium or

Sec. 37. Every body politike, or corporate, is either ecclesiastical
or lay; ecclesiastical, either regular, as abbots, priors, etc .,
or secular, as bishops, deans, archdeacons, parsons, vicars,
etc.; lay, as maior or communal tie, baylifes and burgesses,
etc. • • • And againe it is either sole, or aggregate of
many. • • • And this body politike, or corporate,
aggregate of many, is by the civilians called cotlegeium or
universitas

universitas

Coke's Littleton, § 413, c. 1613.

(a) As to number of members, corporations are:

1. Sole.
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2. Aggregate.

OVERSEERS OF THE POOR OF THE CITY OF BOSTON v. SEARS

Et Ux.1

1839. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 22

Coke's Littl~ton, § 413, c. 1613.

Pickering (Mass.) Rep. 122-135.

[Writ of right by plaintiff against defendants to recover certain lands

in Boston, claiming upon the seizin of their predecessors within the

last forty years. Defendants demurred.]

Shaw, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. It is a well-settled

rule of law, applicable to real actions, that it is not necessary, as in

(a) As to number of members. corporations are:
1. Sole.
2. Aggregate.

personal actions, to plead a statute of limitations, and, therefore, if it

appear, on the face of the record, that the action is not brought within

the time limited by law, the tenant may avail himself of it by general

OVERSEERS OF THE POOR OF THE CITY OF BOSTON v. SEARS
ET Ux. 1

demurrer. Holmes v. Holmes, 2 Pick. 23.

By statute 1786, ch. 13, § 3, no person or body politic shall sue or

0

1839.

IN

THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

22

Pickering (Mass.) Rep. 122-135.

maintain any action, for any lands, upon his or their own seizin or pos-

session therein, above thirty years next before the teste of the same

writ. And by statute 1807, ch. 75, § 1, no person shall sue or main-

tain any writ of right to any lands, upon the seizin of his or their an-

cestor or predecessor, beyond the term of forty years next before the

teste of the same writ.

1 Arguments and part of opinion omitted. Statement of facts condensed.

13—Wil. Cases.

[Writ of right by plaintiff against defendants to recover certain lands
in Boston, clainring upon the seizin of their predecessors within the
last forty years. Defendants demurred.]
SHAW, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court.
It is a well-settled
rule of law, applicable to real actions, that it is not necessary, as in
personal actions, to plead a statute of limitations, and, therefore, if it
appear, on the face of the record , that the action is not brought within
the time limited by law, the tenant may avail himself of it by general
demurrer. Holmes v. Holmes, 2 Pick. 23.
By statute 1786, ch. 13 1 § 3, no person or body politic shall sue or
maintain any action, for any lands, upon his or their own seizin or possession therein, above thirty years next before the teste of the same
writ. And by statute 18o7, ch. 75, § 1 1 no person shall sue or maintain any writ of right to any lands, upon the seizin of his or their ancestor or predecessor, beyond the term of forty years next before the
teste of the same writ.
1

Arguments and part of opinion omitted. Statement of facts condensed.
13-WIL. CASES.
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It is therefore manifest that if this writ is taken to be one on which
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the plaintiff corporation count on their own seizin; or, if they consti-

§ 37

tute a corporation of such a character that they could have no prede-

It is ' therefore manifest that i( this writ is taken to be one on which
the plaintiff corporation count on their own seizin; or, if they constitute a corporation of such a character that they could have no predecessor in legal contemplation, and, of course, could not count on the
seizin of predecessors, then this action can not be maintained. This
distinctly presents the question for consideration. On the part of the
tenants, it is contended, that this is a common case of a corporation
aggregate, consisting of many persons, with the usual incidents of an
aggregate corporation, that as such they must declare upon their own
seizin within thirty years. On the contrary, it is contended by the demandants, that although the plaintiff corporation is composed of many
persons, yet that is more analogous to the case of a sole corporation,
particularly in this, that they <lo not elect the members of their own
body, that they all go out at once and new members come in at once,
as the necessary consequence of an annual election by others, and,
therefore, that the corporation of one year and that of another, when
an election has intervened, bear to each other the legal relation of predece-;sor and successor.
It becomes, therefore, necessary to distinguish with some care between these different kinds of corporations. "The first division of
corporations," says Blackstone, " is into aggregate and sole. Corporati'ons aggregate consist of many p e1·sons unz'ted togeth er £nto one
sodety, and are kept up by a perpetual successt"on of members, so as
to continue forever. Corporations sole consist of one person only,
and his successors, in some particular stati'on, who are i'ncorporated
by law £n order to give them some legal capadties, particularly that
of perpetuity." We are not aware that there is any instance of a
sole corporation in this commonwealth except that of a person who
may be seized of parsonage lands to hold to him and his successors, in
the same office, in right of his parish. There are some instances in
which certain public officers are empowered by statute to maintain
a~tions, as successors, such as judges of probate, county and to\.\'-n
treasurers; but it is only where expressly provided hy statute. "There
are," says Chancellor Kent, 2 Commentaries (3d ed.), 273, 274,
"very few points of corporation law, applicable to a corporation sole."
"The corporations generally in use with us are aggregate or the union
of two or more individuals in one body politic, with a capacity of suc·
cession and perpetuity."
It becomes then necessary to consider what are the distinctions established by law, between a sole and an aggreg-ate corporation. The flrst
and the most important is that a corporation aggregate has a perpetual
existence without change, so that an estate once vested in it continues
vested without interruption. Whereas, when a bishop or parson,
holding estate as a sole corporation, dies or resigns his office, the fee
is in abeyance until a successor is appointed. From this flows one
necessary, but obvious legal consequence, which is that a grant to an
aggregate corporation carries a fee without the word "successors";
but a grant to a corporation sole , \•:ithout including succe!'sors, carries
a life estate only to the actual incumbent, who is the first taker. Co.

cessor in legal contemplation, and, of course, could not count on the

seizin of predecessors, then this action can not be maintained. This

distinctly presents the question for consideration. On the part of the

tenants, it is contended, that this is a common case of a corporation

aggregate, consisting of many persons, with the usual incidents of an

aggregate corporation, that as such they must declare upon their own

seizin within thirty years. On the contrary, it is contended by the de-

mandants, that although the plaintiff corporation is composed of many

persons, yet that is more analogous to the case of a sole corporation,

particularly in this, that they do not elect the members of their own

body, that they all go out at once and new members come in at once,

as the necessary consequence of an annual election by others, and,

therefore, that the corporation of one year and that of another, when

an election has intervened, bear to each other the legal relation of pred-

ecessor and successor.

It becomes, therefore, necessary to distinguish with some care be-
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tween these different kinds of corporations. "The first division of

corporations," says Blackstonc, "is into aggregate and sole. Corpo-

rations aggregate consist of many persons united together into one

society, and are kept up by a perpetual succession of members, so as

to continue forever. Corporations sole consist of one person only,

and his successors; in some particular station, who are incorporated

by law in order to give them some legal capacities, particularly that

of perpetuity." We are not aware that there is any instance of a

sole corporation in this commonwealth except that of a person who

may be seized of parsonage lands to hold to him and his successors, in

the same office, in right of his parish. There are some instances in

which certain public officers are empowered by statute to maintain

actions, as successors, such as judges of probate, county and town

treasurers; but it is only where expressly provided by statute. "There

are," says Chancellor Kent, 2 Commentaries (3d ed.), 273, 274,

"very few points of corporation law, applicable to a corporation sole."

"The corporations generally in use with us are aggregate or the union

of two or more individuals in one body politic, with a capacity of suc-

cession and perpetuity."

It becomes then necessary to consider what are the distinctions estab-

lished by law, between a sole and an aggregate corporation. The first

and the most important is that a corporation aggregate has a perpetual

existence without change, so that an estate once vested in it continues

vested without interruption. Whereas, when a bishop or parson,

holding estate as a sole corporation, dies or resigns his office, the fee

is in abeyance until a successor is appointed. From this flows one

necessary, but obvious legal consequence, which is that a grant to an

aggregate corporation carries a fee without the word "successors";

but a grant to a corporation sole, without including successors, carries

a life estate only to the actual incumbent, who is the first taker. Co.
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SOLE AND AGGREGATE CORPORATIONS.

being; having a perpetual and uninterrupted existence must be coex-

195

tensive with a fee or perpetuity, and words of limitation could not ex-

tend it. But where property vests in a bishop, parson or other sole

corporation, he holds it to his own use and benefit whilst he holds the

office, and afterward the estate and the enjoyment of it go together to

his successor when established. The transmission of the estate is per-

petual, but the beneficial enjoyment changes at each succession.

Another well settled distinction is that by the common law a sole

corporation can not take personal property in succession, and that its

corporate capacity is confined to real estate. 2 Kent's Com., 273.

An aggregate corporation may take personal property for themselves

and successors. The reason why a sole corporation can not, says

Blackstone, is that such movable property is liable to be lost or em-

bezzled, and would raise a multitude of disputes between the succes-

sor and executor. 1 Comm., 477.

There are a great variety of other particulars, in which the incidents

and characteristics which are considered essential to an aggregate cor-

poration do not extend to a sole corporation because by the reason and
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nature of their respective modes of operation they do not apply; upon

tlie principle that when the reason of a rule ceases the rule ceases.

An aggregate corporation may have and use a common seal by which

the will of the body is expressed and its acts executed; they are to

take and grant by their appropriate corporate name; may take and

hold real and personal property; may make by-laws forthe regulation

of all matters within the scope of their authority, not contrary to the

law of the land or repugnant to the provisions of the charter or act of

incorporation; they must perform all corporate acts, by deed under

their common seal, by vote or by the agency of officers or agents duly

authorized for the purpose; they must appear by attorney and can not

appear in person; the will of the majority, orderly taken at a meeting

duly called and held, is the will of the body and must govern unless

otherwise provided by charter or by-law; they must regularly keep a

record, journal or other written account of their votes and proceed-

ings, which is the proper evidence of their acts, and may elect and

qualify a clerk or secretary for that purpose; they may elect a presi-

dent or head, a treasurer, managers, directors and other suitable offi-

cers, with such powers as the terms import, and such as may be spe-

cially conferred upon them by vote or deed to manage their affairs;

they may elect members to fill vacancies when it is not otherwise pro-

vided by the charter. Indeed this last qualification must be added in

regard to almost all these enumerated powers, and it maybe remarked

generally that when these are denominated incidents to an aggregate

corporation, it is to be understood that they are the most common and

usual characteristics of such a corporation, and that they exist by im-

plication, in cases where it is not otherwise provided in the charter;

hut that its constitution and organization, the mode in which individu-

als may become and cease to be members, and also its action in all

respects, the manner, times, places and occasions on which meetings

Lit., 86, 96, 94b; 4 Cruise's Dig., 442. A life estate to an ideal
being having a perpetual and uninterrupted existence must be coextensive with a fee or perpetuity, and words of limitation could not extend it. But where property vests in a bishop, parson or other sole
corporation, he holds it to his own use and benefit whilst he holds the
office, and afterward the estate and the enjoyment of it go together to
his successor when established. The transmission of the estate is perpetual, but the beneficial enjoyment changes at each succession.
Another well settled distinction is that by the common law a sole
corporation can not take personal property in succession, and that its
corporate capacity is confined to real estate. 2 Kent's Com., 273.
An aggregate corporation may take personal property for themselves
and successors. The reason why a sole corporation can not, says
Blackstone, is that such movable property is liable to be lost or embezzled, and would raise a multih1de of disputes between the successor and executor. 1 Comm., 477.
There are a great variety of other particulars, in which the incidents
and characteristics which are considered essential to an aggregate corporation do not extend to a sole corporation because by the reason and
natu re of their respective modes of operation they do not apply; upon
the pr1nciple that when the reason of a rule ceases the rule ceases.
Au aggregate corporation may have and use a common seal by which
the will of the body is expressed and its acts executed; they are to
take and grant by their appropriate corporate name; may take and
hold real and personal property; may make by-laws for the regulation
of all matters within the scope of their authority, not contrary to the
law of the land or repugnant to the provisions of the charter or act of
incorporation; they must perform all corporate acts, by deed under
their common seal, by vote or by the agency of officers or agents duly
authorized for the purpose; they must appear hy attorney and can not
appear in person; the will of the majority, orderly taken at a meeting
duly called and held, is the will of the hody and must govern unless
otherwise provided by charter or hy-law; they must regularly keep a
record, journal or other written account of their votes and proceeding -, which is the proper evidence of their acts, and may elect and
qualify a clerk or secretary for that purpose; they may elect a president or head, a treasurer, managers, directors and other suitable officers, with such powers as the terms import, and such as may be specially conferred upon them by vote or deed to manage their affairs;
they may elect members to fill vacancies when it is not otherwise provided by the charter. Indeed this last qualification must be added in
regard to almost all these enumerated powers, and it may be remarked
generally that when these are denominated incidents to an aggregate
corporation, it is to be understood that they are the most common and
u ual characteristics of such a corporation, and that they exist by implication, in cases where it is not otherwise provided in the charter;
but that its constitution and organization , the mode in which individual!\ may become and cease to be members, and also its action in all
respects, the manner, tiiries, places and occasions on which meetings
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present and vote to constitute a valid act, the officers who may or must
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be chosen, the property they may hold, the powers they may exercise,

may be held, the members or particular individuals who must be
present and vote to constitute a valid act, the officers who may or must
be chosen, the property they may hold, the powers they may exercise,
the duration of their existence, may all be modified and regulated ad
libitum, by the power which constitutes the corporation. Nothing
seems essential to a corporation but a capacity to have perpetual succession , un<ler a special denomination and in an artificial form, a capacity to take, hold and grant property, to sue and be sued by its corporate name, and in common to exercise powers and enjoy franchises
and immunities. 2 Kent's Com., 277.
In all these respects the distinction between an aggregate and sole
cor1>0ration, growing out of their different modes of constitution and
forms of action, is striking and obvious. A bishop or parson acting
in a corporate capacity, and holding property to him and his successor
in right of his office, has no need of a corporate name; he requires no
p eculiar seal ; he performs ·all legal acts under his own seal, in his own
name and name of office; his own will alone regulates his acts, and he
has no occasion for a secretary, for he need not keep a record of his
acts; no need of a treasurer, for he has no personal property, except
the rents and proceeds of the corporate estate, and these he takes to
his own use when received. By-laws are unnecessary, for he regulates his own action, by his own will and judgment, like any other individual acting in bis own right. But it is not necessary to pursue the
comparison into all its details; the points suggested are sufficient to
show the legal distinctions between the two classes of corporations.
With these views of the characters of these two kin<ls of corporations, it becomes necessary to examine the act under which the demandants were made a corporation, and under which they act, in
order to ascertain their legal character and rights. This act was
passed by the provincial government shortly before the revolution , in
1772. It recites that many charitably disposed persons had given
sums of money and other interest and estate to the poor of Boston,
and others were well inclined to make such charitable donations, but
the overseers of the poor of the same town , not being incorporated ,
such good intentions had been fmstrated, or not carried into full
effect; it then enacts that the said overseers for the time being, be
made and incorporated into a body politic by the name, etc., and that
they and their successors in said office have a perpetual succession by
said name. The second section provides that all money and estate,
real or personal, before given, or which should be afterwards given
to the poor of said town, not exceeding the amount and value therein
limited , should be vested in the same overseers, and their successors
in their said corporate capacity; and they were enabled to receive
and manage the same for the use of said poor. The third section
authorizes them to take and hold moneys, securities and personal
property to the amount of sixty thousand pounds and no more. The
fourth section again declares that the sai<l overseers and their 9Uccessors in said office, by the said name, shall have perpetual succession
and power, by their said corporate name, to purchase and hold lands

the duration of their existence, may all be modified and regulated ad

libitum, by the power which constitutes the corporation. Nothing

seems essential to a corporation but a capacity to have perpetual suc-

cession, under a special denomination and in an artificial form, a ca-

pacity to take, hold and grant property, to sue and be sued by its cor-

porate name, and in common to exercise powers and enjoy franchises

and immunities. 2 Kent's Com., 277.

In all these respects the distinction between an aggregate and sole

corporation, growing out of their different modes of constitution and

forms of action, is striking and obvious. A bishop or parson acting

in a corporate capacity, and holding property to him and his successor

in right of his office, has no need of a corporate name; he requires no

peculiar seal; he performs -all legal acts under his own seal, in his own

name and name of office; his own will alone regulates his acts, and he

has no occasion for a secretary, for he need not keep a record of his

acts; no need of a treasurer, for he has no personal property, except
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the rents and proceeds of the corporate estate, and these he takes to

his own use when received. By-laws are unnecessary, for he regu-

lates his own action, by his own will and judgment, like any other in-

dividual acting in his own right. But it is not necessary to pursue the

comparison into all its details; the points suggested are sufficient to

show the legal distinctions between the two classes of corporations.

With these views of the characters of these two kinds of corpora-

tions, it becomes necessary to examine the act under which the de-

mandants were made a corporation, and under which they act, in

order to ascertain their legal character and rights. This act was

passed by the provincial government shortly before the revolution, in

1772. It recites that many charitably disposed persons had given

sums of money and other interest and estate to the poor of Boston,

and others were well inclined to make such charitable donations, but

the overseers of the poor of the same town, not being incorporated,

such good intentions had been frustrated, or not carried into full

effect; it then enacts that the said overseers for the time being, be

made and incorporated into a body politic by the name, etc., and that

they and their successors in said office have a perpetual succession by

said name. The second section provides that all money and estate,

real or personal, before given, or which should be afterwards given

to the poor of said town, not exceeding the amount and value therein

limited, should be vested in the same overseers, and their successors

in their said corporate capacity; and they were enabled to receive

and manage the same for the use of said poor. The third section

authorizes them to take and hold moneys, securities and personal

property to the amount of sixty thousand pounds and no more. The

fourth section again declares that the said overseers and their succes-

sors in said office, by the said name, shall have perpetual succession

and power, by their said corporate name, to purchase and hold lands
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and sell the same, and do all other acts, as natural persons may, as

they shall judge best for the use and advantage of said poor. The

fifth section authorizes them to have a common seal, to make by-laws,

to choose a treasurer, clerk and other subordinate officers, and at

pleasure to displace them. The sixth and last section declares that all

instruments executed under their common seal, and all acts done or

matters passed upon by consent of a major part of said overseers for

the time being, shall bind said corporation and be valid in law.

Here are all the characteristics and incidents of a complete, full,

aggregate corporation. It was to be composed of several persons.

They were to hold personal as well as real estate, to make by-laws

for their government, to have a common seal, to have perpetual suc-

cession, and to act by the vote of a majority. Indeed it is not denied

that they are literally an aggregate corporation, consisting of many

persons, in contradistinction to a sole corporation; but it is contended,

that as they have no power of electing their own members, and thereby

perpetuating their own existence, but all come in by annual election
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and go out at the end of the year, they constitute a body more analog-

ous to a sole corporation than to an aggregate one. But this analogy

is not such as wholly to change the character of such a corporation.

Indeed, the analogy even in this respect is rather slight.

The strong argument is, that in this corporation there is no provis-

ion that the body shall perpetuate itself by an election of new mem-

bers in place of those who die or resign. But this mode of perpetu-

ating its existence is not essential; all that is essential is, that some

mode be provided by the charter, or act by which it is constituted, by

means of which it shall be so perpetuated. Blackstone, in the defini-

tion already cited, says, that "corporations aggregate consist of many

persons, united together into one society, and are kept up by a per-

petual succession of members, so as to continue forever." 1 Comm.,

469. If such a succession is effectually provided for, it is all that is

requisite. Here we are to consider that the legislature, in framing

this act of incorporation, had in their view the general laws of the

government, and the manner in which towns in general, and the town

of Boston in particular, were organized. Those laws provided, that

that town should annually choose twelve persons to be overseers of

the poor, and the general laws provided, that if overseers were not

specially chosen, the selectmen should act as overseers. Towns were

of themselves corporations, having perpetual succession, consisting of

all persons inhabiting within certain territorial limits, so that by the

ordinary operation of the laws, a perpetual succession of overseers

was secured. The better opinion is, that town officers thus annually

chosen hold their offices until others are chosen and qualified in their

place. But this is not essential to the argument; it is made the duty

of towns to choose officers annually, it being for their interest to'do

so; and when chosen, they become, by force of the statute, members

of the corporation, and thus all the purposes contemplated by the in-

corporation would be attained. And this mode of continuing a sue-

not exceeding five hundred pounds annual income, to manage, lease
:mci sell the same, and do all other acts, as natural persons may, as
they shall judge best for the use and advantage of said poor. The
fifth section authorizes them to have a common seal, to make by-laws,
to choose a treasurer, clerk and other subo1rdinate officers, and at
pleasure to displace them. The sixth and last section declares that all
instruments executed under their common seal, and all acts done or
matters passed upon by consent of a major p~ut of said overseers for
the time being, shall bind said corporation anc11 be valid in law.
Here are all the characteristics and incidents of a complete, full,
aggregate corporation. It was to be composed of several persons.
They were to hold personal as well as real 4estate, to make by-laws
for their government, to have a common seal,, to have perpetual succession, and to act by the vote of a majority. Indeed it is not denied
that they are literally an aggregate corporation, consisting of many
persons, in contradistinction to a sole corporation; but it is contended,
that as they have no power of electing their own members, and thereby
perpetuating their own existence, but all come in by annual election
and go out at the end of the year, they constitute a body more analogous to a sole corpo'r ation than to an aggregate one. But this analogy
is not such as wholly to change the characteir of such a corporation.
Indeed, the analogy even in this respect is rather slight.
The strong argument is, that in this corpora1tion there is no provision that the body shall perpetuate itself by an election of new members in place of those who die or resign. But this mode of perpetuating its existence is not essential; all that is essential is, that some
mode be provided by the charter, or act by which it is constituted, by
means of which it shall be so perpetuated. Bl'ackstone, in the definition already cited, says, that "corporations aggregate consist of many
persons, united together into one society, and are kept up by a perpetual succession of members, so .as to contimw forever." 1 Comm.,
469. If such a succession is effectually provided for, it is all that is
requisite. Here we are to consider that the legislature, in framing
this act of incorporation, had in their view tl~e general laws of the
government, and the manner in which towns in general, and the town
of Boston in particular, were organized. Those laws provided, that
that town should annually choose twelve persons to be overseers of
the poor, and the general laws provided, that: if overseers were not
specially chosen, the selectmen should act as O'Verseers. Towns were
of themselves corporations, having perpetual S1L1ccessiop, consisting of
all persons inhabiting within certain territorial limits, so that by the
ordinary operation of the laws, a perpetual succession of overseers
was secured. The better opinion is, that town officers thus annually
chosen hold their offices until others are chosein and qualified in their
place. But this is not essential to the argument; it is made the duty
of towns to choose officers annually, it being . for their interest to ·do
so; and when chosen, they become, by force of the statute, members
of the corporation, and thus all the purposes contemplated by the incorporation would be attained. And this mode of continuing a sue-
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cession of members, without election by the corporation itself, applies

§ 37

to the great majority of corporations in this commonwealth. In all

cession of members, without election by the corporation itself, applies
to the great majority of corporations in this commonwealth. In all
quasi corporations, as cities, towns, parishes, school districts, membership is constituted by living within certain limits. In all bridge,
railroad and turnpike companies, in all banks, insurance companies,
manufacturing companies, and generally in corporations having a capital stock, and looking to profit, membership is constituted by a transfer of shares, according to the by-laws, without any election on the
part of the corporation itself. In some, the assent of the corporation
is made necessary to such transfer and consequent membership. In
some instances more nearly resembling t he present, all the members
of the corporation are chosen, annually or otherwise, by a body other
than itself, as trustees of ministerial funds, chosen by the parish, deacons of Congregational churches and wa·rdens and vestry of Episcopal
churches, by the members of those chur·c hes; and in the latter case,
the corporators are elected by persons not themselves being a corporation, and having a perpetual existence as voluntary associations,
only by the ancient and established usagies of the country. St. 1785,
ch. 51.
In the present case abundant provision was made for perpetuating
,the corporation. Supposing the act to be framed with reference to
the established and perpetual laws then in force, it was equivalent to
declaring that those persons, who were then overseers of the poor,
and those who should thereafter be annually and successively chosen
by the town, forever, as such overseers, should be a body corporate
and have perpetual succession. And this was an ample provision
made in the act, for the perpetual succession of members, declared by
the act itself. It was stated in the argument for the demandants, on
the authority of Lord Coke, that by the ancient law an abbot or convent would not take as an aggregate corporation, because, though
consisting of many, it had not po\.ver to perpetuate itself by election,
but the abbot comes in by appointment. But this argument is not
sustained by the authority. The reason assigned by Lord Coke is
that the abbot only is capable of taking; the convent or monks are
dead persons in law, and for that reason the estate vests in the abbot
alone as a sole corporation. Co. Lit., 9.4a, 94b.
Some cases were cited from the New York Reports, supposed to
have a bearing on this subject, in which it was held that overseers
might sue and be sued upon the acts of their predecessors. Todd v.
Birdsall, r Cowen 260; Grant v. Fancher, 5 Cowen 369. These
cases have very little bearing upon the present question. They depend upon general statute provisions, very different from ours. These
cases went on the ground that the overseers were not corporations, but
exercised certain public trust!> am! duties, which, when done within
the scope of their authority, devolved upon their successors in the
same trust, in the nature of corporate obligations. Whatever may be
the relation of the overseers of the poor in this commonwealth, by the
general laws, in this respect, these dcmandants were specially incorporated for the purpose of taking and holding property, for the use of

quasi corporations, as cities, towns, parishes, school districts, mem-

bership is constituted by living within certain limits. In all bridge,

railroad and turnpike companies, in all banks, insurance companies,

manufacturing companies, and generally in corporations having a cap-

ital stock, and looking to profit, membership is constituted by a trans-

fer of shares, according to the by-laws, without any election on the

part of the corporation itself. In some, the assent of the corporation

is made necessary to such transfer and consequent membership. In

some instances more nearly resembling the present, all the members

of the corporation are chosen, annually or otherwise, by a body other

than itself, as trustees of ministerial funds, chosen by the parish, dea-

cons of Congregational churches and wardens and vestry of Episcopal

churches, by the members of those churches; and in the latter case,

the corporators are elected by persons not themselves being a corpo-

ration, and having a perpetual existence as voluntary associations,

only by the ancient and established usages of the country. St. 1785,

ch. 51.
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In the present case abundant provision was made for perpetuating

•the corporation. Supposing the act to be framed with reference to

the established and perpetual laws then in force, it was equivalent to

declaring that those persons, who were then overseers of the poor,

and those who should thereafter be annually and successively chosen

by the town, forever, as such overseers, should be a body corporate

and have perpetual succession. And this was an ample provision

made in the act, for the perpetual succession of members, declared by

the act itself. It was stated in the argument for the demandants, on

the authority of Lord Coke, that by the ancient law an abbot or con-

vent would not take as an aggregate corporation, because, though

consisting of many, it had not power to perpetuate itself by election,

but the abbot comes in by appointment. But this argument is not

sustained by the authority. The reason assigned by Lord Coke is

that the abbot only is capable of taking; the convent or monks are

dead persons in law, and for that reason the estate vests in the abbot

alone as a sole corporation. Co. Lit., 94a, 94A

Some cases were cited from the New York Reports, supposed to

have a bearing on this subject, in which it was held that overseers

might sue and be sued upon the acts of their predecessors. Todd v.

Birdsall, 1 Cowen 260; Grant v. Fancher, 5 Cowen 369. These

cases have very little bearing upon the present question. They de-

pend upon general statute provisions, very different from ours. These

cases went on the ground that the overseers were not corporations, but

exercised certain public trusts and duties, which, when done within

the scope of their authority, devolved upon their successors in the

same trust, in the nature of corporate obligations. Whatever may be

the relation of the overseers of the poor in this commonwealth, by the

general laws, in this respect, these demandants were specially incor-

porated for the purpose of taking and holding property, for the use of
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the poor, and their rights and duties, in this respect, do not depend

upon these general laws.

§ 37

SOLE AND AGGREGATE CORPORATIONS.

199

If the legislature who granted this act of incorporation, knew and

recognized the distinction between an aggregate and sole corporation,

it is very clear that they intended to constitute an aggregate corpora-

tion, to take and hold personal property, and provided for the appoint-

ment of a treasurer for that purpose. » * *

If it be asked what reason can be assigned why a sole corporation

shall have forty years to bring a writ of right, counting on the seizin

of a predecessor, and why an aggregate corporation generally, or such

a corporation as the demandants, in particular, shall have only thirty

years, in addition to the technical reasons already assigned, we think

that there are some others bearing more directly on the merits.

A parson, acting in the capacity of a sole corporation, comes to the

estate of his predecessor, as an heir does to his inheritance, a stranger.

He is usually a young clergyman, knowing nothing of the parsonage,

till about the time of his settlement. He is dependent on the duty and

courtesy of the representative of his predecessor, to be furnished with

the title deeds. Considerable time may elapse before he can become

acquainted with the amount and condition of the estate, which he is
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bound to preserve and defend for the benefit of himself, his parish,

and his successors. The condition of a corporation-aggregate, situated

like the demandants, vested with corporate powers for the better

executing of a public trust, is altogether different. Looking at the

matter practically, as the legislature may be'presumed to have done,

many, perhaps most of the overseers, will be re-chosen, and the board

will change gradually. But suppose an entire new board comes in,

the records, votes, and muniments of title are all in the hands of their

clerk; the money, securities and personal property are held by the

treasurer; confidential officers, the performance of whose duty is

usually secured by oath and bond. They are in as good a condition

to execute the trusts reposed in them, in regard to these charitable

funds, as to understand and perform the other duties confided to them.

They are in the same condition with all other city and town officers,

and indeed all officers of the state government, and of all corporations,

where they come in by annual election. In most cases of aggregate

corporations, the trustees, directors, managers and executive officers,

all those who are charged with the duty of investigating and maintain-

ing the rights of such corporations, either to real or personal property,

come into office by annual election, and yet they have but thirty years,

within which to commence writs of right.

On the whole, the court are all of opinion that the demandants

were constituted an aggregate corporation, with perpetual and con-

tinued succession; that a grant to them of real estate would have

carried a fee without being to their successors; that in a writ of right

they can count only upon their own seizin, within thirty years next

before the commencement of the action, and that, not having so

counted in the present case, the demurrer is well taken.

Note. 1807, Weston v. Hunt, 2 Mass. 500, (Parson aa to parsonage lands is

the poor, and their rights and duties, in this respect. do not depend
upon these general laws.
If the legislature who granted this act of incorporation, knew and
recognized the distinction between an aggregate and sole corporation,
it is very clear that they intended to constitute an aggregate corporation, to take and hold personal property, and provided for the appointment of a treasurer for that purpose. • • •
If it be asked what reason can be assigned why a sole corporation
shall have forty years to bring a writ of right, counting on the seizin
of a predecessor, and why an aggregate corporation generally, or such
a corporation as the demanJants, in particular, shall have only thirty
years, in addition to the technical reasons already assigned, we think
that there are some others bearing more directly on the merits.
A parson, acting in the capacity of a sole corporation, comes to the
estate of his predecessor, as an heir does to his inheritance, a stranger.
He is usually a young clergyman, knowing nothing of the parsonage,
till about the time of his settlement. He is dependent on the duty and
courtesy of the representative of his predecessor, to be furnished with
the title deeds. Considerable time may elapse before he can become
acquainted with the amount and condition of the estate, which he is
bound to preserve and defend for the benefit of himself, his parish,
and his successors. The condition of a corporatioil' aggregate, situated
like the demandants, vested with corporate powers for the better
executing of a public trust, is altogether different. Looking at the
matter practically, as the legislature may be· presumed to have done,
many, perhaps most of the overseers, will be re-chosen, and the board
will change gradually. But suppose an entire new board comes in,
the records, votes, ancl muniments of title are all in the hands of their
clerk; the money, securities and personal prope1ty are held by the
treasurer; confidential officers, the performance of whose duty is
usually secured by oath and bond. They are in as good a condition
to execute the trusts reposed in them, in regard to these charitable
funds, as to understand and perform the other duties confided to them.
They are in the same condition with all other city and town officers,
and indeed all officers of the state government, and of all corporations,
"vhere they come in by annual election. In most cases of aggregate
corporations, the tmstees, directors, managers and executive officers,
all those who are charged with the duty of investigating and maintaining the rights of such corporations, either to real or personal property,
come into office by annual election, and yet they have but thirty years,
within which to commence writs of right.
On the whole, the court are all of opinion that the dem~ndants
were constituted an aggregate corporation, with perpetual and continued succession; that a grant to them of real estate would have
carried a fee without being to their successors; that in a writ of right
they can count only upon their own seizin, within thirty years next
before the commencement of the action, and that, not having so
counted in the present case, the demurrer is well taken.
Note. 1807, Weston v. Hunt, 2 Mass. 500, (Parson as to parsonage lands is
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a corporation sole); 1811, Brunswick v. Dunning, 7 Mass. 445-7, (Same); 1889,
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§ 37

Archbishop v. Shipman, 79 Cal. 288, (Roman Catholic bishop holding church

lands is a corporation sole); 1875, Westcott v. Fargo, 61 N. Y. 542, (Presi-

a corporation sole); 1811, Brunswick v. Dunning, 7 Mass. 445-7, (Same); 1889,
Archbishop v. Shipman, 79 Cal. 288, (Roman Catholic bishop holding church
lands is a corporation sole) ; 1875, Westco1~ v. Fargo, 61 N. Y. 542, ( President and treasurer of a joint stock company for purposes of suits under statutes are substantially corporations sole).
1. Officers. What were formerly classed as corporations sole in the old
digests with us are now usually classed as o:fficers, and found under that title
in digests.
The King of England (Co. Lit. 43, 1 Bl. Com. 469, 1 Kyd 20), the chamberlain of the city of London for purpose of taking certain bonds to himself
and snccessors <Fulwood 's Case, 4 Coke 64; Cro. Eliz., 464) ; minister of a
parish seized of its freehold (Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, U. S. 292); the governor of the state (The Governor v. Allen, 8. Humph: (27 Tenn.. ) 176, infra,
p. ~70); and certain county officers, in taking bonds, r ecognizances. et.. .
{Kinney v. Sanders, 3 Ired". (N . C. ) .360; McDowell v. Hemphill, 60 N. C.
(1 Winst. Law) 96, have been held to be corporations sole. In Louisville
Banking Co. v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 42 Am . St. Rep. 335, it is said there is
no such being as a sole corporation in this state , and none such allowed to be
created by the statute. This was said concE1rning a corporation in which one
member had become the owner of all the shares, and in some measure misconceived the difference between a corporation sole and a corporation aggregate, the latter being one in which th ere is the capacity of having more than
one member at a time, and the former one i.n which there is the capacity of
having only one :'Dember at a time.
2. One man companies. In corporations with shares of stock, one man
may become the owner of all the shares of stock, but this does not convert
the corporation into ·a corporation sole, fo:r there is yet the capacity to sell
shares by the owner, and bring in other members. For most purposes, ns
Mr. Cook says (§ 709), "the existence ~ relations and business met.hods of the
corporation continue." Bat in Maryland and Kentucky it is held that the
corporate existence or franchise is suspended while one owns all the stock to
the extent that the corporate property becomes liable for the debts of the sole
owner in the same way as his own; but on the other hand, the sole owner
does not become individually liable for debts created for the corporation and
~nits name._ (Swift v. Smithz. 65 Md. 428, 57 Am. Rep. 336; Louisville Bankmg Co. v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. is3, 42 Am. St. Rep. 335, 19 L. Rep. A. 684.) Bnt
such distinction has not usually been made. See 1897, Salomon v. Salomon,
etc., L . R. App. Cas. 22; 1897, Harrington v. Connor, 51 Neb. 214, 70 N. W .
Rep. 911; 189i, Randall v. Dudley, 111 Mi.ch. 437, 69 N. W. Rep. 729; 1896i
Parker v. Bethel Hotel Co., 96 Tenn. 252, 31 L . R. A. 706; 1896, Nationa
W ater-Works Co. v. Kansas City, 78 Fed. Rep. 428; 1895, Bank v. Macon
Construction Co. , 97 Ga. 1; 1892, Union Paciific R. v . Chicago, etc., R., 51 Fed.
Rep. 309; 1891, Humphreys v. McKissock, ll40U. S. 304; 1889, Farmers, etc.,
Trust Co. v. Chicago, P. & S. R. Co., 39 ll"ed . Rep. 143; 1886, England v.
Dearborn, 141 Mass. 590; 1884, Button v. Hoffman, 61Wis.20, 50 Am. Rep.
131.
See note, pp. 889, 890.

dent and treasurer of a joint stock company for purposes of suits under stat-

utes are substantially corporations sole).

1. Officers. What were formerly classed as corporations sole in the old

digests with us are now usually classed as officers, and found under that title

in digests.

The King of England (Co. Lit. 43, 1 Bl. Com. 469, 1 Kyd 20), the cham-

berlain of the city of London for purpose of taking certain bonds to himself

and successors ^Fulwood's Case, 4 Coke 64; Cro. Eliz., 464); minister of a

parish seized of its freehold (Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, TJ. S. 292) ; the gov-

ernor of the state (The Governor v. Allen, 8 Humph. (27 Tenn.) 176, infra,

p. 270); and certain county officers, in taking bonds, recognizances, etc.

(Kinney v. Sanders, 3 Ired. (N. C. ) 360; McDowell v. Hemphill, 60 N. C.

(1 Winst. Law) 96, have been held to be corporations sole. In Louisville

Banking Co. v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 42 Am. St. Rep. 335, it is said there is

no such being as a sole corporation in this state, and none such allowed to be

created by the statute. This was said concerning a corporation in which one
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member had become the owner of all the shares, and in some measure mis-

conceived the difference between a corporation sole and a corporation aggre-

gate, the latter being one in which there is the capacity of having more than

one member at a time, and the former one in which there is the capacity of

having only one member at a time.

2. One man companies. In corporations with shares of stock, one man

may become the owner of all the shares of stock, but this does not convert

the corporation into 'a corporation sole, for there is yet the capacity to sell

shares by the owner, and bring in other members. For most purposes, as

Mr. Cook says (§ 709), "the existence, relations and business methods of the

corporation continue." But in Maryland and Kentucky it is held that the

corporate existence or franchise is suspended while one owns all the stock to

the extent that the corporate property becomes liable for the debts of the sole

owner in the same way as his own; but on the other hand, the sole owner

does not become individually liable for debta created for the corporation and

in its name. (Swift v. Smith, 65 Md. 428, 57 Am. Rep. 336; Louisville Bank-

ing Co. v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 42 Am. St. Rep. 335, 19 L. Rep. A. 684.) But

such distinction has not usually been made. See 1897, Salomon v. Salomon,

etc., L. R. App. Cas. 22; 1897, Harrington v. Connor, 51 Neb. 214, 70 N. W.

Rep. 911; 1897, Randall v. Dudley, 111 Mich. 437, 69 N. W. Rep. 729; 1896.

Parker v. Bethel Hotel Co., 96 Tenn. 252, 31 L. R. A. 706; 1896, National

Water-Works Co. v. Kansas City, 78 Fed. Rep. 428; 1895, Bank v. Macon

Construction Co., 97 Ga. 1; 1892, Union Pacific R. v. Chicago, etc., R.,51 Fed.

Rep. 309; 1891, Humphreys v. McKissock, 140 XT. S. 304; 1889, Farmers, etc.,

TruBt Co. v. Chicago, P. & S. R. Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 143; 1886, England v.

Dearborn, 141 Mass. 590; 1884, Button v. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 20, 50 Am. Rep.

See note, pp. 889, 890.
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Sec. 38. Same, (b) As to purpose, corporations are:

(1) Ecclesiastical, or religious.

ECCLESIASTICAL AND LAV CORPORATIONS.

(2) Lay, which are (a) Eleemosynary, or (b) Civil.

201

HARDIN v. TRUSTEES OF SECOND BAPTIST CHURCH.

1883. In the Supreme Court of Michigan, 51 Mich. Reports,

PP- i37~I39> 47 Am- ReP- 555-

Sec. 38. Same. ( b)

Error to Wayne. (Jennison, J.) June 13. June 22.

As to purpose, corporations are:

(1) Ecclesiastical, or religious.
(2) Lay, which are (a) Eleemosynary, or (b) Civil.

Case. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Cooley, J. The preliminary objection to the maintenance of this

action is so unmistakably fatal that there can be no occasion or excuse

HARDIN v. TRUSTEES OF SECOND BAPTIST CHURCH.

for considering any other.

The plaintiff, who, previous to February 2, 1881, was a member in

;i

good standing of the Second Baptist Church of Detroit, brings suit

883. IN THE SUPREME CouaT

OF

MrcHIGAN, 51 Mich. Reports,

PP· 137-139, 47 Am. Rep. SSS·

against the defendant to recover damages for having been on that day

unwarrantably and without trial upon charges expelled from member-

Error to Wayne.

ship. The suit is against the corporate body known in law as "The

(Jennison,

J.)

June 13.

June

22.

Trustees of the Second Baptist Church of Detroit," and which was

Case.

organized by voluntary association under authority conferred by the

Plaintiff brings error.

Affirmed.

Revised Statutes of 1S38. The provision contained in that code is

CooLEY, J. The preliminary objection to the maintenance of this
action is so unmistakably fatal that there can be no occasion or excuse
for considering any other:
The plaintiff, who, previous to February 2, 1881, was a member in
good standing of the Second Baptist Church of Detroit, brings suit
against the defendant to recover damages for having been on that day
unwarrantably and without trial upon charges expelled from membership. The suit is against the corporate body known in law as "The
Trustees of the Second Baptist Church of Detroit," and which was
organized by voluntary association under authority conferred by the
Revised Statutes of 1838. The provision contained in that code is
substantially the same which has always existed in this state, and
which is simple and easily understood. Persons desirous of forming
themselves into a religious society sign articles of association for the
purpose, agree upon a name, elect trustees and put their a1ticles on
record when duly perfected. They thereby become a corporation by
the name agreed upon, and may take, hold and convey property and
exercise the ordinary functions of corporate bodies. The associates
are not necessarily professors of any particular belief or faith, or members of any church; and corporate succession is kept up by conferring
the privileges of corporators on all who regularly attend worship in
the society and contribute to its support. And the trustees who are
to manage the temporal affairs of the corporation may or may not be
church members.
Connected with the corporation the statute contemplates that there
will be a church, though possibly this may not be essential. In this
case there is one. The church has its members, who are supposed to
hold certain beliefs and subscribe some covenant with each other, if
such is the usage of the denomination to which the church is attached. The church is not incorporated, and has nothing whatever
to do with the temporali#cs. It docs not control the property or the
trustees; it can receive nobody into the society and can expel nobody
from t't. On the other hand, the corporation has nothing to do with
the church, except as it provides for the church wants. It can not
alter the church faith or covenant; £t can not receive members; it
can not expel members; t't can not prevent the church receiving or

substantially the same which has always existed in this state, and
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which is simple and easily understood. Persons desirous of forming

themselves into a religious society sign articles of association for the

purpose, agree upon a name, elect trustees and put their articles on

record when duly perfected. They thereby become a corporation by

the name agreed upon, and may take, hold and convey property and

exercise the ordinary functions of corporate bodies. The associates

are not necessarily professors of any particular belief or faith, or mem-

bers of any church; and corporate succession is kept up by conferring

the privileges of corporators on all who regularly attend worship in

the society and contribute to its support. And the trustees who are

to manage the temporal affairs of the corporation may or may not be

church members.

Connected with the corporation the statute contemplates that there

will be a church, though possibly this may not be essential. In this

case there is one. The church has its members, -who are supposed to

hold certain beliefs and subscribe some covenant -with each other, if

suck is the usage of the denomination to -which the church is at-

tached. The church is not incorporated, and has nothing -whatever

to do -with the temporalities. It docs not control the property or the

trustees; it can receive nobody into the society and can expel nobody

from it. On the other hand, the corporation has nothing to do -with

the church, except as it provides for the church -wants. It can not

alter the church faith or covenant; it can not receive members; it

can not expel members; it can not prevent the church receiving or
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expelling whomsoever that body shall see Jit to receive or expel. This

HARDIN V. TRUSTEES, ETC.

concise statement is amply sufficient to show that this suit has no

foundation. The corporation is sued for a tort which it neither com-

cxpcllt"ng whomsoever that body shall see fit to recei"ve or expel. This
concise statement is amply sufficient to show that this suit has no
foundation. The corporation is sued for a to1t which it neither committed nor had any power to prevent, and which has occurred in a
proceeding where the interference of the corporation would have be~n
an impertinence.
But it is said that the church is an integral part of the corporation , or
rather, that it is the corporation in its spiritual capacity. Its being an
integral part of the corporation proves nothing. Counties, towns and
school districts are integral parts of the state, but the state is not for
that reason liable for their torts. And as to spiritual capacity, the
corporation has none; it is given capacity in respect to temporalities
only. If the corporation had assumed to expel this plaintiff from the
church, she might treat its action with contempt.· But as she makes
no complaint of wrongful corporate action, we must assume that the
corporation has never invaded her rights. If the church has done so,
the church alone is culprit.
The distinction between church and corporation in these cases is
sufficient! y explained in the following authorities: Baptist Church v.
Witherell, 3 Paige 296, s. c. 24 Am. Dec. 223; Lawyer v. Cipperly, 7 Paige 281; Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N. Y. 243; Bellportv.
Tooker, 29 Barb. 256, and 21 N. Y. 267; Burrel v. Associate Reformed Church, 44 Barb. 282; Miller v. Gable, 2 Denio 492; Ferrari av. Vasconcellos, 31 Ill. 25; Calkins v. Cheney, 92 Ill. 463;
Keyser v. Stansifer, 6 Ohio 363; Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Mon. 253;
German, etc., Cong. v. Pressler, 17 La. Ann. 127; O'Hara v. Stack,
90 Pa. St. 477; Sohier v. Trinity Church, r09 Mass. 1; Walrath v.
Campbell, 28 Mich. I I 1. See, also, Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 9.
The judgment must be affirmed with costs.
The other justices concurred.

mitted nor had any power to prevent, and which has occurred in a

proceeding where the interference of the corporation would have been

an impertinence.

But it is said that the church is an integral part of the corporation, or

rather, that it is the corporation in its spiritual capacity. Its being an
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school districts are integral parts of the state, but the state is not for

that reason liable for their torts. And as to spiritual capacity, the

corporation has none; it is given capacity in respect to temporalities

only. If the corporation had assumed to expel this plaintiff from the

church, she might treat its action with contempt.' But as she makes

no complaint of wrongful corporate action, we must assume that the

corporation has never invaded her rights. If the church has done so,

the church alone is culprit.

The distinction between church and corporation in these cases is

sufficiently explained in the following authorities: Baptist Church v.
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Witherell, 3 Paige 296, s. c. 24 Am. Dec. 223; Lawyer v. Cip-

perly, 7 Paige 281 ; Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N. Y. 243; Bellportv.

Tooker, 29 Barb. 256, and 21 N. Y. 267; Burrel v. Associate Re-

formed Church, 44 Barb. 282; Miller v. Gable, 2 Denio 492; Fer-

raria v. Vasconcellos, 31 111. 25; Calkins v. Cheney, 92 111. 463;

Keyser v. Stansifer, 6 Ohio 363; Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Mon. 253;

German, etc., Cong. v. Pressler, 17 La. Ann. 127; O'Hara v. Stack,

.90 Pa. St. 477; Sohier v. Trinity Church, 109 Mass. 1; Walrath v.

Campbell, 28 Mich. m. See, also, Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 9.

The judgment must be affirmed with costs.

The other justices concurred.

Note. 1765, Rex v. Chancellor of Cambridge, 3 Burr. 1656, a. c. 1 W. Black.

550; 1815, Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch 292; 1868, Hale v. Everett, 53 N.

H. 9, 16 Am. Rep. 82; 1883, Sale v. First Regular Baptist Church, etc.. 62

Iowa 26, 49 Am. Rep. 136; 1883, Landis v. Campbell, 79 Mo. 433,49 Am. Rep.

239; 1890, Lillv v. Tobbein, 103 Mo. 477, 23 Am. St. Rep. 887; 1895. Russie v.

Brazzell, 128 Mo. 93, 49 Am. St. Rep. 542; 1832, First Baptist Church v.

Witherell, 3PaigeCh. (N.Y.)296,24 Am. Dec. 223; 1890, Connellyv. Masonic,

Note. 1765, Rex v. Chancellor of Cambridge, 3 Burr. 1656, e. c. 1 W. Black.
550; 1815, Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch 292; 1868, Hale v. Everett, 53 N.
H. 9, 16 Am. Rep. 82; 1883, Sale v. First Regular Baptist Church, etc. , 62
Iowa 26, 49 Am. Rep. 136; 1883, Landis v. Campbell, 79 Mo.433,49 Am. Rep.
239; 1890, Lilly v. Tobbein, 103 Mo. 477, 23 Am. St. Rep. 887; l 895, Russie v.
Brazzell, 128 Mo. 93, 49 Am. St. Rep. 542; 1832, First Baptist Church v.
Witherell, 3 Paige Ch. (N. Y. ) 296, 24 Am. Dec. 223; 1890, Connelly v. 1\1 asonic,
etc., Association, 58 Conn. 552, 18 Am. St. Rep. 296; 1894, Reorganized
Chur~h of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Church of Christ, 60 Fed. Rep.
937, 45 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 529; 1894, Auracher v. Yerger, 90 Iowa558, 45
Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 554; 1883, White Lick Quarterly Meeting, etc., v.
·White Lick Quarterly Meeting, etc., 89 Ind. 136, 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Caa. 87;
1894, Bnettnerv. Frazer, 100 Mich. 179, 58 N. W. Rep. 834; 1891, Winnepesaukee Camp Meeting Ass'n v. Gordon, 67 N. H. 98, 45 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cas. 576; 1883, Whitecar v. Michenor, 37 N. J. Eq. 6, 1 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cas. 258; 1888, Liggett v. Ladd, 17 Ore. 89, 27 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 406.

etc., Association, 58 Conn. 552, 18 Am. St. Rep. 296; 1894,"Reorganized

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Church of Christ, 60 Fed. Rep.

937, 45 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 529; 1894, Auracher v. Yerger, 90 Iowa558, 45

Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 554; 1883, White Lick Quarterly Meeting, etc., v.

White Lick Quarterly Meeting, etc., 89 Ind. 130, 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 87;

1894, Bnettnerv. Frazer, 100 Mich. 179, 58 N. W. Rep. 834; 1891, Winnepe-

saukee Camp Meeting Ass'n v. Gordon, 67 N. H. 98, 45 Am. & Eng. Corp.

Cas. 576; 1883, Whitecar v. Michenor, 37 N. J. Eq. 6, 1 Am. & Eng. Corp.

Cas. 258; 1888, Liggett v. Ladd, 17 Ore. 89, 27 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 406.
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1850. In the Supreme Court of New York. 9 Barbour (N. Y.)

Rep., pp. 64-150.

[In equity. Appeal from the vice-chancellor. In 1754 "the As-

ROBERTSON ET AL. v. BULLIONS ET AL.1

sociate Presbytery of Pennsylvania," subordinate to the Associate

Synod of Scotland, was organized out of the American congregations

of the Associate Church. In 1785, a church known as the Associate

1850.

Congregation of Cambridge, N. Y., adhering to the Associate Pres-

IN

THE

SUPREME CouRT OF NEw YoRK.
Rep., pp. 64-150.

9 Barbour (N. Y.)

bytery of Pennsylvania, was formed. In 1S02, connection with Scot-

land was dissolved, and the Pennsylvania Presbytery was terminated

by being divided into four presbyteries, one being called the Associate

Presbytery of Cambridge, and a synod called "Associate Synod of

North America," organized. Local churches were called congrega-

tions. In 1826 the Cambridge Associate Congregation became in-

corporated. In 1786 certain land was conveyed by F. to seven per-

sons designated as trustees of the Associate Congregation of Cambridge,

"adhering to the Associate Presbytery of Pennsylvania," and to their

successors forever. F.'s wife failing to join in the conveyance of
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17S6, in 1810 a new deed was made to fourteen persons (three being

the same as formerly) described as trustees of the same congregation,

"adhering to the principles of the Associate Synod of North America,

and now under the inspection of the Associate Presbytery of Cam-

bridge, belonging to the said synod, and whereof the Rev. Alexander

Bullions is the present pastor," for the use and in trust for those who

then were or should thereafter be in full communion, and should com-

pose the said Associate Congregation.

In 1786, a church was built on this property, and in 1833, a new

one. In 1808, Dr. Bullions was called as pastor "by the elders and

other members of the Associate Congregation of Cambridge, in full

communion, as professed by the Associate Presbytery of Cambridge,

as subordinate to the Associate Synod of North America." And Dr.

Bullions on ordination promised to submit himself to the admonition of

the Cambridge Presbytery. In 1S38, he was deposed and excommuni-

cated by this Presbytery; its action was affirmed by the Synod of

North America, the pastorate declared vacant, and other pastors sent

by the Synod to preach temporarily, but a majority of trustees refused

to allow them to preach, but permitted Dr. Bullions to continue. The

bill prayed that the offending trustees be required to allow a clergy-

man in good standing to preach, that they be enjoined from using the

church or its funds in support of any other, be required to account for

all money so expended, that they be removed, and Dr. Bullions re-

strained from acting as minister. The answer alleged that the greater

part of the subscriptions by which the new church was built was con-

1 Statement of facts condensed. Arguments and much of the opinion omit-

ted. Dissenting opinion of Cady, J., omitted. See decision of court of ap-

peals, affirming the decree rendered by the supreme court, 11 N. Y. 243.

[In equity. Appeal from the vice-chancellor. In 1754 "the Associate Presbytery of Pennsylvania," subordinate to the Associate
Synod of Scotland, was organized out of the American congregations
of the Associate Church. In 1785, a church known as the Associate
Congregation of Cambridge, N. Y., adhering to the Associate Presbytery of Pennsylvania, was formed. In 1802, connection with Scotland was dissolved, and the Pennsylvania Presbytery was terminated
by being divided into four presbyteries, one being called the Associate
Presbytery of Cambridge, and a synod called "Associate Synod of
North America," organized. Local churches were called congregations. In 1826 the Cambridg-e Associate Congregation became incorporated. In 1786 certain land was conveyed by F. to seven per, sons designated as trustees of the Associate Congregation of Cambridge,
" adhering to the Associate Presbytery of Pennsylvania," and to their
successors forever. F. 's wife failing to join in the conveyance of
1786, in 1810 a new deed was made to fourteen persons (three being
the same as formerly) described as trustees of the same congregation,
"adhering to the principles of the Associate Synod of North America,
and now under the inspection of the Associate Presbytery of Cambridge, belonging to the said synod, and whereof the Rev. Alexander
Bullions is the present pastor," for the use and in trust for those who
then were or should thereafter be in full communion, and should compose the sajd Associate Congregation.
In 1786, a church was built on this property, and in 1833, a new
one. In 18o8, Dr. Bullions was called as pastor "by the elders and
other members of the Associate Congregation of Cambridge, in full
communion, as professed by the Associate Presbytery of Cambridge,
as sµbordinate to the Associate Synod of North America." And Dr.
Bullions on ordination promised to submit himself to the admonition of
the Cambridge Presbytery. In 1838, he was deposed and excommunicated by this Presbytery; its action was affirmed by the ·Synod of
North America, the pastorate declared vacant, and other pastors sent
by the Synod to preach temporarily, but a majority of trustees refused
to allow them to preach, but permitted Dr. Bullions to continue. The
bill prayed that the offending trustees be required to allow a clergy_man in good standing to preach, that they be enjoined from using the
church or its funds in support of any other, be required to account for
all money so expended, that they be removed, and Dr. Bullions restrained from acting as minister. The answer alleged that the greater
part of the subscriptions by which the new church was built was con1 St11tement of facts condensed.
Arguments and much of the opinion omitted. Dissenting opinion of CADY, J., omitted. See decision of court of appeals, affirming the decree rendered by the supreme court, 11 N. Y. 248.
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cluding 221 communicants, all the elders and all the trustees at that
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time, while the complainants were only 75 persons including 60 com-

tributed by supporters of Dr. Bullions, of whom there were 340, including 221 communicants, all the elders and all the trustees at that
time, while the complainants were only 75 persons including 6o communicants; that Dr. Bullions had been wrongfully deposed by the
Presbytery, which was illegally constituted, and that neither he nor
his supporters had departed from the principles of the Associate
church. The vice-chancellor held that the property was vested in the
trustees for the use of the congregation, in accordance with the discipline and government of the Associate church of North America,
which did not allow excommunicated preachers to act as minister,
and the appropriation of the property for such use would be enjoined.
Also that the trustees be removed, and new ones be elected by those
who adhered to the Associate Presbytery of Cambridge, including
those who statedly worshiped with them; also that there be an accounting for the use of the property.
The statute under which the corporation was formed provided:
"That it shall be lawful for the male persons of full age, belonging
to any church, congregation, or religious society, now or hereafter
to be established in this state, and not already incorporated, to assemble at the church, meeting-house, or other place where they statedly
attend for divine worship, and by plurality of voices. to elect any
number of discreet persons of their church, congregation or society,
not less than three nor exceeding nine in number, as trustees, to take
charge of the estate and property belonging thereto, and to transact
all affairs relative to the temporalities thereof; and that at such election every male person of full age, who has statedly worshiped with
such church, congregation or society, and has formerly been considered as belonging thereto, shall be entitled to vote; and the said
election shall be conducted as follows: the minister of such church,
congregation or society, or in case of his death or absence, one of the
elders or deacons, church wardens or vestrymen thereof, and for want
of such officers, any other person being a member or a stated hearer
in such church, congregation or society, shall publicly notify the con·
gregation of the time when, and place where, the said election ~all
be held, at least fifteen days before the day of election; that the said
notification shall be given for two successive Sabbaths, or days on
which sa;d church, congregation or society, shall statedly meet for
public worship, preceding the day of election; that on the day of said
election, two of the elders or church wardens, and if there be no such
officers, then two of the members of the said church, congregation or
society, to be nominated by a majority of members present, shall preside at such election, receive the votes of the electors, be the judges
of the qualifications of such electors, and the officers to return the
names of the persons who by plurality of voices shall be elected to
serve as trustees for the said church, congregation or society, and the
said returning officers shall immediately thereafter certify under their
hands and seals the names of the persons elected to serve as trnstees
for such church, congregation or society, in which certificate the name
or title by which the said trustees and their successors shall forever

municants; that Dr. Bullions had been wrongfully deposed by the

Presbytery, which was illegally constituted, and that neither he nor

his supporters had departed from the principles of the Associate

church. The vice-chancellor held that the property was vested in the

trustees for the use of the congregation, in accordance with the dis-

cipline and government of the Associate church of North America,

which did not allow excommunicated preachers to act as minister,

and the appropriation of the property for such use would be enjoined.

Also that the trustees be removed, and new ones be elected by those

who adhered to the Associate Presbytery of Cambridge, including

those who statedly worshiped with them; also that there be an ac-

counting for the use of the property.

The statute under which the corporation was formed provided:

"That it shall be lawful for the male persons of full age, belonging

to any church, congregation, or religious society, now or hereafter

to be established in this state, and not already incorporated, to assem-
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ble at the church, meeting-house, or other place where they statedly

attend for divine worship, and by plurality of voices, to elect any

number of discreet persons of their church, congregation or society,

not less than three nor exceeding nine in number, as trustees, to take

charge of the estate and property belonging thereto, and to transact

all affairs relative to the temporalities thereof; and that at such elec-

tion every male person of full age, who has statedly worshiped with

such church, congregation or society, and has formerly been con-

sidered as belonging thereto, shall be entitled to vote; and the said

election shall be conducted as follows: the minister of such church,

congregation or society, or in case of his death or absence, one of the

elders or deacons, church wardens or vestrymen thereof, and for want

of such officers, any other person being a member or a stated hearer

in such church, congregation or society, shall publicly notify the con-

gregation of the time when, and place where, the said election s,hall

be held, at least fifteen days before the day of election; that the said

notification shall be given for two successive Sabbaths, or days on

which said church, congregation or society, shall statedly meet for

public worship, preceding the day of election; that on the day of said

election, two of the elders or church wardens, and if there be no such

officers, then two of the members of the said church, congregation or

society, to be nominated by a majority of members present, shall pre-

side at such election, receive the votes of the electors, be the judges

of the qualifications of such electors, and the officers to return the

names of the persons who by plurality of voices shall be elected to

serve as trustees for the said church, congregation or society, and the

said returning officers shall immediately thereafter certify under their

hands and seals the names of the persons elected to serve as trustees

for such church, congregation or society, in which certificate the name

or title by which the said trustees and their successors shall forever
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thereafter be called and known, shall be particularly mentioned and

described; which said certificate being proved or acknowledged as

above directed shall be recorded as aforesaid; and such trustees and
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their successors shall also thereupon by virtue of this act be a body

corporate by the name or title expressed in such certificate."

The law also empowered the trustees to take into their custody and

control all the temporalities belonging to the church, congregation or

society, to sue and be sued, to purchase and hold property for the use

of the same, to make repairs, to regulate the renting of pews, etc.,

and all other matters relating to the temporal concerns and revenues

of such church. Appoint clerk, treasurer, etc. The law provided

that no one but such as "shall have been a stated attendant on divine

worship in said church, and shall have contributed to support" of

same, shall be an elector. Another section provided that the salary of

the minister should be fixed by a majority of electors, at a meeting

called for that purpose; provision was also made for reducing the

number of trustees to not less than three; for reporting yearly reve-

nues to the chancellor, for selling all the property in certain contin-

gencies, and upon dissolution, "for the religious society which was

connected with such corporation to reincorporate" in a way prescribed.]
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Hand, J. * * * Then what kind of corporations are they? The

answer to this inquiry may be of some importance in this case. Chan-

cellor Kent, in his Commentaries, denominates them "ecclesiastical cor-

porations," and Angel & Ames, in their valuable work on corporations,

upon this authority adopt the same application. (2 Kent, 274; Angel

& Ames on Corporations, 33.) Neither cites any decision. Consid-

ering the high authority from whence the remark emanates, I express

a dissent with much timidity; but with deference, I think it correct.

I doubt whether, in a technical sense, there are any ecclesiastical cor-

porations in this state, particularly under the third section of this act.

As an ecclesiastical body they have no legal existence; they have no

ecclesiastical power. They are not controlled by and can not control

the church, or any church judicatory, or interfere in spiritual concerns.

Their object and purpose is to manage the temporalities of the society.

"Ecclesiastical corporations," says Blackstone, "are, where the mem-

bers who compose it are entirely spiritual persons, such as bishops,

certain deans and prebendaries; all archdeacons, parsons and vicars,

which are sole corporations; deans and chapters at present, and for-

merly prior and convent, abbots and monks, and the like, bodies

aggregate." And in describing the class of lay corporations, known

as eleemosynary, he adds: "And all these eleemosynary corporations

are, strictly speaking, lay, and not ecclesiastical, even though com-

posed of ecclesiastical persons, and although they in some things par-

take of the nature, privileges and restrictions of ecclesiastical bodies."

(1 Bl. 470. And see Phillips v. Bury, 1 Ld. Ray. 6; Cawdrey's

Case, 5 Co. fol. 15; 2 Bac. Abr., 2; 1 Kyd, 22.)

It is not the profession of piety by the individuals that renders the

corporation, of which they are the members, ecclesiastical. The cor-

poration must be spiritual in a legal and not in a popular or scriptural

thereafter be called and known, shall be particularly mentioned and
described; which said certificate being proved or acknowledged as
above directed shall be recorded as aforesaid; and such trustees and
their successors shall also thereupon by virtue of this act be a body
corporate by the name or title expressed in such certificate."
The law also empowered the trustees to take into their custody and
control all the temporalities belonging to the church, congregation or
society, to sue and be sued, to purchase and hold property for the use
of the same, to make repairs, to regulate the renting of pews, etc.,
and all other matters relating to the temporal concerns and revenues
of such church. Appoint clerk, treasurer, etc. The law provided
that no one but such as "shall have been a stated attendant on divine
worship in said church, and shall have contributed to support" of
same, shall be an elector. Another section provided that the salary of
the minister should be fixed by a majority of electors, at a meeting
ca lled for that purpose; provision was also made for reducing the
number of trustees to not less than three; for reporting yearly revenues to the chancellor, for selling all the property in certain contingencies, and upon dissolution, "for the religious society which was
connected with such corporation to reincorporate'' in a way prescribed.]
HAND, J. • • • Then what kind of corporations are they? The
a nswer to this inquiry may be of some importance in this case. Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, denominates them "ecclesiastical corporations," and Angel & Ames, in their valuable work on corporations,
upon this authority adopt the same application. (2 Kent, 274; Angel
& Ames on Corporations, 33.) Neither cites any decision. Considering the high authority from whence the remark emanates, I express
a dissent with much timidity; but with deference, I think it correct.
I douht whether, in a technical sense, there are any ecclesiastical corporations in this state, particularly under the third section of this act.
A s an ecclesiastical body they have no legal existence; they have n o
ecclesiastical power. They are not controlled by and can not control
the church, or any church judicatory, or interfere in spiritual concerns.
Their object and purpose is to manage the temporalities of the society.
"Ecclesiastical corporations," says Blackstone, "are, where the members who compose it are entirely spiritual persons, such as bishops,
certain deans and prebendaries ; all archdeacons, parsons and vicar. ,
which are sole corporations; deans and chapters at present, and fo rmerly prior and convent, abbots and monks, and the like, b odi es
aggregate. " And in describing the class of lay corporations , known
as eleemosynary, he adds: "And all these eleemosynary .c orporations
are, strictly speaking, lay, and not ecclesiastical, even though composed of ecclesiastical persons, and although they in some things partake of the nature, privileges and restrictions of ecclesiastical bodies."
( 1 Bl. 470.
And see Phillips v. Bury, I Ld. Ray. 6; Cawdrey's
Case, 5 Co. fol. 15; 2 Bae. Abr., 2; 1 Kyd, 22.)
It is not the profession of piety by the individual s that renders the
corporation, of which they are the members, ecclesiastical. The corporation must be spiritual in a legal and not in a popular or scriptural
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sense. Lay corporations may be for the advancement of religion, and

the members may all be clergymen, even, but that does not make the

sense. Lay corporations may be for the advancement of religion, and
the members may all be clergymen, even, but that does not make the
corporation ecclesiastical. The king is said, in Cawdrey's case, to be
"vicar of the highest of kings," and he is a corporation , but I believe
he is not considered an ecclesiastical corporation. And if he were ,
it would be becau se he is the head of the church, an ecclesiastical body
in law. Dartmouth College is an lay and not an ecclesiastical corporation, and would be if the individual members were all ecclesiastical
persons. (Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518. See
the opinion.of Mr. J. Story, Ang. & Ames, 34.) And one distinctive
feature of ecclesiastical cotporations is, that they are subject to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts or the visitatorial power of the
ordinary. (1Bl.471, n. 1; Tomi. Die., 436; 1 Kyd , 22; Holt, C. ].,
1 Show. 252.)
Our religious corporations have no such amenabilities.
There the ordinary is the visitor of ecclesiastical corporations, and
from him there is an appeal. The king, as the "supreme ordinary,"
visits the metropolitan, and the metropolitan the bishop. Church
wardens (in England) are said to be lay corporations, although instituted for the benefit and advancement of religion and to suppress profaneness and immorality, and to see that public worship be performed
with due decency and reverence; and are elected by the parish or the
minister and parish. ( 1 Bae. Abr., 597; Dawson v. Fowle, Ha¥dr.
378. Holt, C. J., in Rex v. Rees, r2 Mod. 116. Tomi. Die.
"Church wardens." r Lill. Ahr. "Church wardens." 1 Bum's Eccl.
L., 378.) It may be added, that our corporations have power to build
school-houses and dwellings for the minister, and other buildings , etc.
If these were ecclesiastical corporations, there would be no visitor, for
the reason that no person or officer, with us , has any such jurisdiction.
That system is a part of the ecclesiastical polity of England, and does ·
not apply to our religious corporations. ( 2 Kent, 304.)
If lay corporations then they are either eleemosynary or civil. If
the former, the visitatorial power is with the founders or their heirs;
unless it has been delegated by them to some other person. If a civ il
corporation, they are not subject to this species of visitation at all.
( 2 Kent , 304.)
Perhaps, for the purpose of ascertaining the power
of a court of chancery in this case, it is not important to decide
whether they are eleemosynary or civil ; for that court has no visitatorial power oYer a private eleemosynary corporation. Where there
is a failure or want of a visitor in such cases, in England, the crovvn
becomes the visitor, and that power is exercised by the court of king's
bench if not .a charity (Rex v. Gregory, 4 T. R. 240, 1 , n.), and if a
charity, within the statute of charitable uses (43 Eliz., ch. 4), by a
petition to the great seal and not by bill or information; and then the
lord chancellor acts in his visitatorial capacity. (Ex parte Wrangham,
2 Ves. Jr. 609: Attorney-General v. Earl of Clarendon, 17 Ves. Jr.
499; Attorney-General v. Dixie, 13 Ves. Jr. 519; Attorney-General
v. Smart, r Ves. Sen. 92; In re Bedford Charity, 2 Swanst. 524;
Dann, Ex parte, 9 Ves. 547, 3 Atk. 109, 1 Jae. 1; Hill on Trustees,
46o.) His jurisdiction over charities, it is said, is a personal author-

corporation ecclesiastical. The king is said, in Cawdrey's case, to be

"vicar of the highest of kings," and he is a corporation, but I believe

he is not considered an ecclesiastical corporation. And if he were,

it would be because he is the head of the church, an ecclesiastical body

in law. Dartmouth College is an lay and not an ecclesiastical corpo-

ration, and would be if the individual members were all ecclesiastical

persons. (Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518. See

the opinion of Mr. J. Story, Ang. & Ames, 34.) And one distinctive

feature of ecclesiastical corporations is, that they are subject to the ju-

risdiction of the ecclesiastical courts or the visitatorial power of the

ordinary. (1 Bl. 471, n. 1; Toml. Die, 436; 1 Kyd, 22; Holt, C. J.,

1 Show. 252.) Our religious corporations have no such amenabilities.

There the ordinary is the visitor of ecclesiastical corporations, and

from him there is an appeal. The king, as the "supreme ordinary,"

visits the metropolitan, and the metropolitan the bishop. Church

wardens (in England) are said to be lay corporations, although insti-
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tuted for the benefit and advancement of religion and to suppress pro-

faneness and immorality, and to see that public worship be performed

with due decency and reverence; and are elected by the parish or the

minister and parish. (1 Bac. Abr., 597; Dawson v. Fowle, Hardr.

378. Holt, C. J., in Rex v. Rees, 12 Mod. 116. Toml. Die.

"Churchwardens." 1 Lill. Abr. "Church wardens." 1 Burn's Eccl.

L., 378.) It may be added, that our corporations have power to build

school-houses and dwellings for the minister, and other buildings, etc.

If these were ecclesiastical corporations, there would be no visitor, for

the reason that no person or officer, with us, has any such jurisdiction.

That system is a part of the ecclesiastical polity of England, and does

not apply to our religious corporations. (2 Kent, 304.)

If lay corporations then they are either eleemosynary or civil. If

the former, the visitatorial power is with the founders or their heirs;

unless it has been delegated by them to some other person. If a civil

corporation, they are not subject to this species of visitation at all.

(2 Kent, 304.) Perhaps, for the purpose of ascertaining the power

of a court of chancery in this case, it is not important to decide

whether they are eleemosynary or civil; for that court has no visita-

torial power over a private eleemosynary corporation. Where there

is a failure or want of a visitor in such cases, in England, the crown

becomes the visitor, and that power is exercised by the court of king's

bench if not a charity (Rex v. Gregory, 4 T. R. 240, 1, n.), and if a

charity, within the statute of charitable uses (43 Eliz., ch. 4), by a

petition to the great seal and not by bill or information; and then the

lord chancellor acts in his visitatorial capacity. (Ex parte Wrangham,

2 Ves. Jr. 609; Attorney-General v. Earl of Clarendon, 17 Ves. Jr.

499; Attorney-General v. Dixie, 13 Ves. Jr. 519; Attorney-General

v. Smart, 1 Ves. Sen. 92; In re Bedford Charity, 2 Swanst. 524;

Dann, Ex parte, 9 Ves. 547, 3 Atk. 109, 1 Jac. 1; Hill on Trustees,

460.) His jurisdiction over charities, it is said, is a personal author-
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ity of the chancellor, and not within the ordinary powers of equity.

(Corporation of Bedford v. Lenthall, 2 Atk. 553.) I am aware of

the conflict of opinion in the English courts as to the extent of the
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jurisdiction of the king's bench in cases of private eleemosynary

foundations. (King v. Cath. Hall, 4 T. R. 233; Eden v. Footer, 2

P. Wms. 326, 12 Mod. 116, F. N. B. 42; King v. Bishop of Ches-

ter, 2 Str. 797; Rex v. Gregory, 4 T. R. 240, 1, n.; Green v. Ruther-

food, 1 Ves. Sen. 471; King v. Bishop of Ely, 2 T. R. 339; Ex

parte Wrangham, supra.") Visitatorial power, perhaps, is not now

professional language when speaking of the law courts; but the king's

bench has a superintendent authority where other jurisdictions are de-

ficient. And at all events, the power where it exists on the other side

of the courts belongs to the great seal and not to chancery as a court

of equity jurisdiction, except on the ground of trust.

But I am inclined to the opinion that these corporations are not

eleemosynary, although occasionally so called. Eleemosynary corpora-

tions ''are constituted for the perpetual distribution of the free alms or

bounty of the founder of them, to such persons as he has directed,"

(1 Bl., 471); and are of two general descriptions; hospitals for the

maintenance and relief of poor and impotent persons, and colleges for
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the promotion of learning, and the support of persons engaged in

literary pursuits. Blackstone says, that the universities of Cambridge

and Oxford are not eleemosynary corporations, "though stipends are

annexed to particular magistrates and professors, any more than other

corporations where the acting officers have standing salaries, for these

are rewards pro opere et labore, not charitable donations only, since

every stipend is preceded by service and duty." No writer upon

elementary law uses the term in a different sense than that given by

Blackstone, which also accords with its etymology. (2 Kent, 274; 1

Wooddes., §474; 1 Kyd on Corp., 25; Phillips v. Bury, 1 Ld. Ray. 5,

s. c. 2 T. R. 346, s. c. Holt, 724; Webst. Die. tit. Eleemosynary;

Babb v. Reed, 5 Rawle 151.) Those institutions are considered of

this kind, where the plan is one of bounty, charity, and benevolence

to others; not those which are for the use of, and beneficial and make

return to, the donors. Even a school, unless it be a free school, does

not come within the statute of charitable uses, 43 Eliz. (Attorney-

General v. Hewer, 2 Vern. 387.) In this very case, the land was pur-

chased and paid for by, and conveyed to the society for their own use,

and the attorney-general is not a necessary party. Religious societies

may be the means of dispensing the richest bounties, but the bene-

ficiaries are, in a great measure, the founders themselves.

If, then, these corporations are not ecclesiastical nor eleemosynary,

they fall into the remaining class, private and civil. I think they

possess the nature and qualifications of private, civil corporations,

created mainly for the purpose of aiding in the promotion and enjoy-

ment of religion by managing the property of the church. Civil cor-

porations are subject to no visitation, except in England by the king,

who exercises this power in the king's bench, which is his representa-

tive, by mandamus or quo warranto; and here this power, in a degree,

fry of the chancellor, and not within the ordinary powers of equity.
(Corporation of Bedford v. Lenthall, 2 Atk. 553.) I am aware of
the conflict of opinion in the English courts as to the extent of the
jurisdiction of the king's bench in cases of private eleemosynary
foundation s. (King v. Cath. Hall, 4 T. R. 233; Eden v. Footer, 2
P. Wms. 326, 12 Mod. 1161 F. N. B. 42; King v. Bishop of Chester, 2 Str. 797; Rex v. Gregory, 4 T. R. 240, 1, n.; Green v. Rutherfoocl, 1 V es. Sen. 471; King v. Bishop of Ely, 2 T. R. 339; Ex
p a rte W rangham , supra.) Visitatorial power, perhaps, is not now
p rofessional language when speaking of the law courts; but the king's
bench has a superintendent authority where other jurisdictions are defici ent. And at all events, the power where it exists on the other side
of the courts belongs to the great seal and not to chancery as a court
of equity jurisdiction , except on the ground of tiust.
But I am inclinea to the opinion that these corporations are not
eleemosynary, although occasionally so called. Eleemosynary corporations " are constituted for the perpetual distribution of the free alms or
bounty of the founder of them, to such persons as he has directed,"
( 1 Bl. , 4 7 I) ; and are of two general descriptions; hospitals for the
maintenance and relief of poor and impotent persons, and colleges for
the promotion of learning, and the support of persons engaged in
literary pursuits. Blackstone says, that the universities of C a mbridge
and Oxford are not eleemosynary corporations, "though stipends are
annexed to particular magistrates and professors, any more than other
corporations where the acting officers have standing salaries, for these
are rewards pro opere et labore, not charitable donations only, since
every stipend is preceded by service and duty." No writer upon
elementary law uses the term in a different sense than that given by
Blackstone, which also accords with its etymology. ( 2 Kent, 274; r
Wooddes., § 474; 1 Kyd on Corp., 25; Phillips v. Bury, 1 Ld. Ray. 5,
s . c. 2 T. R. 346, s. c. Holt, 724; Webst. Die. tit. Eleemosynary;
Babb v. Reed, 5 Rawle 151.) Those institutions are considered of
this kind, where the plan is one of bounty, charity, and benevolence
to others; not those which are for the use of, and beneficial and make
return to, the donors. Even a school, unless it be a free school, does
not come within the statute of charitable uses, 43 Eliz. (AttorneyGeneral v. Hewer, 2 Vern. 387.) In thi s very case, the land w as purchased and paid for by, and conveyed to the society for their own use,
a nd the attorney-general is not a necessary party. Religious societies
may be the means of dispensing the richest b ounties, but the beneficiaries are, in a great measure, the founders themselves.
If, then , these corporations are not ecclesiastical nor eleemosynary,
they fall into the remaining class, private and civil. I think they
possess the nature and qualifications of private, civil corporations,
created mainly for the purpose of aiding in the promotion and enjoyment of religion by managing the property of the church. Civil corporations are subject to no visitation, except in England by the king,
who exercises this power in the king's bench, which is his representative , by mandamus or quo warranto; and here this power, in a degree,

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

2o8

ROBERTSON V. BULLIONS.

ROBERTSON V. BULLIONS.

208

belongs to the government and was exercised in our supreme court,

§ 39

which is the representative, in our judicial system, of the king's benchT

and, in the same manner, if such power did formerly exist here at allr

belongs to the government and was exercised in our supreme court,
which is the representative, in our judicial system, of the king's bench't
and, in the same manner, if such power did formerly exist here at all r
as the king's bench superintends the civil corporations of the kingdom_
(3 Bl., 42; 2 Kyd on Corp., 174; 2 Kent, 304; Ordinance of 1704,
establishing our Supreme Court; 2d R. L. App. 6.) Our statutes
now give certain powers over corporations to the supreme court and
the court of chancery, but religious corporations are expressly excepted from their operation. ( 1 R. S. 6o3, § 5, 6o5, § 1 r; 2 R. S.
462, §§ 33, 35; 466, § 57.) So the law, as to these, remains as before. The king of England and the legislature here, as founders in a
certain sense of all civil corporations, are said to have visitatorial capacity; and they are visited and inspected, where no statute interposes,.
in the court of king's bench according to the rules of common law,.
and not elsewhere or by other authority. (r BJ.,·481; Attorney-General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 John Ch. Rep. 371; Auburn Academy v.
Strong, Hopk. R. 278; 2 Kent, 300.) But whether ecclesiastical,
eleemosynary or civil, our court of chancery has no jurisdiction as
visitor over these religious corporations. • • •
Another important inquiry is, who are the corporators? This is not
without difficulty. Chancellor Walworth, in Lawyer v. Cipperly,
says that the statute of r 784 recognized three distinct classes or bodies
existing in a religious corporation; "the church or spiritual body,
consisting of the office-bearers and communicants; the congregation
or electors, embracing all the stated hearers or attendants on divine
worship who are competent to vote for trustees; and the trustees of
the corporation." ( 7 Paige, 285. See 16 Mass. 503, 4; 10 Pick.
193; r 1 Pick. 494.) • • •
The chancellor adds, in The Baptist Church in Hartford v. \Vitherell, that, although a church or body of professing Christians is almost
uniformly connected with such a society or congregation, the members
of the church have no other or greater rights than any other members
of the society who statedly attend with them for the purposes of di,·ine
worship. (3 Paige, 301.) If it be one of the integral parts of the
corporation, and the church should become extinct, the corporation
would be dissolved. That was so settled in the well-considered case
of King v. Pasmore (3 T. R. 199). This would be so clearly, unless
the corporators have power to restore the church. A neglect to elect
trustees is provided for by the statute, and is, perhaps, more properly
a suspension. (Phillips v. \Vickham, 1 Paige 590. And see Angel
& Ames on Corporations, 464, 734, 5.) The language of the third
section is that it shall be lawful for the "male persons belonging to
any other church, congregation or religious society" to choose the
trustees. .The whole statute has reference to religious associations. A
"church" (ecclesia) may be: First, a temple or building consecrated
to the honor of God and religion; or second, an assembly of persons
united by the profession of the same Chri stian faith , met together
for religious worship. (Jae. Law Diet. "Church;" Tomi. Die.
"Church;" 5 Petersd. Abr.., 409; Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch

as the king's bench superintends the civil corporations of the kingdom.

(3 Bl., 42 ; 2 Kyd on Corp., 174; 2 Kent, 304; Ordinance of 1704,

establishing our Supreme Court; 2d R. L. App. 6.) Our statutes-

now give certain powers over corporations to the supreme court and

the court of chancery, but religious corporations are expressly ex-

cepted from their operation. (1 R. S. 603, § 5, 605, § 11; 2 R. S.

462, §§ 33, 35; 466, § 57.) So the law, as to these, remains as be-

fore. The king of England and the legislature here, as founders in a

certain sense of all civil corporations, are said to have visitatorial ca-

pacity; and they are visited and inspected, where no statute interposesT

in the court of king's bench according to the rules of common lawr

and not elsewhere or by other authority. (1 Bl.,'481; Attorney-Gen-

eral v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 John Ch. Rep. 371; Auburn Academy v.

Strong, Hopk. R. 278; 2 Kent, 300.) But whether ecclesiastical,

eleemosynary or civil, our court of chancery has no jurisdiction as

visitor over these religious corporations. * * *
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Another important inquiry is, who are the corporators? This is not

without difficulty. Chancellor Walworth, in Lawyer v. Cipperly,

says that the statute of 1784 recognized three distinct classes or bodies

existing in a religious corporation; "the church or spiritual body,

consisting of the office-bearers and communicants; the congregation

or electors, embracing all the stated hearers or attendants on divine

worship who are competent to vote for trustees; and the trustees of

the corporation." (7 Paige, 285. See 16 Mass. 503,4; 10 Pick.

193; 11 Pick. 494.) * » •

The chancellor adds, in The Baptist Church in Hartford v. With-

erell, that, although a church or body of professing Christians is almost

uniformly connected with such a society or congregation, the members

of the church have no other or greater rights than any other members

of the society who statedly attend with them for the purposes of divine

worship. (3 Paige, 301.) If it be one of the integral parts of the

corporation, and the church should become extinct, the corporation

would be dissolved. That was so settled in the well-considered case

of King v. Pasmore (3 T. R. 199). This would be so clearly, unless

the corporators have power to restore the church. A neglect to elect

trustees is provided for by the statute, and is, perhaps, more properly

a suspension. (Phillips v. Wickham, 1 Paige 590. And see Angel

& Ames on Corporations, 464, 734, 5.) The language of the third

section is that it shall be lawful for the "male persons belonging to

any other church, congregation or religious society" to choose the

trustees. .The whole statute has reference to religious associations. A

"church" (ecclesia) may be: First, a temple or building consecrated

to the honor of God and religion; or second, an assembly of persons

united by the profession of the same Christian faith, met together

for religious worship. (Jac. Law Diet. "Church;" Toml. Die.

"Church;" 5 Petersd. Abr., 409; Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch
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292.) These give the legal, though the word has various popular, defi-

nitions. (Webster's Die. "Church.") In our statute I think it is used
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in the sense of the second definition above. "Congregation" has per-

haps no settled legal signification. The pleadings in this case state and

admit that in the Associate Church it is used to designate a local church,

and it would seem that the word "church" with them implies the

church of that denomination in its aggregate capacity, the same as the

term "Church of England," which is not a corporation. (Town of

Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch 292, Story, J.; Comm. v. Green, 4 Whart.

531.) The word "congregation" occurs frequently in the books

made exhibits in this suit. (See the Ordination Vows, in the book con-

taining the Narrative and the Declaration and Testimony, 174 et seq.;

the Form of Church Government, "Of Particular Congregations," p.

572; Perdivan, b. 1, tit. 1, and, indeed, throughout; 2 Gib's Display

76, and Church Government, art. 3.) "Congregation" was an ap-

pellation given to the Protestants in Scotland in 1559, from their

union. (Robertson's History of Scotland, b. 2.) The term is used

in the penal laws of England against disturbing public worship, par-

ticularly those to protect the worship of Protestant dissenters. (1 W.
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& M., ch. 18.) But, as used in this statute, a congregation, I take

it, is an assembly met, or a body of persons who usually meet in some

stated place for the worship of God and religious instruction, and

may or may not include a church or spiritual body.

And the same may be said of the term "religious society," used in

the same connection in the third section. The church, congregation

or society must, to organize, have stated "divine worship," for the

electors must have attended the same to constitute them such by the

third and seventh sections. Whether religion and divine worship in

their broadest sense, or Christian sects only, are intended, it is not

necessary now to inquire. The statute declares that the persons

chosen trustees shall be a body corporate. Most of our statutes, in

similar cases, use different expressions; as in the acts for the incor-

poration of literary, manufacturing, and medical societies, cities and

villages, etc. And the 13th and 16th sections speak of the corpora-

tion being dissolved (not suspended) and authorizes the "religious

society which was connected therewith" to reincorporate. But the

9th section permits a religious corporation to reduce the number of

trustees, and the congregation or society, I think, is there intended.

The nth section speaks of the "society, to which the real estate

so sold did belong;" and the act of 1826 declares that if there be an

omission to elect trustees, the church, congregation or religious society

shall not be deemed thereby to have been dissolved. Several ambigu-

ous expressions of this nature are found in the statute. Upon the

whole, I am inclined to think, all of the electors are corporators.

They elect the trustees and from their own body, and these are the

officers of the society. It is true, a right of election is often vested in

others besides the corporators. This is almost invariably so with sole

corporations. Church wardens, who are a corporation for certain pur-

14—Wil. Cases.

292.) These give the legal, though the word has various popular, definitions. (Webster's Die. "Church.") In our statute I think it is used
in the sense of the second definition above. "Congregation" has perhaps no settled legal signification. The pleadings in this case state and
admit that in the Associate Church it is used to designate a local church,
and it would seem that the word "church" with them implies tne
church of that denomination in its aggregate capacity, the same as the
term "Church of England," which is not a corporation. (Town of
Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch 292, Story,].; Comm. v. Green, 4 Whart.
531.) The word "congregation" occurs frequently in the books
made exhibits in this suit. (See the Ordination Vows, in the book containing the Narrative and the Declaration and Testimony, 174 et seq.;
the Form of Church Government, "Of Particular Congregations," p.
5 72; Perdivan, b. 1, tit. 1, and, indeed, throughout; 2 Gib's Display
76, and Church Government, art. 3.) "Congregation" was an appellation given to the Protestants in Scotland in 1559, from their
union. (Robertson's History of Scotland, b. 2.) The term is used
in the penal laws of England against disturbing public worship, particularly those to protect the worship of Protestant dissenters. (1 W.
& M., ch. 18.) But, as used in this statute, a congregation, I take
it, is an assembly met, or a body of persons who usually meet in some
stated place for the worship of God and religious instruction, and
may or may not include a church or spiritual body.
And the same may be said of the term "religious society," used in
the same connection in the third section. The church, congregation
or society must, to organize, have stated "divine worship," for the
electors must have attended the same to constitute them such by the
third and seventh sections. Whether religion and divine worship in
their broadest sense, or Christian sects only, are intended, it is not
necessary now to inquire. The statute declares that the persons
chosen trustees shall be a body corporate. Most of our statutes, in
similar cases, use different expressions; as in the acts for the incorporation of literary, manufacturing, and medical societies, cities and
villages, etc. And the 13th and 16th sections speak of the corporation being dissolved (not suspended) and authorizes the "religious
society which was connected therewith" to reincorporate. But the
9th section permits a religious corporation to reduce the number of
trustees, and the congregation or society, I think, is there intended.
The I 1th section speaks of the "society, to which the real estate
so sold did belong;'' and the act of 1826 declares that if there be an
omission to elect trustees, the church, congregation or religious society
shall not be deemed thereby to have been dissolved. Several ambiguous expressions of this nature are found in the statute. Upon the
whole, I am inclined to think, all of the electors are corporators.
They elect the trustees and from their own body, and these are the
officers of the society. It is true, a right of election is often vested in
others besides the corporators. This is almost invariably so with sole
corporations. Church wardens, who are a corporation for certain pur14- WJL.
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several opinions concur in the position that the electors are corpo-
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rators. Those of Chancellor Walworth in the Baptist Church v.

poses, are elected by the parish, or by the minister and parish. But
several opinions concur in the position that the electors are corporators. Those of Chancellor Walworth in the Baptist Church v.
Witherell, 1 and Lawyer v. Cipperly, 2 have been stated. A . V. Ch.
Sandford seems to have entertained the same opinion. (Cammeyer
v. United German Lutheran Churches, 2 Sand£., ch. 186), and so
I infer did G ardiner, president, in Miller v. Gable, in the court for
the correction of errors. ( 2 Denio 548.) The persons entitled to vote
are designated by the statute. At the first election, for the purpose
of organizing, they must be male adults, belonging to the church ,
congregation or society, and must have statedly worshiped with the
same, or have formerly been considered as belonging thereto. And
after the first election they must have been stated attendants on divine
worship in said church, congregation or society, at least one year
previous, and have contributed to the support of the church, congregation or society, according to its usages a nd customs.
The statute, therefore, declares who are the corporators, and the court
of chancery can not indirectly disfranchise a member by declaring that
he does not possess the necessary qualifications. That power is expressly given to others by the act, and law courts, in case of controversy, alone can review the matter, if that can be done by any tribunal.
If the foregoing views are correct, then those parts of the decree
appealed from in this case, which removed some of the d efendants as
trustees or officers of the corporation, and which declare that the adherents of Dr. Bullions are not members of the corpuration, and who
are electors therein, and which provide for a new election of trustees, are en·oneous ; the court of chancery having no power of amotion
of an officer of these corporations, or to disfranchise a member thereof,
or interfere with or control the election of its officers.
But, although a court of chancery has no jurisdiction with regard to
the election or amotion of corporators , it may, in some cases, where a
corporation is a trustee, take from it the trust fund, if the trust be
abused. • • •
In this case the corporation, together with four of the six trustees ,
and Dr. Bullions, claiming to be and officiating as minister, are made·
defendants. It is admitted that the legal estate is in the corporation. The officers of the corporation, as individuals, have no more
beneficial interest than any other corporators. It was said in Verplank v. The Mer. Ins. Co. that the relation of cestui" que trust and
trustee does not exist between the corporation and stockholders of an
incorporated company. (1 Edw. Ch. R ep. 47, per McCoun, V. C.)
But the vice-chancellor further added, that a r elation was created between the stockholders and those directors, who in their character of
trustees become accountable for any dereliction of duty or violation of"
the trust reposed in them. And he saw no objection to the exercise
of an equity power over such persons, in the same manner as it would
be exercised over any other trustees. Now a trustee is a "person in
whom some estate, interest or power, in or affecting property of any

Witherell,1 and Lawyer v. Cipperly,2 have been stated. A. V. Ch.

Sandford seems to have entertained the same opinion. (Cammeyer

v. United German Lutheran Churches, 2 Sandf., ch. 1S6), and so

I infer did Gardiner, president, in Miller v. Gable, in the court for

the correction of errors. (2 Denio 548.) The persons entitled to vote

are designated by the statute. At the first election, for the purpose

of organizing, they must be male adults, belonging to the church,

congregation or society, and must have statedly worshiped with the

same, or have formerly been considered as belonging thereto. And

after the first election they must have been stated attendants on divine

worship in said church, congregation or society, at least one year

previous, and have contributed to the support of the church, congre-

gation or society, according to its usages and customs.

The statute, therefore, declares who are the corporators, and the court

of chancery can not indirectly disfranchise a member by declaring that

he does not possess the necessary qualifications. That power is ex-
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pressly given to others by the act, and law courts, in case of contro-

versy, alone can review the matter, if that can be done by any tribunal.

If the foregoing views are correct, then those parts of the decree

appealed from in this case, which removed some of the defendants as

trustees or officers of the corporation, and which declare that the ad-

herents of Dr. Bullions are not members of the corporation, and who

are electors therein, and which provide for a new election of trus-

tees, are erroneous; the court of chancery having no power of amotion

of an officer of these corporations, or to disfranchise a member thereof,

or interfere with or control the election of its officers.

But, although a court of chancery has no jurisdiction with regard to

the election or amotion of corporators, it may, in some cases, where a

corporation is a trustee, take from it the trust fund, if the trust be

abused. * * *

In this case the corporation, together with four of the six trustees,

and Dr. Bullions, claiming to be and officiating as minister, are made

defendants. It is admitted that the legal estate is in the corpora-

tion. The officers of the corporation, as individuals, have no more

beneficial interest than any other corporators. It was said in Ver-

plank v. The Mer. Ins. Co. that the relation of cestui que trust and

trustee does not exist between the corporation and stockholders of an

incorporated company. (1 Edw. Ch. Rep. 47, per McCoun, V. C.)

But the vice-chancellor further added, that a relation was created be-

tween the stockholders and those directors, who in their character of

trustees become accountable for any dereliction of duty or violation of

the trust reposed in them. And he saw no objection to the exercise

of an equity power over such persons, in the same manner as it would

be exercised over any other trustees. Now a trustee is a "person in

whom some estate, interest or power, in or affecting property of any

»3 Paige 296. «7 Paige 281.

13 Paige 296 .
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description, is vested for the benefit of another." (Hill on Trustees,

411.) In The People v. Runkle the congregation are said to be the
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constituents of the trustees. (9 John. 156.) In the case of the

Dutch Church in Garden Street v. Mott, the chancellor speaks of the

legislature having power to "transfer the legal title from the naked

trustees to the cestui que trust, after the latter were incorporated."

(7 Paige S2.) In Gable v. Miller, the chancellor decided that the

property of the corporation was held in trust for the support of the

worship of God by a church to be in a particular connection; and for

teaching certain particular doctrines. (10 Paige 649.) Senator

Porter, in the same cause, in deliving an opinion in the court for the

correction of errors, in favor of sustaining the decree, considered those

members of the church who had remained faithful to their allegiance

to the government of the church as "the rightful members of the church,

and the only ccstuis que trust of the property held for the use of the

church." (2 Denio 568.) In Bowden v. McLeod, Vice-Chancellor

McCoun thought equity would exercise jurisdiction over the property

of religious societies, as being trust property. In that case, by a

special act, the minister, elders and deacons were constituted trustees for
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life. (1 Edw. Ch. Rep. 588. And see 16 Mass. 495, 505, 510.) By

the fourth section of the statute under which religious societies are in-

corporated, the trustees, as we have seen, take possession of and hold all

the estate, whether real or personal, and whether'before held directly

by the church, congregation or society, or by some other person to

their use, and however acquired, or by whomsoever held; and they

may purchase and demise, lease and improve the same for the use of

the church, congregation or society, or other pious uses. * * *

The legal estate is clearly in the trustees, and they are to manage

the same, and regulate and order all matters relating to the temporal

concerns and revenues of the church, congregation or society. It is

said they hold the property in trust, and this is so stated in the plead-

ings. But I think not in the ordinary sense of that expression. They

too, individually, are usually cestuis que trust, only holding the legal

estate while in office, but in the management of it, and in everything

relating to their responsibility, they are upon the same footing with

the officers of any incorporated company, and liable for fraud or neg-

ligence, or gross mismanagement. Mere trustees are liable for these,

but in this case the trustees are, as to the management of the prop-

erty, more properly officers or agents, and with a broader discretion

in some respects than mere trustees. (Ang. & Ames on Corp.,

306-7.) * * »

This brings us to the great question in this cause: are the defend-

ants, or any of them, violating the trust reposed in them, or their

duty, by adhering to and supporting Dr. Bullions? For, if that is so,

although a court of chancery can not remove them and can not divest

them of this property, it can compel them to do their duty in relation

to it. * « *

Upon this examination of the subject, it seems to me that certain

general rules are applicable to these institution^ when incorporated

description, is vested for the benefit of another." (Hill on Trustees,
411.) In The People v. Runkle the congregation are said to be the
constituents of the trustees. (9 John. 156.) In the case of the
Dutch Church in Garden Street v. Mott, the chancellor speaks of the
legislature having power to "transfer the legal title from the naked
trustees to the cestu£ que trust, after the latter were incorporated."
(7 Paige 82.) In Gable v. Miller, the chancellor decided that the
property of the corporation was held in trust for the support of the
worship of God by a church to be in a particular connection; and for
teaching certain particular doctrines. ( 10 Paige 649.) Senator
Porter, in the sa me cause, in deliving an opinion in the court for the
correction of errors, in favor of sustaining the decree, considered those
members of the church who had remained faithful to their allegiance
to the government of the church as "the rightful members of the church,
and the only cestuis que trust of the property held for the use of the
church." (2 Denio 568.) In Bowden v. McLeod, Vice-Chancellor
McCoun thought equity would exercise jurisdiction over the property
of religious societies, as being 'trust property. In that case, by a
special act, the minister, elders and deacons were constituted trustees for
life. (1 Edw. Ch. Rep. 588. And see 16 Mass. 495, 505, 510.) By
the fourth section of the statute under which religious societies are incorporated, the trustees, as we have seen, take possession of and hold all
the estate, whether real or personal, and whether' before held directly
by the church, congregation or society, or by some other person to
their use, and however acquired, or by whomsoever held; and they
may purchase and demise, lease and improve the same for the use of
the church, congregation or society, or other pious uses. • • •
The legal estate is clearly in the trustees, and they are to manage
the same, and regulate and order all matters relating to the temporal
concerns and revenues of the church, congregation or society. It is
said they hold the property in trust, and this is so stated in the pleadings. But I think not in the ordinary sense of that expression. They
too, individually, are usually cestu£s que trust, only holding the legal
estate while in office, but in the management of it, and in everything
relating to their responsibility, they are upon the same footing with
the officers of any incorporated company, and liable for fraud or negligence, or gross mismanagement. Mere trustees are liable for these,
but in this case the trustees are, as to the management of the property, more properly officers or agents, and with a broader discretion
in some respects than mere trustees. (Ang. & Ames on Corp.,

3o6-7.)

•

•

•

This brings us to the great question in this cause: are the defendants, or any of them, violating the trust reposed in them, or their
duty, by adhering to and supporting Dr. Bullions? For, if that is so,
although a court of chancery can not remove them and can not divest
them of thi s property, it can compel them to do their duty in relation
to it. • • •
Upon this examination of the subject, it seems to me that certain
general rules are applicable to these institutioq,s "vhen incorporated
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under the third section of the act—that chancery has no power to dis-

212

franchise one of the members, nor to remove the trustees or declare

ROBERTSON V. BULLIONS.
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their election void; nor direct who shall vote; or in any way interfere

under the third section of the act-that chancery has no power to dis franchise one of the members, nor to remove the trustees or declare
their election void; nor direct who shall vote; or in any way interfere
with their election. This I have already very fully considered; that
the trustees may be restrained from wasting the property, and from
such management of it as the court can clearly see, unreasonable and
unconscientiously deprives the s_o ciety, or some part of it, of its enjoyment; and also from applying it to the promotion of tenets clearly opposed and adverse to the fundamental principles of the faith and doctrine professed by the church or society at the time the corporation
purchased the property. But the exercise of this jurisdiction should
generally be restrictive, and not mandatory; for the statute is their
guide and authority for the future, and gives a very broad margin for the
exercise of discretion and religious freedom. (Lord Cottenham in
The Attorney-General v. Shore, 1 in the House of Lords; Lord Brougham in Milligan v. Mitchell; 1 Lane v.Newdigate, 10 Ves. 193;) thatthe
support of particular doctrines, or systems of worship or government,
or a connection with some particular judicatory, may be made a condition in a grant or donation, but if no such condition be expressed,
none should be implied, except as to cardinal points. This last principle, I think, may be deduced from the cases already cited, particularly The Attorney-General v. Pearson, 3 The Attorney-General
v. Shore, 1 The Attorney-General v. Drummond,' Craigdallie v.
Aikman/ Milligan v. Mitchell, 2 Porter v. Clark, 6 Miller v. Gable, 7
Baptist Church v. Witherell, 8 Lawyer v. Cipperly, 9 The Presbyterian Church v. Johnston. 10 It is hardly necessary to remark that,
in Deun v. Bolton, 11 the office bearers of the church were,
by statute, ex o.ffido trustees, and of course a deposition of
the former would be an amotion of the latter. Another general
rule is, that the church or spiritual body is authorized to call the minister, either by itself or by some other mode, according to usage. In
order to reach the revenues of the corporation, that call must be ratified by the congregation or body entitled to elect trustees, by fixing
the salary of the minister; and then the trustee may apply the revenues to his support. • • •
But whether the use of the house by a majority of the congregation under the ministry of the defendant, Dr. Bullions, is such an act
as that the minority can complain in this court, and ask for restrictive
measures, is a point of much difficulty. • • • It must be remembered that this associate church adheres to the presbyterial form of
government. (Dec. and Tes., p. 3, art. 8, Ch. Gov. and Dis. , p. 1,
art. 4 ; p. 3, art. 1 2.) And after the cases of Diefendorf v. Reformed Calvinistic Church, 12 and The Dutch Church v. Bradford, 1 a I
17 Sim. 309n, 9 Cl. & F. R. 355.
72 Denio 492.

with their election. This I have already very fully considered; that

the trustees may be restrained from wasting the property, and from

such management of it as the court can clearly see, unreasonable and

unconscientiously deprives the society, or some part of it, of its enjoy-

ment; and also from applying it to the promotion of tenets clearly op-

posed and adverse to the fundamental principles of the faith and doc-

trine professed by the church or society at the time the corporation

purchased the property. But the exercise of this jurisdiction should

generally be restrictive, and not mandatory; for the statute is their

guide and authority for the future, and gives a very broad margin for the

exercise of discretion and religious freedom. (Lord Cottenham in

The Attorney-General v. Shore,1 in the House of Lords; Lord Broug-

ham in Milligan v. Mitchell;8 Lane v.Newdigate, roVes. I93;)thatthe

support of particular doctrines, or systems of worship or government,

or a connection with some particular judicatory, may be made a con-

dition in a grant or donation, but if no such condition be expressed,
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none should be implied, except as to cardinal points. This last prin-

ciple, I think, may be deduced from the cases already cited, particu-

larly The Attorney-General v. Pearson,3 The Attorney-General

v. Shore,1 The Attorney-General v. Drummond,4 Craigdallie v.

Aikman,5 Milligan v. Mitchell,2 Porter v. Clark," Miller v. Gable,7

Baptist Church v. Witherell,8 Lawyer v. Cipperly,* The Presbyte-

rian Church v. Johnston.10 It is hardly necessary to remark that,

in Deun v. Bolton,11 the office bearers of the church were,

by statute, ex officio trustees, and of course a deposition of

the former would be an amotion of the latter. Another general

rule is, that the church or spiritual body is authorized to call the min-

ister, either by itself or by some other mode, according to usage. In

order to reach the revenues of the corporation, that call must be rati-

fied by the congregation or body entitled to elect trustees, by fixing

the salary of the minister; and then the trustee may apply the reve-

nues to his support. * « *

But whether the use of the house by a majority of the congrega-

tion under the ministry of the defendant, Dr. Bullions, is such an act

as that the minority can complain in this court, and ask for restrictive

measures, is a point of much difficulty. * * * It must be remem-

bered that this associate church adheres to the presbyterial form of

government. (Dec. and Tes., p. 3, art. 8, Ch. Gov. andDis.,p. 1,

art. 4; p. 3, art. 12.) And after the cases of Diefendorf v. Re-

formed Calvinistic Church,12 and The Dutch Church v. Bradford,1* I

1 7 Sim. 309 n, 9 CI. & F. R. 355. » 2 Demo 492.

»1 Myl. & K. 446, 3 Myl. & C. 72, "3 Paige 296.

433,511. ' 9 7 Paige 281.

3 7 Sim. 290. 101 Watts & S. 9.

41 Con. & L. 210. 117 HalBt. 206.

51 Dow'sP. C. 1. 12 20 John. 12.

"2 Sim. 520. ■ 13 8 Cowen 457.

1 1 Myl. & K. 446, 3 Myl. & C. 72,
433, 511.
8 7 Sim. 290.
'1 Con. & L. 210.
6 1 Dow's P. C. 1.
8 2 Sim. 520.
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do not see how we can look beyond the decision of the synod. All the

authorities agree that the civil courts can not, upon the merits, over-
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hale the decisions of ecclesiastical judicatories in matters properly

within their province. Dr. Bullions himself took the case to the synod,

and the deposition of a minister is purely an ecclesiastical matter;

though the effect of that deposition upon civil rights is quite another

thing. The church judicatories had power to depose him, but they

could not sequester the property of the corporation, nor compel the

congregation, against the will of a majority, and the trustees, to re-

ceive a minister. The defendants, in their answer, admit that a min-

ister who is under rightful sentence of excommunication can not be

permitted to occupy the pulpit or administer divine ordinances. Our

courts have, as we have seen, declared that such dissolution of the

connection between pastor and flock discharges the civil contract,

even the individual subscriptions for the support of the former. It is

true, a majority of the church in those cases were probably opposed

to the minister, but the decisions were not put upon that ground. Dr.

Bullions must, for the purpose of this case, be deemed deposed from

the office of the holy ministry; and, notwithstanding a large majority

of this enlightened society still consider him in good standing, a mi-
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nority of the corporators are of the opposite opinion, and, giving full

effect to proceedings against him, insist that his employment is a griev-

ance that deprives them of a reasonable enjoyment of the corporate

property, which can be redressed in this court. And with much hesi-

tation, I have come to the conclusion that, upon this point, the law is

with them. • * *

There must be a decree restraining -the defendants from using the

temporalities of the corporation for the support of Dr. Bullions' min-

istry as long as he is under sentence of deprivation. All the other

portions of the decree which have been appealed from must be re-

versed. Neither party can have costs against the other on this

appeal. The complainants have asked too much, and neither side is

free from blame. The nde is, where both parties have claimed what

they are not entitled to, and each has succeeded as to part of the mat-

ters in litigation between them, to give costs to neither. (Crippen v.

Hermance, 9 Paige 211.) Nor am I disposed to burden the corpo-

rate funds with the costs, except the costs of putting in the answer by

the corporation. Each party must in all other respects bear their own.

It was stated on the argument that the complainants, under the

vice-chancellor's decree, had taken possession of and occupied the

church edifice. The defendants, who were trustees at the time of the

commencement of the suit, and their successors, are entitled to the

possession of the property of the corporation, but, under all the cir-

cumstances of this case, there should be no accounting for the mere

use of the property.

If there has been waste or destruction of property, that should be

made good.

Paige, P. J., concurred.

(Dissenting opinion of Cady, J., omitted.)

do not see how we can look beyond the decision of the synod. All the
authorities agree that the civil courts can not, upon the merits, overh ale the decisions of ecclesiastical judicatories in matters properly
within their province. Dr. Bullions himself took the case to the synod,
and the deposition of a minister is purely an ecclesiastical matter;
though the effect of that deposition upon civil rights is quite another
thing. The church judicatories had power to depose him, but they
could n o t sequester the property of the corporation, nor compel the
congregation, against the will of a majority, and the trustees, to receive a minister. The defendants, in their answer, admit that a minister who is under rightful sentence of excommunication can not be
permitted to occupy the pulpit or administer divine ordinances. Our
courts have, as we have seen, declared that such dissolution of the
connection between pastor and flock discharges the civil contract,
e\·en the individual subscriptions for the support of the former. It is
true, a majority of the church in those cases were probably opposed
to the minister, but the decisions were not put upon that ground. Dr.
Bullions must, for the purpose of this case, be deemed deposed from
the office of the holy ministry; and, notwithstanding a large majority
of this enlightened society still consider him in good standing, a minority of the corporators are of the opposite opinion, and, giving full
effect to proceedings against him, insist that his employment is a grievance that deprives them of a reasonable enjoyment of the corporate
property, which can be redressed in this court. And with much hesitation, I h ave come to the conclusion that, upon this point, the law is
with them. • • •
There must be a decree restraining ·the defendants from using the
temporalities of the corporation for the support of Dr. Bullions' ministry as long as he is under sentence of deprivation. All the other
portions of the decree which have been appealed from must be reversed. Neither party can have costs against the other on this
appeal. The complainants have asked too much, and neither side is
free from blame. The rule is, where both parties have claimed what
they are not entitled to, and each has succeeded as to part of the matters in litigation between them, to give costs to neither. (Crippen v.
Hermance , 9 Paige 21 x.) Nor am I disposed to burden the corporate funds with the costs, except the costs of putting in the answer by
the corporation. Each party must in all other respects bear their own.
It was stated on the argument that the complainants, under the
vice-chancellor's decree, had taken possession of and occupied the
church edifice. The defendants, who were trustees at the time of the
commencement of the suit, and their successors, are entitled to the
possession of the property of the corporation, but, under all the circumstances of this case, there should be no accounting for the mere
use of the property.
If there has been waste or destruction of property, that should be
made good.
PAIGE , P. ]., concurred.
(Dissenting opinion of C\Dv, J., omitted.)
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Sec. 40. Same. Civil corporations are:

1. Quasi.

Sec. 40. Same.

2. Pure or complete.

I.
2.

THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF HAMILTON COUNTY v.

MIGHELS.1

Civil corporations are:
Quasi.
Pure or complete .

1857. In the Supreme Court of Ohio. 7 Ohio State Reports

THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF HAMILTON COUNTY v.
MIGHELS. 1

109-125.

In error to the superior court of Cincinnati.

Brinkerhoff, J. The defendant in error brought suit in the

1857.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF OHIO.

7 Ohio State Reports

superior court of Cincinnati against the plaintiffs in error, and, on the

109-125·

14th of May, 1855, filed therein the following petition, to wit: "The

plaintiff, a citizen of the state of Ohio, and a resident of the county of

Hamilton, says that the defendants, the board of county commission-

ers of the county of Hamilton, in the state of Ohio, being authorized

by law, in the exercise of their discretion, to erect a good and con-

venient court-house, upon such plan as they might project, in the city

of Cincinnati, the seat of justice of such county, were, on the eleventh

and twelfth days of December, 1854, engaged in the erection of such

court-house, in the city of Cincinnati, which building was designed

and then used for the holding of the courts of the county of Hamil-

ton, and for the offices of the sheriff, clerk of the courts and certain

other county officers, under the direction and sanction of the defend-

ants. On the eleventh and twelfth days of December, 1854, the

rooms of the northwest corner of said building, on the first floor, were

used, under the direction of the defendants, for the holding of the

criminal court of Hamilton county, and a certain trial was then and

there had, at which the plaintiff was required, by a writ of subpena,

to appear and testify, and was detained under the order of the court, as

such witness, till night. In the erection of such court-house, upon the

1 Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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first to the second floor, opposite to the main entrance into the building,

which persons in their egress from the said court-room by the usual

passages into the street must necessarily pass, and under said stair-

way was a large opening into the cellar, which the defendants wrong-

fully and unjustly permitted to remain open, unprotected and

uncovered, and wrongfully and negligently omitted in any manner to

guard the same, so as to prevent persons passing along said passage

from falling into such opening, and wholly omitted to light the same

at night, by reason whereof, and for want of such light and protection

over said opening, the plaintiff, being such witness required to be

in such building, and necessarily detained there in obedience to the

order of said criminal court of Hamilton county, till after nightfall on

the twelfth day of December, 1854, in passing along said passages on

his way from the court-room to the street, necessarily and unavoidably

slipped and fell into said opening, and thereby the thigh and two ribs

of the plaintiff were fractured and broken, and the plaintiff became

sick, lame and disordered, and so remained for a long space of time,

during all which time he suffered great pain, and was prevented from

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:14 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

attending to and transacting his necessary and lawful business, and

was obliged to expend and did expend a large sum of money in en-

deavoring to get healed of said wound, sickness or disorder. The

plaintiff, therefore, demands judgment against the defendants for

$10,000 damages."

To this petition the defendants below demurred on the ground that

it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. On

hearing, the demurrer was overruled and leave was taken to answer.

An answer was filed, admitting a part of the material facts alleged

in the petition, and denying the remainder. The case was tried by a

jury who found the issues in favor of the plaintiff below, and assessed

his damages at $7,750. After motions for a new trial, and in arrest

of judgment were made, heard and overruled, judgment was entered

on the verdict. No bill of exceptions was taken to any ruling of the

court below on the trial.

The case having been reviewed on error by the superior court at

general term, and the judgment there affirmed, a petition in error is

filed here to reverse that judgment of affirmance.

All the errors assigned or assignable on the record present but the

single question which was originally made by the demurrer to the

petition, *. e., does the petition state facts sufficient to constitute a

cause of action? If it does, there is no error apparent on this record;

if it does not, the judgment is erroneous and must be reversed.

It will be noticed that this is an action brought by an individual

plaintiff against the commissioners of a county in their official or

quasi corporate capacity, to recover damages resulting from the negli-

gence and misconduct of those officers. No claim is made against

those officers as individuals, but the recovery is sought against the

county, and if this judgment can be maintained, it must in some way

be met and paid by the people of Hamilton county. And thus we
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are presented with the question, is a county, or, in other words, the

TiIE DOA RD, ETC. I

v.
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people of a county, liable in an action sounding in tort, for the per-

are presented with the question, is a county, or, in ot~er words, the
people of a county, liable in an action sounding in tort, for the personal misconduct or negligence of the county commissioners while in
the performa nce of their official functions?
If a county be thus liable, that liability must be derived either expressly or by necessary implication from the provisions of some statute~
or must rest on the principles of the common law.
[After holding there was no statutory liability proceeds:]
2. Is the action maintainable on the principles of the common law?
In entering on this inquiry, it is but justice to ourselves to say, that,
assisted by the researches of diligent counsel, we have given it an unusual share of labor and attention; and this not only because of the
importance of the question itself, but for the reason that the conclusion
to which our minds have been compelled is in conflict with a case
(Commissioners of Brown County v. Butt, 2 Ohio Rep. 348) decided
by judges for whose judgment we entertain that degree of respect
which renders even involuntary and irresistible dissent from their conclusions reluctant and self-distrustful.
For the purpose of maintaining this action, an effo1t has been made
in argument to assimilate counties to natural persons and municipal
and other corporations proper. Now it is conceded, that if the negligence, and consequent injury to the plaintiff below had been the act
of a natural person in the construction of a private building, to which
the plaintiff below had been invited, the party guilty of the negligence
would properly be liable in damages. So, al so, it now seems to be
well settled that, had the defendants below been the agents of a municipal or other corporation proper, and bad the plaintiff below been
injured through like negligence and under like circumstances, the co rporation might be held to answer for the injury. And why? Because
where there is a wrong there ought to be a remedy; persons, whether
natural or artificial, are bound so to use their own property and conduct their own affairs as not to injure others; and where an act is
done to the injury of another by a natural person in the pursuit of his
own interests, or, through its agents, by an artificial person, a corporation proper, which is called into existence, either at the direct solicitation or by the free consent of the persons composing it, for the promotion of their own local and private advantage and convenience,
and which can work only through agents, such natural or artificial
person is, on every principle of justice and enlightened reason, bound
to rectify the consequence of his own misfeasance. And it is freely
admitted that if counties are in all material respects like municipal
corporations proper, and may be fairly classed with them, then this
action ought to be maintained. But how is the fact? This question
is vital, and on its solution the case must depend.
As before remarked, municipal corporations proper are called into
existence, either at the direct solicitation or by the free consent of the
people who compose them.
Counties are local subdivisions of a state created by the sovereign
power of the state, of its own sovereign will, without the particular

sonal misconduct or negligence of the county commissioners while in

the performance of their official functions?

If a county be thus liable, that liability must be derived either ex-

pressly or by necessary implication from the provisions of some statute,

or must rest on the principles of the common law.

[After holding there was no statutory liability proceeds:]

2. Is the action maintainable on the principles of the common law?

In entering on this inquiry, it is but justice to ourselves to say, that,

assisted by the researches of diligent counsel, we have given it an un-

usual share of labor and attention; and this not only because of the

importance of the question itself, but for the reason that the conclusion

to which our minds have been compelled is in conflict with a case

(Commissioners of Brown County v. Butt, 2 Ohio Rep. 348) decided

by judges for whose judgment we entertain that degree of respect

which renders even involuntary and irresistible dissent from their con-

clusions reluctant and self-distrustful.

For the purpose of maintaining this action, an effort has been made
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in argument to assimilate counties to natural persons and municipal

and other corporations proper. Now it is conceded, that if the neg-

ligence, and consequent injury to the plaintiff below had been the act

of a natural person in the construction of a private building, to which

the plaintiff below had been invited, the party guilty of the negligence

would properly be liable in damages. So, also, it now seems to be

well settled that, had the defendants below been the agents of a muni-

cipal or other corporation proper, and had the plaintiff below been

injured through like negligence and under like circumstances, the cor-

poration might be held to answer for the injury. And why? Because

where there is a wrong there ought to be a remedy; persons, whether

natural or artificial, are bound so to use their own property and con-

duct their own affairs as not to injure others; and where an act is

done to the injury of another by a natural person in the pursuit of his

own interests, or, through its agents, by an artificial person, a corpo-

ration proper, which is called into existence, either at the direct solici-

tation or by the free consent of the persons composing it, for the pro-

motion of their own local and private advantage and convenience,

and which can work only through agents, such natural or artificial

person is, on every principle of justice and enlightened reason, bound

to rectify the consequence of his own misfeasance. And it is freely

admitted that if counties are in all material respects like municipal

corporations proper, and may be fairly classed with them, then this

action ought to be maintained. But how is the fact? This question

is vital, and on its solution the case must depend.

As before remarked, municipal corporations proper are called into

existence, either at the direct solicitation or by the free consent of the

people who compose them.

Counties are local subdivisions of a state created by the sovereign

power of the state, of its own sovereign will, without the particular
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by the people it embraces; the latter is super-imposed by a sovereign

and paramount authority.

A municipal corporation proper is created mainly for the interest,

advantage and convenience of the locality and its people; a county

organization is created almost exclusively with a view to the policy of

the state at large, for the purposes of political organization and civil

administration, in matters of finance, of education, of provision for

the poor, of military organization, of the means of travel and trans-

port, and especially for the general administration of justice. With

scarcely an exception, all the powers and functions of the county

organization have a direct and exclusive reference to the general policy

of the state, and are, in fact, but a branch of the general administration

of that policy. Ward v. County of Hartford, 12 Conn. 406; Boalt v.

Commissioners of Williams County, 18 Ohio Rep. 16; C. W. & Z.

Railroad v. Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. Rep. 89.

The idea that the board of county commissioners is the agent of the

county or of its people is prominently advanced and pressed on our
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attention. That board is, in some sort, the agent of the county, it is

true; inasmuch as it alone is authorized to sue and be sued in respect

to contracts growing out of the county organization. There is an ad-

ministrative necessity that some name should be employed as the rep-

resentative of the public interests involved in such suits; and that of

the board of county commissioners has, by law, been designated for

that purpose; but the name of the county auditor, or the name of the

county itself, had the legislature chosen so to prescribe, would have

answered the same purpose quite as well; and, in fact, we think, has

no special weight or significance.

But, it is said, the members of the board of county commissioners

are chosen by the electors of the county, and hence the board is to be

regarded as the agents of the county, for whose torts in the perform-

ance of artificial duties the county ought to be responsible. True, the

people of the county elect the board of county commissioners; but

they also elect the sheriff and treasurer of the county. Are the peo-

ple of the county, therefore, responsible for the malfeasance in office

of the sheriff, or for the official defalcations of the county treas-

urer? This will not be pretended. And yet, if this case is to rest on

the principles governing the relation of principal and agent, wherein is

the distinction between the case at bar and the case supposed? We

confess our inability to discover any such distinction. In the case of

municipal corporations proper, the electors are, mediately or immedi-

ately, invested with very ample control over their agents, not only as

to what shall be done, but how it shall be done, and by whom it shall

be done; they may exact such guarantees as they deem proper for

their own indemnity, and may prescribe by-laws for their government.

As between the commissioners and the electors of a county all this is

wanting. All his powers and duties are prescribed by the supreme

legislature; and the electors can exercise no control over him whatso-

solicitation, consent or concurrent action of the people who inhabit
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ever, except stich as springs from the bare fact of election; and to this

extent they can control a sheriff or treasurer as well as a commissioner.

ever: except such as springs from the bare fact of election; and to this
extent they can control a sheriff or treasurer as well as a commissioner.
Chancellor Kent ( 1 Com. 572-3) says, that "a great proportion of
the rules and maxims which constitute the code of the common law,
grew into use by the application of the dictates of natural justice and
cultivated reason to particular cases;" and that "the best evidence"
of what that law is, "is to be found in the decisions of courts of justice, contained in books of reports, and in the treatises and digests of
learned men."
Now, on what principles of "natural justice," or of "cultivated
reason," aside from positive statute, the people of a county should be
held responsible for the personal or official misconduct of a county
commissioner, we are wholly unable to perceive.
But how stands the case upon authority, "by the decision of courts
of justice, and the treatises of learned men?"
The county organization, substantially similar in all its general
features and functions, has existed in England from the earliest times,
and in all the states of this Union, with perhaps one or two exceptions,
more nominal than real, from the period of their settlement; yet the
researches of diligent counsel have failed to furnish a single case
where an action has been maintained against a county in a case like
the one before us, except that of the Commissioners of Brown County
v. Butt, before cited, and which was recognized as authoritative in
Richardson v. Spencer, 6 Ohio Rep. 13, but, apparently without any
particular examination of the principles on which it was based, or of
the authorities bearing upon them.
It is said that the court below sustained the action in the case before
us, on the authority of Commissioners of Brown County v. Butt; and
we concur with the court below in the opinion that if that case w as
proeerly decided this action must be maintained. We have looked in
vain for any substantial distinction behveen them. In that case, the
debtor, having been surrendered by his appearance bail, and committed to the custody of Butt, who was sheriff of Brown county, escaped
by reason of there being no jail in Brown county, and the sheriff not
being by law at liberty to imprison the debtor elsewhere than in the
jail of the county. The creditor having recovered against' him, as
sheriff, for the escape, Butt brought his action on the case against the
board of commissioners of the county to recover the damages he had
thus sustained by reason of its neglect of duty to provide a jail. The
court, Burnet, J., dissenting, held the action to be well brought, on
the ground that the commissioners were the agents and representatives
of the county. In that opinion, for the reason before indicated , as
well as on the authorities about to b e noticed, we find ourselves unable
to concur. We can not but think that county commissioners are not
agents or representatives of the county in any such sense or manner
as to render the people of the county justly answerable for their neglect. The reported opinion of the majority of the court in that case
may furnish very abunda nt reason why the utter neglect of county
commissioners to furnish a jail, and: the ~heriff himself he ing in no

Chancellor Kent (i Coin. 572-3) says, that "a great proportion of

the rules and maxims which constitute the code of the common law,

grew into use by the application of the dictates of natural justice and

cultivated reason to particular cases;" and that "the best evidence"

of what that law is, "is to be found in the decisions of courts of jus-

tice, contained in books of reports, and in the treatises and digests of

learned men."

Now, on what principles of "natural justice," or of "cultivated

reason," aside from positive statute, the people of a county should be

held responsible for the personal or official misconduct of a county

commissioner, we are wholly unable to perceive.

But how stands the case upon authority, "by the decision of courts

of justice, and the treatises of learned men?"

The county organization, substantially similar in all its general

features and functions, has existed in England from the earliest times,

and in all the states of this Union, with perhaps one or two exceptions,
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more nominal than real, from the period of their settlement; yet the

researches of diligent counsel have failed to furnish a single case

where an action has been maintained against a county in a case like

the one before us, except that of the Commissioners of Brown County

v. Butt, before cited, and which was recognized as authoritative in

Richardson v. Spencer, 6 Ohio Rep. 13, but, apparently without any

particular examination of the principles on which it was based, or of

the authorities bearing upon them.

It is said that the court below sustained the action in the case before

us, on the authority of Commissioners of Brown County v. Butt; and

we concur with the court below in the opinion that if that case was

properly decided this action must be maintained. We have looked in

vain for any substantial distinction between them. In that case, the

debtor, having been surrendered by his appearance bail, and commit-

ted to the custody of Butt, who was sheriff of Brown county, escaped

by reason of there being no jail in Brown county, and the sheriff not

being by law at liberty to imprison the debtor elsewhere than in the

jail of the county. The creditor having recovered against him, as

sheriff, for the escape, Butt brought his action on the case against the

board of commissioners of the county to recover the damages he had

thus sustained by reason of its neglect of duty to provide a jail. The

court, Burnet, J., dissenting, held the action to be well brought, on

the ground that the commissioners were the agents and representatives

of the county. In that opinion, for the reason before indicated, as

well as on the authorities about to be noticed, we find ourselves unable

to concur. We can not but think that county commissioners are not

agents or representatives of the county in any such sense or manner

as to render the people of the county justly answerable for their neg-

lect. The reported opinion of the majority of the court in that case

may furnish veiy abundant reason why the utter neglect of county

commissioners to furnish a jail, and. the sheriff himself being in no
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fault, a plea of these facts ought to be held a good bar to an action

for an escape, and the creditor turned over to an action against the

commissioners personally, or why, if such plea be held bad, the sheriff

might maintain his action against the county commissioners in their

individual capacity, for the personal injury resulting to him from their

neglect—and as to these alternatives, the question not being directly

before us, we express no opinion—but it affords to our minds no satis-

factory reason why the people of a county should be held pecuniarily

responsible for the delinquencies of officers over whose acts that peo-

ple have no supervision or control whatsoever. And the case itself,

as before remarked, stands alone. At the time it was made it was

unsupported by any reported case; and, so far as we can ascertain, it

remains still unsupported by any case outside of Ohio, while the cases

on the other side are uniform and so numerous as to render a particu-

lar notice of all of them too tedious to be attempted.

The leading case on this subject seems to be that of Russell v. The

Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667, which was an action on the case against

the men dwelling in the county of Devon, to recover satisfaction for an
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injury done to a wagon of the plaintiff in consequence of a bridge

being out of repair, which ought to have been repaired by the county;

to which two of the inhabitants, for themselves and the rest of the

men dwelling in that county, appeared and demurred generally. On

hearing, the court of king's bench unanimously sustained the demur-

rer; and this, apparently, on three grounds: (1) That there was

no precedent for such an action. (2) By reason of the inconvenience

resulting from the multiplicity of actions for contribution to which

a recovery and levying of the judgment upon the inhabitants of the

county would give rise; and, (3) That the county of Devon had no

fund out of which satisfaction could be made. And this last reason,

it seems to us, applies with great weight to the case in hand. It is

true, counties in Ohio have a treasury, and in it various funds. But

those funds are all raised for specific purposes; to those purposes they

must be devoted; the commissioners are authorized to levy no tax, ex-

cept for such purposes as are authorized by statute; and we have

no statute authorizing the levy of a tax to satisfy such a judgment as

this. And in Boalt v. Commissioners of Williams County, before

cited, it was decided that a bill in chancery would not lie against a

county to subject equities, and, in the opinion of the court in that

case, it is assumed, arguendo, as indisputable, that county bridges,

court-house, public offices, jail or poor-house, can not be sold on exe-

cution at law.

In Riddle v. The Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on Merri-

mack River, 7 Mass. Rep. 169,1 Parsons, C. J., delivering the opin-

ion of the court, clearly lays down the principle on which we proceed.

Hesays: "We distinguish between proper aggregate corporations, and

the inhabitants of any district who are by statute invested with particular

powers without their consent. These are in the books sometimes called

quasi corporations. Of this description are counties and hundreds in

1 S'ipra, p. 47.

fault, a plea of these facts ought to be held a good bar to an action
for an escape, and the creditor turned over to an action against the
commissioners personally, or why, if such plea be held bad, the sheriff
might maintain his action against the county commissioners in their
individual capacity, for the personal injury resulting to him from their
neglect-and as to these alternatives, the question not being directly
- before us, we express no opinion-but it affords to our minds no satisfactory reason why the people of a county should be held pecuniarily
responsible for the delinquencies of officers over whose acts that people have no supervision or control whatsoever. And the case itself,
as before remarked, stands alone. At the time it was made it was
unsupported by any reported case; and, so far as we can ascertain, it
remains still unsupported by any case outside of Ohio, while the cases
on the other side are uniform and so numerous as to render a particular notice of all of them too tedious to be attempted.
The leading case on this subject seems to be that of Russell v. The
Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667, which was an action on the case against
the men dwelling in the county of Devon, to recover satisfaction for an
injury done to a wagon of the plaintiff in consequence of a bridge
being out of repair, which ought to have been repaired by the county;
to which two of the inhabitants, for themselves and the rest of the
men dwelling in that county, appeared and demurred generally. On
hearing, the court of king's bench unanimously sustained the demurrer; and this, apparently, on three grounds: (I) That there was
no precedent for such an action. (2) By reason of the inconvenience
resulting from the multiplicity of actions for contribution to which
a recovery and levying of the judgment upon the inhabitants of the
county would give rise; and, (3) That the county of Devon had no
fund out of which satisfaction could be made. And this last reason,
it seems to us, applies with great weight to the case in hand. It is
tme, counties in Ohio have a treasury, and in it various funds. But
those funds are all raised for specific purposes; to those purposes they
must be devoted; the commissioners are authorized to levy no tax, except for such purposes as are authorized by statute; and we have
no statute authorizing the levy of a tax to satisfy such a judgment as
this. And in Boalt v. Commissioners of Williams County, before
cited, it was decided that a bill in chancery would not lie against a
county to subject equities, and, in the opinion of the court in that
case, it is assumed, arguendo, as indisputable, that county bridges,
court-house, public offices, jail or poor-house, can not be sold on execution at law.
In Riddle v. The Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on Merrimack River, 7 Mass. Rep. 169, 1 Parsons, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court, clearly lays down the principle on which we proceed.
He says: "We distinguish between proper aggregate corporations, and
the inhabitants of any district who are by statute invested with particular
powers without their consent. These are in the books sometimes called
<jttaSi corporations. Of this description are counties and hundreds in
' S•rpra,
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England; and counties, towns, etc., in this state. Although quasi cor-

THE BOARD, ETC., V. MIGHELS.

porations are liable to information or indictment, for a neglect of

England; and counties, towns, etc., in this state. Although quasi corporations are liable to information or indictment, for a neglect of
public duty, imposed on them by law; yet it is settled in the case of
Russell et al. v. Inhabitants of the County of Devon, that no private
action can be maintained against them for a breach of their corporate
duty, unless such action be given by statute. And the sound reason is
that having no corporate fund and no legal means of obtaining one,
each corporator is liable to satisfy any judgment rendered against the
corporation. This burden the common law will not impose, but in
cases where the statute is an authority, to which every man must be
considered as assenting. But in regular corporations, whkh hav'e, or
are supposed to have, a corporate fund, this reason does not apply."
The same doctrine is asserted by the same court in Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. Rep. 247; and is recognized as settled
law by Angell & Ames on Corporations, section 630, note. So in
South Carolina, 2 Nott & McCord 537; Young v. Commissioners of
the Roads; and White v. City Council, 2 Hill's Rep. 571. So in
Connecticut, Ward v. The County of Hartford, 12 Conn. 404. The
case of the Freeholders of Sussex County v. Strader, 3 Harr. N. J.
Rep. 158, before alluded to, was an action brought ~y Strader against
the county of Sussex, New Jersey, to recover damages for an injury
to a team of the plaintiff, on account of a defect in a public bridge
which the chosen freeholders of the county were bound to keep in
repair. In that case the court not only sustain the doctrine and distinction laid down in the Men of Devon, and by Chief Justice Parsons
in 7th Mass.; but Chief Justice Hornblower, in delivering his opinion,
supposes, and remarks upon almost the very case before us. He says:
"It is the duty, for instance, of the board of freeholders, to erect and
keep in repair court-houses and jails; a neglect to do so may occasion
great inconvenience, perhaps positive loss or injury, to some individual
whose business or duty requires his attendance at court; the building,
by being old and out of repair, may give way, and break a man's
limbs, or occasion . him an injury in some other way, but no one will
pretend that in such a case an action would lie by the person injured
against the county.''
The same doctrine was recognized and applied in Illinois, in Hedges
v. The C_o unty of Madison, 1 Gilman's Rep. 567, by the supreme
court of the United States in Fowle v. Common Council of Alexandria, 3 Peters 409, and is also applied and strongly urged and approved
by the supreme court of New York in the able opinion of Selden,
J., in Morey v. The Town of Newfane, 8 Barb. S. C. Rep. 645.
It is undoubtedly competent for the' legislature to make the people
of a county liable for the official delinquencies of the county commissioners, and, if they think it wise and just, without any power in the
people to control the acts of the commissioners, or to exact indemnity
from them; but this has not yet been done, and we think that such liability can not be derived from the relation of the parties either on the
principles or the precedents of the common law.
In conclusion, and at the risk of the penalties of tautology, I repeat,

public duty, imposed on them by law; yet it is settled in the case of

Russell et al. v. Inhabitants of the County of Devon, that no private

action can be maintained against them for a breach of their corporate

duty, unless such action be given by statute. And the sound reason is

that having no corporate fund and no legal means of obtaining one,

each corporator is liable to satisfy any judgment rendered against the

corporation. This burden the common law will not impose, but in

cases where the statute is an authority, to which every man must be

considered as assenting. But in regular corporations, which have, or

are supposed to have, a corporate fund, this reason does not apply."

The same doctrine is asserted by the same court in Mower v. In-

habitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. Rep. 247; and is recognized as settled

law by Angell & Ames on Corporations, section 630, note. So in

South Carolina, 2 Nott & McCord 537; Young v. Commissioners of

the Roads; and White v. City Council, 2 Hill's Rep. 571. So in

Connecticut, Ward v. The County of Hartford, 12 Conn. 404. The

case of the Freeholders of Sussex County v. Strader, 3 Harr. N. J.
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Rep. 158, before alluded to, was an action brought by Strader against

the county of Sussex, New Jersey, to recover damages for an injury

to a team of the plaintiff, on account of a defect in a public bridge

which the chosen freeholders of the county were bound to keep in

repair. In that case the court not only sustain the doctrine and dis-

tinction laid down in the Men of Devon, and by Chief Justice Parsons

in 7th Mass.; but Chief Justice Hornblower, in delivering his opinion,

supposes, and remarks upon almost the very case before us. He says:

"It is the duty, for instance, of the board of freeholders, to erect and

keep in repair court-houses and jails; a neglect to do so may occasion

great inconvenience, perhaps positive loss or injury, to some individual

whose business or duty requires his attendance at court; the building,

by being old and out of repair, may give way, and break a man's

limbs, or occasion him an injury in some other way, but no one will

pretend that in such a case an action would lie by the person injured

against the county."

The same doctrine was recognized and applied in Illinois, in Hedges

v. The County of Madison, 1 Gilman's Rep. 567, by the supreme

court of the United States in Fowle v. Common Council of Alexan-

dria, 3 Peters 409, and is also applied and strongly urged and approved

by the supreme court of New York in the able opinion of Selden,

J., in Morey v. The Town of Newfane, 8 Barb. S. C. Rep. 645.

It is undoubtedly competent for the legislature to make the people

of a county liable for the official delinquencies of the county commis-

sioners, and, if they think it wise and just, without any power in the

people to control the acts of the commissioners, or to exact indemnity

from them; but this has not yet been done, and we think that such lia-

bility can not be derived from the relation of the parties either on the

principles or the precedents of the common law.

In conclusion, and at the risk of the penalties of tautology, I repeat,
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that while, both upon principle and authority, we find ourselves com-

pelled to overrule the case of The Commissioners of Brown County

v. Butt, as having been erroneously decided, we do so with extreme

§ 41
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reluctance, and with all respect for the judgment and veneration for

the memory of the judges who decided it, but, with our convictions,

we could not do otherwise, and, in overruling it, we are satisfied we

are contributing to place the law of Ohio upon a footing of sound

principle, as well as in harmony with that of other states whose juris-

prudence, like our own, rests on the basis of common law.

Judgment reversed.

Bartley, C. J., and Swan, Bowen and Scott, JJ., concurred.

Note. 1816, Rumford School District v. Wood, 13 Mass. 193; 1823, Todd v.

Birdsall, 1 Cowen (N. Y.) 260; 1834, Andrews v. Estes, 11 Maine 267, 26 Am.

Dec. 521; 1835, McLoud v. Selby, 10 Conn. 390, 27 Am. Dec. 689; 1837, Chase

v. Merrimac Bank, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 564, 31 Am. Dec. 163; 1841, Connell v.

Woodward, 5 How. (Miss.) 665, 37 Am. Dec. 173; 1843, Gaskill v. Dudlev, 6

that while, both upon principle and authority, we find ourselves compelled to overrule the case of The Commissioners of Brown County
v. Butt, as having been erroneously decided, we do so with extreme
reluctance, and with all respect for the judgment and veneration for
the memory of the judges who decided it, but, with our convictions,
we could not do otherwise, and, in overruling it, we are satisfied we
are contributing to place the law of Ohio upon a footing of sound
principle, as well as in harmony with that of other states whose jurisprudence, like our own, rests on the basis of common law.
Judgment reversed.
BARTLEY, C. J., and SwAN, BowEN and ScoTT, JJ., concurred.

Met. (Mass.) 546, 39 Am. Dec. 750; 1873, Whitney v. Stow, 111 Mass. 368;

1878, Talbot Co. v. Queen Anne Co., 50 Md. 245. Joint stock companies are

sometimes called private quasi corporations, i. e., they have some of the feat-

ares of corporations, but not all. Morawetz Corp., § 6, and cases cited.
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See case cited supra, p. 110.

Sec. 41. (0 Corporations in their relation to the state are:

1. Purely public.

2. Quasi-Public.

3. Private.

THE BANK OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA v. GIBBS,

Note. 1816, Rumford School District v. Wood, 13 Mass. 193; 1823, Todd v.
Birdsall, 1 Cowen (N. Y.) 260; 1834, Andrews v. Estes, 11 Maine 267, 26 Am.
Dec. 521 ; 1835, McLoud v. Selby, 10 Conn. 390, 27 Am. Dec. 689; 1837, Chase
v. Merrimac Bank, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 564, 31 Am. Dec. 163; 1841, Connell v.
Woodward, 5 How. (Miss.) 665, 37 Am. Dec. 173; 1843, Gaskill v. Dudley, 6
Met. (Mass.) 546, 39 Am . Dec. 750; 1873, Whitney v. Stow, 111 Mass. 368;
1878, Talbot Co. v. Queen Anne Co., 50 Md. 245. Joint soock companies are
sometimes called private quasi corporations, i. e., they have some of the features of corporations, but not all. Morawetz Corp., § 6, and cases cited.
See case cited supra, p. 110.

Executor.

1825. In the Court of Appeals of South Carolina. 3 McCord

(S. Car.) Reports *377-

Sec. 41. ( c)

The question in this case was, whether a simple contract debt due

to the Bank of the State of South Carolina was a debt due to the

1.

Corporations in their relation to the state are:
Purely public.

2.

Quasi-Public.

3. Priv.ate.

public, within the provisions of the executor's act (Pub. Laws, 494),

and as such entitled to a preference, as a public debt.

Nott, J.—The act of the legislature, upon the construction of

THE BANK OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA v. GIBBS,
EXECUTOR.

which the decision of this case depends, directing the order in which

the debts due by a testator or intestate shall be paid, provides, "that

the funeral and other expenses of the last sickness, charges of probate

of the will, or of letters of administration, shall be first paid; next,

debts due to the public," etc.

The question now is, whether the debt in this case is in the sense

of the act a debt due to the public. There is nothing on the face of

the proceedings which will authorize us to view it in that light, for we

must look beyond the case itself to see that the state has any interest

in it. It is not then a debt due to the public; but it is due to the cor-

poration, though the money, when received, may be for the use of

the state. In the case of the United States Bank against the Planters'

Bank of Georgia (9 Wheat. 907), Chief Justice Marshall, who de-

1825. IN THE CoURT OF APPEALS OF SouTH CAROLINA. 3 McCord
(S. Car.) Reports •377.
The question in this case was, whether a simple contract" debt due
to the Bank of the State of South Carolina was a debt due to the
public, within the provisions of the executor's act (Pub. Laws, 494),
and as such entitled to a preference, as a public debt.
NOTT, J .-The act of the legislature, upon the construction of
which the decision of this case depends, directing the order in which
the debts due by a testator or intestate shall be paid, provides, "that
the funeral and other expenses of the last sickness, charges of probate
of the will, or of letters of administration, shall be first paid; next,
debts due to the public," etc.
The question now is, whether the debt in this case is in the sense
of the act a debt due to the public. There is nothing on the face of
the proceedings which will authorize us to view it in that light, for we
must look beyond the case itself to see that the state has any interest
in it. It is not then a debt due to the public; but it is due to the corporation, though the money, when received, may be for the use of
the state. In the case of the United States Bank against the Planters'
Bank of Georgia (9 Wheat. 907), Chief Justice Marshall, who de-
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livered the opinion of the court, said: "The suit is against a corpo-

222

ration, and the judgment is to be satisfied by the property of the cor-

M'KIM V. ODOM.

poration and not by that of the corporators. The state does not, by

livered the opinion of the court, said: "The suit is against a corporation, and the judgment is to be satisfied by the property of the corporation and not by that of the corporators. The state does not, by
becoming a corporator, identify itself with the corporation. The
Planters' Bank of Georgia is not the state of Georgia, although
the state holds an interest in it. It is," he says, "a sound principle,
that when a government becomes a partner in a trading company, it
divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of
its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen." I can
not distinguish that case from the one now under consideration. It is
true, the state of Georgia held but a part of the interest in that bank,
and the state of South Carolina owns the whole in this. But, nevertheless, we may, with truth, say, in the language of that opinion, the
Bank of the State of South Carolina is not the state of South Carolina; it is only a corporation created for particular purposes, possessing the same powers and privileges of other corporations, and no
more. The stare did not transfer any portion of its sovereignty to
this corporation, nor communicate to it any of its privileges or prerogatives, but has placed it on the same level with other corporate bodies,
with the same privilege of suing, and liabil ity of being sued, as an incident to such corporations. I am of opinion, therefore, that the
same principle by which the case referred to was govemed is applicable to this case, and that the bank is not entitled to any such preference as is contended for-and that is the opinion of the court.
The motion is therefore refused.
Note. See cases cited to People v. Morris, infra, pp. 229, 234.

becoming a corporator, identify itself with the corporation. The

Planters' Bank of Georgia is not the state of Georgia, although

the state holds an interest in it. It is," he says, "a sound principle,

that when a government becomes a partner in a trading company, it

divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of

its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen." I can

not distinguish that case from the one now under consideration. It is

true, the state of Georgia held but a part of the interest in that bank,

and the state of South Carolina owns the whole in this. But, never-

theless, we may, with truth, say, in the language of that opinion, the

Bank of the State of South Carolina is not the state of South Caro-

lina; it is only a corporation created for particular purposes, possess-

ing the same powers and privileges of other corporations, and no

more. The state did not transfer any portion of its sovereignty to

this corporation, nor communicate to it any of its privileges or prerog-

atives, but has placed it on the same level with other corporate bodies,
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with the same privilege of suing, and liability of being sued, as an in-

cident to such corporations. I am of opinion, therefore, that the

same principle by which the case referred to was governed is appli-

cable to this case, and that the bank is not entitled to any such prefer-

ence as is contended for—and that is the opinion of the court.

The motion is therefore refused.

Note. See cases cited to People v. Morris, infra, pp. 229, 234.

Sec. 42. Same.

McKIM v. ODOM.1

1831. In the High Court of Chancery of Maryland. 3 Bland

Chancery (Md.) 407-433.

[This bill was filed on the 23d of June, 1827, by William S. Moore

and John McKim, Jr., John Odom, George Law, William G. Har-

rison, William F. Anderson and the president and directors of the

Franklin Bank of Baltimore. The bill states that the plaintiff, Moore,

Sec. 42. Same.

and the defendant, Odom, being joint and equal owners of the

schooner Beauty, sent her on a voyage from Baltimore to Montevideo,

McKIM v. ODOM. 1

under Odom as master; that, for the better management of the con-

cerns of their vessel, they employed the defendants, Law & Harrison,

183r.

then partners in trade, as her ship's husband; that it was agreed by

IN THE HIGH CouRT OF CHANCERY OF MARYLAND.

3 Bland

Chancery (Md.) 407-433.

these owners, before their vessel sailed, that she might be sold, and

she was sold accordingly, at Montevideo, for about $12,000; and

[This bill was filed on the 23d of June, 18.27, by William S. Moore
and John McKim, Jr., John Odom, George Law, William G. Harrison, William F. Anderson and the president and directors of the
Franklin Bank of Baltimore. The bill states that the plaintiff, Moore,
and the defendant, Odom, being joint and equal owners of the
schooner Beauty, sent her on a voyage from Baltimore to Montevideo,
under Odom as master; that, for the better management of the concerns of their vessel, they employed the defendants, Law & Harrison,
then partners in trade, as her ship's husband; that it was agreed by
these owners, before their vessel sailed, that she might be sold, and
she was sold accordingly, at Montevideo, for about $12,000; and
there were remitted in specie, by the United States ship Cyane, as a
part of the proceeds of sale, about $9 1000, with a bill of lading for
1 Statement of facts abridged.
Arguments omitted; much of the opinion
omitted.

there were remitted in specie, by the United States ship Cyane, as a

part of the proceeds of sale, about $9,000, with a bill of lading for

1 Statement of facts abridged. Arguments omitted; much of the opinion

omitted.

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 42 PUBLIC, QUASI-PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CORPORATIONS. 223

the defendant Law; that on the ioth of April, 1826, the plaintiff

Moore assigned all his interest in the schooner and her earnings to the

~ 42
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plaintiff McKim, of which Law was duly notified; that afterward and

immediately on the arrival of the ship Cyane, the defendant Law, by

means of his bill of lading, obtained possession of the specie remitted,

had it exchanged in Philadelphia, and thence transmitted to Baltimore,

where he had the greater part of it deposited in the Franklin Bank,

in the name of the defendant Anderson, in trust for his, Law's, use;

that the object of the defendant Law in withholding, and thus secretly

depositing the proceeds of sale, was fraudulently to compel the

plaintiff McKim to submit to certain unjust and improper charges,

which he, Law, as ship's husband, claimed a right to have allowed

and deducted from those proceeds. Upon which the plaintiffs prayed

relief and an injunction to stay the money so deposited in the hands

of the bank. An injunction was granted accordingly.

On the 12th of December, 1828, the plaintiffs, by their petition,

stated that the president and directors of the Franklin Bank of Balti-

more had been regularly returned summoned, and had refused to

answer the amended bill, whereupon the plaintiffs prayed that a

distringas might be issued against that corporation.]
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Bland, Chancellor. * * * The mode of proceeding against

contumacious natural persons, who neglect or refuse to answer, is well

established and sufficiently energetic, but the course of proceeding for

that purpose against artificial bodies or corporations is different, more

feeble and much more tardy, there being no legislative provision for

enforcing an appearance or answer from such defendants.

So far as I have been able to ascertain, this is the first instance of

an application to this court for coercive process against a body politic.

Corporations have latterly become very numerous, and new ones are

created at almost every session of the legislature; the matter now sub-

mitted for determination, therefore, has an importance much above

the interests of the case out of which it arises, and requires to be care-

fully considered with a view to the course of proceeding in future.

Under the provincial government corporations were framed and called

into existence, as in England, either directly by or with the immedi-

ate sanction of the lord proprietary or the monarch. But, however

they may have been originated formerly or elsewhere, it is certain

that they can now only be established here by the authority of the

legislature. The multitude of bodies politic that have been created

either by the government of the province or of the republic, most of

which still subsist, may be considered, in reference to their objects, as

belonging to one or other of three distinct classes.

[Public] The first kind are such as relate merely to the public police,

which, by assuming upon themselves some of the duties of the state,

in a partial or detailed form, and having neither power nor property

for the purposes of personal aggrandizement, can be considered in no

other light than as the auxiliaries of the government of the Republic;

and consequently, as the secondary and deputy trustees and servants

of the people. The right to establish, alter or abolish such corpora-

the defendant Law; that on the 10th of April, 1826, the plaintiff
Moo re assig ned all his interest in the schooner and her earnings to the
plaintiff McKim , of which Law was duly notified; that afterward and
immediately on the arrival of the ship Cyane, the defendant Law, by
means of his bill of lading, obtained possession of the specie remitted,
bad it exchanged in Philadelphia, and thence transmitted to Baltimore,
where he had the greater part of it deposited in the Franklin Bank,
in the name of the defendant Anderson, in trust for his, Law's, use;
that the object of the defendant Law in withholding, and thus secretly
qepositing the proceeds of sale, was fraudulently to compel the
plaintiff McKim to submit to certain unjust and improper charges,
which he, Law, as ship's husband, claimed a right to have allowed
and deducted from those proceeds. Upon which the plaintiffs prayed
relief and an injunction to stay the money so deposited in the hands
of the bank. An injunction was granted accordingly.
On the 12th of December, 1828, the plaintiffs, by their petition,
stated that the president and directors of the Franklin Bank of Baltimore had been regularly returned summoned, and had refu sed to
answer the amended bill, whereupon the plaintiffs prayed that a
distringas might be issued against that corporation. J
BLA!'D, Chancellor.
• • • The mode of proceeding against
contumacious natural persons, who neglect or refuse to answer, is well
e tablished and sufficiently energetic, but the course of proceeding for
that purpose against artificial bodies or corporations is different, more
feeble and much more tardy, there being no legislative provision for
enforcing an appearance or answer from such defendants.
So far a s I have been able to ascertain, this is the first instance of
an application to this court for coercive process against a body politic.
Corporations have latterly become very numerous, and new ones are
created at almost every session of the legislature; the matter now submitted for determination, therefore, has an importance much above
the interests of the case out of which it arises, and requires to be carefully considered with a view to the course of proceeding in future.
Under the provincial government corporations were framed and called
into existence, as in England, either directly by or \ vith the immediate sanction of the lord proprietary or the monarch. But, however
they may have been originated formerly or elsewhere, it is certain
that they can now only be established here by the authority of the
legislature. The multitude of bodies politic that have been created
either by the government of the province or of the republic, most of
which still subsist, may be considered, in reference to their objects, as
belonging to one or other of three distinct classes.
[Publie.] The first kind are such as relate merely to the public police,
which, by assuming upon themselves some of the duties of the state,
in a partial or detailed form, and having neither power nor property
for the purposes of personal aggrandizement, can be considered in no
other light than as the auxiliaries of the government of the Republic;
and consequently, as the secondary and deputy trustees and servants
of the people. The right to establish, alter or abolish such corpora1
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M KIM V. ODOM.

Hons seems to be a principle evidently inherent in the very nature of

the institutions themselves, since all mere municipal regulations

tions seems to be a principle evidently inherent in the very nature of
the institutions themselves, since all mere municipal regulations
must, from the nature of things, be subject to the absolute control of
the government. These institutions, being, in their nature, the auxiliaries of the government in the great business of municipal rule, can
not have the least pretention to sustain their privileges, or their existence, upon any thing like a contract between them and the government, because there can be no reciprocity of stipulation, and because
their objects and duties are incompatible with everything of the nature of such a compact.
•
The power of acquiring and holding property, although almost
always given, is by no means a necessary incident to corporations of
this class; they may be established without any such capacity; as
in the instance of the commissioners for emitting bills of credit. 1
The preservation of morals, and the administration of justice are the
chief ends for which government has been instituted; and infancy,
insanity, infirmity and helpless poverty have an undoubted claim
upon the protecting care of the republic. 2 Bodies politic of this
class, having these objects in view, are city corporations; 1 levy
courts ;• county schools for the provincial or state government;~
public colleges; 6 hospitals; 7 trustees of the poor of several counties, 8 etc.
[Private.] The second class of corporations are such as have no concern whatever with the duties of the republic; nor in any manner
bound to perform any acts for its benefit; but whose only object is
the personal emolument of its members. The corporators in such institution may also, in some sense, be considered as trustees; but then,
even in that character, they are the mere factors of individuals; and,
therefore, their resignation or removal can not divest or alter any of the
rights of the individuals they represented. Each member of such an
aggregation either was a proprietor at the commencement, or became
so during the existence of its incorporation; and consequently, unless
he has aliened his right, must continue to be so after its dissolution.
A corporation not being, like a natural person, one of the elements of
society, of which government is formed, can only be considered as a
creature of the law. It is the law alone which gives to it a personality
distinct from that of each of its members, and confers on it the right to
act by its president, directors, or agents, in a manner analogous to
that in which the government itself acts by its regularly constituted
functionaries. This individuality of character, and the right so to
act is , then, nothing more than a portion of the power of the government with which it has been invested. It is this power which is given
by the creation of a body politic, and which, by its extinguishment, is
resumed, and nothing more; the rights of property vested in its

must, from the nature of things, be subject to the absolute control of

the government. These institutions, being, in their nature, the auxil-
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ture of such a compact.

The power of acquiring and holding property, although almost

always given, is by no means a necessary incident to corporations of

this class; they may be established without any such capacity; as
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class, having these objects in view, are city corporations;* levy

courts;4 county schools for the provincial or state government;5

public colleges;6 hospitals;7 trustees of the poor of several coun-

ties,8 etc.

[Private.] The second class of corporations are such as have no con-

cern whatever with the duties of the republic; nor in any manner

bound to perform any acts for its benefit; but whose only object is

the personal emolument of its members. The corporators in such in-

stitution may also, in some sense, be considered as trustees; but then,

even in that character, they are the mere factors of individuals; and,

therefore, their resignation or removal can not divest or alter any of the
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so during the existence of its incorporation; and consequently, unless

he has aliened his right, must continue to be so after its dissolution.

A corporation not being, like a natural person, one of the elements of

society, of which government is formed, can only be considered as a

creature of the law. It is the law alone which gives to it a personality

distinct from that of each of its members, and confers on it the right to

act by its president, directors, or agents, in a manner analogous to

that in which the government itself acts by its regularly constituted

functionaries. This individuality of character, and the right so to

act is, then, nothing more than a portion of the power of the govern-

ment with which it has been invested. It is this power which is given

by the creation of a body politic, and which, by its extinguishment, is

resumed, and nothing more; the rights of property vested in its

>1769, ch. 14, §6.

* Montesq. Sp. Laws, b. 23, ch. 29.

•1708, ch. 7; 1796, ch. 68.

41804, ch. 73.

•1696, ch. 17; 1723, ch. 19.

•April, 1782, ch. 8.

'1797, ch. 102; 1816, ch. 156.

1 1769, ch. 14, § 6.
1 Montesq. Sp. Laws, b. 23,
1 1708, ch. 7; 1796, ch. 68.

•1768, ch. 29; 1785, ch. 15.

'1804, ch. 73.
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It is remarkable that there is no instance of the creation of any

body politic of this description under the provincial government; but

since the establishment of the republic they have increased and multi-

plied to a very large and still rapidly growing family. The examples

of this class of corporations are the insurance companies;1 the Free

Mason societies;2 the banks;8 the manufacturing companies;* the

library companies,5 etc.

[^uasi-publie.] The third species of corporations partake, in many

respects, of the nature of the first two classes; and are such as have a

concern with some of the expensive duties of the state, the trouble and

charge of which are undertaken and defrayed by them, in considera-

tion of a certain emolument allowed and secured to their members.

In cases of this kind there is certainly many of the material features

of a contract between the government and the corporation; there is

manifestly a quid pro quo. But this contract, if it be so, is, and of ne-

cessity must be, like all others to which a government or state is a

party, one of imperfect obligation as regards the state;8 and, as such,

subject to be dealt with by the government of the state as the public good
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may require, on making a just compensation for any private property

which may be taken for a public use. No bodies politic of this descrip-

tion were ever created under the provincial government; but since our

independence, a great number of them have been called into existence;

such as canal companies;' bridge companies;' turnpike road com-

panies;9 etc.

In regard to the irrepealable nature of an act of incorporation, it may

be well not onlv to bear in mind the distinctions as explained above in

the text, according to which it is quite obvious that at least two out of

the three kinds of corporations, there' described, may be modified or re-

pealed at the pleasure of the legislature, without the slightest interference

with the rights of private property of any kind, but that there must also

several members, in all other respects, remain unaffe-ted by its dissolution.
It is remarkable that there is no instance of the creation of any
body politic of this description under the provincial government; but
since the establishment of the republic they have increased and multiplied to a very large and still rapidly growing family. The examples
of this class of corporations are the insurance companies; 1 the Free
Mason societies ; 2 the banks ; 8 the manufacturing companies;• the
library companies, 5 etc.
[Quasi-public.] The third species of corporations partake, 'in many
respects, of the nature of the first two classes; an<l are such as have a
concern with some of the expensive duties of the state, the trouble and
charge of which are undertaken and defrayed by them, in consideration of a certain emolument allowed and secured to their members.
In cases of this kind there is certainly many of the material features
of a contract between the government and the corporation; there is
manifestly a quid pro quo. But this contract, if it be so, is, and of necessity must be, like all others to which a government or state is a
party, one of imperfect obligation as regards the state; e and, as such,
subject to be dealt with by the government of the state as the public good
may require, on making a just compensation for any private property
which may be taken for a public use. No bodies politic of this description were ever created under the provincial government; but since our
independence, a great number of them have been called into existence;
such as canal companies; 1 bridge companies; a turnpike ron<l companies; 9 etc.
·

be a variety of cases in which corporations of the third class, such as turn-

pike roads, may have their stock, even considering it as private property, in-

definitely depreciated, or, in effect, totally annihilated, without, in the opin-

ion of any one, giving rise to a claim for compensation, as in cases where

mere private property is taken, by virtue of the government's power of emi-

nent domain, for public use. Without going into an argument, it will be suffi-

cient to state a case which has occurred. By the act of 1812, chapter 78, the

legislature incorporated a company for making a turnpike road from Balti-

more to Washington; under which the road was made, and the stock yielded

a considerable dividend annually. After which the legislature, by the act of

1830, chapter 158, authorized the construction of a railroad between the same

cities, and nearly parallel with the turnpike road, which was accordingly put

in operation. In consequence of which the annual dividends on the stock of

1 April, 1787, ch. 20.

M821, ch. 147.

•1790, ch. 5.

• 1808, ch. 49.

11797, ch. 36.

'Vattel Law Nation, Prelim., J 17.

'November, 1783, ch. 23.

•1795, ch. 62.

•1797, ch. 65.

15—Wil. Cases.

In regard to the irrepealable nature of an act of incorporation, it may
be we\1 not only to bear in mind the distinctions as explained above in
the text, according to which it is quite obvious that at least two out of
the three kinds of corporations, there' described, may be modified or repealed at the pleasure of the legislature, without the slightest interference
with the rights of private property of any kind, but that there must also
be a variety of cases in which corporations of the third class, such as turn pike roads, may have their stock, even considering it as private property, indefinitely depreciated, or, in effect, totally annihilated, without, in the opinion of any one, giving rise to a claim for compensation, as in cases where
mere private property is taken, by virtue of the government's power of eminent domain, for public use. Without going into an argument, it will be sufficient to state a case which has occurred. By the act of 1812, chapter 78, the
legislature incorporated a company for making a turnpike road from Baltimore to Washington; under which the road waa made, and the stock yielded
a considerable dividend annually. After which the legislature. by the act of
1830, chapter 158, authorized the construction of a railroad between the same
cities, and nearly parallel with the turnpike road, which was accordingly put
in·operation. In consequence of which the annual dividends on the stock of
1

April, I787, ch. 20.
1821, ch. 147.
1
1790, ch. 5.
'1808, ch. 49.
' 1797, ch. 35.
• Vattel Law Nation, Prelim., f 17.
'November, I783, ch. 23.
1 li95, ch . 62.
1
1797,ch. 65.
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The right and capacity to sue and be sued is an incident to bodies
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politic of all descriptions;1 even to those which have been incor-

The right and capacity to sue and be sued is an incident to bodies
politic of all descriptions; 1 even to those which have been incorporated by and are located in another state or in a foreign country. 2
It is held to be incumbent upon every body politic, not being incorporated by a public law of which the court is bound to take notice,
which comes into a court of justice as a plaintiff, if required, even
upon the general issue only being pleaded, to show the authority
under which it has assumed to act as a corporation. a When
called on as a defendant its corporate capacity is thus admitted, and
it appears by attorney and responds under its seal, or in the manner
specially prescribed to it.• But there is no legislative enactment
which directs in what mode a corporation of any kind may be compelled to answer in case it should neglect or refuse to do so.
It is admitted on all hands that in a suit against a corporation none
of its members can be taken or personally punished , except, perhaps,
as a last resort, on account of any contumacy in their corporate
capacity. The only mode of proceeding, either to enforce an answer
or obedience to a decree, is by a distringas and sequestration of
the property of the body politic. 5 The state itself is regarded
in many respects as a mere body politic; a and in the various
instances where it becomes necessary to have it made a party to
the litigation, it is represented by its attorney-general; in which cases
the course of the court merely allows that he should be attended with
a copy of the bill; but he can not be forced to answer in any manner
whatever; 7 and therefore, if the bill can not be taken pro conf esso
against the state, 8 the further progress of the case must await his
good pleasure.
Every corporation is and must be composed of, and conducted by,
natural persons; yet the distincti9n between the natural and artificial
capacities and liabilities of its members has been drawn in such a manner as to create the most serious inconvenience. A body politic, it
has been quaintly said, has no soul; and therefore can not be called on
to answer under the obligation of an oath by which a natural person
may be bound. 9 To avoid this difficulty the court of chancery has

porated by and are located in another state or in a foreign country.'

It is held to be incumbent upon every body politic, not being incor-

porated by a public law of which the court is bound to take notice,

which comes into a court of justice as a plaintiff, if required, even

upon the general issue only being pleaded, to show the authority

under which it has assumed to act as a corporation.3 When

called on as a defendant its corporate capacity is thus admitted, and

it appears by attorney and responds under its seal, or in the manner

specially prescribed to it.4 But there is no legislative enactment

which directs in what mode a corporation of any kind may be com-

pelled to answer in case it should neglect or refuse to do so.

It is admitted on all hands that in a suit against a corporation none

of its members can be taken or personally punished, except, perhaps,

as a last resort, on account of any contumacy in their corporate

capacity. The only mode of proceeding, either to enforce an answer
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in many respects as a mere body politic;8 and in the various

instances where it becomes necessary to have it made a party to

the litigation, it is represented by its attorney-general; in which cases

the course of the court merely allows that he should be attended with

a copy of the bill; but he can not be forced to answer in any manner

whatever;7 and therefore, if the bill can not be taken pro confesso

against the state,1 the further progress of the case must await his

good pleasure.

Every corporation is and must be composed of, and conducted by,

natural persons; yet the distinction between the natural and artificial

capacities and liabilities of its members hasbeen drawn in such a man-

ner as to create the most serious inconvenience. A body politic, it

has been quaintly said, has no soul; and therefore can not be called on

to answer under the obligation of an oath by which a natural person

may be bound." To avoid this difficulty the court of chancery has

the turnpike road have been very materially diminished. Currie v. The Mu-

tual Assurance Society, 4 Hen. & Man. 315.

11 Blac. Com. 475.

* 1 Blac. Com. 385; 4 Com. Dig. 487; Henriques v. Dutch West India Com-

panv, 2 Id. Raym. 1532; The National Bank of St. Charles v. De Bernales,

11 Com. Law Rep. 475.

» 4 Com. Dig. 487; McMechen v. The Mayor of Baltimore, 2 H. & J. 41;

the turnpike road have been very materially diminished. Currie v. The Mutual Assurance Society, 4 Hen. & Mun. 315.
1 1 Blac. Com. 475.
1 1 Blac. Com. 385; 4 Com. Dig. 487; Henriques v. Dutch West India Company, 2 Ld. Raym . 1532; The National Bank of St. Charles v. De Bernales,
11 Com. Law Rep. 475.
1 4 Com. Dig. 487; McMechen v. The Mayor of Baltimore, 2 H. & J. 41;
A~new v. The Bank of Gettysburg, 2 H. & G. 479.
1804, ch. 731 § 6.
s Bae. Abr. t1t. Corporations, E. 2; Lynch v. The Mechanic's Bank, IS
Johns. 127.
& 1785, ch . 36.
1 Willis Eq. Plea. 7.
1 2 Mad. Pr. Chan. 335; 1 Fowl. Exch. Prac. 401; Nabob of the Carnatic v.
The East India Company, 1 Vee., Jun., 371; s. c. I Hoven. Supp. 149.
'The case of Sutton's Hospital, 10 Co. 33.

Agnew v. The Bank of Gettysburg, 2 H. & G. 479.

11804, ch. 73, § 6.

6 Bac. Abr. tit. Corporations, E. 2; Lynch v. The Mechanic's Bank, 13

Johns. 127.

81785, ch. 36.

7 Willis Eq. Plea. 7.

• 2 Mad. Pr. Chan. 335; 1 Fowl. Exch. Prac. 401; Nabob of the Carnatic v.

The East India Company, 1 Ves., Jun., 371; a. c. 1 Hoven. Supp. 149.

'The case of Sutton's Hospital, 10 Co. 33.
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had recourse to a singular shift, which it is admitted rests on very

questionable principles; it allows the secretary, bookkeeper or some

one or more of the chief members of the body politic to be made co-
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defendants for the express purpose of obtaining an answer on oath,

which answer, contrary to the general rule in other cases, is received

as evidence against the corporation itself.1 Thus allowing the

plaintiff to select from among the corporators such one or more of

them as he may think proper to make witnesses, and to extract from

them only such proof as may be entirely responsive to his case.

It is said, in one of the very respectable treatises on equity plead-

ing, that, in the case of a corporation aggregate, where the answer is

under the common seal, the bill must pray that a writ called a writ

of distringas may issue under the great seal, which is for the pur-

pose of distraining them by their goods and chattels, rents and profits,

until they obey the summons or direction of the court.2 What is

here said, however, as to the prayer of the bill, is certainly wrong,

the authorities cited warrant no such assertion.3 And it has also

been said, that a subpena is not the proper original process against a

• corporation, because it has no conscience.4 This is also an error,

for, in all cases, where a corporation is made defendant, the first and
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proper process for calling it in to appear and answer is the same as

that used for summoning a natural person, that is, a subpena; and

accordingly the bill prays for a subpena, and no other process.6

The bill, it is true, must always ask for that original process which

is suited to the nature of the case; against natural and artificial per-

sons a subpena is prayed for; against non-residents an order of pub-

lication made the substitute of a subpena, is asked, and against the

attorney-general it is prayed that he may be attended with a copy of

the bill;* which form of prayer, as against the attorney-general,

appears to be recognized by several acts of assembly,7 with only

two exceptions, in which he is directed to be summoned, or served

with a subpena* These prayers are indispensably necessary, be-

cause it is an established rule, that no one is to be considered a party

to the suit, against whom no process or publication is prayed and

served with it, or the publication made.*

If the body politic neglects or refuses to appear as required by the

subpena which has been served on the mayor, president or any director

or manager, or other officer, then the next process is a distringas, the

1 Fenton v. Hughes, 7 Ves. 289; Dommer v. Corporation of Chippenham,

14 Ves. 253.

1 Coop. PI. Eq. 16.

* Harvey v. East India Company, 2 Vern. 395; e. c. Prec. Cha. 128.

4 Com. Dig. tit. Franchises, F. 19.

» Willis Eq. Plea. 8; Lowten v. The Mayor of Colchester, 2 Meriv. 395.

6 Willis Eq. Plea. 7; 2 Mad. Pra. Chan. 202.

71785, ch. 72, s. 29, and ch. 78, s. 1; April, 1787, ch. 30, s. 4; 1799, ch. 79,

8. 7.

» 1786, ch. 49, s. 8; 1794, ch. 60, s. 6.

•Windsor v. Windsor, 2 Dick. 707; Reilly v. Ward, 5 Bro. P. C. 495;

Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland 245.

had recourse to a singular shift, which it is admitted rests on very
questionable principles; it allows the secretary, bookkeeper or some
one or more of the chief members of the body politic to be made codefendants for the express purpose of obtaining an answer on oath,
which answer, contrary to the general rule in other cases, is received
as evidence against the corporation itself. 1
Thus allowing the
plaintiff to select from among the corporators such one or more of
them as he may think proper to make witnesses, and to extract from
them only such proof as may be entirely responsive to his case.
It is said, in one of the very respectable treatises on equity pleading, that, in the case of a corporation aggregate, where the answer is
under the common seal, the bill must pray that a writ called a writ
of distringas may issue under the great seal, which is for the purpose of distraining them by their goods and chattels, rents and profits,
until they obey the summons or direction of the court. 2 What is
here said, however, as to the prayer of the bill, is certainly wrong,
the authorities cited warrant no such assertion. 8 And it has also
been said, that a subpena is not the proper original process against a
• corporation, because it has no conscience. 4 This is also an error,
for, in all cases, where a corporation is made defendant, the first and
proper process for calling it in to appear and answer is the same as
that used for summoning a natural person, that is, a subpena; and
accordingly the bill prays for a subpena, and no other process. 6
The bill, it is true, must always ask for that original process which
is suited to the nature of the case; against natural and artificial persons a subpena is prayed for; against non-residents an order of publication made the substitute of a subpena,, is asked, and against the
attorney-general it is prayed that he may be attended with a copy of
the bill; 11 which form of prayer, as against the attorney-general,
appears to be recognized by several acts of assembly, 7 with only
two exceptions, in which he is directed to he summoned, or served
with a subpena. 8
These prayers are indispensably necessary, because it is an established rule, that no one is to be considered a party
to the suit, against whom no process or publication is prayed and
served with it, or the publication made. 9
If the body politic neglects or refuses to appear as required by the
subpena which has been served on the mayor, president or any director
or manager, or other officer, then the next process is a distringas, the
1 Fenton v. Hughes, 7 Vea. 289; Dummer v. Corporation of Chippenham,
14 Ves. 253.
I Coop. Pl. Eq. 16.
•Harvey v. East India Company, 2 Vern. 395; s. c. Pree. Cha. 128.
'Com. Dig. tit. Franchises, F. 19.
'Willis Eq. Plea. 8; Lowten v. The Mayor of Colchester, 2 Meriv. 395.
11 Willis Eq. Plea. 7; 2 Mad. Pra. Chan. 202.
7 1785, ch. 72, a. 29, and ch. 78, a. 1; April, 1787, ch. 30, s. 4; 1799, ch. 79,

7.
• 1786, ch. 49, s . 8; 1794, ch. 60, s. 6.
'Windsor v. Windsor, 2 Dick. 707; Reilly v. Ward, 5 Bro. P. C. 495;
Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland 245.
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form of which writ is substantially the same at law as in equity.1
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By this writ the sheriff is commanded to make a distress upon the

1

M KIM V. ODOM.

lands and tenements, goods and chattels of the corporation; and it is

form of which writ is substantially the same at law as in equity. 1
By this writ the sheriff is commanded to make a distress upon the
lands and tenements, goods and chattels of the corporation; and it is
indorsed thus: "By the court at the suit of A. B. for want of an appearance (or answer, as the case may be)." But in England upon the
first writ the sheriff generally levies forty shillings issues; upon the
alias distringas, four pounds; on the pluries distringas he levies the
whole property; and on the return of the pluries a sequestration is
granted. 2 Thus far there appears to be not the slightest difference
to be found in the books, either as to the form of the process, or in
reference to the character of the corporation to be affected by it.
I can, therefore, feel myself at liberty to make no other alteration
than to settle the amount in reference to the present value of money,
and to declare, that upon the first distringas to compel an appearance
or answer, the sheriff shall take issues or personal property of the
corporation, to the amount of twenty dollars; and upon the alias distringas he shall levy forty dollars; and on the pluries distrz"ngas he
shall distrain the whole of the personal estate, together with the rents
and profits of the lands. 8
If it shall be ascertained by the return of all these successive writs.
that the corporation has no property upon which a distri°ngas may be
levied, or which can be taken under a sequestration, then the bill may
be taken pro confesso, and the plaintiff may obtain relief accordingly;• or if, having no property, or after all its property has
been sequestered, it still stands out, and refuses to appear and answer,
then, according to what seems to be the better and more reasonable
opinion, the plaintiff may have an attachment against the members,
or, at least, those of them who have been duly summoned, or served
with the subpena, and thus notified of the institution of the suit. 5
If, after a decree, the corporation neglects to comply therewith,
upon being served with a copy of it according to the ancient
practice, 6 as recognized by the act of assembly, 7 now dispensed with, 8 the plaintiff may obtain a distrlngas to enforce
obedience to it, and after the return of the first writ of distringas he
may have a sequestration, 9 and if the sheriff returns that the body
politic has nothing upon which the distringas can be levied, then the
members of the corporation may be attached, or such other proceedings had according to the nature of the case, and having proper re-

indorsed thus: "By the court at the suit of A. B. for want of an ap-

pearance (or answer, as the case may be)." But in England upon the

first writ the sheriff generally levies forty shillings issues; upon the

alias distringas, four pounds; on the pluries distringas he levies the

whole property; and on the return of the pluries a sequestration is

granted.2 Thus far there appears to be not the slightest difference

to be found in the books, either as to the form of the process, or in

reference to the character of the corporation to be affected by it.

I can, therefore, feel myself at liberty to make no other alteration

than to settle the amount in reference to the present value of money,

and to declare, that upon the first distringas to compel an appearance

or answer, the sheriff shall take issues or personal property of the

corporation, to the amount of twenty dollars; and upon the alias dis-

tringas he shall levy forty dollars; and on the pluries distringas he

shall distrain the whole of the personal estate, together with the rents

and profits of the lands.3
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If it shall be ascertained by the return of all these successive writs

that the corporation has no property upon which a distringas may be

levied, or which can be taken under a sequestration, then the bill may

be taken fro confesso, and the plaintiff may obtain relief accord-

ingly;4 or if, having no property, or after all its property has

been sequestered, it still stands out, and refuses to appear and answer,

then, according to what seems to be the better and more reasonable

opinion, the plaintiff may have an attachment against the members,

or, at least, those of them who have been duly summoned, or served

with the subpena, and thus notified of the institution of the suit.*

If, after a decree, the corporation neglects to comply therewith,

upon being served with a copy of it according to the ancient

practice,6 as recognized by the act of assembly,' now dis-

pensed with,8 the plaintiff may obtain a distringas to enforce

obedience to it, and after the return of the first writ of distringas he

may have a sequestration,9 and if the sheriff returns that the body

politic has nothing upon which the distringas can be levied, then the

members of the corporation may be attached, or such other proceed-

ings had according to the nature of the case, and having proper re-

>2 Harr. Ent. 674; 1 Harri. Pra. Chan. 264; 1832, ch. 306, 8. 5.

'1 Harr. Prac. Chan. 264.

'East India Company's case, 1 Salk. 191.

4 Salmon v. The Hamborough Company, 1 Ca. Chan. 204; Curson v. African

Company, 1 Vern. 121.

6 Rex v. Gardner, Cowp. 85; London v. Lynn, 1 H. Blac. 206.

6 2 Mad. Pr. Chan. 466.

71785, ch. 72, s. 25.

2 Harr. Ent. 674; 1 Harri. Pra. Chan. 264; 1832, ch. 306, s. 5.
1 Harr. Prac. Chan. 264.
East India Company's case, 1 Salk. 191.
• Salmon v. The Hamborough Company, 1 Ca. Chan. 204; Curson v. African
Company, 1 Vern. 121.
6 Rex v. Gardner, Cowp. 85; London v. Lynn, 1 H. Blac. 206.
e 2 Mad. Pr. Chan. 466.
7 1785, ch. 72, B. 25.
8 1818, ch.193, B. 4.
9 Harvey v. East India Company, 2 Vern. 395; s. c. Pree. Chan. 129; Com.
Dig. tit. Franchises, F. 19.
1

! 1818, ch. 193, s.4.

1

9 Harvey v. East India Company, 2 Vern. 395; e. c. Prec. Chan. 129; Com.

3

Dig. tit. Franchises, F. 19.
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gard to the extent of the liability of the members of the body politic

as may be deemed proper and lawful.1
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Whereupon it is ordered that a writ of distringas be issued as

prayed by the said petition of the plaintiffs, which writ is hereby

directed to be indorsed and levied as above prescribed.

[Soon after the president and directors of the Franklin Bank of

Baltimore put in their answer, and, after hearing, the bill of complaint

was dismissed as to them.]

(See cases cited to People v. MorriB, infra, p. 234.)

Sec. 43. Same.

THE PEOPLE v. MORRIS.'

1835. ^N THE Supreme Court of New York. 13 Wendell (N.Y.)

325-337-

gard to the extent of the liability of the members of the body politic
as may be deemed proper and lawful. 1
Whereupon it is ordered that a writ of d£str£ngas be issued as
prayed by the said petition of the plaintiffs, which writ is hereby
directed to be indorsed and levied as above prescribed.
[Soon after the president and directors of the Franklin Bank of
Baltimore put in their answer, and, after hearing, the bill of complaint
was dismissed as to them.]
(See cases cited to People v. Morris, infra, p. 234.)

[Error from the St. Lawrence oyer and terminer. The defendant

was tried on an indictment for selling spirituous liquors and •permit-

ting the same to be drank in his grocery store, without having ob-

tained a license as a tavern keeper.

See. 43. Same.

The village charter of 1824 authorized the trustees to regulate and

THE PEOPLE v. MORRIS.1

"license grocers, and keepers of victualing houses, where fruit victuals
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and liquor shall be sold to be eaten or drank in such houses or grocer-

ies." In 1830 the revised statutes went into effect and provided

1835.

IN

THE SUPREME

CouRT OF NEw YORK.

13 Wendell (N.Y.)

that only certain excise commissioners could grant licenses to sell

32 5-337.

liquors and wines to tavern and inn-keepers to be drank in their

houses, and licenses to grocers should be granted to sell only in five-

gallon quantities or over, but not to be drank in their houses. De-

fendant had obtained his license from the village authorities under the

charter, and admitted the selling in his grocery to be drank there, after

the revised statutes went into effect.]

By the court, Nelson, J. The defendant insists that the stat-

ute under which he has been convicted is inoperative, upon the

grounds. (1) That the power or franchise of the corporation of the

village of Ogdensburgh to grant licenses to grocers to sell spirituous

liquors to be drank in their houses is a vested right, and can not be

impaired or taken away; and (2) That if such power can be taken

away, it can be done only by bill having the assent of two-thirds of

the members elected to each branch of the legislature, in conformity

to the ninth section of the seventh article of the constitution of the

state.

As to the first objection urged by the defendant, the only limita-

l2 Mad. Pr. Chan. 466; Salmon v. The Hamborough Company, 1 Cha."

Caa. 204; Adley v. The Whitestable Company, 17 Ves. 324; s. c. I Meriv. 107.

'Statement of facta abridged. Much of the opinion omitted.

[Error from the St. Lawrence oyer and terminer. The defendant
was tried on an indictment for selling sp£r£tuous #quors and perm£tt£ng the same to be drank in his grocery store, without having obtained a license as a tavern keeper.
The village charter of 1824 authorized the trustees to regulate and
"license grocers, and keepers of victualing houses, where fruit victuals
and liquor shall be sold to be eaten or drank in such houses or groceries." In 1830 the revised statutes went into effect and provided
that only certain excise commissioners could grant licenses to sell
liquors and wines to tavern and inn-keepers to be drank in their
houses, and licenses to grocers should be granted to sell only in fivegallon quantities or over, but not to be drank £n the£r houses. Defendant had obtained his license from the village authorities under the
charter, and admitted the selling in his grocery to be drank there, after
the revised statutes went into effect.]
By the court, NELSON, J. The defendant insists that the statute under which he has been convicted is inoperative, upon the
grounds, ( 1) That the power or franchise of tlie corporation of the
village of Ogdensburgh to grant licenses to grocers to sell spirituous
liquors to be drank in their houses is a vested right, and can not be
impaired or taken away; and ( 2) That if such power can be taken
away, it can be done only by bill having the assent of two-thfrds of
the members elected to each branch of the legislature, in conformity
to the ninth section of the seventh article of the constitution of the
state.
As to the first objection urged by the defendant, the only limita12 Mad. Pr. Chan. 466; Salmon v. The Hamborougb Company, 1 Cha. '
Oas. 204; Adley v. The Whitestable Company, 17 Ves. 324; s. c. 1Meriv.107.
1
Statement of facts abridged. Much of the opinion omitted.
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found either in the constitution of the United States or of this state,

THE PEOPLE V. MORRIS.

or in the natural and inherent rights of the citizens, which they can not

tion to the powers of the legislative department that can exist must be
found either in the constitution of the United States or of this state,
or in the natural and inherent rights of the citizens, which they can not
part with or be deprived of by the society to which they belong. • •
Vested rights are indefinite terms, and of extensive signification,
not unfrequently resorted to when no better argument exists, in cases
neither within tbe reason nor spirit of the principle. Rights in one
sense vested, that is, vested as it regards every other body or power
except the government, are numerous, and the subject of common
regulation and even abrogation. All general and local laws, restraining the free action of the citizen as to person or property, the imposition of burthens and of duties, partake more or less of this character,
and may be referred to in illustration of the remark. Government was
instituted for the purpose of modifying and regulating these rights with a
view to the general good, and under the constitution the mode by which
it was thought this great object might best be attained was left to the
wisdom and direction of the people themselves, acting through the
medium of their representatives. We may concede to the defendant
that if any rights vested under the national or state constitutions, or
others inherent and inalienable, and, therefore, also vested, have been
violated by any provision of the revised statutes, such provision is inoperative and void. But if such rights have not been violated, we do
not perceive how its penalties can be eluded. Now the defendant's
rights are in no way improperly interfered with by the revised statutes, except so far as there may be an infraction of the corporate
privileges of the village, because it will not be pretended that the
right to sell spirituous liquors falls within the most extended class of
vested rights. Nor can it be claimed that the right of any corporator,
in his individual capacity, has been at all touched by this statute. It
acts solely and exclusively upon the powers and prt'vt'leges previously
conferred upon the whole or aggregate body of citizens by the village
charter. It is this power, thus previously granted to the corporation,
which the revised statutes intended to modify, not the private rights
of an individual member of it.
What was the power thus conferred by the village charter? We
answer that it was wholly political. Instead of prescribing at their
discretion every duty to be performed, and forbidding every act to be
avoided, in a word, directing the whole system of government to be
observed and executed, the legislature have merely defined the outlines and leading principles, and conferred upon the inhabitants,
within the bounds of the corporation, the power at discretion to fill
up :md carry them into operation. Strictly speaking, individual
rights or private interests are no more involved in the arrangement
than they are in the general laws passed with reference to the government of a town, a county or the state. Their rights, as citizens of the
• government, subject to its control, and to be so regulated and directed
as to harmonize with the general good, arc those and those only,
within the contemplation of the charter. • • •

part with or be deprived of by the society to which they belong. * *

Vested rights are indefinite terms, and of extensive signification,

not unfrequently resorted to when no better argument exists, in cases

neither within the reason nor spirit of the principle. Rights in one

sense vested, that is, vested as it regards every other body or power

except the government, are numerous, and the subject of common

regulation and even abrogation. All general and local laws, restrain-

ing the free action of the citizen as to person or property, the imposi-

tion of burthens and of duties, partake more or less of this character,

and may be referred to in illustration of the remark. Government was

instituted for the purpose of modifying and regulating these rights with a

view to the general good, and under the constitution the mode by which

it was thought this great object might best be attained was left to the

wisdom and direction of the people themselves, acting through the

medium of their representatives. We may concede to the defendant

that if any rights vested under the national or state constitutions, or
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others inherent and inalienable, and, therefore, also vested, have been

violated by any provision of the revised statutes, such provision is in-

operative and void. But if such rights have not been violated, we do

not perceive how its penalties can be eluded. Now the defendant's

rights are in no way improperly interfered with by the revised stat-

utes, except so far as there may be an infraction of the corporate

privileges of the village, because it will not be pretended that the

right to sell spirituous liquors falls within the most extended class of

vested rights. Nor can it be claimed that the right of any corporator,

in his individual capacity, has been at all touched by this statute. It

acts solely and exclusively upon the powers and privileges previously

conferred upon the whole or aggregate body of citizens by the village

charter. It is this power, thus previously granted to the corporation,

which the revised statutes intended to modify, not the private rights

of an individual member of it.

What was the power thus conferred by the village charter? We

answer that it was wholly political. Instead of prescribing at their

discretion every duty to be performed, and forbidding every act to be

avoided, in a word, directing the whole system of government to be

observed and executed, the legislature have merely defined the out-

lines and leading principles, and conferred upon the inhabitants,

within the bounds of the corporation, the power at discretion to fill

up and carry them into operation. Strictly speaking, individual

rights or private interests are no more involved in the arrangement

than they are in the general laws passed with reference to the govern-

ment of a town, a county or the state. Their rights, as citizens of the

• government, subject to its control, and to be so regulated and directed

as to harmonize with the general good, are those and those only,

within the contemplation of the charter. * * *
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[The constitution, article 7, section 9, provided: "The assent of

tvvo-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature

shall be requisite to every bill, etc., creating, continuing, altering,

or renewing any body politic or corporate."]

We are of the opinion the constitutional provision does not apply to

public corporations.1 That the village of Ogdensburgh is "a body

politic and corporate," is not denied. The charter falls within the

definition of Lord Coke and of other approved authors. "A body

politic," he says, "is a body to take in succession, framed as to its

capacity by policy, and therefore is called by Littleton (section 413) a

body politic; and it is called a corporation or body corporate because

the persons are made into a body, and are of capacity to take, grant,

etc., by a particular name." Viner's Abr. Corp. (02). A public

corporation is also defined to be, "an investing the people of the

place with the local government thereof." This latter description is

the most appropriate, and is justified by the history of these institu-

tions, and the nature of the powers with which they were and are in-

vested. • * *

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:14 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

The fact conceded that they are "bodies politic and corporate," is

not, by fair reasoning, necessarily conclusive. So are towns and

counties, for they come within one or other of the above or most ap-

proved definitions. They possess every requisite to constitute them

corporations, besides being declared to be so by statute, as are also

superintendents of the poor and trustees of school districts. 1 R. S.

337, 42 id. 364, 486, 617, 498. Each town, as a body corporate, has

capacity to sue and be sued; to purchase and hold real estate; to

make such contracts and hold such personal property as may be neces-

sary to its corporate and administrative powers; and to make such

order for the disposition, regulation and use of its public property as

may be conducive to the interests of the inhabitants. Large powers

are also conferred, as has already appeared, in respect to their munic-

ipal and domestic regulations. So in respect to superintendents of the

poor. It is expressly declared (1 R. S. 617, § 16) "they shall be a

corporation by the name of the superintendents of the poor of the

county for which they shall be appointed, and shall possess the usual

powers of a corporation for public purposes." Large powers are

conferred upon them also to enable them to execute their trust, and

especially for the "good order and government of the place and poor-

houses belonging to the county, for the employment, relief, manage-

ment and government of the persons placed under their care." The

trustees elected in a town having lands belonging to it for the support

of the gospel, or of schools, or both, "shall be a corporation for the

purposes of their office, by the name of the 'Trustees of the Gospel

and School Lot,' " in the town in which they are elected. They shall

have power, "besides the ordinary powers of a corporation," to man-

age these lots, as particularly set forth in the statute. 1 R. S. 497, 8.

Other cases might be referred to. That they come within the letter

of the provision is not enough, unless the different bodies above

1 The subsequent case of Purely v. People, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 384, held that this

constitutional provision applied "to public as well as private corporations.

[The constitution, article 7, section 9, provided: "The assent of
two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature
shall be requisite to every bill, etc., creating, continuing, altering,
or renewing any body politic or corporate.'']
We are of the opinion the constitutional provision does not apply to
public corporations.1 That the village of Ogdensburgh is "a body
politic and corporate,'' is not denied. The charter falls within the
definition of Lord Coke and of other approved authors. 11 A body
politic," he says, "is a body to take in succession, framed as to its
capacity by policy, and therefore is called by Littleton (section 413) a
body politic; and it is called a corporation or body corporate because
the persons are made into a body, and are of capacity to take, grant,
etc., by a particular name." Viner's Ahr. Corp. (az). A public
corporation is also defined to be, "an investing the people of the
place with the local government thereof." This latter description is
the most appropriate, and is justified by the history of these institutions, and the nature of the powers with which they were and are invested. • • •
The fact conceded that they are "bodies politic and corporate," is
not, by fair reasoning, necessarily conclusive. So are towns and
counties, for they come within one or other of the above or most approved definitions. They possess every requisite to constitute them
corporations, besides being declared to be so by statute, as are also
superintendents of the poor and trustees of school districts. 1 R. S.
337, 42 id. 364, 486, 617, 498. Each town, as a body corporate, has
capacity to sue and be sued; to purchase and hold real estate; to
make such contracts and hold such personal property as may be necessary to its corporate and administrative powers; and to make such
order for the disposition, regulation and use of its public property as
may be conducive to the interests of the inhabitants. Large powers
are also conferred, as has already appeared, in respect to their municipal and domestic regulations. So in respect to superintendents of the
poor. It is expressly declared (1 R. S. 617, § 16) "they shall be a
corporation by the name of the superintendents of the poor of the
county for which they shall be appointed, and shall possess the usual
powers of a corporation for public purposes." Large powers are
conferred upon them also to enable them to execute their trust, and
especially for the ".good order and government of the place and poorhouses belonging to the county, for the employment, relief, management and government of the persons placed under their care." The
trustees elected in a town having lands belonging to it for the support
of the gospel, or of schools, or both, "shall be a corporation for the
purposes of their office, by the name of the 'Trustees of the Gospel
and School Lot,' " in the town in which they are elected. They shall
have power, "besides the ordinary powers of a corporation," to manage these lots, as particularly set forth in the statute. 1 R. S. 497, 8.
Other cases might be referred to. That they come within the letter
of the provision is not enough, unless the different bodies above
1
The subsequent ruse of Purdy v. People, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 384, held that tilis
constitutional provision applied to public as well as private corporations.
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alluded to are also included, which probably will not be pretended;

THE PEOPLE V. MORRIS .

for, if so, most of the legislation of the state must be in conformity

to this provision of the constitution.

alluded to are also included, which probably will not be pretended;
for, if so, most of the legislation of the state must be in conformity
to this provision of the constitution.
Are they within the evil this provision was designed to remedy?
No one, I think, acquainted with the history of the times, or with the
introduction of this clause into the constitution, will venture upon this
ground. It may be fortunate for truth, and what is deemed a sound
exposition of this provision, that all who may desire to examine it can
recur to his own recollection and challenge that of others upon this
point. We think we hazard nothing in asserting that the multiplication of cities or villages by the legislature has at no time been a subject of complaint. Only four of the former existed in the state at the
adoption of the constitution. The latter, which were somewhat numerous, have always been viewed by the people of the state as a matter
in which the inhabitants of the village were exclusively interested, and
to be left to their option. But private incorporations had multiplied
to an extent that had attracted public attention, especially banki'ng instituti'ons. These had been sought for with zeal, and their enactment
attended with circumstances that awakened public suspicion and
alarm. So extreme had the evil become at one period of our history,
that the chief magistrate of the state felt it his duty to exercise the
power then existing in the constitution, of proroguing the legislature,
and was triumphantly sustained by the people in the execution of this ·
high and delicate trust. The fact affords strong evidence of the deep
impression made upon the public mind as to these and simi'lar private
corporations, and of the scope and purpose of the clause on this subject. If we resort to the history of its introduction into the new constitution, the above view will be confirmed. Mr. King, chairman of
the committee of the legislath·e department, reported the section; and
when it came under consideration, said that the committee had looked
upon the multiplication of corporations as an evil; they had been
created for a great variety of purposes ; they were exceptions to the
common law; they could not be proceeded against in the ordinary way
of prosecutions against individuals in courts of justice; they ought not
to be increased, but should be diminished as far as could be done consistently with the preservation of vested rights. It is obvious, though
the language used in the clau c in question is general, that the honorable chairman had in his mind (and he spoke for the committee) the
case of private corporations; that the great inducement to the adoption
of the clause was a check upon them ; and that the organization of
communities, and the investing them with the privileges of mere
municipal jurisdiction and authority, were not at all in contemplation.
The distinction between public and private corporations is strongly
marked, and, as to all essential purposes, they correspond only in
name. We speak of the erection of a town or a county, and the
term would be just as appropriate when applied to cities or villages.
They are severally political institutions, erected to be employed in the

Are they wifhin the evil this provision was designed to remedy?

No one, I think, acquainted with the history of the times, or with the

introduction of this clause into the constitution, will venture upon this

ground. It may be fortunate for truth, and what is deemed a sound

exposition of this provision, that all who may desire to examine it can

recur to his own recollection and challenge that of others upon this

point. We think we hazard nothing in asserting that the multiplica-

tion of cities or villages by the legislature has at no time been a sub-

ject of complaint. Only four of the former existed in the state at the

adoption of the constitution. The latter, which were somewhat numer-

ous, have always been viewed by the people of the state as a matter

in which the inhabitants of the village were exclusively interested, and

to be left to their option. But private incorporations had multiplied

to an extent that had attracted public attention, especially banking in-

stitutions. These had been sought for with zeal, and their enactment

attended with circumstances that awakened public suspicion and
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alarm. So extreme had the evil become at one period of our history,

that the chief magistrate of the state felt it his duty to exercise the

power then existing in the constitution, of proroguing the legislature,

and was triumphantly sustained by the people in the execution of this

high and delicate trust. The fact affords strong evidence of the deep

impression made upon the public mind as to these and similar private

corporations, and of the scope and purpose of the clause on this sub-

ject. If we resort to the history of its introduction into the new con-

stitution, the above view will be confirmed. Mr. King, chairman of

the committee of the legislative department, reported the section; and

when it came under consideration, said that the committee had looked

upon the multiplication of corporations as an evil; they had been

created for a great variety of purposes; they were exceptions to the

common law; they could not be proceeded against in the ordinary way

of prosecutions against individuals in courts of justice; they ought not

to be increased, but should be diminished as far as could be done con-

sistently with the preservation of vested rights. It is obvious, though

the language used in the clause in question is general, that the honor-

able chairman had in his mind (and he spoke for the committee) the

case of private corporations; that the great inducement to the adoption

of the clause was a check upon them; and that the organization of

communities, and the investing them with the privileges of mere

municipal jurisdiction and authority, were not at all in contempla-

tion.

The distinction between public and private corporations is strongly

marked, and, as to all essential purposes, they correspond only in

name. We speak of the erection of a town or a county, and the

term would be just as appropriate when applied to cities or villages.

They are severally political institutions, erected to be employed in the
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government and governed, for but one party is concerned—the public;

and the inhabitants upon whom the powers and privileges are con-

ferred are mere trustees, who hold and exercise such powers for the

public good. The only interest involved is the public interest, and no

other is concerned in their creation, continuance, alteration or renewal.

The nature and operation of these corporations repudiate the idea of

vested rights, and, therefore, no evil arising out of them could have

influenced the convention. We know of no vested rights of political

power, in any citizen or body of citizens, except those conferred by

the constitution. That is our bill of rights, and is analogous to those

granted to kingdoms or minor communities, such as towns and

cities, by princes and superior lords on the continent, or by the crown

of England.

Private corporations are the private property of the corporators.

They are designed to regulate private interests. Large investments

are made in pursuance of their authority, and the tenure by which

such corporate property is held is like that of an individual to his
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farm or personal estate; and an invasion of such corporate power is

like a violation of private right. One of the strongest reasons why

these private corporations should be cautiously granted arises from

the inviolability of the rights acquired under them; for notwithstand-

ing the reserved power in the charter to modify or repeal, an inter-

ference seriously affecting this species of property is calculated to

shake public confidence in the security of these corporations gener-

ally, and might and probably would be immediately disastrous to

the property invested under their faith, in the particular instance in

which the legislature exercised its reserved power. This wide dis-

tinction was well known to the members of the convention, and shows

that the clause in the constitution may be fully satisfied by confining

its operation to the case of private corporations. Nor can it be ad-

mitted that it was intended to restrict the action of the legislature, in

the municipal regulations of the state, as to one place more than an-

other, or that less latitude was to be given to such regulations in the

government of the citizens residing within the bounds of cities and

villages than of those residing in towns and counties. The nature

and object of the power exercised and the claims of those concerned,

are alike, and it is difficult to discover any solid reason for the dis-

tinction. All our public laws, civil and criminal, however impor-

tant or severe their operation, enacted for the good government of

the people throughout the state, are passed by majority votes', and

it would be inconceivably strange if laws passed with a view to a

more perfect government of a particular place (laws better adapted

to the organization of society and the business and conditions of the

governed residing in small districts), should depend upon a different

and greatly restricted rule of action on the part of the legislature.

Judgment affirmed.

internal government of the state. There ' is no contract between the
government and governed, for but one party is concerned-the public;
and the inhabitants upon whom the powers and privileges are conferred are mere trustees, who hold and exercise such powers for the
public good. The only interest involved is the public interest, and no
other is concerned in their creation, continuance, alteration or renewal.
The nature and operation of these corporations repudiate the idea of
vested rights, and, therefore, no evil arising out of them could have
influenced the convention. We know of no vested rights of poNtical
power, in any dtizen or body of citizens, except those conferred by
the constitution. That is our bill of rights, and is analogous to those
granted to kingdoms or minor communities, such as towns and
cities, by princes and superior lords on the continent, or by the crown
of England.
Private corporations are the private property of the corporators.
They are designed to regulate private interests. Large investments
are made in pursuance of their authority, and the tenure by which
such corporate property is held is like that of an individual to his
farm or personal estate; and an invasion of such corporate power is
like a violation of private right. One of the strongest reasons why
these private corporations should be cautiously granted arises from
the inviolability of the rights acquired under them; for notwithstanding the reserved power in the charter to modify or repeal, an interference seriously affecting this species of property is calculated to
shake public confidence in the security of these corporations generally, and might and probably would be immediately disastrous to
the property invested under their faith, in the particular instance in
which the legislature exercised its reserved power. This wide distinction was well known to the members of the convention, and shows
that the clause in the constitution may be fully satisfied by confining
it operation to the case of private corporations. Nor can it be admitted that it was intended to restrict the action of the legislature, in
the municipal regulations of the state, as to one place more than another, or that less latitude was to be given to such regulations in the
gO\·emment of the citizens residing within the bounds of cities and
villages than of those residing in towns and counties. The nature
and object of the power exercised and the claims of those concerned,
are alike, and it is difficult to discover any solid reason for the distinction. All our public laws, civil and criminal, however important or severe their operation, enacted for the good government of
the people throughout the state, are passed by majority votes; and
it would be inconceivably strange if laws passed with a view to a
more perfect government of a particular place (laws better adapted
to the organization of society and the business and conditions of the
governed residing in small districts), should depend upon a different
and greatly restricted rule of action on the part of the legislature.
Judgment affirmed.
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Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Wabash, St. L., etc., R., 61 Fed. Rep. 993; 1891,
Downing v. Ind. St. Bd. of Ag., 129 Ind. 443, 35 Am. & Eng. C. C. 216; 1890,
Wolfe v. Underwood, 91 Ala. 523, 8 So. Rep. 774; 1889, State v. District of
Narragansett, 16 R. I. 424, 24 Am . & Eng. C. C. 131; 1889, Appeal of Pittsburgh, 123 Pa. St. 374, 25 Am. & Eng. C. C. 364; 1888, Turlock Irrigation
Diet. v. Williams, 76 Cal. 360, 22 Am. & Eng. C. C. 198; 1888, Wambersie v.
Orange Humane Soc., 84 Va. 446, 28 Am. & Eng. C. C. 83; 1885, Hockett v.
State, 105 Ind. 2.50; 1883, Pierce v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. St. 150; 1876,
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; 1869, Miners' Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach, 37 Cal.
543, 99 Am. Dec. 300; 1868, Foster v. Fowler, 60 Pa, St. 27; 1866, Commonw.
v. Lowell Gas Co., 12 Allen (Mass.) 75; 1862, State of Iowa v. Wapello Co., 13
Iowa 388, on 400-403; 1850, Mills v. Williams, 11 Ire. (N. C.) Law 558;
1842, Inhabitants of Worcester v. Western R. Co., 4 Met. (Mass.) 564; 1841,
Ten Eyck v. Canal Co., 18 N. J. L . 200; 1819, Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, infra, p. 708,
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Sec. 44. Same. (1) Private corporations, as to the method of

acquiring or losing membership, are:

1. Stock, or
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2. Non-stock.
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Sec. 44. Same. ( 1)

Private corporations, as to the method of
acquiring or losing membership, are:

1882. In the Supreme Court of Ohio. 38 Ohio State Reports

281-299.

[Quo Warranto: The object of this action is, to oust the defend-

1.

ant, a corporation organized under section 3630 of the Revised

2.

Statutes, from its franchise to do business, as an insurance company,

Stock, or
Non-stock.

on the co-operative or assessment plan, as authorized by said section.

The ground alleged is misuser of its corporate privileges, and the

THE STATE v. THE STANDARD LIFE ASSOCIATION.1

exercise of rights and privileges not conferred by law. Among other

things it is specified as grounds for the judgment of ouster, that this

company has issued certificates of membership for the payment of

1882. IN

stipulated sums of money for the member's benefit, instead of the

THE

benefit of his family or heirs as the law authorizes; that it has issued

SUPREME CounT OF Omo.
281-299.

38 Ohio State Reports

such certificates to very aged and infirm persons without regard to

[Quo W ARRANTO: The object of this action is, to oust the defendant, a corporation organized under section 3630 of the Revised
Statutes, from its franchise to do business, as an insurance company,
on the co-operative or assessment plan, as authorized by said section.
The ground alleged is misuser of its corporate privileges, and the
exercise of rights and privileges not conferred by law. Among other
things it is specified as grounds for the judgment of ouster, that this
company has issued certificates of membership for the payment of
stipulated sums of money for the member's benefit, instead of the
benefit of his family or heirs as the law authorizes; that it has issued
such certificates to very aged and infirm persons without regard to
their prospects of life; that it has issued them for the benefit of
cousins, sons-in-law, and other relatives who are not of the family or
heirs of such member; that it has delayed the approval of proofs of
death, and making the proper assessments to pay in case of death;
and that it has treated others than the family or heirs as beneficiaries,
making assessments against them, and looking to them and not to the
member for the payment.

their prospects of life; that it has issued them for the benefit of

cousins, sons-in-law, and other relatives who are not of the family or

heirs of such member; that it has delayed the approval of proofs of

death, and making the proper assessments to pay in case of death;

and that it has treated others than the family or heirs as beneficiaries,

making assessments against them, and looking to them and not to the

member for the payment.

1 Statement of facts abridged, part of opinion omitted.
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The answer puts in issue these allegations, and avers that the defend-
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ant is doing a business authorized by law.]
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Johnson, J. This association was incorporated September 1, 1880.

The record of the company shows that seven persons, to wit: D. R.

Johnston, W. H. Carter, J. B. Netscher, Jerry Shank, George W.

Cole, S. W. Anderson and John F. Wood, met on that day in Mans-

field for the purpose, as is stated, of organizing an association "to

furnish mutual protection and relief to its members," under section

3630 of the Revised Statutes; Mr. Anderson was made chairman of

the meeting, and he thereupon presented a plan of operations, which

was unanimously adopted. What that plan was does not appear from

the record of the company, but is subsequently disclosed in the pro-

ceedings and acts of the association.

At the same meeting, those present drew up, and five of them ex-

ecuted, articles of incorporation, which were subsequently authenticated

and filed with the secretary of state, under which they became a body

corporate.

Before adjourning, and, of course, before they had become incor-

porated, these seven persons proceeded to elect themselves "officers
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and trustees" of the association for one year, giving to each an office,

and also appointed an executive committee from among themselves.

It appears that by-laws were also adopted, but the record of the trus-

tees is silent as to their provisions. This record and the books of the

association show they proceeded to transact business as a corporation

soon after.

The certificate of corporation, after stating the name and place of

business, states the purpose of the association to be "to receive

money, either by voluntary donation or contribution, or to collect the

same by assessment of its members, and to distribute and appropriate

the same to the families or heirs of its deceased members, in such

manner as may be prescribed by the rules and regulations of the asso-

ciation, not inconsistent with the laws of Ohio, and so as to carry out

the objects and purposes of the association as above expressed." The

section of the Revised Statutes authorizing such a corporation is as

follows:

"Section 3630. A company or association may be organized for

the mutual protection and relief of its members, and for the pay-

ment of stipulated sums of money to the families or heirs of the de-

ceased members of such company or association,* and may receive

money, either by voluntary donation or contribution, or collect the

same by assessment on its members, and may distribute, invest and

appropriate the same in such manner as it may deem proper; but the

aggregate sum stipulated to be paid to the family or heirs of any

member at his decease shall in no case exceed $7,000, nor shall any

assessment on account of the death of any member be made against

any surviving member exceeding one-fifth of one per centum stipu-

lated to be paid to such survivor at his decease, and such association

shall not be subject to the preceding sections of this chapter."

The answer puts in issue these allegations, and avers that the defendant is doing a business authorized by law.]
JoHNSON, J. This association was incorporated September 1, 1880.
The record of the company shows that seve~ persons, to wit: D.R.
Johnston, W. H. Carter, J. B. Netscher, Jerry Shank, George W.
Cole, S. W. Anderson and John F. Wood, met on that day in Mansfield for the purpose, as is stated, of organizing an association "to
furnish mutual protection and relief to its members," under section
3630 of the Revised Statutes; Mr. Anderson was made chairman of
the meeting, and he thereupon presented a plan of operations, which
was unanimously adopted. What that plan was does not appear from
the record of the company, but is subsequently disclosed in the proceedings and acts of the association.
At the same meeting, those present drew up, and five of them executed, articles of incorporation, which were subsequently authenticated
and filed with the secretary of state, under which they became a body
corporate.
Before adjourning, and, of course, before they had become incorporated, these seven persons proceeded to elect themselves "officers
and trustees" of the association for one year, giving to each an office,
and also appointed an executive committee from among themselves.
It appears that by-laws were also adopted, but the record of the trustees is silent as to their provisions. This record and the books of the
association show they proceeded to transact business as a corporation
soon after.
The certificate of corporation, after stating the name and place of
business, states the purpose of the association to be "to receive
money, either by voluntary donation or contribution, or to collect the
same by assessment of its members, and to distribute and appropriate
the same to the families or heirs of its deceased members, in such
manner as may be prescribed by the rules and regulations of the association, not inconsistent with the la\vs of Ohio, and so as to carry out
the objects and purposes of the association as above expressed." The
section of the Revised Statutes authorizing such a corporation is as
follows:
" Section 3630. A company or association ~ay be organized for
the mutual protection and relief of its members, and for the payment of stipulated sums of money to the families or heirs of the deceased members of such company or association ; and may receive
money, either by voluntary donation or contribution, or collect the
same by assessment on its members, and may distribute , inve st and
appropriate the same in such manner as it may deem proper ; but the
aggregate sum stipulated to be paid to the family or heirs of any
member at his decease shall in no case exceed $7 1000, nor shall any
assessment on account of the death of any member be made against
any surviving member exceeding one-fifth of one per centum stipulated to be paid to such survivor at his decease, ar.d such association
shall not be subject to the preceding sections of this chapter."
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It will be noticed that this section authorizes such corporation for

the mutual protection and relief of its members, and also for the pay-

236

ment of stipulated sums of money to the family or heirs of the de-
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ceased members. The certificate of incorporation is silent as to

It will be noticed that this section authorizes such corporation for
th.e mutual protection and relief of its members, and also for the payment of stipulated sums of money to the family or heirs of the deceased members. The certificate of incorporation is silent as to
furnishing mutual protection and relief to members. It limits the
scheme, so far as relief is concerned, to the distribution of its funds to
the family or heirs of deceased members.
It does not purport, therefore, to afford any relief or protection to
its members, but only to provide for their family or heirs after their
decease. It is in no sense, therefore, according to the charter, a mutual
aid association to members, but a mutual insurance company of
members, for the benefit of the family or heirs of members.
It has issued what are termed certificates of membership, but the
real nature of the contract is that of insurance.
The so-called member, for in fact he is not treated as a member of
the corporate body, contracts to pay an admission fee, and annual
dues of specified amounts, and a stated assessment for each death in
the class to which he belongs, in consideration of which the company
agrees to pay his beneficiary named the assessment collected (less the
deductions stated hereafter), not exceeding the amount of insurance
named in the certificate, which is either $2,<X>O or $3,<XX>·
In Commonwealth v. Wetherbe, 105 Mass. 149, it was held, that
such a contract was one of insurance, whatever be the terms of payment of the consideration by the assured, or the mode of payment of
the sum to be paid in the event of loss, and although the object of the
insurer, in making the contract, is benevolent and not speculative.
It was further held in that case that it was none the less a contract
of mutual insurance because the amount to be paid is not a gross sum,
but one graduated by the number of members, nor because a portion of the premiums are to be paid upon uncertain periods of the
d eath of members, nor because in case of non-payment of assessments
the contract provides no mode of enforcing payment thereof but
merely declares the contract forfeited.
From the specific terms of the charter, as well as from the tenor of
certificates of membership, the contract entered into is one of insurance on the lives of members, and not one for the mutual protection
and relief of its members.
Whether it is competent to become a corporation for that single
purpose when the .statute authorizes such corporations for the double
purpose of mutual protection and relief of its members , and also for
life insurance for the benefit of the family or heirs of such members,
is a question we need not now stop to answer, as the petition admits
that the association was duly incorporated.
Section 3630 provides, however, that these corporations shall not
be subject to the preceding sections of the chapter, relating to life
insurance companies "on the mutual or stock plan." Chapter 10,
sections 3587 to 3629, Revised Statutes.
This leads to the inquiry, to what extent they are regulated by law,

furnishing mutual protection and relief to members. It limits the

scheme, so far as relief is concerned, to the distribution of its funds to

the family or heirs of deceased members.

It does not purport, therefore, to afford any relief or protection to

its members, but only to provide for their family or heirs after their

decease. It is in no sense, therefore, according to the charter, a mutual

aid association to members, but a mutual insurance company of

members, for the benefit of the family or heirs of members.

It has issued what are termed certificates of membership, but the

real nature of the contract is that of insurance.

The so-called member, for in fact he is not treated as a member of

the corporate body, contracts to pay an admission fee, and annual

dues of specified amounts, and a stated assessment for each death in

the class to which he belongs, in consideration of which the company

agrees to pay his beneficiary named the assessment collected (less the

deductions stated hereafter), not exceeding the amount of insurance
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named in the certificate, which is either $2,000 or $3,000.

In Commonwealth v. Wetherbe, 105 Mass. 149, it was held, that

such a contract was one of insurance, whatever be the terms of pay-

ment of the consideration by the assured, or the mode of payment of

the sum to be paid in the event of loss, and although the object of the

insurer, in making the contract, is benevolent and not speculative.

It was further held in that case that it was none the less a contract

of mutual insurance because the amount to be paid is not a gross sum,

but one graduated by the number of members, nor because a por-

tion of the premiums are to be paid upon uncertain periods of the

death of members, nor because in case of non-payment of assessments

the contract provides no mode of enforcing payment thereof but

merely declares the contract forfeited.

From the specific terms of the charter, as well as from the tenor of

certificates of membership, the contract entered into is one of insur-

ance on the lives of members, and not one for the mutual protection

and relief of its members.

Whether it is competent to become a corporation for that single

purpose when the statute authorizes such corporations for the double

purpose of mutual protection and relief of its members, and also for

life insurance for the benefit of the family or heirs of such members,

is a question we need not now stop to answer, as the petition admits

that the association was duly incorporated.

Section 3630 provides, however, that these corporations shall not

be subject to the preceding sections of the chapter, relating to life

insurance companies "on the mutual or stock plan." Chapter 10,

sections 3587 to 3629, Revised Statutes.

This leads to the inquiry, to what extent they are regulated by law,
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and to what extent such associations may adopt their own rules and

regulations?

STOCK AND NON-STOCK CORPORATIONS.

Though not subject to the provisions relating to life insurance in

237

chapter 10, they are subject to the general provisions relating to cor-

porations found in chapter 1 of title 11 of the Revised Statutes.

That chapter provides for two classes of corporations, (1) those for

profit, which must have a capital stock, and (2) those not for profit,

which need not have a capital stock.

If it is of the first kind, its name must begin with "The," and end

with "Company," and in each kind the place of business and purpose

for which it is formed must be stated in the certificate. R. S., sec-

tion 3226. By section 3240 a majority of the subscribers to the arti-

cles of incorporation of a corporation, other than for profit, may elect

not less than five trustees, who shall hold their offices until the next

election, or until their successors are elected and qualified. In the

case at bar, the incorporators elected seven trustees for one year.

By section 3246, unless the regulations otherwise provide, the annual

election for trustees or directors shall be held (this section applies as

well to corporations not for profit as those for profit) on the first

Monday in January of each year. It further contemplates that the
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elective body consists of the "members" of the corporation in those

not for profit, and the "stockholders," in those for profit.

Section 3249 provides that every corporation may adopt a code of

regulations for its government, not inconsistent with the laws of the

state.

Section 3250 authorizes the trustees or directors of a corporation to

adopt a code of by-laws for their government not inconsistent with

the regulations of the corporation, or the constitution and laws of the

state, and may change them at pleasure, but section 3251 requires that

regulations may be adopted or changed by the assent in writing of two-

thirds of the stockholders, or, if there is no capital stock, of the mem-

bers, or by a majority of the stockholders or members, at a meeting

held for that purpose, of which due notice is given.

By section 3252, a corporation, by its regulations, when no other

provision is especially made in this title, may provide, first, for the

time, place, etc., of meetings; second, the number of stockholders or

members to make a quorum; third, the time for the election of trus-

tees or directors; fourth, the duties and compensation of officers;

fifth, the mode of filling and tenure of all offices other than trustees

or directors; and, sixth, the qualification of members when the corpo-

ration is not for profit.

By section 3261, the trustees of corporations, other than for profit,

are made personally liable for all debts by them contracted.

These are the chief provisions of the statute relating to corporations

other than for profit.

We are of opinion (1) That associations incorporated for the pur-

poses named in section 3630 are corporations other than for profit,

and to what extent such associations may adopt their own rules and
regulations?
Though not subject to the provisions relating to life insurance in
chapter 10, they are subject to the general provisions relating to corporations found in chapter 1 of title 11 of the Revised Statutes.
That chapter provides for two classes of corporations, ( 1) those for
profit, which must have a capital stock, and (2) those not for profit,
which need not have a capital stock.
If it is of the first kind, its name must begin with "The," and end
with "Company," and in each kind the place of business and purpose
for which it is formed must be stated in the certificate. R. S., section 3226. By section 3240 a majority of the subscribers to the articles of incorporation of a corporation, other than for profit, may elect
not less than five trustees, who shall hold their offices until the next
election, or until their successors are elected and qualified . In the
case at bar, the incorporators elected seven trustees for one year.
By section 3246, unless the regulations otherwise provide, the annual
election for trustees or directors shall be held (this section applies as
w ell to corporations not for profit as those for profit) on the first
Monday in January of each year. It further contemplates that the
elective body consists of the "members" of the corporation in those
not for profit, and the "stockholders," in those for profit.
Section 3249 provides that every corporation may adopt a code of
r egulations for its government, not inconsistent with the laws of the
state.
Section 3250 authorizes the trustees or directors of a corporation to
adopt a code of by-laws for thefr government not inconsistent with
the regulatt"ons of the corporation, or the constitution and laws of the
state, and may change them at pleasure, but section 3251 requires that
regulations may be adopted or changed by the assent in writing of twothirds of the stockholders, or, if there is no capital stock, of the members, or by a majority of the stockholders or members, at a meeting
held for that purpose, of which due notice is given.
By section 3252, a corporation, by its regulations, when no other
provision is especially made in this title, may provide, first, for the
time, place, etc., of meetings; second, the number of stockholders or
members to make a quorum; third, the time for the election of trustees or directors; fourth, the duties and compensation of officers ;
fifth, the mode of filling and tenure of all offices other than trustees
or directors; and, sixth , the qualification of members when the corporation is not for profit.
By section 3261, the trustees of corporations, other than for profit,
are made personally liable for all debts by them contracted.
These are the chief provisions of the statute relating to corporations
other than for profit.
We are of opinion ( 1) That associations incorporated for the purposes named in section 3630 are corporations other than for profit,
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and hence any plan or scheme which is intended to earn profits for its

238

trustees, managers or agents, is in violation of law.
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(2) That the members of such a corporation, and not the incorpo-

rators nor the first board of trustees, elected by them, are the elective

and hence any plan or scheme which is intended to earn profits for its
trustees, managers or agents, is in violation of law.
(2) That the members of such a corporation, and not the incorporators nor the first board of trustees, elected by them, are the elective
body. These members, and not the trustees or incorporators, are authorized to elect trustees, and adopt regulations for the government
of the corporation in the transaction of its business. Hence the trustees are the chosen agents of the members. They have no authority
to adopt or alter regulations, nor to prescribe their terms of office,
though they may make by-laws for their government and change them
at pleasure.
The facts in this case show that this association has been organized
and is doing business in direct violation of these provisions of law.
I. The members of the corporation have had no voice in th~ election of trustees or in the management of its affairs. The incorporators,
at the first meeting to organize, elected themselves trustees for one
year. At the end of that year these same trustees re-elected themselves; the meeting, as the record shows, was the annual meeting of
the trustees, and all being present.
On January 25, 1882, they adopted a new code of "by-laws, rules
and regulations," by which they provided that they should hold office
during life, and in case of vacancy by death or resignation, or removal for good cause, which could be done by a majority vote, such
vacancy should be filled by the remaining trustees. Thus they arrogated to themselves all authority. They made regulations, and conducted the whole businesss on the theory that the members had no
voice. They were under no obligations to become members, and
most of them were not.
They thus became a perpetual body, invested with all the franchises
and powers which the statute vested in the members.
II. The plan upon which the business has been don@, was to make
money for these trustees and their agents.
These self-constituted trustees clothed themselves with supreme
and perpetual power, and then proceeded to manage this self-imposed
trust for their own interest, and at the expense of their over-confiding
members, or their speculative beneficiaries. I am aware this is a
serious charge, but it is not made without the most convincing e,·idence, taken from the books and papers of the company. • • •
This is not the case of exceptional excess of corporate power.
The whole plan of operations, and their practical exemplification,
manifest a carefully formed purpose to make money for the trustees.
It is a speculative insurance company, in a most objectionable form.
To prolong its existence and thus enable the trustees to continue in
such business, would be a failure of duty on the part of the court.
Judgment of ouster.
OKEY, C. J., took no part in the decision of this case.

body. These members, and not the trustees or incorporators, are au-

thorized to elect trustees, and adopt regulations for the government

of the corporation in the transaction of its business. Hence the trus-

tees are the chosen agents of the members. They have no authority

to adopt or alter regulations, nor to prescribe their terms of office,

though they may make by-laws for their government and change them

at pleasure.

The facts in this case show that this association has been organized

and is doing business in direct violation of these provisions of law.

I. The members of the corporation have had no voice in the elec-

tion of trustees or in the management of its affairs. The incorporators,

at the first meeting to organize, elected themselves trustees for one

year. At the end of that year these same trustees re-elected them-

selves; the meeting, as the record shows, was the annual meeting of

the trustees, and all being present.

On January 25, 1882, they adopted a new code of "by-laws, rules

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:14 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

and regulations," by which they provided that they should hold office

during life, and in case of vacancy by death or resignation, or re-

moval for good cause, which could be done by a majority vote, such

vacancy should be filled by the remaining trustees. Thus they arro-

gated to themselves all authority. They made regulations, and con-

ducted the whole businesss on the theory that the members had no

voice. They were under no obligations to become members, and

most of them were not.

They thus became a perpetual body, invested with all the franchises

and powers which the statute vested in the members.

II. The plan upon which the business has been done, was to make

money for these trustees and their agents.

These self-constituted trustees clothed themselves with supreme

and perpetual power, and then proceeded to manage this self-imposed

trust for their own interest, and at the expense of their over-confiding

members, or their speculative beneficiaries. I am aware this is a

serious charge, but it is not made without the most convincing evi-

dence, taken from the books and papers of the company. * * *

This is not the case of exceptional excess of corporate power.

The whole plan of operations, and their practical exemplification,

manifest a carefully formed purpose to make money for the trustees.

It is a speculative insurance company, in a most objectionable form.

To prolong its existence and thus enable the trustees to continue in

such business, would be a failure of duty on the part of the court.

Judgment of ouster.

Okey, C. J., took no part in the decision of this case.

Note. 1858, Union Insurance Co. v. Hoge, 21 How. (62 U. 8.) 36; 1871,

Bryant v. Ohio Dental College, 1 an. Sup. Ct. Rep. (Ohio) 67, 307; 1887,

Note. 1858, Union Insurance Co. v. Hoge, 21 How. (62 U. 8.) 85; 1871,
Bryant v. Ohio Dental College, 1 Oin. Sup. Ct. Rep. (Ohio) 67, 807; 1887,
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Ohio College of Dental Surgery v. Rosenthal, 45 Ohio St. 183; 1889, Crawford

239

v. Gross (Pa. Com. PI.), 7 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 419, 7 R. & Corp. L. J. 123. See

Inflow, The Corporate Funds, p. 760; Lindley's Partnership, vol. 1, p. 5, etseq.;

"Stock, Its Nature and Transfer," by Henry Budd, Jr.,"7 So. Law Rev. 430.

It seems that originally the idea of a stock company was one in which each

member traded on his individual stock, but in accordance with rules laid

down by the company. The East India Company, incorporated in 1600, was

of this character originally—each voyage to the East Indies was on a separate

joint-stock, to which each member, if he wished, might contribute such sum

as he chose; each took shares in each voyage, as had been the immemorial

shipping customs of merchants. But in 1612 it was determined by the com-

pany that it would have one joint-stock—the aggregate of the subscriptions of

the members—all to be managed by the governor and directors of the com-

pany. Most of the trading companies afterward were either organized upon

or changed to this plan. See Cunningham's Growth of Eng. Indus., Modern

Times, pp. 124, 162, 225. In 1731 the colony of Connecticut incorporated the

New London Society for Trade and Commerce United, with a capital stock to

be controlled by members voting in proportion to their shares.

Ohio College of Dental Surgery v. Roeenthal, 45 Ohio St. 183; 1889, Crawford
v. Gross (Pa. Com . Pl.), 7 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 419, 7 R. & Corp. L. J. 123. See
b~Jow ,_ Thti Cor_porate FundS, J?. 760; Lindlt:y's.Partnersbi_p.. vol. i, p. 5, et seq. ;
••s tock, Its Xature and Transfer,• 1• by Henry Budd, Jr .. 7 So. Lil.w Rev. 430.
It s eems that originally the idea of a stock company was one in which each
IDember traded on bis individual stock, but in accordance with rules laid
down by the compariy. The East India Company, incorporated in 1600, was
of t his character originally-each voyage to the East Indies was on a separate
j o int-stock, to which each member, if he wished, might contribute such sum
as b e chose; each took shares in each voyage, as had been the immemorial
shipping customs of merchants. But in 1612 it was determined by the companv that it would have one joint-stock- the aggregate of the subscriptions of
t.he m e mbers-all to be managed by the governor and directors of the company. .Most of the trading companies afterward were either organized upon
or changed to this plan. See Cunningham's Growth of Eng. Indus., Modem
Times, pp. 124, 162, 225. In 1731 the colony of Connecticut incorporated the
N e w London Society for Trade and Commerce United, with a capital stock to
be controlled by members voting in proportion to their shares.
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Sec. 45. Same. (2) Private corporations, as to the perfection

of their organization, are:

1. De jure.

2. De facto.

3. By estoppel.

Sec. 45. Sa.me. ( 2) Private corporations, as to the perfection
of their organization, are:

CAPPS & McCREARY v. HASTINGS PROSPECTING COMPANY.1

1894. In the Supreme Court of Nebraska. 40 Nebraska Re-

De jure ._
De facto.
3. By estoppel.
1.
2.

ports, 470-478.

Error from district court of Adams county.

Ragan, C. J. The Hastings Prospecting Company sued Lucius J.

Capps and Willis P. McCreary, co-partners, doing business under

the name, firm and style of Capps & McCreary, in the district court

CAPPS & McCREARY v. HASTINGS PROSPECTING COMPANY.1

of Adams county, on a subscription or writing obligatory signed by

them, in words and figures, as follows: "For the purpose of organiz-

ing a corporation, with a capital stock of $15,000, to bore for gas,

1894.

oil or coal, at or near the city of Hastings, Adams county, Nebraska,

and to buy or lease the land to experiment thereon for such purposes,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA.
ports, 47<>-478.

40 Nebraska Re-

and to buy, lease or hire the necessary machinery and labor for such

purposes, we, the undersigned, agree to subscribe and pay for the

amount of stock set opposite our names, said stock to be paid for in

the manner following, to wit: Ten per cent, within thirty days from

the organization of said corporation, and the balance at the call of the

directors; provided, that said directors shall not have power to call

for more than 10 per cent, of said stock at any one time; and, pro-

vided further, that payment shall not be called for oftener than once

1 Arguments omitted.

Error from district court of Adams county.
RAGAN , C. J. The Hastings Prospecting Company sued Lucius J.
Capps and Willis P. McCreary, co-partners, doing business under
the name, firm and style of Capps & McCreary, in the district court
of Adams county, on a subscription or writing obligatory signed by
them, in words and figures, as follows: "For the purpose of organizing a corporation, with a capital stock of $15 ,000, to bore for gas,
oil or coal, at or near the city of Hastings, Adams county, Nebraska,
and to buy or lease the land to experiment thereon for such purposes,
and to buy, lease or hire the necessary machinery and labor for such
purposes, we, the undersigned, agree to subscribe and pay for the
amount of stock set opposite our names, said stock to be paid for in
the manner following, to wit: Ten per cent. within thirty days from
the organization of said corporation, and the balance at the call of the
directors; provided , that said directors shall not have power to call
for more than 10 per cent. of said stock at any one time; and, provided further, that payment shall not be called for oftener than once
1 Arguments
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a month. Names, Capps & McCreary; number of shares, ten shares;
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dollars, $100.00." The case was tried to the court, a jury being

CAPPS & M'CREARY V. HASTINGS PROSPECTING CO.
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waived, resulting in a finding and judgment in favor of the prospect-

ing company, and Capps & McCreary bring the case here for review.

a month. Names, Capps & McCreary; number of shares, ten shares ;
dollars, $100.00." The case was tried to the court, a jury being
waived, resulting in a finding and judgment in favor of the prospecting company, and Capps & McCreary bring the case here for review.
The only errors assigned are that the finding and judgment of the
court are contrary to the evidence and the law. The undisputed evidence in the case is that the plaintiffs in error and a number of other
citizens signed the subscription paper quoted above; that after the
$15,000 of stock had been subscribed the subscribers, or some of
them. met and elected a board of directors, adopted articles of incorporation, and filed a copy of the same in the office of the secretary of
state and the original in the office of the register of deeds of Adams
county, the county in which the principal place of business was fixed
by the articles of association. This incorporation, or attempted incorporation, occurred on the 15th day of April, 1889. The articles of
incorporation were never filed in the office of the county clerk of
Adams county. We have here then the questions: First, whether
the prospecting company failed to become, as it attempted, a corporation de jure by neglecting to file in the office of the county clerk it
articles of incorporation; second, and if it did, v.·hether such default
or failure on the part of the prospecting company is available as a defen se to the plaintiffs in error? The first inquiry which presents itself
is as to the nature of the agreement which the plaintiffs in error signed.
What did they promise to do? We think a fair construction of the
writing signed by them amounts to this: That they agreed to accept
and pay for ten shares of the capital stock of the corporation the ubscribers to the enterprise of boring for gas should organize, such payment to be made within thirty days after such corporation should be
organized. The next inquiry is, what is meant by the expression,
' ' when the corporation shall be organized"? It must be remembered
that the plaintiffs in error agreed to become stockholders in the corporation that should be formed, and a fair construction of this promise
is that they meant to become stockholders in a corporation de Jure
and not a corporation de facto. A de jure corporation is one ·who e
right to exercise a corporate function would prove invulnerable if a sailed by the state in quo warranto proceedings. The plaintiffs in
error might have been willing to invest a part of their capital towards
a public enterpri se and take their chances of the investment being remunerative, if no further liability would attach to them than that of
stockholders in a de jure corporation, when they would not have embarked the same money for the same pmpose in a partnership or a
de facto corporation, where they would a~sume liabilities greater than
those of stockholders in a de jure corporation. We hold, then , that
by the subscription signed by the plaintiffs in error they promised to
take and pay for ten shares of the capital stock of such de jure corporation as might be formed for the purpose for which the subscription
was made.
Is the Hastings Prospecting Company, or has it ever been, a de Jure

The only errors assigned are that the finding and judgment of the

court are contrary to the evidence and the law. The undisputed evi-

dence in the case is that the plaintiffs in error and a number of other

citizens signed the subscription paper quoted above; that after the

$15,000 of stock had been subscribed the subscribers, or some of

them, met and elected a board of directors, adopted articles of incor-

poration, and filed a copy of the same in the office of the secretary of

state and the original in the office of the register of deeds of Adams

county, the county in which the principal place of business was fixed

by the articles of association. This incorporation, or attempted in-

corporation, occurred on the 15th day of April, 1889. The articles of

incorporation were never filed in the office of the county clerk of

Adams county. We have here then the questions: First, whether

the prospecting company failed to become, as it attempted, a corpora-

tion de jure by neglecting to file in the office of the county clerk its

articles of incorporation; second, and if it did, whether such default
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or failure on the part of the prospecting company is available as a de-

fense to the plaintiffs in error? The first inquiry which presents itself

is as to the nature of the agreement which the plaintiffs in error signed.

What did they promise to do? We think a fair construction of the

writing signed by them amounts to this: That they agreed to accept

and pay for ten shares of the capital stock of the corporation the sub-

scribers to the enterprise of boring for gas should organize, such pay-

ment to be made within thirty days after such corporation should be

organized. The next inquiry is, what is meant by the expression,

"when the corporation shall be organized"? It must be remembered

that the plaintiffs in error agreed to become stockholders in the corpo-

ration that should be formed, and a fair construction of this promise

is that they meant to become stockholders in a corporation de jure

and not a corporation de facto. A de jure corporation is one whose

right to exercise a corporate function would prove invulnerable if as-

sailed by the state in quo -warranto proceedings. The plaintiffs in

error might have been willing to invest a part of their capital towards

a public enterprise and take their chances of the investment being re-

munerative, if no further liability would attach to them than that of

stockholders in a de jure corporation, when they would not have em-

barked the same money for the same purpose in a partnership or a

de facto corporation, where they would assume liabilities greater than

those of stockholders in a de jure corporation. We hold, then, that

by the subscription signed by the plaintiffs in error they promised to

take and pay for ten shares of the capital stock of such de jure corpo-

ration as might be formed for the purpose for which the subscription

was made.

Is the Hastings Prospecting Company, or has it ever been, a de jure
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corporation? It is admitted that it did not file in the office of the
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county clerk of Adams county, that being the county in which its

articles of incorporation fixed its principal place of business, its articles

of incorporation. Did this default prevent the Hastings Prospecting

Company from becoming a corporation de jure? The authorities are

not entirely in harmony on this question, but the weight of authority

is, that where the statute requires the articles of incorporation to be

filed with some public officer before the commencement by the pro-

posed corporation of the business for which it is organized, such filing

is a condition precedent to the right of such corporation to perform

any corporate function; consequently, until a compliance with the

statute, the corporation has no valid existence as a de jure corporation.

Morawctz, Private Corporations, section 27, says, "A substantial

compliance with all the terms of a general incorporation law is a pre-

requisite of the right of forming a corporation under it. Thus where

it is provided that a certificate or articles of association, setting forth

the purposes of the corporation about to be formed, the amount of the

capital, and other details, shall be filed with some public officer, a
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performance of this requirement is essential; and until it has been

performed, the association will have no right whatever to assume cor-

porate franchises." Cook on Stock and Stockholders, section 231,

speaking to this same subject, says: "Occasionally, however, it

happens that this certificate is not fully made out, as required by the

statute, or is not filed, or some other step prescribed by law is not

complied with. The corporation is then not duly incorporated; and

the state, by quo -warranto, may oust it from its user of corporate

franchises." In Doyle v. Mizner, 42 Mich. 332, it was ruled: "All

private corporations must be organized under general laws, and can

be valid only when strictly conforming to all the conditions imposed

on their completion." The court says: "The incorporation was

sought to be shown by asking Doyle, on cross-examination, concern-

ing the signing of a paper purporting to be articles of incorporation

which had been filed in the Detroit city clerk's office April 6, 1875.

This paper was not acknowledged, and was not filed in the county

clerk's office. * * * The statute concerning manufacturing cor-

porations expressly requires that the articles shall be 'acknowledged

before some person authorized by the laws of this state to take

acknowledgment of deeds.' » * • That before any such corpora-

tion shall commence business, the articles should be filed with the

secretary of state and county clerk;" and the court held-that by reason

of the failure to acknowledge and file in the office of the county clerk

the articles of incorporation, the association did not become a corpo-

ration de jure. To the same effect are Stowe v. Flagg, 72 111. 397;

Bigelow v. Gregory, 73 111. 197; Utley v. Union Tool Co., 11 Gray

(Mass.) 139; Unity Ins. Co. v. Cram, 43 N. H. 636; Childs v.

Smith, 46 N. Y. 34; Harris v. McGregor, 29 Cal. 125.

Section 126, chapter 16, Compiled Statutes, 1893, provides:

16—Wil. Casks.

corporation? It is admitted that it did not file in the office of the
county clerk of Adams county. that being the county in which its
articles of incorporation fixed its principal place of business, its articles
of incorporation. Did this default prevent the Hastings Prospecting
Company from becoming a corporation de Jure.2 The authorities are
not entirely in harmony on this question, but the weight of authority
is, that where the statute requires the articles of incorporation to be
filed with some public officer before the commencement by the proposed corporation of the business for which it is organized, such filing
is a condition precedent to the right of such corporation to perform
any corporate function ; consequently, until a compliance with the
statute, the corporation has no valid existence as a de Jure corporation.
Morawctz, Private Corporations, section 27, says, "A substantial
compliance with all the terms of a general incorporation law is a prerequisite of the right of forming a corporation under it. Thus where
it is provided that a certificate or articles of association, setting forth
the purposes of the corporation about to be formed, the amount of the
. capital, and other details, shall be filed with some public officer. a
performance of this requirement is essential; and until it has been
performed, the association will have no right whatever to assume corporate franchises." Cook on Stock and Stockholders, section 231,
peaking to this same subject, says: "Occasionally, however, it
happens that this certificate is not fully made out, as required by the
statute, or is not filed, or some other step prescribed by law is not
complied with. The corporation is then not duly incorporated; and
the state, by quo warranto, may oust it from its user of corporate
franchises." In Doyle v. Mizner, 42 Mich. 332, it was ruled: "All
private corporations must be organized under general laws, and can
be valid only when strictly conforming to all the conditions imposed
on their completion." The court says: "The incorporation was
sought to be shown by asking Doyle, on cross-examination, concerning the signing of a paper purporting to be articles of incorporation
which had been filed in the Detroit city clerk's office April 6, 1875.
This paper was not acknowledged, and was not filed in the county
clerk's office. • • • The statute concerning manufacturing corporations expressly requires that the articles shall be 'acknowledged
before some person authorized by the laws of this state to take
acknowledgment of deeds.' • • • That before any such corporation shall commence business, the articles should be filed with the
secretary of state and county clerk;'' and the court held· that by reason
of the failure to acknowledge and file in the office of the county clerk
the articles of incorporation, the association did not become a corporation de Jure. To the same effect are Stowe v. Flagg, 72 Ill. 397;
Bigelow v. Gregory, 73 Ill. 197; Utley v. Union Tool Co., I I Gray
(Mass.) 139; Unity Ins. Co. v. Cram, 43 N. H. 636; Childs v.
Smith, 46 N. Y. 34; Harris v. McGregor, 29 Cal. 125.
Section 126, chapter 16, Compiled Statutes, 1893, provides:
l6---W1L. CASES.
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"Every corporation, previous to the commencement of any business

except its own organization, when the same is not formed by legisla-

242

tive enactment, must adopt articles of incorporation and have them

CAPPS & M'CREARV V. HA TINGS PROS PECTING CO.

§ 45

recorded in the office of the county clerk of the county * • * in

''Every corporation, previous to the commencement of any business
except its own organization, when the same is not formed by legislative enactment, must adopt articles of incorporation and have them
recorded in the office of the county clerk of the county • • • in
which the business is to be transacted." • • • Section 132 of
said chapter provided: "Any corporation formed without legislative
enactment may commence business as soon as its articles of incorporation are filed by the county clerks of the counties as required by
this subdivi ion, and shall be valid if a copy of its articles be filed in
the office of the secretary of state, and the notice required be published within four months from the time of filing such articles in the
clerk's office." These two sections of the statute, read together,
leave little room for doubt that the filing of the articles of incorporation in the office of the county clerk is one of the things required to
make the corporation one de jure. To organize a corporation there
must be subscribers to the stock; a meeting of said subscribers, or
some of them ; the adoption of a1ticles of association for the government of the proposed corporation, and such articles must be filed in ·
the office of the county clerk of the county in whii.:h is fixed the corporation's principal place of business. These sections of the statute
quoted above were construed by this court in Abbott v. Omaha
Smelting and Refining Co., 4 Neb. 416 , and it was there said: "In
this state the filing of articles of incorporation with the county cl erk
is a condition precedent to the existence of any corporate franchise.
The law and the articles so filed , taken together, are considered in
the nature of a grant from the state and constitute the charter of the
company." A corporate franchise is a privilege, a power, a right .
It is a very different thing from the performance of any step necessary
to the organization. In Indianapoli s Furnace and Mining Co. v.
Herkimer, 46 Ind. 142, the question we are considering arose and
was decided by the supreme court of Indiana, under a statute substantially like the one we have quoted above, and the court said:
" The sig ning of a1ticles of association by parties proposing to form a
manufacturing corporation does not create such corporation. The
subscribers must also make, sign, and acknowledge the certificate of
incorpor3:tion prescribed (by the statute) and must file the same in
the recorder's office of the proper county." We think, therefore,
that the Hastings Prospecting Company, the name of the corporation
attempted to be organized by the subscribers who signed the subscription on which· the plaintiffs in error are sued, is not, and has never
been, a corporation de jure.
Is that fact available to the plaintiffs in error as a defense to this
suit? It is to be borne in mind that the plaintiffs in en-or did not subscribe for the stock of any corporation, either de facto or de jure, then
in existence; and there is a distinction as to the liability of parties for
subscriptions to a corporation, or an association vthich assumes to be
and is acting as a corporation, and the li ability for subscriptions made
by the parties for the purpose of organizing a corporation from among

which the business is to be transacted." * * * Section 132 of

said chapter provided: "Any corporation formed without legislative

enactment may commence business as soon as its articles of incorpo-

ration are filed by the county clerks of the counties as required by

this subdivision, and shall be valid if a copy of its articles be filed in

the office of the secretary of state, and the notice required be pub-

lished within four months from the time of filing such articles in the

clerk's office." These two sections of the statute, read together,

leave little room for doubt that the filing of the articles of incorpora-

tion in the office of the county clerk is one of the things required to

make the corporation one de jure. To organize a corporation there

must be subscribers to the stock; a meeting of said subscribers, or

some of them; the adoption of articles of association for the govern-

ment of the proposed corporation, and such articles must be filed in

the office of the county clerk of the county in which is fixed the cor-

poration's principal place of business. These sections of the statute
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quoted above were construed by this court in Abbott v. Omaha

Smelting and Refining Co., 4 Neb. 416, and it was there said: "In

this state the filing of articles of incorporation with the county clerk

is a condition precedent to the existence of any corporate franchise.

The law and the articles so filed, taken together, are considered in

the nature of a grant from the state and constitute the charter of the

company." A corporate franchise is a privilege, a power, a right.

It is a very different thing from the performance of any step necessary

to the organization. In Indianapolis Furnace and Mining Co. v.

Herkimer, 46 Ind. 142, the question we are considering arose and

was decided by the supreme court of Indiana, under a statute sub-

stantially like the one we have quoted above, and the court said:

"The signing of articles of association by parties proposing to form a

manufacturing corporation does not create such corporation. The

subscribers must also make, sign, and acknowledge the certificate of

incorporation prescribed (by the statute) and must file the same in

the recorder's office of the proper county." We think, therefore,

that the Hastings Prospecting Company, the name of the corporation

attempted to be organized by the subscribers who signed the subscrip-

tion on which the plaintiffs in error are sued, is not, and has never

been, a corporation de jure.

Is that fact available to the plaintiffs in error as a defense to this

suit? It is to be borne in mind that the plaintiffs in error did not sub-

scribe for the stock of any corporation, either de facto ox de jure, then

in existence; and there is a distinction as to the liability of parties for

subscriptions to a corporation, or an association which assumes to be

and is acting as a corporation, and the liability for subscriptions made

by the parties for the purpose of organizing a corporation from among
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the subscribers. If the subscription made by Capps & McCreary had

been made to the Hastings Prospecting Company when it was acting

as a corporation, when it was exercising the functions of a corpora-

tion, when it was claiming to be a corporation, and had their agree-

ment been to pay such corporation certain sums of money for certain

shares of its stock, it seems that they would then be estopped from set-

ting up as a defense that the prospecting company was not a corpora-

tion de jure. (Cook Stock and Stockholders, § 186, and cases cited.)

Morawetz on Private Corporations, section 67, thus lays down the

rule in such cases: "Every subscription (to the stock of a corpora-

tion to be organized) by implication refers to and incorporates the

terms of the charter or general law under which the corporation is

to be formed ; and every subscriber agrees to become associated with the

others only upon condition that the formalities prescribed by the char-

ter shall be observed in making the mutual contract. Thus, if certain

preliminaries, such as the filing of a certificate, are required to be per-

formed after the articles of association have been subscribed, but be-

fore the corporation shall be in existence, the contract of membership
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does not go into effect until these formalities are complied with, and

a subscriber to the articles can not until then be made to contribute

the amount of his subscription." In Rikhoff v. Brown's Rotary

Shuttle Sewing Machine Co., 68 Ind. 388, it was held: "A subscrip-

tion of stock to preliminary articles of association, not purporting to

be a contract with an existing corporation, does not estop the sub-

scriber to afterward deny the existence of the corporation in a suit

upon the subscription." See, also, Indianapolis Furnace and Mining

Co. v. Herkimer, 46 Ind. 142, where it is said: "Until the statutory

requirements to organize a corporation have been complied with, a sub-

scriber to the articles of association is not estopped to deny the exist-

ence of the corporation." (See, also. Dorris v. Sweeney, 60 N. Y.

463.) We think these authorities are decisive of the case under con-

sideration. The rule they lay down is sound law, good sense and

exact justice.

If the plaintiffs in error are to pay for the stock subscribed, it, of

course, follows that they become entitled to the stock. This would

make them stockholders in a de facto corporation and liable as co-

partners, whereas their contract was to become liable as stockholders.

The plaintiffs in error have not broken their promise. The judgment

of the district court is reversed.

Note. See infra, Conditions precedent to de jure existence, p. 585.

.the subscribers. If the subscription made by Capps & McCreary had
been made to the Hastings Prospecting Company when it was acting
as a corporation, when it was exercising the functions of a corporation, when it was claiming to be a corporation, and had their agreement been to pay such corporation certain sums of money for certain
shares of its stock, it seems that they would then be estopped from setting up as a defense that the prospecting company was not a corpor~
fion de Jure. (Cook Stock and Stockholders,§ 186, and cases cited.)
Morawetz on Private Corporations, section 67, thus lays down the
rule in such cases: "Every subscription (to the stock of a corporation to be organized) by implication refers to and incorporates the
terms of the charter or general law under which the corporation is
to be formed ; and every subscriber agrees to become associated with the
others only upon condition that the formalities prescribed bythe charter shall be observed in making the mutual contract. Thas, if certain
preliminaries, such as the filing of a ce1tificate, are required to be performed after the articles of association have been subscribed, but before the corporation shall be in existence, the contract of membership
does not go into effect until these formalities are complied with, and
a subscriber to the articles can not until then be made to contribute
the amount of his subscription." In Rikhoff '" Brown's Rotary
Shuttle Sewing Machine Co., 68 Ind. 388, it was held: "A subscription of stock to preliminary articles of association, not purporting to
be a contract with an existing corporation, does not estop the subs criber to afterward deny the existence of the corporation in a suit
upon the sub cription." See, also, Indianapolis Furnace and Mining
Co. Y. Herkimer, 46 Ind. 142, where it is said: ''Until the statutory
requirement to organize a corporation have been complied with, a 8ubscriber to the articles of association is not cstopped to deny the existence of the corporation." (See, also~ Dorris v. Sweeney, 6o N. Y.
463.) vVe think these authorities are decisive of the case under consideration. The rule they lay dowp is sound law, good sense and
exact justice.
If the plaintiffs in error are to pay for the stock subscribed, it, of
cour e, follows that they become entitled to the stock. This would
make them stockholders in a de facto corporation and liable as copartner . whereas their contract was to be~ome liable as stockholders.
The plaintiffs in error have not broken their promise. The judgment
of the district court is reverst:d.
Nok.
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presiding.

1893.

The case was referred to Stanley W. Little, Esq., as auditor. Before

IN

the auditor, W. F. Hallstead, guardian of Mary E. Clapp et al.,

SuPRRME CounT OF PENNSYLVANIA. 157 Pennsylvania State Reports 59-74; 22 L. R. A. 276.
.

THE

claimed to recover from the estate of decedent, Henry Gibbs, the sum

Appeal by Hallstead, guardian of Mary E. Clapp et al., from decree of orphan's court dismissing exceptions to auditor's report in
estate of Henry Gibbs, deceased.
Exceptions to report of auditor on exceptioi:is to administrator's account. Before METZGER, P. J., twenty-ninth judicial district, specially
presiding.
The case was referred to Stanley W. Little, Esq., as auditor. Before
the auditor, W. F. Hallstead, guardian of Mary E. Clapp et al.,
claimed to recover from the estate of decedent, Henry Gibbs, the sum
of $z,900.46, the amount of a deposit in the Home Savings Bank, of
which decedent was a stockholder. The claim was made on the
ground that the bank was a general partnership, and that its stockholders were liable as partners for its debts.
The auditor reported in part as follows:
"The exceptants to the account of the administrator ask to take out
of the fonds for distribution the sum of $36,167.53 and interest. This
request is based on the position that the 'Home Savings Bank' was
not a corporation, or a limited partnership, or a joint stock association,
and therefore was a common partnership. That, being a common
partnership, and Henry Gibbs having been a stockholder therein, his
individual estate is liable for the entire amount of money deposited in
said bank during the time said Gibbs was a member thereof, and unpaid, with what interest may be due thereon.
"This statement of the case at.once discloses its importance to the
parties concerned. The industry of counsel and the research of the
auditor have failed to find much authority in this state to aid in the
solution of the question which distinguishes this case. All fair minds
must agree that a party seeking to divert so large a fund from its
ordinary channel into the pockets of strangers, should present a case
strong in the fact and clear in the law.
''As a starting point in this investigation the auditor can find nothing
better than the opinion of Mr. Justice Williams, in the case of Hallstead v. Coleman, 143 Pa., at page 364, in these words: 'Now the
important question in this case, which lay at the threshold of plaintiff's
cause of action, was whether this bank was a partnership. The plaintiff alleged it and claimed to recover against the defendants as members of the banking firm. The burden of proving the partnership
was on him, and until this proof was given the defendants were not
called upon to enter upon their defense.' Applying this law to this
case, which involves questions very similar to those in the case just
mentioned, the first question is, have the exceptants proved this was

of $2,900.46, the amount of a deposit in the Home Savings Bank, of

which decedent was a stockholder. The claim was made on the

ground that the bank was a general partnership, and that its stock-

holders were liable as partners for its debts.

The auditor reported in part as follows:

"The exceptants to the account of the administrator ask to take out

of the funds for distribution the sum of $36,167.53 and interest. This
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request is based on the position that the 'Home Savings Bank' was

not a corporation, or a limited partnership, or a joint stock association,

and therefore was a common partnership. That, being a common

partnership, and Henry Gibbs having been a stockholder therein, his

individual estate is liable for the entire amount of money deposited in

said bank during the time said Gibbs was a member thereof, and un-

paid, with what interest may be due thereon.

"This statement of the case at once discloses its importance to the

parties concerned. The industry of counsel and the research of the

auditor have failed to find much authority in this state to aid in the

solution of the question which distinguishes this case. All fair minds

must agree that a party seeking to divert so large a fund from its

ordinary channel into the pockets of strangers, should present a case

strong in the fact and clear in the law.

"As a starting point in this investigation the auditor can find nothing

better than the opinion of Mr. Justice Williams, in the case of Hall-

stead v. Coleman, 143 Pa., at page 364, in these words: 'Now the

important question in this case, which lay at the threshold of plaintiff's

cause of action, was whether this bank was a partnership. The plaint-

iff alleged it and claimed to recover against the defendants as mem-

bers of the banking firm. The burden of proving the partnership

was on him, and until this proof was given the defendants were not

called upon to enter upon their defense.' Applying this law to this

case, which involves questions very similar to those in the case just

mentioned, the first question is, have the exceptants proved this was
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a partnership, of which Henry Gibbs was a member at the time they

245

deposited their money in this bank, and for all the debts and defalca-

tions of which his estate is liable?

"The evidence offered by them shows that in September, 1873, a

bank was opened at South Waverly, in this state; that it had over its

door the name 'The Home Savings Bank;' that it organized by elect-

ing a board of directors and a president and cashier; that its capital

stock was divided into shares of $100; that to each holder of stock it

issued certificates of stock, saying upon their face that the bank was or-

ganized under act of the legislature of Pennsylvania; that its authorized

capital was $100,000; that these certificates had on their back

blank powers of attorney for transfer, and in all respects were in the

form and style usually adopted by banks; (that these certificates when

issued were signed by the president and cashier, and to some of them

the seal was affixed;) (17) (that it had a seal, which was affixed to

all cashier's checks;) (18) that said bank registered in the office of

the auditor-general under section 1 of act of June 7, 1879; that it

filed these separate reports in said office of its net earnings or income
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under the tenth section of said act; (that it also filed in said office at

least six reports for publication, covering the four quarters of the year,

in accordance with the requirements of the acts of April 16, 1850,

and April 17, 1861 ;) (19) that it paid dividends to its stockholders;

that it failed and passed into the hands of a receiver; that none of the

certificates of stock, certificates of deposit, books of account with cus-

tomers, bills, letters, checks or drafts bore upon their face the names

of any member other than the president and cashier, and the person to

whom addressed or issued; that the transfer of any stockholder's in-

terest was at his own option, and neither such transfer, nor the death

of any stockholder worked any change in the name or conduct of the

business; that so slight was the effect upon the business of the death

of Mr. Gibbs that a large amount of claims have been presented be-

fore the auditor for allowance for money deposited after his death,

or deposited before and re-deposited and new certificates therefor

issued after his death. (What is there in all this evidence from be-

ginning of the business to the failure tending to prove a partnership?

What in it all inconsistent with a corporate existence? Only one

thing has been urged upon the auditor, and that is to be found in the

form of the reports made by the bank to the auditor-general of its net

earnings or income under section 10 of act of 1879; (20) and the

position was taken that the provisions of this section only apply to un-

incorporated banks. While it is true that in the printed portion of

these reports the word 'firm' is used instead of 'corporation,' yet,

remembering that these printed forms were not made by the bank,

but were sent to it from the auditor-general's office, and that they

were made and returned under an act which is not applicable solely to

unincorporated banks, but applies to those which are incorporated as

well (and as at most was only the declaration of one member in

the absence of and without the knowledge of any others, the auditor

does not deem this single fact sufficient to overcome the preceding

a pa rtnership, of which Henry Gibbs was a member at the time they
dt·p osited their money in this bank, and for all the debts and defalcation of which his estate is liable?
'' The evidence offered by them shows that in September, 1873, a
bank was opened at South Waverly, in this state; that it had over its
door the name •The Home Savings Bank;' that it organized by electing a board of directors and a president and cashier; that its capital
stock was divided into shares of $ 100; that to each holder of stock it
i ·sued certificates of stock, saying upon their face that the bank was organized under act of the legislature of Pennsylvania; that its authorized
capital was $ 100,0CX>; that these certificates had on their back
blank powers of attorney for transfer, and in all respects were in the
form and style usually adopted by banks; (that these certificates when
issued were signed by the president and cashier, and to some of them
the seal was affixed;) ( 17) (that it had a seal, which was affixed to
all cashier's checks;) (18) that said bank registered in the office of
the auditor-general under section 1 of act of June 7, 1879; that it
filed these separate reports in said office of its net earnings or income
under the tenth section of said act; (that it also filed in said office at
least six reports for publication, covering the four quarters of the year,
in accordance with the requirements of the acts of April 16, 1850,
and April 17 , 1861 ;) (19) that it paid dividends to its stockholders ;
that it failed and passed into the hands of a receiver; that none of the
certificates of stock, certificates of deposit, books of account with customers, bills, letters, checks or drafts bore upon their face the names
of a ny member other than the president and cashier, and the person to
whom addressed or issued; that the transfer of any stockholder's intere t was at his own option, and neither such transfer, nor the death
of any stockholder worked any change in the name or conduct of the
bu siness ; that so slight was the effect upon the business of the death
of Mr. Gibbs that a large amount of claims have been presented befo re the auditor for allowance for money deposited after his death ,
or de posited before and re-deposited and new certificates therefor
is ued after his death. (What is there in all this evidence from beginning of the business to the failure tending to prove a partnership?
\.Yhat in it all inconsistent with a corporate existence? Only one
thing bas been urged upon the auditor, and that is to be found in the
form of the reports made by the bank to the auditor-general of its net
earnings or income under section 10 of act of 1879; (20) and the
position was taken that the provisions of this section only apply to unincorporated banks. While it is true that in the printed portion of
these reports the word ' firm' is used instead of 'corporation,' yet ,
remembering that these printed forms were not made by the bank,
but were sent to it from the auditor-general's office, and that they
were made and returned under an act which is not applicable solely to
unincorporated banks, but applies to those which are incorporated as
well (and as at most was only the declaration of one member in
the absence of and without the knowledge of any others, the auditor
doei: not deem this single fact sufficient to overcome the preceding
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evidence of incorporation, or, more accurately, to prove the partner-

ship) (21).
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"This comprises the affirmative evidence of the exceptants. It is

supplemented by some of a negative character, showing that searches

evidence of incorporation , or, more accurately , to prove the partnership) (21 ).
"This comprises the affirmative evidence of the exceptants. It is
supplemented by some of a negative character, showing that searches
in the office of the recorder of deeds in this county have failed to find
any record of this bank as a limited partnership; and that searches in
the auditor-general's office have proved equally futile in finding any
record of its incorporation. From these two negatives the auditor is
urged to find an affirmative. In other words, as no record can be
found showing this bank to have been a limited partnership or a corporation, it must have been a simple partnership.
"Upon the certificates issued to Mr. Gibbs each time he acquired
stock in this bank, it declared it was organized under 'act of the legislature of Pennsylvania.' If this was true, a search among those
local acts of the legislature which filled our pamphlet laws prior to
1874 might have been better rewarded.
"(But is it true that if this was not a corporation or a limited partnership, it follows necessarily that it was a common partnership?
This has been urged with much force , and the auditor admits that he
entertained that belief at the outset of this case; but from authority
consulted, and reflection, he has come to a different conclusion. A
partnership inter se can not result from any aggregation of negatives.
The formation of such a partnership is a positive action and can not
exist without an agreement of some kind among all its members.)
( 22) Parsons in his work on Partnership, in discussing who are liable
as partners, says: 'The first thing to be remembered is that persons
may be charged as partners of a firm, on either one or two perfectly
distinct grounds; one of them is that the person actually is a partner,
the other is that he has, with his own knowledge. and consent, held
forth as a partner to the person having a claim , or to the public generally.' (Upon which of these two distinct grounds can Mr. Gibbs
be charged as a partner in this case? Certainly not upon the first,
for no articles of partnership and no agreement to be partners, and
no agreement of any kind existed between Mr. Gibbs and the other
stockholders, and no person can be a partner in fact in a partnership
having no existence. If, then , this estate is to be charged it must be
upon the second ground above mentioned. But the evidence fails to
show any holding forth .o f him as a partner by the bank or by himself.
His name nowhere appears in any business transaction of the bank
with others ; he took no part in its management or control; he never
held any official position therein; no one of these claimants knew that
he was a stockholder therein at the time of depositing their money;
the bank never represented to any one of them that it was a partnership, and none of them dealt with it as such, and the evidence does
not show that Mr. Gibbs ha<l any knowledge of the transactions between the bank and these claimants, or had a personal acquaintance
with them. But, on the contrary, the weight of the evidence tends
to show that this bank held itself out to the world and to Mr. Gibbs
as a corporation and nothing else.) (23.)

in the office of the recorder of deeds in this county have failed to find

any record of this bank as a limited partnership; and that searches in

the auditor-general's office have proved equally futile in finding any

record of its incorporation. From these two negatives the auditor is

urged to find an affirmative. In other words, as no record can be

found showing this bank to have been a limited partnership or a cor-

poration, it must have been a simple partnership.

"Upon the certificates issued to Mr. Gibbs each time he acquired

stock in this bank, it declared it was organized under 'act of the leg-

islature of Pennsylvania.' If this was true, a search among those

local acts of the legislature which filled our pamphlet laws prior to

1874 might have been better rewarded.

"(But is it true that if this was not a corporation or a limited part-

nership, it follows necessarily that it was a common partnership?

This has been urged with much force, and the auditor admits that he

entertained that belief at the outset of this case; but from authority
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consulted, and reflection, he has come to a different conclusion. A

partnership inter sc can not result from any aggregation of negatives.

The formation of such a partnership is a positive action and can not

exist without an agreement of some kind among all its members.)

(22) Parsons in his work on Partnership, in discussing who are liable

as partners, says: 'The first thing to be remembered is that persons

may be charged as partners of a firm, on either one or two perfectly

distinct grounds; one of them is that the person actually is a partner,

the other is that he has, with his own knowledge and consent, held

forth as a partner to the person having a claim, or to the public gen-

erally.' (Upon which of these two distinct grounds can Mr. Gibbs

be charged as a partner in this case? Certainly not upon the first,

for no articles of partnership and no agreement to be partners, and

no agreement of any kind existed between Mr. Gibbs and the other

stockholders, and no person can be a partner in fact in a partnership

having no existence. If, then, this estate is to be charged it must be

upon the second ground above mentioned. But the evidence fails to

show any holding forth of him as a partner by the bank or by himself.

His name nowhere appears in any business transaction of the bank

with others; he took no part in its management or control; he never

held any official position therein; no one of these claimants knew that

he was a stockholder therein at the time of depositing their money;

the bank never represented to any one of them that it was a partner-

ship, and none of them dealt with it as such, and the evidence does

not show that Mr. Gibbs had any knowledge of the transactions be-

tween the bank and these claimants, or had a personal acquaintance

with them. But, on the contrary, the weight of the evidence tends

to show that this bank held itself out to the world and to Mr. Gibbs

as a corporation and nothing else.) (23.)
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''But it is said Mr. Gibbs took dividends on his stock, and hence

his estate is liable in this case. (As tending to discharge the burden

resting upon the claimants, to prove that this bank was a partnership

instead of a corporation, the fact of the receipt of dividends does not

go far;) (24) because the taking of dividends is as consistent with

the corporate, as with the partnership relation.

"(Nor does this fact, standing alone and disconnected with any

agreement between the stockholders, or any holding forth of Mr.

Gibbs as a partner by the bank or by himself, or with any credit given

to the bank by the claimants knowing Mr. Gibbs to be in any way

connected therewith, make his estate liable) (25) in the opinion of

the auditor. The old doctrine enunciated in Waugh v. Carver, 2

H. Bl. 235, that one taking a share of profits shall, by operation of

law, be made liable to losses, upon the principle that, by taking a

part of the profits, he takes from the creditors a part of that fund

which is the proper security to them for the payment of their debts,

is not the accepted law to-day in England, and, as the auditor thinks,

is not in accordance with the weight of authority in this country:
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Edwards v. Tracy, 62 Pa. 380. (Profits can only exist after pay-

ment of all liabilities; and how any one who shares only in what may

remain after all creditors are secured takes from them any security

is not quite plain.) (26) This is especially true of the banking

business. (Every man buying stock in a bank that is conducted upon

usual and sound banking principles, as he has a right to expect it will

be, knows that he will get no dividends, only such as may remain after

all liabilities are deducted.) (27) When a person induces others to

credit a firm upon the assurance or belief that he is a member thereof,

his property ^should make good any loss thereby sustained by such

creditor, whether such person receives any dividend or not; (but to

hold one who puts money into a business and draws out no part of

the principal, and but a small part of the interest, liable for all debts,

should rest on better reason than that he has reduced the creditor's

security. Mr. Gibbs' purchase of this stock and the receipt of divi-

dends thereon, did nothing to lessen the amount these exceptants

may, or have realized on their claims. He put in $6,000, and drew

out $1,820, thereby making the fund for creditors $4,180 larger.)

(28) That this fund was diverted or misappropriated, does not make

him liable; it not having been done by him or by any agent of his,

in fact or in law.

"It has been said in support of these claims that there must be a

liability somewhere, that persons doing business in this state must do

it subject to the liability either of incorporators, partners or individ-

uals. Suppose this is admitted. Is there a want of all liability here?

If this bank were solvent to-day, and these claimants brought suit

against it as a corporation, what would prevent their recovery?

(Having declared to the world for nearly eighteen years that it was a

corporation, and having induced these parties to trust it as such, what

court would now permit it to defend on the ground that it was not

incorporated, and thereby allow it to benefit by its own fraud?

' 'But it is said Mr. Gibbs took dividends on h is stock, and hence
bis estate is liable in this case. (As tending to discharge the burden
resting upon the claimants, to prove that this bank was a partnership
instead of a corporation, the fact of the receipt of dividends does not
go far;) ( 24) because the taking of dividends is as consistent with
the corporate, as with the partnership relation.
"(Nor does this fact, standing alone and disconnected with any
agreement between the stockholders, or any holding forth of Mr.
Gibbs as a partner by the bank or by himself, or wlth any credit given
to the bank by the claimants knowing Mr. Gibbs to be in any way
connected therewith, make his estate liable) (25) in the opinion of
the auditor. The old doctrine enunciated in Waugh v. Carver, 2
H. Bl. 235, that one taking a share of profits shall, by operation of
law, be made liable to losses, upon the principle that, by taking a
part of the profits, he takes from the creditors a part of that fund
which is the proper security to them for the payment of their debts,
is not the accepted law to-day in England, and, as the auditor thinks,
is not in accordance with the weight of authority in this country:
Edwards v. Tracy, 62 Pa. 380. (Profits can only exist after payment of all liabilities; and how any one who shares only in what may
remain after all creditors are secured takes from them any security
is not quite plain.) (26) This is especially true of the banking
business. (Every man buying stock in a bank that is conducted upon
usual and sound banking principles, as he has a right to expect it will
be , knows that he will get no dividends, only such as may remain after
all liabilities are deducted.) ( 27) When a person induces others to
credit a firm upon the assurance or belief that he is a member thereof,
his property .should make good any loss thereby sustained by such
creditor, whether such person receives any dividend or not; (but to
hold one who puts money into a business and draws out no part of
the principal, and but a small part of the interest, liable for all debts,
should rest on better reason than that he has reduced the creditor's
security. Mr. Gibbs' purchase of this stock and the receipt of dividends thereon, did nothing to lessen the amount these exceptants
may, or have realized on their claims. He put in $6,ooo, and drew
out $1 ,820, thereby making the fund for creditors $4, 180 larger.)
(28) That this fund was diverted or misappropriated, does not make
him liable; it not having been done by him or by any agent of his,
in fact or in law.
"It has been said in support of these claims that there must be a
liability somewhere, that persons doing business in this state must do
it subject to the liability either of incorporators, partners or individuals. Suppose this is admitted. Is there a want of all liability here ?
If this bank were solvent to-day, and these claimants brought suit
against it as a corporation, what would prevent their recovery?
(Having declared to the world for nearly eighteen years that it was a
corporation , and having induced these P,arties to trust it as such, what
court would now permit it to defend on the ground that it was not
incorporated, and thereby allow it to benefit b y its own fraud?
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Clearly it would be estopped.) (29) Spahr v. Farmers' Bank, Car-

lisle, 94 Pa. 429, and authorities there cited. The inability of claim-

Clearly it would be estopped.) ( 29) Spahr v. Farmers' Bank, Carlisle, 94 Pa. 429, and authorities there cited. The inability of claimants to get their pay seems to result more from a want of ability than
liability on the part of the bank; a want from which this estate has
suffered in common with these parties.
"(The auditor is therefore of the opinion that the demand of the
claimant is not sustained;) ( 30) and· dismisses the exceptions, feeling
satisfaction in the knowledge that his decision, if erroneous, can be
corrected in a higher court. In coming to this conclusion the auditor
has been influenced to some extent (he hopes not too far) by the
opinion of Judge Martin of the supreme court of New York, and the
many authorities cited by him in the case of the Merchants' National
Bank of Binghamton, New York, v. Charles E. Pendleton et al., 1
which is attached to this report; \\•hich opinion has been recently
affirmed by the court of appeals of the same state."
Exceptions among others to above findings in brackets were dismissed. Whereupon exceptant appealed.
Errors asst'gned were ( 18-30) dismissal of exceptions, quoting them.
Opinion by Mr. JusTICE WILLIAMS, October 2, 1893.
This case involves substantially the same question that was heard
and determined in Hallstead v. Coleman, 143 Pa. 354. The appellant seeks to charge the estate of Henry Gibbs with money deposited
by him, as guardian, in the Home Savings Bank, located at South
Waverly, on the theory that the bank was a general partnership and
that the decedent was one of the partners . The appellees deny that
the Home Savings Bank was a partnership, and assert that the decedent purchased shares of the stock in the bank, as and for the shares
of the stock in an incorporated bank, and not otherwise. •At this point
it seems desirable to define the words oyer which this contest extends.
First. What i's a corporatt'on.? The several answers given by text
writers may be reduced to the following formula: A corporation is an
artificial person created by the law as the representative of those p ersons, natural or artificial, who contribute to, or become holders of
shares in, the property entrusted to it for a common purpose. As it
is the creature of positive law, its rights, PO\·v ers and duties are prescribed by the law. Beyond the legitimate purposes which it was
created to serve, and the lines of limitation the law has drawn around
it, it is without power to act or capacity to take . Thus a banking corporation, while fully competent to do what is usual and necessary in
its own business, may not own and operate a railroad or engage permanently in any other business than that for which it was created. It
has neither the legal capacity, nor the right, to do so; and if it undertakes to go in any direction beyond its corporate powers its acts are
ultra vt'res. The creation of a corporation is not within the power of
the individuals who subscribe to its stock. It is exclusively the work
of the law; and the best evidence to the existence of a corporation is
the grant of corporate powers by the commonwealth.
Second. What is a corporation de facto.? It i's an apparent cor-

ants to get their pay seems to result more from a want of ability than

liability on the part of the bank; a want from which this estate has

suffered in common with these parties.

"(The auditor is therefore of the opinion that the demand of the

claimant is not sustained ;) (30) and dismisses the exceptions, feeling

satisfaction in the knowledge that his decision, if erroneous, can be

corrected in a higher court. In coming to this conclusion the auditor

has been influenced to some extent (he hopes not too far) by the

opinion of Judge Martin of the supreme court of New York, and the

many authorities cited by him in the case of the Merchants' National

Bank of Binghamton, New York, v. Charles E. Pendleton et al.,1

which is attached to this report; which opinion has been recently

affirmed by the court of appeals of the same state."

Exceptions among others to above findings in brackets were dis-

missed. Whereupon exceptant appealed.

Errors assigned were (18—30) dismissal of exceptions, quotingthem.
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Opinion by Mr. Justice Williams, October 2, 1893.

This case involves substantially the same question that was heard

and determined in Hallstead v. Coleman, 143 Pa. 354. The appell-

ant seeks to charge the estate of Henry Gibbs with money deposited

by him, as guardian, in the Home Savings Bank, located at South

Waverly, on the theory that the bank was a general partnership and

that the decedent was one of the partners. The appellees deny that

the Home Savings Bank was a partnership, and assert that the dece-

dent purchased shares of the stock in the bank, as and for the shares

of the stock in an incorporated bank, and not otherwise. «At this point

it seems desirable to define the words over which this contest extends.

First. What is a corporation? The several answers given by text

writers may be reduced to the following formula: A corporation is an

artificial person created by the law as the representative of those per-

sons, natural or artificial, who contribute to, or become holders of

shares in, the property entrusted to it for a common purpose. As it

is the creature of positive law, its rights, powers and duties are pre-

scribed by the law. Beyond the legitimate purposes which it was

created to serve, and the lines of limitation the law has drawn around

it, it is without power to act or capacity to take. Thus a banking cor-

poration, while fully competent to do what is usual and necessary in

its own business, may not own and operate a railroad or engage per-

manently in any other business than that for which it was created. It

has neither the legal capacity, nor the right, to do so; and if it under-

takes to go in any direction beyond its corporate powers its acts are

ultra vires. The creation of a corporation is not within the power of

the individuals who subscribe to its stock. It is exclusively the work

of the law; and the best evidence to the existence of a corporation is

the grant of corporate powers by the commonwealth.

Second. What is a corporation de facto? It is an apparent cor-

1 20 St. Rep. 891.

1
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porate organization, asserted to be a corporation by its members and

249

actually acting as such, but lacking the creative fiat of the law. In

Taylor on Private Corporations, 145, it is said that a de facto corpo-

ration may exist "when a body of men are acting as a corporation

under color of apparent organization, in pursuance of some charter or

enabling act." Their organization may be imperfect, so that upon a

quo -warranto they could not show a sufficient compliance with the

law to justify the exercise of corporate powers, but, as to parties deal-

ling with them, and as to each other, they are estopped to deny that

they are what they hold themselves out to be. In a recent case in

Minnesota, Finnegan v. The Knights of Labor Building Association,1

it was held that a de facto corporation exists when these three things

concur, viz.: A law under which the alleged corporation might be

created; an attempt to organize under the law; an assumption and

exercise of corporate powers under such attempted organization. In

Church v. Pickett, 19 N. Y. 482, only two things were held necessary,

viz: "The existence of a charter or law underwhich a corporation with

the powers assumed might be lawfully created; and the user by the
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party to the suit of the rights claimed to be conferred by such a charter

or law." Where there has been a substantial compliance with the

law the corporation is, of course, de jure. Where there has been no

substantial compliance, but there has been, nevertheless, an assump-

tion and exercise of corporate powers in pursuance of an attempted

organization, the alleged corporation is such de facto only. The

Minnesota courts hold the correct rule, and three things are necessary

to create the liability, a law or charter under which an organization

de jure might be effected, an attempt to organize which falls so far

short of the requirements of the law or charter as to be i?ieffectual,

an assumption and exercise of corporate powers notwithstanding the

failure to comply with the law or charter.

Third. What is a partnerships. Perhaps the best defi7iitwn is

that given by Story: a relation created by a'■'■contract between two

or more persons to place their money, effects, labor, or skill, or some

or all of them, in lawful commerce and divide the profits between

them.'1'' Its foundation is a contract express or implied. It results

from the act of the parties, not from the act of the law. Hedge's

App., 63 Pa. 273, 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 829. See, also, 8

W. & S. 63; 16 Ohio 166; 14 Johns. 318; 49 111. 437. But as to

third parties one may be held liable as a partner by implication of

law arising upon his own acts, contrary even to his own intention.

Thus the officers and acting members of a corporation de facto may

be liable as partners if their conduct has led others to trust the con-

cern upon that basis. 47 Conn. 443. But without a contract of part-

nership, or such acts and declarations as lead others to infer its exist-

ence and to extend credit on that basis, there is no foundation on

which liability as a partner can rest. The best evidence of the exist-

ence of a partnership is the contract creating it. If proof of the

contract is not within reach, its existence may be inferred from proof

1 Infra, p. 614.

porate organizati'on , asserted to be "'a corpora#on by i'ts members and
actually acting as such, but lacking the creative fiat of the law. In
Taylor on Private Corporations, 145, it is said that a de facto corporation may exist "when a body of men are acting as a corporation
under color of apparent organization, in pursuance of some chatter or
enabling act." Their organization may be imperfect, so that upon a
quo warranto they could not show a sufficient compliance with the
law to justify the exercise of corporate powers, but, as to parties dealling with them, and as to each other, they are estopped to deny that
they are what they hold themselves out to be. In a recent case in
Minnesota, Finnegan v. The Knights of Labor Building Association, 1
it was held that a de facto corporation exists when these three things
concur, viz.: A law under which the alleged corporation might be
created; an attempt to organize under the law; an assumption and
exercise of corporate powers under such attempted organization. In
Church v. Pickett, 19 .N. Y. 482, only two things were held necessary,
,·iz: "The existence of a charter or law under which a corporation with
the powers assumed might be lawfully created; and the user by the
party to the suit of the rights claimed to be conferred by such a charter
or law.'' Where there has been a substantial compliance with the
law the corporation is, of course , de jure. Where there has been no
substantial compliance, but there has been, nevertheless, an assumption and exercise of corporate powers in pursuance of an attempted
organization, the alleged corporation is such de facto only. The
Minnesota courts hold the correct rule, and three things are necessary
to create the liability, a law or charter under which an organization
de jure might be effected, an attempt to organt'ze whz'ch falls so far
short of the requirem ents of the law or charter as to be z'neffectual,
an assumption and exerdse of corporate powers notwi'thstandz'ng the
failure to comply with the law or charter.
Third. What is a partnershz'p? Perhaps the best de.ftnz"tion i's
that given by Story: a relation created by a " contract between two
or more p ersons to place their money, effects, labor, or skz'll, or some
or all of them , in lawful commerce and divide the profits between
them." Its foundati'on is a contract express or implied. It results
from the act of the parties, not from the act of the law. Hedge's
App., 63 Pa. 273, 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 829. See, also, 8
W. & S. 63; 16 Ohio 166; 14 Johns. 318; 49 Ill. 437. But a s to
third parties one may be held liable as a partner by implication of
law arising upon his own acts, contrary even to his own.. intention.
Thus the officers and acting members of a corporation de facto may
be liable as partners if their conduct has led others to trust the concern upon that basis. 47 Conn. 443. But without a contract of partnership, or such acts and declarations as lead others to infer its existence and to extend credit on that basis, there is no foundation on
which liability as a partner can rest. The best evidence of the existence of a partnership is the contract creating it. If proof of the
contract is not within reach, its existence may be inferred from proof
1

Infra, p. 614.
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of contribution to the partnership stock. If direct proof of contribu-

tion can not be had, it may be inferred from participation in profits.
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In the absence of all this, the acts and declarations of the parties

sought to be charged may be resorted to. Participation in profits is

of contribution to the partnership stock. If direct proof of contrib ution can not be had, it may be inferredl from participation in profits.
In the absence of all this, the acts and declarations of the parties
sought to be charged may be resorted to. Participation in profits is
not conclusive proof of the existence of the p artnership rela tio n.
Edwards v. Tracy, 62 Pa. 374. But both in England and in this
country it is cogent evidence upon the question, It puts the defendant
upon his proofs explanatory of the fact. If he is able to show that
such participation was referable to some other reason, such as compensation for services rendered by an ag·ent, broker, salesman or othe rwise, the prima facies is overcome. So, if the participation in the
profits is referable to some other relation other than that of partnership between the participants, such as membership in a joint-stock
association or a corporation, the effect of proof of participation will
be overcome.
In the light of these well settled rnles, let .us consider briefly the
position of the parties and the important findings of fact made by the
learned auditor in this case. The claimant's right to share in the fund
in court rested on the theory that the Home Savings Bank, in which
the money of his wards had been deposited , was a partnership, and
that the decedent was a partner. Th~ burden of proving the fact that
the bank was a partnership was on him; and as was said in Hallstead
v. Coleman, 143 Pa. 364, "until that proof was give n, the defendants
w ere not called upon to enter upon their defense." The proof made
upon this subject showed the organization of a bank under the name
of the Home Savings Bank, with a president, cashier, and a b oard of
directors. This is the mode of organization usually adopted by corporations, and did not tend to prove a partnership. It was then shown
that the decedent bought and held certificates of stock in the bank,
after its organization, which recited not the formation of a partnership,
but the organization of a bank under the laws of the state, and the
division of its capital into shares of one hundred dollars each. This
is not the usual way in which partnerships are created and partners
admitted. It is the usual way in which stocks are issued and transferred in corporations. Proof was then made of the receipt by the
decedent of several dividends upon his stock. The e did not purport
to be shares in the profits of firm business , but dividends, declared in
the manner usual among corporations, upon the stock of the bank;
and were paid by dividend checks drawn under the authority of the
board of directors. The only other evidence was the returns made
by the officers of the bank under the tax law of 1879, which threw
very little light upon the character of the organization of the bank.
Upon this proof the questions for the auditor were whether the bank
was shown to be a partnership, and the decedent a partner. The
bank did business for a number of yea rs and then failed. Its books
and papers w ere in the hands, or subject to the control, of the receiver.
The manner of its organization was not shown; the partnership agreement, if any such existed, was not produced.
No proof was given that the officers o r stockholders claimed or held

not conclusive proof of the existence of the partnership relation.

Edwards v. Tracy, 62 Pa. 374. But both in England and in this

country it is cogent evidence upon the question, It puts the defendant

upon his proofs explanatory of the fact. If he is able to show that

such participation was referable to some other reason, such as com-

pensation for services rendered by an agent, broker, salesman or other-

wise, the prima fades is overcome. So, if the participation in the

profits is referable to some other relation other than that of partner-

ship between the participants, such as membership in a joint-stock

association or a corporation, the effect of proof of participation will

be overcome.

In the light of these well settled rules, let us consider briefly the

position of the parties and the important findings of fact made by the

learned auditor in this case. The claimant's right to share in the fund

in court rested on the theory that the Home Savings Bank, in which

the money of his wards had been deposited, was a partnership, and
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that the decedent was a partner. The burden of proving the fact that

the bank was a partnership was on him; and as was said in Hallstead

v. Coleman, 143 Pa. 364, "until that proof was given, the defendants

were not called upon to enter upon their defense." The proof made

upon this subject showed the organization of a bank under the name

of the Home Savings Bank, with a president, cashier, and a board of

directors. This is the mode of organization usually adopted by cor-

porations, and did not tend to prove a partnership. It was then shown

that the decedent bought and held certificates of stock in the bank,

after its organization, which recited not the formation of a partnership,

but the organization of a bank under the laws of the state, and the

division of its capital into shares of one hundred dollars each. This

is not the usual way in which partnerships are created and partners

admitted. It is the usual way in which stocks are issued and trans-

ferred in corporations. Proof was then made of the receipt by the

decedent of several dividends upon his stock. These did not purport

to be shares in the profits of firm business, but dividends, declared in

the manner usual among corporations, upon the stock of the bank;

and were paid by dividend checks drawn under the authority of the

board of directors. The only other evidence was the returns made

by the officers of the bank under the tax law of 1879, which threw

very little light upon the character of the organization of the bank.

Upon this proof the questions for the auditor were whether the bank

was shown to be a partnership, and the decedent a partner. The

bank did business for a number of years and then failed. Its books

and papers were in the hands, or subject to the control, of the receiver.

The manner of its organization was not shown; the partnership agree-

ment, if any such existed, was not produced.

No proof was given that the officers or stockholders claimed or held

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§46

251

CORPORATIONS DE FACTO.

CORPORATIONS DE FACTO.

out to the public that the stockholders were partners or the bank a

partnership enterprise. It is not alleged that the decedent participated

in any manner in the business, or exercised any control over it. The

whole case against him rested on the fact that he had purchased shares

in a bank, then organized and doing business, and received dividends

declared by the directors and paid to him in a cashier's check. We

are not surprised that the auditor was led to ask, "What is there in all

this evidence from the beginning of the business to the failure tend-

ing to prove a partnership?" Nor that he answered his own question

by holding that this proof was insufficient to establish, prima facie,

the existence of the partnership relation. On the other hand, there

was much tending to show that Henry Gibbs understood that he was

the holder of stock in an incorporated bank, and that the bank assumed

and exercised corporate powers; and was dealt with by the public as

a corporation. The form of its certificates, the manner of their trans-

fer, the election of directors by the stockholders, the management of the

business of the bank by the directors and the officers elected by them,

the mode of declaring and paying dividends, were all suggestive of a
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corporation. They were not suggestive of a partnership. We are

unable, therefore, to say that the auditor erred in finding that the bank

was not shown to be a partnership. The learned judge who heard

the exceptions to this report seems to have concurred with the auditor,

and we require under such circumstances to be satisfied that a mistake

was made before interfering with the findings. We are not so satis-

fied; but are of opinion that the state of the evidence justified the

auditor's conclusion. This disposes of the whole case.

It is said with earnestness and energy that this is a case in which

the depositors deserve protection. We assent to this proposition.

We can extend protection to them, however, in accordance with the es-

tablished rules of law, and in no other manner. What the Home Sav-

ings Bank was in its organization, in what capacity those who held

its stock were liable to its depositors are questions not now before us.

It may have been a corporation de jure, a corporation de facto, a joint-

stock association or a general partnership so far as we are able to de-

clare. What we say is that the evidence in this case is not sufficient to

make a case, prima facie, against Henry Gibbs as a partner, or the

bank as a general partnership. It does not appear that the bank was

organized as a partnership, conducted business as a partnership, or

held itself out to the public as such. It does not appear that Gibbs

understood the bank to be other than what his certificates of stock in-

dicated; or that he treated the business of the bank as that of a firm,

or exercised the slightest control over, or influence upon it, or mislead

the appellant or any other depositor by act or word as to his relation

to it. What does appear is that he purchased shares of stock in the

usual manner, and received some dividends thereon. These circum-

stances are naturally referable to the relation of a stockholder to a

corporation; and standing alone, are not proof, prima facie, of the

appellant's proposition that the bank was organized as a partnership,

and that the purchase of shares of stock made Gibbs a partner. If he

out to the public that the stockholders were partners or the bank a
partnership enterprise. It is not alleged that the decedent participated
in any manner in the business, or exercised any control over it. The
whole case against him rested on the fact that he had purchased shares
in a b~nk, then organized and doing business, and received dividends
declared by the directors and paid to him in a cashier's check. We
are not surprised that the auditor was led to ask, "What is there in all
this evidence from the beginning of the business to the failure tending to prove a partnership?" Nor that he answered his own question
by holding that this proof was insufficient to establish, pri"ma fac£e,
the existence of the partnership relation. On the other hand, there
was much tending to show that Henry Gibbs understood that he was
the holder of stock in an incorporated bank, and that the bank assumed
and exercised corporate powers; and was dealt with by the public as
a corporation. The form of its certificates, the manner of their tramfer, the election of directors by the stockholders, the management of the
business of the bank by the directors and the officers elected by them,
the mode of declaring and paying dividends, were all suggestive of a
corporation. They were not suggestive of a partnership. We are
unable, therefore, to say that the auditor erred in finding that the bank
was not shown to be a partnership. The learned judge who heard
the exceptions to this report seems to have concurred with the auditor,
and we require under such circumstances to be satisfied that a mistake
was made before interfering with the findings. We are not so satisfied; but are of opinion that the state of the eyidence justified the
auditor's conclusion. This disposes of the whole case.
It is said with earnestness and energy that this is a case in which
the depositors deserve protection. We assent to this proposition.
We can extend protection to them, however, in accordance with the established rules of law, and in no other manner. What the Home Sayings Bank was in its organization, in what capacity those who held
its stock were liable to its depositors are questions not now before us.
It may have been a corporation de Jure, a corporation de facto, a jointstock association or a general partnership so far as we are able to declare. What we say is that the evidence in this case is not sufficient to
make a case, prima facie, against Henry Gibbs as a partner, or the
bank as a general partnership. It does not appear that the hank was
organized as a partnership, conducted business as a partnership. or
held itself out to the public as such. It does not appear that Gibbs
understood the bank to be other than what his certificates of stock indicated; or that he treated the business of the bank as thnt of a firm,
or exercised the slightest control over, or influence upon it, or mislead
the appellant or any other depositor by act or word as to his relation
to it. \.Vhat does appear is that he purchased shares of stock in the
usual manner, and received some dividends thereon. These circumstances are naturally referable to the relation of a stockholder to a
corporation; and standing alone, are not proof, pri"ma fac£e, of the
appellant's proposition that the bank was organized as a partnership,
and that the purchase of shares of stock made Gibbs a partner. If he
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had received profits from the business apparently conducted by a
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partnership, he would have been put upon his explanation, and, fail-

had received profits from the business apparently conducted b y a
partnership, he would have been put upon his explanation, and, failing to make one, would have been held to be a partner. The burden
in that case would have been on him. Having received dividends declared by a board of directors upon the stock into which the capital of
the bank was divided, he could rest securely upon the apparent character of the transaction and the inferences naturally to be drawn from
it. The burden of explanation necessary to give another character to
the dividend declared, and to the stock on which it was paid, was on
him who asserted that such other was the true character of these circumstances.
It was also said in the argument that the recitals in the stock certificates are not evidence of actual incorporation as against a
stranger. This must be granted. They do not prove incorporation.
But the appellees are not bound, upon the evidence in this case, to
prove incorporation. The significant question is, where is the proof
that this bank w as organized or conducted as a partnership concern?
The certificates do not prove that, but the inferences naturally drawn
from them tend the other way. It will not do for the appell ants to
say: "We have shown that the decedent was a stockholder in this
bank and received dividends upon his stock, now you must show that
the bank was incorporated or be liable to us as a general partner."
This is attempting to change the burden of proof. Again the learned
counsel says : " This is the sole fact (the form of the certificate ) that
is before the court, and if it is sufficient to authorize a court to find an
incorporation in this case, why is it not in any other?" The court
below did not find that the bank w as a corporation. That question
was not before it. It was alleged by the appellant to be a partnership, but the auditor and the judge of the court below regarde d the
evidence in support of that allegation insufficient to justify a finding
that the bank was not "organized by act of the legislature of
Pennsylva nia ," as its certificates alleged , but by the parties as copartners. The appellant failed, not because the b ank was held to be
a corporation, but because it was not shown to be a partnership. Until
evidence in support of the appellant's position is given sufficient to
lead fairly to the conclusion that the bank was organized as a partnership, or that Henry Gibbs contracted to become a partner when he
bought his stock, or that he Jed the public by his acts and declar ations to. deal with him or the bank on the basis of his being a partner,
there is nothing that makes it the duty of his representatives to enter
upon a defense, or that makes it possible for the court to decide upon
the character of the bank. In such a state of the evidence the court
can only say, as the court below said in this case, "lt is not shown
that the bank is a partnership,'' and for that reason the claimant fails.
The assignments of error are not sustained, and the decree is affinned.

ing to make one, would have been held to be a partner. The burden

in that case would have been on him. Having received dividends de-

clared by a board of directors upon the stock into which the capital of

the bank was divided, he could rest securely upon the apparent char-

acter of the transaction and the inferences naturally to be drawn from

it. The burden of explanation necessary to give another character to

the dividend declared, and to the stock on which it was paid, was on

him who asserted that such other was the true character of these cir-

cumstances.

It was also said in the argument that the recitals in the stock cer-

tificates are not evidence of actual incorporation as against a

stranger. This must be granted. They do not prove incorporation.

But the appellees are not bound, upon the evidence in this case, to

prove incorporation. The significant question is, where is the proof

that this bank was organized or conducted as a partnership concern?

The certificates do not prove that, but the inferences naturally drawn
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from them tend the other way. It will not do for the appellants to

say: "We have shown that the decedent was a stockholder in this

bank and received dividends upon his stock, now you must show that

the bank was incorporated or be liable to us as a general partner."

This is attempting to change the burden of proof. Again the learned

counsel says: "This is the sole fact (the form of the certificate) that

is before the court, and if it is sufficient to authorize a court to find an

incorporation in this case, why is it not in any other?" The court

below did not find that the bank was a corporation. That question

was not before it. It was alleged by the appellant to be a partner-

ship, but the auditor and the judge of the court below regarded the

evidence in support of that allegation insufficient to justify a finding

that the bank was not "organized by act of the legislature of

Pennsylvania," as its certificates alleged, but by the parties as co-

partners. The appellant failed, not because the bank was held to be

a corporation, but because it was not shown to be a partnership. Until

evidence in support of the appellant's position is given sufficient to

lead fairly to the conclusion that the bank was organized as a partner-

ship, or that Henry Gibbs contracted to become a partner when he

bought his stock, or that he led the public by his acts and declara-

tions to deal with him or the bank on the basis of his being a partner,

there is nothing that makes it the duty of his representatives to enter

upon a defense, or that makes it possible for the court to decide upon

the character of the bank. In such a state of the evidence the court

can only say, as the court below said in this case, "It is not shown

that the bank is a partnership," and for that reason the claimant fails.

The assignments of error are not sustained, and the decree is af-

firmed.

Note. See infra, Conditions precedent to de facto existence, p. 614

Note. See infra, Conditions precedent to de facto existence, p. 614.
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Sec. 47. Same.

McCarthy v. lavasche.

1878. In the Supreme Court of Illinois. 89 111. Rep. 270-

See. 4 7. Same.

277, 31 Am. R. 83.

Appeal from the superior court of Cook county, the Hon. Joseph

McCARTHY v. LAV ASCHE.

E. Gary, Judge, presiding.

Mr. Justice Walker delivered the opinion of the court.

The National Loan and Trust Company was organized under an

1878.

IN

THE SuPREME CouRT

OF

ILL1No1s.

89 Ill. Rep. 270-

277, 31 Am. R. 83.

act of the general assembly, approved on the 9th of March, 1867.

Under the provisions of an act adopted and approved the 26th of

March, 1872, the corporation changed its name to the "Bank of Chi-

cago," and appellee, being a creditor of the bank, brought an action

Appeal from the superior court of Cook county, the Hon. JosEPH

E. GARY, Judge, presiding.

of debt against appellant for its recovery.

The declaration avers that the corporation was, among other things,

authorized to borrow money, to receive money on deposit, to loan

money and make discounts, etc.; that on the 26th of August. 1873,

the bank owed, and was and still is indebted to appellee in the sum

of $100 for money received of appellee on deposit; that appellant

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:14 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

then was, and still is, a stockholder and the owner of one share of

$100 in the bank; that the bank had become, and still is, utterly in-

solvent, and that appellant had not assigned or transferred his stock in

the bank.

The declaration further avers that the charter of the corporation

contains this provision: "And each stockholder shall be liable to

double the amount of the stock held or owned by him, and for three

months after giving notice of transfer, as hereinafter mentioned," and

that, by virtue of this provision of the act of incorporation, appellant

as such stockholder, was individually liable to the creditor or credit-

ors of the bank in double the amount of the stock held by him, where-

by he became liable to pay appellee.

A demurrer was filed to the declaration, which the court overruled,

and appellant abided by his demurrer; and the court thereupon ren-

dered judgment in favor of plaintiff, and assessed the damages and

rendered judgment for $110.50, and defendant appeals, and assigns

errors.

It is urged that the corporation was never legally organized, as the

act under which the stockholders incorporated was unconstitutional

and void; that if not, then the clause in the charter rendering stock-

holders liable is too vague to render them liable to the individual

creditors of the company; or if it shall be held that they are so liable

then the remedy is in equity, against all the stockholders.

On the other hand, it is contended that the law does not contravene

the constitution; but if it should be so held, the stockholders having

organized the corporation, and held themselves out to the world as

Mr. Justice WALKER delivered the opinion of the court.
The National Loan and Trust Company was organized under an
act of the general assembly, approved on the 9th of March, 1867.
Under the provi sions of an act adopted and approved the 26th oi
March , 1872, the corporation changed its name to the "Bank of Chicago,'' and appellee, being a creditor of the bank, brought an action
of debt against appellaot for its recovery.
The de claration avers that the corporation was, among other things,
authorized to borrow money, to receive money on deposit, to loan
money and make di scounts, etc.; that on the 26th of August, 1873,
the bank owed, and was and still is indebted to appellee in the sum
of $100 for money received of appellee on deposit; that appellant
then was, and still is, a stockholder and the owner of one share of
$100 in the bank; that the bank had become, and still is, utterly insolvent, and that appellant had not assigned or transferred his stock in
the bank.
The declaration further avers that the cha rter of the corporation
contains this provision: ''And each stockholder shall be li able to
double the amount of the stock held or owned by him, and for three
months after giving notice of transfer, as hereinafter mentioned , ' ' and
that, by virtue of this provision of the act of incorporation, appellant
as such stockholder, was individually liable to the creditor or creditors of the bank in double the amount of the stock held by him , whereby be became liable to pay appellee.
A demurrer was filed to the declaration , which the court overruled,
and appellant abided by his d emurrer; and the court thereupon rende red judgment in favor of plaintiff, and assessed the damages and
rendered judgment for $110.50, and defendant appeals, and assigns
errors .
It is urged that the corporation was never legally organized, as the
act under which the stockholders incorporated was unconstitutional
and void; that if not, then the clause in the charter rendering stockho lders liable is too vague to render them liable to the individual
creditors of the company; or if it shall be held that they are so liable
then the remedy is in equity, against all the stockholders.
On the other hand , it is contended that the law does not contraY ene
the constitution; but if it should be so held , the stockholders having
organizen the corporation , and held themselves out to the world as
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such, and thereby obtained credit and incurred indebtedness, they are

estopped to deny the validity of the act of their organization under it,

such, and thereby obtained credit and incurred indebtedness, they a re
estopped to deny the validity of the act of their organization under it,
and that a reasonable and fair construction of the clause of the act
quoted renders the shareholders individually liable to each and every
creditor, and that the remedy for a recovery on the liability is complete at law. These are the questions raised and discussed on this
record.
Even if the law is unconstitutional, .can the promoters and those
engaged in its operation be heard to say that they may relieve themselves from liability, and from all their engagements, because the law
under which they have acted is prohibited by the organic law? May
shrewd, intelligent persons go to the general assembly and procure an
a ct that they should know is prohibited by the fundamental law, avail
the mselves of its benefits, obtain the money of the uninformed and
the confiding, and then be heard to say, we are not incorporated, our
charter and organization are void, and we will bold your money? Or,
may those who promoted the enterprise by becoming shareholders, to
en able the company to organize, and to procure other people's money,
be hear<l to interpose such a defense? The presumption is, that each
subscriber for stock knew at the time of the subscription that the charter contained the provision rendering him liable for double the sum he
subscribed, and such persons could not but have known that this provision w ould contribute largely to give credit to the concern and greatly
augment its business.
The subscribers for shares of the stock, no doubt, expected to reap
large profits, and expected those profits to be greatly enhanced by this
provision. It enabled them to point to it and assure individuals ~md
the public that the institution was safe, as, if the business was not
lucrative, all the stockholders were severally liable for double the
a mount of the ir subscriptions. They thus, no doubt, did increase
their business, and thus obtained money and credit, which now, when
the institution has proved a failure, they endeavor to avoid paying by
urging that their organization, and, consequently, their subscriptions to
its stock, were void. Fair dealing would say that they should be
estopped from interposing such a defense.
The question is by no means new in the jurisprudence of this country. The question has been frequently considered in the courts, in
the form here presented or in analogous cases. See Ba~er v. Brannan, 6 Hill 47; Embry v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511; Eaton v. Aspinwall, 19 N. Y. l 19; Mead v. Keeler, 24 Barb. 25; Ferguson v.
Landran, 5 Bush (Ky.) 230. These were all cases where the parties
were held to be estopped from insisting that the organization was
illegal, or a law unconstitutional, because of the acts or consent of the
parties urging the objections.
In our own court analogous questions have been presented and de·
termined. In the case of Tarbell v. Page, 24 Ill. 46, it was held that
in a suit by a creditor against a stockholder, the former could not
show that the corporation had failed to file a certificate of organiza-

and that a reasonable and fair construction of the clause of the act

quoted renders the shareholders individually liable to each and every

creditor, and that the remedy for a recovery on the liability is com-

plete at law. These are the questions raised and discussed on this

record. •

Even if the law is unconstitutional, .can the promoters and those

engaged in its operation be heard to say that they may relieve them-

selves from liability, and from all their engagements, because the law

under which they have acted is prohibited by the organic law? May

shrewd, intelligent persons go to the general assembly and procure an

act that they should know is prohibited by the fundamental law, avail

themselves of its benefits, obtain the money of the uninformed and

the confiding, and then be heard to say, we are not incorporated, our

charter and organization are void, and we will hold your money? Or,

may those who promoted the enterprise by becoming shareholders, to

enable the company to organize, and to procure otherpeople's money,
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be heard to interpose such a defense? The presumption is, that each

subscriber for stock knew at the time of the subscription that the char-

ter contained the provision rendering him liable for double the sum he

subscribed, and such persons could not but have known that this pro-

vision would contribute largely to give credit to the concern and greatly

augment its business.

The subscribers for shares of the stock, no doubt, expected to reap

large profits, and expected those profits to be greatly enhanced by this

provision. It enabled them to point to it and assure individuals and

the public that the institution was safe, as, if the business was not

lucrative, all the stockholders were severally liable for double the

amount of their subscriptions. They thus, no doubt, did increase

their business, and thus obtained money and credit, which now, when

the institution has proved a failure, they endeavor to avoid paying by

urging that their organization, and, consequently, their subscriptions to

its stock, were void. Fair dealing would say that they should be

estopped from interposing such a defense.

The question is by no means new in the jurisprudence of this coun-

try. The question has been frequently considered in the courts, in

the form here presented or in analogous cases. See Baker v. Bran-

nan, 6 Hill 47; Embry v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511; Eaton v. Aspin-

wall, 19 N. Y. 119; Mead v. Keeler, 24 Barb. 25; Ferguson v.

Landran, 5 Bush (Ky.) 230. These were all cases where the parties

were held to be estopped from insisting that the organization was

illegal, or a law unconstitutional, because of the acts or consent of the

parties urging the objections.

In our own court analogous questions have been presented and de-

termined. In the case of Tarbell v. Page, 24 111. 46, it was held that

in a suit by a creditor against a stockholder, the former could not

show that the corporation had failed to file a certificate of organiza-
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tion with the secretary of state; that in a collateral proceeding the

regularity of the corporate organization could not be questioned. And

this is a rule of uniform application. If, then, the plaintiff, by con-

tracting with a body exercising the franchises of a corporation, is

estopped from denying the legality of its organization, the same rea-

son must apply with increased force to prevent a stockholder in such

an organization from questioning the legality of the corporation.

That the legality of an incorporation can not be attacked collater-

ally, see Rice v. Rock Island and Alton Railroad Co., 21 111. 93.

Goodrich v. Reynolds et al., 31 HI. 490, and numerous subsequent

cases. In fact, the books abound in adjudged cases which hold that

a person doing an act or making a statement which misleads another

to his injury shall not be permitted to question the act or the truth of

.the statement. So, on the same principle, appellant should be estopped,

as his acts contributed to the organization of this company, and he

held himself but to the world as a stockholder therein, and liable to

the extent of double the amount of his subscription. Had the com-

pany not been organized, appellee would not have lost his money,
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and appellant thus contributed to that loss.

In Ferguson v. Landran, supra, appellants denied the validity of a

tax levied under a local law, but the court held they were estopped

to deny the validity of the law, because they had approved it and

availed of its benefits and aided in procuring its passage. The court

held the law unconsitutional, but enforced the tax. The court says,

'■parties are estopped from denying the constitutionality of a local

statute by participating in the procurement of its passage, and by

ratifying, acquiescing in, or approving it after its passage, and by

becoming recipients of benefits under it; and all such persons are held

to be liable to the tax authorized by such enactment, although it is

unconstitutional and invalid to all other persons."

Here, appellant approved of the act, and availed himself of its

benefits by subscribing for stock and becoming entitled to exercise all

the rights and privileges of a stockholder in the corporation, yustice,

morality, public policy and precedent all demand that appellant

should be estopped from denying the constitutionality of the law.

If stockholders might show the law unconstitutional. and their

organization void, and all their acts unauthorized, then allpersofis

engaged in the organization of the corporation should be held liable

for the consequences of their illegal and unauthorized acts, inde-

pendent of the clause in their charter. So they should, in no event,

escape liability for obtaining money without authority.

Suppose these stockholders had formed a partnership, with articles

of partnership containing precisely the same provisions that are con-

tained in their charter, and had put in capital stock to the same ex-

tent, and the same amounts they each subscribed in shares, would any

one question the legality of the organization, or the legal liability of

each of the members of the firm? We apprehend these propositions

would be conceded. And if so, in principle, what distinction can be

tion with the secretary of state; that in a collateral proceeding the
regularity of the corporate organization could not be questioned. And
this is a rule of uniforn1 application. If, then, the plaintiff, by contracting with a body exercising the franchises of a corporation, is
estopped from denying the legality of its organization, the same reason must apply with increased force to prevent a stockholder in such
an organization from questioning the legality of the corporation.
That the legality of an incorporation can not be attacked collaterally, see Rice v. Rock Island and Alton Railroad Co., 21 Ill. 93.
Goodrich v. Reynolds et al., 31 Ill. 490, and numerous subsequent
cases. In fact, the books abound in adjudged cases which bold that
a person doing an act or making a statement which misleads another
to his injury shall not be permitted to question the act or the truth of
.the statement. So, on the same principle, appellant should be estopped,
as his acts contributed to the organization of this company, and he
held himself out to the world as a stockholder therein, and liable to
the extent of double the amount of his subscription. Had the company not been organized, appellee would not have lost his money,
and appellant thus contributed to that loss.
In Ferguson v. Landran, supra, appellants denied the validity of a
tax levied under a local law, but the court held they were estopped
to deny the validity of the law, because they had approved it and
a,·aiJed of its benefits and aided in procuring its passage. The court
held the law unconsitutional, but enforced the tax. The court says,
"parties are estopped from denying the constitutionality of a local
statute by participating in the procurement of its passage, and by
ratifying, acquiescing in, or approving it after its passage, and by
becoming recipients of benefits under it; and all such person s are held
to be liable to the tax authorized by such enactment, although it is
uncon stitutional and invalid to all other persons."
Here, appellant approved of tlte act, and availed ht'mseif of its
benefits by subscribing for stock and becoming entitled to exerct'se all
the rights and privileges of a stockholder in the corporation. yustt'ce,
morali'ty, public policy and precedent all demand that appellant
should be estoppcd from denying the consti'tutt'onality of the law.
If stockholders might show the law unconstitutional. and thet'r
organizati'on void, and all their acts unauthorized. then all p ersons
engaged in the organization of the corporati'on should be held !£able
for the consequences of thet'r £/legal and unauthorized acts, independent of the clause in thet'r charter. So they should, in no event,
escape liability for obtaining money wi'thout authort'ty.
Suppose these stockholders had formed a partnership, with articles
of partnership containing precisely the same provisions that are contained in their charter, and had put in capital stock to the same extent, and the same amounts they each subscribed in shares, would any
one question the legality of the organization, or the legal liability of
each of the members of the firm? We apprehend these propositions
would be conceded. And if so, in principle, what distinction can be
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taken between the supposed case and the one at bar? Had the share-

holders written under the charter a statement that it was unconstitu-

taken between the supposed case and the one at bar? Had the shareholders written under the charter a statement that it was unconstitutional and void as a law, but that they adopted it as articles of partnership, and that each would be bound by its terms and conditions, and
would pay in, for capital stock, the sums set opposite their several
names, and they had signed it, and specified the sum to be paid in,
could it be doubted that each member would have been liable, under
the articles thus executed? And 1f so, when stripped of mere form,
and substance is alone considered, this organization is in effect the
same. We can perceive no well-grounded distinction. We are
therefore of opinion that, independent of all constitutional questions,
each shareholder became liable under the charter as articles of partnership, as it operated as an agreement by each subscriber to be liable
to creditors to double the amount each subscrihed.
It is urged that under the language of the third section of the charter, although a liability may be created to double the amount of the
stock, still it is to the corporation and not to the creditors. The obvious purpose of the general assembly was to secure the creditors of
the institution. And if so, why make a provision which the creditor
could not, and the directors woi1ld not, in all probability enforce?
On their refusal the creditor, if that constniction is to be given,
would be compelled to proceed by mandamus, had the law been
valid, to compel suits to be brought by the corporation against shareholders, and then in all probability, after years of delay in litigation,
to get the money into their hands, a further delay would be liable to
ensue until a recovery could be had against the bank and the money
realized at the end of a long, obstinate and expensive litigation. Such
a course could not, we th.i nk, have been intended. Such a requirement would greatly impair if it did not render the security worthless.
We must therefore conclude, that as the provision was intended to
secure the creditor, it was intencled that his remedy should be direct
and effective, and that he might sue in his own name and at law.
If this association only amounted to a pa1tnership, as we have seen
it was, then the firm could not sue one of its members to compel the
payment. Nor do we perceive how the firm could maintain a bill for
the purpose. Hence we must conclude that it was intended that the
liability should be direct to the creditor and not to the firm.
It is next urged that a remedy is in equity and not at law. Actions
at law were maintained in the cases of Culver v. Third National Bank,
64 Ill. 528, and Corwith v. Culver, 69 Ill. 502, under a statute creat·
ing a liability of the stockholders. It was then urged that the remedy
was in equity, but we held that it was a legal liability and could be
enforced by an action at law. That statute did not determine , in
terms, in which forum the remedy should be sought. But it being a
legal right, the remedy was held to be at law.
It is urged that the liability should be construed to be joint against
all the stockholders. To do so would, we think, do violence to the
language of the statute; the language is, "each stockholder shall be

tional and void as a law, but that they adopted it as articles of partner-

ship, and that each would be bound by its terms and conditions, and

would pay in, for capital stock, the sums set opposite their several

names, and they had signed it, and specified the sum to be paid in,

could it be doubted that each member would have been liable, under

the articles thus executed? And if so, when stripped of mere form,

and substance is alone considered, this organization is in effect the

same. We can perceive no well-grounded distinction. We are

therefore of opinion that, independent of all constitutional questions,

each shareholder became liable under the charter as articles of part-

nership, as it operated as an agreement by each subscriber to be liable

to creditors to double the amount each subscribed.

It is urged that under the language of the third section of the char-

ter, although a liability may be created to double the amount of the

stock, still it is to the corporation and not to the creditors. The ob-

vious purpose of the general assembly was to secure the creditors of
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the institution. And if so, why make a provision which the creditor

could not, and the directors would not, in all probability enforce?

On their refusal the creditor, if that construction is to be given,

would be compelled to proceed by mandamus, had the law been

valid, to compel suits to be brought by the corporation against share-

holders, and then in all probability, after years of delay in litigation,

to get the money into their hands, a further delay would be liable to

ensue until a recovery could be had against the bank and the money

realized at the end of a long, obstinate and expensive litigation. Such

a course could not, we think, have been intended. Such a require-

ment would greatly impair if it did not render the security worthless.

We must therefore conclude, that as the provision was intended to

secure the creditor, it was intended that his remedy should be direct

and effective, and that he might sue in his own name and at law.

If this association only amounted to a partnership, as we have seen

it was, then the firm could not sue one of its members to compel the

payment. Nor do we perceive how the firm could maintain a bill for

the purpose. Hence we must conclude that it was intended that the

liability should be direct to the creditor and not to the firm.

It is next urged that a remedy is in equity and not at law. Actions

at law were maintained in the cases of Culver v. Third National Bank,

64 111. 528, and Corwith v. Culver, 69 111. 502, under a statute creat-

ing a liability of the stockholders. It was then urged that the remedy

was in equity, but we held that it was a legal liability and could be

enforced by an action at law. That statute did not determine, in

terms, in which forum the remedy should be sought. But it being a

legal right, the remedy was held to be at law.

It is urged that the liability should be construed to be joint against

all the stockholders. To do so would, we think, do violence to the

language of the statute; the language is, "each stockholder shall be
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liable to double the amount of stock held or owned by him, for three

months after giving notice of transfers, as hereinafter mentioned."

This language renders the stockholders severally and individually

liable.

The judgment of the court below must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Note. See infra, Conditions precedent to existence by estoppel, p. 630.

17—Wil. Cask.

liable to double the amount of stock held or owned by him, for three
months after giving notice of transfers, as hereinafter mentioned."
This language renders the stockholders severally and individually
liable.
The judgment of the court below must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Note. See infra, Conditions precedent to existence by estoppel, p. &3().
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PART II.

THE BODY CORPORATE, ITS PARENTAGE, CONCEP-

TION, BIRTH, ANATOMY, LIFE AND DEATH.

Title I. Parentage—The State and Promoters.

Subdivision I. The State, Its Power to Create.

CHAPTER 2.

NATURE OF THE POWER AND METHODS OF EXERCISE.

ARTICLE I. NATURE OF THE POWER.

PART II.

Sec. 48. "The state creates the corporation upon the application

of individuals, who are called incorporators. The incorpo-

THE BODY CORPORATE, ITS PARENTAGE, CONCEP·
TION, BIRTH, ANATOMY, LIFE AND DEATH.

rators then organize the corporation. The functions of the

incorporators thereupon cease, and the stockholders proceed

to contribute the capital and elect directors. The directors

then start and continue to keep in operation the powers of the

corporation." I Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 2, 3d

TITLE I.

ed., p. 4.

p ARENT AGE-THE ST ATE AND PROMOTERS.

(a) The power to create is an incident of sovereignty, and the

sovereign's consent is essential. A corporation is the creature of

SUBDIVISION I.

THE STATE, ITS POWER TO CREATE.

the sovereignty that creates it, and to that alone is it amenable for

violation or usurpation of its purely corporate authority.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, Ex Rel. WILCOX, v. CURTIS.1

CHAPTER 2.
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1868. In the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. 35

Conn. 374-384, 95 Am. Dec. 263.

NATURE OF THE POWER AND METHODS OF EXERCISE.

[Information in the nature of a quo -warranto upon the relation of

Wilcox, who claimed to have been duly elected a director of the First

ARTICLE I.

National Bank of Meriden, Conn., but who claimed to have been de-

NATURE OF THR POWER.

prived of exercising the franchises thereof by Curtis, who, without

Sec. 48.

''The state creates the corporation upon the application
of individuals, who are called incorporators. The incorporators then organize the corporation. The functions of the
incorporators thereupon cease, and the stockholders proceed
to contribute the capital and elect directors. The directors
then start and continue to keep in operation the powers of the
corporation.' ' 1 Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 2, 3d
ed., p. 4.

warrant, exercised the same and wrongfully excluded the relator. The

suit was brought in the superior court for the county of New Haven.

1 Statement of facts abridged. Arguments omitted.

(258)

(a) The power to create is an incident of sovereignty, and the
sovereign's consent is essential. A corporation is the creature of
the sovereignty that creates it, and to that alone is it amenable for
violation or usurpation of its purely corporate authority.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, Ex REL. WILCOX, v. CURTIS.1

1868.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT.
Conn. 374-384, 95 Am. Dec. 263.

35

[Information in the nature of a quo warranto upon the relation of
Wilcox, who claimed to have been duly elected a director of the First
National Bank of Meriden, Conn., but who claimed to have been deprived of exercising the franchises thereof by Curtis, who, without
warrant, exercised the same and wrongfully excluded the relator. The
suit was brought in the superior court for the county of New Haven.
1 Statement of facts abridged.
Arguments omitted.

(258)
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Defendant demurred, and the case was reserved for the advice of the

supreme court.]

Butler, J. The power to create a corporation is an attribute of

sovereignty; and the government of the United States created the

corporation in question, in the exercise of that independent and su-

preme sovereign power which the people delegated to it by the consti-

tution. It is, therefore, the creature of that sovereignty, and amena-

ble to, and controllable by it, and by none other.

An information in the nature of a quo warranto against a corpora-

tion lies only at the instance and in the name of the sovereign power

which created it. (5 Wheaton 291.) The original writ so lay against

any person who usurped any franchise or liberty against the king, or

for misuser or non-user of franchises or privileges granted by him.

The information in the nature of a quo warranto, authorized by the

statute of the 9th Anne, at the relation of any person against any

other person usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding any fran-

chise or office in any corporation, is but an extension and simplifica-

tion of the ancient writ, and is grantable only where that would lie.
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In England it lies in the name of the sovereign against those who

usurp such franchises, because such usurpation is in derogation of the

rights of the crown. In this country it lies in the name of the gov-

ernment, against those who usurp such franchises, because grantable

or granted by the commonwealth.

•'The state, or commonwealth," says Mr. Angell in his work on

corporations, '■ •stands in the place of the king, and has succeeded to

all the prerogatives and franchises proper to a republican government.

With us therefore to assume a power which can not be exercised

-without a grant from the sovereign authority, or to intrude into the

office of a private corporation, contrary to the provisions of the stat-

ute which creates it, is, in a large sense, to invade the sovereign pre-

rogative and to assume or violate a sovereign franchise." And the

cases cited fully sustain his positions. Upon the same principles the

information can lie only in the name of the United States and in the

federal courts, against those who invade a franchise grantable or

granted by the national government.

As then the corporation in question is the creature of federal sover-

eignty, and in respect to its internal organization, operation and con-

tinual existence is amenable to and controllable by that sovereignty

alone; and as the writ in question is properly grantable by that sover-

eignty alone whose franchise has been invaded and violated, it would

seem upon principle too clear for argument (if there be nothing more

in the case) that the relator has erred in invoking the interference of

another uninvaded and unviolated sovereignty, and the court below

have erred in assuming jurisdiction and granting the writ.

Such is the obvious prima facie character of the case before us.

But the plaintiff insists that there is no error and makes several

claims, founded upon the complex character of sovereignty as it ex-

ists in this country, divided between the national and state govern-

ments.

Defendant demurred, and the case was reserved for the advice of the
supreme court.]
BUTLER, J.
The power to create a corporat£on £s an attribute of
sovereignty; and the government of the Unt'ted States created the
corporat£on t'n questi'on , i'n the exercise of that £ndependent and supreme sovereign power wh£ch the people delegated to t't by the const£tut£on. It i's, therefore, the creature of that soverei'gnty, and amenable to, and controllaple by t't, and by none other.
An information in the nature of a quo warranto against a corporation lies only at the instance and in the name of the sovereign power
which created it. (S Wheaton 291.) The original writ so lay against
any person who usurped any franchise or liberty against tjie king, or
for misuser or non-user of franchises or privileges granted by him.
The information in the nature of a quo warranto, authorized by the
statute of the 9th Anne, at the relation of any person against any
other person usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding any franchise or office in any corporation, is but an extension and simplification of the ancient writ, and is grantable only where that would lie.
In England it lies in the name of the sovereign against those who
usurp such franchises, because such usurpation is in derogation of the
rights of the crown. In this country it lies in the name of the government, against those who usurp such franchises, because grantable
or granted by the commonwealth.
••The state, or commonwealth," says #Ir. Angell £n ht's work on
corporat£ons, "stands t'n the place of the k£ng, and has succeeded to
all the prerogatives and franch£ses proper to a republt'can government.
lYith us therefore to assume a power wh£ch can not be exercised
--.~·ithottt a grant from the soveret'gn authori'ty, or to intrude t'nto the
office of a pr£vate corporat£on, contrary to the provi'sions of the statute which creates it, is, i'n a large sense, to i'nvade the soverei'gn prerogati've and to assume or vi'olate a soverei'gn franchi'se.'' And the
cases cited fully sustain his positions. Upon the same principles the
information can lie only in the name of the United States and in the
federal courts, against those who invade a franchise grantable or
granted by the national government.
As then the corporation in question is the creature of federal sovereignty, and in respect to its internal organization, operation and continual existence is amenable to and controllable by that sovereignty
alone; and as the writ in question is properly grantable by that sovereignty alone whose franchise has been invaded and violated, it would
seem upon principle too clear for argument (if there be nothing more
in the case) that the relator has erred in invoking the interference of
another uninvaded and unviolated sovereignty, and the court below
have erred in assuming jurisdiction and granting the writ.
Such is the obvious pri'ma facie character of the case before us.
But the plaintiff insists that there is no error and makes several
claims, founded upon the complex character of sovereignty as it exists in this country, divided between the national and state governments.

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

26o

§48

THE STATE V. CURTIS.

26o

1. He insists in the first place that this institution is amenable to

THE STATE V. CURTIS.

state sovereignty, because it is located and its officers discharge their

1. He insists in the first place that this institution is amenable to
state sovereignty, because it is located and its officers discharge their
duties and perform their functions within this state. This claim is
groundless.
It is indeed true, in the language of the supreme court of the United
States (2 Howard 555), that a "corporation created by a state to perform its functions under the authority of that state, and only suable
there, though it may have members out of the state, is a person,
though an artificial one, inhabiting and belonging to that state, and,
therefore, entitled-for the purpose of suing and being sued-to be
deemed a citizen of the state.'' But this is not such a corporation. It was
not created by us; it does not perform its functions under our authority, and it is the creature of and controllable by another and superior sovereignty. That other sovereignty is exercised over the whole
country irrespective of state lines or state authority. It places its
officers, agents and instruments wherever its necessities or its interests
require, and necessarily within the limits of the states. With those
officers, and agents, and instruments, in the exercise of their functions,
state authority can in no way interfere. The national banks are its
instruments, by which it performs its functions in establishing a national currency; on that fact their constitutionalt'ty is placed, and in
the exercise of the powers conferred upon them they are as independent of state control as the army, or navy, or the officers of the subtreasury and custom-house, or any other instrumentality by which the
functions of the federal government are performed. No other view is
compatible with the principles of our own jurisprudence, or those
recognized and declared by the supreme court of the United States in
numerous cases, and particularly in the exhaustive opinion of Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316.
2. The relator insists, in the second place, that the superior court
has jurisdiction of the defense set forth in the information, because
the judicial power of the federal and state governments is exercised
concurrently by the courts of either, unless congress has conferred
exclusive jurisdiction, in respect to the subject-matter, on the federal
courts, and no such exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred in relation to this. This claim is equally unfounded.
It is undoubtedly true that the state courts retain jurisdiction over
some matters, ·to which, by the constitution and laws of the United
States, jurisdiction is given to the federal government and courts, and
in respect to which jurisdiction appertained to anti was exercised Ly
the state courts prior to the adoption of that constitution. On that
subject the rule seems to be, that the state courts retain the jurisdiction which they had before that event except where it was taken away by
an exclusive constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the federal government, or congress have made the jurisdiction exclusive in the federal
courts, or the exercise of the jurisdiction is repugnant to, and incompatible with such exercise by those courts.
But the cases where such concurrent jurisdiction can be entertained

duties and perform their functions within this state. This claim is

groundless.

It is indeed true, in the language of the supreme court of the United

States (2 Howard 555), that a "corporation created by a state to per-

form its functions under the authority of that state, and only suable

there, though it may have members out of the state, is a person,

though an artificial one, inhabiting and belonging to that state, and,

therefore, entitled—for the purpose of suing and being sued—to be

deemed a citizen of the state." But this is not such a corporation. It was

not created by us; it does not perform its functions under our au-

thority, and it is the creature of and controllable by another and su-

perior sovereignty. That other sovereignty is exercised over the whole

country irrespective of state lines or state authority. It places its

officers, agents and instruments wherever its necessities or its interests

require, and necessarily within the limits of the states. With those

officers, and agents, and instruments, in the exercise of their functions,
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state authority can in no way interfere. The national banks are its

instruments, by which it performs its functions in establishing a na-

tional currency; on that fact their constitutionality is placed, and in

the exercise of the powers conferred upon them they are as indepen-

dent of state control as the army, or navy, or the officers of the sub-

treasury and custom-house, or any other instrumentality by which the

functions of the federal government are performed. No other view is

compatible with the principles of our own jurisprudence, or those

recognized and declared by the supreme court of the United States in

numerous cases, and particularly in the exhaustive opinion of Chief

Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316.

2. The relator insists, in the second place, that the superior court

has jurisdiction of the defense set forth in the information, because

the judicial power of the federal and state governments is exercised

concurrently by the courts of either, unless congress has conferred

exclusive jurisdiction, in respect to the subject-matter, on the federal

courts, and no such exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred in rela-

tion to this. This claim is equally unfounded.

It is undoubtedly true that the state courts retain jurisdiction over

some matters, to which, by the constitution and laws of the United

States, jurisdiction is given to the federal government and courts, and

in respect to which jurisdiction appertained to and was exercised by

the state courts prior to the adoption of that constitution. On that

subject the rule seems to be, that the state courts retain the jurisdic-

tion which they had before that event except where it was taken away by

an exclusive constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the federal govern-

ment, or congress have made the jurisdiction exclusive in the federal

courts, or the exercise of the jurisdiction is repugnant to, and incom-

patible with such exercise by those courts.

But the cases where such concurrent jurisdiction can be entertained
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and all to which we have been particularly referred, were cases of a

criminal character where the act was an offense against both sover-

eignties, and punished by the law of the state. Here there could be

no jurisdiction anterior to the adoption of the constitution. Nor has

there been any invasion of the sovereignty of this state or violation

of its laws, or any offense which the state is called upon to redress in

its own behalf. It is a clear principle that where there has been no

offense there can be no judicial jurisdiction; and equally clear that a

state has no authority to enforce a national law in behalf of the na-

tional government.

And this is one of that class of cases where jurisdiction in the state

court is utterly incompatible with the necessary jurisdiction of the

national government. The corporation in question being the creature

and instrument of that government must necessarily be subject to that

alone. By the common law, and by our statute, an information of

this character lies as well to deprive a corporation of its charter as to

determine the rights of its competing officers; and if the relator is

right in this claim, its charter can be taken away and its franchises
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seized by the courts of the state. Nothing could be more repugnant

in character than such an unauthorized interference, for such a pur-

pose, or for any purpose.

3. The plaintiff claims in the third place, that concurrent jurisdic-

tion of the subject-matter is conferred upon the state courts by the

amended currency act of 1864, section 57, which provides, "that suits,

action and proceedings against any association, under this act, may

be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States,

held within the district in which such association may be established;

or in any state, county or municipal court in the county or city in

which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases.

Provided, however, that all proceedings to enjoin the comptroller

under this act shall be had in a circuit, district or territorial court of

the United States held in the district in which association is located."

To this claim also we find it impossible to assent.

The information in the nature of a quo warranto, although grant-

ahle to determine a private right to an office in a corporation, between

party and party, as well as to determine the right of the corporation

to the franchise assumed, and a civil proceeding must be filed and

issued in the name of the sovereignty which created the corporation,

and is still so far forth a prerogative writ. Congress, in the exercise

of its authority to apportion the judicial power among the inferior fed-

eral courts, has been very cautious in conferring the power to grant

prerogative writs. That power is nowhere conferred, in express

terms, upon the circuit or anv other federal court located in the states.

They did attempt to confer the power to grant a mandamus upon the

supreme court, as a matter of original jurisdiction, but that court, in

Marbury v. Madison, held the act unconstitutional, on the ground

by the courts of the states are few. Most of those where such jurisdiction has been sustained by the supreme court of the United States,
and all to which we have been particularly referred, were cases of a
criminal character where the act was an offense against both sovereignties, and punished by the law of the state. Here there could be
no jurisd iction anterior to the adoption of the constitution. Nor has
ther~ been any invasion of the sovereignty of this state or violation
of its laws, or any offense which the state is called upon to redress in
its own behalf. It is a clear principle that where there has been no
offense the re can be no judicial jurisdiction; and equally clear that a
state has no authority to enforce a national law in behalf of the national government.
And this is one of that class of cases where jurisdiction in the state
court is utterly incompatible with the necessary jurisdiction of the
national government. The corporation in question being the creature
and instrument of that government must necessarily be subject to that
alone. By the common law, and by our statute, an information of
thi character lies as well to deprive a corporation of its charter as to
determine the rights of its competing officers; and if the rel a tor is
right in this claim, its charter can be taken away and its franchises
seized by the courts of the state. Nothing could be more repugnant
in character than such an unauthorized interference, for such a pur. pose, or for any purpose.
3. The plaintiff claims in the third place, that concurrent jurisdiction of the subject-matter is conferred upon the state courts by the
amended currency act of 1864, section 57, which provides, "'that suits,
action and proceedings against any association, under this act, may
be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States,
held within the district in which such association may be established;
or in any state, county or municipal court in the county or city in
which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases.
Provided, however, that all proceedings to enjoin the comptroller
under this act shall be had in a circuit, district or territorial court of
the United States held in the district in which association is located."
To this claim also we find it impossible to assent.
The information in the nature of a quo warranto, although grantable to determine a private right to an office in a corporation, between
party and party, as well as to determine the right of the corporation
to the franchise assumed, and a civil proceeding must be filed and
issued in the name of the sovereignty which created the corporation,
and is still so far forth a prerogath·e writ. Congress, in the exercise
of its authority to apportion the judicial power among the inferior federal courts, has been very cautious in conferring the power to grant
prerogative writs. That power is nowhere conferred, in express
terms, upon the circuit or any other federal court located in the states.
They did attempt to confer the power to grant a mandamus upon the
supreme court, as a matter of original jurisdiction, but that court, in
Marbury v. Madison, held the act unconstitutional, on the ground
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that it was not competent for congress to increase the original jurisdic-

tion of the supreme court. By the eleventh section of the judiciary

that it was not competent for congress to increase the original jurisdiction of the supreme court. By the eleventh section of the judiciary
act of 1789 jurisdiction was given to the circuit courts of all suits of a
civil natute at common law and in equity to the amount of $500 or
more between certain parties. This writ, though in its nature grantable at the discretion of the court, is one of right, and constitutes a suit
within the meaning of that term as used in the act, but it is not of the
character, or between the parties contemplated by it.
The 14th section also authorizes the circuit and other federal courts
"to issue writs of habeas corpus and all other writs not specially
provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise
of their respective jurt'sdictions, and agreeable to the principles and
usages of law." But the supreme court, in Mcintire v. Wood ( 7
Cranch 504), and M'Lung v. Silliman (6 Wheaton 598), and Kendall v. The United States (12 Peters 524), held that the circuit
courts, within the states, had not power under those sections to grant
a mandamus, which is one of those writs, unless necessary for the
exercise of their jurisdiction within the limits prescribed, although the
power was sustained in the latter case, as having been given to the
circuit court of the District of Columbia. The granting of those
writs undoubtedly appertains to the judicial power of the government,
but that part of the power seems not to ha\·e been conferred by congress upon any of the courts but that of the District of Columbia, in
prescribing their jurisdiction, except as incident to and necessary for
the exercise of the other special powers with which they are cl othed.
The circuit court of the United States for this district has not the
power, therefore, to issue a quo warranto in a case like this, by Yirtue
of ai:iy general jurisdiction. And is it to be assumed that congress,
having been thus cautious of entrusting the federal courts with that
power, intended nevertheless to confer it by the language quoted , and
not only on the federal, but upon the state courts; to delegate to the
state courts a part of their sovereignty; to submit a corporation-a
creature of their creation, and an instrument by which they perform
one of their functions-to the absolute and unrestrained supervision
and control of the courts of another sovereignty, especially when by
the act which created it they reserved to their own officers unusual
supervisory power and control? I think not. And if the case turned
upon that question alone, I should be strongly inclined to the opinion
that congress intended by the clause quoted to provide a more convenient forum for determining the 01·dinary questions which must:naturally arise between the corporations and others in the course of
their business, and intended no more.
But there is another and conclusive objection to this claim of the
plaintiff. The section in question authorizes Sttt'ts against the corporation only. This is not a suit against the corporation, but a proceeding by one individual against another individual competing for
the office of director of it, and it is not within the letter or spirit of
the act.

act of 1789 jurisdiction was given to the circuit courts of all suits of a

civil nature at common law and in equity to the amount of $500 or

more between certain parties. This writ, though in its nature grant-

able at the discretion of the court, is one of right, and constitutes a suit

within the meaning of that term as used in the act, but it is not of the

character, or between the parties contemplated by it.

The 14th section also authorizes the circuit and other federal courts

"to issue writs of habeas corpus and all other writs not specially

provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise

of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and

usages of law." But the supreme court, in Mclntire v. Wood (7

Cranch 504), and M'Lung v. Silliman (6 Wheaton 598), and Ken-
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courts, within the states, had not power under those sections to grant
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exercise of their jurisdiction within the limits prescribed, although the
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power was sustained in the latter case, as having been given to the

circuit court of the District of Columbia. The granting of those

writs undoubtedly appertains to the judicial power of the government,

but that part of the power seems not to have been conferred by con-

gress upon any of the courts but that of the District of Columbia, in

prescribing their jurisdiction, except as incident to and necessary for

the exercise of the other special powers with which they are clothed.

The circuit court of the United States for this district has not the

power, therefore, to issue a quo warranto in a case like this, by virtue

of any general jurisdiction. And is it to be assumed that congress,

having been thus cautious of entrusting the federal courts with that

power, intended nevertheless to confer it by the language quoted, and

not only on the federal, but upon the state courts; to delegate to the

state courts a part of their sovereignty; to submit a corporation—a

creature of their creation, and an instrument by which they perform

one of their functions—to the absolute and unrestrained supervision

and control of the courts of another sovereignty, especially when by

the act which created it they reserved to their own officers unusual

supervisory power and control? I think not. And if the case turned

upon that question alone, I should be strongly inclined to the opinion

that congress intended by the clause quoted to provide a more con-

venient forum for determining the ordinary questions which must

naturally arise between the corporations and others in the course of

their business, and intended no more.

But there is another and conclusive objection to this claim of the

plaintiff. The section in question authorizes suits against the cor-

poration only. This is not a suit against the corporation, but a pro-

ceeding by one individual against another individual competing for

the office of director of it, and it is not within the letter or spirit of

the act.
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For these reasons we advise that the information is insufficient and

THE STATE ONLY CAN CREATE.

the demurrer should be sustained.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

For these reasons we advise that the information is insufficient and

1809, Commonwealth v. Union Ins. Co., 5 Mass. 230, 4 Am. Dec. 50; 1824,

Commonwealth v. Murray, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 73, 14 Am.Dec. 614; 1836,Peo-

the demurrer should be sustained.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

ple v. Rensselaer, etc., R. Co., 15Wend. 113, 30 Am. Dec. 33, note 44; 1841,

State v. Harris, 3 Ark. 570, 36 Am. Dec. 460; 1841, State v. Evans, 3 Ark. 585,

36 Am. Dec. 468; 1864, People v. River Raisin, etc., R. Co., 12 Mich. 389.86 Am.

Dec. 64; 1867, Commonwealth v. Cluley, 56 Pa. St. 270,94 Am. Dec. 75; 1888,

Moore v. Brooklyn, etc., R., 108 N. Y. 98; 1892, Pickett v. Abney, 84 Texas

645; 1893, Republican Mountain Silver Mines v, Brown, 58 Fed. Rep. 644, 24

L. R. A. 776; 1897, Madden v. Penn. Elec. L. Co., 181 Pa. St. 617, 38 L. R. A.

638; 1898, Coquard v. National L. O. Co., 171 111. 480, 49 N. E. Rep. 563; 1899,

Clark v. Mutual Res. F. L. Ass'n, 14 App. Cas. (D. C.) 154, 43 L. R. A. 390.

Sec. 49. (£) None but the sovereign can create.

THE MEDICAL INSTITUTION OF GENEVA COLLEGE v. PATTER-

SON.'

1809, Commonwealth v. Union Ins. Co., 5 Mass. 230, 4 Am. Dec. 50; 1824,
Commonwealth v. Murray, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 73, 14 Am.Dec. 614; 1836,People v. Rensse!aer, etc., R. Co:, 15Wend. 113, 30 Am. Dec. 33, note 44; 1841,
State v. Harne, 3 Ark. 570, 36 Am. Dec. 460; 1841, State v. Evans, 3 Ark.585,
36 Am. Dec. 468; 1864, Peoplev. River Raisin, etc., R. Co., 12Mich. 389, 86Am.
Dec. 64; 1867, Commonwealth v. Clnley, 56 Pa. St. 270, 94 Am. Dec. 75; 1888,
~loore v. Brooklyn, etc., R., 108 N. Y. 98; 1892, Pickett v. Abney, 84 Texas
645; 1893, Republican Mountain Silver Mines v, Brown, 58 Fed. Rep. 644, 24
L. R. A. 776; 1897 l l\1addE;n v. Penn. Elec. L. Co., 181 Pa. St. 617, 38 L. R. A.
638; 1898, Coquar<t v. Nat10nal L. 0. Co., 171 Ill. 480J.. 49 ~. E. Rep. 563; 1899,
Clark v. Mutual Ree. F. L. Ass'n, 14 App. Cas. (D. \J.) 154, 43 L. R. A. 390.

1845. In the Supreme Court of New York, i Denio (N. Y.)

61-69.
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[Suit by the medical institution upon a note given by defendant pay-

able to the Medical Institution of Geneva College. Special verdict

Sec. 49. ( b) NQne

but the sovereign can create.

raising the question as to the plaintiff's corporate existence. ]

By the Court: Bronson, C. J. If "The Medical Institution of Ge-

neva College" is not a corporation it has no capacity to sue, and the

THE MEDICAL INSTITUTION OF GENEVA COLLEGE v. PATTERSON.1

defendant is entitled to judgment. This is the only question made

IN THR SUPREME CounT OF NEw YoRK.

by the special verdict. The principal argument for the plaintiffs de-

1

Denio (N. Y.)

61-69.

pends upon maintaining the following propositions: 1. Each of the

English Universities of Oxford and Cambridge has the power of creat-

ing subordinate corporations, such as colleges for giving instruction

in the liberal arts and sciences. 2. Columbia College, in the city of

New York, has the same power in this respect as the English uni-

versities. 3. Geneva College has the same powers as Columbia

College, and, 4. Geneva College, thus having the power, has created

a corporation by the name of "The Medical Institution of Geneva

College." If any one link in this chain is broken, the whole argument

falls to the ground.

[By the charter Geneva College was given all the corporate rights

and privileges of Columbia College, the governors of which were

empowered by their charter from the king to appoint a president,

professors and other officers, who could exercise their office, as freely

and fully as any of the like officers in the English universities; the

governors also had the power to make laws and ordinances for the

government of the college and students, and to grant degrees the same

as English universities.]

1 Statement of facts abridged. Arguments and part of opinion omitted.

[Suit by the medical institution upon a note given by defendant payable to the Medical Institution of Geneva College. Special verdict
raising the question as to the plaintiff's corporate existence. ]
By the Court: BRONSON, C. J. If "The Medical Institution of Geneva College" is not a corporation it has no capacity to sue, and the
defendant is entitled to judgment. This is the only question made
by the special verdict. The principal argument for the plaintiffs depends upon maintaining the following propositions: 1. Each of the
English Universities of Oxford and Cambridge has the power of creating subordinate corporations, such as colleges for giving instruction
in the liberal arts and sciences. 2. Columbia College, in the city of
New York, has the same power in this respect as the English universities. 3. Geneva College has the same powers as Columbia
College, and, 4. Geneva College, thus having the power, has created
a corporation by the name of "The Medical Institution of Geneva
College." 1£ any one link in this chain is broken, the whole argument
falls to the ground.
[By the charter Geneva College was given all the corporate rights
and privileges of Columbia College, the governors of which were
empowered by their charter from the king to appoint a president,
professors and other officers, who could exercise their office, as freely
and fully as any of the like officers in the English universities; the
governors also bad the power to make laws and ordinances for the
government of the college and students, and to grant degrees the same
as English universities.]
1
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These are all the provisions of the charter to which we have been

referred in support of the plaintiff's case; and, whatever may be the

powers of the English universities, I think it entirely clear that Co-

lumbia College has no power to create corporations of any kind, or

for any purpose. It can not be necessary to discuss the question. It

is enough to say that there is nothing in the charter which looks like

a license or authority to erect corporations. The chancellor of the

university of Oxford has power by charter to erect corporations.

(1 Kyd on Corp. 50; 1 Black. Comm. 474.) But Columbia College has

no chancellor. Its principal officer is a president, who has no greater

powers than are usually conferred on the presidents of other colleges.

They can not make corporations.

Although it is now settled that the king may delegate his authority

to create corporations; or, in other words, may exercise the power by

another as his instrument, on the principle qui facit per alium, facit

per se, I find no authority for the position that a general power to

erect corporations has ever been delegated to either of the English

universities. But, however that may be, I think there is no color for

saying that such a power has been conferred upon any of our colleges.
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Judgment for defendant.

Note. 1830, People v. Trustees of Geneva College, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 211;

1894, State v. International Ins. Co., 88 Wis. 512, 43 Am. St. Rep. 920; 1697,

Robinson v. Groscot, Comberbach 372; 1704, Cuddon v.Eastwick, 1 Salk. 192;

1829, McKira v. Odom, 3 Bland Ch. (Md.) 407, supra, p. 222; 1852, Pennsyl-

vania R. v. Comm're, 21 Pa. St. 9; 1&53, Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14 Ga.

80, infra, p. 279: 1859, State v. Bradford, 32 Vt. 60; 1870, Hoadley v. Essex

Co., 105 Mass. 519; 1874, Stowe v. Flagg, 72 111. 397. Also cases infra, on

conditions precedent to corporate existence, de jure, de facto and by estoppel.

ARTICLE II. MKTHODS OF EXERCISE EVIDENCE OF SOVEREIGN'S CON-

SENT.

Sec. 50. (a) In general.

THE CASE OF SUTTON'S HOSPITAL.

1613. 10 Coke, 23a, 30a, 30^, 31a.

(Extracts from the Report.)

"* * * And it is to be known, that every corporation or incor-

poration, or body politic or incorporate, which are all one, either

stands upon one sole person, as the king, bishop, parson, etc., or

aggregate of many, as mayor, commonalty, dean and chapter, etc.,

and these are in the civil law called universitas sive collegium. Now

it is to be seen what things are of the essence of a corporation. 1.

Lawful authority of incorporation; and that may be by four means,

sc. by the common law, as the king himself, etc., by authority of par-

liament; by the king's charter (as in this case), and by prescription.

The 2d, which is of the essence of the incorporation, are persons to

METHODS OF CREATING.
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be incorporated', and that in two manners, sc. persons natural, or

bodies incorporate and political. 3. A name by which they are in-

~so

METHODS OF CREATING.

corporated, as in this case governors of the lands, etc. 4. Of a place,

for without a place no incorporation can be made; here the place is \

the charter-house in the county of Middlesex. Vide 3 Hen. VI

'Det.,' 20; 17 Edw. Ill 59^, and 45 Edw. Ill 17. 5. By words suf-

ficient in law, but not restrained to any certain legal and prescript form

of words. And for as much as good pleading is lapis lydius, the

touch-stone of the true sense and knowledge of the common law, the

form of pleading of a corporation by prescription is to be observed, for

in such case he ought to prescribe in everything which is of the essence

of the incorporation. * * * It appears that incorporo, or any

derivative thereof, is not in law requisite to create an incorporation,

but other equivalent words are sufficient, as nominati and cogniti;

and therewith agree 44 Assizes, p. 9. In Prior of Plimpton's Case

and 4 Edw. IV yb, in the case of Abbot of Glastenbury, and in none

of these books or records was any mention made of these words,

/undo, erigo, etc., or any other like words, for, as it hath been said,

they are only declaratory words, and the effect of them may be done by
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the owner of the land without any grant. And it was well observed

that in old time the inhabitants or burgesses of a town or borough

were incorporated when the king granted to them to have gildam

mercatoriam. * * * Vide for this word guild or fraternity in the

Book of Entries, 68; 37 Edw. Ill, c. 5; 15 Rich. II, c. 5; the statute

of 1 Edw. VI of Chantries. In which three things were observed.

1. How prudens antiquitas did always comprehend much matter in

a narrow room. 2. That to the creation of an incorporation the law

had not restrained itself to any prescript and incompatible words. 3.

That when a corporation is duly created, all other incidents are tacite"

annexed. And for direct authority in this point, in 22 Edw. IV

Grants, 30, it is held by Brian, chief justice, and Choke, that corpora-

tion is sufficient without the words to implead and to be impleaded,

etc., and therefore divers clauses subsequent in the charters are not of

necessity, but only declaratory, and might well have been left out.

As 1. By the same to have authority, ability and capacity to purchase,

hut no clause is added that they may alien, etc., and it need not, for it is

incident. 2. To sue and be sued, implead and be impleaded. 3.

To have a seal, etc.; that is also declaratory, for when they are in-

corporated, they may make or use what seal they will. 4. To restrain

them from aliening or demising but in certain form; that is an ordi-

nance testifying the king's desire, but it is but a precept, and doth not

bind in law. 5. That the survivors shall be the corporation; that is a

good clause to oust doubts and questions which might arise, the number

being certain. 6. If the revenues increase, that they shall be employed

to increase the number of poor, etc. ; that is but explanatory, as appears

in the Case of Thetford School, in the eighth part of my Reports

(f. 3itf). 7. To be visited by the governors, etc.; that is also explana-

tory, * * • for if no visitor had been appointed by the charter, the

governors should visit; and the books in 8 Edw. Ill 28, and S Assizes,

oe incorporated, and that in hvo manners, sc. persons natural , or
bodies incorporate and political. 3. A name oy which they are i'ncorporated, as in this case governors of the lands, etc. 4. Of a place,
for without a place no incorporation can be made; here the place is
the charter-house in the county of Middlesex. Vide 3 Hen. VI
'Det.,' 20; 17 Edw. III 590, and 45 Edw. III 17. 5. By words sufficient in law, but not restrained to any certain legal and prescript form
of words. And for as much as good pleading is lap is lydi'us, the
touch-stone of the true sense and knowledge of the common law, the
form of pleading of a corporation by prescription is to be observed, for
in such case he ought to prescribe in everything which is of the essence
of the incorporation. • • • It appears that incorporo, or any
derivative thereof, is not in l~w requisite to create an incorporation,
but other equivalent words are sufficient, as nominati and cogn#i;
and therewith agree 44 Assizes, p. 9. In Prior of Plimpton's Case
and 4 Edw. IV 70, in the case of Abbot of Glastenbury, and in none
of these books or records was any mention made of these words,
fundo, en.go, etc., or any other like words, for, as it hath been said ,
they are only declaratory words, and the effect of them may be done by
the owner of the land without any grant. And it was well observed
that in old time the inhabitants or burgesses of a town or borough
were incorporated when the king granted to them to have gt"tdam
mcrcatoriam. • • • Vi'de for this word guild or fraternity in the
Book of Entries, 68; 37 Edw. III , c. 5; 15 Rich. II, c. 5; the statute
of I Edw. VI of Chantries. In which three things were observed.
1. How prudens antt'qu#as did always comprehend much matter in
a narrow room. 2. That to the creation of an incorporation the law
had not restrained itself to any prescript and incompatible words. 3.
That when a corporation is duly created, all other incidents are tacite'
annexed. And for direct authority in this point, in 22 Edw. IV
Grants, 30, it is held by Brian, chief justice, and Choke, that corporation is sufficient without the words to implead and to be impleaded,
etc. , and therefore divers clauses subsequent in the charters are not of
necessity, but only declaratory, and might well have been left out.
As I. By the same to have authority, ability and capacity to purchase,
but no clause is added that they may alien, etc., and it need not, for it is
incident. 2. To sue and be sued, implead and be impleaded. 3.
To have a seal, etc. ; that is also declaratory, for when they are incorporated, they may make or use what seal they will. 4. To restrain
them from aliening or d~mising but in certain form; that is an ordinance testifying the king's desire, but it is but a precept, and doth not
bind in law. 5. That the survivors shall be the corporation; that is a
good clause to oust doubts and questions which might arise, the number
being certain. 6. If the revenues increase, that they shall be employed
to increase the number of poor, etc.; that is but explanatory, as appears
in the Case of Thetford School, in the eighth part of my Reports
(f. 3ra). 7. To be visited by the governors, etc.; that is also explanatory, • • • for if no visitor had been appointed by th e charter, the
governors should visit; and the books in 8 Edw. III 28, and S A ssizes,
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29, do not gainsay it, where it is held, that if the hospital be lay, the
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patron shall visit, and if spiritual the bishop shall visit, so that every

RUTTER V. CHAPMAN.

hospital is visitable; it is true, but in the case at the bar the poor of

29 , do not gainsay it, where it is held, that if the hospital be lay, the
patron shall visit, and if spiritual the bishop shall visit, so that every
hospital is visitable; it is true, but in the case at the bar the poor of
the hospital are not incorporated, and so no legal hospital. 8. To
make ordinances; that is requisite for the good order and government
of the poor, etc., but not to the essence of the incorporation. 9. The
exemption from the ordinary is but declaratory, for being a lay incor·
poration he neither can nor ought to visit. IO. The license to pur·
chase in mortmain is necessary for the maintenance and support of
the poor, etc., for without revenues they can not live, and without a
license in mortmain they can not lawfully purchase revenues, and yet
that is not of the essence of the corporation, for the corporation is
perfect without it, so that by what h.as been said, it appears wh11t
things in genere are requisite to a complete body incorporate, and
which are verba operativa in this case (which are necessary to be
known in every case), in the resolution whereof it appears how
necessary it is that the law and experience should join with their
hands together. • • • "

the hospital are not incorporated, and so no legal hospital. 8. To

make ordinances; that is requisite for the good order and government

of the poor, etc., but not to the essence of the incorporation. 9. The

exemption from the ordinary is but declaratory, for being a lay incor-

poration he neither can nor ought to visit. 10. The license to pur-

chase in mortmain is necessary for the maintenance and support of

the poor, etc., for without revenues they can not live, and without a

license in mortmain they can not lawfully purchase revenues, and vet

that is not of the essence of the corporation, for the corporation is

perfect without it, so that by what has been said, it appears whiit

things in genere are requisite to a complete body incorporate, and

which are verba operativa in this case (which are necessary to be

known in every case), in the resolution whereof it appears how

necessary it is that the law and experience should join with fheir

hands together. * * *"

Note. See cases following, pp. 266, 270, 275, 279.
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Sec. 51. Same. (£) King's or Queen's Charter.

RUTTER v. CHAPMAN.1

1841. In the English Exchequer Chamber. 8 Mees. & W. (Ex-

chequer) 1—117.

[This was a controversy between two coroners. The plaintiff had

Note.

been one of the coroners of the county palatine of Lancaster, and

See cases following, pp. 266, 270, 275, 279.

had been entitled to hold inquests, and receive the fees therefrom.

Upon the sudden death of Bridget Garratty, within the territory form-

Sec. 51. Same. (b) King's or Queen's Charter.

erly within the jurisdiction of the plaintiff, he claimed the right to

hold the inquest, but was prevented from doing so by the defendant

who claimed to be a properly selected coroner by the council of Man-

RUTTER v. CHAPMAN. 1

chester, which he claimed was a borough duly incorporated, by the

queen's charter, with jurisdiction over the territory where the death

1841. IN

occurred. By act of parliament it had been provided that the queen,

THE ENGLISH ExcHEQUER CHAMBER.

chequer)

upon petition from the inhabitant householders of any town or

8 Mees. & W.

(Ex·

1-117.

borough, by advice of the privy council, might extend to such inhabi-

[This was a controversy between two coroners. The plaintiff had
been one of the coroners of the county palatine of Lancaster, and
had been entitled to hold inquests, and receive the fees therefrom.
Upon the sudden death of Bridget Garratty, within the territory form·
erly within the jurisdiction of the plaintiff, he claimed the right to
hold the inquest, but was prevented from doing so by the defendant
who claimed to be a properly selected coroner by the council of Manchester, which he claimed was a borough duly incorporated, by the
queen's charter, with jurisdiction over the territory where the death
occurred. By act of parliament it had been provided that the queen,
upon petition from the inhabitant householders of any town or
borough, by advice of the privy council, might extend to such inhabitants "within the district to be set forth in such charter, all the powers
and privileges" given to municipal corporations, by the 5 and 6
William IV, c. 76, which included several powers that were beyond
the prerogative of the queen to grant without parliamentary authority.
A petition agreed upon at a meeting of the rate-payers of the parliamentary borough of Manchester, convened by advertisement, and

tants "within the district to be set forth in such charter, all the powers

and privileges" given to municipal corporations, by the 5 and 6

William IV, c. 76, which included several powers that were beyond

the prerogative of the queen to grant without parliamentary authority.

A petition agreed upon at a meeting of the rate-payers of the parlia-

mentary borough of Manchester, convened by advertisement, and

1 Statement of facts abridged. Only part of opinion of Bosanqcet, J., is

given, all others omitted.

1 Statement of facts abridged.
Only part of opinion of BosA.NQUET, J ., is
given, all others omitted.
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attended by 1.000 persons, which petition was signed by 4,000 house-

§ 51

EXISTENCE BY KING'S CHARTER.

holders of the borough, was presented to the queen asking for a char-

ter incorporating such borough with the powers and privileges of the

act of 5 and 6 William IV. Afterwards and before the petition was

acted upon a counter petition was presented, signed by 6,000 house-

holders, praying the queen not to grant the charter. The whole num-

ber of householders was 48,000. The queen nevertheless granted the

charter and the corporation was organized by election of mayor,

council, etc., and Chapman as coroner for the territory where the death

occurred. The plaintiff claimed the queen could not create the cor-

poration, except in strict compliance with the act of parliament, and

that required a majority of householders to petition to be incorpo-

rated. The lower court found for defendant, holding that the queen

by her prerogative could create a corporation without authority of

parliament.]

Bosanquet, J.— * * * The next head of objection is, that,

in granting the charter, the various provisions of the municipal cor-

poration act with respect to times and modes of proceeding have not
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been pursued. But there is no provision in the act which requires that

this should be done. All the matters contained in that act related to

corporations then in existence, whose constitutions were to be altered

by authority of parliament, in carrying which object into effect it was

necessary that all the provisions prescribed should be strictly ad-

hered to.

But when a new corporation is to be erected by the authority of the

crown, the constitution of such new corporation originates in the will

of the sovereign; subject, however, to the assent or dissent of the new

corporations by their acceptance or non-acceptance thereof. And

such a grant, made by the known prerogative of the crown, requires

no petition from any particular description of persons, as a condition

precedent to its validity.

It has been contended, however, that the queen has exceeded the

powers which she derived from her common law prerogative, as well

as those conferred on her by the act of parliament, in delegating her

authority to others, in matters respecting the selection of persons who

are to constitute the burgesses of the corporation, particularly David

Price, who is empowered to make out the burgess list, and Edward

Rushton to revise it. Now I take it to have been long settled bylaw,

that the queen, in erecting a corporation, may name, of her own

authority, all the officers and all the corporators, or may empower a

subject to do so in her stead. And although no one but the queen

can make a corporation, yet when it is made under her authority, it is

deemed in law to have been made by herself.

"When the king," says Lord Coke, in the case of Sutton's Hospital,

10 Rep. 33, "reserves as well the nomination of the persons as the

name of incorporation to a person who shall be the founder, then he

ought to name the parties and declare by what name they shall be in-

corporated, and when he has done so in writing, according to his

authority, they are incorporated by the king's letters patent and not

attended by 1,000 persons, which petition was signed by 4,000 householders of the borough, was presented to the queen asking for a charter incorporating such borough with the powers and privileges of the
act of 5 and 6 William IV. Afterwards and before the petition was
acted upon a counter petition was presented, signed by 6,ooo householders, praying the queen not to grant the charter. The whole number of householders was 48,000. The queen nevertheless granted the
charter and the corporation was organized by election of mayor,
council, etc., and Chapman as coroner for the territory where the death
occurred. The plaintiff claimed the queen could not create the corporation, except in strict compliance with the act of parliament, and
that required a majority of householders to petition to be incorporated. The lo:wer court found for defen<lant, holding that th.e queen
by her prerogative could create a corporation without authority of
parliament.]
BosANQUET, J.- • • • The next head of objection is, that,
in granting the charter, the various provisions of the municipal corporation act with respect to times and modes of proceeding have not
been pursued. But there is no provision in the act which requires that
this should be done. All the matters contained in that act related to
corporations then in existence, whose constitutions were to be altered
hy authority of parliament, in carrying which object into effect it was
necessary that all the provisions prescribed should be strictly adhered to.
But when a new corporation is to be erected by the authority of the
crown, the constitution of such new corporation originates in the will
of the sovereign; subject, however, to the assent or dissent of the new
corporations by their acceptance or non-acceptance thereof. And
such a grant, made by the known prerogative of the crown, requires
no petition from any particular description of persons, as a condition
precedent to its validity.
It has been contended, however, that the queen has exceeded the
powers which she derived from her common law prerogative, as well
as those conferred on her by the act of parliament, in delegating her
authority to others, in matters respecting the selection of persons who
are to constitute the burgesses of the corporation, particularly David
Price. who is empowered to make out the burgess list, and Edward
Rushton to revise it. Now I take it to have been long settled bylaw,
that the queen, in erecting a corporation, may name, of her own
'authority, all the officers and all the corporators, or may empower a
subject to do so in her stead. And although no one but the queen
can make a corporation, yet when it is made under her authority, it is
deemed in law to have been made by herself.
"\Vhen the king," says Lord CoKE, in the case of Sutton's Hospital,
10 Rep. 33, "reserves as well the nomination of the persons as the
name of incorporation to a person who shall be the founder, then he
ought to name the parties and declare by what name they shall be incorporated, and when he has done so in writing, according to his
authority, they are incorporated by the king's letters patent and not
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by the common person, for he is but an instrument, and the king

makes the corporation, in such case, in the same manner as if all had
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been comprehended in the letters patent themselves. It is true," he

RUTTER V. CHAPMAN.

§ 51

adds, "that none but the king can make a corporation, as it is held,

by the common person, for he is but an instrument, and the king
makes the corporation, in such case, in the same manner as if all bad
been comprehended in the letters patent themselves. It is true,'' he
adds, '•that none but the king can make a corporation, as it is held,
49 Ed. 3, 4, 29 Ass. 8; but qui p er alium fadt , perse ipsum f ac.ere
vi'detur." So it is said in Bro. Abr. Prerogative, 53: " JVota, the
king, by his charter, may by express words grant to a corporation or
commonalty to ma ke another corporation or commonalty." Again, in
Jenkins' Centuries 88, p. 270, it is said: "Only the king can make
a corporation;" but, presently after, "the king may give power to
name a corporation, and where it is named it is the king's corpora·
ti on.''
In Com. Dig., Franchise (F. 5), citing I Roll. Ahr. 512, it is said
that a subject may choose the person, invent the name, etc., for the
king, also, the king by charter to the E ast India Company may enable
them to constitute such persons as shall be incorporated. lb. In
Bacon's Abr. Corporations (B), it is said: "The king, by virtue of
his prerogative, is the only person that can erect either an ecclesiastical or lay corporation; yet the king may grant power to a common
person to name the corporation , and the persons of whom it is to consist, but when he has done so, the corporation does not take its essence
from the common person, but from the king ."
I am not aware that the proposition laid down in these authorities
has ever been disputed since the second H eri. 7. Blackstone, vol. 1 ,
p . 474, says, "The king, it is said, may grant to a subject the power
of making corporations (Bro . Abr., tit. Prerog. 53; Vin. Ahr.
Prerog. 88, pl. 16), although the contrary was formerly held (Year
Book, 2 H. 7, 13), that is, he may permit the subject to name the
persons and powers of the corporation at his pleasure; but it is really
the king that erects, and the subject is but the instrument; for though
none but the king can make a corporation, yet qui' facit ali'um f acit
p er se. In this manner the chancellor of the University of Oxford has
power by charter to erect corporations, and has actually often exerted
it, in the erection of several matriculated companies,· now subsisting,
of tradesmen subservient to the students." The same doctrine will
be found in Kyd on Corporations, 50. No distinction is made in these
authorities between ecclesiastical and lay, eleemosynary and municipal corporations. I refer to these authorities for the purpose of showing in what broad terms the authority of the crown to delegate the
nomination of corporations and corporate officers has been recognized.
But it is not necessary to rely upon them to their full extent in this
case; for no discretionary power of choice or appointment is given
either to Mr. Price or to Mr. Rushton. The constitution of the corporation and the qualification of the burgesses are fixed by the charter; and these persons are only required to make a list of those who
have such qualifications.
·
It is to be observed, that no method of proceeding is pointed out by
the 5 and 6 Will. 4, c. 4 , or r Viet . , c. 78, for setting the corporation
in motion: these acts simply provide, that it shall be lawful for her

49 Ed. 3, 4, 29 Ass. S; but qui -per alium facit, perse ipsum facere

videtur." So it is said in Bro. Abr. Prerogative, 53: "Aoia, the

king, by his charter, may by express words grant to a corporation or

commonalty to make another corporation or commonalty." Again, in

Jenkins' Centuries 88, p. 270, it is said: "Only the king can make

a corporation;" but, presently after, "the king may give power to

name a corporation, and where it is named it is the king's corpora-

tion."

In Com. Dig., Franchise (F. 5), citing 1 Roll. Abr. 512, it is said

that a subject may choose the person, invent the name, etc., for the

king, also, the king by charter to the East India Company may enable

them to constitute such persons as shall be incorporated. Ib. In

Bacon's Abr. Corporations (B), it is said: "The king, by virtue of

his prerogative, is the only person that can erect either an ecclesiasti-

cal or lay corporation; yet the king may grant power to a common

person to name the corporation, and the persons of whom it is to con-
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sist, but when he has done so, the corporation does not take its essence

from the common person, but from the king."

I am not aware that the proposition laid down in these authorities

has ever been disputed since the second Hen. 7. Blackstone, vol. 1,

p. 474, says, "The king, it is said, may grant to a subject the power

of making corporations (Bro. Abr., tit. Prerog. 53; Vin. Abr.

Prerog. 88, pi. 16), although the contrary was formerly held (Year

Book, 2 H. 7, 13), that is, he may permit the subject to name the

persons and powers of the corporation at his pleasure; but it is really

the king that erects, and the subject is but the instrument; for though

none but the king can make a corporation, yet qui facit alium facit

per se. In this manner the chancellor of the University of Oxford has

power by charter to erect corporations, and has actually often exerted

it, in the erection of several matriculated companies, now subsisting,

of tradesmen subservient to the students." The same doctrine will

be found in Kyd on Corporations, 50. No distinction is made in these

authorities between ecclesiastical and lay, eleemosynary and munici-

pal corporations. I refer to these authorities for the purpose of show-

ing in what broad terms the authority of the crown to delegate the

nomination of corporations and corporate officers has been recognized.

But it is not necessary to rely upon them to their full extent in this

case; for no discretionary power of choice or appointment is given

either to Mr. Price or to Mr. Rushton. The constitution of the cor-

poration and the qualification of the burgesses are fixed by the char-

ter; and these persons are only required to make a list of those who

have such qualifications.

It is to be observed, that no method of proceeding is pointed out by

the 5 and 6 Will. 4, c. 4, or 1 Vict., c. 78, for setting the corporation

in motion: these acts simply provide, that it shall be lawful for her
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majesty, under the advice of her privy council, to extend to the in-

EXISTENCE BY KING 's CHARTER.

habitants of any town or borough, within the district to be set forth

in such charter, the powers and provisions in the act contained; and

I know no mode by which the crown can confer them except by char-

ter. If the crown be authorized to grant the powers in question

(which without the authority of the act could not have been done),

must it not by necessary inference be authorized to prescribe the

means by which they are to be made effective; provided at least that

the means adopted are not at variance with those which might be re-

sorted to in a common-law charter of incorporation. Many of the regu-

lations of the municipal corporation act are inapplicable to a new

corporation. David Price is appointed to make out the burgess list

instead of the overseers, who, under the municipal corporation act,

are required and compelled to make out such a list, but these officers

would not be compellable to make out a burgess list for a new cor-

poration. For the purpose, therefore, of securing the attainment of

the end contemplated by the act, the crown has nominated a person,

of whose willingness to undertake the duty it may be assured; Edward

Rushton is appointed to revise the burgess list instead of a revising
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barrister appointed by the senior judge of assize; no power to any

judge to appoint such a barrister being given by the act, after the

year which had elapsed at the grant of this charter. And to have

given authority to any other person to appoint a revising barrister would

be at least as objectionable as a direct appointment by the queen herself.

It has been contended, indeed, that if the act of parliament be

defective in prescribing the proper means of carrying its object into

effect, the object can not be effected; but the more reasonable inter-

pretation of the act in such cases appears to be, that where no particu-

lar means are prescribed, the crown may proceed to accomplish the

object by the same means which it is authorized by the common law

to employ in conferring the usual powers upon a new corporation,

namely, by letters patent under the great seal. * • *

Judgment affirmed.

Viner's Abr. Corp. B. 1, 5; Y. B. 2 Henry VII, 13; 1613, Sutton's Hospital

Case, 10 Coke 27, tupra, p. 264; 1819, Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4

Wheat. 518, infra, p. 708;1815, Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch (U. S.) 43; 1815,

Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch (U. S.) 292; 1817, Denton v. Jackson, 2

Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 320; 1828, N. Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. (N. Y.)

109; 1830, Society for Propagation of Gospel v. Town of Pawlet, 4 Pet. (U. S.)

majesty, under the advice of her privy council, to extend to the inhabitants of any town or borough, within the district to be set forth
in such charter, the powers and provisions in the act contained; and
I know no mode by which the crown can confer them except by charter. If the crown be authorized to grant the powers in question
(which without the authority of the act could not have been done),
must it not by necessary inference be authorized to prescribe the
means by which they are to be made effective ; provided at least that
the means adopted are not at variance with those which might be resorted to in a common-law charter of incorporation. Many of the regulations of the municipal corporation act are inapplicable to a new
corporation. David Price is appointed to make out th.e burgess list
instead of the overseers, who, under the municipal corporation act,
are required and compelled to make out such a list, but these officers
would not be compellable to make out a burgess list for a new corporation. For the purpose, therefore, of securing the attainment of
the end contemplated by the act, the crown has nominated a person,
of whose willingness to undertake the duty it may be assured; Edward
Rushton is appointed to revise the burgess list instead of a revising
barrister appointed by the senior judge of assize ; no power to any
judge to appoint such a barrister being given by the act, after the
year which had elapsed at the . grant of this charter. And to have
given authority to any other person to appoint a revising barrister would
be at least as objectionable as a direct appointment by the queen herself.
It has been contended, indeed, that if the act of parliament be
defective in prescribing the proper means of carrying its object into
effect, the object can not be effected ; but the more reasonable interpretation of the act in such cases appears to be, that where no particular means· are prescribed, the crown may proceed to accomplish the
object by the same means which it is authorized by the common law
to employ in conferring the usual pCTWers upon a new corporation,
namely, by letters patent under the great seal. • • •
Judgment affirmed.

480; 1831, McKim v. Odom, 3 Bland Ch. (Md.) 407, note, p. 416; 1889, Baeder

v. Jennings, 40 Fed. R. 199.

1. The king's power formerly. It is said that both before and for some

time after the Norman conquest, many nobles claimed and exercised the right

of creating corporations within their own territories. So also the Pope exer-

cised the privilege of creating university corporations on the continent, and

claimed a like right in England, which,"though exercised, was not recognized

as conferring legitimate corporate existence. (Greystock College Case, Dyer,

81, pi. 64,1553.) Bracton (c. 1263) says: "Those things called privileges, al-

though they pertain to the crown, may nevertheless be separated from the

crown and be transferred to private persons, but only with the special grace

of the king; whose grace and special grant if it have not intervened, time

does not exclude the king from such a claim, for no time runs against a dona-

■

Viner's Abr. Corp. B. 1, 5; Y. B. 2 Henry VII, 13; 1613, Sutton's Hospital

Case, 10 Coke 27, Bttpra, p. 264; 1819, Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheat. 518, infra, p. 708;1815, Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch (U. 8.) 43; 1815,
Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch (U . S.) 292; 1817, Denton v. Jackson, 2
Johns.Ch. (N. Y.) 320; 1828, N. Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. CN. Y.)
109; 1830, Society for Propagation of Gospel v. Town of Pawlet, 4 Pet. (U. S.)
480; 1831, McKim v. Odom, 3 Bland Ch. (Md.) 407, note, p. 416; 1889, Baeder
v. Jennings, 40 Fed. R. 199.
1. The king's power formerly. It is said that both before and for some
time after the~orman conquest, many nobles claimed and exercised the right
or creating corporations within their own territories. So also the Pope exercised the privilege of creating university corporations on the continent, and
claimed a like ri~ht in England, which, though exercised, was not recognized
as conferring legitimate corporate existence. IGreystock College Case, Dyer,
81, pl. 64, 1553.) Bracton ( c. 1263) says: "Those things called privileges, altbongh they pertain to the crown, may nevertheless be separated from the
crown and be transferred to private persons, but only with the special grace
of the king; whose grace and special grant if it have not intervened, time
does not exclude the king from such a claim, for no time runs against a dona-
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tion of the king's or contrary to it. • • • But this kind of liberties, when
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they have been granted by the king, are as it were possessed, and he to whom
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they are granted * * » will be in possession * » * until he has lost

tion of the king's or contrary to it. • • • But this kin<l of liberties, when
they have been granted by the king, are as il were ,rossessed, and he to whom
they are granted • • • will be in possession
• • until be bas lost
it from abuse or non-user." l Bract. Twiss's Trans., p. 55. By the time of
Edward III, the absolute necessity of the king's consent to the erection of a
corporation seems to be fully established, 4!l Edward III, 4; 49 AEs. 8; Viner
Corp. B.; 1 Kyd Corp. 42, 44; Bro. Corp. 15; Angell & Ames, § 67. By the
civil late the sovereign's consent was necessary also, either by statute, senatm
con.mltttm, or constitution of the emperor. Digest 47, Lib. 22, 23; also 3, 4, l;
Hunter's Roman Law, 314; l Brown Civil Law, 101, 102; 1 Domat, Oiv. Law,
Title II, § 2, No. 15.
·
2. At the present time.-In England, the king or queen alone, when a cor·
poration is intended with privileges, wLich, by the principles of the English
law, may be granted by the kinf{, is qualified to create a corporation by bis
or her sole charter. Thus the city of Annapolis, in Maryland, was incorpo·
rated by a charter from Queen Anne, when she held the government of the
province. When, on the other hand, it is intended to establish a corporation
vested with powers which the king can not himself grant, recourse must be
had to an act of parliament; as if it be intended, for example, to grant the
power of imprisonment, as in the case of the College of Physicians; or to
confer a monopoly, as in the ca~e of the East India Company; or when a
court is erected, with a power to proceed in a manner contrary tot.he rules of
the common law. Angell & Ames Corp. , § 68.
There seems now to be the following methods of creating corporations in
England:
1. Bf royal cbl.lil·tc1·, now usually exercised by the king, by virtue of his
prerogative m forei~n affairs, for creating companies for governing and trad·
mg with the colonial possessions iu Africa and the East Indies. Recent
creations of this sort are the North Borneo Company, 1881 (State Papers, vol.
Ix.xiii, p. 932); The Royal Niger Company, 1886 IHertalet, Treaties, vol. xvii,
p. 118); Imperial British East Africa Company, 1889 (State Papers, vol. lxxix,
p. 641); and the British South Africa Company, 1889 (Hertslet, Treaties, vol.
xviii , p. 134). These are quite similar to, thouj?h differing in some respects
from, the Virginia (1609), Massachusetts Ray (1629), and Hudson's Bay, Companies (1670), for colonizing and trading in North America, and the East India
Company (1600), for a like purpose in India.
·
2. By parliament,-pnblic companies,-surh as railways, canals, water·
works, etc.,- those engaged in a public undertaking that requires the exercise
of the power of eminent domain. These are incorporated by special act of
parliament in each case after investigation and report upon the necel!Bity, but
are regulated (unless expressly excepted ) by the general provisions of the
Companies Clauses Acts of 1845.
3. By re~istration.-All private business, social, or benevolent companies
having more than twenty members (or if bankin~, more than ten members),
under the general incorporation law of 1862, called the Companies Act. See
Ency. of Laws of Eng., Companies, Chartered, vol. iii, p. 148; Company, p.162,
and Public Company, vol. x, p. 545; also, Railways, vol. xi, p. 1.

it from abuse or non-user.'" 1 Bract. Twiss's Trans., p. 55. By the timeo!

Edward III, the absolute necessity of the king's consent to the erection of a

corporation seems to be fully established, 40 Edward III, 4; 49 Ass. 8; Viner

Corp. B.; 1 Kyd Corp. 42, 44; Bro. Corp. 15; Angell & Ames, § 67. By the

civil law the sovereign's consent was necessary also, either by statute, senates

consultum, or constitution of the emperor. Digest 47, Lib. 22, 23; also 3, 4,1;

Hunter's Roman Law, 314; 1 Brown Civil Law, 101, 102; 1 Domat, Civ. Law,

Title II, § 2, No. 15.

2. At the present time.—In England, the king or queen alone, when a cor-

poration is intended with privileges, which, by the principles of the English

law, may be granted by the king, is qualified to create a corporation by hie

or her sole charter. Thus the city of Annapolis, in Maryland, was incorpo-

rated by a charter from Queen Anne, when she held the government of the

province. When, on the other hand, it is intended to establish a corporation

vested with powers which the king can not himself grant, recourse must be

had to an act of parliament; as if it be intended, for example, to grant the

power of imprisonment, as in the case of the College of Physicians; or to
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confer a monopoly, as in the case of the East India Company; or when a

court is erected, with a power to proceed in a manner contrary "to the rules oi

the common law. Angell & Ames Corp., §68.

There seems now to be the following methods of creating corporations in

England:

1. By royal charter, now usually exercised by the king, by virtue of hiB

prerogative in foreign affairs, for creating companies for governing and trad-

ing with the colonial possessions in Africa and the East Indies. Recent

creations of this sort are the North Borneo Company, 1881 (State Papers, vol.

lxxiii, p. 932); The Royal Niger Company, 1886 iHertalet, Treaties, vol. xvii,

p. 118); Imperial British East Africa Companv, 1889 (State Papers, vol. Ixxix,

p. 641); and the British South Africa Company, 1889 (Hertslet, Treaties, vol.

xviii, p. 134). These are quite similar to, though differing in some respects

from, the Virginia (1609), Massachusetts Ray (1629), and Hudson's Bay, Com-

panies (1670), for colonizing and trading in North America, and the East India

Company (1600), for a like purpose in India.

2. By parliament,—public companies,—such as railways, canals, water-

works, etc.,—those engaged in a public undertaking that requires the exercise

of the power of eminent domain. These are incorporated by special act of

parliament in each case after investigation and report upon the necessity, but

are regulated (unless expressly excepted) by the general provisions of the

Companies Clauses Acts of 1845.

3. By registration.—All private business, social, or benevolent companies

having more than twenty members (or if banking, more than ten members),

under the general incorporation law of 1862, called the Companies Act. See

Ency. of Laws of Eng., Companies, Chartered, vol. iii, p. 148; Company, p. 162,

and Public Company, vol. x, p. 545; also, Railways, vol. xi, p. 1.
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Common law.

THE GOVERNOR v. ALLEN AND McMTJRDIE.1

THE GOVERNOR v. ALLEN AND McMURDiE.1

1847. In the Supreme Court of Tennessee. 8 Humphrey (27

Tennessee) 176-184.

1847. IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF TENNESSEE. 8 Humphrey (27
Tennessee) 176-184.

Turley, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

On the 18th day of August, 1843, G. A. Davie, who had been

elected trustee for the county of Montgomery, executed his bond,

TURLEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
On the 18th day pf August, 1843, G. A. Davie, who had been
elected trustee for the county of Montgomery, executed bis bond,

'Arguments omitted.
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with G. P. Allen and Robert McMurdie his sureties, to the governor

in and over the state of Tennessee, in the penal sum of $3,000, to be

void upon condition that he received and securely kept and paid over

the school-funds of said county, as the law directs. This bond was

acknowledged in open court at the August term, 1843, of the county

court of Montgomery. The condition of this bond being broken, a

suit thereon was commenced at the July term, 1846, of the circuit

court of Montgomery, in the name of Aaron V. Brown, governor, in

and over the state of Tennessee, against G. P. Allen and Robert

McMurdie, two of the obligors. To the declaration the defendants

filed a general demurrer, which was sustained by the circuit judge, and

judgment given accordingly, from which an appeal in error is prose-

cuted to this court.

The question presented for consideration upon this demurrer is

whether a suit at law can be maintained upon this bond, in the name

of the governor of the state. By the 43d section of the act of 1838, ch.

148, and the 41st section of the act 1840, ch. 38, the trustees of the

different counties of this state, before the reception of the portion of
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common school fund belonging to their counties under the general

law for distributing it to them, are required to enter into bond, with

two or more securities, for the proper performance of their duties in

relation thereto, to the superintendent of public instruction and his

successors in office. The bond sued on then, in this action, is not a

good statutory bond, according to all the decisions of the state courts

upon such subjects and the question necessarily is whether it can be

held to be a good common law bond to be sued upon in the name o£

the governor of the state.

Before entering into a general investigation of this subject we deem

it proper to premise that the bringing this suit in the name of Aaron

V. Brown, governor and successor of James C. Jones, gives no addi-

tional strength to the action which it would not have had, provided

the suit had been brought merely in the name of the governor of the

state, and that the question must be examined as if it had been so

brought, for if the bond be not a good common law bond when made

payable to the office of the governor as such, the making it payable

to a particular governor described eo nomine and his successors could

not sustain the action, for in such case, the suit would not enure to

bis successors, but must be brought in his name if alive, and if not,

in the name of his personal representative. The bond in this case,

in point of fact, was not executed to any particular governor, co

nomine, but to the governor in and over the state of Tennessee, then

can an action at law be maintained upon it? The solution of this ques-

tion depends upon the fact whether a bond can upon common law-

principles be executed to the governor of the state. In the case of

Polk v. Plummer and others, 2 Humph. 506, Judge Reese, who de-

livered the opinion of the court, says, "that when a statute directs a

bond for the public benefit to be made payable to the governor or

other functionary having legal succession, the office is the payee, and

the successor, whether described eo nomine, either in the statute or

with G. P. Allen and Robert McMurdie his sureties, to the governor
in and over the state of Tennessee, in the penal sum of $3 1 000, to be
Yoid upon condition that he received and securely kept and paid over
the school-funds of said county, as the law directs. This bond was
acknowledged in open court at the August term, 1843, of the county
court of Montgomery. The condition of this bond being broken, a
suit thereon was commenced at the July term, 1846, of the circuit
court of Montgomery, in the name of Aaron V. Brown, governor, in
and over the state of Tennessee, against G. P. Allen and Robert
McMurdie, two of the obligors. To the declaration the defendants
nled a general demurrer, which was sustained by the circuit judge, and
judgment given accordingly, from which an appeal in error is prosecuted to this court.
The question presented for consideration upon this demurrer is
whether a suit at law can be maintained upon this bond, in the name
of the governor of the state. By the 43d section of the act of 1838, ch.
148, and the 41st section of the act 18401 ch. 38, the trustees of the
different counties of this state, before the reception of the portion of
common school fund belonging to their counties under the general
law for distributing it to them , are required to enter into bond, with
two or more securities, for the proper performance of their duties in
relation thereto, to the superintendent of public instruction and his
successors in office. The bond sued on then, in this action, is not a
good statutory bond, according to all the decisions of the state courts
upon uch subjects and the question necessarily is whether it can be
held to be a good common law bond to be sued upon in the name of.
the governor of the state.
Before entering into a general investigation of this subject we deem
it proper to premise that the bringing this suit in the name of Aaron
V. Brown, governor and successor of James C. Jones, gives no additional strength to the action which it would not have had, provided
the suit had been brought merely in the name of the governor of the
state, and that the question must be examined as if it had been l'O
brought, for if the bond be not a good common law bond when made
payable to the office of the governor as such, the making it payable
to a particular governor described eo nomi"ne and his successors could
not sustain the action, for in such case, the suit would no.t enure to
bis successors, but must be brought in his name if alive, and if not,
in the name of his personal representative. The bond in this case,
in point of fact, was not executed to any particular governor, co
nomine, but to the governor in and over the state of Tennessee, then
can an action at law be maintained upon it? The solution of this question depends upon the fact whether a bond can upon common law
principles be executed to the governor of the state. In the case of
Polk v. Plummer and others, 2 Humph. 5o6, Judge Reese, who delivered the opinion of the court, says, "that when a statute directs a
bond for the public benefit to be made payable to the governor or
other functionary having legal succession, the office is the payee, and
the successor, whether described eo nomine, either in the statute or
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by form of the statute and for the public benefit, quod hoc, a corpora-

bond, or not, may yet maintain the action, such officer being made
by form of the statute and for the public benefit, quod hoc, a corporation sole." There is no reason whatever, for questioning the general
truth of this proposition; it is sustained by the judgment of the
supreme court of North Carolina in the case of the Justices of Cumberland v. John Armstrong and others, 3 Dev. 284, where it is
held that the acts of assembly which direct the justices of the county
courts to take bonds to themselves in their official capacity confer
on them, as to such bonds, a corporate character.
But it must be admitted in both these cases that, if they be only
quoad corporations, and the bonds be not within the statute autho1;zing them, they will not enure by succession. But is a governor of a
state only quoad a corporation sole? We think not. It is true it is held
in the case of Polk v. Plummer and others to be quoad that particular
transaction a corporation sole, but that was all that it was necessary
to hold him in that case; but it is not determined that he is not a corporation sole for other purposes besides those in which bonds are
directed by statute to be made payable to him. Blackstone, in the
first volume of his Commentaries, page 469, says: "A corporation
sole consists of one person only, and his successors in some particz'lar stati'on, who are i'ncorporated by law, t'n order to give them sole
legal capaci'tt'es and advantages, partz'cularly that ofperpetut'ty, wh ick
in their natural persons they could not have had." In this view the
kt'ng is a sole corporatt'on; so i's a bt'shop, and so i's every parson and
vt'car.
Now the governor constitutes the executive department of the state;
he is vested by the constitution of the state with great and important
powers to be executed for the benefit of the state, and it is absolutely
necessary that there shou ld be no t'nterregnum in his office, to avoid
many and great inconveniences; this can not be unless we apply to
him the maxim of the common law, applicable to the king, that he never
dies; this maxim of the common law (like most, if not all, of them) is
based upon wise conceptions, and not upon any foolish reverence for
kings or belief in their sanctity or immunity from the common lot of
mankind, but upon the necessary assumption that the state, which
protects and cares for ail, never ceases to exist, but that it is always
alive and · active in the performance of its duties to the citizen.
The state, being an ideality, can only be conceived of through the
public functionaries who constitute the different depa1tments by which
it exists; therefore, to hold that it never dies is necessarily to hold that
those who constitute its necessary departments never die. The departments by which the government of Great Britain exists are the king and
houses of parliament; the king is the executive of the nation, and
he and the two houses of parliament are the legislature; there is ne,·er
in contemplation of law an interregnum in either of these departments, for the law-making and the law-executing power being absolutely necessary to the exi tence of the state, if they cease to be, the
state pro tempore ceases to exist, which would be a solecism in a gov-

tion sole." There is no reason whatever, for questioning the general

truth of this proposition; it is sustained by the judgment of the

supreme court of North Carolina in the case of the Justices of Cum-

berland v. John Armstrong and others, 3 Dev. 284, where it is

held that the acts of assembly which direct the justices of the county

courts to take bonds to themselves in their official capacity confer

on them, as to such bonds, a corporate character.

But it must be admitted in both these cases that, if they be only

quoad corporations, and the bonds be not within the statute authoriz-

ing them, they will not enure by succession. But is a governor of a

state only quoad a corporation sole? We think not. It is true it is held

in the case of Polk v. Plummer and others to be quoad that particular

transaction a corporation sole, but that was all that it was necessary

to hold him in that case; but it is not determined that he is not a cor-

poration sole for other purposes besides those in which bonds are

directed by statute to be made payable to him. Blackstone, in the

first volume of his Commentaries, page 469, says: '•'■A corporation
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sole consists of one person only, and his successors in some -particu-

lar station, who are incorporated by law, in order to give them sole

legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, wh ick

in their natural persons they could not have had." In this view the

kifig is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, and so is every parson and

vicar.

Now the governor constitutes the executive department of the state;

he is vested by the constitution of the state with great and important

powers to be executed for the benefit of the state, and it is absolutely

necessary that there should be no interregnum in his office, to avoid

many and great inconveniences; this can not be unless we applv to

him the maxim of the common law, applicable to the king, that he never

dies; this maxim of the common law (like most, if not all, of them) is

based upon wise conceptions, and not upon any foolish reverence for

kings or belief in their sanctity or immunity from the common lot of

mankind, but upon the necessary assumption that the state, which

protects and cares for all, never ceases to exist, but that it is always

alive and active in the performance of its duties to the citizen.

The state, being an ideality, can only be conceived of through the

public functionaries who constitute the different departments by which

it exists; therefore, to hold that it never dies is necessarily to hold that

those who constitute its necessary departments never die. The depart-

ments by which the government of Great Britain exists are the king and

houses of parliament; the king is the executive of the nation, and

he and the two houses of parliament are the legislature; there is never

in contemplation of law an interregnum in either of these depart-

ments, for the law-making and the law-executing power being abso-

lutely necessary to the existence of the state, if they cease to be, the

state pro tempore ceases to exist, which would be a solecism in a gov-
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emment not destroyed by invasion or rebellion, and thrown back

upon the primitive principles of society.
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The governor of this state is the executive of it; it is one of his

duties, among many others, to see that the laws of the state are exe-

cuted and obeyed; this is a great and fundamental duty, without the

proper observance of which society might and would necessarily be

greatly distracted, and the proper security of life, liberty and property

seriously endangered for the purpose of enforcing the execution of

the laws, and the protection of the state from rebellion and invasion;

he is the commander of the forces of the state; to hold that there can

be an interregnum in this office would be to hold to the tempo-

rary anarchy of the state, and in order to hold that there is no such in-

terregnum we must hold that the governor, as such, never dies; to do

this he must be a corporation sole, with succession in office. Such

we think he is, constituted so by the organization of our state govern-

ment, and not by any particular statute or statutes; and therefore

when bonds are directed to be made payable to him in his official ca-

pacity, they are payable to him in his capacity as a corporation sole

quoad that particular transaction.
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If the governor of the state be a corporation sole, then he may be a

trustee, and that, too, in things not connected with his office; for it is

well settled that corporations, both aggregate and sole, may be trus-

tees for others. A bond, then, executed to a governor of a state vol-

untarily, which violates no public policy or private morality, but on

the contrary is made to secure a public right, maybe sued upon at law

in the name of the governor, for the benefit and use of those inter-

ested in it, and that, too, though there be no express statute author-

izing it. There is no case to be found contradicting this position.

In the case of The United States v. Thos. Tingley, 5 Pet. 114, it

was held "that a bond voluntarily given to the United States, and not

prescribed by law, is a valid instrument, upon the parties to it, in

point of law, because the United States have in their political capacity

a right to enter into a contract, or take a bond not previously pro-

vided by law, and the United States, being a body politic, may within

the sphere of the constitutional power granted to it enter into con-

tracts not prohibited by law and appropriate to the just exercise of

those powers."

In the case of Hibbits v. Canada et al., 10 Yerg. 465, it was held

by this court that when an administration bond was made payable to

James Hibbits, chairman of Smith.county, and his successors in office,

instead of the governor, as is directed by law, "that no action at law

could be maintained on the bond in the name of a successor, but that

the bond was valid at common law as a voluntary bond, and that a suit

at law might be maintained upon it in the name of the personal rep-

resentative of Hibbits." The chairman of the county court is not a

corporation sole, and, therefore, upon his death he has no successor, and

a bond executed to him without authority by statute necessarily descends

to his personal representative, and must be sued upon in his name.

18—Wil. Cases.

emment not destroyed by invasion or rebellion, and thrown back
upon the primitive principles of society.
The governor of th is state is the executi've of it; it is one of his
duties, among many others, to see that the laws of the state are executed and obeyed; this is a great and fundamental duty, without the
proper observance of which society might and would necessarily be
greatly distracted, and the proper security of life, liberty and property
. eriously endangered for the purpose of enforcing the execution of
the laws, and the protection of the state from rebellion and invasion;
he is the commander of the forces of the state; to hold that there can
be an interregnum in this o,ffice would be to hold to the temporary anarchy of the state, and m order to hold that there is no such interregnum we must hold that the governor, as such, never dies; to do
this he must be a corporation sole, with succession in office. Such
we think he is, constituted so by the organization of our state government, and not by any particular statute or statutes; and therefore
when bonds are directed to be made pay~ble to him in his official capacity, they are payable to him in his capacity as a corporation sole
9uoad that particular transaction.
If the governor of the state be a corporation sole, then he may be a
trustee, and that, too, in things not connected with his office; for it is
, ..·e ll settled that corporations, both aggregate and sole, may be trustees for others. A bond, then, executed to a governor of a state voluntarily, which violates no public policy or private morality, but on
the contrary is made to secure a public right, may be sued upon at law
in the name of the governor, for the benefit and use of those interested in it, and that, too, though there be no express statute authorizing it. There is no case to be found contradicting this position.
In the case of The United States v. Thos. Tingley, 5 Pet. 114, it
was held "that a bond voluntarily given to the United States, and not
prescribed by law, is a valid instrument, upon the parties to it, in
point of law, because the United States have in their political capacity
a right to enter into a contract, or take a bond not previously prov ided by law, and the United States, being a body politic, may within
the sphere of the constitutional power granted to it enter into contracts not prohibited by law and appropriate to the just exercise of
those powers."
In the case of Hibbits v. Canada et al., IO Y erg. 465, it was held
by this court that when an administration bond was made payable to
James Hibbits, chairman of Smith.county, and his successors in office,
instead of the governor, as is directed by law, "that no action at law
could be maintained on the bond in the name of a successor, but that
the bond was valid at common law as a voluntary bond, and that a suit
at law might be maintained upon it in the name of the personal representative of Hibbits.'' The chairman of the county court is not a
corporation sole, and, therefore, upon his death he has no successor, and
a bond executed to him without authority by statute necessarily descends
to his personal representative, and must be sued upon in his name.
18-WIL.
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The case of Polk, Governor, v. Plummer etal., in 2 Humph. 1500,
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holds, as we have seen, in a too restricted sense, that the governor is

a corporation sole when a bond has been executed to him by statutory

The case of Polk, Governor, v. Plummer et al., in 2 Humph. 500,
holds , as we have seen, in a too restricted sense, that the governor is
a corporation sole when a bond has been executed to him by statutory
provision. In the case of Jones, Governor, v. Wiley et al., 4
Humph. 146, a bond was taken from the clerk of Roane county
court, payable to Newton Cannon and his successors in office, but
taken before the wrong tribunal, it was held that th~ bond was not a
good statutory bond, but that it was a good common law bond , and
might be sued upon in the name of Cannon's personal representative,
but not in the name of his successor. But Newton Cannon w as not
a corporation sole, and, therefore, could have no successors, and eYen
if the bond had been made p ayable to him calling him governor , it
is probable it would have been held to be a description personal only .
In the case of The Justices of Carroll County Court v. Buchanan, 2
Murph. 40, it is held by the supreme court of North Carolina that a
guardian bond made payable to the justices of Carroll county is void
at common law, because it was held that the justices of the county
court are not a corporation, and their individual names were not used
in the bond or suit; but it may be doubted whether, if the bond was
executed in pursuance of the statute, the justices \\'ould not, under the
authority of the case of The Justices of Cumberland ". Armstrong, 3
Dev., be considered a corporation quoad th at transaction.
In the case of the governor for use of the State Bank v. Twitty et
al., 1 Dev. 1 53, it was held by the supreme court of N orth Carolina
that a sheriff's bond in a sum different from that directed by law,
made payable to John Branch, governor, and his successors was not
a good statutory bond , and could not be sued upon in the name of
Gabriel Holmes, governor, and his successors. This case is the same
with that of Jones, Governor, v. Wiley et al., 4 Humph. 46, and was
decided as that was, for the same reason, to wit, that the b ond is
payable to the governor as an individual eo nomine, and not to his
office, and, th.!refore, descends to his personal representative. _These
are all the cases to which we have been referred as conflicting with
the view we have taken of this case. We think, as we have endea,·ored to show, that they are not in conflict with it.
Upon the whole, then, we are of opinion that the execution of this
bond being voluntary, and for the purpose of securing a fund belonging to the county of Montgomery, don:ited to it by the state, and fo r
which the trustee of the county was hound to enter into bond and
security before he received it, the mistake of the county court in not
taking this bond, payable to the superintendent of public instruction,
but to the governor of the sta te, though it vitiates it as a statutory
bond, does not avoid it at common law , but that the governor of the
state being a corporation sole, a suit may be maintained upon it in bis
name for the benefit of the county of Montgomery.
We therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court, overrule the
demurrer and remand the case for further proceeding.

provision. In the case of Jones, Governor, v. Wiley et al., 4

Humph. 146, a bond was taken from the clerk of Roane county

court, payable to Newton Cannon and his successors in office, but

taken before the wrong tribunal, it was held that the bond was not a

good statutory bond, but that it was a good common law bond, and

might be sued upon in the name of Cannon's personal representative,

but not in the name of his successor. But Newton Cannon was not

a corporation sole, and, therefore, could have no successors, and even

if the bond had been made payable to him calling him governor, it

is probable it would have been held to be a description personal only.

In the case of The Justices of Carroll County Court v. Buchanan, 2

Murph. 40, it is held by the supreme court of North Carolina that a

guardian bond made payable to the justices of Carroll county is void

at common law, because it was held that the justices of the county

court are not a corporation, and their individual names were not used

in the bond or suit; but it may be doubted whether, if the bond was
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executed in pursuance of the statute, the justices would not, under the

authority of the case of The Justices of Cumberland v. Armstrong, 3

Dev., be considered a corporation quoad that transaction.

In the case of the governor for use of the State Bank v. Twitty et

al., 1 Dev. 153, it was held by the supreme court of North Carolina

that a sheriff's bond in a sum different from that directed by law,

made payable to John Branch, governor, and his successors was not

a good statutory bond, and could not be sued upon in the name of

Gabriel Holmes, governor, and his successors. This case is the same

with that of Jones, Governor, v. Wiley et al., 4 Humph. 46, and was

decided as that was, for the same reason, to wit, that the bond is

payable to the governor as an individual co nomine, and not to his

office, and, therefore, descends to his personal representative. These

are all the cases to which we have been referred as conflicting with

the view we have taken of this case. We think, as we have endeav-

ored to show, that they are not in conflict with it.

Upon the whole, then, we are of opinion that the execution of this

bond being voluntary, and for the purpose of securing a fund belong-

ing to the county of Montgomery, donated to it by the state, and for

which the trustee of the county was bound to enter into bond and

security before he received it, the mistake of the county court in not

taking this bond, payable to the superintendent of public instruction,

but to the governor of the state, though it vitiates it as a statutory

bond, does not avoid it at common law, but that the governor of the

state being a corporation sole, a suit may be maintained upon it in his

name for the benefit of the county of Montgomery.

We therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court, overrule the

demurrer and remand the case for further proceeding.

Note. It is frequently said that corporations do not exist by common law

with us. That, perhaps, is true in regard to private corporations; but so far

N ote. It is frequently ea.id that corporations do not exist by common Jaw
with us. That, perhaps, is true in regard to private corporations; but so far
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as public officers, or the state itself, or the National Government are corpora-

tions they are so by common law.

1. As to officers, see supra, p. 200.

2. The United States is a corporation.—1878, Dickson v. United States,

125 Mass. 311, 28 Am. Rep. 230; United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock (U. S.)

96, 109; Cotton v. United States, 11 How. (U. S.) 229, 231; United States v.

Tingev, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 115, 128.

3. 'The states are corporations also.—1843, State of Indiana v. Woram, 6

Hill (N. Y.i 33, 40 Am. Dec. 378; People v. Utica Insurance Company, 15

Johns. (N. Y.) 358, 8 Am. Dec. 243; People v. Assessors of Watertown, 1

Hill (N. Y.) 620.
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as public officers, or the state itself, or the National Government are corpora·
tions they are so by common law.
l. As to officers, see supra, p. 200.
2. The United States is a corporation.-1878, Dickson v. United States,
125 Mass. 311, 28 Am. Rep. 230; United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock (U.S.)
96, 109 ; Cotton v. United States, 11 How. (U.S.) 229, 231; United Statesv.
Tingev, 5 Pet. (U. 8.) 115, 128.
3. The states are corporations also.-1843, State of Indiana v. Woram, 6
Hill (N. Y. 1 33, 40 Am. Dec. 378; People v. Utica Insurance Company, 15
Johns. (N. Y. ) 358, 8 Am. Dec. 243; People v. Assessors of Watertown, 1
Hill (N. Y. ) 620.

Sec. 53. Same, {d) Prescription.

GREENE Et Al. v. DENNIS.1

1826. In the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. 6

Conn. 292-305, 16 Am. Dec. 58.

See. 53. Same. ( d)

Prescription.

[This was an action of ejectment, for a tract of land in Pomfret,

GREENE ET AL. v. DENNIS. 1

tried at Brooklyn, September term, 1825, before Bristol, J.

The plaintiffs claimed title to the demanded premises, as the heirs
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at law of Sylvester Wickes; and the defendant, as the lessee of the

1826.

IN

THE SUPREME CouRT oF ERRORS oF CONNECTICUT.

6

Conn. 292-305, 16 Am. Dec. 58.

Yearly Meeting of the people called Quakers, who claimed to be de-

visees of Wickes and the lessee of Rowland Greene, who claimed as

a residuary devisee. To prove his title, the defendant exhibited in

evidence the last will and testament of Wickes, dated the 17th of

January, 1822. The clause of the will comprising the demanded

premises was in these words: "I give the Yearly Meeting of the peo-

ple called Quakers, of New England, my farm in Pomfret, that I

bought of Clark and Nightingale, the net income of which is to be

appropriated in aid of the charitable fund of the boarding school es-

tablished by Friends in Providence, to them the said people called

Quakers, and their successors in the same faith forever." After making

numerous other devises and bequests, the testator disposed of the resi-

due in the following terms: "Also, I give to my said nephew, Row-

land Greene, all the rest and residue of my estate, of what kind or

nature it may be, or wherever found not herein or otherwise disposed

of on condition that he, the said Rowland, pay or cause to be paid,

all my just debts, the foregoing legacies, funeral charges and expense

of settling my estate." The testator died soon afterward, and his

will was duly proved and approved. The defendant also proved who

the members of the Yearly Meeting were, viz., Benjamin Freeborn

and thirty-two others, whose names were specified. To prove that

the Yearly Meeting was a corporation, capable of taking and holding

lands by devise, the defendant adduced in evidence certain votes and

proceedings from the records of that body, beginning in 1683 and ex-

tending to the commencement of this suit. * * *

1 Arguments omitted. Statement of facts abridged. Parts of opinion on

other points omitted.

[This was an action of ejectment, for a tract of land in Pomfret,
tried at Brooklyn, September term, 1825, before BRISTOL, J.
The plaintiffs claimed title to the demanded premises, as the heirs
at law of Sylvester Wickes; and the defendant, as the lessee of the
Yearly Meeting of the people called Quakers, who claimed to be devi ees of Wickes and the lessee of Rowland Greene, who claimed as
a residuary devisee. To prove his title, the defendant exhibited in
evidence the last will and testament of Wickes, dated the 17th of
January, 1822. The clause of the will comprising the demanded
premises was in these words: ''I give the Yearly Meeting of the people called Quakers, of New England, my farm in Pomfret, that I
bought of Clark and Nightingale, the net income of which is to be
appropriated in aid of the charitable fund of the boarding school established by Friends in Providence, to them the said people called
Quakers, and their successors in the same faith forever." After making
numerous other devises and bequests, the testator disposed of the residue in the following terms: ''Also, I give to my said nephew, Rowland Greene, all the rest and residue of my estate, of what kind or
nature it may be, or wherever found not herein or otherwise disposed
of on condition that he, the said Rowland, pay or cause to be paid,
all my just debts, the foregoing legacies, funeral charges and expense
of settling my estate." The testator died soon afterward, and his
will was duly proved and approved. The defendant also proved who
the members of the Yearly Meeting were, viz., Benjamin Freeborn
and thirty-two others, whose names were specified. To prove that
the Yearly Meeting was a corporation, capable of taking and holding
lands by devise, the defendant adduced in evidence certain votes and
proceedings from the records of that body, beginning in 1683 and extending to the commencement of this suit. • • •
1
Arguments omitted. Statement of facts abridged. Parts of opinion on
other points omitted.
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The judge instructed the jury that the members of the Yearly Meet-

GREENE V. DENNIS.

ing could not take and hold the farm, as individuals, for the purposes

mentioned in the will; that the votes and acts done by the society,

The judge instructed the jury that the members of the Yearly Meetmg could not take and hold the farm, as individuals, for the purposes
mentioned in the will; that the votes and acts done by the society,
however long their continuance, would not authorize the presumption
of a charter of incorporation, with power to purchase and hold real
estate, unless they were such acts of the society as they could not perform without being incorporated; that if such devise to the Yearly
Meeting was void for uncertainty, or because the society was not incorporated, the farm would descend to the heirs at law of the t estator,
would not pass by the residuary clause in the will to Rowland Gre'e ne.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the defendant moved
for a new trial on the ground of misdirection.]
Hos:MER, Ch. J. • • • 2. The next question that arises in the
case is, whether the Yearly Meeting was a corporation, capable of
holding land in trust.
By a corporation it is understood, in contradistinction from a voluntary association of individuals, a society created by the sovereign
power.
At the trial of this cause no charter of incorporatio.n was exhibited.
It, however, was contended, from a long and continued exercise of
certain acts, that an incorporation ought to be presumed.
That a grant of charter is presumable from the long continued exercise of authority is indisputable, and has not been disputed, and all
the cases cited by the defendant's counsel tend only to prove this unquestionable principle. The inquiry in this case involves no question
of law, and turns entirely on a point of fact. Admitting all the acts
done by the Yearly M eeting for more than a century to have b een
lawful, do they warrant the presumption that they were incorporated?
This is the precise inquiry, and in his charge to the jury, the judge,
recognizing the law of presumptions, instructed them that the acts
done must have been such as an unincorporated Y early Meeting could
not have performed.
When fairly construed, the following was
virtually the opinion expressed: If the acts done by the Yearly Meeting bear on the face of them the impress of corporate acts, such as
individuals can not, and a corporation alone is competent to p erform,
you may presume the Yearly Meeting to be a corporation. But if
their acts were within the competency of individuals to perform, they
furnish no ground to presume that they were other than the acts of
individuals. The inference to be drawn by the jury was a fact inquired after from facts established, and their reasoning was to be from
the effect to the cau se. The law made no inference on the subject,
nor gave to the testimony a technical efficacy beyond the simple and
natural operation. The principle had before been recognized in H art
v. Chalker, S Conn. Rep. 3 I I. "A usage," said the court," supposed to be founded on a grant or agreement, determines the extent
of the supposed grant or agree ment. The right granted is supposed
to be commensurate with the right enjoyed. They are different m edi"a,
proving precisely the same fact; and it is be.c ause of this indentity of
proof that the usage is supposed to evince the grant. In short, like

however long their continuance, would not authorize the presumption

of a charter of incorporation, with power to purchase and hold real

estate, unless they were such acts of the society as they could not per-

form without being incorporated; that if such devise to the Yearly

Meeting was void for uncertainty, or because the society was not in-

corporated, the farm would descend to the heirs at law of the testator,

would not pass by the residuary clause in the will to Rowland Greene.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the defendant moved

for a new trial on the ground of misdirection.]

Hosmer, Ch. J. * * * 2. The next question that arises in the

case is, whether the Yearly Meeting was a corporation, capable of

holding land in trust.

By a corporation it is understood, in contradistinction from a volun-

tary association of individuals, a society created by the sovereign

power.

At the trial of this cause no charter of incorporation was exhibited.
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It, however, was contended, from a long and continued exercise of

certain acts, that an incorporation ought to be presumed.

That a grant of charter is presumable from the long continued ex-

ercise of authority is indisputable, and has not been disputed, and all

the cases cited by the defendant's counsel tend only to prove this un-

questionable principle. The inquiry in this case involves no question

of law, and turns entirely on a point of fact. Admitting all the acts

done by the Yearly Meeting for more than a century to have been

lawful, do they warrant the presumption that they were incorporated?

This is the precise inquiry, and in his charge to the jury, the judge,

recognizing the law of presumptions, instructed them that the acts

done must have been such as an unincorporated Yearly Meeting could

not have performed. When fairly construed, the following was

virtually the opinion expressed: If the acts done by the Yearly Meet-

ing bear on the face of them the impress of corporate acts, such as

individuals can not, and a corporation alone is competent to perform,

you may presume the Yearly Meeting to be a corporation. But if

their acts were within the competency of individuals to perform, they

furnish no ground to presume that they were other than the acts of

individuals. The inference to be drawn by the jury was a fact in-

quired after from facts established, and their reasoning was to be from

the effect to the cause. The law made no inference on the subject,

nor gave to the testimony a technical efficacy beyond the simple and

natural operation. The principle had before been recognized in Hart

v. Chalker, 5 Conn. Rep. 311. "A usage," said the court," sup-

posed to be founded on a grant or agreement, determines the extent

of the supposed grant or agreement. The right granted is supposed

to be commensurate with the right enjoyed. They are different media,

proving precisely the same fact; and it is because of this indentity of

proof that the usage is supposed to evince the grant. In short, like
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in a point of proof, precisely and identically the same."

The principle declared by the judge was unquestionably correct;

and the verdict of the jury necessarily implies that the Yearly Meet-

ings was not a corporation.

From the evidence exhibited, and spread on the motion before us,

my mind is led to the same results. Every act of the Yearly Meeting

is entirely reconcilable with the belief that it was done by persons, not by

virtue of corporate authority,but as a voluntary association of individuals.

Let it be supposed that the members of the Yearly Meetings were a

delegation, to whom was confided the supervision of the spiritual con-

cerns of the people called Quakers; that by voluntary"contributions of

their constituents and others, they were invested with funds to this

end; and that they directed the general concerns and the application of

their funds, by joint agreement, and with no more of compulsion than

is implied in the voluntary and cheerful acquiescence of those whose

interests they are pursuing. Superadd to this, that they kept records

of their proceedings; that they appointed a clerk and treasurer; that
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they held lands, as individuals, for the general advantage, that they

advised the payment of money and sent to the respective quarterly

meetings for their proportion; that, in fact, they celebrated marriages,

had burying places and admitted members of their Meeting or dis-

carded them. Every one of these acts might be done by them as in-

dividuals without corporate authority and without coercion except over

their own funds. Their organization for the transaction of business

and disposing of their property, with a president at their head (which

I believe did not exist), with their clerk and treasurer, and minutes of

their proceedings, were nothing more than is usually done by an un-

incorporated library company or bible society or other voluntary as-

semblies. It does not appear that land or property of any kind was

held by the Yearly Meeting, unless as tenants in common, or that a tax

was laid by them other than an appointment for a voluntary contribu-

tion; nor is there exhibited in their constitution, organization or pro-

ceedings, one mark or indicium of a corporation. Nothing was done

by them beyond the competency of individuals.

So far as the testimony adduced may be relied on, the members of

the Yearly Meeting have never exercised one of those incidents which

necessarilly and inseparably are annexed to every corporation. They

have no perpetual succession, the primary object of corporate author-

ity; there has been no suing or being sued, no granting and receiving,

no holding of lands or estate for their own use, or that of others, as a

corporation; no common seal, by which the intention of a corporate

body is manifested, and no by-laws for the better government of them-

selves. They appear to have had the capacity of agreeing, of advis-

ing, and of disposing of their own, as individuals; and beyond this, no

capacity of theirs is discerned.

The inference from such premises, that the Yearly Meeting was

incorporated, would be as groundless as the supposition that an

a seal with its correspondent impression, the grant and the usage are
in a point of proof, precisely and identically the same.''
The principle declared by the judge was unquestionably correct;
and the verdict of the jury necessarily implies that the Yearly Meetings was not a corporation.
From the evidence exhibited, and spread on the motion before us,
my mind is led to the same results. Every act of the Yearly Meeting
is entirely reconcilable with the belief that it was done by persons, not by
virtue of corporate authority, but as a voluntary association of individuals.
Let it be supposed that the member's of the Yearly Meetings were a
delegation, to whom was confided the supervision of the spiritual concerns of the people called Quakers; that by voluntary· contributions of
their constituents and others, they were invested with funds to this
end; and that they directed the general concerns and the application of
their funds, by joint agreement, and with no more of compulsion than
is implied in the voluntary and cheerful acquiescence of those whose
interests they are pursuing. Superadd to this, that they kept records
of their proceedings; that they appointed a clerk and treasurer; that
they held lands, as individuals, for the . general advantage, that they
advised the payment of money and sent to the respective quarterly
meetings for their proportion; that, in fact, they celebrated marriages,
bad burying places and admitted members of their Meeting or discarded them. Every one of these acts might be done by them as individuals without corporate authority and without coercion except over
their own funds. Their organization for the transaction of business
and disposing of their property, with a president at their head (which
I believe did not exist), with their clerk and treasurer, and minutes of
their proceedings, were nothing more than is usually done by an unincorporated library company or bible society or other voluntary assemblies. It does not appear that land or property of any kind was
held by the Yearly Meeting, unless as tenants in common, or that a tax
was laid by them other than an appointment for a voluntary contribution; nor is there exhibited in their constitution, organization or proceedings, one mark or indicium of a corporation. Nothing was done
by them beyond the competency of individuals.
So far as the testimony adduced may be relied on, the members of
the Yearly Meeting have never exercised one of those incidents which
necessarilly and inseparably are annexed to every corporation. They
have no perpetual succession, the primary object of corporate authority; there has been no suing or being sued, no granting and receiving,
no holding of lands or estate for their own use, or that oi others, as a
corporation; no common seal, by which the intention of a corporate
body is manifested, and no by-laws for the better government of themselves. They appear to have had the capacity of agreeing, of advising, and of disposing of their own, as individuals; and beyond this, no
capacity of theirs is discerned.
The inference. from such premises, that the Yearly Meeting was
incorporated, would be as groundless as the supposition that an
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individual, by virtue of his personal acts, gives proof of his being a

corporation.

individual, by virtue of his personal acts, gives proof of his being a
corporation.
It is not sufficient for the defendant to show that the Yearly Meeting was a corporation, but he must proceed further, and prove that it
is authorized, by virtue of its corporate powers, to hold property in
trust for others. Such confidence is not incidental to e\·ery corporation, but in general, it is foreign to the end of its institution. Hence
a corporation can not be seized of land to the use of another (Bro.
Abr. tit. Feoffment. D. Cmise on Uses 22) unless it has explicit
authority for this purpose. Now what act was ever exercised by the
Yearly Meeting from which this power may be presumed? No such
act appears; and hence the presumption of the corporate power in
question can not be made.
I conclude, then, that the Yearly Meeting never was a corporation;
and if it were, that it never had the capacity of becoming a trustee for
others. • • •
The other judges were of the same opinion.
New trial not to be granted.

It is not sufficient for the defendant to show that the Yearly Meet-

ing was a corporation, but he must proceed further, and prove that it

is authorized, by virtue of its corporate powers, to hold property in

trust for others. Such confidence is not incidental to every corpora-

tion, but in general, it is foreign to the end of its institution. Hence

a corporation can not be seized of land to the use of another (Bro.

Abr. tit. Feoffment. D. Cmise on Uses 22) unless it has explicit

authority for this purpose. Now what act was ever exercised by the

Yearly Meeting from which this power may be presumed? No such

act appears; and hence the presumption of the corporate power in

question can not be made.

I conclude, then, that the Yearly Meeting never was a corporation;

and if it were, that it never had the capacity of becoming a trustee for

others. • » *

The other judges were of the same opinion.

New trial not to be granted.
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Note. See 1774, Kingston upon Hull v. Horner, 1 Cowper 102; 1807, Dil-

lingham v. Snow, 3 Mass. 276; 1809, Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547; 1815,

Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge, 12 Mass. 400; 1820, Hagerstown Turnpike

Co. v. Creeger, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 122,9 Am. Dec. 495; 1823, Craftof Mercers,

Note. See 1774, Kingston upon Hull v. Horner, 1 Cowper 102; 1807, Dillingham v. Snow, 3 Mass. 276; 1809, Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547; 1815,
Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge, 12 Mass. 400; 1820, Hagerstown Turnpike
Co. v. Creeger, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 122, 9 Am. Dec. 495; 1823, Craft of Mercers,
etc., v. Hart, 12 Eng. C. L. 76, 1 Car & P. •11:-l; 1829, River Tone v. Ash, 21
Eng. C. L . 152, 10 Bar. & C. •349; 1841, Stnte v. Miami Exporting Co., 11
Ohio 126; 1844, New Boston v. Dunbarton, 15 N. H. 201; 1844, People v. Oakland County Bank, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 282; 1857, Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H.
351, 69 Am. Dec. 489; 1861, Robie v. Sedgwick, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 319 ; 1862,
State ex rel., etc., v. Bailey, 19 Ind . 452; 1868, Calkins v. State, 18 Ohio ~t.
366; 1876, Douthitt v. Stinson, 63 Mo. 268; 1882, State, ex rel. Sleeth, v. Gorden , 81 Ind. 171; i885, Society Perun v. Cleveland, 43 Ohio St. 481. See cases
below on estoppel to deny corporate existence, p. 630, et seq.
Co1,LrER, C..J., in Selma and Tennessee Railroad Co. v. Tipton, 5 Alabama
Reports 787 (1843), on page 804, s. c. 39 American Decisions 344, on page
353, says:
"It is said that presumptions are applicable as well to corporations as individuals; that persons acting publicly as officers of the corporation are presumed rightfully in office, and all necessary steps presumed, m order to make
a corl?orate act le~ally operative. So a charter, from the long exercise of corporative right.s, or accept.ance of a new charter from the acts of the corporate
officers, as well as many other things, may be presumed from circumstances.
(Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. Rep. 70, et post; The
State v. Carr, 5 New Hamp. Rep. 367; Hagerstown T . l'. Comp. v. Creeger,
5 Har. & J. R. 125. See also, 1 Pick. Rep. 279; 1 Pick . 372; 17 Mass. Rep. 1
and 479.) The court say: 'Where a corporation bas gone into operation, and
rights have beea acquired under it, every presumption should be made in
favor of the legality of it.s existence.' (See also, Trott v. Warren , 2 Fairf.
(11 Me.) Rep. 227.) So, in All Saint's Church v. Lovett, 1 Hall's Rep. (N. Y.
Superior Ct.) 191, it is held that where there h ad been a corporate body de
fa cto , for a considerable time claiming to be a corporation and holding and
enjoying property as such, it will be presumed that all merely formal requisites to the due creation of a corporation have been complied with. ( See
also, U.S. v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. Rep. 392.)"

etc., v. Hart, 12 Eng. C. L. 70, 1 Car & P. *113; 1829, River Tone v. Ash, 21

Eng. C. L. 152, 10 Bar. & C. *349; 1841, State v. Miami Exporting Co., 11

Ohio 126; 1844, New Boston v. Dunbarton, 15 N. H.201; 1844, People v. Oak-

land County Bank, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 282; 1857, Bow v. Allenstown. 34 N. H.

351,69 Am. Dec. 489; 1861, Robie v. Sedgwick, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 319; 1862,

State ex rel., etc., v. Bailey, 19 Ind. 452; 1868, Calkins v. State, 18 Ohio St.

366; 1876, Douthitt v. Stinson, 63 Mo. 268; 1882, State, ex rel. Sleeth, v. Gor-

don, 87 Ind. 171; 1885, Society Perun v. Cleveland, 43 Ohio St. 481. See cases

below on estoppel to deny corporate existence, p. 630, et seq.

Colli BR, C. J., in Selma and Tennessee Railroad Co. v. Tipton, 5 Alabama

Reports 787 (1843), on page 804, s. c. 39 American Decisions 344, on page

353, says:

"It is said that presumptions are applicable as well to corporations as indi-

viduals; that persons acting publicly as officers of the corporation are pre-

sumed rightfully in office, and all necessary steps presumed, in order to make

a corporate act legally operative. So a charter, from the long exercise of cor-

porative rights, or acceptance of a new charter from the acts of the corporate

officers, as well as many other things, mav be presumed from circumstances.

(Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. Rep. 70, et post; The

State v. Carr, 5 New Hamp. Rep. 367; Hagerstown T. P. Comp. v. Creeger,

5 Har. & J. R. 125. See also, 1 Pick. Rep. 279; 1 Pick. 372; 17 Mass. Rep. 1

and 479.) The court say: 'Where a corporation has gone into operation, and

rights have been acquired under it, every presumption should be made in

favor of the legality of its existence.' (See also, Trott v. Warren, 2 Fairf.

(11 Me.) Rep. 2270 'So, in All Saint's Church v. Eovett, 1 Hall's Rep. (N. Y.

Superior Ct.) 191, it is held that where there had been a corporate body de

facto, for a considerable time claiming to be a corporation and holding and

enjoying property as such, it will be presumed that all merely formal re-

quisites to the due creation of a corporation have been complied with. (See

also, U. S. v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. Rep. 392.)"
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Sec. 54. Same, (e) Legislative acts, which are, as to the power:

(i) Inherent.

MONTGOMERY BELL v. THE BANK OF NASHVILLE.

1823. In the Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals of Ten-

See. 54. Same. ( e) Legislative acts, which are, as to the power:
( 1) Inherent.

nessee. Peck's (Term.) Rep. 269.

MONTGOMERY BELL v. THE BANK OF NASHVILLE.

Haywood, J., delivered the opinion of himself, Judges White and

Brown, Judge Peck being absent.

I823.

The declaration states that on the 7th day of August, 1819, a bill

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS
NESSEE. Peck's (Tenn.) Rep. 269.

OF

TRN•

single was made and signed by Whitesides, his agent, duly authorized,

by which he undertook in sixty days to pay at the bank of Nashville

to Whitesides, who indorsed to Alfred Balch, who indorsed to the

bank, that on the last day of grace it was presented for payment and

was not paid, whereby an action accrued, etc. To this there was a

demurrer for several causes, all which were overruled but two, and

these two are now to be decided by this court. The first of these two

questions is this: Could the legislature of Tennessee create a bank-

ing corporation? To which the answer is, that the legislature of

Tennessee, like the legislatures of all other sovereign states, can do
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all things not prohibited by the constitution of this state or of

the United States, and, amongst other things, may establish a bank-

ing corporation with a capacity to sue and be sued, and, of course, to

institute and maintain this action.

A second question made is, whether the bank had power to dis-

count this bill single, and sue upon it. By the act of 1807, ch. 103,

§ 1, art. 14, the bank is not to trade in any sort of stock except bank

bills, etc., but by section 19, bonds, notes and bills shall not be re-

ceived at the bank unless made payable there, which implies that bills

made so payable may be received there. This bill single is of that

description; the bank may receive, discount and sue upon it.

Judgment of the circuit court affirmed.

Sec. 55. Same. (2) Exclusive.

THE FRANKLIN BRIDGE COMPANY, Plaintiffs in Ereob, v. YOUNG

WOOD, Defendant.

1853. In the Supreme Court of Georgia. 14 Ga. 80-86.

Assumpsit in Heard superior court. Tried before Judge Hill, May

term, 1853.

The Franklin Bridge Company was incorporated under the act of

HAYWOOD, J., delivered the opinion of himself, Judges White and
Brown, Judge Peck being absent.
The declaration states that on the 7th day of August, 18I9, a bill
single was made and signed by Whitesides, his agent, duly authorized,
by which he unde1took in sixty days to pay at the bank of Nashville
to Whitesides, who indorsed to Alfred Balch, who indorsed to the
bank, that on the last day of grace it was presented for payment and
was not paid, whereby an action accrued, etc. To this there was a
demurrer for seYeral causes, all which were overruled but t\vo, and
these two are now to be decided by this court. The first of these two
questions is this: Could the legislature of Tennessee create a banking corporation? To which the answer is, that the legislature of
Tennessee, like the legt"slatures of all other sovere£gn states. can do
all things not proht"bt"ted by the constituli"on of tht"s state or of
the United States, and, amongst other things, may establi'sh a banking corporation wt"th a capadty to sue and be sued, and, of course, to
i11stt"tute and ma£ntain thi"s action.
A second question made is, whether the bank had power to discount this bill single, and sue upon it. By the act of I8o7, ch. Io3,
§ I , art. I4 1 the bank is not to trade in any sort of stock except bank
bills, etc., but by section 19, bonds, notes and bills shall not be received at the bank unless made payable there, which implies that bills
made so payable may be received there. This bill single is of that
description; the bank may receive, discount and sue upon it.
Judgment of the circuit court affirmed.

the legislature of 1843, to prescribe the mode of incorporating com-

panies for certain purposes, by an order of the inferior court of Heard

county.

Sec. 55. Same.

( 2)

Exclusive.

The company sued the defendant, Wood, for his subscription to

their stock.

THE FRANKLIN BRIDGE COMPANY,

PLAINTIP'11'8

IN ERROR, v. YOUNG

WOOD, DBFBNDANT.

The defendant pleaded that the company was not legally incorpo-

I853.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF GEORGIA.

14 Ga. 8o-86.

Assumpsit in Heard superior court. Tried before Judge Hill, May
term, 1853.
The Franklin Bridge Company was incorporated under the act of
the legislature of I843, to prescribe the mode of incorporating companies for certain purposes, by an order of the inferior court of Heard
county.
The company sued the .defendant, Wood, for his subscription to
the ir stock.
The defendant pleaded that the company was not legally incorpo-
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rated; contending that the act of the legislature, referred to, was un-

ra~ed;

contending that the act of the legislature, referred to, was unconstitutional and void.
·
Upon argument, the court held that the act aforesaid was unconstitutional, and non-suited the plaintiffs.
To this decision plaintiff excepted.
By the court.-LUMPKIN, J., delivering the opinion.
Is the act of 1843, and that of 1845, amendatory thereof, pointing
out the manner of creating certain corporations and defining their
rights, privileges and liabilities, unconstitutional?
By the first section of the act of 1843 1 it is provided: "That when
the persons interested shall desire to have any church, camp-ground,
manufacturing company, trading company, ice company, fire company,
theater company, or hotel company, bridge company and ferry company, incorporated, they shall petition in writing the superior or infer·
ior court of the county where such association may have been formed,
or may desire to transact business for that purpose, setting forth the
object of their association, and the privilege they desire to exercise,
together with the name and style by which they desire to be incorporated; and said court shall pass a rule or order, directing said petition
to be entered of record on the minutes of said court."
Section 2 enacts "That when such rule or order is passed, and said
petition is entered of record, the said companies or associations shall
have power respectively, under and by the name designated in their
petition, to have and use a common seal; to contract and to be contracted with ; to sue and be sued ; to answer and to be answered
unto in any court of law or equity; to appoint such officers as they
may deem necessary, and to make such rules and regulations as they
may think proper for their own government, not contrary to the laws
of this state, but shall make no contracts or purchase, or hold any
property of any kind except such as may be absolutely necessary to
carry into effect the object of their incorporation. Nothing herein
contained shall be so construed as to confer banking or insurance privileges on any company or association herein enumerated; and the individual members of such manufacturing, trading, theater, ice and hotel
companies shall be bound for the punctual payment of all the contracts
of said companies, as in case of partnership."
The third section declares that "No company or association shall
be incorporated under th is act for a longer period than fourteen years;
but the same may be renewed whenever necessary, according to the
provisions of the first section of this act."
The fourth section conf~rs upon the superior and inferior courts,
respectively, the power to change the names of the individuals.
Section 5. "For entering any of said petitions and orders, and furnishing a certified copy thereof, the clerk shall be entitled to a fee of
five dollars; except in cases of applications by individuals for the
change of names-in which case, the clerk of said court shall be entitled to the fee of one dollar-and that sudi certified copy shall be evidence of the matters therein stated in any court of law and equity in
this state. (Cobb's Digest, 542-3.)

constitutional and void.

Upon argument, the court held that the act aforesaid was uncon-

stitutional, and non-suited the plaintiffs.

To this decision plaintiff excepted.

By the court.—Lumpkin, J., delivering the opinion.

Is the act of 1843, and that of 1S45, amendatory thereof, pointing

out the manner of creating certain corporations and defining their

rights, privileges and liabilities, unconstitutional?

By the first section of the act of 1843, it is provided: "That when

the persons interested shall desire to have any church, camp-ground,

manufacturing company, trading company, ice company, fire company,

theater company, or hotel company, bridge company and ferry com-

pany, incorporated, they shall petition in writing the superior or infer-

ior court of the county where such association may have been formed,

or may desire to transact business for that purpose, setting forth the

object of their association, and the privilege they desire to exercise,

together with the name and style by which they desire to be incorpo-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:15 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

rated; and said court shall pass a rule or order, directing said petition

to be entered of record on the minutes of said court."

Section 2 enacts "That when such rule or order is passed, and said

petition is entered of record, the said companies or associations shall

have power respectively, under and by the name designated in their

petition, to have and use a common seal; to contract and to be con-

tracted with; to sue and be sued; to answer and to be answered

unto in any court of law or equity; to appoint such officers as they

may deem necessary, and to make such rules and regulations as they

may think proper for their own government, not contrary to the laws

of this state, but shall make no contracts or purchase, or hold any

property of any kind except such as may be absolutely necessary to

carry into effect the object of their incorporation. Nothing herein

contained shall be so construed as to confer banking or insurance privi-

leges on any company or association herein enumerated; and the in-

dividual members of such manufacturing, trading, theater, ice and hotel

companies shall be bound for the punctual payment of all the contracts

of said companies, as in case of partnership."

The third section declares that "No company or association shall

be incorporated under this act for a longer period than fourteen years;

but the same may be renewed whenever necessary, according to the

provisions of the first section of this act."

The fourth section confers upon the superior and inferior courts,

respectively, the power to change the names of the individuals.

Section 5. "For entering any of said petitions and orders, and fur-

nishing a certified copy thereof, the clerk shall be entitled to a fee of

five dollars; except in cases of applications by individuals for the

change of names—in which case, the clerk of said court shall be en-

titled to the fee of one dollar—and that such' certified copy shall be evi-

dence of the matters therein stated in any court of law and equity in

this state. (Cobb's Digest, 542-3.)
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ance companies; and the individual members of all such incorporations
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are made personally liable for all the contracts of said associations or

companies. (Cobb's Digest, 542-3.)

The argument against the validity of the charter of the Franklin

Bridge Company, created under these statutes, is this:

(1) That in England corporations are created and exist by prescrip-

tion, by royal charter and by act of parliament. With us, they are

created by authority of the legislature and not otherwise. That to es-

tablish a corporation is to enact a law, and that no power but the

legislative body can do this.

(2) That legislative power is vested under our constitution, in the

general assembly, to consist of a senate and house of representatives,

to be elected at stated periods by the citizens of the respective coun-

ties.

(3) And that the general assembly is bound to exercise the power

of making laws, thus conferred upon them, by the people, in the

primordial compact, in the mode therein prescribed, and in none

other, and that a law made in any other mode is unconstitutional and
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void. That the legislature is but the agent of their constituents, and

that they can not transfer authority delegated to them to any other

body, corporate or otherwise—not even to the judiciary, a co-ordinate

department of the government, unless expressly empowered by the

constitution to do so. That to do this would be to violate one of the

fundamental maxims of jurisprudence, as well as of political science,

namely: delegata fotestas, non potest delegari. That to do this

would not only be to disregard the constitutional inhibition, which is

binding upon the representative, but by shifting responsibility, in-

troduce innovations upon our system, which would result in the over-

throw and ultimate destruction of our political fabric.

The constitutional inquiry thus presented is an exceedingly grave

one. It reaches far beyond the case made in the bill of exceptions,

and extends to the whole range of topics which fall under legislative

cognizance. In the view we take, however, of the statutes before us,

no such proposition as that which has been discussed is presented for

our adjudication. And we rejoice that it is so, not only on account

of the delicacy of the task in pronouncing an act of the legislature un-

constitutional and void, one which is never justifiable, unless the case

is clear and free from doubt; and even then one might almost be for-

given for shrinking from the performance of the duty, which would be

productive of such incalculable mischief and confusion. Bridges have

been built at a heavy expense, manufacturing and innumerable other

associations have been formed in Georgia, and are in full operation,

under charters incorporated under this law. And in view of the con-

sequences any court might'hesitate, unless the repugnance between

the statute and the constitution was so palpable as to admit of no

doubt, and produce a settled conviction of their incompatibility with

each other.

By the act of 1845, the provisions of the act of 1843 are extended
to all associations and companies whatever, except banks and insurance companies; and the individual members of all such incorporations
are made personally liable for all the contracts of said associations or
companies. (Cobb's Digest, 542-3.)
The argument against the validity of the charter of the Franklin
Bridge Company, created under these statutes, is this:
( 1) That in England corporations are created and exist by prescription, by royal charter and by act of parliament. With us, they are
created by authority of the legislature and not otherwise. That to establish a corporation is to enact a law, and that no power but the
legislative body can do this.
.
(2) That legislative power is vested under our constitution, in the
general assembly, to consist of a senate and house of representatives,
to be elected at stated periods by the citizens of the respective counties.
(3) And that the general a~sembly is bound to exercise the power
of making laws, thus conferred upon them, by the people, in the
primordial compact, in the mode therein prescribed, and in none
other, and that a law made· in any other mode is unconstitutional and
void. That the legislature is but the agent of their constituents, and
that they can not transfer authority delegated to them to any other
body, corporate or otherwise-not even to the judiciary, a co-ordinate
department of the government, unless expressly empowered by the
constitution to do so. That to do this would be to violate one of the
fundamental maxims of jurisprudence, as well as of political science,
namely: delegata potestas, non potest delegari. That to do this
would not only be to disregard the constitutional inhibition, which is
binding upon the representative, but by shifting responsibility, introduce innovations upon our system, which would result in the overthr~w and ultimate destruction of our political f?bric.
The constitutional inquiry thus presented is an exceedingly grave
one. It reaches far beyond the case made in the bill of exceptions,
and extends to the whole range of topics which fall under legislative
cognizance. In the view we take, however, of the statutes before us,
no such proposition as that which has been discussed is presented for
our adjudication. And we rejoice that it is so, not only on account
of the delicacy of the task in pronouncing an act of the legislature unconstitutional and void, one which is never justifiable, unless the case
is clear and free from doubt; and even then one might almost be forgiven for shrinking from the performance of the duty, which would be
productive of such incalculable mischief and. confusion. Bridges have
been built at a heavy expense, manufacturing and innumerable other
associations have been formed in Georgia, and are in full operation,
under charters incorporated under this law. And in view of the consequences any court might• hesitate, unless the repugnance between
the statute and the constitution was so palpable as to admit of no
doubt, and produce a settled conviction of their incompatibility with
each other.
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(4) It was formerly asserted that in England the act of incorpora-

tion must be the immediate act of the king himself, and that he could

( 4) It was formedy asserted that in England the act of incorporation mu st be the immediate act of the king himself, and that he could
not grant a license to another to create a corporation. ( 10 R~p.
27.) But Mes&rs. Angell & Ames, in their Treaties on Corporations,
state th at the law has since been settled to the contrary, and that the
king may not only grant a license to a subject to erect a particular
corporation, but give a general power, by charter, to erect corporations indefinitely, on the principle that 9ui faci't per ali"um, facit per
se; that the persons to whom the power is delegated, of establishing
corporations, are only an instrument in the hands of the government.
(I Kyd 50, I Black. Comm. Ang. & Am. 63.)
Before the revolution, charters of incorporations were granted by
the proprietaries of P ennsylvania, under a derivative authority fro m
the crown, and those chatters have since been recognized as valid.
(3 ·W ilson's Lectures 409.) A similar power has been delegated by
the legislature of Pennsylvania with regard to churches. (7 S. &
R. 517.) The acts of the instrument jn these cases become the acts
of the mover under the familiar maxim above mentioned. (See, also,
1 Mo. Rep. 5.)
(5) Our opinion is, that no legislative power is delegated to the
courts by the acts under consideration. There is simply a ministeri:il
act to be performed-no discretion is given to the courts. The duty
of passing the rule or order, directing the petition of the corporators
to be entered of record on the minutes of the court, setting forth to
the public the object of the association, and the privilege they de ire
to exercise, together with the name and style by which they are to be
called and known, is made obHgatory upon the courts; and sbquld
they refuse to discharge it, a mandamus would lie to coerce them. It
is true, the legislature has seen fit to use the courts for the purpose of
giving legal form to these companies. But it might have been done
in any other way. .Under the free banking law of 1838, instead of
petitioning the court, and having the order passed and entered upon
its minutes, the certificate, specifying the name of the association, its
place of doing business, the amount of its capital stock, the names
and residence of the shareholders, and the time for which the company was organized, is required merely to be proven, and acknowledged, and recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court,
where any office of the association is established, and a copy filed
with the comptroller general. (Cobb's Digest, w7-8.)
And so under the act of I 84 7, authorizing the citizens of this
state, and such others as they may associate with them, to prosecute
the business of manufacturing with corporate powers and priYileges.
The persons who propose to embark in that branch of business are
required to draw up a declaration, specifying the objects of their association , and the particular branch of business they intend carrying on,
together with the name by which they will be known as a corporation, and the amount of capital to be employed by them; which
declaration is required to be first recorded in the clerk' s office of the
superior comt of the county where such corporation is located and

not grant a license to another to create a corporation. (10 Rtp.

27.) But Messrs. Angell & Ames, in their Treaties on Corporations,

state that the law has since been settled to the contrary, and that the

king may not only grant a license to a subject to erect a particular

corporation, but give a general power, by charter, to erect corpora-

tions indefinitely, on the principle that qui facit per a/ium, facit per

se; that the persons to whom the power is delegated, of establishing

corporations, are only an instrument in the hands of the government.

(1 Kyd 50, 1 Black. Comm. Ang. & Am. 63.)

Before the revolution, charters of incorporations were granted by

the proprietaries of Pennsylvania, under a derivative authority from

the crown, and those charters have since been recognized as valid.

(3 Wilson's Lectures 409.) A similar power has been delegated by

the legislature of Pennsylvania with regard to churches. (7 S. &

R. 517.) The acts of the instrument in these cases become the acts

of the mover under the familiar maxim above mentioned. (See, also,
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1 Mo. Rep. 5.)

(5) Our opinion is, that no legislative power is delegated to the

courts by the acts under consideration. There is simply a ministerial

act to be performed—no discretion is given to the courts. The duty

of passing the rule or order, directing the petition of the corporators

to be entered of record on the minutes of the court, setting forth to

the public the object of the association, and the privilege they desire

to exercise, together with the name and style by which they are to be

called and known, is made obligatory upon the courts; and should

they refuse to discharge it, a mandamus would lie to coerce them. It

is true, the legislature has seen fit to use the courts for the purpose of

giving legal form to these companies. But it might have been done

in any other way. Under the free banking law of 1838, instead of

petitioning the court, and having the order passed and entered upon

its minutes, the certificate, specifying the name of the association, its

place of doing business, the amount of its capital stock, the names

and residence of the shareholders, and the time for which the com-

pany was organized, is required merely to be proven, and acknowl-

edged, and recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court,

where any office of the association is established, and a copy filed

with the comptroller general. (Cobb's Digest, 107—8.)

And so under the act of 1847, authorizing the citizens of this

state, and such others as they may associate with them, to prosecute

the business of manufacturing with corporate powers and privileges.

The persons who propose to embark in that branch of business are

required to draw up a declaration, specifying the objects of their asso-

ciation, and the particular branch of business they intend carrying on,

together with the name by which they will be known as a corpora-

tion, and the amount of capital to be employed by them; which

declaration is required to be first recorded in the clerk's office of the

superior court of the county where such corporation is located and
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published once a week for two months in the two nearest gazettes,

-

BY LEGISLATIVE ACT.

which being done, it is declared that said association shall become a

body corporate and politic, and known as such, without being spe-

cially pleaded in all courts of law and equity in this state, to be gov-

erned by the provisions, and be subject to the liabilities therein speci-

fied. (Cobb's Digest, 439, 440.)

In these two instances, and in others which might be cited, the leg-

islature have dispensed with the action of the courts, or of any other

agency, to carry out their enactments, with regard to these various

associations, which have become the usual and favorite mode of con-

ducting the industrial pursuits of the civilized world in modern times.

All these statutes were complete as laws when they came from the

hands of the legislature; and did not depend for their force and effi-

cacy upon the action or will of any other power. It is true that they

could only take effect upon the happening of some event, such as the

filing the petition or declaration, and giving publicity to the purpose

of the association, and the mode prescribed bv the act. But if this

were a good reason for regarding these statutes as invalid, then how
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few corporations could abide the test. For it requires the acceptance

of the charter to create a corporate body, for the government can not

compel persons to become an incorporated body without their consent.

And this consent, either express or implied, is generally subsequent,

in point of time, to the creation of the charter. And yet, no charter

that we are aware of has been adjudged invalid, because the law cre-

ating it and previously defining its powers, rights, capacities and lia-

bilities, did not take effect until the acceptance of the corporate body,

or at least a majority of them, was signified.

The result, therefore, of our deliberation upon this case is, that the

acts of 1843 and '^45, vesting in all associations, except for banking

and insurance, the power of self-incorporation, do not impugn the con-

stitution; and that the charter of the Franklin Bridge Company and

all others, created under them, and in conformity to their provisions,

are legal and valid. With the policy of these statutes, we have noth-

ing to do. The province of this, and all other courts, is jus dicere,

not jus dare.

Judgment reversed.

Sec. 56. Same. (3) Plenary.

PENOBSCOT BOOM CORPORATION v. WILLIAM P. LAMSON Et Al.1

1839. IN THE Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 16 Maine (4

Shepley) 224-233, 33 Am. Dec. 656.

Exceptions from the court of common pleas, Perham, J., presiding.

Assumpsit for boomage of logs, asserted to belong to the defend-

published once a week for two months in the two nearest gazettes,
which being done, it is. declared that said association shall become a
body corporate and politic, and known as such, without being specially pleaded in all courts of law and equity in this state, to be governed by the provisions, and be subject to the liabilities therein specified. (Cobb's Digest, 439, 440.)
In these two instances, and in others which might be cited, the legislature have dispensed with the action of the courts, or of any other
agency, to carry out their enactments, with regard to these various
associations, which have become the usual and favorite mode of conducting the industrial pursuits of the civilized ·world in modem time~.
All these statutes were complete as laws when they came from th('
hands of the legislature; and did not depend for their force and efficacy upon the action or will of any other power. It is true that they
could only take effect upon the happening of some event, such as the
filing the petition or declaration, and giYing publicity to the purpose
of the association, and the mode prescribed by the act. But if this
were a good reason for regarding these statutes as invalid, then how
few corporations could abide the test. For it requires the acceptance
of the charter to create a corporate body, for the government can not
compel persons to become an incorporated body without their consent.
And this consent, either express or implied, is generally subsequent,
in point of time, to the creation of the charter. And yet, no charter
that we are aware of has been adjudged invalid, because the law creating it and previously defining its powers, rights, capacities and liabilities, did not take effect until the acceptance of the corporate body,
or at least a majority of them, was signified.
The result, therefore, of our deliberation upon this case is, that the·
acts of I843 and 1845, vesting in all associations, except for banking
and insurance, the power of self-incorporation, do not impugn the constitution; and that the charter of the Franklin Bridge Company and
all others, created under them, and in conformity to their provisions,
are legal and valid. With the policy of these statutes, we have nothing to do. The province of this, and all other courts, is jus d£cere,
notjus dare.
Judgment reversed.

ants. The writ was dated December 21, 1835, the action was

entered at January term, 1836, and continued to October term follow-

'Arguments omitted. Part of opinion omitted.

Sec. 56. Same.

( 3) Plenary .

PENOBSCOT BOOM CORPORATION v. WILLIAM P. LAMSON ET AL. 1

1839.

IN THE SUPREME JumcIAL CouRT OF MAINE.
Shepley) 224-233, 33 Am. Dec. 656.

16 Maine (4

Exceptions from the court of common pleas, PERHAM, J., presiding.
Assumpsit for boomage of logs, asserted to belong to the defendants. The writ was dated December 21 , I835, the action was
entered at January term, 1836, and continued to October term follow•Arguments omitted. Part of opinion omitted.
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ing, when the defendants called for the right of the attorneys acting

for the corporation to appear and act therefor. The judge ruled that

PENOBSCOT BOOM CORPORATION V. LAMSON.
it was unnecessary. The action came on for trial at January term,

1837, when the general issue was pleaded, and a brief statement was

ing, when the defendants called for the right of the attorneys acting
for the corporation to appear and act therefor. The judge ruled that
it was unnecessary. The action came on for trial at January term,
1837, when the general issue was pleaded, and a brief statement was
filed, denying the existence of the corporation then or at any time;
alleging that the charter by and under which the plaintiffs claimed
a corporate existence had been forfeited by non-user; that there had
been no organization under the same; that it was dissolved by a total
loss of all its members; and that it had never complied with the provisions of the act of its incorporation by a total neglect to choose any
officers under said act. To support the action, the act incorporating
the Penobscot Boom Corporation, February 13, 1832, Spec. Laws, c.
236; a bill of sale from Rufus Dwinal, named in the act, to Samuel
Veazie, dated February 17, 1832, conveying one-half of the charter,
booms, and property; and another bill of sale from Dwinal to Veazie,
dated April 1, 1833, conveying the other half; were introduced.
Also, a book called and offered as the records of the corporation, but
not verified by the oath of any one; "to the sufficiency of which, to
prove the organization, as well as to the introduction of all the testimony offered by plaintiff, the defendants' counsel objected. The
objection was overruled, and a part of the book was read to the jury.
The defendants' counsel having called for the records.'' The charter and the bills of sale were copied into this book, and the following
vote appeared therein: "Bangor, April 2, 1833, I, Samuel Veazie,
being the only owner of the Penobscot Boom Corporation, have this
day had a meeting of said corpqration at my house, and appointed
myself to the office of president of said corporation, and clerk of said
meeting, with full powers to make all records and to transact all business that may be necessary for carrying said corporation into full effect
and to receive and collect all tolls that may be due from time to time,
and pay all bills against the said corporation, and to continue until
some person is chosen or appointed in my stead. A true record. Attest, Samuel Veazie, clerk." The plaintiff then proved that the logs
were surveyed in the boom by Davis & Young scalers, appointed by
the surveyor-general of the county of Pen<1bscot, under the statute of
March 2, 1833, Spec. Laws, c. 373. Young also testified that he took
charge of the boom in the spring of 1833, and had retained it since;
that a large amount had been expended on the boom by Veazie, and
that the witness is the· general agent of Veazie at Oldtown, and drew
on him for money and paid him money received for boomage, and
knew nothing of the corporation of his own knowledge. It ·was
proved that the boom was erected in the spring of 1832, under the
direction of Dwinal, and has been in operation ever since. The defendants requested the court to order a non-suit, but the judge refused.
The defendaqts then proved that the boom, when full, prevented the
free passage of rafts and logs. The counsel for the defendants requested the judge to instnict the jury that there was no such corporation as alleged; that there was no vote or direction of the Penobscot
Boom Corporation, at any regular meeting of the corporation~ author-

filed, denying the existence of the corporation then or at anytime;

alleging that the charter by and under which the plaintiffs claimed

a corporate existence had been forfeited by non-user; that there had

been no organization under the same; that it was dissolved by a total

loss of all its members; and that it had never complied with the pro-

visions of the act of its incorporation by a total neglect to choose any

officers under said act. To support the action, the act incorporating

the Penobscot Boom Corporation, February 13, 1832, Spec. Laws, c.

236; a bill of sale from Rufus Dwinal, named in the act, to Samuel

Veazie, dated February 17, 1S32, conveying one-half of the charter,

booms, and property; and another bill of sale from Dwinal to Veazie,

dated April 1, 1833, conveying the other half; were introduced.

Also, a book called and offered as the records of the corporation, but

not verified by the oath of any one; "to the sufficiency of which, to

prove the organization, as well as to the introduction of all the testi-

mony offered by plaintiff, the defendants' counsel objected. The
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objection was overruled, and a part of the book was read to the jury.

The defendants' counsel having called for the records." The char-

ter and the bills of sale were copied into this book, and the following

vote appeared therein: "Bangor, April 2, 1833, I, Samuel Veazie,

being the only owner of the Penobscot Boom Corporation, have this

day had a meeting of said corporation at my house, and appointed

myself to the office of president of said corporation, and clerk of said

meeting, with full powers to make all records and to transact all busi-

ness that may be necessary for carrying said corporation into full effect

and to receive and collect all tolls that may be due from time to time,

and pay all bills against the said corporation, and to continue until

some person is chosen or appointed in my stead. A true record. At-

test, Samuel Veazie, clerk." The plaintiff then proved that the logs

were surveyed in the boom by Davis & Young scalers, appointed by

the surveyor-general of the county of Penobscot, under the statute of

March 2, 1833, Spec. Laws, c. 373. Young also testified that he took

charge of the boom in the spring of 1833, and had retained it since;

that a large amount had been expended on the boom by Veazie, and

that the witness is the general agent of Veazie at Oldtown, and drew

on him for money and paid him money received for boomage, and

knew nothing of the corporation of his own knowledge. It was

proved that the boom was erected in the spring of 1832, under the

direction of Dwinal, and has been in operation ever since. The de-

fendants requested the court to order a non-suit, but the judge refused.

The defendants then proved that the boom, when full, prevented the

free passage of rafts and logs. The counsel for the defendants re-

quested the judge to instruct the jury that there was no such corpora-

tion as alleged; that there was no vote or direction of the Penobscot

Boom Corporation, at any regular meeting of the corporation, author-
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izing the erection of the boom, and that the action was not maintain-
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EXISTENCE BY LEGISLATIVE ACT.

able. The judge did not thus instruct them, but directed them to

inquire, if the evidence submitted to them proved the existence of such

a corporation as is named in the writ; and if not, they would return

a verdict for the defendants. But if such corporation had been

proved, it not being denied that the sum claimed in this action was

due, if the contents of the logs had been legally ascertained, they

would find for the plaintiff. They were also directed to inquire if

the boom had been erected and continued by authority of the Penob-

scot Boom Corporation. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff,

and being inquired of at the request of the counsel for the defendants,

stated that they found the boom to have been erected and continued

by the authority of the Penobscot Boom Corporation. The defend-

ants excepted.

Shepley, J. * * * The existence of such a corporate body is

denied, and it is said that it does not come within the legal description of

a corporation, either sole or aggregate, as defined by any code of laws.

Corporations originating according to the rules of the common law
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must be governed by it in their mode of organization, in the manner

of exercising their powers, and in the use of the capacities conferred.

And when one claims its origin from such a course, its rules must be

regarded in deciding upon its legal existence. The legislature may,

however, create a corporation, not only -without conforming to such

rules, but in disregard of them, and when a corporation is thus

created, its existence, powers, and capacities, the mode of exer-

cising them, must depend upon the law of its creation. It was-the

pleasure of the legislature in this case to create a corporate body,

without requiring a conformity to the usual mode of organization

known to the law. The grant is to one person who was at liberty.to

associate others, or to have a succession without it. No provision is

made for a division of the property allowed to be held into shares, or

for the call of any meeting, or the choice of a clerk, or any other offi-

cer, or the keeping of any records, or any mode of organization. And

yet many important powers and privileges are granted with an evi-

dent design to permit their exercise. The grant being to one person

and without any such provisions, the inference necessarily is that it

was the intention of the legislature to permit that one person or his

successor to exercise all the corporate powers, a'nd to make his acts

when acting upon the subject-matter of the corporation and within its

sphere of action and grant of power the acts of the corporation.

There does not appear to be any other mode of carrying into effect

the intention of the legislature. And if there are doubts whether the

person controlling the corporation has acted in behalf of the corpora-

tion, they are necessarily to be solved by proof. And if any evils

have arisen or shall arise from any proceedings under the act, the leg-

islature may provide a remedy. The answer to the arguments against

its existence arising from a want of organization and choice of officers

is, that the act requires them. In the case of Day v. Stetson, 8

Greenl. 365, where a charter was granted to one, and provision was

izing the erection of the boom, and that the action was not maintainable. The judge did not thus instruct them, but directed them to
inquire, if the evidence submitted to them proved the existence of such
a corporation as is named in the writ; and if not, they would return
a verdict for the defendants. But if such corporation had been
proved, it not being denied that the sum claimed in this action was
due, if the contents of the logs had been legally ascertained, they
would find for the plaintiff. They were also directed to inquire if
the boom had been erected and continued by authority of the Penobscot Boom Corporation. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff,
and being inquired of at the request of the counsel for the defendants,
stated that they found the boom to have been erected and continued
by the authority of the Penobscot Boom Corporation. The defendants excepted.
SHEPLEY, J.
• • • The existence of such a corporate body is
denied, and it is said that it does not come within the legal description of
a corporation, either sole or aggregate, as defined by any code of laws.
Corporations originating according to the rules of the common law
must be governed by it in their mode of organization, in the manner
of. exercising their powers, and in the use of the capacities conferred.
And when one claims its origin from such a course, its rules must be
regarded in deciding upon its legal existence. The legislature may,
/,071,•ever, create a corporation, not only without conforming to such
rules, but in disregard of them, and when a corporation is thus
created, its ex·i'stence, powers, and capadti'es, the mode of exercising them, must depend upon the law of its creation. It was Jhe
pleasure of the legislature in tht"s case to create a corporate body,
wt"thout requfrt"ng a conformt'ty to the usual mode of organt'zation
known to the law. The grant is to one person who was at liberty.to
associate others, or to have a succession without it. No provision is
made for a division of the property allowed to be held into shares, or
for the call of any meeting, or the choice of a clerk, or any other officer, or the keeping of any records, or any mode of organization. And
yet many important powers and privileges are granted with an evident design to permit their exercise. The grant being to one person
and without any such provisions, the inference necessarily is that it
was the intention of the legislature to permit that one person or his
successor to exercise all the corporate powers, a·nd to make his acts
when acting upon the subject-matter of the corporation and within its
sphere of action and grant of power the acts of the corporation.
There does not appear to be any other mode of carrying into effect
the intention of the legislature. And if there are doubts whether the
person controlling the corporation has acted in behalf of the corporation, they are necessarily to be solved by proof. And if any evils
have arisen or shall arise from any proceedings under the act, the legislature may provide a remedy. The answer to the arguments against
its existence arising from a want of organization and choice of officers
is, that the act requires them. In the case of Day v. Stetson, 8
Greenl. 365, where a charter was granted to one, and provision was
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made for taking associates and calling a meeting of them, it was de-

286

cided that it was a condition subsequent, and that the neglect would

PENOBSCOT

BOO~f

CORPORATION V. LAMSON.

not prevent the act taking effect, or the exercise of the powers granted

by it. The case finds that, "it was proved that the boom was erected

made for taking associate and calling a meeting of them, it was decided that it was a condition subsequent, and that the neglect would
not prevent the act taking effect, or the exercise of the powers granted
by it. The case finds that, " it was pro\'ed that the boom was erected
under the direction of R . .Dwinal, and went into operation in the
spring of 1832, and continued so ever since," ancl this sufficiently
proves that the acceptance of the act of incorporation, for it could not
be lawfully done but by virtue of the act, and the presumption of the
law is that one acts lawfully when he may do so by a special grant of
authority for that purpose. There is not the same finding in all the
other cases, but there is sufficient testimony to prove that the boom
was erected, and that it has been maintained by the one professing to
own the franchi se and to act under it. And the acceptance may be
presumed from the exercise of the corporate powers. Bank of the
United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 71; Trott v. Warren, 2
Fair£. 227. And the act of incorporation, with proof of the exercise
of the corporate pO\·v ers since 1832, was sufficient evidence of the existence of the corporation. Utica Ins. Co. v. Caldwell, 3 Wend. 296;
Day v. Stetson, 8 Green!. 365. There being no provision for the
call of any meeting, or for the choice of any officer, when a sale .of
part of the franchise to Veazie required some evidence of the assent of two minds to perform a corporate act, there might be more
difficulty in proving the acts of the corporation, but it is not perceived
that the mode of proof would be changed.
It is contended, also, that if the corporation has existed, it has been
dissolved. In what manner corporations may be dissolved, and what
will not operate as a dissolution, has been determined in many decided
cases. A corporation will not be dissolved by a sale of the franchi e,
or ·of all the corporate property and a settlement of all its concern
and a division of the surplus, or by a cessation of all corporate acts,
or by any neglect of corporate duty, or any abuse of corporate powers, or by doing acts which cause a forfeiture of the chatter, without a
judgment declaring such forfeiture. Such dissoh1tion can take place
only: 1. By an act of the legislature, where, as in this state, power is
reserved for that purpose. 2. By a surrender, which is accepted, of
the charter. 3. by a loss of all its members, or of an integral part, so
that the exercise of the corporate functions can not be restored. 4. By
forfeiture, which must be declared by judgment of court. .Slee v.
Bloom, 5 Johns. Ch. Rep. 367; Tnistees of Vernon Society v. Hills ,
6 Cowen 23; Bank of Niagara v. Johnson, 8 Wend. 645; Wilde'"
Jenkins, 4 Paige 481; Canal Company v. Railroad Company, 4 Gill.
& Johns. 121; Russell v. McLellan, 14 Pick. 63; Revere v. Boston
Copper Company, 15 Pick. 351; Porter v. Kendall, 6 B. & C. 703;
2 Kent 312. • • •
Exceptions overruled.

under the direction of R. Lhvinal. and went into operation in the

spring of 1832, and continued so ever since," and this sufficiently

proves that the acceptance of the act of incorporation, for it could not

be lawfully done but by virtue of the act, and the presumption of the

law is that one acts lawfully when he may do so by a special grant of

authority for that purpose. There is not the same finding in all the

other cases, but there is sufficient testimony to prove that the boom

was erected, and that it has been maintained by the one professing to

own the franchise and to act under it. And the acceptance may be

presumed from the exercise of the corporate powers. Bank of the

United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 71; Trott v. Warren, 2

Fairf. 227. And the act of incorporation, with proof of the exercise

of the corporate powers since 1832, was sufficient evidence of the exist-

ence of the corporation. Utica Ins. Co. v. Caldwell, 3 Wend. 296;

Day v. Stetson, 8 Greenl. 365. There being no provision for the

call of any meeting, or for the choice of any officer, when a sale of
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part of the franchise to Veazie required some evidence of the as-

sent of two minds to perform a corporate act, there might be more

difficulty in proving the acts of the corporation, but it is not perceived

that the mode of proof would be changed.

It is contended, also, that if the corporation has existed, it has been

dissolved. In what manner corporations may be dissolved, and what

will not operate as a dissolution, has been determined in many decided

cases. A corporation will not be dissolved by a sale of the franchise,

or>of all the corporate property and a settlement of all its concerns

and a division of the surplus, or by a cessation of all corporate acts,

or by any neglect of corporate duty, or any abuse of corporate pow-

ers, or by doing acts which cause a forfeiture of the charter, without a

judgment declaring such forfeiture. Such dissolution can take place

only: 1. By an act of the legislature, where, as in this state, power is

reserved for that purpose. 2. By a surrender, which is accepted, of

the charter. 3. by a loss of all its members, or of an integral part, so

that the exercise of the corporate functions can not be restored. 4. By

forfeiture, which must be declared by judgment of court. Slee v.

Bloom, 5 Johns. Ch. Rep. 367; Trustees of Vernon Society v. Hills,

6 Cowen 23; Bank of Niagara v. Johnson, 8 Wend. 645; Wilde v.

Jenkins, 4 Paige 481; Canal Company v. Railroad Company, 4 Gill.

& Johns. 121; Russell v. McLellan, 14 Pick. 63; Revere v. Boston

Copper Company, 15 Pick. 351; Porter v. Kendall, 6 B. & C. 703;

2 Kent 312. * * *

Exceptions overruled.

Note. 1 Hamilton's Works iii; 1819, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.

(U. S.) 316; Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; 1840, Falconer v. Camp-

bell, 2 McLean 195, infra, p. 287; 1844, Green v. Graves, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 351,

infra, p. 292; 1844, People v. Marshall, 6 111. 672; 1851, Myers v. Manhattan

Note. 1 Hamilton's Works iii; 1819, McCulloch v. Maryland·, 4 Wheat.
(U.S.) 316; Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 9 Wheat. 738; 1840, Fnlconer v. Campbell, 2 McLean 195, infra, p. 287; 1844, Green v. Graves, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 351,
t1ifra, p. 292; 1844, People v. Marshall, 6 Ill. 672; 1851, Myers v. Manhattan
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Bank, 20 Ohio 283: 1873, Robinson v. Jones, 14 Fla. 256; 1874, Stowe v.

Flagg, 72 111. 397; 1874. Hadley v. Freedman's Sav. & T. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch. 122,

126; 1874, United States v. Ins. Co., 22 Wall. (U. 8.) 99; 1875, Mayor of

Mobile v. Moog, 53 Ala. 561; 1876, Cotton v. Mississippi Boom Co., 22 Minn.

372; 1876, Gordon v. Association, etc., 12 Bush (Ky.) 110; 1876, Williams
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(i) Special or general law.

(a) Policy of general laws.

FALCONER AND HIGGINS v. HENRY M. CAMPBELL Et Al.»

1840. In the Circuit Court of the United States, 7TH Circuit.

2 McLean's Reports (U. S. Circuit Ct.) 195-213.

Action against the directors of the Detroit bank to recover the

See. 57. Same. As

to form of exercising such authority:

( 1) Special or general law.
(a) Policy of general laws.

amount of bill of exchange, drawn by the bank in favor or the plaint-

iffs on a New York bank, and protested for non-payment. The

FALCONER AND HIGGINS v. HENRY M. CAMPBELL Er AL.1

declaration set forth the organization of the bank under the general

banking law of 1838. The defendants filed a general demurrer rais-

1840.

ing the questions (among others) stated below.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 7TH CIRCUIT.
2 McLean's Reports (U.S. Circuit Ct.) 195-213.
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Opinion by McLean, J. * * *

First: Are the associations authorized by the general law corpora-

tions?

Second: Had the legislature power to pass such a law?

The act in question is entitled "an act to organize and regulate

banking associations." The first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth

and seventh sections provide in what mode the associations shall be

formed. Application is to be made, in writing, to the treasurer and

clerk of the county, where the business is to be transacted, stating the

amount of capital proposed. Of this application public notice is re-

quired to be given. Bond, in the sum of thirty thousand dollars, to

be approved of by the treasurer and clerk, must be entered into. The

capital stock is limited, and the subscriptions are to be received and

apportioned, etc. Ten per cent, on shares subscribed are required to

be paid.

And when the capital stock of the proposed association shall be

subscribed and ten per cent, paid, on notice being given to, the stock-

holders, they are authorized to meet and elect nine directors, a major-

ity of whom are authorized to manage the affairs of the association.

They are required to elect one of their number president; and in the

ninth section it is provided, that "all such persons as shall become stock-

holders of any such association shall, on compliance with the provisions

of the act, constitute a body corporate and politic in fact and in name, and

by such name as they shall designate and assume to themselves, etc.,

and by such name they and their successors shall and may have con-

tinued succession, and shall, in their corporate capacity, be capable

1 Arguments and part of opinion omitted.

Action against the directors of the Detroit bank to recover the
amount of bill of exchange, drawn by the bank in favor or the plaintiffs on a New York bank, and protested for non-payment. The
declaration set forth the organization of the bank under the general
banking law of 1838. The defendants filed a general demurrer raising the questions (among others) stated below.
Opinion by McLEAN, J. • • •
First: Are the associations authorized by the general law corporations?
Second: Had the legislature power to pass such law?
The act in question is entitled "an act to organize and regulate
banking associations." The first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth
and seventh sections provide in what mode the associations shall be
formed. Application is to be made, in writing, to the treasurer and
clerk of the county, where the business is to be transacted, stating the
amount of capital proposed. Of this application public notice is required to be g-iven. Bond, in the sum of thirty thousand dollars, to
be approved of by the treasurer and clerk, must be entered into. The
capital stock is limited, and the subscriptions are to be received and
apportioned, etc. Ten per cent. on shares subscribed are required to
be paid.
And when the capital stock of the proposed association shall be
subscribed and ten per cent. paid, on notice being given t~ the stockholders, they are authorized to meet and elect nine directors, a majority of whom are authorized to manage the affairs of the association.
They are required to elect one of their number president; and in the
ninth section it is provided, that'' all such persons as shall become stockholders of any such association shall, on compliance with the provisions
of the act, constitute a body corporate and politic in fact and in name, and
by such name as they shall designate and assume to themselves, etc.,
and by such name they and their successors shall and may have continued succession, and shall, in their corporate capacity, be capable
1 Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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of suing and being sued, pleading and being impleaded, etc., in all

courts whatsoever; and that they and their successors may have a

of suing and being sued, pleading and being impleaded, etc., in all
courts whatsoever; and that they andl their successors may have a
common seal, and by such name as they shall designate, adopt and
assume as aforesaid, shall be in law capable of purchasing, holding
and conveying any estate, real or personal," etc. By the 15th section
the directors, for the time being, or a majority of them, have power
to make by-laws.
The ordinary powers of a corporation are-1. Perpetual succession. 2. To sue and to be sued, and to receive and grant by their
corporate name. 3. To purchase and hold lands and chattels. 4.
To have a common seal; and 5. To make by-laws.
Some of these powers are incidents to a corporation, but they are
all generally expressly given by a statute in this country, and these
powers are all given in the act under consideration. It expressly provides that the association authorized by the act, when formed, shall
"constitute a body corporate and politic in fact and in name."
The act not only gives in terms all the requisites to co;istitute a corporation, but the body, when formed, i:s technically designated by it
as such. Where then is the ground for argument or doubt on the
subject? Did not the legislature comprehend the force of the language they used? They have created an artificial being, giving to it
in well defined terms its just propor tions and powers , and have
called it by its appropriate and technical name. Could the legislature
in language more clear and forcible have created a· corporation? Not
a quasi corporation, not a joint stock company, or a limited partnership, but substantially and technically a corporation.
In illustration of this act of the legislature, it is unnecessary to refer
to the mode of creating corporations in England by grant from the
crown, or point out the distinction which may exist between a body
thus created and one created by a statutory grant, or between an
ancient and modern being of this sort. It is enough to know that
it is not essential to the character of a corporation, that its powers
should be equal to any similar association, either ancient or modem.
It is sufficient if in its corporate name it exercises the powers and
rights of a natural person, in the management of its concerns.
We can entertain no doubt that the associations authorized under
the above act were intended to be, and are, in fact, corporations.
Had the legislature power to pass this law? This is the great question in the tase, and it is fully and fairly presented by the ~emurrer.
The second section ·of the twelfth article of the constitution of
Michigan declares that "the legislature shall pass no act of incorporation, unless with the assent of at least two-thirds of each house." And
it is earnestly, ingeniously and ably contended that this is an inhibition
of the creation of corporations by a general law. That corporate
powers, under it, can only be conferred by express enactment in each
case. • • •
We are told that the people of Michigan were jealous of monopolies, and especially of bank monopolies, and that by the introduction
of the above section into their. constitution they intended to restrict the

common seal, and by such name as they shall designate, adopt and

assume as aforesaid, shall be in law capable of purchasing, holding

and conveying any estate, real or personal," etc. By the 15th section

the directors, for the time being, or a majority of them, have power

to make by-laws.

The ordinary powers of a corporation are—1. Perpetual succes-

sion. 2. To sue and to be sued, and to receive and grant by their

corporate name. 3. To purchase and hold lands and chattels. 4.

To have a common seal; and 5. To make by-laws.

Some of these powers are incidents to a corporation, but they are

all generally expressly given by a statute in this country, and these

powers are all given in the act under consideration. It expressly pro-

vides that the association authorized by the act, when formed, shall

"constitute a body corporate and politic in fact and in name."

The act not only gives in terms all the requisites to constitute a cor-

poration, but the body, when formed, is technically designated by it
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as such. Where then is the ground for argument or doubt on the

subject? Did not the legislature comprehend the force of the lan-

guage they used? They have created an artificial being, giving to it

in well defined terms its just proportions and powers, and have

called it by its appropriate and technical name. Could the legislature

in language more clear and forcible have created a corporation? Not

a quasi corporation, not a joint stock company, or a limited partner-

ship, but substantially and technically a corporation.

In illustration of this act of the legislature, it is unnecessary to refer

to the mode of creating corporations in England by grant from the

crown, or point out the distinction which may exist between a body

thus created and one created by a statutory grant, or between an

ancient and modern being of this sort. It is enough to know that

it is not essential to the character of a corporation, that its powers

should be equal to any similar association, either ancient or modem.

It is sufficient if in its corporate name it exercises the powers and

rights of a natural person, in the management of its concerns.

We can entertain no doubt that the associations authorized under

the above act were intended to be, and are, in fact, corporations.

Had the legislature power to pass this law? This is the great ques-

tion in the ease, and it is fully and fairly presented by the demurrer.

The second section of the twelfth article of the constitution of

Michigan declares that "the legislature shall pass no act of incorpora-

tion, unless with the assent of at least two-thirds of each house." And

it is earnestly, ingeniously and ably contended that this is an inhibition

of the creation of corporations by a general law. That corporate

powers, under it, can only be conferred by express enactment in each

case. * * *

We are told that the people of Michigan were jealous of monop-

olies, and especially of bank monopolies, and that by the introduction

of the above section into their constitution they intended to restrict the
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confers corporate powers can only be passed by a vote of two-thirds

of the members of each house. But must each corporation be created

by a .separate act? This is the ground taken in support of the de-

murrer. No act of incorporation shall be passed by the legislature,

unless with the assent of at least two-thirds of each house, are the

words of the section. The word act is used in the singular, but does

it necessarily import that not more than one corporation can be created

in the same act?

Suppose ten distinct applications were made to the legislature for

bank incorporations at the same session, and the legislature were dis-

posed to grant each application, must they pass ten acts of incorpora-

tion, or may not the ten corporations be granted in the same act?

Would not such a law be within the letter and spirit of the constitu-

tion? Of this there would seem to be little doubt.

As distinctive a character may be given to each corporation in such

an act as if it were established by a special law. In 1834 an act was

passed by the legislative council of the territory of Michigan, entitled
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''An act to establish branches of the Bank of Michigan, Farmers' and

Mechanics' Bank of Michigan, and Bank of the River Raisin." Such

acts are common, and it is believed never to have been supposed that

the legislative power might not be exercised in this mode. The re-

striction in the constitution does not prohibit it.

And if this may be done under the constitution, then the construc-

tion, that each corporation must be created by a special law, can not

be sustained. * * *

At the time the constitution of Michigan was adopted, in many of

the states and in this territory, it was the ordinary course of legislation

to create corporations by a general law. This was the case in Ohio,

and in many of the other states. And it can be of no importance

whether banking or other associations were thus incorporated. The

power was exercised. Does the constitution prohibit the exercise of

this power?

It has already been shown that an act which shall establish several

banking corporations is not repugnant to the constitution. And this

reduces the objections to the law under consideration to two points:

First. That a corporation being a grant must be made to a person

or persons in esse.

Second. The indefinite number of banking corporations which,

under the law, may be established.

The first objection on examination will be found to have but little

force.

The creation of a corporate existence can. never take effect until

the association be formed and the organization completed. Commis-

sioners are generally designated in the act, ivho are to superintend

the opening of the books and receive the Subscriptions of stock. And

when the amount shall be subscribed and .the necessary payments

19—Wil. Cases.

powers of the legislature in making such grants. That such was their
intention is clear from the language of the section. A law which
confers corporate powers can only be passed by a vote of two-thirds
of the members of each house. But must each corporation be created
by a .separate act? This is the ground taken in support of the demurrer. No act of incorporation shall be passed by the legislature,
unless with the assent of at least two-thirds of each house, are the
words of the section. The word act is used in the singular, but does
it necessarily import that not more than one corporation can be created
in the same act?
Suppose ten distinct applications \Vere made to the legislature for
bank incorporations at the same session ? and the legislature were disposed to grant each application, must they pass ten acts of incorporation, or may not the ten corporations be granted in the same act?
Would not such a law be within the letter and spirit of the constitution? Of this there would seem to be little doubt.
As distinctive a character may be given to each corporation in such
an act as if it were establi shed by a special law. In 1834 an act was
passed by the legislative council of the territory of Michigan, entitled
"An act to establish branches of the Bank of Michigan, Farmers' and
Mechanics' Bank of Michigan, and Bank of the River Raisin." Such
acts are common, and it is believed never to have been supposed that
the legislative power might not be exercised in this mode. The restriction in the constitution does not prohibit it.
And if this may be done under the constitution, then the construction, that each corporation must be created by a special law, can m>t
be sustained. • • •
At the time the constitution of Michigan was adopted, in many of
the states and in this territory, it was the on.linary course of legislation
to create corporations by a general law. This was the case in Ohio,
and in many of the other states. And it can be of no importance
whether banking or other associations were thus incorporated. The
power was exercised. Does the constitution prohibit the exercise of
this power?
It has already been shown that an act which shall establish several
banking corporations is not repugnant to the constitution. And this.
reduces the objections to the law under consideration to two points:
First. That a corporation being a grant must be made to a person
or persons in esse.
Second. The indefinite number of banking corporations which,
under the law, may be established.
The first objection on examination will be found to have but little·
force .
The creation of a corporate existence can.. never take effect unti'l
the assocz'ati'on be form ed and the organization completed. Commissioners are generally designated in the act, w h o are to superintend
the opening of the books and recei've th e subscripti'ons of stock. And
when th e amount shall be subscrz'bed and .the necessary payments
19-WIL. CASES.
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made, the stockholders elect directors who appoint a president and

cashier. The organization being completed, existence is given to

made, the stockholders elect directors who appoint a president and
cashi"er. The organization bei"ng completed, existence i"s g£ven to
the artificial being, and £ts agency commences. It is now £11 csse.
but befor e this it was not. Vitalt'ty is given to it by the voluntary
associat£on and organt'zation of its members. Had they r eJHained
passt've the law could have had no effect.
In this case then, the grant of the franchise is not made to a person
or persons t'n esse. The commissioners did not constitute the corporation, nor was the frnnchise in any form or degree vested in them.
This is the general mode in which corporations are created, and it
has stood the test of time, and of legal scrutiny. No valid objection
is perceived to it.
In regard to this objection the act under consideration rests upon
the same ground as other and more special acts on the same subject.
The franchise is n ot vested in either until the organization be completed, and this depends upon the voluntary association of individuals.
In a special act commissioners are named to open the books and re·
ceive s ubscriptions of stock; in the act under consideration the clerk
and treasurer of each county are required to perform this duty. They
are commissioners for this purpose; and, so far as the grant is concerned, if it be valid under one law it must be so under the other.
We come now to consider the objection, that an indefinite number of banking corporations are authorized by the general law, and
this, it is supposed, is not only repugnant to the policy, but the exprc -s provi sion of the constitution.
It can not be sa id that this law violates any express provision of the
constitution. The extent of the provision referred to is that no act of
incorporation sha ll be passed. except by at least a majority of two-thirds
of each branch of the leg islature.
Now, this does not limit the number of corporations which shall be
established, nor the number which may be created in one act. Tbe
act must be passed by a majority of two-third , and this is the only
express r estriction on the s ubj ect. If the range of legislative power
be restricted beyond thi;;, it must be done by construction .
There may be a wide distinction between the policy of a gener:il
a nd a special banking law, but this is not the qnestion for judicial
cognizance. Is there such a difference in principle, as to make the
one constitutional and the other unconstitutional? This is the inquiry
now to be made.
As it regards the power of the legi lature, it is unquestionable,
whether they establ ish one or fifty banking institutions. The same
power which· may establish one bank, under the constitution , may
establish fifty.
In the general law, as above ob erved, commi. sioners are appointed,
the county clerk and treasurer, to receive subscription. of the stock
the same as in a special act. And the mode of organization, under
both acts, is substantially the same.
The only difference seems to be that in the special act the number

the artificial being, and its agency commences. It is now in esse,

but before this it was not. Vitality is given to it by the voluntary

association and organization of its members. Had they remained

passive the law could have had no effect.

In this case then, the grant of the franchise is not made to a person

or persons in esse. The commissioners did not constitute the corpo-

ration, nor was the franchise in any form or degree vested in them.

This is the general mode in which corporations are created, and it

has stood the test of time, and of legal scrutiny. No valid objection

is perceived to it.

In regard to this objection the act under consideration rests upon

the same ground as other and more special acts on the same subject.

The franchise is not vested in either until the organization be com-

pleted, and this depends upon the voluntary association of indi-

viduals.

In a special act commissioners are named to open the books and re-
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ceive subscriptions of stock; in the act under consideration the clerk

and treasurer of each county are required to perform this duty. They

are commissioners for this purpose; and, so far as the grant is con-

cerned, if it be valid under one law it must be so under the other.

We come now to consider the objection, that an indefinite num-

ber of banking corporations are authorized by the general law, and

this, it is supposed, is not only repugnant to the policy, but the ex-

press provision of the constitution.

It can not be said that this law violates any express provision of the

constitution. The extent of the provision referred to is that no act of

incorporation shall be passed, except by at least a majority of two-thirds

of each branch of the legislature.

Now, this does not limit the number of corporations which shall be

established, nor the number which may be created in one act. The

act must be passed by a majority of two-thirds, and this is the only

express restriction on the subject. If the range of legislative power

be restricted beyond this, it must be done by construction.

There may be a wide distinction between the policy of a general

and a special banking law, but this is not the question for judicial

cognizance. Is there such a difference in principle, as to make the

one constitutional and the other unconstitutional? This is the inquiry

now to be made.

As it regards the power of the legislature, it is unquestionable,

whether they establish one or fifty banking institutions. The same

power which- may establish one bank, under the constitution, may

establish fifty.

In the general law, as above observed, commissioners are appointed,

the county clerk and treasurer, to receive subscriptions of the stock

the same as in a special act. And the mode of organization, under

both acts, is substantially the same.

The only difference seems to be that in the special act the number
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And here it is contended that the legislature have, in substance,

conferred the power to form corporations by voluntary associations,

without exercising that special scrutiny, in each case, as is required

by the constitution.

But is this a sound and practical view of the case?-

It may be admitted that it derives great force from the disastrous

results which have been realized under this law; but these have noth-

ing to do with the question of power under consideration. Suppose

the results had been as beneficial as they have been injurious, how

changed would have been the argument. But the question remains

unaffected bv the good or evil which resulted from the law.

The legislature, in the exercise of their discretion, seem to have

concluded that, by requiring securities on real estate, and subjecting

the directors to certain liabilities, it would be good policy to multiply

the banking institutions of the state. And in order to avoid the

charge of monopoly, -which had been so liberally applied to banking

incorporations by a general law, they held out to the community at
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large equal privileges in forming such associations. The act which

thus sanctions an indefinite number of banks, depending upon volun-

tary associations, is passed by the requisite majority of two-thirds of

both houses of the legislature.

Now, what is the practical operation of this law? It, in effect, de-

clares that the clerk and treasurer of each county in the state shall

be authorized to open books and receive subscriptions of stock, and

when the associations, thus formed, shall become organized, they shall

be in fact and in name bodies corporate and politic. The law acts as

directly upon associations thus formed as if it had been passed ex-

pressly to incorporate each association. It is special to each. And

the difference between a general and a special law of this character,

in this respect, seems to be that the one is passed o?i the special ap-

plication of a few individuals, whilst the other is enacted u?idcr the

influence of a general policy. But the question of power is the

same.

May not the legislature determine the number of banks that shall

be established? This will not be controverted. And if they may do

this, may they not, under the constitution, pass an act, by a majority

of two-thirds of each house, to establish voluntary associations with-

out limiting their number?

Suppose the general law had limited the number of banks to be

established under it to ten, could their power to pass the law have

been doubted? They throw around the institutions, thus to be organ-

ized, all the guards and checks which they deem necessary for the

public interest. The law acts as directly and distinctly upon each

association as if it had been the only one established under it. And,

in passing the law, the legislature exercise the same scrutiny as if they

were about to incorporate only one bank. Such a law would be

within the letter and spirit of the constitution. And if the legislature

of corporations is limited, whilst under the general act they are indefinite.
And here it is contended that the legislature have, in substance,
conferred the power to form corporations by voluntary associations,
without exercising · that special scrutiny, in each case, as is required
by the constitution.
But is this a sound and practical view of the case?·
It may be admitted that it derives great force from the disastrous
results which have been realized under this law; but these have nothing to do with the question of power under consideration. Suppose
the results had been as beneficial as they have been injurious, how
· changed would have been the argument. But the question remains
unaffected by the good or evil which resulted from the law.
The legislature, in the exercise of their discretion, seem to have
concluded that, by requiring securities on r eal estate, and subjecting
the directors to certain liabi/t'ties, t't would be good policy to multiply
the bank£ng £nstitutions of the state. And in order to avoid the
charge of monopoly, whz'ch had been so lt'berally applied to banking
incorporations by a gC11e1·al law, they held out to the co1mmmity at
large equal privi'leges in forming such associations. The act which
thus sanctions an indefinite number of banks, depending upon voluntary associations, is passed by the requisite majority of two-thirds of
both houses of the legislature.
Now, what is the practical operation of this law? It, in effect, declares that the clerk and treasurer of each county in the state shall
be authorized to open books and receive subscriptions of stock, and
when the associations, thus formed, shall become organized, they shall
be in fact and in name bodies corporate and politic. The law acts as
directly upon assoct'ations thus formed as if it had been passed expressly to incorporate each association. It is special to each. And
the difference between a general and a spect'al law of this character,
in this respect, seems to be that the one is passed on the special applt'cation of a few individuals, whilst the other is enacted under the
influence of a general policy. But the question of power is th e
same.
May not the legi lature determine the number of lxtnks th at shall
be est:ibhshed? This will not he controverted. And if they may do
this, may they not, under the constitution, pass an act, by a majority
of two-thirds of each house , to establish voluntary associations without limiting their number?
Suppose the general law had limited the number of banks to be
established under it to ten, could their power to pass the law have
been doubted? They throw around the in stitutions, thus to be organized , all the guards and checks which they deem necessary for the
public interest. The law acts as d.irectly and distinctly upon each
as ociation as if it had been the only one established under it. And,
in pa sing the law, the legislature exercise the same scrutiny as if they
were about to incorporate only one b a nk. Such a law would be.
within the letter and spirit of the constitution. And if the legislature
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or may they not, in the exercise of their discretion, authorize the
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establishment of an indefinite number? Whether the number shall

may do this, may they not fix on a greater number of banks than ten,
or may they not, in the exercise of their discretion, authorize the
establishment of an indefinite number? Whether the number shall
be large or small is a question of policy and n9t of constitutional
power. If a large or indefinite number of corporations may be created
in the same act, under as salutary restrictions as the creation of one,
is the policy of the constitution disregarded?
It is contended that the general law throws off the restraints imposed by the constitution. But is this so? There is not a restriction
in the exercise of corporate powers, which can be imposed by a special
law, that may not be imposed under a general law. And the power
of the legislature acts as directly in the one case as in the other. In
the general law, then, there is no disregard of the restraints of the
constitution. Having the power to establish more than one corporation in the same act, the legislature may establish many, or an indefinite numoer.
The number, whether indefinite or limited, does not render the law
repugnant to the constitution. If it has been passed by the constitutional majority, it is within the restriction.
By the thirty-sixth section of this law the legislature reserve ''the
power to alter or amend the act, and to dissolve any association to be
incorporated under its provisions, by a vote of two-thirds of each
house."
Here is a power not usually reserved in granting franchises. And
it would seem that, so far as the policy of the law may be considered,
this reservation of power gives to the legislature as salutary a control
over these grants, for the public good, as would have been exercised
in acting on special applications for charters. And the presumption
is, that if the general law had not passed, the number of banks, under
special laws, would have been as great, and the consequences not less
disastrous.
The evil is not to be found in the constitution, or in the construction of the constitution, but in the elements of which the government
is composed. The true remedy is found in the sober reflection, experience and intelligence of the community. • • •
D emurrers withdrawn, and leave to plead, etc.

be large or small is a question of policy and not of constitutional

power. If a large or indefinite number of corporations may be created

in the same act, under as salutary restrictions as the creation of one,

is the policy of the constitution disregarded?

It is contended that the general law throws off the restraints im-

posed by the constitution. But is this so? There is not a restriction

in the exercise of corporate powers, which can be imposed by a special

law, that may not be imposed under a general law. And the power

of the legislature acts as directly in the one case as in the other. In

the general law, then, there is no disregard of the restraints of the

constitution. Having the power to establish more than one corpora-

tion in the same act, the legislature may establish many, or an in-

definite numDer.

The number, whether indefinite or limited, does not render the law

repugnant to the constitution. If it has been passed by the constitu-

tional majority, it is within the restriction.
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By the thirty-sixth section of this law the legislature reserve "the

power to alter or amend the act, and to dissolve any association to be

incorporated under its provisions, by a vote of two-thirds of each

house."

Here is a power not usually reserved in granting franchises. And

it would seem that, so far as the policy of the law may be considered,

this reservation of power gives to the legislature as salutary a control

over these grants, for the public good, as would have been exercised

in acting on special applications for charters. And the presumption

is, that if the general law had not passed, the number of banks, under

special laws, would have been as great, and the consequences not less

disastrous.

The evil is not to be found in the constitution, or in the construc-

tion of the constitution, but in the elements of which the government

is composed. The true remedy is found in the sober reflection, ex-

perience and intelligence of the community. » • •

Demurrers withdrawn, and leave to plead, etc.

Sec. 57a. Same.

WHIPPLE, J., IN GREEN v. GRAVES,

1844, 1 Douglass (Mich.) Reports, p. 351 (on pp. 363-367), says

upon substantially the same facts as in Falconer v. Campbell, supra,

p. 287, in regard to the policy of the general banking law of Michi-

gan:

Let me now advert to some of those "circumstances extrinsic of the

act," for the purpose of discovering the reason or "cause of the act."

Sec. 57a. Same.

The constitution of Michigan was formed in 1835. All who Qrtt

WHIPPLE, J., IN GREEN v. ORA VES,

1844, 1 Do~glass ( Mich.) Reports, p. 351 (on pp. 363-367), says
upon su?stantrnlly th e . ame .facts as in F a lconer v. Campbell , supra,
p. 287, m regard to the policy of the general banking law of Michigan:
.
L et me now advert to some of those "circumstances extrinsic of the
act," for the purpose of di scovering the reason or "cause of the act."
The constitution of Michigan was formed in 1835. All who srft
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that a strong public feeling existed against corporations, and especially

293

in respect to those possessing banking powers. It may be said to

have been the absorbing question of the day. The community were

alarmed at the vast increase of corporations. They feared the power

which such institutions were capable of wielding. The belief was

entertained that this power had actually been wielded for bad pur-

poses. It was argued that all corporations were, in a greater or less

degree, monopolies, and hence the prejudices of the community were

arrayed against them. It was alleged that, notwithstanding the gross

corruptions and fraudulent conduct of banking corporations, they

could not be reached, or be made amenable to justice and the violated

laws of the country. It was boldly charged that bribery and corrup-

tion had been resorted to for the purpose of procuring or perpetuating

charters. Regarded as contracts between the state and the company,

they could not ordinarily be affected by legislative interference. Im-

munity was offered to the persons and property of the corporators,

not invested in the corporate stock. Such were some of the circum-

stances under which the provision was incorporated into our constitu-
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tion, circumstances well calculated to challenge the attention of the

convention, and induce that body to devise new guards by which the

community might be protected against the evils growing out of legisla-

tion in respect to corporations. But the object they had in view could

not be achieved, unless some statutory check was imposed, by which

to prevent the multiplication of corporations. This was the crying

evil; for, in proportion as they increased, in just that proportion would

the evils to which I have adverted increase also.

Chancellor Kent, who was a member of the convention that re-

vised the constitution of New York in 1821, says that the convention

"endeavored to check the improvident increase of corporations, by re-

quiring the assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of

the legislature, to every bill for creating, continuing, altering or renew-

ing any body politic or corporate." 2 Kent's Com. 271. Mr. King, who

was also a member of the convention, and chairman of the committee

on the legislative department, in reporting the section embodied in the

constitution referred to by Chancellor Kent, remarked that "the com-

mittee looked upon the multiplication of corporations as an evil," and

that "they ought not to be increased, but should be diminished as far

as could be done consistently with the preservation of vested rights."

If such were "the extrinsic circumstances," and the reasons which in-

duced the convention that framed our constitution to impose the re-

striction, is it not indisputable that we can give full effect to the inten-

tion of the framers of the constitution, and of the people by whom it

was ratified, only by insisting upon such a construction as the words

themselves justify; and that to affirm the general banking law of this

state constitutional would be warranting an interpretation at war both

with the letter and spirit of that instrument? Indeed, Chief Justice

Nelson, in the case of Thomas v. Dakin, admits that the intention

of the framers of the constitution of New York would be best ful-

familiar with the history of that period will bear testimony to the fact
that a strong public feeling existed against corporations, and especially
in respect to those possessing banking powers. It ma)' be said to
haYe been the absorbing question of the clay. The community were
alarmed at the vast increase of corporations. They feared the power
which such institutions were capable of wielding. The belief was
entertained that this power had actually ·been wielded for bad purposes. It was argued that all corporations were, in a greater or less
degree, monopolies, and hence the prejudices of the community were
arrayed against them. It was alleged that, notwithstanding the gross
corruptions and fraudulent conduct of banking corporations, they
could not be reached, or be made amenable to justice and the violated
laws of the country. It was boldly charged that bribery and co1TUption had been resorted to for the purpose of procuring or perpetuating
charters. Regarded as contracts between the state and the company,
they could not ordinarily be affected by legislative interference. Immunity was offered to the persons and property of the corporators,
not invested in the corporate stock. Such were some of the circumstances under which the provision was incorporated into our constitution, circumstances well calculated to challenge the attention of the
convention, and induce that body to devise new guards by which the
community might be protected against the evils growing out of legislation in respect to corporations. But the object they had in view could
not be achieved, unless some statutory check was imposed, by which
to prevent the multiplication of corporations. This was the crying
evil; for, in proportion as they increased, in just that proportion would
the evils to which I have adverted increase also.
Chancellor Kent, who was a member of the convention that revised the constitution of New York in 182 r, says that the convention
"endeavored to check the improvident increase of corporations, by requiring the assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of
the legislature, to every bill for creating, continuing, altering or renewing any body politic or corporate." 2 Kent's Com. 27 I. Mr. King, who
was also a member of the convention, and chairman of the committee
on the legislative department, in reporting the section embod.jed in the
constitution referred to by Ch:'!ncellor Kent, remarked that ''the committee looked upon the multiplication of corporations as an evil," and
that "they ought not to be increased , but should be diminished as far
as could be done consistently with the preservation of vested rights."
If such were ''the extrinsic circumstances," and the reasons which induced the convention that framed our constitution to impose the restriction, is it not indisputable that we can give full effect to the intention of the framers of the constitution, and of the people by whom it
was ratified, only by insisting upon such a construction as the words
themselves justify; and that to affirm the general banking la'vv of this
state constitutional would be warranting an interpretation at war both with the letter and spirit of that instrument? Indeed, Chief Justice
Nelson, in the case of Thomas v. Dakin, admits that the t"ntention
of the framers of the constitution of New York would b e best ful-
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filled by the construction contended for by the defendant. If such be
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the case, and the letter of the clause in question not only warrants,

filled by the construction contended fo11· by the defendant. If such be
the case, and the letter of the clause i111 question not only warrants,
but deman~s a literal construction, I know of no power less potent
than that of the people competent Ito chang'e, alter, or modify
the clause. We are the mere creatures of the constitution, bound
by the highest motives to preserve it unimpaired, as it came from
the hands of those by vvholn it was ordained and established. We
do not sit here to make constih1tions and laws, but to expound
them. Who that is familiar with the opinions of the convention, or has consulted the journal of its proceedings upon the
subject of corporations, can hesitate as to the true construction of the
clause relating to this subject? Those opinions were hostile to the
multiplication of corporations. Nol only is this manifest from the
clause itself, which requires a vote of two-thirclsof each house topass
an act of incorporation, but the journal shows that the clause wns
unanimously adopted. That member would have been rega..rded as
insane who should have offered a separate proposition, or a proviso
to the clause as it now stands, granting to the legislature a p<>wer to
pass a general law, for the erection of moneyed corporations, at the
will of any twelve inhabitants of the state. • • •
And yet it has been gravely argued that, notwithstanding the inhibitfon in the constitution, that law can be sustained which violates its
letter and spirit; that law which gave bi 1th in tweh·e short months to
some forty banks, with an aggregate capital of nearly $4,000,000,
while there were in existence e ighteen chartered banks, with an aggregate capital of over $z,ooo,ooo; that law whose history was blackened with frauds and perjuries; under the operation of which individual and state credit staggered and at last fell; a law which brought
odium and reproach upon the state within a year after its enactment.
I have not been unmindful of the fact that the policy of the act was
attempted to be vindicated, upon the ground that, under the system
of creating private corporations, which prevailed before the adoption
of the constitution, but comparatively a small number of the commu"
nity could participate in the rights, privileges and profits of banking;
whereas under the general law, the many might have privileges which
before were enjoyed by the few; and hence the doctrine of equal rights
and equal privileges, so much cherished by the people, was respected.
In other words, that the law stmck a death blow at the monopoly
which previously existed. This reasoning is plausible; but is it
sound? All corporations are, to a .certain extent, monopolies. In
the language of Mr. Justice McLean, in the case of Beaty v. Knowles,
4 Pet. 168, the "exercise of the corporate franchise is restrictive of
individual rights." If so, it is difficult to sustain the construction
s;ontendcd for by the plaintiff, on the ground of policy; for in proportion as corporations are created, in the same proportion are the rights
of individuals restricted; so that, although more individuals would,
under the general banking law, become members of banking corporations, yet the consequences would be an increase of institutions admitted to be monopolies and restrictive of individual rights. The

but demands a literal construction, I know of no power less potent

than that of the people competent to change, alter, or modify

the clause. We are the mere creatures of the constitution, bound

by the highest motives to preserve it unimpaired, as it came from

the hands of those by whom it was ordained and established. We

do not sit here to make constitutions and laws, but to expound

them. Who that is familiar with the opinions of the conven-

tion, or has consulted the journal of its proceedings upon the

subject of corporations, can hesitate as to the true construction of the

clause relating to this subject? Those opinions were hostile to the

multiplication of corporations. Not only is this manifest from the

clause itself, which requires a vote of two-thirds of each house to pass

an act of incorporation, but the journal shows that the clause was

unanimously adopted. That member would have been regarded as

insane who should have offered a separate proposition, or a proviso

to the clause as it now stands, granting to the legislature a power to

pass a general law, for the erection of moneyed corporations, at the
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will of any twelve inhabitants of the state. * * *

And yet it has been gravely argued that, notwithstanding the inhi-

bition in the constitution, that law can be sustained which violates its

letter and spirit; that law which gave birth in twelve short months to

some forty banks, with an aggregate capital of nearly $4,000,000,

while there were in existence eighteen chartered banks, with an ag-

gregate capital of over $2,000,000; that law whose history wasblack-

ened with frauds and perjuries; under the operation of which indi-

vidual and state credit staggered and at last fell; a law which brought

odium and reproach upon the state within a year after its enactment.

I have not been unmindful of the fact that the policy of the act was

attempted to be vindicated, upon the ground that, under the system

of creating private corporations, which prevailed before the adoption

of the constitution, but comparatively a small number of the commu-1

nity could participate in the rights, privileges and profits of banking;

whereas under the general law, the many might have privileges which

before were enjoyed by the few; and hence the doctrine of equal rights

and equal privileges, so much cherished by the people, was respected.

In other words, that the law struck a death blow at the monopoly

which previously existed. This reasoning is plausible; but is it

sound? All corporations are, to a certain extent, monopolies. In

the language of Mr. Justice McLean, in the case of Beaty v. Knowles,

4 Pet. 168, the "exercise of the corporate franchise is restrictive of

individual rights." If so, it is difficult to sustain the construction

contended for by the plaintiff, on the ground of policy; for in propor-

tion as corporations are created, in the same proportion are the rights

of individuals restricted; so that, although more individuals would,

under the general banking law, become members of banking corpo-

rations, yet the consequences would be an increase of institutions ad-

mitted to be monopolies and restrictive of individual rights. The
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chief itself; and I think a community, like an individual, should en-

dure a lesser evil, if, in attempting to cure it, a greater one would be

entailed upon them. * * *

[This case held the Michigan banking act to be unconstitutional.]

See note, supra, p. 32.

Sec. 57b. Same.

remedy for the mischief, then, would certainly be worse than the mischi e f itself; and I think a community, like an individual, should endure a lesser evil, if, in attempting to cure it, a g:reater one would be
entailed upon them. • • •
[This case held the Michigan banking act to be unconstitutional.]

DEADY, J., IN WELLS, FARGO & CO. v. NORTHERN PACIFIC RY.

COMPANY,

See note, supra, p. 32.

1884, Circuit Court of Oregon, 23 Fed. Rep. 469, on pp. 473-4,

in a suit by the Wells Fargo Express Company, organized under a

Sec. 57b. Same.

special act of the territory of Colorado, to constrain the railway com-

pany to furnish it with express facilities in Oregon, says:

Another objection is made to the relief demanded in this bill on

DEADY, J., IN WELLS, FARGO & CO. v. NORTHERN PACIFIC RY.
COMPANY,

the ground of the inability of the plaintiff to exercise the powers

claimed by it in Washington Territory, and that is that it is created by a

special act of Colorado. This objection is founded upon section 1S89,

of the Revised Statutes, which is applicable to all territories, and
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reads as follows:

"The legislative assemblies of the several territories shall not grant

private charters or special privileges; but they may, by general incor-

poration acts, permit persons to associate themselves together as bodies

corporate for mining, manufacturing and other industrial pursuits, or the

construction or operation of railroads, wagon roads, irrigating ditches,

and the colonization and improvement of lands in connection there-

with, or for colleges, seminaries, churches, libraries, or any other

benevolent, charitable or scientific association."

Now, it is argued, first, that because a corporation can not be

organized in Washington Territory by a special act of the legislature,

but must be organized under a general law; therefore, a corporation

existing before this restriction was made, under a special act of a sister

state or territory, can not come into that territory and exercise the pow-

ers, although they are in no way excluded by the law of the land, or

contrary to the public policy. The ground is that it is not brought

into being in the peculiar or particular way in which the general law

now requires corporations to be formed in Washington Territory; but

I can not see that there is anything in this objection. There is noth-

ing in this section ( 1889) to prevent any corporation exercising its

powers in Washington Territory in particular cases. Everybody who

is familiar at all with the history of the growth and organization

of corporations in the United States knows that this rule, requiring

corporations to be organized under a general law, is the growth of

some years, and has grown out of the confusion, corruption, the

partial and inequitable legislation that was the result of allowing

parlies to go before the legislature and ask for a special charter.

The time of the legislature was unnecessarily consumed by it; the in-

tegrity of the members of the legislature was unduly exposed; or,

1884, Circuit Court of Oregon, 23 Fed. Rep . 469, on pp. 473-4,
in a suit by the Wells Fargo Express Company, organized under a
special act of the territory of Colorado, to constrain the railway company to furni sh it with express facilities in Oregon, says:
Another objection is made to the relief demanded in this bill on
the ground of the inability of the plaintiff to exercise the powers
claimed by it in \iVashington Territory , and that is that it is created by a
special act of Colorado. This objection is founded upon section 1889,
of the Revised Statutes, which is applicable to all territories, and
reads as follows:
"The legislative assemblies of the several territories shall not grant
private charters or special privileges; hut they may, by general incorporatio n acts, permit persons to associate themselves together as bodies
corporate for mining, manufacturing and other industrial pursuits, or the
construction or operation of ra ilroads, wagon roads, irrigating ditches,
and the colonization and improvement of lands in connection therewith, or for colleges, seminaries, churches, libraries, or any other
benevolent, charitable or scientific assaciation.''
Now , it is argued , first, that because a corporation ca n not be
organized in Washington Territory by a special act of the legislature,
but must be organized under a general law; therefore, a corporation
existing before this restriction w as made, under a special act of a sister
state or territory, can not come into that territm}' a nd exercise the powers, although they are in no way excluded by the law of the land, or
contrary to the public policy. The ground is "that it is not brought
into b eing in the peculiar or particul ar way in which the general law
now requires corporations to be formed in \Vashington T erritory ; but
I can not see that there is anything in this objection. There is nothing in this section ( 1889) to prevent any corporation exercising its
powers in Washington T erritory in particular cases. Everybody who
is fam i Nar at all with the history of the grcnoth and organizatio1J
of corporatums in the United States knows that th£s rule, 1·equ£ring
corporations to be organized under a general law, is the grO'wth of
som e years, and has grtnvn out of the confusion, corruption, the
partial and inequitable legislation that was the result of allowing
parties to go before the legislature and ask for a special charter.
The time of the legislature was unnecessarily coinsumed by it ; the integrity of the members of the legislature was unduly exposed; or,
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through the ignorance or carelessness of the legislature, and the

296

astuteness and diligence of designing and overreaching men, there

MOKELUMNE HILL CANAL, ETC., CO. V. WOODBURY.

§ 58

were constantly coming to light obscure clauses in these acts of the

legislature, giving powers and granting privileges which were unjust,

through the ignorance or carelessness of the legislature, and the
astuteness and diligence of designing and overreaching men, there
were constantly coming to light obscure clauses in these acts of the
legislature, giving powers and granting privileges which were unjust,
inequitable, and which would never have been done with the knowledge of the legislature.
Therefore, owing to the evils resulting to the territory of Washington, to the people and to the legislature, this act was passed, and has
no reference whatever to the fact whether a corporation, othenvise
formed, might exercise powers in that territory not prohibited or contrary to its public policy. It is a matter of no moment whatever to
Washington Territory that corporations in Colorado are created by
special acts. The people of the latter te1Titory are not ·corrupted by
it; the legislature is not corrupted by it; their time is not taken up
with it. The only interest that they have in the matter is the interest
that any portion of the people of the United States have in the welfare of all the other people in the United States. See, also, on this
point, the remarks of Mr. Justice Field in Cowell v. Springs Co., IOO
u. s. 59·

inequitable, and which would never have been done with the knowl-

edge of the legislature.

Therefore, owing to the evils resulting to the territory of Washing-

ton, to the people and to the legislature, this act was passed, and has

no reference whatever to the fact whether a corporation, otherwise

formed, might exercise powers in that territory not prohibited or con-

trary to its public policy. It is a matter of no moment whatever to

Washington Territory that corporations in Colorado are created by

special acts. The people of the latter territory are not corrupted by

it; the legislature is not corrupted by it; their time is not taken up

with it. The only interest that they have in the matter is the interest

that any portion of the people of the United States have in the wel-

fare of all the other people in the United States. See, also, on this

point, the remarks of Mr. Justice Field in Cowell v. Springs Co., 100

U. S. 59.

Note. 1879, Cowell v. Springs Company. 100 U. 8. 56.
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Sec. 58. Same, (b) Difference between method by general and

by special laws.

MOKELUMNE HILL CANAL AND MINING CO. v. WOODBURY.1

1859. In The Supreme Court of California. 14 Cal. 424-428;

73 Am. Dec. 658.

1879, Cowell v. Springs Company, 100 U.S. 55.

Note.

Cope, J., delivered the opinion of the court, Baldwin, J., and

Field, C. J., concurring.

It is alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff is a corporation, and

this allegation being denied in the answer, the case was tried in the

Sec. 58.

court below upon that issue alone. The plaintiff dates its corporate

Same.

( b) Difference between method by general and

by special laws.

existence as far back as 1852, and claims to have been duly and reg-

ularly incorporated under the general act of 1850, providing for the

formation of corporations for manufacturing, mining, mechanical and

MOKELUMNE HILL CANAL AND MINING CO. v. WOODBURY.'

chemical purposes. Section 122 of that act provides that any three or

more persons, who may desire to form a company for either of these

1859.

purposes, "may make, sign and acknowledge before some officer

competent to take the acknowledgment of deeds, and file in the office

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF CALIFORNIA.
73 Am. Dec. 658.

14 Cal. 424-428;

CoPE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, BALDWIN, J., and
FIELD, C. J., concurring.
It is alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff is a corporation, and
this allegation being denied in the answer, the case was tried in the
court below upon tha~ issue alone. The plaintiff dates its corporate
existence as far back as I852, and claims to have been duly and reg·
ularly incorporated under the general act of I850, providing for the
formation of corporations for manufacturing, mining, mechanical and
chemical purposes. Section r 22 of that act provides that any three or
more persons, who may desire to form a company for either of these
purposes, "may make, sign and acknowledge before some officer
competent to take the acknowledgment of deeds, and file in the office
of the clerk of the county in which the business of the company shall
be carried on, and a duplicate thereof in the office of the secretary of
state, a certificate in writing," etc. Section r 23 provides, that "when
the certificate shall be filed as aforesaid," the persons executing the
same and their successors. shall be a body politic and corporate. Sec·
1 Arguments omitted.

of the clerk of the county in which the business of the company shall

be carried on, and a duplicate thereof in the office of the secretary of

state, a certificate in writing," etc. Section 123 provides, that "when

the certificate shall be filed as aforesaid," the persons executing the

same and their successors, shall be a body politic and corporate. Sec-

1 Arguments omitted.
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tion 130 provides, that "the copy of any certificate of incorporation

filed in pursuance of this act, certified by the county clerk or his

§ 58
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deputy, to be a true copy, and of the whole of such certificate, shall

be received in all courts and places as presumptive legal evidence of the

facts therein stated. On the trial of the case, it was shown that a certifi-

cate, in conformity with the requirements of the act had been filed in

the office of the clerk of the proper county, and a certified copy there-

of was produced and read in evidence, but it was not shown that a

duplicate had been filed in the office of the secretary of state. It ap-

peared in proof that the company had been doing business as a corpo-

ration since 1852, but the court held, that as it was not shown that a

duplicate had been filed as required by the act, the evidence did not

establish the fact of incorporation.

The general rule is, that the existence of a corporation may be

■proved by producing its charter, and showing acts of user under it;

but this rule has no application to a corporation formed under the pro-

visions of a general statute, requiring certain acts to be performed

before the corporation can be considered in esse, or its transactions

possess any validity. The existence of a corporation thus formed
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must be proved by showing at least a substantial compliance with the

requirements of the statute. But there is a broad and obvious distinc-

tion between such acts as are declared to be necessary steps in the process

of incorporation, and such as are required of the individuals seeking

to become incorporated, but which are not made prerequisites to the

assumption of corporate powers. In respect to the former, any ma-

terial omission will be fatal to the existence of the corporation, and

may be taken advantage of, collaterally, in any form in which the

fact of incorporation can properly be called in question. In respect

to the latter, the corporation is responsible only to the government,

and in a direct proceeding to forfeit its charter. The right of the

plaintiff to be considered a corporation, and to exercise corporate

powers, depends upon the fact of the performance of the particular

acts named in the statute as essential to its corporate existence. Un-

der the issues presented in the pleadings, there is no doubt that per-

formance of these acts should have been shown, and if the filing of

the duplicate of the certificate of incorporation is to be regarded as

one of them, the court below properly held that the existence of the

corporation had not been established. But we do not see upon what

principle such a construction of the statute is admissible. It is cer-

tainly not justified by the natural and ordinary import of the language

used, which must furnish the rule of construction, unless a contrary

intention clearly appear. Section 122 of the act provides, as we have

seen, for the filing of a certificate with the clerk, and a duplicate with

the secretary of state; but section 123 declares that when the certifi-

cate shall be filed, the persons executing the same and their successors,

shall be a body politic and corporate. The intention of the legislature

clearly was, that, so far as individuals are concerned, the corporation

should acquire a valid legal existence upon the filing of the certificate.

tion 130 provides, that ''the copy of any certificate of incorporatiop.
filed in pursuance of this act, certified by the county clerk or his
deputy, to be a true copy, and of the whole of such certificate, shall
be received in all courts and places as presumptive legal evidence of the
facts therein stated. On the trial of the case, it was shown that a certificate, in conformity with the requirements of the act had been filed in
the office of the clerk of the proper county, and a certified copy thereof ·was produced and read in evidence, but it was not shown that a
duplicate had been filed in the office of the secretary of state. It appeared in proof that the company ha<l been doing business as a corporation since 1852, but the court held, that as it was not shown that a
duplicate had been filed as required by the act, the evidence did not
establish the fact of incorporation.
The general rule is, that the existence of a corporation may be
proved by producing its charter, and showing acts of user under it;
but this rule has no appNcation to a corporation formed under the provisions of a general statute, requt'ring certain acts to be p erformed
/Jifore the corpora#on can be considered in esse, or its transactions
possess any validity. The existence of a corporation thus formed
must be proved by showing at least a substantial compliance with the
requirements of the statute. But there is a broad and obvious disti'nct£on between such acts as are aeclared to be necessary steps in the process
of incorporation, and such as are required of the individuals seeking
to become incorporated, but wh£ch are not made prerequ£s£tes to the
assumpt£on of corporate powe1·s. In respect to the former, any material omiss£on will be fatal to the existence of the corporation, and
may be taken advantage of, collaterally, in any form in whfrh the
fact of £11corporation can properly be called £n question. In resp ect
to the latter, the corporation is responsible only to the government,
and in a direct proceeding to forfeit its charter. The right of the
plaintiff to be considered a corporati'on, and to exercise corporate
powers, depends upon the fact of the performance of the particular
ads named in the statute as essential to its corporate existence. Under the issues presented in the pleadings, there is no doubt that performance of these acts should have been shown, and if the filing of
the duplicate of the certificate of incorporation is to be regarded as
one of them , the court below properly held that the existence of the
corporation had not been established. But we do not see upon what
principle such a construction of the statute is admissible. It is certainly not justified by the natural and ordinary import of the language
used, which must furnish the rule of construction, unless a contrary
intention clearly appear. Section 122 of the act provides, as we have
seen, for the filing of a certificate with the clerk, and a duplicate with
the secretary of state; but section 1 23 declares that when the certificate shall be filed, the persons executing the same and the.i r successors,
shall be a body politic and corporate. The intention of the legislature
clearly was, . that, so far as individuals are concerned, the corporation
should acquire a valid legal existence upon the filing of the certificate.
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The filing of the duplicate is exclusively a matter between the corpo-
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ration and the state. The rights and privileges conferred by the stat-

§ 59

ute vest in the corporation upon the filing of the certificate, and can

be divested only by a direct proceeding for that purpose. If the

The filing of the <luplicate is exclusively a matter between the corporation and the state. The rights and privileges conferred by the statute vest in the corporation upon the filing of the certificate, a nd can
be divested only by a direct proceeding for that purpose. If the
duplicate has not been filed, the assumption of the corporate powers '
amounts simply to a usurpation of the sovereign rights of the state,
the remedy for which rests with the state alone.
Judgment re,·ersed, and cause remanded for a new trial.

duplicate has not been filed, the assumption of the corporate powers

amounts simply to a usurpation of the sovereign rights of the state,

the remedy for which rests with the state alone.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.

Note. See below, cases upon Conditions Precedent to Valid Corporate Ex-

istence, pp. 585, 614, 630; When Does Corporate Existence Begin? pp. 565-

585; also, Schemes of Organization.

Sec. 59. (2) Same. By implication.

DUNN Et Al. v. THE UNIVERSITY OF OREGON.1

N()tP.. See below, cases upon ConditionB Precedent to Valid Corporate Existence, pp. 585, 614, 630; When Does Corporate Existence Begin? pp. 565585; also, Schemes of Organization.

1881. In the Supreme Court of Oregon. 9 Oregon Reports

357"362-

This suit was brought by respondents in the circuit court for Lane

county, to set aside a conveyance of real property situated in said

county, from the Union University Association to the said board of

directors of the University of Oregon, executed on or about Decem-

Sec. 59.

ber 31, 1873, upon the ground of fraud, and to subject such property

( 2)

Same.

By implication.
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to the payment of certain judgments, which had been recovered in

said court by respondents against said association.

DUNN ET AL. v. THE UNIVERSITY OF OREGON. 1

The complaint alleges the due incorporation of the Union University

Association as a private corporation under the laws of Oregon, and

1881.

the creation of the board of directors of the University of Oregon by

IN

THE

SUPREME CouRT OF OREGON.

9 Oregon Reports

357-36z.

act of the legislature, approved October 19, 1872, subsequently

changed to the "Regents of the University," by act of the legislature

This suit was brought by respondents in the circuit court for Lane
county, to set aside a conveyance of real property situated in said
county, from the Union University A ssociation to the said board of
directors of the University of Oregon , executed on or about December 3r, 1873, upon the ground of fraud, and to subject such property
to the payment of certain judgments, which had been recovered in
said court by respondents against said association.
The complaint alleges the due incorporation of the Union University
Association as a private corporation under the laws of Oregon, and
the creation of the board of directors of the University of Oregon by
act of the legi slature, approved October 19, 1872, subsequently
changed to the "Regents of the University," by act of the legislature
October 2 r, 1876. It also shows that in the year 1873 , and pri or to
the conveyance sought to be impeached, the Union University Association became indebted to the respondents severally in large amounts
which have never been pnid. That at the time said indebtedness :-iccrued, and prior thereto, said association was the owner in fee-simple
of certain real property in Eugene City, in said county, worth $so,ooo,
and gives a description of it by metes and bounds. That said real
estate was all the property owned by said association, and that by
conveying it to the hoa rd of directors of the University of Oregon, it
made itself insolvent, and thereupon became and has ever since remain ed wholly unable to pay its debts. That said conveyance was
executed in fraud of the rights of the respondents, and for the purpose
of hindering and delaying them in collecting their said debts, and that
there was no consideration therefor, and these facts were fully within.

October 21, 1876. It also shows that in the year 1873, and prior to

the conveyance sought to be impeached, the Union University As-

sociation became indebted to the respondents severally in large amounts

which have never been paid. That at the time said indebtedness ac-

crued, and prior thereto, said association was the owner in fee-simple

of certain real property in Eugene City, in said county, worth $50,000,

and gives a description of it by metes and bounds. That said real

estate was all the property owned by said association, and that by

conveying it to the board of directors of the University of Oregon, it

made itself insolvent, and thereupon became and has ever since re-

mained wholly unable to pay its debts. That said conveyance was

executed in fraud of the rights of the respondents, and for the purpose

of hindering and delaying them in collecting their said debts, and that

there was no consideration therefor, and these facts were fully within

1 Arguments omitted. Parts of opinion omitted.
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the knowledge of said board of directors when they received said con-
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veyance.

Prior to instituting this suit the respondents severally duly recov-

ered judgments against the Union University Association upon their

said claims, in said circuit court, and caused them to be duly docketed

in said county, and executions to be issued and placed in the hands

of the sheriff for service, which were duly returned by him wholly

unsatisfied.

The board of regents demurred, and the court below overruled

the demurrer, and upon their failing to answer, rendered a decree for

respondents as prayed for in their complaint. From this decree the

board of regents have brought this appeal.

By the court, Watson, J.:

That the state university itself was incorporated under the provis-

ions of the act of October 19, 1S72, entitled "an act to create, organ-

ize and locate the university of the state of Oregon," is not claimed;

but that the "board of directors" created by that act was an incor-

porated body can hardly be denied. Section 2 declares: "The gen-

eral government and superintendence of the university shall vest in a
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hoard of directors, to be denominated the board of directors of the

university of Oregon," to consist of nine members, all of whom shall

be citizens and permanent residents of the state of Oregon."

Section 4 provides: "The board of directors shall have the

custody of the books, records, buildings and all other property of the

university. All lands, money, bonds, securities and other property

which shall be donated, transferred or conveyed to the said board of

directors by gift, devise or otherwise, for the use and benefit of the

university, shall be taken, received, held and managed, invested and

reinvested, sold, transferred and in all respects managed, and the

proceeds thereof used, bestowed and invested in the manner, for the

purpose and under the terms and conditions respectively prescribed

by the act or gift, devise or other act in the respective cases. They

shall have power, and it shall be their duty, to enact by-laws for the

government of the university; to elect a president of the university,

and the requisite number of professors, instructors and employes, and

to fix their salaries and the term of office of each, and to do all other

acts necessary and proper to carry out the design of this act."

Sections 11 and 12 provide, that on or before January 1, 1874,

"The Union University Association of Eugene City, Ore., shall secure

a site for said university at or in the vicinity of Eugene City, and

erect thereon and furnish a building for the use of the state uni-

versity, on a plan to be approved, and, after the erection of the

same, to be accepted by the board of commissioners for the sale and

management of the school and university lands, and for the invest-

ment of the funds arising therefrom; said building and furniture to

be of not less value than $50,000; and to convey the said site and

building, in fee-simple, free from all incumbrances, to said board of

directors, on or before said January 1, 1S74."

By an amendatory act, passed October 16, 1874, the time was ex-

the knowledge of said board of directors "vhen they received said conveyance.
Prior to instituting this suit the respondents severally duly recovered judgments against the Union University Association upon their
said claims, in said circuit court, and caused them to be duly docketed
in said county, an<l executions to be issued and placed in the hands
of the sheriff for service, which were duly returned by him wholly
unsatisfied.
The board of regents demurred, and the court below overruled
the demurrer, and upon their failing to answer, rendered a decree for
respondents as prayed for in their complaint. From this decree the
board of regents have brought this appeal.
By the court, W ATSON 1 ] . :
That the state university itself was incorporated under the provisions of the act of October 19, 1872 1 entitled "an act to create, organize and locate the university of the state of Oregon," is not claimed;
but that the "board of directors" created by that act was an incorporated body can hardly be denied. Section 2 declares: "The general government and superintendence of the university shall vest in a
hoard of directors, to be denominated the board of directors of the
university of Oregon," to consist of nine members, all of whom shall
be citizens and permanent residents of the state of Oregon."
Section 4 provides: " The hoard of directors shall ha Ye the
custody of the books, records, buildings and all other property of the
university. All lands, money, bonds, securities and other property
which shall be donated, transferred or conveyed to the said board of
directors by gift, devise or otherwise, for the use and benefit of the
university, shall be taken, received, held and mannged, invested and
reinvested, sold, transferred and in all respects managed, and _the
proceeds thereof used, bestowed and invested in the manner, for the
purpose and under the terms and conditions respectively prescribed
by the act or gift, devise or other act in the respective c.a ses. They
shnll have power, and it shall be their duty, to enact by-laws for the
government of the university; to elect a president of the university,
and the requisite number of professors, instructors and employes, and
to fix their salaries and the term of office of each, and to do all other
acts necessary and proper to carry out the design of this act. "
Sections I I and 12 provide, that on or before January 1, 1874 1
"The Union University Association of Eugene City, Ore., shall secure
a site for said university at or in the vicinity of Eugene City, and
erect thereon and furnish a building for the use of the state university, on a plan to be appro\·ed, and, after the erection of the
same, to be accepted by the board of commissioners for the sale and
management of the school and university lands, and for the investment of the funds arising therefrom; sai<l building and furniture to
be of not less value than $50,000; and to convey the said site and
building, in fee-simple, free from all incumbrances, to said board of
directors, on or before said January 1, 1874.''
By an amendatory act, passed October 161 1874, the time was ex-
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tended to January i, 1S77, for securing such site and building and

DUNN V . THE UNlVERSITY OF OREGON.

conveying them to the board of directors.

While it can not be denied that some of these powers might be ex-

tended to January r, r 877, for securing such site and building and
conveying them to the board of directors.
While it can not be denied that some of these powers might be exercised by a board of directors in their collective capacity, without
being incorporated, it is equally undeniable that some of them could
not. The capacity and power to take conveyances of lands and hold
and dispose of them for the use and benefit of the university, according to the various and diverse trusts imposed upon them by their
donors, and to transmit title to lands to their successors in office in
perpetual succession, without intermediate conveyances, could pot belong to this board of directors unless incorporated.
It is true the legislature has not declared it to be a corporation in
express terms, but this was not essential. (Angell & Ames on Corporations,§ 76; Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 70, 103, rn6.)

ercised by a board of directors in their collective capacity, without

being incorporated, it is equally undeniable that some of them could

not. The capacity and power to take conveyances of lands and hold

and dispose of them for the use and benefit of the university, accord-

ing to the various and diverse trusts imposed upon them by their

donors, and to transmit title to lands to their successors in office in

perpetual succession, without intermediate conveyances, could not be-

long to this board of directors unless incorporated.

It is true the legislature has not declared it to be a corporation in

express terms, but this was not essential. (Angell & Ames on Cor-

porations, § 76; Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 70, 103, 106.)

"It is indeed a principle of law -which has been often acted on.

that -where rights, privileges and powers arc granted by law to an

association of persons by a collective name, and there is no mode by

which such rights can be enjoyed, or such powers exercised, without

"It i's i"ndeed a principle of law wht"ch has been often acted on,
that where rights, privileges and powers are granted by l<r.JJ to an
assoct'att"on of pers<ms by a collective name, and there is no mode by
whz'ch such rights can be enjoyed, or such powers exercised, without
acting in a corporate capacity, such associations are, by implication,
a corporation, so far as to enable them to exerct'se the rights and
powers granted." (Angell & Ames on Corporations, § 78.) • • •
The decree of the court below is affirmed with costs.
Decree affirmed.

acting in a corporate capacity, such associations arc, by implication,
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a corporation, so far as to enable them to exercise the rights and

powers granted." (Angell & Ames on Corporations, § 78.) * • *

The decree of the court below is affirmed with costs.

Decree affirmed.

Note. Creation by implication. 1. No precise words, such as found, erect,

establish, create, or incorporate, are necessary, provided the legislative in-

tent be manifest. 1613, Sutton's Hospital, 10 Coke 30, supra, p. 264; 1817,

Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 320; 1828, North Hempstead v.

Hempstead, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 109; 1829, River Tone v. Ash, 21 E. C. L. 152,10

Barn. & C. 349; 1839, Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 9 on 94, supra, p. 19; 1857,

Note. Creation by implication. 1. No precise words, such as found, erect,
establish, create, or incorporate, are necessary, provided the legislative intent be manifest. 16L3, Sutton's Hospital, 10 Coke 30, supra, p. 264; 1817,
Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 320; 1828, North Hempstead v.
Hempstead, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 109; 1829, River Tone v. Ash, 21 E. C. L. 152, 10
Barn. & C. 349; 1839, Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 9 on 94, supm, p. 19; 1857,
Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. II. 351, 69 Am. D. 489; 1869, 0. & V. R.R. Co. v.
Plumas Co., 37 Cal. 354 ( contra); 1870, Liverpo.ol Ins. Co. v. Mass., 10 Wall.
(U. S.) 566; 1881, Cent. Ag. & Mech. Assn. v. Ala. G. L. Ins. Co., 70 Ala.
120, 3 Am. & Eng. C. C. 78; 1884, Walsh v. Trustee N. Y. & B. Bridge, 96
N. Y. 427, 6 Am. & E. C. C. 4:); 1889, People, ex rel., v. Wemple, 52 Hun
<N. Y.) 434; 1894, Shields v. Clifton Hill L. Co., 94 Tenn. 123, 45 Am. St. R.
700; 1896, Edgworth v. Wood, 58 N. J . L. 463, supra, p. 29; 1898, Andrews
Bros. v. Youngstown Coke Co., 86 Fed. R. 5&5.
2. The implication may arise from legislRtive recognition or ratification.
1830, Society for Propagation of Gospel v. Town of Pawlet, 4 Peters (U. 8.)
480, 502; 1839, Mcintyre · Poor School v. Zanesville, 9 Ohio 203; 1841, Williams v. Union Bank, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 339; 1864, People v. Farnham, 35 Ill.
562; 1867, Toledo P. & W. R. R . v. Town of Chenoa, 43 Ill. 209; 1884, Walsh
v. Trustees, 96 N. Y. 427, 6 Am. & Eng. C. C. 45; 1894, Shieldsv. Clifton Bill
L . Co., 94 Tenn. 123, 45 Am. St. R. 700; 1894, Andes v. Ely, 158 U.S. 312.
3. Or by a grant of lands to be held as a corporation holds lands. 1468,
"If the king granted land to the men or inhabitants of D. to their heirs and
successors, rendering rent therefor, as to everything touching this l and they
are a corporation, but for no other pnrpose." Rolle's Abr. Corp. F, citjii.1g Y. B . 7 Ed. 4, 30; 1817, Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch . (N. Y. l 320;
1828, North Hempsteadv. H empstead, 2Wend. (N. Y.) 109; 1830, 8ocietyfor
Prop. of Gospel, etc., v. Town of Pawlet, 4 Peters (U. 8.) 480; 1840, Commis·
sioners of Bath v. Boyd, 1 Ired. Law (N. C.) 194; 1&55, People v. Scherme~
.horn, 19 Barb. IN. Y.) 540.
4. Or by grants of powers. 1154-89, "Of ancient times the inhabitants of

Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351, 69 Am. D. 489; 1869, O. & V. R. R. Co. v.

Plumas Co., 37 Cal. 354 (contra); 1870, Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Mass., 10 Wall.

(U. S.) 566; 1881, Cent. Ag. & Mech. Assn. v. Ala. G. L. Ins. Co., 70 Ala.

120, 3 Am. & Eng. C. C. 78; 1884, Walsh v. Trustee N. Y. & B. Bridge, 96

N. Y. 427, 6 Am. & E. C. C. 45; 1889, People, ex rel., v. Wemple, 52 Hun

(N. Y.) 434; 1894, Shields v. Clifton Hill L. Co., 94 Tenn. 123, 45 Am. St. R

700; 1896, Edgworth v. Wood, 58 N. J. L. 463, supra, p. 29; 1898, Andrews

Bros. v. Youngstown Coke Co., 86 Fed. R. 585.

2. The implication may arise from legislative recognition or ratification.

1830, Society for Propagation of Gospel v. Town of Pawlet, 4 Peters (U. S.)

480,502; 1839, Mclntyre Poor School v. Zanesville, 9 Ohio 203; 1841, Will-

iams v. Union Bank, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 339; 1864, People v. Farnham, 35 111.

562; 1867, Toledo P. & W. R. R. v. Town of Chenoa, 43 111. 209; 1884, Walsh

v. Trustees, 96 N. Y. 427 , 6 Am. & Eng. C. C. 45; 1894, Shields v. Clifton Hill

L. Co., 94 Tenn. 123, 45 Am. St. R. 700; 1894, Andes v. Ely, 158 U. S. 312.

3. Or by a grant of lands to be held as a corporation holds lands. 1468,

"If the king granted land to the men or inhabitants of D. to their heire and

successors, rendering rent therefor, as to everything touching this land they

are a corporation, but for no other purpose." Rolle's Abr. Corp. F. cit-

ing Y. B. 7 Ed. 4, 30; 1817, Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 320;

1828, North Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 109; 1830, Society for

Prop, of Gospel, etc., v. Town of Pawlet, 4 Peters (U. S.) 480; 1840, Commis-

sioners of Bath v. Bovd, 1 Ired. Law (N. C.) 194; 1855, People v. Schermer-

born, 19 Barb. (N. Y.) 540.

4. Or by grants of powers. 1154-89, "Of ancient times the inhabitants of
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a vill were incorporated when the king granted to them to have a merchant

guild." Rolle, Abr., Corporations F, p. 513, citing Register of Writs, 219, 10

Co. 30. But seel Kyd, 64. (The first printed edition of the Register was in

1531, but Coke claims to have had edition containing entries of writs used prior

to the Norman Conquest. Preface, 10 Rep. The Register is usually consid-

ered as dating in the reign of Henry II, 1154-1189.) 1831, Justices of Cum-

berland v. Armstrong, 3 Dev. (N. C.) 284; 1839, Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend.

(N. Y.) 9 on 94, supra, p. 19; 1844, Proprietors, etc., of Southhold v. Horton, 6

Hill (N. Y.)501; 1857, Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351; 1870, Liverpool Ins.

Co. v. Mass., 10 Wall. (U. 8.) 566; 1896, Edgworth v. Wood, 58 N. J. L. 463,

supra, p. 29; 1898, Andrews Bros. v. Youngstown C. C, 86 Fed. Rep. 585.

5. By grant to successors. 1829, Conservators of River Tone v. Ash, 10

Barn. & C. 349.

6. But in order that a grant of powers will have the effect to create a cor-

poration by implication, they must be really corporate powers, and not

merely such as could as well be exercised by unincorporated persons or

associations. 1830, Stebbins v. Jennings, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 172; 1858, Shelton

v. Banks, 10 Gray (Mass.) 401.

a vill were incorporated when the king granted to them to have a merchant
guild." Rolle, Abr., Corporations F, p. 513, citing Register of ·writs, 219, 10

Co. 30. But see 1 Kyd, 64. (The first printed edition of the Reg-ister was in
1531, but Coke claims to have had edltion containing entries of writs used prior
to the Norman Conquest. Preface, 10 Rep. The Register is usually considered as dating in the reign of Henry II, 1154-1189.) 1831, Justices of Cumberland v. Armstrong, 3 Dev. (N . C.) 284; 1839, Thomas v. Dakin, 22 \Vend.
(N. Y.) 9 on 94, supra, p. 19; 1844, Proprietors, etc., of South hold v. Horton, 6
Hill (N. Y.)501; 1857, Bowv. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351; 1870, Liverpool Ins.
Co. v. Mass., 10 Wall. (U.S.) 566; 1896, Edgworth v. Wood, 58 N. J. L. 463,
supra, p. 29; 1898, Andrews Bros. v. Youngstown C. C., 86 Fed. Rep. 585.
5. By grant to successors. 1829, Conservators of River Tone v. Ash, 10
Barn. & C. 349.
6. But in order that a grant of powers will have the effect to create a corporation by implication, they must be really corporate powers, and not
merely such as could as well be exercised by unmcorporated persons or
associations. 1830, Stebbins v. Jennings, IO Pick. (Mass.) 172; 1858, Shelton
v. Banks, 1.t't Gray (Mass.) 401.
.
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Sec. 59a. (3) Same. By consolidation. See infra, pp. 984-1007.

Sec. 59a. ( 3) Same. By consolidation. See infra, pp. 984-1007 .
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CHAPTER 3.

LIMITS ON THE POWER OF THE STATE TO CREATE.

ARTICLE I. FROM THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.

Sec. 60. (a) Delegation: General rule: There can be no

general delegation of legislative authority to create corpora-

tions.

See Frankljn Bridge Company v. Wood, supra, p. 279, and note below,

p. 304.

CHAPTER 3.

Sec. 61. (b) Exceptions, or apparent exceptions:

I. Territorial legislatures. •

LIMITS ON THE POWER OF THE STATE TO CREATE.

EIDDICK, Chairman, Etc., v. AMELIN Et Al.

182 i. In the Supreme Court of Missouri, i Missouri Reports

5-7-

ARTICLE

I.

FROM.

THE

NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.

Cook, J., delivered the opinion of the court. This is a writ of

error, prosecuted to reverse the judgment of the circuit court of St.

Sec. 60.

(a) Delegation: Ge neral rule:
There can be no
general delegation of legislative authority to create corporations .

Louis county in an action of debt instituted by the plaintiff, Riddick,

as chairman of the board of trustees of the town of St. Louis, on a

bond executed by said defendants to said chairman. To which the

defendants plead that said Riddick and others, trustees of said town,

See Franklin Bridge Company v. Wood, s11pra, p. 279, and note below,
p . 304.

fraudulently represented that they had legal right to lease a certain

ferry, and that said Riddick, as chairman of the board of trustees,
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was authorized to make and execute such lease, and that said bond

was executed in consideration of a lease so made by said chairman to

Sec. 61.

the defendant, Amelin. To this plea the plaintiff replied: The act

(b) Exceptions, or apparent exceptions:

of the territorial legislature, authorizing the incorporation of towns;

I.

the order of the court of St. Louis county incorporating the town of

•

Territoria l legislatures.

St. Louis; the act of said legislature authorizing said corporation to

RIDDICK , CHAIRMAN, ETC. ,

license and regulate ferries therein, and the ordinance of said corpo-

Y.

AMELIN ET AL.

ration authorizing the chairman thereof to let and license such ferries.

1821.

To which replication the defendants agreed to demur generally, and

IN

THE

SUPREME Cou wr OF M1ssouR1.

r Missouri Reports

5-7.

except to the legal force and effect of the statute authorizing the in-

corporation of towns, and to the right of said trustees to have of and

CooK , J., delivered the opinion of the court. This is a writ o f
error, prosecuted to reverse the judg ment of the circuit court of S t.
Louis county in an action of d ebt instituted by the plaintiff, Riddick,
as chairman of the board of trustees of the town of St. Louis, on a
bond executed by said defend ants to said chairm an. To ·which the
d efendants plead th at said Riddi ck and others, trustees of said town ,
fraudul ently rep resented that they had legal right to lease a certa in
ferry, and that said Riddick, as ch airman of the board of trustees,
w as authori zed to m ake and execute su ch lease, and th at said b on d
was executed in conside ration of a lease so m ad e hy sa id cha irm a n to
the d efend ant , A melin. T o this pl ea the plaintiff replied: The act
of the territori al legislature, authoriz ing the incorporation of t owns;
the ord er of the co urt of S t. L ouis county in corporating the t0\\'11 of
S t. L ouis ; the act of sa id legislature authorizing said corp orat ion to
license and regulate ferr ies the re in , a nd the o rdinance of sa id corpora tio n au thoriz ing the cha irman th ereof to let a nd li cense such fe rries.
T o w hi ch repli cation th e d efe ndants agreed to de mur ge nerally, and
except to th e legal fo rce a nd effect of ·the statute authori zing the incorpo ra tion of towns, and to the rig ht of said tru stees to have of a n d
from a ny p erson I icensed to keep a ferry in said town more than
one hundred doll ars fo r such lice nse.
In support of the first po int, it is insisted by the de fendants tha t
nothing short of sovereign power can create a corporation; that the

from any person licensed to keep a ferry in said town more than

one hundred dollars for such license.

In support of the first point, it is insisted by the defendants that

nothing short of sovereign power can create a corporation; that the

(302)

(302)
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territorial legislature was not sovereign, and hence draw the con-

clusion that the act of that legislature had not the force and effect of a

~

61

LIMITS ON POWER TO CREATE.

law. That the power which creates a corporation must be sovereign

as to that matter is a principle which seems to be well settled; but

sovereignty may be either general or limited, absolute or controllable.

If this be not true, sovereignty could exist nowhere but with the orig-

inal power of making laws, which alone is absolute. The power to

legislate on any subject is sovereign as to that matter, and to general

sovereignty is incident the power of general legislation. It remains

then only to ascertain the power of the territorial legislature, under

the act of congress creating that body, and vesting it with legislative

powers. It seems to be admitted that congress possessed the power

of legislating for the territory, with no other limitations than such as

were imposed by the federal constitution, and it has not been denied

that the establishment of the territorial government with legislative

powers was a constitutional exercise of the powers of congress. If

congress could impart to the territorial legislature a power to legislate

on any subject in relation to the government of the people of the ter-

ritory, that power might, by the same authority, be made as general

as the legislative powers of congress over such territory; and that
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congress intended to vest the territorial legislature with general pow-

ers, for the government of the inhabitants thereof, is manifest, the

terms of the provisions being general, with a restrictive proviso, that

no law should be passed inconsistent with the constitution of the

United States.

The territorial legislature, then, had power to make all laws which

they might deem conducive to the good government of the inhabitants

of said territory, and the right being reserved by congress to disap-

prove and thereby revoke any law passed by said legislature, does not

render the power of such legislature less sovereign in relation to one

subject of their legislation than another; it is sovereign as to all, sub-

ject to the control of congress. On the second part, it was contended

by the plaintiff's counsel that the corporation was not limited by law

as to the sum which they may demand for ferry license within the

limits of their corporation, and if they are, the defendants having ex-

ecuted their bond to the chairman, can not avoid it by showing that it

was given for the payment of a sum which the trustees had no right

to demand.

The fourth section of the act extending certain powers to said

trustees (Acts of 1814—' 15) provides that said trustees shall have full

power to license and regulate ferries established within their limits,

and to apply the license money to the use of the town. Here the

court see no other power vested in the trustees than such as had

been given by law to the courts of the several counties on that sub-

ject. On the last point the court can not see the propriety of the

reasoning why this is assimilated to an individual transaction not regu-

lated by special enactment. It is the statute which authorizes the

trustees to license and regulate ferries within their limits. The terms

of such license and manner of such regulations were prescribed by

•.erritorial legislature was not sovereign, and hence draw the conclusion that the act of that legislature had not the force and effect of a
Jaw. That the power which creates a corporation mu ~t be sovereign
as to that matter is a principle which seems to he well settled; but
sovere ig nty may be either general or limited, absolute or controllable.
If this be not true, sovereignty could exist nowhere but \vith the original p ower of making laws, which alone is absolute. The power to
legi late on any subject is sovereign as to that matter, and to general
sovere ig nty is incident the power of g eneral legislation. It remains
then only to ascertain the power of the territorial legislature, under
the act of congress creating that body, and vesting it with legislntive
powers. It seems to be admitted that congress possessed the power
of legislating for the tetTitory, with no other limitations than such as
were imposed by the federal constitution, and it has not been d enied
that the establishment of the territorial government with legislath·e
powers was a <;onstitutional exercise of the powers of congress. If
congress could impart to the territori al legislature a power to legislate
on any subject in relation to the government of the people of the territory, that power might, by the same authority, be made as general
as the legislative powers of cong ress· oY er such territory; and that
·cong ress intended to Yest the territorial legislature with general powers, for the government of the inhabitants thereof, is manifest , the
terms of the provisions being general, with a restrictive provi so, that
no law should be passed inconsistent with the constitution of the
United States.
The territorial legislature, then, had power to make all laws which
they might deem conducive to the good government of the inhabitants
of said territory, and the right being reserved by congress to disapprove and thereby revoke any law passed b y sa id legislature, does not
render the power of such legislature less soYereign in r elation to one
subject of the ir legisl ation th an another; it is sovereig n as to all, subject to the control of cong ress. On the second p art, it was contended
by the plaintiff's counsel that the corporation was not limited hy law
as to the su m which they may demand for ferry licen se within th e
limits of their corporntio n, and if they a rc, the d efend ants haYing executed th eir bond to the chairman, can n o t aYoid it by sh owing that it
was given for the payment of a sum which the tru stees had no right
to demand.
The fou rth section of the act extending certa in p o\·v ers to said
tru tee ( Acts of 1814-' 15) provides that sa id tru stees sh all h ave full
power to license and regulate ferries establ ished within their limit ,
and to apply the li cense money to the use of the tov•n. H erc the
court see no other power vested in the trustees than such as had
been g ive n by law to the courts of the several counties on that subject. On the last point the court can n ot see the propt:iety of the
reasoning why this is assimilated to an indiv idual tran saction n ot regulated by special enactment. It is the statute ~·hich authorizes the
trustees to license and regulate ferries within their limits. The terms
of such 1icense and manner of such regulat.i ons ·w ere prescribed by
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law, and not left to the discretion of the trustees who were to exercise

Jaw, and not left to the discretion of the trustees who were to exercise
those powers. It is the opinion of the court that the trustees were
not authorized by law to demand, or exact of any person, more than
one hundred dollars for any such license, and that any obligation or
promise for the payment of a greater sum for such license is void
and not obligatory on the party making it. It is, therefore, considered and adjudged, that the said judgment of the circuit court of the
county of St. Louis be affirmed, and that said defendants recover of
the said Thomas F. Riddick, chairman as aforesaid, their costs by
them about their defense of this writ of error expended, etc.

those powers. It is the opinion of the court that the trustees were

not authorized by law to demand, or exact of any person, more than

one hundred dollars for any such license, and that any obligation or

promise for the payment of a greater sum for such license is void

and not obligatory on the party making it. It is, therefore, consid-

ered and adjudged, that the said judgment of the circuit court of the

county of St. Louis be affirmed, and that said defendants recover of

the said Thomas F. Riddick, chairman as aforesaid, their costs by

them about their defense of this writ of error expended, etc.

Note. See below, Note on delegation of power to create corporations.

See. 62. Same, (2) Regents of University of New York:

2 Rev. St. N. Y., p. 1474. Laws of 1892, c. 378, provides:

Note.

§ 27. Charters.—The regents [of the University of New York,

See below, Note on delegation of power to create corporations.

established in 1784] may, "by an instrument under their seal and

recorded in their office, incorporate any university, college, academy,

library, museum or other institution or association for the promotion

Sec. 62. Same, ( 2) Regents of University of New York:

of science, literature, art, history or other department of knowledge,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:15 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

under such name, with such number of tnistees or other managers,

and with such powers, privileges and duties, and subject to such limi-

2 Rev. St. N. Y., p. 1474.

tations and restrictions in all respects as the regents may prescribe in

Laws of 1892, c. 378, provides:

conformity to law." (As Am. by L. 1893, c. 859, going into effect

§ 27 . Charters.-The regents [of the University of New York,
established in 1784] may, "by an instrument under their seal and
recorded in their office, incorporate any university, college, academy,
library, museum or other in stitution or association for the promotion
of science, literature, art, history or other department of knowledge,
under such name, with such number of tnistees or other manage~,
and with such powers, privileges and duties, and subject to such limitations and restrictions in all respects as the regents may prescribe in
conformity to law." (As Am. by L. 1893 1 c. 859, going into effect
June r, 1895.)

June 1, 1895.)

Note. DELEGATION OP POWER TO CREATE CORPORATIONS.

1. In England: Although it was early stated that the king could not dele-

gate his power to create a corporation (2 Henry VII, 13, 10 Coke Rep. 27) it

has been settled otherwise on the theory of the maxim quifacit per alium facit

perse. This authority has been delegated for the creation of a single corpora-

tion, or for an indefinite number. (1 Kyd 50; 1 Bl. Com. 473.) The chancel-

lor of the university of Oxford has a general power by charter to create

corporations, and has created many, including trading corporations, to serve

the students. (1 Bl. Com. 474; Angell & A., § 74.) The lords and proprie-

tors of Maryland (McKim v. Odom, 3 Bland Ch. 416, supra, p. 222) and of

Pennsylvania (3 Wils. Lect. 409) exercised such delegated authority (Ang. &

Note.

Ames, § 74).

D.ELEOATION OF POWER TO CREATE CORPORATIONS.

1. In England: Although it was early stated that the king could not delegate his power to create a corporation (2 Henry VII, 13, 10 Coke Rep. 27) it

Parliament, in theory not exercising delegated but original sovereign

authority, and not hampered by constitutional restrictions, can delegate,

has been settled otherwise on the theory of the maxim quifacit per aliumfa~
pr.r se. This authority has been delegated for the creation of a single corporation, or for an indefinite number. (l Kyd 50; l Bl. Com. 473.) The chancellor of the university of Oxford has a general power by charter to create
corporations, and has created many, including trading corporations, to serve
the students. (l Bl. Com. 474; Angell & A.,§ 74.) The lords and proprietors of Maryland (McKim v. Odom, 3 Bland Ch. 416, supra, p. 222) and of
Pennsylvania (3 Wils. Leet. 409) exercised such delegat.ed authority (Ang. &
Ames,§ 74).
Parliainrmt, in theory not exercising delegated but original sovereign
authority, and not hampered by constitutional restrictions, can delegat.e,
either generally or specially, its power to create corporations. l\forawetz
Corp.,§ l !l ; Am . & E ng. Ency., vol. 7, p. 645 {2d ed.).
2. In tho United States: (a) In general. For the reasons that there is no
nerutine with authority to create corporations in the United States, that this
function pertai ns to legislative bodies exclusively, and these, with us, exercise
only rlr>lr>rtatP.d, and not original power, and that the creation of a corporation
is the em1etment of n law that requires the exercise of discretion, it is
held that there can be no general delegation of the power to create corpor:itions in this country , on the maxim, <lPlegnt11s <lelegare non potest. Franklin
Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14 Ga. 80, supra, p. 279; 1884, State v. Simons, 32 Minn.

either generally or specially, its power to create corporations. Morawetz

Corp., § 15; Am. & Eng. Ency., vol. 7, p. 045 (2d ed.).

2. In the United States: (a) In general. For the reasons that there is no

executive with authority to create corporations in the United States, that this

function pertains to legislative bodies exclusively, and these, with us, exercise

only delegated, and not original power, and that the creation of a corporation

is the enactment of a law that requires the exercise of discretion, it is

held that there can be no general delegation of the power to create corpora-

tions in this countrv, on the maxim, delegatus delegare non potest. Franklin

Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14 Ga. 80, supra, p. 279; 1884, State v. Simons, 32 Minn.
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540; 1821, Cohen's v. Virginia, 6 Wheat (U.S.) 264, 442; 1822, In re St.Mary's

Ll:\fJTS ON POWER TO CREATE.
Church, 7 S. & R. (Pa.) 517; 1843, Case of Borough of West Philadelphia, 5

Watts & S. 281; 1856, State v. Armstrong, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 634; 1858, Mayor,

v. Shelton, 1 Head (Tenn.) 24; 1885, Factors' & Traders' Ins. Co. v. N. H. P.

Co., 37 La. Ann. 233; 1889, Heiskell v. Chickasaw Lodge No. 8, 87 Tenn. 668.

What violates and what does not violate this doctrine are well illustrated by

the two cases of State v. Armstrong, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 634, and Mayorv. Shel-

ton, 1 Head (Tenn.) 24, to the effect that "when the extent, character of pow-

ers and objects of incorporation are fixed by the legislature," and not left to

the persons themselves seeking incorporation, or the body to whom certain

ministerial acts are delegated, there is no delegation of legislative powers.

if>) Apparent exceptions: (1) Thepowerof the regents of the University

of New York, as above indicated, however, is discretionary to a great extent,

and Mr. Morawetz (§ 15, note 5) considers this a valid delegation of power.

Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 110. The power to create churches under the

Pennsylvania act of 1791 (3 Pa. Laws 40) was largely discretionary, to be ex-

ercised by those seeking incorporation, and the courts and attorney-general.

(Caseof St. Mary's Church, 7 S. & R. (Pa.) 517.)

(2) Ministerial functions, such as certifying compliance with laws, re-
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cording articles, etc., can be delegated—the creative power in such cases is

that of the legislature. 1853, Franklin Bridge Co. v. AVood, 14 Ga. 80, supra,

p. 279; 1877, In re New York Elevated R. Co., 70 N. Y. 327; 1883, Heck v. Mc-

Ewen, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 97; 1888, Granby Min. & S. Co. v. Richards, 95 Mo.

106. There seems to be no inherent incapacity in the nature of legislative

power that prevents its delegation, and there has always been a well recog-

nized exception in the case of municipal ordinances, and the tendency is to

extend the sphere of delegating legislative functions. Am. & Eng. Ency.,

vol. 6, p. 1022 (2d ed.); Cooley's Const'l Lim., p. "120, n. 1; Oberholtzer, The

Referendum in America, 17.

(3) Congress and the territorial legislatures: It seems never to have been

questioned that congress could not delegate a general power to create corpo-

rations to the territorial legislatures, on the ground that such was a delega-

tion of delegated powers. Perhaps aside from the constitutional power to

legislate for the territories, it might be held that congress does not exercise

delegated powers in its purely national or international relations, outside of

the states of the Union, but that it is sovereign in those particulars, much as

the parliament of England, so far as wavs and means are concerned.

See, 1821, Douglas v. State Bank, 1 Mo. 24; 1831, Williams v. Bank of

Michigan, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 539; 1844, People v. Marshall, 1 Gilm. (6 111.) 672;

1851, Myers v. Manhattan Bank, 20 Ohio 283; 1852, Vincennes v. University

of Indiana, 14 How. (U. S.) 268; 1864, Allen v. Pegram, 16 Iowa 163; 1888,

Carver Mercantile Co. v. Hulme, 7 Mont. 566; 1894, Bashford-Burm. Co. v.

Agua Fria C. Co., 35 Pac. (Ariz.) 983.

Territorial corporations become state corporations upon admission of the

territory to the Union, as a state. 1820, Vance et al. v. Farmers' and M.

Bank, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 80; 1823, Bank of Vincennes v. State, I Blackf. (Ind.)

267; 1884, Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co., 112 U. S. 414. But

see, 1851, Myers v. Manhattan Bank, 20 Ohio 283.

Thev are subject to the power of congress to control or abolish. 1887,

United States v. Church of Jesus Christ, 5 Utah 361; 1889, Mormon Church

".. United States, 136 U. S. 1, infra, p. 906.

See below: Limits on power of territorial legislatures, p. 332.

By the present New Jersey law "The certificate of incorporation may also

oontain any provision which the incorporation may choose to insert * * *

creating » » * the powers of the corporation, the directors and the stock-

holders * * * not inconsistent with tiiis act." N. J. L. 1890, Am. 1898, §8.

See Ellerman v. Chicago Junct. Ry. Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 217, holding that the

certificate of incorporation is equivalent to special act of the legislature.

540; 1821, Cohen's v. Virginia, 6 Wheat (U.S.) 264, 442; 1822, In re St. Mary's
Church, 7 S. & R. (Pa. l 517; 1843, Case of Borough of West Philadelphia, 5
Watts & S. 281; 1856, State v. Armstrong, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 634; 1858, Mayor.
v. Shelton, 1 Head (Tenn.) 24:; 1885, Factors ' & Traders' Ins. Co. v. N. H.P.
Co., 37 La. Ann. 233; 1889, Heiskell v. Chickasaw Lodge No. 8, 87 Tenn. 668.
What violates and what does not violate this doctrine are well illustrated by
the t\VO cases of State v. Armstrong, 3 Sneed (Tenn. ) 634, and Mayor v. Shelton, 1 Head (Tenn.) 24, to the effect that "when the extent, character of powers and objects of incorporation are fixed by the legislature," and not left to
Uie persons themselves seeking incorporation, or the body to whom certain
mirusterial acts are delegated, there is no delegation of legislative powers.
(b\ Apparent exceptions: (ll The po·wer of the regents of the University
of New York, as above indicated, however, is discretionary to a greet extent,
and Mr. Morawetz (§ 15, note 5) considers this a valid delegation of power.
Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 110. The power to create churches under the
Pennsylvania act of 1791 (3 Pa. Laws 40) was largely discretionary, to be exercised by those seeking incorporation, and the courts and attorney-general.
(Case of St. Mary's Ch urch, 7 S. & R. (Pa. ) 517.)
(21 Ministerial functions, such as certifying compliance with laws, recording articles, etc., can be delegated-the creative power in such cases is
that of the legislature. 1853, Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14 Ga. 80, supra,
p. 279; 1877, In re New York Elevated R. Co., 70 N. Y. 327; 1883, Heck v. McEwen, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 97; 1888, Granby Min. & S. Co. v. Richards, 95 Mo.
106. There seems to be no inherent incapacity in the nature of legislative
power that prevents its delegation, and there has alwuys been a well recognized exception in the case of municipal ordinances, and the tendency is t.o
extend the sphere of delegating legislative functions. Am. & Eng. Ency.,
vol. 6, p. 1022 (2d ed.); Cooley's Const'l Lim., p. •120, n.1; Oberholtzer, The
Referendum in America, 17.
(3) Congress and the territorial legislatures: It seems never to have been
qnestioned that congress could not de legate a general power to create corporations to the territorial legislatures, on the ground that such was a delegation of delegated powers. Perhaps aside from the constitutional power to
legislate for the territories, it might be helrl that congress does not exercise
delegated powers in its purely national or international relations, outside of
the 11tates of the Union, but that it is sovereign in those particulars, much as
the parliament of England, so far as ways and means are cohcerned.
See, 1821, Douglas v. State Bank, 1 Mo. 24; 1831, Williams v. Bank of
Michigan, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 539; 1844, People v . Marshall , 1 Gilm. (6 Ill.) 672;
1851, ".\lyera v. Manhattan Bank, 20 Ohio 283; 1852, Vincennes v. University
of Indiana, 14 How. (U.S.) 268; 1864, Allen v. Pegram, 16 Iowa 163; 1888,
Carver Mercantile Co. v. Hulme, 7 Mont. 566; 1894, Bashford-Burm. Co. v.
Agua Fria C. Co., 35 Pac. (Ariz. ) 983.
Territorial corporations become state corporations upon admission of the
territory to the Union, as a state. 1820, Vance et al. v. Farmers' and M.
Bank, 1 Blackf. (Ind. ) 80; 1823, Bank of Vincennes v. State, l Blackf. (Ind. )
267; 1884, Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. A .. T . & 8. F. R. Co., 112 U.S. 414. But.
eee. l S.51, Mye rs v . Manhattan Bank, 20 Ohio 283.
They are subject to the power of congoress to control or abolish. 1887,
Unitecl .'tates v. Church of J esus Christ, 5 Utah 361; 1889, Mormon Church
·.. Cnitcd Slates, 136 U.S. 1, i11fra, p. 906.
See below: Limits on power of territorial legislatures, p. 3:32.
By P1e present .~ew Je~sey l a '~ "The cer~ifiC'nte of incorporation may also
coutarn a ny ,prov1s1on wluch the rn corporat1011 may choose to insert • • •
·'7eating •
" the powers of the corporatio n, the tlirectort:i and the 1-1tock.10lders • • • n ot iu co n sis t~ntwi thtiii sact." ~.J.L.l K!lti,Am .18flS,§8.
~e Ellerman v . Chicago .Jund. H.1·. Co., 4H ~- J . .Eq. '..' Ji , holding that t.he
rertifioote of incorporatio11 is eq uiv nlPnt t• 1 SJJPcial ad o f lnP legislat ure.
'imilar provisions exist i11 the Delaware, ('onn ecliC'ut a 11cl l"o rlh Cnrolinn
laws. Such provisionl!, it would se1•111, ca 11 ha n.lly be su pported under tlie
early holdings. ThPy do not seem to have bee n passed upon .
20- WIL. C ..\SKS.

Similar provisions exist in the Delaware, Connecticut and North Carolina

taws. Such provisions, it would seem, can hardly be supported under the

early holdings. Thev do not seem to have been passed upon.

20-Wil. Casks.
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563

ELLIS V. MARSHALL.

ARTICLE II. LIMITS ON LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY, FROM THE NATURE

OF A FRANCHISE.

Sec 63. (a) Can not be forced on any one.

ELLIS v. MARSHALL.1

1807. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 2

Mass. Reports, 269-279; 3 Am. Dec. 49.

[Ejectment by plaintiff, claimed under a sale, by the Front Street

Corporation, of the defendant's land to pay an assessment for con-

structing a street. The corporation was composed of sundry persons

described as being "owners and proprietors of the land over which

the street will pass," the defendant being one of such proprietors,and

named in the act of incorporation, which had been passed upon peti-

tion by a majority of said proprietors. Marshall had not been one of

such petitioners, and, although a public notice of a time for a hearing

by all persons interested was given by the general court, Marshall did

not appear. The proprietors were duly incorporated and authorized

to make the improvement, levy the cost upon the adjoining lands, and

upon failure to pay the assessment made, seize and sell the land.]
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Parker, J. From the foregoing facts and the arguments thereon

by the counsel, it appears that all the proceedings of the corporation

relative to the assessment and sale were correct, so that if Marshall

were, at the time thereof, a member of the corporation, the title to the

demanded premises in Ellis could not be disputed.

We are, therefore, necessarily brought to the question, indeed, the

only one in the case, whether Marshall, by virtue of the act aforesaid,

became a member of the said corporation, subject to its rules and

regulations, and liable to be assessed for the purpose of building said

street.

The counsel for the plaintiff have contended.

1. That by the virtue of the act itself. Marshall being named therein,

he became, ipso facto, a member of the corporation, the legislature

having competent power to compel him thereto.

2. That should this not be the case, the foregoing facts contain

sufficient evidence of his consent, tacit at least, to the passing of said

act, and the insertion of his name therein.

The determination of the first point requires that we should ascer-

tain the true nature and character of this legislative proceeding. If

it were a public act, predicated upon a view to the general good, the

question would be more difficult. If it be a private act, obtained at

the solicitation of individuals, for their private emolument or for the

1 Statement of facta abridged. Arguments omitted. Part of opinion

omitted.
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improvement of their estates, it must be construed, as to its effect

LIMITS ON POWER TO CREATE.
and operation, like a grant. We are all of opinion that this was a

grant or charter to the individuals who prayed for it, and those who

should associate with them; and all incorporations to make turnpikes,

canals and bridges must be so considered.

Can then one, whose name is by mistake or misrepresentation inserted

in such an act, refuse the privileges it confers and avoid the burdens

it imposes? If he can not, then the legislature may, at all times,

press into the service of such corporations those whose lands may be

wanted for such objects whenever they may be prevailed on to insert

the names of such persons by the intrigue or mistake of those more

interested in the success of the object. No apprehension exists in the

community that the legislature has such power. That the land of any

person, over or through which a turnpike or canal may pass, may be

taken for that purpose if the legislature deem it proper, is not doubted.

The constitution gives power to do this, provided compensation is

made. But it was never before known that they have power over

the person, to make him a member of a corporation, and subject him

to taxation, nolens vo/ens, for the promotion of a private enterprise.
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That a man may refuse a grant, whether from the government or

an individual, seems to be a principle too clear to require the support

of authorities. That he may decline to improve his land no one will

doubt. Although the legislature may wisely determine that a certain

use of his property will be highly beneficial to him, he has a right to

judge for himself on points of this nature. The fact, therefore, in

the case, that Marshall is benefited equally with the other owners by

the making of this street, is of no importance. In Bagg's Case, Rolle's

Reports, 224, it seems to be agreed by the court that a patent pro-

cured by some persons of a corporation shall not bind the rest, unless

they assent. And in Brownlow's Reports, 100, there is this passage:

"It was said that inhabitants of a town can not be incorporated with-

"out the consent of the major part of them, and an incorporation

"without their consent is void."

In Comberbach 316, Holt, speaking of a new charter made to the

city of Norwich by Henry IV and confirmed by Charles II, says the

new charter had been void, if the corporation had refused it, but

when they accept it, and put it in execution, it is good.

If these principles were correct in England in times when preroga-

tive ran high, and the crown or the parliament could not force char-

ters or patents upon the subject without his assent, surely in this free

country, where the legislature derives its power from the people, such

authority can not be contended for.

It being then the opinion of the court that this act is of a nature to

require the assent of Marshall, either express or implied, before it can

operate upon him, it is necessary to inquire into the second point, viz.,

whether the facts agreed upon in this case furnish evidence of such

assent.

It is contended that the act itself, as it contains Marshall's name,

improvement of their estates, it must be construed, as to its effect
and operation, like a grant. We are all of opinion that this was a
grant or charter to the individuals who prayed for it, and those who
should associate with them; and all incorporations to make turnpikes,
canals and bridges must be so considered.
Can then one, whose name is by mi·s take or misrepresentation inserted
in such an act, refuse the privileges it confers and :avoid the burdens
it imposes? If he can not, then the legislature may, at all times,
press into the service of such corporations those whose lands may be
\•:anted for such objects whene\'er they may be prevailed on to insert
the names of such persons by the intrigue or mistake of those more
interested in the success of the object. No apprehension exists in the
community that the legislature has such power. That the land of any
person , over or through which a turnpike or canal may pass, may be
taken for that purpose if the legislature deem it proper, is not doubted.
The constitution gives power to do this, provided compensation is
made. But it was never before known that they have power over
the person, to make him a member of a corporation, and subject him
to taxation, no/ens volcns, for the promotion of a private enterprise.
That a man may refuse a grant, whether from the government or
an individual , seems to be a principle too clear to require the support
of authorities. That he may decline to improve his land no one will
doubt. Although the legislature may wisely determine that a certain
use of his property will be highly beneficial to him, he has a right to
judge for himself on points of this nature. The fact, therefore, in
the case, that Marshall is benefited equally with the other owners by
the making of this street, is of no importance. In Bagg's Case, Rolle'<;
Reports, 224, it seems to be agreed by the court that a patent procured by some persons of a corporation shall not bind the rest, unless
they assent. And in Brownlow's Reports, roo, there is this passage:
"It was said that inhabitants of a town can not be incorporated '"'·ith"out the consent of the major part of them, and an incorporation
"without their consent is void."
In Comberbach 316, Holt, speaking of a new charter made to the
city of Norwich by Henry IV and confirmed by Charles II, says the
new charter had been void, if the corporation had refused it, but
when they accept it, and put it in execution, it is good.
If these principles were correct in England in times when prerogative ran high, and the crown or the parliament could not force charters or patents upon the subject without his assent, surely in this free
country, where the legislature derives its power from the people, such
authority can not be contended for.
·
It being then the opinion of the court that this ac:t is of a nature to
require the assent of Marshall, either express or implied, before it can
operate upon him, it is necessary to inquire into the second point, viz.,
whether the facts agreed upon in this case furnish evidence of such
assent.
It is contended that the act itself, as it contains Marshall's name,
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furnishes such evidence, since it must be presumed that the legislature
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were satisfied on this point before they passed the act.

furnishes such evidence, since it must be presumed that the legislature
were satisfied on this point before they passed the act.
This argument would have great weight, if its force were not impaired by the facts stated in the case. It appearing that Marshall
did not sign the petition; that he did not, in word or writing, assent
to it, or to the act founded upon it; that he did not attend before the
committee, and that in the only transaction, in which he noticed the
corporation, he protested against its authority over him, the presumption arising from his name being in the act is weakened, if not destroyed.
It is then said that, public notice having been given of the hearing
intended by the committee, his silence is evidence of his tacit assent
to the passage of the act. As we are bound to presume everything
in favor of the doings of the legislature, we should think this a strong,
if not a conclusive argument, if the notice given had been such as
necessarily to signify to M arshall that he was to be included in the
act prayed for. But on perusing the petition, which probably was
published in the papers, we find nothing in it from which we could
infer that his property or rights were to be affected in the manner
contemplated by this act. He may be considered as notified that a
street was intended to be built over his ground: and all that he could
infer from this was that so much of his land as the street would pass
over would be taken for this purpose, and that he would receive indemnity for it in the usual way, and that any opposition to it would
be unavailing. Ile certainly could never have understood that it was
intended to make him a member of the corporation without his consent. There is therefore no evidence, even of a tacit consent, before
the passing of the act, and his conduct, after it passed, amounts to a
direct disavowal of all the doings of the corporation, as they respected
him or his property.
Upon the whole, therefore, we are of opinion that the act, under
which the plaintiff sets up his title, could not bind Marshall without
his assent: that he, having uniformly, whenever opportunity occurred,
signified his dissent, is not a member of the corporation it created,
was not liable to their assessments, and therefore the sale of his land
was without authority of law and is void. • • •
Plaintiff non-suit.

This argument would have great weight, if its force were not im-

paired by the facts stated in the case. It appearing that Marshall

did not sign the petition; that he did not, in word or writing, assent

to it, or to the act founded upon it; that he did not attend before the

committee, and that in the only transaction, in which he noticed the

corporation, he protested against its authority over him, the presump-

tion arising from his name being in the act is weakened, if not de-

stroyed.

It is then said that, public notice having been given of the hearing

intended by the committee, his silence is evidence of his tacit assent

to the passage of the act. As we are bound to presume everything

in favor of the doings of the legislature, we should think this a strong,

if not a conclusive argument, if the notice given had been such as

necessarily to signify to Marshall that he was to be included in the

act prayed for. But on perusing the petition, which probably was

published in the papers, we find nothing in it from which we could
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infer that his property or rights were to be affected in the manner

contemplated by this act. He may be considered as notified that a

street was intended to be built over his ground: and all that he could

infer from this was that so much of his land as the street would pass

over would be taken for this purpose, and that he would receive in-

demnity for it in the usual way, and that any opposition to it would

be unavailing. He certainly could never have understood that it was

intended to make him a member of the corporation without his con-

sent. There is therefore no evidence, even of a tacit consent, before

the passing of the act, and his conduct, after it passed, amounts to a

direct disavowal of all the doings of the corporation, as they respected

him or his property.

Upon the whole, therefore, we are of opinion that the act, under

which the plaintiff sets up his title, could not bind Marshall without

his assent: that he, having uniformly, whenever opportunity occurred,

signified his dissent, is not a member of the corporation it created,

was not liable to their assessments, and therefore the sale of his land

was without authority of law and is void. * * *

Plaintiff non-suit.

Note. 1. While the granting of a charter is the enactment of a law, it is a

law of a peculiar character; it is one made to take effect upon any one only

after its acceptance by those to whom, or for whose use, it is granted. It does

not become binding upon them or any one till accepted, but when accepted

by the grantees it then becomes the law of the corporate existence, binding

upon, not only those who accept, but also upon all others who may have any

dealings with or be affected by the existence of the corporation thereby cre-

Note. l. While the granting of a charter is the enactment of a law, it is ll
law of a peculiar character; it is one made to take effect upon any one only
after its acceptance by those to whom, or for whose use, it is granted. It does
not become binding upon them or any one till accepted , but when accepted
by tl.1e grantPes it then becomes the law of the corporate existence. binding
upon, not only those who accept, but also upon all others who may lrnve any
dealings with or be affected by the existence of the corporation thereby created. It then becomes a law of the state, the same as any other law, and the
maxim that "ignorance of the law excuses no one," applies in tbis cllse as in
all others, not only to the corporntors anrl members, but otbers as well. Not
only thi s, but llfter its acceptance it becomes an executer! grant upon a condition suhsequent- i. e., that it will be used properly under penalty of forfeiture
for abuse-but otherwise not the subject of revocation or amendment without
consent of the grantees, unless the power to do so is reserved at the time of

ated. It then becomes a law of the state, the same as any other law, and the

maxim that "ignorance of the law excuses no one," applies in this case as in

all others, not only to the corporators and members, but others as well. Not

only this, but after its acceptance it becomes an executed grant upon a condi-

tion subsequent—i. e., that it will be used properly under penalty of forfeiture

for abuse—but otherwise not the subject of revocation or amendment without

consent of the grantees, unless the power to do so is reserved at the time of
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the grant. See infra, cases on the subject, acceptance of the charter, contracts

contained in the charter, pp. 409, 707.

Pee 1705, Rex v. Chancellor of Cambridge, 3 Burr. 1661; 1787, Rex v.

Amerv, 1 T. R. 575; 178'.), King v. Passmore, 3 T. R. 240; 1819, Dartmouth

College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, infra, p. 708; 1820, Lincoln, etc.,

Bank v. Richardson, 1 Greenleaf (Me.) 79; 1825, Rex v. Westwood, 4 B. &

C. 781; 1833, Fire Department v. Kip, 10 Wend. 266; 1840, Falconer v. Camp-

bell, 2 McLean (U. S. C. C.) 196, supra, p. 287; 1840, Coffin v. Collins, 17 Me.

440; 1842, Bailev v. Mavor of N. Y., 3 Hill (N. Y.)531; 1847, Haslett v.

Wotherspoon, 1 Strob. Eq. (S. C.) 209; ia54, New Orleans J. & G. N. R. v.

Harris, 27 Miss. 517; 1861, State v. Dawson, 16 Ind. 40, infra, p. 412; 1883,

McKav v. Beard, 20 S. C. 156; 1885, Smith v. Silver Valley M. Co., 64 Md.

85; 1889, Be Metropolitan Transit Co., Ill N. Y. 588; 1891, Demarest v.

Flack, 128 N. Y. 205; 1892, Welsh v. Plumas Co., 94 Cal. 368; 1896, Quinlan

v. Houston, etc., Ry., 89 Tex. 356.

the grant. See infra, cm;es on the subject, acceptance of the charter, contracts
contained in the charter, pp. 401;1, 707.
• ee 1765, Rex v. Chancellor of Cambridge, 3 Burr. 1661; 1787, Rex v.
Amery, 1 T . R. 515; 178!1, Kingv. Passmore, 3 T. R. 240; 1819, Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518, infra, p. 708; 1820, Lincoln, etc.,
Bank v. Richardson, 1 Greenleaf (Me.) 79; 1825, Rex v. Westwood, 4 B. &
C. 181; 1 8.~3, Fire Department v. Kip, 10 Wend. 266; 1840, Falconer v. Campbell, 21\lcLean .(U.S. C. C.) 196, supra, p. 287; 1840, Coffin v. Collins, 17 .M:e.
440; 1842, Bailey v. Mayor of N. Y., 3 Hil!'(N. Y. ) 531; 1847, Haslett v.
Wotherspoon, 1 Stroh. Eq. (8. C.) 209; 1854, New Orleans J . & G. N. R. v.
Harris, 27 Miss. 5 17; 1861, State v. Dawson, 16 Ind. 40, infra, p. 412; 1883,
:McKay v. Beard, 20 S. C. 156; 1885, Smith v. Silver Valley M. Co., 64 Md.
85; 1889, Re Metropolitan Transit Co., 111 N. Y. 588; 1891, Demarest v.
Flack, 128 N. Y. 205; 1892, Welsh v. Plumas Co., 94 Cal. 368; 1896, Quinlan
v. Houston, etc., Ry., 89 Tex. 356.

Sec. 64. (b) May be exclusive, but not so unless expressly made

so. But even when made exclusive may be appropriated to

a public use under the power of eminent domain, upon com-
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pensation being made.

See. 64. ( b) May be exclusive, but not so unless expressly made
so. But even when made exclusive may be appropriated to
a public use under the power of eminent · domain, upon compensation being made.

THE PROPRIETORS OF THE PISCATAQUA BRIDGE v. THE NEW

HAMPSHIRE BRIDGE Et Al.1

1834. In the Superior Court of the Judicature of New Hamp-

shire. 7 N. H. Rep. 35-72.

[Bill in chancery to restrain defendants from erecting a bridge across

the Piscataqua river at any place between Nanny's Island and Wal-

ton's Point. In 1793 plaintiffs were incorporated to build a bridge

THE PROPRIETORS OF THE PISCATAQUA BRIDGE v. THE NEW
HAMPSHIRE BRIDGE ET AL. 1

between Bloody Point and Furbur's Ferry (as stated in the title), the

preamble stating that a bridge at the place above named would be of

1834.

IN

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE JUDICATURE OF NEW HAMP-

SHIRE.

public utility. The third section of the act authorized the bridge to

7 N. H.

Rep. 35-72.

be built anywhere between Bloody Point and Furbur's Ferry, inclu-

sively, while the sixth section provided that the "exclusive right of build-

ing and maintaining a bridge across said Piscataqua river, anywhere

between Walton's Point, so called, being easterly of Knight's or

Bloody Point Ferry and Nanny's Island, so called, laying at the bot-

tom of Great Bay, above Furbur's Ferry, be and the same is fully

granted to said petitioners, and such as are or may be associated with

them, and become proprietors, their heirs and assigns." In 1853,

the defendants were incorporated with authority to build and main-

tain a bridge across the same river between Newington and Durham.

Plaintiff's bridge was erected in 1794 between these towns. It was

conceded that the place where the defendants proposed to erect this

bridge was within the limits stated in the sixth section of plaintiff's

charter, but not within the limits set forth in the title, preamble and

third section.]

'Statement of facte abridged. Arguments omitted. Part of opinion

omitted.

[Bill in chancery to restrain defendants from erecting a bridge across
the Piscataqua river at any place between Nanny's Island and Walton's Point. In 1793 plaintiffs were incorporated to build a bridge
between Bloody Point and Furbur's Ferry (as stated in the title), the
preamble stating that a bridge at the place above named would be of
public utility. The third section of the act authorized the bridge to
be built anywhere between Bloody Point and Furbur's Ferry, inclusively, while the sixth section provided that the "exclusive right of building and maintaining a bridge across said Piscataqua river, anywhere
between Walton's Point, so called, being easterly of Knight's or
Bloody Point Ferry and Nanny's Island, so called, laying at the bottom of Great Bay, above Furbur's Ferry, be and the same is fully
granted to said petitioners, and such as are or may be associated with
them, and become proprietors, their heirs and assigns." In 1853,
the defendants were incorporated with authority to build and maintain a bridge across the same river between Newington and Durham.
Plaintiff's bridge was erected in 1794 betw~en these towns. It was
conceded that the place where the defendants proposed to erect this
bridge was within the limits stated in the sixth section of plaintiff's
charter, but not within the limits set forth in the title, preamble and
third section.]
1
Statement of facts
omitted.
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Parker, J. * * * The answer admits that defendants are about to

erect a bridge at the place specified, and claims a right so to do under

310

the authority of the legislature, and we must, therefore, proceed to in-

quire whether its erection will infringe the rights of the plaintiffs, and

PARKER, J. • * • The nnswer admits that defendants are about to
erect a bridge at the place specified, and claims a right so to do under
the authority of the legislature, and we must, therefore, proceed to inquire whether its erection will infringe the rights of the plaintiffs, and
be the means of such injustice to them as should be prevented by a writ
of injunction.
It is objected, on the part of the defendants, that the charter of
the plaintiffs does not g ive them such limits that the erection of a proposed bridge, by the defendants, will interfere with their exclusive
rights. It is said that by the terms of their charter the plaintiffs had
no right to build a bridge anywhere, except between Bloody Point
and Furbur's Ferry, and that, taking the title of the act, together with
the section cited , all the exclusive rights of the plaintiffs, if they ha,·e
any beyond the place occupied by their bridge, must be limited to
Bloody Point on the one hand and Furbur's Ferry on the other; th:it
if they have any claim of right above Furbur's Ferry, it can be only
a right to preclude others from building a bridge, not to build one
themselves, that this can not be a franchi se , and that their exclu ive
limits can not extend beyond the limits in which they might erect a
bridge. And if this be the true construction of the plaintiffs' rights,
the defendants allege that they can accompfo,h all they are attempting
to do without any violation of the rights or franchise s of the plaintiffs.
But we can not r estrict the grant to the plaintiffs by the title and
preamble of the act. If w e find within the body of the act an express and unequivocal grant of po ..,·ers and rights not mentioned in
the title or preamble, we can not restrict the grant of those right
merely because the terms of such grant are more extensive than
the terms of the title and preamble. 7 Pick. 455.
If the title had been an act to incorporate certain persons for the
purpose of building a bridge at Fox Point, the place where the plaintiffs erected their bridge, and the act itself granted to the corporation,
in explicit terms, the right to build between Walton's Point and
Nanny's Island, the grant could not be construed to be of the right
mentioned in the title alone.
The sixth section of the plaintiffs' charter gave them , in terms, the
exclusive right of building and maintaining a bridge across the Pi cataqua river, anywhere bet\'veen Walton's Point and Nanny's I sland;
and there is, in this section. no reference to any other part of the
charter by which this grant of power and right is to be restricted.
On the supposition that hy the charter the plaintiffs were obliged to
erect this bridge within the limits betv•een Bloody Point and Furbur•s
Ferry, as specified in the third section, we see no reason, if the legi lature may grant exclusive rights, to doubt their power to grant to the
plaintiffs exclusive limits, connected with the grant of their bridge
even beyond the limits in which their bridge must be erected.
Such right of exclusion might be essentially necessary to ensure the
erection and maintenance of the bridge , notwithstanding the bridge
itself might be required to be erected within smnller limits, or at a
definite place-and if so it was competent for the legislature to make

be the means of such injustice to them as should be prevented by a writ

of injunction.

It is objected, on the part of the defendants, that the charter of

the plaintiffs does not give them such limits that the erection of a pro-

posed bridge, by the defendants, will interfere witli their exclusive

rights. It is said that by the terms of their charter the plaintiffs had

no right to build a bridge anywhere, except between Bloody Point

and Furbur's Ferry, and that, taking the title of the act, together with

the section cited, all the exclusive rights of the plaintiffs, if they have

any beyond the place occupied by their bridge, must be limited to

Bloody Point on the one hand and Furbur's Ferry on the other; that

if they have any claim of right above Furbur's Ferry, it can be only

a right to preclude others from building a bridge, not to build one

themselves, that this can not be a franchise, and that their exclusive

limits can not extend beyond the limits in which they might erect a

bridge. And if this be the true construction of the plaintiffs' rights,

the defendants allege that they can accomplish all they are attempting
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to do without any violation of the rights or franchises of the plaintiffs.

But we can not restrict the grant to the plaintiffs by the title and

preamble of the act. If we find within the body of the act an ex-

press and unequivocal grant of powers and rights not mentioned in

the title or preamble, we can not restrict the grant of those rights

merely because the terms of such grant are more extensive than

the terms of the title and preamble. 7 Pick. 455.

If the title had been an act to incorporate certain persons for the

purpose of building a bridge at Fox Point, the place where the plaint-

iffs erected their bridge, and the act itself granted to the corporation,

in explicit terms, the right to build between Walton's Point and

Nanny's Island, the grant could not be construed to be of the right

mentioned in the title alone.

The sixth section of the plaintiffs' charter gave them, in terms, the

exclusive right of building and maintaining a bridge across the Pisca-

taqua river, anywhere between Walton's Point and Nanny's Island;

and there is, in this section, no reference to any other part of the

charter by which this grant of power and right is to be restricted.

On the supposition that by the charter the plaintiffs were obliged to

erect this bridge within the limits between Bloody Point and Furbur's

Ferry, as specified in the third section, we see no reason, if the legis-

lature may grant exclusive rights, to doubt their power to grant to the

plaintiffs exclusive limits, connected with the grant of their bridge

even beyond the limits in which their bridge must be erected.

Such right of exclusion might be essentially necessary to ensure the

erection and maintenance of the bridge, notwithstanding the bridge

itself might be required to be erected within smaller limits, or at a

definite place—and if so it was competent for the legislature to make
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such a grant, attached to the grant of the bridge, if they might law-

3uc.h a grant, attached to the grant of the bridge, if they might lawfully grant any exclusive limits.
It might, perhaps. admit of question whether the sixth section did
not give the plaintiffs power to erect their bridge anywhere within
the exclusive limits designated in that section, but this is not material
t'o !lie present case.
It is further contended that the plaintiffs' chatter gave them only
the exclu. ive rig ht of selecting a site for their bridge within ce1tain
limits, and that, having made their selection and erected their biidge,
the place of erection becomes thenceforth the only exclu sive right
\vhich they can claim under their charter.
But we· can not adopt this construction of the grant, not only because such are not the terms in which the grant is made, but because
it is apparent that such construction would defeat the object which
must have been in contemplation in procuring and making the grant
of an exclusive right.
The charter of the plaintiffs, then , confers upon them by its terms
the exclusive right of building and maintaining a bridge between
Walton's Point and Nanny's Island, and it is conceded that these
limits cover the whole ground upon which the defendants claim a
right to erect their bridge.
The next question is whether this ·was a constitutional and valid
grant.
The answer alleges that at the time of this grant one Levi Furbur
had a right of ferry within those limits; that no compensation was
provided for Furbur, and that the grant is unconstitutional and void.
That Furbur was in the occupation of a ferry at the time of the
grant of the plaintiffs, which was within the exclusive limits granted
to them, seems to be conceded. What his right was, or how it originated, does not appear.
There is nothing to show that his ferry was not set up by him
without any authority.
On the supposition that he occupied under a grant, it is not to be
inferred of course that the grant exte.nded beyond the place he occupied.
If Furbur had had the grant of a ferry, generally, we should pause
before holding that the legislature could not grant a bridge, or even
another ferry, so near as to be consequentially injuriou s to him. Upon
this subject different opinions have been entertained; and it may be
well questioned whether the grantee of a f erry, or of a right to erect
and maintain a bridge at a parti'cular place without any terms of
exclusion in the grant, can set up that right iu avoidance of any
other g rant which is not directly injurious in its operation, but iniurious merely in £ts remote consequences by dive1·t£ng travel and
tolls. Callender v. Marsh, I Pick. 432.
It would seem to have been the understanding in this state, at least,
that if the party intended to secure himself from competition of this
character he must obtain a provision to that effect in his grant: a nd
if no such provision is found, it may well be held that the grant was

fully grant any exclusive limits.

It might, perhaps, admit of question whether the sixth section did

not give the plaintiffs power to erect their bridge anywhere within

the exclusive limits designated in that section, but this is not material

to the present case.

It is further contended that the plaintiffs' charter gave them only

the exclusive right of selecting a site for their bridge within certain

limits, and that, having made their selection and erected their bridge,

the place of erection becomes thenceforth the only exclusive right

which they can claim under their charter.

But we can not adopt this construction of the grant, not only be-

cause such are not the terms in which the grant is made, but because

it is apparent that such construction would defeat the object which

must have been in contemplation in procuring and making the grant

of an exclusive right.

The charter of the plaintiffs, then, confers upon them by its terms

the exclusive right of building and maintaining a bridge between
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Walton's Point and Nanny's Island, and it is conceded that these

limits cover the whole ground upon which the defendants claim a

right to erect their bridge.

The next question is whether this was a constitutional and valid

grant.

The answer alleges that at the time of this grant one Levi Furbur

had a right of ferry within those limits; that no compensation was

provided for Furbur, and that the grant is unconstitutional and void.

That Furbur was in the occupation of a ferry at the time of the

grant of the plaintiffs, which was within the exclusive limits granted

to them, seems to be conceded. What his right was, or how it orig-

inated, does not appear.

There is nothing to show that his ferry was not set up by him

without any authority.

On the supposition that he occupied under a grant, it is not to be

inferred of course that the grant extended beyond the place he occu-

pied.

If Furbur had had the grant of a ferry, generally, we should pause

before holding that the legislature could not grant a bridge, or even

another ferry, so near as to be consequentially injurious to him. Upon

this subject different opinions have been entertained: and it may be

well questioned whether the grantee of a ferry, or of a right to erect

and maintain a bridge at a particular place -without any terms of

exclusion in the grant, can set tip that right in avoidance of any

other grant which is not directly injurious in its operation, but in-

jurious merely i?t its remote consequences by diverting travel and

tolls. Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 432.

It would seem to have been the understanding in this state, at least,

that if the party intended to secure himself from competition of this

character he must obtain a provision to that effect in his grant; and

if no such provision is found, it may well be held that the grant was
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taken with a reliance on the wisdom and discretion of the legislature

to protect the grantee from injurious competition, by refusing to
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authorize any other enterprise of a similar character in the immediate

vicinity, unless required by an imperious necessity; and with an assent

taken with a reliance on the wisdom and discretion of the legislature
to protect the grantee from injurious competition, by refusing to
authorize any other enterprise of a similar character in the immediate
vicinity, unless required by an imperious necessity; and with an assent
on the part of the grantee that, whenever the legislature should deem
it expedient, they might make other grants remotely affecting the
former, so long as the right and privilege conferred by the terms of
the grant were not infringed. But it is not important to settle that question here.
If it was shown that Furbur had an exclusive right of ferry within
certain limits, we are not prepared to hold that the legislature might
not lawfully grant a right to erect a bridge within those limits if the
locus in quo occupied by him for his ferry was not taken, and he was
left to the enjoyment of an exclusive right of ferry as before.
The erection of a bridge near his ferry might be consequentially
injurious to him. It might deprive him of. the profits of his ferry;
and yet if his right of ferry was not infringed, how could the act be
held to be unconstitutional?
The grant of an exclusive right of ferry is certainly not an exclusive
right of all modes of transportation and conveyance.
Whatever Furbur's rights may have been, he does not appear to
have complained of the erection of the plaintiffs' bridge; and whether
they purchased his consent, or he abandoned his ferry without, the defendants are in no way connected with him, nor would the state, by
an extinguishment of his right of ferry, gain a right to grant a bridge
within the exclusive limits for a bridge already granted to the plaintiffs; although the legislature might perhaps for that reason grant another ferry at the same place.
It is further contended that the legislature which granted the charter of the plaintiffs' had no power to grant such an exclusive right,
and that the act, therefore, so far as it purports to give exclusive limits, is void.
By the constitution of this state, full power and authority are given
and granted to the general court "from time to time to make, ordain
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws,
statutes, ordinances, directions and instructions, either with penalties
or without, so as the same be not repugnant or contrary to this constitution, as they may judge for the benefit and welfare of the state,"
etc. N. H. Laws 7.
There is certainly no express provision of the constitution authorizing, in so many words, a grant of this character. It is equally certain
that there is no express prohibition of such an act. "When," says
Chief Justice Kent, "the people erect a single entire government, they
grant at once all the rights of sovereignty. The powers granted are
indefinite and incapable of enumeration. Everything is granted that is
not expressly reserved in the constitutional charter, or necessarily retained as inherent in the people." Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9
Johns. 574.

on the part of the grantee that, whenever the legislature should deem

it expedient, they might make other grants remotely affecting the

former, so long as the right and privilege conferred by the terms of

the grant were not infringed. But it is not important to settle that ques-

tion here.

If it was shown that Furbur had an exclusive right of ferry within

certain limits, we are not prepared to hold that the legislature might

not lawfully grant a right to erect a bridge within those limits if the

locus in quo occupied by him for his ferry was not taken, and he was

left to the enjoyment of an exclusive right of ferry as before.

The erection of a bridge near his ferry might be consequentially

injurious to him. It might deprive him of the profits of his ferry;

and yet if his right of ferry was not infringed, how could the act be

held to be unconstitutional?

The grant of an exclusive right of ferry is certainly not an exclusive

right of all modes of transportation and conveyance.
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Whatever Furbur's rights may have been, he does not appear to

have complained of the erection of the plaintiffs' bridge; and whether

they purchased his consent, or he abandoned his ferry without, the de-

fendants are in no way connected with him, nor would the state, by

an extinguishment of his right of ferry, gain a right to grant a bridge

within the exclusive limits for a bridge already granted to the plaint-

iffs; although the legislature might perhaps for that reason grant an-

other ferry at the same place.

It is further contended that the legislature which granted the char-

ter of the plaintiffs' had no power to grant such an exclusive right,

and that the act, therefore, so far as it purports to give exclusive lim-

its, is void.

By the constitution of this state, full power and authority are given

and granted to the general court "from time to time to make, ordain

and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws,

statutes, ordinances, directions and instructions, either with penalties

or without, so as the same be not repugnant or contrary to this consti-

tution, as they may judge for the benefit and welfare of the state,"

etc. N. H. Laws 7.

There is certainly no express provision of the constitution authoriz-

ing, in so many words, a grant of this character. It is equally certain

that there is no express prohibition of such an act. "When," says

Chief Justice Kent, "the people erect a single entire government, they

grant at once all the rights of sovereignty. The powers granted are

indefinite and incapable of enumeration. Everything is granted that is

not expressly reserved in the constitutional charter, or necessarily re-

tained as inherent in the people." Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9

Johns. 574.
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It will not be necessary to resort to any principle so broad as this
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to show that the legislature may make a grant of this character.

313

The constitution nowhere gives the legislature, in terms, the power

to make a grant of land, or a charter of incorporation, or to confer a

right to make bridges, turnpikes or canals, but such power has always

been exercised, and no one doubts the right to make such grants.

Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 128.

If this is conceded, the legislature may certainly make exclusive

grants.

They may grant land in fee-simple, and the grantee will have an

exclusive right. uCujus est solum ejus est usque ad coclum, et ad in-

feros"—and he has this to him, and his heirs and assigns forever.

Nothing can well be imagined more exclusive than this.

They may grant a bridge across a navigable river. No one can

justify such erection without a grant. But such grant is necessarily

exclusive to a certain extent. So far as the structure itself extends,

so far the right must be exclusive. No one will contend that a sub-

sequent legislature could regard such grant as void, and for that rea-

son authorize the building of another upon the same foundation, or
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one which should occupy a part of the space already in the possession

of the grantee.

The legislature then has power to grant a right to build and main-

tain a bridge, and the right will be exclusive to the extent occupied

by the bridge, which may be of greater or less dimensions, according

to the grant.

What limits the power of the legislature to the positions occupied

by the wood and stone used in the construction of the work?

If the legislature may grant a right which will be exclusive to the

extent of forty feet or sixty feet, or what number of feet or rods, shall

we fix the limits of the power so that all beyond is void?

If it be necessary, in order to effect the object, that the grant should

be exclusive to the usual width of the bridge, it may be equally

necessary to the accomplishment of the purpose, that the limits

should be still more extensive. It may be necessary to lay the foun-

dation much broader. It may be necessary to erect works above and

below for the preservation of the structure.

If the legislature may grant the right to build the bridge, and may

grant exclusive power over space sufficient for its erection, because

otherwise the grant could not be carried into effect, why may they

not grant such power over space sufficient in other respects to insure

its erection? Why may they not make a grant of such extent that

the grantees will think the prospect of remuneration sufficient to in-

duce them to undertake the work?

Again the legislature may undoubtedly grant with reference to the

preservation of the bridge. Such is one of the objects in granting a

toll. If they may grant powers and rights with a view to preserve it

from floods, by the erection of works of security above or below;

and if they may grant tolls in order to preserve it from decay, why

It will not be necessary to resort to any principle so broad as this
to show that the legislature may make a grant of this character.
The con stitution nowhere gives the legislature, in terms, the power
to make a grar.t of land, or a cha1ter of incorporation, or to confer a
right to make bridges, turnpikes or canals, but such power has always
been exercised, and no one doubts the right to make such grants.
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 128.
If this is conceded, the legislature may certainly make exclusive
grants.
They may grant land in fee-simple, and the grantee will have an
exclusi\'e right. "Cujus est so/um ejus est us9ue ad coelum, et ad i'nf cros" -and he has this to him, and his heirs and assigns forever.
)iothing can well be imagined more exclusive than this.
They may grant a bridge across a navigable river. No one can
justify such erection without a grant. But such grant is necessarily
exclusive to a certain extent. So far as the structure itself extends,
o far the right must be exclusive. No one will contend that a subsequent legislature could regard such grant as void, and for that reason authorize the building of another upon the same foundation, or
one which should occupy a part of the space already in the possession
of the grantee.
The legislature then has power to grant a right to build and maintain a bridge, and the right will be exclusive to the extent occupied
by the bridge, which may be of greater or less dimensions, according
to the grant.
What limits the power of the legislature to the positions occupied
by the wood and stone used in the construction of the work?
If the legislature may grant a right which will be exclusive to the
extent of forty feet or sixty feet, or what number of feet or rods, shall
we fix the limits of the power so that all beyond is void?
If it be necessary, in order to effect the object, that the grant should
be exclusive to the usual width of the bridge, it may be equally
necessary to the accomplishment of the purpose, that the limits
should be still more extensive. It may be necessary to lay the foundation much broader. It may be necessary to erect works above and
below for the preservation of the structure.
If the legislature may grant the right to build the bridge, and may
grant exclusive power over space sufficient for its erection, because
otherwise the grant could not be carried into effect, why may they
'not grant such power over space sufficient in other respects to insure
its erection? Why may they not make a grant of such extent that
the grantees will think the prospect of remuneration sufficient to induce them to undertake the work?
Again the legislature may undoubtedly grant with reference to the
preservation of the bridge. Such is one of the objects in granting a
toll. If they may grant powers and rights with a view to preserve it
from floods, by the erection of works of security above or below;
and if they may grant tolls in order to preserve it from decay, why
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may they not extend the exclusive right so far that these tolls will
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furnish adequate means for keeping it in repair?
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It is not our province to judge how extensive the grant to the plaint-

iffs ought to have been. It was said in the argument that the neces-

may they not extend the exclu ive right so far that these tolls will
furnish adequate m eans for keeping it in repair?
It i not our pro,·ince to judge how extensive the grant to the plaintiff ought to have been. It was said in the argument that the necessiry of the act authodzing the defendants to erect a bridge is concluively proved by the grant itself-that the comt are not to inqi:1ire into
that nece sity. And so of the plaintiffs' exclusive limits-the necessity of their extent in order to effect the object was for the consideration of the legislature and not for us.
Charters with exclusive priYileges have been repeatedly granted
here and elsewhere. 9 Wheat. 97, note a. They have been deemed
necessary to the promotion of enterprises of public utility, and have
in m any instances operated grei.tly to the convenience of the community, as the means of accomplishing public improvements which
would not otherwise have been undertaken, or must ha\·e been delayed
to a much later period.
Th e rt"glzt to make such exclusive grants has been supported by
som e of the most eminent counsel i"n the United Stales, and has not
been contested by others w ho would not have fai"led to deny it had it
been d eemed of a questionable character. It has r eccz"vcd the sane·
lion of some of the most learned tribunals in the Union, and we see
no reason to doubt the soundness of the prindple. Proprietors of
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 393, f+O, 448, 456,
465, 473, 476, 492, 519; Livingston v. Van lngen, 9 Johns. 525,
551, 559, 563, 573, 584; Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. C. R. 150;
17 Johns. 488; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 74, 143·
It has not been contended that there is anything in the provision of
the constitution of the United States authorizing congress to regulate
commerce, or in any act of congress which militates, in any degree,
with the power of granting an exclusive right of building a bridge
within the territory of a state, and there seems to be no ground for
any such supposition. North River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston,
3 ~owen 733, 754, 9 Wheat. 19, 203, 235; The People v. Babcock,
r r Wendell 590; 2 Peters S. C. R. 245.
It has been urged in the argument that if the legislature may grant
exclusive rights of this character, a legislature opposed to manufactures, to internal improvements or to banking might grant a small
cotton factory, with the exclusive right of manufacturing within the
state, or a short railroad or a single bank, with exclusi\"e privileges,
and the public thu s suffer great injury.
It will be in time to consider whether grants of such a character
are within the constitutional exercise of the legislative po·wer and
whether they may or may not be avoided, when a case is presented
to u in which it is apparent that a fraud must have been practiced in
obtaining the grant, or the circumstances under which it was made
how that it was merely colorable, and intended to effect other purpo es than those which appear upon the face of it.
There is nothing in this case to lead to :i i;;upposition that this grant
was not fairly obtained-that the public good did not require a grant

sity of the act authorizing the defendants to erect a bridge is conclu-

sively proved by the grant itself—that the court are not to inquire into

that necessity. And so of the plaintiffs' exclusive limits—the neces-

sity of their extent in order to effect the object was for the considera-

tion of the legislature and not for us.

Charters with exclusive privileges have been repeatedly granted

here and elsewhere. 9 Wheat. 97, note a. They have been deemed

necessary to the promotion of enterprises of public utility, and have

in many instances operated greatly to the convenience of the com-

munity, as the means of accomplishing public improvements which

would not otherwise have been undertaken, or must have been delayed

to a much later period.

The right to make such exclusive grants has been supported by

some of the most eminent counsel in the United Stales, and has not

been contested by others who would not have failed to deny it had it

been deemed of a questionable character. It has received the sanc-
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tion of some of the inost learned tribunals in the Union, and we see

no reason to doubt the soundness of the principle. Proprietors of

Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 393, 440, 448, 456,

465, 473, 476, 492, 519; Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 525,

551' 559. 563- 573. 584! Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. C. R. 150;

17 Johns. 488; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 74, 143.

It has not been contended that there is anything in the provision of

the constitution of the United States authorizing congress to regulate

commerce, or in any act of congress which militates, in any degree,

with the power of granting an exclusive right of building a bridge

within the territory of a state, and there seems to be no ground for

any such supposition. North River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston,

3 Cowen 733, 754, 9 Wheat. 19, 203, 235; The People v. Babcock,

11 Wendell 590; 2 Peters S. C. R. 245.

It has been urged in the argument that if the legislature may grant

exclusive rights of this character, a legislature opposed to manufac-

tures, to internal improvements or to banking might grant a small

cotton factory, with the exclusive right of manufacturing within the

state, or a short railroad or a single bank, with exclusive privileges,

and the public thus suffer great injury.

It will be in time to consider whether grants of such a character

are within the constitutional exercise of the legislative power and

whether they may or may not be avoided, when a case is presented

to us in which it is apparent that a fraud must have been practiced in

obtaining the grant, or the circumstances under which it was made

show that it was merely colorable, and intended to effect other pur-

poses than those which appear upon the face of it.

There is nothing in this case to lead to a supposition that this grant

was not fairly obtained—that the public good did not require a grant
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of the powers and rights contained in the charter—or that the consid-

§ 6-t-

LIMITS ON POWER TO CREATE.

315

eration on the part of the grantees, in providing a great public high-

way for the convenience of the citizens, was not fully adequate to all

the rights and privileges they received. It appears that the grantees

did not overreach the legislature. The enterprise was one of great

public utility; and while the community have had all the benefit which

was contemplated from the grant, the grantees, it is not denied, were

subjected to great loss—the expenditure far exceeding the estimates.

Cases may exist where, owing to a change in the population, busi-

ness and intercourse of the country, the public interest may require

the opening of new avenues within the limits of such exclusive grants,

and in which the individual right should be made subservient to the

public use ; but this maybe done without a violation of the public faith.

Whatever the public requires they are able to pay for—and it is not

for the public interest that the grants of the government should be

held good so long only as there is no desire to interfere with them—

good while they are onerous to the grantee, and invalid when others

may wish to participate in the benefits derived from them.

It is argued that the only pretended right of the plaintiffs is a prom-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:15 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ise not to give liberty to others to build a bridge; but we do not view

it in that light. The charter of the plaintiffs contains a grant of a

franchise—an incorporeal hereditament. The grant of an exclusive

right is part of that franchise—granted in connection with their right

to build a bridge, and in aid of that right—holden with that right—

capable of being used by the erection of a bridge elsewhere than in its

present location—may be attached with the rest of the franchise, and

taken on execution—and under it the plaintiffs may grant a license to

build a bridge within those limits to any one who has obtained a grant

of authority from the legislature to erect such bridge.

The plaintiffs have a property in their exclusive grant and it is not

a mere stipulation on the part of the legislature that no other liberty

to erect a bridge shall be granted.

The plaintiffs then having an exclusive grant to the extent set forth

in their bill, the next inquiry is, whether the defendants, by virtue of

their charter, can lawfully proceed to erect another bridge within

those limits?

It is urged that if the charter of the plaintiffs is a contract, it is

subject to the implied condition of yielding to the public necessity

and convenience—that if their grant be property, it may, like other

property, be taken for public use, and that although no compensation

is provided here, that does not make the grant to the defendants

void, but the plaintiffs may have an action.

The charter of the defendants is not unconstitutional or void. Of

itself it impairs no rights. As a grant to the individuals named in it

to be a corporation, it is conceded to be good. As against the pub-

lic, it contains a valid grant of a right to build a bridge and to take

tolls, and if the defendants can agree with the plaintiffs, we see no

objection with their proceeding under their charter, and enjoying all

the privileges it purports to confer.

of the powers and rights contained in the charter-or that the consideration on the part of the grantees, in providing a great public highway for the convenience of the citizens, was not fully adequate to all
the rights and privileges they received. It appears that the grantees
did not overreach the legislature. The enterprise was one of great
public utility; and while the community have had all the benefit which
was contemplated from the grant, the grantees, it is not denied, were
subjected to great loss-the expenditure far exceeding the estimates.
Cases may exist where, owing to a change in the population, business and intercourse of the country, the public interest may require
the opening of new avenues within the limits of such exclusive grants,
and in which the individual right should be made subservient to the
public use; but this may be done without a violation of the public faith.
Whatever the public requires they are able to pay for-and it is not
for the public interest that the grants of the government should be
held good so long only as there is no desire to interfere with themgood while they are onerous to the grantee, and invalid when others
may wish to participate in the benefits derived from them.
It is argued that the only pretended right of the plaintiffs is a promise not to give liberty to others to build a bridge; but we do not view
it in that fight. The charter of the plaintiffs contains a grant of a
franchise-an incorporeal hereditament. The grant of an exclusive
right is part of that franchise-granted in connection with their right
to build a bridge, and in aid of that right-holden with that rightcapable of being used by the erection of a bridge elsewhere than in its
present location-may be attached with the rest of the franchise, and
taken on executjon-and under it the plaintiffs may grant a license to
build a bridge within those limits to any one who has obtained a grant
of authority from the legislature to erect such bridge.
The plaintiffs have a property in their t:xclusive grant and it is not
a mere stipulation on the part of the legislature that no other liberty
to erect a bridge shall be granted.
The plaintiffs then having an exclusive grant to the extent set forth
in their bill, the next inquiry is, whether the defendants, by virtue of
their charter, can lawfully proceed to erect another bridge within
those limits?
It is urged that if the charter of the plaintiffs is a contract, it is
subject to the implied condition of yielding to the public necessity
and convenience-that if their grant be property, it may, like other
property, be taken for public use, and that although no compensation
is provided here, that does not make the grant to the defendants
void, but the plaintiffs may have an action.
The charter of the defendants is not unconstitutional or void. Of
itself it impairs no rights. As a grant to the individuals named in it
to be a corporation, it is conceded to be good. As against the public, it contains a valid grant of a right to build a bridge and to take
tolls, and if the defendants can agree with the plaintiffs, we see no
objection with their proceeding under their charter, and enjoying all
the privileges it purports to confer.
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If the charter itself was an unconstitutional act, it would he wholly

PISCATAQUA BRIDGE V. NEW HAMPSHIRE BRIDGE.

void, and the defendants could not rightfully build a bridge and de-

mand tolls, on purchasing of the plaintiffs a right or license to erect

one within their limits, which it is admitted they might do.

If the charter itself was an unconstitutional act, it would be wholly
void, and the defendants could not rightfully huild a bridge and demand tolls, on purchasing of the plaintiffs a right or license to erect
one within their limits, which it is admitted they might do.
But can they lawfully proceed to erect such bridge without the consent of the plaintiffs ?
vVe are of opinion that if the charter of the defendants had made
proper provision for a compensation to the plaintiffs, the legislature
might have authorized the building of another bridge within their exclusive limits, even without their consent.
In such case the grant itself would furnish plenary evidence that
the public interest required the taking of private· property for public
use; and we see no objec_tion to taking a part of the plaintiffs' franchise.
That franchise, as we have said, is property. "No part of a
man's property shall be taken from him or applied to public uses,
without his own consent, or that of the representative body of the
people. " N. H. Bill of Rights, Art. 12.
This has always been understood necessarily to include, as a matter
of right, and as one of the first principles of justice, the further limitation, that in case his property is taken without his consent, due compensation must be provided. 1 Black. Com. 139; Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. C. R. 166, and authorities there cited.
It is not supposed here that even the consent of the representative
body of the people could give authority to take the property of individual citizens for highways, bridges, ferries and other works of internal improvement without the assent of the owner, and without
any indemnity provided by law. Such a power would be essentially
tyrannical and in contravention of other articles in the bill of rights.
This defense is not attempted to be supported upon any such principle.
But if adequate compensation is provided, in a proper manner, it
is admitted that private property may be taken without the special
consent of the owner in each particular case.
No distinction is made in the constitution between property of one
description and that of another; and if a franchise is property we do
not discover upon what ground it claims an exemption from the same
liabilities to which other property is subjected.
If the government had been the owner of the land along the Piscat·
aqua river, and had granted to the plaintiffs a tract of land co-extensive with their exclusive limits, the legislature might, afterwards, have
authorized the taking of a portion of the land so granted, making provision for compensation to the grantee-notwithstanding the exclusive
nature of the grant.
If instead of a corporeal hereditament, the legislature have granted
an incorporeal hereditament of such a nature that it may afterwards
be necessary that the property, or a part of it, be taken for public use,
why is not that subjected to the public servitude, and in the same

But can they lawfully proceed to erect such bridge without the con-

sent of the plaintiffs?

We are of opinion that if the charter of the defendants had made

proper provision for a compensation to the plaintiffs, the legislature

might have authorized the building of another bridge within their ex-

clusive limits, even without their consent.

In such case the grant itself would furnish plenary evidence that

the public interest required the taking of private property for public

use; and we see no objection to taking a part of the plaintiffs' fran-

chise.

That franchise, as we have said, is property. "No part of a

man's property shall be taken from him or applied to public uses,

without his own consent, or that of the representative body of the

people." N. H. Bill of Rights, Art. 12.

This has always been understood necessarily to include, as a matter

of right, and as one of the first principles of justice, the further limi-
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tation, that in case his property is taken without his consent, due com-

pensation must be provided. 1 Black. Com. 139; Gardner v. Vil-

lage of Newburgh, 2 Johns. C. R. 166, and authorities there cited.

It is not supposed here that even the consent of the representative

body of the people could give authority to take the property of indi-

vidual citizens for highways, bridges, ferries and other works of in-

ternal improvement without the assent of the owner, and without

any indemnity provided by law. Such a power would be essentially

tyrannical and in contravention of other articles in the bill of rights.

This defense is not attempted to be supported upon any such prin-

ciple.

But if adequate compensation is provided, in a proper manner, it

is admitted that private property may be taken without the special

consent of the owner in each particular case.

No distinction is made in the constitution between property of one

description and that of another; and if a franchise is property we do

not discover upon what ground it claims an exemption from the same

liabilities to which other property is subjected.

If the government had been the owner of the land along the Piscat-

aqua river, and had granted to the plaintiffs a tract of land co-exten-

sive with their exclusive limits, the legislature might, afterwards, have

authorized the taking of a portion of the land so granted, making pro-

vision for compensation to the grantee—notwithstanding the exclusive

nature of the grant.

If instead of a corporeal hereditament, the legislature have granted

an incorporeal hereditament of such a nature that it may afterwards

be necessary that the property, or a part of it, be taken for public use,

why is not that subjected to the public servitude, and in the same
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which requires the adoption of a different rule in this respect.

Had the legislature granted merely the right to build and main-

tain a bridge from point to point, and take tolls, and the public neces-

sities afterward required that a portion or even the whole of that

bridge should be taken for other public purposes, is there any ques-

tion that this might have been done, if due compensation was pro-

vided for the owners? We think not. 7 Pick. 459, 500. Yet, as

has been before stated, the grantees would most unquestionably have

had an exclusive right in their bridge and tolls. Where, then, is the

difference between a grant exclusive in its effect, and one exclusive in

its terms? The latter is no more than exclusive.

If the grant had been of the "exclusive" right of building a bridge

from point to point, without any extended limits, the property of the

bridge when built would be no more exclusive, nor the right more

exclusive than it would be if the grant had been made without the

use of the term "exclusive;" and if the property is subject to be taken

for public use in the one case it must be so in the other. If these

extended limits of exclusion are added, how does that change the
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nature of the case?

If the grant amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the legis-

lature to bestow the same identical franchise upon another corporate

body, and implies a contract not to reassert the right to grant the fran-

chise to another, or to impair it (4 Wheat. 658, 682), there is the

same extinguishment of the right of the grantor, and the same implied

contract not to reassert that right in a grant of lands. 6 Cranch 137.

7"hc grantee of a fee-simple takes, under a contract, an absolute

estate in some respects, but subject to an implied condition or limita-

tion, by -which the lands may afterwards be taken for public use—

for turnpikes, railroads, canals, bridges, etc., whenever the public

necessities demand it; and a tlgrant of franchises is not in point

of principle distinguishable from a grant of any other property."

4 Wheat. 684.

The grant under which the plaintiffs took this property is admitted

to be a contract, and that contract is inviolable. The legislature can

not annul that contract, or in any way impair its obligation. The

plaintiffs have taken and received all the legislature contracted to

give. It is an executed contract (4 Wheat. 690), and the plaintiffs

entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of the property acquired un-

der it, to as great an extent as they are protected in the enjoyment of

any other species of property.

It does not impair that contract to hold that the property acquired

under it may be taken for public use—that it is liable to be subjected

to the public servitude and the public burdens. Fletcher v. Peck,

6 Cranch 145; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. S9, 101 ; Providence Bank

v. Billings, 4 Peters S. C. R. 563.

The grant contains no covenant, in terms, that the state will never

grant another bridge within those limits, nor do we think that any

such covenant is to be implied, and of course no obligation to that

manner? There seems to be no substantial difference between the two
"\.Vhich requires the adoption of a different rule in this respect.
Had the legislature granted merely the right to build and maintain a bridge from point to point, and take tolls, and the public necessities afterward required that a po1tion or even the whole of that
bridge should be taken for other public purposes, is there any question that this might have been done, if due compensation was provided for the owners? vVe think not. 7 Pick. 459, 500. Yet, as
has been before stated, the grantees would most unquestionably have
had an exclusive right in their bridge and tolls. vVhere, then, is the
difference between a grant exclusive in its effect, and one exclusive in
its terms? The latter is no more than exclusiYe.
If the grant had been of the "exclusiYe" right of building a bridge
from point to point, without any extended limits, the property of the
bridge when built would be no more exclusive, nor the right more
exclusive than it would be if the grant had been made without the
use of the term "exclusive;" and if the prope1ty is subject to be taken
for public use in the one case it must be so in the other. If these
extended limits of exclusion are added, how does that change the
nature of the case?
If the grant amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the legislature to bestow the same identical franchise upon another corporate
body, and implies a contract not to reassert the right to grant the franchise to another, or to impair it (4 Wheat. 658, 682), there is the
same extinguishment of the right of the grantor, and the same implied
contract not to reassert that right in a grant of lands. 6 Cranch 137.
77ie grantee of a fee-simple takes, under a contract, an absolute
estate in some respects, but subject to an implied condition or lim£tat£on, by wht"ch the lands may afterwards be taken for publt'c usefo1' turnpt'kes, railroads, canals, bridges, etc., whenever the publt"c
necesst'ti'es demand £t; and a "grant of franchises is not in point
of pr£ndple d£stinguishable from a grant of any other property."
4 Wheat. 684.
The grant under which the plaintiffs took this property is admitted
to be a contract, and that contract is inviolable. The legislature can
not annul that contract, or in any way impair its obligation. The
plaintiffs have taken and received all the legislature contracted to
give . It is an executed contract (4 Wheat. 690), and the plaintiffs
entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of the property acquired under it, to as great an extent as they are protected in the enjoyment of
any other species of property.
It does not impair that contract to hold that the property acquired
under it may be taken for public use-that it is liable to be subjected
to the public servitude and the public burdens. Fletcher v . Peck,
6 Cranch 145; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 89, IOI; Providence Bank
v. Billings, 4 Peters S. C.R. 563.
The grant contains no covenant, in terms, that the state will never
grant another bridge within those limits, nor do we think that any
such covenant is to be implied, and of course no obligation to that
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effect is imposed. Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 197; Jackson

PISCATAQUA BRIDGE V. NEW HAMPSHIRE BRIDGE.

v. Lamphire, 3 Peters 289.

The terms and object of the grant are satisfied without anv such

effect is imposed. Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 \Vheat. 197; Jackson
v. Lamphire, 3 Peters 289.
The terms and object of the grant are satisfied without any such
stipulation. The grantees have all the state professed to grant-the
exclusive right. They have a property in this, and no part of it can
be taken from them except for public use, and upon adequate compensation being matle.
If a grant of a franchise is like other grants of property, why should
a covenant be implied extending the right of property in a franchise
of this character beyond the rights of the holders of other property ,
and enabling the grantees to resist all public improvements, and deny
all public wants entirely, or until such compensation as they please to
demand shall be made to them?
When the legislature shall have granted land, with a covenant that no
highway, canal or railroad shall ever be made through it,-or a bridge,
with a stipulation that no other bridge shall ever be erected within a
certain distance, it may deserve inquiry whether such a contract is
within the scope of its constitutional power ?-whether the right to
provide for the public necessities, and to take property for public
use whenever those nece ·sities require it, making therefor an adequate compensation, are not inherent rights of sovereignty which no
legislature can pa1t with or control by any stipulation so as to bind
the people or their successors who represent the people?
How far the case, New Jersey v. \\Tilson, 7 Cranch 164, may countenance the supposition that the legislature may even make a contract
of that character, need not be considered. It may be remarked that
the question, whether the legislature had the power to make a contract
which would bind the state not to tax the lands after they came into the
possession of the citizens, does not seem to have been brought into discussion. But it must have been involved in the decision, the inquiry
being whether the act of exemption was a contract.
Whether upon reconsideration the principle of that case can be supported, and if it may, whether it is to be extended beyond the decision itself, we do not inquire. 4 Peters' S. C. R. 561.
We conclude, then, that the legislature might lawfu11y authorize the
taking of a portion of the plaintiffs' franchise for public use, making
a just oompensation; but have they done so in the present instance?
It is not pretended that the defendants' chaiter provides for any
indemnity to the Piscataqua Bridge corporation; and the position that
the defendants may take their property because the plaintiffs will have
a right of action can not be supported.
Had the plaintiffs seen fit to suffer their prope1ty to be taken, and
soug ht redress for the injury by action, it might have been sustained;
but this is not the compensation intended by the law when property is
taken for public use. Gardner v. The Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns.
C. R. 162; Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass. 393 '; Callender v. Marsh I
Pick. 430; Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,
6 Pick. 404.
It is not by way of damages to be obtained in an action for an in-

stipulation. The grantees have all the state professed to grant—the

exclusive right. They have a property in this, and no part of it can

be taken from them except for public use, and upon adequate com-

pensation being made.

If a grant of a franchise is like other grants of property, why should

a covenant be implied extending the right of property in a franchise

of this character beyond the rights of the holders of other property,

and enabling the grantees to resist all public improvements, and deny

all public wants entirely, or until such compensation as they please to

demand shall be made to them?

When the legislature shall have granted land, with a covenant that no

highway, canal or railroad shall ever be made through it,—or a bridge,

with a stipulation that no other bridge shall ever be erected within a

certain distance, it may deserve inquiry whether such a contract is

within the scope of its constitutional power?—whether the right to

provide for the public necessities, and to take property for public

use whenever those necessities require it, making therefor an ade-
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quate compensation, are not inherent rights of sovereignty which no

legislature can part with or control by any stipulation so as to bind

the people or their successors who represent the people?

How far the case, New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164, may coun-

tenance the supposition that the legislature may even make a contract

of that character, need not be considered. It may be remarked that

the question, whether the legislature had the power to make a contract

which would bind the state not to tax the lands after they came into the

possession of the citizens, does not seem to have been brought into dis-

cussion. But it must have been involved in the decision, the inquiry

being whether the act of exemption was a contract.

Whether upon reconsideration the principle of that case can be sup-

ported, and if it may, whether it is to be extended beyond the decis-

ion itself, we do not inquire. 4 Peters' S. C. R. 561.

We conclude, then, that the legislature might lawfully authorize the

taking of a portion of the plaintiffs' franchise for public use, making

a just compensation; but have they done so in the present instance?

It is not pretended that the defendants' charter provides for any

indemnity to the Piscataqua Bridge corporation; and the position that

the defendants may take their property because the plaintiffs will have

a right of action can not be supported.

Had the plaintiffs seen fit to suffer their property to be taken, and

sought redress for the injury by action, it might have been sustained;

but this is not the compensation intended by the law when property is

taken for public use. Gardner v. The Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns.

C. R. 162; Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass. 393; Callender v. Marsh 1

Pick. 430; Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,

6 Pick. 404.

It is not by way of damages to be obtained in an action for an in-

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

LIMITS ON POWER TO CREATE.

319

LIMITS ON POWER TO CREATE.

jury done that the party is entitled to be indemnified for property thus

319

lawfully taken.

There is a dictum in Stevens v. The Proprietors of Middlesex

Canal, 13 Mass. Rep. 408, implying that the act of taking may be

lawful, and yet an action sustained for the injury, but this evidently

had not been fully considered. 1 Pick. 430, 435. Such a proposi-

tion may be said to be felo de se.

The plaintiffs have a grant of certain exclusive limits. The de-

fendants claim a right to erect a bridge within those limits, upon the

ground that their charter give them a right to erect such bridge, and

that the plaintiffs may have compensation for the injury done to them

by a suit at law. But if the defendants have a right to erect a bridge,

what wrong or injury is done? If the plaintiffs might have an action

on the case for the injury, which was the form in Chadwick v. The

Proprietors of Haverhill Bridge, cited in support of the position, that

negatives the idea of a right. It presupposes an interference contrary

to law. The legislature can not empower any one to do a wrong,

and a right to take by wrong would be a solecism. So far as the de-

fendants may act lawfully under their charter, they will not subject
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themselves to an action for an injury. So far as they can not lawfully

act, they ought to refrain from acting.

Whenever lawful authority is given to take property for public use,

tne act of taking is justifiable. There is no injury to the rights of the

party, and no action as for a tort can accrue. Recompense is made

for what is legally taken, and the party can not complain that a wrong

is done, for his property has been taken according to the laws of the

land.

It might have been sufficient, in this case, to have said that the

charter of the defendants does not purport to give them any right to

interfere with the property of the plaintiffs without their consent. It

authorizes them to purchase real estate, and hold it in fee-simple. It

does not authorize the taking of any property whatever, except by

agreement with the owners; and there is, of course, no evidence of

any public necessity requiring that the property of others should be

taken, except by their own consent.

The defendants, therefore, in attempting to build their bridge with-

out the consent of the plaintiffs, can not, for this reason, rely upon

their charter; and we might have waived any discussion of some of the

questions raised in the case; but the interest of these parties, and per-

haps of others, rendered it expedient for us to consider all the points

which have been suggested.

It has been said that equity will not relieve against a statute. The

authority cited only goes to establish the position, that equity can not

disregard the provisions of a valid law, and relieve against it. Of this

there is no question. It is not pretended that we can restrain the de-

fendants from doing a lawful act.

But if the principle was. that, sitting as a court of equity, we would

not decide in this mode against the constitutionality or validity of a

statute or grant, which we find nowhere sustained, there is nothing in

jury done that the party is entitled to be indemnified for property thus
lawfully t aken.
There is a di'ctum in Stevens v. The Proprietors of Middlesex
C a nal, 12 Mass. Rep. 408, implying that the act of taking may be
lawful, and yet an action sustained for the injury, but this evidently
bad not been fully considered. I Pick. 430 1 435. Such a proposition may be said to be felo de se.
The plaintiffs have a grant of certain exclusive limits. The defendants claim a right to erect a bridge within those limits, upon the
ground that their charter give them a right to erect such bridge, and
that the plaintiffs may have compensation for the injury done to them
by a suit at law. But if the defendants have a right to erect a bridge,
what \·v rong or injury is done? If the plaintiffs might have an action
on the case for the injury, which was the form in Chadwi ck v. The
Proprietors of Haverhill Bridge, cited in support of the position , that
negatives the idea of a right. It presupposes an interference contrary
to law. The legislature can not empower any one to do a wrong,
and a right to take by wrong would be a soleci sm. So far as the defendants may act lawfully under their charter, they will not subject
themselves to an action for an injury. So far as they can not lawfully
act, they ought to refrain from acting.
Whenever lawful authority is given to take property for public use,
tne act of taking is justifiable. There is no injury to the rights of the
party, and no action as for a tort can accrue. Recompense is made
for what is legally taken, and the party can not complam that a wrong
is done, for his property has been taken according to the laws of the
land.
It might have been sufficient, in this case , to have said that 1;he
charter of the defendants does not purport to give them any right to
interfere with the property of the plaintiffs without their consent. It
authorizes them to purchase real estate, and hold it in fee-simple. It
does not authorize the taking of any property whatever , except by
agreement with the owners; and there is, of course, no eviden ce of
any public necessity requiring that the property of others should be
taken, except by their own con sent.
The defendants, therefore , in attempting to build the ir bridge without the consent of the plaintiffs, can not, for this reason, rely upon
their charter; and we might have wajYed any discussion of some of the
questions raised in the case; but the interest of these parties, and perhaps of others, rendered it expedient for us to consider all the points
which have been suggested .
It has been said that equity will not relieve against a statute . The
authority cited only goes to establish the position , that equity can not
disregard the provisions of a valid law, and relieve against it. Of this
there is no question. It is not pretended that we can restrain the defendants from doing a lawful act.
But if the principle was. that, sitting as a court of equity, we would
not decide in this mode against the constitution ality or validity of a
5tatute or grant, which we find nowhere sustained, there is nothing in
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the facts in this case that would bring us in conflict with such a prin-

ciple.

the facts in this case that would bring us in conflict with such a principle.
The question is, whether we shall enjoin the defendants from doing
an act under color of their charter, which it does not authorize them
to do, and we are all of opinion that the right being clear, the relief
sought by the bill must be granted, and an injunction issued to restrain
the defendants from building a bridge at any place within the limits of
the exclusive grant to the plaintiffs, without their consent.
Injunction issued.
Note. See 1835, Dyer v. Tuskaloosa Bridge Co., 2 P orter (Ala. l 296, 27 Am .
Dec. 655; 1837, ChRrles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters (U.S.) 420;
1840, Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. Tuckahoe, 11 Leigh (Va.) 42, 36 Am. Dec. 374;
1845, Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. H. & N. H. R.. Co., 17 Conn. 40, 454, 42 Am.
Dec . 716, note 728, 44 Am. Dec. 556; 18-18, \Vest RiYer Bridge v . Dix , 6 H ow.
(47 U.S.) 507, 531; 1859, LaFayette Plank Road Co. v. N. A. & S. R., rn Ind.
90, 74 Am. Dec. 246; 1863, Bridge Propri et0rs v. Hoboke n, I Wall. (6 U. :-.)
116; 186·1, The Binghampton Bridge, 3 W all. ( 70 LS. ) 5l; 1872, Eastern R.
v. Boston , etc., R ., 111 Mass. 125, 15 Am . Rep . 13; 1877, Hudson v. Cnero
Land & Em. Co., 47 Tex. 56, 26 Am. Rep. 289 ; 1880, Louisville Water Works
Co. v. :ii!vers, 115 U. S. 674; infrfl, p. 1416; 1885, New Orleans Gas L. Co. \'. L.
L. & H.P. Co., 115 U.S. 630; 1888, Appeal of Pittsburgh J. R., 122 Pa. 't.
511, 9 Am. St. Rep. _128 ; infra, p. 1342 ; 1888). Rockland Water Co. v. Camden
& R. W. Co., 80 Mame 544, 25 Am. & Eng. v . C. 423.

The question is, whether we shall enjoin the defendants from doing

an act under color of their charter, which it does not authorize them

to do, and we are all of opinion that the right being clear, the relief

sought by the bill must be granted, and an injunction issued to restrain

the defendants from building a bridge at any place within the limits of

the exclusive grant to the plaintiffs, without their consent.

Injunction issued.

Note. See 1835, Dver v. Tuskaloosa Bridge Co., 2 Porter (Ala.) 296, 27 Am.

Dec. 656; 1837, Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters (U. S.) 420;

1840, Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. Tuckahoe, 11 Leigh (Va.) 42, 36 Am. Dec. 374;

1845, Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. H. & N. H. R. Co., 17 Conn. 40, 454, 42 Am.

Dec. 716, note 728,44 Am. Dec. 556; 1848, West River Bridge v. Dix, 6 How.

(47 U. S.) 507, 531; 1859, LaFavette Plank Road Co. v. N. A. & S. R., 13 Ind.

90, 74 Am. Dec. 246; 1863, Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken, 1 Wall. (68 U. S.)

116; 1865, The Binghampton Bridge, 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 51; 1872, Eastern R.

v. Boston, etc., R., Ill Mass. 125, 15 Am. Rep. 13; 1877, Hudson v. Cnero

Land & Em. Co., 47 Tex. 56, 26 Am. Rep. 289; 1885, Louisville Water Works
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Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674; infra, p. 1416; 1885, New Orleans Gas L. Co. v. L.

L. & H. P. Co., 115 U. 8. 650; 1888, Appeal of Pittsburgh J. R., 122 Pa. St.

511, 9 Am. St. Rep. 128; infra, p. 1342; 1888, Rockland Water Co. v. Camden

& R. W. Co., 80 Maine 544, 25 Am. & Eng. C. C. 423.

ARTICLE III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS.

. (a) In the National Constitution.

Sec. 65. (i) On congress.

LUXTON v. NORTH RIVER BRIDGE COMPANY.

1894. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 153 U. S

ARTICLE HI.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS.

Reports 525-534; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 891.

This was a petition by the North River Bridge Company, incorpo-

1

rated by the act of congress of July II, 1890, ch. 669. for the appoint-

ment under that act of commissioners to assess damages for the appropri-

S~c.

ation and condemnation, for the approaches to its bridge across the

(a) In the National Con stitution .

65. (I) On congress.
LUXTON v. NORTH RIVER BRIDGE COMPANY.

Hudson or North River, between the states of New York and New Jer-

sey, of land of Sarah Luxton in the city of Hoboken and the county of

1894. Is

Hudson, in the latter state. Upon the order of the circuit court, appoint-

THE SUPREME Cou RT OF THE UNITED STATES.

153 U. S

Reports 525-534; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 891.

ing commissioners, she sued out a writ of error, which was dismissed

by this court, at the last term, because that order was not a final judg-

This was a petition by the North River Bridge Company, incorporated by the act of congress of Jul y I 1, 1890, ch. 669. for the appointment under that act of commissioners to assess damages for the appropriation and condemnation, for the approaches to its bridge across the
Hudson or North River, between the state. of New York and New Jersey, of land of Sarah Luxton in th(! city of Hoboken a nd the county of
Hudson, in the latter state. Upon the order of the circuit court, appointing commissioners, she sued out a writ of error, which w as dismi ed
by this court, at the last term, because that order was not a final judgm ent. 147 U. S . 337. The commissioners afterward s made an
award and report, assessing her damage at the sum of $z,ooo, to the
acceptance of which she ohjected, upon the grou nds that the act of
congress was unconstitutional, and particularly that congress could not
confer the rig ht of eminent domain upon the company. But the court
overruled the objection, and adjudged that the award be approved and
confirmed, and remain on record in the office of its clerk, and that,
upon payment or tcndt:r of the sum awarded, the company might

ment. 147 U. S. 337. The commissioners afterwards made an

award and report, assessing her damages at the sum of $2,000, to the

acceptance of which she objected, upon the grounds that the act of

congress was unconstitutional, and particularly that congress could not

confer the right of eminent domain upon the company. But the court

overruled the objection, and adjudged that the award be approved and

confirmed, and remain on record in the office of its clerk, and that,

upon payment or tender of the sum awarded, the company might
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enter upon and take possession of the land for the purpose for which

it was condemned. She thereupon sued out this writ of error.
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Mr. Justice Gray, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of

the court.

The validity of the act of congress incorporating the North River

Bridge Company rests upon principles of constitutional law, now

established beyond dispute.

The congress of the United States being empowered by the con-

stitution to regulate commerce among the several states, and to pass

all laws necessary or proper for carrying into execution any of the

powers specifically conferred, may make use of any appropriate

means for this end. As said by Chief Justice Marshall, ''the power

of creating a corporation, though appertaining to sovereignty, is not,

like the power of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating com-

enter upon and take possession of the land for the purpose for which
it was condemned. She thereupon sued out this writ of error.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of
the court.
The validity of the act of congress incorporating the North River
Bridge Company rests upon principles of constitutional law, now
established beyond dispute.
The congress of the United States being empowered by the constitution to regulate commerce among the several states, and to pass
all laws necessary or proper for carrying into execution any of the
p0\vers specifically conferred, may make use of any appropriate
means for this end. As said by Chief Justice Marshall, ••the power
of creating a corporation, though appertaining to sovereignty, is not,
like the power of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating commerce, a great substantive and independent power, which can not be
implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a means of executing
them. It is never the end for which other powers are exercised, but a
means by which other objects are accomplished." Congress, therefore, may create corporations as appropriate means of executing the
powers of government, as, for. instance, a bank for the purpose of
carrying on the fiscal operations of the United States, or a railroad
corporation for the purpose of promoting commerce among the states.
McCulloch v . Maryland, 4 Wheat. 3 16, 411, 42 2; Osborn v. Bank
of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 861, 873; Pacific Railroad Removal
Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 18; California v. Pacific Railroad, 127 U.S. 1,
39. Congress has likewi e the power exercised early in this century
by successive acts in the case of the Cumberland or National Road
from the Potomac across the Alleghenies to the Ohio, to authorize
the construction of a public highway connecting several states. See
Indiana v. United States, 148 U. S. 148. And whenever it becomes
necessary for the accomplishment of any object within the authority
of congress, to exercise the right of eminent domain and take private
lands, making just compensation to the owners, congress may do this
with or without a concurrent act of the state in which the lands lie.
Van Bracklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 154, and cases cited;
Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Railway, 135 U. S. 641, 656.
From these premises, the conclusi"on appears to be inevitable that,.
although congress may, if it sees fit, and as it has often done, recognize and approve bridges erected by authority of two states across
navigable waters between them, it may, at its dt'scretion, use £ts sovereign powers, dfrectly or through a corporation created for that object, to construct bridges for the accommodation of interstate commerce by land, as t't undoubtedly may to improve the navigation of
rivers for the convenience of interstate commerce by water. t Hare's
Constitutional Lllw, 248, 249. See acts of July 14, 1862, ch. 167, lZ.
Stat. 569; February 17, 1865, ch. 38, 13 Stat. 43 r; July 25, 1866,
ch.246, 14Stat.244; March 3,1871, ch. 121, §5, 16 Stat.572,
573; June 16, 1886, ch. 4 r 7, 24 Stat. 78.
The judicial opinions cited in support of the opposite view are not,
1

merce, a great substantive and independent power, which can not be

implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a means of executing

them. It is never the end for which other powers are exercised, but a

means by which other objects are accomplished." Congress, there-

fore, may create corporations as appropriate means of executing the
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powers of government, as, for instance, a bank for the purpose of

carrying on the fiscal operations of the United States, or a railroad

corporation for the purpose of promoting commerce among the states.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 411, 422; Osborn v. Bank

of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 861, 873; Pacific Railroad Removal

Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 18; California v. Pacific Railroad, 127 U. S. I,

39. Congress has likewise the power exercised early in this century

by successive acts in the case of the Cumberland or National Road

from the Potomac across the Allcghenies to the Ohio, to authorize

the construction of a public highway connecting several states. See

Indiana v. United States, 148 U. S. 148. And whenever it becomes

necessary for the accomplishment of any object within the authority

of congress, to exercise the right of eminent domain and take private

lands, making just compensation to the owners, congress may do this

with or without a concurrent act of the state in which the lands lie.

Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 154, and cases cited;

Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Railway, 135 U. S. 641, 656.

From these premises, the conclusion appears to be inevitable that,

although congress may, if it sees fit, and as it has often done, recog-

nize and approve bridges erected by authority of two states across

navigable waters between them, it may, at its discretion, use its sover-

eign powers, directly or through a corporation created for that ob-

ject, to construct bridges for the accommodation of interstate com-

merce by land, as it undoubtedly may to improve the navigation of

rivers for the convenience of interstate commerce by water. 1 Hare's

Constitutional Law, 248, 249. See acts of July 14, 1862, ch. 167, 12

Stat. 569; February 17. 1865, ch. 38, 13 Stat. 431 ; July 25, 1866,

ch. 246, 14 Stat. 244; March 3, 1871, ch. 121, § 5, 16 Stat. 572,

573; June 16, 1886, ch. 417, 24 Stat. 78.

The judicial opinions cited in support of the opposite view are not,

21—Wil. Casks.
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having regard to the facts of the cases in which they were uttered, of

controlling weight.

having regard to the facts of the cases in which they were uttered, of
controlling weight.
Mr. Justice McLean, indeed, in an opinion delivered by him in the
circuit court, by which a bill by the United States to restrain the construction of a bridge across the Mississippi Ri,·er was dismissed, no
injury to property of the United States and no substantial obstruction
to navigation being shown, and there having been no legislation by
congress upon the subject, took occasion to remark that ''neither under
the commercial power, nor under the power to establish post roads,
can congress constmct a bridge over a navigable water;" that "if
congress can construct a bridge over a navigable water, under the
power to regulate commerce or to establish post roads, on the same
principle it may make turnpike or railroads throughout the entire
country;" and that "the latter power has generally been considered
as exhausted in the designation of roads on which the mails are to be
transported; and the former by the regulation of commerce upon the
high seas and upon our rivers and lakes." United States v. Railroad
Bridge Co., 6 McLean 517, 524, 525.
The same learned justice repeated and enlarged upon that idea in
his dissenting opinion in Pennsylvani.a v. Wheeling Bridge, 18 How.
42 l, 442, 443, where, after the Wheeling Bridge, constructed across
the Ohio river under an act of the state of Virginia, had by a decree
of this court, at the suit of the state of Pennsylvania, been declared to
be in its then condition an unlawful obstruction of the navigation of
the river, and in conflict with the acts of congress regulating such
nnvigation, and therefore ordered to be elevated or abated, congress
passed an act declaring the bridge to be a lawful structure in its then
position and ele,·ation, establishing it as a post road for the passage
of the mails of the United States, authorizing the corporation to ha\'e
and maintain the bridge at that site and elevation, and requiring the
captains and crews of all vessels and boats navigating the riYer to
regulate the use thereof, and of any pipes or chimneys belonging
thereto, so as not to interfere with the elevation and construction of
the bridge. Acto£August31, 1852,ch.111,secs.6,7, 10Stat.,112.
But the majority of this court in that case held that "the act of congress afforded full authority to the defendants to reconstruct the
bridge." 18 How. 436. Mr. Justice Nelson, in delivering its opinion, said: "We do not enter upon the question whether or not congress possess the p ower under the authority of the constitution to
establish post offices and post roads, to legalize this bridge, for conceding that no such powers can be derived from this clause, it must
he admitted that it is, at least, necessarily included in the p ower confer red to regulate commerce among the several states. The regubtion of commerce includes intercourse and navigation. and, of course,
the power to determine what shall or shall not be deemed in judgment of law an obstruction to navigation; and that power, as we
have seen, has been exercised · consistently with the continuance of
the bridge." 18 How. 431. And Mr. Justice Daniel, in a concurring opinion, sustaining the ,·alidity of the act of congress, said:

Mr. Justice McLean, indeed, in an opinion delivered by him in the

circuit court, by which a bill by the United States to restrain the con-

struction of a bridge across the Mississippi River was dismissed, no

injury to property of the United States and no substantial obstruction

to navigation being shown, and there having been no legislation by

congress upon the subject, took occasion to remark that "neither under

the commercial power, nor under the power to establish post roads,

can congress construct a bridge over a navigable water;" that "if

congress can construct a bridge over a navigable water, under the

power to regulate commerce or to establish post roads, on the same

principle it may make turnpike or railroads throughout the entire

country;" and that "the latter power has generally been considered

as exhausted in the designation of roads on which the mails are to be

transported; and the former by the regulation of commerce upon the

high seas and upon our rivers and lakes." United States v. Railroad

Bridge Co., 6 McLean 517, 524, 525.
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The same learned justice repeated and enlarged upon that idea in

his dissenting opinion in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge, 18 How.

421, 442, 443, where, after the Wheeling Bridge, constructed across

the Ohio river under an act of the state of Virginia, had by a decree

of this court, at the suit of the state of Pennsylvania, been declared to

be in its then condition an unlawful obstruction of the navigation of

the river, and in conflict with the acts of congress regulating such

navigation, and therefore ordered to be elevated or abated, congress

passed an act declaring the bridge to be a lawful structure in its then

position and elevation, establishing it as a post road for the passage

of the mails of the United States, authorizing the corporation to have

and maintain the bridge at that site and elevation, and requiring the

captains and crews of all vessels and boats navigating the river to

regulate the use thereof, and of any pipes or chimneys belonging

thereto, so as not to interfere with the elevation and construction of

the bridge. Act of August 31, 1852, ch. in, sees. 6, 7, 10 Stat.,112.

But the majority of this court in that case held that "the act of con-

gress afforded full authority to the defendants to reconstruct the

bridge." 18 How. 436. Mr. Justice Nelson, in delivering its opin-

ion, said: "We do not enter upon the question whether or not con-

gress possess the power under the authority of the constitution to

establish post offices and post roads, to legalize this bridge, for con-

ceding that no such powers can be derived from this clause, it must

be admitted that it is, at least, necessarily included in the power con-

ferred to regulate commerce among the several states. The regula-

tion of commerce includes intercourse and navigation, and, of course,

the power to determine what shall or shall not be deemed in judg-

ment of law an obstruction to navigation; and that power, as we

have seen, has been exercised consistently with the continuance of

the bridge." 18 How. 431. And Mr. Justice Daniel, in a concur-

ring opinion, sustaining the validity of the act of congress, said:
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''They have regulated this matter upon a scale by them conceived

to be just and impartial, with reference to that commerce which pur-

sues the course of the river, and to that which traverses its channel,

and is broadly diffused through the country. They have at the same

time, by what they have done, secured to the government and to the

public at large the essential advantage of a safe and certain transit

over the Ohio." 18 How. 458. A similar decision was made in the

Clinton Bridge, 10 Wall. 454. See also Miller v. New York, 109

U. S. 385.

In the cases cited at the bar, of The Passaic Bridges, 3 Wall. App.

782, decided by Mr. Justice Grier in the circuit court, and of Gil-

man v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, and Wright v. Nagle, 101 U. S.

791, in this court, the bridge in question had been erected under

authority of a state, and was wholly within the state, and no question

arose or was considered as to the power of congress, in regulating in-

terstate commerce, to authorize the erection of bridges between two

states.

But in Stockton v. Baltimore and New York Railroad, 32 Fed.
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Rep. 9, Mr. Justice Bradley, sitting in the circuit court, upheld the

constitutionality of the act of congress of June 16, 1886, ch. 417, au-

thorizing a corporation of New York and one of New Jersey to build

and maintain a bridge, as therein directed, across the Staten Island

Sound or Arthur Kill. 24 Stat. 78.

The reasons upon which the "decision in that case rested were, in

substance, the same as were stated by that eminent judge in two opin-

ions afterwards delivered by him in behalf of this court, in which the

power of congress, by its own legislation, to confer original authority

to erect bridges over navigable waters, whenever congress considered

it necessary to do so to meet the demands of interstate commerce by

land, is so clearly demonstrated as to render further discussion on the

subject superfluous.

In Willamette Bridge v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1, in which it was held

that section 2 of the act of February 14, 1859, ch. 33 (11 Stat. 383),

for the admission of Oregon into the Union, providing that "all the nav-

igable waters of the said state shall be common highways, and forever

free, as well to the inhabitants of said state as to all other citizens of

the United States," did not prevent the state, in the absence of legis-

lation by congress, from authorizing the erection of a bridge over

such a river, Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the whole court, said:

v'And although, until congress acts, the states have the plenary power

supposed, yet, when congress chooses to act, it is not concluded by

anything that the states, or that individuals by its authority or ac-

quiescence, have done, from assuming entire control of the matter,

and abating any erections that may have been made, and preventing

any others from being made, except in conformity with such regula-

tions as it may impose. It is for this reason, namely, the ultimate

(though yet unexerted) power of congress over the whole subject-

matter, that the consent of congress is so frequently asked in the erec-

tion of bridges over navigable streams. It might itself give original

"They have regulated this matter upon a scale by them conceived
to be just and impartial, with reference to that commerce which pursues the course of the rh·er, and to that which traverses its channel,
and is broadly diffused through the country. They have at the same
time, by what they have done, secured to the government and to the
public at large the essential advantage of a safe and certain transit
over the Ohio." 18 How. 458. A similar decision was made in the
Clinton Bridge, IO Wall. 454. See also Miller v. New York, 109
385.
In the cases cited at the bar, of The Passaic Bridges, 3 Wall. App.
782, decided by Mr. Justice Grier in the circuit court, and of Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, and Wright v. Nagle, 101 U. S.
791, in this court, t:he bridge in question had been erected under
authority of a state, and was wholly within the state, and no question
arose or was considered as to the power of congress, in regulating interstate commerce, to authorize the erection of bridges between two
states.
But in Stockton v. Baltimore and New York Railroad, 32 Fed.
Rep. 9 , Mr. Justice Bradley, sitting in the circuit court, upheld the
constitutionality of the act of congress of June 16, 1886, ch. 417, authorizing a corporation of New York and one of New Jersey to build
and maintain a bridge, as therein directed, across the Staten Island
Sound or Arthur Kill. 24 Stat. 78. ·
The reasons upon which the 'decision in that case rested were, in
substance, the same as \.Vere stated by that eminent judge in two opinions afterwards delivered by him in behalf of this court, in which the
power of congress, by its own legislation, to confer original authority
to erect bridges O\"er navigable waters, whenever congress considered
it necessary to do so to meet the demands of interstate commerce by
land, is so clearly demonstrated as to render further discussion on the
subject superfluous.
In Willamette Bridge v . .Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 1 in which it was held
that section 2 of the act of February 14, 1859, ch. 33 (II Stat. 383),
for the admissi9n of Oregon into the Union, providing that "all the navigable waters of the said state shall be common highways, and forever
free, as well to the inhabitants of said state as to all other citizens of
the United States," did not prevent the state, in the absence of legislation by congress, from authorizing the erection of a bridge over
such a river, Mr. Justice Bradley , speaking for the whole court, said:
°"And although, until congress acts, the states have the plenary power
supposed, yet, when congress chooses to act, it is not conclud ed by
anything that the states, or that individuals by its authority or acquiescence, have done, from assuming entire control of the matter ,
and abating any erections that may have been made, and preventing
any others from being made, except in conformity with such regulations as it may impose. It is for this reason, namely, the ultimate
(though yet unexerted) power of congress over the whole subjectmatter, that the consent of congress is so frequently asked in the erection of bridges over navigable streams. It might itself give original
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authority for the erection of such bridges, when called for by the de-
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mands of interstate commerce by land; but in many, perhaps the

authority for the erection of such bridges, when called for by the demands of interstate commerce by land; but in many, perhaps the
majority, of cases its assent only is asked, and the primary authority is
sought at the hands of the state." . 125 U. S. l 2, 13·
In California v. Pacific Railroad, 127 U.S. 1, it was directly adjudged that congress has authority, in the exercise of its powers, to
regulate commerce among the several states, to authorize corporations
to construct railroads across the states as well as the territories of the
United States; and Mr. Justice Bradley, again speaking for the court,
and referring to the acts of congress establishing corporations to build
railroads across the continent, said: "It can not at the present day
be doubted that congress under the power to regulate commerce
among the several states, as well as to provide for postal accommodations and military exigencies, had authority to pass these laws. The
power to construct or to auth01·izc individuals or corporations to
construct national highways and br£dgcs from state to state £s essential to th e complete control and rcgulat£on of i"nterstate commerce.
Without authort"ty in congress to establish and maintain sttch highways and bn"dges, it would be without authority to regulate one o.f
the most important adjuncts of c01111nerce. This power in former
times was exerted to a very limited extent, the Cumberland or National road heing the most no.table instance. Its exertion was but
·little called for, as commerce was then mostly conducted by water,
and many of our statesmen entertained doubts as to the existence of
the power to establish ways of communication.by land. But since,
in consequence of the expansion of the country, the multiplication of
its products and the invention of railroads and locomotion by steam,
land transportation has so vastly increased a sounder consideration of
the subject has prevailed and led to the conclusion that congress has
plenary power over the whole subject. Of course, the authority of
congress over the territories of the Unites States, and its power to
grant franchises exercisible therein, are, and ever have been, undoubted. But the wider power was very freely exercised. and much
to the general satisfaction in the creation of the vast system of railroads connecting the east with the Pacific, traversing states as ·well as
teJTitories, and employing the agency of state as well as Federal corporations." 127 U.S. 39, 40.
The act of congress now in question declares the construction of
the North River Bridge between the states of New York and New
Jersey to be ''in order to facilitate interstate commerce," and it makes
due pro,·ision for the condemnation of lands for the construction and
maintenance of the bridge and its approaches, and for just compensation to the owners, which has been accordingly awarded to the
plaintiff in error.
In the light of the foregoing principles and authorities, the objection made to the constitutionality of this act can not be sustained.
J udgrnent affirmed.
Note. National corporations. See generally l6 Am. & Eng. Ency. 216;
24 Am. & Eng. R. Caa. 21; 21 Am. L. R. 258; Angell & Ames, §§ 72, 73;

majority, of cases its assent only is asked, and the primary authority is

sought at the hands of the state." . 125 U. S. 12, 13.

In California v. Pacific Railroad, 127 U. S. 1, it was directly ad-

judged that congress has authority, in the exercise of its powers, to

regulate commerce among the several states, to authorize corporations

to construct railroads across the states as well as the territories of the

United States; and Mr. Justice Bradley, again speaking for the court,

and referring to the acts of congress establishing corporations to build

railroads across the continent, said: "It can not at the present day

be doubted that congress under the power to regulate commerce

among the several states, as well as to provide for postal accommoda-

tions and military exigencies, had authority to pass these laws. The

power to construct or to authorize individuals or corporations to

construct national highways and bridges from state to state is essen-

tial to the complete control and regulation of interstate commerce.

Without authority in congress to establish and maintain such high-
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ways and bridges, it would be without authority to regulate one of

the most important adjuncts of commerce. This power in former

times was exerted to a very limited extent, the Cumberland or Na-

tional road being the most notable instance. Its exertion was but

little called for, as commerce was then mostly conducted by water,

and many of our statesmen entertained doubts as to the existence of

the power to establish ways of communication by land. But since,

in consequence of the expansion of the country, the multiplication of

its products and the invention of railroads and locomotion by steam,

land transportation has so vastly increased a sounder consideration of

the subject has prevailed and led to the conclusion that congress has

plenary power over the whole subject. Of course, the authority of

congress over the territories of the Unites States, and its power to

grant franchises exercisible therein, are, and ever have been, un-

doubted. But the wider power was very freely exercised, and much

to the general satisfaction in the creation of the vast system of rail-

roads connecting the east with the Pacific, traversing states as well as

territories, and employing the agency of state as well as Federal cor-

porations." 127 U. S. 39, 40.

The act of congress now in question declares the construction of

the North River Bridge between the states of New York and New

Jersey to be "in order to facilitate interstate commerce," and it makes

due provision for the condemnation of lands for the construction and

maintenance of the bridge and its approaches, and for just compensa-

tion to the owners, which has been accordingly awarded to the

plaintiff in error.

In the light of the foregoing principles and authorities, the objec-

tion made to the constitutionality of this act can not be sustained.

Judgment affirmed.

Note. National corporations. See generally 16 Am. & Eng. Enov. 216;

24 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 21; 21 Am. L. R. 258; Angell & Ames, §§ 72, 73;
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Beach, §§ 3-fi; Clark, p. 30, et aeq.; Cook, § 1001; Elliott, § 28; Field, § 13; 1

Morawetz, § !»; Taylor, i; 4(i7; 1 Thompson, §§605-685.

1. In the District of Columbia: Chapter 15 of the Compiled Statutes of the

District of Columbia relates to the formation of corporations within the Dis-

trict. The following are provided for: Institutions of learning, religious so-

cieties, benevolent, educational, etc., societies, manufacturing, agricultural,

mining, mechanical, insurance, transportation, market, savings banks, ceme-

tery associations, boards of trade, trust companies, insurance and vestries.

This is under the constitutional provision giving congress exclusive legisla-

tive authority within the District. Art. i, § 8, cl. 17.

Such corporations may act. in the slates by their consent and that of con-

gress. Hadley v. Freedman's Trust Co., 2 Tenn. Ch. 122; Williams v. Cres-

well, 51 Miss. 817. Congress has authorized a District insurance company to

do business in the states, with their consent, 15 St. at L. 184; also authorizes

National Trades' Unions with power to establish branches in the states, 1

Supp. R. S. 498 (1886). The Freedman's Saving & Trust Co. was authorized

by 13 St. at L. 510; National Asylum for Disabled Volunteers, 14 St. at L. 10;

Centennial Board of Finance, 17 St. at L. 203. Societies for benevolent pur-
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poses, R. S. §§ 546; 1 Supp. R. S. 425.

2. In the. Territories: Congress has general legislative authority over the

territories, and can, therefore, create corporations within the territories, or

authorize the territorial legislatures to create corporations. It has provided

for the territorial legislatures to do so by a general act. U. S. Const., art. iv,

§3, cl. 2; Rev. Stat., § 1889, infra, p. 332.

3. In the States: Substantially all the authorities upon this point are cited

in the Lux ton case. The U. S. bank was chartered in 1791, by 1 St. at L.

191, and in 1816, 3 St. at L. 266; the present national banking system was

established in 1863 by 12 St. at L. 665; the Union Pacific Rv. in 1862. 12 St.

at L. 489; Northern Pacific Rv., 1864, 13 St. at L. 365; Atlantic and Pacific

Rv., 1866,14 St. at L. 292; Texas and Pacific Ry. in 1871, 16 St. at L. 573, and

1872, 17 St. at L. 59. Sections 5263-5269, Revised Statutes, authorize state in-

corporated telegraph companies to construct their lines on all post roads. See

Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. IT. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1, infra, p. 326.

Such a corporation is not a foreign corporation within any state. 1881,

Commonwealth v. Texas, etc., R., 98 Pa. St. 90; 1882, Market National Bank

v. Pacific, etc., Bank, 64 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 1; 1879, Ebv v. Northern Pac. Ry.

Co., 36 Leg. Int. 164, s. c. 6 Weekly N. C. 385.

Such corporation may exercise the power of eminent domain within the

states. 1875, Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367; 1890, Searl v. Dist. No. 2,

133 U. S. 553; 1890, Cherokee Nation v. R. Co., 135 U. S. 641; 1890, Ryan v.

U. S., 136 U. S. 69; 1892, Bellaire v. R. Co., 146 U. S. 117.

Such corporation is exempt from state taxation or control, so far as the

same might impair its efficiency as an instrument of the national government.

1869, National Bank v. Commw., 9 Wall. (U. S.) 353; 1869, Thomson v. Pacific

R. R., 9 Wall. (U. S.I 579; 1873, Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 5.

But state taxation of national banks is provided for by U. S. Rev. Stats.,

A national corporation has a right to sue and be sued in the United States

courts. 1897, Texas, etc., R. v. Cody, 166 U. S. 606; infra, p. 1098.

4. To operate outside, of the territory of the, United States: In 1889 congress

chartered the Maritime Canal Company of Nicaraugua (25 St. at L. 673). The

company also has a charter from the state of Vermont. Beach Corp., § 6, n.

2, p. 10.

the states from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts, does

not apply to congress. lience, congress may repeal a corporate charter

created by itself or the territorial legislatures, prior to the territory becoming

a state. 1890, Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ, etc., v. United States,

E each, §§ 3-6; Clark. p. 39, et :seq.; Cook,§ 1001; Elliott, § 28; Field,§ 13; 1
1\lorawetz , § \!; Taylor, ; 467; 1 Thompson , §§ 665-68-5.
!. Jn tlie Di:Jtrict of l'1Jl1tmbia : Chapter 15 .of the Compiled Statutes of the
District of Columbia relates to the formation of corporations within the District. The following are provided for: Institutions of learning, religious sociPties, benevolent, educational, etc., societies, manufacturing, agricultural,
wining, meehanil'al, insurance, transportatio n, market, savings banks, cemet E> ry associ:1 tions, boards of trade, trust companies, insurance and vestrier;.
This is under the co nstitutional provision givmg congress exclusive legislative authority within the District. Art. i, § 8, cl. 17.
ucb corporatious may act in the s tates by their consent find that of congres. Hadley v. Freedman's Trust Co., 2 Tenn. Cli. 122; Williums v. Cresw e ll, 51 Miss. 817. Congress has authorized a District insurarn·e company to
do business in the states, with their consent, J5 St. at L. 184; also authorizes
National Trades' 'Gnions with power to establish branches in the states, 1
Sapp. R. S. 498 (1886). The Freedman's 8aving & Trust Co. was autliorized
by 13 St. at L. 510; National Asylum for Disabled Volunteers, 14 St. at L. 10;
Centennial Board of Finance, 17 St. at L. 203. Societies for benevolent purposes, R. S. §§ 546; 1 Supp. R. S. 425.
2. /11 the Te1·1itori.e.~ : Congress has general legislative authority over the
territories, ancl can, therefore, f'reate corporations witliin the te rritories, or
authorize the territorial legil'<latures to create corporations. It tutS provided
for the territorial legislatures to do so by a general act. U.S. Const., art. iv,
§3, cl. 2; Rev. Stat.,§ 1889, tnfra, R· 332.
3. /11 the State:i: SubstantiriDy all the authorities upon this point are cited
in the Luxton case. The U.S. bank was chartered in 1791, by 1 St. at L.
191, and in 1816, 3 St. at L. 266; the present national hankin~ system was
established in 1863 by 12 St. at L. 665; the Union Pacific Ry. m 1862. 12 St.
at L. 489; Northern Pricific Ry., 1864, 13 St. at L. 365; Atlantic and Pacific
Ry., 1866, 14 St. at L. 292; Texas and Pacific Ry. in 1871, 16 St. at L. 573, and
1 72, 17 St. at L. 59. Sections 5263- 5269, Revised Statutes, authorize state incorporated t elegraph companies to construct their lines on all post roads. See
Pensacola Tel. C<>. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 96 U.S. l, infra, p. 326.
Such a corporation is not a foreign corporation within any state. 1881,
Commonwealth v. Texas, etc., R., 98 Pa. St. 90; 1882, Market National Bank
v. Pacific, etc., Bank, 64 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 1; 1879, Eby v. Northern Pac. Ry.
C<>., 36 Leg. Int. 164, s. c. 6 Weekly N. C. 385 .
•. uch corporation may exercise the power of eminent domain within the
states. 1875, Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367; 1890, Searl v. Dist. No. 2,
133 U.S. 553; 1890, Cherokee Nation v. R. Co ., 135 U.S. 641; 1890, Ryan v.
U.S., 136 U.S. 69; 1892, Bellnire v . R. Co., 146 U . S. 117.
Snch corporation is exempt from state taxation or control , so far as the
same might impair its efficiency as an instrument of the national government.
1869, National Bank v . Commw., 9Wall. (U.S.) 353; 1869, Thomson v. Pacific
R. R., 9 Wall. (U.S.\ 579; 1873, Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 5.
But state taxation of national banks is provided for by U . S. Rev. Stats.,
§ 5219.

A national rorporation bas a right to sue and be sued in the United States
courts. 1897, Texas, etc., R. v. Cody, 166 U.S. 606; infra, p. 1.098.
4. To operau outside of the territory of the United States: In 1889 congress
chartered the Maritime Canal Company of Nicaraugua (25 St. at L. 673). The
company also has a charter from the state of Vermont. Beach Corp., § 6, n.
2, p. JO.
5. Dissolution: The constitutional provision (art. i, § 10, cl. 1) forhidding
the states from passing a.nv law impairing the obligation of contracts. does
not apply to congress. Rene&, congress may repeal a corporntt> charter
created by itself or the territorial legislatures, prior to the territory bt>coming
a state. 1890, Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ, etc., v. Unitect States,
136 U.S. 1, i11frn, p .' 906. But see 1878. United States v. Union Pacific Rail~oad Co., 98 U. S. 569, and 1878, The Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700. But
m the early bank charters, the creating congress pledged the faith of the

136 U. S. 1, infra, p/906. But see 1878. United States v. Union Pacific Rail-

road Co., 98 U. S. 569, and 1878, The Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700. But

in the early bank charters, the creating congress pledged the faith of the

§5219.
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government not to repeal the charter before the charter period elapsed. See 1

St. at L. 191; 3 St. at L. 266.
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Sec. 66. (2) On state legislatures.

PENSACOLA TEL. CO. V. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.

§ 66

PENSACOLA TELEGRAPH COMPANY v. WESTERN UNION TELE-

government not to repeal the charter before the charter period elapsed. See 1
St. at L. 191; 3 St. at L. 266.

GRAPH COMPANY.1

1877. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 96 U. S.

Reports 1-24.

Appealed from the circuit court of the United States for the north-

Sec. 66.

ern district of Florida.

( 2)

On state legislatures.

PENSACOLA TELEGRAPH COMPANY v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY. 1

In 1859 an association of persons, known as the Pensacola Tele-

graph Company, erected a line of electric telegraph upon the right of

way of the Alabama and Florida Railroad from Pensacola, in Flor-

1877.

ida, to Pollard, in Alabama, about six miles north of the Florida line.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Appealed from the circuit court of the United States for the northem district of Florida.
In 1859 an association of persons, known as the Pensacola Telegraph Company, erected a line of electric telegraph upon the right of
way of the Alabama and Florida Railroad from Pensacola, in Floricla, to Pollard, in Alabama, about six miles north of the Florida line.
The compai~y operated the whole line until 1862, when, upon the
evacuation of Pensacola by the confederate forces, the wire was taken
down for twenty-three miles, and Cooper's Station made the southern
terminus. In 1864 the whole was abandoned, as the section of the
country in which it was situated had fallen into the possession of the
United States troops.
On the 1 ·t of December, 1865, the stockholders met, and it appearing that the assets of the company were insufficient to rebuild the line,
a new association was formed for that purpose, with the old name,
and new stock to the amount of $5 ,ooo subscribed. A resolution was
adopted by the new company to purchase the property of the old, at a
valuation put upon it in a report submitted to the meeting, and a
new board of directors was elected.
A meeting of the directors was held on the 2<l of January, 1866, at
which the president reported the completion of the line to Pensacola,
and a resolution was adopted, authorizing the purchase of wire for its
extension to the navy yard. The attorneys of the company were al o
instructed to prepare a draft for a charter, to be presented to the legislature for enactment.
On the 24th day of July, 1866, congress passed the following act:
"An act to aid in the constmction of telegraph line , and to secure
to the government the use of the same for postal, military and other
purposes.
"Be it enacted by the senate and the house of representatives of the
United States of America in congress assembled, That any telegraph
company now organized, or which ;nay hereafter be organized, under
the laws of any state in this Union, ;,hall have the right to construct,
maintain and operate lines of telegraph through and over any portion
of the public domain of the United States over and along any of the
military or post roads of the United States v.-hich have been or may be
hereafter declared such by act of congress, and over, under or across
the navigable streams or waters of the United States: Provided, That
such lines of telegraph shall be so constructed and maintained as not
1 Arguments and dissenting opinion!! of Justice Field and Hunt omitted.

evacuation of Pensacola by the confederate forces, the wire was taken

down for twenty-three miles, and Cooper's Station made the southern

terminus. In 1S64 the whole was abandoned, as the section of the

country in which it was situated had fallen into the possession of the

United States troops.

On the 1st of December, 1865, the stockholders met, and it appear-

ing that the assets of the company were insufficient to rebuild the line,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:15 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

C)6 U.S.

Reports 1-24.

The company operated the whole line until 1S62, when, upon the

a new association was formed for that purpose, with the old name,

and new stock to the amount of $5,000 subscribed. A resolution was

adopted by the new company to purchase the property of the old, at a

valuation put upon it in a report submitted to the meeting, and a

new board of directors was elected.

A meeting of the directors was held on the 2d of January, 1866, at

which the president reported the completion of the line to Pensacola,

and a resolution was adopted, authorizing the purchase of wire for its

extension to the navy yard. The attorneys of the company were also

instructed to prepare a draft for a charter, to be presented to the legis-

lature for enactment.

On the 24th day of July, 1866, congress passed the following act:

"An act to aid in the construction of telegraph lines, and to secure

to the government the use of the same for postal, military and other

purposes.

"Be it enacted by the senate and the house of representatives of the

United States of America in congress assembled, That any telegraph

company now organized, or which jnay hereafter be organized, under

the laws of any state in this Union, shall have the right to construct,

maintain and operate lines of telegraph through and over any portion

of the public domain of the United States over and along any of the

military or post roads of the United States which have been or may he

hereafter declared such by act of congress, and over, under or across

the navigable streams or waters of the United States: Provided, That

such lines of telegraph shall be so constructed and maintained as not

1 Arguments and dissenting opinions of Justice Field and Hunt omitted.
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to obstruct the navigation of such streams and waters, or interfere

with the ordinary travel on such military or post roads. And any of

§ 66

LIMITS ON POWER TO CREATE.

said companies shall have the right to take and use from such public

lands the necessary stone, timber and other materials for its posts,

piers, stations and other needful uses in the construction, maintenance

and operation of said lines of telegraph, and may pre-empt and use

such portion of the unoccupied public lands subject to pre-emption

through which its said lines of telegraph may be located as may he

necessary for its stations, not exceeding forty acres for each station;

but such stations shall not be within fifteen miles of each other.

"Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That telegraphic communica-

tions between the several departments of the government of the United

States and their officers and agents shall, in their transmission over

the lines of any of said companies, have priority over all other busi-

ness, and shall be sent at rates to be annually fixed by the postmaster-

general.

"Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the rights and privileges

hereby granted shall not be transferred by any company acting under

this act to any other corporation, association or person: Provided,
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however, That the United States may at any time after the expiration

of five years from the date of the passage of this act, for postal, mil-

itary or other purposes, purchase all the telegraph lines, property

and effects of any or all of said companies at an appraised value, to be

ascertained by five competent disinterested persons, two of whom shall

be selected by the postmaster-general of the United States, two by

the company interested, and one by the four so previously selected.

"Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That, before any telegraph com-

pany shall exercise any of the powers or privileges conferred by this

act, such company shall file their written acceptance with the post-

master-general of the restrictions and obligation required by this act."

14 Stat. 221 ; Rev. Stat., § 5263, et seq.

All railroads in the United States are by law post roads. Rev.

Stat., § 3964; 17 Stat. 308, § 201.

On the nth of December, 1S66, the legislature of Florida passed

an act incorporating the Pensacola Telegraph Company, and grant-

ing it "the sole and exclusive privilege and right of establishing and

maintaining lines of electric telegraph in the counties of Escambia

and Santa Rosa, either from different points within said counties, or

connecting with lines coming into said counties, or either of them,

from any point in this (Florida) or any other state." The capital

stock was fixed at $5,000, with privilege of increasing it to such an

amount as might be considered necessary. The company was author-

ized to locate and construct its lines within the counties named,

"along and upon any public road or highway or across any water, or

upon any railroad or private property for which permission shall first

have been obtained from the proprietors thereof." In this act all the

stockholders of the new association which had rebuilt the line were

named as corporators. No meeting of the directors was held until

January 2, 1868, when the secretary was instructed to notify the

to obstruct the navigation of such streams and waters, or interfere
with the ordinary travel on such military or post roads. And any of
said companies shall have the right to take and use from such public
lands the necessary stone, timber and other materials for its posts,
piers, stations and other needful ui-es in the construction, maintenance
and operation of said lines of telegraph, and may pre-empt and use
such portion of the unoccupied public lands subject to pre-emption
through which its said lines of telegraph may be located as may be
necessary for its stations, not exceeding forty acres for each station;
but such stations shall not be within fifteen miles of each other.
''Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That telegraphic communications between the several departments of the government of the United
States and their officers and agents shall, in their transmission over
the lines of any of said companies, have priority over all other business, and shall be sent at rates to be annually fixed by the postmastcrgeneral.
"Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the rights and privileges
hereby granted shall not be transferred by any company acting under
this act to any other corporation, association or person: Provt'ded,
however, That the United States may at any time after the expiration
of five years from the date of the passage of this act, for postal, military or other purposes, purchase all the telegraph lines, property
and effects of any or all of said companies at an appraised value, to be
ascertained by five competent disinterested p ersons, two of whom shall
be selected by the postmaster-general of the United States, two by
the company interested, and one by the four so previously selected.
"Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That, before any telegraph company shall exercise any of the powers or privileges conferred by this
act, such company shall file their written acceptance with the postmaster-general of the restrictions and obligation required by this act."
q Stat. 221; Rev. Stat., § 5263, et seq.
All railroads in the United States are by law post roads. Rev.
Stat., § 3964; 17 Stat. 308, § 201.
On the 11th of December, 1866, the legislature of Florida passed
an act incorporating the Pensacola Telegraph Company, and granting it ''the sole and exclusive privilege and right of establishing and
maintaining lines of electric telegraph in the counties of Escambia
and Santa Rosa, either from different points within said counties, or
connecting with lines coming into said counties, or either of them,
from any point in this (Florida) or any other state." The capital
stock was fixed at $5,000, with privilege of increasing it to such an
amount as might be considered necessary. The company was authorized to locate and construct its lines within the counties named ,
"along and upon any public road or highway or across any water, or
upon any railroad or private property for which permission shall first
have been obtained from the proprietors thereof." In this act all the
tockholders of the new association which had rebuilt the line were
named as corporators. No meeting of the directors was held until
January 2, 1868, when the secretary was instructed to notify the

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

328 PENSACOLA TEL. CO. V. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO. §66

stockholders "that the charter drawn up by Messrs. Campbell & Perry,

attorneys, as per order of board, January 2, 1866," had been passed.

PENSACOLA TEL. CO. V. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO .

On the 5th of June, 1867, the directors of the defendant, the West-

(

§ 66

ern Union Telegraph Company, a New York corporation, passed

stockholders "that the charter drawn up by Messrs. Campbell & Perry,
attorneys, as per order of board, January 2, 1866," had been passed.
On the 5th of June, 1867, the directors of the defendant, the West·
ern Union Telegraph Company, a New York corporation, passed
the following resolution, which was duly filed with the postmaster·
general:
"Resolved, That this company does hereby accept the provisions
of the act of congress, entitled 'An act to aid in the construction of
telegraph lines, and to secure to the government the use of the same
for postal, military and other purposes,' approved July 24, 1866, with
all the powers, privileges, restrictions, and obligations conferred and
required thereby; and that the secretary be, and he is hereby authorized and directed to file this resolution with the postmaster-general of
the United States, duly attested by the signature of the acting presi·
dent of the company and the seal of the corporation, in compliance
with the fourth section of said act of congress."
In 1872 the property of the Alabama and Florida Railroad Company, including its right of way and railroad, was transfened to the
Pensacola and Louisville Railroad Company; and on the 14th of Febnrnry, 1873, the legislature of Florida passed an act, which, as
amended February 18, 1874, ai1thorizcd the last named company "to
construct, maintain and operate a telegraph line from the Bay of Pensacola along the line of the said (its) road as now located, or as it
m~y hereafter be located, and along connecting roads in said county
to the boundary lines of the state of Alabama, and the said lines may
connect and be consolidated with other telegraph companies within or
without the state, and said company may pledge, mortgage, lease, sell,
assign and convey the property appertaining to the said telegraph
lines, and the rights, privileges and franchises conferred by this act,
with full power in such assignees to construct, own and operate such
telegraph lines, and enjoy all the privileges, rights and franchises
conferred by this act, but in such case the said railroad company
shall be responsible for the proper performance of the duties and obligations imposed by this act."
This was within the territory embraced by the exclusive grant to
the Pensacola Telegraph Company.
On the 24th of June, 1874, the Pensacola and Louisville Railroad
Company granted to the Western Union Telegraph Company the
right to erect a telegraph line upon its right of way, and also the ·
rights and privileges conferred by the acts of February, 1873 and 1874.
The Western Union Company immediately commenced the erection
of the line, but before its completion, to wit, July 27, 1874, the bill
in this case was filed by the Pensacola Telegraph Company to enjoin
the work and the use of the line, on account of the alleged exclusive
right of that company under its cha1ter. Upon the hearing, a decree
was passed dismissing the bill, and this appeal was taken.
Mr. Chief Justice VVAITE delivered the opinion of the court.
Congress has power ; 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states" (Const., art. i, § 8, par. 3), and "to

the following resolution, which was duly filed with the postmaster-

general:

"Resolved, That this company does hereby accept the provisions

of the act of congress, entitled 'An act to aid in the construction of

telegraph lines, and to secure to the government the use of the same

for postal, military and other purposes,' approved July 24, 1S66, with

all the powers, privileges, restrictions, and obligations conferred and

required thereby; and that the secretary be, and he is hereby author-

ized and directed to file this resolution with the postmaster-general of

the United States, duly attested by the signature of the acting presi-

dent of the company and the seal of the corporation, in compliance

with the fourth section of said act of congress."

In 1872 the property of the Alabama and Florida Railroad Com-

pany, including its right of way and railroad, was transferred to the

Pensacola and Louisville Railroad Company; and on the 14th of Feb-

ruary, 1873, the legislature of Florida passed an act, which, as
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amended February 18, 1874, authorized the last named company "to

construct, maintain and operate a telegraph line from the Bay of Pen-

sacola along the line of the said (its) road as now located, or as it

may hereafter be located, and along connecting roads in said county

to the boundary lines of the state of Alabama, and the said lines may

connect and be consolidated with other telegraph companies within or

without the state, and said company may pledge, mortgage, lease, sell,

assign and convey the property appertaining to the said telegraph

lines, and the rights, privileges and franchises conferred by this act,

with full power in such assignees to construct, own and operate such

telegraph lines, and enjoy all the privileges, rights and franchises

conferred by this act, but in such case the said railroad company

shall be responsible for the proper performance of the duties and obli-

gations imposed by this act."

This was within the territory embraced by the exclusive grant to

the Pensacola Telegraph Company.

On the 24th of June, 1874, the Pensacola and Louisville Railroad

Company granted to the Western Union Telegraph Company the

right to erect a telegraph line upon its right of way, and also the

rights and privileges conferred by the acts of February, 1873 and 1S74.

The Western Union Company immediately commenced the erection

of the line, but before its completion, to wit, July 27, 1874, the bill

in this case was filed by the Pensacola Telegraph Company to enjoin

the work and the use of the line, on account of the alleged exclusive

right of that company under its charter. Upon the hearing, a decree

was passed dismissing the bill, and this appeal was taken.

Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court.

Congress has power ilto regulate commerce with foreign nations

and among the several states" (Const., art. i, §8, par. 3), and "to
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establish post-offices and post reads." (Const., art. i, § S, par. 7.) The

constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance

§ 66
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thereof are the supreme law of the land. Art. vi, par. 2. A law of

congress made in pursuance of the constitution suspends or overrides

all state statutes with which it is in conflict.

Since the case of Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheat. 1), it has never

been doubted that commercial intercourse is an element of commerce

■which comes within the regulating power of congress. Post-offices

and post roads are established to facilitate the transmission of intel-

ligence. Both commerce and the postal service are placed within the

power of congress, because, being national in their operation, they

should be under the protecting care of the national government.

The powers thus granted are not confined to the instrumentalities

of commerce, or the postal service known or in use when the consti-

tution was adopted, but they keep pace with the progress of the coun-

try, and adapt themselves to the new developments of time and

circumstances. They extend from the horse with its rider to the stage

coach, from the sailing vessel to the steamboat, from the coach and

the steamboat to the railroad, and from the railroad to the telegraph,
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as these new agencies are successively brought into use to meet the

demands of increasing population and wealth. They were intended

for the government of the business to which they relate, at all times

and under all circumstances. As they were intrusted to the general

government for the good of the nation, it is not only the right, but

the duty, of congress to see to it that intercourse among the states and

the transmission of intelligence are not obstructed or unnecessarily

encumbered by state legislation.

The electric telegraph marks an epoch in the progress of time. In

a little more than a quarter of a century it has changed the habits of

business, and become one of the necessities of commerce. It is indis-

pensable as a means of inter-communication, but especially is it so in

commercial transactions. The statistics of the business before the re-

cent reduction in rates show that more than eighty per cent, of all the

messages sent by telegraph related to commerce. Goods are sold and

money paid upon telegraphic orders. Contracts are made by tele-

graphic correspondence, cargoes secured, and the movements of ships

directed. The telegraphic announcement of the markets abroad reg-

ulates prices at home, and a prudent merchant rarely enters upon an

important transaction without using the telegraph freely to secure in-

formation.

It is not only important to the people, but to the government. By

means of it the heads of the departments in Washington are kept in

close communication with all their various agencies at home and

abroad, and can know at almost any hour, by inquiry, what is trans-

piring anywhere that affects the interests they have in charge. Under

such circumstances, it can not for a moment be doubted that this pow-

erful agency of commerce and inter-communication comes within the

controlling power of congress, certainly as against hostile state legisla-

tion. In fact, from the beginning, it seems to have been assumed

establis h post-offices and post reads." (Const., art. i, § S, par. 7.) The
constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance
thereof are the supreme law of the land. Art. vi, par. 2. A law of
congress made in pursuance of the constitution suspends or overrides
all state statutes with which it is in conflict.
Since the case of Gibbons v . Ogden (9 \Vheat. r), it has never
been doubted that commercial intercourse is an element of commerce
which comes within the regulating power of congress. Post-offices
and post roads are established to facilitate the transmission of intelligence. Both commerce and the postal service are placed within the
power of congress, because, being national in their operation, they
should be under the protecting care of the national government.
The powers thus granted are not confined to the instrumentalities
of commerce, or the postal service known or in use when the constitution was adopted, but they keep pace with the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the new developments of time and
circums tances. They extend from the horse with its rider to the stage
coach. from the sailing vessel to the steamboat, from the coach and
the steamboat to the railroad, and from the railroad to the telegraph,
as these new agencies are successively brought into use to meet the
demands of increasing population and wealth. They were intended
for the government of the business to which they relate, at all times
and under all circumstances. As they were intrusted to the general
government for the good of the nation, it is not only the right, but
the duty, of congress to see to it that intercourse among the states and
the transmission of intelligence are not obstructed or unnecessarily
encumbered by state legislation.
The electric telegraph marks an epoch in the progress of time. In
a little more than a quarter of a century it has changed the habits of
busine s, and become one of the necessities of commerce. It is indispensable as a means of inter-communication, but especially is it so in
commercial transactions. The statistics of the business before the recent reduction in rates show that more than eighty per cent. of all the
messages sent by telegraph related to commerce. Goods are sold and
money paid upon telegraphic orders. Contracts are made by telegraphic correspondence, cargoes secured, and the movements of ships
directed. The telegraphic announcement of the markets abroad regulates prices at home, and a prudent merchant rarely enters upon an
importa nt transaction without using the telegraph freely to secure information.
It is not only important to the people, but to the government. By
means of it the heads of the departments in Washington are kept in
close communication with all their various agencies at home and
abroad, and can know at almost any hour, by inquiry, what is transpiring -anywhere that affects the interests they have in charge. Under
such circumstances , it can not for a moment be doubted that this powerful agency of commerce and inter-communication comes within the
controlling power of congress, certainly as against hostile state legislation. In fact, from the beginning, it seems to have been assumed
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that congress might aid in developing the system, for the first tele-

graph line of any considerable extent ever erected was built between
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Washington and Baltimore, only a little more than thirty years ago,
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with money appropriated by congress for that purpose Stat. 618),

that congress might aid in developing the system, for the first telegraph line of any considerable extent ever erected was built between
Washington and Baltimore, only a little more than thirty years ago,
w_ith money appropriated by congress for that purpose (5 Stat. 618),
and large donations of land and money have since been made to aid
in the construction of other lines. ( 12 Stat. 489, 772; 13 Stat. 365; 14
Stat. 292.) It is not necessary now to inquire whether congress may
assume the telegraph as part of the postal service, and exclude all others from its use. The present case is satisfied, if we find that congress has power, by appropriate legislation , to prevent the states from
placing obstructions in the way of its usefulness.
The government of the United States within the scope of its powers operates upon every foot of territory under its jurisd iction. It
legislates for the whole nation, and is not embarrassed by state lines.
Its peculi ar duty is to protect one part of the country from encroachments by another upon the national rights which belong to all.
The state of Florida has attempted to confer upon a single corporation the exclusive right of transmitting intelligence by telegraph over
a certain portion of its territory. This embraces the two western
most counties of the state, and extends from Alabama to the Gulf.
~o telegraph line can cross the state from east to west, or from north
to south, within these counties, except it passes over this territory.
Within it is situated an important seaport at which bu si ness centers,
and with which those engaged in commercial pursuits. ha·,re occasion
more or less to communicate. The United States have there also the
necessary machinery of the national government. They have a navyyard, forts, custom-houses, courts, post-offices, and the appropriate
officers for the enforcement of the laws. The legislation of Florida,
if sustained, excludes all commercial intercourse by telegraph between
the citizens of the other states and those residing upon this territory,
except by the employment of this corporation. The United States
can not communicate with their own officers by telegraph except in
the same way. The state, therefore, clearly has attempted to regulate
commercial intercourse between its citizens and those of other states,
and to control the transmission of all telegraphic correspondence
within its own jurisdiction.
It is unnecessary to decide how far this might have been done if
congress had not acted upon the same subject, for it has acted. The
~tatutc of July 24, 1866, in effect, amounts to a prohibition of all state
monopolies in this particular. It substantially declares, in the interest
of commerce and the convenient transmission of intelligence from
place to place by the government of the United States and its citizens, that the erection of telegraph lines shall, so far as state interference is concerned, be free to all who will submit to the conditions
imposed by congress, and that corporations organized under the laws
of one state for con structing and operating telegraph lines shall not be
excluded by another from prosecuting their business within its jurisdiction, if they accept the terms proposed hy the n ationnl government
for this national privilege . To this extent. certainly, the st::itute is a

and large donations of land and money have since been made to aid

in the construction of other lines. (12 Stat. 4S9, 772; 13 Stat. 365 ; 14

Stat. 292.) It is not necessary now to inquire whether congress may

assume the telegraph as part of the postal service, and exclude all oth-

ers from its use. The present case is satisfied, if we find that con-

gress has power, by appropriate legislation, to prevent the states from

placing obstructions in the way of its usefulness.

The government of the United States within the scope of its pow-

ers operates upon every foot of territory under its jurisdiction. It

legislates for the whole nation, and is not embarrassed by state lines.

Its peculiar duty is to protect one part of the country from encroach-

ments by another upon the national rights which belong to all.

The state of Florida has attempted to confer upon a single corpora-

tion the exclusive right of transmitting intelligence by telegraph over

a certain portion of its territory. This embraces the two western

most counties of the state, and extends from Alabama to the Gulf.
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No telegraph line can cross the state from east to west, or from north

to south, within these counties, except it passes over this territory.

Within it is situated an important seaport at which business centers,

and with which those engaged in commercial pursuits have occasion

more or less to communicate. The United States have there also the

necessary machinery of the national government. They have a navv-

yard, forts, custom-houses, courts, post-offices, and the appropriate

officers for the enforcement of the laws. The legislation of Florida,

if sustained, excludes all commercial intercourse by telegraph between

the citizens of the other states and those residing upon this territory,

except by the employment of this corporation. The United States

can not communicate with their own officers by telegraph except in

the same way. The state, therefore, clearly has attempted to regulate

commercial intercourse between its citizens and those of other states,

and to control the transmission of all telegraphic correspondence

within its own jurisdiction.

It is unnecessary to decide how far this might have been done if

congress had not acted upon the same subject, for it has acted. The

statute of July 24, 1866, in effect, amounts to a prohibition of all state

monopolies in this particular. It substantially declares, in the interest

of commerce and the convenient transmission of intelligence from

place to place by the government of the United States and its citi-

zens, that the erection of telegraph lines shall, so far as state inter-

ference is concerned, be free to all who will submit to the conditions

imposed by congress, and that corporations organized under the laws

of one state for constructing and operating telegraph lines shall not be

excluded by another from prosecuting their business within its juris-

diction, if they accept the terms proposed by the national government

for this national privilege. To this extent, certainly, the statute is a
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is appropriate legislation to carry into execution the powers of con-

~

GG

Ll.\l!TS ON POWER TO CREATE.

331

gress over the postal service. It gives no foreign corporation the

right to enter upon private property without the consent of the owner

and erect the necessary structures for its business; but it does pro-

vide that, whenever the consent of the owner is obtained, no state

legislation shall prevent the occupation of post roads for telegraph

purposes by such corporations as are willing to avail themselves of its

privileges.

It is insisted, however, that the statute extends only to such military

and post roads as are upon the public domain; but this, we think, is

not so. The language is, "Through and over any portion of the pub-

lic domain of the United States, over and along any of the military

or post roads of the United States which have been or may hereafter be

declared such by act of congress, and over, under or across the navi-

gable streams or waters of the United States." There is nothing to

indicate an intention of limiting the effect of the words employed,

and they are, therefore, to be given their natural and ordinary signifi-

cation. Read in this way, the grant evidently extends to the public
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domain, the military and post roads, and the navigable waters of the

United States. These are all within the dominion of the national gov-

ernment to the extent of the national powers, and are, therefore, sub-

ject to the legitimate congressional regulation. No question arises as

to the authority of congress to provide for the appropriation of pri-

vate property to the uses of the telegraph, for no such attempt has

been made. The use of public property alone is granted. If pri-

vate property is required, it must, so far as the present legislation is

concerned, be obtained by private arrangement with its owner. No

compulsory proceedings are authorized. State sovereignty under the

constitution is not interfered with. Only national privileges are

granted.

The state law in question, so far as it confers exclusive rights upon

the Pensacola Company, is certainly in conflict with this legislation of

congress. To that extent it is, therefore, inoperative as against a

corporation of another state entitled to the privileges of the act of

congress. Such being the case, the charter of the Pensacola Com-

pany does not exclude the Western Union Company from the occu-

pancy of the right of way of the Pensacola and Louisville Railroad

Company under the arrangement made for that purpose.

We are aware that, in Paul v. Virginia (8 Wall. 168), this court

decided that a state might exclude a corporation of another state from

its jurisdiction, and that corporations are not within the clause of the

constitution, which declares that "the citizens of each state shall be

entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several

states." Article 4, section 2. That was not, however, the case of a

corporation engaged in interstate commerce; and enough was said

by the court to show that, if it had been, very different questions

would have been presented. The language of the opinion is, "It is

undoubtedly true, as stated by counsel, that the power conferred upon

b gitimate regulation of commercial intercourse among the states, and
is appropriate legislation to carry into execution the powers of congress over the postal service. It gives no for.eign corporation the
right to enter upon private property without the consent of the owner
and erect the necessary structures for its business; but it does provide that, whenever the consent of the owner is obtained, no state
legislation shall prevent the occupation of p ost roads for telegraph
purposes by such corporations as are willing to avail themselves of its
privileges.
It is insisted, however, that the statute extends only to such military
and post roads as are upvn the public domain; but this, we think, is
not so. The language is, "Through and over any portion of the public domain of the United States, over and along any of the military
or post roads of the United States which have been or may hereafter be
declared such by act of congress, and over, under or across the navigable streams or waters of the United States." There is nothing to
indicate an intention of limiting the effect of the words employed,
and they are, therefore, to be given their natural and ordinary signification. Read in this way, the grant evidently extends to the public
domain, the military and post roads, and the navigable waters of the
United States. These are all within the dominion of the national government to the extent of the national powers, and are, therefore, subject to the legitimate congressional regulation. No question arises as
to the authority of congress to provide for the appropriation of private property to the uses of the telegraph, for no such attempt has
been made. The use of public property alone is granted. If private property is required, it must, so far as the present legislation is
concerned, be obtained by private arrangement with its owner. No
compulsory proceedings are authorized. State sovereignty under the
constitution is not interfered with. Only national privileges are
granted.
The state law in question, so far as it confers exclusive rights upon
the Pensacola Company, is certainly in conflict with this legislation of
congress. To that extent it is, therefore, inoperative as against a
corporation of another state entitled to the privileges of the act of
congress. Such being the case, the charter of the Pensacola Company does not exclude the Western Union Company from the occupancy of the right of way of the Pensacola and Louisville Railroad
Company under the arrangement made for that purpose.
We are aware that, in Paul v. Virginia (8 Wall. 168), this court
decided that a state might exclude a corporation of another state from
its jurisdiction, and that corporations are not within the clause of the
constitution, which declares that "the citizens of each state shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several
states." Article 4, section 2. That was not, however, the case of a
corporation engaged in interstate commerce; and enough was said
by the court to show that, if it had been , very different questions
would have been presented. The language of the opinion is. " It is
undoubtedly true, as stated by counsel, that the power conferred upon

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

332 REVISED STATUTES OF UNITED STATES, § 1889. § 67

congress to regulate commerce includes as well commerce carried on

by corporations as commerce carried on by individuals. * * *
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This state of facts forbids the supposition that it was intended in the

REVISED STATUTES OF UNITED STATES,

§ 1889.

grant of power to congress to exclude from its control the commerce

congrc ·s to regulate commerce includes as well commerce carried on
by corporations as commerce carried on by individuals. • • •
This state of facts forbids the supposition that it was intended in the
grant of power to congress to exclude from its control the commerce
of corporations. The langliage of the grant makes no reference to
the instrumentalities by which commerce may be carried on; it is
general, and includes alike commerce by individuals, partnerships.
associations and corporations. • • • The defect of the argument
lies in the character of their (insurance companies) business. Issuing
a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce. • • •
Such contracts (policies of insurance) ane not interstate transactions,
though the parties are domiciled in different states."
The questions thus suggested need not be considered now because
no prohibitory legislation is relied upon, except that which, as has
already been seen, is inoperative. Upon principles of comity, the
corporations of one state are permitted to do business in another, unless it conflicts with the law or unjustly interferes with the rights of the
citizens of the state into which they come.. Under such circumstances,
no citizen of a state can enjoin a foreign corporation from pursuing
its business. Until the state acts in its sovereign capacity, individual
citizens can not complain. The state must determine for itself when
the public good requires that its implied assent to the admission shall
be withdrawn. Here, so far from withdrawing its assent, the state by
its legislation of 1874, in effect, invited foreign telegraph corporations
to come in. Whether that legislation , in the absence of congressional
action, would have been sufficient to authorize a foreign corporation
to construct and operate a line within the t'vVO counties named, we
need not decide; but we are clearly. of the opinion that with such action and a right of way secured by private arrangement with the
owner of the land, this defendant corporation can not be excluded by
the present complainant.
Decree affirmed.

of corporations. The language of the grant makes no reference to

the instrumentalities by which commerce may be carried on; it is

general, and includes alike commerce by individuals, partnerships,

associations and corporations. * * * The defect of the argument

lies in the character of their (insurance companies) business. Issuing

a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce. * * *

Such contracts (policies of insurance) are not interstate transactions,

though the parties are domiciled in different states."

The questions thus suggested need not be considered now because

no prohibitory legislation is relied upon, except that which, as has

already been seen, is inoperative. Upon principles of comity, the

corporations of one state are permitted to do business in another, un-

less it conflicts with the law or unjustly interferes with the rights of the

citizens of the state into which they come. Under such circumstances,

no citizen of a state can enjoin a foreign corporation from pursuing

its business. Until the state acts in its sovereign capacity, individual
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citizens can not complain. The state must determine for itself when

the public good requires that its implied assent to the admission shall

be withdrawn. Here, so far from withdrawing its assent, the state by

its legislation of 1874, in effect, invited foreign telegraph corporations

to come in. Whether that legislation, in the absence of congressional

action, would have been sufficient to authorize a foreign corporation

to construct and operate a line within the two counties named, we

need not decide; but we are clearly, of the opinion that with such ac-

tion and a right of way secured by private arrangement with the

owner of the land, this defendant corporation can not be excluded by

the present complainant.

Decree affirmed.

Sec. 67. (3) On territorial legislatures.

The Revised Statutes of the United States provide: "The legis-

lative assemblies of the several territories shall not grant private char-

ters or special privileges, but they may, by general incorporation acts,

permit persons to associate themselves together as bodies corporate

for mining, manufacturing and other industrial pursuits, and for con-

ducting the business of insurance, banks of discount and deposit (but

not of issue), loan, trust and guarantee associations, and for the con-

struction or operation of railroads, wagon roads, irrigating ditches,

Sec. 67. ( 3) On territorial legislatures.

and the colonization and improvement of lands in connection there-

with, or for colleges, seminaries, churches, libraries or any other

benevolent, charitable or scientific association."1

The Revised Statutes of the United States provide: "The legislative assemblies of the several territories shall not grant private charters or special privileges, but they may, by general incorporation acts,
permit persons to associate themselves together as bodies corporate
for mining, manufacturing and other industrial pursuits, and for conducting the business of insurance, banks iof discount and deposit (but
not of issue), loan, trust and guarantee associations, and for the construction or operation of railroads, wagon roads, irrigating ditches,
and the colonization and improvement of lands in connection therewith , or for colleges, seminaries, churches, libraries or any other
benevolent, charitable or scientific association." 1
1 Revised Statutes of the United States, 187:3-74 (§ 1889), as amended July
80, 1886, ch. 818, § 6 (24 St. 170).

1 Revised Statutes of the United States, 1873-74 (§ 1889), as amended July

30, 1886, ch. 818, § 5 (24 St. 170).
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Statute June 8, 187s, ch. 168 (20 St. 101) provided that the fore-

going section should not be so construed as to prevent the territorial

legislatures from creating municipal corporations either by a general

Statute June 8, 1878, ch. 168 (20 St. 101) provided that the foregoing section should not be so construed as to pre1 ent the territorial
legislatures from creating municipal corporations either by a general
or special act, subject to amendment or repeal at any time.
1

or special act, subject to amendment or repeal at any time.

Wote. Territorial charter is binding on the state legislature after the state

is organized. 1822, State v. N. O. N. Co., 11 Martin (La.) 309; 1831, Will-

iams v. Bank of Michigan, 7 Wend. (N.Y.) 539. But see, 1851, Myers v. Man-

hattan Bank, 20 Ohio 283.

(3) In the State Constitutions.

Sec. 68. (1) General and special laws, what are.

Note. Territorial charter is binding on the state legislature after the state
is organized. 1822, Slate v. N. 0. N. Co., 11 Martin (La.) 309; 1831, Williams v. Bank of :Michigan, 7 Wend. (N .Y. ) 539. But see, 1851, Myers v. Manhattan Bank, 20 Ohio 283.

"The legislature shall pass no special act creating corporations or

conferring corporate powers, but they shall provide by general law

for the creation and formation of corporations, but all such laws shall

be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal at the will of the legis-

( b) In the State Constitutions.

lature."

THE STATE, Ex Rix. JACOB J. VAN RIPER Et Al., v. CHARLES H.

PARSONS Et Al.1

Sec. 68. (I) General and special laws, what are.

1878. In the Supreme Court of Judicature of New Jersey.
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40 N. J. L. Rep. 1—11.

On demurrer.

By the charter of Jersey City, passed in 1871, provision was made

for the appointment by the senate and general assembly, in joint

meeting, of a fire board, and certain other municipal boards.

On March 6, 1877 (Laws 1877, p. 54), an act was passed entitled

"The legislature shall pass no special act creating corporations or
conferring corporate powers, but they shall provide by general law
for the creation and formation of corporations, but all such laws shall
be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal at the will of the legislature."

"An act concerning commissioners to regulate municipal affairs,"

which provided for abolishing all laws in reference to legislative com-

missioners, and terminating the offices of the legislative commission-

THE STATE, Ex REL. JACOB J . VAN RIPER ET AL., v. CHARLES H.
PARSONS ET AL. 1

ers then in existence, and for substituting therefor new boards, to be

elected by the people.

Under this latter act an election was held in Jersey City, and the

1878.

IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF NEW JERSEY.

40 N. ]. L. Rep.

defendants were elected members of the fire board in lieu of the legis-

1-11.

lative commissioners. There was no question made with respect to

the fairness and formality of this election.

The present proceeding is an information in the name of the attor-

ney-general, in the nature of a quo -warranto, charging that the de-

fendants usurp the office to which they were thus elected.

Argued at November term, 1877, before Beasley, chief justice, and

Justice Depue, Van Syckel and Knapp.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Beasley, chief justice.

'Part of opinion relating to another point omitted.

On demurrer.
By the charter of Jersey City, passed in 1871, provision was made
for the appointment by the senate and general assembly, in joint
meeting, of a fire board, and certain other municipal boards.
On March 6, 1877 (Laws 1877, p. 54), an act was passed entitled
"An act concerning commissioners to regulate municipal affairs,"
which provided for abolishing all laws in reference to legislative commissioners, and terminating the offices of the legislative commissioners then in existence, and for substituting therefor new boards, to be
elected by the people.
Under this latter act an election was held in Jersey City, and the
defendants were elected members of the fire hoard in lieu of the legislative commissioners. There was no question made with respect to
the fairness and formality of this election.
The present proceeding is an information in the name of the attorney-general , in the nature of a quo warranto, charging that the defendants usurp the office to which they were thus elected.
Argued at November term, 1877, before Beasley, chief justice, and
Justice Depue, Van Syckel and Kn app.
The opinion of the court was delivered by BEASLEY, chief justice.
1 Part
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The purpose of this proceeding is to test the constitutionality of the
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act of the legislature passed on the 6th day of March, in the year of

§ 68

STATE V. PARSONS.

1877, entitled "An act concerning commissioners to regulate munici-

The purpose of this proceeding is to test the constitutionality of the
act of the legislature passed on the 6th day of March, in the year of
1877, entitled "An act concerning commissioners to regulate municipal affairs."
The law thus brought under our cognizance is composed of two
sections, the first of which declares "that such parts of a ll public, special and local laws as provide for the appointment of commissions or
commissioners, by the senate and general assembly of the leg islature,
in joint meeting, to regulate municipal affairs in any city in this state,
be and the same are hereby repealed," and the second section provides "that in all cases where the above r epealing section shall operate in any city in this state, there shall be substituted, in lieu of each
of the existing boards of said commissions or commissioners, to exercise all the powers heretofore conferred upon such commissio ns or
commissioners, a board to consist of six persons, namely, one shall be
chosen by the electors in each aldermanic district in said city, who
shall be a qualified voter of said city." The rest of this lattersectidn
consists of regulations touching the mode of canvassing the votes at
the election thus authorized, or designating the terms of office and the
salaries of the officers thus to be chosen.
Against this law thus summarized, the principal exception that has
been urged is, that it is, in substance and effect, special and local , and
consequently is in conflict with one of the recent amendments of the
constitution of the state. The provision of the primary law thus invoked in clause 2, section 7 of article iv, and which, so far as relates
to the present subject, is in these words, viz., "The legislature shall
not pass private, local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: • • • Regulating the internal affairs
of towns and counties; appointing local offi cers or commissions to regulate municipal affairs," and, again, subsequently, in the same clause,
the words are, " the legislature shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers, but they shall pass general laws, under which corporations may be organized and corporate powers of every nature obtained, subject, nevertheless, to repeal or alteration at the will of the
legislature. • • • "
First, then, is this statute, obviously and upon judicial view of its
contents, a local or speci al law ?
In point of form it is manifest that this act does not belong to such
a category . It imports generality of pro\'ision in all its parts; its title
is general, embracing all commissioners appointed by the leg islature
to regulate municipal affairs, so, in its body, it repeals such parts of
all public , special or local laws as provide for the appointment of
such commissioners, and substitutes for s uch officers others, to be selected by the people. Upon the face of this law, therefore, the repealer is general, and the substitution of other agencies is equally so.
But it is said that, although such is the frame and aspect of this
statute, still it must be regarded as local and special, as of necessity
it can be applicable to but a few places of the state, inasmuch as it is
well known that but few localities in the state have been subjected to

pal affairs."

The law thus brought under our cognizance is composed of two

sections, the first of which declares "that such parts of all public, spe-

cial and local laws as provide for the appointment of commissions or

commissioners, by the senate and general assembly of the legislature,

in joint meeting, to regulate municipal affairs in anycitv in this state,

be and the same are hereby repealed," and the second section pro-

vides "that in all cases where the above repealing section shall oper-

ate in any city in this state, there shall be substituted, in lieu of each

of the existing boards of said commissions or commissioners, to exer-

cise all the powers heretofore conferred upon such commissions or

commissioners, a board to consist of six persons, namely, one shall be

chosen by the electors in each aldermanic district in said city, who

shall be a qualified voter of said city." The rest of this lattersectidn

consists of regulations touching the mode of canvassing the votes at

the election thus authorized, or designating the terms of office and the

salaries of the officers thus to be chosen.
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Against this law thus summarized, the principal exception that has

been urged is, that it is, in substance and effect, special and local, and

consequently is in conflict with one of the recent amendments of the

constitution of the state. The provision of the primary law thus in-

voked in clause 2, section 7 of article iv, and which, so far as relates

to the present subject, is in these words, viz., "The legislature shall

not pass private, local or special laws in any of the following enumer-

ated cases, that is to say: * * * Regulating the internal affairs

of towns and counties; appointing local officers or commissions to reg-

ulate municipal affairs," and, again, subsequently, in the same clause,

the words are, "the legislature shall pass no special act conferring cor-

porate powers, but they shall pass general laws, under which corpo-

rations may be organized and corporate powers of every nature ob-

tained, subject, nevertheless, to repeal or alteration at the will of the

legislature. * * *"

First, then, is this statute, obviously and upon judicial view of its

contents, a local or special law?

In point of form it is manifest that this act does not belong to such

a category. It imports generality of provision in all its parts; its title

is general, embracing all commissioners appointed by the legislature

to regulate municipal affairs, so, in its body, it repeals such parts of

all public, special or local laws as provide for the appointment of

such commissioners, and substitutes for "such officers others, to be se-

lected by the people. Upon the face of this law, therefore, tbe re-

pealer is general, and the substitution of other agencies is equally so.

But it is said that, although such is the frame and aspect of this

statute, still it must be regarded as local and special, as of necessity

it can be applicable to but a few places of the state, inasmuch as it is

well known that but few localities in the state have been subjected to
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the rule of legislative commissions. This contention assumes the
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truth of the hypothesis that a law that embraces but a few localities,

or a small number of objects, is not a general, but a special or local

law. But I think there is a mistake in this. The term "general

law" does not import universality in the subjects or operation of such

law. The constitutional clause in question calls for the enactment,

in this particular field of legislation, of general acts, but such so-

called general acts are, for the most part, special and local in their

effect and applicability, provided we put the widest possible signifi-

cation on the terms special and local. But these two latter terms do

not carry with them such a compass of meaning as this, as they stand

in the clause of the constitution now under consideration. If such

were their scope, they would render almost every attempt at useful

legislation abortive. A law settling the methods by which all rail-

roads should become incorporated would be special in the sense that

it would be confined in its operation to but a single kind of corpo-

ration, and so a law would be local, by this same test, that should

the rule of legislative commissions. This contention assumes the
truth of the hypothesis that a law that embraces but a few localities,
or a small number of objects, is not a general, but a special or local
law. But I think there is a mistake in this. The term "general
law" does not import universality in the subjects or operation of such
law. The constitutional clause in question calls for the enactment,
in this particular field of legislation, of general acts, but such socalled general acts are, for the most part, special and local in their
effect and applicability, provided we put the widest possible signification on the terms special and local. But these two latter terms do
not carry with them such a compass of meaning as this, as they stand
in the clause of the constitution now under consideration. If such
were their scope, they would render almost every attempt at useful
legislation abortive. A law settling the methods by \ vhich all railroads should become incorporated would be special in the sense that
it would be confined in its operation to but a single kind of corporation: and so a law would be local, by this same test, that should
provide for the organization, under one system, of all the municipal
governments in the state, as such a law would manifestly have a
restricted effect with respect to locality. But who, conversant with
the usage touching these terms, would venture the assertion that such
statutes as these would not be general laws? All legislation is based
of necessity on a classification of its subjects, and when such classification is fairly made, and the legislation founded upon it is appropriate to such classification, such legislation is as legitimate now as it
would have been prior to the recent amendments to the constitution.
My theory is, that if a set of objects be fairly classified, a law embracing them will be a general one, and in all respects unobjectionable;
but undoubtedly if the classification be illusive, being contrived with
a view of escaping the consti'tutional restriction, it can lend no support to the legislation connected wz'th it. As, for example, a statute
declaring that all cities containing a population over a certain number
, shall have a given number of voting places, and all cities containing a
lesser number shall have a prescribed lesser number, would be, to my
mind, obviously legal, because the classes of persons thus distinguished
from each other would naturally stand upon a different footing with
respect to the particular subject to which such legislation related;
but if a law, based on the same classifications, should provide that the
former of such classes should have a certain system of laying out
streets, and the latter a different system, such a classification would be
clearly illusive, inasmuch as the law thus enacted would bear no affinity to the qualities or attributes forming the basis of classification. Interdicted local and special laws are all those that rest on a false or
deficient class~fication; thez'r vice is that they do not embrace all the
class to whz'ch they are naturally related; they create preference and
establish inequalities; they apply to persons, things or places possessed of certain qualiti'es or situations, and exclude from thet'r
effect other persom, things or places whfrh arc not dissi'milar i'n these
1

provide for the organization, under one system, of all the municipal

governments in the state, as such a law would manifestly have a
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restricted effect with respect to locality. But who, conversant with

the usage touching these terms, would venture the assertion that such

statutes as these would not be general laws? All legislation is based

of necessity on a classification of its subjects, and when such classifi-

cation is fairly made, and the legislation founded upon it is appropri-

ate to such classification, such legislation is as legitimate now as it

would have been prior to the recent amendments to the constitution.

My theory is, that if a set of objects be fairly classified, a law embrac-

ing them will be a general one, and in all respects unobjectionable;

but undoubtedly if the classification be illusive, being contrived with

a view of escaping the constitutional restriction, it can lend no sup-

fort to the legislation connected with it. As, for example, a statute

declaring that all cities containing a population over a certain number

shall have a given number of voting places, and all cities containing a

lesser number shall have a prescribed lesser number, would be, to my

mind, obviously legal, because the classes of persons thus distinguished

from each other would naturally stand upon a different footing with

respect to the particular subject to which such legislation related;

but if a law, based on the same classifications, should provide that the

former of such classes should have a certain system of laying out

streets, and the latter a different system, such a classification would be

clearly illusive, inasmuch as the law thus enacted would bear no affin-

ity to the qualities or attributes forming the basis of classification. In-

terdicted local and special laws are all those that rest on a false or

deficient classification; their vice is that they do not embrace all the

class to which they are naturally related; they create preference and

establish inequalities; they apply to persons, things or places pos-

sessed of certain qualities or situations, and exclude from their

effect other persons, things or places which arc not dissimilar in these
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respects. The present law therefore is not objectionable on the former

of the grounds assigned—that in its operation it must necessarily be

respects. The present law therefore is not objectionable on the former
of the grounds assigned-that in its operation it must necessarily be
confined to certain localities. As it does not exclude from its sway or
effect any place or subject belonging to the class to which it relates, it
is, upon its face, a general, and not a local or special law, within the
clause of the constitution now under consideration.
The second objection above noted to the statute in question is that,
in point of fact, it applies to but a single place, that is, to Jersey
City, and therefore, being thus local and special, it is invalid for the
want of a notice of an intention to apply for its passage.
In laboring this point in their argument the counsel of the relators
seemed to incline to the conclusion that a special or local law could
in no case be passed, the purpose of which was to regulate the internal affairs of any municipality. But I can not agree to this
view. According to my reading of the constitutional clause in question, its purpose was not to limit legislation, but to forbid only the
doing, by special or local laws, those things that can be done by general laws. The provision relates to the methods and not to the substance of legislation, and the substitution of general laws in the stead
of those that are special or local, necessarily indicates the limits and
extent of the prohibition, for as the mandate is to do, by general legi1;lation, that which is interdicted to special or local legislation, it
seems unavoidably to follow that it is only those things that can be
accomplished by the former method that are forbidden to the latter
method. The intent here, I think, is perfectly plain, and '"'as to require,
within this department, all things that could be effected by general
statutes, to be effected in that way, but there was no intent to abrogate the legislative power outside of this field. The opposite interpretation would be full of impracticabilities, not to say absurdities.
By its prevalence, the peculiar imperfections inherent in the frame of
any existing public corporation would at once be made unalterable
and irremediable; the boundary of every city, township and county
would become insusceptible of change, and the constitution of such
bodies, with respect to matters unique, and therefore not to be reached
by general laws, would be beyond the hand of improvement or modification. Indeed, the present case, if we assume that this statute
applies to Jersey City alone, and is on that account to be regarded as
special and local and consequently forbidden, would stand as a conspicuous example of the evils that would result, for although in this
same constitutional provision, the ruling of particular places by legislative commissions is denounced in the form of a prohibitory clause,
the success of the view set up would be to establish such a mode of
government, so long as our organic law should retain its present
characteristics in the only place in which it is said at present to exist.
The correct interpretation of the passage, as already denoted, keeps
it clear of any such hurtful efficiency.
But it is further. and in the last place, urged that as this statute can
apply to Jersey City alone, it is, at all events, special and local
within the effect of that other provision of the constitution which ex-

confined to certain localities. As it does not exclude from its sway or

effect any place or subject belonging to the class to which it relates, it

is, upon its face, a general, and not a local or special law, within the

clause of the constitution now under consideration.

The second objection above noted to the statute in question is that,

in point of fact, it applies to but a single place, that is, to Jersey

City, and therefore, being thus local and special, it is invalid for the

want of a notice of an intention to apply for its passage.

In laboring this point in their argument the counsel of the relators

seemed to incline to the conclusion that a special or local law could

in no case be passed, the purpose of which was to regulate the in-

ternal affairs of any municipality. But I can not agree to this

view. According to my reading of the constitutional clause in ques-

tion, its purpose was not to limit legislation, but to forbid only the

doing, by special or local laws, those things that can be done by gen-

eral laws. The provision relates to the methods and not to the sub-

stance of legislation, and the substitution of general laws in the stead
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of those that are special or local, necessarily indicates the limits and

extent of the prohibition, for as the mandate is to do, by general leg-

islation, that which is interdicted to special or local legislation, it

seems unavoidably to follow that it is only those things that can be

accomplished by the former method that are forbidden to the latter

method. The intent here, I think, is perfectly plain, and was to require,

within this department, all things that could be effected by general

statutes, to be effected in that way, but there was no intent to abro-

gate the legislative power outside of this field. The opposite inter-

pretation would be full of impracticabilities, not to say absurdities.

By its prevalence, the peculiar imperfections inherent in the frame of

any existing public corporation would at once be made unalterable

and irremediable; the boundary of every city, township and county

would become insusceptible of change, and the constitution of such

bodies, with respect to matters unique, and therefore not to be reached

by general laws, would be beyond the hand of improvement or modi-

fication. Indeed, the present case, if we assume that this statute

applies to Jersey City alone, and is on that account to be regarded as

special and local and consequently forbidden, would stand as a con-

spicuous example of the evils that would result, for although in this

same constitutional provision, the ruling of particular places by leg-

islative commissions is denounced in the form of a prohibitory clause,

the success of the view set up would be to establish such a mode of

government, so long as our organic law should retain its present

characteristics in the only place in which it is said at present to exist.

The correct interpretation of the passage, as already denoted, keeps

it clear of any such hurtful efficiency.

But it is further, and in the last place, urged that as this statute can

apply to Jersey City alone, it is, at all events, special and local

within the effect of that other provision of the constitution which ex-
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acts a notice of an intention to make application to the legislature for

bills of this character. Article iv, § 7, pi. 9. But unfortunately, it is

in this information assumed without the necessary showing of facts,
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that this law has this singleness of applicability. This pleading shows

that the defendants are clothed with office by force of a popular elec-

tion duly held in accordance with this legislative act, and as under

such circumstances the regularity and validity of such act will be

strongly implied, the facts necessary to vacate it must be set forth in

a direct and traversable form. This has not in this case been done.

An allegation that the statute is special and local as to Jersey City is

not the statement of a fact, but a naked inference as to the law. The

question, therefore, that was discussed, and which was founded on

the assumption that the present law was operative in but a single

place, can not be considered or disposed of upon the record as it is

now presented to our attention.

As the pleadings at present stand, the demurrer must be sustained.

Note. General and special laws. It has been said that a Btatute which

relates to persons or things as a class, is a general law; while one which re-

lates to particular things or persons of a class, is special. 1876, Wheeler v.

Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St. 338; 1884, Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 80 Mo. 64; 1892,
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Smith v. McDermott, 93 Cal. 421.

acts a notice of an intention to make application to the legislature for
bills of this character. Article iv, § 7, pl. 9. But unfortunately, it is
in this information assumed without the necessary showing of facts,
that this law has this singleness of applicability. This pleading shows
that the defendants are clothed with office by force of a popular election duly held in accordance with this legislative act, and as under
such circumstances the regularity and validity of such act will be
strongly implied, the facts necessary to vacate it must be set "forth in
a direct :ind traversable form. This has not in this case been done.
An allegation that the statute is special and local as to Jersey City is
not the statement of a fact, but a naked inference as to the law. The
question, therefore, that was discussed, and which was founded on
the assumption that the present law was operative in but a single
place, can not be considered or disposed of upon the record as it is
now presented to our attention.
As the pleadings at present stand, the demurrer must be sustained.

So, a general law need not operate upon all classes of persons or things in

a state, but if it relates to or operates uniformly upon the whole of any

class it is general. 1890, Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226.

And "a law which applies only to an individual or to a number of individ-

uals, selected out of any class to which they belong, is a special law." 1880,

State v. California Min. Co., 15 Nev. 234.

"Public statutes are those which concern the government, or the public in-

terest, or all persons, or the whole of any class of persons." Robinson's

Elementary Law, § 10. Citing, 1 Bl. Com. 86; 1 Kent Lect, 20; Bac. Abr.

Stat. F. L.; Potter's Dwarris on Stat., 52; Sedgwick Stat. & Const. L., 30.

See, also, 1897, Wanser v. Hoos, 60 N. J. Law 482, 64 Am. St. Rep. 600;

1895, State v. Bargus, 53 Ohio St. 94. 63 Am. St. Rep. 628; 1892, State v. Sher-

iff, 48 Minn. 236, 31 Am. St. Rep. 650, n. 653; 1890, State v. Ellett, 47 Ohio

St. 90, 21 Am. St. Rep. 772, n. 780, et serj.; 1889, Town Council v. Pressley, 33

S. C. 66, 26 Am. St. Rep. 659; 1889, Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 40 Minn. 117,

12 Am. St. Rep. 707, n. 716; 1888, People v. Squire, 107 N. Y. 593, 1 Am. St.

Rep. 893, n . 903.

See, further, on the general topic of creation under general and special

lawB. 1 Abb. Digest 362,4 Am. & Eng. Ency. 194, 1st ed.; 7 Am. & Eng. Encyc.

639, et seq., 2d ed.; Baldwin's Polit. Inst., ch. 6, Freedom of Incorporation"; 1

Beach, §§ 9-12; Boone, §§ 21-23; Clark, §§19-20; Cook, §§2,231-235; Elliott,

§4 32-50; Field. § 13; 2 Kent. Comm. »272, n., a, b, c, 12th ed.; 1 Morawetz,

§§26-30; Taylor, § 451; 1 Thompson, §§ 35-249. For statutory provisions,

see infra, Schemes of Organization, pp. 426, 560; American Corp. Legal Man-

ual, vol. 7, 1899, and previous volumes; 2 Stimson's Am. Statute Laws, ch. 1;

Annotated Corporation Laws of all the states, by Cumming, Gilbert & Wood-

ward, 1899; Appendix.

22—Wil. Cases.

Noie. General and special laws. It has been said that a statute which
relates to persons or things as a class, is a general law; while one which relates to particular things or persons of a class, is special. 1875, Wheeler v.
Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St. 338; 1884, :Bwing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64; 1892,
Smith v. McDermott, 93 Cal. 421.
So, a general law need not operate upon all classes of persons or things in
a state, but if it relates to or operates uniformly upon the whole of any
class it is general. 1890, A beel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226.
And "a law which applies only to an individual or to a number of individuals, selected out of any ciass to which they belong, is a special law." 1880,
Stllte v . California Min. Co., 15 Nev. 234.
"Public statutes are those which concern the government, or the public interest, or a11 persons, or the whole of any class of persons." Robinson's
Elementary Law.§ 10. Cit.iog, 1 Bl. Com. 86; 1 Kent Leet. 20; Bae. Ahr.
Stat. F. L.; Potter's Dwarris on Stat., 52; Sedgwick Stat. & Const. L., 30.
See, also, 1897, Wanser v. Hoos, 60 N. J. Law 482, 64 Am. St. Rep. 600;
1895, State v. Bargus, 53 Ohio St. 94. 53 Am. St. Rep. 628; 1892, State v. Sheriff, 48 Minn. 236, 31 Am. St. Rep. 650, n. 653; 1890, State v. EHett, 47 Ohio
St. 90, 21 Am. St. Rep. 7i2, n. 780, et seq.; 1889, Town Council v. Pressley, 33
S. C. 66, 26 Am. ~t. Rep. 659; 1889, Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 40 Minn. 117,
12 Am. St. Rep. 707, n. 716; 1888, People v. Squire, 107 N. Y. 593, 1 Am. St.
Rep. 893, n . 903.
See, further, on the general topic of creation under general and special
laws. 1 Abb. Digest 362, 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. 194, let ed.; 7 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
639, et seq., 2d ed.; Baldwin's Polit. Inst., ch. 6, Freedom of Incorporation; 1
Beach, §§ 9-12; Boone, §§ 21-23; Clark, §§ 19-20; Cook, §§ 2, 231-235; Elliott,
§§ 32-60; Field, § 13; 2 Keal. Comm. •212, n., a, b, c, 12th ed.; 1 Morawetz,
§§ 26-30; Taylor, § 451; 1 Thompson, §§ 35-249 . . For _statutory provisions,
see irifra, Schemes of Organization, pp. 426, 560; American Corp. Legal Manual, vol. 7, 1899, and previous volumes; 2 Stimson's Am. Statute Laws ch. J ·
Annotated Corporation Laws of aH the states, by Cumming, Gilbert & 'Wood:
ward, 1899; Appendix.
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Sec. 69. (2) Creating.

WALLACE V. LOOMIS.

"The legislature shall pass no special or local act creating cor-

Sec. 69.

porations."

(2) Creating.

''The legislature shall pass no special or local act creating corporations.''

WALLACE v. LOOMIS.1

1877. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 97 U. S.

Reports 146-163.

WALLACE v. LOOMIS.1

Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the south-

ern district of Alabama.

1877.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

97 u. s.

Reports 146-163.

Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was instituted by a bill in equity filed May 30, 1872, by

Francis B. Loomis, John C. Stanton and Daniel N. Stanton, trustees

Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the south·
ern district of Alabama.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.
This suit was instituted by a bill in equity filed May 30, 1872, by
Francis B. Loomis, John C. Stanton and Daniel N. Stanton, trustees
of what is known as the first mortgage of the Alabama and Chatta·
nooga Railroad Company, for the purpose of procuring a foreclosure ·
and sale of the mortgaged premises, being the railroad of said com·
pany, with its appurtenances and rolling-stock, situated in Tennessee,
Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi, but principally in Alabama. A
further object of the bill was to remove the cloud from the title caused
by the bankruptcy of said company, the seizure of its property by the
governor of Alabama, and the sale thereof by the assignees in bank·
ruptcy; also to protect and preserve the property from waste and
dilapidation until it could be applied to the satisfaction of the mort·
gage. • • •
In February, 1873, by leave of the court, Wallace was made a de·
fendant, and thereupon filed an answer and cross-bill, claiming to be
the holder and owner of five second mortgage bonds for $1,000 each.

of what is known as the first mortgage of the Alabama and Chatta-

nooga Railroad Company, for the purpose of procuring a foreclosure

and sale of the mortgaged premises, being the railroad of said com-

pany, with its appurtenances and rolling-stock, situated in Tennessee,

Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi, but principally in Alabama. A

further object of the bill was to remove the cloud from the title caused
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by the bankruptcy of said company, the seizure of its property by the

governor of Alabama, and the sale thereof by the assignees in bank-

ruptcy; also to protect and preserve the property from waste and

dilapidation until it could be applied to the satisfaction of the mort-

gage. » • »

In February, 1873, by leave of the court, Wallace was made a de-

fendant, and thereupon filed an answer and cross-bill, claiming to be

the holder and owner of five second mortgage bonds for $1,000 each.

••»

The answer alleges that the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad

Company was not a corporate body, and the decree affirms the contrary.

The cross-bill states at large the reason for the allegation of the answer.

It is, that the company had its alleged corporate existence alone in

virtue of a special act of the legislature of Alabama, passed the 17th

of September, 1868, which act upon its face was a violation of the

constitution of the state, which declares that "corporations may be

• • •

formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special act,

The answer alleges that the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad
Company was not a corporate body, and the decree affirms the contrary.
The cross-bill states at large the reason for the allegation of the answer.
It is, that the company had its alleged corporate existence alone in
virtue of a special act of the legislature of Alabama, passed the 17th
of September, 1868, which act upon its face was a violation of the
constitution of the state, which declares that "corporat£ons may be
formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special act,
except for municipal purposes.'' The act referred to is set out in
full as an· exhibit to the cross-bill. It authorizes the Wills Valley
Railroad Company (a pre-existing corporation) to purchase the railroad and franchises of the Northeast and Southwestern Alabama Railroad Company (another pre-existing corporation), and after doing so,
to change its own name to that of the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad Company.
We are unable to see anything in this legislation repugnant to the
constitutional provision referred to. That provision can not surely be
construed to prohibit the legislature from changing the name of a cor1 Only so much of the case is given as relates to the single point.

except for municipal purposes." The act referred to is set out in

full as an exhibit to the cross-bill. It authorizes the Wills Valley

Railroad Company (a pre-existing corporation) to purchase the rail-

road and franchises of the Northeast and Southwestern Alabama Rail-

road Company (another pre-existing corporation), and after doing so,

to change its own name to that of the Alabama and Chattanooga Rail-

road Company.

We are unable to see anything in this legislation repugnant to the

constitutional provision referred to. That provision can not surely be

construed to prohibit the legislature from changing the name of a cor-

1 Only so much of the case is given as relates to the single point.
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poration, or from giving it power to purchase additional property,

and this was all that it did in this case. No new corporate powers ol

§ 70
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franchises were created. * * *

Decree affirmed.

Sec. 70. Same.

GEORGE GREEN v. KNIFE FALLS BOOM CORPORATION.

1886. In the Supreme Court of Minnesota. 35 Minnesota

Reports 155-162.

poration, or from giving it power -to purchase additional property,
and this was all that it did in this case. No new corporate powers ot
franchises were created. • • •
Decree affirmed.

Plaintiff brought this action, in the district court for St. Louis

county, to recover possession of certain logs, alleged to be wrongfully

Sec. 70. Same.

detained by the defendant. The answer admits the detention of the

GEORGE GREEN v. KNIFE FALLS BOOM CORPORATION.

logs by the defendant, and justifies such detention under claim of a

lien for boomage in accordance with the provisions of Sp. Laws 1872,

ch. 106. On plaintiff's motion judgment on the pleadings was directed

1886.

by Stearns, J., on the ground that Sp. Laws 1872, ch. 106, is uncon-

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF MINNESOTA.
Reports 155-162.

35 Minnesota

stitutional.

Defendant appeals from the judgment.

The cause was argued at the April term, and, by order of the court,

was reargued at the October term, 1885.
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Vanderburgh, J. The defendant, it appears, first organized as a

boom corporation under the general law. The original articles of

incorporation are not disclosed by the record, but it is manifest (and

it is not disputed) that the organization must have been made under

Gen. St.. ch. 34, tit. 2, and that the powers and privileges thereby

acquired could not include either the right to exercise the power of

eminent domain, or to take tolls, or to obstruct the navigable portion

of the St. Louis river, where the defendant's booms and works are

located, so as to prevent the free passage of the logs of other owners.

Stevens Point Boom Co. v. Reilly, 44 Wis. 295, 305; s. c. 46 Wis.

237, 242. It was, by virtue of its original articles of incorporation,

entitled only to the same rights in the river as other riparian owners,

and to erect and maintain booms in connection with the navigation of

the stream, for its own use, and the use of others who might contract for

its services. It was merely a private boom corporation. Soon after

such organization under the general laws, the legislature passed an act

entitled "An act relating to the Knife Falls Boom Corporation" (Sp.

Laws 1872, ch. 106), which purports to confer new and independent

franchises and enlarge powers upon the defendant corporation, within

the St. Louis river, and over the navigation and use thereof, as respects

the passage of logs, including the right of eminent domain, the right

to charge compensation for boomage, in the nature of tolls, prescribed

by the act, upon all logs passing through their works, and to receive

and take the entire charge and control of all logs and timber which

might run, come or be driven within the same, and to boom, scale

and deliver them as provided in such act. Osborne v. Knife Falls

Plaintiff brought this action, in the district court for St. Louis
county, to recover possession of certain logs, alleged to be wrongfully
detained by the defendant. The answer admits the detention of the
logs by the defendant, and justifies such detention under claim of a
lien for boomage in accordance with the provisions of Sp. Laws 1872,
ch. 106. On plaintiff's motion judgment on the pleadings was directed
hy STEARNS, J., on the ground that Sp. Laws 1872, ch. 1o6, is unconstitutional.
Defendant appeals from the judgment.
The cause was argued at the April term, and, by order of the court,
was reargued at the October term, 1885.
VANDERBURGH, J. The defendant, it appears, first organized as a
boom corporation under the general law. The original articles of
incorporation are not disclosed by the record, but it is manifest (and
it is not disputed) that the organization must have been made under
Gen. St., ch. 34, tit. 2, and that the powers and privileges thereby
acquired could not include either the right to exercise the power of .
eminent domain, or to take tolls, or to obstruct the navigable portion
of the St. Louis river, where the defendant's booms and works are
located, so as to prevent the free passage of the logs of other owners.
Stevens Point Boom Co. v. Reilly, 44 Wis. 295, 305; s. c. 46 Wis.
237, 242. It was, by virtue of its original articles of incorporation,
entitled only to the same rights in the river as other riparian owners,
and to erect and maintain booms in connection with the navigation of
the stream, for its own use, and the use of others who might contract for
its services. It was merely a private boom corporation. Soon after
uch organization under the general laws, the legislature passed an act
entitled • 1 An act relating to the Knife Falls Boom Corporation" (Sp.
Laws 1872, ch. 106), which purports to confer new and independent
franchises and enlarge powers upon the defendant corporation, within
the St. Louis river, and over the navigation and use thereof, as respects
the passage of logs, including the right of eminent domain, the right
to charge compensation for boomage, in the nature of tolls, prescribed
by the act, upon all logs passing through their works, and to receive
and take the entire charge and control of all logs and timber which
might run, come or be driven within the same, and to boom, sc11le
and deliver them as provided in such act. Osborne v. Knife Falls
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Boom Co., 32 Minn. 412 (21 N. W. Rep. 704). And the corpora-

tion is also thereby granted a lien upon all such logs or timber for
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their compensation, which may be enforced by a sale.
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The detention of the plaintiff's logs, taken and held in invitum by

defendant under a claim of lien for the boomage allowed by this act,

Boom Co., 3.t Minn. 412 (21 N. W. Rep. 704). And the corporation is also thereby granted a lien upon all such logs or timber for
their compensation, which may be enforced by a sale.
The detention of the plaintiff's logs, taken and held in invitum by
defendant under a claim of lien for the boomage allowed by this act,
brings up the question of its constitutionality in this case. This question was not suggested or mooted in the case of Osborne against the
defendants, just cited, but the question there determined was as respects the power of the legislature to authorize such improvements in
the use of a navigable river. The question which is raised here, and
which has been elaborately argued by counsel, is the constitutional
power of the legislature to so amend the charter, and to confer upon
an existing corporation additional special powers and privileges of
the character described, under the provisions of article 10, section 2,
of the c'mstitution, forbidding the forma#on of corporations by spe. dal acts. The discussion by counsel at the bar embraced the question of the proper original construction of this clause, and the intention of the framers of the constitution in inserting it, and also the question of the construction thereof which has in fact prevailed and been
acted on in this state, and the effect which the court ought to give
to such construction in considering this case.
1. The charter of a corporati'on represents a two-fold contract:
(a) The executed grant by the state of a portion of its sovereignty,
irrevocable in its nature, wizen once accepted and acted on; (b) the
mutual compact between the corpora/ors or stockholders among themselves. And in the absence of constitutional restraints, a corporation
might be endowed with new and enlarged powers by legislative grant,
and its original character, object and business might thereby be changed,
with the consent of the stockholders, for any lawful purpose. If the
clause under consideration was intended simply to prohibit special
acts establishing corporate entities or granting original charters, then
it is clear that an existing corporation may receive the grant of new
and extensive privileges and franchises, and the amendment to 'the
defendant's charter by the act in question may undoubtedly be upheld
as a valid exercise of legislative power. But the respondent contends
that this provision of the constitution has a wider significance and
was intended to restrain all grants of corporate privileges and franchises by special acts of the legislature, and this is, in the opinion of
the writer, the proper construction. A corporation, created or formed
by special acts, could only be so formed by means of the grant of a
charter conferring essential corporate powers or franchises. "Franchises" are defined to be special privileges conferred by government
upon individuals, and which do not belong to the citizens of the country, generally, of common right. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet.
519. The grant of such a franchise is the essential thing in a charter,
and whether given to new corporators, or those already organized, or
in an original or amended charter, the grant of a corporate franchise
is, as between the sovereign and the corporators, so far the grant of
a charter, or the grant of a ••franchise by act of incorporation.••

brings up the question of its constitutionality in this case. This ques-

tion was not suggested or mooted in the case of Osborne against the

defendants, just cited, but the question there determined was as re-

spects the power of the legislature to authorize such improvements in

the use of a navigable river. The question which is raised here, and

which has been elaborately argued by counsel, is the constitutional

power of the legislature to so amend the charter, and to confer upon

an existing corporation additional special powers and privileges of

the character described, under the provisions of article 10, section 2,

of the constitution, forbidding the formation of corporations by spe-

cial acts. The discussion by counsel at the bar embraced the ques-

tion of the proper original construction of this clause, and the inten-

tion of the framers of the constitution in inserting it, and also the ques-

tion of the construction thereof which has in fact prevailed and been

acted on in this state, and the effect which the court ought to give
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to such construction in considering this case.

1. The charter of a corporation represents a two-fold contract:

(a) The executed grant by the state of a portion of its sovereignty,

irrevocable in its nature, when once accepted and acted on; (b) the

mutual compact between the corporators or stockholders among them-

selves. And in the absence of constitutional restraints, a corporation

might be endowed with new and enlarged powers by legislative grant,

and its original character, object and business might thereby be changed,

with the consent of the stockholders, for any lawful purpose. If the

clause under consideration was intended simply to prohibit special

acts establishing corporate entities or granting original charters, then

it is clear that an existing corporation may receive the grant of new

and extensive privileges and franchises, and the amendment to the

defendant's charter by the act in question may undoubtedly be upheld

as a valid exercise of legislative power. But the respondent contends

that this provision of the constitution has a wider significance, and

was intended to restrain all grants of corporate privileges and fran-

chises by special acts of the legislature, and this is, in the opinion of

the writer, the proper construction. A corporation, created or formed

by special acts, could only be so formed by means of the grant of a

charter conferring essential corporate powers or franchises. '"Fran-

chises" are defined to be special privileges conferred by government

upon individuals, and which do not belong to the citizens of the coun-

try, generally, of common right. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet.

519. The grant of such a franchise is the essential thing in a charter,

and whether given to new corporators, or those already organized, or

in an original or amended charter, the grant of a corporate franchise

is, as between the sovereign and the corporators, so far the grant of

a charter, or the grant of a "franchise by act of incorporation."
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I think, it was clearly the purpose of the framers of the constitution

to prohibit by special acts.

It is true, the right to be a corporation is itself a franchise, but all

franchises granted to a corporation become corporate franchises, and

essential portions of its charter or act of incorporation, and the

chief value of the charter in order to accomplish the purposes of

the corporate organization. The constitutional provision requires

that corporations, except for municipal purposes, shall be formed

under general laws, and not under or by special acts. This can not.

7 think, mean that a portion of the franchises or privileges in a pro-

posed charter might be obtained under a general law, and the re-

mainder by special enactments; or, in other-words, that a general law

might be a mere enabling act to confer corporate existence, leaving

the door open to the corporation thereafter to apply to the legislature

for additional franchises. Such construction must be given to the

provision in question as will manifestly be in harmony with its spirit,

and give effect to the intent and purpose of its framers. The object

being to restrict the granting of charters to general laws, the courts
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can not sanction an evasion by limiting the application of the princi-

ple to the case of original charters or corporate organizations. The

object of this constitutional restriction was, as it is well understood, to

correct an existing evil, and prevent favoritism and abuses in secur-

ing grants of special charters, and to establish uniform rules for the

endowment of corporations with chartered privileges. Any special

legislation affecting the charters of corporations should therefore be

strictly construed, so as to give full effect to the leading object of the

provision. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp., § 17; Atkinson v. Marietta, etc. R.

Co., 15 Ohio St. 21, 35.

Charters, then, since the adoption of the constitution, are to be ac-

quired under general laws, and to them must we look to ascertain

what franchises may be conferred by charter upon corporations.

Every new grant of special powers must, as between the sovereign

and a corporation, be regarded, as respects the exercise of such

powers, in the light of a new charter, and especially since, when ac-

cepted, the new or amended charter becomes a contract irrevocable,

unless the power of amendment or repeal is reserved in the grant.

Every new grant of a portion of its sovereignty by the state through

the legislature must, in principle, be within the prohibition, and be

equivalent to the grant of a charter de novo. In accordance with this

view, the legislature accordingly, upon the adoption of the constitu-

tion, enacted general laws for the formation of corporations for the

various purposes required in the commonwealth, and carefully defined

their powers and obligations, and made them of uniform application.

These general provisions have been amended from time to time, as

the public needs have required, and general laws have been passed

applicable alike to corporations of the same kind, and proper provis-

ions made for amended articles of incorporation. The general pro-

visions of law applicable to any class of corporations, together with

Attorney-General v. Railroad Cos., 35 Wis. 425, 56o. Such grants,
I think, it was clearly the purpose of the framers of the constitution
to prohibit by special acts.
It is true, the right to be a corporation is itself a franchise, but all
franchises granted to a corporation become corporate franchises, and
es ential portions of its charter or act of incorporation, and the
chief value of the charter in order to accomplish the purposes of
the corporate organization. Th~ constitutional provision re<Juires
that corporat£ons, except for muni'cipal purposes, shall be formed
under general laws, and not under or by special acts. This can not,
I th-ink, mean that a portt"on of the franchises or privileges in a proposed charter might be obtained under a general law, and the remainder by special enactments; or, in other words, that a general law
11nght be a mere enabling act to confer corporate existence, leaving
the door open to the corporation thereafter to apply to the legislature
for addit£onal franchises. Such construction must be given to the
provision in question as will manifestly be in harmony with its spirit,
and give effect to the intent and purpose of its framers. The object
being to restrict the granting of charters to general laws, the courts
can not sanction an evasion by limiting the application of the principle to the case of original charters or corporate organizations. The
object of this constitutional restriction was, as it is well understood, to
correct an existing evil, and prevent favoritism and abuses in securing grants of special charters, and to establish uniform rules for the
endowment of corporations with chartered privileges. Any special
legislation affecting the charters of corporations should therefore be
strictly construed, so as to give full effect to the leading object of the
provision. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp., § 1 7; Atkinson v. Marietta, etc. R.
Co., 15 Ohio St. 2 1, 35.
Charters, then, since the adoption of the constitution, are to be ac- .
quired under general laws, and to them must we look to ascertain
what franchises may be conferred by charter upon corporations.
Every new grant of special powers must, as between the sovereign
and a corporation, be regarded, as respects the exercise of such
powers, in the light of a new charter, and especially since, when accepted, the new or amended charter becomes a contract irrevocable,
unless the power of amendment or repeal is reserved in the grant.
E\"ery new grant of a portion of its sovereignty by the state through
the legislature must, iq principle, be within the prohibition, and be
equivalent to the grant of a charter de novo. In accordance with this
view, the legislature accordingly, upon the adoption of the constitution , enacted general laws for the formation of corporations for the
Yarious purposes required in the commonwealth, and carefully defined
their powers and obligations, and made them of uniform application.
These general provisions haYe been amended from time to time, as
the public needs have required, and general laws have been passed
applicable alike to corporations of the same kind, and proper provisions made for amend~d articles of incorporation. The general provisions of law applicable to any class of corporations, together with
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the articles of association, constitute the charter of any particular cor-
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poration. The general character of this legislation is entirely in har-
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mony with the construction that corporations under general laws must

derive their essential powers therefrom. We lay no stress upon the

the a1ticles of association, constitute the charter of any particular corporation. The general character of this legislation is entirely in harmony with the construction that corporations under general laws mu t
derive their essential powers therefrom. We lay no stress upon the
use of the word "formed" instead of "create" in the constitution;
the distinction is immaterial in respect to the matter of the grants of
corporate franchises. The supreme court of Wisconsin, upon a careful consideration of the question, while determining that the charters of
pre-existing corporations were subject to alteration or amendment
under the power expressly reserved in the constitution of that state,
hold that there is no distinction, as respects the constitutional inhibition, between a grant of corporate powers and privileges, and the
grant of corporate charters de novo. Attorney-General v. Railroad
Cos., 35 Wis. 425 1 560; Kimball v. Town of Rosendale, 42 Wis.
407 1 416; Stevens Point Boom Co. v. Reilly, 44 'i\Tis. 295, 301. And
the same doctrine is also affirmed in San Francisco v. Spring Valley
Water-Works, 48 Cal. 493 1 507; Spring Valley Water-Works v.
Bryant, 52 Cal. 132, 140.
2. The defendant also makes the point that it was competent for
the state to invest a corporation, as it might an individual, with the
power and duty to assume an agency in behalf of the public to make
the improvements and transact the business authorized by the amendment to the charter here in question for the purpose of facilitating the
business of driving, handling and assorting logs in the common interest. But the nature of the agency and business thereby created
and authorized does not affect the application of the rule. The precise point was raised in Stevens Point Boom Co. v. Reilly, 44 Wis.
295, 301, where the plaintiff was organized under a general law, and
subsequently granted powers similar to those conferred on this plaintiff by the act in controversy, and the court, by Ryan, C. J., said:
"The court was not indisposed, if it could, to construe the sections
of the latter statute relied on as an employment of an existing corporation to improve the navigation of the river in the public right, and
provide a compensation for it; but the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant appears to be conclusive against such a view.
His position was that corporate franchises are always supposed to
he granted on some public consideration, with corresponding benefit
to the grantees; and that to hold the sections in question a valid grant
of power on the ground suggested would open the door indefinitely
to special grants to corporations under general laws, so far nullifying
the constitutional amendment and continuing the evils which the
amendment was intended to obviate." Such powers when conferred
upon a corporation, become corporate powers or francht"ses , and
hence, subject to the same objection as in other cases where a francht'se wht'ch may lawfully be conferred upon an individual by special act can not be so conferred upon a corporation. Ames v. Lake
Superior and Mississippi R. Co., 21 Minn. 241, 258.
3. It is unnecessary to consider whether there is any distinction
between corporations formed under general laws and corporations

use of the word "formed" instead of "create" in the constitution;

the distinction is immaterial in respect to the matter of the grants of

corporate franchises. The supreme court of Wisconsin, upon a care-

ful consideration of the question, while determining that the charters of

pre-existing corporations were subject to alteration or amendment

under the power expressly reserved in the constitution of that state,

hold that there is no distinction, as respects the constitutional inhibi-

tion, between a grant of corporate powers and privileges, and the

grant of corporate charters de novo. Attorney-General v. Railroad

Cos., 35 Wis. 425, 560; Kimball v. Town of Rosendale, 42 Wis.

407, 416; Stevens Point Boom Co. v. Reilly, 44 Wis. 295, 301. And

the same doctrine is also affirmed in San Francisco v. Spring Valley

Water-Works, 48 Cal. 493, 507; Spring Valley Water-Works v.

Bryant, 52 Cal. 132, 140.

2. The defendant also makes the point that it was competent for

the state to invest a corporation, as it might an individual, with the
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power and duty to assume an agency in behalf of the public to make

the improvements and transact the business authorized by the amend-

ment to the charter here in question for the purpose of facilitating the

business of driving, handling and assorting logs in the common in-

terest. But the nature of the agency and business thereby created

and authorized does not affect the application of the rule. The pre-

cise point was raised in Stevens Point Boom Co. v. Reilly, 44 Wis.

295, 301, where the plaintiff was organized under a general law, and

subsequently granted powers similar to those conferred on this plaint-

iff by the act in controversy, and the court, by Ryan, C. J., said:

"The court was not indisposed, if it could, to construe the sections

of the latter statute relied on as an employment of an existing corpo-

ration to improve the navigation of the river in the public right, and

provide a compensation for it; but the argument of the learned coun-

sel for the appellant appears to be conclusive against such a view.

His position was that corporate franchises are always supposed to

be granted on some public consideration, with corresponding benefit

to the grantees; and that to hold the sections in question a valid grant

of power on the ground suggested would open the door indefinitely

to special grants to corporations under general laws, so far nullifying

the constitutional amendment and continuing the evils which the

amendment was intended to obviate." Such powers -when conferred

upon a corporation., become corporate powers or franchises, and

hence, subject to the same objection as in other cases where a fran-

chise which may lawfully be conferred upon an individual by spe-

cial act can not be so conferred upon a corporation. Ames v. Lake

Superior and Mississippi R. Co., 21 Minn. 241, 258.

3. It is unnecessary to consider whether there is anv distinction

between corporations formed under general laws and corporations
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created by special charters prior to the adoption of the constitution,

as respects the effect of subsequent special legislation. It has been

the habit of the legislature, in both classes of cases, and especially

in the latter class, to amend and alter charters, by special acts, ever

since the constitution was adopted; but I have not been able to dis-

cover that there are many other instances like the case at bar, wherein

such new and important grants of power have been made to pre-ex-

isting corporations. The legislation in such cases is more generally,

as I understand it, confined to amendments and alterations relating to

matter of form, or affecting the remedy, or the method and details of

the management of the corporate business, or the mutual relations,

rights or interests of the corporators among themselves, in the exercise

of franchises already possessed by them, which legislation might be

had, with the consent of the corporators, without any new or further

grant of corporate powers by the state. This court, in the several

cases which have been before it for adjudication, has always recog-

nized the restrictive force of the constitution as respects such grants,

though it has never attempted to define the exact limits of such legis-
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lation, or to formulate any rule on the subject; and while some of the

cases have recognized and sustained departures from the strict rule we

have attempted to lay down, none of them, I think, lend any sanction

to so wide a departure therefrom as would be necessary to sustain the

grant of the special charter in this case. But no case seems to have

gone farther in upholding a grant of new powers than the limits sug-

gested in Ames v. Lake Superior and Mississippi R. Co., 21 Minn.

241, 286, where the court, while not assuming to accurately define the

limits of the constitutional restriction, indicate very clearly that a law

authorizing such additions or changes in the business of a corpora-

tion as to constitute substantially a new enterprise, to which its old

the legislature has not generally transcended such limits in amend-

ments made to corporate charters. In exceptional cases, like the one

under consideration, the corporators should be deemed to have ac-

cepted and acted under the charter amendments assumed to be granted,

at their peril.

It would not, in my judgment, be a reasonable construction of this

act to hold that the new business authorized was incidental to the

original enterprise, or a mere extension or enlargement of it; nor do

I think that public interests would be seriously affected by a construc-

tion that should defeat legislation of this kind. I think that the diffi-

culties and inconvenience likely to result could, in a great measure,

he remedied through the operation of general laws, as was the case in

Stevens Point Boom Co. v. Reilly, supra, and see People v. Perrin,

In San Francisco v. Spring Valley Water-Works, 48 Cal. 493, 523,

the court, in the face of similar arguments and considerations, re-

versed what was held to be an erroneous construction of a similar

clause in a state constitution, in an earlier case, decided eleven years

business -would be a mere

unconstitutional; and

56 Cal. 345.

created by special charters prior to the adoption of the constitution,
as respects the effect of subsequent special legislation. It has been
the habit of the legislature, in both classes of cases, and especially
in the latter class, to amend and alter charters, by special acts, ever
since the constitution wa~ adopted; but I have not been able to discover that there are many other instances like the case at ·bar, wherein
such new and important grants of power have been made to pre-existing corporations. The legislation in such cases is more generally,
as I understand it, confined to amendments and alterations relating to
matter of form, or affecting the remedy, or the method and details of
the management of the corporate business, or the mutual relations,
rights or interests of the corpora tors among themselves, in the exercise
of franchises already possessed by them, which legislation might be
had, with the consent of the corporators, without any new or further
grant of corporate powers by the state. This court, in the several
cases which have been before it for adjudication, has always recognized the restrictive force of the constitution as respects such grants,
though it has never attempted to define the exa'Ct limits of such legislation, or to formulate any rule on the subject; and while some of the
cases have recognized and sustained departures from the strict rule we
have attempted to lay down, none of them, I think, lend any sanction
to so wide a departure therefrom as would be necessary to sustain the
grant of the special charter in this case. But no case seems to have
gone farther in upholding a grant of new powers than the limits suggested in Ames v. Lake Superior and Mississippi R. Co., 21 Mim~.
241, 286, where the court, while not assuming to accurately define the
limits of the constitution:il restriction, indicate very clearly that a law
authorizing such additions or changes in the business of a corporation as to constitute substantially a new enterprt'se, to wht'ch t'ts old
business would be a mere t'nddent, would be unconstt'tutt'onal; and
the legislature has not generally transcended such limits in amendments ma<le to corporate charters. In .exceptional cases, like the one
under consideration, the corporators should be deemed to have accepted and acted under the charter amendments assumed to be granted,
at their peril.
It would not, in my judgment, be a reasonable construction of this
act to hold that the new business authorized was incidental to the
original enterprise, or a mere extension or enlargement of it; nor do
I think that public interests would be seriously affected by a construction that should defeat legislation of this kind. I think that the difficulties and inconvenience likely to result could, in a great measure,
be remedied through the operation of general laws, as was the case in
Stevens Point Boom Co. v. Reilly, supra, and see People v. Perrin ,
56 Cal. 345·
In San Francisco v. Spring Valley Water-Works, 48 Cal. 493, 523,
the court, in the face of similar arguments and considerations, reversed what was held to be an erroneous construction of a similar
clause in a state constitution, in an earlier case, decided eleven years
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before, and which upheld legislative grants of new franchises, and
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adopted the strict rule contended for by the respondent here.
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4. The majority of the court, however, do not agree to the views

above expressed in respect to the character of the special law in ques-

before, and which upheld legislative grants of new franchises, and
adopted the strict rule contended for by the respondent here.
4. The majority of the court, however, do not agree to the views
above expressed in r espect to the character of the spedal law in <ptestiQn, and the effect to be given to it, and are of the opinion th.at it
ought not be held unconstt"tutz"onal. They hold that the strict rule
forbidding the grant of additt"onal powers or franchises, while it
may be the more logical and satisfactory, treated as an original question,
has never £n fact bean recognized or adopted by the legi"slature or
courts of the state; that this constitutional provision was open to construction, and, during a long course of legislation, the practical construction placed upon it by the legislature and people has been a
liberal one in respect to amendments, and that the court should be
very slow to change it, at this late day, for the reason that the extensive and varied legislation affecting corporate charters, so long continued, has come to involve very large public and private interests.
Considering the amount and character of such legislation, and in view
of the decisions of this court, it would often be difficult to accurately
define the boundary line between valid and void acts, leaving many
cases in doubt and uncertainty until actually adjudicated.
Under these circumstances the constitutional amendment of 1881 was
adopted (laws 1881, c. 3), which, in direct and plain terms, forbids
special legislation of the character complained 0£ The language of
this amendment is: " The legislature is prohibited from enacting
any special or private laws in the following cases: • <i • ( 7) For
granting corporate powers or privileges, except to cities." This
amendment, in their opinion, indicates a change of policy, and unquestionably inaugurates or restores the strict rule of construction as
to all subsequent legislation affecting the charters of existing corporations. Its language and meaning are too clear to call for construction , and there will be no ground upon which to build any subsequent
erroneous legislation or popular construction.
My brethren are also of the opinion that the act in question does
not, within the rule laid down in Ames v. Lake Superior and Mississippi R. Co., supra, work such a change in the character of the corporation as to constitute it essentially a new or different corporation,
though it enlarges its business, and grants the necessary incidental
powers to make such enlargement practical and effective, and that
for these reasons the act should not be held void.
Judgment reversed.
See 1899, Bank of Commerce v. Wiltsie, 153 Ind. 460, 47 L. R. A. 489.

tion, and the effect to be given to it, and are of the opinion that it

ought not be held unconstitutional. They hold that the strict rule

forbidding the grant of additional powers or franchises, while it

may be the more logical and satisfactory, treated as an original question,

has never in fact been recognized or adopted by the legislature or

courts of the state; that this constitutional provision was open to con-

struction, and, during a long course of legislation, the practical con-

struction placed upon it by the legislature and people has been a

liberal one in respect to amendments, and that the court should be

very slow to change it, at this late day, for the reason that the ex-

tensive and varied legislation affecting corporate charters, so long con-

tinued, has come to involve very large public and private interests.

Considering the amount and character of such legislation, and in view

of the decisions of this court, it would often be difficult to accurately

define the boundary line between valid and void acts, leaving many

cases in doubt and uncertainty until actually adjudicated.
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Under these circumstances the constitutional amendment of 1881 was

adopted (laws 1881, c. 3), which, in direct and plain terms, forbids

special legislation of the character complained of. The language of

this amendment is: "The legislature is prohibited from enacting

any special or private laws in the following cases: * * » (7) por

granting corporate powers or privileges, except to cities." This

amendment, in their opinion, indicates a change of policy, and un-

questionably inaugurates or restores the strict rule of construction as

to all subsequent legislation affecting the charters of existing corpo-

rations. Its language and meaning are too clear to call for construc-

tion, and there will be no ground upon which to build any subsequent

erroneous legislation or popular construction.

My brethren are also of the opinion that the act in question does

not, within the rule laid down in Ames v. Lake Superior and Missis-

sippi R. Co., supra, work such a change in the character of the cor-

poration as to constitute it essentially a new or different corporation,

though it enlarges its business, and grants the necessary incidental

powers to make such enlargement practical and effective, and that

for these reasons the act should not be held void.

Judgment reversed.

See 1899, Bank of Commerce v. Wiltsie, 153 Ind. 460, 47 L. R. A. 489.
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THE CITY AND COUNTY OF 8AN FRANCISCO v. THE SPRING VAL-

. 345

LEY WATER-WORKS.1

1874. In the Supreme Court of California. 48 Cal. Rep.

493-535-

Sec. 71. Same.

[Appeal from the district court. The general iaw providing tor

the incorporation of water-works companies took effect April 22,

1S58. The next day the legislature enacted the "Ensign Act," per-

THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO v. THE SPRING VAL
LEY WATER-WORKS. 1

mitting one Ensign and his associates, upon becoming incorporated

under the general corporation laws, to supply water to San Francisco,

1874.

IN

THE

SUPREME CouRT OF CALIFORNIA.

use the city streets therefor, charge certain rates, have certain privi-

leges, and be subject to certain burdens, not included in the general

law relating to the incorporation of water companies.]

By the court, Crockett, J. On the former appeal, and at the first

hearing of the present appeal, it was assumed, by both court and

counsel, that the rights and obligations of the defendant were to be

ascertained by reference to the act of April 23, 1858, authorizing

Ensign and his associates to lay down water-pipes in the streets of

San Francisco. But on the rehearing the point is made for the first
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time by the defendant that the Ensign act is unconstitutional and void,

and consequently can confer no rights on the plaintiff nor impose any

duties on the defendant. The eighth section of the act is in these words:

'•This act shall not take effect unless the parties named in section 1

shall, within sixty days after its passage, duly organize themselves in

conformity with the existing laws regulating corporations now in force

in this state."

It is contended that this is an attempt to confer corporate rights by

a special act upon Ensign and his associates, in violation of section 31,

article 4, of the constitution, which provides that '■'■corporations may

be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special act

except for municipal purposes. All general laws and special acts

passed pursuant to this section may be altered from time to time or

repealed." The act in question does not purport to organize Ensign

and his associates as a corporation. On the contrary, it requires them

to "organize themselves in conformity with the existing laws regular*

ing corporations," as a condition on which they shall become entitled

to the benefits and privileges enumerated in the act. It is clear, there-

fore, that the corporation, when formed, did not derive its corporate

existence from the Ensign act; nor could it have done so under the

constitution. But it is claimed that under this provision of the con-

stitution, corporations must not only be formed under general laws,

but that their rights, duties and obligations must be prescribed in the

same method, and can not be created bv special acts. On the other

1 Statement of facts abridged. Arguments omitted. Opinions of McKin-

stry (concurring) and Rhodes, J., dissenting, omitted.

48 Cal. Rep.

493-535·
[Appeal from the district court. The general 1aw providing tor
the incorporation of water-works companies took effect April 22 1
1858. The next day the legislature enacted the "Ensign Act," permitting one Ensign and his associates, upon becoming incorporated
under the general corporation laws, to supply water to San Francisco,
use the city streets therefor, charge certain rates, have certain privileges, and be subject to certain burdens, not included in the general
law relating to the incorporation of water companies.}
By the court, CROCKETT, J. On the former appeal, and at the first
hearing of the present appeal, it was assumed, by both court and
counsel, that the rights and obligations of the defendant were to be
ascertained by reference to the act of April 23, 1858 1 authorizing
Ensign and his associates to lay down water-pipes in the streets of
San Francisco. But on the rehearing the point is made for the first
time by the defendant that the Ensign act is unconstitutional and void,
and consequently can confer no rights on the plaintiff nor impose any
duties on the defendant. The eighth section of the act is in these words:
"This act shall not take effect unless the parties named in section I
shall, within sixty days after its passage, duly organize themselves in
conformity with the existing laws regulating corporations now in force
in this state."
It is contended that this is an attempt to confer corporate rights by
a special act upon Ensign and his associates, in violation of section 31,
article 4, of the constitution, which provides that "corporations maJ

be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special act
except for municipal purposes. All general laws and special acts
passedpursuant to this section may be altered from time to time or
repealed." The act in question does not purport to organize Ensign
and his associates as a corporation. On t.he contrary, it requires them
to "organize themselves in conformity with the existing laws regula~
ing corporations," as a condition on which they shall become entitled
to the benefits and privileges enumerated in the act. It is clear, there•
fore, that the corporation, when formed, did not derive its corporate
existence from the Ensign act; nor could it have done so under the
constitution. But it is claimed that under this provision of the constitution, corporations must not only be formed under general laws,
but that their rights, duties and obligations must be prescribed in the
same method, and can not be created by special acts. On the other
1

Statement of facts abridged. Arguments omitted. Opinions of McKin-

stry (concurring) and Rhodes, J., dissenting, omitted.
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hand, it is insisted that the constitution is wholly silent as to the
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powers and duties of corporations, and goes no further than to require

that they shall be "formed" under general laws, and prohibits them

from being "created by special act;" but left the legislature free to

hand, it is insisted that the constitution is wholly silent as to the
powers and duties of corporations, and goes no further than to require
that they shall be "formed" under general laws , and prohibits them
from being "created by special act;" but left the legislature free to
confer upon them, by either general laws or special acts, such powers
as it shall see fit. If this theory be correct, the constitutional provision has imposed upon the legislature only the duty of providing by
general laws the formulas by which corporations may be formed-the
mere routine by which an artificial entity may be created-but has in
no degree limited the power of the legislature to confer upon it by
special grant, at its discretion, any powers or privileges of whatsoever nature. On this construction, it would be competent fo1· the legislature to provide, by a general law, that any number of persons
might become a body corporate, on filing a certificate stating their
intention to that effect, and the name of the corporation; and the
legislature might then, by special grant, confer on the corporation
any powers, however great, and any privileges, however diversified.
It might authorize it to constnict railroads, to transact the business of
banking or insurance, deal in lands and establish steamship lines.
There would be no limit to its power in this respect. Nor, when once
granted by special act, could these privileges be recalled or modified
by the legislature. The grant, and its acceptance by the corporation ,
would have created a contract, the obligation of which could not be
impaired by any subsequent legislation.
Long prior to the adoption of our constitution, experience had demonstrated the enormous evils resulting from legislation of this character. By means of hasty or corrupt legislation, great monopolies
had been created, which were beyond legislative control.
Capital was aggregated in the hands of large corporations with
peculiar and oppressive privileges, frequently procured through venal
legislation. There was no uniformity in the powers exercised by
corporations pursuing the same business. So long as they derived
their powers, privileges and immunities from special legislative grants,
these, of course, varied according to the temper of the legislature, and
the result was that each succeeding corporation had greater or less
powers than its predecessors. With no limitation upon the discretion
of the legislature in respect to the particular powers and privileges
to be granted to each, nor as to the innumerable purposes for which
corporations might be formed, nor as to the term of their duration,
gross abuse necessarily resulted from such a system. Extraordinary
privileges, oppressive powers, and onerous monopolies were conferred upon some and denied to others engaged in the same business.
Their powers were frequently enlarged, and the terms of their duration extended by special grant. Under this system there was danger
that large aggregations of capital would so practice upon the credulity or venality of legislative bodies as to secure the most oppressive
monopolies, and seriously interfere with the enterprise and industry
of the individual citizen. One of the latest and most startling illustrations of this danger is to be found in an act of the legislature of

confer upon them, by either general laws or special acts, such powers

as it shall see fit. If this theory be correct, the constitutional pro-

vision has imposed upon the legislature only the duty of providing by

general laws the formulas by which corporations may be formed—the

mere routine by which an artificial entity may be created—but has in

no degree limited the power of the legislature to confer upon it by

special grant, at its discretion, any powers or privileges of whatso-

ever nature. On this construction, it would be competent for the leg-

islature to provide, by a general law, that any number of persons

might become a body corporate, on filing a certificate stating their

intention to that effect, and the name of the corporation; and the

legislature might then, by special grant, confer on the corporation

any powers, however great, and any privileges, however diversified.

It might authorize it to construct railroads, to transact the business of

banking or insurance, deal in lands and establish steamship lines.

There would be no limit to its power in this respect. Nor, when once
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granted by special act, could these privileges be recalled or modified

by the legislature. The grant, and its acceptance by the corporation,

would have created a contract, the obligation of which could not be

impaired by any subsequent legislation.

Long prior to the adoption of our constitution, experience had de-

monstrated the enormous evils resulting from legislation of this char-

acter. By means of hasty or corrupt legislation, great monopolies

had been created, which were beyond legislative control.

Capital was aggregated in the hands of large corporations with

peculiar and oppressive privileges, frequently procured through venal

legislation. There was no uniformity in the powers exercised by

corporations pursuing the same business. So long as they derived

their powers, privileges and immunities from special legislative grants,

these, of course, varied according to the temper of the legislature, and

the result was that each succeeding corporation had greater or less

powers than its predecessors. With no limitation upon the discretion

of the legislature in respect to the particular powers and privileges

to be granted to each, nor as to the innumerable purposes for which

corporations might be formed, nor as to the term of their duration,

gross abuse necessarily resulted from such a system. Extraordinary

privileges, oppressive powers, and onerous monopolies were con-

ferred upon some and denied to others engaged in the same business.

Their powers were frequently enlarged, and the terms of their dura-

tion extended by special grant. Under this system there was danger

that large aggregations of capital would so practice upon the credu-

lity or venality of legislative bodies as to secure the most oppressive

monopolies, and seriously interfere with the enterprise and industry

of the individual citizen. One of the latest and most startling illus-

trations of this danger is to be found in an act of the legislature of
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ated by special grant, with the exclusive right to establish and main-

tain slaughter-houses and landings for cattle for a period of twenty-

five years in the city of New Orleans and several of the contiguous

parishes. The constitution of Louisiana contains no limitation on

the power of the legislature to confer corporate rights by special act,

and the validity of this statute has been upheld by the supreme court

of the state and of the United States.

But this unrestricted power to endow corporations with peculiar and

exclusive privileges would be less dangerous if a succeeding legis-

lature could correct the abuses practiced by its predecessor, and abolish

or restrict the privileges once granted. « * *

It was the special purpose of the framers of our constitution to

guard against these abuses by providing that "corporations may be

formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special act,

except for municipal purposes." Nor were they content to leave it

doubtful whether the legislature would have power to modify or abro-

gate these general laws or special acts to create municipal corpora-
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tions so as to affect the rights of existing corporations. Hence, the

constitution contains the further provision that all general laws and

special acts "passed pursuant to this section may be altered from time

to time, or repealed." * * *

Under these provisions the source from which private corporations

must derive their powers and immunities is perfectly apparent. They

can only "be formed under general laws," and can exercise no

powers, except such as are derived from general laws. If this provis-

ion means nothing more than that the legislature shall prescribe the

mere formula by which a corporate entity may be called into life,

and may then proceed to confer upon it by special act, at its discre-

tion, extraordinary powers and privileges which it could not after-

wards revoke or modify, because they were granted under special and

not general laws, then, indeed, has the constitution signally failed to

provide a remedy for the abuses already adverted to. On this con-

struction, when a railroad corporation is once formed under a general

law, the legislature, by special grant, may conferupon it extraordinary

powers, greatly in excess of those exercised by other similar corpora-

tions. It may authorize it to engage in banking, mining or any other

business enterprise, or to charge higher rates of fare then are permitted

to other competing roads. In like manner it might discriminate in

favor of a particular banking corporation, or confer special, or per-

haps, exclusive privileges on a particular mining, insurance or manu-

facturing corporation. But, on the other, and the true construction

of this constitutional provision, all private corporations must derive

their powers from general laws, and not from special statutes. The

general laws under which they were formed, and such others as shall

afterward be enacted, must alone define their rights and powers. On

this theory, all private corporations, formed for similar purposes, will

stand upon the same footing, enjoy the same rights, and be subject to

Louisiana, passeJ in the year 1869, by which a corporation was created by special grant, with the exclusive right to establish and maintain slaughter-houses and landjngs for cattle for a period of twentyfive years in the city of New Orleans and several of the contiguous
parishes. The cohstitution of Louisiana contains no limitation on
the power of the legislature to confer corporate rights by special act,
- and the validity of this statute has been upheld by the supreme court
of the state and of the United States.
But this unrestricted power to endow corporations with peculiar and
exclusive privileges would be less dangerous if a succeeding legislature could correct the abuses practiced by its predecessor, and abolish
or restrict the privileges once granted. • • •
It was the special purpose of the framers of our constitution to
guard against these abuses by providing that "corporations may be
formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special act,
except for municipal purposes." Nor were they content to leave it
doubtful whether the legislature would have power to modify or abrogate these general laws or special acts to create municipal corporations so as to affect the rights of existing corporations. Hence, the
constitution contains the further provision that all general laws and
special acts "pas~e<l pursuant to this section may be altered from time
to time, or repealed." • • •
Under these provisions the source from which private corporations
must derive their powers and immunities is perfectly apparent. They
can only "be formed under general laws," and can exercise no
powers, except such as are derived from general laws. If this provisi.o n means nothing more than that the legislature shall prescribe the
mere formula by which a coqlOrate entity may be called into life,
and may then proceed to confer upon it by special act, at its discretion, extraordinary powers and privileges which it could not afterwards revoke or modify, because they were granted under special and
not general laws, then, indeed, has the constitution signally failed to
provide a remedy for the abuses already adverted to. On this construction, when a railroad corporation is once formed under a general
law, the legislature, by special grant, may confer upon it extraordinary
powers, greatly in excess of those exercised by other similar corporations. It may authorize it to engage in banking, mining or any other
business enterprise, or to charge higher rates of fare then are permitted
to other competing roads. In like manner it might discriminate in
favor of a particular banking corporation, or confer special, or perhaps, exclusive privileges on a particular mining, insurance or manufacturing corporation. But, on the other, and the trne construction
of this constitutional provision, all private corporations must derive
their powers from general laws, and not from special statutes. The
general laws under which they were formed, and such others as shall
afterward be enacted, must alone define their rights and powers. On
this theory, all private corporations, formed for similar purposes, will
stand upon the same footing, enjoy the same rights, and be subject to
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the same burdens, which can not be increased or diminished except

CITY, ETC., V. SPRING VALLEY WATER-WORKS.

by general laws, applicable to all. * * *

§ 7l

Nothing short of some imperative rule of constitutional construction

would justify us in holding at this late day, that, though corporations

the same burdens, which can not be increased or diminished except
by general laws, applicable to all. • • •
Nothing short of some imperative rule of constitutional construction
would justify us in holding at this late day, that, though corporations
must be "formed" under general laws, it .is, nevertheless, competent
for the legislature, by special grant, to confor upon a corporation
once organized, any powers, however extraordinary. We think, on
the contrary, that no corporate rights or powers can be conferred by
special grant, but must all be derived under general laws.
This brings us to the consideration of the Ensign act, so-called. The
first seven sections confer upon Ensign and his associates certain privileges, and impose upon them certain duties in respect to furnishing
the city and county of San Francisco with water for the extinguishment of fires and other municipal uses. Section 8, already quoted,
provides that "this act shall not take effect unless the parties named
in section 1 shall, within sixty days after its passage, duly organize
themselves in conformity with the existing laws regulating corporations now in force in this state.'' The grant, therefore, wai; not to
take effect until Ensign and his associates had become a corporation
under existing laws. It took effect as a grant, not to Ensign and bis
associates as private individuals, but to the corporation when formed.
It was an attempt by the legislature to confer, by special grant, upon
a private corporation about to be formed, certain peculiar privileges,
and to subject it to certain duties not common to other corporations
formed under the same general law. For the reasons already stated,
this was not within the constitutional power of the legislature.
Judgment and order affirmed.
The foregoing opinion was delivered at the April term, 1874, and
a rehearing having been applied for, the following opinion, denying
the same, was delivered at the July term, 1874.
In the former opinion on this appeal, we held that the act of April
23, 1858, known as the "Ensign Act," is in violation of art. iv, § 3 I
of the constitution, which provides that ''corporations may be formed
under general laws, but shall not be created by special act, except for
municipal purposes." A rehearing is asked, partly on the ground
that this clause of the constitution has received a different construction in the case of the California State Telegraph Company v. Alta
Telegraph Company ( 22 Cal. 398), and that this decision has become
a rule of property in this state, and ought not now to be disturbed,
even though it was erroneous. After a careful examination of that
case, I am satisfied that it can not be sustained, either on reason or
authority. Mr. Justice Crocker, in delivering the opinion of the
court, refers to several adjudged cases as supporting the conclusions
at which he arrived, but an examination of these cases shows that
they were misapprehended by the court, and do not support the decision. • • •
[After discussing the cases of Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 85; Gifford v.
New Jersey R. & T. Co., 2 Stockton Ch. R. 171; C., P. & A. R.

must be "formed" under general laws, it is, nevertheless, competent

for the legislature, by special grant, to confer upon a corporation

once organized, any powers, however extraordinary. We think, on

the contrary, that no corporate rights or powers can be conferred by

special grant, but must all be derived under general laws.

This brings us to the consideration of the Ensign act, so-called. The

first seven sections confer upon Ensign and his associates certain privi-

leges, and impose upon them certain duties in respect to furnishing

the city and county of San Francisco with water for the extinguish-

ment of fires and other municipal uses. Section 8, already quoted,

provides that "this act shall not take effect unless the parties named

in section i shall, within sixty days after its passage, duly organize

themselves in conformity with the existing laws regulating corpora-

tions now in force in this state." The grant, therefore, was not to

take effect until Ensign and his associates had become a corporation

under existing laws. It took effect as a grant, not to Ensign and his
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associates as private individuals, but to the corporation when formed.

It was an attempt by the legislature to confer, by special grant, upon

a private corporation about to be formed, certain peculiar privileges,

and to subject it to certain duties not common to other corporations

formed under the same general law. For the reasons already stated,

this was not within the constitutional power of the legislature.

Judgment and order affirmed.

The foregoing opinion was delivered at the April term, 1874, and

a rehearing having been applied for, the following opinion, denying

the same, was delivered at the July term, 1874.

In the former opinion on this appeal, we held that the act of April

23, 1858, known as the "Ensign Act," is in violation of art. iv, § 31

of the constitution, which provides that "corporations may be formed

under general laws, but shall not be created by special act, except for

municipal purposes." A rehearing is asked, partly on the ground

that this clause of the constitution has received a different construc-

tion in the case of the California State Telegraph Company v. Alta

Telegraph Company (22 Cal. 398), and that this decision has become

a rule of property in this state, and ought not now to be disturbed,

even though it was erroneous. After a careful examination of that

case, I am satisfied that it can not be sustained, either on reason or

authority. Mr. Justice Crocker, in delivering the opinion of the

court, refers to several adjudged cases as supporting the conclusions

at which he arrived, but an examination of these cases shows that

they were misapprehended by the court, and do not support the de-

cision. * * *

[After discussing the cases of Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 85; Gifford v.

New Jersey R. & T. Co., 2 Stockton Ch. R. 171; C, P. & A. R.

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 71

349

LIMITS ON POWER TO CREATE.

v. Erie, 27 Pa. St. 380, relied upon by Justice Crocker in the former

§ 71

LIMITS ON POWER TO CREATE.

349

decision, and holding they did not involve the question here proceeds:]

The only remaining case referred to was the Syracuse City Bank v.

Davis (16 Barb. 188). The constitution of New York provides that

"the legislature shall have no power to pass any act granting any spe-

cial charters for banking purposes; but corporations or associations

may be formed for such purposes under general laws." The Syra-

cuse City Bank was organized under the general law; but in some

trifling particulars, the forms prescribed by the general law were not

complied with, and the legislature passed a curative act, to the effect

that the bank should be deemed a valid corporation, and to have been

duly incorporated notwithstanding these informalities. The court held

the curative act to be valid, on the ground that it did not create a cor-

poration, but only remedied defects in the organization of one already

created. That proposition has no analogy to the question involved

here, which relates to the power of the legislature to confer upon an

existing corporation, by special act, other powers than those derived

from the general law. These are the only cases referred to by Mr.
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Justice Crocker, and none of them support his ruling. * * *

On the other hand, authorities are not wanting in support of the

opposite construction of the clause of the constitution. In Low v.

The City of Marysville (5 Cal. 214) the question was whether it was

competent for the legislature, by special act, to authorize the city

(a municipal corporation) to subscribe for stock in a steamboat

company organized to establish a line of steamers plying between

that city and San Francisco. In delivering the opinion of the

court, Chief Justice Murray holds that " the powers of municipal cor-

porations must be confined strictly to police or governmental pur-

poses," and that the power conferred upon the corporation to sub-

scribe for stock in a railroad could not be granted by special act;

"for as it would have been in violation of the constitution to create

an incorporation by special act, for other than municipal purposes, it

follows that it would be equally unconstitutional to confer special

power on a corporation already created. In other words, it would

be doing by two acts that which the legislature could not do by one,

and corporations for almost every purpose might be created by special

act, by first incorporating the stockholders as a municipal body." This

reasoning, I think, is unanswerable, and the decision is a direct ad-

judication upon the question involved here.

The constitution of Ohio contains these clauses:

"Section 1. The general assembly shall pass no special act con-

ferring corporate powers.

"Section 2. Corporations may be formed under general laws; but

all such laws may, from time to time, be altered or repealed."

In Atkinson v. The M. & C. R. Co., 15 Ohio St. Rep. 35, the

court, in construing these clauses, says: "Constitutional provisions

would be of little value if they could be evaded by a mere change of

forms. These provisions of the constitution are too explicit to admit

of the least doubt that they are intended to disable the general assem-

v. Erie, 27 Pa. St. 38o, relied upon by Justice Crocker in the former
decision, and holding they did not involve the question here proceeds:]
The only remaining case referred to was the Syracuse City Bank v.
Davis (16 Barb. 188). The constitution of New York provides that
"the legislature shall have no power to pass any act granting any special charters for banking purposes; but corporations or as£ociations
may be formed for such purposes under general laws." The Syracuse City Bank was organized under the general law; but in some
trifling particulars, the forms prescribed by the general law were not
complied with, and the legislature passed a curative act, to the effect
that the bank should be deemed a valid corporation, and to have been
duly incorporated notwithstanding these informalities. The court held
the curative act to be valid, on the ground that it did not create a ~or
poration, but only remedied defects in the organization of one already
created. That proposition has no analogy to the question involved
here, which relates to the power of the legislature to confer upon an
existing corporation, by special act, other powers than those derived
from the general law. These are the only cases referred to by Mr.
Justice Crocker, and none of them support his ruling. • • •
On the other hand, authorities are not wanting in support of the
opposite construction of the clause of the constitution. In Low v.
The City of Marysville (S Cal. 2 14) the question was whether it was
competent for the legislature, by special act, to authorize the city
(a municipal corporation) to subscribe for stock in a steamboat
company organized to establish a line of steamers plying between
that city and San Francisco. In delivering the opinion of the
court, Chief Justice Murray holds that" the powers of municipal corporations must be confined strictly to police or governmental purposes," and that the power conferred upon the corporation to subscribe for stock in a railroad could not be granted by special act;
"for as it would have been in violation of the constitution to create
an incorporation by special act, for other than municipal purposes, it
follows that it would be equally unconstitutional to confer special
power on a corporation already created. In other words, it would
be doing by two acts that which the legislature could not do by one,
and corporations for almost every purpose might be created by special
act, by first incorporating the stockholders as a municipal body.'' This
reasoning, I think, is unanswerable, and the decision is a direct adjudication upon the question involved here.
The constitution of Ohio contains these clauses:
"Section l. The general assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers.
"Section 2. Corporations may be formed under general laws; but
all such laws may, from time to time, be altered or repealed."
In Atkinson v. The M. & C. R. Co., l 5 Ohio St. Rep. 35, the
court, in construing these clauses, says: "Constitutional provisions
would be of little value if they could be evaded by a mere change of
forms. These provisions of the constitution are too explicit to admit
of the least doubt that they are intended to disable the general assem-
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bly from either creating corporations or conferring upon them corpo-

rate powers by special acts of legislation. It was intended to correct
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an existing evil, and to inaugurate the policy of placing all corpora-

bly from either creating corporations or conferring upon them corporate powers by special acts of legislation. It was intended to correct
an existing evil, and to inaugurate the policy of placing all corporations of the same kind upon a perfect equality as to all future grants
of power; of making such laws applicable to all parts of the st ate,
and thereby securing the vigilance and attention of its whole representation, and, finally, of making all judicial constructions of their
powers, or the restrictions imposed upon them, equally applicable to
a ll corporations of the same class." • • •
The constitution of Iowa provides that " the general assemblJ1
shall not pass local or special laws in the following cases:
• • • for the incorporation of cities and towns," and for other
specified purposes. ''In all the cases above enumerated, and in all
other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall
be general and of uniform operation throughout the state."
The legislature passed a special act to amend the charter of the city
of Davenport, a municipal corporation, and in Ex parte Pritz (9
Iowa 30), the question before the court was, whether the legislature,
by a special act, could amend the charter of a municipal corporation,
and thereby place it upon a different footing from other municipal
corporations, organized under the general law. In considering this
point, the court says the intention of the constitution was "to prevent
special or local legislation; to require that the legislature should pass
general laws upon all the subjects named, and in all other cases where
su ch general laws could be made applicable. There can be no question but that it was designed to confine the legislature to general legislation, and leave the people, in their municipal capacity , t~ organize
and carry out their government under such general laws. If this be
so, then to say that the legislature may not pass a law to incorporate
a city, but may, to amend an act of incorporation in existence before
the adoption of the constitution, or charters formed under the general
law , would make this provision of the constitution practically amount
to nothing. For if they may amend, they may, to the extent of passing an entire new law, except as to one section. Or they may at one
session amend half the law, and the next the othet half, and thus the
plain and positive prohibition of the fundamental law be evaded. By
such a construction the evil sought to be remedied would continue, if
possible, in a more objectionable form."
The same principle was substantially decided in the Town of
McGregor v. Bauliss (19 Iowa 43). It will be observed that by the
constitution of Iowa, the prohibition of the constitution was against
special laws, "for the incorporation of cities and towns;" whilst in
our constitution the provision is that corporations, except for municipal purposes, shall not be "created" by special act. In neither is
the legislature in express terms prohibited from conferring additional
powers upon, or amending the charter of an existing corporation
formed under the general law. The reasoning of the supreme court
of Iowa, however, is conclusive on the point that, under our constitution, the legislature, by special act, can not either amend the

tions of the same kind upon a perfect equality as to all future grants

of power; of making such laws applicable to all parts of the state,

and thereby securing the vigilance and attention of its whole repre-

sentation, and, finally, of making all judicial constructions of their

powers, or the restrictions imposed upon them, equally applicable to

all corporations of the same class." * * *

The constitution of Iowa provides that '■'■the general assembly

shall not pass local or special laws in the following cases:

* * * for the incorporation of cities and towns," and for other

specified purposes. "In all the cases above enumerated, and in all

other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall

be general and of uniform operation throughout the state."

The legislature passed a special act to amend the charter of the city

of Davenport, a municipal corporation, and in Ex parte Pritz (9

Iowa 30), the question before the court was, whether the legislature,

by a special act, could amend the charter of a municipal corporation,
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and thereby place it upon a different footing from other municipal

corporations, organized under the general law. In considering this

point, the court says the intention of the constitution was "to prevent

special or local legislation; to require that the legislature should pass

general laws upon all the subjects named, and in all other cases where

such general laws could be made applicable. There can be no ques-

tion but that it was designed to confine the legislature to general legis-

lation, and leave the people, in their municipal capacity, to organize

and carry out their government under such general laws. If this be

so, then to say that the legislature may not pass a law to incorporate

a city, but may, to amend an act of incorporation in existence before

the adoption of the constitution, or charters formed under the general

law, would make this provision of the constitution practically amount

to nothing. For if they may amend, they may, to the extent of pass-

ing an entire new law, except as to one section. Or they may at one

session amend half the law, and the next the other half, and thus the

plain and positive prohibition of the fundamental law be evaded. By

such a construction the evil sought to be remedied would continue, if

possible, in a more objectionable form."

The same principle was substantially decided in the Town of

McGregor v. Bauliss (19 Iowa 43). It will be observed that by the

constitution of Iowa, the prohibition of the constitution was against

special laws, "for the incorporation of cities and towns;" whilst in

our constitution the provision is that corporations, except for munici-

pal purposes, shall not be "created" by special act. In neither is

the legislature in express terms prohibited from conferring additional

powers upon, or amending the charter of an existing corporation

formed under the general law. The reasoning of the supreme court

of Iowa, however, is conclusive on the point that, under our con-

stitution, the legislature, by special act, can not either amend the
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In the case of the Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 519)

it had been decided by the supreme court of the United States that

privileges secured by special acts of incorporation constituted con-

tracts, which were protected by that clause of the constitution of the

United States, which prohibits a state from passing laws impairing

the obligation of contracts. That case was followed by numerous other

decisions of like import, in the same court, and in almost every state

of the Union, including New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,

Pennsylvania, Michigan, Iowa, Indiana, Illinois and Virginia.

In his work on Constitutional Limitations (page 279), Judge Cooley

says: "It is under the protection of the decision in the Dartmouth

College case that the most enormous and threatening powers in our

country have been created, some of the great and wealthy corpora-

tions actually having greater influence in the country at large, and

upon the legislation of the country, than the states to which they owe

their corporate existence. Every privilege granted or right conferred,

no matter by what means or on what pretense, being made inviolable
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by the constitution, the government is frequently found stripped of

its authority in very important particulars by unwise, careless or cor-

rupt legislation; and a clause of the federal constitution whose pur-

pose was to preclude the repudiation of debts and just contracts, pro-

tects and perpetuates the evil. To guard against such calamities in

the future, it is customary now for the people in framing their consti-

tutions to forbid the granting of corporate power, except subject to

amendment and repeal, but the improvident grants of an early day

are beyond their reach." In view of these calamities, the framers of

our constitution were not content merely to reserve to the legislature

the power of amendment and repeal, but prohibited in terms the

power to create corporations, except for municipal purposes by spe-

cial act, and almost ever)' state which has recently amended its con-

stitution has followed our example. In the face of these facts it is

altogether incredible that in forbidding corporations, except for munici-

pal purposes, to be "created" by special act, it was intended to pro-

vide only that the mere forms by which corporate entity was created

should be prescribed by the general laws; but that when thus formed,

it may be endowed by special act with any powers however diversi-

fied, at the discretion of the legislature. * * *

It is claimed, however, that the introduction of water in a city for

the use of the inhabitants and of the corporate authorities, is a "mu-

nicipal purpose" within the sense of the constitution, and that private

corporations may be created by special act for such purposes. In

Low v. Marysville, supra, it was decided that the term "municipal

purposes," as employed in this section of the constitution, referred

only to governmental and police powers, and that the legislature is

prohibited from conferring even upon a municipal corporation by

special act, any powers except for police and governmental purposes."

But however this may be in respect to the corporation itself, it is

charter of an existing corporation, or confer upon it powers and Immunities not granted by the general law. • • •
In the case of the Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 519)
it had been decided by the supreme court of the United States that
privileges secured by special acts of iflcorporation constituted contracts, which were protected by that clause of the constitution of the
United States, which prohibits a state from passing laws impairing
the obligation of contracts. That case was followed by numerous other
decisions of like import, in the same court, and in almost every state
of the Union, including New York, Massachusetts, New .Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, Michigan, Iowa, Indiana, Illinois and Virginia.
Io his work on Constitutional Limitations (page 279), Judge Cooley
says: "It is under the pr~tection of the decision in the Dartmouth
College case that the most enormous and threatening powers in our
country have been created, some of the great and wealthy corporations actually having greater influence in the country at large, and
upon the legislation of the country, than the states to which they owe
their corporate existence. Every privilege granted or right conferred,
no matter by what means or on what pretense, being made inviolable
by the constitution, the government is frequently found stripped of
its authority in very important particulars by unwise, careless or corrupt legislation; and a clause of the federal constitution whose purpose was to preclude the repudiation of debts and just contracts, protects and perpetuates the evil. To guard against such calamities in
the future, it is customary now for the people in framing their constitutions to forbid the granting of corporate power, except subject to
amendment and repeal, but the improvident grants of an early day
are beyond their reach." In view of these calamities, the framers of
our constitution were not content merely to reserve to the legislature
the power of amendment and repeal, but prohibited in terms the
power to create corporations, except for municipal purposes by special act, and almost every state which has recently amended its constitution has followed our example. . In the face of these facts it is
altogether incredible that in forbidding corporations, except for municipal purposes, to be "created" by special act, it was intended to provide only that the mere forms by which corporate entity was created
should be prescribed by the general laws; but that when thus formed,
it may be endowed by special act with any powers however diversified, at the discretion of the legislature. • • •
It is claimed, however, that the introduction of water in a city for
the use of the inhabitants and of the corporate authorities, is a ''municipal purpose" within the sense of the constitution, and that private
corporations may be created by special act for such purposes. In
Low v. Marysvil1e, supra, it was decided that the term "municipal
purposes,·~ as employed in this section of the constitution, referred
only to governmental and police powers, and that the legislature is
prohibited from conferring even upon a municipal corporation by
special act, any powers except for police and governmental purposes."
But however this may be in respect to the corporation itself, it is
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a corporation organized for "municipal purposes" in the sense of the

constitution. If the legislature, by special act, can confer such pow-

clear that the right to introduce water into a city can not be conferred
upon a private corporation by special act, upon the plea that it w as
a corporation organized for "municipal purposes" in the sense of the
constitution. If the legislature, by special act, can confer such powers upon a private corporatioTi for supplying a city with water, it can
confer similar powers upon all corporations for similar purposes. It
might by special act incorporate a gas company to furnish the inhabitants
with gas, or a coal or wood company to furnish them with fuel , or a paving company to pave the streets, or a slaughter-house company to furnish
the people with meat, or a milling company to supply them with bread.
Every county in the state is a quasi municipal corporation, and it is
the duty of the corporation to see that proper roads, bridges and public buildings are provided for the use of the inhabitants. On this
theory, the legislature, by special act, might organize private corporations for all these purposes, and endow them with peculiar, oppressive, and, perhaps , exclusive powers and privileges. In this way the
constitutional prohibition would be frittered away, and would practically amount to nothing. • • •
It is further claimed that the decision in the case of The CaJifomia
State Telegraph Co. v. The Alta Telegraph Co. has become a rule of
property, and ought not now to be disturbed, even though it be conceded to be erroneous. In support of this proposition we have been
referred to numerous statutes claimed to be similar to the Ensign act,
under which it is said great property rights have grown up. It may
be that some, but I think no serious, injury will result to property
rights from overruling that decision. If it shall be found that serious
inconvenience would otherwise result, the legislature may amend the
general law regulating corporations, so as to obviate the difficulties
that would otherwise arise, and allow these corporations to reincorporate under the new law. But, in any event, it is better that some
temporary inconvenience should be submitted to rather th'ln that one
of the most valuable provisions of the fundamental law should be
practically obliterated. No greater calamity could befall this state
than to open wide the door leading to careless or corrupt legislation
in the form of special acts granting peculiar and onerous privileges to
private corporations. • • •
It has been suggested that the grant to th-e Spring Valley WaterW orks under the Ensign act was not a grant of corporate rights, but
only an easement permitting the company to lay its pipes through the
streets, subject to the performance of certain duties imposed by the
act. The argument is that an easement of this character is property,
which it was in the power of the state to grant to an existing corporation as it might grant property to any corporation, coupled with such
conditions as it saw fit to impose; and that this is not a grant of corporate rights within the purview of the constitution. It is a conclusive answer to this proposition that the Ensign act did not grant to
the Spring Valley Water-\Vorks any easement of this character which
it did not already possess under the general law, under which it was
incorporated. By the fifth section of the general act (Statutes 1858,

ers upon a private corporation for supplying a city with water, it can

confer similar powers upon all corporations for similar purposes. It

might by special act incorporate a gas company to furnish the inhabitants

with gas, or a coal or wood company to furnish them with fuel, or a pav-

ing company to pave the streets, or a slaughter-house company to furnish

the people with meat, or a milling company to supply them with bread.

Every county in the state is a quasi municipal corporation, and it is

the duty of the corporation to see that proper roads, bridges and pub-

lic buildings are provided for the use of the inhabitants. On this

theory, the legislature, by special act, might organize private corpo-

rations for all these purposes, and endow them with peculiar, oppres-

sive, and, perhaps, exclusive powers and privileges. In this way the

constitutional prohibition would be frittered away, and would prac-

tically amount to nothing. * * *

It is further claimed that the decision in the case of The California

State Telegraph Co. v. The Alta Telegraph Co. has become a rule of
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property, and ought not now to be disturbed, even though it be con-

ceded to be erroneous. In support of this proposition we have been

referred to numerous statutes claimed to be similar to the Ensign act,

under which it is said great property rights have grown up. It may

be that some, but I think no serious, injury will result to property

rights from overruling that decision. If it shall be found that serious

inconvenience would otherwise result, the legislature may amend the

general law regulating corporations, so as to obviate the difficulties

that would otherwise arise, and allow these corporations to reincor-

porate under the new law. But, in any event, it is better that some

temporary inconvenience should be submitted to rather than that one

of the most valuable provisions of the fundamental law should be

practically obliterated. No greater calamity could befall this state

than to open wide the door leading to careless or corrupt legislation

in the form of special acts granting peculiar and onerous privileges to

private corporations. * * *

It has been suggested that the grant to the Spring Valley Water-

Works under the Ensign act was not a grant of corporate rights, but

only an easement permitting the company to lay its pipes through the

streets, subject to the performance of certain duties imposed by the

act. The argument is that an easement of this character is property,

which it was in the power of the state to grant to an existing corpo-

ration as it might grant property to any corporation, coupled with such

conditions as it saw fit to impose; and that this is not a grant of cor-

porate rights within the purview of the constitution. It is a conclu-

sive answer to this proposition that the Ensign act did not grant to

the Spring Valley Water-Works any easement of this character which

it did not already possess under the general law, under which it was

incorporated. By the fifth section of the general act (Statutes 1858,

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 71 LIMITS ON POWER TO CREATE. 353

p. 219;, the company had the absolute right "to use so much of the

streets, ways, and alleys in any town, city or county, or any public

road therein, as may be necessary for laying pipes for conducting
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water into any such town, city, or city and county, or through or into

any part or parts thereof." The corporation already having this

right, under its act of incorporation, it is clear that the Ensign act con-

ferred upon it no additional privileges in this respect.

When the state grants to a private corporation an easement over

the streets, not common to the public at large, it acts in its sovereign

capacity and grants a franchise, -which enters into and forms an es-

sential element in the corporate powers of the corporation; which be-

cotnes entitled to the right, not because the state has parted ■with any

proprietary interest in the land, but because in its sovereign capacity\

having the control of public highways, it has granted to the corpora-

tion a franchise, entitling it to an easement over the streets not com-

mon to the general public. This is purely a grant of corporate power,

and nothing more or less, and, as we have already seen, such rights

can not be conferred by special act. But even if it be conceded that

the right to the use of the streets may be granted by special act, still

the Ensign act must fail, because the right to use the streets is insep-
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arably blended with the grant of other rights, and the imposition of

certain burdens, which are in plain violation of the constitution. As,

for example, the right in a certain contingency to charge higher rates

for water than other corporations organized under the same general

law, and the imposition of greater burdens upon the company, than

are imposed by the general law. It is a well-settled rule, that where

a portion of an act is constitutional and another portion is unconstitu-

tional, if the two are so inseparably blended together as to make it

clear that either clause would not have been enacted without the other,

the whole act must fall. It is perfectly clear that such is the condi-

tion of this act, and that all its provisions must stand or fall together.

We are satisfied that these views are in strict accordance with the

letter and spirit of the constitution. On the opposite theory the leg-

islature, by special act, may grant to a railroad corporation the right

to lay down its tracks in the streets on condition that it supply the

inhabitants with water or gas, or keep the streets in repair at a spec-

ified price, thus opening the door to corrupt and vicious legislation,

against which the constitution has so carefully guarded.

Rehearing denied.

See note, p. 706.

23—Wil. Casks.

p. 219,, the company had the absolute right "to use so much of the
streets, ways, and alleys in any town, city or county, or any public
road therein, as may be necessary for laying pipes for conducting
water into any such town, city, or city and county, or through or into
any part or parts thereof." The corporation already having this
right, under its act of incorporation, it is clear that the Ensign act conferred upon it no additional privileges in this respect.
Wh en the state grants to a private corporatt'on an easement over
the streets, not common to the public at large, it acts in i'ts soverei'gn
capacity and grants a franchise, which enters into and forms an essential elem_ent in tlte corporate powers of the corpora#on; whi'ch becomes entitled to the right, not because the state has parted with any
proprietary interest in the land, but because t'n i'ts sovereign capadty,
having the control of publ£c highways, it has granted to the corporation a franchise, entitling it to an easement over the streets not common to the general public. This is purely a grant of corporate power,
and nothing more or less, and, as we have already seen, such rights
can not be conferred by special act. But even if it be conceded that
the right to the use of the streets may be granted by special act, still
the Ensign act must fail, because the right to use the streets is inseparably blended with the grant of other rights, and the imposition of
certain burdens, which are in plain violation of the constitution. As,
for example, the right in a certain contingency to charge higher rates
for water than other corporations organized under the same general
law, and the imposition of greater burdens upon the company, than
are imposed by the general law. It is a well-settled rule, that where
a portion of an act is constitutional and another portion is unconstitutional, if the two are so inseparably blended together as to make it
clear that either clause would not have been enacted without the other,
the whole act must fall. It is perfectly clear that such is the condition of this act, and that all its provisions must stand or fall together.
We are satisfied that these views are in strict accordance with the
letter and spirit of the constitution. On the opposite theory the legislature, by special act, may grant to a railroad corporation the right
to lay down its tracks in the streets on condition that it supply the
inhabitants with water or gas, or keep the streets in repair at a specified price! thus opening the door to corrupt and vicious legislation,
against which the constitution has so carefully guarded~
Rehearing denied.
See note, p. 706.
23-WIL. CASES.
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Sec. 72. Same.

SOUTHERN PACIFIC R. CO. v. ORTON.1

§ 72

SOUTHERN PACIFIC R. CO. V. ORTON.
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1879. In the Circuit Court of the United States, District

of California. 32 Fed. Rep. 457-480.

[Action to recover lands. Plaintiff claimed, under congressional

Sec. 72. Same.

grant, to aid Southern Pacific Railroad. Patent had issued. De-

fendant claimed by pre-emption. The railroad company was incor-

SOUTHERN PACIFIC R. CO. v. ORTON. 1

porated by the state of California in 1861.

On April 4, 1870, the legislature of California passed an act as

1879.

follows: "Whereas, by the provisions of a certain act of congress

of the United States of America, entitled 'An act granting lands

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
OF CALIFORNIA. 32 Fed. Rep. 457-480.

DISTRICT

to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from San

[Action to recover lands. Plaintiff claimed, under congressional
grant, to aid Southern Pacific Railroad. Patent had issued. Defendant claimed by pre-emption. The railroad company was incorporated by the state of California in 1861.
On April 4, 1870, the legislature of California passed an act as
follows: "Whereas, by the provisions of a certain act of congress
of the United States of America, entitled 'An act granting lands
to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from San
Francisco to the eastern line of the state of California,' approved
July 27 1 1866, certain grants were made to, and certain rights, privileges, powers and authority were vested in and conferred upon
the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the state of California ; therefore, to
enable the said company to more fully and completely comply with
and perform the requirements, provisions and conditions of the said
act of congress, and all other acts of congress now in force or which
may hereafter be enacted, the state of California hereby consents to
said act; and the said company, its successors and assigns are hereby
authorized and empowered to change the line of its railroad so as to
reach the eastern boundary line of the state of California by such route
as the company shall determine to be the most practicable, and to file
new and amendatory articles of association; and the right, power
and privilege is hereby granted to, conferred upon and vested in them,
to construct, maintain and operate, by steam or other power, the said
railroad and telegraph line mentioned in said acts of congress, hereby
confirming to and vesting in the said company, its successors and a ·signs, all the rights, privileges and franchises, power and authority
conferred upon, granted to or vested in said company by the said acts
of congress, and any act of congress which may be hereafter enacted."]
SAWYRR, J. • • • But it is insisted that this act was ·passed in
violation of the provisions of section 31 of article iv of the constitution
of California, which reads: "Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special act except for municipal
purposes." After a carefu 1 consideration of the question, I am, myself
unable to perceive wherein that portion of the act, at least, which authorizes the company to change the line of its road, and to accept the
grant made by and to build the road provided for in the act of congress is in contravention of this provision of the constitution. It is
unnecessary to consider the provision of this act authorizing the cor-

Francisco to the eastern line of the state of California,' approved

July 27, 1866, certain grants were made to, and certain rights, privi-

leges, powers and authority were vested in and conferred upon

the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation duly organized

and existing under the laws of the state of California; therefore, to

enable the said company to more fully and completely comply with

and perform the requirements, provisions and conditions of the said

act of congress, and all other acts of congress now in force or which
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may hereafter be enacted, the state of California hereby consents to

said act; and the said company, its successors and assigns are hereby

authorized and empowered to change the line of its railroad so as to

reach the eastern boundary line of the state of California by such route

as the company shall determine to be the most practicable, and to file

new and amendatory articles of association; and the right, power

and privilege is hereby granted to, conferred upon and vested in them,

to construct, maintain and operate, by steam or other power, the said

railroad and telegraph line mentioned in said acts of congress, hereby

confirming to and vesting in the said company, its successors and as-

signs, all the rights, privileges and franchises, power and authority

conferred upon, granted to or vested in said company by the said acts

of congress, and any act of congress which may be hereafter enacted."]

Sawyer, J. * * * But it is insisted that this act was passed in

violation of the provisions of section 31 of article iv of the constitution

of California, which reads: "Corporations maybe formed under gen-

eral laws, but shall not be created by special act except for municipal

purposes." After a careful consideration of the question, I am, myself

unable to perceive wherein that portion of the act, at least, which au-

thorizes the company to change the line of its road, and to accept the

grant made by and to build the road provided for in the act of con-

gress is in contravention of this provision of the constitution. It is

unnecessary to consider the provision of this act authorizing the cor-

1 Only that part of the case relating to construction of constitutional pro-

vision (riven.

1

Only that part of the case relating to construction of constitutional pro-

\•ision given.
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ceded to be in excess of the legislative power, it can be separated
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from the others, and does not vitiate the other provisions. I do not

perceive that any amendment of the articles was necessary, for the

corporation was already formed or created, was already in existence

with all the essential faculties that go to make up a corporation for

building a railroad, and the act authorizing the change of line and

acceptance of the congressional grant with its conditions, only granted

to an existing person permission to do a thing which had no necessary

relation to the corporate grantee, and was not at all essential to the

existence of the legal entity created by law, or to any other person,

natural or artificial. But if an amendment to the articles was neces-

sary, it was already authorized and provided for by the prior act of

March i, 1870, and it was not necessary to repeat the authority in

this act, and the act of March 1 is a general act, and, therefore, not

obnoxious to the objection urged against the said act of April 4, 1870.

The settled rule of construction of state constitutions is that they are

not special grants of power to legislative bodies, like the constitution

of the United States, but general grants of all the usually recognized
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powers of legislation not actually prohibited or expressly excepted.

In the language of Mr. Justice Shatter in Bourland v. Hildreth, 26

Cal. 183: "The constitution is not a grant of power or an enabling

act to the legislature. It is a limitation on the general powers of a

legislative character, and restrains only so far as the restriction ap-

pears either by express terms or by necessary implication, and the

delicate office of declaring an act of the legislature unconstitutional

and void should never be exercised unless there be a clear repug-

nancy between the statute and the organic law." See, also, Bour-

land v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 215, 225, et sea.; People v Sassovich, 29

Cal. 482; Railroad Co. v. City of Stockton, 41 Cal. 161. And it is

equally well settled that the exception must be strictly construed. In

the language of Mr. Chief Justice Wallace in the last case cited:

"The construction is '■strict against those who stand upon the excep-

tion and liberal in favor of the government itself S" Railroad Co.

v. City of Stockton, 41 Cal. 162. And in Sharpless v. Mayor of

Philadelphia, 21 Pa. St. 160, Mr. Chief Justice Black said upon

the same subject: "The federal constitution confers powers expressly

enumerated, that of the state contains a general grant of all powers

not excepted. The construction of the former instrument is strict

against those who claim under it, the interpretation of the latter is

strict against those who stand upon the exceptions, and liberal in

favor of the government itself; the federal government can do noth-

ing but what is authorized expressly, or by clear implication ; the state

may do whatever is not prohibited."

The authorities establishing this canon of construction are numer-

ous, and, so far as I know, uniform. Bearing this rule of construc-

tion in mind, what does the constitutional prohibition relied on mean?

The only prohibitory words are that corporations of the class in ques-

tion "shall not be created by special act." The word "create" has

poration to file amended articles of association, for, if that be conceded to be in excess of the legislative power, it can be separated
from the others, and does not vitiate the other provisions. r do not
perceive that any amendment of the articles was necessary, for the
corporation was already formed or created, was already in existence
with all the essential faculties that go to make up a corporation for
building a railroad, and the act authorizing the change of line and
acceptance of the congressional grant with its conditions, only granted
to an existing person permission to do a thingwhich had no necessary
relation to the corporate grantee, and was not at all essential to the
existence of the legal entity created by law, or to any other person,
natural or artificial. But if an amendment to the articles was necessary, it was already authorized and provided for by the prior act of
:M arch 1 , 1870, and it was not necessary to repeat the authority in
this act, and the act of March I is a general act, and, therefore, not
obnoxious to the objection urged against the said act of April 4 , 1870.
The settled rule of construction of state constitutions is that they are
not special grants of power to legislative bodies, like the constitution
of the United States, but general grants of all the usually recognized
powers of legislation not actually prohibited or expressly excepted.
In the language of Mr. Justice Shafter in Bourland v. Hildreth, 26
Cal. 183: "The constitution is not a grant of power or an enabling
act to the legislature. It is a limitation on the general powers of a
legislative character, and restrains only so far as the restriction appears either by express terms or by necessary implication, and the
delicate office of declaring an act of the legislature unconstitutional
and void should never be exercised unless there be a clear repug·
nancy between the statute and the organic law." See, also, Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 215 , 225, et seq. ; People v Sassovich, 29
Cal. 482; Railroad Co. v. City of Stockton, 41 Cal. 16r. And it is
equally well settled that the excep#on must be strictly construed. In
the language of Mr. Chief Justice Wall ace in the last case cited:
1
•The construction is 'strict against those who stand upon the exception and liberal in favor of the government itself.''' Railroad Co.
v. City of Stockton, 41 Cal. 162. And in Sharpless v. Mayor of
Philadelphia, 21 Pa. St. 16o, Mr. Chief Justice Black said upon
the same subject: "The federal constitution confers powers expressly
enumerated, that of the state contains a general grant of all powers
not excepted. The construction of the former instrument is strict
against those who claim under it, the interpretation of the latter is
strict against those who stand upon the exceptions, and liberal in
favor of the government i"tself; the federal government can do nothing but what is authorized expressly, or by clear implication ; the state
may do whatever is not proht"bt"ted."
The authorities establishing this canon of constniction are numerous, and, so far as I know, uniform. Bearing this rule of construction in mind, what does the constitutional prohibition relied on mean?
The only prohibitory words are that corporations of the class in question "shall not be created by special ·act." The word "create" has
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a clear, well-settled, and well-understood signification. It means to
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bring into being, to cause to exist, to produce, to make, etc. To

a clear, well-settled, and well-understood signification. It means to
bring into being, to cause to exist, to produce, to make, etc. To
my apprehension, it appears to be one thing to create, or bring into
being, a corporation, and quite another to deal with it as an existing
entity, a person, after it is created by regulating its intercourse, relations and acts as to other existing persons, natural and artificial. '' A
corporation is a franchise possessed by one or more individuals, who
subsist as a body politic, under a special denomination, and are vested,
by the policy of the law, with the capacity of perpetual succession,
and of acting in several respects, however numerous the association
may be, as a single individual." 2 Kent Comm. (9th ed.) 3o6; Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, I 12 U.S.~' 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 299. The
ordinary incidents to a corporation are to have perpetual succession,
and the power of electing or otherwise providing members in the place
of those removed by death or otherwise, to sue and to be sued, to grant
and receive and to purchase and hold lands and chattels by their corporate name; to have a common seal; to make by-laws for the government of the corporation, and sometimes the power of amotion or
removal of members. "The essence of a corporation consists only of
a capacity to have perpetual succession under a special denomination,
and an artificial form, and to take and grant property, contract obliga·
tions , and sue and be sued by its corporate name, and to receive and
enjoy in common grants of privileges and immunities.'' Railroad Co.
v. Commissioners, 112 U. S. 6o9, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 325.
The creative act necessarily extends only to the bringing into being
of an artificial person, with the capacities stated, among which is " a
capadty to receive and enjoy in common grants and privileges, and
immunities;" that is to say, a capacity to receive and enjoy such
grants, privileges, and immunities as may be made either at the time
of the creation or any other time. The creation of the being with the
capacity to receive grants is one thing; the granting of other privileges and immunities, which it has the capacity to receive when created,
is another. When such a being is brought into existence, a corporation
has been created. A legal entity, a person, has been created, with a
capacity to do by its corporate name such things as the legislative
power may permit, and receive such grants of such rights and pri\'ileges, and of such property , as the legislature itself or private persons
with the legislative permission may give. But I do not understand
that every right, privilege, or grant that can be conferred upon a corporation must be given simultaneously with the creative act of incor·
poration. On the contrary, I suppose the artificial being must be created with a capacity to receive before anything can be received. The
tight to be a corporation is itself a separate, distinct, and independ·
ent franchise, complete within itself. And a corporation having been
created, enjoying this franchise, may receive a grant and enjoy other
distinct and independent franchises, such as may be granted to and
enjoyed by natural persons; but because it enjoys the latter franchises,
they do not, therefore , constitute a part of the distinct and independ·
ent essential franchise,-the right to be a corporation. They are ad-

my apprehension, it appears to be one thing to create, or bring into

being, a corporation, and quite another to deal with it as an existing

entity, a person, after it is created by regulating its intercourse, rela-

tions and acts as to other existing persons, natural and artificial. "A

corporation is a franchise possessed by one or more individuals, who

subsist as a body politic, under a special denomination, and are vested,

by the policy of the law, with the capacity of perpetual succession,

and of acting in several respects, however numerous the association

may be, as a single individual." 2 Kent Comm. (9th ed.) 306; Rail-

road Co. v. Commissioners, 112U. S. 609, 5 Sup. Ct, Rep. 299. The

ordinary incidents to a corporation are to have perpetual succession,

and the power of electing or otherwise providing members in the place

of those removed by death or otherwise, to sue and to be sued, to grant

and receive and to purchase and hold lands and chattels by their cor-

porate name; to have a common seal; to make by-laws for the gov-

ernment of the corporation, and sometimes the power of amotion or
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removal of members. "The essence of a corporation consists only of

a capacity to have perpetual succession under a special denomination,

and an artificial form, and to take and grant property, contract obliga-

tions, and sue and be sued by its corporate name, and to receive and

enjoy in common grants of privileges and immunities." Railroad Co.

v. Commissioners, 112 U. S. 609, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 325.

The creative act necessarily extends only to the bringing into being

of an artificial person, with the capacities stated, among which is "a

capacity to receive and enjoy in common grants and privileges, and

immunities;" that is to say, a capacity to receive and enjoy such

grants, privileges, and immunities as may be made either at the time

of the creation or any other time. The creation of the being with the

capacity to receive grants is one thing; the granting of other privi-

leges and immunities, which it has the capacity to receive when created,

is another. When such a being is brought into existence, a corporation

has been created. A legal entity, a person, has been created, with a

capacity to do by its corporate name such things as the legislative

power may permit, and receive such grants of such rights and privi-

leges, and of such property, as the legislature itself or private persons

with the legislative permission may give. But I do not understand

that every right, privilege, or grant that can be conferred upon a cor-

poration must be given simultaneously with the creative act of incor-

poration. On the contrary, I suppose the artificial being must be cre-

ated with a capacity to receive before anything can be received. The

right to be a corporation is itself a separate, distinct, and independ-

ent franchise, complete within itself. And a corporation having been

created, enjoying this franchise, may receive a grant and enjoy other

distinct and independent franchises, such as may be granted to and

enjoyed by natural persons; but because it enjoys the latter franchises,

they do not, therefore, constitute a part of the distinct and independ-

ent essential franchise,—the right to be a corporation. They are ad-
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ditional franchises given to the corporation, and not parts of the cor-

poration itself,—not of the essence of the corporation.
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Natural persons, with certain physical capacities, being brought

into existence through the process appointed by nature, may be pro-

hibited by law from doing one thing and permitted to do another;

may enjoy one franchise and be excluded from the enjoyment of an-

other; but these permissions and prohibitions constitute no part of the

person, and were in no manner connected with the creative act. So,

with reference to corporations, being once created, they have the

physical capacity, through their officers, to do anything that a natural

person may do; such as building a church, a steamship or a railroad.

But, being created, they may be prohibited from doing one thing and

permitted to do another, like natural persons; but this permission or

prohibition is not a creative act, but an act regulating the conduct of

the corporation, and determining its rights and relations to the public,

and to other existing persons, natural and artificial. Corporate pow-

ers, strictly speaking, I suppose, are those peculiar and essential to a

corporation—not those which are or may be possessed in common

with natural persons; and they are very few in number, embracing
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those which pertain to the essence of the corporation. The term is,

undoubtedly, often and conveniently used in a broader sense, but it is

not found in the constitutional provision in question. Section 33,

article 4, defines the term "corporation" as used in the constitution,

and says it "shall be construed to include all associations and joint-

stock companies having any of the powers of corporations not possessed

by individuals or partnerships." Of course, it excludes all associa-

tions that do not have any powers other than those possessed by indi-

viduals and partnerships. And this provision is a recognition of the

idea that corporate powers are only such as are not possessed in com-

mon with individuals and partnerships—or natural persons.

The power to create a corporation, as the terms are used in section

33, extends, therefore, to the bringing into being of a legal entity,

having powers and privileges not possessed by individuals; that is to

say, possessing the powers, which, as before stated, constitute the

essence of a corporation, or corporate powers, strictly speaking, and

has no reference to the legislative dealings with that artificial person

after its creation. I suppose the constitution might have devolved the

power of creating a corporation on some other body, as the supreme

court, and the power to deal with it after its creation—to regulate its

conduct and relations to the public, and to prescribe its rights, powers,

and duties other than those strictly corporate, to the legislature. Had

it been so provided, there can be no doubt that such powers would

have been wholly distinct and independent. I do not perceive that

they are any the less so because exercised by the same body. The

act of creating a corporation by conferring upon an association of in-

dividuals certain strictly corporate powers, embracing only powers

and privileges not possessed by individuals and partnerships, and then

granting to it other privileges, enlarging or restricting its right to the

enjoyment of other franchises that may be possessed in common with

1

ditional franchises given to the corporation, and not parts of the corporation itself,-not of the essence of the corporation.
Natural persons, with certain physical capacities, being brought
into existence through the process appointed by nature, may be prohibited by law from doing one thing and permitted ~o do another;
may enjoy one franchise and be excluded from the enjoyment of another; but these permissions and prohibitions constitute no part of the
person , and were in no manner connected with the creative act. So,
with reference to corporations, being once created, they have the
physical capacity, through their officers, to do anything that a natural
per on may do; such as building a church, a steamship or a railroad.
But, being created,.they may be prohibited from doing one thing and
permitted to do another, like natural persons; but this permission or
prohibition is not a creative act, but an act regulating the conduct of
the corporation, and determining its rights and relations to the public,
and to other existing persons, natural and artificial. Corporate powers, strictly speaking, I suppose, are those peculiar and essential to a
corporation-not those which are or may be possessed in common
with natural persons; and they are very few in Humber, embracing
those which pertain to the essence of the corporation. The term is,
undoubtedly, often and conveniently used in a broader sense, but it is
not found in the constitutional provision in question. Section 33,
ar·ticle 4, defines the term "corporation" as used in the constitution,
and says it "shall be construed to include all associations and jointstock companies having any ofthe powers ofcorporations not possessed
by z"ndividuals or partnershi"ps." Of course, it excludes all associations that do not have any powers other than those possessed by individuals and partnerships. And this provision is a recognition of the
i<lea that corporate powers are only such as are not possessed in common with individuals and partnershipS-or natural persons.
The power to create a corporation, as the terms are used in section
33, extends, therefore, to the bringing into being of a legal entity,
having powers and privileges not possessed by individuals; that is to
say, possessing the powers, which, as before stated, constitute the
essence of a corporation, or corporate powers, strictly speaking, and
has no reference to the legislative dealings with that artificial person
after its creation. I suppose the constitution might have devolved the
power of creating a corporation on some other body, as the supreme
court, and the power to deal with it after its creation-to regulate its
conduct and relations to the public, and to prescribe its rights, powers,
and duties other than those strictly corporate, to the legislature. Had
it been so provided, there can be no doubt that such powers would
have been wholly distinct and independent. I do not perceive that
they are any the less so because exercised by the same body. The
act of creating a corporation by conferring upon an association of individuals certain strictly corporate powers, embracing only powers
and privileges not possessed by individuals and partnerships, and then
granting to it other privileges, enlarging or restricting its right to the
enjoyment of other franchises that may be possessed in common with
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distinct and independent, and I find nothing in the constitution pro-
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hibiting the latter power to the legislature. There are numerous dis-

tinct, independent franchises, any one or more of which may be

natural persons, and regulating its external relations are, to my mind,
distinct and independent, and I find nothing in the constitution prohibiting the latter power to the legislature. There are numerous distinct, independent franchises, any one or more of which may be
granted indifferently either to natural persons or existing corporations,
and, in my judgment, the constitution no more prohibits the granting
of any one of those franchises, except such as are expressly prohibited,
to corporations, by special act, than to indh·iduals. It only prohibits the creation of a corporation by special act; that is to say, that the
creating or granting of the particular franchise const£tuting a corporation shall not be by special act. The prohibition applies to no other
of the numerous franchises which are subjects of legistative grant.
In this case there was a corporation-a railroad corporation--duly
created under the general act, for the purpose of building a railroad
in 1a southeastern direction through the state of California to the eastern line of the state, to intersect with a road which, it was supposed,
would soon be built to the eastern states, the route of which was till
undetermined an<l uncertain. It had all the faculties physically nece. sary to enable it to build any railroad. Afterward congress authorized
the building of a road across the continent on or near the thirty-fifth
parallel of latitude to intersect the line of the state at a point different
from that designated in the articles of association of said corporation,
and made a grant to the corporation on condition that it should build
a road from a point of intersection with said transcontinental road,
near the eastern line of the state, to San Francisco, and the legislature, by special act, authorized the said corporation, already in existence, with authority and capacity to build a railroad, to build its road
upon said line, and accept and receive said grant. In my judgment,
this is in no sense an act creating a corporation, or a new corporate
power, or new corporate franchise within the proper meaning of the
term, but a dealing with a corporation already in existence authorized
to build a road in the same general direction, with the same object in
view; that the change of line was a matter of detail only, and, if not,
but on the contrary, the grant of an independent right, and an additional privilege or franchise, it was still one entirely coinpetent for
the legislature to confer upon the existing corporation, as well as on
any natural person, and in no way obnoxious to the provision prohibiting the creation of a corporation for such purpose by special a ct.
To reach any other conclusion would be to violate the canon of constitutional construction before stated; to disregard the plain meaning
of the terms used in the constitution , and upon imaginary grounds interpolate into that instrument language which the people have not seen
fit to place there themselves. A s said , in substance, by Mr. Justice
Crocker, in Telegraph Co. v. Telegraph Co., 22 Cal. 425, to give
the constitution any such construction as claimed we would have to
make it read thus : "Corporations may be formed, and other francht:ses and special privileges granted, under general laws, but shall
not be created , nor shall other fran chises or spcdal priv ileges he
granted by speci al act, e xcept for municipal purposes." He well re-

granted indifferently either to natural persons or existing corporations,

and, in my judgment, the constitution no more prohibits the granting

of any one of those franchises, except such as are expressly prohibited,

to corporations, by special act, than to individuals. It only prohib-

its the creation of a corporation by special act; that is to say, that the

creating or granting of the particular franchise constituting a corpo-

ration shall not be by special act. The prohibition applies to no other

of the numerous franchises which are subjects of legislative grant.

In this case there was a corporation—a railroad corporation—duly

created under the general act, for the purpose of building a railroad

in 'a southeastern direction through the state of California to the east-

ern line of the state, to intersect with a road which, it was supposed,

would soon be built to the eastern states, the route of which was still

undetermined and uncertain. It had all the faculties physically neces-

sary to enable it to build any railroad. Afterward congress authorized

the building of a road across the continent on or near the thirty-fifth
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parallel of latitude to intersect the line of the state at a point different

from that designated in the articles of association of said corporation,

and made a grant to the corporation on condition that it should build

a road from a point of intersection with said transcontinental road,

near the eastern line of the state, to San Francisco, and the legisla-

ture, by special act, authorized the said corporation, already in exis-

tence, with authority and capacity to build a railroad, to build its road

upon said line, and accept and receive said grant. In my judgment,

this is in no sense an act creating a corporation, or a new corporate

power, or new corporate franchise within the proper meaning of the

term, but a dealing with a corporation already in existence authorized

to build a road in the same general direction, with the same object in

view; that the change of line was a matter of detail only, and, if not,

but on the contrary, the grant of an independent right, and an addi-

tional privilege or franchise, it was still one entirely competent for

the legislature to confer upon the existing corporation, as well as on

any natural person, and in no way obnoxious to the provision prohib-

iting the creation of a corporation for such purpose by special act.

To reach any other conclusion would be to violate the canon of con-

stitutional construction before stated; to disregard the plain meaning

of the terms used in the constitution, and upon imaginary grounds in-

terpolate into that instrument language which the people have not seen

fit to place there themselves. As said, in substance, by Mr. Justice

Crocker, in Telegraph Co. v. Telegraph Co., 22 Cal. 425, to give

the constitution any such construction as claimed we would have to

make it read thus: "Corporations may be formed, and other fran-

chises and special privileges granted, under general laws, but shall

not be created, nor shall other franchises or special privileges be

granted by special act, except for municipal purposes." He well re-

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

LIMITS ON POWER TO CREATE.

359

marks: "If such had been the meaning intended by the framers of
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The language used by them is clear, and they well knew that it in-

cluded but one of the numerous class of franchises the subject of leg-

islative grant, and that a regulation of one could not by any reasonable

implication be extended to others not mentioned." * * *

I should have contented myself with the simple reference to this

authority without any discussion of the question, but for the fact that

defendant has cited the case of San Francisco v. Water-Works, 48

Cal. 493, decided by the supreme court of the state, in which it is

held that corporations can exercise no powers except such as are con-

ferred by the general laws under which they are formed, and that the

legislature can not confer on such corporations any powers, or grant

them any privileges by special act. * * *

In 1863, the same question arose in Telegraph Co. v. Telegraph

Co., 22 Cal. 398, and was elaborately considered. It was then held

that the legislature might confer upon existing corporations by special

act a direct grant of special privileges and franchises ; and that there was

no restriction upon the power imposed by the constitution, except as
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to the particular privileges therein specified. * * *

Of the six justices of the supreme court, who have considered

the question, three took one view and three the other, so they stand

in number equally balanced. The able and eminent justice who

delivered the opinion of the court in the last case, for whose

opinion I entertain profound respect, very ably presented the same

views adopted in his opinion, in his argument as counsel in the

former case, so that the court in the first case did not overlook, but, on

the contrary, fully considered them. Had the justices who have

passed upon the question in the two cases sat as one court, there would

have been no decision of the question. Thus, the matter stands

equally balanced, the only difference as authority being that the decis-

ion against the constitutionality of the power is last. • * *

For these reasons, under the following authorities, I feel at liberty

to adopt my own and the views of the United States supreme court,

which accord with the first case decided by the supreme court of Cali-

fornia, and not with the second. Insurance Co. v. Debolt, 16 How.

431, 432; Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 206. But this case

falls within the principle decided in the two cases cited, as well as

others, in another particular. The act in question was passed and

acted upon by the railroad company four years before the decision in

San Francisco v. Water-Works, and rights have become vested under

it. During all that time it was the settled construction of the consti-

tutional provision in question that such legislation was valid. The

act, therefore, became a contract between the state and the company,

under which the latter entered upon the construction of its road in

pursuance of the terms of the several statutes mentioned.

In the last case cited the court, quoting from the opinion in the

next preceding case, says: "The sound and true rule is, that if the

contract, when made, was valid by the laws of the state, as then ex-

marks: "If such had been the meaning intended by the framers of
the constitution, they could easily have expressed it in apt words.
The language used by them is clear, and they well knew that it included but one of the numerous class of franchises the subject of legislative grant, and that a regulation of one could not by any reasonable
implication be extended to others not ment£oned." • • •
I should have contented myself with the simple reference to this
authority without any discussion of the question, but for the fact that
defendant has cited the case of San Francisco v. Water-Works, 48
Cal. 493, decided by the supreme court of the state, in which it is
held that corporations can exercise no powers except such as are conferred by the general laws under which they are formed, , and that the
legislature can not confer on such corporations any powers, or grant
them any privileges by special act. • • •
In 1863, the same question arose in Telegraph Co. v. Telegraph
Co., 22 Cal. 398, and was elaborately considered. It was then held
that the legislature might confer upon existing corporations by special
act a direct grant of special privileges and franchises; and that there was
no restriction upon the power imposed by the constitution, except as
to the particular privileges therein specified. • • •
Of the six justices of the supreme court, who have considered
the question, three took one view and three the other, so they stand
in number equally bal.anced. The able and · eminent justice who
delivered the opinion of the court in the last case, for whose
opinion I entertain profound respect, very ably presented the same
views adopted in his opinion, in his argument as counsel in the
former case, so that the court in the first case did not overlook, but, on
the contrary, fully considered them. Had the justices who have
passed upon the question in the two cases sat as one court, there would
have been no decision of the question. Thus, the matter stands
equally balanced, the only difference as authority being that the decision against the constitutionality of the power is last. • • •
For these reasons, under the following authorities, I feel at liberty
to adopt my own and the views of the United States supreme court,
which accord with the first case decided by the supreme court of California, and not with the second. Insurance Co. v. Debolt, 16 How.
431, 432; Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 2o6. But this case
falls within the principle decided in the two cases cited, as well as
others, in another particular. The act in question was passed and
acted upon by the railroad company four years before the decision in
San Francisco v. W ater-\iVorks, and rights have become vested under
it. During all that time it was the settled construction of the constitutional provision in question that such legislation was valid. The
act, therefore, became a contract between the state and the company,
under which the latter entered upon the construction of its road in
pursuance of the terms of the several statutes mentioned.
Tn the last case cited the court, quoting from the opinion in the
next preceding case, says: "The sound and true rule is, that if the
contract, when made, was valid by the laws of the state, as then ex-
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■pounded by all the departments of the government and administered

in its courts of justice, its validity and obligation can not be impaired

by any subsequent legislation, or decision of its courts altering the

pounded by all the departments of the government and adm£nistered
£n £ts courts ofjustice, its validity and obligation can not be impaired
by any subsequent legislation, or deds£on of £ts courts altering the
constructi"on of the law. The same principle applies when there is
a change of judidal dedsion as to the const£tutional power of the
legislature to enact the law. To this rule we adher e. It £s the law
of th£s court. It r ests upon the plainest principles of justice. To
hold otherwise would be as unjust as to hold that rights acquired under statutes may be lost by repeal. The rule embraces this case."
1 Wall. 2o6.
And so it does the case now in hand. • • •
I, therefore, hold the act of April 4, 1870, authorizing the defendant to build .i ts road upon the line indicated in the plat filed with the
commissioner of the general land office, and to accept the congressional grant, was a valid act, and at the time of its passage conferred
the rights and powers indicated upon the Southern Pacific Railroad
Company. • • •
Judgment for plaintiff.

construction of the law. The same principle applies when there is

a change of judicial decision as to the constitutional power of the

legislature to enact the law. To this rule we adhere. It is the law

of this court. It rests upon the plainest principles of justice. To

hold otherwise would be as unjust as to hold that rights acquired un-

der statutes may be lost by repeal. The rule embraces this case."

i Wall. 206. And so it does the case now in hand. * * *

I, therefore, hold the act of April 4, 1870, authorizing the defend-

ant to build its road upon the line indicated in the plat filed with the

commissioner of the general land office, and to accept the congres-

sional grant, was a valid act, and at the time of its passage conferred

the rights and powers indicated upon the Southern Pacific Railroad

Company. * * *

Judgment for plaintiff.

Note. Supporting this view see: 1880, Attorney-General v. North Am. L.

Ins. Co., 82 N. Y. 172; 1881, Central Ag. & Mech. Assn. v. Ala. G. L. Ins.
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Co., 70 Ala. 120; 1884, Attorney-General v. Joy, 55 Mich. 94; 1887, Wiley v.

Bluffton, 111 Ind. 152; 1891, St. Joseph and Iowa R. Co. v. Shambaugh, 106

Mo. 557; 1898, Indianapolis v. Navin, 151 Ind. 139, 47 N. E. Rep. 525.

Note. Supporting this view see: 1880, Attorney-General v. North Am. L.
Ins. Co., 82 N. Y. 172; 1881, Central Ag. & Mech. Assn. v. Ala. G. L. Ins.
Co., 70 Ala. 120; 1884, Attorney-General v. Joy, 55 Mich. 94; 1887, Wiley v.
Bluffton, 111 Ind. 152; 1891, St. Joseph and Iowa R. Co. v. Shambaugh, 106
Mo. 557; 1898, Indianapolis v. Navin, 151Ind.139, 47 N. E. Rep. 625 .

Sec. 73. (3) Conferring corporate powers.

"The legislature shall pass no special or local act conferring cor-

porate powers."

THE STATE OF OHIO, Ex Rkl. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, v. THE CITY

OF CINCINNATI.1

1870. In the Supreme Court of Ohio. 20 Ohio State Reports,

•

18-37-

Brinkerhoff, C. J. [This is an information in the nature of a

Sec. 73.

writ of quo warranto, filed in this court by the attorney-general for

( 3 ) Con fe,.,.ing co,.porate powe,.s.

the purpose of testing and contesting the validity of certain extensive

annexations of outlying territory and incorporated villages claimed by

''The legislature shall pass no special or local act conferring corporate powers. ' '

the city to have been made to it under the authority and in accordance

with the provisions of the act of the 16th of April, 1870, to prescribe

the corporate limits of Cincinnati. 67 Ohio L. 141.

The city, by plea, set out the statute, and relied upon it for her au-

THE STATE OF OHIO, Ex RxL. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, v. THE CITY
OF CINCINNATI.I

thority in annexing the territory and exercising her jurisdiction over

it. The state filed a reply, to which the city demurred, and thereby

raised the legal sufficiency of all the preceding pleadings, the main

1870.

1 Statement of facts abridged. Arguments and part of opinion omitted.

IN

THE SUPREME CoURT OF OHIO.
18-37.

20 Ohio State Reports,

BRINKERHOFF, C. ]. [This is an information in the nature of a
writ of quo warranto, filed in this court by the attorney-general for
the purpose of testing and contesting the validity of certain extensive
annexations of outlying territory and incorporated villages claimed by
the city to have been made to it under the authority and in accordance
with the provisions of the act of the 16th of April, 1870, to prescribe
the corporate limits of Cincinnati. 67 Ohio L. 141.
The city, by plea, set out the statute, and relied upon it for her authority in annexing the territory and exercising her jurisdiction over
it. The state filed a reply, to which tbe city demurred , and thereby
raised the legal sufficiency of all the preceding pleadings, the main
1
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point being the constitutionality of the act. The constitution, article

xiii, provides:
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"Sec. 1. The general assembly shall pass no special act, confer-

ring corporate powers."

"Sec. 2. Corporations may be formed under general laws, but all

such laws may, from time to time, be altered or repealed."

"Sec. 6. The general assembly shall provide for the organization

of cities and incorporated villages by general laws, and restrict their

power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts

and loaning their credit so as to prevent the abuse of such power."]

In looking at these provisions of our constitution—and indeed, in

looking over all the provisions of our constitution from beginning to

end—it will be seen that they make no distinction as respects legisla-

tive power in the creation of them, and in the conferring of powers

upon them between any classes of corporations proper. They make

no distinction between private corporations such as railroad, manu-

facturing or mining corporations or the like and public municipal

corporations, such as cities and villages. On the contrary, and as if

to preclude the hypothesis of any such distinction, the sixth section of
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the thirteenth article assumes the imperative form of expression and

declares that "the general assembly shall provide for the organization

of cities and incorporated villages by general laws." In respect to

corporations proper, whether private or municipal, the provisions of

section 1, article xiii, are all comprehensive. "The general assembly

shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers." These pro-

visions of the constitution are as imperative, as comprehensive and

emphatic as if the people, speaking through their constitution, had

said: "The bane and curse of our legislation, as it existed under the

latitudinarian provisions of the constitution of 1802, is in future utterly

and absolutely prohibited. Henceforth, the laws conferring corporate

powers shall be general, affecting or liable to affect the interests of

the constituency of every individual member of the general assembly

and so by powerful motives calling his attention to the effect of pro-

posed enactments upon his own immediate constituency as well as

upon the people of other localities." This is the policy and intent

of the provisions of the constitution above quoted, and they are as

clearly apparent as if they had been expressed in so many words.

No one who has read the proceedings and debates of the convention

which presented to the people of Ohio the framework of the consti-

tution which the latter by their votes established and adopted, or is

old enough to remember the apprehensions of evil consequences with

which the conferring of corporate powers by special acts were re-

garded, can fail to see that it was one of the ends and aims of the

constitutional convention and of the people who adopted the frame-

work of a constitution which that convention presented for their adop-

tion or rejection, to cut up by the roots at once and forever, all capac-

ity of the general assembly to confer by special act any powers what-

soever upon any corporate body whatsoever.

At one time, indeed, an attempt was made to escape the effect of

point being the constitutionality of the act. The constitution, article
xiii, provides:
"Sec. 1. The general assembly shall pass no special act, conferring corporate powers.''
"Sec. 2. Corporations may be formed under general Jaws, but all
such laws may, from time to time, be altered or repealed.''
"Sec. 6. The general assembly shall provide for the organization
of cities and incorporated villages by general laws, and restrict their
power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts
and loaning their credit so as to prevent the abuse of such power."]
In looking at these provisions of our constitution-and indeed, in
looking over all the provisions of our constitution from beginning to
end-it will be seen that they make no distinction as respects legislative power in the creation of them, and in the conferring of powers
upon them between any classes of corporations proper. They make
no distinction between private corporations such as railroad, manufacturing or mining corporations or the like and public municipal
corporations, such as cities and villages. On the contrary, and as if
to preclude the hypothesis of any such distinction, the sixth section of
the thirteenth article assumes the imperative form of expres~ion and
declares that "the general assembly shall provide for the organization
of cities and incorporated villages by general laws." In respect to
corporations proper, whether private or municipal, the provisions of
section 1, article xiii, are all comprehensive. "The general assembly
shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers.'' These provisions of the constitution are as imperative, as comprehensive and
emphatic as if the people, speaking through their constitutidn, had
said: "The bane and curse of our legislation, as it existed under the
latitudinarian provisions of the constitution of 1802, is in future utterly
and absolutely prohibited. Henceforth, the laws conferring corporate
powers shall be general, affecting or liable to affect the interests of
the constituency of every individual member of the general assembly
and so by powerful motives calling his attention to the effect of proposed enactments upon his own immediate constituency as well as
upon the people of other localities." This is the policy and intent
of the provisions of the constitution above quoted, and they are as
clearly apparent as if they had been expressed in so many words.
No one who has read the proceedings and debates of the convention
which presented to the people of Ohio the framework of the constitution which the latter by their votes established and adopted, or is
old enough to remember the apprehensions of evil consequences with
which the conferring of corporate powers by special acts were regarded, can fail to see that it was one of the ends and aims of the
constitutional convention and of the people who adopted the framework of a constitution which that convention presented for their adoption or rejection, to cut up by the roots at once and forever, all capacity of the general assembly to confer by special act any powers whatsoever upon any corporate body whatsoever.
At one time, indeed, an attempt was made to escape the effect of
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these constitutional restrictions on legislative power, on the theory

that the phrase "conferring corporate powers" meant simply the con-

these constitutional restrictions on legislative power, on the theory
that the phrase " conferring corporate powers " meant simply the conferring of corporate existence-the creation of a corporation, so that
if corporations were only created under general laws, the legislature
might then proceed by special acts to confer upon existing corpora. tions as many and as varied powers as it pleased. Such a construction would leave a door wide open for the re-introduction of all the
evils of special legislation which these restrictions and mandatory provisions of the constitution were obviously designed to guarrl again t
and prevent. Accordingly such a construction was distinctly repudiated by this court in the carefully considered case of Atkinson v. The
Marietta, etc., R. Co., 15 Ohio St. 21. In that case Ranney, J.,
delivering the opinion of the court, and referring to the first and second sections of the thi1teenth article of the constitution above quoted,
says: "These provisions of the constitution are too explicit to admit
of the least doubt that they were intended to disable the general assembly from either creating corporations or conferring upon them
corporate powers by special acts of legislation. It was intended to
correct an existing evil , and to inaugurate the policy of placing all
corporations of the same kind upon a p erfect equality as to all future
grants of power.,. of making such law applicable to all parts of the
state, and thereby securing the vigilance and attention of its whole
representation, and finally, of making all judicial constructions of
their powers, or the restrictions imposed upon them, equally applicable
to all corporations of the same class. We must give such a construction to the constitution as will preserve its leading objects intact."
I think the following propositions to be impregnable:
I. The general assembly can not, by a special act, create a corporation.
2. It can not, by special act, confer additional powers upon corporations already existing.
·
3. In the purview of these propositions and of the constitutional
provisions on which they are based, there is no distinction between
private and municipal corporations.
Now for the application of these propositions to the case before
us. The act of the general assembly under which the corporate authorities of Cincinnati proceeded to make the annexations of outside
territory which they claimed to have made and consummated, is " a
special act." It does not purport to be otherwise. Its language is:
"Be it enacted by the general assembly of the state of Ohio, that the
corporate limits of the city of Cincinnati shall be as follows: Commencing at the mouth of the Little Miami river, thence northe astwardly,'' etc. And now but one question remains. Does this special
act assume to confer upon the corporation of the city of Cincinnati
additional corporate powers--powers which , as a municipal corporation, she did not previously possess? The answer is plain. It does
assume to confer, on certain prescribed conditions, the power of municipal government, the power of police regulation , the power of
judicial jurisdiction, and the powers of assessment and taxation, over

ferring of corporate existence—the creation of a corporation, so that

if corporations were only created under general laws, the legislature

might then proceed by special acts to confer upon existing corpora-

tions as many and as varied powers as it pleased. Such a construc-

tion would leave a door wide open for the re-introduction of all the

evils of special legislation which these restrictions and mandatory pro-

visions of the constitution were obviously designed to guard against

and prevent. Accordingly such a construction was distinctly repudi-

ated by this court in the carefully considered case of Atkinson v. The

Marietta, etc., R. Co., 15 Ohio St. 21. In that case Ranney, J.,

delivering the opinion of the court, and referring to the first and sec-

ond sections of the thirteenth article of the constitution above quoted,

says: "These provisions of the constitution are too explicit to admit

of the least doubt that they were intended to disable the general as-

sembly from either creating corporations or conferring upon them

corporate powers by special acts of legislation. It was intended to
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correct an existing evil, and to inaugurate the policy of placing all

corporations of the same kind upon a perfect equality as to all future

grants of power, of making such law applicable to all parts of the

state, and thereby securing the vigilance and attention of its whole

representation, and finally, of making all judicial constructions of

their powers, or the restrictions imposed upon them, equally applicable

to all corporations of the same class. We must give such a construc-

tion to the constitution as will preserve its leading objects intact."

I think the following propositions to be impregnable:

1. The general assembly can not, by a special act, create a corpo-

ration.

2. It can not, by special act, confer additional powers upon corpo-

rations already existing.

3. In the purview of these propositions and of the constitutional

provisions on which they are based, there is no distinction between

private and municipal corporations.

Now for the application of these propositions to the case before

us. The act of the general assembly under which the corporate au-

thorities of Cincinnati proceeded to make the annexations of outside

territory which they claimed to have made and consummated, is "«

special act." It does not purport to be otherwise. Its language is:

"Be it enacted by the general assembly of the state of Ohio, that the

corporate limits of the city of Cincinnati shall be as follows: Com-

mencing at the mouth of the Little Miami river, thence northeast-

wardly," etc. And now but one question remains. Does this special

act assume to confer upon the corporation of the city of Cincinnati

additional corporate powers—powers which, as a municipal corpora-

tion, she did not previously possess? The answer is plain. It does

assume to confer, on certain prescribed conditions, the power of mu-

nicipal government, the power of police regulation, the power of

judicial jurisdiction, and the powers of assessment and taxation, over
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a number of outlying suburban incorporated villages, and of other

§ 74
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territory hitherto subjected to no jurisdiction except such as belongs

to the township, county and state organizations.

A majority of the court are of opinion that the act is clearly in

contravention of the restrictive provisions of the constitution, and,

therefore, of no binding force and validity.

Ami here I might properly stop; yet, for the purpose of excluding

a possible conclusion, I will, on my own individual responsibility, say

one word more. It may be asked, Do we intend to include township

and county organizations in the category with municipal and other

corporations proper? The question is not involved in the present

case, and so it is not properly before us; but, if it were, I apprehend

the answer to it would readily be found in the case of the Commis-

sioners of Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109,1 where it is

held that a county is not properly a corporation, but that "it is at

most but a local organization, which, for purposes of civil administra-

tion, is invested with a few functions characteristic of a corporate ex-

istence."
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Judgment of ouster.

Scott, Welch and Day, JJ., concurred.

White, J., did not concur.

note. See, 1878, State v. Maloy (City of Council Grove), 20-Kan. 619; 1880,

School District v. Insurance Co., 103 U. S. 707; McGregorv. Baylies, 19 Iowa43.

See. 74. (4) Title and special privileges.

"The legislature shall pass no bill embracing more than one

subject, and that shall be expressed in the title; nor shall any pri-

vate or local bill be passed granting to any corporation, association

or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege, immunity or

a number of outlying suburban incorporated villages, and of other
territory hitherto subjected to no jurisdiction except such as belongs
to tile township, county and state organizations.
A majority of the court are of opinion that the act is clearly in
contravention of the restrictive provisions of the constitution, and,
therefore, of no binding force and validity.
And here I might properly stop; yet, for the purpose of excluding
a possible conclusion, I will, on my own individual responsibility, say
•one word more. It may be asked, Do we inte nd to include township
and county organizations in the category with municipal and other
corporations proper? The question is not involved in the present
case, and so it is not properly before us; but, if it were, I apprehend
the answer to it would readily be found in the case of the Commissioners of Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109, 1 where it is
held that a county is not properly a corporation, but that " it is at
most but a local organization, which, for purposes of civil administration, is invested with a few functions characteristic of a corporate exi tence."
Judgment of ouster.
ScoTT, WELCH and DAY, JJ., concurred.
WHITE, J., did not concur.
Nou. See, 1878, State v. Maloy (City of Council Grove), 20-Kan. 619; 1880,
&hool District v. Insurance Co., 103 U. S. 707; McGregor v. Baylies, 19 Iowa 43.

franchise whatsoever.''

JOHN JACOB ASTOR Et Al., Respondents, v. THE ARCADE RAIL-

WAY COMPANY, Appellant.'

1889. In the Court of Appeals of New York. 113 New

See. 74.

( 4)

Title and special privileges.

York Reports 93-115.

Appeal from an interlocutory judgment of the general term of the

supreme court in the first judicial department, entered upon an order

made May 18, 1888, which reversed a judgment of special term sus-

taining a demurrer to the complaint herein and dismissing said com-

plaint, and which overruled said demurrer. (Reported below, 48

Hun 562.)

''The legislature shall pass no bill embracing more than one
subject, and that shall be expressed in the title; nor shall any private or local bill be passed granting to any corporation, association
or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege, immunity or
franchise whatsoever. ''

This action was brought by plaintiffs, who are the owners of the

'Supra, p. 214.

* Arguments omitted.

JOHN JACOB ASTOR ET AL., RESPONDENTS, v. THE ARCADE RAILWAY COMPANY, APPELLANT. 2

1889.

IN THR CouRT OF APPEALS OF NEW YoRK.
York Reports 93-115.

113 New

Appeal from an interlocutory judgment of the general term of the
· supreme court in the first judicial department, entered upon an order
made May 18, 1888, which reversed a judgment of special term sustaining a demurrer to the complaint herein and dismissing said complaint, and which overruled said demurrer. (Reported below, 48
Hun 562.)
This action was brought by plaintiffs, who are the owners of the
1
1

Supra. p . 214.
Argument.a omitted.

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

364

§74

ASTOR V. THE ARCADE RY. CO.

ASTOR V. THE ARCADE RY. CO.

property fronting upon Broadway and Madison avenue, in the city of

New York, to restrain the construction by defendant of a railway

property fronting upon Broadway and Madison avenue, in the city of
New Yark, to restrain the construction by defendant of a railway
under the surface of said streets, which the complaint alleged defendant was about to attempt to do, claiming authority under the act
(ch. 312, Laws of 1886), which act the complaint alleged to be un·
constitutional and void.
EARL, J. The sole question for our determination is whether the
defendant has legal authority to construct and operate a railway under
Broadway and Madison avenue in the city of New York. The de·'
fendant traces its corporate existence to the act, chapter 842 of the laws
of 1868, entitled "An act to provide for the transmission of letters,
packages and merchandise in the cities of New York and Brooklyn
and across the North and East rivers by means of pneumatic tubes,
to be constructed beneath the surface of the streets and public places
in said cities and under the waters of said rivers." The first section
of the act authorized and empowered Alfred E. Beach and other persons named, and their assigns, "to lay down, construct and maintain
one or more pneumatic tubes in the soil beneath the surface, squares,
avenues and public places, in the cities of New York and Brooklyn
and under the bed of the waters of the East river between the said
cities, and also under the bed of the waters of the North river from the
city of New York to the shore of New Jersey, but at such depth as
not to interfere with navigation; and to convey letters, parcels, packages, mails, merchandise and property in and through said tubes for
compensation, by means of vehicles to be run and operated therein by
the pneumatic system of propulsion; and to the end that the puhlic
convenience may be promoted in the operation of said vehicles, the
said persons and their assigns are also hereby authorized and required
to erect upon the sidewalks of the said streets, squares, avenues and
public places suitable ornamental lamp-posts, boxes, pillars or recept·
acles, not exceeding thirty inches in diameter, connected with said
pneumatic tubes for the deposit of letters, packages and property to
be transmitted therein." And it provided that the tubes should not
extend through any vault, nor under any sidewalk fronting on private
property, without the consent of the owners of such private property,
and compensation to them, which should be ascertained and deter·
mined, in case the parties could not agree, in the manner provided in
the general railroad act of 1850. Section 2 provided that the pneu·
matic tubes should be so constructed as to have a mean interior diam·
ter of not exceeding fifty-four inches.
Section 5 authorized the persons named in the act to hold a meet·
ing and determine the terms and conditions upon which the powers,
privileges and franchises conferred by the act might be transferred to
a corporation to be organized as provided in the next section, and sec·
tion 6 provided that in case the persons attending the meeting named
in the prior section should so determine, they might organize them·
selves into a corporation in the manner specified in the general manu·
facturing act of 1848, and the acts amendatory thereof, "for the
purpose of constructing and maintaining the pneumatic tubes afore·

under the surface of said streets, which the complaint alleged de-

fendant was about to attempt to do, claiming authority under the act

(ch. 312, Laws of 1886), which act the complaint alleged to be un-

constitutional and void.

Earl, J. The sole question for our determination is whether the

defendant has legal authority to construct and operate a railway under

Broadway and Madison avenue in the city of New York. The de-*

fendant traces its corporate existence to the act, chapter 842 of the laws

of 1868, entitled "An act to provide for the transmission of letters,

packages and merchandise in the cities of New York and Brooklyn

and across the North and East rivers by means of pneumatic rubes,

to be constructed beneath the surface of the streets and public places

in said cities and under the waters of said rivers." The first section

of the act authorized and empowered Alfred E. Beach and other per-

sons named, and their assigns, "to lay down, construct and maintain

one or more pneumatic tubes in the soil beneath the surface, squares,
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avenues and public places, in the cities of New York and Brooklyn

and under the bed of the waters of the East river between the said

cities, and also under the bed of the waters of the North river from the

city of New York to the shore of New Jersey, but at such depth as

not to interfere with navigation; and to convey letters, parcels, pack-

ages, mails, merchandise and property in and through said tubes for

compensation, by means of vehicles to be run and operated therein by

the pneumatic system of propulsion; and to the end that the public

convenience may be promoted in the operation of said vehicles, the

said persons and their assigns are also hereby authorized and required

to erect upon the sidewalks of the said streets, squares, avenues and

public places suitable ornamental lamp-posts, boxes, pillars or recept-

acles, not exceeding thirty inches in diameter, connected with said

pneumatic tubes for the deposit of letters, packages and property to

be transmitted therein." And it provided that the tubes should not

extend through any vault, nor under any sidewalk fronting on private

property, without the consent of the owners of such private property,

and compensation to them, which should be ascertained and deter-

mined, in case the parties could not agree, in the manner provided in

the general railroad act of 1850. Section 2 provided that the pneu-

matic tubes should be so constructed as to have a mean interior diam-

ter of not exceeding fifty-four inches.

Section 5 authorized the persons named in the act to hold a meet-

ing and determine the terms and conditions upon which the powers,

privileges and franchises conferred by the act might be transferred to

a corporation to be organized as provided in the next section, and sec-

tion 6 provided that in case the persons attending the meeting named

in the prior section should so determine, they might organize them-

selves into a corporation in the manner specified in the general manu-

facturing act of 1S48, and the acts amendatory thereof, "for the

purpose of constructing and maintaining the pneumatic tubes afore-
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said and using and operating the same as hereinbefore authorized,"

and that the corporation so organized shall "possess all the powers
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and privileges conferred by said acts and be subject to all the duties

and obligations imposed therein, not inconsistent with the provisions

of this act."

In August, 1868, in pursuance of the powers conferred by the act,

the persons therein named organized themselves into a corporation by

the name of "The Beach Pneumatic Transit Company," and in the

certificate executed and filed by them, they declared that the object

of the corporation was "to construct and operate pneumatic railroads

in the cities of New York and Brooklyn and under the waters of the

North and East rivers, and to exercise all the powers, privileges and

franchises conferred upon said corporation by the act" of 1868, that

the capital stock should be $5,000,000 and that the corporation should

continue in existence for the term of fifty years. The certificate could

give the corporation no greater powers than were conferred by the act

of 1868, and to that act we must look for the scope and measure of

its powers.

The act did not confer railroad powers upon the corporation, and
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did not subject it to any of the railroad acts, except for the purpose

of ascertaining the compensation to be paid to the owners of

property interests in the streets. It authorized the formation of a

manufacturing corporation, with the incidents, powers and duties of

such a corporation, so far as they were consistent with the purposes

of the act. The corporation formed was, in fact, a manufacturing

corporation, not, however, with the general power to engage in any

manufacturing business, but for the sole purpose of constructing,

maintaining, using and operating the pneumatic tubes. The forma-

tion of such a corporation was a matter fairly embraced within the

title of the act. It was an appropriate instrumentality to accomplish

the purposes of the act, and in no sense a new and independent sub-

ject. The legislature, having authorized the construction and opera-

tion of the pneumatic tubes, could, in the act itself, have created the

corporation, or could have authorized its organization under any of

the general laws of the state adapted to the formation of any business

corporation; and the formation of such a corporation would be ger-

mane to the main purpose of the act as indicated by its title. While

the general manufacturing laws regulated the corporation as to its

mode of existence, its manner of action and its corporate life and

being generally, yet all its powers and duties related and were con-

fined to the construction, maintenance, use and operation of the pneu-

matic tubes; and, therefore, section 16 of article 3 of the constitu-

tion, which provides that '■'■no private or local bill which may be

passed by the legislature shall embrace more than one subject, and

that shall be expressed in the title" was not, as contended on behalf

of the plaintiffs, violated.

What do the words pneumatic tubes mean? They convey to our

minds no other meaning than that of tubes for the transmission of

parcels operated by atmospheric pressure applied within the tubes.

said and using and operating the sa me as hereinbefore authorized,"
and that the corporation so organized shall "possess all the powers
and privileges conferred by said acts and be subject to all the duties
and obligations imposed therein, not inconsistent with the provisions
of this act.''
In August, 1868, in pursuance of the powers conferred by the act,
the persons therein named organized themselves into a corporation by
the name of "The Beach Pneumatic Transit Company," and in the
certificate executed and filed by them, they declared that the object
of the corporation was "to construct and operate pneumatic railroads
in the cities of New York and Brooklyn and under the waters of the
North and E ast rivers, and to exercise all the powers, privileges and
franchises conferred upon said corporation by the act" of 1868, that
the capital stock should be $s ,ooo,ooo and that the corporation should
continue in existence for the term of fifty years. The certificate could
give the corporation no greater powers than were conferred by the act
of 1868, and to that act we must look for the scope and measure of
its powers.
The act did not confer railroad powers upon the corporation, and
did not subject it to any of the railroad acts, except for the purpose
of ascertaining the compensation to be paid to the owners of
property interests in the streets. It authorized the formation of a
manufacturing corporation , with the incidents, powers and duties of
such a corporation, so far as they were consistent with the purposes
of the act. The corporation formed was, in fact, a manufacturing
corporation, not, however, with the general power to engage in any
manufacturing business, but for the sole purpose of constructing,
maintaining, using and operating the pneumatic tubes. The formation of such a corporation was a matter fairly embraced within the
title of the act. It was an appropriate instrumentality to accomplish
the purposes of the act, and in no sense a new and independent sub ject. The legislature, having authorized the construction and operation of the pneumatic tubes, could, in the act itself, have created the
corporation, or could have authorized its organization under any of
the general laws of the state adapted to the formation of any business
corporation; and the formation of such a corporation would be g ermane to the main purpose of the act as indicated by its title. While
the general manufacturing laws regulated the corporation as to its
mode of existence, its manner of action and its corporate life :mcl
being generally, yet all its powers and duties related and were confined to the construction, maintenance, use and operation of the pneumatic tubes; and, therefore, sect£on I6 of art£cle 3 of the constitution, which provides that "no private or local b£ll wht"ch may be
passed by the legt"slature shall embrace more than one subject, and
that shall be expressed in the title," was not, as contended on behalf
of the plaintiffs, violated.
What do the words pneumatic tubes mean? They convey to our
minds no other meaning than that of tubes for the transmission of
parcels operated by atmospheric pressure applied within the tubes.
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tached to a piston operated within the tubes by atmospheric pressure,

.f 74

or they may be transmitted within the tubes by atmospheric pressure

The parcels may be transmitted outside the tubes upon vehicles attached to a piston operated within the tubes by atmospheric pressure,
or they may be transmitted within the tubes by atmospheric pressure
applied behind them. But they are in no sense railways. Such a
tube may contain vehicles placed upon wheels, and the wheels may
run upon rails or in grooves, and yet the structure could not, according to the popular sense, or in any legal sense, be what is generally
known as a railway. The tubes may be so constructed that in a technical or scientific sense the structure might be called a railway; and
so, too, any structure upon which vehicles may be moved upon rails,
however peculiar or small, may in some limited sense be called a railway, and yet it may not be a railway within the meaning of the constitution and the general laws of the state. When they speak of railways they
always mean railways either for the general carriage of property or
of passengers, or of both, and a railway which may be operated in
small pneumatic tubes by atmospheric pressure for the transmission of
small packages is not within such meaning.
Such was the character and status of the corporation organized under the act of 1868. That act was amended by the act, chapter 512,
of the laws of 1869, entitled "An act supplementary to chapter 842,
of the laws of 1868, in relation to carrying letters, packages and merchandise by means of pneumatic tubes in New York and Brooklyn,"
but there is nothing in that act pertinent to the present discu E<sion.
From 1868 to the commencement of this action in 1886, so far as
this record discloses, nothing whatever was done by the corporation
except to change its name several times and to procure acts of the
legislature purporting to enlarge its powers and extend its corporate
life. No pneumatic tubes have been constructed, and it is a fair inference from the admitted facts that the system for the pneumatic
transmission of property was before the year 1873 found to be impracticable. It had been tried in various parts of Europe, but had
proved a failure, and for the general transmission of property or passengers was in the year 1873 nowhere in use. (Chamber's Encyclop edia, titles, "Atmospheric Railway" and "Pneumatic Dispatch,"
Encyclopedia Britannica, title ''Atmospheric Railway,'' Appleton's
Cyclopedia, title "Atmospheric Railway," Johnson's Cyclopedia,
title, ''Pneumatic Transmission.'')
In 1873 the persons interested in the corporation, as we may infer.
being aware of its insufficiency for any practical purpose, concluded
to procure an enlargement of its powers, and a radical change in its
character and purposes, and, therefore, they obtained the passage of
the act (chapter 185), entitled "an act supplemental to and amendatory of chapter 842 of the laws of 1868, an act entitled 'an act to
provide for the transmission of letters, packages and merchandise in
the cities of New York and Brooklyn, and across the North and East
rivers by means of pneumatic tubes, to be constructed beneath the surface of the streets, squares, avenues and public places, in said cities,
and under the waters of said rivers,' passed June r, 1868, and of chapter 512 of the laws of r8'59, entitled 'an at:t supplementary to chapter

applied behind them. But they are in no sense railways. Such a

tube may contain vehicles placed upon wheels, and the wheels may

run upon rails or in grooves, and yet the structure could not, accord-

ing to the popular sense, or in any legal sense, be what is generally

known as a railway. The tubes may be so constructed that in a tech-

nical or scientific sense the structure might be called a railway; and

so, too, any structure upon which vehicles may be moved upon rails,

however peculiar or small, may in some limited sense be called a rail-

way, and yet it may not be a railway within the meaning of the constitu-

tion and the general laws of the state. When they speak of railways they

always mean railways either for the general carriage of property or

of passengers, or of both, and a railway which may be operated in

small pneumatic tubes by atmospheric pressure for the transmission of

small packages is not within such meaning.

Such was the character and status of the corporation organized un-

der the act of 1868. That act was amended by the act, chapter 512,
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of the laws of 1869, entitled "An act supplementary to chapter 842,

of the laws of 1868, in relation to carrying letters, packages and mer-

chandise by means of pneumatic tubes in New York and Brooklyn,"

but there is nothing in that act pertinent to the present discussion.

From 1868 to the commencement of this action in 1886, so far as

this record discloses, nothing whatever was done by the corporation

except to change its name several times and to procure acts of the

legislature purporting to enlarge its powers and extend its corporate

life. No pneumatic tubes have been constructed, and it is a fair in-

ference from the admitted facts that the system for the pneumatic

transmission of property was before the year 1873 found to be im-

practicable. It had been tried in various parts of Europe, but had

proved a failure, and for the general transmission of property or pas-

sengers was in the year 1873 nowhere in use. (Chamber's Encyclo-

pedia, titles, "Atmospheric Railway" and "Pneumatic Dispatch."

Encyclopedia Britannica, title "Atmospheric Railway," Appleton's

Cyclopedia, title "Atmospheric Railway," Johnson's Cyclopedia,

title, "Pneumatic Transmission.")

In 1873 the persons interested in the corporation, as we may infer,

being aware of its insufficiency for any practical purpose, concluded

to procure an enlargement of its powers, and a radical change in its

character and purposes, and, therefore, they obtained the passage of

the act (chapter 185), entitled "an act supplemental to and amenda-

tory of chapter 842 of the laws of 1868, an act entitled 'an act to

provide for the transmission of letters, packages and merchandise in

the cities of New York and Brooklyn, and across the North and East

rivers by means of pneumatic tubes, to be constructed beneath the sur-

face of the streets, squares, avenues and public places, in said cities,

and under the waters of said rivers,' passed June 1, 1866, and of chap-

ter 512 of the laws of 1869, entitled 'an att supplementary to chapter
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merchandise by means of pneumatic tubes in New York and Brook-

lyn, and to provide for the transportation of passengers in said

tubes.'" The last phrase of this title "and to provide for the trans-

portation of passengers in said tubes" did not appear in the title of

the act of 1869, and yet in the act in all its stages through the legis-

lature, as approved by the governor, filed in the office of the secre-

tary of state and printed in the session laws, the quotation marks are

so placed as to make the phrase appear to be a part of that title. The

title of the act, therefore, was well calculated to deceive any persons

to whose attention it came while the act was under consideration in

the legislature. But we will assume that this title is to have the same

force and effect as if that of the act of 1869 had been properly quoted,

and then the only addition to the titles of the prior acts is the final

phrase above quoted, and the only subject expressed in the title is

the transportation of property and passengers in pneumatic tubes.

This title is assailed by the plaintiffs as not in compliance with sec-

tion 16 of article 3 of the constitution above quoted. A particular

examination of the provisions of the act is, therefore, necessary. The

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:15 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

first section provides that it shall be lawful for the Beach Pneumatic

Transit Company "to construct, maintain and operate an underground

railway for the transportation of passengers and property," under

Broadway and Madison avenue, "by means of tubes of enlarged in-

terior diameters sufficient for the construction of a railway or railways

therein, and for the running of cars and the carrying of passengers

therein, and also to construct, in connection with said tubes, two or

more tracks of railway with the necessary turnouts and stations for the

ingress and egress and accommodation of the passengers, and for the

receipt and discharge of packages and freight and said company shall

have the right and privilege, subject to the approval of the board of

engineer commissioners hereinafter provided for, to make connection

with the Harlem and connecting railroads at any point deemed best,

at or above Forty-second street, and also to make connection with the

Hudson River Railroad at any point northerly of Fifty-ninth street."

Section 2 provides that the passenger tubes shall, as far as practica-

ble, follow the center line of the streets, and shall not occupy in the

aggregate a greater space than thirty-one feet in width by eighteen

feet in height, exterior measurement, and that they shall be laid and

constructed under the supervision of a board of three engineer com-

missioners, whose duty it is to see that the "passenger tubes and rail-

ways" are constructed in a thorough and workmanlike manner; and

that they shall constitute a board of commissioners, a majority of

whom "shall determine whether the pneumatic system or other mo-

tive power shall be adopted by said corporation for the propulsion of

the cars running within said passenger tubes."

Section 4 authorizes the corporation to acquire the title to such real

estate or interest therein as may be necessary to enable it to construct,

operate and maintain "said tubes and railways," and to construct and

maintain the proper platforms, stations and buildings at such points

8.p of the laws of 1868 in relation to carrying letters, packages and
merchandise by means of pneumatic tubes in New York and Brooklyn, and to provide for the transportation of passengers in said
tubes.' " The last phrase of this title "and to provide for the transportation of passengers in said tubes" did not appear in the title of
the act of 1869, and yet in the act in all its stages through the legislature, as approved by the governor, filed in the office of the secretary of state and printed in the session laws, the quotation marks are
so placed as to make the phrase appear to be a part of that title. The
title of the act, therefore, was well calculated to deceive any persons
to whose attention it came while the act was under consideration in
the legislature. But we will assume that this title is to have the same
force and effect as if that of the act of 1869 had been properly quoted,
and then the only addition to the titles of the prior acts is the final
phrase above quoted, and the only subject expressed in the title is
the transportation of property and passenger!l in pneumatic tubes.
This title is assailed by the plaintiffs as not in compliance with section 16 of article 3 of the constitution above quoted. A particular
examination of the provisions of the act is, therefore, necessary. The
first section provides that it shall be lawful for the Beach Pneumatic
Transit Company "to construct, maintain and operate an underground
railway for the transportation of passengers and property," under
Broadway and Madison avenue, "by means of tubes of enlarged interior diameters sufficient for the construction of a railway or railways
therein, and for the running of cars and the carrying of passengers
therein, and also to construct, in connection with said tubes, two or
more tracks of railway with the necessary turnouts and stations for the
ingress and egress and accommodation of the passengers, and for the
receipt and discharge of packages and freight and said company shall
have the right and privilege, subject to the approval of the board of
engineer commissioners hereinafter provided for, to make connection
with the Harlem and connecting railroads at any point deemed best,
at or above Forty-second street, and also to make connection with the
Hudson River Railroad at any point northerly of Fifty-ninth street."
Section 2 provides that the passenger tubes shall, as far as practicable, follow the center line of the streets, and shall not occupy in the
aggregate a greater space than thirty-one feet in width by eighteen
feet in height, exterior measurement, and that they shall be laid and
constructed under the supervision of a board of three engineer commissioners, whose duty it is to see that the "passenger tubes and railways" are constructed in a thorough and workmanlike manner; and
that they shall constitute a board of commissioners, a majority of
whom "shall determine whether the pneumatic system or other motive power shall be adopted by said corporation for the propulsion of
the cars running within said passenger tubes."
·
Section 4 authorizes th<? corporation to acquire the title to such real
estate or interest therein as may be necessary to enable it to construct,
operate and maintain "said tubes and railways," and to construct and
maintain the proper platforms, stations and buildings at such points
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along the route of its tubes as may be convenient and suitable for the

along the route of its tubes as may be convenient and suitable for the
ingress and egress of its passengers and for the receipt and discharge
of freight and packages, and necessary for the successful operation of
"said tubes and railway, and for the proper connections between said
tubes and railways, platform, stations and buildings;" and in case the
corporation is unable to agree with the owners of real estate for the
purchase and use thereof, it is authorized to acquire the title to the
same in the manner provided in the general railroad act of 1850; and
in all cases the · use of the streets, avenues, squares, grounds and public places, and the right of way under the same for the purpose of
"said tubes and railway or railways therein," shall be considered and
is declared to be a public use.
Section 5 provides that "it shall be lawful for said corporation to
convey passengers on said railway or railways through said tubes for
hire," and regulates the rate of fare that may be charged.
Section 6 provides that the corporation shall commence active operations in the construction of its works within six months after the
passage of the act, and shall complete the section of passenger tubes
with two railway tracks from Bowling Green to Fourteenth street
within three years, and shall complete the remainder of the passenger
tubes, as authorized, within five years thereafter.
Section 7 provides that the corporation shall not construct any station, depot or other building, or work above the surface of any land
belonging to the city of New York, either in its own right or as a
trustee, without the consent of the mayor and aldermen, but that
nothing in the act shall be construed to authorize the mayor and aldermen to donate, lease or sell any portion of any of the ground surface
of any public park in the city beyond what may be absolutely necessary for the exit from and entrance to the railroad.
Section 9 provides that the corporation shall possess "all the powers and be subjected to all the duties and liabilities imposed on railroad corporations by the laws of this state not inconsistent with the
charter of this company or the purposes of its incorporation."
Here we read nothing of pneumatic tubes or of propulsion by atmospheric pressure, or even pneumatic railways. We read of passenger
tubes, but we must not be deceived by the juggle of words. We find
authorized a grand underground railway, not less than fifteen miles
long, with two or more tracks, tum-outs, platforms, stations, buildings
and other appurtenances, with power to connect with surface steam
railroad, to be operated through passage-ways called tubes, eighteen
feet in height and thirty-one feet in width, exterior measurements; in
fact, tunnels which could not be operated by atmospheric pressure.
What was before a manufacturing corporation was converted into a
railroad corporation, or, at least, had superadded the powers, privileges, duties and liabilities of railroad corporations under the general
laws of the state, with authority, by the consent of the engineercommissioners, to use, for the movement of its cars, horses, steam or
any other motive power. The constmction of such a railway by such
a corporation is certainly a subject not expressed in the title of the

ingress and egress of its passengers and for the receipt and discharge

of freight and packages, and necessary for the successful operation of

"said tubes and railway, and for the proper connections between said

tubes and railways, platform, stations and buildings;" and in case the

corporation is unable to agree with the owners of real estate for the

purchase and use thereof, it is authorized to acquire the title to the

same in the manner provided in the general railroad act of 1850; and

in all cases the use of the streets, avenues, squares, grounds and pub-

lic places, and the right of way under the same for the purpose of

"said tubes and railway or railways therein," shall be considered and

is declared to be a public use.

Section 5 provides that "it shall be lawful for said corporation to

convey passengers on said railway or railways through said tubes for

hire," and regulates the rate of fare that may be charged.

Section 6 provides that the corporation shall commence active oper-

ations in the construction of its works within six months after the

passage of the act, and shall complete the section of passenger tubes
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with two railway tracks from Bowling Green to Fourteenth street

within three years, and shall complete the remainder of the passenger

tubes, as authorized, within five years thereafter.

Section 7 provides that the corporation shall not construct any sta-

tion, depot or other building, or work above the surface of any land

belonging to the city of New York, either in its own right or as a

trustee, without the consent of the mayor and aldermen, but that

nothing in the act shall be construed to authorize the mayor and alder-

men to donate, lease or sell any portion of any of the ground surface

of any public park in the city beyond what may be absolutely neces-

sary for the exit from and entrance to the railroad.

Section 9 provides that the corporation shall possess "all the pow-

ers and be subjected to all the duties and liabilities imposed on rail-

road corporations by the laws of this state not inconsistent with the

charter of this company or the purposes of its incorporation."

Here we read nothing of pneumatic tubes or of propulsion by atmos-

pheric pressure, or even pneumatic railways. We read of passenger

tubes, but we must not be deceived by the juggle of words. We find

authorized a grand underground railway, not less than fifteen miles

long, with two or more tracks, turn-outs, platforms, stations, buildings

and other appurtenances, with power to connect with surface steam

railroad, to be operated through passage-ways called tubes, eighteen

feet in height and thirty-one feet in width, exterior measurements; in

fact, tunnels which could not be operated by atmospheric pressure.

What was before a manufacturing corporation was converted into a

railroad corporation, or, at least, had superadded the powers, privi-

leges, duties and liabilities of railroad corporations under the general

laws of the state, with authority, by the consent of the engineer—

commissioners, to use, for the movement of its cars, horses, steam or

any other motive power. The construction of such a railway by such

a corporation is certainly a subject not expressed in the title of the
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act. The only subject there indicated is the transportation of pas-

sengers and property through pneumatic tubes by atmospheric pressure.
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A title purporting that an act provides for pneumatic transportation

would not be sufficient for an act authorizing the construction and

operation of a horse railway or a steam railway, as a title purporting

that an act authorizes a line of omnibuses for the transportation of

passengers would not be sufficient for an act authorizing the construc-

tion of a railway for the same purpose.

The constitutional provision referred to has been deemed by states-

men and jurists, conditores legum, of so much importance that it is

found in the fundamental laws of most of the states. Its purpose is

to prevent fraud and deception by concealment, in tile body of acts,

subjects not by their titles disclosed to the general public and to legis-

lators who may rely upon them for information as to pending legis-

lation. When the subject is expressed, all matters fairly and reason-

ably connected -with it. and all measures which will or may facilitate

its accomplishment, are proper to be incorporated in the act and arc

germane to the title. The title must be such, at least, as fairly to

suggest or give a clue to the subject dealt with in the act, and unless
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it comes up to this standard it falls below the constitutional require-

ment. (Mayor, etc., v. Colgate, 12 N. Y. 146; People v. Hills, 35

N. Y. 449, 452; Matter of New York, etc., Bridge, 72 N. Y. 527;

Matter of Application of Department of Public Parks, 86 N. Y. 439;

People v. Whitlock, 92 N. Y. 191; Matter of Knaust, 101 N. Y. 188;

Coole v's Constitutional Limitations 141.) Here the only subject sug-

gested by the title is the transportation of passengers and property

through pneumatic tubes, by atmospheric pressure, and everything ap-

propriate and germane to that subject could be provided for in the act.

But a person reading the title alone would have no clue whatever

to the great railway scheme actually authorized by the act; and so the

corporators themselves evidently regarded the act, for, finding that

the corporation had outgrown its name, "The Beach Pneumatic Tran-

sit Company," they, by the act, chapter 503 of the laws of 1874, had

it changed to "The Broadway Underground Railway Company," and

in that act what were before called "tubes" are called "tunnels;"

and ten years later, by an order of the proper court, the name was

again changed to the "New York Arcade Railway Company."

While by the acts of 1874, chapter 454 of 1881 and chapter 312 of

1886. the charter of the corporation was amended and its powers

gTeatly enlarged, pneumatic tubes, propulsion by atmospheric pressure

and pneumatic railways are nowhere mentioned, and all that is left as a

result of all the legislation is a grand scheme for underground railways

operated by any motive power except such as shall emit "smoke, gas or

cinders" which, if carried into effect, would, doubtless, be one of the

marvels of the world. But if it is as desirable and safe as it is mar-

velous, it should be placed upon a constitutional basis and make an

undisguised appeal upon its merits for the public sanction.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the act of 1873 for the insufficiency

24—Wil. Cases.

act. The only subject there indicated is the transportation of passengers and property through pneumatic tubes by atmospheric pressure.
A title purporting that an act provides for pneumatic transportation
would not be sufficient for an act authorizing the construction and
operation of a horse railway or a steam railway, as a title purporting
that an act authorizes a line of omnibuses for the transportation of
passengers would not be sufficient for an act authorizing the construction of a railway for the same purpose.
Th e constz'tutz'onal provision referred to has been deemed by statesmen and jurists, conditores legum, of so much importance that it is
found in the fundamental laws of most of the states. Its purpose is
to prevent fraud and decepti'on by concealment, in th·c body of acts,
subjects not by their titles disclosed to the general publz'c and to legislators who may rely upon them for information as to p endt'ng legt'slation. When th e subject i's expressed, all matters fairly and reasonably connected with i't, and all measures wht'ch wt'll or may fad/£tate
its accomplishment, are proper to be incorporated in the act and are
germane to the title. The title must be such, at least , as fairly to
suggest or give a clue to the subject dealt with in th e act, and unless
t't comes up to this standard it falls below the constitutz'onal requirement. (Mayor, etc., v. Colgate, 12 N. Y. 146; People v. Hills, 35
N. Y. 449, 452; Matter of New York, etc., Bridge, p N. Y. 527;
::\fatter of Application of Department of Public Parks, 86 N. Y. 439;
People v. Whitlock, 92 N. Y . 191; Matter of Knaust, 101 N. Y. 188;
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 141.) Here the only subject suggested by the title is the transportation of passengers and property
through pneumatic tubes, by atmospheric pressure, and everything appropriate and germane to that subject could be provided for in the act.
But a person reading the title alone would have no clue whatever
to the great railway scheme actually authorized by the act; and so the
corporators themselves evidently regarded the act, for, finding that
the corporat1on had outgrown its name, " The Beach Pneumatic Transit Company," they, by the act, chapter 503 of the laws of 1874, had
it changed to "The Broadway Underground Railway Company, " and
in that act what were before called "tubes'' are called "tunnels;"
and ten years later, by an order of the proper court, the name was
again changed to the "New York Arcade Railway Company."
\.Vhile by the acts of 1874, chapter 454 of 1881 and chapter 312 of
r 886, the charter of the corporation was amended and its powers
greatly enlarged, pneumatic tubes, propulsion by atmospheric pressure
and pneumatic railways are nowhere mentioned, and all that is left as a
result of all the legislation is a grand scheme for underground railways
operated by any motive power except such as shall emit "smoke, gas or
cinders" which, if carried into effect, would, doubtless, be one of the
marvels of the world. But if it is as desirable and safe as it is marvelous, it should be placed upon a constitutional basis and make an
undisguised appeal upon its merits for the public sanction.
,
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the act of 1873 for the insufficiency
24-WIL. CASES.
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of its title is unconstitutional and void, and hence all subsequent legis-

lation based upon that act must fall with it. When the act of 1886

of its title is unconstitutional and void, and hence all subsequent legislatio n based upon that act must fall with it. When the act of 1886
was passed, under which the defendant proposes to lay down its tracks
and to construct its underground railways, it had no power to construct an underground railway for the transportation of passengers and
general freight through tunnels, and, therefore, that act is in conflict
with section 18 of article 3 of the constitution, which forbids the legislature to pass a private or local bill granting to any corporation the
right to lay down railroad tracks or to construct a stre.et railroad, except upon conditions mentioned in that section. (MatterofN. Y. District R. Co., 107 N. Y. 42.)
We need go no further. The conclusion already reached renders
it unnecessary to solve the various other questions argued with mucb
ability and learning by the able counsel who appeared before us.
The judgment should be affirmed with costs.
GRAY, J . I concur with EARL, J., in his opinion that the act of
1873 was unconstitutional and void, in that it failed to comply with
section 16 of article 3 of the constitution. But I am further of the
opinion, assuming that the act of 1873 was valid, and that there was an
acceptance of and a valid compliance with its conditions, and that
there was a waiver of causes of forfeiture by the passage of the act of
1886, that the latter act was in violation of the provisions of the constitutional amendment, which went into effect on January l , 1875. By
that amendment the legislature was inhibited from passing a private or local bill, granting to any corporation the right to lay down
railroad tracks, or any exclusive privilege, immunity or fran chise
whatever. The act of 1886, under which the appellant claims to have
acquired its present rights, can not, in my view of what it grants, be
upheld as legislation which merely regulates the exercise of powers
formerly granted to and possessed by an existing corporation. It
went far beyond that. It was, in fact, a new grant of substantive
rights, in addition to and differing from what might have been claimed
under the act of 1873. By the act of 1873 the company would have
had a right to construct a railway in tubes, which should not occupy a greater space than thirty-one feet in width, by eighteen feet in
height, exterior measurements. The company could not have approached within two feet of the curb line , nor within eighteen feet of
the building line. These restrictions must be deemed to be important
limitations and wholesome provisions, designed for the protection of
the rights of the abutting property-owners and to secure to the public
the rightful enjoyment of the streets as such. By the act of 1886 they
would possess the right to excavate for their railways a space of fortyfour feet, inside measurements, in width, and without any limitation
as to depth. They might construct railways without the u se of tubes
or tunnels, and use any motive power which would not permit of the
emission of smoke, gas or cinders.
I think we have here a pretty wide departure from the rights and
powers to be enjoyed under the act of 1873. The pneumatic tube
of a diameter of fifty-four inches, for the transportation of pack'ages

was passed, under which the defendant proposes to lay down its tracks

and to construct its underground railways, it had no power to con-

struct an underground railway for the transportation of passengers and

general freight through tunnels, and, therefore, that act is in conflict

with section 18 of article 3 of the constitution, which forbids the legis-

lature to pass a private or local bill granting to any corporation the

right to lay down railroad tracks or to construct a street railroad, ex-

cept upon conditions mentioned in that section. (Matterof N. Y. Dis-

trict R. Co., 107 N. Y. 42.)

We need go' no further. The conclusion already reached renders

it unnecessary to solve the various other questions argued with much

ability and learning by the able counsel who appeared before us.

The judgment should be affirmed with costs.

Gray, J. I concur with Earl, J., in his opinion that the act of

1873 was unconstitutional and void, in that it failed to comply with

section 16 of article 3 of the constitution. But I am further of the
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opinion, assuming that the act of 1873 was valid, and that there was an

acceptance of and a valid compliance with its conditions, and that

there was a waiver of causes of forfeiture by the passage of the act of

1886, that the latter act was in violation of the provisions of the consti-

tutional amendment, which went into effect on January 1, 1875. By

that amendment the legislature was inhibited from passing a pri-

vate or local bill, granting to any corporation the right to lay down

railroad tracks, or any exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise

whatever. The act of 1886, under which the appellant claims to have

acquired its present rights, can not, in my view of what it grants, be

upheld as legislation which merely regulates the exercise of powers

formerly granted to and possessed by an existing corporation. It

went far beyond that. It was, in fact, a new grant of substantive

rights, in addition to and differing from what might have been claimed

under the act of 1873. By the act of 1873 the company would have

had a right to construct a railway in tubes, which should not oc-

cupy a greater space than thirty-one feet in width, by eighteen feet in

height, exterior measurements. The company could not have ap-

proached within two feet of the curb line, nor within eighteen feet of

the building line. These restrictions must be deemed to be important

limitations and wholesome provisions, designed for the protection of

the rights of the abutting property-owners and to secure to the public

the rightful enjoyment of the streets as such. By the act of 1886 they

would possess the right to excavate for their railways a space of forty-

four feet, inside measurements, in width, and without any limitation

as to depth. They might construct railways without the use of tubes

or tunnels, and use any motive power which would not permit of the

emission of smoke, gas or cinders.

I think we have here a pretty wide departure from the rights and

powers to be enjoyed under the act of 1873. The pneumatic tube

of a diameter of fifty-four inches, for the transportation of packages
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and merchandise, authorized under the original charter of 1868, and

which was transmuted by the act of 1873 into a tubular passenger
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and freight railway, has now wholly disappeared, and in its place ap-

pears a scheme for what amounts to a complete occupation of the

street for railway purposes, except so far as it leaves a roof over the

excavation to take the place of the street surface. This grant of right

to excavate the street to an extent practically unlimited, and the per-

mission to abandon tubes and to construct railways in the excavations

are matters of grant too serious in their nature and consequences, un-

der the circumstances of the case, to be passed over as in mere regu-

lation of an existing franchise. To allow such legislation is, in my

opinion, to nullify the beneficial and protective objects aimed at by

the constitutional amendment of 1875.

Under the guise of an amendment, there was a legislative grant to

this company of franchises and privileges beyond any naturally fol-

lowing upon, or flowing from, those granted under the act of 1873,

not in harmony with the spirit of that grant, and of necessity, exclu-

sive in their nature. It, therefore, fell within the prohibition of the

constitutional afnendment.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:15 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

When the people have, by amending the constitution, restricted the

powers of their respresentatives in the legislature to pass private or

local bills, which grant the right to lay down railroad tracks, or any

exclusive privileges or franchises to a corporation, the courts should

see to it that the constitutional limitation is not evaded, under the

pretense of an amendment of the charter. They should scrutinize

the legislative act complained of, not with the idea of seeking the

way to a construction adverse to its constitutionality, but rather to up-

hold it, if possible. But if the scrutiny reveals a real and serious

violation of the constitutional provisions, they must condemn the act

as invalid.

It is said, however, that a scope of action is offered for the legisla-

ture, with respect to corporations already in the possession of corpo-

rate rights, acquired under statutes passed before the adoption of the

constitutional amendment. As a general proposition this is true.

Conceding to the legislature its full measure of authority to legis-

late, under the general grant of power by the constitution of the state,

we hold that such authority, when now exercised by a private bill in

behalf of a corporation, can not, under the guise of measures for

the regulation of the exercise of the corporate powers and franchises,

be upheld by the court, when, by a practical construction, the act per-

mits what the amendment to the constitution prohibits. A regulation

of these powers and franchises, when the act touches them so as

to alter them, means their restriction rather than their enlargement.

If enlargement of powers may be sometimes consistent with the con-

stitutional limitations, it may not go to the. extent of trenching on the

territory of private and public rights, over which the constitution

was plainly intended to operate in its limitations. When enlarge-

ment of corporate powers becomes indistinguishable from a grant of

new substantive rights, within the purview of the section in question,

and merchandise, authorized under the original charter of 1868, and
which was transmuted by the act of 1873 into a tubular passenger
and freight railway, has now wholly disappeared, and in its place appears a scheme for what amounts to a complete occupation of the
street for railway purposes, exc~pt so far as it leaves a roof over the
excavation to take the place of the street surface. This grant of right
to excavate the street to an extent practically unlimited, and the permi sion to abandon tubes and to construct railways in the excavations
are matters of grant too serious in their nature and consequences, under the circumstances of the case, to be passed over as in mere regulation of an existing franchise. Tq allow such legislation is, in my
opinion, to nullify the beneficial and protective objects aimed at by
the constitutional amendment of 1875.
Under the guise of an amendment, there was a legislative grant to
thi · company of franchises and privileges beyond any naturally following upon, or flowing from, those granted under the act of 1873,
not in harmony with the spirit of that grant, and of necessity, exclusi\·e in their nature. It, therefore, fell within the prohibition of the
constitutional amendment.
When the people have, by amending the constitution, restricted the
powers of their respresentatives in the legislature to pass private or
local bills, which grant the right to lay down railroad tracks, or any
exclu ive privileges or franchises to a corporation, the courts should
see to it that the constitutional limitation is not evaded, under the
pretense of an amendment of the charter. They should scrutinize
the legislative act complained of, not with the idea of seeking the
way to a construction adverse to its constitutionality, but rather to uphold it, if possible. But if the scrutiny reveals a real and serious
violation of the constitutional provisions, they must condemn the act
as invalid.
It is said, however, that a scope of action is offered for the legislature, with respect to corporations already in the possession of corporate rights, acquired under statutes passed before the adoption of the
con titutional amendment. As a general proposition this is true.
Conceding to the legislature its full measure of authority to legislate, under the general grant of power by the constt'tutt'on of the state,
we hold that such authority, when now exerdsed by a private bt'll in
behalf of a corporation, can not, under the guise of measures for
llze regulation of the exerdse of the corporate prr.J.Jers and franchises,
be upheld by the court, when, by a practical constructt'on, the act permits what the amendment to the constitution prohibits. A regulation
of these powers and franchises, when the act touches them so as
to alter them, means their restri'cti'on rather than their enlargement.
if enlargement of p<r..vers may be sometimes consi'stent with the constituiional limitations, it may not go to the extent of trenching on the
territory of private and publfr rights, over which the consti'tution
was plainly intended to operate i'n t'ts lt'mt'tatt'ons. When enlargement of corporate powers becomes indistinguishable from a grant of
new substantive rights, within the purview of the section in question,
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In the Matter of the Gilbert Elevated Railway Company (70 N. Y.

then the mischief is accomplished, to prevent which the constitutional
amendment was designed.
In the Matter of the Gilbert Elevated Railway Company (70 N. Y.
361), Church, Ch. J., in discussing the changes of structure, etc.,
made by the commissioners under the provisions of the rapid transit
act, said the changes were restrictive in their character. ''By the
charter the whole street was to b~ covered by the structure; by the
conditions imposed only a portion of some streets could be oc·
cu pied." And he says in that connection: "l can not accede to the
proposition that any change in the structure and in the manner of occupying the streets, however restrictive upon the company, or bene·
ficial to the public in the use of the streets, constitutes a fresh grant
of the right to lay down railroad tracks. It is a misnomer to call such
restrictions grants of any ri"ght whatever. As well might the cutting
down of a fee to a life estate be termed a grant of land." Again he
says: ''No exclusive right or franchise was granted to the respondent
corporation upon any construction of the clause. Every substantial
right existed before the passage of the act, and the conditions imposed,
embracing changes of structure and manner of occupying streets,
.should be regarded as restrictive of existing rights, and not grants, of
rights or franchises within the constitutional sense. • • • This
series of amendments designed to restrict the powers of the legislature
in matters of detail, under general phrases and undefined words, is
experimental in this state. They must be sustained and applied by a
rational and practical construction, so as to subserve the purposes in·
tended, and prevent the evils designed to be remedied; but not, by an
artificial and technical construction, to extend their application to
cases never contemplated."
.
I think the meaning of the decision is clear. If the legislative act
operates upon a charter in the direction of a regulation, an adjustment or a restriction of powers possessed, it could not be objectionable. Within its reserved powers the legislature may, at all times,
amend or alter the charter, but the constitutional amendment will not
permit it by a private bill to make any new grant of rights, comprehended within those specified by the amendment. I do not think that
it can be said, in the present case, that every substantial right given
by the act of 1886 existed previously.
For the reasons I have briefly given, I think the act of 1886 practically gave to this corporation a right to lay down railroad tracks,
which it could not have exercised under the act of 1873, and, also,
gave what are practically exclusive privileges. I think it contravened
the constitution, in the letter and in the spirit, and is therefore void.
All concur with EARL, J.; RUGER, Ch. J., DANFORTH and PECK·
HAM, JJ., concur with GRAY, J.
Judgment affirmed.

361), Church, Ch. J., in discussing the changes of structure, etc.,

made by the commissioners under the provisions of the rapid transit

act, said the changes were restrictive in their character. "By the

charter the whole street was to be covered by the structure; by the

conditions imposed only a portion of some streets could be oc-

cupied." And he says in that connection: "I can not accede to the

proposition that any change in the structure and in the manner of oc-

cupying the streets, however restrictive upon the company, or bene-

ficial to the public in the use of the streets, constitutes a fresh grant

of the right to lay down railroad tracks. It is a misnomer to call such

restrictions grants of any right whatever. As well might the cutting

down of a fee to a life estate be termed a grant of land." Again he

says: "No exclusive right or franchise was granted to the respondent

corporation upon any construction of the clause. Every substantial

right existed before the passage of the act, and the conditions imposed,

embracing changes of structure and manner of occupying streets,
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should be regarded as restrictive of existing rights, and not grants, of

rights or franchises within the constitutional sense. * * * This

series of amendments designed to restrict the powers of the legislature

in matters of detail, under general phrases and undefined words, is

experimental in this state. They must be sustained and applied by a

rational and practical construction, so as to subserve the purposes in-

tended, and prevent the evils designed to be remedied; but not, by an

artificial and technical construction, to extend their application to

cases never contemplated."

I think the meaning of the decision is clear. If the legislative act

operates upon a charter in the direction of a regulation, an adjust-

ment or a restriction of powers possessed, it could not be objection-

able. Within its reserved powers the legislature may, at all times,

amend or alter the charter, but the constitutional amendment will not

permit it by a private bill to make any new grant of rights, compre-

hended within those specified by the amendment. I do not think that

it can be said, in the present case, that every substantial right given

by the act of 1886 existed previously.

For the reasons I have briefly given, I think the act of 1886 prac-

tically gave to this corporation a right to lay down railroad tracks,

which it could not have exercised under the act of 1873, and, also,

gave what are practically exclusive privileges. I think it contravened

the constitution, in the letter and in the spirit, and is therefore void.

All concur with Earl, J.; Ruger, Ch. J., Danforth and Peck-

ham, JJ., concur with Gray, J.

Judgment affirmed.
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S6C. 75. (5) Two-thirds vote required.

''The assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch
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of the legislature shall be requisite to every bill creating, continu-

ing, altering or renewing any body politic or corporate."

Note. See Warner v. Beers, Thomas v. Dakin, Falconer v. Campbell and

Sec. 75. ( 5) Two-thirds vote required .

Green v. Graves, supra, pp. 2, 19, 287, 292, and notes there given.

' 'The assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch
of the legislature shall be requisite to every bill creating, continuing, altering or renewing any body politic or corporate.' '
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No~. See Warner v. Beel'S, Thomas v. Dakin, Falconer v. Campbell and
Green v. Graves, Btlpra, pp. 2, 19, 287, 292, and notes there given.
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Subdivision II. The Body Corporate, Its Parentage—The

Promoters. 1

CHAPTER 4.

FUNCTIONS AND CLASSES OF PROMOTERS.

Sec. 76. Definitions.

In the English Companies Act, 7 and 8 Vict., c. 120 (1844), the

expression "promoter" or "promoter of a company" (is declared) to

apply to every person acting by whatever name in the forming and es-

tablishing of a company at any period prior to the company obtaining

SUBDIVISION

a certificate of complete registration provided for. The same act pro-

vided that before proceeding to make public, either by prospectus,

II.

THE BODY CORPORATE, ITS PARENTAGE-THE
PROMOTERS. 1

hand-bill or advertisement, any intention or proposal to form any com-

pany, it should be the duty of the promoters to make to the registra-

tion office returns as to the name of the proposed company, its pur-

CHAPTER 4.

pose and the names, occupation, place of business and place of resi-

dence of the promoters; the promoters were also to file a written state-

FUNCTIONS AND CLASSES OF PROMOTERS.

ment consenting to become such promoter, and a written contract en-

tered into with some one or more persons as trustees for the company,

See. 76. Definitions.

to take one or more shares; also, afterward to file a statement as to

provisional place of meeting, names of members of the committee in

In the English Companies Act, 7 and 8 Viet., c. 120 (1844), the
expression "promoter" or "promoter of a company" (is declared) to
apply to every person acting by whatever name in the forming and e tablishing of a company at any period prior to the company obtaining
a certificate of complete registration provided for. The same act provided that before proceeding to make public, either by prospectus,
hand-bill or advertisement, any intention or proposal to form any company, it should be the duty of the promoters to make to the regi tration office returns as to the name of the proposed company, its purpose and the names, occupation, place of business and place of residence of the promoters; the promoters were also to file a written statement consenting to become such promoter, and a written contract entered into with some one or more persons as trustees for the compirny,
to take one or more shares; also, afterward to file a statement as to
provisional place of meeting, names of members of the committee in
'the formation of the company, names of the officers of the company,
names of subscribers, copy of prospectus, etc.
The method of formation of English companies now , under the
companies act of 1862 (25 and 26 Viet., c. 89), is much the same a
was provided by the act of 1844, although " promoter" is not defined
or used in the act of 1862. See, also, Directors' Liability act of 189<J,
53 and 54 Vic., c. 64, § 3, ch. 2.
1892. In 2 Stimson's American Statute Law, art. 8o2 , § 8o21 , it
is said "the petition for incorporation or articles may be made by a
number of persons. • • • Such persons are in this work termed
the promoters; in some states they are called pet#ioners, in other commisst"oners.''
·
''A promoter is a person who brings about the incorporation and
organization of a corporation. He brings together the persons who
become interested in the enterprise, aids in procuring subscriptions,
and sets in motion the machinery which leads to the formation of the

the formation of the company, names of the officers of the company,
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names of subscribers, copy of prospectus, etc.

The method of formation of English companies now, under the

companies act of 1862 (25 and 26 Vict., c. 89), is much the same as

was provided by the act of 1844, although "promoter" is not defined

or used in the act of 1862. See, also, Directors' Liability act of 1890,

53 and 54 Vic, c. 64, § 3, ch. 2.

1892. In 2 Stimson's American Statute Law, art. 802, § 8021, it

is said "the petition for incorporation or articles may be made by a

number of persons. * * * Such persons are in this work termed

the promoters; in some states they are called petitioners, in other com-

missioners."

"A promoter is a person who brings about the incorporation and

organization of a corporation. He brings together the persons who

become interested in the enterprise, aids in procuring subscriptions,

and sets in motion the machinery which leads to the formation of the

1 Upon the subject of promoters generally, their relation to each other, to

the corporation, to the members and to third parties, see infra, pp. 1546-1658,

1767-1769.

(374)

1 Upon the subject of promoters generally, their relation to each other, to
the corporation, to the members and to third parties, see i1ifra, pp. 1646-1558,
1767-1769.

(374)
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corporation itself." 2 Cook Stock and Stockholders, § 651, 3d ed.,

FUN<;f!ONS OF PROMOTERS.

p. 910.

3i5

"The constitution of a company is merely a means to an end,—

the carrying on by the company of some business, the building of a

pier or a railway. * * * It is the person called a promoter who-

determines what this end shall be, and who sets the statutory ma-

chinery of formation in motion. Promoter is a term not of law, but

of business, summing up a number of business operations familiar to the

commercial world by which a company is generally brought into ex-

istence. * * * Preparing or settling the prospectus, forming the

company, negotiating agreements between vendors and a proposed

company, providing directors, making contracts for the company or

otherwise actively engaging either alone or in co-operation with others

in the formation of a joint stock company will make a man a promo-

ter. • • « The promoter has in his hands the creation and mould-

ing of the company. He has the power of defining how and when,

and in what shape and under what supervision it shall start into exist-

ence and begin to act as a trading corporation." 3 Ency. of the

Laws of England, p. 182.
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See 4 Am. and Eng. Ency., 201; Beach, §§269, 270; Clark, ch. iv; Cook,

§§650. 7*5; Elliott, §§51-62; Morawetz, §§ 234, 291,545; Taylor, ch. v; 1

Thompson, §§415^90, vii /&.,§§ 8282-8291; 1828, Frankfort S. T. Co. v.

Churchill, 6 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 427, 17 Am. D. 159; 1846, Reynell v. Lewis,

15 Meea. & W. 517; 1877, Bagnall v. Carlton, 6 Ch. D. 371; 1877, Er-

corporation itself."

2

Cook Stock and Stockholders, § 651, 3d ed.,

P· 9 IO.
' ·The constitution of a company is merely a means to an end,the carrying on by the company of some business, the building of a
pier or a railway. • • • It is the person called a promoter who·
determines what this end shall be, and who sets the statutory machinery of formation in motion. Promoter is a term not of law, but
of business, summing up a number of business operations familiar to the
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defendent brings error.]

Opinion by Simpson, J. * * * Condensing the documentary and

in the lower court for plaintiff. Motion for new trial overruled, and
defendent brings error. J
Opinion by SIMPSON, J. • • • Condensing the documentary and
oral evidence into a brief summary, and reciting both in chronological
order, the material facts are as follows: The note sued upon by the
plaintiff below was executed by the president of the railroad company,
and it was claimed that this was done in pursuance of a resolution of
the board of directors, adopted at a meeting held on the roth day of
March, 1882. The authority of the president to execute the note is
denied by a verified answer. As this is one of the most vigorously contested questions in the case, we pass it for the present. The residue of
the plaintiff's demand against the railroad company consisted of a claim
for salary as president and general manager from March 7, 1882, to
March 7, 1884, at an established rate of $5,000 per year; and about
this part of the claim there does not seem to be much controversy. The
answer of the defendant below alleges that Tieman and Ayers were
promoters, incorporators and directors of the railroad company, and
that Tiernan was its president and active manager; that while acting
in that capacity, he and Ayers, on the 12th of January, 1881, purchased from one M. S. Carter, a road-bed of a defunct railroad corporation extending from Fort Scott to Humboldt, at its full value for
$I 5 ,ooo, and then, in collusion with other certain officers and directors
of the St. Louis, Fort Scott and Wichita Railroad Company, sold it
to that company for the sum of $zoo,ooo cash or its equivalent, and
$3 1 6oo,ooo of the capital stock of said company; that this was done
in violation of their obligations and duties as officers of said railroad
company, and that the stock was of par value, and defendant prays
for a judgment against Tiernan for $3 1 804,6oo.95.
For some years before the organization of the St. Louis, Fort
Scott and Wichita Railroad Company, there had been graded a roadbed with some bridges built on it from Fort Scott to a little distance
beyond Humboldt, by an organization known as the Fort Scott,
Humboldt and Western Railroad Company. The length of thi
road-bed was about forty-four miles.
The company which had
graded the road-bed and built the bridges had failed, and one M. S.
Carter had foreclosed the mortgage against it, and bid in its property, consisting of the road-bed and bridges, and had become the
absolute owner thereof. On the 17th of February, 188o, Carter sold
this road-bed to Francis Tiernan and Alexander M. Ayers, together
with all maps and profiles in the possession or in the control of Carter, of said line of road between Fort Scott and Humbolt, and thence
westward or southwestward through the state of Kansas. The
consideration of this sale was the sum of $ 15 ,ooo to be paid as follows: One thousand dollars within ninety days, and $14,000 within
one year, and the additional agreement that the said Tieman and
Ayers were to commence within thirty days to procure the unsecured
right of way over which the said road-bed or line of railroad was
originally surveyed, established and partially graded, and all deeds

oral evidence into a brief summary, and reciting both in chronological

order, the material facts are as follows: The note sued upon by the

plaintiff below was executed by the president of the railroad company,

and it was claimed that this was done in pursuance of a resolution of

the board of directors, adopted at a meeting held on the ioth day of

March, 1882. The authority of the president to execute the note is

denied by a verified answer. As this is one of the most vigorously con-

tested questions in the case, we pass it for the present. The residue of

the plaintiff's demand against the railroad company consisted of a claim

for salary as president and general manager from March 7, 1882, to

March 7, 1884, at an established rate of $5,000 per year; and about

this part of the claim there does not seem to be much controversy. The

answer of the defendant below alleges that Tiernan and Ayers were

promoters, incorporators and directors of the railroad company, and

that Tiernan was its president and active manager; that while acting

in that capacity, he and Ayers, on the 12th of January, 1881, pur-
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chased from one M. S. Carter, a road-bed of a defunct railroad cor-

poration extending from Fort Scott to Humboldt, at its full value for

$15,000, and then, in collusion with other certain officers and directors

of the St. Louis, Fort Scott and Wichita Railroad Company, sold it

to that company for the sum of $200,000 cash or its equivalent, and

$3,600,000 of the capital stock of said company; that this was done

in violation of their obligations and duties as officers of said railroad

company, and that the stock was of par value, and defendant prays

for a judgment against Tiernan for $3,804,600.95.

For some years before the organization of the St. Louis, Fort

Scott and Wichita Railroad Company, there had been graded a road-

bed with some bridges built on it from Fort Scott to a little distance

beyond Humboldt, by an organization known as the Fort Scott,

Humboldt and Western Railroad Company. The length of this

road-bed was about forty-four miles. The company which had

graded the road-bed and built the bridges had failed, and one M. S.

Carter had foreclosed the mortgage against it, and bid in its prop-

erty, consisting of the road-bed and bridges, and had become the

absolute owner thereof. On the 17th of February, 1880, Carter sold

this road-bed to Francis Tiernan and Alexander M. Ayers, together

with all maps and profiles in the possession or in the control of Car-

ter, of said line of road between Fort Scott and Humbolt, and thence

westward or southwestward through the state of Kansas. The

consideration of this sale was the sum of $15,000 to be paid as fol-

lows: One thousand dollars within ninety days, and $14,000 within

one year, and the additional agreement that the said Tiernan and

Ayers were to commence within thirty days to procure the unsecured

right of way over which the said road-bed or line of railroad was

originally surveyed, established and partially graded, and all deeds
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S. Carter, and were to inure to his benefit and to be absolutely his

until Tiernan and Ayers paid in accordance with the terms herein

specified, and Tiernan and Ayers agreed that within ninety days

they would use their best endeavors to secure aid to said road, by

procuring bonds to be voted by the various municipalities through

which said line would pass in Bourbon and Allen counties, and that

all such aid procured in the construction of a railroad from Fort

Scott to Humboldt should accrue to the benefit of Carter and become

his property if they should fail to pay him as specified. The terms

of this agreement were reduced to writing and signed by the parties

on the 17th day of February, 1880. The first $1,000 was paid on

the 14th of May following. On the 23 day of February, 1880, the

charter of the St. Louis, Fort Scott and Wichita Railroad Company

was filed in the office of the secretary of state. It was signed and

acknowledged by Francis Tiernan and Alexander M. Ayers in Cham-

paign county, Illinois, on the 20th clay of January, 1880. On the

20th day of February, 1880, the company was organized at Fort
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Scott by the election of Francis Tiernan as president, Alexander

M. Ayers as vice-president and Ira D. Bronson as secretary.

On the 17th day of April, 1880, Tiernan and Ayers sold to John J.

Franklin, of Philadelphia, one-third interest in the road-bed known

and called the Fort Scott, Humboldt and Western Railroad, com-

mencing at Fort Scott and running to Humboldt, the estimated dis-

tance being forty-four miles, for the consideration of $25,000. Of

that amount $5,000 was to be paid as soon as Franklin could examine

the title and approve it, and the sum of $20,000 was to be paid within

eight months. When Franklin paid the $5,000 he was to be elected

treasurer of the St. Louis, Fort Scott and Wichita Railroad Company.

Some time during the month of May, 1880, the St. Louis, Fort Scott

and Wichita Railroad Company made an agreement to purchase the

old road-bed of the Fort Scott, Humboldt and Western Company,

and it is this agreement which is hereafter referred to in the minutes

of the meeting of the directors of the St. Louis, Fort Scott and Wichita

Railroad, held on November 12, 1880. On the 12th day of Novem-

ber, 1880, the directors of the St. Louis, Fort Scott and Wichita Rail-

road adopted a resolution approving and confirming the contract of

Tiernan, Ayers and Franklin, of the sale by them, and the purchase

by the company, of the road-bed, etc., ordering the issue and delivery

of the stock, and the execution and delivery of orders for cash or first

mortgage bonds, as provided in the agreement of sale. On the 3d

day of December, 1880, Franklin sold to Ira J. Bronson all his right,

title, interest and claim in and to the St. Louis, Fort Scott and Wichita

Railroad Company, and the old road-bed, etc. On the 6th day of

March, 1881, at a meeting of the stockholders of the St. Louis, Fort

Scott and Wichita Railroad Company, the following resolution was

adopted, by a vote of all the stockholders present, in its favor:

"Be it resolved, That all actions of the board of directors of the

and contracts for the right of way, side tracks and switches, depot
grounds, tanks and stock yards were to be taken in the name of M.
S. Carter, and were to inure to his benefit and to be absolutely his
until Tiernan and Ayers paid in accordance with the terms herein
specified, and Tiernan and Ayers agreed that within ninety days
they would use their best endeavors to secure aid to said road, by
procuring bonds to be voted by the various municipalities through
which said line would pass in Bourbon and Allen counties, and that
all such aid procured in the construction of a railroad from Fort
Scott to Humboldt should accrue to the benefit of Carter and become
bis property if they should fail to pay him as specified. The terms
of this agreement were reduced to writing and signed by the parties
on the 17th day of February, 1880. The first $1 ,ooo was paid on
the 14th of May following. On the 23 day of Febmary, 188o, the
charter of the St. Louis, Fort Scott and Wichita Railroad Company
was filed in the office of the secretary of state. It was signed and
acknowledged by Francis Tiernan and Alexander M. Ayers in Champaign county, Illinois, on the 20th day of January, 1880. On the
20th day of February, 1880, the company was organized at Fort
Scott by the election of Francis Ti eman as president, Alexander
M. Ayers as vice-president and Ira D. Bronson as secretary.
On the 17th day of April, 1880, Tieman and A yers sold to John J.
Franklin, of Philadelphia, one-third interest in the road-bed known
and called the Fort Scott, Humboldt and Western Railroad, commencing at Fort Scott and running to Humboldt, the estimated distance being forty-four miles, for the consideration of $25,000. Of
that amount $5,000 was to be paid as soon as Franklin could examine
the title and approve it, and the sum of $20,000 was to be paid within
eight months. When Franklin paid the $5.ooo he was to be elected
treasurer of the St. Louis, Fort Scott and Wichita R ailroad Company.
Some time during the month of May, 1880, the St. Louis, Fort Scott
and Wichita Railroad Company made an agreement to purchase the
old road-bed of the Fort Scott, Humboldt and Western Company,
and it is this agreement which is hereafter referred to in the minutes
of the meeting of the directors of the St. Louis, Fort Scott and Wichita
Railroad, held on November 12, 1880. On the 12th day of November, 188o, the directors of the St. Louis, Fort Scott and 'Vichi ta Railroad adopted a resolution approving and confirming the contract of
Tiernan, Ayers and Franklin, of the sale by them , and the purchase
by the company, of the road-bed, etc., ordering the issue and delivery
of the stock, and the execution and delivery of orders for cash or first
mortgage bonds, as provided in the agreement of sale. On the 3d
day of December, 1880, Franklin sold to Ira J. Bronson all his right,
title, interest and claim in and to the St. Louis, Fort Scott and Wichita
Railroad Company, and the old road-bed, etc. On the 6th day of
March, 1881, at a meeting of the stockholders of the St. Louis, Fort
Scott and Wichita Railroad Company, the following resolution was
adopted, by a vote of all the stockholders present, in its favor:
" Be it resolved, That all actions of the board of directors of the
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selling and disposing of the capital stock of said railroad, and receiv-

St. Louis, Fort Scott and Wichita Railroad Company, in relation lo
selling and disposing of the capital stock of said railroad, and receiving payment therefor in the manner and kind in which such payments
were made, be and they are hereby approved and ratified."
The road-bed was paid for by issuing to Francis Tiernan, Alexander M. Ayers and Ira J. Bronson, or his assignee, each $1,200,000
of paid-up capital stock, and an order on the railroad company in
favor of each one of these persons for $66,666.66 ~ in cash, or first
mortgage bonds, but the order for cash or bonds was in no manner to
become a lien on that part of the road running from Fort Scott to a
point where it crosses the Kansas City, Lawrence and Southern Kansas Railroad in Allen county. At the time of these various transactions about the old road-bed there had been no amount of the capital
stock of the railroad company issued, the first being issued to one L.
M. Bates, of New York, in December, 1880. Bates was an assignee
of Ira J. Bronson for a part of Bronson's share of the stock of the
purchase of the road-bed. • • •
Plaintiff in error contends (inter alia):
Fourth. Tiernan and Ayers, occupying the positions hereinbefore
recited, bought an old road-bed which the company needed, for $15,000, and for the purpose and with the intention of selling it to the
company, with an agreement among themselves, Bronson and Hill,
divided the profits of the transactions, sold it to the company for $zoo,ooo cash and $3,6oo,ooo of the company's capital stock, and then
carried out their agreement about the division of profits. The company is entitled to recover of Tieman the difference between the price
paid by him and Ayers for the road-bed and that at which they sold it
to the company,
Fifth. Tiernan and Ayers did not disclose to any of their associate directors, except Bronson and Hill, the price paid by them for the
road-bed, and the other five directors had no knowledge on that subject. Such a transaction will not be upheld when it is challenged in
a proper action by the company.
Sixth. Tiernan took $3,6oo,ooo of the company's capital stock in
the manner above set forth , and in a proper action by the company
he is answerable to it for the par value of the stock, and judgment
should be rendered against him accordingly.
Seventh . Tieman was a director from the time of the organization
of the company down to the time of the commencement of the action
to recover for the matters hereinbefore referred to, and , as, during all
that time he was trustee for the company, statutes of limitation did
not commence to run as long as that relation continued. • • •
I. Some very important questions grow out of the purchase of the
road-bed by Tiernan and his associates, and their sale of it to the railroad company. It is alleged in the answer of the railroad company,
that at the time the purchase was made Tiernan was one of the in·
corporators and directors of the company, and occupied such a position
toward the company that whatever dealings he had respecting the
road-bed resulted to the benefit of the corporation, or that, if this is

ing payment therefor in the manner and kind in which such payments

were made, be and they are hereby approved and ratified."

The road-bed was paid for by issuing to Francis Tiernan, Alexan-

der M. Ayers and Ira J. Bronson, or his assignee, each $1,200,000

of paid-up capital stock, and an order on the railroad company in

favor of each one of these persons for $66,666.66^ in cash, or first

mortgage bonds, but the order for cash or bonds was in no manner to

become a lien on that part of the road running from Fort Scott to a

point where it crosses the Kansas City, Lawrence and Southern Kan-

sas Railroad in Allen county. At the time of these various transac-

tions about the old road-bed there had been no amount of the capital

stock of the railroad company issued, the first being issued to one L.

M. Bates, of New York, in December, 1880. Bates was an assignee

of Ira J. Bronson for a part of Bronson's share of the stock of the

purchase of the road-bed. * * *

Plaintiff in error contends (inter alia):
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Fourth. Tiernan and Ayers, occupying the positions hereinbefore

recited, bought an old road-bed which the company needed, for $15,-

000, and for the purpose and with the intention of selling it to the

company, with an agreement among themselves, Bronson and Hill,

divided the profits of the transactions, sold it to the company for $300.-

000 cash and $3,600,000 of the company's capital stock, and then

carried out their agreement about the division of profits. The com-

pany is entitled to recover of Tiernan the difference between the price

paid by him and Ayers for the road-bed and that at which they sold it

to the company,

Fifth. Tiernan and Ayers did not disclose to any of their associ-

ate directors, except Bronson and Hill, the price paid by them for the

road-bed, and the other five directors had no knowledge on that sub-

ject. Such a transaction will not be upheld when it is challenged in

a proper action by the company.

Sixth. Tiernan took $3,600,000 of the company's capital stock in

the manner above set forth, and in a proper action by the company

he is answerable to it for the par value of the stock, and judgment

should be rendered against him accordingly.

Seventh. Tiernan was a director from the time of the organization

of the company down to the time of the commencement of the action

to recover for the matters hereinbefore referred to, and, as, during all

that time he was trustee for the company, statutes of limitation did

not commence to run as long as that relation continued. * * *

1. Some very important questions grow out of the purchase of the

road-bed by Tiernan and his associates, and their sale of it to the rail-

road company. It is alleged in the answer of the railroad company,

that at the time the purchase was made Tiernan was one of the in-

corporators and directors of the company, and occupied such a position

toward the company that whatever dealings he had respecting the

road-bed resulted to the benefit of the corporation, or that, if this is

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

FUNCTIONS OF PROMOTERS.

379

not so, then if he made the sale to the company while acting in the

capacity of president and director, he was bound to disclose the price

§ 77

FUNCTIONS- OF PROMOTERS.

379

he paid, the profit he was making and that the whole transaction

must be characterized by fair, open and unmistakable candor in all

its features. The first question we shall discuss is were the defend-

ants in error, Tiernan and Ayers, corporate fiduciaries at the time

"they purchased the road-bed? They signed and acknowledged the

charter of the St. Louis, Fort Scott and Wichita Railroad Company

on the 20th day of January, 1880, at Champaign county, state of

Illinois. It was filed with the secretary of state on the 23d day of

February, 1880. The contract of purchase of the road-bed was made

on the 17th day of February, 1880. It thus appears that the road-bed

was purchased before the railroad company had any existence. Sec-

tion 10, chapter 23, of the Compiled Laws of Kansas, 1885, being

the act concerning private corporations, is as follows: "Section 10.

The existence of the corporation shall date from the time of filing

the charter, and the certificate of the secretary of state shall be evi-

dence of the time of such filing." This express statutory declaration

determines the fact that the railroad company had no existence prior

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:15 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

to the 23d day of February. Important legal consequences flow from

this determination. The legislature has prescribed the act that gives

life to a corporation, and the date of the performance of that act is

the birthday of its creation. From the moment of the filing of the

charter with the secretary of state, the duties and obligations of those

named as its first directors began. There would not have existed

any fiduciary relations before that time, because there was no corpo-

ration in existence to create them. It is clear, then, that at the time

they made the purchase of the road-bed they were not directors, and

did not occupy such a relation of confidence and trust to this railroad

company that this purchase was presumably for its benefit, or by

operation of law resulted in its favor. All such theories and consid-

erations are swept out of our pathway by the vigorous terms of the

statute.

It is sometimes the case that parties who are dealing with each

other about the organization of a corporation make such declarations

or give such pledges respecting its future creation that causes of action

arise between them which must be settled in accordance with the recog-

nized rules of law with reference to contracts, agency or partnership.

There is nothing developed in the record which justifies the assertion

that such causes of action arose against Tiernan and his associates on

behalf of others who participated in the organization. We do not be-

'lieve that any one would seriously contend for a single moment that

there is such a statement of facts in the record that, if Tiernan had

refused to sell his road-bed to the railroad company, it could have en-

forced the sale. To make him responsible in this action there must be

an affirmative showing that at the time he made the purchase he was

either acting for and on behalf of the company, or that he so assumed

to act, or that he occupied such a relation of trust and confidence with

respect to the company that his purchase resulted to its benefit, and

not so, then if he made the sale to the company ''vhile acting in the
capacity of president and director, he was bound to disclose the price
be paid, the profit he was making and that the whole transaction
muet be characterized by fair, open and unmistakable candor in all
its features. The first question we shall discuss is were the defendants in error, Tiernan and Ayers, corporate fiduciaries at the time
- they purchased the road-bed? They signed and acknowledged the
charter of the St. Louis, Fort Scott and Wichita Railroad Company
on the 20th day of January, 1880, at Champaign county, state of
Illinois. It was filed with the secretary of state on the 23d day of
February, 188o. The contract of purchase of the road-bed was made
on the 17th day of Febrnary, 1880. It thus appea1rs that the road-bed
was purchased before the railroad company had any existence. Section IO, chapter 23, of the Compiled Laws of Kansas, 1885, being
the act concerning private corporations, is as follows: "Section IO.
The existence of the corporation shall date from the time of filing
the charter, and the certificate of the secretary of state shall be evidence of the time of such filing." This express statutory declaration
determines the fact that the railroad company had no existence prior
to the 23d day of February. Important legal consequences flow from
this determination. The legislature has prescribed the act that gives
life to a corporation, and the date of the performance of that act is
the birthday of its creation. From the moment of the filing of the
charter with the secretary of state, the duties and obligations of those
named as its first directors began. There would not have existed
any fiduciary relations before that time, because there was no corporation in existence to create them. It is clear, then, that at the time
they made the purchase of the road-bed they were not directors, and
did not occupy such a relation of confidence and trust to this railroad
company that this purchase was presumably for its benefit, or by
operation of law resulted in its favor. All such theories and considerations are swept out of our pathway by the vigorous terms of the
statute.
It is sometimes the case that parties who are dealing with each
other about the organization of a corporation make such declarations
or give such pledges respecting its future creation that causes of action
arise between them which must be settled in accord1ance with the recognized rules of law with reference to contracts, agency or partnership.
There is nothing developed in the record which justifies the assertion
that such causes of action arose against Tieman and his associates on
behalf of others who participated in the organ.i zation. We do not be- lieve that any one would seriously contend for a single moment that
there is such a statement of facts in the record that, if Tieman had
refused to sell his road-bed to the railroad company, it could have enforced the sale. To make him responsible in this action there must be
an affirmative showing that at the time he made the purchase he was
either acting for and on behalf of the company, or that he so assumed
to act, or that he occupied such a relation of trust and confidence with
respect to the company that his purchase resulted! to its benefit, and
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acted on its behalf or authority, and for the same reason he could not

not to his own profit. The first we regard as impossible, because at
that time the company had no existence, and hence he could not have
acted on its behalf or authority, and for the same reason he could not
have assumed to act for a corporation when there was none in being.
z. It is alleged in the answer of the railroad company that Tieman
was a promoter of the railroad company, and the same statement is
repeated in the briefs with italicized vigor, and great stress seems to
be laid upon the assumed fact. This word promoter had £ts ort"gin
t"n the methods b-y which jot"nt-stock companies were formed in England, where, by law, they were declared partnersht"ps. Subsequently,
when the era of railroad building began t"n that country, the business of promott"ng the organizatt"on of such companies assumed dejint"te form. The ordinary proceeding was this: The promoter introduced the enterprise to the nott"ce of persons of wealth in the
locali"ty through wht"ch the lt"ne of the road was proposed to be located,
informing them of t"ts nature and prospects, and furnt"shing an
estz"mate of £ts probable cost. These persons were solt'ct"ted to aid by
thet"r t"njluence, or subscripti"ons, or both. Enough persons were
secured to constt"tute a provist"onal committee, and then this committee appot"nted from their number a managt"ng commi"ttee, which
issued a prospectus, announci"ng the nature and probable profits of
the scheme, the proposed means to carry it out, the amount of capital
required, the number and price of shares and other details to which
were generally attached the names of the promoters, with references
to the names of those persons constt"tuting the provisional committees.
If all this resulted i'n fair probabilitt"es of success, applicati'on was
then made to parli"ament for a bt"ll of incorporation. If the scheme
failed, the expenses t"ncurred gave rise to litt'gatt"on, and many questions as to the lt"abilt"ty of these committees and of the promoters were
determt"ned. If the incorporatt"on was secured by the action of parliament, then another class of questions arose as to what acts of the
promoters could be ratified by, and what acts resulted to the benefit
of, the t"ncorporation, and many others growz"ng out of the conditt"on
of a.Ifairs; that that has no resemblance to our method of organizing
corporatt"ons. It is true that the word has been found to have t"ls
uses t"n our jurisprudence, but t"n a much mo,-e restricted sense than
that used in the Englt"sh reports.
The American cases upon this subject are not very numerous, and
most all of them will be found in the 16 American Law Review, and
in Morawetz on Corporations, vol. 1, p. 545. Assuming that a promoter is a person who organizes a corporation, and that he intends to
sell it property, or to subscribe for its stock, or to take an active part
in its management, and business, let us inquire whether there are sufficient facts recited in this record to determine that the fiduciary relation of promoter of this corporation was ever assumed by Tieman,
or whether his acts in respect to its organization were such that a relation of this character could fairly be inferred. To start on, there is
not one single word of parol testimony which can be fairly said to authorize an inference that Tiernan was the promoter of the corpora-

have assumed to act for a corporation when there was none in being.

2. It is alleged in the answer of the railroad company that Tiernan

was a promoter of the railroad company, and the same statement is

repeated in the briefs with italicized vigor, and great stress seems to

be laid upon the assumed fact. This word promoter had its origin

in the methods by which joint-stock companies were formed in Eng-

land, where, by law, they were declared partnerships. Subsequently,

when the era of railroad building began in that country, the busi-

ness of promoting the organization of such companies assumed defi-

nite form. The ordinary proceeding was this: The promoter in-

troduced the enterprise to the notice of persons of wealth in the

locality through which the line of the road was proposed to be located,

informing them of its nature and prospects, and furnishing an

estimate of its probable cost. These persons were solicited to aid by

their influence, or subscriptions, or both. Enough persons were

secured to constitute a provisional committee, and then this commit-
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tee appointed from their number a managing committee, which

issued a prospectus, announcing the nature and probable profits of

the scheme, the proposed means to carry it out, the amount of capital

required, the number and price of shares and other details to which

were generally attached the names of the promoters, with references

to the names of those persons constituting the provisional committees.

If all this resulted in fair probabilities of success, application was

then made to parliament for a bill of incorporation. If the scheme

failed, the expenses incurred gave rise to litigation, and many ques-

tions as to the liability of these committees and of the promoters were

determined. If the incorporation was secured by the action of parlia-

ment, then another class of questions arose as to what acts of the

promoters could be ratified by, and what acts resulted to the benefit

of, the incorporation, and many others growing out of the condition

of affairs; that that has no resemblance to our method of organizing

corporations. It is true that the word has been found to have its

uses in our jurisprudence, but in a much more restricted sense than

that used in the English reports.

The American cases upon this subject are not very numerous, and

most all of them will be found in the 16 American Law Review, and

in Morawetz on Corporations, vol. I, p. 545. Assuming that a pro-

moter is a person who organizes a corporation, and that he intends to

sell it property, or to subscribe for its stock, or to take an active part

in its management, and business, let us inquire whether there are suf-

ficient facts recited in this record to determine that the fiduciary re-

lation of promoter of this corporation was ever assumed by Tiernan,

or whether his acts in respect to its organization were such that a re-

lation of this character could fairly be inferred. To start on, there is

not one single word of parol testimony which can be fairly said to au-

thorize an inference that Tiernan was the promoter of the corpora-
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organization of the company. In the next place, there is nothing in

very many voluminous written instruments in the record that justifies

any such inference. The charter itself would seem to rebut any such

conclusion so far as Tiernan was concerned, as it was signed and ac-

knowledged by him in the state of Illinois. There is nothing to jus-

tify the allegation in the answer of the railroad company, or the as-

sumption of its counsel in their briefs, that Tiernan was a promoter of

the company.

There is in the written agreement between Tiernan, Ayers and

Franklin, whereby a one-third interest in the road-bed purchased by

them from Carter was sold to Franklin, an understanding on the part

of Franklin that if Tiernan and Avers wish to sell the road-bed to the

St. Louis, Fort Scott, and Wichita Railroad Company, Franklin will

join in the conveyance of it to the company, if his share of the pur-

chase-money is not less than $40,000, but this agreement was made

on the 7th day of April, 1880, after the purchase by Tiernan and

Ayers, and after the organization of the company; so that we can not

utilize this fact to establish a relation as existing before the railroad
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company had any corporate life. There is no evidence that Tiernan

was a promoter.

3. At the time of the sale of the road-bed to the railroad company

Tiernan was part owner of the road-bed, and was a director and

president of the railroad company, and hence it is very properly said

that the sale must be a fair, open one in all respects, the price paid

by Tiernan and his associates must have been disclosed to the directors

of the company, and the whole transaction must not only be for the

evident interests of the company, but it must have been conducted in

all its stages in the utmost good faith on the part of the directors, and

with a complete knowledge of the time when, the circumstances under

which, and the exact amount paid by Tiernan at the date of his pur-

chase, to be relieved of that suspicion with which courts of justice

universally regard a transaction in which the seller and the buyer are

represented by one and the same person. It has been decided that a

director is not prohibited from dealing with his company; he can sell

it real estate or any other kind of property, but there arc certain rules

strictly applicable to him that do not operate upon a person entirely

disconnected with the corporation, and these he must faithfully ob-

serve to make his contract of sale one that the law will uphold. (Hotel

Company v. Wade, 97 U. S. 13; Morawetz on Corporations, §§ 297,

521, 545; Simmons v. Vulcan Oil Co., 61 Pa. St. 202; Van Cott v.

Van Brunt, 82 N. Y. 535; Parker v. Nickerson, 137 Mass. 487.)

It has been decided, time and time again, that the owner of a mine,

an oil well or a valuable patent, can organize a corporate company to

develop mineral or oil, or to manufacture the patented article, take a

very large amount of stock in payment of his mine, oil well or patent,

and trust to the value given the stock by the success of the corporation

for payment of his labor and discovery. In this class of cases there

is a mere transfer of the status of the mine, oil well or patent. It

tion. It does not appear that he ever advised or suggested the
organization of the company. In the next place, there is nothing in
very many voluminous written instruments in the record that justifies
any such inference. The charter itself would seem to rebut any such
conclusion so far as Tiernan was concerned, as it was signed and acknowledged by him in the state of Illinois. There is nothing to justify the allegation in the answer of the railroad company, or the asumption of its counsel in their briefs, that Tiernan was a promoter of
the company.
There is in the written agreement between Tieman, Ayers and
Franklin, whereby a one-third interest in the road-bed purchased by
them from Carter was sold to Franklin, an understanding on the part
of Franklin that if Tiernan and Avers wish to sell the road-bed to the
St. Louis, Fort Scott, and vVichita Railroad Company, Franklin will
join in the conveyance of it to the company, if his share of the purchase-money is not less than $40,000, but this agreement was made
on the 7th day of April, 1880, after the purchase by Tiernan and
Ayers, and after the organization of the company; so that we can not
utilize this fact to establish a relation as existing before the railroad
company had any corporate life. There is no evidence that Tiernan
was a promoter.
3. At the time of the sale of the road-bed to the railroad company
Tiernan was part owner of the road-bed, and was a director and
president of the railroad company, and hence it is very properly said
that the sale must be a fair, open one in all respects, the price paid
by Tiernan and bis associates must have been di closed to the directors
of the company, and the whole transaction must not only be for the
evident interests of the company. but it must have been conducted in
all its stages in the utmost good faith on the part of the directors, and
with a complete knowledge of the time when, the circumstances under
which, and the exact amount paid by Tieman at the date of his purchase, to be relieved of that suspicion with which courts of justice
universally regard a transaction in which the seller and the buyer arc
represented by one and the ame person: It has been decided that a
director is not prohibited from dealing with bis company; he can sell
it real estate or any other kind of property, but there are certain rules
strictly applicable to him that do not operate upon a person entirely
disconnected with the corporation, and these he must faithfully observe to make his contract of sale one that the law will uphold. (Hotel
Company v. Wade, 97 U.S. 13; Morawetz on Corporations,§§ 297,
521, 545; Simmons v. Vulcan Oil Co., 61 Pa. St. 202; Van Cott v.
Van Brunt, 82 N. Y. 535; Parkerv. Nickerson, 137 Mass. 487.)
It has been decided, time and time again, that the owner of a mine,
an oil well or a valuable patent, can organize a corporate company to
develop mineral or oil, or to manufacture the patented article, take a
very large amount of stock in payment of his mine, oil well or patent,
and trust to the value given the stock by the success of the corporation
for payment of his labor and discovery. In this class of cases there
is a mere transfer of the status of the mine, oil well or patent. It
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each individual interest, as well that of the owner, discoverer or pat-

entee, is represented by shares of stock.

ceases to be personal property, and becomes corporate property, and
each individual interest, as well that of the owner, discoverer or patentee, is represented by shares of stock.
It is now decided in this case that the owners of a graded railroadbed can sell the same to a railroad company whose officers and directors
are composed of the same identical persons who own the road-bed,
and issue the capital stock of the railroad company in payment thereof,
at a time when those who sell the road-bed and own and control the
railroad corporation are the absolute owners of all the stock issued by
the railroad company, and when the terms of sale and the issue of
stock are matters of record on the books of the railroad company,
and when this transaction occurs months before any other or additional
stock is issued by the company, that parties owning an old railroad
grade with culverts and some bddges erected thereon, and who organize, control, manage and own a railroad company, whose stock at the
time of the issue has no market but only a nominal value, can transfer the railroad grade to the railroad company and issue the stock of
the company, in the payment therefor, they, and they alone, at that
time being the only persons interested in the road-bed and in the railroad company. At the time of the sale of the railroad grade or old
road-bed it was owned by Tiernan, Ayers, Bronson and Hill, and
they in fact constituted the railroad company. There were some other
directors, but the evidence is that just sufficient stock was placed in
the name of the other directors to authorize them to act as such, and
this transfer was but temporary, and for that sole purpose. This sale
was ratified by the directors of the railroad company, and subsequently
by the stockholders, but the directors, stockholders and owners of the
road-bed were one and the same persons. By this transaction the
value of the road-bed was represented by the stock of the railroad
company, instead of remaining as the personal estate of the owners.
At the time of the sale, and when the board of directors ordered
the issue of the obligations and stock of the company in payment of
the purchase-price of the road-bed, the record affirmatively shows
that all the persons . who had any interest of any kind or· character
whatever in the railroad company, except Bates, the assignee of part of
Bronson's stock, were Tieman, Ayers, Bronson and Hill. Theyom1ed
the road-bed, they constituted the railroad company, they sold the roadbed to the railroad company and took the stock of the railroad company
in payment, at a time when witnesses on both sides concede that the stock
had only a nominal valu e. The developments in this record abundantly show that the title to and possession of the road-bed were of
great pecuniary benefit to the railroad company. It alone enabled
the company to construct the first fifty miles of its road, and to make
such a beginning that its future success and final accomplishment
were assured. The record does not show that there has ever been any
other stock issued by the railroad company, except small amounts to
municipalities through whose territory the line was built, and that it
is owned, managed and controlled to-day by the amount of stock
issued to pay for this road-bed. Tiernan and his associates sold their

It is now decided in this case that the owners of a graded railroad-

bed can sell the same to a railroad company whose officers and directors

are composed of the same identical persons who own the road-bed,

and issue the capital stock of the railroad company in payment thereof,

at a time when those who sell the road-bed and own and control the

railroad corporation are the absolute owners of all the stock issued by

the railroad company, and when the terms of sale and the issue of

stock are matters of record on the books of the railroad company,

and when this transaction occurs months before any other or additional

stock is issued by the company, that parties owning an old railroad

grade with culverts and some bridges erected thereon, and who organ-

ize, control, manage and own a railroad company, whose stock at the

time of the issue has no market but only a nominal value, can trans-

fer the railroad grade to the railroad company and issue the stock of

the company in the payment therefor, they, and they alone, at that

time being the only persons interested in the road-bed and in the rail-
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road company. At the time of the sale of the railroad grade or old

road-bed it was owned by Tiernan, Ayers, Bronson and Hill, and

they in fact constituted the railroad company. There were some other

directors, but the evidence is that just sufficient stock was placed in

the name of the other directors to authorize them to act as such, and

this transfer was but temporary, and for that sole purpose. This sale

was ratified by the directors of the railroad company, and subsequently

by the stockholders, but the directors, stockholders and owners of the

road-bed were one and the same persons. By this transaction the

value of the road-bed was represented by the stock of the railroad

company, instead of remaining as the personal estate of the owners.

At the time of the sale, and when the board of directors ordered

the issue of the obligations and stock of the company in payment of

the purchase-price of the road-bed, the record affirmatively shows

that all the persons who had any interest of any kind or character

whatever in the railroad company, except Bates, the assignee of part of

Bronson's stock, were Tiernan, Ayers, Bronson and Hill. They owned

the road-bed, they constituted the railroad company, they sold the road-

bed to the railroad company and took the stock of the railroad company

in payment, at a time when witnesses on both sides concede that the stock

had only a nominal value. The developments in this record abun-

dantly show that the title to and possession of the road-bed were of

great pecuniary benefit to the railroad company. It alone enabled

the company to construct the first fifty miles of its road, and to make

such a beginning that its future success and final accomplishment

were assured. The record does not show that there has ever been any

other stock issued by the railroad company, except small amounts to

municipalities through whose territory the line was built, and that it

is owned, managed and controlled to-day by the amount of stock

issued to pay for this road-bed. Tiernan and his associates sold their
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stock to Gould, in August, 1882, for a consideration of $100,000, so

that now, so far as it appears, the value of the stock issued represent-

ing a completed road one hundred and fifty miles in length, is much

less than the actual cost of the road-bed. The railroad company, in

this action, represents this stock, and it seeks to retain it. It has the

use and enjoyment of the road-bed, and wants to recover from Tier-

nan the par value of the stock, being the sum of $3,600,000.

It is useless to pursue the discussion further, as it is not controlled,

or governed, or affected in any degree by those self-evident, equitable

principles and unyielding rules of law that govern in all cases where

persons sustain fiduciary relations to corporations, or to other persons,

by reason of their being representatives of their pecuniary interests.

This case involves the proposition as to whether or not the absolute

owners of property can, when it seems to them to be to their profit,

so change the relation of their property as to make it stock in a cor-

poration. Whoever succeeded to the rights of Tiernan and his asso-

ciates as the holders of the stock, did so with all the facts showing the

sale and purchase of the road-bed and the issue of the obligations and
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stock of the railroad company spread upon its record, and have now

no right to complain, however different the case may be if they had

then an interest in the corporation. This same issue in its most im-

portant features has very recently been tried and decided by the cir-

cuit court of the United States for the district of Kansas, in the action

of E. R. Stewart v. The St. Louis, Fort Scott and Wichita Railroad

Company, a manuscript opinion of Judge Foster's having been fur-

nished us. Stewart brought his action to recover on several promis-

sory notes issued by the railroad company, aggregating $85,000.

These notes constituted a part of the $200,000 that was to be paid in

cash, or its equivalent, for the road-bed, and a $5,000 note issued to

Hill for salary as general manager. The same defenses which are

made here were set up in that action. The circuit court rendered

judgment for the full amount claimed by Stewart, overruled all the de-

fenses and discussed very many of the questions alluded to in this

opinion, with the same result.

We see no material error in the record, and recommend that the

judgment of the district court be affirmed.

By the Court: It is so ordered. All the justices concurring.

See note supra, p. 375*

Sec. 78. Same.

MARCHAND v. THE LOAN AND PLEDGE ASSOCIATION.

1874. In the Supreme Court of Louisiana. 26 La. Ann. Re-

ports 389-90.

Appeal from the fifth district, parish of Orleans.

Wyly, J. Plaintiff sued defendant for the sum of $4,000 for

stock to Gould, in August, 1882, for a consideration of $100,000, so
th at now, so far as it appears, the value of the stock issued representing a completed road one hundred and fifty miles in length, is much
less than the actual cost of the road-bed. The railroad company, in
this action, represents this stock, and it seeks to retain it. It has the
u e and enjoyment of the road-bed, and wants to recover from Tiernan the par value of the stock, being the sum of $3,6oo,ooo.
It is useless to pursue the discussion further, as it is not controlled,
or governed, or affected in any degree by those self-evident, equitable
principles and unyielding rules of law that govern in all cases where
persons sustain fiduciary relations to corporations, or to other persons,
by reason of their being representatives of their pecuniary interests.
This case involves the proposition as to whether or not the absolute
owners of property can, when it seems to them to be to their profit,
so change the relation of their property as to make it stock in a corporation. \Vhoever succeeded to the rights of Tiernan and his associates as the holders of the stock, did so with all the facts showing the
sale and purchase of the road-bed and the issue of the obligations and
stock of the railroad company spread upon its record, and have now
no right to complain, however different the case may be if they had
then an interest in the corporation. This same issue in its most important features has very recently been tried and decided by the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kansas, in the action
of E. R. Stewart v. The St. Louis, Fort Scott and Wichita Railroad
Company, a manuscript opinion of Judge Foster's having been furnished us. Stewart brought his action to recover on several promissory notes issued by the railroad company, aggregating $85,000.
These notes constituted a part of the $zoo,ooo that was to be paid in
cash, or its equivalent, for the road-bed, and a $5,000 note issued to
Hill for salary as general manager. The same defenses which are
made here were set up in that action. The circuit court rendered
judgment for the full amount claimed by Stewart, overruled all the defenses and discussed very many of the questions alluded to in this
opinion, with the same result.
\Ve see no material error in the record, and recommend that the
judgment of the district court be affirmed.
Bv THE CouRT: It is so ordered. All the justices concurring.
See note supra, p. 375·

services, etc., as alleged, viz:

See. 78. Same.
MARCHAND v. THE LOAN AND PLEDGE ASSOCIATION.

1874.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF LOUISIANA.
ports 389-90.

26

La.

Ann. Re-

Appeal from the fifth district, parish of Orleans.
Plaintiff sued defendant for the sum of $4,000 for
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"That, as a preliminary to the formation of said corporation, your

petitioner, at the instance of the stockholders and members thereof,

MARCHAND V. THE LOAN, ETC., ASSOCIATION.

visited the cities of New York, Philadelphia and Boston for the pur-

pose of acquainting himself with the proper formation and efficient

"That, as a preliminary to the formation of said corporation, your
petitioner, at the instance of the stockholders and members thereof,
visited the cities of New York, Philadelphia and Boston for the purpose of acquainting himself with the proper formation and efficient
management and practical operation of similar institutions in said
cities, and that in order to do so he was compelled to expend for his
traveling expenses, for consultation with counsel and for obtaining information considerable sums of money, and that he is entitled to be
paid for the value of his time and services expended during said visit,
which consumed some eight weeks, and that said expenses and aid
los of time and services amount to the sum of $1 ,ooo.
"That petitioner furnished the charter for said corporation and gave
zealous and efficient aid in presenting the same to the legislature, in.
obtaining subscribers to the capital stock thereof, in organizing said
corporation, in putting it in succeisful operation, in fitting up its place
of business, in the purchase and erection of fixtures therefor, and in
the performance of its business and management of its affairs for one
month after it commenced operations, and that his services in that behalf are well worth the further sum of $3 1000."
The answer is a general denial, and the averment that the association is not liable for services rendered before it went into operation as
a corporation.
The court gave judgment for the plaintiff for $zo8.33, the value
of one month's service as president in organizing the company. From
this judgment plaintiff appeals.
We see no error in the judgment. A claim for money expended
and time employed, before the incorporation of the Loan and Pledge
Association, can not be regarded as a debt of the institution.
How the defendant, a juridical person, incurred a debt before its
existence we can not imagine.
Besides, it is shown that $1,000 of the plaintiff's claim was for
cash advanced to S. F. Casanave for the purpose of influencing legislation ; that is, bribing the legislature to pass the act incorporating the
Loan and Pledge Association.
For the recovery of money thus expended this court can give no
relief. The guilty suitor must be left where his immorality has placed
him.
Judgment affirmed.

management and practical operation of similar institutions in said

cities, and that in order to do so he was compelled to expend for his

traveling expenses, for consultation with counsel and for obtaining in-

formation considerable sums of money, and that he is entitled to be

paid for the value of his time and services expended during said visit,

which consumed some eight weeks, and that said expenses and said

loss of time and services amount to the sum of $1,000.

"That petitioner furnished the charter for said corporation and gave

zealous and efficient aid in presenting the same to the legislature, in

obtaining subscribers to the capital stock thereof, in organizing said

corporation, in putting it in successful operation, in fitting up its place

of business, in the purchase and erection of fixtures therefor, and in

the performance of its business and management of its affairs for one

month after it commenced operations, and that his services in that be-

half are well worth the further sum of $3,000."

The answer is a general denial, and the averment that the associa-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:15 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

tion is not liable for services rendered before it went into operation as

a corporation.

The court gave judgment for the plaintiff for $208.33, the value

of one month's service as president in organizing the company. From

this judgment plaintiff appeals.

We see no error in the judgment. A claim for money expended

and time employed, before the incorporation of the Loan and Pledge

Association, can not be regarded as a debt of the institution.

How the defendant, a juridical person, incurred a debt before its

existence we can not imagine.

Besides, it is shown that $1,000 of the plaintiff's claim was for

cash advanced to S. F. Casanave for the purpose of influencing legis-

lation; that is, bribing the legislature to pass the act incorporating the

Loan and Pledge Association.

For the recovery of money thus expended this court can give no

relief. The guilty suitor must be left where his immorality has placed

him.

Judgment affirmed.

Note. See, also, 1889, Minneapolis T. M. Co. v. Davie, 40 Minn. 110, 41 N.

W. 1026, 12 Am. St. Rep. 701, 3 L. K. A. 796, infra, p. 492, and note, supra^

p. 376.

Note. See, also, 1889, Minneapolis T. M. Co. v. Davis, 40 Minn. 110, 41 N.
W. 1026, 12 Am. St. Rep. 701, 3 L. R. A. 796, infra, p. 492, and note, .upr~~
p. 375.
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Sec. 79. Statutory. Commissioners.

WALKER v. DEVEREAUX Et Al.1

§ 79

FUNCTIONS OF PROMOTERS.

1833. In the Court of Chancery of New York. 4 Paige's

Chancery (New York) Reports 229—257.

[Application for an injunction to restrain defendants from holding

See. 79. Statutory.

Commissioners.

an election of directors of the Utica and Schenectady Railroad Com-

pany, and also from disposing of stock which had been apportioned

WALKER v. DEVEREAUX ET AL. 1

to them, or in which they were interested. The defendants were

commissioners named in the act to incorporate the railroad company,

1833.

to open books, receive subscriptions to the stock, distribute the same,

IN THE CouRT OF CHANCERY OF NEw YoRK.
Chancery (New York) Reports 22~257.

4 Paige's

and call a meeting for the election of directors, the act providing that:

All persons who shall become stockholders pursuant to this act shall

be and they are hereby constituted a body corporate by the name,

etc. (Laws of 1833, p. 462, et seq.) There were, within the time

limited, 2909 subscriptions received, and the stock was distributed to

only 1423 of those who subscribed, and the others were notified to

receive back the preliminary deposit paid. Plaintiff had received his

money back. Some of the shares that had been distributed had been

sold to bona fide purchasers. The complaint was that the commis-
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sioners had wrongfully recognized themselves as subscribers and had

arbitrarily distributed the stock to themselves and their friends.]

The Chancellor (Walworth). The act under which the com-

missioners opened books of subscription to the capital stock of the

Utica and Schenectady Railroad Company did not create a corpora-

tion, co instanti, when that act took effect as a law. It only consti-

tuted such persons a body corporate as should thereafter become

stockholders in the manner prescribed in the act. If the whole cor-

porate stock, and no more, had been subscribed within the three days

during which the commissioners were bound to keep the books open,

then those persons who had thus subscribed and paid their money to

the commissioners would have acquired legal rights as corporators.

And they would also have had the right to call upon the commission-

ers, not as their agents or trustees, but as agents or officers of the

public, to notify an election of directors, and to preside as inspectors

thereof, by a committee of their body, as directed by the act. But in

the event which has happened, of an excess of subscriptions, no per-

son can be a stockholder of the corporation, neither does any corpo-

ration exist, nor has any person any interest in the stock, as the legal

owner thereof, so as to authorize him to vote upon it, or to transfer it

as stock, until a majority of the commissioners have proceeded to ap-

portion the same, and to designate the persons who are to be the

stockholders, and the amount which each is to receive. It is evident,

therefore, if the counsel for the complainant are right in supposing

1 Statement of facts abridged. Arguments and part of opinion omitted.

25—Wil. Casks.

[Application' for an injunction to restrain defendants from holding
an election of directors of the Utica and Schenectady Railroad Company, and also from disposing of stock which had been apportioned
to them, or in which they were interested. The defendants were
commissioners named in the act to incorporate the railroad company,
to open books, receive subscriptions to the stock, distribute the same,
and call a meeting for the election of directors, the act providing that:
All persons who shall become stockholders pursuant to this act shall
be and they are hereby constituted a body corporate by the name,
etc. (Laws of 1833, p. 462, et seq.) There were, within the time
limited, 2909 subscriptions received, and the stock was distributed to
only 1423 of those who subscribed, and the others were notified to
receive back the preliminary deposit paid. Plaintiff had received his
money back. Some of the shares that had been distributed had been
sold to bona fide purchasers. The complaint was that the commissioners had wrongfully recognized themselves as subscribers and had
arbitrarily distributed the stock to themselves and their frie nds.]
THE CHANCELLOR (WALWORTH). The act under which the commissioners opened books of subscription to the capital stock of the
Utica and Schenectady Railroad Company did not create a corporation, eo instanti, when that act took effect as a law. It only constituted such persons a body corporate as should thereafter become
stockholders in the manner prescribed in the act. If the whole corporate stock, and no more, had been subscribed within the three days
during which the commissioners were bound to keep the books open,
then those persons who had thus subscribed and paid their money to
the commissioners would have acquired legal rights as corporators.
And they would also have had the right to call upon the commissioners, not as their agents or trustees, but as agents or officers of the
public, to notify an election of directors, and to preside as inspectors
thereof, by a committee of their body, as directed by the act. But in
the event which has happened, of an excess of subscriptions, no person can be a stockholder of the corporation, neither does any corporation exist, nor has any person any interest in the stock, as the legal
owner thereof, so as to authorize him to vote upon it, or to transfer it
as stock, until a majority of the commissioners have proceeded to apportion the same, and to designate the persons who are to be the
stockholders, and the amount which each is to receive. It is evident,
therefore, if the counsel for the complainant are right in supposing
1

Statement of facts abridged . Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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WALKER V. DEVEREAUX. § jg

that the distribution in this case was absolutely void, and not merely

WALKER V. DEVEREAUX.
voidable, that the election of directors, which they now seek to re-

§ 79

strain by injunction, can not possibly affect the rights of their client.

that the distribution in this case was absolutely void, and not merely
voidable, that the election of directors, which they now seek to restrain by injunction, can not possibly affect the rights of their client.
As there could be neither a corporation nor stockholders in existence
until after the stock was apportioned, the commissioners did not hold
the stock; nor did they act in the character of officers, servants, agents
or trustees of the corporation or of the subscribers. But they acted
merely as officers or agents of the government, appointed by the legislature to assist in the organization of a corporation and to create a
stock in the same. The legislature might, by law. have designated
the stockholders, as they had done in the case of other corporations,
or they might have delegated that portion of their authority to other .
But as they did not delegate that power to the courts, neither this or
any other court has the power to create a corporation by designating
who shall be the persons to hold stock in the same.
The appropriate tribunal, however, upon a proper application, may
compel the commissioners to open books, to apportion the stock in
the manner prescribed by law, and to notify and, by a committee of
their body, preside at the election of the directors. Such a tribunal
may also decide as to the proper construction of the act of incorporation, and can enforce a compliance with such decision. If the apportionment of the stock in this case was absolutely void, as the
complainant insists it was, he has mistaken his remedy. He should,
in that case, have applied to the supreme court for a mandamus to
compel these public officers, or agents of the legislature, to distribute
the stock, as required by the statute. And if it was necessary to apply
to this court, either for a discovery or an injunction, in aid of, or as
ancillary to his remedy at law, he should have stated in the bill either
that he had applied, or that he intended to apply to the legal tribunal
for relief. (Jones v. Jones, 3 Meriv. Rep. 173.)
I apprehend, however, the complainant is under a mistake in sup·
posing that the apportionment of stock in this case was absolutely
void. It was, at the most, voidable, even upon the principles upon
which the complainant supposes it was absolutely void. And if any
portion of the stock has been apportioned to persons who ought not
to hold it, or if any one has received more than his share, under circumstances which would amount to a fraud upon the commissioners, or
upon the law, such persons must be deemed to hold it for the benefit
of all or some of the subscribers who have received no stock, or who
have not received stock to the extent of their subscriptions. • • •
It was not necessary in this case that the commissioners should gi\'e
to each subscriber an equal or any other amount of stock. Where a
distribution or apportionment is to be made between or among any
number of persons, or a class of individuals, and no discretion i
vested in those who are to execute the power of making the distribution or apportionment, each individual of the whole number, or clas>
of persons named, is entitled to an equal share. But if the designa·
tion of a class or number of persons is made merely for the purpose of

As there could be neither a corporation nor stockholders in existence

until after the stock was apportioned, the commissioners did not hold

the stock, nor did they act in the character of officers, servants, agents

or trustees of the corporation or of the subscribers. But they acted

merely as officers or agents of the government, appointed by the leg-

islature to assist in the organization of a corporation and to create a

stock in the same. The legislature might, by law. have designated

the stockholders, as they had done in the case of other corporations,

or they might have delegated that portion of their authority to others.

But as they did not delegate that power to the courts, neither this or

any other court has the power to create a corporation by designating

who shall be the persons to hold stock in the same.

The appropriate tribunal, however, upon a proper application, may

compel the commissioners to open books, to apportion the stock in

the manner prescribed by law, and to notify and, by a committee of

their body, preside at the election of the directors. Such a tribunal
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may also decide as to the proper construction of the act of incorpora-

tion, and can enforce a compliance with such decision. If the ap-

portionment of the stock in this case was absolutely void, as the

complainant insists it was, he has mistaken his remedy. He should,

in that case, have applied to the supreme court for a mandamus to

compel these public officers, or agents of the legislature, to distribute

the stock, as required by the statute. And if it was necessary to apply

to this court, either for a discovery or an injunction, in aid of, or as

ancillary to his remedy at law, he should have stated in the bill either

that he had applied, or that he intended to apply to the legal tribunal

for relief. (Jones v. Jones, 3 Meriv. Rep. 173.)

I apprehend, however, the complainant is under a mistake in sup-

posing that the apportionment of stock in this case was absolutely

void. It was, at the most, voidable, even upon the principles upon

which the complainant supposes it was absolutely void. And if any

portion of the stock has been apportioned to persons who ought not

to hold it, or if any one has received more than his share, under cir-

cumstances which would amount to a fraud upon the commissioners, or

upon the law, such persons must be deemed to hold it for the benefit

of all or some of the subscribers who have received no stock, or who

have not received stock to the extent of their subscriptions. * * *

It was not necessary in this case that the commissioners should give

to each subscriber an equal or any other amount of stock. Where a

distribution or apportionment is to be made between or among any

number of persons, or a class of individuals, and no discretion is

vested in those who are to execute the power of making the distribu-

tion or apportionment, each individual of the whole number, or class

of persons named, is entitled to an equal share. But if the designa-

tion of a class or number of persons is made merely for the purpose of
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pointing out those trom whom the selection is to be made, giving to

the person intrusted with the power a discretionary right of distribut-

§ 79

FUNCTIONS OF PROMOTERS.

ing among that particular class as he shall think proper, then the

whole may be allotted to one or more of that class, to the exclusion of

the others. Formerly the question as to the right of the person in-

trusted with the power to exclude any one of the class designated, by

giving what was called an illusory portion, was frequently agitated in

the courts, and produced much litigation. But the Revised Statutes

have forever put that question at rest in this state.

By the 98th and 99th sections of the article relative to powers, it is

declared, that where a disposition under a power is directed to be

made to, or among, or between several persons, without any specifi-

cation of the share or sum to be allotted to each, all the persons

designated shall be entitled to an equal portion. But when the terms

of the power import that the estate or fund is to be distributed be-

tween the persons so designated in such manner or proportions as the

trustee of the power shall think proper, the trustee may allot the

whole to any one or more of such persons, in exclusion of the others.

(1 R. S. 774, and Revisors' Report on ch. 1, pt. 2, p. 61.) Al-
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though the power in the present case was to be exercised by these

commissioners as the officers or agents of the public, and not strictly

in the character of mere trustees of a power in trust, yet, as the leg-

islature had established this general principle as one of the fundamen-

tal rules of construction in reference to powers, I must presume they

meant the same rule of construction should be adopted in relation to

the power granted to or conferred upon these commissioners. The

only restriction imposed upon them, therefore, was that they should

exercise the power according to the best of their judgment, and appor-

tion the stock to such of the subscribers, and in such proportions, as a

majority of them should deem most advantageous to the interests of

the corporation. And there is no allegation in this bill from which I

have a right to infer that the complainant believes they have not distrib-

uted the stock in this manner. Although it is alleged that the com-

plainant is informed, and believes, they have distributed the stock

principally among themselves and their relatives and friends, it would

only be in accordance with the principles of human nature, were we

to conclude, from that circumstance alone, they honestly believed

that they and their friends would be more likely to appoint directors

who would manage the concerns of the corporation well, than others

would if the control of the corporation should be given to their oppo-

nents. In this, perhaps, they may have acted under a mistake, but

that alone is not sufficient to authorize an interference with their dis-

tribution. Where a discretion is to be exercised according to certain

fixed legal principles, especially when that discretion is to be exer-

cised by a person or body acting as a court of justice, if the person or

body intrusted with the power has mistaken the law, or violated such

fixed legal principles, it may be a proper case for review and correc-

tion by the appropriate tribunal.

pointing out those trom ""·horn the selection is to be made, giving to
the person intrusted with the power a discretionary right of distributing among that particular class as he shall think proper, then the
whole may be allotted to one or more of that class, to the exclusion of
the others. Formerly the question as to the right of the person intrusted with the power to exclude any one of the class designated, by
giving what was called an illusory portion, was frequently agitated in
the courts, and produced much litigation. But the Revised Statutes
have forever put that question at rest in this state.
By the 98th and 99th sections of the article relative to powers, it is
declared, that where a disposition under a power is directed to be
made to, or among, or between several persons, without any specific:-ition of the share or sum to be allotted to each, all the persons
designated shall be entitled to an equal portion. But when the terms
of the power import that the estate or fund is to be distributed between the persons so designated in su.ch manner or proportions as the
trustee of the power shall think proper, the trustee may allot the
whole to any one or more of such persons, in exclusion of the others.
(1 R. S. 774, and Revisors' Report on ch. r, pt. 2, p. 61.) Although the power in the present case was to be exercised by these
commissioners as the officers or agents of the public, and not strictly
in the character of mere trustees of a power in trust, yet, as the· legislature had established this general principle as one of the fundamental rules of construction in reference to powers, I must presume they
meant the same rule of construction should be adopted in relation to
the power granted to or conferred upon these commissioners. The
only restriction imposed upon them, therefore, was that they should
exercise the power according to the best of their judgment, and apportion the stock to such of the subscribers, and in such proportions, as a
majority of them should deem most advantageous to the interests of
the corporation. And there is no allegation in this bill from which I
have a right to infer that the complainant believes they have not distributed the stock in this manner. Although it is alleged that the complainant is informed, and believes, they have distributed the stock
principally among themselves and their relatives and friends, it would
only be in accordance with the principles of human nature, were we
to ~onclude, from that circumstance alone, they honestly believed
that they and their friends would be more likely to appoint directors
who would manage the concerns of the corporation well, than others
would if the control of the corporation should be given to their opponents. In this, perhaps, they may have acted under a mistake, but
that alone is not sufficient to authorize an interference with their distribution. Where a discretion is to be exercised according to certain
fixed legal principles, especially when that discretion is to be exercised by a person or body acting as a court of justice, if the person or
body intrusted with the power has mistaken the law, or violated such
fixed legal principles, it may be a proper case for review and correction by the appropriate tribunal.
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But if the legislature has intrusted the exercise of the power to the

NALKER V. DEVEREAUX.

sole judgment and discretion of a particular person or body of indi-

viduals, no court is authorized to interfere with or control that discre-

But if the legislature has intrusted the exercise of the power to the
sole judgment and discretion of a particular person or body of individuals, no court is authorized to interfere with or control that discretion, provided it is exercised in good faith. In the recent case of
The King, ex rel. Scales, v. The Mayor and Aldermen of London (3
Barn. & Adolph. Rep. 271 ), the late Lord Tenterden says, "if a
matter is left to the discretion of any individual or body of men, who
are to decide according to their own conscience and judgment, it
would be absurd to say that any other tribunal is to inquire into the
grounds and reasons on which they have decided, and whether they
have exercised their discretion properly or not." The same principle
is recognized in the case of The King v. The Justices of Norfolk ( 1
Neville & Man. Rep. 67), and in a variety of cases in our own
c.o urts. This point was also expressly decided by the vice-chancellor
of the first circuit in the case of The Brooklyn Bank ( 1 Edwards' Ch.
Rep. 371) where the powers of the commissioners were the same,
substantially, as in the present case. Chancellor Sanford also admitted the correctness of this principle in the case which was before
him relative to the distribution of the stock in the Commercial Bank
of Albany; although he very properly decided that it was not applicable to the case then under consideration. (Meades v. 'Valker, r
Hopkins' Rep. 591.) It is not necessary for the decision of the present motion that I should consider the question whether the commissioners could themselves become subscribers for the stock of the corporation. But as that question has been fully argued, it may save
expense to the parties, and prevent further litigation in this case, if I
proceed to dispose of that objection to the distribution at this time.
The general principles, that a trustee can not traffic in the subject
of his trust, that no person shall be a judge in his own cause, and that
a public officer can not do an act which is inconsistent with the duty
he owes to another, or to the public, are well understood. And it
certainly does seem to be inconsistent with these principles that
the legislature should, in any case, permit commissioners for the distribution of stocks to decide between themselves and others what portion of such stock shall belong to the commissioners and what part
they shall award to other subscribers. It certainly would better accord with these leading principles of law were the legislature to state,
in express terms, what portion of the whole stock each commissioner
should be permitted to take, and to prohibit him from taking, either
directly or indirectly, any greater share, except in a case of deficiency
in the amount subscribed. But where it was in the power of the legislature to give all the stock to certain individuals who had already become subscribers therefor, as was the case in relation to many of the
early acts creating joint-stock companies, the legislature might unqu~stionably confer the power upon such individuals of deciding how
much of such stock they would keep themselves and how much they
would apportion to others. The question here is, whether the legislature, in the case now under consideration, expected or intended that

tion, provided it is exercised in good faith. In the recent case of

The King, ex re/. Scales, v. The Mayor and Aldermen of London (3

Barn. & Adolph. Rep. 271), the late Lord Tenterden says, "if a

matter is left to the discretion of any individual or body of men, who

are to decide according to their own conscience and judgment, it

would be absurd to say that any other tribunal is to inquire into the

grounds and reasons on which they have decided, and whether they

have exercised their discretion properly or not." The same principle

is recognized in the case of The King v. The Justices of Norfolk (1

Neville & Man. Rep. 67), and in a variety of cases in our own

courts. This point was also expressly decided by the vice-chancellor

of the first circuit in the case of The Brooklyn Bank (1 Edwards' Ch.

Rep. 371) where the powers of the commissioners were the same,

substantially, as in the present case. Chancellor Sanford also ad-

mitted the correctness of this principle in the case which was before

him relative to the distribution of the stock in the Commercial Bank
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of Albany; although he very properly decided that it was not applica-

ble to the case then under consideration. (Meades v. Walker, 1

Hopkins' Rep. 591.) It is not necessary for the decision of the pres-

ent motion that I should consider the question whether the commis-

sioners could themselves become subscribers for the stock of the cor-

poration. But as that question has been fully argued, it may save

expense to the parties, and prevent further litigation in this case, if I

proceed to dispose of that objection to the distribution at this time.

The general principles, that a trustee can not traffic in the subject

of his trust, that no person shall be a judge in his own cause, and that

a public officer can not do an act which is inconsistent with the duty

he owes to another, or to the public, are well understood. And it

certainly does seem to be inconsistent with these principles that

the legislature should, in any case, permit commissioners for the dis-

tribution of stocks to decide between themselves and others what por-

tion of such stock shall belong to the commissioners and what part

they shall award to other subscribers. It certainly would better ac-

cord with these leading principles of law were the legislature to state,

in express terms, what portion of the whole stock each commissioner

should be permitted to take, and to prohibit him from taking, either

directly or indirectly, any greater share, except in a case of deficiency

in the amount subscribed. But where it was in the power of the legis-

lature to give all the stock to certain individuals who had already be-

come subscribers therefor, as was the case in relation to many of the

early acts creating joint-stock companies, the legislature might un-

questionably confer the power upon such individuals of deciding how

much of such stock they would keep themselves and how much they

would apportion to others. The question here is, whether the legis-

lature, in the case now under consideration, expected or intended that
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these twenty-one commissioners named in the act of incorporation

should be permitted to subscribe for and receive a part of the stock of
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this company.

The fundamental principle to be observed in the construction of

statutes, is to discover, if possible, the true intention of the law-giver.

And when that intention is ascertained, the court is bound to give

effect to such intention, whatever opinion the judge may entertain as

to the wisdom or policy of the law; provided such intention does not

contravene any principle of the constitution or transcend the powers of

the legislature. * * * It is therefore proper to refer to the provisions

of the several acts authorizing commissioners and others to receive sub-

scriptions for and to distribute the stock of moneyed and other corpo-

rations, and to the known usage under such statutes, for the purpose,

of ascertaining whether the legislature intended that the commission-

ers in this case should be excluded from subscribing-or receiving any

portion of the stock, on account of the peculiar nature of their official

duties in the distribution of the stock in case of an excess. The case

of Haight et al. v. Day et al. (1 Johns. Ch. Rep. 18), came before this

court, in 1814, upon a complaint against the commissioners for the
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distribution of the stock in the Catskill Bank, under a provision in the

act of incorporation very similar to that which is now under consider-

ation. The complaint in that case was that there was a gross in-

equality in the apportionment among the subscribers; and that the

distribution was principally confined to the commissioners themselves,

their relations and favorites. The bill also charged that the appor-

tionment was unjust, fraudulent and corrupt. Yet, upon the answer

of the defendants merely denying that they were governed by any

improper motive in the execution of their trust, and alleging that they

had apportioned the stock as they deemed discreet and proper, Chan-

cellor Kent dissolved the injunction and permitted them to proceed,

and to elect themselves directors to control and manage the institu-

tion.

It is suggested by the complainant's counsel that it does not appear

by the report of that case that the objection was there raised that it

was inconsistent with their character as commissioners to distribute

the stock—to subscribe for and apportion a part thereof to themselves.

It appears to me, however, impossible to suppose the chancellor could

have overlooked this general principle, if he had considered it as ap-

plicable to the case, for, upon looking into the pleadings in that cause,

on file in the register's office, a more appropriate case for the enforce-

ment of that principle can hardly be conceived. The whole stock to

be distributed was 6,000 shares; and more than six times that amount

was actually subscribed by one hundred and twenty-three persons,

including the twenty-two complainants, who subscribed between five

and six thousand shares. Yet the four commissioners took about one-half

of the stock to themselves, and gave all the residue, except 108 shares,

to nine of their nearest relatives by blood and marriage, and to two or

three other persons connected with them in business. And they dis-

the e twenty-one commissioners named in the act of incorporation
should be permitted to subscribe for and receive a part of the stock of
this company.
The fundamental principle to be observed in the construction of
statutes, is to discover, if possible, the true intention of the law-giver.
And when that intention is ascertained, the court is bound to give
· effect to such intention, whatever opinion the judge may entertain as
to the wisdom or policy of the law; provided such intention does not
contravene any principle of the constitution or transcend the powers of
the legislature. • • • It is therefore proper to refer to the provisions
of the several acts authorizing commissioners and others to receive subscriptions for and to distribute the stock of moneyed and other corporations, and to the known usage under such statutes, for the purpose.
of ascertaining whether the legislature intended that the commissioner in this case should be excluded from subscribing ·or receiving any
portion of the stock, on account of the peculiar nature of their official
duties in the distribution of the stock in case of an excess. The case
of Haight et al. v. Day et al. (1 Johns. Ch. Rep. 18), came before this
court, in 1814, upon a complaint against the commissioners for the
distribution of the stock in the Catskill Bank, under a provision in the
act of incorporation very similar to that which is now under consideration. The complaint in that case was that there was a gross inequality in the apportionment among the subscribers; and that the
distribution was principally confined to the commissioners themselves,
their relations and favorites. The bill also charged that the apportionment was unjust, fraudulent and corrupt. Yet, upon the answer
of the defendants merely denying that they were governed by any
improper motive in the execution of their trust, and alleging that they
bad apportioned the stock as they deemed discreet and proper, Chancellor Kent dissolved the injunction and permitted them to proceed,
and to elect themselves directors to control and manage the institution.
It is suggested hy the complainant's counsel that it does not appear
by the report of that case that the objection was there raised that it
was inconsistent with their character as commissioners to distribute
the stock-to subscribe for and apportion a part thereof to themselves.
It appears to me, however, impossible to suppose the chancellor could
have overlooked this general principle, if he had considered it as applicable to the case, for, upon looking into the pleadings in that cause,
on file in the register's office, a more appropriate case for the enforcement of that principle can hardly be conceived. The whole stock to
he distributed was 6,ooo shares; and more than six times that amount
was actually subscribed by one hundred and twenty-three persons,
including the twenty-two complainants, who subscribed between five
and six thousand shares. Yet the four commissioners took about one-half
of the stock to themselves, and gave all the residue, except 108 shares,
to nine of their nearest relatives by blood and marriage, and to two or
three other persons connected with them in business. And they dis-
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tributed the 108 shares among the complainants and others, by giving
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one share to each. In a case so glaring, I can not believe my learned

and now venerable predecessor would have forgotton or have hesi-

tributed the 108 shares among the complainants and others, by giving
one share to each. In a case so glaring, I can not believe my learned
and now venerable predecessor woul<l have forgotton or have hesitated to apply this principle, if he had not been satisfied from the
course of legislation which had been adopted in relation to the di tribution of the stocks of incorporated companies, that there was something which took the case of commissioners and tru stees for the di~
tribution of such stocks out of the operation of the general rule.
Whether he was right in his construction of the law as to the powers
of the commissioners in such a case, it is useless now to inquire, as
his decision has been received and acted on as law ever since tliat
time. And the numerous prohibitions contained in subsequent acl~
of incorporations, restricting the commissioners as to the number of
shares they shall be permitted to distribute to themselves, but without giving them in terms the power to take any, show the understanding of the legislature that such was the established law.
I must, therefore, conclude, from these circumstances, and also
from the fact, of public notoriety, that commissioners have always
been in the habit of apportioning a patt of the stock to themselves;
that the legislature did not intend the commissioners in this cas·e should
be excluded from a participation in the stock of the company. As to
the amount taken by them, they have restricted themselves far below
the smallest maximum which has ever been adopted by the legislature
in a similar case. I can not, therefore, say they have abused the
right of appropriating a portion of the capital stock of the company
to themselves. • • •
Injunction denied.

tated to apply this principle, if he had not been satisfied from the

course of legislation which had been adopted in relation to the distri-

bution of the stocks of incorporated companies, that there was some-

thing which took the case of commissioners and trustees for the at-

tribution of such stocks out of the operation of the general rule.

Whether he was right in his construction of the law as to the powers

of the commissioners in such a case, it is useless now to inquire, as

his decision has been received and acted on as law ever since that

time. And the numerous prohibitions contained in subsequent acts

of incorporations, restricting the commissioners as to the number of

shares they shall be permitted to distribute to themselves, but with-

out giving them in terms the power to take any, show the understand-

ing of the legislature that such was the established law.

I must, therefore, conclude, from these circumstances, and also

from the fact, of public notoriety, that commissioners have always

been in the habit of apportioning a part of the stock to themselves:
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that the legislature did not intend the commissioners in this case should

be excluded from a participation in the stock of the company. As to

the amount taken by them, they have restricted themselves far below

the smallest maximum which has ever been adopted by the legislature

in a similar case. I can not, therefore, say they have abused the

right of appropriating a portion of the capital stock of the company

to themselves. * * *

Injunction denied.

Note. See particularly: 1839, Crocker v. Crane, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 211,34

Am. Dec. 228; Beach, § 519; Cook, § 57; Elliott, § 363; Morawetz, §§64-i>8;

Tavlor, § 91; 1 Thompson, §§ 1204-1250; 2 Thompson, §§ 1368,1540; 5 Thomp-

son, §§ 5908, 6570.

Authority and functions of commissioners.—1. Their functions are of a

public character, and action will be compelled by mandamus. 1833, Walker

v. Devereaux, 4 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 229, supra; 1851, In re, White River Bank.

Note. See particularly: 1839, Crocker v. Crane, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 211, 3~
Am. Dec. 228; Beach, § 519; Cook, § 57; Elliott, § 363; Morawetz, §§ 6Ui8;
Taylor, § 91; 1 Thompson, §§ 1204-1250; 2 Thompson,§§ 1368, 1540; 5 Thompson, §§ 5908, 6570.
Authority and functions of commissioners.-1. Their ft.mctio1is are of a
public character, and aetion will be compelle<l by mandamus. 1833, Walkt•r
v. Devereaux, 4 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 229, supra; 1851, bi re, White River Bank,
23 Vt. 478.
2. As to those dealing with them, their authority is similar to that of an
agent with a special power of attorney. 1871, Nippenose Mfg. Co. v. Staclon,
68 Pa. St. 256.
3. As to the corporation, and subscribers, they are trustees, subject to control by courts of equity. 1831, Attorney-General v. Stevens, 1 N. J. Eq.
(Saxt.) 369, 22 Am. Dec. 526.
4. Their power is m1ually of a discretionaMJ character. 1858, Thomas v. Citizens' Pass. R. Co., 15 Leg. Int. (Pa. ) 189; 1858, Brower v. Pass. R. Co., 3
~hil. (Pa. l 161 ; ~enerally so, in apportioning or allotting excessive subacript10ns. 1814, Haight v. Day, 1 .Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 18; 1832, Clarke v. Brooklyn Bank, 1 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 361; but sometimes it is not so: 1850, Van
Dyke v. Stout, 8 N. J. Eq. (4 Haist.) 333; 1856, Buffalo & N. Y. C.R. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. (4 Kem.) 336. ·When miniBterial it can be delegated: 1848,
Lohman v. N. Y. & E. R., 2 Sanclf. IN. Y.) 39; 1872, Saugatuck Bridge Co. v.
Westport, 39 Conn. 337, but see 1861, Shurtz v. Schoolcraft, etc., R., 9 Mich.
269, contra .
5. The'// usually act as a board, and a majority r,o11t1·ols. 1839, Crocker v.

23 Vt. 478.

2. As to those dealing with them, their authority is similar to that of an

agent with a special power of attorney. 1871, Nippenose Mfg. Co. v. Stadon,

68 Pa. St. 256.

3. As to the corporation, and subscribers, they are trustees, subject to con-

trol by courts of equitv. 1831, Attorney-General v. Stevens, 1 N. J. Eq.

(Saxt.) 369, 22 Am. Dec". 526.

4. Their power is usually of a discretionary character. 1858, Thomas v. Cit-

izens'Pass. R. Co., 15 Leg. Int. (Pa.) 189; 1858, Brower v. Pass. R. Co., 3

Phil. (Pa.) 161; generallv so, in apportioning or allotting excessive subscrip-

tions. 1814, Haight v. Day, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 18; 1832. Clarke v. Brook-

lyn Bank, 1 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 361; but sometimes it is not so: 1850, Van

Dyke v. Stout, 8 N. J. Eq. (4 Halst.) 333; 1856, Buffalo & N. Y. C. R. v. Dud-

ley, 14 N. Y. (4 Kern.) 336. When ministerial it can be delegated: 1M8,

Lohman v. N. Y. & E. R., 2 Sandf. fK. Y.t 39; 1872, Saugatuek Bridge Co. v.

Westport, 39 Conn. 337, but see 1861, Shurtz v. Schoolcraft, etc., R., 9 Mich.

269, contra.

5. They usually act as a board, and a majority controls. 1839, Crocker v.
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White, 41 Maine 512, 66 Am Dec. 257. Acts of de facto boards, however,

making allotment to themselves only, have been held to be void. 1895, Shel-

lenberger v. Patterson, 168 Pa. St. 30, 31 Atl. 943.

6. Their authority continues till the subscription is completed. 1836, Lallande v.

Louisiana State Ins. Co., 9 La. 326. But ceases as soon as the subscription is

completed and organization takes place. 1854, Smith v. Bangs, 15 111. 399;

1858, Ellison v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 36 Miss. 572; 1858, James v. C, H. & D.

R.Co., 2 Disney (Ohio) 261.

7. In some states it is held the commissioners hare exclusive authority to receive

subscriptions. 1811, Essex Turnpike Corp. v. Collins, 8 Mass. 292; 1861,

Shurtz v. Schoolcraft & T. R. Co., 9 Mich., 269; 1875, Parker v. Northern

Cent. M. R. Co., 33 Mich 23. But in other states it is held that any one may

take a subscription, provided it is accepted by the corporation. 1857, North-

eastern R. Co. v. Rodrigues, 10 Rich. Law (S. C.) 278; 1857, Walker v. Mobile

& O. R. Co., 34 Miss. 245; 1876, Scarlett v. Academy of Music, etc., 46 Md. 132.
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C'rnne, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 211, 34 Am. Dec. 228; 1856, Penobscot R. Co. v.
\'lhite, 41 Maine 512, 66 Am. Dec. 257. Acts of de facto boards, howevn,
making Rllotment to themselves only, have been held to be void. 1895, Shellenberger v. Patterson, 168 Pa. St. 30, 31 Atl. 943.
6. Their atlthority continues till the subscription is completed. 1836, Lallande v.
Louisiana 8tate Ins. Co., 9 La. 326. But ceases as soon as the subscription is
completed and organization takes placf\. 1854, Smith v. Bangs, 15 Ill. 399;
1858, Ellison v. Mobile & 0. R . Co., 36 Miss. 572; 1858, James v. C., H. & D.
R. Co., 2 Disney (Ohio) 261.
7. In some states it is held the commissioners hat•e exclusive authority to receive
8Ubscriptions. 1811, Essex Turnpike Corp. v. Collins, 8 Maes. 292; 1861,
Shurtz v. Schoolcraft & T. R. Co., 9 Mich., 269; 1875, Parker v. Northern
Cent. )f. R. Co., 33 Mich 23. But in other states it is held that any one may
take a subscription, provided it is accepted by the corporation. 1857, Northeastern R. Co. v. Rodrigues, 10 Rich . Law (S. C.) 278; 1857, Walker v. Mobile
« 0. R. Co., 34 Miss. 245; 1876, Scarlett v. Academy of Music, etc., 46 Md. 132.

NICKUM v. BURCKHARDT.1

1897. In the Supreme Court of Oregon. 30 Oregon Reports
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464-477, 60 Am. St. R. 822, 47 Pac. R. 888.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Wolverton.

This is an action to recover for assessments levied upon unpaid

Sec. 80.

capital stock of a private corporation. About June 18, 1893, some

Incorporators under general statutes.

thirteen persons, among whom were Guy Posson, who signed for two

shares; J. E. Jiiston, for four; F. C. Barnes, for ten; and H. Pease,

NICKUM v. BURCKHARDT. 1

for three—subscribed the following agreement, each placing opposite

his name the number of shares presumably intended to be taken: "We,

the undersigned, each in consideration of the promise of the other,

1897. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OREGON. 30 Oregon Reports

agree to subscribe for and take the number of shares of the capital

464-477, 6o Am. St. R. 822, 47 Pac. R. 888.

stock set opposite our respective names of a company to be incor-

porated for the purpose of operating a fertilizer, feeding and fatten-

ing stock and poultry, and if obtainable, collecting and disposing of

Opinion by Mr. Justice WoLVERTON.

swill, and other purposes of like nature; said company to be incor-

porated in accordance with the laws of the state of Oregon, with a

capital stock of $15,000, divided into 150 shares of the value of $100

each." There were seventy-eight shares subscribed for upon this

paper, representing $7,800. On the 7th day of October, r893, three

of the subscribers executed, duly acknowledged, and caused to be

filed and recorded in the proper offices, articles of incorporation, in-

1 Opinion on rehearing upon the point as to estoppel omitted.

This is an action to recover for assessments levied upon unpaid
capital stock of a private corporation. About June 18, 1893, some
thirteen persons, among whom were Guy Posson, who signed for two
hares ; J.E. Jµston, for four; F. C. Barnes, for ten; and H. Pease ,
for three-subscribed the following agreement, each placing opposite
his name the number of shares presumably intended to be taken: "We,
the undersigned, each in consideration of the promise of the other,
agtee to subscribe for and take the number of shares of the capital
stock set opposite our respective names of a company to be incorporated for the purpose of operating a fertilizer, feeding and fattening stock and poultry, and if obtainable, collecting and disposing of
swill , and other purposes of like nature; said company to be incorporated in accordance with the laws of the state of Oregon , with a
capital stock of $ 15 ,ooo, divided into 1 50 shares of the value of $ 100
each." There were seventy-eight shares subscribed for upon th is
paper, representing $7 1 800. On the 7th day of October, 1'893, three
of the subscribers executed, duly acknowledged, and caused to be
filed and recorded in the proper offices, articles of incorporation, in1

Opinion on rehearing upon the point as to estoppel omitted.
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corporating the Oregon Fertilizing Company specifying the object and

corporating the Oregon Fertilizing Company specifying the object and
business thereof to be "to transport wood, produce and garbage and
to cremate such garbage, or to use the same for feed or fertilizing
purposes." A little later, nll the subscribers to said instrument, except the four above named, signed with others the following writing,
which is contained in a minute book kept for the purpose of recording the proceedings of the corporation to wit: ''We, the undersigned, hereby subscribe for the number of shares of capital stock of
the Oregon Fertilizing Company set opposite our respective names,
and agree to pay for the same at such time or times as may be ordered
by the board of directors hereafter to be elected." Only sixty-nine
shares of the capital stock were subscribed for upon this latter instrument. Subsequently all the subscribers to this instrument, together
with Posson and Juston, signed an agreement to hold the first meeting of the stockholders on October 14, 1893, waiving the thirty days'
notice required by law, and in pursuance thereof the meeting was
held, all said signers being present, either in person or by proxy, but
no others, and participated in the election of directors and other business. The corporators having certified to the result of the election,
the directors elected took the oath of office, and at once organized by
electing the officers of the board. To abate the action, the defendants plead that the plaintiff company is not an incorporation.
It was urged at the hearing that the defendants ought to be estopped
from alleging that the Oregon Fertilizing Company is not a corporation duly incorporated and organized in all respects as contemplated
by law, inasmuch as they are subscribers or purchasers of stock
subsequent to the alleged completed organization of the company;
that having dealt with the company in its corporate capacity, and haYing entered into contractual relations with it, they have recognized
its existence as a body corporate, and that now, when sued upon their
obligation to it as such a body, they should not be permitted to deny
its legal existence. The doctrine here contended for is undoubtedly
well grounded in the law, but it can not be invoked in this case because not pleaded. The opportunity was afforded for setting up the
supposed estoppel in the reply, but it was not done, and it is now too
late to assert it. It is said that "if a party who has an opportunity to
plead an estoppel upon which he relies fails to do so, but goes to issue
on the fact, he thereby waives the estoppel, puts the matter at large,
and the jury may disregard the estoppel, and are at liberty to find
the truth." Note to Tyler v. Hall, rn6 Mo. 313, 27 Am. St. Rep.
337-346, 15 S. W. 319. To the same effect are Bruce v. Phrenix
Ins. Co., 24 Ore. 486, 34 Pac. 16; and Bays v. Trulson, 25 Ore. 109,
46 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 386, 35 Pac. 26.
This question disposed of, we come to another, more complex in its
nature, and that is whether there has been an organization of the
plaintiff corporation under and in pursuance of the general statutes
providing therefor. The regularity of the execution and filing of the
articles of incorporation is conceded. The persons subscribing the

business thereof to be "to transport wood, produce and garbage and

to cremate such garbage, or to use the same for feed or fertilizing

purposes." A little later, all the subscribers to said instrument, ex-

cept the four above named, signed with others the following writing,

which is contained in a minute book kept for the purpose of record-

ing the proceedings of the corporation to wit: "We, the under-

signed, hereby subscribe for the number of shares of capital stock of

the Oregon Fertilizing Company set opposite our respective names,

and agree to pay for the same at such time or times as may be ordered

by the board of directors hereafter to be elected." Only sixty-nine

shares of the capital stock were subscribed for upon this latter instru-

ment. Subsequently all the subscribers to this instrument, together

with Posson and Juston, signed an agreement to hold the first meet-

ing of the stockholders on October 14, 1893, waiving the thirty days'

notice required by law, and in pursuance thereof the meeting was

held, all said signers being present, either in person or by proxy, but

no others, and participated in the election of directors and other busi-
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ness. The corporators having certified to the result of the election,

the directors elected took the oath of office, and at once organized by

electing the officers of the board. To abate the action, the defend-

ants plead that the plaintiff company is not an incorporation.

It was urged at the hearing that the defendants ought to be estopped

from alleging that the Oregon Fertilizing Company is not a corpora-

tion duly incorporated and organized in all respects as contemplated

by law, inasmuch as they are subscribers or purchasers of stock

subsequent to the alleged completed organization of the company:

that having dealt with the company in its corporate capacity, and hav-

ing entered into contractual relations with it, they have recognized

its existence as a body corporate, and that now, when sued upon their

obligation to it as such a body, they should not be permitted to deny

its legal existence. The doctrine here contended for is undoubtedly

well grounded in the law, but it can not be invoked in this case be-

cause not pleaded. The opportunity was afforded for setting up the

supposed estoppel in the reply, but it was not done, and it is now too

late to assert it. It is said that "if a party who has an opportunity to

plead an estoppel upon which he relies fails to do so, but goes to issue

on the fact, he thereby waives the estoppel, puts the matter at large,

and the jury may disregard the estoppel, and are at liberty to find

the truth." Note to Tyler v. Hall, 106 Mo. 313, 27 Am. St. Rep.

337-346, 15 S. W. 319. To the same effect are Bruce v. Phoenix

Ins. Co., 24 Ore. 486, 34 Pac. 16; and Bays v. Trulson, 25 Ore. 109,

46 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 386, 35 Pac. 26.

This question disposed of, we come to another, more complex in its

nature, and that is whether there has been an organization of the

plaintiff corporation under and in pursuance of the general statutes

providing therefor. The regularity of the execution and filing of the

articles of incorporation is conceded. The persons subscribing the
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are purely statutory. They may open books and receive subscriptions
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to the capital stock; "they shall give notice to the subscribers to meet"

at such time and place as they may designate for the purpose of elect-

ing directors; they shall act as inspectors at the first meeting for

that purpose, certifv who are elected, and appoint the time and place

of their first meeting. This enumeration comprises the substance of

their powers (See section 3222, Hill's Code). These are all acts neces-

sary to and in furtherance of the completion of the organization. The

organization is completed only -when directors have been elected, and

they have elected a president and secretary, which it is contemplated

they shall do at their first meeting. From the time of the first meet-

ing of the directors, that is to say, from the time of the organization

of the board, '•'■the powers vested in the corporation are exercised by

them, or by their officers or agents under their direction" (Hill's

Code, sec. 3225), thus relieving the incorporators of further duty or

power in the premises, or, rather, their functions then cease, because

their duties have been fulfilled and their powers executed. From

the date of its completed organization the incorporation may begin
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the prosecution of its enterprise or business. It may then sue and be

sued, contract and be contracted with, and exercise any of the other

statutory powers incident to its organization and the enterprise, busi-

ness, pursuit or occupation adopted. The corporation may elect its

board of directors when one-half of the capital stock has been sub-

scribed. Hill's Code, § 3222; Fairview R. Co. v. Spillman, 23

Ore. 587, 32 Pac. 688. And one question here is, whether one-half

of the capital stock had been subscribed when the board was elected.

It seems to be supposed that in ordef to constitute a person a sub-

scriber to the capital stock of a corporation he must have subscribed

to the stock books of the concern after its articles of incorporation

have been perfected and filed, and Coyote Mining Co. v. Ruble, 8

Or. 284, is cited as authority. Boise, J., at page 294, says, in effect,

that to put a person in the position of a subscriber to the capital stock

it must be shown by the stock book signed by him, or evidence equiv-

alent to such signing. This would seem to support the proposition,

but at another place (page 298) he says: "It is necessary for the

corporation to prove the subscription by producing the supscription

signed by Ruble, either by himself or by another for him with his au-

thority, or by some acts of his which are equivalent to a subscription."

So that the case does not decide either that the primary subscription

must be made upon the stock book, or that it shall have been made

subsequent to the execution of the articles of incorporation. In a late

case (Balfour v. Baker City Gas Co., 27 Ore. 307, 41 Pac. 165),

Bean, C. J., speaking for this court, says: "From an extended ex-

amination of the authorities we take the law to be that when the pro-

posed corporation is formed as contemplated in the preliminary sub-

scription, and within a reasonable time thereafter, the subscription,

unless revoked in the manner authorized by law, becomes irrevocable,

art£cles are lm<J"Wn as the incorporators, and their powers and duties
are purely statutory. They may open books and receive subscrip#ons
to the capital stock; ''they shall give notice to the subscribers to meet''
at such time and place as they may designate for the purpose of electing directors; they shall act as inspectors at the first meeting for
that purpose, certzfv who are elected, and appoint the time and place
of their first meeting. This enumera#on comprises the substance of
their powers (See section3222, Hill's Code). These are all acts necessary to and in furtherance of the completion of the organization. The
organizati"on is completed only when directors have been elected, and
they have elected a president and secretary, which it i's contemplated
they shall do at their first meeti'ng. From the time of the first meeting of the dfrectors, that i's to say, from the time of the organi'zali:on
of the board, "the powers vested in the corporati'on are exerci'sed by
them, or by their officers or agents under thei'r di'rec#on'' ( Ht"ll' s
Code, sec. 3225), thus reli"evi'ng the i'ncorporators of further duty or
power in the premises, or, rather, their functions then cease, because
their duties have been ful:ftlled and their powers executed. From
the date of its completed organization the incorporation may begin
the prosecution of its enterprise or business. It may then sue and be
sued, contract and be contracted with, and exercise any of the other
statutory powers incident to its organization and the enterprise, business, pursuit or occupation adopted. The corporation· may elect its
board of directors when one-half of the capital stock has been subscribed. Hill's Code, § 3222; Fairview R. Co. v. Spillman, 23
Ore. 587, 32 Pac. 688. And one question here is, whether one-half
of the capital stock had been subscribed when the board was elected.
It seems to be supposed that in ordef to constitute a person a subscriber to the capital stock of a corporation he must have subscribed
to the stock books of the concern after its articles of incorporation
have been perfected and filed, and Coyote Mining Co. v. Ruble, 8
Or. 284, is cited as authority. Boise, ]. , at page 294, says, in effect,
that to put a person in the position of a subscriber to the capital stock
it must be shown by the stock book signed by him, or evidence equivalent to such signing. This would seem to support the proposition,
but at another place (page 298) he says: "It is necessary for the
corporation to prove the subscription by producing the supscription
signed by Ruble, either by himself or by another for him with his authority, or by some acts of his which are equivalent to a subscription."
So that the case does not decide either that the primary subscription
must be made upon the stock book, or that it shall have been made
subsequent to the execution of the articles of incorporation. In a late
case (Balfour v. Baker City Gas Co., 27 Ore. 307, 41 Pac. 165),
Bean, C. J., speaking for this court, says: "From an extended examination of the authorities we take the law to be that when the proposed corporation is formed as contemplated in the preliminary subscription, and within a reasonable time thereafter, the subscription,
unless revoked in the manner authorized by law, becomes irrevocable,
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the subscriber becomes a shareholder, and liable as such without any

NICK UM V. BURCKHARDT.

further act on his part." And this seems to be so, although the statute

may provide for the opening of stock books by designated persons after

the subscriber becomes a shareholder, and liable as such without any
further act on his part.'' And this seems to be so, although the statute
may provide for the opening of stock books by designated persons after
the articles are filed. Balfour v. Baker City Gas Co. , 27 Ore. 307, 41
Pac. 165; 1 Thompson on Corporations, §§ I I 52, II66; Buffalo R.
Co. v. Gifford , 87 N. Y. 294. Nor is the distinction taken in some
of the cases between a present subscription and an agreement to subscribe to the stock of a corporation thereafter to be created thought to
be sound. 1 Cook on Stocks and Stockholders, § 75; Knox against
Childersburg Land Co. , 86 Ala. 180-184, 5 South. 578; Athol Music
Hall Co. v. Carey, 1 r6 Mass. 47r.
Now, it appears that by the preliminary subscription seventy-eight
shares of the capital stock were signed for, three more than was necc;.sary for the completion of the organization by the election of directors.
Four of the individuals signing this paper, representing nineteen
shares, did not sign the later agreement, to which sixty-nine c;hares
only were subscribed. All those subscribing the latter paper, to~ether
with Guy Posson and J. E. Juston, who signed the preliminary suhscription, signed the consent agreement, for holding the first meeting,
and participated therein, and Juston was elected a director. So it will
be seen that if the two shares of Posson and the four of Juston are
added to the sixty-nine. shares signed to the second paper, one-half of
the capital stock was represented at such meeting. But the question
arises, Were they subscribers to the capital stock? We think that,
having signed the preliminary subscription and the consent agreement
for the first meeting, and having participated therein , they became
bound in that capacity, and must be so considered.
They
certainly are estopped by their acts from denying that they are
subscribers, and, this being so, the law requiring a subscription
of one-half of the capital stock before organizat10n was substantially
complied with.
Incidental to this question, it is argued that the purposes designated
in the articles of incorporation do not correspond with those set forth
in the preliminary subscription, and, therefore, that Posson and Ju ton can not be held to be subscribers. We presume that ordinarily a
material departure in this respect will avoid the original agreement,
but in this case the persons named have construed the purposes to be
one and the same by participation in the organization under the articles
of incorporation , or, rather, to speak more concisely, they have assented to the departure, if such it may be termed. Knox v. Childersburg Land Co. , 86 Ala. 180, 5 So. R ep. 578.
Again it is urged that if the primary subscription is sufficient to
bind the subscribers to the capital stock of the concern, then Barnes
and Pease not being present, and having no notice of the first meeting, and not having waived the same by writing or otherwise, the
election of directors was irregular and void. We are not to be understood as passing upon the sufficiency of this paper within itself,
but that, considering the subscription thereto of Posson and Juston,

the articles are filed. Balfour v. Baker City Gas Co., 27 Ore. 307, 41

Pac. 165; 1 Thompson on Corporations, §§ 1152, 1166; Buffalo R.

Co. v. Gifford, S7 N. Y. 294. Nor is the distinction taken in some

of the cases between a present subscription and an agreement to sub-

scribe to the stock of a corporation thereafter to be created thought to

be sound. 1 Cook on Stocks and Stockholders, § 75: Knox against

Childersburg Land Co., 86 Ala. 180-184, 5 South. 57S; Athol Music

Hall Co. v. Carey, 116 Mass. 471.

Now, it appears that by the preliminary subscription seventy-eight

shares of the capital stock were signed for, three more than was neces-

sary for the completion of the organization by the election of directors.

Four of the individuals signing this paper, representing nineteen

shares, did not sign the later agreement, to which sixty-nine shares

only were subscribed. All those subscribing the latter paper, together

with Guy Posson and J. E. Juston, who signed the preliminary sub-

scription, signed the consent agreement, for holding the first meeting,
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and participated therein, and Juston was elected a director. So it will

be seen that if the two shares of Posson and the four of Juston are

added to the sixty-nine, shares signed to the second paper, one-half of

the capital stock was represented at such meeting. But the question

arises, Were they subscribers to the capital stock? We think that,

having signed the preliminary subscription and the consent agreement

for the first meeting, and having participated therein, they became

bound in that capacity, and must be so considered. They

certainly are estopped by their acts from denying that they are

subscribers, and, this being so, the law requiring a subscription

of one-half of the capital stock before organization was substantially

complied with.

Incidental to this question, it is argued that the purposes designated

in the articles of incorporation do not correspond with those set forth

in the preliminary subscription, and, therefore, that Posson and Jus-

ton can not be held to be subscribers. We presume that ordinarily a

material departure in this respect will avoid the original agreement,

but in this case the persons named have construed the purposes to be

one and the same by participation in the organization under the articles

of incorporation, or, rather, to speak more concisely, they have as-

sented to the departure, if such it may be termed. Knox v. Childers-

burg Land Co., 86 Ala. 180, 5 So. Rep. 578.

Again it is urged that if the primary subscription is sufficient to

bind the subscribers to the capital stock of the concern, then Barnes

and Pease not being present, and having no notice of the first meet-

ing, and not having waived the same by writing or otherwise, the

election of directors was irregular and void. We are not to be un-

derstood as passing upon the sufficiency of this paper within itself,

but that, considering the subscription thereto of Posson and Juston,
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in connection with their subsequent acts they were properly recog-

§ 80

FUNCTIONS OF PRO.\IOTERS.

nized as stockholders, and hence, that one-half of the capital stock was

395

represented at the organization of the company. The fact that Barnes

and Pease had not been notified of the meeting could not furnish

grounds for objection by those subscribers present and participating

therein, they have not suffered by the omission, and are not in a posi-

tion to object as to others: Schenectady R. Co. v. Thatcher, n N.

Y. 102. See, also, Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 422, 11 Sup. Ct.

530; Morawetz on Private Corporations, § 399. Thus we have an

organization perfected by persons bound as subscribers, and repre-

senting fully one-half of the capital stock as fixed by the articles of

incorporation, and all bound by its proceedings. We think the

organization valid, although Barnes and Pease were not notified. As

to how they would be affected by want of notice it is not for us to

determine at this time; it is sufficient to say that those subscribers par-

ticipating can not object on that account.

The defendants, if subscribers to the capital stock, became such

after the organization, and the want of notice to Barnes and Pease

could not affect them; so that they are in no better position to object
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to the regularity of the organization on that account than those partic-

ipating in the first meeting. The result is that, in so far as they are

concerned, the company was duly incorporated, and this result is

reached, not because they are estopped by having dealt with it, but

because it was legally organized prior to their subscription to the cap-

ital stock. For the purpose of estopping the plaintiff from asserting

its due and legal organization, it is alleged in the answer in abatement

that plaintiff had, theretofore, instituted an action in a justice's court

against Guy Posson for assessments made by the company upon his

alleged subscription to the capital stock; that a trial was had upon the

sole issue whether Posson was a subscriber at the date of the attempted

organization; and that it was determined by the judgment that he was

not. It is claimed that, as the same question is necessarily involved

in determining in this action whether the plaintiff was duly organized,

the plaintiff is estopped to assert its truth, the judgment having gone

against him in the justice's court. The plea is argumentative, and

avers in effect that, as the judgment in the justice's court estops the

plaintiff to now assert that Posson is a subscriber, therefore it can not

be affirmed that the corporation is duly organized. That this is an

action upon a different cause from the one against Posson can not be

gainsaid ; the inquiry, therefore, to which the estoppel is pertinent must

be confined to the point or question actually determined in the Posson

case. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 353. Thus far, the

plea is apparently within the rule. But a very important essential to

the estoppel is wanting in that this cause and the one adjudicated in

the justice's court are not between the same parties in the same right

or capacity, or their privies claiming under them. This objection is

fatal to the plea. 1 Freeman on Judgments, § 252. The judgment

of the court below must, therefore be reversed, and the cause re-

in connection with their subsequent acts they were properly recognized as stockholders, and hence, that one-half of the capital stock wa~
represented at the organization of the company. The fact that Bame~
and Pease had not been notified of the meeting could not furni sh
grounds for objection by those subscribers present and participating
therein, they have not suffered by the omission, and are not in a position to object as to others: Schenectady R. Co. v. Thatcher, 11 N.
Y. 102. See, also, Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 422, 11 Sup. Ct.
530 ; Morawetz on Private Corporations, § 399. Thus we have an
organization perfected by persons bound as subscribers, and representing fully one-half of the capital stock as fixed by the article of
incorporation, and all bound by its proceedings. We think the
organization valid, although Barnes and Pease were not notified. As
to how they would be affected by want of notice it is not for us to
determine at thi s time; it is sufficient to say that those subscribers participating can not object on that account.
The defendants, if subscribers to the capital stock, became such
after the organization, and the want of notice to Barnes and Pease
could not affect them; so that they are in no better position to object
to the regularity of the organization on that account than those participating in the first meeting. The result is that, in so far as they are
concerned, the company was duly incorporated, and this result is
reached, not because they are estopped by having dealt with it, but
because it was legally organized prior to their subscription to the capital stock. For the purpose of estopping the plaintiff from asserting
its due and legal orga11ization, it is alleged in the answer in abatement
that plaintiff had, theretofore, instituted an action in a justice's court
against Guy Posson for assessments made by the company upon his
alleged subscription to the capital stock; that a trial was had upon the
ole issue whether Posson was a subscriber at the date of the attempted
organization; and that it was determined by the judgment that he was
not. It is claimed that, as the same question is necessarily involved
in determining in this action whether the plaintiff was duly organized ,
the plaintiff is estopped to assert its truth, the judgment having gone
against him in the justice's court. The plea is argumentative, and
avers in effect that, as the judgment in the justice's court estops the
plaintiff to now assert that Posson is a subscriber, therefore it can not
be affirmed that the corporation is duly organized. That this is an
action upon a different cause from the one against Posson can not be
gainsaid; the inquiry, therefore, to which the estoppel is pertinent must
be confined to the point or question actually determined in the Posson
case. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 353. Thus far, the
plea is apparently within the rule. But a very important essential to
the estoppel is wanting in that this cause and the one adjudicated in
the justice's court are not between the same parties in the same right
or capacity, or their privies claiming under them. This objection is
fatal to the plea. 1 Freeman on Judgments, § l52. The judgment
of the court below must, therefore be reversed, and the cause re-
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manded for such further proceedings as may be deemed proper not in-
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consistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

NICKUM V. BURCKHARDT.

§ 80

Note. See schemes of organization, infra, pp. 426, 560; In In re Lady Bryan

manded for such further proceedings as may be deemed proper not in·
consistent with this opinion.
Reversed.

Co., 1 Sawyer (U. 8. C. C.) 349,14 Fed. Can. 926 (1870), it was said that "corpora-

tors" in the Bankrupt Actj meant the stockholders. But so far as organiza-

tion is concerned "corporators exist before stockholders, and do not exist

with them. When stockholders come in, corporators cease to be." Chase v.

Note. See schemes of organization, infra, pp. 426, 060; In In rll Lady Bryan
Co., 1 Sawyer (U. 8. C. C.) 349, 14 Fed. Cas. 926 (1870), it was said that "corpora.
tore" in the Bankrupt" Act; meant the stockholders. But so far as organization is concerned "corporators exist before stockholder9, and do not exist
with them. When stockholders come in, corporators cease to be." Chase v.
Lord, 77 N. Y. 1, 1l (1879). Corporators or incorporatore need not become
members of the corporation by subscribing for stock, unless the law expressly
so provides:, 1870, Densmore Oil Co. v..Densmo~, 64 Pa. St. 43; 1890, Welch
v. Importers, etc., Bank, 122 N. Y. 177, 1898, Bnstol Bank & T. Co. v. Jonesboro B. & T. Co., 101 Tenn. 645, 48 S. W. 228.

Lord, 77 N. Y. 1, 11 (1879). Corporators or incorporators need not become

members of the corporation by subscribing for stock, unless the law expressly

so provides: 1870, Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore, 64 Pa. St. 43; 1890, Welch

v. Importers', etc., Bank, 122 N. Y. 177; 1898, Bristol Bank & T. Co. v. Jones-

boro B. & T. Co., 101 Tenn. 645, 48 S. W. 228.
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Title II. The Body Corporate: Its Formation, or Its Con-

ception and Incubation.

CHAPTER 5.

THE CORPORATE CHARTER.1

ARTICLE I. NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE CHARTER.

Sec. 81. In general. The conception of a corporation consists in

the offer and acceptance of a charter, wherein is set forth the

terms and conditions upon which the state will permit an in-

dividual or association of individuals to exercise a part of the

sovereign franchises of the state. When the offer is made

TITLE

and accepted there results a contract between the state, the

n.

THE BODY CORPORATE: !Ts FORMATION, OR !Ts CON•
CRPTION AND INCUBATION.

corporation, and those who accept it, authorizing them to con-

vert themselves, or others, or an association of other persons,

by organization, into a body corporate, having the powers

CHAPTER 5·

and privileges set forth expressly, or necessarily implied from

those set forth, in the charter.

THE CORPORATE CHARTER.1

Sec. 82. More particularly, the charter is both a law and a con-

tract.

ARTICLE I.

"A charter of incorporation is the written instrument by which the

NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE CHARTER.

crown institutes the body politic, and conveys to it its peculiar constitu-

tion, its rights, privileges, powers or estates, etc., imposes a name upon

See. 81. In general.

The conception of a corporation consists in
the offer and acceptance of a charter, wherein is set forth the
terms and conditions upon which the state will permit an individual or association of individuals to exercise a part of the
sovereign franchises of the state. When the offer is made
and accepted there results a contract between the state, the
corporation, and those who accept it, authorizing them to convert themselves, or others, or an association of other persons,
by organization, into a body corporate, having the powers
and privileges set forth expressly, or necessarily implied from
those set forth, in the charter.
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the corporation, defines its objects and purposes, and assigns such con-

ditions and limitations upon the exercise of the powers, privileges, etc.,

conferred, as to the crown seems fit." Grant, Corporation, '13

[Am. ed. p. 25, 1854].

"The charter of a corporation serves a twofold purpose; it operates

as a law conferring upon the corporators the right or franchise of act-

ing in a corporate capacity, and, furthermore, it contains the terms of

the fundamental agreement between the corporators themselves."

Morawetz, Private Corporations, § 316.

"The charter of a private business corporation or incorporated com-

pany operates primarily as a law repealing the common law prohibi-

'See, generally. 1 Abbott's Digest, 146; 4 Am. & Eng. Enc, 193-4; Angell

& Ames, ch. ii, iii; Beach, §§ 11, 13, 15, 17-36; Boone, ch. ii; Clark, ch. ii;

Cook, §§ 2, 3, 492-503, 640; Elliott, §§ 21-50, 89-120; Field, §§ 9-36; Grant,

pp. *9-*47; Morawetz, §§ 8-27, 38, 39, 318-759, 760, 1046-1050; Taylor, §§ 118,

147, 195, 227, 264, 438, 448, 496-504; 1 Thompson, §§35-218.

(397)

See. 82. More particularly, the clzarter i's both a law and a contract.
"A charter of incorporation is the written instrument by which the
crown institutes the body politic, and conveys to it its peculiar constitution , its rights , privileges, powers or estates, etc., imposes a name upon
the corporation, defines its objects and purposes, and assigns such conditions and limitations upon the exercise of the powers, privileges, etc.,
conferred, as to the crown seems fit." Grant, Corporation, • 13
[Am. ed. p. 25, 1854].
''The charter of a corporation serves a twofold purpose; it operates
as a law conferring upon the corporators the right or franchi se of acting in a corporate capacity, and, furthermore, it contains the terms of
the fundamental agreement between the corporators themselves."
Morawetz, Prh·ate Corporations, § 316.
"The charter of a private business corporation or incorporated company operates primarily as a law repealing the common law prohibi1 See, generally. 1 Abbott's Digest, 146 ; 4 Am. & Eng. Enc., 193-4; Angell
& Amee, ch. ii , iii ; Beach, §§ 11 , 13, Hi, l 7-3fl; Boone, ch. ii; Clark, ch. ii ;
Cook, §§2, 3, 492-503, 640; Elliott, §§21-50, 89- 120; Field, §§9-36; Grant,
pp. •9-•47; Morawetz, §§ 8-27, 38, 39, 318- 759, 760, 1046-1050; Taylor, §§ l18,
147, 195, 227, 264, 438, 448, 496-504; 1 Thompson, §§ 35-218.

(397)
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tion against the formation of corporate associations, and enabling the

PLANK-ROAD V. WOODHULL.

members of the company legally to accomplish the purposes for which

§ 82

they have associated. * * « After the corporation has been

ti on against the formation of corporate associations, and enabling the
members of the company legally to accomplish the purposes for which
they haye associated. * • • After the corporation has been
formed pursuant to such a charter or incorporation law, it fulfills a
second equally important function. It contains, in whole, or in part.
the terms of the contract, or articles of agreement, by which the shareholders or members of the corporation are bound together, and indicates the purposes for which they have contributed or agreed to contribute the company's capital." Morawetz, Private Corporations,

formed pursuant to such a charter or incorporation law, it fulfills a

second equally important function. It contains, in whole, or in part,

the terms of the contract, or articles of agreement, by which the share-

holders or members of the corporation are bound together, and indi-

cates the purposes for which they have contributed or agreed to con-

tribute the company's capital." Morawetz, Private Corporations.

§ 1046.

"The constitution of a corporation is of a dual nature; it is law in

that it consists of rules for conduct set by a political superior to polit-

ical inferiors, and it embodies a contract the obligation of which is the

§ 1046.

selfsame constitution regarded as law. The contract embodied in the

"The constitution of a corporation is of a dual nature; it is law in
that it consists of rules for conduct set by a political superior to political inferiors, and it embodies a contract the obligation of which is the
selfsame constitution regarded as law. The contract embodied in the
constitution always subsists among the corporators as parties thereto.
and it may subsist between the corporation and the state, for the state
is sometimes a party to it." Taylor, Private Corporations, § 438.

constitution always subsists among the corporators as parties thereto,

and it may subsist between the corporation and the state, for the state

is sometimes a party to it." Taylor, Private Corporations, § 438.

Sec. 83. Same. The charter as a law and as a contract.

FLINT AND FENTONVILLE PLANK-ROAD v. WOODHULL.
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1872. In the Supreme Court of Michigan. 25 Mich. Rep. 99-113.

Cooley, J. The legislature of 1848 passed an act incorporating

the Flint and Fentonville Plank-road Company, with power to lay out,

establish and construct a plank-road, and all necessary buildings,

from the village of Flint to the village of Fentonville. The act was

to remain in force sixty years from and after its passage, but the fourth

Sec. 83. Same.

section provided that "the legislature may at any time alter, amend,

or repeal this act by a vote of two-thirds of each branch thereof; but

The charter as a law and as a contract.

such alteration, amendment, or repeal shall not be made within thirty

FLINT AND FENTONVILLE PLANK-ROAD v. WOODHULL.

years of the passage of this act, unless it shall be made to appear to

the legislature that there has been a violation by the company of

1872. IN THE SUPREME CouRT

some of the provisions of this act." The fifth section made the gen-

OF

M1cH1GAN. 25 Mich. Rep. ~11 3.

eral plank-road act of 184S a part of this special charter. Laws 1S4S,

p. 404.

CooLEY, J. The legislature of 1848 passed an act incorporating
the Flint and Fentonville Plank-road Company, with power to lay out,
establish and construct a plank-road, and all necessary buildings,
from the village of Flint to the village of Fentonville. The act was
to remain in force sixty years from and after its passage, but the fourth
section provided that ' 'the legislature may at any time alter, amend.
or repeal this act by a vote of two-thirds of each branch thereof; but
such alteration, amendment, or repeal shall not be made within thirty
years of the passage of this act, unless it shall be made to appear to
the legislature that there has been a violation by the company of
some of the provisions of this act." The fifth section made the general plank-road act of 1848 a patt of this special charter. Laws 1848,
p. 404.
The corporators appear to have organized under their charter, and
to have constructed the road provided for by it, a part of which they
now keep up and mainta in. In 1871 , the legislature passed an act to
repeal this charter. This act is very brief, has no preamble, contains
no recitals, and simply declares that the act first above named " be
and the same is hereby repealed.'' Sess. L. 187 r , vol. iii, p. 167.
No notice was given to the company or to any of its officers, of the
intention to adopt or to propose any su ch repeal, or to enter upon any
investigation of a violation by the company of any of the provisions

The corporators appear to have organized under their charter, and

to have constructed the road provided for by it, a part of which they

now keep up and maintain. In 1871, the legislature passed an act to

repeal this charter. This act is very brief, has no preamble, contains

no recitals, and simply declares that the act first above named "be

and the same is hereby repealed." Sess. L. 1871, vol. iii, p. 167.

No notice was given to the company or to any of its officers, of the

intention to adopt or to propose any such repeal, or to enter upon any

investigation of a violation by the company of any of the provisions
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of its charter; neither the journals of the legislature, nor the files or

CHARTER AS A LAW AND CONTRACT.
records in the office of the secretary of state, show that any investiga-

399

tion was ever had, nor is it claimed or suggested that there is evidence

anywhere that any tribunal, legislative or judicial, has passed upon

the question of such a violation, and adjudged it to have taken place,

unless the repealing act itself affords such evidence. The company

denies the validity of this act, and the defendant, having treated it as

valid, and acted upon it adversely to their interests, an issue has been

made, which is now before us for decision.

It is not disputed on the part of the defendant that the charter of a

private corporation is to be regarded as a contract, whose provisions

are binding upon the state, and can not be set aside at the will of the

legislature. Such a charter is a law, but it is also something more

than a law, in that it contains stipulations which are terms of com-

pact between the state as the one party, and the corporators as the

other, which neither party is at liberty to disregard or repudiate,

and which are as much removed from the modifying and controlling

power of legislation as would be the contracts of private parties.

But the defendant insists that the repealing act in this case is one con-
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templated and justified by the contract itself; and no attempt is made

to defend it, except upon what the defendant regards as a just con-

struction of the original charter. The positions taken by the defend-

ant may be succinctly stated as follows:

1. The legislature had a right to repeal the charter whenever the

fact should be made to appear that a violation of the charter had

taken place.

2. The inquiry into the fact of violation would be an inquiry for

the purpose of enabling the legislature to exercise its legitimate pow- -

ers, and would, therefore, be legislative in character, and might be

entered upon in any manner and through any channels the legislative

wisdom might devise or see fit to employ, untrammeled by any of the

rules which govern the action of judicial tribunals.

3. The repealing act is not only of itself a determination that the

violation of charter has taken place, but it is evidence, also, that the

legislature has first informed itself of the facts; and no court or other

authority is at liberty to assume that it has acted improvidently or

without due inquiry.

4. But, although all presumptions favor the legislative action, it is

conceded that the parties concerned are entitled to a judicial investi-

gation afterwards, and, upon an issue properly framed for that pur-

pose, may show the act invalid by establishing the fact that no

violation of the charter has taken place, and that the legislature must

have acted under mistake or in misapprehension of the facts.

The first of these positions must be conceded. The right of the

legislature to repeal, when it was properly made to appear that a

breach of the charter had taken place, can not be questioned.

The second will be equally indisputable, if the main point be estab-

lished, that the inquiry to determine the violation of the charter is

legislative in character. The legislature will not Only choose its own

of its charter; neither the journals of the legislature, nor the files or
records in the office of the secretary of state, show that any investigation was ever had, nor is it claimed or suggested that there is evidence
anywhere that any tribunal, legislative or judicial, has passed upon
the question of such a violation, and adjudged it to have taken place,
unless the repealing act itself affords such evidence. The company
denies the validity of this act, and the defendant, having treated it as
valid, and acted upon it adversely to their interests, an issue has been
made, which is now before us for decision.
It is not disputed on the part of the defendant that the charter of a
private corporation is to be regarded as a contract, whose provisions
are binding upon the state, and can not be set aside at the will of the
legislature. Such a charter i"s a law, but i"t £s also somethz"ng more
titan a law, z"n that t"t contai"ns stt"pulati"ons whi"ch are terms of compact between the state as the one party, and the c01·porators as the
other, whi"ch nez"ther party t"s at lz"berty to dt"sregard or repudiate,
and whi"ch are as much removed from the modi"fyz"ng and contro!Nng
power of legislatt"on as would be the contracts of prt"vate partt"es.
But the <lefendant insists that the repealing act in this case is one contemplated and justified by the contract itself; and no attempt is made
to defend it, except upon what the defendant regards as a just construction of the original charter. The positions taken by the defendant may be succinctly stated as follows:
1. The legislature had a right to repeal the charter whenever the
fact should be made to appear that a violation of the charter had
taken place.
z. The inquiry into the fact of violation would be an inquiry for
the purpose of enabling the legislature to exercise its legitimate pow- ers, and would, therefore, be legislative in character, and might be
entered upon in any manner and through any channels the legislative
wisdom might devise or see fit to employ, untrammeled by any of the
rules which govern the action of judicial tribunals.
3. The repealing act is not only of itself a determination that the
violation of charter has taken place, but it is evidence, also, that the
legislature has first informed itself of the facts; and no court or other
authority is at liberty to assume that it has acted improvidently or
without due inquiry.
4. But, although all presumptions favor the legislative action, it is
conceded that the parties concerned are entitled to a judicial investigation afterwards, and, upon an issue properly framed for that purpose, may show the act invalid by establishing the fact that no
violation of the charter has taken place, and that the legislature must
have acted under mistake or in misapprehension of the facts.
The first of these positions must be c<>nceded. The right of the
legislature to repeal, when it was properly made to appear that a
breach of the charter had taken place, can n~t be questioned.
The second will be equally indisputable, if the main point be established, that the inquiry to determine the violation of the charter is
legislative in character. The legislature will not only choose its own
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modes of collecting information to guide its legislative discretion, but

from due courtesy to a co-ordinate department of the government, we

modes of collecting information to guide its legislative discretion , but
from due courtesy to a co-ordinate department of the government, we
must assume that those methods were the suitable and proper ones,
and that they led to correct results. And if the records show no investigation, we must still presume the proper information was
obtained; for we must not suppose the legislature to have acted improperly, unadvisedly, or from any other than public motives, under
any circumstances, when acting within the limits of its authority.
Baltimore v. St~te, 15 Md. 376; Lusher v. Scites, 4 W. Va. l l i
People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 545, 555; Wright v. Defrees, 8 Ind.
302 ; Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 514; Bradshaw v. Omaha, 1 Neb.
16; Humboldt Co. v. Churchill Co. Com'rs, 6 Nev. 30.
The third point must also be conceded to this extent; that the leg·
islative act, not violative of any constitutional principle, must be its
own sufficient and conclusive evidence, when assailed, of the justice,
propriety, and policy of its passage. \Ve ourselves acted upon this
principle in People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 484, and it is not disputed anywhere so far as we are aware.
But there lies at the basis of all these propositions the question
whether the determination that the charter has been violated is in
truth legislative in character. The defendant affirms that it is; the
plaintiff insist5 that it is properly and ·essentially judicial. This point
decided one way, disposes of the case; decided the other, it is followed
by other of a difficult and somewhat delicate nature, which would neces·
sari! y be considered before a conclusion could be reached on the merits.
Now it must be conceded that, if the act in question is not judicial
in character, it is at least strikingly analogous. There is a question
which is or may be disputed, there are adverse parties, there are private interests involved, there is evidence to be received, there is the
fact to be found, there is punishment to be inflicted, there is a forfeit·
ure to be enforced. Legislative action does not often, to say the least,
include all or many of these elements. It may affect private rights
incidentally, but it does not often proceed to pass directly upon the
controversies between the state and individuals. In some cases the
legislature has judicial power, because it is incident and essential to
the discharge of legislative functions. Such is the power to determine upon the election and qualification of its members and the powers
to punish for contempts of its authority. In these cases it is entitled to all
the presumptions which support the action of courts, and having no au·
thority set over it, to review its determinations, they must be accepted
everywhere as correct and conclusive. People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich.
· 481 ; Anderson v . Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; Hiss v. Bartlett, 3 Gray, 468;
Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226; State v. Matthews, 37 N. H.
450; State v. Jarrett, 17 Md. 309; Lamb v. Lynd, 44 Pa. St. 336.
But every judgment must have something preceding it to put the judicial body in motion; the sentence, by any authority pronounced,
however august or powerful, will be a mere idle fulmination if there
was no It's mota to base it upon. The order of a legislative body for
the punishment of an individual would be merely idle and void, un-
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subjected him to its jurisdiction for such punishment.

It is conceded in the present case that the fact of corporate abuse

was to be found before the charter could be taken away. The re-

pealing act, however, is only a sentence. It inflicts the penalty of

corporate death, without in any way declaring or intimating, except

by the penalty, that the corporation has been found worthy of death.

It is precisely such an act as might have been passed had the legisla-

tive power been unlimited and untrammeled. The legislature had

power to repeal for cause, and was prohibited from repealing without

cause; it repeals, expressing no cause, and it is said the cause must be

inferred. Then comes what is to have the effect of punishment,

though it does not purport to be such, and only on its face appears to

be the withdrawal of a privilege; and yet, as there was a right assured

and no mere privilege to be withdrawn, it is supposed, we must infer,

first, that a punishment was designed, and then, from the punishment

infer the guilt, the accusation, the trial, and the conviction. Having

thus assumed the conclusion to begin with, we must next, from the

conclusion, assume that the premises existed to deduce it from. This
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is certainly much more than can be assumed in support of the action

of any court. In the courts, there must at least be an accusation and

a condemnation, before there can be the infliction of any penalty. To

infer cause w here none is assigned in the taking away of private rights,

is to take up and adopt the arguments in favor of the arbitrary arrests

under the command of Charles I. His warrants assigned no cause,

and, therefore, it was argued sufficient cause must be presumed. If

this repealing act is good as a judgment of abuse of corporate privi-

leges, then Sir Nicholas Hyde was correct in holding that he could

not release on habeas corpus the parties committed to prison by the

special command of the king for refusing to submit to his illegal exac-

tions. The king had power to order a committal for cause; no cause

was expressed; therefore a sufficient cause was to be assumed. Dar-

nel's Case, 3 State Trials 1 ; Broom's Const. L., 162.

The defendant refers to certain cases in support of his positions, of

which The Miner's Bank v. The United States, Morris, 482, s. c,

1 Greene (Iowa) 553, goes to the full extent of holding that such a

legislative act is not only valid, but is conclusive that cause existed

for its passage. This case, however, stands alone, and was not very

much insisted upon on the argument. The cases of Crease v. Bab-

cock, 23 Pick. 334, and Erie & N. E. R. R. Co. v. Casey, 26 Penn.

St. 287, are more relied upon as laying down the correct rule. The

Pennsylvania case is most directly in point, and as it appears to have

been carefully considered, the conclusion is entitled to great respect,

notwithstanding those eminent jurists, Mr. Chief Justice Lewis and

Mr. Justice Woodward dissented. In that case, the corporation was

protected by a clause in its charter, similar to the one under consider-

ation here, and the legislature had thought proper to act upon it by re-

pealing the charter, without any preliminary judicial investigation. In

26—Wil. Casks.

less somewhere in the record there· appeared a cause alleged which
subjected him to its jurisdiction for such punishment.
It is conceded in the present case that the fact of corporate abuse
was to be found before the charter could be taken away. The repealing act, however, is only a sentence. It inflicts the penalty of
corporate death, without in any way declaring or intimating, except
by the penalty, that the corporation has been found worthy of death.
It is precisely such an act as might have been passed had the legislative power been unlimited and untrammeled. The legislature had
power to repeal for cause, and was prohibited from repealing without
cause; it repeals, expressing no cause, and it is said the cause must be
inferred. Then comes what is to have the effect of punishment,
though it does not purport to be such, and only on its face appears to
be the withdrawal of a privilege; and yet, as there was a right assured
and no mere privilege to be withdrawn, it is supposed, we must infer,
first, that a punishment was designed, and then, from the punishment
infer the guilt, the accusation, the trial, and the conviction. Having
thus assumed the conclusion to begin with, we must next, from the
conclusion, assume that the premises existed to deduce it from. This
is certainly much more than can be assumed in support of the action
of any court. In the courts, there must at least be an accusation and
a condemnation, before there can be the infliction of any penalty. To
infer cause where none is assigned in the taking away of private rights,
is to take up and adopt the arguments in favor of the arbitrary arrests
under the command of Charles I. His warrants assigned no cause,
and, therefore, it was argued sufficient cause must be presumed. If
this repealing act is good as a judgment of abuse of corporate privileges, then Sir Nicholas Hyde was correct in holding that he could
not release on habeas corpus the parties committed to prison by the
special command of the king for refusing to submit to his illegal. exactions. The king had power to order a committal for cause; ·no cause
was expressed; therefore a sufficient cause was to be assumed. Darnel's Case, 3 State Trials 1: Broom's Const. L., 162.
The defendant refers to certain cases in support of his positions, of
which The Miner's Bank v. The United States, Morris, 482, s. c.,
I Greene (Iowa) 553, goes to the full extent of holding that such a
legislative act is not only valid, but is conclusive that cause existed
for its passage. This case, however, stands alone, and was not very
much insisted upon on the argument. The cases of Crease v. Babcock, 23 Pick. 334, and Erie & N. E. R. R. Co. v. Casey, 26 Penn.
St. 287, are more relied upon as laying down the correct rule. The
Pennsylvania case is most directly in point, and as it appears to have
been carefully considered, the conclusion is en~itled to great respect,
notwithstanding those eminent jurists, Mr. Chief Justice Lewis and
Mr. Justice Woodward dissented. In that case, the corporation was
protected by a clause in its charter, similar to the one under consideration here, and the legislature had thought proper to act upon it by repealing the charter, without any preliminary judicial investigation. In
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stating the position assumed in support of the repealing act, Mr. Jus-

stating the position assumed in support of the repealing act, Mr. Justice Black says: "For the defendant, it is insisted that the repealing
act is itself not only evidence, but conclusive evidence, that the company had previously committed some abuse or misuse which justified
the repeal. No case has been cited which denies this doctrine h:
terms; and it was held for the true rule by the supreme courts of
Iowa (1 Greene 561) and of New York (19 Barb. 81). But I do
not see clearly the principle on which it can stand. A legislative
body in a matter like this is known to proceed without formal notice,
without specific accusation, and without opportunity to answer. There
is no confronting of the parties with the witnesses, nor anything that
can be called a hearing or trial. It would, therefore, seem unjust to
hold that a legislative act is, like a judicial sentence, conclusive of
every fact which ought to have been found before it was passed. It
might more plausibly be likened to an award made by an umpire to
whom both parties have agreed that the subject should be referred."
"For myself," he says, "I incline to the opinion that, when the constitutional power of the legislature to pass a law depends on matter
of fact, the party to be affected by it ought to have an opportunity
afterward of showing how the fact is." E. & N. E. R.R. Co. v.
Casey, 26 Penn. St. 316.
Having thus expressed the opinion that legislative conclusions on
questions of fact were subject to review in the courts, the learned
judge goes further, and proceeds to lay down rules for the legislative
guidance in determining the causes which are to justify the legislature
in acting at all. The legislature is not to judge finally for itself what
is abuse or misuse of corporate privileges by a company; but,
1. The illegal act must be posi'tz've.
A mere omission, like the
failure of a bank to make its annual returns, is not enough.
2. A disregard of the charter, which is injurious only to pri"vate
interests, and which, therefore, admits of pri'vate compensation, is
not, he thinks, within the fair meaning of the words. It must be
some conduct which infringes upon a right reserved by a state for the
benefit of the public.
3. It must be wi'llful; that is, not involuntary, accidental, or the
consequence of mere mistake of fact.
4. It must not be the mere transgression of the act of incorporation by a subordinate officer, or agent without authority, express or
implied, from the board of directors. E. & N. E. R. Co. v. Casey,
26 Pa. St. 319.
Thus the majority of the supreme court of Pennsylvania lays down
the rules of law which are to control the legislature in the exercise of
its legislative authority, and at the same time declares the right of
the court to review the conclusions of the legislative body in matters
of fact. With great respect to the eminent tribunal we are unable to
understand why this is not a setting of the court above the legislature,
as an appellate tribunal in matters both of law and of fact, in a manner which wholly ignores the divisions of the powers in the constitution, and is quite inconsistent with the harmonious operation of the
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of fact, the party to be affected by it ought to have an opportunity
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machinery of government. It is not consistent with legislative inde-

pendence and dignity, that the court should assert a right to sit in

judgment upon legislative action, or to attribute to the legislature

erroneous or oppressive conduct in the exercise of any of its proper

and legitimate functions. These two departments of the government

being co-ordinate, and neither of them occupying a position subordi-

nate to the other, the conclusions of each must be accepted by the

other as proceeding from good motives, and as warranted by the

proper information. It could only be productive of endless discord

and confusion, not to say of jealousies and conflicts of authority, if

the legislature was to review and set aside the judgments of the courts,

or the courts to allow parties to appeal to them from the conclusions

the legislature had reached in determining upon the propriety of pass-

ing or declining to pass a proposed law. Careful endeavor has been

made to prevent any such jealousies and conflicts when, in framing

our constitutions, a line of distinction has been drawn between the

legislative and judicial functions, and the departments to which these

functions respectively have been confided have been entrusted with
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no power to pass that line. It is, therefore, in the highest degree

impertinent and obtrusive, when either department undertakes to

advise the other, that in the exercise of its proper functions, it has

acted unwisely and indiscreetly, has misjudged the facts or perverted

the law; and its action must be still more offensive if it entertains the

appeal of parties from the decisions of the other, when acting within

a province which was set apart to be peculiarly under its jurisdiction

and control.

Moreover, there is, in the nature of the case, and the difference in

the manner in which legislative and judicial functions are performed,

reason sufficient to demonstrate the impossibility of a proper review

by one department of the decisions the other has made. Legislators

have a right to act upon their own knowledge and observation, upon

hearsay, upon information derived from the public press, upon the

ex parte petitions of interested parties, upon anything, in short, which

satisfies their judgment; and public opinion is one of the most impor-

tant facts to be considered in determining upon the propriety or advis-

ability of a proposed law. Even an unreasonable prejudice, if gen-

eral or widespread, may sometimes very properly be a controlling

consideration when the case is such that to the enforcement of the law

a strong supporting public sentiment would be a necessity. But these

are things the courts must not allow to influence their action. With

them the question must simply be, first, what is the law; and second,

what are the facts; and the facts they must reach through inflexible

rules of evidence laid down for their guidance. A review of a legis-

lative determination by the courts would, therefore, not only be

highly indecorous and objectionable, for the reasons already stated, but

it would be eminently improper also, for the further reason, that it could

not possibly be had upon the same evidence. It is wholly foreign to

any proper administration of law or justice, that the decision of the

proper authority upon any subject should be liable to review by an-

machinery of government. It is not consistent with legislative independence and dignity, that the court should assert a right to sit in
judgment upon legislative action, or to attribute to the legislature
erroneous or oppressive conduct in the exercise of any of its proper
and legitimate functions. These two departments of the government
being co-ordinate, and neither of them occupying a position subordinate to the other, the conclusions of each must be accepted by the
other as proceeding from good motives, and as warranted by the
proper information. It could only be productive of endless discord
and confusion, not to say of jealousies and conflicts of authority, if
the legislature was to review and set aside the judgments of the courts ,
or the courts to allow parties to appeal to them from the conclusions
the legislature had reached in determining upon the propriety of passing or declining to pass a proposed law. Careful endeavor has been
made to prevent any such jealousies and conflicts when, in framing
our constitutions, a line of distinction has been drawn between the
legislative and judicial functions, and the departments to which these
fonctions respectively have been confided have been entrusted with
no power to pass that line. It is, therefore, in the highest degree
impertinent and obtrusive, when either department undertakes to
advise the other, that in the exercise of its proper functions, it has
acted unwisely and indiscreetly, has misjudged the facts or perverted
the law; and its action must be still more offensive if it entertains the
appeal of parties from the decisions of the other, when acting within
a province which was set apart to be peculiarly under its jurisdiction
and control.
Moreover, there is, in the nature of the case, and the difference in
the manner in which legislative and judicial functions are performed,
reason sufficient to demonstrate the impossibility of a proper review
by one department of the decisions the other has made. Legislators
have a right to act upon their own knowledge and observation , upon
hearsay, upon information derived from the public press, upon the
ex parte petitions of interested parties, upon anything, in short, which
satisfies their judgment; and public opinion is one of the most important facts to be considered in determining upon the propriety or advi sability of a proposed law. Even an unreasonable prejudice, if general or widespread, may sometimes very properly be a controlling
consideration when the case is such that to the enforcement of the law
a strong supporting public sentiment would be a necessity. But these
are things the courts must not allow to influence their action. With
them the question must simply be, first, what is the law; and second,
what are the facts; and the facts they must reach through inflexible
rules of evidence laid down for their guidance. A review of a legislative determination by the courts would, therefore, not only be
highly indecorous and objectionable, for the reasons already stated, but
it would be eminently improper also, for the further reason, that it could
not possibly be had upon the same evidence. It is wholly foreign to
any proper administration of law or justice, that the decision of the
proper authority upon any subject should be liable to review by an-
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other tribunal, which in such review is shut off from the sources of in-

formation to which the other had access So far, therefore, from the

other tnbunal, which in such review is shut off from the sources of information to which the other had access . So far, therefore, from the
different ways the legislature and the judiciary have of reaching the
facts being a reason why the latter should give parties who have been
decided against by the former a rehearing, they constitute with us a
very conclusive reason for holding that those cases in which there is a
hearing to be had on questions of private right and private property.
are, and must in their very nature be, regarded as exclusively of judicial cognizance.
But there are still further rea sons why the doctrine declared in the
Pennsylvania case can not, we think, be sound. That doctrine is, to
state it more fully, that though the legislature may repeal the corporate charter, on the ground of abuse or misuse, thereby taking away
from the corporators the franchise of greater or less property value,
yet the legislative decision is only prima facie correct, and the parties are entitled to have it set aside in the courts afterward, on showing by evidence that they have not been guilty of such abuse or misuse.
In other words, the legislative act, which may perhaps be passed
without any notice, is to stand as a conviction of guilt until the parties charged can prove their innocence. But their innocence of what?
In other cases it would be thought the .grossest perversion of right
and justice if, in any proceeding in court, the party was to be presumed guilty of any one specific charge until he proved himself innocent; but that case would be a much less serious departure from the
rules of justice than this. The general plank-road act of 1848 was
made a part of this company's charter, and it contained a great many
provisions to be observed by it, and for a· violation of some of them
specific penalties were imposed. The company has been in operation upward of twenty years, when its franchi se is taken away on a
presumption of guilt, which is only to be removed by the corporator
proving that in all that time they have observed every provision of
their charter and been guilty of no default. It is safe to say that what
is required of them is, and would be in any such case, a simple impossibility. It is ifs if an individual should be charged generally, and
without further specification, with an offense against the criminal
laws, and the trial-court should say to him: ''You are charged, and
prt"ma facie convicted, of crime, but you shall be relieved of the conviction on making proof that you have never disobeyed the law.
Meantime, and until you do so, the state will take from you your
property in punishment for your presumed guilt."
Now, it is simply impossible that any doctrine which leads to such
results can be sound. But the illustrations of its anomalous and unjust character might be multiplied indefinitely, and if it were possible
for the question of corporate default to be fairly tried under it, it must
be remembered, aJso, that as the question would or might arise between individuals and the company, as it has in this instance, there
might be repeated trials of the same question, none of which would
be conclusive in a new suit. The question involved in each suit
would be the validity of a statute, dependent upon the facts , and,

different ways the legislature and the judiciary have of reaching the

facts being a reason why the latter should give parties who have been

decided against by the former a rehearing, they constitute with us a

very conclusive reason for holding that those cases in which there is a

hearing to be had on questions of private right and private property,

are, and must in their very nature be, regarded as exclusively of judi-

cial cognizance.

But there are still further reasons why the doctrine declared in the

Pennsylvania case can not, we think, be sound. That doctrine is, to

state it more fully, that though the legislature may repeal the corpo-

rate charter, on the ground of abuse or misuse, thereby taking away

from the corporators the franchise of greater or less property value,

yet the legislative decision is only prima facie correct, and the par-

ties are entitled to have it set aside in the courts afterward, on show-

ing by evidence that they have not been guilty of such abuse or misuse.

In other words, the legislative act, which may perhaps be passed
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without any notice, is to stand as a conviction of guilt until the par-

ties charged can prove their innocence. But their innocence of what?

In other cases it would be thought the grossest perversion of right

and justice if, in any proceeding in court, the party was to be pre-

sumed guilty of any one specific charge until he proved himself inno-

cent; but that case would be a much less serious departure from the

rules of justice than this. The general plank-road act of 1848 was

made a part of this company's charter, and it contained a great many

provisions to be observed by it, and for a-violation of some of them

specific penalties were imposed. The company has been in opera-

tion upward of twenty years, when its franchise is taken away on a

presumption of guilt, which is only to be removed by the corporators

proving that in all that time they have observed every provision of

their charter and been guilty of no default. It is safe to say that what

is required of them is, and would be in any such case, a simple im-

possibility. It is a"s if an individual should be charged generally, and

without further specification, with an offense against the criminal

laws, and the trial-court should say to him: "You are charged, and

prima facie convicted, of crime, but you shall be relieved of the con-

viction on making proof that you have never disobeyed the law.

Meantime, and until you do so, the state will take from you your

property in punishment for your presumed guilt."

Now, it is simply impossible that any doctrine which leads to such

results can be sound. But the illustrations of its anomalous and un-

just character might be multiplied indefinitely, and if it were possible

for the question of corporate default to be fairly tried under it, it must

be remembered, also, that as the question would or might arise be-

tween individuals and the company, as it has in this instance, there

might be repeated trials of the same question, none of which would

be conclusive in a new suit. The question involved in each suit

would be the validity of a statute, dependent upon the facts, and,
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therefore, submitted to a jury, and while the jury in one cause might

CHARTER AS A LAW AND CONTRACT.

hold it valid, another in a different case, acting upon somewhat dif-

ferent evidence, or influenced by more persuasive advocates, might

declare it void, and thus it would be a law to-day as to one party and

no law to-morrow as to another, and so on indefinitely, according to

the varying views which different panels of jurymen might take of dis-

puted facts, until, perhaps, the state would be compelled to interfere

by quo -Warranto, and have, after all these proceedings, the authori-

tative adjudication which sound policy, not less than correct principle,

demanded at the beginning. But we need hardly say that a law, if

valid at all, must be valid from its enactment, and can not be made

to depend upon the opinion of a jury as to the sufficiency of the rea-

sons for its being passed.

We are constrained, therefore, from all these considerations, to say

that the determination whether a corporation has violated its charter

is judicial in its nature. It requires the action of those tribunals

which must hear before they condemn, and must proceed upon in-

quiry. If it were properly legislative, it may be that the legislature

must be presumed to have given a hearing, but the fact, as we have
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seen in this case, is otherwise, and the cases in which presumptions

are to be indulged against the facts, ought not to be multiplied. It is

sufficient to say that, in our opinion, the case is one in which the party

is entitled to a trial of right in fact, and can not be put off with one

which rests exclusively in a presumption of law, indulged against the

fact. The violation of the charter can not be legally made to appear,

except on trial in a tribunal whose course of proceeding is devised for

the determination of questions of this nature.

We think this the fair construction of that clause of the charter

which is in question. It is not to be presumed that the legislature

designed to take upon itself judicial powers, and as the act does not

necessarily require that construction, it should not be given it. We

must suppose that an inquiry in some proper form was contemplated

by means of which on fair trial it should be made to appear to the

legislature that a cause existed justifying repeal. Any other view

renders the stipulation worthless as a protection, but this view pro-

tects the interests of corporators, and at the same time enables the

legislature to exercise its power of taking away the charter, even

though the violation of corporate duty might not be of that serious

character which would seem to justify declaring a forfeiture on judi-

cial proceedings instituted, independent of this clause. The repeal-

ing act, it must be assumed, was passed through inadvertence, and

probably under the impression that the charter, like many others in

this state, was subject to repenl in the legislative discretion.

This being our view, it follows that the judgment of the circuit

court must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial granted.

Christiancy, Ch. J., and Campbell, J., concurred.

Graves, J., did not sit in the case.

therefore, submitted to a jury, and while the jury in one cause might
hold it valid, another in a different case, acting upon somewhat different evidence, or influenced by more persuasive advocates, might
declare it void, and thus it would be a law to-day as to one party and
no law to-morrow as to another, and so on indefinitely, according to
the varying views which different panels of jurymen might take of disputed facts, until, perhaps, the state would be compelled to interfere
by quo warranto, and have, after all these proceedings, the authoritatiYe adjudication which sound policy, not less than correct principle,
demanded at the beginning. But we need hardly say that a law, if
valid at all, must be valid from its enactment, and can not be made
to depend upon the opinion of a jury as to the sufficiency of the reasons for its being passed.
VI/ e are constrained, therefore, from all these considerations, to say
that the determination whether a corporation has violated its charter
is judicial in its nature. It requires the action of those tribunals
which must hear before they condemn, and must proceed upon inquiry. If it were properly legislative, it may be that the legislature
must be presumed to have given a hearing, but the fact, as we have
seen in this case, is otherwise, and the cases in which presumptions
arc to be indulged against the facts, ought not to be multiplied. It is
i-ufficient to say that, in our opinion, the case is one in which the party
i entitled to a trial of right t'n fact, and can not be put off with one
\vhich rests exclusively in a presumption of law, indulged against the
fact. The violation of the charter can not be legally made to appear,
except on trial in a tribunal whose course of proceeding is devised for
the determination of questions of this nature.
\Ve think this the fair construction of that clause of the chatter
which is in question. It is not to be presumed that the legislature
designed to take upon itself judicial powers, and as the act does not
nece sarily require that construction, it should not be given it. We
must suppose that an inquiry in some proper form was contemplated
by means of which on fair trial it should be made to appear to the
legislature that a cause existed justifying repeal. Any other view
renders the stipulation worthless as a protection, but this view protects the interests of corporators, and at the same time enables the
legislature to exercise its power of taking a\'\'ay the charter, even
though the violation of corporate duty might not be of that serious
character which would seem to justify declaring a forfeiture on judicial proceedings instituted , independent of this clause. The repealing act, it must be assumed, was passed through inadvertence, and
probably under the impression that the charter, like many others in
this state, was subject to repeal in the legislative discretion.
This being our view, it follows that the judgment of the circuit
court must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial granted.
CHRJSTJANCY, Ch. J., and CAMPBELL, J., concurred.
GRAVES, J., did not sit in the case.
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Note. The charter as a law.

1. The courts take judicial notice of general incorporation laws. 1861, Heas-

Yote. The chal'ter as a law.
1. The courts take jud:icial notice of general incorporation laws. 1861, Heaston v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 16 Ind. 275.
And evell of special acts incorporating state banks. 1850, Jemison v. Planters' ,
etc., Bank, 17 Ala. 754; 1860, Davis v. Fulton Bank, 31 Ga. 69; 1861, Buell v.
Warner, 33 Vt. 570; 1862, Gordon v. Montgomery, 19 Ind. 110; Compure
Kelly v. Alabama & Cin. R. Co., 58 Ala. 489.
Or mmiicipal corporations. 1860, Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220; 1862,
Macey v. Titcombe, 19 Ind. 135; 1864, Swain v. Comstock, 18 Wis. 463; 1875,
Stier v. Oscaloosa, 4L Iowa 353; 1877, Albrittin v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. 486;
1894, Jones v. Lake View, 151 III. 663.
And sometimes railroad companies. 1866, Wright v. Hawkins, 28 Tex. 452;
1898, Millerv. Mattbews, 87 Md. 464, 41 Atl. Rep. 176. Butnotalwaysor~en
erallv. 1872, A., T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Blackshire, IO Kan. 477; 1876, Perrv \'N. o:, etc ., R. Co., 55 Ala. 413.
·
2. The charter, even though a special act, is a law of the state creating the
corporation, in the sense that "ignorance uf the law eXC11,ses no one;" hence all
persons are supposed to take notice of its contents. 1859, Hoyt v. Thompson ,
19 N. Y. 207; 1879, Thomas v. H.. Co., 101 U.S. 71; 1881, Davisv. Old Colony
R. Co., 131 Mass. 258, 41 Am. R . 221; 1887, Bocock v. Allegheny, etc., Co., 82
Va. 913, 3 Am. St. R. 128; 1887, Elevator Co. v. Memphis, etc., R. Co. , 85
Tenn. 703, 4 Am. St. R. 798; 1890, Jemison v. Citizens' Sav. Bank, 122 N. Y.
135, 19 Arn. St. R. 482; 1893, Franco-Texan Lan<! Co.v .McCo rmick,85Texas416,
34 Am. St. R. 815; 1895, Durkee v. People , 155 JIJ. 354, 46 Am. St. R. 340; 1897,
Franklin Nat'I Bank v. White head, 149 Jud. 560, 63 Am . St. R. 302. See pnrticularly Elliott, §§ 212, 213; Morawetz, §§ 59 1, 592; Taylor,§ 264; V . Thompson, § 5973, et seq.; VII. Thompson, § 83~ , Pt !le').
3. The charter, as a law, is conclusive evidf'nce of its validity, even though
obtained by fraud; ye t it will not protect those who obtained it by fraud, or
fraudulently organize under it. 1863, Paterson v. Arnold, 45 Pa. St. 410;
1865, Booth v. Bunce, 33 N. Y . 139, 88 Am, Dec . 372i 1894, Davirlson v. Hobson, 59 Mo. App. 130. But see Morawetz, § 769; ana Taylor,§ 147.
4. The charter as a contract, see, infra, pp. 707-760.

ton v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 16 Ind. 275.

And even of special acts incorporating state banks. 1850, Jemison v. Planters',

etc., Bank, 17 Ala. 754; 1860, Davis v. Fulton Bank, 31 Ga. 69; 1861, Buell v.

Warner, 33 Vt. 570; 1862, Gordon v. Montgomery, 19 Ind. 110; Compare

Kelly v. Alabama & Cin. R. Co., 58 Ala. 489.

Or municipal corporations. 1860, Pavne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220; 1862,

Macey v. Titcombe, 19 Ind. 135; 1864, Swain v. Coinstock, 18 Wis. 4ti3; 1875,

Stier v. Oscaloosa, 41 Iowa 353; 1877, Albrittin v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. 486;

1894, Jones v. Lake View, 151 111. 663.

And sometimes railroad companies. 1866, Wright v. Hawkins, 28 Tex. 452;

1898, Miller v. Matthews, 87 Md. 464, 41 Atl. Rep. 176. But not al way 8 or gen-

erally. 1872, A., T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Blackshire, 10 Kan. 477; 1876, Perrv v.

N. O., etc., R. Co., 55 Ala. 413.

2. The charter, even though a special act, is a law of the state creating the

corporation, in the sense that "ignorance of thelaw excuses no one;" hence all

persons are supposed to take notice of its contents. 1859, Hovt v. Thompson,
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19 N. Y. 207; 1879, Thomas v. R. Co., 101 U. S. 71; 1881, Davis v. Old Colony

R. Co., 131 Mass. 258, 41 Am. R. 221; 1887, Bocock v. Allegheny, etc., Co., 82

Va. 913, 3 Am. St. R. 128; 1887, Elevator Co. v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 85

Tenn. 703, 4 Am. St. R. 798; 1890, Jemison v. Citizens' Saw Bank, 122 N. Y.

135,19 Am. St. R. 482; 1893, Franco-Texan Land Co.v.McCormick,85Texas416,

34 Am. St. R. 815; 1895, Durkee v. People, 155111. 354, 46 Am. St. R. 340; 1897,

Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Whitehead, 149 Ind. 560, 63 Am. St. R. 302. See par-

ticularly Elliott, §5 212, 213; Morawetz, 591, 592; Taylor, § 264; V. Thomp-

son, § 5973, et seii.; VII. Thompson, § 8309, H seq.

3. The charter, as a law, is conclusive evidence of its validity, even though

obtained by fraud ; yet it will not protect those who obtained it by fraud, or

fraudulently organize under it. 1863, Paterson v. Arnold, 45 Pa. St. 410;

1865, Booth v. Bunee, 33 N. Y. 139, 88 Am, Dec. 372; 1894, Davidson v. Hob-

son, 59 Mo. App. 130. But see Morawetz, § 769; and Taylor, § 147.

4. The charter as a contract, see, infra, pp. 707-760.

Sec. 84. Same. The charter, or articles of incorporation or asso-

ciation under a general law, is a license of authority for the

persons named, or the promoters, to convert persons or an

.Sec. 84. Same. The charter, or articles of incorporation or asso-

association of persons into the designated corporation in ac-

ciation under a general law, is a Ncense of authority for the
persons named , or the promoters, to convert persons or an
association of persons into the designated corporation in accordance with the terms indicated in the charter, or general
law .

cordance with the terms indicated in the charter, or general

law.

STATE, Ex Rel., v. INSURANCE COMPANY.1

1892. In the Supreme Court of Ohio. 49 Ohio State Reports

440-447, 16 L. R. A. 611, 37 A. & E. C. C. 583.

Syllabus: 5. The making andfiling, for the purpose of profit, of

articles of incorporation in the office of the secretary of state, do not

STATE, Ex REL., v. INSURANCE COMPANY. 1

make an incorporated company; such articles are simply authority to

1 Only the opinion on the point as to authority to form corporations is

given.

1892.

IN

THE

SUPREME CouRT

OF

Omo.

49 Ohio State Reports

440-447 , 16 L. R . A. 61 r, 37 A. & E. C. C. 583.
SYLLABUS: 5. Tltc making and.ftling,for the purpose ofprofit, of
articles of incorporation in the <?ffice of the secretary of state. do not
make an incorporated company ; such articles are simply au/hor£ty to
1

Only the opinion on the point as to authority to form corporations is

~iven.

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 84 CHARTER IS A LICENSE TO FORM A CORPORATION. 407

do so. No company exists -within the meaning of the statute until the

requisite stock has been subscribed and paid in, and the directors

CHARTER IS A LICENSE TO FORM A CORPORATION.

chosen.

In quo warranto.

Minshall, J. 1. The defendant is a fidelity and casualty insur-

ance company, organized under the laws of the state of New York,

and doing, in this state, what by the laws of New York is authorized

do so. No company exists within the meaning of the statute until the
requisite stock has been subscribed and paid in, and the directors
chosen.
'

and known as four lines of such insurance, to wit: First, against in-

jury, disablement or death, of persons resulting from traveling, or

In quo warranto.

general accidents by land or water; second, guaranteeing the fidelity

of persons holding places of public or private trust; third, upon plate

glass against breakage; fourth, upon steam boilers against explosion,

and against loss or damage to life or property resulting therefrom. Its

right to do more than one of such lines of business in this state is

challenged by the attorney-general on the ground that, by the laws of

New York, no company incorporated in this state can transact in that

state more than one of such lines of insurance, and, therefore, under

the provisions of section 282, Revised Statutes, of this state, it has no

right to make in this state more than one of the lines of insurance it

is doing. That section reads as follows:
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"When, by the laws of any other state or nation, any taxes, fines,

penalties, license fees, deposits of money, or of securities, or other

obligations or prohibitions are imposed on insurance companies of

this state, doing business in such state or nation, or upon their agents

therein, so long as such laws continue in force, the same obligations

and prohibitions, of whatever kind, shall be imposed upon all insur-

ance companies of such other state or nation doing business within

this state, and upon their agents here."

A demurrer to the petition, objecting to the jurisdiction of the

court, as well as to the sufficiency of the pleading, having been over-

ruled, the defendant, as a third defense to the petition, answered:

"That under the laws of New York, it is legally authorized and em-

powered to do, and is now doing, the four lines of insurance in that

state, which the petition charges it with illegally doing in Ohio; and

that under the laws of Ohio, a corporation could be legally incorpo-

rated and organized, with power to do the same four lines of insur-

ance, or any one or more of them therein, but that no such company

has yet been organized to do said four lines of insurance in Ohio, and

hence no such company has yet made, or could make, application to

the proper officers in New York for a license to do said four lines

of insurance in the state of New York." A demurrer to this de-

fense having been overruled, the plaintiff asked leave to reply in sub-

stance as follows: That on January 13, 1887, the requisite number

of persons, citizens of Cuyahoga county, "subscribed and acknowl-

edged articles of incorporation," stating therein the name, place of

business, and capital stock of the proposed corporation and its object,

to wit: Under paragraph 2, § 3641, Revised Statutes, to do the four

kinds of insurance now being done by the defendant in this state; and

J. 1. The defendant is a fidelity and casualty insurance company, organized under the laws of the state of New York,
and doing, in this state, what by the laws of New York is authorized
and known as four lines of such insurance, to wit: Ft'rst, against injury, disablement or death, of persons resulting from traveling, or
general accidents by land or water; second, guaranteeing the fidelity
of persons holding places of public or private trust; third, upon plate
glass against breakage; fourth, upon steam boilers against explosion,
and against loss or damage to life or property resulting therefrom. Its
right to do more than one of such lines of business in this state is
challenged by the attorney-general on the ground that, by the laws of
New York, no company incorporated in this state can transact in that
state more than one of such lines of insurance, and, therefore, under
the provisions of section 282 1 Revised Statutes, of this state, it has no
right to make in this state more than one of the lines of insurance it
is doing. That section reads as follows:
"When, by the laws of any other state or nation, any taxes, fines,
penalties, license fees, deposits of money, or of securities, or other
obligations or prohibitions are imposed on insurance companies of
this state, doing business in such state or nation, or upon their agents
therein, so long as such laws continue in force, the same obligations
and prohibitions, of whatever kind, shall be imposed upon all insurance companies of such other state or nation doing business within
this state, and upon their agents here."
A demurrer to the petition , objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court, as_well as to the sufficiency of the pleading, having been overniled, the defendant, as a third defense to the petition, answered:
"That under the laws of New York, it is legally authorized and empowered to do, and is now doing, the four lines of insurance in that
state, which the petition charges it with illegally doing in Ohio; and
that under the laws of Ohio, a corporation could be legally incorporated and organized, with power to do the same four lines of insurance, or any one or more of them therein , but that no such company
ha yet been organized to do said four lines of insurance in Ohio, and
hence no such company has yet made, or could make, application to
the proper officers in New York for a license to do said four lines
of insurance in the state of Nev.- York." A demurrer to this de. fense having been overruled , the plaintiff asked leave to reply in substance as follows: That on January 13 1 1887 1 the requisite number
of persons, citizens of Cuyahoga county, "subscribed and acknowledged articles of incorporation," stating therein the name, place of
business, and capital stock of the proposed corporation and its ohject ,
to wit: Under paragraph 2, § 3641, Revised Statutes, to do the four
kinds of insurance now being done by the defendant in this state; and
MINSHALL,
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the same having been approved by the attorney-general, as in con-

formity to the laws of the state, were then filed and recorded in the

the same having been approved by the attorney-general, as in conformity to the laws of the state, were then filed and recorded in the
office of the secretary of state of Ohio, "whereby" it is averred, "an
Ohio corporation was duly and legally formed for the purpose of doing the lines of insurance mentioned in the articles of incorporation."
[The court, after holding it had jurisdiction to oust the corporation
from exercising its franchises in Ohio, and that the third defense was
insufficient, because there was no Ohio company to do business in Ne\•1
York, proceeded]:
The next question is, should leave be given to file the proposed
reply to the third defense? We think not, for the reason that it does
not show that an Ohio company has been formed to do the four lines
of insurance in which the defendant is engaged. It will be observed
that it does not aver that any officers or directors have been chosen,
or that any of the stock has been subscribed, or that any organization
whatever has been affected. It is simply that "articles of incorporation" have been made, and filed and recorded in the office of the secretary of state. 1 Articles of incorpo,ration do not make an incorporated company, they are simply autltor£ty to do so.
Before disposing of the case, it may be well enough to notice another defense relied on in the answer, and to which a demurrer has
been sustained, and that is, the license granted the defendant to do
business in this state by the superintendent of insurance. We are all
of the opinion that the issuing of a license to a foreign insurance company to do business in this state is a ministerial and not a judicial act,
an<l, whilst it will protect the company in the transaction of its business during its continuance, is not a bar to a proceeding against it in
quo warranto, where it is found to be exercising any of the franchises
of the state without authority of law. State v. Fidelity and Casualty
Ins. Co., 39 Min. 538, and cases cited in brief of counsel for relator.
Applicat£on for leave to reply to the third defense of the answer
overruled and pet£t£on dismt'ssed.

office of the secretary of state of Ohio, '-whereby" it is averred, "an

Ohio corporation was duly and legally formed for the purpose of do-

ing the lines of insurance mentioned in the articles of incorporation."

[•The court, after holding it had jurisdiction to oust the corporation

from exercising its franchises in Ohio, and that the third defense was

insufficient, because there was no Ohio company to do business in New-

York, proceeded]:

The next question is, should leave be given to file the proposed

reply to the third defense? We think not, for the reason that it does

not show that an Ohio company has been formed to do the four lines

of insurance in which the defendant is engaged. It will be observed

that it does not aver that any officers or directors have been chosen,

or that any of the stock has been subscribed, or that any organization

whatever has been affected. It is simply that "articles of incorpora-

tion" have been made, and filed and recorded in the office of the sec-

retary of state.1 Articles of incorporation do not make an incorpo-
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rated company, they are simply authority to do so.

Before disposing of the case, it may be well enough to notice an-

other defense relied on in the answer, and to which a demurrer has

been sustained, and that is, the license granted the defendant to do

business in this state by the superintendent of insurance. We are all

of the opinion that the issuing of a license to a foreign insurance com-

pany to do business in this state is a ministerial and not a judicial act,

and, whilst it will protect the company in the transaction of its busi-

ness during its continuance, is not a bar to a proceeding against it in

quo warranto, where it is found to be exercising any of the franchises

of the state without authority of law. State v. Fidelity and Casualty

Ins. Co., 39, Min. 538, and cases cited in brief of counsel for re-

lator.

Application for leave to reply to the third defense of the answer

overruled and petition dismissed.

1 The Revised Statutes of Ohio, § 3236, provides that "any number of

persons, not leas than five * * * desiring to become incorporated shall

subscribe * * * articles of incorporation * * * which must contain

[certain enumerated things]." Section 3238 provides that "the articles shall

be filed in the office of the secretary of state." Section 3239 provides that

"upon the filing of the articles of incorporation, the persons who subscribed

1 The Revised Statutes of Ohio, § 3236, provides that "any number of
persons, not less than five • • • desiring to become incorporated shall
subscribe * * • articles of incorporation • * * which mast contain
[certain enumerated things]." Section 3238 provides that "the articles shall
be filed in the office of the secretary of state." Section 3239 provides that
"upon the filing of the articles of incorporation, the persons who subscribed
the same, their associates, successors and assigns, by the name and style provided thert1in, shall thereafter be deemed a body corporate, with succession
and power to sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with," etc. It will
be noticed that the statute seems to make the subscribers a corporation, before any stock is subscribect. or any organization had, yet tbe supreme court
holds that in fact the subscribing and filing articles of incorporation only re- ·
salts in a license to obtain subscription to stock and organize a corporation in
accordance with the farther provisions of the 11;eneral law.
,'ee, also, Walton v. Oliver, 49 Kan. 107, infra, p. 565; 1895, Whetstone v.
Crane Bros., 1 Kan. App. 320, and cases given under§§ 144- 148, infra.

the same, their associates, successors and assigns, by the name and style pro-

vided therein, shall thereafter be deemed a body corporate, with succession

and power to sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with," etc. It will

be noticed that the statute seems to make the subscribers a corporation, be-

fore any stock is subscribed, or any organization had, yet the supreme court

holds that in fact the subscribing and filing articles of incorporation only re-

sults in a license to obtain subscription to stock and organize a corporation in

accordance with the further provisions of the general law.

See, also, Walton v. Oliver, 49 Kan. 107, infra, p. 565; 1895, Whetstone v.

Crane Bros., 1 Kan. App. 320, and cases given under §§ 144-148, infra.
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ARTICLE n. ITS GENERAL FORM AN OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE.

See. 85. The offer may be by parties, and an acceptance by the

state; or it may be a special or general offer by the state, and
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an acceptance by individuals, or an association of individuals.

PERKINS v. SANDERS.1

1879. In the Supreme Court of Mississippi. 56 Miss. Rep.

733-743-

ARTICLE

U.

ITS GENERAL FORM-AN OFFER

AND

ACCEPTANCE.

George, C.J. * * * The appellant is a stockholder in the Perkins-

ville Manufacturing Company, and he also claims to be its creditor;

Sec. 85. The offer may be by parties, and an acceptance by the
state; or it may be a special or general offer by the state, and
an acceptance by individuals, or an association of individuals.

and by his bill he seeks to recover from the other stockholders, under a

provision of the charter of that company, hereinafter to be set out, the

amount of his debt. This bill is filed also in behalf of all of the

PERKINS v. SANDERS. 1

creditors of the company, and is against all the stockholders. The

company itself is not made a party, which would have been the regular

course in a bill of this character (a creditor's bill), since it is not

I

1879.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF M1ss1ssIPP1.

56

Miss. Rep.

733-743.

clear, from the allegations of the bill, that the company is either dis-

solved or entirely without assets.

The main point raised by the demurrer denied the right of the com-

plainant, upon the ground that he was not a creditor of the company,

because he did not show in his bill that the company was sufficiently
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organized under its charter to make the contract sued on, at the time

it was made. This position is founded on the second section of the

charter (Sess. Laws 1870, p. 194), which provides "that the capital

stock of the said company shall amount to $60,000, and may be in-

creased, at the option of the stockholders, to $500,000, and that it

shall be divided into shares of $100 each."

The obligation sued on is dated in September, 1872, and is signed

by the president and secretary of the company. The authority shown

for the action of these officers, is a resolution and a by-law passed by

the stockholders, dated in December, 1871.

The bill alleges that $60,000 of stock was subscribed before the

execution of this obligation, but it does not aver that this subscription

was made before the date of the resolution and by-law, which consti-

tute the authority for making the contract. The chancellor sustained

the objection, but in this we are unable to agree with him.

It will be here noticed that this is not a bill by a creditor to collect

the unpaid balance of stock due by a stockholder to the company, as

was the case of Vick v. Lane,2 but a suit to enforce a personal

liability of the stockholders for all the debts of the company.

So that the only points to be decided are, first, whether the obliga-

tion which the complainant sued on is a valid debt of the company;

and. second, whether the circumstances exist which, under the pro-

1 Onlv that part of the opinion relating to acceptance of charter given.

»5fi Miss. 681.

GEORGE, C. J. • • • The appellant is a stockholder in the Perkins\' ille Manufacturing Company, and he also claims to be its creditor;
a nd by his bill he seeks to recover from the other stockholders, under a
provision of the charter of that company, hereinafter to be set out, the
a mount of his debt. This bill is filed also in behalf of all of the
creditors of the company, and is against all the stockholders. The
company itself is not made a party, which would have been the regular
course in a bill of this character (a creditor's bill), since it is not
clear, from the allegations of the bill, that the company is either di ssolved or entirely without assets.
The main point raised by the demurrer denied the right of the complainant, upon the ground that he was not a creditor of the company,
because he did not show in his bill that the company was sufficiently
organized under its charter to make the contract suecl on, at the t ime
it was made. This position is founded on the second section of the
charter (Sess. Laws 1870, p. 194), which provides "that the capital
tock of the said company shall amount to $60,000, and may be increased, at the option of the stockholders, to $soo,ooo, and that it
sha ll be divided into shares of $100 each."
The obligation sued on is dated in September, 1872, and is signed
by the president and secretary of the company. The authority shown
for the action of these officers, is a resolution and a by-l aw passed by
the stockholders, dated in ,December, 187 l.
The bill alleges that $6o,ooo of stock was subscribed before the
execution of this obligation , but it does not aver that this subscription
was made before the <late of the resolution and by-law, which constitute the authority for making the contract. The chancellor sustained
the objection, but in this we are unable to agree with him.
It will be here noticed that this is not a bill by a creditor to collect
the unpaid balance of stock due by a stockholder to the company, as
was the case of Vick v. Lane, 2 but a suit to enforce a personal
1iabil ity of the stockholders for all the d ebts of the company.
So that the only points to be decided are , first, whether the obligation which the complainant sued on is a valid debt of the company;
anrl. second. whether the circumstances exist which , under the proOnly that part of the opinion relating to acceptance of charter given.
' 56 Miss. 681.
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visions of the charter, make the stockholders liable for the debts of

the company. It is, therefore, wholly immaterial whether the stock-

410

holders were liable to assessments on their stock, in virtue of the fail-
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PERKINS V. SANDERS.

ure of the subscriptions to amount to $60,000, except so far as such

visions of the charter, make the stockholders liable for the debts of
the company. It is, therefore, wholly immaterial whether the stockho lders were liable to assessments on their stock, in virtue of the failure of the subscriptions to amount to $6o,ooo, except so far as su ch
failure may, in law, be an obstacle to the due organization of the
company, and the creation by it of the debt sought to be enforced.
In charters which are mere propositions for the organization of a
corporation, and which require certain acts to be performed precedent
to the existence of the corporation, no corporation can exist, and of
course, no corporate act can be performed till these conditions h:·w e
been complied with. In all such cases, where a certain amount is
named in the charter as necessary to be subscribed as the capital stock
of the company, such subscription is regarded as a condition precedent to the existence of the corporation, unless otherwise provided in
the charter. Persons, therefore, who subscribe for stock under such
a charter have a right to assume that they will not be called upon to
pay until the amount na med in the charter shall he subscribed, and,
accordingly, in that class of charters it has been held that subscriber
for the stock are not liable to asse~sments on their stock until the full
a mount of the subscription has been made. But this rul e does not
apply if there be anything in the charter which shows a right in the
corporation to make the assessments before the full amount of the stock
is subscribed, as was decided in Selma and Marion Railroad Company v. Anderson, 5 r Miss. 829.
The charter of this company is not of that character. By the first
section of it, it is provided that the twenty-one persons named in it,
"and all others who are now or hereafter become associated with
them and their successors and assigns, be, and they are hereby.
created a body politic and corporate under the name and style .of the
Perkinsville M anufacturing Company ," etc. Th i's was no propositi'on
to create a corporati'on 1,pon the performa1lce of precedent conditions.
but t't was £/self the creati'on of a corporati"on, requi'rt'ng no other act
to be performed by the co rporators than thl!ir acceptance of the charter: and thi's even was unnecessary, if, as i't i's probable, th e corporators had apph'cd for the grant of th e charter, and thus accepted t't
t'n advance. Action under the charter would be an acceptance o_f t't.
and h ence, there never could be any questt'on as to the ext'stence and due
organizaii"on of the corporation , when determt'n.t'ng upon the validt'ty
of a corporate act done wt'tht'n t'ts charter powers, for the p erforma1Ue
of th e act t'tself would be an acceptance of the charter.
Th e dt'stt'nctt'on between the two classes of charters i's thus seen to
be, that in the first-class the charter i's a mere p ermt'sst'on on the part
of the legt'slature for the formatt'on of a corporatt'on, upon the dot'ng
of certat'n acts prescn"bed t'n the charter as precedent condt'tt'ons, and
as a necessary result, no corporate act can be done untt'l these conditt'ons have been p erformed , except such as may be expressly permitted
by the charter; and as to those acts, t't would be const'dered that the
corporatt'on had an ext'stence before £ts full t'nvestt'ture wt'tli £ts corporate franchises. ln th e latter class. t'n whi'ch i's this compatl)' ,

failure may, in law, be an obstacle to the due organization of the

company, and the creation by it of the debt sought to be enforced.

In charters which are mere propositions for the organization of a

corporation, and which require certain acts to be performed precedent

to the existence of the corporation, no corporation can exist, and of

course, no corporate act can be performed till these conditions have

been complied with. In all such cases, where a certain amount is

named in the charter as necessary to be subscribed as the capital stock

of the company, such subscription is regarded as a condition prece-

dent to the existence of the corporation, unless otherwise provided in

the charter. Persons, therefore, who subscribe for stock under such

a charter have a right to assume that they will not be called upon to

pay until the amount named in the charter shall be subscribed, and,

accordingly, in that class of charters it has been held that subscribers

for the stock are not liable to assessments on their stock until the full

amount of the subscription has been made. But this rule does not
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apply if there be anything in the charter which shows a right in the

corporation to make the assessments before the full amount of the stock

is subscribed, as was decided in Selma and Marion Railroad Com-

pany v. Anderson. 51 Miss. 829.

The charter of this company is not of that character. By the first

section of it, it is provided that the twenty-one persons named in it,

"and all others who are now or hereafter become associated with

them and their successors and assigns, be, and they are herebv.

created a body politic and corporate under the name and style of the

Perkinsville Manufacturing Company," etc. This was no proposition

to create a corporation upon the performance of precedent conditions,

but it was itself the creation of a corporation, requiring no other act

to be performed by the corporators than their acceptance of the char-

ter, and this even was unnecessary', if, as it is probable, the corpora-

tors had applied for the. grant of the. charter, and thus accepted it

in advance. Action under the charter would be an acceptance of it.

and hence, there never could be any question as to the existence and due

organization of the corporation, when determining upon the validity

of a corporate act done within its charter powers, for the performance

of the act itself would be an acceptance of the charter.

The distinction between the. two classes of charters is thus seen to

be, that in the first-class the charter is a mere permission on the part

of the legislature for the formation of a corporation, upon the doing

of certain acts prescribed in the charter as precedent conditions, and,

as a necessary result, no corporate act can be done until these condi-

tions have been performed, except such as may be expressly permitted

by the charter; and as to those acts, it would be considered that the

corporation had an existence before its full investiture with its cor-

porate franchises. In the latter class, in which is this company,
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the corporation is in existence, for all the purposes of its creation,

from the beginning, except so far as there may be restraints placed

on it by the charter, either expressly or by plain implication.
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I

As the bill alleges that the $60,000 of stock was subscribed before

the execution of the obligation sued on, it is unnecessary for us to de-

cide whether the charter so far restricts the power of the corporation

to make contracts within the scope and purpose for which the charter

was granted, as to prohibit the making of this contract until such

subscription is made. But it is insisted that the corporation could

not elect a president or a board of directors, nor confer the power on

them, when elected, to make contracts until after the subscription of

$60,000 of stock should be made, and for this reason it is urged that

the obligation sued on, and which was made by the president and

secretary on behalf of the company, should be held as made without

the proper authority of the corporation.

We do not consider the position a sound one. There is no restric-

tion in the charter upon the exercise, by the corporation, from the

moment of its creation, of any of its corporate powers, unless it can

be implied from the terms of the second section, fixing the amount of

the capital stock, as hereinbefore quoted.
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It has been seen that the subscription of the prescribed amount of

capital stock is not a precedent condition to the organization of the

corporation,—that the corporation was created by the very terms of

the charter, eo instanti with its acceptance by the corporators. The

charter does not prescribe how nor when the subscription is to be

made, nor the time at which the subscription is to be made payable,

nor does it attach any disability to the corporation prior to the sub-

scription. It makes no provision as to how the stock shall be divided

among the corporators named, nor as to the terms on which new cor-

porators should be admitted. All these were necessarily left to the dis-

cretion of the corporation, and the power to regulate those matters

was also expressly granted to the corporation as it was created by the

charter, by the provision contained in the first section of that instru-

ment, that the corporation might, "make all by-laws, rules and regu-

lations for the management of its business, property and effects, and

the transfer of its stock, as to them may seem best."

See notes to State v. Dawson, and Benbow v. Cook, infra, pp. 413, 416.

See, also, Angell & Ames, §§81-95; Beach, §15; Boone, §§23,24; Clark,

§5 23,24; Cook, §§499, 640; Elliott, §§23-25; Field, §§23-26; Grant, pp.

*18-*24; Morawetz, §§ 21-23, 25, 26, 40; Taylor, § 449; 1 Thompson, §§ 52, et

teq.; VII Thompson, §8160.

th e corporat£on is £n exi"stence, for all the purposes of its creati'on,
from the beginn£ng, except so far as there may be restraints placed
on it by the charter, e£ther expressly or by plain £mpl£cation.
As the bill alleges that the $6o,ooo of stock was s ubscribed before
the execution of the obligation sued on, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether the charter so far restricts the power of the corporation
- to make contracts within the scope and purpose for which the charter
was granted, as to prohibit the making of this contract until such
subscription is made. But it is insisted that the corporation could
not elect a president or a board of directors, nor confer the power on
them , when elected, to make contracts until after the subscription of
$6o,ooo of stock should be made, and for this reason it is urged that
the obligation sued on, and which was made by the president and
secretary on behalf of the company, should be held as made without
the proper autho1;ty of the corporation.
We do not consider the position a sound one. There is no restriction in the charter upon the exercise, by the corporation, from the
moment of its creation, of any of its corporate powers, unless it can
be implied from the terms of the second section, fixing the amount of
the capital stock, as hereinbefore quoted.
It has been seen that the subscription of the prescribed amount of
capital stock is not a precedent condition to the organization of the
corporation,-that the corporation was created by the very terms of
the charter, eo instanti with its acceptance by the corporators. The
charter does not prescribe how nor when the subscription is to be
made, nor the time at which the subscription is to be made payable,
nor does it attach any disability to the corporation prior to the subscription. It makes no provision as to how the stock shall be divided
among the corporators named, nor as to the terms on which new corporators should be admitted. All these were necessarily left to the discretion of the corporation, and the power to regulate those matters
was also expressly granted to the corporation as it was created by the
charter, by the provision contained in the first section of that instrument, that the corporation might, "make all by-laws, rules and regulations for the management of its business, property and effects, and
the transfer of its stock, as to them may seem best."
See notes to State v." Dawson, and Benbow v. Cook, infra, pp. 413, 416.
See, also, Ange ll & Ames, §§ 81-95; Bet1ch, § 15; Boo-n e, §§ 23, 24; Clark,
§§ 23, 24; Cook, §§ 499, 640; Elliott, §§ 23-25; Field, §§ 23-26; Grant, pp.
*IS-*24; Morawetz, §§ 21-23, 25, 26, 40; Taylor, § 449; 1 Thompson, §§ 52, et
&tq.; VII Thompson, § 8160.
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Sec. 86. The offer may be withdrawn before acceptance. Accept-
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ance is essential.

THE STATE, Ex Rbl., v. DAWSON.

1861. In the Supreme Court of Indiana. 16 Ind. Rep. 40-43.

Sec. 86. The offer may be withdrawn before acceptance. Accept-

Appeal from the Clark circuit court.

ance is essential.

Perkins, J. Information against the defendants, charging that

they are pretending to be a corporation, and to act as such, when they

are not a corporation. It charges that in January, 1849, the legisla-

THE STATE, Ex REL., v. DAWSON.

ture of the state of Indiana enacted a special charter of incorporation

(which is set out at length) for a railroad from Fort Wayne, Indiana,

1861.

to Jeffersonville, to be called the Fort Wayne and Southern Rail-

IN THE SUPREME CouRT

OF

INDIANA.

16 Ind. Rep. 4<>-43·

road; that the persons named in the charter as directors did not ac-

Appeal from the Clark circuit court.
PERKINS, J. Information against the defendants, charging that
they are pretending to be a corporation, and to act as such, when they
are not a corporation. It charges that in January, 1849, the legislature of the state of Indiana enacted a special charter of incorporation
(which is set out at length) for a railroad from Fort Wayne, Indiana,
to Jeffersonville, to be called the Fort Wayne and Southern Railroad; that the persons named in the charter as directors did not accept said charter till June 2, 1852, when they did meet and accept the
same, and organized under it. It is alleged that the defendants are
assuming to act under said charter, never having organized under any
other. The court below sustained a demurrer to the information, thus
holding the defendants to be a legal corporation.
The present constitution of Indiana took effect on November 1,
1851. It contains these provisions:
"All laws now in force, and not inconsistent with this constitution,
shall remain in force, until they shall expire or be repealed." Sched.
(1 sub. sec.) of Constitution.
' 'Corporations, other than banking, shall not be created by special
act, but may be formed under general laws." Art. xi, § 13·
"All acts of incorporation for municipal purposes shall continue in
force under this constitution, until such time as the general assembly
shall, in its discretion, modify or repeal the same." Sched., supra ,
sub. § 4.
The charter for the Fort Wayne and Southern Railroad was not a
charter for municipal purposes, and hence was not specially continued
in existence. Article 1 l, § 13, above quoted, prohibits the creation
of a corporation by special act or charter, that is, as we construe the
prohibition, through or by virtue of, such special act or charter, after
November 1, 1851. The policy that induced the prohibition. as well
as its literal import, demands this construction. It is necessary for
u to ascertain, then, when the defendants, if ever, were created a
corporation. The simple enactment of the charter for the corporation by the legislature, did not create the corporation. It required
one act on the part of the persons named in the charter to do that,
viz.: acceptance of the charter enacted.
Says Grant in his work on corporations, vide, p. 13 "Nor can a
charter be forced on any body of persons who do not choose to accept it." Anci again at p. 18, he says, "The fundamental rule is thi. :
no charter of incorporation is of any effect until it is accepted by a majority of the grantees, or persons who are to be the corporators under

cept said charter till June 2, 1852, when they did meet and accept the

same, and organized under it. It is alleged that the defendants are

assuming to act under said charter, never having organized under any

other. The court below sustained a demurrer to the information, thus

holding the defendants to be a legal corporation.

The present constitution of Indiana took effect on November 1,

1851. It contains these provisions:
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"All laws now in force, and not inconsistent with this constitution,

shall remain in force, until they shall expire or be repealed." Sched.

(1 sub. sec.) of Constitution.

"Corporations, other than banking, shall not be created by special

act, but may be formed under general laws." Art. xi, § 13.

"All acts of incorporation for municipal purposes shall continue in

force under this constitution, until such time as the general assembly

shall, in its discretion, modify or repeal the same." Sched., supra,

sub. § 4.

The charter for the Fort Wayne and Southern Railroad was not a

charter for municipal purposes, and hence was not specially continued

in existence. Article 11, § 13, above quoted, prohibits the creation

of a corporation by special act or charter, that is, as we construe the

prohibition, through or by virtue of, such special act or charter, after

November 1, 1851. The policy that induced the prohibition, as well

as its literal import, demands this construction. It is necessary for

us to ascertain, then, when the defendants, if ever, were created a

corporation. The simple enactment of the charter for the corpora-

tion by the legislature, did not create the corporation. It required

one act on the part of the persons named in the charter to do that,

viz.: acceptance of the charter enacted.

Says Grant in his work on corporations, vide, p. 13 "Nor can a

charter he forced on any body of persons who do not choose to ac-

cept it." And again at p. 18, he says, "The fundamental rule is this:

no charter of incorporation is of any effect until it is accepted by a ma-

jority of the grantees, or persons who are to be the corporators under
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it. Bagge's case, 2 Brownl. & G. 100, s. c. 1 Roll. Rep. 224; Dr.

Askew's case, 4 Burr. 2200; Rutter v. Chapman, 8 M. & W. 25;

per Wilmot, J., Rex v. Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge, 3 Burr. 1661.

This is analogous to the general rule that a man can not be obliged to

accept the grant or devise of an estate. Townson v. Tickell, 3 B. &

Aid. 31." See, also, Ang. & Am., § 83, where it is said, if a charter

is granted to those who do not apply for it, the grant is said to be in

fieri till acceptance. We need not inquire whether this rule extends

to municipal corporations in this country. As to what may constitute

an acceptance we are not here called on to decide, as the information

expressly shows that there was none in this case till June, 1852,

which fact is admitted by the demurrer.

The grant of the charter in question, then, to those who had not

applied for it, was but an offer, on the part of the state; a consent

that the persons named in the charter might become a corporation,

might be created such an artificial being by accepting the charter

offered. But an offer, till accepted, may be withdrawn. In this case,

the offer made by the state in 1849 was withdrawn by the state No-

vember 1, 1851, by them declaring that no corporation, after that

date, should be created except pursuant to regulations which she, in
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future, through her legislature would prescribe.

This pretended corporation, then, was not created before Novem-

ber 1, 1851, and it could be created afterward only by the concurrent

consent of the state and the corporators. But, at that date, the con-

stitution prohibited both the state and coqiorators from giving consent

to such a corporation, to wit: One coming into existence through a

special charter; and hence necessarily prohibited the creation thereof.

This decision accords with that of the supreme court of the United

States in Aspinwall v. Daviess County, 22 How., p. 364, where it

was held that the new constitution prohibited a subscription of stock

to the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company, authorized by the

charter of the corporation, granted under the former constitution and

actually voted by the people of the county under that constitution.

Whether, as a matter of fact, the charter in this case was accepted

under the old constitution, must be determined on a trial of the cause

below.

Had the provision in our constitution, like that on this subject in the

constitution of Ohio, ordained that the legislature should "pass no

special act conferring powers." the restraint would clearly have been

imposed alone upon future legislative action; but, in our constitution,

the restraint is plainly imposed upon the creation, the organization

of the corporation itself. See The State v. Roosa, 11 Ohio St. Rep. 16.

Per Curiam.—The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause re-

manded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Note. The original act provided that Allen Hamilton and others named

"are hereby constituted a body corporate," etc. In the later case, State v.

Dawson, 22 Ind. 272 (18641, it appeared that the charter had been applied for

by the corporators; this was held to be an acceptance. See 1807, Ellis v.

Marshall, 2 Mass. 269, 3 Am. Dec. 49, supra, p. 306; 1820, Lincoln & K. B. v.

Richardson, 1 Maine (1 Greenl.) 79, 10 Am. Dec. 34; 1839, Thomas v. Dakin,
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it. Bagge's case, 2 Brown I. & G . 100, s. c. 1 Roll. Rep. 224; Dr.
Askew's case, 4 Burr. 2200; Rutter v. Chapman, 8 M. & W. 25;
per Wilmot, J., Rex v. Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge, 3 Burr. 1661.
This is analogous to the general rule that a man can not be obliged to
accept the grant or devise of an estate. Townson v. Tickell, 3 B. &
Aid. 31." See, also, Ang. & Am.,§ 83, where it is said, if a charter
is granted to those who do not apply for it, the grant is said. to be in
fieri till acceptance. We ne~d not inquire whether this rule extends
to municipal corporations in this country. As to what may constitute
an acceptance we are not here called on to decide, as the information
expressly shows that there was none in this case till June, 1852,
which fact is admitted by the demurrer.
The grant of the charter in question, then, to those who had not
applied for it, was but an offer, on the part of the state; a consent
that the persons named in the charter might become a corporation,
might be created such an artificial being by accepting the charter
offered. But an offer, till accepted, may be withdrawn. In this case,
the offer made by the state in 1849 was withdrawn by the state November 1, 1851, by them declaring that no corporation, after that
date, should be created except pursuant to regulations which she, in
future, through her legislature would prescribe.
This pretended corporation, then, was not created before November 1, 185 1, and it could be created afterward only by the concurrent
consent of the state and the corporators. But, at that date, the constitution prohibited both the state and corporators from giving consent
to such a corporation, to wit: One coming into existence through a
special charter; and hence necessarily prohibited the creation thereof.
This decision accords with that of the supreme court of the United
States in Aspinwall v. Daviess C ounty, .iz How. , p. 364, where it
was held that the new constitution prohibited a subscription of stock
to the Ohio and Missi ssippi Railroad Company, authorized by the
charter of the corporation , granted under the former constitution and
actually voted by the people of the county under that constitution.
Whether, as a matter of fact, the charter in this case was accepted
under the old constitution, must be determined on a trial of the cause
below.
Had the provision in our constitution, like that on this subject in the
constitution of Ohio, ordained that the legislature should "pass no
special act conferring powers, " the restraint would clearly have been
imposed alone upon future legislative action; but, in our constitution ,
the restraint is plainly imposed upon the creation, the organization
of the corporation itself. See The State v. Roosa, 11 Ohio St. Rep. 16.
Per Curiam.-The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Note. The original act provided that Allen Hamilton and others named
"are hereby constitut.ed a body corporate," etc. In the lat.er case, Stare v.
Dawson, 22 Ind. 272 (18641, it appeared that the charter bad been applied for
by the corporators; this was held to be an acceptance. See 1807. Ellis v.
~larshall, 2 Mass. 269, 3 Am. Dec. 49, supra, p. 306; 1820, Lincoln & K. B. v.
Richardson, l Maine ll Green!.) 71J, 10 Aw. Dec. 34; 1839, Thomas v. Dakin,
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22 Wend, 9, supra, p. 19; 1842, State v. B. & 0. R. R., 12 Gill & 3. (Md.) 399,

' :t2 Wend, 9, supra, p. 19; 1842, State v. B. & 0. R.R., 12 Gill & J. (Md.) 399,

38 Am. Dec. 317; 1847, Haslett v. Wotherspoon, 1 Strob. Eq. (S. C.) 209;

38 Am. Dec. 317; 1847, Haslett v. Wotherspoon, 1 Strob. Eq. (S. C.) 209;
1859, Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 2 Mete. (Ky .) 350; 1870, Lyon8
v. Orange , A. & M. R. Co., 32 Md. 18; 1872, Mason v. Finch, 28 Mich. 282;
1876, P. W. & B. R. Co. v. Kent Co. R. Co., 5 Houst. (Del.) 127; 1885, Smith
v. Silver Valley M. Co., 64 Md. 85, 54 Am. Rep. 760, 20 Atl. 1032; 1893,
Atkinson v. Fennill, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 922. See references to text-books,
3ttpra, p. 411.

1859, Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 2 Mete. (Kv.) 350; 1870, Lvons

v. Orange, A. & M. R. Co., 32 Md. 18; 1872, Mason v. Finch, 28 Mich. 282;

1875, P. VV. & B. R. Co. v. Kent Co. R. Co., 5 Houst. (Del.) 127; 1885, Smith

v. Silver Valley M. Co., 64 Md. 85, 54 Am. Rep. 760, 20 Atl. 1032; 1893,

Atkinson v. Fennill, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 922. See references to text-bookB,

supra, p. 411.

Sec. 87. Acceptance may be inferred from signing articles, hold-

ing meetings, organizing and acting as a corporation.

Sec. 87. Acceptance may be inferred from signing articles, hold-

BENBOW v. COOK.1

1894. In the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 115 N.C.

ing meetings, organizing and acting as a corporation.

Rep. 324-334, 44 Am. St. Rep. 454.

["Plaintiff sued to recover possession or damages for non-delivery

BENBOW v. COOK. 1

of cotton mills machinery claimed under a mortgage from the Crown

Mills corporation, and which defendant had seized as sheriff and sold

1894.

under executions against the corporation."]

IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA.

I

15 N.

c.

Rep. 3 2 4-334, 44 Am. St. Rep. 454·

Avery, J. If the corporation never had any lawful existence, as
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the defendant contends, of course it did not authorize the execution

["Plaintiff sued to recover possession or damages for non-delivery
of cotton mills machinery claimed under a mortgage from the Crown
Mills corporation, and which defendant had seized as sheriff and sold
under executions against the corporation.'']
AVERY, J. If the corporation never had any lawful existence, as
the defendant contends, of course it did not authorize the execution
of a mortgage some months after it is claimed that it was duly organ·
ized. The statute, The Code , § 677, provides that " Any number of
p ersons, not less than three, who may be desirous of engaging in any
business not unlawful, except building railroads or banking or insurance, at any place within the state, may, if it please them, become
incorporated in the manner following," etc. It seems that three per:-.ons, Amos Ragan, 0. S. Causey and R. E. Causey, as the sole corporators of a manufacturing company, having ten shares each, signed
articles of agreement before the clerk of the superior court of Guilford
county, which were duly recorded. Having complied with the requirements as to the form of the articles of agreement and caused the
proper record to be made, the three persons named as sole corporators became a body politic for the purposes set forth in the agreement.
Thi; Code, §§ 678, 679. When corporate powers are granted by a
special instead of a general act of the legislature, there must be evidence of acceptance by the corporators and compliance with all conditions precedent prescribed by law, in order to show affirmatively
that the corporation is lawfully organized. But in our case every
corporator affixed his hand and seal to the articles of agreement recorded, and by such signature and the recording of the instrument,
became invested with all the powers which it was contemplated by law
to confer in such cases. The Code, § 679. Private corporations are
formed when the necessary contractual relations are created between
the persons clothed by law with the powers of a body politic. I Mor·
awetz 24. The existence of the company depends upon the fact of
the acceptance of the privilege ( r Morawetz 26), and it was evidently

of a mortgage some months after it is claimed that it was duly organ-

ized. The statute, The Code, § 677, provides that "Any number of

persons, not less than three, who may be desirous of engaging in any

business not unlawful, except building railroads or banking or insur-

ance, at any place within the state, may, if it please them, become

incorporated in the manner following," etc. It seems that three per-

sons, Amos Rngan, O. S. Causey and R. E. Cause)', as the sole cor-

porators of a manufacturing company, having ten shares each, signed

articles of agreement before the clerk of the superior court of Guilford

county, which were duly recorded. Having complied with the re-

quirements as to the form of the articles of agreement and caused the

proper record to be made, the three persons named as sole corpora-

tors became a body politic for the purposes set forth in the agreement.

The Code, §§ 678, 679. When corporate powers are granted by a

special instead of a general act of the legislature, there must be evi-

dence of acceptance by the corporators and compliance with all con-

ditions precedent prescribed by law, in order to show affirmatively

that the corporation is lawfully organized. But in our case every

corporator affixed his hand and seal to the articles of agreement re-

corded, and by such signature and the recording of the instrument,

became invested with all the powers which it was contemplated bylaw

to confer in such cases. The Code, § 679. Private corporations are

formed when the necessary contractual relations are created between

the persons clothed by law with the powers of a body politic. 1 Mor-

awetz 24. The existence of the company depends upon the fact of

the acceptance of the privilege (1 Morawetz 26), and it was evidendy

1 Only the part of the decision relating to acceptance of charter is given.

1
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the intent of the legislature that the signature to the articles should be

deemed an acceptance, leaving no other condition precedent to be

performed, except the recording, this being a substantial compliance

with the requirements of the law. 1 Morawetz, 32, 33, 27 et seq. In

such cases the corporators are usually constituted only a <^«a«'-corpo-

ration, "whose sole function is to bring into existence the corpora-

tions consisting of the real body of stockholders." But in our case

the signers of the certificate, as appears from the recorded articles of

agreement, were not only the sole corporators, but the only stock-

holders, and, as between themselves, constituted a corporate body,

wanting only formal organization in order to transact business with

the public.

The law, intending to protect the rights of minorities, requires that

notice of the meetings of the stockholders of a corporation shall be

given to every person who holds a share of the stock, and, if no other

mode of notification be provided in the charter or by-laws of a com-

pany, or by statute, express notice must be given. The owner of

every unit of interest constituting a part of the aggregate body of stock
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is entitled to the opportunity which due notice affords him of protect-

ing it, by being present and participating in meetings. 1 Cook on

Stockholders, § 574. The reason for this rule is plainly met, so far

as the organization of the company is concerned, when it appears that

all the stockholders assented to the call of the meeting, participated

in it, and acquiesced in its consequences afterwards. The state has

not complained or taken any steps to question its rights or annul its

powers as a body politic. If we concede that section 665 of 77ie

Code was intended to apply in such a case as this, the only purpose

of the legislature in enacting it was to provide that every corporator

should have notice of the time and place of a meeting for organiza-

tion. There was no necessity for proving a compliance with the

statute, when every person interested had express notice and partici-

pated in the meeting. Angell & Ames on Corporation, § 492. The

strict requirements as to notice, being intended to protect stockhold-

ers, may be waived by them, and when they do waive it, "the meet-

ing and all proceedings are as valid as they would be had the full

statutory notice been given." 1 Cook, supra, § 599.

It is always presumed that notice is given, and that any meeting of

which a minute is found in the proceedings of the stockholders of a

corporation, was regularly and lawfully held. Cook, § 600. When

a party assumes the burden of showing irregularity, and actually

shows that the meeting for organization, or any subsequent one, was

not called in the manner prescribed by law or the by-laws of the com-

pany, the action of the meeting will nevertheless be declared valid

when it appears that every stockholder who did not participate in the

meeting ratified its action afterward. Stutz v. Handly, 41 Fed. Rep.

531; Nelson v. Hubbard, 96 Ala. 238; Campbell v. Argenta, etc.,

Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 1.

If the three directors, Amos Ragan, O. S. Causey and R. E. Cau-

sey, met at High Point without notice, they being also the holders of

the intent of the legislature that the signature to the articles should be
deemed an acceptance, leaving no other condition precedent to be
performed, except the recording, this being a substantial compliance
with the requirements of the law. 1 Morawetz.l 32, 33, 27 et seq. In
such cases the corporators are usually constituted only a quasi-corpor atio n, "whose sole function is to bring into existence the corporations consisting of the real body of stockholders.'' But in our case
the signers of the certificate, as appears from the recorded articles of
agreement, were not only the sole corporators, but the only stockholders, and, as between themselves, constituted a corporate body,
wanting only formal organization in order to transact business with
the public.
The law, intending to protect the rights of minorities, requires that
notice of the meetings of the stockholders of a corporation shall be
given to every person who holds a share of the stock, and, if no other
mode of notification be provided in the charter or by-laws of a company, or by statute, express notice must be given. The owner of
every unit of interest constituting a part of the aggregate body of stock
is entitled to the opportunity which due notice affords him of protecting it, by being present and participating in meetings. I Cook on
Stockholders, § 574. The reason for this rule is plainly met, so far
as the organization of the company is concerned, when it appears that
all the stockholders assented to the call of the meeting, participated
in it, and acquiesced in its consequences afterwards. The state has
not complained or taken any steps to question its rights or annul its
powers as a body politic. If we concede that section 665 of The
Code was intended to apply in such a case as this, the only purpose
of the legislature in enacting it was to provide that every corporator
should have notice of the time and place of a meeting for organization. There was no necessity for proving a compliance with the
statute, when every person interested had express notice and participated in the meeting. Angell & Ames on Corporation, § 492. The
strict requirements as to notice , being intended to protect stockholders, may be waived by them, and when they do waive it, "the meeting and all proceedings are as valid as they \vould be had the full
statutory notice been given." 1 Cook, supra, § 599.
It is always presumed that notice is given, and that any meeting of
which a minute is found in the proceedings of the stockholders of a
corporation, was regularly and lawfully held. Cook, § 6oo. \Vhen
a party assumes the burden of showing irregularity, and actually
shows that the meeting for organization, or any subsequent one, was
not called in the manner prescribed by law or the by-laws of the company, the action of the meeting will nevertheless be declared valid
when it appears that every stockholder who did not participate in the
meeting ratified its action afterward. Stutz v. Handly, 41 Fed. Rep.
531; Nelson v. Hubbard, 96 Ala. 238; Campbell v. Argenta , etc.,
Co., 51 Fed. R ep. 1.
If the three directors, Amos Ragan, 0. S. Causey and R. E. Causey, met at High Point without notice, they being also the holders of
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all the stock, it was a waiver of the requirements of the by-laws that

such meeting should be called by the president or a majority of the

all the stock, it was a waiver of the requirements of the by-laws that
such meeting should be called by the president or a majority of the
directors. Nelson v. Hubbard, supra; Jones v. Turnpike Co.. i
Ind. 547. Whether the directors met at Greensboro or High Point.
and whether in pursuance of previous notice or not, is immaterial, if
in fact they met together and agreed to create the indebtedness and
authorize the execution of the mortgage to secure it, they, as stock·
holders and directors, constituting, as they did, the whole of each
body, waived objection to the want of the notice prescribed by the
by-laws, and the failure to make a record of their proceedings at that
time does not affect the validity of their action. Handly v. Stutz, 139
U. S. 417. The signing of the minutes at another time would not
affect the vali<lity of the action of the board, if in fact all three met,
discussed t.he question of executing the mortgage and agreed to what
was afterward entered on the minutes and signed by them. It is tnie
that the assent of each of the three, obtained at different times or
places, to a certain course of proceedings, would not bind them, because it would not be the action of the directors as a collective bodr;
but if, as a body, they assemble together and conferred in taking certain action they waived all objection to irregularities, though the meet·
ing may have been informal and the minutes may not have been then
recorded. The case of Duke v. Markham, 105 N. C. 131, is clearly
distinguishable in that there the stockholders at no time as~embled as
a body, but the assent of each individual was asked and obtained,
separately. It is not contended that the consent of each individual
has the same force as the concurrence of all assembled together, given
after an opportunity to discuss their proceedings, interchange views
and acquire benefit of such consultation. • • •
New trial granted.

directors. Nelson v. Hubbard, supra; Jones v. Turnpike Co., 7

Ind. 547. Whether the directors met at Greensboro or High Point,

and whether in pursuance of previous notice or not, is immaterial, if

in fact they met together and agreed to create the indebtedness and

authorize the execution of the mortgage to secure it, they, as stock-

holders and directors, constituting, as they did, the whole of each

body, waived objection to the want of the notice prescribed by the

by-laws, and the failure to make a record of their proceedings at that

time does not affect the validity of their action. Handly v. Stutz, 139

U. S. 417. The signing of the minutes at another time would not

affect the validity of the action of the board, if in fact all three met,

discussed the question of executing the mortgage and agreed to what

was afterward entered on the minutes and signed by them. It is true

that the assent of each of the three, obtained at different times or

places, to a certain course of proceedings, would not bind them, be-

cause it would not be the action of the directors as a collective body;
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but if, as a body, they assemble together and conferred in taking cer-

tain action they waived all objection to irregularities, though the meet-

ing may have been informal and the minutes may not have been then

recorded. The case of Duke v. Markham, 105 N. C. 131, is clearly

distinguishable in that there the stockholders at no time assembled as

a body, but the assent of each individual was asked and obtained,

separately. It is not contended that the consent of each individual

has the same force as the concurrence of all assembled together, given

after an opportunity to discuss their proceedings, interchange views

and acquire benefit of such consultation. • • *

New trial granted.

Note. See 18&3, Russell v. McLellan, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 63; 1839, Penobscot

Boom Corp. v. Lamson, 16 Maine 224, supra, p. 283; 1840, Newton v. Carberv,

5 Cranch C. C. 632, Fed. Cas. 10.190; 1848, Blandford Third School Dist. v.

Gibbs, 2 Cush. (56 Mass.) 39; 1852, Baldwin v. Hillsboro & C. R. Co., 1 Ohio

Dec. 532; 1855, Taylor v. Newberne, 2 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 141; 1864, State v.

Dawson, 22 Ind. 272; 1872, Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. v. Buck, 1 Luz. Leg. Reg.

Note. See 1833, Russell v. McLellan, 14 Pick. (Mass. ) 63; 1839, Penobscot
Boom Corp. v. Lamson, 16 Maine !!24, stpra , p. 283; 1840, Newton v. Carbery,
5 Cranch C. C. 632, Fed. Cas. 10, 190; 1848, "Blandford Third School Dist. v.
Gibbs, 2 Cush. (56 ~fass.) 39; 1852, Baldwin v. Hillsboro & C. R . Co., 1 Ohio
Dec. 532; 1855, Taylor v. Newberne, 2 .lones Eq. (N . C. l 141; 1864, State'"
Dawson, 22 Ind. 272; 1872, Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. v. Buck, 1 Luz. Leg. Reg.
(Pa.) 357; 1~75\ He~tb v. Silverthorn Lead M. Co. , 39 Wis. 146; 188_3, McKay
v. Band, 20 ~. C. 156; 1894, Glymont Imp. Co. v . Toller, 80 Md. 218, 30 At!.
651; 1896, Quinlan v. Houston & T. Ry. 89 Tex. 356, 34 S. W. 738. See, also,
I Thompson, §§ 60, 61; III Thompson, § 3652; IV Thompson, §§ 5266, 5388.
5416; VI Thompson, § 7703, et seq.; VII Thompson, § 8161. And other text
booke cited, supra, p. 397 .

(Pa.) 357; 1875, Heath v. Silverthorn Lend M. Co., 39 Wis. 146; 1883, McKsv

v. Band, 20 S. C. 156; 1894, Glymont Imp. Co. v. Toller, 80 Md. 278, 30 Atl.

651; 1896, Quinlan v. Houston & T. Ry. 89 Tex. 356, 34 S. W. 738. See, also,

I Thompson, §§ 60, 61; III Thompson, § 3652; IV Thompson, §§ 5266, 5388.

5416; VI Thompson, § 7703, et seq.; VII Thompson, § 8161. And other text

books cited, supra, p. 397.
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MILLER v. EWER, 27 Maine 509, 46 Am. Dec. 619, infra, p. 841.

417

Sec. 89. Renewals, extensions and amendments, must also be ac-

cepted, to make them effective.

COMMONWEALTH, Ex Rkl. CLAGHORN Et Al. v. CULLEN.1

1850. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 13 Pa. St.

Sec. 88. Acceptance must be within the state offering the charter.

Rep. 133-145, 53 Am. Dec. 450.

Error to the Common Pleas of Philadelphia county.

l\llLLER v. EWER, 27 Maine 509, 46 Am. Dec. 619, infra, p.841.

An information in the nature of a quo warranto was filed in the

court below on the 19th of May, 1849, by John W. Claghorn and

others, to show cause why Peter Cullen and others claimed to enjoy

the franchises, etc., of The Equitable Life Insurance Company, of

Philadelphia. It set forth that a charter was granted in May, 1848,

Sec. 89. Renewals, extensions and amendments, must also be accepted, to make them effective.

which provided that the corporate powers of the company should be

exercised by a board of trustees, to consist of six persons and a sec-

COMMONWEALTH, Ex REL. CLAGHORN ET AL. v. CULLEN. 1

retary, to be elected on the second Monday in December, annually,

or within forty days thereafter. Until the first election the board of

1850.

IN THE SUPREME

CouRT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

13

Pa.

St.

Rep. 133-145, 53 Am. Dec. 450.

trustees was to consist of the seventeen persons named as commis-

sioners to receive subscriptions, and that thereupon the company went
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into corporation, and Claghorn was elected president; that on the

iSth of January, 1849, within the forty days after the first election

should have been held, a supplement to the charter was passed, which

provided that the board of trustees should thereafter consist of seven-

teen persons and secretary, to be elected by the stockholders in the

manner prescribed by the charter, and that the board as it consisted

on the 1st of January immediately preceding, should be continued in

office until the next annual election thereafter; that while the com-

pany were in operation under these two acts, the passage of another

supplement was by some persons obtained on the 9th of April, 1849,

which declared that the board of trustees should thereafter consist of

seventeen persons, to be elected in May, annually, the first election

to be held in May, 1849, and repealed the supplement of January;

that the act last mentioned had been obtained without the assent of

the board of trustees or of the company, and that although certain of

the stockholders might have assented to it. such assent had not been

given by the trustees nor by the company in meeting duly convened,

and that said act was in no way binding; that nevertheless Peter Cul-

len, vice-president of the company, called a general meeting of stock-

holders, to elect seventeen trustees on the 7th of May; that the board

1 Arguments omitted.

27—Wil. Casks.

Error to the Common Pleas of Philadelphia county.
An information in the nature of a 9uo warranto was filed in the
court below on the 19th of May, 1849, by John W. Claghorn and
others, to show cause why Peter Cullen and others claimed to enjoy
the franchises, etc., of The Equitable Life Insurance Company, of
Philadelphia. It set forth that a charter was granted in May, 1848,
which provided that the corporate powers of the company should he
exercised by a board of trustees, to consist of six persons and a secretary, to be elected on the seconcl Monday in December, annually,
or within forty days thereafter. Until the first election the board of
trustees was to consist of the seventeen persons named as commissioners to receive subscriptions, and that thereupon the company went
into corporation, and Claghorn was elected president; that on the
18th of January, 1849, within the forty days after the first election
should have been held, a supplement to the charter was passed, which
provided that the board of trustees should thereafter consist of seventeen persons and secretary, to be elected by the stockholders in the
manner prescribed by the charter, and that the board as it consisted
oo the 1s t of January immediately preceding, should be continued in
office until the next annual election thereafter; that while the company were in operation under these two acts, the passage of another
upplement was by some persons obtained on the 9th of April, 1849,
which declared that the board of trustees should ther.eafter consist of
seventeen persons, to be elected in May, annually, the first election
to be held in May, 1849, and repealed the supplement of January;
that the act last mentioned had been obtained without the assent of
the board of trustees or of the company, and that although certain of
the stockholders might have assented to it, such assent had not been
given by the trustees nor by the company in meeting duly convened,
and that said act was in no way hinding; that nevertheless Peter Cullen , vice-president of the company, called a general meeting of stockholders, to elect seventeen trustees on the 7th of May; that the boar~
1 Arguments omitted.
27- WIL. CASES.
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of trustees, before the day of election so named, passed resolutions re-

§ 89

fusing to accept the last supplement declaring the call for the meet-

of trustees, before the day of election so named, passed resolutions refu ~i ng to accept the last supplement declaring the call for the meeting unauthorized, and appointing a committee to attend at the meeting of stockholders, to protest against any proceeding under that call;
that the said Cullen, with others, sti ll persisted in convening the
meeting of stockholders at which the defendants were elected trustees,
and the parties so elected thereupon ej ected the old board of trustees,
and usurped the franchises of the company.
The answer, after admitting the incorporation of the company and
its going into operation, set forth that certain of the defendants who
WC're of the number of commissioners and , therefore, of the first board
of trustees, were not informed by the other members of the board of
the intended passage of the supplement of January , 1849, in manner
a nd form as set forth, yet that it was produced by Mr. Claghorn at a
mee ting of the board on the 24th of January, 1849, and that, although
110 acceptance thereof was ever made, either by the board or the stockholders, that the trustees continued to hold their offices under it; that
while thus in office the supplement of April was passed, which wa
not only done with the knowledge of a large number of the tnistees,
but that the majority in val ue of the stockholders signed an acceptance
of it and held an election in pursuance of its provisions. The answer
set forth at length the proceedings of this election. To this the relator
demurred.
The court below decided that there had been no such acceptance of
either supplement as to render it binding on the corporation , and
made the following decree:
This c:rnse came on to be heard at the June term , and was argued
by counsel, and thereupon, upon consideration thereof, the court do
order, decree and adjudge as follows, this twenty-ninth day of September, A. D. 1849, to wit:
That judgment of ouster be entered against the defendants, and fora much, as in the opinion of the court, the rclators are not entitled to
pos ess and enjoy the offices and franchi ses of the said "Equitable
Life Insurance Company," the court do order an election to be held
for trustees of said company at a general meeting of the stockholders
convened for that purpose by ten days' public notice in two or more
of the daily papers of the 'city of Philadelphia, on Thursday, the
eleventh day of October, A. D. 1849, between the hours of ten A. l\f.
and two P. M., and the court do appoint Frederick Fraley, Charles F.
Lex and William G. Alexander,. E qs., trustees to take charge of
said corporation until other shall be e lected in their stead, pursuant
to the laws of this commonwealth, regulating said corporation and
this order of court; and the court do direct that the trustees appointed
as aforesaid by this decree, shall give the public notice aforesaid, and
shall be the judges at said election and shall receive the votes of said
stockholders duly qualified to vote. and shall make return to the court
on Saturday, October 13, 1849, of the proceedings to b e had by virtue
of this decree .
The rdators objected to this decree being entered on the ground

ing unauthorized, and appointing a committee to attend at the meet-

ing of stockholders, to protest against any proceedings under that call;

that the said Cullen, with others, still persisted in convening the

meeting of stockholders at which the defendants were elected trustees,

and the parties so elected thereupon ejected the old board of trustees,

and usurped the franchises of the company.

The answer, after admitting the incorporation of the company and

its going into operation, set forth that certain of the defendants who

were of the number of commissioners and, therefore, of the first board

of trustees, were not informed by the other members of the board of

the intended passage of the supplement of January, 1849, in manner

and form as set forth, yet that it was produced by Mr. Claghorn at a

meeting of the board on the 24th of January, 1849, and that, although

no acceptance thereof was ever made, either by the board or the stock-

holders, that the trustees continued to hold their offices under it; that

while thus in office the supplement of April was passed, which was
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not only done with the knowledge of a large number of the trustees,

but that the majority in value of the stockholders signed an acceptance

of it and held an election in pursuance of its provisions. The answer

set forth at length the proceedings of this election. To this the relators

demurred.

The court below decided that there had been no such acceptance of

either supplement as to render it binding on the corporation, and

made the following decree:

This cause came on to be heard at the June term, and was argued

by counsel, and thereupon, upon consideration thereof, the court do

order, decree and adjudge as follows, this twenty-ninth day of Sep-

tember, A. D. 1849, to wit:

That judgment of ouster be entered against the defendants, and for-

asmuch, as in the opinion of the court, the relators are not entitled to

possess and enjoy the offices and franchises of the said "Equitable

Life Insurance Company," the court do order an election to be held

for trustees of said company at a general meeting of the stockholders

convened for that purpose by ten days' public notice in two or more

of the daily papers of the city of Philadelphia, on Thursday, the

eleventh day of October, A. D. 1849, between the hours of ten A. m.

and two p. m., and the court do appoint Frederick Fraley, Charles F.

Lex and William G. Alexander, Esqs., trustees to take charge of

said corporation until others shall be elected in their stead, pursuant

to the laws of this commonwealth, regulating said corporation and

this order of court; and the court do direct that the trustees appointed

as aforesaid by this decree, shall give the public notice aforesaid, and

shall be the judges at said election and shall receive the votes of said

stockholders duly qualified to vote, and shall make return to the court

on Saturday, October 13, 1849, of the proceedings to be had by virtue

of this decree.

The relators objected to this decree being entered on the ground
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plement, and not to that of January. An argument was then ordered

by the court as to the efficacy of the January supplement, and in the

meantime no decree was entered. After this argument the decree

was entered as above.

The relators took out a writ of error, of which they notified the

three trustees appointed by the court, and warned them not to pro-

ceed with the election. The court below, under the 15th section of

the act of 13th of June 1836 (Pur. 990, quo warranto), then made a

decree awarding execution of their former decree, notwithstanding

the writ of error. The election was held and six of the defendants

elected trustees. These proceedings the court confirmed and author-

ized the delivery of the property of the corporation by the three trust-

ees appointed by the court, to the trustees thus elected.

The relators assigned for error:

1. "That the court below erred in deciding that the relators were

not entitled to possess and enjoy the offices and franchises of the

Equitable Life Insurance Company.
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2. "That said court erred in ordering that an election for trustees of

said company be held on October 11, 1849, and in appointing Fred-

erick Fraley, and others, trustees to take charge of the corporation in

the interim."

Bell, J. So far as we may judge from the pleadings and accom-

panying exhibits, under which the cause is brought before us, it pre-

sents the history of a struggle between rival parties for the govern-

ment of a private corporation, pending which, each has sought the

aid of special legislation, apparently too hastily accorded to both.

Such a course is usually detrimental to the best interests of companies

entrusted with the management of capital; and, it is to be feared, the

present instance can not be esteemed an exception. Both the supple-

mental acts, here in question, propose to graft upon the original act

of incorporation, some very material alterations. Each provides for

an increase in the number of trustees and for changing the time of

their election. The earlier of them continued in office for an addi-

tional year the first board of managers, and directs the election of a

secretary by the whole body of corporators. If, under the facts de-

veloped, this is to be regarded as a valid amendment of the charter,

the second supplement of April, 1849, becomes of decisive impor-

tance, not only because it fixes a new time for the annual election,

and restores the appointment of secretary to the board of trustees,

but by force also of its repealing clause, is destructive of the first

supplement. Should, however, this be decreed invalid, then the

changes proposed by the younger enactment, in the organization of

the board, as originally designed, and the time of the election of its

members, must be deemed radical in their character.

Of the numerous decisions that have been pronounced on this sub-

ject, it is unnecessary to bring to view other than the case of

Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, and our recent deter-

mination of in Brown v. Hummell, 6 Barr. 86, to prove that sub-

that the argument had been directed to the validity of the April supplement, and not to that of January. An argument was then ordered
hy the court as to the efficacy of the January supplement, and in the
meantime no decree was entered. After this argument the decree
was entered as above.
The relators took out a writ of error, of which they notified the
three trustee appointed by the court, and warned them not to proceed with the election. The court below, under the 15th section of
the act of 13th of June 1836 (Pur. 990, quo warranto) , then made a
decree awarding execution of their former decree, notwithstanding
the writ of error. The election was held and six of the defendants
elected trustees. These proceedings the court confirmed and authorized the deli,·ery of the property of the corporation by the three trustee appointed by the court, to the trustees thus elected.
The relators a ·signed for error:
I. "That the court below erred in deciding that the relators were
not entitled to possess and enjoy the offices and franchises of the
Equitable Life Insurance Company.
2. "That said court erred in ordering that an election for trustees of
said company be held on October 11, 1849, and in appointing Frederick Fraley, and others, trustees to t?ke charge of the corporation in
the interim."
BELL, ]. So far as we may judge from the pleadings and accompanying exhibits, under which the cause is brought before us, it presents the history of a struggle between rival parties for the government of a private corporation, pending which, each has sought the
aid of special legislation , .apparently too hastily accorded to both.
Such a course is usually detrimental to the best interests of companies
entrusted with the management of capital; and, it is to be feared, the
present instance can not be esteemed an exception. Both the supplemental acts, here in question, propose to graft upon the original act
of incorporation, some very material alterations. Each provides for
an increase in the number of trustees and for changing the time of
their election. The earlier of them continued in office for an additional year the first board of managers, and directs the election of a
. ecretary by the whole body of corpora tors. If, under the facts developed, this is to be regarded as a valid amendment of the charter,
the second supplement of April, 1849, becomes of decisive importance, not only because it fixes a new time for the annual election,
and restores the appointment of secretary to the board of trustees,
but by force also of its repealing clause, is destructive of the first
supplement.
Should, however, this be decreed invalid, then the
changes proposed by the younger enactment, in the organization of
the board, as originally designed, and the time of the election of its
members, must be deemed radical in their character.
Of the numerous decisions that have been pronounced on this subject, it is unnecessary to bring to view other than the case of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, and our recent determination of in Brown v. Hummell, 6 Barr. 86, to prove that sub-
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mentary acts, are not to be taken as parcel of a private charter,

without the previous concurrence of the corporators, manifested in

stantive alterations, such as those proposed by each of these supplementary acts, are not to be taken as parcel of a private charter,
without the previous concurrence of the corporators, manifested in
some way recognized by the law. Unless so sanctioned they are
esteemed as unauthorized interferences with a solemn compact between the public and the individuals composing the corporation, and.
therefore, obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition touching the
obligation of contracts. Whether this sanction has been extended to
bath, or either of the supplements of January and April, are the leading questions presented for decision. Each of the contending parties
claim this advantage for the enactment of their own procurement, and
deny it to the antagonist statute. Neither of them, however, pretend
that there was any express, formal and recorded act of acceptance, either
by the corporators at large or the board of trustees, nor, as will be presently seen, was this absolutely necessary.
That the then board of
trustees tacitly gave their assent to the older supplement is not to be denied, for, while the petition in effect asserts this, the answer admits it was
produced as a recognized act by the president of the board, at a meeting held on the 24th of January, 1849, and that the tnistees, including
several of the defendants, continued to hold their offices by virtue of
the supplement after the period for which they were first appointed.
Had these officers been clothed with power to accept or reject this
statute, it is not to be doubted, their silent acquiescence in its provisions and ·continued exercise of authority by virtue of it, would have
been sufficient to establish their assent.
Anciently, indeed, it was supposed that from the very nature of
an artificial corporate body, it could legallr manifest its acts and conclusions only by the use of its corporate seal, affixed to a deed in pursuance of authority previously given. But this idea has long since
given way to the more reasonable doctrine that the act of a sent
of a corporation may be inferred from such circumstances of commission or omission as would raise a similar presumption in favor of
or against a natural person. Corporations, it is now held, may be
affected by impl£cation, just as individuals are, and where its action
or acquiescence are the natural result, or necessary accompaniment of
some other supposed precedent fact, the existence of that fact will be
assumed, both for purpose of charge and discharge. In the leading
case of the Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 11 Wheat. 70,
Mr. Justice STORY stated the principles thus: ''Acts done by corporation, which pre-suppose the existence of other acts to make them
legally operative, are presumptive proof of the latter," and this i
trne , though no minute of them can be found among the records
of the corporation. By way of illustration, he instanced the case
of one notoriously acting as cashier of a bank, and so recognized by the
directors, which is sufficient of it<;clf to raise a presumption of his due
appointment, and his acts as cashier will bind the institution, though
no written proof of the appointment can be produced. Both in
England and with us, this principle has been liberally extended and
applied, where the questions were of the acceptance of a charter. In

some way recognized by the law. Unless so sanctioned they are

esteemed as unauthorized interferences with a solemn compact be-

tween the public and the individuals composing the corporation, and,

therefore, obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition touching the

obligation of contracts. Whether this sanction has been extended to

both, or either of the supplements of January and April, are the lead-

ing questions presented for decision. Each of the contending parties

claim this advantage for the enactment of their own procurement, and

deny it to the antagonist statute. Neither of them, however, pretend

that there was any express, formal and recorded act of acceptance, either

by the corporators at large or the board of trustees, nor, as will be pres-

ently seen, was this absolutely necessary. That the then board of

trustees tacitly gave their assent to the older supplement is not to be de-

nied, for, while the petition in effect asserts this, the answer admits it was

produced as a recognized act by the president of the board, at a meet-

ing held on the 24th of January, 1849, and that the trustees, including
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several of the defendants, continued to hold their offices by virtue of

the supplement after the period for which they were first appointed.

Had these officers been clothed with power to accept or reject this

statute, it is not to be doubted, their silent acquiescence in its provis-

ions and continued exercise of authority by virtue of it, would have

been sufficient to establish their assent.

Anciently, indeed, it was supposed that from the very nature of

an artificial corporate body, it could legally manifest its acts and con-

clusions only by the use of its corporate seal, affixed to a deed in pur-

suance of authority previously given. But this idea has long since

given way to the more reasonable doctrine that the act of assent

of a corporation may be inferred from such circumstances of com-

mission or omission as woidd raise a similar presumption in favor of

or against a natural person. Corporations, it is now held, may be

affected by implication, just as individuals arc, and where its action

or acquiescence are the natural result, or necessary accompaniment of

some other supposed precedent fact, the existence of that fact will be

assumed, both for purpose of charge and discharge. In the leading

case of the Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 11 Wheat. 70,

Mr. Justice Story stated the principles thus: "Acts done by corpora-

tion, which pre-suppose the existence of other acts to make them

legally operative, are presumptive proof of the latter," and this is

true, though no minute of them can be found among the records

of the corporation. By way of illustration, he instanced the case

of one notoriously acting as cashier of a bank, and so recognized by the

directors, which is sufficient of itself to raise a presumption of his due

appointment, and his acts as cashier will bind the institution, though

no written proof of the appointment can be produced. Both in

England and with us, this principle has been liberally extended and

applied, where the questions were of the acceptance of a charter. In
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this country, where private corporations are very numerous, and con-

stant use of their privileges naturally engenders indolence in the crea-
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tion of regular evidence of corporate acts, and negligence in its pres-

ervation, the recognition of presumptions, as legitimate sources of

proof, was a legal necessity. While, therefore, a charter granted to

persons who have not solicited it, is said to be in fieri until af ter

acceptance, yet it is not indispensable to show a written instrument',

or even a vote acceding to the grant, unless the charter expressly pro-

hibit it; every formality may be presumed', from a continual exercise

of the corporate powers.

This is also true of assent to a new or additional charter by an ex-

isting corporation, which may, in like manner, be inferred from acts

or omissions inconsistent with any other hypothesis; and where the

new grant is beneficial in its aspect, it is thought very little is required

to found a presumption of acceptance. Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat.

71 ; The Charles River Bridge v. Essex Bridge, 7 Pick. 334; Trott v.

Warren, 2 Fair'd 227; Bridge Co. v. Bragg, 2 N. H. Rep. 102;

Riddle v. Proprietors of Canals, 7 Mass. 184; Penobscot Co. v.

Lawson, 4 Shep. 924; Kings v. Avery, 1 Term Rep. 575; s. c. 2
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Term Rep. 515; Newling v. Francis, 3 Term Rep. 189.

-Viz)', a single unequivocal act may be potent enough conclusively to

establish assent; as, for instance, if a suit be brought and persisted in,

where it could be sustained only under the provisions of the amended

charter. A similar observation was made in deciding the Lincoln

and Kentucky Bank v. Richardson, 1 Greenl. Rep. 460, and the

court added that the stockholders of the bank are bound by every act,

which amounts to an acceptance on the part of the directors. But if

by this was meant that the whole body of the corporation may gener-

ally be so bound by the acts of their agents, selected to administer the

affairs of the corporation, the proposition can not be acceded to.

As is well remarked of this proposition in another place, it is

founded upon the consideration that certain persons have been in-

vested with sufficient power to bind the whole body by their accept-

ance, for where it is otherwise the charter must be accepted by a ma-

jority of the whole number of the company. Angell & Ames on Cor-

porations, 53. Corporate powers arc usually distinguished into leg-

islative, electoral and administrative; in private corporations ag-

gregate, though sometimes all the members act immediately in the. ad-

ministration of its affairs, usually. for the sake of convenience, the.

direct management is entrusted by the charter to certain officers, or

board of managers, elected by the members at large, though deriving

their ordinary powers from the act of incorporation. These officers

exercise the legislative and administrative functions—the former in

the institution of by-laws for the general government of the company,

the latter in the siiperititcnde.nce and execution of its general business.

Union Turnpike Company v. Jenkins, 1 Caine 381.

In other instances, a select few, representing all those interested in

the object of the association, are erectedlnto and vested with all the pow-

ers of a corporation, and sometimes the selected branches are divided into

this country, where private corporations are very numerous, and conl-tant use of their privileges naturally engenders indolence in the creation of regular evidence of corporate acts, and negligence in its prt:st>n: ation, the recognition of presumptions, as legitimate sources of
proof, was a legal necessity. vVhile, therefore, a charter granted to
persons who have not sol£c£ted £t, £s sa£d to be £n .fter£ unt£! after
acceptance, yet i"t £snot £nd£spensable to show a wr£tten £nstrument,
or even a vote acced£ng to the grant , unless the charter expressly prohib£t it; every formal£ty may be presumed, from a cont£nual exerdse
of the corporate powers.
This is also true of assent to a new or additional charter by an existing corporation, which may, in like manner, be inferred from acts
or omissions inconsistent with any other hypothesis; and where the
new grant is beneficial in its aspect, it is thought very little is required
to found a presumption of acceptance. Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat.
71; The Charles River Bridge v. Essex Bridge, 7 Pick. 334; Trott v.
\\ arren, 2 Fair'd 227; Bridge Co. v. Bragg, 2 N. H. Rep. w2;
Riddle v. Proprietors of Canals, 7 Mass. 184 ; Penobscot Co. v.
Lawson, 4 Shep. 924; Kings v. Avery, 1 Term Rep. 575; s. c. 2
Term Rep. 515; Newling v. Francis, 3 T enn Rep. 189 .
.J\Tay, a single unequivocal act may be potent enough conclusi"vely to
establish assent; as, for instance, if a suit be brought and persisted in,
where it could be sustained only under the provisions of the amended
charter. A similar observation was made in deciding the Lincoln
and Kentucky Bank v. Richardson, I Green!. Rep. 46o, and the
court added that the stockholders of the bank are bound by every act,
,.,.·hich amounts to an acceptance on the part of the directors. But if
hy this was meant that the whole body of the corporation may generally be so bound by the acts of their agents, selected to administer the
affairs of the corporation, the proposition can not be acceded to.
As is well remarked of this proposition in another place, it is
fo unded upon the consideration that certain persons have been in>csted with sufficient power to bind the whole body by their acceptance, for where it is otherwise the charter must be accepted by a majority of the whole number of the company. Angell & Ames on C orporations, 53. Corporate powers a1·e usually d£st£ngu£shed £nto leg£slative, electoral and adm£nistrat£ve; £n pr£vate corporat£ons aggregate, though somet£mes all th e m embers act immed£ately in the administrat£on of its a_ffairs, usually, for the sake of convenience. the
dir ed management is entrusted by the charter to certain officers. or
board of managers, elected by the members at large, thoug h deriv£ng
their ordinary powers from the act of incorporation. Th ese ojjicers
e.xerc£se the legislat£ve and admin£strative functions-the form er in
the instt"tution of by-laws for the general government of the company,
the latter in the superi'ntendcnce and execut£on of its general busi"ness.
Un.ion Turnpike Company Y. Jt•nkinl'- , I Caine 38 r.
In other instances, a select few, representing all those interested in
the object of the association, are erected'into and vested with all the powers of a corporation, and sometimes the selected branches are divided into
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in this city. When the corporate existence is devolved on a board of

officers, they not only wield the whole corporate authority, but mas-

distinct classes, as is the case in the corporation of St. Mary's Church.
in this city. When the corporate exhtence is devolved on a board of
officers, they not only wield the whole corporate authority, but may
apply for and agree to radical changes in the instrument to which
they owe their corporate being. When such a board is separated
into intregal parts, occupying distinct positions, both must concur in
any act, having for its object an alteration of the fundamental law,
though in the exercise of the ordinary powers of a corporation , they
act jointly, and are governed by a majority of the united bodi e~.
Case of St. Mary's Church, 8 S. & R. 5 I 7. But th ese and other
authorities evidence that where the whole body of stockholders, or
other p ersons in interest, compose the corporation, the r£ght of assenting to any proposed change in the charter resides in them, though
ordinarily represented by a board of directors charged wt'tll the ~-cr
dse of the corporate powers. Th ese in their capacity of managers
have no authort"ty, either to call for or assent to a change of the corporate constitution, but by th e agreement of a majority of the corpora/ors. B eing neither legislative nor administrative, the exprfss
assumption of such authority by th e servants of the corporati'on would
be an usurpation, for it is paramount not only to every corporate junction , but the constitution itself, and as it may touch the very existc11ce
of the body, it can only be exerted by that body. It ca n not then be
said that the assent of the original trustees to the January supplement
is such an act of acceptance as will bind the corporation. Yet, as we
have seen, a long acquiescence by the members of the company in
acts and declarations of the trustees, recognizing the supplement :is
part of the charter, mig ht constitute conclusive evidence of assent to
it. Was there here any such acquiescence? Is there anything sho\\11
from which we can safely draw the inference that the company, knowing of the supplement, agreed to it as a portion of their constitution?
Perhaps it may be said that as the terms of the additional grant
were favorable to the company, slight circumstances would justif~· a
presumption of acceptance. But is there any ground, however narrow, upon which we can safely erect such an hypothesis? I ha\'e
looked with some solicitude, but in vain, for a precedent that might
justify an affirmative answer to this proposition, to ·which my judg·
ment refuses its assent.
It does not appear that the company was ever officially notified of
the enactment. The defendants swear it was first produced at a
meeting of the board by Mr. Claghorn , then president, on the 24th of
January. By the provision s of the original charter, the trustees thrn
in office might lega lly continue until about that time. From thence
until the enactment of the second supplement, was a little over two
months. During this interval we are not informed that the trustees
or their agents p erformed any official act, or distinctly exerted the
corporate power with the knowledge of their constituents. For aught
the pleadings show, they sat still with folded arms, doing nothing,
and requiring nothing. Now•it seems to me , that the mere omission
of the stockholders to assemble in formal m eeting within that period.

apply for and agree to radical changes in the instrument to which

they owe their corporate being. When such a board is separated

into intregal parts, occupying distinct positions, both must concur in

any act, having for its object an alteration of the fundamental law.

though in the exercise of the ordinary powers of a corporation, they

act jointly, and are governed by a majority of the united bodie*.

Case of St. Mary's Church, 8 S. & R. 517. But these and other

authorities evidence that where the whole body of stockholders, or

other persons in interest, compose the corporation, the right of assent-

ing to any proposed change in the charter resides in them, though

ordinarily represented by a board of directors charged with the exer-

cise of the corporate powers. These in their capacity of managers

have no authority, either to call for or assent to a change of the cor-

porate constitution, but by the agreement of a majority of the corpo-

rators. Being neither legislative nor administrative, the express

assumption of such authority by the servants of the corporation would
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be an usurpation, for it is paramount not only to every corporate func-

tion, but the constitution itself, and as it may touch the very existence

of the body, it can only be exerted by that body. It can not then be

said that the assent of the original trustees to the January supplement

is such an act of acceptance as will bind the corporation. Yet, as we

have seen, a long acquiescence by the members of the company in

acts and declarations of the trustees, recognizing the supplement as

part of the charter, might constitute conclusive evidence of assent to

it. Was there here any such acquiescence? Is there anything shown

from which we can safely draw the inference that the company, know-

ing of the supplement, agreed to it as a portion of their constitution?

Perhaps it may be said that as the terms of the additional srrant

were favorable to the company, slight circumstances would justify a

presumption of acceptance. But is there any ground, however nar-

row, upon which we can safely erect such an hypothesis? I have

looked with some solicitude, but in vain, for a precedent that might

justify an affirmative answer to this proposition, to which my judg-

ment refuses its assent.

It does not appear that the company was ever officially notified of

the enactment. The defendants swear it was first produced at a

meeting of the board by Mr. Claghorn, then president, on the 24th of

January. By the provisions of the original charter, the trustees then

in office might legally continue until about that time. From thence

until the enactment of the second supplement, was a little over two

months. During this interval we are not informed that the trustees

or their agents performed any official act, or distinctly exerted the

corporate power with the knowledge of their constituents. For aught

the pleadings show, they sat still with folded arms, doing nothing,

and requiring nothing. Now'it seems to me, that the mere omission

of the stockholders to assemble in formal meeting within that period.
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for the purpose of electing other trustees, affords no presumption of

assent sufficient to fasten upon them radical changes of their charter.

Mere non-action for so brief a time ought not to draw after it a con-

sequence so serious, particularly when it is recollected that the call of

such a meeting would come most appropriately from the board itself.

In answer to this it is not sufficient to suggest that a failure to elect

trustees ought to be received as strong proof of acceptance; since,

without this, a dissolution of the corporation must ensue. Perhaps,

anciently, such would have been the result; but the present doctrine

is, that a corporation does not become defunct from a simple neg-

lect to elect officers, while the capacity to elect remains in the mem-

bers. Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh C. & N. Co., 4 Rawle 24; Slee

v. Bloom, 5 John. Ch. Rep. 336. It is said a corporation possesses a

strong and tenacious principle of vitality (Corp. of Colchester v. Sea-

ber, 3 Burr. 1816), and it therefore requires a long non-user of fran-

chises to induce the courts to presume a surrender of corporate rights.

Briggs v. Penniman, 1 Hopk. Ch. Rep. 300.

It follows the argument derives no aid from tbis source to establish
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a presumption of assent. But is there not evidence of positive dis-

sent? We find that very shortly after its passage a sentiment of act-

ive hostility to the first supplement is manifested by a majority in

number and value of the stockholders. When this began, we are not

precisely informed, but we know that in less than three months

after the date of the objectionable enactment, the feeling of opposi-

tion led to its repeal. It is fair, therefore, to infer it commenced at

the moment the law was communicated to the board of trustees. How,

then, with a knowledge of this important fact, can we regard the as-

sertion that a majority of the company had agreed to accept it as an

approved amendment of the first act of incorporation? It is, how-

ever, claimed that the supplement of April recognizes that of Janu-

ary to be in full force, because the latter repeals the former. The

position is that if invalid, a formal repeal of the unaccepted act was

unnecessary. Admitting this, I am at a loss to perceive how mere

supererogation can derive an unintended positive effect from its non-

usefulness. Besides, the repealing clause is not the work of the dis-

senting members of this corporation. Their rights are consequently

unaffected by it. But the argument in favor of the first supplement

is chiefly founded upon certain passages in the answer of the defend-

ants, by which it is said they concede the first board of trustees were

continued rightfully in office by virtue of this supplement. It is ob-

vious, however, these passages are but echoes of the relator's petition,

introduced, not in confirmation of it, but with reference to the im-

mediately preceding denial of acceptance formally averred, and thus

putting in issue the title of the relators. It is replied, this denial is

not responsive to the bill, which does not distinctly aver acceptance.

I think this is a mistake. Although in this part of the complaint

there is no direct assertion of the assent of the company to the Janu-

ary supplement, the act is distinctly referred to as an operative por-

tion of the charter, which it could not be without acceptance. But

for the purpose of electing other trustees, affords no presumption of
assent sufficient to fasten upon them radical changes of their charter.
Mere non-action for so brief a time ought not to draw after it a consequence so serious, particularly when it is recollected that the call o{
such a meeting would come most appropriately from the board itself.
In answer to this it is not sufficient to suggest that a failure to elect
trustees ought to be received as strong proof of acceptance; since,
without this, a dissolution of the corporation must ensue. Perhaps,
anciently, such would have been the resu It; but the present doctrine
i , that a corporation does not become defunct from a simple neglect to elect officers, while the capacity to elect remains in the members. Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh C. & N. Co., 4 Rawle 24; Slee
v. Bloom, 5 John. Ch. Rep. 336. It is said a corporation possesses a
strong and tenacious principle of vitality (Corp. of Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1816), and it therefore requires a long non-user of franchi es to induce the courts to presume a surrender of corporate rights.
Briggs v. Penniman , I Hopk. Ch. Rep. 300.
It follows the argument derives no aid from this source to establish
a presumption of assent. But is there not evidence of positive dissent? \Ve find that very shortly after its passage a sentiment of active hostility to the first supplement is manifested by a majority in
number and value of the stockholders. When this began, we are not
precisely informed, but we know that in less than three months
after the date of the objectionable enactment, the feeling of opposition led to its repeal. It is fair, therefore, to infer it commenced at
the moment the law was communicated to the board of trustees. How,
then, with a knowledge of this imp01tant fact, can we regard the assertion that a majority of the company had agreed to accept it as an
approved amendment of the first act of incorporation? It is, however, claimed that the supplement of April recognizes that of January to be in full force, because the latter repeals the former. The
position is that if invalid, a formal repeal of the unaccepted act was
unnecessary. Admitting this, I am at a loss to perceive how mere
supererogation can derive an unintended positive effect from its nonusefulness. Besides, the repealing clause is not the work of the dissenting members of this corporation. Their rights are consequently
unaffected by it. But the argument in favor of the first supplement
is chiefly founded upon certain passages in the answer of the defendant , by which it is said they concede the first board of trustees were
continued rightfully in office by virtue of this supplement. It is obvious, however, these passages are but echoes of the relator's petition,
introduced, not in confirmation of it, but with reference to the immediately preceding denial of acceptance formally averred, and thus
putting in issue the title of the relators. It is replied, this denial is
not responsive to the bill, which does not distinctly aver acceptance.
I think this is a mistake. Although in this part of the complaint
there js no direct assertion of the assent of the company to the J an uary supplement, the act is distinctly referred to as an operative po rtion of the charter, which it could not be without acceptance. But
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were this not so, the counter allegation would be by no means value-

§ 89

less. In equity proceedings, the distinction seems to be that an an-

were this not so, the counter allegation would be by no means valueless. In equity proceedings, the distinction seems to be that an answer, if responsive, is evidence of the fact it alleges, requiring testimony to rebut it, but if the matter set forth be not responsive, it is
not evidence of that matter at all, but must be proved. 1 Smith's
Ch. Pr. 272, in note; Clark's Executors v . Van Ramsdyk, 9 Cranch
16o; Hart v. Ten Eyk, 2 Johnson's Ch. Rep. 90. But this is in fact
a proceeding at common law. Unoer its system, a new defensive
averment, if it answers the plaintiff's case, is admissible. As, under
our act of 1840, to be presently more pmticularly noticed, the relator's
title may be put in issue under the quo warranto, any allegation
affecting it may be material, and its truth will be conceded by a demurrer. If, therefore, in this instance, we adhered strictly to technical rule, we might, perhaps, be compelled to say that the plaintiffs,
by their demurrer, admitted the non-acceptance of the first settlement
and are thus concluded now to deny it. But as we think neither
party contemplated this, when framing their pleadings, we prefer to
rest our conclusions, as to this part of the case, on the absence of
reliable proof of assent, either direct or inferential.
This brings us to the second question, whether there is an evidence
of the acceptance of the April supplement? Our own determination
in Shortz v. Unangst, 3 Watts & Serg. 45, follo\.ving earlier decisions,
settles, tlzat to make a vote ofacceptance valid, as the act of a corpora-

swer, if responsive, is evidence of the fact it alleges, requiring testi-

mony to rebut it, but if the matter set forth be not responsive, it is

not evidence of that matter at all, but must be proved, i Smith's

Ch. Pr. 272, in note; Clark's Executors v. Van Ramsdyk, 9 Cranch

160; Hart v. Ten Eyk, 2 Johnson's Ch. Rep. 90. But this is in fact

a proceeding at common law. Under its system, a new defensive

averment, if it answers the plaintiff's case, is admissible. As, under

our act of 1840, to be presently more particularly noticed, the relator's

title may be put in issue under the quo warranto, any allegation

affecting it may be material, and its truth will be conceded by a de-

murrer. If, therefore, in this instance, we adhered strictly to tech-

nical rule, we might, perhaps, be compelled to say that the plaintiffs,

by their demurrer, admitted the non-acceptance of the first settlement

and are thus concluded now to deny it. But as we think neither

party contemplated this, when framing their pleadings, we prefer to

rest our conclusions, as to this part of the case, on the absence of

reliable proof of assent, either direct or inferential.
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This brings us to the second question, whether there is an evidence

of the acceptance of the April supplement? Our own determination

in Shortz v. Unangst, 3 Watts & Serg. 45, following earlier decisions,

settles, that to make a vote of acceptance valid, as the act of a corpora-

tion, it should be passed at a meeting duly convened, after notice to all the

members. In such cases, congregated deliberation is deemed essential,

and where an opportunity for this is afforded, the decision of a majority

is binding, if no other mode be prescribed by the charter. The private

procurement of a written assent, signed by the majority of the members,

tion, it should be passed at a meeting duly convened, after noti'ce to all the
members. In such cases, congregated deliberation is deemed essential,
and where an opportunity for this is afforded, the dedsion of a majon"IJ'
£s binding, if no otker mode be prescribed by the charier. The pn·vafe
procurement of a written assent, signed by t!te majority of the members,
will not supply the want of a meeting. Such an expedient depn·ves
tlwse interested of the benefit of mutual discussion, and subjects them lo
Ike hazard of fraudulent 1·epresentation and uudue influence. Notwithstanding tke o~jection, however, it seems to be agreed that a written
acceptance, thouglz not executed at a meeting, may be sufficient, if signed
by all the stockholders or parties in interest. Davies Y. Hawkins, 3

will not supply the want of a meeting. Such an expedient deprives

those interested of the benefit of mutual discussion, a fid subjects them to

the hazard of fraudulent representation and undue influence. Not-

withstanding the objection, however, it seems to be agreed that a written

acceptance, though not executed at a meeting, may be sufficient, if signed

by all the stockholders or parties in interest. Davies v. Hawkins, 3

Maul. & Selw. 488; Stow v. Wyse, 7 Conn. Rep. 214; Livingston v.

Lynch, 4 John. Ch. Rep. 573; St. Mary's Church, 6 Serg. & Ravvle

498. As this is not true of the paper of the 9th of April, 1849, the

defendants very properly disclaim it, as furnishing evidence of accept-

ance. But they rely on the unanimous act of the majority of stock-

holders at a meeting convened by public advertisement, for the pur-

Maul. & Selw. 488; Stowv. Wyse, 7 Conn. R ep. 214; Livingston v.
Lynch , 4 John. Ch. Rep. 573; St. Mary's Church, 6 Serg. & Rawle
498. As this is not true of the paper of the 9th of April, 1849, the
defendants very properly disclaim it, as furnishing evidence of acceptance. But they rely on the unanimous act of the majority of stockholders at a meeting convened by public advertisement, for the purp ose of electing trustees, at which those now exercising that office
received the whole number of votes of those in attendance. I con·
cede there can scarcely be stronger evidence of acceptance than that
furnished by an election of corporate officers in pursuance of a new,
or the alteration of an old charter. King v. Larwoad, 1 Lord Raym.
32; Lewling v. Francis, 3 Term Rep. 189. Yet, like other corporate
acts, it is but presumptive evidence of the prior assent of the company,
by a vote of its members, at some supposed meeting, or at least of a

pose of electing trustees, at which those now exercising that office

received the whole number of votes of those in attendance. I con-

cede there can scarcely be stronger evidence of acceptance than that

furnished by an election of corporate officers in pursuance of a new,

or the alteration of an old charter. King v. Larwoad, 1 Lord Raym.

32; Lewling v. Francis, 3 Term Rep. 189. Yet, like other corporate

acts, it is but presumptive evidence of the prior assent of the company,

by a vote of its members, at some supposed meeting, or at least of a
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deliberate waiver of a vote by all in the corporation having that right.

But how can such a presumption be entertained, in the face of a re-

ACCEPT.-\NCE OF AMENDMENTS.

monstrance against the proposed election, made by some of the mem-

bers on the ground of non-acceptance of the younger supplement?

This is obviously out of the question. The record shows that the

same persons who signed the written acceptance, also signed the

requisition for a new election of trustees, claiming to be a majority of

the stockholders; and that the votes subsequently cast were by the

same individuals.

All this was done in disregard of a formal resolution, adopted by

those then claiming to be trustees, repudiating the last supplement,

and denouncing as illegal the election proposed to be held under it.

This resolution was communicated by a committee appointed for that

purpose, to the subsequent electoral meeting, but without effect. It

will not do to say the resolution, as the act of a defunct body, was

naught. It, at least, served to express dissent, entertained and ex-

pressed by a portion of the members—a dissent that could only be

legally overcome at a meeting regularly convened to consider the pro-

posed amendment. The opportunity to deliberate, and, if possible,

to convince their fellows, is the right of the minority, of which they
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can not be deprived by the arbitrary will of the majority. That the

call for an election, and the subsequent steps were in contempt of this

right, is manifest. The attempt consequently defeats itself. We have,

therefore, no hesitancy in holding there is an entire want of proof

of the acceptance of either supplement.

Was the court of common pleas authorized so to declare in this

proceeding, and so decree a new election? The relators insist the

only question before that court was as to the binding efficacy of the

April supplement; and that their title as trustees under the act of

January was not in issue. But this objection proceeds from too nar-

row an estimate of the act of the 13th of April, 1840; though the 12th

section of that statute speaks only of disputes between persons claim-

ing to be duly elected to fill any office, its purview is broad enough to

cover all questions arising on writs of quo warranto, between rival

claimants of elective offices, though some of them may, as here, claim

to hold by temporary legislative appointment. The object of-the stat-

ute is to invest the court with power to settle the pretensions of all the

claimants in the same proceeding, whether they be complainants or de-

fendants, and whether in or out of possession. To exclude from its op-

eration corporate officers, who, like these plaintiffs, derived their first

appointment from the act of incorporation, in anticipation of a regu-

lar election, would be to sacrifice to literal interpretation, the plain

intent of the law-givers. The act speaks of disputed elections between

persons claiming to be duly elected, and these, doubtless, were prin-

cipally regarded in passing its provisions. But cases like ours are

within the mischief intended to be remedied, and so questionless

within the equity of the statute, which, being highly remedial, ought

to be so literally construed as to secure the attainment of substantial

justice. Here, then, is a case of contested election, intimately con-

deliberate waiver of a vote by all in the corporation having that right.
But how can such a presumption be entertained, in the face of a remonstrance against the proposed election, made by some of the members on the ground of non-acceptance of the younger supplement?
This is obviously out of the question. The record shows that the
same persons who signed the written acceptance, also signed the
requisition for a new election of trustees, claiming to be a majority of
the stockholders; and that the votes subsequently cast were by the
same individuals.
All this was done in disregard of a formal resolution, adopted by
those then claiming to be trustees, repudiating the last supplement,
and denouncing as illegal the election proposed to be held under it.
This resolution was communicated by a committee appointed for that
purpose, to the subsequent electoral meeting, but without effect. It
will not do to say the resolution, as the act of a defunct body, '"'as
naught. It, at least, served to express dissent, entertained and expressed by a portion of the members--a dissent that could only be
legally overcome at a meeting regularly convened to consider the proposed amendment. The opportunity to deliberate, and, if possible ,
to convince their fellows, is the right of the minority, of ·which they
can not be deprived by the arbitrary will of the majority. That the
call for an election, and the subsequent steps were in contempt of this
right, is manifest. The attempt consequently defeats itself. We have,
therefore, no hesitancy in holding there is an entire want of proof
of the acceptance of either supplement.
Vt/ as the court of common pleas authorized so to declare in this
proceeding, and so decree a new election? The relators rnsist the
only question before that court was as to the binding efficacy of the
April supplement; and that their title as tnistees under the act of
January was not in issue. But this objection proceeds from too narrow an estimate of the act of the I 3th of April , 1840; though the 12th
. ection of that statute speaks only of disputes between persons claiming to be duly elected to fill any office, its purview is broad enough to
cover all questions arising on writs of quo warranto, between rival
claimants of elective offices, though some of them may, as here, claim
to hold by temporary legislative appointment. The object of-the statute is to invest the court with power to settle the pretensions of all the
claimants in the same proceeding, whether they be complainants or defendants, and whether in or out of possession. To exclude from its operation corporate officers, who, like these plaintiffs, derived their first
appointment from the act of incorporation, in anticipation of a reg ular election, would be to sacrifice to literal interpretation, the plain
intent of the law-givers. The act speaks of disputed elections bet ...veen
persons claiming to be duly elected, and these, doubtless , were principally regarded in passing its provisions. But cases like ours are
within the mischief intended to be remedied , and so questionless ·
within the equity of the statute, which , being highly r emedial, ought
to be so literallv construed as to secure the attainment of suhstanti:"tl
justice. Here,-then, is a case of contested election , intimHtely con-
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nected with the title set up by the plaintiff and almost necessarily in-

CHARTER FROM THE KING.

volving an investigation of it. Being within the object of the act.

which was to end disputes at a blow, that title was as open to inquiry

as the defendants. The result shows that neither party was entitled

nected with the title set up by the plaintiff and almost necessarily involving an investigation of it. Being within the object of the act.
which was to end disputes at a blow, that title was as open to inquiry
as the defendants. The result shows that neither party was entitled
to enjoy, and this put it within the authority of the court to order :i
new election. This conclusion leaves to the company the right of determining, in an orderly way, whether it vvill accept of either supplement as an amendment of its charter, and if so, which of them? The
cli spute now existing may be so settled as to leave no room for future
contest- a consummation much to be desired by a business corporation situate as this is. It is gratifying to find that the conclusions of
the law are thus in harmony with the best interests of the corporators,
and we accordingly recommend that steps be taken as soon as pr:ic·
ticable to determine this unhappy disagreement.
Proceedings affirmed.

to enjoy, and this put it within the authority of the court to order a

new election. This conclusion leaves to the company the right of de-

termining, in an orderly way, whether it will accept of either supple-

ment as an amendment of its charter, and if so, which of them? The

dispute now existing may be so settled as to leave no room for future

contest—a consummation much to be desired by a business corpora-

tion situate as this is. It is gratifying to find that the conclusions of

the law are thus in harmony with the best interests of the corporators,

and we accordingly recommend that steps be taken as soon as prac-

ticable to determine this unhappy disagreement.

Proceedings affirmed.

Vote. See 1854, Trov and R. Co. v. Kerr, 17 Barb. tN. Y.) 581; 1859, Ban-

gor, O. & M. R. Co. v. Smith, 47 Maine 34; 1866, City of San Antonio v.

Jones, 28 Tex. 19; 1874, Kenton County Court v. B. L. T. Co., 10 Bush (73

Ky.) 529; 1876, Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Cole, 29 Ohio St. 126; 1879,

State v. Sibley, 25 Minn. 387; 1889, Gibbs v. Baltimore C. G. Co., 130 V. S.
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390, 9 Sup. Ct. 553; 1892, Miller v. Am. Mut. Acc. Ins. Co., 92 Tenn. 167, 20

Note. See 18.54, Troy and R. Co. v. Kerr, 17 Barb. IN. Y.) 581; 1859, Ban·
g-or, 0. & i\L R. Co. v. Smith , 47 Maine 34; 1866, City of San Antonio v.
Jones, 28Tex. 19; 1874, Kenton County Court v. B. L. T. Co., 10 Bush (73
Ky.) .529; 1876, Cincinnati, H. & D.R. Co . v. Cole, 29 Ohio St. 126; 18i9,
State v. Sibley, 25 Minn. 387; 1889, Gibbs v. Baltimore C. G. Co., 130 U. S.
396, 9 Sup. Ct. 553; 1892, Miller v. Am. Mut. Acc. Ins. Co., 92 Tenn. 167, 20
L. R. A. 765; 1896, State v. Taylor, 55 Ohio St. 61, 44 N. E . Rep. 513.

L. R. A. 765; 1896, State v. Taylor, 55 Ohio St. 61, 44 N. E. Rep. 513.

ARTICLE III. THE CHARTER ITS CONTENTS.

Sec. 90. In general. The "means and instruments effecting in-

corporation may be numerous, consisting of statutes, articles

of association, deeds of settlement, by-laws and notices, some

of which are usually required to be recorded and others pub-

lished. The convenience of using some short term to express

all of these fundamental acts and instruments has led to the

adoption of 'constating instruments.'" Field on Corpora-

ARTICLE Ill.

tions, § 28.

THE CHARTER-ITS CONTENTS.

Note. See supra, p. 133.

Sec. 90. 11l general.

The "means and instruments effecting in·
corporation may be numerous, consisting of statutes, articles
of association , deeds of settlement, by-laws and notices, some
of which are usually required to be recorded and others pub·
lished . The convenience of using some short term to expre ·s
all of these fundamental acts and instruments has led to the
adoption of 'constating instruments.' " Field on Corpora·
tions , § 28.

Sec. 91. Under special charter from the king, illustration:

1769. The Dartmouth College Charter.

After a preamble setting forth the circumstances and reasons for granting

a charter, it proceeds: "Know ye, therefore, that we * * » do of our

special grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion, by and with the advice

of our counsel for said province, by these presents, will, ordain, grant and con-

stitute that there be a college erected in our said province of New Hampshire

by the name of Dartmouth College, for the education and instruction of youth

Note. See the full charter of Dartmouth College, given in 4 Wheat. (U. S.)

Reports, pp. *519-538.

Note. · See supra, p. 133.

Sec. 91. Under special charter from the king, illustration:
1769.

The Dartmouth College Charter.

After a preamble setting fortb the circumstances and reasons for granting
a charter, it proceeds : "Know y e, therefore, that we • * • do of ~ur
special grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion, by and with the advice
of our counsel for said province, by these prese nts, will , ordain, grant and c~n
stitute that there be a college erected in our said province of New Hampsbtre
by the name of Dartmouth College, for the education and instruction of youth
Note . See the full charter of Dartmouth College, given in 4 Wheat. (U. S.)
Reports, pp. *519-538.
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CHARTER UNDER A SPECIAL LAW.

of the Indian tribes in this land, in reading, writing* and all parte of learning

which shall appear necessary and expedient for civilizing and Christianizing

children of pagans, as well as in all liberal arts and sciences, and also of En-

glish youth and any others. And the trustees of said college may and shall l)e

one body corporate and politic, in deed, act and name, and shall be called,

named and distinguished by the name of the Trustees of Dartmouth College.

* * * And for the more full and perfect erection of said corporation and

body politic * * * we do by these presents, for us, our heirs and successors,

make, ordain, constitute and appoint our trusty and well-beloved [twelve

persons named, 'the whole number of said trustees consisting, and here-

after forever to consist, of twelve and no more'], to be trustees of said Dart-

mouth College » • * * that the said trustees and their successors shall

forever hereafter be, in deed, act and name, a body corporate, * * * by

the name of the Trustees of Dartmouth College, » » » and by that name

'shall be able * * * to have, get, acquire, etc.,' property, etc. 'And

• * * to the intent that our said corporation * » * may have perpetual

succession and continuance forever, we * * * give and grant unto the

Trustees of Dartmouth College, and to their successors forever, that there
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shall be once a year, and every year, a meeting of said trustees held at said

Dartmouth College, at such time as by said trustees shall be agreed on, the

first meeting to be called by the said Eleazer Wheelock,' etc., to conduct the

affairs of the college; » » * 'also that the said trustees and their suc-

cessors, or the major part of any seven or more of them, which shall convene

for that purpose * * * as often as one or more of said trustees shall die,

or by removal or otherwise shall, according to their judgment, become unfit

or incapable to serve the interests of said college, do, as soon as may be after

the death, etc., * * * elect and appoint such trustee or trustees as shall

supply the place of him or them so dying,' etc. * * *"

Many other privileges concerning the management in detail of the college

oi the Indian tribes in this land, in reading, writing' and all parts of learning
which s hall nppear necessary and exP.edient for civilizing and Christianizing
children of pagans, as well as in all liberal arts and sciences, and also of English youth and any others. And the trustees of said college may and shall be
one body cor{>Orate and/olitic, in deed, act. and name, and s hall be called,
named and dIStinguishe by the name of the Trustees of Dartmouth College.
• • • And for the more full and perfect erection of said corporation and
body politic • • • we do by these presents, for us, our heirs and successors,
make, ordain, constitute and appoint our trusty and well-beloved [twelve
persons named, 'the whole number of said trustees consisting, and hereafter forever to consist, of twelve and no more'], to be Lrustees of said Dartmouth College • • • • that the said trustees and their successors shull
forever hereafter be, in deed, act and name, a bodl corporate, • • • by
the name of the Trustees of Dartmouth College,
• • and by that name
'shall be able • • • to have, get, acquire, etc.,' property, etc. 'And
• • • to the intent that our said corporation • • • may have perpetnal
succession and continuance forever, we • • • give and grant unto the
Trustees of Dartmouth College, and to their successors forever, that there
shall be once a year, and every year, a meeting of said trustees held at said
Dartmouth College, at such time as by said trustees shall be agreed on, t.be
first meeting to be called by the said Eleazer Wheelock,' etc., to conduct the
affahs of the college; • • • 'also that the said trustees and their successors, or the major part of any seven or more of them, which shall convene
for that purpose • • • as often as one or more of said trustees shall die,
or by removal or otherwise shall, according to their judgment, become unfit
or incapable to serve the interests of said college, do, as soon as may be after
the deatll, etc., • * • elect and appoint such trustee or trustees as shall
supply the place of him or them so dying,' etc. • • •"
Many other privileges concerning the management in detail of the college
are expressly set forth.

are expressly set forth.

See. 92. Under a special law or act of the legislature, illustra-

tion:

1826. An act to incorporate the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Com-

pany.

See. 92.

Under a special law or act of the legislature, illustra-

tion:

Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland, That Isaac

McKim (and eight others named) be, and they are hereby appointed com-

missioners, under the direction of a majority of whom, subscriptions may be

1826.

An act to incorporate the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company.

received to the capital stock of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company

hereby incorporated; and they, or a majority of them, may cause books to be

opened at such times and places as they may direct, for the purpose of receiv-

ing subscriptions to the capital stock of said company, after having given such

notice as they may deem proper * » *

Sec. 2. That the capital stock * * * shall be $3,000,000, in shares of $100

t-acli, 10,000 shares to be reserved for subscription to the state of Maryland,

and o,000 for the city of Baltimore * * * and the remaining 15,000 shares

may be subscribed for by any other corporation, or individuals; and as soon

10,000 shares * * * shall be subscribed, the subscribers * * * their

successors and assigns shall be, and they are hereby declared to be, incor-

porated into a company by the name of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad

Company, and by that name shall be capable in law of purchasing • * »

and conveying estates, real and personal, * * * so far as shall be neces-

sary for purposes » * * mentioned, and no farther, and shall have per-

petual succession, and by said name may sue and be sued, and may have and

Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland, That Isaac
){cKim (and eight others nnmed) be, and they are hereby appointed commissioners, under the direction of a majority of whom, subscnptions may be
received t.o the capital stock of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company
hereby incorporated; and they, or a majority of them, may cause books to be
opened at such times and places as they may direct, for the purpose of receiving sn bscriptions to the capital stock of said company, after having given such
notice as they may deem proper • • •
Set>. 2. That the capital stock • • •shall be $3,000,000, in shares of $100
Pach, 10,000 shares to be reserved for subscription to the state of Mnryland,
an<l o,000 for the city of Baltimore • • • and the remaining 15.000 s hares
may be subscribed for by any other corporation, or individuals; and as soon
as 10,000 shares • • • shall be subscribed, the subscribers • • * their
successors and assigns shall be, and they are hereby declared to be, inoorporate<l into a company by the name of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Company, and by that name shall be capable in law of purchasing • • •
and r.onveying estates, real and personal, • • • so far as shall be necessary for purposes • • • mentioned, and no farther, and shall have perpetual succession, and by said name may sue and be sued, and may have and
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use a common seal, whfch they shall have power to alter or renew at their

pleasure, etc. » * *

use a common seal, which they shall have power to alter or renew at their
pleasure, etc. • • •
8ec. 3. Provided for apportioning the stock if there were subscriptions received for more than 15,000 shares.
Sec. 4. Required one dollar on each share to be paid at the time of snbscription, and the residue in such installments as may be required by the president
and directors-not more than one-third in any year and only after BIXty days
notice; arnl upon failure to pay, the stock to be forfeited to the company, and
may be sold by it.
Sec. 5. Provided that the charter ahould become forfeited if 10,000 shares
were not suhecribed within one year.
t-lec. 6. Provided that when 10,000 shares were takerr, "the said commissioners or a majority of them shall call a general meeting of the subscribers.
at such time and place as they may appoint, and shall give at lelll!t twenty
d ays' public notice thereof, and at such meeting the commissioners shall
lay the subscription books before the subscribers then and there present, nnd
thereupon the said subscribers, or a majority of them, shall elect twelve directors, by ballot to manage the affairs of said company. and these tweke
directors, or a majority of them, shall have the power of electing a president
of said company either from amongst the directors or others. • • • Each
stockholder shall be allowed one vote for every share owned by him, • • •
and he may depute any other person to vote for him as his proxy, and th~ com·
missioners, or any three or more of them, shall be judges of the first election
of directors."
Sec. 7. Provided for continuing the succession of the president and directors, by requiring them to be chosen annualJy on the second Monday of October, the state of Maryland and tlie City of Baltimore to appoint one for earh
2,500 shares owneJ by them, but not to vote for others; the president :ind
directors to appoint judges of elections and to fill vacancies in the board.
ec. 8. Annual meeting of stockholders to be held, or called meetings at
any time upon call by president and directors, or stockholders holding onefourth of the stock subscribed, on thirty days' notfre.
Sec. 9. Statement of affairs of the company to be laid before sharebolclera at
. the annual meeting; a majority in value of stockholders may at a general
meeting remove the president or any director.
Sec. 10. President and directors to take oath faithfully to dischanze their
duties.
•
·
Sec. 11. Reserved Rtock may be disposed of by directors opening books to
receive subscriptions to the same.
Secs. 12-18. Directors were e mpowered to appoint all other officers and fix:
their compensation, make by-laws, increase the stock, negotiate loans, con·
struct the road, make lateral roads, agree for land and materials, or condemn
the same in the mRnner set forth, cross other roads, put the machinery ou
the road and operate it.
Sec. 18. Fixed maximum rates of transportation, forbade all persons from
traveling upon the road without license of the company, and exempted shares
from taxation .
Sec. 19. Provided for dividends from the net profits only .
Sec. 20. Provided for a pennlty of $.500 for willful injury done to the road.
Sec . 21. Pl'Ovided that the act should take effect on it.a passage.
Sec. 22. Provided that the road should be commenced within two years
and completed•within ten years.
Sec. 23. Reserved a right to incorporate other companies.

Sec. 3. Provided for apportioning the stock if there were subscriptions re-

ceived for more than 15,000 shares.

Sec. 4. Required one dollar on each share to be paid at the time of subscrip-

tion, and the residue in such installments as may be required by the president

and directors—not more than one-third in any year and only after sixty days

notice; anil upon failure to pay, the stock to be forfeited to the company, and

may be sold by it.

Sec. 5. Provided that the charter should become forfeited if 10,000 shares

were not subscribed within one year.

Sec. 6. Provided that when 10,000 shares were taken", "the said commis-

sioners or a majority of them shall call a general meeting of the subscribers,

at such time and place as they may appoint, and shall give at least twenty

days' public notice thereof, and at such meeting the commissioners shall

lay the subscription books before the subscribers then and there present, and

thereupon the said subscribers, or a majority of them, Bhall elect twelve di-

rectors, by ballot to manage the affairs of said company, and these twelve
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directors, or a majority of them, shall have the power of electing a president

of said company either from amongst the directors or others. • * » Each

stockholder shall be allowed one vote for every share owned by him, * * *

and he may depute any other person to vote for him as his proxy, and the com-

missioners, or any three or more of them, shall be judges of the first election

of directors."

Sec. 7. Provided for continuing the succession of the president and direc-

tors, by requiring them to be chosen annually on the second Monday of Octo-

ber, the state of Maryland and the City of Baltimore to appoint one for each

2.500 shares owned by them, but not to vote for others; the president and

directors to appoint judges of elections and to fill vacancies in the board.

Sec. 8. Annual meeting of stockholders to be held, or called meetings at

any time upon call by president and directors, or stockholders holding one-

fourth of the stock subscribed, on thirty days' notice.

Sec. 9. Statement of affairs of the company to be laid before shareholders at

the annual meeting; a majority in value of stockholders may at a general

meeting remove the president or any director.

Sec. 10. President and directors to take oath faithfully to discharee their

duties.

Sec. 11. Reserved stock may be disposed of by directors opening books to

receive subscriptions to the same.

Sees. 12-18. Directors were empowered to appoint all other officers and fix

their compensation, make by-laws, increase the stock, negotiate loans, con-

struct the road, make lateral roads, agree for land and materials, or condemn

the same in the manner set forth, cross other roads, put the machinery on

the road and operate it.

Sec. 18. Fixed maximum rates of transportation, forbade all persons from

traveling upon the road without license of the company, and exempted shares

from taxation.

Sec. 19. Provided for dividends from the net profits only.

Sec. 20. Provided for a penalty of $500 for willful injury done to the road.

Sec. 21. Provided that the act should take effect on its passage.

Sec. 22. Provided that the road should be commenced within two years

and completed'within ten years.

Sec. 23. Reserved a right to incorporate other companies.
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Sec. 93. Under general laws, (a) The charter consists of ( 1)

the provisions of the general corporation law, and (2) articles

of incorporation, authorized thereby, and consistent therewith.

OREGON RAILWAY CO. v. OREGONIAN RAILWAY CO.1

See. 93. Under general laws . (a) The charter consists of ( 1 )
the provisions of the general corporation law, and ( 2) articles
of incorporation, authorized thereby, and consistent therewith.

1888. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 130 U. S.

[Error to the United States circuit court. The Oregonian Co.,

organized in Scotland under the English Companies Act of 1862,

with authority to build and operate a railroad in Oregon, or sell or

OREGON RAILWAY CO. v. OREGONIAN RAILWAY 00.1

lease the same, constructed its road in Oregon, and then leased

it to the Oregon Co. which was incorporated in Oregon under a

general law, authorizing the formation of corporations for any law-

ful business, enterprise, pursuit or occupation. The articles of as-

1888.

Lv

130 U.S.

THE SUPREME CouRT OF THE UNITED STATES.

r-39.

sociation provided that it might lease another railroad, and in ac-

cordance with this authority it leased, through its president and sec-

retary, by direction of the board of trustees, the road of the Ore-

gonian Co., which before had complied with the Oregon statutes au-

thorizing foreign corporations to do business in the state, and providing

that upon such compliance such foreign corporation should have the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:16 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

same rights, powers and privileges as domestic corporations. The

Oregonian Co. had obtained judgment in the lower court for unpaid

rentals under the lease. The Oregon Co. claimed this judgment was

erroneous for the reason that the Oregonian Co. had no authority to dis-

pose of its road in Oregon by lease, and the Oregon Co. had no au-

thority to acquire one in that way.]

Miller, J. * * * It may be considered as the established doc-

trine of this court in regard to the powers of corporations, that they

are such and such only as are conferred upon them by the acts of the

legislatures of the several states under which they are organized. A

corporation in this country, whatever it may have been in England at

a time when the crown exercised the right of creating such bodies, can

only have an existence under the express law of the state or sovereignty

by which it is created. And these powers, where they do not relate to

municipal corporations, exercising authority conferred solely for the

benefit of the public, and in some sense parts of the body politic of

the state, have in this country, until within recent years, always been

conferred by special acts of the legislative body under which they

claim to exist. But the rapid growth of corporations, which have

come to take a part in all or nearly all of the business operations of

the country, and especially in enterprises requiring large aggregations

of capital and individual energy, as well as their success in meeting the

needs of a vast number of most important commercial relations, have

'Statement of facte abridged. Arguments, dissenting opinion of Field, J.,

and parts of the opinion of Mii.lek, J., omitted.

[Error to the United States circuit court. The Oregonian Co.,
organized in Scotland under the English Companies Act of 1862,
with authority to build and operate a railroad in Oregon, or sell or
lease the same, constructed its road in Oregon, and then leased
it to the Oregon Co. ' 'vbicb was incorporated in Oregon under a
general law, authorizing the formation of corporations for any lawful business, enterprise, pursuit or occupation. The articles of association provided that it ~ight lease another railroad, and in accordance with this authority it leased, through its president and secretary , by direction of the board of tmstecs, the road of the Oregonian €0., which before had complied with the Oregon statutes authorizing foreign corporations to do business in the state, and providing
that upon such compliance such foreign corporation should have the
. ame rights, powers and privileges as domestic corporations. The
Oregonian Co. had obtained judgment in the lower court for unpaid
rentals under the lease. The Oregon Co. claim ed this judg ment \Vas
erroneous for the reason that the Oregonian Co. had no authority to di ~ 
pose of its road in Oregon by lease, and the Oreg on Co. had no a uthority to acquire one in that way.]
~liLLER, J.
• • • It may be consid e red as th e establish e d doctrine of this court in regard to the powers 'of corporations, that they
are such and such only as are conferred upon the m by the acts of the
legislatures of the several stntes under which they a re organized. A
corporation in this country, v•hatever it mny have bee n in England at
a time when the crown exercised the right of creating su ch bodies. ca n
only have an existence under the express law of the state or !>O\'ereignty
by which it is created. And th ese powers , where they do not relntc to
municipal corporations, exercising authority conferred solely for the
benefit of the public, and in som e sense parts of the body politic (If
the state, have in this country. until within recent years, al·ways been
conferred by special acts of the legislative body under which they
claim to exist. But the rapid growth of corporations, which h a\'e
come to take a part in all or nearly a ll of the business operations of
the country, and especially in enterprises requiring large aggrega tions
of capital and individual energy. as well as the ir success in meetin g the
needs of a vast number of most important commercial r e lations. h a \'e
1 Statement of facts abridged . Argnm t>nts, dissenting opinion of
and parts or the opinion of M11.r.E1t, J ., 01111tted .
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demanded the serious attention and consideration of lawmakers. And

430

while valuable services have been rendered to the public by this class

OREGON RY. CO. V. OREGONlAN RY. CO.

of organizations, which have stimulated their formation by numerous

demanded the serious attention and consideration of lawmakers. And
while valuable services have been rendered to the public by this class
of organizations, which have stimulated their formation by numerou~
special acts, it came at last to be perceived that they were attended by
many evi"ls in their operation as well as much good, and that the hasty
manner in which they were created by the legislatures, sometime
with exclusive privileges, often without due consideration and under
the influence of improper motives, frequently led to bad results.
Whether it was this consideration, or mainly the desire to fix some
more uniform rule by which the rights and powers of private corr'°rations, or those of pecuniary profit, should come into existence, it i5
certain that not many years ago state constitutions which were formed
or remodeled came to have in them a provision like that which is now
to be found in the constitution of the state of Oregon, art. 11, § 2:
"Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be
created by special laws, except for municipal purposes. All laws
passed pursuant to this section may be altered, amended, or repealed,
but not so as to impair or destroy any vested corporate rights."
Outside of the powers conferred and privileges granted to those organizations by the statutes under which they exist, they are in all the
states of the Union, which, like Oregon, have the common law as the
foundation of their jurisprudenee, governed by that common law; and
it is the established doctrine of this court, and, with some exceptions.
of the states in which that common law prevails, as well as of Great
Britain, from which it is derived, that such a corporation can exercise
no power or authority which is not granted to it by the charter under
which it exists or by some other act of the legislature which granted
that charter.
[After citing and discussing Thomas v. R. Co., 101 U.S. 71; The
Asbury R. C. & I. Co. v. Richie, L. R. 7 H. L. 653; The East
Anglian R. Co. v. Eastern. Counties R., 1 r C. B. 775; Green Bay
& M. R. Co., 107 U. S. 98; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. St. Louis,
etc., R. Co .. II8 U.S. 290, 309, proceeds:]
It may be considered that this is the law of the state of Oregon, except as it has been altered or modified by its constitution and statute. .
\Ve are here met with an embarrassment arising out of the circumstance that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant in the present case
profess to exercise its powers under any special charter conferred on
it by the legislat'ure of Oregon. That state, in accordance with the
principle laid down in its constitution, to which we have already referred, passed general laws for the formation of private corporations.
See laws of Oregon (Deady's Comp.) ch. 8. Under title 1, § 1,
reads as follows:
"Whenever three or more persons shall desire to incorporate them•
selves for the purposes of engaging in any lawful enterprise, business,
pursuit or occupation, they may do so in the manner provided in this
act."
Provision is then made for the manner in which these persqns shall
constitute themselves a corporation , by filing articles of association,

special acts, it came at last to be perceived that they were attended bv

many evils in their operation as well as much good, and that thehastv

manner in which they were created by the legislatures, sometimes

with exclusive privileges, often without due consideration and under

the influence of improper motives, frequently led to bad results.

Whether it was this consideration, or mainly the desire to fix some

more uniform rule by which the rights and powers of private corpora-

tions, or those of pecuniary profit, should come into existence, it is

certain that not many years ago state constitutions which were formed

or remodeled came to have in them a provision like that which is now

to be found in the constitution of the state of Oregon, art. n, § 2:

"Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be

created by special laws, except for municipal purposes. All laws

passed pursuant to this section may be altered, amended, or repealed,

but not so as to impair or destroy any vested corporate rights."

Outside of the powers conferred and privileges granted to those or-
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ganizations by the statutes under which they exist, they are in all the

states of the Union, which, like Oregon, have the common law as the

foundation of their jurisprudence, governed by that common law; and

it is the established doctrine of this court, and, with some exceptions,

of the states in which that common law prevails, as well as of Great

Britain, from which it is derived, that such a corporation can exercise

no power or authority which is not granted to it by the charter under

which it exists or by some other act of the legislature which granted

that charter.

[After citing and discussing Thomas v. R. Co., 101 U. S. 71: The

Asbury R. C & I. Co. v. Richie, L. R. 7 H. L. 653; The East

Anglian R. Co. v. Eastern Counties R., 11 C. B. 775; Green Bay

& M. R. Co., 107 U. S. 9S; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. St. Louis,

etc., R. Co.. 118 U. S. 290, 309, proceeds:]

It may be considered that this is the law of the state of Oregon, ex-

cept as it has been altered or modified by its constitution and statutes.

We are here met with an embarrassment arising out of the circum-

stance that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant in the present case

profess to exercise its powers under any special charter conferred on

it by the legislature of Oregon. That state, in accordance with the

principle laid down in its constitution, to which we have already re-

ferred, passed general laws for the formation of private corporations.

See laws of Oregon (Deady's Comp.) ch. 8. Under title 1, § I,

reads as follows:

"Whenever three or more persons shall desire to incorporate them-

selves for the purposes of engaging in any lawful enterprise, business,

pursuit or occupation, they may do so in the manner provided in this

act."

Provision is then made for the manner in which these persons shall

constitute themselves a corporation, bv filing articles of association,
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acknowledged before a proper officer, in the office of the secretary

of state and in that of the clerk of the county where the business is to

§ 93 .
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431

he carried on. What these articles shall contain is specified with

some particularity. But title 2 of this same chapter is more impor-

tant in regard to the matter at issue, because it relates, among other

things, to corporations which are organized for the construction of

railroads. The mode of their formation is the same as that of those

coming under title 1, but the declaration of the powers which may be

exercised by railroad corporations may become important in the con-

sideration of the present case.

By the act of the legislature of October 21, 1878, Session Laws,

95, it is provided "that any foreign corporation incorporated for the

purpose of constructing, or constructing and operating, or for the pur-

poses of, or with the power of, acquiring and operating any railway,

* * * shall, on compliance with the laws of this state, for the

regulation of foreign corporations transacting business therein, have

the same rights, powers and privileges" as a domestic corporation

formed for such purpose, and no more.

When we have found, therefore, what powers were conferred bv
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the laws of Oregon on the defendant corporation in this case we shall

also have determined that the powers of the plaintiff corporation were

no greater with regard to the same subject-matter, so far as the stat-

utes are concerned, except as it may be shown that other powers are

given by some express statute.

It may also be conceded, at the outset of the argument, that the

memorandum made under the companies act of 1862 by the plaintiff,

and the articles of association made under the laws of Oregon by the

defendant, both contain declarations of the powers of these companies

and of each of them to buy or sell or lease railroads. The only

question, therefore, to be considered is whether this declaration of

power is authorized by the laws of Oregon.

It is argued that the articles of association, under the Oregon law,

and the memorandum of association, under the companies act of

Great Britain, are themselves the equivalent of an act of incorporation

by the legislature, and that whatever is found as a grant of power, or

description of the purpose of the company, set forth in such articles

or memorandum, is tantamount to a legislative act. A phrase in the

opinion of the court, in Thomas v. Railroad Co., supra, is cited as

supporting this proposition, namely: "The memorandum of associa-

tion, as Lord Cairns said, stands in place of a legislative charter."

But what was meant, both by Lord Cairns and by this court, was that

anything not claimed, granted or described in such instrument in rela-

tion to the powers and business of the corporation could not be held

to be a part of them by construction; in other words, that its powers

could not exceed those enumerated therein. It was necessarily im-

plied in such a remark that anything in such articles of memorandum

not warranted by the statutes in question, authorizing the formation of

corporate bodies, was void for want of authority.

Of course, any authority for the exercise of corporate powers, de-

a-:knowledged before a proper officer, in the office of the secretary
of state arid in that of the clerk of the county where the business is to
he carried on. What these articles shall contain is specified with
some particularity. But title 2 of this same chapter is more important in regard to the matter at issue, because it relates, among other
things, to corporations which are organized for the construction of
railroads. The mode of their formation is the same as that of those
coming under title I , but the declaration of the powers which may be
exercised by railroad corporations may become important in the consideration of the present case.
By the act of the legislature of October 21, 1878, Session Laws,
95, it is provided "that any foreign corporation incorporated for the
purpose of constructing, or constructing and operating, or for the purposes of, or with the power of, acquiring and operating any railway,
• • • shall, on compliance with the laws of this state, for the
regulation of foreign corporations transacting business therein, have
the same rights, powers and privileges'' as ·a domestic corporation
fo rmed for such purpose, and no more.
When we have found, therefore, what powers were conferred by
the laws of Oregon on the defendant corporation in this case we shall
also have determined that the powers of the plaintiff corporation were
no greater with regard to the same subject-matter, so far as the statutes are concerned, except as it may be shown that other powers are
given by some express statute.
It may also be conceded, at the outset of the argument, that the
memorandum made under the companies act of x862 by the plaintiff,
and the articles of association made under the laws of Oregon by the
defendant, both contain declarations of the powers of these companies
and of each of them to buy or sell or lease railroads. The only
question, therefore, to be considered is whether this declaration of
power is authorized by the laws of Oregon.
It is argued that the articles of association, under the Oregon law,
and the memorandum of association, under the companies act of
Great Britain, are themselves the equivalent of an act of incorporation
by the legislature, and that whatever is found as a grant of pO\ver, or
description of the purpose of the company, set forth in such articles
or memorandum, is tantamount to a legislative act. A phrase in the
opinion of the court, in Thomas v. Railroad Co., supra, is cited as
supporting this proposition, namely: "The memorandum of association, as Lord Cairns said, stands in place of a legi slative charter.''
But what was meant, both by Lord Cairns and by this court, was that
anything not claimed, granted or described in such instniment in relation to the powers and business of the corporation could not be held
to be a part of them by construction; in other words, that its powers
could not exceed those enumerated therein. It was necessarily implieq in such a remark that anything in such articles of memorandum
not \Vattanted by the statutes in question, authorizing the formation of
corporate bodies, was void for want of authority.
Of course, any authority for the exercise of corporate powers, de-
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i ived from the laws of Oregon, must be in accord with the constitu-

tion of that state and its statutes upon that subject. The constitutional

432

provisions, above quoted, that corporations shall not be created by-

OREGON RY. CO. V. OREGONIAN RY . CO.

special laws, but may be formed under general laws, implies that no

1\'ed from the la\.\'S of Oregon, must be in accord with the con titution of that state and its statutes upon that subject. The constitutional
provisions, above quoted , that corporations shall not be created by
special laws, but may be formed under general laws, implies that no
private corporation could be created thereafter until such general law
had been enacted , and that it thereupon became the fundamental law
of the state in regard to all corporations formed under it. It is idle to
say, therefore , that any corporation could assume to itself powers of
action by the mere declaration . in its articles or memorandum that it
possessed them.
We have examined with much care the two statutes already referred
to concern ing incorporation, enacted in accordance with that constitutional provision , and do not find any express authority for a railroad
company to lease its road for an indefinite period or for it to take such
a lease; nor are we able to find any general language in those statutes, or either of them , in relation to the powers that may be conferred upon corporations \vhich justifies a departure from the principles
laid down in Thomas \". Railroad Co.
It is to be rememhered that where a statute making a grant of property, or of powers, or of franchises to a p1; vate individua l, or a private corporation becomes the subject of con,;truction as regards the
extent of the grant, the universal nile is that in doubtful points the
construction shall be against the grantee and in favor of the government or the genera l public. As was said in the case of Charles River
Bridge v. vVarren Bridge, I I P et. 420: " ln this court the principle
is recognized that in grants by the public nothing passes by implication." See, also, Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Co. v. Litchfield,
23 How. 66 ; Turnpike Co. v. Illinoi s, 96 U.S. 63.
Therefore if the articles of association of these two corporations.
instead of be ing the mere adoption by the corporators themselves of
the declaration of their own purposes an<l powers, had been an act of
the legi slature of Oregon conferring such powers on the corporations.
they would be subject to the rule abo\·e stated and to rigid construction in regard to powers granted . How much more, then, should this
rule be applied, and with how much more reason should a court,
called upon to determine the powers grnnted by these articles of a ociation, construe them rig idly, with the stronger leaning in doubtful
cases in favor of the public and against th e private corporntion.
We have to consider, when such articles become the subject of construction, that they are, in a sense , ex parte; the ir formation and execution-what shall be put into them as well as what shall be left ou t
-do not take place under the supen·ision of any official authority whatever. They are the production of private citizens, gotten up in the
interest of the parties who propose to become corporators, and stimulated by their zeal for the p ersonal advantage of the parties concerned
rather than the general good.
These articles, when signed by the corporators, acknowledj,{ed hefore any ju stice of the peace or notary public, and filed in the office of
the secretary of state and the clerk of the proper county, become com-

i

private corporation could be created thereafter until such general law-

had been enacted, and that it thereupon became the fundamental law

of the state in regard to all corporations formed under it. It is idle to

say, therefore, that any corporation could assume to itself powers of

action by the mere declaration in its articles or memorandum that it

possessed them.

We have examined with much care the two statutes already referred

to concerning incorporation, enacted in accordance with that consti-

tutional provision, and do not find any express authority for a railroad

company to lease its road for an indefinite period or for it to take such

a lease; nor are we aide to find any general language in those stat-

utes, or either of them, in relation to the powers that may be con-

ferred upon corporations which justifies a departure from the principles

laid down in Thomas v. Railroad Co.

It is to be remembered that where a statute making a grant of prop-

erty, or of powers, or of franchises to a private individual, or a pri-
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vate corporation becomes the subject of construction as regards the

extent of the grant, the universal ride is that in doubtful points the

construction shall be against the grantee and in favor of the govern-

ment or the general public. As was said in the case of Charles River

Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420: "In this court the principle

is recognized that in grants by the public nothing passes by implica-

tion." See, also, Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Co. v. Litchfield,

23 How. 66; Turnpike Co. v. Illinois, 96 U. S. 63.

Therefore if the articles of association of these two corporations,

instead of being the mere adoption by the corporators themselves of

the declaration of their own purposes and powers, had been an act of

the legislature of Oregon conferring such powers on the corporations,

they would be subject to the rule above stated and to rigid construc-

tion in regard to powers granted. How much more, then, should this

ride be applied, and with how much more reason should a court,

called upon to determine the powers granted by these articles of asso-

ciation, construe them rigidly, with the stronger leaning in doubtful

cases in favor of the public and against the private corporation.

We have to consider, when such articles become the subject of con-

struction, that thev are, in a sense, ex parte; their formation and exe-

cution—what shall be put into them as well as what shall be left out

—do not take place under the supervision of any official authority what-

ever. They are the production of private citizens, gotten up in the

interest of the parties who propose to become corporators, and stimu-

lated by their zeal for the personal advantage of the parties concerned

rather than the general good.

These articles, when signed by the corporators, acknowledged he-

fore any justice of the peace or notary public, and filed in the office of

the secretary of state and the clerk of the proper county, become com-
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plete and operative. They are, so far as framed in accordance with

law, a substitute for legislation, put in the place of the will of the
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people of the state, formerly expressed by acts of the legislature.

Neither the officer who takes such acknowledgment, nor those who

file the articles, have any power of criticism or rejection. The duty

of the first is to certify to the fact, and of the second to simply mark

them filed as public documents, in their respective offices.

These articles, which necessarily assume, by the sole action of the

corporators, enormous powers, many of which have been heretofore

considered of a public character, sometimes affecting the interests of

the public very largely and very seriously, do not commend them-

selves to the judicial mind as a class of instruments requiring or justi-

fying any very liberal construction. Where the question is whether

they conform to the authority given by statute in regard to corporate

organizations, it is always to be determined upon just construction of

the powers granted therein, with a due regard for all the other laws of

the state upon that subject, and the rule stated above.

It is not urged with much apparent confidence that there is any-

thing in the general provision of the laws of Oregon, in relation to
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the formation of private corporations, which are to be found in ch. 8,

titles i and 2, Deady's Comp., which by.express terms authorizes a

corporation to include within the powers enumerated in its articles of

association that of making such a lease as the one which is the sub-

ject of the action. Arguments based upon these laws are founded

upon the implication that building railroads is, within the meaning of

§ i of title i, a "lawful enterprise, business, pursuit or occupation;"

and the further inference that the power of leasing a railroad, either

as a lessor or a lessee, is one which is incident and proper to the

pursuit of the lawful business of constructing and operating a rail-

road. The same argument is drawn from the general fact that title

3 recognizes the authority of corporations organized for the construc-

tion of railroads, macadamized roads, plank roads, clay roads, canals

or bridges, to appropriate lands for their necessary uses by the exer-

cise of the right of eminent domain, in the manner pointed out.

The language of the statute of New Jersey (quoted in Thomas v.

Railroad Co., supra), under which it was urged that the railroad

company had authority to make the lease in controversy, was quite

a.s general and as liberal in its description of the powers which that

corporation was authorized to exercise as anything to be found in the

Oregon statutes. In fact, in the authority which was given to that

company in regard to making contracts for the transportation of pas-

sengers and freight, and the doing of a general railroad business with

other corporations and private persons, it approaches nearer the

power to make leases than anything which is to be found in the laws

of Oregon; yet this court held that although it was a direct authority

from the legislature itself, and not subject to the restrictive criticisms

above subjected, the lease made in that case was ultra vires, and

without authority on the part of the company.

Another important consideration to be observed, peculiarly applica-

28. WIL CAS

p rete anu operative. They are, so far as framed in accordance with
l aw, a substitute for legislation, put in the place of the will of the
people of the state, formerly expressed by acts of the legislature.
Neither the officer who takes such acknowledgment, nor those who
file the articles, have any power of criticism or rejection. The duty
of the first is to certify to the fact, and of the second to simply mark
them filed as public documents, in their respective offices.
These articles, which necessarily assume, by the sole action of the
corporators, enormous powers. many of which have been heretofore
considered of a public character, sometimes affecting the interests of
the public very largely and very seriously, do not commend themselves to the judicial mind as a class of instmments requiring or justifying any very liberal construction. Where the question is whether
they conform to the authority giYen by statute in regard to corporate
organizations, it is always to be determined upon just construction of
the powers granted therein, with a due regard for all the other laws of
the state upon that subject, and the rule stated above.
It is not urged with much apparent confidence that there is anything in the general provision of the laws of Oregon, in relation to
the formation of private corporations, which are to be found in ch. 8,
titles I and 2, Deady's Comp., which by . express terms authorizes a
corporation to include within the powers enumerated in its articles of
association that of making such a lease as the one which is the subj ect of the action. Arguments based upon these laws are founded
upon the implication that building railroads is, within the meaning of
§ 1 of title 1, a ''lawful enterprise, business, pursuit or occupation;''
a:nd the further inference that the power of leasing a railroad, either
as a lessor or a lessee, is one which is incident and proper to the
pursuit of the lawful business of constmcting and operating a railroad. The same argument is drawn from the general fact that title
2 recognizes the authority of corporations organized for the construction of railroads, macadamized roads, plank roads, clay roads, cam1ls
or bridges, to appropriate lands for their necessary uses by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, in the manner pointed out.
The language of the statut~ of New Jersey (quoted in Thomas v.
Railroad Co., supra), under which it was urged that the railroad
company had authority to make the lease in controversy, was quite
as general and as liberal in its description of the powers which that
corporation was authorized to exercise as anything to be found in the
Oregon statutes. In fact, in the authority which was given to that
c ompany in regard to making contracts for the transportation of pas. engers and freight, and the doing of a general railroad business with
other corporations and private persons, it approaches nearer the
power to make leases than anything which is to be found in the laws.
of Oregon; yet this court held that although it was a direct authority
from the legi slature itself, and not subject to the restrictive criticisms
above subjected, the lease made in that case was ultra vi'res, and
without authority on the part of the company.
Another important consideration to be observed, peculiarly applica28.
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ble to the acts of corporations formed by the corporators themselves,

OREGON R\'. CO. V. OREGONIAN RY. CO.

§ 93

declaring what business they are about to pursue, and the powers

which they propose to exercise in carrying it on, is, that while the

hie to the acts of corporations formed by the corporators themselv'es,
declaring what business they are about to pursue, and the powers
which they propose to exercise in carrying it on, is, that while the
thing to be done may be lawful in a general way, there are and must
be limitations upon the m eans by which it is to be done or the pur·
pose carried out, which the articles of incorporation can not remoYe
or violate. A company might be authorized by its articles to establish a large manufactory in a particular locality, and might be held
to be a valid incorporation with sufficient powers to prosecute the
bu siness described; but such articles, although mentioning the particu·
lar place, would not empower the company, in the exercise of the
power thus conferred, to carry on a business injurious to the health or
comfort of those living in that vicinity.
Instances might be multiplied in which powers described in general
terms as belonging to the objects of the parties who thus become in·
corporated would be valid, but the corporation, in carrying out this
general purpose, would not be authorized to exercise the powers
necessary for so doing in any mode which the law of the state would
not justify in any priva te person or any unincorporated body. The
manner in which these powers shall be exercised, and their subjection
to the restraint of the general laws of the state and its general princi·
pies of public policy are not in any sense enlarged by inserting in the
articles of association the authority to depart there from.
[The rest of the opinion considering other points raised, viz., the
effect of the words " successors and assigns" in a proviso mak ing a
specific grant to the corporation-a provision in a general law author·
izing a navigation company to construct a railroad where portage was
necessary, but forbidding the lease of the same, and a provision in a
general corporation act authorizing a corporation to dissolve itself
and dispose of its property-and holding that none of them impliedly
authorized the giving or taking of a lease by a railroad company, is
omitted. J
Judgme nt below reversed.

thing to be done may be lawful in a general way, there are and must

be limitations upon the means by which it is to be done or the pur-

pose carried out, which the articles of incorporation can not remove

or violate. A company might be authorized by its articles to estab-

lish a large manufactory in a particular locality, and might be held

to be a valid incorporation with sufficient powers to prosecute the

business described; but such articles, although mentioning the particu-

lar place, would not empower the company, in the exercise of the

power thus conferred, to carry on a business injurious to the health or

comfort of those living in that vicinity.

Instances might be multiplied in which powers described in general

terms as belonging to the objects of the parties who thus become in-

corporated would be valid, but the corporation, in carrying out this

general purpose, would not be authorized to exercise the powers

necessary for so doing in any mode which the law of the state would
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not justify in any private person or any unincorporated body. The

manner in which these powers shall be exercised, and their subjection

to the restraint of the general laws of the state and its general princi-

ples of public policy are not in any sense enlarged by inserting in the

articles of association the authority to depart therefrom.

[The rest of the opinion considering other points raised, viz., the

effect of the words "successors and assigns" in a proviso making a

specific grant to the corporation—a provision in a general law author-

izing a navigation company to construct a railroad where portage was

necessary, but forbidding the lease of the same, and a provision in a

general corporation act authorizing a corporation to dissolve itself

and dispose of its property—and holding that none of them impliedly

authorized the giving or taking of a lease by a railroad company, is

omitted.]

Judgment below reversed.

Note. The charter under general laws, consists of the provisions of the gen-

eral incorporation law, and the articles of association. 1856, The Eastern

Plank R. Co. v. Vaughan, 14 N. Y. (4 Kern.) 546; 1866, Society for Visitation

of Sick v. Coramw., 52 Pa. St. 125, 91 Am. Dec. 139; 1869,Van Etten v. Eaton.

19 Mich. 187; 1876, Abbott v. Omaha Smelting Co., 4 Neb. 416: 1882, Gran-

gers' Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Kemper, 73 Ala. 325; 1883, Heck v. Mo

Ewen, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 97 ; 1889, People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 III. 2fiS,

Note. The charter under general laws, consists of the provisions of the gen·
eral incorporation law, and the articles of association. 1856, The Eastern
Plar~k R. Co. v. Vaughan, 14 N. y. (4 Kern.) 546; 1866, Society for Visitation
of Sick v. Commw., 52 Pa. St. 120, 91 Am. Dec.139; 1869,Van Etten v. Eaton ,
19 Mich. 187; 1876, Abbott v. Omaha Smelting Co., 4 Neb. 416: 1882, Gran·
gers' Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Kemper, 73 Ala. 325; 1883, Heck v. i\lr·
Ewen, 12 Lea (Tenn. ) 97; ·1889, People v. Chicago Gas Trm~t Co., 130 Ill. 268,
17 Arn. St. Rep. 319; 1891, Ellerman v. Chicago J ct., etc., Co., 49 ~- J. Eq.
217; 1892, Cronin v. Potters' Co-op. Co., 29 W. L. B. (Ohio) 52; 1893, Repub·
lican Mountain Silve r MineR v. Brown, 58 Fed. Rep. 644, 7 C. C. A. 41'.?, 1!J
U.S. App. 203, 24 L. R. A. 776; 189:), Linroln Shoe Mf)?. Co. v . 8heldon. 44~eb.
279, 62 N. \V. Rep. 480; 1896, Knij?hts of Pythias v. Weller, 93 Ya. 605; 189g.
· North, etc., R. Co. v. Utah, etc., R. Co., 16 Utah 246, 40 LR. A. 851,52 P11c. Rep.
168. Provisions in the articles inco11sistent with the general law will be con·
sidered void or surplusage. 1856, The Eastern Plank Road Co. v. Vat1ghan, H
N. Y. 546; 1883, Heck v. McEwen, 12 Lea(Tenn.) 97; 1889, People v.Chi·
caj?o Gas T . Co ., 130 Ill. 268, 17 Am. St. Rep. 319: 1893, Republican M. 8. ~1.
v. Brown, 58 Fed. Rep. 644, 19 U.S. App. 203, 24 L. R. A. 776. But perhaps
in some cases additional powers consistent with the general law may be pro-

17 Am. St. Rep. 319; 1891, Ellerman v. Chicago Jet., etc., Co., 49 N. J. Eq

217; 1892, Cronin v. Potters' Co-op. Co., 29 W. L. P. (Ohio) 52; 1893, Repub-

lican Mountain Silver Mines v. Brown. 58 Fed. Rep. 644, 7 C. C. A. 412. It*

U. S. App. 203, 24 L. R. A. 776; 1895, Lincoln Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Sheldon. 44Neb.

279, 62 N. W. Rep, 480; 1896, Knights of Pythias v. Weller, 93 Va. 605; 18W.

North, etc., R. Co. v. Utah, etc., R. Co., 16 Utah 246,40 L. R. A. 851,52 Pac. Rep.

168. Provisions in the articles inconsistent with the general law will be con-

sidered void or surplusage. 1856, Tbe Eastern Plnnk Road Co. v. Vaughan, 14

N. Y. 546; 1883, Heck v. MoEwen, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 97; 1889, People'v. Chi-

cago Gas T. Co., 130 111. 268, 17 Am. St. Rep. 319; 1893, Republican M. 8. M.

y. Brown, 58 Fed. Rep. 644, 19 U. S. App. 203, 24 L. R. A. 776. But perhaps

in some cases additional powers consistent with the general law may be pro-
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vided for in the articles of association. 1866, Society for Visitation of the

Sick v. Commw., 52 Pa. St. 125, 91 Am. Dec. 139; 1892, Cronin v. Potters'

Co-op. Co., 29 W: L. B. (Ohio) 52. See, also, text-book citations, supra, p. 397.
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For rules of construing charters see infra, p. 934.

Sec. 94. (b) Usual provisions in the general law:

The general law usually contains provisions enumerating the pur-

poses for which corporations may be formed, varying greatly in detail

from "any lawful business or purpose," with a short list of excep-

vided for in the articles of association. I866, Society for Visitation of the
Sick v. Com mw., 52 Pa. St. 125, 91 Am. Dec. 139; 1892, Cronin v. Potters'
Co-op. Co., 29 W: L.B. (Ohio) 52. See, also, text-book citations, aupra, p. 397.
For rules of construing charters see infra, p. 934.

tions, to a long list in detail, like Michigan and Texas, the latter of

which sets forth a list of forty-seven classes of purposes for which pri-

vate corporations may be formed, and the former has special pro-

visions made for each of fifty-six different classes of corporations. The

general law usually contains restrictions concerning the selection of

the name, the duration of the corporation, the amount of stock—both

a maximum and minimum limit, the maximum indebtedness allowed,

location of principal office, place of keeping corporate books, number

(least or greatest, or both) of directors, qualifications of the same, oath

of same, other officers and qualifications, individual liability of mem-

bers, annual meetings and elections, notices to be given of meetings,

places of meeting, voting (number of votes, ballots, proxy, by trus-
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tees, pledges, etc.), quorum, of shareholders' and directors' meet-

ings, power and method of adopting by-laws, with the things to be

regulated thereby (such as time and places of meeting, quorums,

proxy voting, number of directors, choosing officers, term of office,

mode of selling stock for unpaid assessments, mode of transfer of

stock, etc.), general powers of the corporation as to amount and kind

of property it may own, the contracts it may make, etc., methods

of dissolution, etc., reports to be made and reserving a right to repeal

or amend the laws relating to corporations.

Sec. 95. (c) Articles of incorporation, form and contents:

General corporation laws usually provide that those desiring to

form a corporation shall make an application in writing to some

court or officer, who (in some cases, after a formal hearing) is to

determine whether the application is according to law; and, if so,

to make a record of that fact, and furnish an authenticated copy

of the application, or the record made, to those applying; this

authenticated copy then becomes prima facie evidence of their au-

thority to organize and exist as a corporation. The statutes vary

much, but the most important things to be said and done in the

Sec. 94. (b) Usual provisions in the general law:
The general law usually contains prov~sions enumerating the purposes for which corporations may be formed, varying greatly in detail
from "any lawful business or purpose," with a short list of exceptions, to a long list in detail, like Michigan and Texas, the latter of
which sets forth a list of forty-seven classes of purposes for which private corporations may be formed, and the former has special provi sions made for each of fifty-six different classes of corporations. The
general law usually contains restrictions concerning the selection of
the name, the duration of the corporation, the amount of stock-both
a maximum and minimum limit, the maximum indebtedness allowed,
location of principal office, place of keeping corporate books, number
(least or greatest, or both) of directors, qualifications of the same, oath
of same, other officers and qualifications , individual liability of members, annual meetings and elections, notices to be given of meetings,
places of meeting~ voting (number of votes, ballots, proxy, by trustees, pledges, etc.), quorum, of shareholders' and directors' meetings, power and method of adopting by-laws, with the things to be
regulated thereby (such as time and places of meeting, quorums,
proxy voting, number of directors, choosing officers, term of office,
mode of selling stock for unpaid assessments, mode of transfer of
stock, etc.), general powers of the corporation as to amount and kind
of property it may own, the contracts it may make, etc., methods
of dissolution, etc., reports to be made and reserving a right to repeal
or amend the laws relating to corporations.

various states are indicated in the following table:

8ec. 95. ( c) Articles of t'ncorporation, form and co_ntents:
General corporation laws usually provide that those desiring to
form a corporation shall make an application in writing to some
court or officer, who (in some cases, after a formal hearing) is to
determine whether the application is according to law; and, if so,
to make a record of that fact, and furnish an authenticated copy
of the application, or the record made , to those applying; this
authenticated copy the n becomes prima facie evidence of their authority to organize and exist as a corporation. The statutes va ry
much, but the most important things to be said and done in the
various states are indicated in the following table :
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Application for Incorporation.

[The student is advised to indicate in the blank columns the various things
required by the law of bis state to be done in prepa ring arti~les of incorporation, by a check-mark opposite the point noted in the table.]

I. How entitled:

1. Application

2. Agreement

3. Articles of association

APPLI CATION FOR INCORPORATION.
4. Articles of incorporation

5. Certificate of incorporation..

I. Hoto entitled:
1. Application ................................................................................ .
2. Agreement ................................................................................. .
3. Articles of association ................................................................. .
4. Articles of incorporation ............................................................. .
6. Certificate of incorporation .......................................................... .
6. Charter ..................................................................................... .
7. Declaration ................................................................................ .
8. Deed of settlement............................................•..........................
9. License ........................... ........................................................... .
10. Memorandum of association..................... ......... . ... .... . ................ .
11. Petition .. ............................. .. .. ......................... .......................... .

6. Charter

7. Declaration

8. Deed of settlement

9. License

10. Memorandum of association

11. Petition

II. By whom made:

1. Persons, natural

artificial

2. Designation, applicants
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corporators —

commissioners

incorporators..

II. By tohom made:

petitioners

1. Persons, natural.......................................................................... .

promoters

artificial. ....................................................................... .
2. Designation, applicants................................................................ .
corporators ............................................................. .
commissioners ......................................................... .
incorporators .......................................................... .
petitioners .............................................................. .
promoters.... ........................................................... .
subscribers .............................................................. .

subscribers

3. Number

4. Residents of the state

6. Citizens of the state

6. Citizens of the United States

7. Age

8. Sex...'

9. Married women

III. To whom made:

court of record

S. Number..................................................................... ................. .
4. Residents of the state ............. ..................................................... .
6. Citizens of the state ................................. ......... .......................... .
6. Citizens of the United States....................................................... .
7. Age ............................................................................................ .
8. Sex.............................................................................................. .
9. 1\-larried women .......................................................................... .

governor

secretary of state

special court or commission

IV. Contents:

1. Intention to form a corporation

2. Purpose, generally

................................................................ ......... ......... ......... .........

specifically and definitely

III. To whom madi'.:

more than one

court of record ..................................................................... .
governor.............................................................................. .
secretary of state................................................................. .

3. Nature of the proposed business

4. Name, any

indicating it is a corporation

~~~~'.~l..~~~.~.~~.~.~~~-i-~~~.~~::::::::::::::: ::::::::: :::::::::1::::::::: :::::::::

the business

............................................................................................

the place

including names of members

IV.

not including names of members

Content~·.:··············

.. ··· .... ·· .. · .... ······· ....... ······ · ·· ··· · ·· · ··· ·· ... · ·· ···· ·· · ··· · ····

1. Intention to form a corporation.................................................... .
2. Purpose, generally ....................................................................... .

specifically and definitely ............ ......................................... .
more than one ..................................................................... .
3. • •nture of the proposed busineSB ............. ... ................................... .
4. N:uue, any ............................... ...... ............................................ .
in<licating it j-, ll corporation ........ ............................... ..1 .........
the busine1:1s............ ..................
tho plat·e .................................... .................. , ........ .
inC'luding namefl of memtwrs.................................................
.
1
not including names oi members.................] .......................... .

··!······ .....................
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end with

not already in use.

APPLICATION FOR INCORPORATION .

5. Location of principal office or place of

business:

begin with .......................................................................... .
end with ............. ................................................................ .
not already in use................. ........... ......................... ........... .

state

county

city

termini

counties or states, through or in which

it will operate

6. Duration or term of existence:

5. Location of principal office or place of
business:
state .....................................................................................

county ................................................................................. .

perpetual

~!~~;j·~·i::.::::::: :: ::::::::::::: ::: :: ::: ::::::.:::::::: ::: ::: :::: ::::: :::::::::::: ::::: :

years, number, any stated

fixed by law

counties or states, through or in which
it will operate................................ ....... .. . ........................ .

renewals, for original period

any period stated

fixed period

*
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7. Stock, amount allowed, any

maximum

minimum

to be stated

not necessary to state

to be subscribed

to be paid in

6. Duration or t.erm of existence:
I
perpetual. .................................................................. I........ .
years, number, any stated ................................. ·········!·········
fixed by law.............................................. .
renewals, for original period ........... 1••••••••••••••••••••••••••• !. ....... .
any period stated ....................
fixed period .............................................. .

·········1·········

::::::::::.:::::::::::·: :: ::::::::: ::: ::: ::: ::::::: :: ::: :: :::: ::: ::: ::: ::: :: ::: :i::: :: ::::

to begin business

payment, times of

...............................................................................!....... .
....... .... .. ... ... .. .... ... .. ... .. .. .. ..... .. ... ... ......... ... .. .... ... ... ...I.......•.

conditions of

8. Shares of stock, number

amount of each

common

preferred

character of preference

9. Officers, to be designated..

president

vice-president

secretary

7. Stock, amount allowed, any....................... ........................... I. ....... .
maximum ................................... ·········!·········
m1n1mum ............................................. ........•
to be stated ....... ................. .......................... .
not necessary to state ................................... .
to be subscribed............................................ .
to be paid in....................... .... .......................
to begin business .............. ..............................
payment, times of ..............................................................
conditions of ...................................................... .

treasurer

manager

names to be given for first year

residence to be given for first year.

8. Shares of stock, number .............................................................. .
amount of each .................................................. .
common ............................................................. .
preferred ................................................... ........ .
character of preference ................................... .

•••.•..• ..••.••..•.•..•••.••..•.• •........ ....•••.. ••.••..•• !..•..•.•.
9. Officers, to be designated .............................................................. .
preeident.......................................................................... .
vice-president ................................................................... .
secretary.......................................................................... .
treasurer.......................................................................... .
mana~er ........................................................................... .
names to be given for first year ......... .................................. .
residence to be given for first year ...................................... .
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10. Directors, number allowed, any

ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, FORM AND CONTENTS.

§ 95

maximum

minimum

APPLICATION FOR INCORPORATION.

to be Btated

qualifications, shareholders

IO. Directors, number allowed, any ........................... 1.......................... .
maximum ......................................... ..
minimum ................. , .................. ........ .
to be stated ........................................ ..
qualifications, shareholders ....... ........................... ........ .
number of shares ................................... .
citizens, nutnber................................... ..
residents, number .................................. ..
names of those for first yt!ar ....................................... ..
residence of those for first year.................................... ..
11. Applicants, names to be given ...................................................... .
residence to be given ................................. ......... .........
shares of stock subscribed by ...................................... .
12. Indebtedness, amount allowed any .... ................. ........ ..................
maximum .... ................................... .
minimum ........................................
to be stated .....................................

number of shares

citizens, number.,

residents, number

names of those for first year—

residence of those for first year.

11. Applicants, names to be given

residence to be given

shares of stock subscribed by..

12. Indebtedness, amount allowed any

maximum...

minimum...

to be stated

13. Such other matters as are deemed desirable

V. Execution of:
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1. Signed by applicants, all

majority

number

residents

::::.'.'.'.'.".'.'.".'.'.".'.'.'.' ·: .".'.'.'.".'.'.'.'.".".'.".".'.".".·.': ::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::I:::::::::

citizens

13. Such other matters as are deemed desirable ....................................
V. Executio1i of:
1. Signed by applicants, all ...............................................................
majority ...................................................!.
nutnber ..................................................... .
residents .......................... 1.......................... .
citizens........................................................
subscribers for stock ............................ ......................... .
president ................................ ....................................
1
..
directors .....................................................................

subscribers for stock

president

directors

2. Acknowledged by applicants, all

majority

certain number

residents

citizens

subscribers for stock..

president

directors

before judge of court of record

2. Acknowledged by applicants, all.. ................................................ .
majority ........................................... ..
certain number ................................... .
residents......... . ..................................
citizens ............................................ ..
subscribers for stock....................................... ..
president... ...... .............................................. .
directors ....................................................... ..
before judge of court of record .................................. .
clerk of court of...................................
notary public............... ......... ......... . .............. ..
justice of peace............................... ................. .

clerk of court of

notary public

justice of peace

under seal if officer has one

character of officer to be certified

by judge of court of record

clerk of court of record

···!·...... ..

under seal

3. Application to be sworn to by applicants, all

majority

certain number!

under seal if officer has one ....................... ............ .
character of officer to be certified ...................................... .
by judge of court of reeord. ........ ......... ........ . ............... ..
clerk of court of record ........................................... ..
under seal. ............. .. ......... ........................................... .
8. Application to be sworn to by aJ?pl~cants, all .................................. ..
ma1or1ty ............................................. .
certain number .................................. ..
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president

APPLICATION FOR INCORPORATION.

directors

VI. Bearing, none required

if any, before judge of court of record

subscribers to stock ................... ................ .
president .............. ................................... .
directors .................................................. .

governor

secretary of state

attorney-general

insurance commissioner

special court or commission

VII. Finding by said officers,

conforms to law

facts stated are true

decree that parties are incorporated

VIII. Filing with,

VI. Hearing, none required ................................................................... .
if any, before jndge of court of record ......................................... .
governor ............................................................... .
secretary of state................. .................. ................. .
attorney-general .......................................... .......... .
in urance commissioner......................................... .
special court or commission .................................. .

1. Register of deeds of county where principal

office is

2. County clerk of county where principal

office is

VII. Finding by said officers,
conforms to law ................................................................ .
facts stated are true ................................. 1•••••••••••••••••••••••••••
decree that parties are incorporated ....... ..! .......................... .
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3. Clerk of court of county where principal

office is

4. Probate judge of county where principal

I

office is

5. Same of each county where business is done

6. Secretary of state

7. Governor

8. Two or more of those named

IX. Recording by officer with whom filed,

X. Issue of certificate of incorporation, by

Register of deeds..

Judge of court

Clerk of court

Secretary of state.

Governor

XI. Publication:

VIII. Filing with,
1. Register of deeds of county where principal
office is .................................................................................... .
2. County clerk of county where principal
office is .................................................................................... .
3. Clerk of court of county where principal
office is .................................................................................... .
4. Probate judge of county where principal
office is .............................. ...................................................... .
6. Same of each county where business is done .............................. .... . .
6. ,_ ecretary of state ........................................................................ .
7. Governor ................................................................................... .

L Of intention to

8. Two or more of tbose named ........................................................ .

apply, necessary

how long

where

IX. Recording by officer with whom filed,

in what

proof of, affidavit of printer!

applicants

-

/uue of cert{fieate of incorpol'atio1t, by
Register of deeds ............... .......................... .
Judge of court.............................................. .
Clerk of court ............................................... .
ecretary of state...... . .. . . .. . . . . .. . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . ...... .
Governor .................................... ................. .

XI. Publieatton:
1. Of intention to apply, necessary................................................... .
how Jong ....................................... ............. ........ .
where ................................................................. .
in whe.t ............................................................. .
proof of, affidavit of printer ................................... .
uppliranta ................................... .
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2. Of application, necessary

how long

where

2. Of application, necessary .................. ..:......... ................................
bow long ........................................................•......
where ..... ... ..... .................. ......... ......... .........•........
in what ............... .. ....... ..................... ........... .........
proof of, by printe r ..................... ......... ..... :.•. ....•....
by applicants .................. .......................... .
3. Of time and place of bearing, necessary .............. ...........................
how long .................................................... .
where ......... ............ ....................................
in what ...... ............ ....................................
proof of, by printer...................................... .
by applicant ................................... .
4. Of result of application, necessary ............ .... ............................... .
bow long ......... ...... ...... ...... ............................ ..
where ............................................ ................ ..
in what ........................................................... .
proof, by printer...... .........., ............................. .
by applicant........................................... .
ii. Of certificate of incorporation, necessary .... .. ................................ .
bow long .............. ....... ......... ... ................. .
where .................... ......... .......................... .
in what ...... ............................................... .
proof, by printer ..... .. ............... ................ ..
by applicants ................................... .

in what

proof of, by printer

by applicants

3. Of time and place of hearing, necessary..

how long

where

in what

proof of, by printer

by applicant

4. Of result of application, necessary

how long

where

in what

proof, by printer
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by applicant

5. Of certificate of incorporation, necessary

how long

where

in what

proof, by printer..

by applicants

-I

Note. See particularly the American Corporation Legal Manual for 1899
(and previous volumes of the annual publication); the Annotated Corpora·
tion Lawe of all the states, 1899, by Cumming, Gilbert and Woodward, and
2 Stimson's American Statute Law. For further steps in the creation of the
corporation see infra, the subscription to stock, p. 459,and the organization of
the corporation, i nfra, p. 560.

for \m

Note. See particularly the American Corporation Legal Manual

(and previous volumes of the annual publication); the Annotated Corpora-

tion Laws of all the states, 1899, by Cumming, Gilbert and Woodward, and

2 Stimson's American Statute Law. For further steps in the creation of the

corporation see infra, the subscription to stock, p. 459,and the organization of

the corporation, infra, p. 560.

See. 95a. (d) Deed of settlement.

Sec. 95a. ( d) Deed of settlement.

The first general corporation law was 39 Eliz., ch. 5, concerning the

erection of hospitals. It allowed any person seized of an estate in fee,

The first general corporation law was 39 Eliz., ch. 5, concerning the
erection of hospitals. It allowed any person seized of an estate in fee,
by a deed enrolled in chancery, to erect a hospital for the poor, needy
and impotent, and place therein such head, and members, and poor
as he deemed convenient, the sa me to be incorporated with perpetual
succession, under the name given, with all the usual powers of a corporation, provided it be endowed with lands of a certain yearly value
by the founder at the time of its creation.
Lord Coke , in his Second Institute, p. 723 1 gives a proper form of
deed for the formation of such corporation. The 39 Eliz. w as to last
for twenty years, but it was m ade p erpetual by statute of 21 James I,
ch. I, and is still in force. 6 Enc. of Laws of Eng., 233.
Wordsworth on Joint-Stock Companies, p. •5 , enumerates deeds
of settlement as one of the methods of creating joint-stock companies,
the deed being operative between the shareholders themseh-es, but
not affecting strangers without notice, the ordinary rules of p artnerships applying as to the relation with third parties.
These deeds of

by a deed enrolled in chancery, to erect a hospital for the poor, needy

and impotent, and place therein such head, and members, and poor

as he deemed convenient, the same to be incorporated with perpetual

succession, under the name given, with all the usual powers of a cor-

poration, provided it be endowed with lands of a certain yearly value

by the founder at the time of its creation.

Lord Coke, in his Second Institute, p. 723, gives a proper form of

deed for the formation of such corporation. The 39 Eliz. was to last

for twenty years, but it was made perpetual by statute of 21 James I,

ch. 1, and is still in force. 6 Enc. of Laws of Eng., 233.

Wordsworth on Joint-Stock Companies, p. *5, enumerates deeds

of settlement as one of the methods of creating joint-stock companies,

the deed being operative between the shareholders themselves, but

not affecting strangers without notice, the ordinary rules of partner-

ships applying as to the relation with third parties. These deeds of

Digitized by

Go gle

Origi11al from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY -

§ 95k

441

DEED OF SETTLEMENT.

§ 9 51J

DEED OF SETTLEMENT.

settlement were common even in the formation of corporations before

the present English companies acts, and were quite similar to the

memorandum and articles of association now provided for by those

acts. For detailed forms see Wordsworth on Joint-Stock Companies,

Part II. This method does not seem to have been used much in this

country in the formation of corporations.

Sec. 95b. Interpretation of charters.

See Piscataqua Bridge Co. v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N. H. 36, supra,

settlement were common even in the formation of corporations before
the present English companies acts, and were quite similar to the
memorandum and articles of association now provided for by those
act . F or detailed form s see Wordsworth on Joint-Stock Companies,
Part II. This method does not seem to have been used much in this
country in the formation of corporations.

p. 309; Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71, infra, p. 915; People v. Pull-

man's Palace Car Co., 175 111. 125, infra, 926; note, infra, p. 933.

See. 95b. Interpretation of charters.
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See Piscataqua Bridge Co. v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35, supra,
p. 309; Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 71, infra, p. 1H5; People v. Pull·
man's Palace Car Co., -175 Ill. 125, infra, 926; note, infra, p. 933.
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CHAPTER 6.

THE ASSOCIATION—ITS NECESSITY, NATURE, FORMS AND

PARTIES.

ARTICLE I. NECESSITY, NATURE, CONSIDERATION AND GENERAL

FORM OF THE ASSOCIATION.

Sec. 96. Necessity. An association of persons is necessary to,

results from, or may result from the creation of a corporation

aggregate.

'' As the organization of individuals into that artificial being known

as a business corporation is not thrust upon them by the state,

but is a franchise granted to persons, who, first voluntarily com-

bine to obtain the franchise, some contractual relation between

the incorporators necessarily precedes the creation of the cor-

poration. These contractual relations may be very simple, in-

formal and transient. They may on the other hand involve ex-

tended negotiations, distinct agreements, complex stipulations

and the creating of obligations and the securing of property as

preliminaries to the final uniting of the individuals in initiating

the existence of the proposed artificial person." Austin Abbott,

Article on Promoter's Contracts, i Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.)

p. I.
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Sec. 97. Same.

RAILWAY COMPANY v. ALLERTON.

1873. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 85 U. S.

(18 Wall.) Rep. 233-236.

Appeal from the circuit court for the Northern District of Illinois:

the case being thus:

The Chicago City Railway Company was a corporation owning a

street railroad in Chicago. The directors of the company, without

consulting the stockholders or calling a meeting of them, resolved

to increase the capital stock of the company from $1,250,000 to

$1,500,000. To this one Allerton, who was a stockholder, objected,

and filed a bill praying for an injunction to prevent the increase. His

position was that it could not be lawfully made without the concur-

(442)

§97

443

THE ASSOCIATION.

THE ASSOCIATION.

443

rence of the stockholders, and, in support of this view, he relied upon

the constitution of Illinois, adopted in July, 1870, by the thirteenth

section of the eleventh article of which, it is declared as follows:

"No railroad corporation shall issue any stock or bonds, except for

money, labor or property actually received and applied to the purposes

for which such corporation was created, and all stock-dividends and

other fictitious increase of the capital stock, or indebtedness of any

such corporation, shall be void. The capital stock of no railroad

corporation shall be increased for any purpose, except upon giving

sixty days public notice in such manner as may be provided by law."

He also relied on an act of the legislature of Illinois, passed March

26, 1872, to execute and carry out the above provision of the consti-

tution, by which, amongst other things, it was enacted that no corpo-

ration should change its name or place of business, increase or decrease

its capital stock, or the number of its directors, or consolidate with

other corporations without a vote of two-thirds of the stock at a stock-

holders' meeting.

The railway company, in its answer, relied upon its charter, granted

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:16 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

February 14, 1859, the third and fourth sections of which were as

follows:

"Sec. 3. The capital stock of said corporation shall be $100,000,

and may be increased from time to time, at the pleasure of said cor-

poration.

"Sec. 4. All the corporate powers of said corporation shall be

vested in and exercised by a board of directors, and such officers and

agents as said board shall appoint."

The position of the company was that the third section conferred

an unrestricted right to increase the capital stock at will, and that the

fourth vested this power in the board of directors, and that the consti-

tutional provision and act above referred to, if applied to this corpo-

ration, would impair the validity of the contract. It was further set

up, however, that the said provision did not apply to railways worked

by horse-power. The court below decreed in favor of the complain-

ant, and the company took the present appeal.

Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court. Without

attempting to decide the constitutional question, or to give a construc-

tion to the act of the legislature, we are satisfied that the decree must

be affirmed on the broad ground that a change so organic and funda-

mental as that of increasing the capital stock of a corporation beyond

the limits fixed by the charter can not be made by the directors alone,

unless expressly authorized thereto. The general power to perform

all corporate acts refers to the ordinary business transaction of the

corporation, and does not extend to a reconstruction of the body itself,

or to an enlargement of its capital stock. A corporation, like a part-

nership, is an association of natural persons -who contribute a joint

capital for a common purpose, and, although the shares may be as-

signed to nerw individuals in perpetual succession, yet the number

of shares and amount of capital can not be increased, except in the

manner expressly authorized by the charter or articles of association.

rence of the stockholders, an<l, in support of this view, he relied upon
the constitution of Illinois, adopted in July, 1870, by the thirteenth
section of the eleventh article of which, it is declared as follows:
"No railroad corporation shall issue any stock or bonds, except for
money, Jabor or property actually received and applied to the purposes
for which such corporation was created, and all stock-dividends and
other fictitious increase of the capital stock, or indebtedness of any
such corporation, shall be void. The capital stock of no railroad
corporation shall he increased for any purpose, except upon giving
sixty days public notice in such manner as may be provided by law."
He aiso relied on an act of the legislature of Illinois, passed March
z6, 1872, to execute and carry out the above provision of the constitution, by which, amongst other things, it was enacted that no corporation should change its name or place of business, increase or decrease
its capital stock, or the number of its directors, or consolidate with
other corporations without a vote of two-thirds of the stock at a stockholders' meeting.
The railway company, in its answer, relied npon its charter, granted
February 14, 1859, the third and fourth sections of which were as
follows:
"Sec. 3. The capital stock of said corporation shall be $100,000,
and may be increased from time to time, at the pleasure of said corporation.
"Sec. 4. All the corporate powers of said corporation shall be
vested in and exercised by a board of directors, and such officers and
agents as said board shall appoint."
The position of the company was that the third section conferred
an unrestricted right to increase the capital stock at will, and that the
fourth vested this power in the board of directors, and that the constitutional provision and act above referred to, if applied to this corporation, would impair the validity of the contract. It was further set
up, however, that the said provision did not apply to railways worked
by horse-power. The court below decreed in favor of the complainant, and the company took the present appeal.
Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court. Without
attempting to decide the constitutional question, or to give a construction to the act of the legislature, we are satisfied that the decree must
be affirmed on the broad gr<ltmd that a change so organic and fundamental as that of increasing the capital stock of a corporation beyond
the limits fixed by the charter can not be made by the directors alone,
unless expressly authorized thereto. The general power to perform
all corporate acts refers to the ordinary business transaction of the
corporation, and does not extend to a reconstruction of the body itself,
or to an enlargement of its capital stock. A corporation, like a partnership, i's an association of natural persons who contrz'bute a joi'nt
capital for a common purpose, and, although the shares may be assigned to new z'ndivi'duals in p erpetual succession, yet !h t' number
of shares and amount of capital can not be i'ncreased,- except i11 the
manner expressly authorized by the cltarter or arti'clcs of associatt'on.
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Authority to increase the capital stock of a corporation may un-

Authority to increase the capital stock of a corporation may undoubtedly be conferred by a law passed subsequent to the charter;
but such a law should regularly be accepted by the stockholders.
Such assent might be inferred by subsequent acquiescence; but in
some form or other it must be given to render the increase valid and
binding on them. Changes in the purposes and object of an as ociation , or in the extent of its constituency or membership, involving the
amount of its capital stock, are necessarily fundamental in their char·
acter, and can not, on general principles, be made without the express or implied consent of the members. The reason is obvious.
First, as it respects the purpose and object. This may be said to
be the final cause of the tissociation, fo1· the sake of wh£ch it was
brought into existence. To change tltis without tlie consent of tlie as-·
sociates, would be to commit t.1wm to an enterprise wlit'ch they never
embraced, and would be manifestly unjust.
Secondly, as it respects tlte constituency, or capital and member·
slup. Thz's is tlze next important and fundamental point in the con·
sti'tution of a body corporate. To change it wi'thout the consent of
the stockholders, would be to make them members of an association in
which they never consented to become such. It would change the re·
lati've injluence, control and profit of each member. If the director
alone could do it, they could always perpetuate their own power.
Their agency does not extend to such an act unless so expressed in
the charter, or subsequent enabling act; and such subsequent act, a
before said, would not bind the stockholders without their acceptance
of it, or assent to it in some form. Even when the additional stock
is distributed to each stockholder pro rata, it would often work injus·
tice, because many of the stockholders might be unable to take their
respective shares, and might thus lose their relative interest and influence in the corporate concerns.
These conclusions flow naturall v from the character of such associations. Of course, the associates themselves may adopt or assent to a
different rule. If the charter provides that the capital stock may be
increased, or that a new business may be adopted by the corporation,
this is undoubtedly an authority for the corporation (that is, the stock·
holders) to make such a change by a stockholders' vote in the regu·
lar way. Perhaps a subsequent ratification or assent to a change
already made, would be equaily effective. It is unnecessary to decide
that point at this time. But if it is desir~d to confer such a power on
the directors, so as to make their acts binding and final, it should be
expressly conferred.
Where the stock expressly allowed by a charter has not been all
subscribed, the power of the directors to receive subscriptions for the
balance may stand on a different footing. Such an act might, perhaps, be considered as merely getting in the capital already provided
for the operations and necessities of the company, and, therefore, as
belonging to the orderly and proper administration of the company's
.a ffairs. Even in such case, however, prudent and fair directors

doubtedly be conferred by a law passed subsequent to the charter;

but such a law should regularly be accepted by the stockholders.

Such assent might be inferred by subsequent acquiescence; but in

some form or other it must be given to render the increase valid and

binding on them. Changes in the purposes and object of an associa-

tion, or in the extent of its constituency or membership, involving the

amount of its capital stock, are necessarily fundamental in their char-

acter, and can not, on general principles, be made without the ex-

press or implied consent of the members. The reason is obvious.

First, as it respects the purpose and object. This may be said to

be the jinal cause of the association, for the sake of "which it was

brought into existence. To change this without the consent of the as-

sociates, would be to commit them to an enterprise which they never

embraced, and would be manifestly unjust.

Secondly, as it respects the constituency, or capital and member-

ship. This is the next important and fundamental point in the con-

stitution of a body corporate. To change it without the consent of
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the stockholders, would be to make them members of an association in

which they never consented to become such. It would change the re-

lative influence, control and profit of each member. If the directors

alone could do it, they could always perpetuate their own power.

Their agency does not extend to such an act unless so expressed in

the charter, or subsequent enabling act; and such subsequent act, as

before said, would not bind the stockholders without their acceptance

of it, or assent to it in some form. Even when the additional stock

is distributed to each stockholder pro rata, it would often work injus-

tice, because many of the stockholders might be unable to take their

respective shares, and might thus lose their relative interest and in-

fluence in the corporate concerns.

These conclusions flow naturally from the character of such associa-

tions. Of course, the associates themselves may adopt or assent to a

different rule. If the charter provides that the capital stock may be

increased, or that a new business may be adopted by the corporation,

this is undoubtedly an authority for the corporation (that is, the stock-

holders) to make such a change by a stockholders' vote in the regu-

lar way. Perhaps a subsequent ratification or assent to a change

already made, would be equally effective. It is unnecessary to decide

that point at this time. But if it is desire'd to confer such a power on

the directors, so as to make their acts binding and final, it should be

expressly conferred.

Where the stock expressly allowed by a charter has not been all

subscribed, the power of the directors to receive subscriptions for the

balance may stand on a different footing. Such an act might, per-

haps, be considered as merely getting in the capital already provided

for the operations and necessities of the company, and, therefore, as

belonging to the orderly and proper administration of the company's

affairs. Even in such case, however, prudent and fair directors
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would prefer to have the sanction of the stockholders to their acts.

But that is not the present case, and need not be further considered.
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Decree affirmed.

Note. See, 1899, Mosier v. Perry, 60 Ohio St. 388. Also, particularly, 23

Am. & Eng. Ency. 776, et seq.; Angell & Ames. §§ 517, et seq., 530-1, 542-3;

Cook, §§492-8; Elliott, §§ 95-8; Mora we tz, §§ 1, 24, 227-237; Taylor, §§ 28-

50; I Thompson, § 1136, III Thompson, §§ 3047, 3423; Compare, Clark,

§§ 27, 86.

Sec. 98. General nature of such contract: An agreement by each

associate with his fellows to organize for purposes contem-

plated, and contribute the funds agreed.

would prefer to have the _sanction of the stockholders to their acts.
But that is not the present case, and need not be further considered.
Decree affirmed.
Note. See, 1899, Mosier v. Perry, 60 Ohio St. 388. Also, particularly, 23
Am. & Eog. Ency. 776, et seq.; Angell & Ames,§§ 517, et seq., 530-1, 542-3;
Cook, §§ 492-8; Elliott, §§ 95-8; Morawetz, §§ 1, 24, 227-237; Taylor, §§ 2850 ; I Thompson, § 1136, III Thompson, §§ 3047, 3423; Compare, Clark,
§§27,86.

EDINBORO' ACADEMY v. ROBINSON.1

i860. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 37 Pa. St. Re-

ports, 210-214, 78 Am. Dec. 421.

S~c.

Error to the common pleas of Erie county.

This was an action brought by Prentiss Burlingham and others,

"trustees of Edinboro' Academy," against Alva Robinson, to re-

98. General nature of suc/i contract: An agreement by each
associate with his fellows to organize for purposes contemplated, and contribute the funds agreed.

cover an installment on his subscription of $50 to the following paper:

EDINBORO' ACADEMY v. ROBINSON. 1

"We, the undersigned, citizens of Edinboro' and vicinity, feeling
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the necessity of an institution of learning in our midst, affording

greater advantages for education than common schools, do hereby

186o.

IN

THE

SuPREME CouRT OF

PENNSYLVANIA.

37 Pa. St. Re-

ports, 210-214, 78 Am. Dec. 421.

agree to pay R. W. Gerrish, Prentiss Burlingham, Josiah J. Comp-

ton, Alfred Green, I. R. Taylor, William Proud and Nelson Clute,

trustees, for the purpose, the sums severally subscribed by each of us,

for the purpose of erecting a building in the borough of Edinboro'

aforesaid, to be used as an academy or institution of learning, said

trustees to act until the sum of $3,000 is subscribed for the purpose

aforesaid, and when so subscribed, public notice of that fact to be

given and of the time and place of organization of said stockholders,

by choosing the necessary and usual officers to carry into effect the de-

sign of the subscribers. No payments to be made until the sum of

$3,000 bona fide, subscription is made; and when paid to be in 'quar-

terly yearly' payments."

The $3,000 subscription was completed some time in 1856, and on

the 30th of December, 1856, five of the trustees named in the paper

gave notice of a meeting to be held on he 5th of January, 1857.

for the purpose of choosing seven trustees to serve for the ensuing

year.

On the 5th day of May, 1856, the "Edinboro' Academy" was incor-

porated by the court of common pleas of Erie county, which charter

of incorporation directed that in all elections each share of stock ($5)

should entitle the holder to a vote. The election of January 5, 1857,

seems to have been held under the provisions of the act of incorpora-

tion.

1 Arguments omitted.

Error to the common pleas of Erie county.
This was an action brought by Prentiss Burlingham and others,
'"trustees of Edinboro' Academy," against Alva Robinson, to recover an installment on his subscription of $50 to the following paper:
"We, the undersigned, citizens of Edinboro' and vicinity, feeling
the necessity of an institution of learning in our midst, affording
greater advantages for education than common schools, do hereby
agree to pay R. W. Gerrish, Prentiss Burlingham , Josiah J. Compton, Alfred Green, I. R. Taylor, William Proud and Nelson Clute ,
tru stees, for the purpose, the sums severally subscribed by each of us ,
for the purpose of erecting a building in the boroug h of Edinboro'
aforesaid, to be used as an academy or institution of lea rning, said
trustees to act until the sum of $3,ooo is subscribed for the purpose
aforesaid, and when so subscribed, public notice of that fact to be
g iven and of the time and place of organization of said stockholders,
by choosing the necessary and usual officers to carry into effect the des ign of the subscribers. No payments to be made until the sum of
$3,000 bona fide, subscription is made; and when paid to be in 'quarterly yearly' payments."
The $3 1000 subscriptipn was completed iome time in 1856, and o n
the 30th of December, 18561 five of the tmstees named in the p i1per
gave notice of a meeting to be held on he 5th of Janu ary, 1857,
for the purpose of choosing seven trustees to serve for the ensuing
year.
On the 5th day of May, 1856. the "Edinboro' Academy" was incorp ora ted by the court of common pleas of Erie county, which cha rter
of incorporation directed that in all elections each share of stock ($5)
should entitle the holder to a vote. The election of J anuary 5 , 1857 1
seem s to have been held under the provisions of the act of incorporation .
1 Arguments omitted.
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EDINBORO' ACADEMY V. ROBINSON.

There were thirty-three voters, and 163 votes cast. The election

resulted in the choice of the plaintiffs in this suit. The meeting did

There were thirty-three voters, and 163 votes cast. The election
resulted in the choice of the plaintiffs in this suit. The meeting did
not vote for, or in any way formally adopt the charter of incorpora·
tion.
Many of the subscribers were opposed to the charter as the basis
of organization, and, on the 14th of February, 1857, three of the trust·
ees named in the subscription paper gave notice of a meeting for
organization on the 21st of February, 1857, at which meeting seven
trustees were elected, who also organized and undertook to collect
the subscriptions. The charter organization obtained possession of
the subscription paper, collected the money, selected the site, and
erected buildings, and brought this suit against the defendant after
notice given.
The defense was that the incorporation of "The Edinboro' Academy" by the court, without the assent of the defendant, released him
from his subscription. The evidence on the part of the plaintiff was
the subscription paper with the signature of the defendant; that
$3,0CX> was subscribed in good faith; and that a meeting of the subscribers was called on due notice, the association incorporated and
trustees elected. On the pa1t of the defendant evidence of another
organization under articles of association, in which the defendant
and thirty-two other subscribers participated, was given and ad·
mitted.
The court instructed the jury that the real plaintiff in the case was the
·''The Edinboro' Academy,'' in the incorporation of which the defendant did not participate, and that as, between that institution in its cor·
porate right, and the defendant, there existed no privity of contract,
the suit could not be sustained. The jury, accordingly, found for the
defendant, and, judgment having been entered on the \'erdict, the
plaintiff removed the case into this court, and assigned for error the
following matters:
I. The court erred in answering the plaintiffs' first point in the
negative, which was:
I. That if the jury find from the evidence that the defendant signed
the subscription-paper given in evidence, and thereby promised to
pay to E.W. Garrish, Prentice Burlingham, Isaac R. Taylor, William
Proud, Josiah J. Compton, Alfred Green and Nelson Clute, tru tees,
for the purpose of erecting a building in the borough of Edinboro' , to
be used for an academy or institution of learning, the sum of $so;
that the said trustees were to act until the sum of $3,0CX> was sub·
scribed for that purpose; that that sum was subscribed; that the de·
fendant's subscription of $so constituted part of the $3 1 000; that
thereafter, in pursuance of a provision in the paper o subscribed, pub·
lie notice was given of the fact that $3,000 had been subscribed, anti
of the time and place of organization of the stockholders; that at th~
time and place at which such notice was given the stockholders met
and organized and elected the plaintiffs in this suit trustees; then, and
in that case the plaintiffs can sustain this suit, to recover an install·
ment of the $SO due when the suit was instituted.

not vote for, or in any way formally adopt the charter of incorpora-

tion.

Many of the subscribers were opposed to the charter as the basis

of organization, and, on the 14th of February, 1857, three of the trust-

ees named in the subscription paper gave notice of a meeting for

organization on the 21st of February, 1S57, at which meeting seven

trustees were elected, who also organized and undertook to collect

the subscriptions. The charter organization obtained possession of

the subscription paper, collected the money, selected the site, and

erected buildings, and brought this suit against the defendant after

notice given.

The defense was that the incorporation of "The Edinboro' Acad-

emy" by the court, without the assent of the defendant, released him

from his subscription. The evidence on the part of the plaintiff was

the subscription paper with the signature of the defendant; that

$3,000 was subscribed in good faith; and that a meeting of the sub-
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scribers was called on due notice, the association incorporated and

trustees elected. On the part of the defendant evidence of another

organization under articles of association, in which the defendant

and thirty-two other subscribers participated, was given and ad-

mitted.

The court instructed the jury that the real plaintiff in the case was the

"The Edinboro' Academy," in the incorporation of which thedefend-

ant did not participate, and that as, between that institution in its cor-

porate right, and the defendant, there existed no privity of contract,

the suit could not be sustained. The jury, accordingly, found for the

defendant, and, judgment having been entered on the verdict, the

plaintiff removed the case into this court, and assigned for error the

following matters:

I. The court erred in answering the plaintiffs' first point in the

negative, which was:

1. That if the jury find from the evidence that the defendant signed

the subscription-paper given in evidence, and thereby promised to

pay to E. W. Garrish, Prentice Burlingham, Isaac R. Taylor, William

Proud, Josiah J. Compton, Alfred Green and Nelson Clute, trustees,

for the purpose of erecting a building in the borough of Edinboro', to

be used for an academy or institution of learning, the sum of $50;

that the said trustees were to act until the sum of $3,000 was sub-

scribed for that purpose; that that sum was subscribed; that the de-

fendant's subscription of $50 constituted part of the $3,000; that

thereafter, in pursuance of a provision in the paper so subscribed, pub-

lic notice was given of the fact that $3,000 had been subscribed, ami

of the time and place of organization of the stockholders; that at the,

time and place at which such notice was given the stockholders met

and organized and elected the plaintiffs in this suit trustees; then, and

in that case the plaintiffs can sustain this suit, to recover an install-

ment of the $50 due when the suit was instituted.
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II. The court erred in answering the plaintiffs' second point in the
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negative, which was as follows:

2. That this action being in the name of the person elected trust-

ees at a meeting of subscribers called for the purpose, in pursuance

of the provisions of the subscription .paper signed by the defendant,

the plaintiffs are entitled to recover in this suit, and the plaintiffs, if

they are not the proper persons to collect and disburse the money col-

lected, will be trustees for those who are legally entitled to it.

III. The court erred in answering the plaintiffs' third point in the

negative, which was as follows:

3. That if the defendant signed the subscription-paper given in ev-

idence, it is no defense that the association contemplated by that paper

was subsequently incorporated by the court of common pleas of Erie

county after due public notice, if the defendant did not object to the

incorporation of the association, and if the object of the incorporation

was substantially to effect the same purpose that was contemplated by

the subscription-paper signed by him, and his interests were not af-

fected or his responsibility increased by the act of incorporation.
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IV. The court erred in not' giving distinct and separate answers

to each of the plaintiffs' three points.

V. The court erred in charging that, "although some of the persons

named as plaintiffs were made payees in the subscription-paper, yet

thev are not necessarily named, but are so by surplusage; that the

real plaintiff is the 'Edinboro' Academy,' between whom, in its corpo-

rate right, and the defendant there exists no privity of contract, we

think they can not sustain this suit."

Lowrie, C. J. So soon as this subscription paper became com-

plete by the subscription of the stipulated amount of money, the sub-

scribers to it became an association of persons united for contributing

to a common fund for a common purpose, to be carried out by them-

selves. Then the subscription of each (at least if not withdrawn be-

fore the actual organization of the associates) became a contract by

each associate with his fellows, in consideration of similar contracts

by them, to contribute to the common fund the amount subscribed by

him.

Such an act of association involves an agreement to organize the

associates when the subscription shall be complete, and in the present

case this is expressly provided for. The duties created by the act of

subscription are duties to the association, and the first of them that is

to be performed is the duty of organization, and when this is com-

plete, the duty of paying the sum subscribed is a duty to the organ-

ized association. In a legal aspect, the most perfect form of organi-

zation is by legal incorporation, and, therefore, this when regularly

obtained by the common consent of the associates, must be regarded

as the true organization of the association, and the corporation be-

comes the proper legal body to which the subscriptions are to be

paid, and which is to sue for them. There can be but one true organ-

ization.

The court below was, therefore, in error in deciding that the action

II. The court erred in answering the plaintiffs' second point in the
negative, which was as follows:
·
2. That this action being in the name of the person elected trustees at a meeting of subscribers called for the purpose, in pursuance
of the provisions of the subscription ,paper signed by the defendant,
the plaintiffs are entitled to recover in this suit, and the plaintiffs, if
they are not the proper persons to collect and disburse the money collected, will be trustees for those who are legally entitled to it.
III. The court erred in answering the plaintiffs' third point in the
negative, which was as follows:
3. That if the defendant signed the subscription-paper given in evidence, it is no defense that the association contemplated by that paper
was subsequently incorporated by the court of common pleas of Erie
county after due public notice, if the defendant did not object to the
incorporation of the association, and if the object of the incorporation
was substantially to effect the same purpose that was contemplated by
the subscription-paper signed by him, and his interests were not affected or his responsibility increased by the act of incorporation.
IV. The court erred in nof giving distinct and separate answers
to each of the plaintiffs' three points.
V. The court erred in charging that, ''although some of the persons
named as plaintiffs were made payees in the subscription-paper, yet
they are not necessarily named, but are so by surplusage; that the
real plaintiff is the 'Edinboro' Academy,' between whom, in its corporate right, and the defendant there exists no privity of contract, we
think they can not sustain this suit."
LowruE, C. J. So soon as tltis subscription paper became complete by the subscription of the stipulated amount of money, the subscribers to it became an assodation of persons united for contributi"ng
to a common fund for a common purpose, to be carri"ed out by themselves. Then the subscrtptt"on of each (at least if not wi"thdrawn before lite actual organi"zati"on of tlte assodates) became a contract 6y
eaclt assodate with /tis fellows, i"n consideratz"on of si"mi"lar contracts
by them, to contri"bute to the common fund the amount subscribed by
lii"m.
Such an act of association involves an agreement to organize the
associates when the subscription shall be complete, and in the present
case this is expressly provided for. The duties created by the act of
subscription are dt1ties to the association, and the first of them that is
to be performed is the duty of organization, and when this is complete, the duty of paying the sum subscribed is a duty to the organized association. In a legal aspect, the most perfect form of organization is by legal incorporation, and , therefore, this when regularly
obtained by the common consent of the associates, must be regarded
as the true organization of the association, and the corporation becomes the proper legal body to which the subscriptions are to be
paid, and which is to sue for them. There can be but one true organization.
•
The court below was, therefore, in error in deciding that the action
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was improperly brought in the name of the association in its corpo-

rate form. The decision ought to have been that if the associates

STEWART V. TRCSTEES OF HA"MILTON COLLEGE.

did organize themselves by legal incorporation, then the corporation

§ 99

is the organized association, and is the proper legal party to demand

was improperly brought in the name of the association in its corporate form. The decision ought to have been that if the associates
did organize themselves by legal iocorporation, then the corporation
is the organized association, and is the proper legal party to demand
and enforce the payment of the subscriptions.
The question of fact is therefore involved in the true decision: did
the associates organize themselves into this corporation called "The
Edinboro' Academy?"
The decision of the court below excluded this que;;tion, though it
is the vital one of the cause. It may not he easily decided, because
there is no complete prescribed form for the process of organization.
And so ct is in the original organization of statesi and there we take
the fact of the existing organism as proof of its legitimacy without inquiring into the regularity of th~ formative process. And in such a
case as this, if we find the associates acting as members of the organism we assume the regularity of its formation as against them.
The only form agreed upon here for the process of organization i ,
that it shall be by a meeting of the associates held according to notice
to be given. If such a meeting was held on reasonable notice, and
if, by consent of a majority, the corporate form of organization was
adopted or assented to, the corporation is the organized body contemplated by the contract of subscription, and has the right to demand
:ind receive the sums subscribed.
The law rather pardons than approves the naming of the trustees
n f the corporation as plaintiffs, in such an action before a justice of
t he peace.
In court the form ought to be amended so as to let the plaintiff appear in its simple corporate name.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial awarded.
THOMPSON J., having been of counsel in the case, did not sit at the
hearing.

and enforce the payment of the subscriptions.

The question of fact is therefore involved in the true decision: did

the associates organize themselves into this corporation called "The

Edinboro' Academy?"

The decision of the court below excluded this question, though it

is the vital one of the cause. It may not be easily decided, because

there is no complete prescribed form for the process of organization.

And so it is in the original organization of states, and there we take

the fact of the existing organism as proof of its legitimacy without in-

quiring into the regularity of the formative process. And in such a

case as this, if we find the associates acting as members of the organ-

ism we assume the regularity of its formation as against them.

The only form agreed upon here for the process of organization is.

that it shall be by a meeting of the associates held according to notice

to be given. If such a meeting was held on reasonable notice, and

if. by consent of a majority, the corporate form of organization was
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adopted or assented to, the corporation is the organized body contem-

plated by the contract of subscription, and has the right to demand

and receive the sums subscribed.

The law rather pardons than approves the naming of the trustees

<>f the corporation as plaintiffs, in such an action before a justice of

the peace.

In court the form ought to be amended so as to let the plaintiff ap-

pear in its simple corporate name.

Judgment reversed, and a new trial awarded.

Thompson J., having been of counsel in the case, did not sit at the

hearing.

See note, infra, p. 456.

Sec. 99. Consideration of the agreement.

STEWART v. TRUSTEES OF HAMILTON COLLEGE.'

1845. In the Court of Correction of Errors, of New York.

2 Denio's (New York) Reports 403-429.

On error from the supreme court. The trustees of Hamilton College

sued Stewart in the court below in assumpsit, to recover a balance of

$600, parcel of $800 subscribed by him towards a fund for the pay-

See note, infra, p. 456.

ment of the salaries of the officers of the college, which subscription

was made at the foot of the paper in the following words:

"Fund for Hamilton College. We, the subscribers, hereby bind

Sec. 99. Consideration of the agreement.

1 Only those parts of the various opinions relating: to consideration are

STEWART v. TRUSTEES OF HAMILTON COLLEGE.1

given. This case afterward came before the new court of appeals, and wag

decided against the trustees of the college, on the ground that there was no

1845.

sufficient consideration. 1 N. Y. 581 (1848).

IN THE CouRT OF CORRECTION OF ERRORS, of New York.
2 Denio's (New York) Reports 403-429.

On error from the supreme court. The trustees of Hamilton College
sued Stewart in the court below in assumpsi't, to recover a balance of
$6oo, parcel of $800 subscribed by him towards a fund for the payment of the salaries of the officers of the college, which subscription
was made at the foot of the paper in the following words:
"Fund for Hamilton College. We, the subscribers, hereby bind
1
Only those parts of the various opinions relatinJ? to consideration are
given. Thit'I case afterward came before the new court of appeals, and w88
der.irlerl against the trustees of the college, on the ground that there was no
sufficient consideration. 1 ~. Y. 581 ( 1848) .
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ourselves to pay to the trustees of Hamilton College, the sums oppo-

>ite to our respective names, in four equal annual payments, the first

to be made on the first day of August, 1834. The conditions of the
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subscription are the following:

"1. That the moneys collected on it shall be permanently invested

as a productive fund, the interest of which shall be applied to the pay-

ment of the salaries of the officers.

"2. That we shall not be holden to pay the sum subscribed by

us unless the aggregate of our subscriptions and of contributions to

this object shall, by the first of July, 1S34, amount to $50,000, nor

until M. Hunt, Esq., or A. B. Johnson, Esq., of Utica, shall certify

that, in his or their judgment, responsible subscriptions or contributions

amounting to $50,000 shall have been made.

"Dated July 6, 1833." The trial court non-suited the plaintiff,

and the supreme court set this aside.

The opinion of the supreme court was by,

Nelson, C. J. Two principal objections have been taken to the

right of the plaintiffs to recover: 1. That the promise is nudum pac-

tum, there being no consideration to support it; 2. That if valid, the

conditions upon which it was made have not been fulfilled.
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Every promise for the breach of which an action of assumpsit may

be sustained, must be founded upon a consideration of benefit to the

defendant, or to a stranger, or of damage or loss to the plaintiff at

the request of the defendant; but any act of the plaintiff from

which the defendant derives a benefit, or any labor, detriment, or in-

convenience, sustained by the plaintiff, however small the benefit or

inconvenience, is a sufficient consideration, if such act is per-

formed, or inconvenience suffered, at the instance and request of the

defendant. (1 Selw. N. P. 32, and cases cited.) It is not claimed

in this case that the defendant has derived any benefit from the contract

upon which the action is founded, and the inquiry will be, whether

the plaintiffs have sustained any damage or detriment at the instance

and request of the defendant, or directly flowing from the promise.

The substance of the contract between the parties, leaving out the

particulars, is this: The defendant agrees to pay the plaintiffs, for the

benefit of the institution they represent, $800, in four annual pay-

ments, provided they will procure subscriptions and contributions

which, with his, shall amount to $50,000 before a given time, and

shall afterwards invest the same as specified. Or, putting it in an-

other form: The defendant agrees, if the plaintiffs will procure sub-

scriptions for the benefit of their institution to the amount of $50,000,

including his, and will invest the same as therein directed, that he will

pay them $800 in four annual payments. The plaintiffs consent, and

perform the conditions. It seems to me that the labor and expense of

procuring the subscriptions and investing the fund constitute damage

.ind loss to the plaintiffs, which bring the case within the very defini-

tion of a good consideration for the promise. In the case of Sir

Anthony Sturlyn v. Albany (Cro. Eliz. 67), the declaration set forth

tnat the plaintiff had made a lease of land to J. S. for life rendering

29—VVil. Casks.

•>ur elves to pay to the trustees of Hamilton College, the sums oppo-..ite to our respective names, in four equal annual payments, the first
to be made on the first day of August, 1834. The conditions of the
subscription are the following:
' ' 1. That the moneys collected on it shall be permanently invested
a a productive fund, the interest of which shall be applied to the payment of the salaries of the officers.
••z. That we shall not be holden to pay the sum subscribed by
us unless the aggregate of our subscriptions and of contributions to
this object shall, by the first of July, 1834, amount to $50,000, nor
until M. Hunt, Esq., or A. B. John son, Esq., of Utica, shall certify
that, in his or their judgment, responsible subscriptions or contributions
amounting to $50,000 shall have been made.
"Dated July 6, 1833." The trial court non-suited the plaintiff,
and the supreme court set this aside.
The opinion of the supreme court was by,
NELSON, C. ].
Two principal objections have been taken to the
right of the plaintiffs to reco,·er: 1. That the promise is nudum paclllm. there being no consideration to support it; 2. That if valid, the
conditions upon which it was made have not been fulfilled.
E very promise for the breach of which an action of assumpsit may
be sustained, must be founded upon a consideration of benefit to the
defendant, or to a stranger, or of damage or loss to the plt1intiff at
the request of the defendant; but any act of the plaintiff from
which the defendant derives a benefit, or any labor, detriment , or inconvenience, sustained by the plaintiff, however small the benefit or
inconvenience, is a sufficient consideration, if such act is performed, or inconvenience suffered, at the instance and request of the
defendant. (1 Selw. N. P. 32, and cases cited.) It is not claimed
in this case that the defendant has derived any benefit from the contract
upon which the action is founded, and the inquiry will be, whether
the plaintiffs have sustained any damage or detriment at the instance
and request of the defendant, or directly flowing from the promise.
The substance of the contract between the parties, leaving out the
particulars, is this: The defendant agrees to pay the plaintiffs, for the
benefit of the institution they represent, $8oo, in four annual payments, provided they will procure subscriptions and contributions
which, with his, shall amount to $50,uoo before a given time, and
hall afterwards invest the same as specified. Or, putting it in an-·
other form: The defendant agrees , if the plaintiffs will procure sub!;criptions for the benefit of their institution to the amount of $50,000,
including his, and will invest the same as therein directed , that he wi!J
pay them $8ou in four annual payment!'i . The plaintiffs consent, and
perform the conditions. It seem s to me that the labor and expense of
p rocuring the subscription s and investing the fund constitute da mage
.md loss to the plaintiffs, which bring the case within the very defini1 ion of a good con. ideration for the promise.
In the case of Sir
. \nthony Sturlyn v. Albany (Cro . Eliz. 67), the decl aration set forth
tnat the plaintiff had made a lease of land to ]. S. for life rendering
29- WIL. CASKS.
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rent, who granted all his estate to the defendant, the rent being be-

hind for several years. The defendant agreed, if the plaintiff could

450

show to him a deed that the rent was due, he would pay it. The
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plaintiff then averred that on such a day, etc., he showed to him the in-

rent, who granted all his estate to the defendant, the rent being behind for several years. The defendant agreed, if the plaintiff could
show to him a deed that the rent was due, he would pay it. The
plaintiff then averred that on su.ch a day, etc., he showed to him the indenture of lease by which the rent was due, etc. The plaintiff
recovered , and motion was made in arrest, for that there was no consideration upon which to ground the action. But it was adjudged for
the plaintiff, the court observing, that when a thing is to be done b_\'
the plaintiff, be it ever so small, it is a sufficient consideration for the
promise.
So in the case of Knight v. Rushwood, in the same book (p. 469),
Mrs. R. had given a bond for £zoo to the plaintiff, and afterward
assigned to the defendant all her goods to pay her debts. The defend ant insisting that it had been read to the obligor as a bond of
£ 100 on!y, promised the plaintiff to pay it, if he and two witnesses
would swear before the mayor of London, that it was read to her as
an obligation of £zoo, which was done. The qu estion was, whether
there was a consideration for the promise; and the whole court helci,
that the inconvenience of making the oaths was a sufficient consideration; that the smallness was immaterial-if any, it was enough-and
referred to the previous case of Sturlyn v. Albany. (See, also, March
v. Culpepper, Cro. Car. 70). So if A. promises B. to pay him a
sum of money if he will call for it at a particular time, and B. calls
accordingly, the promise is binding; the calling for the money being
sufficient consideration for the promise. Powell on Cont., 343, S
Pick. 384). These cases are all referred to as sound law in the modern respectable treatises on the subject. ( Comyn. on Cont., 16; 1
Sewl. N. P. 3z; Powell on Cont. , 343; Saund. Pl. and Ev., 147;
Bae. Ab. Assumpsit, C.) and the principle is recognized in Brooks
v. Ball, ( 18 Johns. 337). It is laid in Comyn's Dig., (Action upon
the case upon A ssumpsit, B. 4), that proof of a debt is a good con·
sideration for an assumpsit, "for it is a charge to the plaintiff; as if a
woman in consideration of the proof of a debt due from her husband,
promise payment. So if an heir promise to pay the debt of his :mcestor; or if an executor promise upon proof of the delivery of goods
to his testator to pay .for them.''
The case of McAuley v. Billenger (20 John. R. 89), is not distinguishable from the present. That was an action to recover a sum
subscribed by the defendant below, for the repairs of a church. The
suit was in the name of a committee appointed to receive subscriptions for this purpose, and to whom the money was made payable,
and who had subsequently entered into a contract with a person for
the repairs as contemplated in the subscription paper. Entering into
this engagment for the repairs, agreeably to the understanding of all
parties concerned in getting up the subscription and in pursuance
thereof, was regarded as a sufficient consideration for the promise to
pay by the subscribers. The case of Amherst Academy v. Cowles
(6 Pick. 431), contains similar doctrine. A subscription to a fund
of $so,ooo to be made a p ermanent investment for the benefit of a

denture of lease by which the rent was due, etc. The plaintiff

recovered, and motion was made in arrest, for that there was no con-

sideration upon which to ground the action. But it was adjudged for

the plaintiff, the court observing, that when a thing is to be done In-

die plaintiff, be it ever so small, it is a sufficient consideration for the

promise.

So in the case of Knight v. Rushwood, in the same book (p. 469).

Mrs. R. had given a bond for ^200 to the plaintiff, and afterward

assigned to the defendant all her goods to pay her debts. The de-

fendant insisting that it had been read to the obligor as a bond of

,£100 only, promised the plaintiff to pay it, if he and two witnesses

would swear before the mayor of London, that it was read to her as

an obligation of ^200, which was done. The question was, whether

there was a consideration for the promise; and the whole court held,

that the inconvenience of making the oaths was a sufficient considera-

tion; that the smallness was immaterial—if any, it was enough—and
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referred to the previous case of Sturlyn v. Albany. (See, also, March

v. Culpepper, Cro. Car. 70). So if A. promises B. to pay him a

sum of money if he will call for it at a particular time, and B. calls

accordingly, the promise is binding; the calling for the money being

sufficient consideration for the promise. Powell on Cont., 343, 5

Pick. 384). These cases are all referred to as sound law in the mod-

ern respectable treatises on the subject. (Comyn. on Cont., 16; I

Sewl. N. P. 32; Powell on Cont., 343; Saund. PI. and Ev., 147;

Bac. Ab. Assumpsit, C.) and the principle is recognized in Brooks

v. Ball, (18 Johns. 337). It is laid in Comyn's Dig., (Action upon

the case upon Assumpsit, B. 4), that proof of a debt is a good con-

sideration for an assumpsit, "for it is a charge to the plaintiff; as if a

woman in consideration of the proof of a debt due from her husband,

promise payment. So if an heir promise to pay the debt of his an-

cestor; or if an executor promise upon proof of the delivery of goods

to his testator to pay for them."

The case of McAuley v. Billenger (20 John. R. 89), is not distin-

guishable from the present. That was an action to recover a sum

subscribed by the defendant below, for the repairs of a church. The

suit was in the name of a committee appointed to receive subscrip-

tions for this purpose, and to whom the money was made payable,

and who had subsequently entered into a contract with a person fur

the repairs as contemplated in the subscription paper. Entering into

this engagment for the repairs, agreeably to the understanding of all

parties concerned in getting up the subscription and in pursuance

thereof, was regarded as a sufficient consideration for the promise to

pay by the subscribers. The case of Amherst Academy v. Cowles

(6 Pick. 431), contains similar doctrine. A subscription to a fund

of $50,000 to be made a permanent investment for the benefit of a
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literary institution, was heid to be valid and binding, as the execution

of the trust on the part of the trustees, or even being engaged in the

process of execution, afforded a sufficient consideration for the un-
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dertaking of the defendant. And the case of The First Religious

Society of Whitestovvn v. Stone (7 John. R. 112) stands upon the

same principle.

I can not doubt, therefore, but that the assent of the plaintiffs to

the proposition contained in this instrument, and the fulfillment of its

terms and conditions on their part, or in other words, the labor and

expense of procuring subscriptions to the fund, and of investing the

same at their instance and request, as may be fairly inferred from all

the circumstances attending the proposition, afford a sufficient consid-

eration for the undertaking of the subscribers. * * *

The Chancellor. The first question in this case, but which I

consider of minor importance, is that of consideration. The agree-

ment upon which the suit was brought was not by the terms of it, nor

was any part of it to be performed within one year from the making

thereof. The subscription is dated upon the 6th of July, 1833, and

all the counts except the third, which was not attempted to be proved,

allege the agreement to have been made by Stewart on that day. The
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first installment of the subscriptions was not to be paid until the 1st

of August, 1834. The case, therefore, comes within the first subdi-

vision of the second section of the title of the Revised Statutes rela-

tive to fraudulent conveyances and contracts in relation to goods,

chattels and things in action; and the agreement must not only be in

writing, but there must be a valid and sufficient consideration appear-

ing upon the face of the writing, upon which the subscribers are sought

to be charged. (2 R. S. 135.) The language of the statute is ex-

plicit in declaring that every agreement that by its terms is not to be

performed within one year from the making thereof, shall be void,

unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof ex-

pressing the consideration is in writing and subscribed by the party

to be charged therewith. The consideration stated in the three counts

of the declaration, which were attempted to be sustained by proof is,

in part, at least, an alleged agreement on the part of the corporation

to procure subscriptions and contributions to the amount of $50,000

by the 1st of July, 1834. But upon the face of the written agreement

I find no evidence of any undertaking on the part of the corporation

that they will procure subscriptions and contributions to the amount

of $50,000 or to any amount within the prescribed period. Nor was

their acceptance of the subscription of Stewart even an implied assent

on the part of the corporation that they would even attempt to raise

the amount by circulating a subscription for the purpose. And if the

subscription papers had never been presented to any one after Stew-

art's name was subscribed to it, he could not have'complained that

the corporation had violated any agreement, either express or implied,

on their part.

It is true that it was made a condition of the agreement that it

should not be binding upon the subscribers, unless the aggregate of

literary institution, was heid to be valid and binding, as the execution
of the trust on the part of the trustees, or even be ing engaged in the
process of execution, afforded a sufficient consideration for the underta king of the defendant. And the case of The First Religious
Society of Whitestown v. Stone (7 John. R. 112) stands upon the
same principle.
I can not doubt, therefore, but that the assent of the plaintiffs to
the proposition contained in this instrument, and the fulfillment of its
terms and conditions on their part, or in other words, the labor and
expense of procuring subscriptions to the fund, and of investing the
same at their instance and r equest, as may be fairly inferred from all
the circumstances attending the proposition, afford a sufficient consideration for the undertaking of the subscribers. • • •
The CHANCELLOR. The first question in this case, but which I
consider of minor importance, is that of considei:ntion. The agreement upon which the suit was brought was not by the terms of it, nor
was any part of it to be performed within one year from the making
thereof. The subscription is dated upon the 6th of July, 1833 , and
all the counts except the third, which was not attempted to be proved,
allege the agreement to have been made by Stewart on that day. The
first installment of the subscriptions was not to be paid until the rst
of August, 1834. The case, therefore, comes within the first subdivision of the second section of the title of the Revised Statutes relative to fraudulent conveyances and contracts in relation to goods,
chattels and things in action; and the agreement must not only be in
writing, but there must be a valid and sufficient consideration appearing upon the face of the writing, upon which the subscribers are sought
to be charged. ( 2 R. S. I 35.) The language of the statute is explicit in declaring that every agreement that by its terms is not to be
performed within one year from the making thereof, shall be void,
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof expressing the consideration is in writing and subscribed by the party
to be charged therewith. The consideration stated in the three counts
of the declaration, which were attempted to be sustained by proof is,
in part, at least, an alleged agreement on the part of the corporation
to procure subscriptions and contributions to the amount of $so,ooo
by the 1st of July, 1834. But upon the face of the written agreement
I find no evidence of any undertaking on the part of the corporation
that they will procure subscriptions and contributions to the amount
of $50,000 or to any amount within the prescribed period. Nor was
their acceptance of the subscription of Stewart even an implied assent
on the part of the corporation that they would eve n attempt to raise
the amount by circulating a subscription for the purpose. And if the
subscription papers had never been presented to any one after Stewart's name was subscribed to it, he could not have· complained that
the corporation had violated any agreement, either express or implied,
on their part.
It is true that it was made a condition of the agreement that it
should not be binding upon the subscribers, unless the aggregate of
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their subscriptions and contributions should amount to at least $50.-

000 within the time specified. But even in this condition there is no

452

intimation that the corporation are to procure, or to have any instru-
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mentality in procuring such subscriptions and contributions, or that

their subscriptions and contributions should amount to at least $30,within the time specified. But even in this condition there is no
intimation that the corporation are to procure, or to have any instrumentality in procuring such subscriptions and contributions, or that
they were to be even permitted to expend the then existing funds of
the college for that purpose. And even if we go out of the writing,
and examine the parol proof which was adduced to make out such
a consideration, I do not find any evidence which shows that there
was an agreement on the part of the trustees to be at the expense of
procuring subscriptions. Indeed, upon reading the written agreement, I should infer the contrary to be the fact; and that the donors,
or some of them, whose names headed the subscription and who were
the friends of the institution, had gotten up this subscription as an
agreement between themselves to contribute certain proportions to increase the funds of ~he college at least $50,000 beyond the amount it
before had; and that it would be inconsistent with the real object of
the donors to have tht>se funds reduced by expenditures of the kind
contemplated.
As a subscription of a single individual, agreeing to make a donation to another individual or to a corporation for the benefit of the donee
merely, I should have great <lifficulty in finding a valid consideration
to sustain a promise to give without any equivalent therefor, and without any binding agreement on the part of the donee to do anything on
his p :ut which would be a loss or injury to him. And it can hardly
be said to be a consideration to support a promise of a donor to give
at a future time, that the donee agrees to receive and invest the fund
wh.!n paid and to apply it to the payment of his debts generally, or
any particular class of his debts; or to apply it to the payment of such
sums as he may thereafter agree to give to his servants for their sen ·ices. In the case of The First Religiou s Society in \Vhitestown v.
Stone (7 John. Rep. n2), no such difficulty existed, for there was a
sufficient consideration stated in the contract itself. The agreement in
that case was stated to be in consideration of $1 received from the
trustees of the corporation, as well as the further consideration that it
was to raise a salary for a clergyman to be employed to preach for
the benefit of the subscribers.
Neither is there any di"fficulty in my mind finding a good and sufficient
consideration to support :'l subscription of this kind made by ,several
individuals. Every member of society has an interest in sttpporting
the in stitutions of religion nnd of learning in the community where he
resides. And when he consents to become a subscriher with others
to raise a fund for that purpose, the real consideration for his promise
is the promise which others have already made or which he expects
them to make, to contribute to the same object. In other word , the
mutual promises of the several subscribers to contribute towards the
fund to be raised for the specified object in which all feel an interest,
is the real consideration of the promise of each. For this purpo e .
also, the various subscriptions to the same paper and for the same object, although in fact made at different times, may in legal contem-

they were to be even permitted to expend the then existing funds of

000

the college for that purpose. And even if we go out of the writing,

and examine the parol proof which was adduced to make out such

a consideration, I do not find any evidence which shows that there

was an agreement on the part of the trustees to be at the expense of

procuring subscriptions. Indeed, upon reading the written agree-

ment, I should infer the contrary to be the fact; and that the donors,

or some of them, whose names headed the subscription and who were

the friends of the institution, had gotten up this subscription as an

agreement between themselves to contribute certain proportions to in-

crease the funds of the college at least $50,000 beyond the amount it

before had; and that it would be inconsistent with the real object of

the donors to have these funds reduced by expenditures of the kind

contemplated.

As a subscription of a single individual, agreeing to make a dona-

tion to another individual or to a corporation for the benefit of the donee
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merely, I should have great difficulty in finding a valid consideration

to sustain a promise to give without any equivalent therefor, and with-

out any binding agreement on the part of the donee to do anything on

his part which would be a loss or injury to him. And it can hardlv

be said to be a consideration to support a promise of a donor to give

at a future time, that the donee agrees to receive and invest the fund

when paid and to apply it to the payment of his debts generally, or

any particular class of his debts; or to apply it to the payment of such

sums as he may thereafter agree to give to his servants for their serv-

ices. In the case of The First Religious Society in Whitestown v.

Stone (7 John. Rep. 112), no such difficulty existed, for there was a

sufficient consideration stated in the contract itself. The agreement in

that case was stated to be in consideration of $1 received from the

trustees of the corporation, as well as the further consideration that it

was to raise a salary for a clergyman to be employed to preach for

the benefit of the subscribers.

Neither is there any difficulty in my mind finding a good and sufficient

consideration to support a subscription of this kind made by several

individuals. Every member of society has an interest in supporting

the institutions of religion and of learning in the community wThere he

resides. And when he consents to become a subscriber with others

to raise a fund for that purpose, the real consideration for his promise

is the promise which others have already made or which he expects

them to make, to contribute to the same object. In other words, the

mutual promises of the several subscribers to contribute towards the

fund to be raised for the specified object in which all feel an interest,

is the real consideration of the promise of each. For this purpose,

also, the various subscriptions to the same paper and for the same ob-

ject, although in fact made at different times, may in legal contem-
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plation be considered a* having been made simultaneously. The

consideration of the promise, therefore, is not any consideration of
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benefit received by each subscriber from the religious or literary cor-

poration to which the amount of his subscription is made payable, nor

is his promise founded upon any consideration of injury which the pavee

has sustained or is to sustain or to be put to for his benefit. But the

consideration of the promise of each subscriber is the corresponding

promise which is made by other subscribers. Mutual promises have

always been held sufficient as between the parties to sustain the prom-

ise to each. And it had also been the settled law from the time of

the decision in the case of Dutton v. Pool (Freem. Law Rep. 471),

in 1678, down to the present time, that a party for whose benefit a

promise is made may sue in assumpsit upon such promise, although

the consideration therefor was a consideration between the promisor

and a third person. (See Schermerhorn v. Vanderheyden, 1 John.

Rep. 139.) Upon this subscription the several subscribers mutually

promise each other to pay to the trustees of Hamilton College the

sums subscribed by them respectively, upon the condition that the

funds when collected by the corporation shall be invested as a perma-

nent fund, and the income thereof applied to the support of the officers
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of the institution. The legal effect of the written agreement, there-

fore, is the same as if it had been stated at length in the subscription

that the consideration of the promise of each was the promise made to

him by the other subscribers to pay to the corporation the sums by

them subscribed respectively. And if this agreement had been set

out in the declaration with the names of the other subscribers thereto,

with the sums subscribed by them respectively, I think a sufficient

consideration to support the promise to pay to the corporation of the

college would have appeared to support the action. * * *

Senator Bockee. But there is another question of very great in-

terest and importance, whether there was any consideration for the

defendant's promise, so as to make it a legal obligation. It may be

assumed as an axiom, which can not be disputed, that a promise

founded on duties of imperfect obligation or mere motives of benevo-

lence, or a desire to promote the interest of education, of charity or

piety, is nothing more than the promise of a gift, and is not a legal con-

tract on which an action can be maintained. If we take the first clause of

this subscription-paper by itself, where the subscribers bind themselves

to pay certain sums of money to the trustees of Hamilton College, it

does most clearly and inevitably oome within the description of a gra-

tuitous promise, and is void for want of consideration. Do the con-

ditions which are underwritten vary the obligations which the sub-

scribers are under to the trustees of the college? The first of these

conditions is merely directory, and relates to the investment and ap-

propriation of the moneys when collected, and can have no bearing

upon this question of consideration. The second condition is not, as

is incorrectly stated in the second count of the plaintiffs' declaration,

"provided that the -plaintiffs should and would, by the first day of

July, 1834, procure subscriptions and contributions to the amount of

plation be considered Mi having been i:iade simultaneously. The
consideration of the promise, therefore, is not any consideration of
benefit received by each subscriber from the religious or literary corporation to which the amount of his subscription is made payable, nor
i bis promise founded upon any consideration of injury which the payee
has sustained or is to sustain or to be put to for his benefit. But the
consideration of the promise of each subscriber is the corresponding
promise which is made by other subscribers. Mutual promises have
always been held sufficient as between the parties to sustain the promise to each. And it had also been the settled law from the time of
the decision in the case of Dutton v. Pool (Freem .. Law Rep. 471 ),
in 1678, clown to the present time, that a party for whose benefit a
promise is made may sue in assumpsit upon such promise, although
the consideration therefor was a consideration between the promisor
and a third person. (See Schermerhorn v. Vandlerheyden, 1 John.
Rep. 139.) Upon this subscription the several subscribers mutually
promise each other to pay to the trustees of Hamilton College the
sums subscribed by them respecti,·ely, upon the condition that the
funds when collected by the corporation shall be invested as a permanent fund, and the income thereof applied to the support of the officers
of the institution. The legal effect of the written agreement, therefore, is the same as if it had been stated at length in the subscription
that the consideration of the promise of each was the promise made to
him by the other subscribers to pay to the corporntion the sums by
them subscribed respectively. And if this agreement had been set
out in the declaration with the names of the other subscribers thereto,
with the sums subscribed by them respectively, I think a sufficient
consideration to support the promise to pay to the corporation of the
college would have appeared to support the action. • • •
Senator BocKEE. But there is another question of very great interest and importance, whether there was any consideration for the
defendant's promise, so as to make it a legal obligation. It may be
assumed as an axiom, which can not be disputed, that a promise
founded on duties of imperfect obligation or mere motives of benevolence, or a desire to promote the interest of education, of charity or
piety, is nothing more than the promise of a gift, and is not a legal contract on which an action can be maintained. If we take the first clause of
this subscripti~n -p aper by itself, where the subscribers bind themselves
to pay certain sums of money to the trustees of Hamilton College. it
does most clearly and inevitably come within the description of a gratuitous promise, and is void for want of considera1tion. Do the conditions which are underwritten vary the obligations which the subscribers are under to the trustees of the college? The first of these
conditions is merely directory, and relates to the investment and appropriation of the moneys when collected, and ca111 have no bearing
upon this question of consideration. The second condition is not, as
is incorrectly stated in the second count of the plaiintiffs' declaration,
"provided that the plaintiffs should and would, by the first day of
July, 1834, procure subscriptions and contributions to the amount of
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$50,000." If the agreement had been that the defendant would pay
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it would be a good executory consideration, and would, in my view,

$50 1 000." If the agreement had been that the defendant would pay
$800 to the plaintiffs, proviaed they should and would raise $so.ooJ
it would be a good executory consideration, and would, in my view,
entirely change the nature of this instrument, and transform what I
·now consider a naked promise of a donation into a legal and hinding
contract.
The meaning of this condition must be ascertained from the terms
in which it is expressed. There is no reference to the plaintiffs, and
it does not appear from the instrument that they are to perform any
cond·itions. The promise is to pay money upon a contingency having no relation to any action on the part of the plaintiffs. If the unqualified promise is void for want of consideration, I can not conceive
that it is rendered more obligatory by the condition contained in this
subscription paper. The promise of the defendant and also the
promises of all the other benevolent and public spirited gentlemen
who h'ave joined with him in the subscription are voluntary and gratuitous donations, and they are not less so because they are conditional
and depend upon the contingency that the subscriptions shall within
a limited period be raised to $so,ooo. This condition was doubtle s
made as an inducement to liberal subscriptions, and as an incentive
to the friends of the college to exert them selves in raising the fund.
It is an arrangement among the parties who are subscribers , and the
obvious motive of each one is to make his own subscription the means
of calling into exercise the liberality of others. In looking for a consideration to support a contract between these parties, we can not go
beyond the subscription paper. That is the only e\·idence on which
any legal claim can be asserted. VI/ e do not find in this paper any
act or thing to be done by the plaintiffs on the performance of which
they can be legally entitled to claim as a debt what was offered as a
gift. • • •
S enator PonTER. The defendant below was sued upon his subscription to the funds of the Hamilton College, and he resists the payment upon a variety of grounds. It appears that a special effort was
made in the year 1833 to raise the sum of $so,ooo to be added to the
permanent funds of that institution, but the income of this sum was
to be applied specially to the payment of the salaries of the officers
of the college. The first objection that I propose to consider is that
which affirms that there w as no consideration for the promise made
by the defendant to pay the tm stees the amount of his subscription.
By the instrument signed by the defendant, the subscribers promised to pay to the trustees of Hamilton College the sums of money set
opposite their respective names, upon certain conditions therein specified. The question is, whether there appears upon the face of the
instrument a consideration to sustain th e promise mad e by the defendant. Let us consider the whole scope and extent of this writing, and
the understa nding and agreement of both p arties at the time it was
signed. The trustees come to the defendant and propose to him , that
if he and others will, promise to pay them $50,00:> as a p ermaneat
fund, the interest of which s~all be applied to the payment of teachers

entirely change the nature of this instrument, and transform what I

now consider a naked promise of a donation into a legal and binding

contract.

The meaning of this condition must be ascertained from the terms

in which it is expressed. There is no reference to the plaintiffs, and

it does not appear from the instrument that they are to perform any

conditions. The promise is to pay money upon a contingency hav-

ing no relation to any action on the part of the plaintiffs. If the un-

qualified promise is void for want of consideration, I can not conceive

that it is rendered more obligatory by the condition contained in this

subscription paper. The promise of the defendant and also the

promises of all the other benevolent and public spirited gentlemen

who have joined with him in the subscription are voluntary and gra-

tuitous donations, and they are not less so because they are conditional

and depend upon the contingency that the subscriptions shall within

a limited period be raised to $50,000. This condition was doubtless

made as an inducement to liberal subscriptions, and as an incentive
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to the friends of the college to exert themselves in raising the fund.

It is an arrangement among the parties who are subscribers, and the

obvious motive of each one is to make his own subscription the means

of calling into exercise the liberality of others. In looking for a con-

sideration to support a contract between these parties, we can not go

beyond the subscription paper. That is the only evidence on which

any legal claim can be asserted. We do not find in this paper any

act or thing to be done by the plaintiffs on the performance of which

they can be legally entitled to claim as a debt what was offered as a

gift. * • • .

Senator Porter. The defendant below was sued upon his sub-

scription to the funds of the Hamilton College, and he resists the pay-

ment upon a variety of grounds. It appears that a special effort was

made in the year 1833 to raise the sum of $50,000 to be added to the

permanent funds of that institution, but the income of this sum was

to be applied specially to the payment of the salaries of the officers

of the college. The first objection that I propose to consider is that

which affirms that there was no consideration for the promise made

by the defendant to pay the trustees the amount of his subscription.

By the instrument signed by the defendant, the subscribers prom-

ised to pay to the trustees of Hamilton College the sums of money set

opposite their respective names, upon certain conditions therein spec-

ified. The question is, whether there appears upon the face of the

instrument a consideration to sustain the promise made by the defend-

ant. Let us consider the whole scope and extent of this writing, and

the understanding and agreement of both parties at the time it was

signed. The trustees come to the defendant and propose to him, that

if he and others will, promise to pay them $50,000 as a permanent

fund, the interest of which shall be applied to the payment of teachers
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in the college, they will incur the labor and expense of obtaining the

subscription to that amount, to be certified by Mr. Hunt or Mr. John-
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son; that they will collect the same, and invest the amount collected

permanently, and in some safe and secure manner; that they will col-

lect, receive and pay over the annual interest forever thereafter to the

teachers of the college, free from all charge upon this fund; and they

engage to take upon themselves the care and expense of taking

charge of the fund, and preserving it in all its integrity, upon a

continued permanent investment, and of applying the income accord-

ing to the designs of its public spirited, enlightened and liberal donors,

free from all abatement; so that their charity may go down to all

time, testifying to their liberality, and enabling this public institution

to confer upon the community that is interested in its prosperity, the

blessings of education and science. All this, they say, we will un-

dertake on our part. The defendant says, very well; if you will

promise for yourselves and your successors to perform this very

charitable service if the subscribers will promise to pay you this

amount, I am content, and will promise, as one qf those subscribers,

to pay you $800 towards that fund, which promise is to be binding

upon me, if responsible subscriptions are obtained to that amount in
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the opinion of Mr. Hunt or Mr. Johnson. It seems to me that this is

a fair and rational paraphrase of the real agreement between these

parties. And if so, is there not a mutuality in it? A promise on the

part of the defendant to pay, provided the trustees will promise on

their part to perform? I think the promise on the part of the trustees

is valid, and obliges them to perform their agreement, and that there-

fore it furnishes a good consideration for the promise of the defend-

ant. There is a contract made between the donors and the trustees,

for the donation, security and disposition of the fund. The promise

on the part of the trustees they have assumed and ratified by accept-

ing the subscriptions and collecting the fund, and they have subjected

themselves to a perpetual obligation to fulfill that promise in good

faith. This obligation maybe enforced at all times; and the man-

ner of executing the trust on their part may always be the subject of

judicial inquiry, and the court will require that the trusts and the prom-

ises are all fulfilled.

In the case of the Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward

(4 Wheat. 518), Ch. J. Marshall, speaking of the contributions to

the fund of that institution, says: "These gifts were made, not in-

deed to make a profit to the donors, or their posterity, but for some-

thing in their opinion of inestimable value, for something which they

deem a full equivalent for the money with which it was purchased.

The consideration for which they stipulated is the perpetual applica-

tion of the fund to its object, in the mode prescribed by themselves."

It is not important that the the consideration of a promise should be

plainly expressed in the writing; it is enough if it appears from the

nature of the instrument and the recitals contained in it. If it is man-

ifest that there was in the minds of the parties some obligation as-

sumed, or some service to be rendered by the promisee, as the equiva-

in the college, they will incur the labor and expense of obtaining the
subscription to that amount, to be certified by Mr. Hunt or Mr. John·on; that they will collect the same, and invest the amount collected
permanently, and in some safe and secure manner; that they will collect, receive and pay oyer the annual interest forever thereafter to the
teachers of the college, free from all charge upon this fund; and they
engage to take upon themselves the care and expense of taking
charge of the fund, and preserving it in all its integrity, upon a
continued permanent investment, and of applying the income aecording to the designs of its public spirited, enlightened and liberal donors,
free from all abatement; so that their charity may go down to all
time, te. tifying to their liberality, and enabling this public institution
to confer upon the community that is interested in its prosperity, the
blessings of education and science. All this, they say, we will undertake on our part. The defendant says, very well; if you will
promise for yourselves and your successors to perform this very
charitable service if the subscribers will promise to pay you this
amount, I am content, and will promise, as one Qf those subscribers,
to pay you $800 towards that fund, which promise is to be binding
upon me, if responsible subscriptions are obtained to that amount in
the opinion of Mr. Hunt or Mr. Johnson. It seems to me that this is
a fair and rational paraphrase of the real agreement between these
parties. And if so, is there not a mutuality in it? A promise on the
part of the defendant to pay, provided the tn1 stees will promise on
their part to perform? I think the promise on the part of the tnistees
is valid, and obliges them to perform their agreement, and that therefore it furnishes a good consideration for the promise of the defendant. There is a contract made between the donors and the trustees,
for the donation, security and disposition of the fund. The promise
on the part of the trustees they have assumed and ratified by accepting the subscriptions and collecting the fund, and they have subjected
themselves to a perpetual obligation to fulfill that promise in good
faith. This obligation m::iy be enforced at all times; and the manner of executing the trust on their part may always be the subject of
judicial inquiry, and the court will require that the trusts and the promises are all fulfilled.
In the case of the Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodv,rard
(4 Wheat. 518), Ch. J. Marshall, speaking of the contributions to
the fund of that institution, says: "These gifts were made, not indeed to make a profit to the donors, or their posterity. but for something in their opinion of inestimable value, for something which they
deem a full equivalent for the money with which it was purchased.
The consideration for which they stipulated is the perpetual application nf the fund to its object, in the mode prescdbed by themselves."
It is not impo1tant that the the consideration of a promise lihould be
plainly expressed in the writing; it is enough if it appears from the
nature of the instrument and the recital s contained in it. H it is manifest that there was in the minds of the parties some obligation assumed, or some service to be rendered by the promisee. as the e quiva~
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lent asked for the promise by the promisor, the promise is not void

§

NULTON V. CLAYTON.

100

for want of a consideration. The law upon this subject is well stated,

lent asked . for the promise by the promisor, the promise is not void
for want of a consideration. The law upon this subject is well stated,
and the authorities collected in Saund. Pl. & Ev. 147. I can not
doubt but that the promise of the defendant was made upon a good
consideration. • • •
For reversal 21, for affirmance 5.

and the authorities collected in Saund. PI. & Ev. 147. I can not

doubt but that the promise of the defendant was made upon a good

consideration. * * *

For reversal 21, for affirmance 5.

See 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. 791 et seq.; Beach, § 584; Boone, § 108; Clark,

§§ 93-7; Cook, §§ 71-5; Elliott, § 349; Langdell's Summary of Contracts,

§§ 183-7; Morawetz, 43-59; Tavlor, §§ 62-64, 509-12; I Thompson,

See 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. 791 et seq.; Beach, § 584; Boone, § 108; Clark,
§§ 9:l- 7; Cook, §§ 71-5; Elliott, § 349; Langdell's Summary of Contracts,
§§ 18~7; Morawetz, §§ 43-59; Taylor, §§ 62-64, 509-12; I Thompson,
§§ 1200-13; VII Thompson, §§ 8606-25.

§§ 1200-13; VII Thompson, §§ 8606-25.

iVote. If subscriptions are acted upon and money is expended on the faith

of them, the donor or subscriher is estopped from claiming there is no consid-

eration. 1816, Kidwelly v. Raby, 2 Price (Eng. Exch.) 93; 1828, Amherst

Note. If subscriptions are acted upon and money is expended on the faith
of them, the donor or subscriber is estopped from claiming there is no consideration. 1816, Kidwelly v. Raby, 2 Price (Eng. Exch.) 93; 1828, Amherst
Acauemy v. Cowls, 6 Pick. (:\'lass.) 427; 1852, Kennebec, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Palmer, 3-1 Maine 366; 1857, Wesleyan Seminary v. Fisher, 4: Mich. 514;
1877, Roche v. Roanoke Classical Sem., 56 Ind. l!l8; 18i7, l\L E. Cburchv.
Kendall, 121 Mass. 528; 1878, Simpson Centenary College v. Bryan, 50 Iowa
293; 1881, Twin Creek, etc., Co. v. Lancaster, 79 Ky. 552; 1885, Osborn v.
Crosby. 63 N. H. 583; 1886, Roberts v. Cobb, 103 N. Y. 600; 1897, School District v. Sheidley, 138 1\fo. 673; 1898, Beatty v. Western Colle~e of Toledo, Iii
Ill. 280, 42 L. R. A. 797; 1899, Lasar v. Johnson, 125 Cal. 549, 49 C. J,. J. 4-09,
58 Pac. 161. Also, see, cases infra, pp. 482, 491-492. But, see, Bryants Pond,
etc., Co. v. Felt, 87 Maine 234, infra, p. 474; Hudson Real Estate Co. v. Tower,
161Mass.10, infra, p. 478; Baptist Church v. Cornell, 117 N. Y. 601.

Academy v. Cowls, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 427; 1852, Kennebec, etc., R. R. Co. v.

Palmer, 34 Maine 366; 1857, Wesleyan Seminary v. Fisher, 4 Mich. 514;

1877, Roche v. Roanoke Classical Sem., 56 Ind. 198; 1877, M. E. Church v.

Kendall, 121 Mass. 528; 1878, Simpson Centenarv College v. Brvan, 50 Iowa

293; 1881, Twin Creek, etc., Co. v. Lancaster, 79 Ky. 552; 1885, Osborn \r.

Croshy. 63 N. H. 583; 1886, Roberts v. Cobb, 103 N. Y. 600; 1897, School Dis-
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trict v. Sheidley, 138 Mo. 673; 1898, Beatty v. Western College of Toledo, 177

111. 280, 42 L. R. A. 797; 1899, Lasar v. Johnson, 125 Cal. 549, 49 C. L. J. 409,

58 Pac. 161. Also, see, cases infra, pp. 482, 491^92. But, see, Bryants Pond,

etc., Co. v. Felt, 87 Maine 234, infra, p. 474; Hudson Real Estate Co. v. Tower,

161 Mass. 10, infra, p. 478; Baptist Church v. Cornell, 117 N. Y. 601.

Sec. 100. The general form of such contract: As a rule, the form

is immaterial, unless the statute or charter requires a particu-

lar form. It may be either a statutory or a common law con-

tract.

Sec. 100. Tlte general form of szec!t contract: As a

rule, the form
is immaterial, unless the statute or charter requires a particular form. It may be either a statutory or a common law contract.
NULTON v. CLAYTON.

NULTON v. CLAYTON.

1880. In the Supreme Court of Iowa. 54 Iowa Reports, 425-

428, 37 Am. Rep. 213.

Action to recover upon an alleged subscription to the stock of a

banking corporation. The question arises upon demurrer to the peti-

tion, the defendant claiming that the petition does not show that the

188o.

defendant became a subscriber to the stock in such sense that he be-

IN

came obligated to take and pay for it. The corporation is the Farmers'

THE SUPREME CouRT OF low A- 54 Iowa Reports,
428, 37 Am. Rep. 213.

425-

and Merchants' Bank of Bloomfield. The plaintiff is the assignee

Action to recover upon an alleged subscription to the stock of a
banking corporation. The question arises upon demurrer to the petition, the defendant claiming that the petition does not show that the
defendant became a subscriber to the stock in such sense that he became obligated to take and pay for it. The corporation is the Farmers'
and Merchants' Bank of Bloomfield. The plaintiff is the assignee
of the corporation. The petition avers that the capital stock was divided into shares of $100 each. and that the defendant subscribed for
ten shares. As constituting the subscription, the plaintiff sets out as
an exhibit to his petition a ce11:ain written statement, and the articles
of incorporation, both purporting to be subscribed by the defendant.
The statement is in these words:
"We, the undersigned, having associated ourselves together for the
purpose of organizing a banking association, and transacting the business of banking under chapter 52, of the revision of 186o, do declare
and state as follows:
"First. The name and title of the association shall be The Farm·
ers' and Merchants' Bank of Bloomfield, Iowa.

of the corporation. The petition avers that the capital stock was di-

vided into shares of $100 each, and that the defendant subscribed for

ten shares. As constituting the subscription, the plaintiff sets out as

an exhibit to his petition a certain written statement, and the articles

of incorporation, both purporting to be subscribed by the defendant.

The statement is in these words:

"We, the undersigned, having associated ourselves together for the

purpose of organizing a banking association, and transacting the busi-

ness of banking under chapter 52, of the revision of 1S60, do declare

and state as follows:

"First. The name and title of the association shall be The Farm-

ers' and Merchants' Bank of Bloomfield, Iowa.
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"Second. The authorized capital of said Farmers' and Merchants'
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Bank of Bloomfield, Iowa, shall be $150,000, which shall be divided

into shares of $100 each.

'•Third. The name and residence of the stockholders of this asso-

ciation, with the number of shares held by each, arc as follows:

"J. W. Clayton 10 shares."

The essential part of the articles of incorporation is in these words:

'■•Eighth. Fifty per cent, of all the stock subscribed for this asso-

ciation before it commences business shall be paid in at the time of

commencing business, and the balance so subscribed shall be paid at

such times and in such installments as the board of directors may

prescribe."

The petition avers that the directors have called for full payment

of all the stock subscribed.

To the petition so showing the defendant demurred. The court

sustained the demurrer. Judgment having been rendered for the de-

fendant, the plaintiff appeals.

Adams, Ch. J. The action is brought to recover one-half of the
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amount of the alleged subscription, the other half having ahead}' been

paid. The defendant insists that it is not shown that he contracted

to pay any sum whatever. The defendant did not become a stock-

holder by subscribing the articles of incorporation. If he became

such he did so by subscribing what we have denominated the state-

ment. The more important portion of it is the third division. That

is a declaration purporting to be made by the associated persons

showing each his respective interest in the corporation. Is it a sub-

scription to stock? If so, the defendant is liable to pay for the num-

ber of shares set opposite his name, without a promise to do so in so

many words. This has been held repeatedly.

In Spews v. Crawford, 14 Wend. 20,1 the writing subscribed was

in these words:

"We, the subscribers, do hereby severally agree to take the shares

by us subscribed in the Harlem Canal Company." A certain num-

ber of shares was set opposite the name of each subscriber. The

question presented was whether the mere agreement to take shares

rendered the defendant liable to pay for them. The court held that

it did.

In Hartford & New Haven R. Co. v. Kennedy, 12 Conn. 500, the

word "subscriber" was used in what was claimed to be the subscrip-

tion to stock. It was held that the subscriber was liable to pay for

the stock, without a promise to do so in so many words. The court

said: "It is true a promise to pay in precise terms does not appear to

have been made. The defendant has not affixed his signature to an

instniment which contains the words, T promise to pay,' but he has

done an equivalent act. He has contracted with the plaintiff to be-

come a member of the corporation, and to be interested in its stock."

In Rensselaer & W. Plank Road Co. v.Barton, 16 N. Y. 460, the

128 Am. Dec. 513.

"Second. The authorized capital of said Farmers' and Merchants'
Bank of Bloomfield, Iowa, shall be $150,000, which shall be divided
into shares of $ 100 each.
' ·Third. The name and residence of the stockholders of this association , ""ith the number of shares held by each, are as follows:
•·J. \\'. Clayton,
IO shares."
The essential part of the articles of incorporation is in these words:
•·Eighth. Fifty per cent. of all the stock subscribed for this association before it commences business shall be paid in at the time of
commencing business, and the balance so subscribed shall be paid at
such times and in such installments as the board of directors may
prescribe."
The petition avers that the directors have called for full payment
of all the stock subscribed.
To the petition so showing the defendant demurred. The court
sustained the demurrer. Judgment having been rendered for the defendant, the plaintiff appeals.
ADAMS, Ch. J.
The action is brought to recoyer one-halt of the
amount of the alleged subscription, the other half having already been
paid. The defendant insists that it is not shown that he contracted
to pay any sum whatever. The defendant did not become a stockholder by subscribing the articles of incorporation . . If he became
ucb he did so by subscribing what we have denominated the statement. The more important portion of it is the third division. That
is a declaration purporting to be made by the associated persons
showing each his respective interest in the corporation. Is it a subscription to stock? If so, the defendant is liable to pay for the munber of shares set opposite his name, without a promise to do so in so
many words. This has been held repeatedly.
In Spea•rs v. Crawford, 14 \iVend. 20 , 1 the writing subscribed was
in these words:
"We, the subscribers, do hereby severally agree to take the shares
by us subscribed in the Harlem c;anal Company." A certain number of 'shares was set opposite the name of each subscriber. The
question presented was whether the mere agreement to take shares
rendered the defendant liable to pay for them. The court held that
it did.
In Hartford & New Haven R. Co. v. Kennedy, 12 Conn. 500, the
word "subscriber" was used in what was claimed to be the subscription to stock. It was held that the subscriber was liable to pay for
tbe stock , without a promise to do so in so many words. The court
said: "It is true a promise to pay in precise terms does not appear to
have been made. The defendant has not affixed his signature to an
instmment which contains the words, 'I promise to pay,' but he has
done an equivalent act. He has contracted with the plaintiff to become a member of the corporation, and to be interested in its stock."
In Rensselaer & W. Plank Road Co. v.Barton, 16 N. Y. 46o, the
1

28 Am. Dec. 513.
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court said: "Whatever may be the form or language of a subscription

r\ U LTON V. CLAYTON.
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to the stock of an incorporated company, any person who in any man-

court said: '' \ Yhate\'er may be the form or language of a subscription
to the stock of an incorporated company, any person who in any manner becomes a subscriber for, or engages to take any portion of. the
stock of such company, thereby assumes to pay according to the conditions of the charter." S ee, also, Small v. Herkimer Manufacturing
and Hydraulic Co., 2 Comst. 335; Dayton v. Borst, 31 N. Y. 437;
Hartford & New Haven R. Co. v. Croswell, S Hill 384; 'Vaukon &
Mississippi R. Co. v. Dwyer, 49 Iowa 12 i .
Probably the defendant would not deny that where there is a valid
subscription to stock, or written agreement to take stock, there arises
upon such subscription or agreement an obligation to pay for it. But
the defendant insists thal the writing in this case, whatever it may be
called , falls short of be ing a subscription to stock, or agreement to
take stock.
It declared that "the numLer of shares held by each are as follows :··
Then follow names and amounts. The averment of the petition in
substance is that the defendant by his contract subscribed for ten
shares. By this we understand that the writing was signed by the
defendant. The association purports to be incorporated under the
general incorporation law. Wh at purpose such a written declaration
by the associated persons could have if they were not thereby to become subscribers, each for the amount set opposite his name , we are
unable to conceive. It is suggested that the written declaration was,
perhaps, designed as a written admission of a previous subsciiption,
but we see no reason for a formal written admission of what must
have been already in writing if there was a subscription to be admitted.
It appears to us far more probable that the declaration was designed
as a subscription. Now it matters not how £nformal the writing may
be, if the t'ntent of the parties can be collected from £!. What the int ent was t'n tht's case we have no 1·easonable doubt. The parties intended to adopt articles of incorporatt"on, and become subscrt'bers to
the stock thereunder. If they dt'd they became obligated to pay £n
accordance with the e£ghth artt'cle to whfrh they m ade themselves
part£es.
·
Suppose a creditor of the asi;;ociation had brought an action upon
his claim against the defendant, alleging that he is a partner. We
think that the defendant might. and w oulcl, have set up the incorporation and sought shelter beneath it. There is no doubt that he in
good faith attempted to become a membe r and limit his liability by
the exemption provided. If he could have escaped liability as a paiiner by setting up the incorporation and his membership, he can not
escape the limited liability incident to such membership.
We think that the demurrer was improperly sustained.
Reversed.
Note. For subscriptions to commissioners see Walker v. Devereaux, !11P'f4t
p. 3&5.
For subscriptions to incorporators, see Nickum v. Burkhardt, supra, p. 391.
See, alAo, 1819, Chester Glass Co. v. Dewey, 16 Mass. 94: 1841 , Chelten·
ham , etc., R. Co. v. Daniel, 2 Q. B. 281; 1848, Lohman v. N. Y., etc.. R. Co.,
2 Sundf. (N. Y.) 39; 1&56, Fisher v. Evansville, etc., R. Co., 7 Ind . 407; 1856,

ner becomes a subscriber for, or engages to take any portion of. the

stock of such company, thereby assumes to pay according to the con-

ditions of the charter." See. also, Small v. Herkimer Manufacturing

and Hydraulic Co., 2 Comst. 335; Dayton v. Borst, 31 N. Y. 437;

Hartford & New Haven R. Co. v. Croswell, 5 Hill 384; Waukon &

Mississippi R. Co. v. Dwyer, 49 Iowa 121.

Probably the defendant would not deny that where there is a valid

subscription to stock, or written agreement to take stock, there arises

upon such subscription or agreement an obligation to pay for it. But

the defendant insists that the writing in this case, whatever it may be

called, falls short of being a subscription to stock, or agreement to

take stock.

It declared that "the number of shares held by each are as follows:"

Then follow names and amounts. The averment of the petition in

substance is that the defendant by his contract subscribed for ten

shares. By this we understand that the writing was signed by the

defendant. The association purports to be incorporated under the
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general incorporation law. What purpose such a written declaration

by the associated persons could have if they were not thereby to be-

come subscribers, each for the amount set opposite his name, we are

unable to conceive. It is suggested that the written declaration was,

perhaps, designed as a written admission of a previous subscription,

but we see no reason for a formal written admission of what must

have been already in writing if there was a subscription to be admitted.

It appears to us far more probable that the declaration w-as designed

as a subscription. IVotv it matters not how informal the -writing may

be, if the intent of the parties can be collected from it. What the in-

tent was in this case we have no reasonable doubt. The parties in-

tended to adopt articles of incorporation, and become subscribers to

the stock thereunder. If they did they became obligated to pay in

accordance with the eighth article to -which they made themselves

parties.

Suppose a creditor of the association had brought an action upon

his claim against the defendant, alleging that he is a partner. We

think that the defendant might, and would, have set up the incorpo-

ration and sought shelter beneath it. There is no doubt that he in

good faith attempted to become a member and limit his liability by

the exemption provided. If he could have escaped liability as a part-

ner by setting up the incorporation and his membership, he can not

escape the limited liability incident to such membership.

We think that the demurrer was improperly sustained.

Reversed.

Note. For subscriptions to commissioners see Walker v. Devereaux, supra.

p. 385.

For subscriptions to incorporators, see Niekum v. Burkhardt, supra, p. 891.

See, also, 1819, Chester Glass Co. v. Dewey, 16 Mass. 94; 1841, Chelten-

ham, etc., R. Co. v. Daniel, 2 Q. B. 281; 1848. Lohman v. N. Y., etc.. R. Co.,

2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 39; 185(5, Fisher v. Evansville, etc., R. Co., 7 Ind. 407; 185<i,
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Poughkeepsie & S. P. P. R. v. Griffin, 21 Barb. (N. Y.I 454; 1858, Mobile <fc

O. R. Co. v. Yandall, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 294; 1860, Clark v. Farrington, etc..

11 Wis. 306; 1864, Ashtabula & N. L. R. Co. v. Smith, 15 O. S. 328; 18«9,

Iowa & M. R. Co. v. Perkins, 28 Iowa 281; 1873, Peninsula R. Co. v. Dun-

can, 28 Mich. 130, infra, p.-482; 1878, Woodruff v. McDonald, 33 Ark.*97;

1882, Wheeler v. Millar, 90 N. Y. 353; 1893, Barron v. Burrill, 86 Maine 72,

29 Atl. 938; 1896, Ventura, etc., R. Co. v. Collins,116 Cal. 260,46Pac. Rep. 287.

See, also, 23 Am. & Eng. Ency., p. 786, et seq.; Beach, §§ 61-5; Boone, § 108;

Cook. $§52-3; Elliott, §348; Morawetz. §43, et seq.; Taylor, §§ 509-12; I

Thompson, §§ 1136-95; II Thompson, §§ 1305, 1788.

Writing is not necessar>)—statute of frauds does not apply. 1853, Chaffin v.

Ciimmings, 37 Maine 76; 1858, Cookney's Case, 3 DeG. & J. 170; 1886, Col-

fax Hotel Co. v. Lvon, 69 Iowa 683; 1887, Wemple v. R. R. Co., 120 111. 196;

1887, Bullock v. Falmouth, etc., Co., 85 Ky. 184; 1893, Webb v. R. R. Co., 77

Md. 92, infra, p. 528: 1894, York v. Park Building Assn., 39 Neb. 834; 1895,

Shellenberger v. Patterson, 168 Pa. St. 30; 1895, Tabler v. Anglo-American

Assn., 32 S. W. (Ky.l 602. See, Cook, §§52-3; Elliott, § 348; I Thompson,

§5 11-16-7. Contra, a subscription requires writing, for subscribe literally me;ins

an underwriting. 1827, Thames T. Co. v. Sheldon, 6 B. &. C. 341; 1858,
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Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Gazzam, 32 Pa. St. 340; 1877, Galveston Hotel Co.

v. Bolton, 46 Tex. 633; 1878, Freeland v. N. J. Stone Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 188;

1887, Fanning v. Ins. Co., 37 O. S. 339, 41 Am. Rep. 517.

ARTICLE II. FORMS OF ASSOCIATION CONTRACTS; STATUTORY SUB-

SCRIPTIONS.

See. 101. An exclusively statutory contract.

THE SEDALIA, WARSAW & SOUTHERN RY., Appkllant, v. WILKER-

SON, Administrator.1

1S84. In the Supreme Court of Missouri. 83 Missouri Reports

235~244-

Martin, C. This is an action to enforce an alleged subscription

to the capital stock of plaintiff. The demand was first presented in

the probate court for allowance against the estate of the subscriber,

and was taken thence by appeal to the circuit court. The principal

facts in the case are set forth in the following agreed statement:

It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto,

that upon the trial of this case the following facts shall stand admitted,

viz.:

1. That the plaintiff is a railroad corporation, created and existing

under the general railroad incorporation laws of the state, under the

corporate name of the Sedalia, Warsaw and Southern Railway Com-

pany.

2. That its articles of association were filed in the office of the

secretary of state, September 16, 1879, the same having been pre-

1 Arguments omitted.
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pared and signed by die parties thereto between the first day of Sep-
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tember, 1879, and the sixteenth day of September, 1879, and that said

§ 101

Smith did not sign said articles, nor authorize any one to sign his

pared and signed by the parties thereto between the first day of Sep·
tember, 1879, and the sixteenth day of September, 1879, and that said
Smith did not sign said articles, nor authorize any one to sign bis
name thereto, and that said Smith died intestate on the eleventh day
of July, 1879.
3. That in the year 1877, the defendant, said George R. Smith,
sig ned and delivered to one Cyrns Newkirk, ·who was afterwards
named in said articles as one of the directors of plaintiff and who was
then soliciting subscription to the capital stock of said proposed incorporation, now the plaintiff herein, a certain written instrument to be
read in evidence in the case.
3 Yz. That prior t o the bringing of the suit in the probate court of
Pettis county, the plaintiff had complied with all the conditions of said
written instrument referred to in the preceding stipulation as to the
construction and completion of said railway, and that on October 30,
1880, plaintiff made a call for payment of all subscriptions to its capi·
ta! stock.
4. That for the purpose of this trial the same effect shall be given
to the instrument referred to in the third stipulation as though the
name of the Sedalia, Warsaw and Southern Railway Company ap·
peared in the stead of that of the Sedalia, VI arsaw and Memphis R..1ilway Company.
5. That after said articles of association were filed in the office of
the secretary of state, as aforesaid, the plaintiff corporation duly or·
ganized by the appointment of \\TilJiam Gentry, one of the director
named in the said a1ticles, as president; also by the appointment of
D. H. Smith, another of said directors, as vice-president; John D.
Crawford, secretary, and Cyrus Newkirk, treasurer.
6. That after such organization by plaintiff, said Cyrus · Newkirk
turned over and delivered said instrument referred to in the third stip·
ulation to the secretary of the plaintiff, and that plaintiff thereupon
received and accepted the same as a subscription to its capital stock,
and ordered the name of said Smith to be placed upon its stock books
as a stockholder of fifty-five shares of its capital stock, which was ac·
corclingly done.
7. For the purpose of this case the instrument of writing referred
to in stipulation No. 3 shall be considered as applying only to the
$1,000 cash part thereof, which yet remains unpaid, the remaining
portion having been heretofore arranged in a manner not affecting the
issues in this case.
8. These stipulations shall not be taken as binding or estopping
e\ther party hereto, in any other cause, but shall be used in the trial of
this case only.
The plaintiff read in evidence the subscription paper refened to in
the stipulation signed by the defendant's intestate, which constitutes
the foundation of the demand against his estate.
"\Ve, the undersigned, agree each severally to take the number of
shares of the capital stock of the Sedalia, Warsaw and Memphis
(Southern) Railway Company written opposite our names respect·

nahie thereto, and that said Smith died intestate on the eleventh day

of July, 1879.

3. That in the year 1877, the defendant, said George R. Smith,

signed and delivered to one Cyrus Newkirk, who was afterwards

named in said articles as one of the directors of plaintiff and who was

then soliciting subscription to the capital stock of said proposed incor-

poration, now the plaintiff herein, a certain written instrument to be

read in evidence in the case.

3^4. That prior to the bringing of the suit in the probate court of

Pettis county, the plaintiff had complied with all the conditions of said

written instrument referred to in the preceding stipulation as to the

construction and completion of said railway, and that on October 30,

1880, plaintiff made a call for payment of all subscriptions to its capi-

tal stock.

4. That for the purpose of this trial the same effect shall be given

to the instrument referred to in the third stipulation as though the

name of the Sedalia, Warsaw and Southern Railway Company ap-
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peared in the stead of that of the Sedalia, Warsaw and Memphis Rail-

way Company.

5. That after said articles of association were filed in the office of

the secretary of state, as aforesaid, the plaintiff corporation duly or-

ganized by the appointment of William Gentry, one of the directors

named in the said articles, as president; also by the appointment of

D. H. Smith, another of said directors, as vice-president; John D.

Crawford, secretary, and Cyrus Newkirk, treasurer.

6. That after such organization by plaintiff, said Cyrus Newkirk

turned over and delivered said instrument referred to in the third stip-

ulation to the secretaiy of the plaintiff, and that plaintiff thereupon

received and accepted the same as a subscription to its capital stock,

and ordered the name of said Smith to be placed upon its stock books

as a stockholder of fifty-five shares of its capital stock, which was ac-

cordingly done.

7. For the purpose of this case the instrument of writing referred

to in stipulation No. 3 shall be considered as applying only to the

$1,000 cash part thereof, which yet remains unpaid, the remaining

portion having been heretofore arranged in a manner not affecting the

issues in this case.

8. These stipulations shall not be taken as binding or estopping

either party hereto, in any other cause, but shall be used in the trial of

this case only.

The plaintiff read in evidence the subscription paper referred to in

the stipulation signed by the defendant's intestate, which constitutes

the foundation of the demand against his estate.

"We, the undersigned, agree each severally to take the number of

shares of the capital stock of the Sedalia, Warsaw and Memphis

(Southern) Railway Company written opposite our names respect-
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ively, and to pay for the same as soon as the road of said company

§
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shall be fully completed and in operation to the south line of Pettis

county, in the direction of Warsaw, and the road-bed of said company

completed from Sedalia to Warsaw. The payment of our several

individual subscriptions to be secured to the satisfaction of the board of

directors of said company before a contract for the building of said

road is closed.

"Namet. Shares. Amount.

"George R. Smith, .... $5,500

"On condition as follows: One thousand dollars cash; $3,000 in

ively, and to p ay for the same as soon as the road of said company
baJI be fully completed and in operation to the south line of P ettis
county, in the direction of Warsaw, and the road-bed of said company
completed from Sedalia to Warsaw. The payment of our several
individual subscriptions to be secured to the satisfaction of the board of
directors of said company before a contract for the building of said
road is closed.

work to be done for said railway company at the shops of the Smith

·· ~va1nes.
Manufacturing Company, at regular prices; $1,500 in real estate,

consisting of the three lots on the north side of Fourth street, in the

••George R. Smith,

Shares.

.Amount.

$s,s00

city of Sedalia, lying south of the lots of the Smith Manufacturing

Company, and adjoining theM., K. & T. railroad on the west—

above mentioned lots are numbered 14, 15 and 16, of block 1, Smith

& Martin's Third Addition.

"(Signed.) G. R. Smith."
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This being all the evidence, the plaintiff asked the court to declare,

in substance, that the plaintiff, upon the agreed facts, was entitled to

recover the $1,000 mentioned in the subscription paper. The court

refused to make the declaration and rendered judgment on said facts

in favor of defendant, from which the plaintiff appeals.

"On condition as follows : One thousand dollars cash; $3 1 000 in.
work to be done for said railway company at the shops of the Smith
.M anufacturing Company, at regular prices; $1 ,500 in real estate,
consisting of the three lots on the north side of Fourth street. in the
city of Sedalia, lying south of the lots of the Smith Manufacturing
Company, and adjoining the M., K. & T. railroad on the westabove mentioned lots are numbered 14, l 5 and 16, of block l , Smith
& Martin's Third Addition.
"(Signed.)
G. R. SMITH."

The only question presented in the record is, whether the defend-

ant's intestate by virtue of his signature to the paper submitted in

evidence, which was preliminary to the execution of the articles of

association, became legally bound as a stockholder in the corporation,

subsequently organized under article 3 of chapter 21 relating to the

voluntary incorporation of railroads. The corporation contemplated

in this preliminary paper is a creature of the statute. By complying

with certain requirements specifically indicated therein, the subscrib-

ers of said paper, or any one else desiring the same thing, might be-

come entitled to the rights and be subject to the liabilities of stock-

holders in a body corporate.

The statute which enables them to call into being the body corpo-

rate governs their relation to that body. It is full and explicit, and

leaves no excuse for resorting to the rules of the common law in de-

termining who are and who are not members of the body. I accept

this proceeding as an attempt to enforce the statutory liability of the

defendant's intestate as a member and stockholder of the association

contemplated in the preliminary paper.

In recurring to the statute it would seem that only two modes are

provided by which a person may become a subscriber to the capital

stock of a corporation, either by signing the articles of association

alluded to in the first section of the second article, or by subscribing

to the capital stock after the creation of the corporation. The defend-

ant's intestate died before the articles of association which gave being

This being all the evidence, the plaintiff asked the court to declare ,
in substance, that the plaintiff, upon the agreed facts, was entitled to
recover the $ 1 ,ooo mentioned .in the subscription paper. The court
refused to make the declaration and rendered judgment on said facts
in fayor of defendant, from which the plaintiff appeals.
The only question presented in the record is, whether the defendant's intestate by virtue of his signature to the paper submitted in
evidence, which was preliminary to the execution of the articles of
association, became legally bound as a stockholder in the corporation,
. ub equently organized under article 2 of chapter 21 relating to the
rnluntary incorporation of railroads. The corporation contemplated
in this preliminary paper is a creature of the statute. By complying
with certain requirements specifically indicated therein, the subscribers of said paper, or any one else desiring the same thing, might become entitled to the rights and be subject to the liabilities of st"ckholders in a body corporate.
The statute which enables them to call into being the body corporate governs their relation to that body. It is full and explicit, and
leaves no excuse for resorting to the rules of the common law in determining who are and who are not members of the body. I accept
this proceeding as an attempt to enforce the statutory liability of the
defendant's intestate as a member and stockholder of the as ociation
contemplated in the preliminary paper.
In recurring to the statute it would seem that only two modes are
pro\'ided by which a person may become a subscriber to the capital
stock of a corporation, either by signing the articles of association
alluded to in the first section of the second article, or by subscribing
to the capital stock after the creation of the corporation. The defendant's iMtestate died before the articlc5 of association which gave being
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to the corporation were executed and filed, consequently he could not

THE SEDALIA, ETC., RY. V. WILKERSON.
have become a member by subsequent subscription. If he did not

§ IOI

become such before they were filed, then he was no subscriber or

to the corporation were executed and filed, consequently he could not
have become a member by subsequent subscription. If he did not
become such before they were fil ed, then he was no sub criber or
stockholder at all. As it appears from the agreed statement of facts
that his name was never s igne<l to the articles of incorporation,
the argument against the plaintiff is conclusive, if the premises are
correct.
That they are correct, I think no one can doubt after reading the
provisions of the statute relating to the incipient steps necessary to be
taken in order to give rise to the relation of stockholder and corporation. Section 764, Revised Statutes, provides that any number of
persons, not less than five, may form a railroad company; that for
such purpose they may make and sign articles of association, in
which shall be set forth the name of the company, period of its exi~t
ence, the termini of its road, its length, the counties through which it
is to ;.11n, the amount of capital stock, number of shares of stock, and
the names and places of residence of the directors. It requires each
member to subscribe to such articles by signing his name and place
of residence, and the number of shares he agrees to take. A certain
amount of capital stock must be subscribed, according to the character
and length of the road, and five per cent. of the amount so subscribd
paid thereon to the directors named in the articles. To these articles
must be attached the certificate of at least three directors, under oath,
to the effect th:i.t the conditions relating to the amount and payment
of stock have been complied with. The section then goes on to say:
"And thereupon the persons who have so subscribed such nrticles.of
association, and all persons who shall become stockholders 'in said
company, shall be a corporation by the name specified in such articles
of association, and shall possess the powers and privileges granted to
corporations, and be subjected to the provisions relating thereto contained in this chapter."
I am unable to perce£ve how any persons of the requ£s£te number,
desfrous ofform£ng a ra£lroad company under the prov£s£ons ofthis
statute, can do so £n any other mode than the one po£ntcd out in it.
In no other mode can the relat£on of stockholder and corporation,
under thi·s state, be establ£shed. The statute neither contemplates
nor alludes to any prelimt"nary paper of subscr£pt£on such as the
one gt'ven £n evt'dence. The fact that informal papers and circular
letters are commonly si'gned and publ£shed as a part of the enterprise
and zeal wht'ch gz'vcs bfrth to publt'c corporatz'ons, can make no dif
f erence as long as the statute faz'ls to r ecognz'ze them among the necessary and prescrt"bed legal steps to be taken by the £ncorporators to
create the body corporate. The allusion in the statute to "all persons
who shall become stockholders in said company," evidently refers to
5uch as become stockholders by subscribing for stock after the corporation is established, in subscription books opened by the directors,
according to the prodsions of section 7 I I, Revised Statutes.
It has been held by the courts of New York, in construing a statute in most respects like our own, that a party failing to sign the arti-

stockholder at all. As it appears from the agreed statement of facts

that his name was never signed to the articles of incorporation,

the argument against the plaintiff is conclusive, if the premises are

correct.

That they are correct, I think no one can doubt after reading the

provisions of the statute relating to the incipient steps necessary to be

taken in order to give rise to the relation of stockholder and corpora-

tion. Section 764, Revised Statutes, provides that any number of

persons, not less than five, may form a railroad company; that for

such purpose they may make and sign articles of association, in

which shall be set forth the name of the company, period of its exist-

ence, the termini of its road, its length, the counties through which it

is to inn, the amount of capital stock, number of shares of stock, and

the names and places of residence of the directors. It requires each

member to subscribe to such articles bv signing his name and place

of residence, and the number of shares he agrees to take. A certain
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amount of capital stock must be subscribed, according to the character

and length of the road, and five per cent, of the amount so subscribed

paid thereon to the directors named in the articles. To these articles

must be attached the certificate of at least three directors, under oath,

to the effect that the conditions relating to the amount and payment

of stock have been complied with. The section then goes on to say:

"And thereupon the persons who have so subscribed such artic!es.of

association, and all persons who shall become stockholders in said

company, shall be a corporation by the name specified in such articles

of association, and shall possess the powers and privileges granted to

corporations, and be subjected to the provisions relating thereto con-

tained in this chapter."

I am unable to perceive haw any persons of the requisite number,

desirous offorming a railroad company under the provisions of Hits

statute, can do so in any other mode than the one pointed out in it.

In no other mode can the relation of stockholder and corporation,

under this state, be established. The statute neither contemplates

nor alludes to any preliminary' paper of subscription such as tie

one given in evidence. The fact that informal papers and circular

letters are commonly signed and published as a part of the enterprise

and zeal which gives birth to public corporations, can make no dif-

ference as long as the statute fails to recognize them among the nec-

essary and prescribed legal steps to be taken by the incorporators to

create the body corporate. The allusion in the statute to "all persons

who shall become stockholders in said company," evidently refers to

such as become stockholders by subscribing for stock after the corpo-

ration is established, in subscription books opened by the directors,

according to the provisions of section 711, Revised Statutes.

It has been held bv the courts of New York, in construing a stat-

ute in most respects like our own, that a party failing to sign the arti-

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ IOI

463

STATUTORY ASSOCIATION CONTRACT.

cles of association could not be subjected to the liability of a stock-
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holder, although he has signed a preliminary subscription paper.

Troy & Boston R. R. v. Tibbitts, 18 Barb. 267; Poughkeepsie &

Salt Point Plank Road Co. v. Griffin, 24 N. Y. 150. I find nothing

in the cases cited by plaintiff's counsel materially conflicting with

this construction. Some of them are cases in which preliminary re-

quests, petitions, or subscriptions are made prior to, or in contempla-

tion of, the grant of a charter by legislative enactment. The acts

when passed took effect upon the petitioners or subscribers, and by

force of their terms made them liable as members or stockholders, al-

though they may have failed to participate in the subsequent pro-

ceedings by which the corporation was organized. Others are cases

in which the act of incorporation, either general or special, had been

passed, and the defendants are held liable as stockholders, by reason

of subscriptions within the peculiar meaning and terms of the acts, or

because the acts, unlike the one before us, failed to prescribe any par-

ticular method of subscription by which a person might acquire the

rights and be subject to the responsibilities of a stockholder. Tonica,
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etc., R. v. McNeely, 21 111. 71: Johnson v. Ewing Female Univer-

sity, 35 111. 51S; Buffalo & N. Y. City R. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y.

336; Hartford & New Haven R. v. Kennedy, 12 Conn. 500; Tag-

gart v. Western Md. R., 24 Md. 663; Penobscot R. Co. v. Dum-

mer, 40 Maine 172; Kennebec & Portland R. v. Palmer, 34 Maine

366; Cross v. Pinckneyville Mill Co., 17 111. 54; Athol Music Hall

Co. v. Cary, 116 Mass. 471.

I do not regard the case of Peninsular R. Co. v. Duncan, 28 Mich.

130, as an authority in point. Without assenting to the conclusion

reached in that case by a majority of the court (there being an able

dissenting opinion against it), I need only remark, for the purposes of

this case, that the construction adopted by the court was placed upon

the peculiar phraseology of the statute which it was held referred to

preliminary subscriptions, thereby intending to make the signers

thereof members of the corporation when established. There being

no such reference or intention contained in the language of our stat-

ute, I am of the opinion that the defendant's intestate can not be held

liable as a stockholder by reason of his signature to the paper submit-

ted in evidence. Accordingly the judgment of the court below is af-

firmed.

Phillips, C, not sitting. Ewing, C, concurs. Hough, C. J.,

absent.

Note. See 1854, Troy & Boston R. Co. v. Tibbitts, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 297;

1856, Buffalo & N. Y. R. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336; 1861, Poughkeepsie &

S. R. Co. v. Griffin, 24 N. Y. 150; 1873, Carlisle v. Saginaw Valley R. Co., 27

Mich. 315; 1874, Dutchess, etc., Co. v. Mabbett, 58 N. Y. 397; 1875, Reed v.

Richmond, etc., Co. 50 Ind. 342; 1875, Parker v. N. C. M. R. Co., 33 Mich.

23; 1878, Monterev, etc., Co. v. Hildreth, 53 Cal. 123. Beach, § 513; Clark,

p. 271; Cook, §§ 57-59; Elliott, § 344; Morawetz, §§ 54-57; Taylor, § 516; I

Thompson, §§ 1157-1160.

des of association could not be subjected to the liability of a stockholder, although he has signed a preliminary subscription paper.
Troy & Bos ton R. R. v. Tibbitts, 18 Barb. 267; Poughkeepsie &
Salt Point Plank Road Co. v. Griffin, 24 N. Y. 150. I find nothing
in the cases cited by plaintiff's counsel materially conflicting with
this construction. Some of them are cases in which preliminary requests, p etitions, or subscriptions are made prior to, or in contemplation of, the grant of a charter by legislative enactment. The acts
wl)en passed took effect upon the petitioners or subscribers, and by
force of their terms made them liable as membe rs or stockholder s, although they may have failed to participate in the subsequent proceedings by whidi the corporation was organized. Others are cases
in which the act of incorporation, either general or special, had been
p assed , and the defendants are held liable as stockholders, by reason
of subscriptions within the peculiar meaning and terms of the acts, or
because the acts, unlike the one before us, failed to prescribe any partic ular method of subscription by which a person might acquire the
rights and be subject to the responsibilities of a stockholder. Tonica,
etc., R. v. McNeely, 21 Ill. 71: Johnson v. Ewing Female University, 35 Ill. 518; Buffalo & N. Y. City R. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y.
336; Hartford & New Haven R. v. Kennedy, 12 Conn. 500; Taggart v. Western Md. R., 24 Md. 663; Penobscot R. Co. v. Dumm e r , 40 Maine 172; Kennebec & Portland R. v. Palmer, 34 Maine
366; Cross v. Pinckneyville Mill Co., 17 Ill. 54; Athol Music Hall
Co. v. Cary, l 16 Mass. 471.
I do not regard the case of Peninsular R. Co. v. Duncan, 28 Mich.
l 30, as an authority in point.
\Vithout assenting to the conclusion
reached in that case by a majority of the court (there heing an able
dissenting opinion against it), I need only remark, for the purposes of
this case, that the construction adopted by the court was placed upon
the peculiar phraseology of the statute which it was held referred to
preliminary subscriptions, thereby intending to make the signers
thereof members of the corporation when established. There beingno such reference or intention contained in the language of our statute, I am of the opinion that the defendant's intestate can not be held
liable as a stockholder by reason of his signature to the paper submitted in evidence. Accordingly the judgment of the court below is affirmed.
PHILLIPS, C., not sitting.
EwtNG, C. , concurs. HouGH, C. J.,
absent.
Note. See 1854, Troy & Boston R. Co. v. Tibbitts, 18 Barb. (N. Y. ) 297;
1856, Buffalo & N. Y. R. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336; 1861, Poughkeepsie &
8. R. Co. v . Griffin, 24 N. Y . 150; 1873, Carlisle v. Saginaw Vallt>y R. Co., 27
Mich. 315; 1874, Dutchess, etc., Co. v. Mabbett, 58 N. Y. 397; 1875, Ree<l v.
Richmond, etc., Co. !')0 Ind. 342; 1875, Parker v. N. C. M. R. Co., 33 Mich.
23; 1878, Monterey, etc., Co. v. Hildreth, 53 Cal. 123. Beach. § 513; Clark.
p. 271; Cook, §§ 57--59; Elliott,§ 344; Morawetz, §§ 54-57; Taylor,§ 516; I
Thompson, §§ 1157-1160.
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Sec. 102. Same. The statute may make those who incorporate

§ 102

members and not those who take the stock.

THE PHILADELPHIA SAVINGS INSTITUTIO!\.
THE CASE OF THE PHILADELPHIA SAVINGS INSTITUTION.1

1836. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, i Wharton

(Pa.) Rep. 461-468.

Sec. 102. Same. The statute may make those who incorporate
members and not those who take the stock.

At the last term, an application was made by Mr. Norris for a rule

to show cause why an information in the nature of a writ of quo -war-

ranto should not be filed, to inquire by what authority Joseph Feinour

and others exercised the rights of members of the Philadelphia Sav-

THE CASE OF THE PHILADELPHIA SAVINGS INSTITUTION.1

ings Institution.

At the same time a rule was granted upon the president and direc-

1836.

tors of the same institution, to show cause why a mandamus should

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

1

Wharton

(Pa.) Rep. 461-468.

not issue, requiring them to admit William C. Bridges to participate

in the transaction of the said institution, at its meetings of business.

At the last term, an application was made by Mr. Norris for a rule
to show cause v•hy an information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto should not be filed, to inquire by what authority Joseph Feinour
and others exercised the right of members of the Phila<lelphia Savings Institution.
At the same time a rule was granted upon the pres i<lent and directors of the same institution, to show cause \vhy a 111anda111us should
not issue, requiring them to admit William C. Bridges to p:irticip:it~
in the transaction of the sa id institution, at its meetings of business.
Upon the re turn of these rules , the following appeared to be the
material circumstances:
The Philadelphia SaYings Institution was incorporated by an act of
the legislature of Pennsylrnnia. passed on the 5th day of April, 1834.
The first section declared that certain persons therein named ( fortysix in number) "and all and every other person or persons. hereafter becoming members of the Philadelphia Savings Institution , in the manner hereinafter mentioned." should be created and made a corporation and body politic, with the usual powers and capacities.
The zd, .3<l and 4th sections were as follows:
'•Sec. z. The object of this corporation shall be to receive from
time to time, and at all times, from all persons dis!'.>osed to entrust
them the rewith, such funds as may be deposited with them, and for
'vvhich they shall pay to the depositor such rates of interest as may be
from time to time agreed upon hy the dir.e ctors of the said institution:
Provided, That the said rates of interest shall not be reduced without giving at least sixty days' notice of their intention so to do, in two
or more of the daily papers of the city of Philadelphia.
"Sec. 3. For the security of the depositors of the said institution,
it shall be the duty of the persons named in the first section , and of
their associates, to raise and form a capital for the said institution, of
not less than $so,ooo, nor more than $zoo,ooo, in shares of $z5 each,
which capital shall be at all times liable to the depositors for the
amount of their deposits and of the interest accruing thereon. The
said shares shall be tran sfcrahle on the books of the company in such
manner as may be designated by the by-laws of the said institution.
"Sec. 4. There shall be a meeting of the members of the aid Philadelphia Savings Institution, on such a day in the month of May next,
and at such place as the five persons first named in this act, or any

Upon the return of these rules, the following appeared to be the

material circumstances:

The Philadelphia Savings Institution was incorporated by an act of

the legislature of Pennsylvania, passed on the 5th day of April, 1834.

The first section declared that certain persons therein named (fortv-

six in number) "and all and every'other person or persons, hereafter be-
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coming members of the Philadelphia Savings Institution, in the man-

ner hereinafter mentioned." should be created and made a corpora-

tion and body politic, with the usual powers and capacities.

The 2d, 3d and 4th sections were as follows:

"Sec. 2. The object of this corporation shall be to receive from

time to time, and at all times, from all persons disoosed to entrust

them therewith, such funds as may be deposited with them, and for

which they shall pay to the depositor such rates of interest as may be

from time to time agreed upon by the directors of the said institution:

Provided, That the said rates of interest shall not be reduced with-

out giving at least sixty days' notice of their intention so to do, in two

or more of the daily papers of the city of Philadelphia.

"Sec. 3. For the security of the depositors of the said institution,

it shall be the duty of the persons named in the first section, and of

their associates, to raise and form a capital for the said institution, of

not less than $50,000, nor more than $200,000, in shares of $25 each,

which capital shall be at all times liable to the depositors for the

amount of their deposits and of the interest accruing thereon. The

said shares shall be transferable on the books of the company in such

manner as may be designated by the by-laws of the said institution.

"Sec. 4. There shall be a meeting of the members of the said Phila-

delphia Savings Institution, on such a day in the month of May next,

and at such place as the five persons first named in this act, or any

1 Note. Arguments omitted.

1

Digitized by

Note.

Arguments omitted.

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

STOCKHOLDERS NOT ALWAYS MEMBERS.

465

three of them, shall appoint, and give at least ten days' notice of such

meeting in two or more newspapers printed in the city of Philadelphia,

§
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and on such day in the month of May, and at such place annually

thereafter as the by-laws of said institution shall provide, for the pur-

pose of choosing from among the members, thirteen directors to man-

age the affairs of the said institution for twelve months thereafter, and

until a new election shall take place, and the five persons first named

shall be judges of the first election of directors, and the judges of all

future elections shall be appointed, and notice of such elections given

in such manner as the by-laws shall provide."

The fifth section declared the duties and powers of the directors;

among which it was provided that they should have power to "pro-

vide for the admission of members, and furnishing proofs of such ad-

mission," and to pass all such by-laws as shall be necessary to the

exercise of their powers and of the other powers vested in the corpo-

ration by the charter; '■^Provided, that all such by-laws as shall be

made by the directors, may be altered or repealed by two-thirds of

the members, at any annual meeting, or at any general meeting called

in pursuance of any by-law made for that purpose; and the majority
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of members may, at any annual or general meeting, pass by-laws

which shall be binding upon the directors."

The sixth section authorized the corporation to invest its funds in

public stocks of the state, or of the United States, or in real securi-

ties, or in the discount of notes, and personal securities; provided that

the rate of discount should not exceed one-half per cent, for thirty

days.

The seventh section was as follows:

•'See. 7. It shall be the duty of the directors, at least once in every

six months, to appoint from the members of the said coporation, five

competent persons as a committee of examination, whose duty it shall

be to investigate the affairs of the said corporation, and to make and

publish a report thereof in one or more newspapers printed in the city

of Philadelphia—and it shall also be the duty of the directors, on the

first Monday of January and July, in each and every year, to make

and declare a dividend of the interest and profits of the said corpora-

tion, after paying its expenses, and the same to pay over to the stock-

holders or their legal representatives, within ten days thereafter."

The eighth section provided that nothing in the act contained should

be so construed as to give or extend any banking privileges to the in-

stitution, or to give or allow any compensation to the directors thereof.

Shortly after the act of incorporation, the directors adopted certain

by-laws, among which were the following:

'•Law 4. Any member of the institution may, by writing addressed

to the treasurer, resign and relinquish his place and right as a member

of the institution, and every member who shall cease to be a stock-

holder, shall at the same time cease to be a member.

"Law 5. No person shall be eligible as a member, unless he shall

have been a depositor one year, or a stockholder six months. All

30—Wil. Casks.

three of them, shall appoint, and giYe at least ten days' notice of such
meeting in two or more newspapers printe<l in the city of Philadelphia,
:i nd on such day in the month of May, and at such place annually
thereafter as the by-laws of said institution shall provide, for the purpose of choosing from among the m embers, thirteen directors to manage the affairs of the said institution for twelve months thereafter, and
until a new election shall take place, and the five persons first named
shall be judges of the first election of directors, and the judges of all
future elections shall be appointed, _and notice of such elections given
in such manner as the by-Jaws shall provide."
The fifth section declared the duties and powers of the directors;
among which it was provided that they should have power to "provide for the admission of members, and furnishing proofs of such admission," and to pass all such by-laws as shall be necessary to the
exercise of their powers and of the other powers vested in the corporation by the charter; "Provided, that all such by-laws as shall be
made by the directors, may be altered or repealed by two-thirds of
the members, at any annual meeting, or at any general meeting called
in pursuance of any by-law made for that purpose; and the majority
of members may, at any at1nual or general meeting, pass by· laws
which shall be binding upon the directors."
The sixth section authorized the corporation to invest its funds in
public stocks of the state, or of the United States, or in real securities, or in the discount of notes, and personal securities; provided that
the rate of discount should not exceed one-half per cent. for thirty
<lays.
The seventh section was as follows :
"Sec. 7. It shall be the duty of the directors, at least once in every
i;ix months, to appoint from the members of the said coporation, five
competent persons as a committee of examination, whose duty it shall
be to investigate the affairs of the said corporation, and to make and
publish a report thereof in one or more newspapers printed in the city
of Philadelphia-and it shall also be the duty of the directors, on the
first Monday of January and July, in each and every year, to make
and declare a divi<lend of the interest and profits of the said corporation , after paying its expenses, and the same to pay over to the stockholders or their legal representatives, within ten days thereafter."
The eighth section provided that nothing in the act contained should
be so construed as to give or extend any banking privileges to the institution, or to give or allow any compensation to the directors thereof.
Shortly after the act of incorporation, the directors adopted certain
by-laws, among which were the following:
" Law 4. Any member of the institution may, by writing addressed
to the treasurer, resign and relinqui sh hi s place and right as a member
of the institution, and eYery member who shall cease to be a stockholder, shall at the sa me time cease to be a member.
"Law 5. No person shall be eligible as a member, unless he shall
have been a depositor one year, or a stockholder six months. All
30--WIL. CASES.
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elections for membership shall be by ballot at a general meeting of

THE PHILAUELPHIA SAVINGS 1:-lSTITUTION.
the institution, at which the votes of two-thirds of the whole number

§ 102

of members of the institution shall be requisite for admission."

elections for mt:mbership shall be by ballot at a general meeting of
the institution, at which the votes of two-thirds of the whole number
of members of the institution shall be requisite for admission."
At a general meeting held on the 5th of January, 1836, the old bylaws were repealed by the members and in lieu of the above laws,
viz., law 4th and 5th, they passed the following by-laws:
"Law 3, section 3. The number of members of the institution
shall be limited to fifty, and in case of vacancy by death, resignation
or otherwise, it shall be the duty of the president immediately to call
a general meeting of the institution to supply such vacancy, and at
any election of members a majority of the whole number of members
shall be present, and the person or persons balloted for shall have
received the votes of at least two-thirds of the members present.
Provided, that no person shall be elected a member who shall not
have been nominated at some meeting previous to that at which he
shall be balloted for.
Sec 4. Any member of the institution may, by writing addressed
to the president, resign and relinquish his place and right as a member of the institution at any general meeting of the members."
The law No. 5 above quoted was repealed.
The board of directors afterward, viz., on the 14th of January,
1836, passed the following by-law, being a repeal of and in substitution of by-law 4 above:
"Law 4. Any member of the institution may, by writing addressed
to the president, resign and relinquish his place and right as a member of the institution at any general meeting of the members."
The questions submitted to the court were:
1. Whether persons originally members, who had transferred their
stock and no longer possessed any interest in the stock, continued to
be members, with the right of voting for directors, etc.
2. Whether a person to whom stock in the institution was assigned-as upon. purchase-became a member, ipso fado, without
admission by the directors.
Mr. James S. Smith and Mr. Sergeant contended that none but
persons having a pecuniary interest in the corporation by holding
stock, were to be considered as members. Mr. Vv. M. Meredith and
Mr. Broom, contra.
RoGERS , J.
The rules obtained in this case involve two questions,
which depend upon the construction of the act of the 5th of April,
1834, incorporating the Philadelphia Savings Institution.
r. Is a stockholder a member of the corporation, and as such entitled to participate in its business?
2. Does he cease to be a member when he ceases to be a stockholder?
In relation to the power of admitting members.of a corporation, as is
said in Angel and Ames on Corporntions, 62, reference must often be
ha<l to the provisions and spirit of the charter, and when the charter
is silent, we must look to the provisions of the common law, and to
the particular nature and purpo. e of the corporation. In certain cor-

At a general meeting held on the 5th of January, 1836, the old by-

laws were repealed by the members and in lieu of the above laws,

viz., law 4th and 5th, they passed the following by-laws:

"Law 3, section 3. The number of members of the institution

shall be limited to fifty, and in case of vacancy by death, resignation

or otherwise, it shall be the duty of the president immediately to call

a general meeting of the institution to supply such vacancy, and at

any election of members a majority of the whole number of members

shall be present, and the person or persons balloted for shall have

received the votes of at least two-thirds of the members present.

Provided, that no person shall be elected a member who shall not

have been nominated at some meeting previous to that at which he

shall be balloted for.

Sec 4. Any member of the institution may, by writing addressed

to the president, resign and relinquish his place and right as a mem-

ber of the institution at any general meeting of the members."
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The law No. 5 above quoted was repealed-

The board of directors afterward, viz., on the 14th of January,

1836, passed the following by-law, being a repeal of and in substitu-

tion of by-law 4 above:

"Law 4. Any member of the institution may, by writing addressed

to the president, resign and relinquish his place and right as a mem-

ber of the institution at any general meeting of the members."

The questions submitted to the court were:

1. Whether persons originally members, who had transferred their

stock and no longer possessed any interest in the stock, continued to

be members, with the right of voting for directors, etc.

2. Whether a person to whom stock in the institution was as-

signed—as upon purchase—became a member, ipso facto, without

admission by the directors.

Mr. James S. Smith and Mr. Sergeant contended that none but

persons having a pecuniary interest in the corporation by holding

stock, were to be considered as members. Mr. W. M. Meredith and

Mr. Broom, contra.

Rogers, J. The rules obtained in this case involve two questions,

which depend upon the construction of the act of the 5th of April,

1834, incorporating the Philadelphia Savings Institution.

1. Is a stockholder a member of the corporation, and as such en-

titled to participate in its business?

2. Does he cease to be a member when he ceases to be a stock-

holder?

In relation to the power of admitting members of a corporation, as is

said in Angel and Ames on Corporations, 62, reference must often be

had to the provisions and spirit of the charter, and when the charter

is silent, wc must look to the provisions of the common law, and to

the particular nature and purpose of the corporation. In certain cor-
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porations (such, for example, as religious, charitable and literary) the

number of members is often limited by charter, and whenever there

§

102

STOCKHOLDERS NOT ALWAYS MEMBERS.

is a vacancy, it is usually filled by a vote of the company. As regards

trading and joint stock operations, no vote of admission is requisite,

for any person who owns stock therein, either by original subscription

or by conveyance, is in general entitled to, and can not be refused, the

rights and privileges of a member. Gray v. Portland (3 Mass. 364);

King v. Bank of England (Doug. 524). In moneyed institutions, such

as banks, insurance, canal and turnpike companies, etc., the mere

owning of shares in the stock of the corporation gives a right of vot-

ing, and a stockholder ceases to be a member by a transfer of stock.

There is then this marked distinction arising from the nature of the

corporation. In the one case, a pecuniary interest is the evidence of

membership, whilst the affairs of religious, charitable or literary in-

stitutions are committed to those who have no pecuniary interest

whatever in their management. If this were a corporation of the

former description, it would greatly strengthen the argument of the

respondent's counsel, but I can not view it in that light, but look upon

this and all institutions of a like kind as partaking of the nature of a
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charity, where the professed object is to advance the interests of the

poor and helpless. The object of this institution is declared to be,

to receive from time to time, from all persons disposed to entrust

them therewith, such funds as may be deposited with them, and for

which they are to pay the depositors such rates of interest as may

be from time to time agreed upon by the directors. These deposits,

as is well known, are made in small sums by the poor, and the insti-

tution is professed to be more especially for their benefit. In aid of

this object, and as subsidiary to it, the legislature in the third section

directs that for the security of the depositors, etc., it shall be the duty

of the persons before named, and of their associates, to raise a capital,

etc.. of not less that $200,000, in shares of $25 each. Which capital

is to be at all times liable to the depositors for the amount of their

deposits and the interest.

In other institutions of the like kind, the latter provisions are

omitted; they were manifestly introduced into this charter, not for

the benefit of the stockholders, but as an additional security or pledge

to the depositors. As an inducement to make this investment, in the

sixth section the coiporation is authorized to invest its funds "in pub-

lic stocks of this state, or the United States, or real securities or in

the discount of notes and personal securities;" and in the seventh

section the directors are authorized to declare a dividend of the inter-

est and profits of the corporation, after paying its expenses, and to

pay it over to the stockholders, or their legal representatives. It seems

to me most clear that the legislature had no intention of establishing

a joint stock company, but that there was a mere modification or

change in the provisions usually inserted in the charters of savings fund

institutions.

But at any rate these rules of construction only apply when the

charter is silent. So that in this, as in every other case, we must look

porations (such, for example, as religious, charitable and literary) the
numher of members is often limited by charter, and whenever there
is a vacancy, it is usually filled by a vote of the company. As regards
trading and joint stock operations, no vote of admission is requisite,
for any person who owns stock therein, either by original subscription
or by convey ance, is in general entitled to, and can not be refused, the
rig hts and pdvileges of a member. Gray\'. Portland (3 Mass. 364);
King v. Bank of England (Doug. 524). In moneyed institutions, such
a s b anks, insurance, canal and turnpike companies, etc. , the m ere
owning of shares in the stock of the corporation gives a right of voting, and a stockholder ceases to be a member by a transfer of stock.
There is then this marked distinction arising from the nature of the
corporation. In the one case, a pecuniary interest is the evidence of
membership, whilst the affairs of religious, charitable or literary institutions are committed to those who have no pecuniary interest
whatever in their management. If this were a corporation of the
former description, it would greatly strengthen the argument of the
respondent's counsel, but I can not view it in that light, but look upon
this and all institutions of a like kind as partaking of the nature of a
charity, where. the professed object is to advance the interests of the
poor and helpless. The object of this institution is declared to be,
to receive from time to time, from all persons disposed to entrust
them therewith, such funds as may be deposited with them, and for
which they are to pay the depositors such rates of interest as may
be from time to time agreed upon by the directors. These deposits,
as is \vell known, are made in small sums by the poor, and the institution is professed to be more especially for their benefit. In aid of
this object, and as subsidiary to it, the legislature in the third section
ciirects that for the security of the depositors, etc., it shall be the duty
of the persons before named, and of their associates, to raise a capital,
etc. , of not less that $zoo,ooo, in shares of $z5 each. Which capital
i · to be at all times liable to the depositors for the amount of their
deposits and the interest.
In other institutions of the like kind, the latter provisions are
omitted; they were manifestly introduced into this charter, not for
the benefit of the stockholders, but as an additional security or pledge
to the depositors. As an inducement to make this investment, in the
sixth section the corporation is authorized to invest its funds "in public stocks of this state, or the United States, or real securities or in
the dis count of notes and personal securities;" and in the seventh
section the directors are authorized to declare a dividend of the interest and profits of the corporation, after paying its expenses, and to
pay it over to the stockholders, or their legal representatives. It seems
to me most clear that the legislature had no intention of estahlishing
a joint stock company, but that there was a mere modification or
change in the provisions usually inserted in the charters of savings fund
institutions.
But at any rate these rules of construction only apply when the
charter is silent. So that in this, as in every other case, we must look
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to the act itself, having regard to the particular nature and purpose of

THE PHILADELPHIA SAVINGS INSTITUTION.

the corporation. In the charter there are antagonist interests; the in-

§ 102

terest of the stockholders is in some measure in opposition to the

to the act itself, having regard to the particular nature and purpose of
the corporation. In the charter there are antagonist interests; the interest of the stockholders is in some measure in opposition to the
interest of the depositors. It is for the benefit of the one to decrease.
and the other to increase the rate of interest on deposits; and hence,
there may be a peculiar propriety in the legislature to intrust the control of the funds to persons who have no pecuniary interest in the corporation. At least I perceive nothing in this of which the stockholders have any right to complain. If the stockholders have the exclusive management of the institution, for which the respondents "Contend, a temptation is held out to divert the institution from its original
and primary object and convert it into a bank, differing only in the
fact that it is a bank of discount and deposit, and not of circulation.
Besides, if a pecuniary interest is the only criterion of membership it
may with equal plausibility be said that the depositors are members
also, and as such entitled to participate in its management. In the
first section it is enacted "that the persons therein named, and all
and every other person or persons hereafter becoming members of the
Philadelphia Savings Institution, in the manner hereinafter mentioned, shall be and are hereby created and made a corporation by
the name and style of the Philadelphia Savings Institution." The
manner in which they can become members is pointed out in the fifth
section. Among other matters, the directors have power to provide
for the admi'ssion of members and furnisht'ng proofs of such admission. This we conceive to be inconsistent with the idea that a stock·
holder is t'pso facto a member of the corporation; for if so why confer
the power to provide for the admission of members? The legislature
does not confine the power to furnishing proofs of the admission of
members, but they, in express words, grant the power to admit members of the corporation. This we conceive to be. an authority to elect
such persons as members as they may deem best fitted to carry into
effect the objects of the charter. The respondent's case also derives
additional strength from the seventh section. A distinction is there
taken between a member of the corporation and a stockholder. It is
made the duty of the directors to appoint from the members of Ike
corporation five competent persons as a committee of examination to
investigate the affairs of the corporation; and in the same section to
declare a dividend, etc., and pay the same over to the stockholders,
or their legal representatives. Why, it has been asked, this change
of phraseology, if a stockholder, as such, is a member of the corporation? It is also worthy of remark that the legislature wholly omit
to regulate the right of voting; a regulation always introduced in all
joint-stock incorporations. It is the uniform policy to limit the munber of votes to which stockholders may be entitled, in all such companies, a limitation which would not have been omitted had the legislature conceived this to be an institution of that description.
Reliance has been placed on the word "associates," in the third
section, which the counsel of the commonwealth says must refer to
stockholde_rs. This is an argument not without plausibility. This

interest of the depositors. It is for the benefit of the one to decrease,

and the other to increase the rate of interest on deposits; and hence,

there may be a peculiar propriety in the legislature to intrust the con-

trol of the funds to persons who have no pecuniary interest in the cor-

poration. At least I perceive nothing in this of which the stockhold-

ers have any right to complain. If the stockholders have the exclu-

sive management of the institution, for which the respondents con-

tend, a temptation is held out to divert the institution from its original

and primary object and convert it into a bank, differing only in the

fact that it is a bank of discount and deposit, and not of circulation.

Besides, if a pecuniary interest is the only criterion of membership it

may with equal plausibility be said that the depositors are members

also, and as such entitled to participate in its management. In the

first section it is enacted "that the persons therein named, and all

and every other person or persons hereafter becoming members of the

Philadelphia Savings Institution, in the manner hereinafter men-
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tioned, shall be and are hereby created and made a corporation by

the name and style of the Philadelphia Savings Institution." The

manner in which they can become members is pointed out in the fifth

section. Among other matters, the directors have power to provide

for the admission of members and furnishing proofs of such admis-

sion. This we conceive to be inconsistent with the idea that a stock-

holder is ipso facto a member of the corporation; for if so why confer

the power to provide for the admission of members? The legislature

does not confine the power to furnishing proofs of the admission of

members, but they, in express words, grant the power to admit mem-

bers of the corporation. This we conceive to be an authority to elect

such persons as members as they may deem best fitted to cam- into

effect the objects of the charter. The respondent's case also derives

additional strength from the seventh section. A distinction is there

taken between a member of the corporation and a stockholder. It is

made the duty of the directors to appoint from the members of the

corporation five competent persons as a committee of examination to

investigate the affairs of the corporation; and in the same section to

declare a dividend, etc., and pay the same over to the stockholders,

or their legal representatives. Why, it has been asked, this change

of phraseology, if a stockholder, as such, is a member of the corpo-

ration? It is also worthy of remark that the legislature wholly omit

to regulate the right of voting; a regulation always introduced in all

joint-stock incorporations. It is the uniform policy to limit the num-

ber of votes to which stockholders may be entitled, in all such com-

panies, a limitation which would not have been omitted had the leg-

islature conceived this to be an institution of that description.

Reliance has been placed on the word "associates," in the third

section, which the counsel of the commonwealth says must refer to

stockholders. This is an argument not without plausibility. This

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

SIGNING ARTICLES.

469

SIGNI:-l"G ARTICLES.

section makes it the duty of the persons named in the act, and of

their associates, to raise a capital of not less than $200,000; but in

what manner this is to be effected is left to their discretion. It would

seem to be the intention of the legislature to give power to admit

members before, as well as after, the capital was raised; and indeed

they might have required the aid of others than those named to effect

this result. I see nothing in the act which forbids this, but I think a

fair construction of this part of the charter shows that this power was

intended to be given. If so, this is an argument to show that a

moneyed interest is not an indispensable condition of membership.

It is said that the directors have passed a by-law that every mem-

ber who shall cease to be a stockholder shall cease to be a member.

Whether this is so or not is of little importance; for although the

charter give authority to the directors to admit members, there is none

given to disfranchise them. A by-law may modify and change the

constitution of a corporation, but can not alter it. It may regulate in

a reasonable manner, the exercise of a right in the internal affairs of

a corporation, in the conduct of its members, or the mode by which

a person is admitted to the exercise of a right to which it has an in-
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choate title; but it can not take away a right, or impose any unrea-

sonable restraint in the exercise of it. 2 Kyd on Corporations, 107,

122.

Rules discharged.

Sec. 103. Same. The statute may require signing and acknowl-

edging articles of association by original shareholders.

COPPAGE, Receiver, v. HUTTON.

1890. In the Supreme Court of Indiana. 124 Indiana Reports

s ection makes it the duty of the persons named in the act, and of
their associates, to raise a capital of not less than $zoo,ooo; but in
what manner this is to be effected is left to their discretion. It would
seem to be the intention of the legislature to give power to admit
members before, as well as after, the capital was raised; and indee<l
they might have required the aid of others than those named to effect
this re1'ult. I see nothing in the act vvhich forbids this, but I think a
fair construction of this part of the charter shows that this power was
intended to be gi,·en. If so, this is an argument to show that a
moneyed interest is not an indispensable condition of membership.
It is said that the directors have passed a by-law that every member who shall cease to be a stockholder shall cease to be a member.
Whether this is so or not is of little importance; for although the
charter give authority to the directors to admit members, there is none
given to disfranchise them. A by-law may modify and change the
conc;tihttion of a corporation, but can not alter it. It may regulate in
a reasonable manner, the exercise of a rigpt in the internal affairs of
a corporation, in the conduct of its members , or the mode by '"'·hich
a person is admitted to the exercise of a right to which it has an inchoate title ·; but it can not take away a right, or impose any unreasonable restraint in the exercise of it. 2 Kyd on Corporations, 107,
122.

Rules discharged.

401-403, 7 L. R. A. 591, 24 N. E. Rep. 112.

From the Montgomery circuit court.

Elliott, J. The appellant sues as the receiver of an insolvent

corporation, and seeks to recover a subscription which he alleges the

appellee made to the capital stock of the corporation. It is alleged that

the appellee, with others, signed articles of association, and that he

See. 103. Same.

The statute may require signing and acknowledging articles of association by original shareholders.

agreed to take two shares of the capital stock, and pay therefor $100.

The introductory clause of the articles of association reads thus: "We,

COPPAGE,

the undersigned, agree to take the stock in the amount set opposite

RECEIVER,

v. HUTTON.

our names in a company to be organized for manufacturing and sell-

ing the Williamson Straw Stacker." There were eighty-three sign-

1890.

ers, and seven of them acknowledged the execution of the articles of

IN THE SuPREME CouRT
401-403,

OF

INDIANA.

7 L. R. A. 591,

24

124

N. E. Rep.

Indiana Reports
112.

association before a notaiy public, and the instrument was duly

recorded. It is also alleged that $8,000 of stock was subscribed, that

the company was duly organized and a board of directors elected.

There can be no doubt under the authorities that a valid subscrip-

From the Montgomery circuit court.
ELLIOTT, J. The appellant sues as the receiver of an insolvent
corporation, and seeks to recover a subscription which he alleges the
appellee made to the capital stock of the corporation. It is alleged that
the appellee, with others, signed articles of association, and th at be
agreed to take two shares of the capita.I stock, and pay therefor$ 100.
The introductory clause of the articles of association reads thus: "We,
the undersigned, agree to take the stock in the amount set opposite
our names in a company to be organized for manufacturing and selling the Williamson Straw Stacker." There were e ig-hty-tbree sig ners, and seven of them acknowledged the execution of the articles of
association before a notary public, and the instrument v;as duly
recorded. It is also alleged that $8,ooo of stock was subscribed, that
the company was duly organized and a board of directors elected.
There can be no doubt under the authorities that a valid subscrip-
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tion to the capital stock of a corporation may be made by signing the

tion to the capital stock of a corporation may be made by signing the
preliminary articles. Such a subscription becomes enforcible upon
the perfection of the corporate organization according to the law under articles of association. Miller v . Wild Cat, G. R. Co., 52 Ind.
51; Nulton v. Clayton, 54 Iowa 425; Phrenix, etc., Co. v . Badger,
67 N . Y. 294; Cravens v. Eagle, etc., Mills Co., 120 Ind. 6. If the
promise of the appellee is not binding it must be for some other reason than that it was made before the organization of the corporation
was fully effected.
The statute requires that the persons who desire to organize a corporation shall "make, sign and acknowledge, before some officer
capable to take acknowledgment of deeds, a certificate in writing.'•
setting forth therein certain enumerated things. Section 3851, R. S.
1881. The contention of the appellee is that .the promise is not effective, because the complaint shows that only seven of the eighty-three
signers acknowledge the certificate. It seems quite clear, under the
decision of this court in I~<lianapolis, etc., Mining Co. v. Herkimer,
46 Ind. 142, that the mere signing of the paper was not sufficient to
complete the obligation, and that, in order to make valid and effecti,·e
articles of association against all who sign, all must acknowledge them
as the statute requires. Here it affirmatively appears that seven only
of the signers acknov.,ledgcd the execution of the instrument, and it
can not be inferred that those who did not acknowledge it re mained
bound by its terms. As to them the instrument was incomplete, and
it is quite well settled that an incomplete subscription can not be enforced. Dutchers, etc., R. Co. v. Mabbett, 58 N. Y. 397; Reed v.
Richmond, etc., R. Co., 50 Ind. 342; Richm ond St. R. Co. v. Reed,
83 Ind. 9; Williamson v. Kokomo, etc. , Ass'n, 89 Ind. 389.
It is, however, argued by appellant's cournsel that the complaint
does affirmatively show that the corporation was organized, but this
docs not meet the question , for it may well be that it was organized
without the appellee as a stockholder. The fact that he did not acknowledge the instrument as the law requires implies that he did not
become a stockholder, and there is nothing in the complaint which
rebuts or opposes this implicntion. It devolved upon the plaintiff
to remove the inference if he could. As the appellee did not acknowledge the instrument as the law requires, he did not become a stockholder, and if he were insisting that he was entitled to the number of
shares set opposite his name, it is quite clear that the corporation
might successfully resist his claim , since it is obvious that only those
who acknowledge the articles of association as the law requires can
successfully insist upon their right to stock. If the appellee can not
be regarded as a stockholder, then it seems quite clear that he did not
bind himself by simply signing the articles of associntion.
Whether a good complaint can be framed is not the question before
us, fo r the only question presented by the record is as to the sufficiency
of the complaint as it is written.
Judgment affirmed.
Note. See cases cited, supra, p. 463.

preliminary articles. Such a subscription becomes enforcible upon

the perfection of the corporate organization according to the law un-

der articles of association. Miller v. Wild Cat G. R. Co., 52 Ind.

51; Nulton v. Clayton, 54 Iowa 425; Phoenix, etc., Co. v. Badger,

67 N. Y. 294; Cravens v. Eagle, etc., Mills Co., 120 Ind. 6. If the

promise of the appellee is not binding it must be for some other rea-

son than that it was made before the organization of the corporation

was fully effected.

The statute requires that the persons who desire to organize a cor-

poration shall "make, sign and acknowledge, before some officer

capable to take acknowledgment of deeds, a certificate in writing."

setting forth therein certain enumerated things. Section 3851, R. S.

1881. The contention of the appellee is that.the promise is not effect-

ive, because the complaint shows that only seven of the eighty-three

signers acknowledge the certificate. It seems quite clear, under the

decision of this court in Indianapolis, etc., Mining Co. v. Herkimer,

46 Ind. 142, that the mere signing of the paper was not sufficient to

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:16 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

complete the obligation, and that, in order to make valid and effective

articles of association against all who sign, all must acknowledge them

as the statute requires. Here it affirmatively appears that seven only

of the signers acknowledged the execution of the instrument, and it

can not be inferred that those who did not acknowledge it remained

bound by its terms. As to them the instrument was incomplete, and

it is quite well settled that an incomplete subscription can not be en-

forced. Dutchers, etc., R. Co. v. Mabbett, 58 N. Y. 397; Reed v.

Richmond, etc., R. Co., 50 Ind. 342; Richmond St. R. Co. v. Reed,

83 Ind. 9; Williamson v. Kokomo, etc., Ass'n, 89 Ind. 389.

It is, however, argued by appellant's counsel that the complaint

does affirmatively show that the corporation was organized, but this

does not meet the question, for it may well be that it was organized

without the appellee as a stockholder. The fact that he did not ac-

knowledge the instrument as the law requires implies that he did not

become a stockholder, and there is nothing in the complaint which

rebuts or opposes this implication. It devolved upon the plaintiff

to remove the inference if he could. As the appellee did not acknowl-

edge the instrument as the law requires, he did not become a stock-

holder, and if he were insisting that he was entitled to the number of

shares set opposite his name, it is quite clear that the corporation

might successfully resist his claim, since it is obvious that only those

who acknowledge the articles of association as the law requires can

successfully insist upon their right to stock. If the appellee can not

be regarded as a stockholder, then it seems quite clear that he did not

bind himself by simply signing the articles of association.

Whether a good complaint can be framed is not the question before

us, for the only question presented by the record is as to the sufficiency

of the complaint as it is written.

Judgment affirmed.

Note. See cases cited, supra, p. 4f>3.
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AGREEMENTS TO SUBSCRIBE TO STOCK.

ARTICLE III. FORMS OF ASSOCIATION CONTRACTS; COMMON LAW

SUBSCRIPTION CONTRACTS.

Sec. 104. (1) Agreements to subscribe for stock in a corpora-

tion formed or to be formed.

CHARLES THRASHER v. THE PIKE COUNTY RAILROAD COMPANY.1

1861. In the Suprf.me Court of Illinois. 25 111. Reports, p.

393 (Orig. ed.); p. 340-348, Gross's Edition, 1876.

Appeal from the circuit court of Pike county; the Hon. J. S.

Bailey, judge, presiding.

This was an action of assumpsit, by the Pike County Railroad

Company against Charles Thrasher, upon the following agreement:

"We, the undersigned, agree to subscribe to the stock of the Pike

County Railroad, the sum set against our names, when the books may

be opened for subscription.

"Griggsville, March 19, 1856.

"Charles Thrasher $3,000."

Mr. Justice Breese delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellee, who was plaintiff in the court below, urges several
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reasons justifying a recovery in this case, which it is necessary to no-

tice. The declaration contains a special count, averring that on the

19th of March, 1856, the plaintiffs were a body politic and corporate

with power to construct and operate a railroad within the county of

Pike, and authorized by law, as such corporation, to secure subscrip-

tions to the capital stock of the company to the amount of $1,000,000,

in shares of $100 each, and, desiring to ascertain what amount of stock

would be subscribed, and not having opened regular subscription

books, but intending so to do, agreed with the defendant that they

would, in a reasonable time thereafter, open books for the purpose

of securing such subscriptions, and that they would permit and allow

the defendant, when the book should be opened, to subscribe to the

capital stock of the company thirty shares of $100 each, and upon

payment therefor, the defendant should be the owner of thirty

shares of the capital stock of the company. It is then averred that

the defendant, in consideration of this promise, undertook and prom-

ised the plaintiff that he would subscribe to the stock of this company

the sum of $3,000 when the books should be opened for subscriptions;

that this promise was by a writing, signed by the defendant, and by

him delivered to the plaintiff. It is then averred, that on the same

day subscription books to the capital stock of the company were

opened, of which the defendant had notice. The breach is, that the

defendant neglected and refused to subscribe anything to the capital

stock, accompanied by an averment that the subscription, when the

1 Only the part of the opinion relating to the nature of the agreement to sub-

scribe is given.
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books were opened, was due and payable before the commencement

THRASHER Y. PIKE COUNTY R. CO.

books were opened , was due and payable before the commencement
of the suit, and although notified thereof, the defendant has refused
to pay any part of the sum of the $3,ooo. The common counts are
added, in one of which the indebtedness is alleged to be for 100 shares
of the stock of the Pike County Railroad, before that time bargained
and sold to the defendant.
This is the cause of action as set forth by the plaintiffs, and it is
claimed by them that they are entitled to recover as damages the par
value of the stock, or the amount of calls made from time to time
upon it, and which, at the commencement of the suit, amounted to
fourteen installments, of five per cent. each, making, in all, $z, 100.
This, we do not think, is a fair view o~ the defendant's liability
upon his promise, if one was made to the plaintiffs. His undertaking
is to subscribe a certain amount of stock when the subscription books
should be opened. This promise does not make him a stockholder,
and, as such, liable to calls. The company has parted with no stock
to him, and can only claim as damages the actual loss sustained by
them by his failure, or refusal to subscribe, when he was notified that
the books were opened for such purpose. The company has the stock
which the defendant promised to take, but did not take. His promise
is like any other promise or agreement to purchase any specific article
of property. If the property contracted be retained by the vendor,
and there is no delivery to the purchaser, or offer to deliver, the dam·
ages must not be measured by the value of the property, for it would
not be just, in such cases, that the vendor should retain the property
and recover also the value of it from the promisor. Some damage
might result from the loss of a bargain, and to such the vendor would
be entitled, if the extent could be established. In many cases they
would be merely nominal. On an agreement for the sale and pur·chase of stocks, and a refusal by the purchaser to take the stocks, the
measure of damages, ordinarily, might be the difference between the
par value of the stocks and their market value, or between them and
money. As well argued by the appellant, the defendant, having vio·
lated his promise by failing to subscribe, he has acquired no right to
stock, nor could a recovery in this action entitle him to become a
stockholder. The company retains its stock, and the defendant his
money. A stock certificate of $3,ooo would represent a value to the
company equivalent to so much money, and, in a statement of their
liabilities, this would appear against the company as so much held by
the stockholders, for which the company was responsible. If there
is no actual subscription, the company does not incur this liability.
There being no special damage alleged, or proved, we do not think
the plaintiffs could recover under this declaration, as they have done,
the par value of the stock the defendant promised and agreed to take.
A proper count might doubtless he so framed as to justify a full recovery under sufficient proof. • • •
·
Reversed.

to pay any part of the sum of the $3,000. The common counts are

added, in one of which the indebtedness is alleged to be for 100 shares

of the stock of the Pike County Railroad, before that time bargained

and sold to the defendant.

This is the cause of action as set forth by the plaintiffs, and it is

claimed by them that they are entitled to recover as damages the par

value of the stock, or the amount of calls made from time to time

upon it, and which, at the commencement of the suit, amounted to

fourteen installments, of five per cent, each, making, in all, $2,100.

This, we do not think, is a fair view of the defendant's liability

upon his promise, if one was made to the plaintiffs. His undertaking

is to subscribe a certain amount of stock when the subscription books

should be opened. This promise does not make him a stockholder,

and, as such, liable to calls. The company has parted with no stock

to him, and can only claim as damages the actual loss sustained by

them by his failure, or refusal to subscribe, when he was notified that

the books were opened for such purpose. The company has the stock

which the defendant promised to take, but did not take. His promise
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of the suit, and although notified thereof, the defendant has refused

is like any other promise or agreement to purchase any specific article

of property. If the property contracted be retained by the vendor,

and there is no delivery to the purchaser, or offer to deliver, the dam-

ages must not be measured by the value of the property, for it would

not be just, in such cases, that the vendor should retain the property

and recover also the value of it from the promisor. Some damage

might result from the loss of a bargain, and to such the vendor would

be entitled, if the extent could be established. In many cases they

would be merely nominal. On an agreement for the sale and pur-

chase of stocks, and a refusal by the purchaser to take the stocks, the

measure of damages, ordinarily, might be the difference between the

par value of the stocks and their market value, or between them and

money. As well argued by the appellant, the defendant, having vio-

lated his promise by failing to subscribe, he has acquired no right to

stock, nor could a recovery in this action entitle him to become a

stockholder. The company retains its stock, and the defendant his

money. A stock certificate of $3,000 would represent a value to the

company equivalent to so much money, and, in a statement of their

liabilities, this would appear against the company as so much held by

the stockholders, for which the company was responsible. If there

is no actual subscription, the company does not incur this liability.

There being no special damage alleged, or proved, we do not think

the plaintiffs could recover under this declaration, as they have done,

the par value of the stock the defendant promised and agreed to take.

A proper count might doubtless be so framed as to justify a full re-

covery under sufficient proof. * * *

Reversed.

Note. See note at the end of next case.

Note.
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Sec. 105. Same.

6TRA8BURG RAILROAD COMPANY v. ECHTERNACHT.1

§ 105

AGREEMENTS TO SUBSCRIBE TO STOCK.

473

1853. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 21 Pa. St. Rep.

220-222, 60 Am. Dec. 49.

Certiorari to the common pleas of Lancaster county.

Sec. 105. Same.

This was a bill in equity on the part of the railroad company, filed

with the view of enforcing the specific performance of an agreement,

STRASBURG RAILROAD COMPANYv. ECHTERNACHT. 1

which was as follows:

"We, the undersigned, agree to take the number of shares of the

capital stock of the Strasburg Railroad Company, set opposite to our

respective names, the price per share to be $100, provided there can

1853. IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
220-222, 6o Am. Dec. 49.

2

r Pa. St. Rep.

be a charter obtained at the next ensuing session of the legislature of

Pennsylvania, granting said company to terminate said road at the

east end of the borough of Strasburg, and connecting with the state

road at or near Lemon Place; granting also the said company to do

all the business connected with the road, such as forwarding and re-

ceiving produce of all kinds, coal, lumber, and all other commodities

as are transportable over other railroads."

William Echtemacht, the defendant, was a signer for five shares.
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Application was made to the legislature, and on the 1 ith of Feb-

ruary, 1851 (which was during the next ensuing session after the

signing of the agreement), the act to incorporate the Strasburg Rail-

road Company was passed (Pam. L. p. 53), the provisions of which

are in accordance with the terms specified in'the above agreement.

The road was commenced, and it -was alleged that the property of

the defendant rose in value. He, however, refused to subscribe to

the stock of the company, and the bill in question was filed.

On the part of the defendant the bill was demurred to. The facts

slated in the bill were not confessed, but it was alleged that no matter

of equity was stated in the bill whereon a decree of specific perform-

ance should be made.

The demurrer was sustained by the court below, and the bill was

dismissed; and to this error was assigned.

Black, C. J. Before the Strasburg Railroad Company was incor-

porated the defendant and others signed a paper, agreeing that if it

should be incorporated with certain privileges, they would subscribe

the number of shares set opposite to their respective names. The char-

ter was obtained, and the defendant refused to take the stock. Where-

upon the company brought this bill in equity to enforce specific per-

formance of the contract.

A contract can not be made by one person alone. It takes two to

make a bargain. Before a promise becomes a binding obligation, it

must not only be made to, but must be expressly or impliedly accepted

'Arguments omitted.

Cert£orar£ to the common pleas of Lancaster county.
This was a bill in equity on the part of the railroad company, filed
with the view of enforcing the specific performance of an agreement,
which was as follows:
''We, the undersigned, agree to take the number of shares of the
capital stock of the Strasburg Railroad Company, set opposite to our
respective names, the price per share to be $100, provided there can
be a charter obtained at the next ensuing session of the legislature of
P ennsylvania, granting said company to terminate said road at the
east end of the borough of Strasburg, and connecting with the state
road at or near Lemon Place; gran6ng also the said company to do
all the business connected with the road, such as forwarding and recei\'ing produce of all kinds, coal, lumber, and all other commodities
as are transportable over other railroads."
\Villiam Echtemacht, the defendant, was a signer for five shares.
Application was made to the legislature, a nd on the I rth of F ebruary, 1851 (which was during the next ensuing session after the
signing of the agreement), the act to incorporate the Strasburg R ailroad Company was passed (Pam. L. p. 53), the provisions of which
are in accordance with the terms specified in ·the above agreement.
The road was commenced, and it .was alleged that the property of
the defendant rose in value. He, however, refused to subscribe to
the stock of the company, and the bill in question was filed.
On the part of the defendant the bill was demurred to. The facts
stated in the bill were not confessed, but it was alleged that no matter
of equity was stated in the bill whereon a decree of sp ecific performance should be made.
The demurrer was sustained by the court below, and the bill was
dismissed; and to this error was assigned.
BLACK, C. J.
Before the Strasburg Railroad C ompany was incorporated the defendant and others signed a paper, agreeing that if it
should be incorporated with certain privil eges, they would subscribe
the number of shares set opposite to their respective names . The charter was obtained, and the d efendant refused to ta ke the stock. \ Vhereupon the company brought this bill in equity to ~ nforce specific performance of the contract.
A contract can not be made by one person alone. It takes two to
make a bargain. Before a promise becomes a binding obligati on, it
must not only be made to, but must be expressly or impliedly accepted
1 Arguments omitted.
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by the party for whose benefit it was meant. The paper before us is

§ 106

no more than a naked expression of the subscriber's intention to pur-

by the party for whose benefit it was meant. The paper before us i
no more than a naked expression of the subscriber's intention to purchase certain shares in the capital stock of a company which it was
expected would be incorporated by the legislature. Besides it is
without any sufficient consideration. It is not pretended and can not
be made out from lhe paper, that the agreement of the defendent was
the motive of the others for taking stock. It is "'·ell settled that procuring legislation of any kind, is not a consideration which will support even a direct promise to pay a fair compensation for the labor of
the promisee about such a business.
Again: If there was a binding engagement, it was not made with
the railroad company, which did not exist at the time.
But, supposing this to have been a valid contract, to which the
plaintiff was a party, and based upon good consideration, a bill in
equity is not the mode of enforcing it; the remedy at law for its violation being full, complete and adequate.
Decree affirmed.

chase certain shares in the capital stock of a company which it was

expected would be incorporated by the legislature. Besides it is

without any sufficient consideration. It is not pretended and can not

be made out from the paper, that the agreement of the defendent was

the motive of the others for taking stock. It is well settled that pro-

curing legislation of any kind, is not a consideration which will sup-

port even a direct promise to pay a fair compensation for the labor of

the promisee about such a business.

Again: If there was a binding engagement, it was not made with

the railroad company, which did not exist at the time.

But, supposing this to have been a valid contract, to which the

plaintiff was a party, and based upon good consideration, a bill in

equity is not the mode of enforcing it; the remedy at law for its vio-

lation being full, complete and adequate.

Decree affirmed.

Note. See, 1880, Lake Ontario, ete., Co. v. Curtis, 80 N. Y. 219; 1898, Yonk-

ers' Gazette Co. v. Taylor, 30 N. Y. App. Div. 334, on 337; 23 Am. and Eng.
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Enc., p. 786; Beach, §§ 61-65, 510-554; Clark, § 99; Cook, §§ 52-63; Elliott,

§§ 345, 345a, 348; Morawetz, § 47, et seq.; Taylor, §§ 509-512, 1 Thompson,

§§ 1138-1145.

Note. See, 1880, Lake Ontario, etc., Co. v. Curtis, 80 N. Y. 219; 1898, Yonk·
ers' Gazette Co. v. Taylor, 30 N. Y. App. Div. 334, on 337; 23 Am. and Eng.
Enc., p. 786; Beach,§§ 6l--65, 510-554; Clark,§ 99; Cook,§§ 52-63; Elliott,
§§ 3-15, 345a, 348; Morawetz, § 4.7, et seq.; Taylor, §§ 509-512, 1 Thompson,
§§ 1138-1145.

Sec. 106. (2) Agreements subscribing to stock in a corporation

to be formed. Theories:

(a) A mere offer that may be withdrawn at any time before

organization and acceptance by the corporation.

BRYANT'S POND STEAM MILL COMPANY v. JOHN G. FELT.'

1895. In the Supreme Court of Maine. 87 Maine Rep. 234-240,

47 Am. St. R. 323.

On report.

Sec. 106.

( 2) Agreements subscribing ·to stock in a corporation
to be formed. Theories:

This was an action of assumpsit brought to recover of the defendant

the sum of two hundred dollars, as appeared by his alleged subscrip-

tion upon an original subscription book, and upon the outer cover of

which was the following writing: "Subscriptions for a steam mill

(a) A mere offer that may be withdrawn at any time before
organization and acceptance by the corporation.

to be erected at or near Bryant's Pond." The original agreement

was as follows:

"We, the undersigned, hereby agree to pay for the number of

shares set opposite our names, said shares to be ten dollars each, and

BRYANT'S POND STEAM MILL COMPANY v. JOHN G. FELT.1

■non-assessable, for the purpose of erecting suitable buildings, with

steam power, for the manufacturing of various kinds of wood to be

1895.

1 Arguments omitted.

IN

THE

SUPREME CoURT OF MAINE. 87 Maine Rep. 234-240,
47 Am. St. R. 323.

On report.
This was an action of assumpsit brought to recover of the defendant
the sum of two hundred dollars, a s appeared by his alleged subscrip·
tion upon an original subscription book, and upon the outer cover of
which was the following writing-: " Subscriptions for a steam mill
to be erected at or near Bryant' Pond." The original agreement
was as follows:
"We, the undersigned, hereby agree to pay for the number of
shares set opposite our names, said shares to be ten dollars each, and
.non-assessable , for the purpose of erecting suitable buildings, with
steam power, for the manufacturing of various kinds of w ood to be
1
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used in the contract of one C. H. Adams, he paying three per cent,
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annually as rent on all money so paid, said moneys to be paid when

needed for the purpose above named, providing the town will abate

taxes on said buildings and stock for the term of ten years."

Plea, general issue and the following brief statement:

And for a brief statement of special matter of defense, to be used

under the general issue pleaded, the defendant further says: That

said defendant never subscribed for nor promised to pay for any shares

in the said Bryant's Pond Steam Mill Company; that the signature

of said defendant was procured and affixed to said paper declared on,

if at all, on Sunday, and whatever contract was made, if any, was

made on Sunday, and therefore void; that subsequent to the time his

said name was affixed to said paper and prior to the commencement

of this suit, and prior to the organization of this company, this de-

fendant revoked said subscription and notified the plaintiff and the

solicitors for said stock that he should not accept the same, and re-

quested his name stricken from the list of subscribers; that no person

is named in said subscription paper as payee, and no contract was

ever entered into with any person or persons; that no sum is named
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in said paper declared upon as a limit to the amount to be raised and

is indefinite and uncertain; that a sufficient sum was not raised or

subscribed for erecting buildings with steam power for the manufact-

uring of the various kinds of wood, as alleged, and plaintiff was

obliged to, and did, mortgage the property to complete the amount;

that at the time the plaintiff company pretended to organize, this de-

fendant was not recognized as a subscriber, did not participate in the

organization, and is not named therein as one of the subscribers to

the stock of the same; that there were conditions attached to said

subscription paper which are essential to be performed, and which

have never been performed on the part of this plaintiff or any other

parties interested in the said subscription, or on the part of the town

of Woodstock; that said paper, purporting to be a subscription of

shares of stock, is without consideration and void.

Walton, J. The only question we find it necessary to consider

is whether a subscriber to the capital stock of an unorganized corpo-

ration has the right to withdraw from the enterprise, provided he ex-

ercises the right before the corporation is organized and his subscrip-

tion is accepted. We think he has. Such a subscription is not a com-

pleted contract. It takes two parties to make a contract. A non-

existing corporation can no more make a contract for the sale of its

stock than an unbegotten child can make a contract for the purchase

of it.

The right of subscribers to the capital stock of a proposed corpora-

tion to withdraw their subscriptions at any time before the organiza-

tion of the corporation is completed has been affirmed in several recent

and well-considered opinions. The right rests upon the impregnable

ground of the legal impossibility of completing a contract between

two parties, only one of which is in existence. There can be no

meeting of the minds of the parties. There can be no acceptance of

used in the contract of one C. H. Adams, he paying three per cent.
annually as rent on all money so paid, said moneys to be paid when
needed for the purpose above named, providing the town will abate
taxes on said buildings and stock for the term of ten years."
Plea, general issue and the following brief statement:
And for a brief statement of special matter of defense, to be used
under the general issue pleaded, the defendant further says: That
said defendant never subscribed for nor promised to pay for any shares
in the said Bryant's Pon.cl Steam Mill Company; that the signature
of said defendant was procured and affixed to said paper declared on,
if at all, on Sunday, an<l whatever contract was made, if any, was
made on Sunday, and therefore void; that subsequent to the time his
said name was affixed to said paper and prior to the commencement
of this suit, and prior to the organization of this company, this defendant revoked said subscription and notified the plaintiff and the
solicitors for said stock that he should not accept the same, and requested his name stricken from the list of subscribers; that no person
is named in said subscription paper as payee, and no contract was
ever entered into with nny person or persons; that no sum is named
in said paper declared upon as a limit to the amount to be raised and
is indefinite and uncertain; that a sufficient sum was not raised or
subscribed for erecting buildings with steam power for the manufacturing of the various kinds of wood, as alleged, and plaintiff was
obliged to, and did, mortgage the property to complete the amount;
that at the time the plaintiff company pretended to organize, this de.fendant was not recognized as a subscriber, did not participate in the
organization, and is not named therein as one of the subscribers to
the stock of the same; that there were conditions attached to said
subscription paper which are essential to be performed, and which
have never been performed on the part of this plaintiff or any other
parties interested in the said subscription, or on the part of the town
of Woodstock; that said paper, purpo~ting to be a subscription of
shares of stock, is without consideration and void.
WALTON, J.
The only question we find it necessary to consider
is whether a subscriber to the capital stock of an unorganized corporation has the right to withdraw from the enterprise, provided he exercises the right before the corporation is organized and his subscription is accepted. We think he has. Such a subscription is not a completed contract. It takes two parties to make a contract. A nonexisting corporation can no more make a contract for the sale of its
stock than an unbegotten child can make a contract for the purchase
of it.
The right of subscribers to the capital stock of a proposed corporation to withdraw their subscriptions at any time before the organization of the corporation is completed has been affirmed in several recent
and well-considered opinions. The right rests upon the impregnable
ground of the legal impossibility of completing a contract between
two parties, only one of which is in existence. There can be no
meeting of the minds of the parties. There can be no acceptance of
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the subscriber's proposition to become a stockholder. There can be

BRYA:-.IT'S PO:-.IU STEA.M MILL CO. V.

FELT.

§ 106

no mutuality of rights or obligations. There can be no consideration

the subscriber's proposition to become a stockholder. There can be
no mutuality of rights or obligations. There can be no consideration
for the subscriber's promise. As said in one of our own deci sions,
it is a m ere mtdum pactttm-a promise without a promi see- a contractor without a contractee. In fact, every element of a binding contract is wanting. If tlie subscriber's promise to take and pay for shares
remains unrevo ked till the organization of the proposed corporation is
effected, and his promi se ha been accepted, then we have all the elements of a valid contract. Competent parties. Mutuality of duties
and obligations. A valid consideration, the promise of one party
being a s ufficient consideration for the promise of the other. A promisee as well as a promisor. A contractce as well as a contrnctor. In
fact, all the elements of a valid contract are present, and the subscription has become binding upon both of the parties. But, till the corporation has come into existence, all these elements are necessarily
wanting, and the subscriber's promise amounts to no more than an
offer, which, like all mere offers, may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance. When accepted it becomes binding. Till accepted
it remains revocable. This conclusion is sustained by reason and
authority.
In Starrett v. R ockland Co., 65 Maine 374, the plaintiff sought to
recover a po1tion of the dividends of a successful insurance company.
He had subscribed for five shares of the stock before the organization
was effected; but the evidence of acceptance of his subscription by
the corporation after its organization was not satisfactory, and th e
court held that without such acceptance there was no completed or
binding contract; that the minds of the parties never met; that the
plaintiff's subscription, being m:tde before the corporation came into
existence, amounted to no more than a proposal to take so many
shares-a mere nudum pactum-imposing no obligations and securing
no rights.
And in Carr v. Bartlet, 72 Maine 120, the right of subscribers to
withdraw from such undertakings while they remain inchoate and incomplete, is recognized and affirmed.
In Muncy Traction Engine Co. v . Green, 143 Pa. St. 269, 13 Atl.
Rep. 747, decided in 1888, the defendant had been active in procuring subscribers to the capital stock of a proposed corporation, and
had himself subscribed for twenty shares, but he wrote to the chairman of the meeting for the organization of the corporation, that, for
reasons satisfactory to himself, he withdrew his subscription. The
court rule<l that the defendant had a right to withdraw his subscription at any time before the organization of the corporation was completed; and the jury having found as a matter of fact that the with::lrawal was before the organization of the corporation was completed,
a verdict for the defendant was affirmed, and judgment rendered
thereon.
In Hudson Real E state Co. v. Tower, 156 Mass. 82 ( 1892), the
action was founded on a subscdption to the capital stock of an unorganized corporation, and the defense was based on an alleged with-

for the subscriber's promise. As said in one of our own decisions,

it is a mere nudum factum—a promise without a promisee—a con-

tractor without a contractee. In fact, every element of a binding con-

tract is wanting. If the subscriber's promise to take and pay for shares

remains unrevoked till the organization of the proposed corporation is

effected, and his promise has been accepted, then wc have all the ele-

ments of a valid contract. Competent parties. Mutuality of duties

and obligations. A valid consideration, the promise of one party

being a sufficient consideration for the promise of the other. A prom-

isee as well as a promisor. A contractee as well as a contractor. In

fact, all the elements of a valid contract are present, and the subscrip-

tion has become binding upon both of the parties. But, till the cor-

poration has come into existence, all these elements are necessarily

wanting, and the subscriber's promise amounts to no more than an

offer, which, like all mere offers, may be withdrawn at any time be-

fore acceptance. When accepted it becomes binding. Till accepted

it remains revocable. This conclusion is sustained by reason and
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authority.

In Starrett v. Rockland Co., 65 Maine 374, the plaintiff sought to

recover a portion of the dividends of a successful insurance company.

He had subscribed for five shares of the stock before the organization

was effected; but the evidence of acceptance of his subscription by

the corporation after its organization was not satisfactory, and the

court held that without such acceptance there was no completed or

binding contract; that the minds of the parties never met; that the

plaintiff's subscription, being made before the corporation came into

existence, amounted to no more than a proposal to take so many

shares—a mere nudum pactum—imposing no obligations and securing

no rights.

And in Carr v. Bartlet, 72 Maine 120, the right of subscribers to

withdraw from such undertakings while they remain inchoate and in-

complete, is recognized and affirmed.

In Muncy Traction Engine Co. v. Green, 143 Pa. St. 269, 13 Atl.

Rep. 747, decided in 188S, the defendant had been active in procur-

ing subscribers to the capital stock of a proposed corporation, and

had himself subscribed for twenty shares, but he wrote to the chair-

man of the meeting for the organization of the corporation, that, for

reasons satisfactory to himself, he withdrew his subscription. The

court ruled that the defendant had a right to withdraw his subscrip-

tion at any time before the organization of the corporation was com-

pleted; and the jury having found as a matter of fact that the with-

drawal was before the organization of the corporation was completed,

a verdict for the defendant was affirmed, and judgment rendered

thereon.

In Hudson Real Estate Co. v. Tower, 156 Mass. 82 (1892), the

action was founded on a subscription to the capital stock of an unor-

ganized corporation, and the defense was based on an alleged with-
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The court held that at the time when the defendant signed the sub-

scription paper declared on, it was not a contract, for want of a con-

tracting party on the other side; that while such a subscription may

become a contract after the corporation has been organized, still, until

the organization is effected, and the subscription is accepted, it is a

mere proposition or offer, which may be withdrawn like any other

unaccepted proposition or offer.

It is urged by the counsel for the plaintiff corporation that such sub-

scriptions create binding and enforcible contracts between the sub-

scribers themselves, and are, therefore, irrevocable, except with the

consent of all the subscribers; and some of the authorities cited by him

seem to sustain that view. But we find, on examination, that such

views, when expressed, are in most cases mere dicta, and that the

cases are very few in which such a doctrine had been acted upon.

Reason"and the weight of authority are opposed to such a view. Of

course, subscription papers may be so worded as to create binding

contracts between the subscribers themselves. But we are not now

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:16 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

speaking of such subscriptions; or of voluntary and gratuitous sub-

scriptions to public or charitable objects, which, when accepted and

acted upon, become binding. We are now speaking only of subscrip-

tions to the capital stock of proposed business corporations. With

regard to such subscriptions we regard it as settled law that they do

not become binding upon the subscribers till the corporations have

been organized and the subscriptions accepted; and that, till then, the

subscribers have a right to revoke their subscriptions. And, in view

of the fact that such subscriptions are often obtained by over-persua-

sion, and upon sudden and hasty impulses, we are not prepared to say

that the rule of law which allows such a revocation is not founded in

wisdom. We think it is.

In the present case an old man, upwards of eighty years of age,

and now dead, was induced to subscribe for twenty shares of stock in

a proposed, but not then organized, manufacturing corporation; but

after a little reflection, he determined to revoke his subscription and

withdraw from the enterprise. lie notified the agent of the pro-

moters, through whom his subscription had been obtained, of his de-

termination to withdraw, and requested him to take his name off the

subscription paper. And he again sent word by his son to have his

name taken off. And notice of his withdrawal, and of his request to

have his name taken off of the subscription paper, was given to the

other subscribers at one of their meetings, and before the corpo-

ration was organized. We think his withdrawal was legal and com-

plete, and that no action to recover the amount of his subscription is

maintainable.

Other grounds are urged in defense of the action, but it is unneces-

sary to consider them.

Judgment for defendant.

Note. See note at end of next case.

drawal of the subscription. The right to withdraw was controverted.
The court held that at the time when the defendant s igned the subscription paper declared on, it was not a contract, for want of a contracting party on the other side; that while such a subscription may
become a contract after the corporation has been organized, still , until
the organization is effected, and the subscription is accepted, it is a
mere proposition or offer, which m ay be withdrawn like any other
unaccepted proposition or offer.
It is urged by the counsel for the plaintiff corporation that such subscriptions create binding and enforcible contracts between the subscribers themselves, and are, therefore, irrevocable, except with the
consent of all the subscribers; and some of the authorities cited by him
seem to sustain that view. But we find , on examination, that such
views, when expressed, are in most cases mere di"cta, and that the
cases are very few in which such a doctrine had been acted upon.
Reason· and the weight of authority are opposed to such a view. Of
course, subscription papers may be so worded as to create binding
contracts between the subscribers themselves. But v•e are not now
speaking of such subscriptions; or of voluntary and gratuitous subscriptions to public or charitable objects, which, when accepted and
acted upon, become binding. We are now speaking only of subscriptions to the capital stock of proposed business corporations. With
regard to such subscriptions we regard it as settled law that they do
not become binding upon the subscribers till the corporations have
been organized and the subscriptions accepted; and that, till then, the
subscribers have a right to revoke their subscriptions. And, in view
of the fact that such subscriptions are often obtained by over-persuasion, and upon sudden and hasty impul ses, we are not prepared to say
that the rule of law which allows such a revocation is not founded in
wisdom. We think it is.
In the present case an old man, upwards of eighty years of age,
and now dead, was induced to subscribe for twenty shares of stock in
a proposed, but not then organized , manufacturing corporation; but
after a little reflection, he determined to revoke his subscription and
withdraw from the enterprise. He notified the agent of the promoters, through whom his subscription had been obtained, of his determination to withdraw, and requested him to take his name off the
subscription paper. And he again sent word by his son to have his
name taken off. And notice of his withdrawal, and of his request to
have his name taken off of the subscription paper, was given to the
other subscribers at one of their meetings, and before the corporation was organized. We think his withdrawal was legal and complete, and that no action to recover the amount of his subscription is
maintainable.
Other grounds are urged in defense of the action, but it is unnecessary to consider them.
Judgment for defendant.
Note.
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HUDSON REAL ESTATE CO. V. TOWER.
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HUDSON REAL ESTATE COMPANY v. HERMAN C. TOWER.

1894. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 161

Mass. Reports 10-16, 42 Am. St. Rep. 379.

Sec. 107. Same.

Contract, to recover the amount of a subscription by the defendants,

Notice of withdrawal.

as copartners, for ten shares of stock in the plaintiff corporation.

HUDSON REAL ESTATE COMPANY v. HERMAN C. TOWER.

After the former decision, reported 156 Mass. 82, the case was tried

in the superior court before Bond, J.

1894.

The jury returned the verdict for the defendants, and the plaintiff

alleged exceptions. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.

IN THE SUPREME Jun1c1AL CouRT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Mass. Reports 10-16, 42 Am. St. Rep. 379.

161

Allen, J. It was heretofore decided in this case that until the

organization of the corporation the defendant's subscription was a

Contract, to recoyer the amount of a subscription by the defendants,
as copartners. for ten shares of stock in the plaintiff corporation.
After the former decision, reported 156 Mass. 82, the case was tried
in the superior court before Bond, J.
The jury returned the verdict for the defendants, and the plaintiff
alleged exceptions. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.
ALLEN, J. It was heretofore decided in this case that u.ntil the
organization of the corporation the defendant's subscription was a
mere proposition or offer which might be withdrawn, like any other
unaccepted offer. r 56 Mass. 82. The principal question which the
plaintiff now seeks to present is whether, upon the evidence and under
the ruling of the court, the jury were warranted in finding a legal withdrawal or revocation of the subscription.
The only withdrawal or revocation relied on occurred in an interview between one of the defendants and Henry Tower, on August 3r,
1889. In view of the verdict the only question left is whether a notification of withdrawal given orally to Henry Tower was sufficient.
It will be necessary to state the situation of the parties. The contract declared on is given below.
"\Ve, the undersigned, hereby subscribe for and agree to purchase
the number of shares set against our respective names, of the capital
stock in the corporation to be organized under the laws of such state,
as a committee hereafter to be appointed from the subscribers shall
determine, said shares of capital stock to be of the par value of $so,
and the capital stock of said corporation to be not less than $25,000,
said corporation to be organized for the purpose of purchasing land,
and erecting a shoe shop thereon , with the necessary appliances connected therewith, in the town of Hudson, to be rented, when completed, to H. H. Mawhinney & Co., for a term of ten years at a
rental of seven per cent. per annum on the cost of the plant when
completed. Said corporation to be organized as soon as may be, and
in advance thereof an agreement in writing betvveen a committee of
the subscribers, in behalf of all, with said H. H. Mawhinney & Co.
to be executed, binding the latter to take said plant for the period
and at the terms stated, and on the organiz:ltion of said corporation to
be re-executed to bind both patties. And the subscribers hereto hereby
bind themselves severally to pay for said stock to the treasurer of said
corporation in the way and manner that the corporation when organized shall determine. And we severally agree that one seal shall be
the seal of each.
"Hudson, August 7, 1889."

mere proposition or offer which might be withdrawn, like any other

unaccepted offer. 156 Mass. 82. The principal question which the

plaintiff now seeks to present is whether, upon the evidence and under

the ruling of the court, the jury were warranted in finding a legal with-

drawal or revocation of the subscription.

The only withdrawal or revocation relied on occurred in an inter-

view between one of the defendants and Henry Tower, on August 31,
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1889. In view of the verdict the only question left is whether a notifi-

cation of withdrawal given orally to Henry Tower was sufficient.

It will be necessary to state the situation of the parties. The con-

tract declared on is given below.

"We, the undersigned, hereby subscribe for and agree to purchase

the number of shares set against our respective names, of the capital

stock in the corporation to be organized under the laws of such state,

as a committee hereafter to be appointed from the subscribers shall

determine, said shares of capital stock to be of the par value of $50,

and the capital stock of said corporation to be not less than $25,000,

said corporation to be organized for the purpose of purchasing land,

and erecting a shoe shop thereon, with the necessary appliances con-

nected therewith, in the town of Hudson, to be rented, when com-

pleted, to H. H. Mawhinney & Co., for a term of ten years at a

rental of seven per cent, per annum on the cost of the plant when

completed. Said corporation to be organized as soon as may be, and

in advance thereof an agreement in writing between a committee of

the subscribers, in behalf of all, with said H. H. Mawhinney & Co.

to be executed, binding the latter to take said plant for the period

and at the terms stated, and on the organization of said corporation to

be re-executed to bind both parties. And the subscribers hereto hereby

bind themselves severally to pay for said stock to the treasurer of said

corporation in the way and manner that the corporation when organ-

ized shall determine. And we severally agree that one seal shall be

the seal of each.

"Hudson, August 7, 1889."
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The corporation was organized under the laws of Maine. The

meeting for the organization was held at Portland, Maine, August

29, 1889, at which time the articles of agreement, having been signed,

§
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were presented, by-laws were adopted, and officers chosen. The

necessary papers were then prepared as required by law. and were

approved by the attorney-general of Maine, on September 5, were

recorded on September 6, and were received and filed in the office of

the secretary of state on September 7, 1889. It was agreed at the

argument that, under the laws of Maine, the legal existence of the

corporation as a corporation, began on September 7.

On the 31st.of August, Henry Tower's position was as follows:

It must be assumed, though the bill of exceptions does not in express

terms so state, that he was one of the subscribers. One of the plaint-

iff's requests for instructions assumes that there was a contract of the

firm above referred to "with Henry Tower and others in behalf of

the associates for the purchase of land and building a shoe shop thereon,

dated August 19, 1889." This contract, being thus referred to by

the plaintiff as an undisputed fact, must be taken to show that Henry

Tower was acting as the person first named on the committee contem-

plated by the subscription paper, to obtain an agreement in writing
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binding said firm to take a lease of the premises. On August 29, at

a meeting which apparently was the first formal step in the organiza-

tion of the corporation, he was chosen president. By the statutes of

Maine, which it was agreed we should refer to, the choice of officers

is a necessary preliminary to the creation of the corporation. Re-

vised Statutes of Maine of 1883, ch. 48, §§ 17-19.

It is also obvious that on August 31 he was, in the opinion of the

jury, acting as an officer in behalf of the associates, and not merely

on account of his personal interest as one of the subscribers. Such is

the fair result of the instructions taken as a whole. The judge, in the

course of his charge, called the jury's attention to this distinction by

saying: "If Henry Tower was one of the officers of the associates

for the purpose of managing their business, it would not be necessary

that any other notice should be given than what was given to him;

but if he went there simply as being interested, not acting as an officer,

* * * it may be that he was not an officer, so that he would be a

party authorized to receive any notice of withdrawal, and if he was

not, then it would be necessary for that fact to be communicated to

the meeting." It being pointed out to the judge, at the close of the

charge, that the plaintiff's records showed that at the meeting on the

29th of August, Henry Tower was chosen president, he further in-

structed the jury that if he had been so chosen president, and if the

defendants notified him distinctly that if a certain event should happen

with reference to the change of the policy of the corporation as to

mortgaging its property they would no longer be in the association

and would not pay a cent on their subscription, that would be a suffi-

cient notification of their withdrawal if the event did happen. The

undisputed testimony, so far as it is recited or disclosed in the bill of

exceptions, goes to show that Henry Tower, in that interview, was

The corporation was organized under the laws of Maine. The
meeting for the organization was held at Portland, Maine, August
29, 1889, at which time the articles of agreement, having been signed,
were presented , by-laws were adopted, and officers chosen. The
necessary papers were then prt:pared as required by law. and were
approved by the attorney-general of Maine, on September 5, were
recorded on September 6, and were received and filed in the office of
the secretary of state on September 7, 1889. It was agreed at the
argument that, under the laws of Maine, the legal existence of the
corporation as a corporation, began on September 7.
.
On the 31 st . of August, Henry Tower's position was as follows:
It must be assumed, though the bill of exceptions does not in express
terms so state, that he was one of the subscribers. One of the plaintiff's requests for instructions assumes that there was a contract of the
firm above referred to "with Henry Tower and others in behalf of
the associates for the purchase of land and building a shoe shop thereon,
dated August 19, 1889." This contract, being tht'ls referred to by
the plaintiff as an undisputed fact, must be taken to show that Henry
Tower was acting as the person first named on the committee contemplated by the subscription paper, to obtain an agreement in writing
binding said firm to take a lease of the premises. On August 29, at
a meeting which apparently was the first formal step in the organization of the corporation, he was chosen president. By the statutes of
Maine, which it was agreed we should refer to, the choice of officers
is a necessary preliminary to the creation of the corporation. Revised Statutes of Maine of 1883, ch. 48, §§ 17-19.
It is also obvious that on August 31 he was, in the opinion of the
jury, acting as an officer in behalf of the associates, and not merely
on account of his personal interest as one of the subscribers. Such is
the fair result of the instructions taken as a whole. The judge, in the
course of his charge, called the jury's attention to this distinction by
saying: "If Henry Tower was one of the officers of the associates
for the purpose of managing their business, it would not be necessary
that any other notice should be given than what was given to him;
but if he went there simply as being interested, not acting as an officer,
• • • it may be that he was not an officer, so that he would be a
party authorized to receive any notice of withdrawal, and if he was
not, then it would be necessary for that fact to be communicared to
the meeting." It being pointed out to the judge, at the close of the
charge, that the plaintiff's records showed that at the meeting on the
29th of August, Hem-y Tower was chosen president, he further instructed the jury that if he had been so chosen president, and if the
defendants notified him distinctly that if a ce1tain event should happen
with reference to the change of the policy of the corporation as to
mortgaging its property they would no longer be in the association
and would not pay a cent on their subscription , that would be a sufficient notification 0£ their withdrawal if the event did happen. The
undisputed testimony , so far as it is recited or disclosed in the hill of
exceptions, goes to show that H enry Tower, in that interview , was
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acting in a representative capacity and not merely 011 his own personal

§ 107

account. The plaintiff's requests for instructions raised no question

on this point, but asked the court to rule that, "in order to constitute

acting in a representative capacity and not merely on his own personal
account. The plaintiff's requests for instructions raised no question
on this point, but asked the court to rule that, "in order to constitute
a valid withdrawal, the defendants must do some act or make some
unequivocal or unconditional statement to the proper officer or officers
of the associates which shall amount to a public withdrawal from said
contract.'' The instructions were given with reference to this request,
and, as we understand them, they amounted to this, that Mr. Tower
having been chosen as president, and acting fo1 the associates, wa,;,
on August 31, a proper officer to be notified by the defendant of
their withdrawal.
We think this instruction was right. No instructioi1 was asked at
the trial that, in order to withdraw from the associates, notice must be
gh·en to all of them individually or at a meeting of the associate .
The plaintiff only contended that the notice must be giYcn to the proper
officer or officers, and it would be plainly impractic:1ble to require a
direct personal notice to them all. The right to ·withdraw would be
nugatory if this were necessary. A subscriber who has a right to
withdraw may not know, or have the means of knowing, who all of
his associates are, or where they liYe. If he does know, they may be
many in number, and widely scattered, or some of them may be away
on a journey. No general meeting of them may be called which he
can attend without leaving the state. He need not \.ntit for a meeting
before giving his .notice of withdrawal. It was. indeed, held, in an early
case in England, that all of the other subscribers must not oniy ha,·e
notice, but must actually consent, before one of the subscribers could
withdraw. Kidwelly Canal Co. v. Raby, 2 Price 93. But, now, in
England, as well as here, no such consent is necessary. If eyery one of
the other subscribers should object, yet it is the right of the subscriber
to withdraw before the corporation is fonned. It is merely a question
of giving due notice of his withdrawal. And in England it is not intimated in any modern case, so far as our examination has gone, that
notice must be given to all the other subscribers, or at a meeting of
subscribers. The retraction has usually been made to the same-persons to whom the application for shares was made. See Lindi. Part.
(4th ed.) 99-105, and numerous cases cited.
In this country no case has been cited, and we have found none,
discussing the question what notice of withdrawal shall be sufficient.
In some cases no attempt to withdraw '"'as made till after the corporation was formed. See, for examples, International Fair and Exposition A ssociation v. Walker, 83 Mich. 386; Richelieu Hotel Co. v.
International Military Encampment Co., r40 Ill. 248; Ashuelot Boot
and Shoe Co. v. Hoit, 56 N. H. 548; Shober v. Lancaster County
Park Association. 68 Pa. St. 429. It is said in Cartright v. Dickinson , 88 Tenn. 476: "Before the organization of the corporation and
acceptance of the subscription •
* • the promoters might, perhaps, agree to release a subscriber by substitutin'g other names for
his." This goes on the idea that the subscriber has not an absolute
right to withdraw, and that somebody' s assent is necessary. In

a valid withdrawal, the defendants must do some act or make some

unequivocal or unconditional statement to the proper officer or officers

of the associates which shall amount to a public withdrawal from said

contract." The instructions were given with reference to this request,

and, as we understand them, they amounted to this, that Mr. Tower

having been chosen as president, and acting for the associates, was,

on August 31, a proper officer to be notified by the defendants of

their withdrawal.

We think this instruction was right. No instruction was asked at

the trial that, in order to withdraw from the associates, notice must be

given to all of them individually or at a meeting of the associates.

The plaintiff only contended that the notice must be given to the proper

officer or officers, and it would be plainly impracticable to require a

direct personal notice to them all. The right to withdraw would be

nugatory if this were necessary. A subscriber who has a right to

withdraw may not know, or have the means of knowing, who all of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:16 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

his associates are, or where they live. If he does know, they may be

many in number, and widely scattered, or some of them maybe away

on a journey. No general meeting of them may be called which he

can attend without leaving the state. He need not wait for a meeting-

before giving his notice of withdrawal. It was. indeed, held, in an early

case in England, that all of the other subscribers must not only have

notice, but must actually consent, before one of the subscribers could

withdraw. Kidwelly Canal Co. v. Raby, 2 Price 93. But, now, in

England, as well as here, no such consent is necessary. If every one of

the other subscribers should object, yet it is the right of the subscriber

to withdraw before the corporation is formed. It is merely a question

of giving due notice of his withdrawal. And in England it is not in-

timated in any modern case, so far as our examination has gone, that

notice must be given to all the other subscribers, or at a meeting of

subscribers. The retraction has usually been made to the samcper-

sons to whom the application for shares was made. See Lindl. Part.

(4th ed.) 99-105, and numerous cases cited.

In this country no case has been cited, and we have found none,

discussing the question what notice of withdrawal shall be sufficient.

In some cases no attempt to withdraw was made till after the corpo-

ration was formed. See, for examples, International Fair and Expo-

sition Association v. Walker, 83 Mich. 386; Richelieu Hotel Co. v.

International Military Encampment Co., 140 111. 248; Ashuelot Boot

and Shoe Co. v. Hoit, 56 N. H. 548; Shober v. Lancaster County-

Park Association, 68 Pa. St. 429. It is said in Cartright v. Dickin-

son, 8S Tenn. 476: "Before the organization of the corporation and

acceptance of the subscription » * * the promoters might, per-

haps, agree to release a subscriber by substituting other names for

his." This goes on the idea that the subscriber has not an absolute

right to withdraw, and that somebody's assent is necessary. In
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Plank's Tavern Co. v. Burkhard, 87 Mich. 182, the subscriber ap-

parently made known his refusal to the persons who brought a second

§ 107

AGREEMENTS SUBSCRIBING TO

~TOCK.

paper to be signed by him, and it was held to be sufficient, but the

proper mode of giving such notice is not discussed, and the court in-

cidentally remarked that "the corporators well knew when the com-

pany was organized * * * that the defendants expressly repudiated

the whole arrangements" It is held that the death of a subscriber be-

fore the formation of the corporation is a revocation of a subscription.

Phipps v. Jones, 20 Pa. St. 260; Wallace v. Townsend, 43 Ohio St.

537; Pratt v. Elgin Baptist Society, 93 111. 475; Sedalia, Warsaw

and Southern Railway v. Wilkerson, S3 Mo. 235. Insanity is also

held to be a revocation in Beach v. First Methodist Episcopal Church,

96 111. 177. Death is a public fact, of which all the world must take

notice, though the above decisions were not put On that ground (Mar-

lett v. Jackman, 3 Allen 287), but insanity is not. In most of the

cases where the right of withdrawal of a subscription has been held

to exist, there is nothing to show that all the other subscribers were

notified, and there has been no question as to the sufficiency of the

mode in which the withdrawal was made. See, in addition to the
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cases above cited. Auburn Bolt and Nut Works v. Shultz, 143 Pa. St.

256; Muncy Traction Engine Co. v. Green, 143 Pa. St. 269; Gar-

rett v. Dillsbury and Mechanicsburg Railroad, 78 Pa. St. 465; Stras-

burg Railroad v. Echternacht, 21 Pa. St. 220. An offer of reward

made by public proclamation may be withdrawn in the same man-

ner, and the fact that a claimant of the reward was ignorant of

the withdrawal of the offer is immaterial. Shuey v. United States,

92 U. S. 73. And if not withdrawn by any express notice, a with-

urawal is implied after the lapse of a considerable time. Loring v.

Boston, 7 Met. 409.

In the present case, it seems to us that Henry Tower was a proper

person to whom a withdrawing subscriber might give notice of his

withdrawal. So far as appears in the bill of exceptions, there was

no other officer or person who so well or fully represented the sub-

scribers at large. He was at the head of the principal committee,

and in addition to this he had been selected and chosen as president,

and he was acting in behalf of the subscribers. There is nothing to

show that the chairman of the meetings had any duties except merely

as presiding officer at the meetings. Taking the case as it stood,

and in view of the requests for instructions, which implied that the

notice of withdrawal would of course be given to some officer, and of

the fact that nobody else was suggested as the proper officer or per-

son to receive the notice, the ruling of the court was right, that notice

to him was sufficient; and the fact that the association did not come

into legal existence as a fully-formed corporation till a later date

does not render the notice to him insufficient, under the circum-

stances.

The plaintiff requested a ruling that the defendants could not

withdraw after the associates had taken action on the strength of their

31—Wil. Casks.

Plank's Tavern Co. v. Burkhard, 87 Mich. 182, the subscriber apparently made known his refusal to the persons \\ ho brought a second
paper to be signed by him, and it was held to be sufficient, but the
proper mode of giving such notice is not discussed, and the court incidentally remarked that "the corporators well knew when the company was organized • • • that the defendants expressly repudiated
the whole arrangement.," It is held that the death of a subscriber before the formation of the corporation is a revocation of a subscription.
Phipps v. Jones, 20 Pa. St. 26o; Wallace v. Townsend, 43 Ohio St.
537; Pratt v. Elgin Baptist Society, 93 Ill. 475; Sedalia, Warsaw
and Southern Railway v. Wilkerson, 83 Mo. 235. Insanity is also
held to be a revocation in Beach v. First Methodist Episcopal Church,
96 Ill. 177. Death is a public fact, ·of which all the world must take
notice, though the above decisions were not put on th'1t ground (Marlett v. Jackman, 3 Allen 287), but insanity is not. In most of the
cases where the right of withdrawal of a subscription has been held
to exist, there is nothing to show that all the other subscribers were
notified, and there has been no question as to the sufficiency of the
mode in which the withdrawal was made. See, in addition to the
cases above cited , Auburn Bolt and Nut Works v. Shultz, 143 Pa. St.
256; Muncy Traction Engine Co. v. Green, 143 Pa. St. 269; Gar•
rett v. Dillsbury and Mechanicsburg Railroad, 78 Pa. St. 465; Strasburg Railroad v. Echternacht, 2 1 Pa. St. 220. An offer of reward
made by public proclamation may be withdrawn in the same manner, and the fact that a claimant of the reward was ignorant of
the withdrawal of the offer is immaterial. Shuey v. United States,
92 U. S. 73. And if not withdrawn by any express notice, a witharawal is implied after the lapse of a considerable time. Loring v.
Boston, 7 Met. 409.
In the present case, it seem!! to us that Henry Tower was a proper
person to whom a withdrawing subscriber might give notice of his
withdrawal. So far as appears in the hill of exceptions, there was
no other officer or person who so ':vell or fully represented the subscribers at large. He was at the head of the principal committee,
and in addition to this he had been selected and chosen as president,
and he was acting in behalf of the subscribers. There is nothing to
show that the chairman of the meetings had any duties except merely
as presiding officer at the meetings. Taking the case as it stood,
and in view of the requests for instmction s, which implied that the
notice of withdrawal would of course be given to some officer, and of
the fact that nobody else was suggcste<l as the proper officer or per~on to receive the notice, the ruling of the court was right, that notice
to him was sufficient; and the fact that the m:sociation did not come
into legal existence as a fully-formed corporation till a late r date
docs not render the notice to him insufficient, under the circumstances.
The plaintiff requested a ruling that the defendants could not
withdraw after the associates had taken action on the strength of their
1
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subscription. This was rightly refused, as was held in the former

§ 108

decision.

subscription.
This was rightly refused, as was held in the former
decision.
The plaintiff also asked an instruction that the defendants' offer
was not conditional, and could not be made so by oral testimony.
This instru ction was given.
.
The evidence to which . the plaintiff objected was properly admitted for the purpose for which it was received 1 and the instructions to
the jury carefully limited it to that purpose, and confined the attention of the jury to the single point of the defendants' withdrawal of
their subscription.
Exceptions overruled.

The plaintiff also asked an instruction that the defendants' offer

was not conditional, and could not be made so by oral testimony.

This instruction was given.

The evidence to which.the plaintiff objected was properly admit-

ted for the purpose for which it was received; and the instructions to

the jury carefully limited it to that purpose, and confined the atten-

tion of the jury to the single point of the defendants' withdrawal of

their subscription.

Exceptions overruled. •

Note. See the following eases: 1857, Lake Ontario, etc., R. Co. v. Mason,

16 N. Y. 451, 403; 1868,. Hose v. San Antonio, etc., R. Co., 31 Texas 49; 1875,

Garrett v. Dillsburg, etc., R. Co., 78 Pa. St, 405; 1877, Gaff v. Flesher, 33

0. S. 107; 1885, Tilsonburg, etc., Co. v. Gooilrich, 8 Out. (Q. B. D. | 565; 1885;

1
Cook v. Chittenden, 25 Fed. Rep. 544; 1885, Gulf, etc., Rv. v. Neelv, 64

Texas 344; 1888, Muncy Traction Eng. Co. v. De La Green, 143 Pa. St. 269;

1891, International F. Ass'n v Walker, 88 Mich. 62;189d, White v. Kahn, 103

Cook v. Chittenden, 25 Fed. Rep. 544; 1885, Gulf, etc., Ry. v. Neely, 64
Texas 344; 1888, Muncy Traction Eng. Co. v. De La Green, 143 Pa. St. 26!J;
1891, International F. Ass'n v Walker, 88 Mich. 62; 1896, White v. Kahn, 103
Ala. 308; 1893, Greenbrier Indus. Ex. v. Rodes, 37 W. Va. 738; 1893, Lewis,
etc., v. Hillsboro, etc., Co., 23 S. W . (Texas) 338; 1894, Nehema Coal Co. v.
Settle, 54 Kan. 424; 1895, Halifax C. Co. v. Moir, 28 N. S. 45; 1896, Providence,
etc., Co. v. Kent, etc., Co.,35 Atl. (R. I.) 152; 1896, Re Hirnnan's, etc., Co., i4
L. T. Rep. 550; 1898, Common v. Matthews' Rap. Inrl. Quebec, 8 B. R. 138.
But see, 1896, Phil. & Del. Co. Ry. v . Conway, 177 Pa. St. 364. See, also,
Beach, §§ 516-517; Clnrk, §§ 93-97; Elliott., §§ 344, 345a; Morawetz, §§ 49-51;
Taylor,§§ 513--515; I Thompson,§§ 1162-1163, VII Thompson,§ 8606.

Ala. 308; 1893, Greenbrier Indus. Ex. v. Rodes, 37 W. Va. 738; 1893, Lewis,
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Nott>.. See th e following cases: 1857, Lake Ontario, etc., R. Co. v. Mason,
16 N. Y. 451, 463; 1868,. Rose v. San Antonio, etc., R. Co., 31 Texas 49; 18i5,
Garrett v. Dillsburg, etc., R. Co., 78 Pa. St. 465; 1877, Gaff v. Flesher, 33
0. S. 107; 1885, Tilson burg, etc., Co. v . Goorlrich, 8 Ont. (Q. B. D.) 565; 188.5;

etc., v. Hillsboro, etc , Co., 23 S. W. (Texas) 338; 1894, Nehema Coal Co. v.

Settle, 54 Kan. 424; 1895, HalifaxC. Co. v. Moir, 28 N. 8.45; 1896, Providence,

etc., Co. v. Kent, etc., Co., 35 Atl. (R. I.) 152; 1896, Re Hannan's, etc., Co., 74

L. T. Rep. 550; 1898, Common v. Matthews' Rap. Ind. Quebec, 8 B. R. 138.

But see, 1896, Phil. & Del. Co. Ry. v. Conway, 177 Pa. St. 364. See, also,

Beach, §S 516-517; Clark, §§ 93-97; Elliott, §§ 344, 345a; Morawetz, §§ 49-51;

Taylor, §§ 513-515; I Thompson, §§ 1162-1163, VII Thompson, § 8606.

Sec. 108. Same.

(6) Offer until acted upon in accordance with its provisions,

then becomes binding.

THE PENINSULAR RAILWAY COMPANY v. DUNCAN.1

1873. In the Supreme Court of Michigan. 28 Mich. Reports

Sec. 108. Same.

130-152.

Error to Kalamazoo Circuit.

Cooley, J. This case presents the question whether one who be-

( b) Offer until acted upon m ac;cordance with its provisions,
then becomes binding.

comes one of the original associates for the formation of a railway

company, and signs a subscription agreeing to take a certain number

of shares of the capital stock of the proposed company, and to pay

THE PENIN8ULAR RAILWAY COMPANY v. DUNCAN.1

therefor, "at such times and in such sums as the same shall be as-

sessed, demanded and required to he paid by the directors of the said

1873.

company." but who afterward fails for any reason to si<^n the articles

IN

THE

of incorporation, or to subscribe for stock on the commissioners' books,

SUPREME

CouRT

OF

MICHIGAN.

28 Mich. Reports

130-I52.

can be held liable upon his preliminary subscription, after the com-

1 Part of opinion omitted, also all of dissenting opinion of Campbell, J.

Error to Kalamazoo Circuit.
CooLEY, J. This case presents the question whether one who becomes one of the original associates for the formation of a railway
company, and signs a subscription agreeing to take a certain number
of shares of the capital stock of the proposed company. an<l to pay
therefor, "at such times and in ~uch sums as the same shall he assessed, d e mand ed and required to be paid by the direc tors of the said
company , " but who afterward fails for any reason to sign the articles
of incorporntion, or to subscribe for stock on the commissioners' books.
can be held liahle upon his preliminary subscription. after the com1
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pany has been formed and assessments been made and payment de-

manded.

§ 108

AGR EDI ENTS SUDSCRIBING TO STOCK .

The question arises upon the first section of the act for incorpora-

tion of railroad companies, approved February 12, 1855, as amended

in 1867. Laws of 1867, vol. i, p. 90. The plaintiffs insist that the

signers of the preliminary subscription, whether they afterward sign

the articles or not, if the corporation is duly formed, have the same

absolute right to stock therein that those have who execute the articles,

or to whom stock is awarded on subscriptions upon the commission-

ers' books; and that having a right to the stock, they are under a

corresponding obligation to pay for it. On the other hand, the posi-

tion of the defendants is that the preliminary subscription, though

possibly a convenient step in the organization of a corporation, is by

no means indispensable, but that the corporation originates with the

articles of association, and that no one who previously had contem-

plated becoming a member, however strongly or in whatever form of

words he may have expressed his intention to that effect, is be und by

that expression, if, when the articles are to be signed, he declines to

unite in them, or for any reason fails to do so, and thereby, expressly
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or by implication, elects not to become a member. Up to that time,

it is insisted everything is provisional and inchoate; nobody is bound

or can be bound without further voluntary action of his own.

A consideration of the question thus presented is peculiarly embar-

rassing, in consequence of the totally different views which have been

taken of it by able jurists in other states where similar statutes exist.

We have examined the reported cases with care, and while we find

many of the opinions able, and in the main well reasoned, yet as it is

impossible to reconcile them, and none of them follows precisely the

train of reasoning through which we have been led to our own conclu-

sion, we have not deemed it advisable to review the cases in this opin-

ion, but shall proceed, with such brevity as the case will admit; to

present our own views.

It may be quite true, as is insisted on the part of the defense, that

a preliminary subscription is not an indispensable requisite in the

formation of a corporation under the general railroad law. If the

requisite number of persons execute the proper articles, naming

therein their directors, and attach thereto the affidavit required by the

statute, verifying the fact that they are subscribers for the requisite

amount of stock, and have paid to the directors five percentum

thereon, it is difficult to perceive any ground upon which it could be

plausibly contended that the corporation was not duly organized, or

to suggest any important function that the preliminary subrcriftion

could have performed for such subscribers, and which in the par-

ticular case has not been performed without it. Nevertheless, a v( ry

cursory examination of the statute must convince any one that such a

subscription, whether indispensable or not, is contemplated as a pro-

ceeding which will generally, at least, take place. This is evident

from the expressions employed in the statute in conferring authority

to organize. The persons who may incorporate themselves are "any

pany h as been formed and assessments been made and payment dem anded .
The question arises upon- the first section of the act for incorporation of railroad companies, approved February 12, 1855, as amended
in 1867. Laws of 1867, vol. i, p. 90. Th e plaintiffs insist that the
signers of the preliminary subscription, whether they afterward sig n
the articles or not, if the corporation is duly formed , have the same
absolute right to stock therein that those haYe who execute the articles,
or to whom stock is awarded on subscriptions upon the commi ssioners' books; and that having a right to the s tock, they nre under a
corresponding obligation to pay for it. On the other h and , the position of the defendants is that the preliminary subscription, though
possibly a convenient step in the organization of a corporation, is by
no means indispensable, but that the corporation orig inates with the
articles of associa tion , and th at no one wh o previously had contemplated becoming a member, however stro ngly or in whatever form of
words he may have expressed his intention to that effect, is bcund by
that expression, if, when the articles are to be sign ed , he d eclines to
unite in them, or for any reason fails to do so, and thereby, expressly
or by implication, elects not to become a member. Up to that time,
it is insisted everything is provisional and inchoate; nobody is bound
or can be bound without further voluntary action of his own.
A consideration of the question thus presented is peculiarly em barrassing, in consequence of the totally differe nt views which have been
taken of it by able jurists in other states where similar statutes exist.
We have examined the reported cases with care , and v.·hile we find
many of the opinions able, and in the main well reasoned , yet as it is
impossible to reconcile them, and none of them follo ...vs precisely the
train of reasoning through which we have been led to our own conclusion, we have not deemed it advisable to review the cases in this opinion, but shall proceed , with such brevity as the case will admit; to
present our own views.
It may be quite true , as is insisted on the part of the defense , that
a preliminary subscription is not an indispensable requi site in the
formation of a corporation under the general railroad law . If the
requisite number of persons exec~te the proper articles, naming
therein their directors, and attach thereto the affidavit required hy the
statute, verifying the fact that they are subscribers for the requisite
amount of stock, irnd have p aid to the directors fi ve p ercentum
thereon , it is difficult to perceive any ground upon which it could be
plau sibly contended that the corporation was not duly organized, or
to suggest any important functi on that the prelimin ary subrcrirti on
could have performed for such subscribers, and which in the r::rti cular case has not been p erformed without it. Neverthele~s, an ry
cursory examination of the statute must convince any one th at such a
subscription , whether indispensable or not, is conte mplated as a proceeding which will generally, at least, take place. This is evident
from the expressions employed in the <>tatute in con fe rring authority
to organize. Th e p ersons who may incorporate themselves are "any
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stock to the amount of $1,000 for every mile of said road so in-

number of persons not less than twenty-five, being subscribers to the
stock of any contemplated railroad." They are allowed to do so "when
stock to the amount of $1,000 for every mile of said road so intended to be built" "shall be in good "faith subscribed, and five per
cent. paid thereon." There can not be subscriptions to the stock until something is in writing for the subscribers to sign. The statute
gives no form for such a subscription; it indicates no machinery by
means of which it is to be originated or signatures obtained. Everything is left to the voluntary action of the promoters of the enterprise,
and whatever form of writing is satisfactory to them, and sufficiently
indicates the general purpose sought to be accomplished, and the
share the several subscribers are to take in it, would undoubtedly be
sufficient.
By any such voluntary subscription to take stock, however, we
should naturally understand some mutual agreement by which the
promoters severally agree to take and pay for certain shares in the
proposed corporation; something, in short, like or similar to the
agreement which was actually entered into in the present case. We
do not understand that there would be any difficulty at the common
law in enforcing the promises contained in an agreement of this
general nature against the several promisors, where the object to be
accomplished was lawfut, where a beneficial purpose was in view,
and where it 'tf!aS possible to make to the several promisors the return
which their subscriptions called for. In such cases the promises are
mutual; acts are done and moneys expended in reliance upon the subscriptions, and the moment the promises are accepted by the organization and action of the corporation to which they are provisionally
made, there can generaliy be no difficulty in their enforcement if the
corporation then has it in its power to give the stock subscribed for,
and offers to do so. In such a subscription thus accepted there would
be .all the requisites of a valid contract, proper parties and a promise
made upon a legal and valu.a ble consideration.
·In this case, however, the question involved is not one to be settled
entirely by the rnles of the common law, but there is involved a question of statutory construction. It is argued by the defense that the
terms of the statute are such as to make any preliminary subscription
that may have been c:;ntered into entirely immaterial and nugatory the
moment the articles are executed, and that promises therein contained
are incapable of enforcement, because under the statute the subscribers
arc not entitled to stock in the corporation, and, consequently, do not
receive a consideration for their promises. This construction arises
principally upoh one clause of the first section of the general railroad
act, which, after providing what the articles of association shall contain, and for their being subscribed and recorded, declares that "thereupon the persons who have suh~cribed, and all persons who shall from
time to time become stockholders in such company, shall be a body
corpor:ite, " etc. The argument is that by the express t e rm~ of this
statute only the subscribers to the articles and those who s11bscqum tly
become stockholclers in the manner provided by law-that is to say,

tended to be built" "shall be in good faith subscribed, and five per

cent, paid thereon." There can not be subscriptions to the stock un-

til something is in writing for the subscribers to sign. The statute

gives no form for such a subscription; it indicates no machinery by

means of which it is to be originated or signatures obtained. Every-

thing is left to the voluntary action of the promoters of the enterprise,

and whatever form of writing is satisfactory to them, and sufficiently

indicates the general purpose sought to be accomplished, and the

share the several subscribers are to take in it, would undoubtedly be

sufficient.

By any such voluntary subscription to take stock, however, we

should naturally understand some mutual agreement by which the

promoters severally agree to take and pay for certain shares in the

proposed corporation; something, in short, like or similar to the

agreement which was actually entered into in the present case. We

do not understand that there would be any difficulty at the common
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lavj in enforcing the promises contained in an agreement of this

general nature against the several promisors, where the object to be

accomplished was lawful, where a beneficial purpose was in view,

and where it was possible to make to the several promisors the return

which their subscriptions called for. In such cases the promises are

mutual; acts are done and moneys expended in reliance upon the sub-

scriptions, and the moment the promises are accepted by the organ-

ization and action of the corporation to which they are provisionally

made, there can generally be no difficulty in their enforcement if the

corporation then has it in its power to give the stock subscribed for,

and offers to do so. In such a subscription thus accepted there would

be.all the requisites of a valid contract, proper parties and a promise

made upon a legal and valuable consideration.

In this case, however, the question involved is not one to be settled

entirely by the rules of the common law, but there is involved a ques-

tion of statutory construction. It is argued by the defense that the

terms of the statute are such as to make any preliminary subscription

that may have been entered into entirely immaterial and nugatory the

moment the articles are executed, and that promises therein contained

are incapable of enforcement, because under the statute the subscribers

are not entitled to stock in the corporation, and, consequently, do not

receive a consideration for their promises. This construction arises

principally upon one clause of the first section of the general railroad

act, which, after providing what the articles of association shall con-

tain, and for their being subscribed and recorded, declares that "there-

upon the persons who have subscribed, and all persons who shall from

time to time become stockholders in such company, shall be a body

corporate," etc. The argument is that by the express terms of this

statute only the subscribers to the articles and those who subsequently

become stockholders in the manner provided by law—that is to say,
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by subscribing for stock on the commissioners' books—can be stock-

holders or entitled to stock, and, consequently, the subscribers to the

preliminary agreement who do not sign the articles are in terms ex-

cluded.

It is possible that a strict and literal interpretation of the statute

would require this construction to be put upon it; but it does not nec-

essarily follow that such a construction would be proper or even ad-

missible. What we should seek here is the intention of the legisla-

ture and not the testing by nice rules of art the language employed.

It may possibly appear, as is too often the case, that the legislation

has been carelessly phrased, and will be perverted if tested by nice

rules. There are two very strong reasons why the statute should not

be so construed as to make the articles nullify the preliminary sub-

scription if any other construction is admissible. The first is that it

nullifies the mutual promises of the parties made for a beneficial

object, and which, on grounds of public policy as well as mutual good

faith, ought to be sustained and enforced, unless abandoned by com-

mon consent. The second is that, by rendering the preliminary sub-
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scription which the statute provides for, if it does not make necessary,

a perfectly useless proceeding, it in effect, as has been well said in a

leading case supporting this construction—Troy and Boston R. R.

Co. v. Tibbits, 18 Barb. 304-305,—imputes folly to the legislature;

an imputation we ought to be very slow to make, and never except

upon the most imperative reasons.

Our own view, after a careful examination of the statute, is that the

construction which excludes the subscribers to the preliminary sub-

scription from corporate membership, is rather forced than otherwise.

The statute docs not say that the persons who have subscribed Me ar-

ticles of association, and those who shall, from time to time, become

stockholders, shall be the corporation, but those "who have sub-

scribed." Subscribed what? The very first words of the section pro-

vides that the subscribers to the stock of a contemplated road may in-

corporate themselves by complying with certain conditions. The

subscribers here intended are unquestionably the subscribers to the

preliminary agreement; and these subscribers, to use the words of the

statute, when the necessary amount of stock is in good faith subscribed

by them, are allowed to organize. These persons, then, are spoken

of as persons who have subscribed, and their subscription contem-

plates that they are to have stock in the proposed corporation. The

parties to the articles also subscribe them; their subscription is pro-

vided for by the same section, and theirs also contemplates that they are

to have stock in the corporation. It is after these different subscrip-

tions for stock are thus spoken of and provided for that the statute

proceeds to say that those who have subscribed shall be corporators.

What warrant have we for saying that one class of subscribers was

intended and not the other?

The truth is, both classes were intended, because in contemplation

of the statute the two were to be identical. The statute does not sup-

pose there will be subscribers to the preliminary agreement who do

by subscribing for stock on the commissioners' books--can be stockholders or entitled to stock, and, consequently, the subscribers to the
preliminary agreement who do not sign the articles are in terms excluded.
It is possible that a strict and literal interpretation of the statute
would require this construction to be put upon it; but it does not necessarily follow that such a construction would be proper or even admissible. What we should seek here is the intention of the legislature and not the testing by nice rules of art the lang uage empioyed.
It may possibly appear, as is too often the case, that the legislation
has been carelessly phrased, and will be perverted if tested by nice
rules. There are two very strong reasons why the statute should not
be so construed as to make the articles nullify the preliminary subscription if any other construction is admissible. The first is that it
nullifies the mutual promises of the parties made for a beneficial
object, and which, on grounds of public policy as well as mutual good
faith, ought to be sustained and enforced, unless abandoned by common consent. The second is that , by rendering the preliminary subscription which the statute provides for, if it does not make necessary,
a perfectly useless proceeding, it in effect, as has been well sa id in a
leading case supporting this construction-Troy and Boston R. R.
C o. v. Tibbits, 18 Barb. 304-305,-imputes folly to the legislature;
an imputation we ought to be very slow to make, and never except
upon the most imperative reasons.
Our own view, after a careful examination of the statute, is that the
construction which excludes the subscribers to the preliminary subscription from corporate membership, is rather forced than otherwise.
Th e statute docs not say that the persons who have subscribed the articles of assodatt"on, and those who shall, from time to time, become
stockholders, shall be the corporation , but those "who h ave subscribed.'' Subscribed what? The very first words of the section provides that the subscrz'bers to the stock of a contemplated road may incorporate themselves by complying with certain conditions. The
subscribers here intended are unquestionably the subscribers to the
pre Ii mi nary agreement; and these subscrz'bers, to u se the words of the
statute, when th e necessary amount of stock is in good faith subscr£bed
by them, are allowed to organize. These persons, then, are spoken
of as persons who have subscrz'bed, and their subscription contemplates that they are t o have stock in the proposed corporation. The
parties to the articles also subscribe them; their subscription is provided for by the same section, and theirs also contemplates that they are
to have stock in the corporation. It is after these different subscriptions for stock are thu s spoken of and proYicled for that the statute
proceeds to say that those who haYe subscrz'bed shall be corporators.
What w arran t have we for saying that one class of subscribers was
intended and not the other?
The truth is, both classes were intended, because in contem pl:-iti on
of the statute the two were to be identical. The statute does not suppose there will be subscribers to the preliminary agreement who do
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not sign the articles. It provides that after the requisite subscriptions

are obtained, the subscribers may select directors, "and thereupon

not sign the articles. It provides that after the requisite subscriptions
are obtained, the subscribers may select directors, "and thereupon
they shall severally subscribe articles of association." They are expected to subscribe the articles, and not merely that portion who may
then, on considering the question as a new one, decide to take interests in the company.
It is not assumed that there will be any doubt or question that all
who have mutually pledged themselves to each other to form a corporation for the object proposed will unite in the necessary steps for
that purpose, and it does not therefore distinguish between the subscribers to the two papers because it supposes no distinction will
exist.
\Ve have, nevertheless, to deal with the case where a subscriber to
the one has neglected or refused to sign the other; and the question
is, whether such neglect or refusal precludes the attaching of any legal
liability. We have the case of a subscription provided for by law,
designed to accomplish an importa nt beneficial purpose , subsc1ibed
by several parties in reliance upon the ir mutual promi~es, but which
one perhaps elects to annul by not taking a certain further step which
the statute contemplates he will take. The corporation to which the
subscriber's promise was provisionally made has been called into being
and has accepted his promise, and now offers to perform its pa11 by
giving the stock subscribed for if it has the power to do so . And the
question is whether, in this exceptional case r.ot proviued for or contemplated by the statute, the subscriber may treat hi:; prelim inary
promise as of no force.
A preliminary question will perhaps be, whether it possessed any
force whatever, or, on the other hand, v.'as to be looked upon as mere
nudum pactum, without either parties or consideration, before the
articles were signed. The necessary conclusion from the defendant's
premises must be, as we think, that it was so . We can not conclude.
ho-iJ.Jever, that such preliminary promises, made in accordance with
the law, as a step in the accomplishment of a public enterprise. am
be 1·egarded as enti"rcly without l egal siguijicance. If a subscriber
pays his five per cent. upon !tis subscription, and it is r eceived and
retained by tl1e custodian agreed upon by the assodates, we think he
has acquired some rights by such subscrij>tt"on and payment. He
has acquired the important rigid to take part in the organization of
th e corporation, in the cl10£ce of directors, in the determination of
th e route, a11d in sltapi11g the constitution of the company. These
rigIlls are often of lttgh value, and m tght even be more so £11 apecuniary poiut of view than the stoc/.· subscribed for is ever expected
to be. It can 1zot be said tlwt a subscrtj>tt"on aud payment. which secure these important pr£vileges, are of 1t0 force, nor ought 1"t to be
the case that the party making them may d£sajfirm his action ai his
own mere pleasure after otlter pa1·ties, more observant of the£r ou:n
stipulat£ons, have taken further act£on wh icli is unquestionably binding upon them, in reliance upon !tis promi!led ass£stance.
In the present case it does not become necessary to discuss the

they shall severally subscribe articles of association." They are ex-

pected to subscribe the articles, and not merely that portion who may

then, on considering the question as a new one, decide to take inter-

ests in the company.

It is not assumed that there will be any doubt or question that all

who have mutually pledged themselves to each other to form a corpo-

ration for the object proposed will unite in the necessary steps for

that purpose, and it does not therefore distinguish between the sub-

scribers to the two papers because it supposes no distinction will

exist.

We have, nevertheless, to deal with the case where a subscriber to

the one has neglected or refused to sign the other; and the question

is, whether such neglect or refusal precludes the attaching of any legal

liability. We have the case of a subscription provided for by law,

designed to accomplish an important beneficial purpose, subscribed

bv several parties in reliance upon their mutual promises, but which

one perhaps elects to annul by not taking a certain further step which
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the statute contemplates he will take. The corporation to which the

subscriber's promise was provisionally made has been called into being

and has accepted his promise, and now offers to perform its part by

giving the stock subscribed for if it has the power to do so. And the

question is whether, in this exceptional case not provided for or con-

templated by the statute, the subscriber may treat his preliminary

promise as of no force.

A preliminary question will perhaps be, whether it possessed any

force whatever, or, on the other hand, was to be looked upon as mere

nudum pactum, without either parties or consideration, before the

articles were signed. The necessary conclusion from the defendant's

premises must be, as we think, that it was so. We can not conclude,

however, that such -preliminary promises, made in accordance with

the law, as a step in the accomplishment of a public enterprise, can

be regarded as entirely without legal significance. If a subscriber

pays his five per cent, upon his subscription, and it is received and

retained by the custodian agreed upon by the associates, we think he

has acquired some rights by such subscription and payment. He

has acquired the important right to take part in the organization of

the corporation, in the choice of directors, in the determination of

the route, and in shaping the constitution of the company. These

rights are often of high value, and might even be more so in a fe-

cuniary point of view than the stock subscribed for is ever expected

to be. It can not be said that a subscription and payment, -which se-

cure these important privileges, are of no force, nor ought it to be

the case that the party making them may disaffirm his action at his

own mere pleasure after other parties, more observant of their own

stipulations, have taken further action which is unquestionably bind-

ing upon them, in reliance upon his promised assistance.

In the present case it does not become necessary to discuss the
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fore the corporation is formed can be compelled to pay it afterward.

Such a case is not, by the record, placed before us. Undoubtedly if

the corporation is never formed, the subscription becomes a nullity.

No promisee in that case ever comes into existence. And if the sub-

scribers are only twenty-five in number, any one of them may defeat

the enterprise, by refusing to join in the articles, because twenty-Jive

are made necessary by the statute. It may, under some circum-

stances, be bad faith in a subscriber to do this, but he would unques-

tionably have the power. It would be equally true if a larger num-

ber of subscribers should subscribe only the requisite amount of stock,

and any one might defeat an organization by refusing to sign the ar-

ticles unless a further subscription could be obtained from some other

source. In these cases the subscriber is discharged', not for reasons

personal to himself, but because on grounds of public policy corpo-

rate privileges are withheld from an association which does not fur-

nish the required evidence of earnestness and ability to carry on the

undertaking.
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The case at bar is neither of these. Here the corporation has not

failed of organization, but a subscriber has failed, for some unex-

plained reason, to sign the articles with the others. We might sug-

gest a great many possible reasons for the failure, some of which,

unquestionably, would discharge him from all moral, as well as legal,

obligation on his subscription. We might suppose, for instance, that

the other subscribers considered him an undesirable associate, and for

that reason refused to allow him to take part in organizing, while willing

enough to receive his money afterwards. As already said, the stock pro-

posed to be given by the corporation is not the sole consideration for

his promise to pay, but he is entitled to the valuable privilege of a voice

in determining the important questions to be settled by the articles,

and if denied that by his associates he is absolved from all responsi-

bility. But this defendant, for aught we know, may have had and

enjoyed that privilege, and then failed to subscribe the articles for the

express purpose of avoiding responsibility, or, on the other hand, be-

cause when sufficient subscriptions were obtained to perfect the or-

ganization it was deemed necessary or important to obtain further

signatures. But as we do not know the reason, it is idle to indulge

in suppositions. It is sufficient that the defense plant themselves on

the broad ground that no original subscriber who fails to sign the

articles can be bound by his subscription.

As it has already been seen that the preliminary subscription is in

proper form for obligatory force as a mutual promise, and is provided

for bv the statute, if one who signs it must also sign the articles of asso-

ciation in order to render himself liable, the reasons for requiring this

must be either: First, reasons personal to himself, and which render

it unjust or inequitable that he should be held in the absence of any

renewal of his promise bv an execution of the articles; or second,

reasons resting on considerations of public policy, and which, inde-

pendent of any questions of justice or equity as between the individual

question whether a party who expressly revokes his subscription before the corporation is formed can be compe]lcd to pay it afterward.
Such a case is not, by the record, placed before us. Undoubtedly if
the corporation is n ever formed, tl1e subscription becomes a nullt'ty.
No promisee £n that case ever comes into existence. And if the subscribers are only twenty-jive in number, any one of th em may defeat
tlte enterprise, by refus£ng to jo£n t'n the articles, because twenty-jive
are made necessary by the statute. It may, under some circumstances, be bad faith in a subscriber to do thi s, but he would unquestionably have the power. It would be equally true if a larger number of subscribers s hould subscribe only the requisite amount of stock,
and any one might defeat an organization by refusing to sign the articles unless a further subscription could be obtained from some other
source. In tltese cases the subscrt'ber £s dt'sclzarged, not for reasons
personal to ht'mseif, but because on grounds of public polt'cy corporate prt'vi'leges are wi'tltheld from an assodatt'on w it iclt does not furni'sh the requi'red evt'dence of earnestness and abil£ty to carry on the
undertaking.
The case at 1:>ar is neither of these. Here the corporation has not
failed of organization, but a subscriber has failed , for some unexplained reason, to sign the articles with the others. W c might suggest a great many possible reasons for the failure, some of which,
unquestionably, would discharge him from all moral, as we ll as legal,
obligation on his subscription. We mig ht suppose, for in stance, that
the other subscribers considered him an unde ~ irahl e associate, a nd for
that reason refused to allow him to take part in organizing, while willing
enough to receive his money afterwards. As al ready sa id , the stock proposed to be given by the corporation is not the sole consideration for
his promise to pay, but he is entitled to the valuable privil ege of a voice
in determining the important questions to be settl ed by the articles,
and if denied that hy his associates he is absolved from all responsibility. But this defendant, for aught we know, may luwe had and
enjoyed that privilege, and then failed to subscribe the articles for the
express purpose of avoiding respon sibility, or, on the other hand, because when sufficient subscriptions were ohtaiued to perfect the organization it was deemed necessary or important to obtain further
signatures. But as we do not know the reason, it is idle to indulge
in suppositions. It is sufficient that the defense plant them selves on
the broad ground that no original subscriber who fai ls to sign the
articles can be bound by his subscription.
As it has already been seen that the preliminary subscription is in
proper form for obligatory force as a mutual promise, and is provided
for by the statute, if one who signs it mu st also sig n the articles of association in order to render himself liable, the reasons for req uiring this
m ust be either: Fz'rst, reasons per on al to himself , and which render
it unjust or inequitable that he should he held in the absence of any
renewal of hi s promise by an executi on of the arti cles; or second,
reasons resting on considerations of public policy , and which, independent of any questions of justice or equity as between the individual
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There can be no reasons of the first class, if the subscriber has par-

and his associates, require all subscriptions to the stock at the time of
the organization to be represented by the signatures to the articles.
There can be no reasons of the first class, if the subscriber has participated in the organization, or has had the opportunity to do so. In
such case, with the right to the stock, the subscriber has had, or might,
at his option, have had everything promised him by his associates or
by the corporation as the consideration for his promise to pay, and
good faith to his associates whose action his promise may be supposed
to have influenced more or less, and who keep on their part the promise mutually made, requires that he should keep it also. It may
safely be assumed that they incur expenses for preliminary surveys,
procuring subscriptions, pledges of rights of way, and such other matters as are necessary to enable them intelligently and properly to settle the questions which are to be determined by the articles, and if he
allows these to be incurred while his promise stands unrevokecl and in
reliance upon it, the moral obligation on his part to fulfill his promise is very strong, and in the absence of any unfair dealing on the part
of his associates ought to be regarded hy him as imperative.
And we can not imagine any reasons of public policy for requiring
all the preliminary subscribers to sign the articles, or for relieving
from responsibility all who do not sign. As the articles constitute a
more formal document than the preliminary subscription usually does.
an<l set forth the definite particulars of the enterprise, it will be more
satisfactory and conclusive of the precise work the subscribers propose
to accomplish, and be less likely to leave questions open to dispute
between the individual associates and the organization. The probability, however, that the preliminary subscription will be so vague
and uncertain as to raise serious questions as to the actual intent can
be no greater than the probability of like questions in innumerable
contracts which are being made constantly, and in which it has neYer
been thought even wise to require by law the observance of more formality. • • •
We suppose the statute to require the articles to be signed hy at
least twenty-five associates, representing subscriptions to the :nnount
of a thousand dollars a mile, upon which five per centum shall have
been paid in, in order that mere bubble enterprises shall not be
allowed the apparent sanction of a legal organization, and be afforded
the opportunity, not only to embarrass and perhaps preclude more
substantial projects, hut al so to have facilities for annoying and perhaps defrauding the public by exercising the right of eminent domain,
and by contracting debts in apparent execution of improvement· which
the means at command give no assurance of being carried out. The
state requires this eYidence of good faith and ability in the associates
before it will endow their association with legal entity; but when
these appear to the extent required, the demanas of public policy in
this regard are satisfied, and we do not see that the state h::is any concern in the question wh ether other associates representmg more aid
subscribe the articles or not. If the state is satisfied with subscriptions to a certain amount, but the projectors have in fact obtained

ticipated in the organization, or has had the opportunity to do so. In

such case, with the right to the stock, the subscriber has had, or might,

at his option, have had everything promised him by his associates or

by the corporation as the consideration for his promise to pay, and

good faith to his associates whose action his promise maybe supposed

to have influenced more or less, and who keep on their part the prom-

ise mutually made, requires that he should keep it also. It may

safely be assumed that they incur expenses for preliminary surveys,

procuring subscriptions, pledges of rights of way, and such other mat-

ters as are necessary to enable them intelligently and properly to set-

tle the questions which are to be determined by the articles, and if he

allows these to be incurred while his promise stands unrevoked and in

reliance upon it, the moral obligation on his part to fulfill his prom-

ise is very strong, and in the absence of any unfair dealing on the part

of his associates ought to be regarded by him as imperative.

And we can not imagine any reasons of public policy for requiring
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all the preliminary subscribers to sign the articles, or for relieving

from responsibility all who do not sign. As the articles constitute a

more formal document than the preliminary subscription usually does,

and set forth the definite particulars of the enterprise, it will be more

satisfactory and conclusive of the precise work the subscribers propose

to accomplish, and be less likely to leave questions open to dispute

between the individual associates and the organization. The proba-

bility, however, that the preliminary subscription will be so vague

and uncertain as to raise serious questions as to the actual intent can

be no greater than the probability of like questions in innumerable

contracts which are being made constantly, and in which it has never

been thought even wise to require by law the observance of more for-

mality. * * »

We suppose the statute to require the articles to be signed by at

least twenty-five associates, representing subscriptions to the amount

of a thousand dollars a mile, upon which five per centum shall have

been paid in, in order that mere bubble enterprises shall not be

allowed the apparent sanction of a legal organization, and be afforded

the opportunity, not only to embarrass and perhaps preclude more

substantial projects, but also to have facilities for annoying and per-

haps defrauding the public by exercising the right of eminent domain,

and by contracting debts in apparent execution of improvements which

the means at command give no assurance of being carried out. The

state requires this evidence of good faith and ability in the associates

before it will endow their association with legal entity; but when

these appear to the extent required, the demands of public policy in

this regard are satisfied, and we do not see that the state has any con-

cern in the question whether other associates representing more aid

subscribe the articles or not. If the state is satisfied with subscrip-

tions to a certain amount, but the projectors have in fact obtained
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more, no very good reason can be suggested why the state should im-

pose, as a penalty upon the corporation, that it shall not enforce such

additional subscriptions unless the names are obtained to a certain

§

108

AGREEMENTS SUBSCRIBING TO STOCK.

paper required for the purpose of giving public evidence of certain

facts already proved by previous subscriptions to the full extent re-

quired. And we are therefore forced to the conclusion that when

such subscriptions are obtained to the articles as are necessary for the

purposes of incorporation, if there are further subscribers to the pre-

liminary subscription, who, for reasons of convenience to themselves,

or because it was supposed to be unnecessary, or for any other reason

than a previous withdrawal from the enterprise, shall neglect to sign

the1 articles, such previous subscribers can not, on any ground of pub-

lic policy, be held discharged from any obligation, either moral or

legal, to fulfill their promises.

So far we have not discussed the question whether there can be any

embarrassment in counting such preliminary subscribers among the

stockholders. We do not see why there need be. The subscriptions,

together with the articles of association, will pass to the hands of the

proper officers, and they will furnish all necessary information to the

commissioners, who are to receive further subscriptions for the bal-
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ance of the capital stock, and apportion it if there shall be any excess.

If we are warranted in so construing the statute as to include in the

subscribers who are to be counted as corporators when the commis-

sioners begin their labors, those who have subscribed preliminary sub-

scriptions, as well as the subscribers to the articles, then the commis-

sioners have only to receive the subscriptions for, and apportion such

portion of the stock as is not represented by these two classes of sub-

scribers. From the best consideration we have been able to give the

statute, we think such a construction perfectly legitimate. Any other

would make the preliminary subscription not what on its face it seems

to be, a provisional offer for the acceptance of the corporation when

formed, but only a provisional offer to make an offer if the subscriber

at a subsequent time shall elect to do so. We are unwilling to conclude

that the legislature, in pointing out the steps in the organization of a

corporation, has indicated among them a proceeding so frivolous and

futile. We think the subscribers, who, with those who subsequently

associate themselves with them, are to be the corporators, are the

subscribers to the original subscription; and though it is perfectly

true that the statute supposes such subscribers will sign the articles

also, it neither takes away their rights, nor absolves them from obli-

gations for a failure to observe this formality, but if the corporation

is duly formed, on general principles applicable to such undertak-

ings as the preliminary subscribers have entered into, they are liable

for the fulfillment thereof in the absence of any provision of the stat-

ute which expressly or by necessary implication must have the effect

to release them therefrom. And our reading of the statute discloses

no such provision.

In our discussion of the case so far we assume that the subscriber

paid his five per cent, on the subscription. This, or something equiva-

more, no very good reason can be suggested why the state should impose, as a penalty upon the corporation, that it shall not enforce such
a dditional subscriptions unless the names are obtained to a certain
paper required for the purpose of giving public ·evidence of certain
facts already proved by previous subscriptions to the full extent require d. And we are therefore forced to the conclusion that when
such subscriptions are obtained to the articles as are necessary for the
purposes of incorporation, if there are further subscribers to the preliminary subscription , who, for reasons of convenience to themselves,
or because it was supposed to be unnecessary, or for any other reason
than a pre\'ious withdrawal from the enterprise, shall neglect to sign
tht! articles, such previous subscribers can not, on any ground of public policy, be held discharged from any obligation, either moral or
legal, to fulfill their promises.
So far we have not discussed the question whether there can be any
embarrassment in counting such preliminary subscribers among the
s tockholders. We do not see why there need be. The subscriptions,
together with the articles of association, will pass to the hands of the
proper officers, and they will furnish all necessary information to the
commissioners, who are to receive further subscriptions for the balance of the capital stock, and apportion it if there shall be any excess.
If we are warranted in so construing the statute as to include in the
subscribers who are to be counted as corporators when the commissioners begin their labors, those who have subscribed preliminary subscriptions, as well as the subscribers to the articles, then the commist>ioner have only to receive the subscriptions for, and apportion such
portion of the stock as is not represented by these two cl,asses of subscribers. From the best consideration we have been able to give the
stah1te, we think such a construction perfectly legitimate. Any other
would make the preliminary subscription not what on its face it seems
to be, a provisional offer for the acceptance of the corporation when
formed, but only a provisional offer to make an offer if the subscriber
at a subsequent time sha~l elect to do so. We are unwilling to conclude
that the legislature, in pointing out the steps in the organization of a
corporation, has indicated among them a proceed ing so frivolous and
futile . We think the subscribers, who, with those who subsequently
associate themselves with them, are to be the corporators, are the
subscribers to the original suhscription; and thou gh it is perfectly
true that the statute supposes such subscribers will sign the articles
also, it neither takes away their rights, nor absolves them from obligations for a failure to observe this formality, but if tlte corpo1'ation
is duly formed, on general principles applicable to suclt undedakings lls tlw preliminary subscribers lzave entered i'nto, tlzey are liable
for the fulfillment tltereof in tlte absence of any provisi'on of tlte statute wlticlt expressly or by necessary £mpli'catio1t must ltave tlte effect
to release tltem therefrom. And our reading of the statute discloses
no su ch provision.
In our discussion of the case so fa1· we assume that th e subscriber
paid his five per cent. on the subscription . . This, or something equiva-
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lent, would be necessary to entitle him to participate in the organiza-
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tion, and if lie fails to obtain that privilege the subscription would

lent, would be necessary to entitle him to participate in the organization, and if he fails to obtain that pri,·ilege the subscription woul<l
probably be ineffectual. He would not be one of the associates in
in such a case. But if the:: requisite amount is paid by the other . ubscribers, we see no reason to doubt that credit might be given to him
for this first payment, and he be admitted to all the privileges of the
rest. What c ircumstances would be equivalent to the giving of credit
by implication, in the absence of any express understanding to that
effect, it would be out of place to discuss here. That there might be
such circumstances is undoubted. The present record as tunes that
the intestate had become one of the original associates, and if any
question of fact is to be raised upon that point, it mu st be presented
upon the proper issue.
The declaration in this ca e sets out the original subscription, avers
that def end ant signed the same and agrce<l to take $1 ,ooo of the stock
of the proposed corporation, but it docs not expr~ss ly i,ay that he
made any payment. It does aver, however, th:1t the ckfendant, in
consideration of his subsctiption, "and in consideration that stock to
the amount of $ c ,ooo for every mile of said Penin !'> ular Raihn1y Extens ion Company had been subscribed for and t ake n in good faith,
and jive per cent. paid tlwrcon as required by said act, in consideration that said Penin ular R a ilway Exte nsion C o mpany was, to wit,
on the third day of January, 1868, duly organized and became a body
politic and corporate under the laws of the said state of Michigan, he,
the l'ia id Delamo rc Duncan, then and the re promised," etc. We are
inclined to think that, under demurre r such as has been interpo ·ed
in this case, it must be assumed that the defendant had done whatever
was necessary to perfect his subscription, and entitle him to participate as one of his associates in organizing, and that his failure to take
part in that proceeding was not because of being wrong fully excluded.
The allegalion that five per cent. had been paid on the sub ·criptions
may fairly be applied di ·tributively, and the allegation that the corporation was dul y organized wou ld imply participation or the opportunity to participate in all the associates. And , though these facts
are set forth by way of the recital merely, the decl aration in this particular would he good on general demurrer at least, and also on a
special demurrer aimed only at other defects. • • *
Our conclusion is that the demurre r oug-ht to have been overruled.
The judgment must, therefore , be re versed, with costs, and the cause
rema nded. And in view of the conclusions reached, it would be
proper that the parties respectively have leave to file new pleadings.
GRAVES, J., and CHRISTAINCY, Ch. J., concurred; CAMBELL, J·~
dissents.

probably be ineffectual. He would not be one of the associates in

in such a case. But if the requisite amount is paid by the other sub-

scribers, we see no reason to doubt that credit might be given to him

for this first payment, and he be admitted to all the privileges of the

rest. What circumstances would be equivalent to the giving of credit

by implication, in the absence of any express understanding to that

effect, it would be out of place to discuss here. That there might be

such circumstances is undoubted. The present record assumes that

the intestate had become one of the original associates, and if any

question of fact is to be raised upon that point, it must be presented

upon the proper issue.

The declaration in this case sets out the original subscription, avers

that defendant signed the same and agreed to take $1,000 of the stock

of the proposed corporation, but it does not expressly say that he

made any payment. It does aver, however, that the defendant, in

consideration of his subscription, "and in consideration that stock to

the amount of $1,000 for every mile of said Peninsular Railway Ex-
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tension Company had been subscribed for and taken in good faith,

and Jive per cent, paid thereon as required by said act, in considera-

tion that said Peninsular Railway Extension Company was, to wit,

on the third day of January, 1868, duly organized and became a body

politic and corporate under the laws of the said state of Michigan, he,

the said Delamore Duncan, then and there promised," etc. We are

inclined to think that, under a demurrer such as has been interposed

in this case, it must be assumed that the defendant had done whatever

was necessary to perfect his subscription, and entitle him to partici-

pate as one of his associates in organizing, and that his failure to take

part in that proceeding was not because of being wrongfully excluded.

a

The allegation that five per cent, had been paid on the subscriptions

may fairly be applied distributively, and the allegation that the cor-

poration was duly organized would imply participation or the oppor-

tunity to participate in all the associates. And, though these facts

are set forth by way of the recital merely, the declaration in this par-

ticular would be good on general demurrer at least, and also on a

special demurrer aimed only at other defects. * * *

Our conclusion is that the demurrer ought to have been overruled.

The judgment must, therefore, be reversed, with costs, and the cause

remanded. And in view of the conclusions reached, it would be

proper that the parties respectively have leave to file new pleadings.

Graves, J., and Chiustaincy, Ch. J., concurred; Cambell, J.,

dissents.

yule. See cases, supra, §99, p. 450.
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Sec. 109. Same.

(*r) Binding contract from time of making.

THE TONICA AND PETERSBURG RAILROAD COMPANY v. Mc-

Sec. 109.

Same.

NEELY.

1859. In the Supreme Court of Illinois. 21 III. Rep. 71-72.

( c) Binding contract from time of maki.ng.

In 1856 a voluntary association, in the name and style of the plaint-

iffs, was formed for the construction of a railroad from Tonica to

Jacksonville, in this state, contemplating an application to the next

THE TONICA AND PETERSBURG RAILROAD COMPANY v. McNEELY.

session of the legislature for an act of incorporation. Said associa-

tion was organized by the election of officers, and subscriptions of

stock, in shares of one hundred dollars each, were obtained in that

I859.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF ILLINOIS.

21

Ill. Rep.

71-72.

year for a large amount. The intestate subscribed two shares and

died some days before the incorporation of the plaintiffs. By consent

of the parties this case was tried by the court, Harriott, judge, and the

plaintiffs proved on the trial the organization of their company, calls

by the directors for the whole of the stock, and notices to the stock-

holders by advertisements in two newspapers.

The court rendered judgment for the defendant below.
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Caton, C. J. A subscription made in contemplation of a char-

ter to construct a railroad or to accomplish any other legitimate object

is a valid contract between the parties, and as such may be enforced

the same as any other contract. The object of the contract is lawful

and is founded on a good consideration, which is the mutual promise

expressed in the contract. Upon the general principles of law by

which all contracts are governed, we are at a loss to see what objec-

tions are to be urged to the enforcement of such a contract, which

could not be urged to any other contract for the pavment of a speci-

fied sum of money. There is no pretense in this case that the objects

contemplated by the contract are not provided for by the charter, or that

the charter which was obtained, or the organization or action under it

were not in strict pursuance of the contract. No such defense has

been insisted upon. But it is simply claimed that the contract was

void—a nudum pactutn. We are of opinion that where the objects of

a contract are lawful, and it is founded upon a good consideration, and

is entered into by parties capable of contracting, it creates a legal ob-

ligation, which may be enforced according to its terms. We know

of no law against this proposition, but are very familiar with a great

deal for its support.

The judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.

Note. Pee, 1816, Kidwelly Canal Co. v. Raby, 2 Price (Eng. Excheq.) Rep.,

p. 93, and cases cited, supra, § 99, p. 456.

In 1856 a voluntary association, in the name and style of the plaintiffs, was formed for the construction of a railroad from Tonica to
Jacksonville, in this state, contemplating an application to the next
session of the legislature for an act of incorporation. Said association was organized by the election of officers, and subscriptions of
stock. in shares of one hundred dollars each, were obtained in that
year for a large amount. The intestate subscribed two shares and
died some days before the incorporation of the plaintiffs. By consent
of the parties this case was tried by the court, Harriott, judge, and the
plaintiff~ proved on the trial the organization of their company, calls
by ~ ~•e directors for the whole of the stock, and notices to the stockholders by advertisements in two newspapers.
The court rendered judgment for the defendant below.
CATON, C. J.
A subscriptt'on made in contemplation of a charter to construct a railroad or to accomphsh any other legitimate object
is a valid contract between the parties, and as such may be enforced
the same as any other contract. The object of the contract is )3wf ul
and is founded on a good consideration, which is the mutual promise
expressed in the contract. Upon the general principles of law by
which all contracts are governed, we are at a loss to see what objectioas are to be urged to the enforcement of such a contract, which
could not be urged to any other contract for the payment of a specifi ed sum of mone_v. There is no pretense in this case that the objects
contemplated by the contract are not provided for by the charter, or that
the charter which was obtained, or the organization or action under it
were not in strict pursuance of the contract. No such defense has
been insisted upon . But it is simply claimed that the contract was
void-a nudzem pactum. We are of opinion that where the objects of
a contract are lawful, and it is founded upon a good consideration, and
is entered into by parties capable o.f contracting, it creates a leg-;:tl obligation, which may be enforced according to its term s. \Ve know
of no law against this proposition, but are very familiar with a great
deal for its support.
The judgment must be reversed and the cause .remanded.
Judgment reversed.
NQte . 8ee, 1816, Kidwelly Canal Co. v. Raby, 2 Price (Eng. Excheq.) Rep.,
p. 93, and cases cited, supra, § 99, p. 456.
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(d) An offer to the corporation, and a binding contract between

MINNEAPOLIS THRESHING MACH. CO. V. DAVIS.

§I IO

the parties

MINNEAPOLIS THRESHING MACHINE CO. v. DAVIS.

Sec. 110. Same.

1889. In the Supreme Court of Minnesota. 40 Minn. Re-

ports, 110-117, 12 Am. St. Rep. 701 , 3 L. R. A. 796,

( d) An offer to the corporation, and a binding contract between

26 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 61, 41 N. W. Rep. 1026.

the parties

Plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Hennepin

county, for installments alleged to be due from defendant as a sub-

MINNEAPOLIS THRESHING MACHINE CO. v. DAVIS.

scriber to its capital stock. A jury was waived, and the action tried by

Lorchren, J., who held that the defendant never became a subscriber,

1889.

and ordered judgment in his favor. A new trial was refused, and the

IN THE SUPREME

CoURT OF

MINNESOTA.

40

Minn.

Re-

ports, 110-117, 12 Am. St. Rep. 701, 3 L. R. A. 796,
26 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 61, 41 N. V\'. Rep. 1026.

plaintiff appealed. The facts on which the question of the defend-

ant's liability turned are stated in the opinion, the material parts of

the subscription paper, exhibits A and B, therein mentioned, being as

Plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Hennepin
county, for installments alleged to be due from defendant as a subscriber to its capital stock. A jury was waived, and the action tried by
Lorchren, J., who held that the defendant never became a subscriber,
and ordered judgment in his favor. A new trial was refused, and the
plaintiff appealed. The facts on which the question of the defendant's liability turned are stated in the opinion, the material parts of
the subscription paper, exhibits A and B, therein mentioned, being as
follows:
"Memorandum of agreement made and entered into between the
undersigned, citizens of Minneapolis, Minn., each for himself, parties of the first part, and John S. McDonald, of Fond du Lac, Wis.,
party of the second pa1t. The paity of the first part, in consideration
of the party of the second part moving his plant and machinery to the
.city of Minneapoli s, to enter into the manufacture of thres hing machines, horse-powers and engines, and for the purpose of forming a
joint-stock company to engage in the manufacture of the aforesaid
threshers and other machinery, • • • with a capital stock of
$z50,ooo, the aforesaid citizens of Minneapolis, parties of the first
pait, hereby subscribe to and severally agree to take and pay for, in
cash, the amount of capital stock set opposite their respective names
in a company to be organized as afore~a id for the purposes aforesa id.
And the sai<l John S. McDonald, hereby agrees, that whenever the
amount subsc ribed , exclusive of his own, shall reach the sum of
$19C>,OOO, he will suuscribe to aitl capital stock the further sum of
$6o,ooo, payable in the manner specified in a ce rtain proposition
signed by him and attached hereto. The conditions upon which said
subscriptions are made are as follows, to wit: Ffrst. No subscription is to be binding until the suni of $250,000 is subscribed, inclucli11g the s ubscription of John S. McDonald. S econd. The $190.000
subscribed by the citizens of Minneapolis to the capital stock afore~aid it is understood and agreed is to ue paid in payments a s follow:;,
as soon as the company i-; o rgani zed. • • • The undersigned
subscribe the amount. set opposite the ir re ·pective nam es on condition
that nil the works of the company s hnll be located at Junction City,
H e nnepin county, Minn. J ohn A. DaYis, $_1.ooo," (and others).
"Proposition made by J ohn S. McDonnld referred lo in the annexed memorandum: The sai<l John S. McDonald is to subscribe

follows:

"Memorandum of agreement made and entered into between the

undersigned, citizens of Minneapolis, Minn., each for himself, par-

ties of the first part, and John S. McDonald, of Fond du Lac, Wis.,

party of the second part. The party of the first part, in consideration
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of the party of the second part moving his plant and machinery to the

city of Minneapolis, to enter into the manufacture of threshing ma-

chines, horse-powers and engines, and for the purpose of forming a

joint-stock company to engage in the manufacture of the aforesaid

threshers and other machinery, « » * with a capital stock of

$250,000, the aforesaid citizens of Minneapolis, parties of the first

part, hereby subscribe to and severally agree to take and pay for, in

cash, the amount of capital stock set opposite their respective names

in a company to be organized as aforesaid for the purposes aforesaid.

And the said John S. McDonald, hereby agrees, that whenever the

amount subscribed, exclusive of his own, shall reach the sum of

$190,000, he will subscribe to said capital stock the further sum of

$60,000, payable in the manner specified in a certain proposition

signed by him and attached hereto. The conditions upon which said

subscriptions are made are as follows, to wit: First. No subscrip-

tion is to be binding until the sum of $250,000 is subscribed, includ-

ing the subscription of John S. McDonald. Second. The $190,000

subscribed by the citizens of Minneapolis to the capital stock afore-

said it is understood and agreed is to be paid in payments as follows,

as soon as the company is organized. * * * The undersigned

subscribe the amounts set opposite their respective names on condition

that all the works of the company shall be located at Junction City,

Hennepin county, Minn. John A. Davis, $5,000," (and others).

"Proposition made by John S. McDonald referred to in the an-

nexed memorandum: The said John S. McDonald is to subscribe
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for $60,000 of the capital stock as follows. * * * John S. Mc-

Donald."
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Mitchell, J. This was an action to recover installments due on

subscriptions to stock of the plaintiff. The facts fully appear from

the findings of the court, in connection with exhibits A and B at-

tached to the complaint. Those material for present purposes are

that, a scheme having been started to organize a manufacturing cor-

poration with $250,000 capital, whose works should be located at

Junction City, near Minneapolis, and one McDonald having proposed

that if the citizens of Minneapolis would subscribe $190,000 to the

capital stock, he would subscribe the remaining $60,000, one Janney,

a promoter, but not a subscriber to the stock of the proposed corpo-

ration, acting as a voluntary solicitor, having with him the subscrip-

tion paper (exhibits A and B), about April 1, 1887, proceeded to

canvass for subscriptions to the stock of the proposed corporation, on

the terms and conditions embodied in the paper. lie first applied to

defendant, who subscribed $5,000 of stock. Afterwards, and about

the same date, other citizens respectively subscribed to the stock, on

the same paper, to the aggregate amount, including defendant's sub-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:16 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

scription, of $190,000, of which over $65,000 has been paid in to

plaintiff. Thereupon McDonald, in accordance with his proposition,

subscribed the remaining $60,000, which he has paid up in full. All-

the conditions expressed in the written subscriptions (exhibit A) having

been fully performed and complied with, the proposed corporation

was afterwards, about April 25, 1887, organized, and these subscrip-

tions to its stock delivered over to it. The corporation, acting in

good faith upon such subscriptions, including that of defendant, ex-

pended large sums of money in locating and constructing its works,

and entered into large contracts, and incurred liabilities to the amount

of over $75,000. During all this time, the corporation had no notice

or knowledge of any condition being attached to defendant's subscrip-

tion other than those expressed in the subscription paper itself.

Neither is it found or claimed that any of the other subscribers to the

stock had any such notice or knowledge. Defendant was not present

at the organization of the corporation, and never attended or took part

in any of its meetings, and had no notice or knowledge that the sub-

scription paper had been transferred or delivered over to the plaintiff,

or that the plaintiff relied on it, until about November, 1887, just

prior to the commencement of this action.

Upon the trial the defendant was permitted, against plaintiff's

objection and exception, to testify that he signed or subscribed to the

stock only upon the express oral condition and agreement then had

between him and Janney, that the latter should retain in his possession

said agreement with his name signed thereto, and not deliver it to

any one, or use it in any way, until certain four persons should sub-

scribe to the stock, each in the sum of $5,000; that Janney took the

agreement from defendant on that express condition and understand-

ing, and not otherwise: that none of these four persons ever did sub-

scribe to the stock of the plaintiff, and that defendant never author-

for $6o,ooo of the capital·stock as follows. • • • John S. McDonald.''
MITCHELL, J.
This was an action to recover installments due on
subscriptions to stock of the plaintiff. The facts fully appear from
the findings of the court, in connection with exhibits A and B attached to the complaint. Those material for present purposes are
that, a scheme having been started to organize a manufacturing corporation with $z50,ooo capital, whose works should be located at
Junction City, near Minneapolis, and one McDonald having proposed
that if the citizens of Minneapolis would subscribe $190,000 to the
capital stock, he would subscribe the remaining $6o,ooo, one Janney,
a promoter, bu~ not a subscriber to the stock of the proposed corporation, acting as a voluntary. solicitor, having with him the subscription paper (exhibits A and B), about April 1, 1887, proceeded to
canvass for subscriptions to the stock of the proposed corporation, on
the terms and conditions embodied in the paper. He first applied to
defendant, who subscribed $s,ooo of stock. Afterwards; and about
the same date, other citizens respectively subscribed to the stock, on
the sa me paper, to the aggregate amount, including ddendant' s subscription, of $190,000, of which over $65 ,000 has been paid in to
plaintiff. Thereupon McDonald, in accordance with his proposition,
subscribed the remaining $6o,ooo, which he has paid up in full. All·
the conditions expressed in the written subscriptions (exhibit A) having
been fully performed and complied with, the proposed corporation
was afterwards, about April 25, 1887, or-ganized, and these subscriptions to its stock delivered over to it. The corporation, acting in
good faith upon such subscriptions, including that of defendant, expended large sums of money in locating and constructing its works,
and entered into large contracts, and incurred liabilities to the amount
o( over $15 ,000.
During all this time , the corporation had no notice
or knowledge of any condition being attached to defendant's subscription other than those expressed in the subscription paper itself.
Neither is it found or claimed that any of the other subscribers to the
stock had any such notice or knowledge . Defendant was not present
at the organization of the corporation. and never attended or took part
in any of its meetings, and had no notice or knowledge that the subscription paper had been transferred or <lclivcrecl over to the plaintiff,
or that the plaintiff relied on it, until about November, 1887, just
prior to the commencement of this action .
. Upon the trial the defendant waS' permitted, against plaintiff's
objection and exception, to testify that he signed or subscribed to the
stock only upon the express oral condition and agreement then had
between him and Janney, that the latter shoul<l retain in his possession
said agreement with his name signed thereto, and not deliYcr it to
any one, or u se it in any way, until certain four persons shou Icl subi:.cribe to the stock, each in the sum of $5,oob; that Janney took the
agreement from defendant on that express condition and und cr~ta nd
ing, and not otherwise; that none of these four person s ever did :;u bscribe to the stock of the plaintiff, and that defendant never author-
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ized Janney or any one to deliver said agreement to any one except

upon the condition referred to. The court found the facts to be in
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accordance with the testimony, and upon that ground found as a con-
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clusion of law that defendant never became a subscriber to the plaint-

ized Janney or any one to deliver said agreement to any one except
upon the condition referred to. The court found the facts to be in
accordance with the testimony, and upon that ground found as a conclusion of law that defendant never became a subscriber to the plaintiff's stock. The competency of this evidence is the sole question in
this case.
Under the elementary rule of evidence that a written agreement can
not be varied or added to by parol, it is not competent for a ~h
scriber to stock to allege that he is but a conditional subscriber. The
condition must be inserted in the writing to be effectual. This rule
applies with special iorce to a case like the present, where to allow
the defendant now to set up a secret parol arrangement by which he
may be released, while his fellow-subscribers continue to be bound,
would be a fraud, not only upon them, but upon the corporation
which had been organized on the faith of these subscriptions and upon
its creditors. The defendant, of course, docs not attempt to controvert so elementary a rule as the one suggested, but contends that the
effect of this evidence was not to vary or contradict the terms of the
writing. but to prove that there was never any delivery of it, and
hence that there never was any contract at all, delivery being prerequisite to the very existence o.f a contract. His claim is that the
"subscription paper was given to and received by Janney merely as an
escrow, or as in the nature of an escrow, only to be delivered or used
upon the performance of ccrtnin conditions precedent, and that until
they were performed there could be no valid delivery.
In determining this question it becomes important to consider the
nature of a subscription to the stock of a proposed corporation, and
the relation of the different parties to each other under the facts of this
case. A subscriptt'on by a number of persons to the stock of a corporation to be thereafter formed by tliem lias in la-..v a double character: First. It is a contract between the subscribers themselves
to become stockholders without further act on tliez"r part, immediately
upon the formation of the corporatt"on. As such a confract it is
binding and irrevocable from the date of the subscription (at least
i'n the absence of fraud or mistake), unless canceled by consent of
all the subscribers before acceptance by tl1e corporation. S econd.
It is also in the nature of a continuz"ng o_tfer to the proposed corporation, which, upon acceptance by it after its formation , becomes as
to each subscrt"ber a contract between him and the corporation. I
Mor. on Priv. Corp., § 47, et "seq.; Red Wing Hotel Company v. ·
Frederich, 26 Minn. I 12, I N. vV. Rep. 827. Janney, the promoter.
who solicited and obtained the subscriptions, occupied the position of
agent for the subscribers as a body, to hold the subscriptions until the
corporation was formed in accordance with the terms and conditions
expressed in the agreem~nt and then tum it over to the company without any further act of delivery on the part of the subscribers. The
corporation would then become the patty to enforce the rights of the
whole body of subscribers. It follows then, that, considering the
subscription as a contract between the subscribers, a ddh·ery to Janney

iff's stock. The competency of this evidence is the sole question in

this case.

Under the elementary rule of evidence that a written agreement can

not be varied or added to by parol, it is not competent for a sub-

scriber to stock to allege that he is but a conditional subscriber. The

condition must be inserted in the writing to be effectual. This role

applies with special lorce to a case like the present, where to allow

the defendant now to set up a secret parol arrangement by which he

may be released, while his fellow-subscribers continue to be bound,

would be a fraud, not only upon them, but upon the corporation

which had been organized on the faith of these subscriptions and upon

its creditors. The defendant, of course, does not attempt to contro-

vert so elementary a rule as the one suggested, but contends that the

effect of this evidence was not to vary or contradict the terms of the

writing, but to prove that there was never any delivery of it, and

hence that there never was any contract at all, delivery being pre-
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requisite to the very existence of a contract. His claim is that the

subscription paper was given to and received by Janney merely as an

escrow, or as in the nature of an escrow, only to be delivered or used

upon the performance of certain conditions precedent, and that until

thev were performed there could be no valid delivery.

In determining this question it becomes important to consider the

nature of a subscription to the stock of a proposed corporation, and

the relation of the different parties to each other under the facts of this

case. A subscription by a number of persons to the stock of a cor-

poration to be thereafter formed by them has in /a~u> a double char-

acter: First. It is a contract between the subscribers themselves

to become stockholders without further act on their part, immediately

upon the formation of the corporation. As such a contract it is

binding and irrevocable from the date of the subscription {at least

in the absence of fraud or mistake}, unless canceled by consent of

all the subscribers before acceptance by the corporation. Second.

It is also in the nature of a continuing offer to the proposed corpo-

ration, which, upon acceptance by it after its formation, becomes as

to each subscriber a contract between him and the corporation. I

Mor. on Priv. Corp., § 47, et'seq.; Red Wing Hotel Company v.-

Frederich, 26 Minn. 112, 1 N. W. Rep. 827. Janney, the promoter,

who solicited and obtained the subscriptions, occupied the position of

agent for the subscribers as a body, to hold the subscriptions until the

corporation was formed in accordance with the terms and conditions

expressed in the agreement and then turn it over to the company with-

out any further act of delivery on the part of the subscribers. The

corporation would then become the party to enforce the rights of the

whole body of subscribers. It follows then, that, considering the

subscription as a contract between the subscribers, a delivery to Janney
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scription became eo instatiti a binding contract. The case stands

precisely as a case where a contract is delivered by the obligor to the

obligee. It can not therefore be treated as a case where the writing

has been delivered to a third party in escrow.

The defendant, however, attempts to bring the case within the rule

of Westman v. Krumweide, 30 Minn. 313, 15 N. W. Rep. 225, in

which this court held that parol evidence was admissible to show that

a note delivered by the maker to the payee was not intended to be

operative as a contract from its delivery, but only upon the happening

of some contingency, though not expressed by its terms; that is, that

the delivery was only in the nature of an escrow. We so held upon

what seemed the great weight of authority, although the doctrine, even

to the extent it was applied in that case, is a somewhat dangerous

one. The distinction between proving by parol that the delivery of a

contract was conditional, and that the contract itself contained a con-

dition not expressed in the writing, is one founded more on refinement

of logic than upon sound practical grounds. It endangers the salutary
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rule that written contracts shall not be varied by parol. Said Earl,

J., in Pym v. Campbell, 6 El. & Bl. 370, in sustaining such a de-

fense: "I grant the risk that such a defense may be set up without

ground, and I agree that a jury should, therefore, look on such a de-

fense with suspicion." And in all the cases where such a defense has

been sustained, so far as we can discover, they have been cases strictlv

between the original parties, and where no one has changed his situa-

tion in reliance upon the contract and in ignorance of the secret oral

condition attached to the delivery, and hence no question of equitable

estoppel arose. Many of these cases have been careful to expressly

limit the rule to such cases. Benton v. Martin, 52 N. Y. 570; Sweet

v. Stevens, 7 R. I. 375.

Conceding the rule of Westman v. Krumweide, supra, to its full

extent, there are certain well-recognized doctrines of the law of equit-

able estoppel which render it inapplicable to the facts of the present

case. This subscription agreement was not intended to be the sole

contract of defendant. It was designed to be also signed by other

parties, and from its very nature defendant must have known this.

Each succeeding subscriber executed it more or less upon the faith of

the subscriptions of others preceding it. The paper purports on its

face to be a completed contract, containing all the terms and condi-

tions which the subscribers intended it should. When this agreement

was presented to others for subscription, defendant had not only signed

it in this form, but he had also done what, under the facts, constituted,

to all outward appearances at least, a complete and valid delivery.

He had placed it in the proper channel according to the ordinary and

usual course of procedure for passing it over to the corporation when

organized, and clothed Jannev with all indicia of authority to hold

and use it for that purpose without any other or further act on his

part, untrammeled by any condition other than those expressed in the

writing. In reliance upon this, others have not onlv subscribed to the

by a subscriber was a complete and valid delivery , so that his subscription became co instanti' a binding contract. The case stands
precisely as a case where a contract is delivered by the obligor to the
obligee. It can not therefore be treated as a case where the writing
has been delivered to a third party in escrow.
The defendant, however, attempts to bring the case within the rule '
of Westman v. Krutm·v eide, 30 Minn. 313, 15 N. W. Rep. 225, in
which this court held thnt parol e\'idence was admissible to show that
a note delivered by the maker to the payee was not intended to be
operative as a contract from its delivery, but only upon the happening
of some contingency, though not expressed by its terms; that is, that
the delivery was only in the nature of an escrow. We so held upon
what seemed the great weight of authority, although the doctrine, even
to the extent it was applied in that case, is a somewhat dangerous
one. The distinction between proving by p arol that the delivery of a
contract was conditional, and that the contract itself contained a condition not expressed in the writing, is one founded more on refinement
of logic than upon sound practical grounds. It endangers the salutary
ml e that written contracts shall not be varied by parol. Said Earl,
J., in Pym v. Campbell, 6 El. & BI. 370, in sustaining such a defense: "l grant the risk that such a defense may be set up without
ground, and I agree that a jury should, therefore , look on such a defense with suspicion." And in all the cases where such a defense has
been sustained, so far as we cary discover, they have been cases strictl.v
between the original parties, and where no one has changed his situation in reliance upon the contract and in ignorance of the secret oral
condition attached to the delivery, and hence no question of equitab)e
estoppel arose. Many of these cases have been careful to expressly
limit the rule to such cases. Benton v. Martin , 52 N. Y. 570; Sweet
v. Stevens, 7 R. I. 375.
Conceding the rule of Westman v. Knimweide, supra, to its full
extent, there are certain well-recognized doctrines of the law of equitable estoppel which render it inapplicable to the facts of the present
case. This subscription agreement was not intended to be the sole
contract of defendant. It was designed to be also signed by other
parties, and from its very nature defendant must have known this.
Each succeeding subscriber executed it more or less upon the faith of
the subscriptions of others preceding it. The paper purports on its
face to be a completed contract, contnining all the terms and conditions which the subscribers intended it should. When this agreement
was presented to others for subscription, defendant hnd not only signed
it in this form, but he had also done what, under the facts. constituted,
to all outward appearances at least, a complete nnd valid delivery.
He had placed it in the proper channel according to the ordinary a nd
u sual course of procedure for passing it over to the corporation when
organized, and clothed Jann ey with all indt'da of authority to bold
and use it for that purpose without any other or further act on his
part. untrammeled by any conditim1 other than those expressed 111 the
writing-. In reliance upon this, others have not only subscribed to the
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stock, but have since paid in a large share of it. The corporation

has been organized and engaged in business, expending large sums of
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money and contracting large liabilities, all upon the strength of these

subscriptions to its stock, and in entire ignorance of this secret oral

stock, but have since paid in a large share of it. The corporation
has been organized and engaged in business, expending large sums of
money and contracting large liabilities, all upon the strength of these
subscriptions to its stock, and in entire ignorance of this secret oral
condition which defendant now claims to have attached to the delivery. To permit defendant to relieve himself from liability on any
such ground, under this state of facts, would be a fraud on others who
have subscribed and paid for stock, upon the corporation which has
been organized and incurred liabilities in reliance upon the subscriptions, and on creditors who have trusted it. The familiar principle
of equitable estoppel by conduct appli.;:s, vi:t.: Where a person, by
his words or conduct, willfully causes another to believe in the existence of a ce1tain state of facts, and induces him to act on that belief
so as to alter his own previous condition, he is estopped from denying
the truth of such facts to the prejudice of the other.
\Ve have examined all the numerous cases cited by the defendants'
counsel, and fail to find one which, in our juclgrne11t, is analogou in
its facts, or the law of which will cover the present case. The two
which at first sight might seem most strongly in his favor, are Beloit
and :\1adison R. Co. v. Palmer, 19 \Vis. 574, and Ottawa, e tc., R. Co. Y.
Hall, I Brachv. (Ill. App.) 6 r 2. But an examination of the c cases\\ ill
show that in neither did or could any question of estoppel arise, and in
both the court held that the person to whom tht.:! instrument was dclirered after signature was a stranger to it, so that it was strictly a deli\'·
ery in escrow to a third party. Cases are cited where a surety signed a
bond or non-negotiable note. and delivered it to the principal obligor,
upon condition that it should not be delivered to the obligee until
~<>me other per on signed it, and where, without such signature, the
principal obligor delivered it to the obligee, and yet the courts held
that the surety was not liable , although the ohligee had no notice of
the condition. Such cases seem usually to proceed upon the theory
that a delivery to the principal obligor under such circumstances is a
mere delivery in escrow to a stranger; the term "stranger," in the
la w of escrows being used in opposition merely to the party to whom the
contract runs. It may well be doubted whether in such cases, where the
instrument is complete on its face, the courts have not sometimes ignored the law of equitable estoppel. No such defense would be allowed in !:'he case of negotiable paper, and it is not clear why the dis·
tinction should be drawn on that line. The doctrine of cstoppel rests
upon totally different grounds, and operates independently of negotiability, being founded upon principles of equity. But whether tl~e
cases referred to be right or wrong, we do not see that they are lll
point here. Our conclusion is that the court .e rred in admitting the
evidence objected to, and for that reason a new trial must be awarded.
Order reversed.
Note. See 1896 Phil. & D. Co. R. v. Conway, 177 Pa. St. 364. Also citations to § 99, supra, p. 456.

condition which defendant now claims to have attached to the deliv-

ery. To permit defendant to relieve himself from liability on any

such ground, under this state of facts, would be a fraud on others who

have subscribed and paid for stock, upon the corporation which has

been organized and incurred liabilities in reliance upon the subscrip-

tions, and on creditors who have trusted it. The familiar principle

of equitable estoppel by conduct applies, viz.: Where a person, bv

his words or conduct, willfully causes another to believe in the ex-
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Hall, 1 Bradw. (111. App.) 612. But an examination of these cases will

show that in neither did or could any question of estoppel arise, and in

both the court held that the person to whom the instrument was deliv-

ered after signature was a stranger to it, so that it was strictly a deliv-

ery in escrow to a third party. Cases are cited where a surety signed a

bond or non-negotiable note, and delivered it to the principal obligor,

upon condition that it should not be delivered to the obligee until

some other person signed it, and where, without such signature, the

principal obligor delivered it to the obligee, and yet the courts held

that the surety was not liable, although the obligee had no notice of

the condition. Such cases seem usually to proceed upon the theory

that a delivery to the principal obligor under such circumstances is a

mere delivery in escrow to a stranger; the term "stranger," in the

law of escrows being used in opposition merely to the party to whom the

contract runs. It may well be doubted whether in such cases, where the

instrument is complete on its face, the courts have not sometimes ig-

nored the law of equitable estoppel. No such defense would be al-

lowed in trie case of negotiable paper, and it is not clear why the dis-

tinction should be drawn on that line. The doctrine of estoppel rests

upon totally different grounds, and operates independently of negotia-

bility, being founded upon principles of equity. But whether the

cases referred to be right or wrong, we do not see that they are m

point here. Our conclusion is that the court erred in admitting the

evidence objected to, and for that reason a new trial must be awarded.

Order reversed.

Note.. See 1896 Phil. & D. Co. R. v. Conway, 177 Pa. St. 364. Also cita-

tions to § 99, suprn, p. 456.
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SAN JOAQUIN LAND AND WATER CO. v. WEST.

1892. In the Supreme Court of California. 94 Cal. Reports,

399-405; 29 Pac. Rep. 785.

See. 111. (3) Subscription to agent or trustee, for proposed

Appeal from a judgment of the superior court of San Joaquin

corporation.

county and from an order denying a new trial.

The following is a copy of the body of the agreement referred to in

SAN JOAQUIN LAND AND WATER CO. v. WEST.

the opinion of the court:

"We, the undersigned, hereby agree with each other, and the one

with the other, that a corporation shall be formed by us under the

1892.

name of 'San Joaquin Land and Water Company,' for the purpose of

IN

THE

SUPREME CouRT OF CALIFORNIA.
399-405 ; 29 Pac. Rep. 785.

94 Cal. Reports,

procuring water rights on one or more of the rivers or streams running

through the counties of Calaveras, Tuolumne, Stanislaus and San Joa-

quin, in this state; * * * that the capital stock of said corporation shall

be $1,000,000, divided into 10,000 shares of $100 per share; and we

hereby agree with each other, and one with the other, that we will take

the number of shares of the capital stock of said corporation which ap-

pears opposite our respective names hereunto subscribed, and will pay
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20 per cent, of the par value of said shares so subscribed by us re-

spectively in five (5) days after the articles of said incorporation shall

have been filed in the office of the county clerk of said county of San

Joaquin, and will pay the same to F. M. West, at the Stockton Sav-

ings and Loan Society Bank at Stockton, Cal. We hereby constitute

said F. M. West as the agent to collect the amount which becomes due

as aforesaid. We further nominate, constitute and appoint L. U. Ship-

pee, J. L. Beecher, and George Gray, as our agents, and the agents of

the corporation so to be formed, to negotiate for the purchase of any one

or more water rights, canals, reservoirs, aqueducts, or water-ways for

said corporation, and draw from said West any or all moneys that

may have been paid to him by us respectively, by virtue hereof, and

use said money for paying for same; and any and all contracts which

our said agents may make in said matter shall be binding upon said

corporation, and also upon us. Our said agents are further authorized

to employ engineers and other assistance, and have them survey routes

for such canals, and examine proper locations for dams, and do such

other service as may be, in their opinion, for our best interest and the

interest of said corporation to accomplish the object or purpose for

which the same is to be formed.

"Dated November 19, 1887."

Further facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Harrison, J. The controversy involved in this action arises out

of the construction to be given to the terms of an instrument executed

between the subscribers thereto for the incorporation of the plaintiff,

32—Wil. Cases.

Appeal from a judgment of the superior court of San Joaquin
county and from an order denying a new trial.
The following is a copy of the body of the agreement referred to in
the opinion of the court:
"We, the undersigned, hereby agree with each other, and the one
with the other, that a corporation shall be formed by us under the
name of •San Joaquin Land and Water Company,' for the purpose ot
procuring water rights on one or more of the rivers or streams running
through the counties of Calaveras, Tuolumne, Stanislaus and San Joaquin, in this state; • • • that the capital stock of said corporation shall
be $ 1 ,000,000, divided into 10,000 shares of $ roo per share ; and we
hereby agree with each other, and one with the other, that we will take
the number of shares of the capital stock of said corporation which appears opposite our respective names hereunto subscribed, and will pay
20 per cent. of the par valu e of said shares so subscribed hy us respectively in five (S) days after the articles of said incorporation shall
have been filed in the office of the county clerk of said county of San
Joaquin, and will pay the same to F. M. vVest, at the Stockton Savings and Loan Society Bank at Stockton, Cal. We hereby constitute
said F. M. \i\T est as the agent to collect the amount which becomes due
as aforesaid. We further nominate, constitute and appoint L. U. Shippee, J. L. Beecher, and George Gray, as our agents, and the agents of
the corporation so to be formed, to negotiate for the purchase of any one
or more water rights, canals, reservoirs, aqueducts, or water-ways for
aid corporation, and draw from said West any or all moneys that
may have been paid to him hy us respectively, by virtue hereof, and
use said money for paying for same; and any and all contracts which
our said agents may make in said matter shall be binding upon said
corporation, and also upon us. Our said agents are further authorized
to employ engineers and other assistance, and have them survey routes
for such canals, and examine proper locations for dams, and do such
other service as may be, in their opinion, for our best interest and the
interest of said corporation to accomplisn the object or purpose for
which the same is to be formed.
"Dated November 19, 1887."
Fmther facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
HARRISON, J. The controversy involved in this action arises out
of the construction to be given to the terms of an instrument executed
between the subscribers thereto for the incorporation of the plaintifft
32-WIL. CASES.
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and preliminary to such incorporation. The instrument itself was be-

fore this court in the case of West v. Crawford, 80 Cal. 19,1 and there
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set out at length. It was then held that West was authorized to col-
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lect in his own name twenty per cent, of the amount that the parties

and preliminary to s uch incorporation. The instrument itself was before this court in the case of West v. Crawford, 80 Cal. 19, 1 and there
set out at length. It was then held that Vv est was authorized to collect in his own name twenty per cent. of the amount that the parties
to that instrument had agreed to subscribe to the capital stock of the
plaintiff by reason of their express agreement therein to pay it to him.
After that decision the subscribers paid their twe nty per cent. to West,
and at the commencement of this action he had in his hands of the
amount so collected by him $35,861.25 , for the recovery of which
the plaintiff brought this action, as money had and r eceived by hi m to
and for its u se and benefit. After the commencement of the action
\Vest, under the order of the court therefor, paid the money to the
clerk of the court, to he he ld subject to the order of the court, and
the appellants were substituted as defendants in his place, and answered
the complaint. Upon the trial of the issues, the court r endered judg·
ment in favor of the plaintiff, from which the defendants who were
substituted for \Vest ha\"e appealed.,
1. The agreement in question is of that character which is not un·
frequently made by the subscribers to a corporation prior to its actual
incorporation, and as preliminary thereto, its obj ect b eing for their
mutual benefit and protection until the organization of the corporate
body, and also for the ultimate benefit of the corpqration. Upon the
formation of the corporation such an agreement, with its advantages
and rights, inures to the benefit of the corporation, irrespective of any
agreement or want of agreement to that effect, and notwithstanding
it m ay contain special provisions for carrying its OWtl terms into CX·
ecution.
By the express terms of this instrument, West was simply "the
agent to collect the amount" which should become due to the plaint·
iff by virtue of the subscription to its capital stock which the partie
to the instrument should make in pursuance of their agreement. B~·
the instrument itself, the subscribers agreed to ''take," i. e., to sub·
scribe for, the number of shares set opposite their names rl'spectively,
and "to pay t'vventy per cent. of the par value of said shares so sub·
scribed, and that they would pay 'the same' to West in five days after
t he articles of incorporation were fil ed. The only m oney which the suh·
scribers agreed to pay to \Vest was for the stock which they should sub·
scribe for to th e plaintiff, and \Vest \'Vas simply constituted the 'agent'
for the corporation, to collect the amount which sh ould become 'due'
under their subscription , and after its collection to hold it for the u c
and benefit of the corporation. By the same instrument, the suh·
scribers appointed the appellants, togeth er with one Shippee, as their
•agents,' and 'the agents o f the corporntion so to be formed,' with
authority 'to negotiate for the purch:t se' of prop erty 'for said corporation,' and draw from \Vest any or all .m oneys paid to him , 'and u!'t'
s aid money for paying for same.' " Giving to this langunge its re~
sonable construction, it was an authority to these three individuals, as
agents of the subscribers prior to the organization of the corporation,
1 See infra, p. 500.

to that instrument had agreed to suhscribe to the capital stock of the

plaintiff by reason of their express agreement therein to pay it to him.

After that decision the subscribers paid their twenty per cent, to West,

and at the commencement of this action he had in his hands of the

amount so collected by him $35,861.25, for the recovery of which

the plaintiff brought this action, as money had and received by him to

and for its use and benefit. After the commencement of the action

West, under the order of the court therefor, paid the money to the

clerk of the court, to be held subject to the order of the court, and

the appellants were substituted as defendants in his place, and answered

the complaint. Upon the trial of the issues, the court rendered judg-

ment in favor of the plaintiff, from which the defendants who were

substituted for West have appealed.

1. The agreement in question is of that character which is not un-

frequently made by the subscribers to a corporation prior to its actual

incorporation, and as preliminary thereto, its object being for their
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mutual benefit and protection until the organization of the corporate

body, and also for the ultimate benefit of the corporation. Upon the

formation of the corporation such an agreement, with its advantages

and rights, inures to the benefit of the corporation, irrespective of anv

agreement or want of agreement to that effect, and notwithstanding

it may contain special provisions for carrying its own terms into ex-

ecution.

By the express terms of this instrument, West was simply "the

agent to collect the amount" which should become due to the plaint-

iff by virtue of the subscription to its capital stock which the parties

to the instrument should make in pursuance of their agreement. By

the instrument itself, the subscribers agreed to ''take," i. e., to sub-

scribe for, the number of shares set opposite their names respectively,

and "to pay twenty per cent, of the par value of said shares so sub-

scribed, and that they would pay 'the same' to West in five davs after

the articles of incorporation were filed. The only money which the sub-

scribers agreed to pay to West was for the stock wdiich they should sub-

scribe for to the plaintiff, and West was simply constituted the'agent'

for the corporation, to collect the amount which should become 'due'

under their subscription, and after its collection to hold it for the use

and benefit of the corporation. By the same instrument, the sub-

scribers appointed the appellants, together with one Shippee, as their

•agents,' and 'the agents of the corporation so to be formed,'with

authority 'to negotiate for the purchase' of property 'for said corpo-

ration,' and draw from West anv or all moneys paid to him, 'and use

said money for paying for same.'" Giving to this language its rea-

sonable construction, it was an authority to these three individuals, as

agents of the subscribers prior to the organization of the corporation,

1 See infra, p. 500.
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to make negotiation for the purchase of property, and that upon the

499

formation of the corporation their agency for the subscribers should

cease, and thereafter they should act for the corporation. They could

not be the agents of the subscribers and of the corporation for the

same puqjose at the same time, inasmuch as the interests of the sub-

scribers as individuals would be adverse to the interests of the corpo-

ration. The instrument does not provide that the appellants with

Shippee would at any time be the custodians of the money collected

by West. They were only to "draw,' from him such money as they

might need to use in paying for any property that they should pur-

chase for the corporation, and as it is not claimed that they have nego-

tiated for the purchase of any property for the corporation, there was

no occasion for them to draw any of the money from West, or for

him to deliver it to them. They, as well as West, were at all times

after the incorporation of the plaintiff only its "agents," and having

no interest coupled with their agency, it was competent for the plaint-

iff to remove them at any time, and appoint other agents in their

places, or itself assume the custody and disposition of the money.
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The finding of the court, that, upon the incorporation of the plaintiff,

the appellants not only ceased to act as agents of the subscribers, but

that "before any of the moneys were paid to West they repudiated

such agency, and refused to act under said appointment, and wholly

abandoned the same," fully established the right of the plaintiff as

against their claim to the custody of the money.

The appellants, however, contend that the court below in its judg-

ment disregarded the construction given to the agreement by this court

in its opinion in the case of West v. Crawford, 80 Cal. 19, and that

it was then held that the plaintiff herein had no right to the custody

of the moneys which might be collected by West under that agree-

ment. While there is some language in that opinion that upholds

this contention, the opinion must be construed with reference to the

case before the court for its determination. That was merely whether

West could maintain an action for the recovery of the twenty per cent,

agreed to be paid by the subscribers, and his right to maintain such

action was upheld upon the ground that the subscribers had made an

express promise to pay it to him at a fixed date after the filing of the

articles of incorporation. The only parties before the court were

West and some of the subscribers, and the ultimate right to the cus-

tody of the money was not involved in the action. For the purpose

of meeting the argument of the appellants therein, that the money be-

longed to the corporation, and could be collected only by it in the

manner provided by statute for collecting assessments, it was stated

in the opinion that it did not appear from the agreement that the cor-

poration would ever be entitled to receive the money. It was not in-

tended thereby to preclude the corporation from asserting its right to

the money, nor could any statement in the opinion have that effect.

The corporation was not before the court, and as its right to the money

had not been submitted by it to the court for determination, it could

not be estopped by any statement in the opinion from subsequently

to make negotiation for the purchase of prope1ty, and that upon the
formation of the corporation their agency for the subscribers should
cease, and thereafter they should act for the corporation. They could
n ot be the agents of the subscribers ancl of the corporation for the
same purpose at the same time, inasmuch as the interests of the subscribers as indivi<luals would be adverse to the interests of the corporation. The instrument does not provide that the appellants with
Shippee would at any time be the custodians of the money collected
by West. They were only to "draw,' from him such money as they
might need to use in paying for any property that they should purchase for the corporation, and as it is not claimed that they have negotiated for the purchase of any property for the corporation, there was
no occasion for them to draw any of the money from West, or for
him to deliver it to them. They, as well a s West, were at all times
after the incorporation of the plaintiff only its "agents," and having
no interest coupled with their agency, it *as competent for the plaintiff to remove them at any time, and appoint other agents in their
places, or itself assume the custody and di sposition of the money.
The finding of the court, that, upon the incorporation of the plaintiff,
the appellants not only ceased to act as agents of the subscribers, but
that "before any of the moneys w ere paid to W est they repudiated
such agency, and refused to act under said appointment, and wholly
abandoned the same," fully es~ablished the right of the plaintiff as
against their claim to the custody of the money .
'fhe appellants, however, contend that the court below· in its judgment disregarded the construction given to the agreement by this court
in its opinion in the case of W est v. Crawford, 80 Cal. 19 1 and that
it was then held that the plaintiff h erein had no right to the custody
of the moneys which mig ht be collect ed by West under that agreement. While there is some language in that opinion that upholds
this contention, the opinion must be construed with r eference to the
case before the court for its determination. That was merely whether
West could maintain an action for the recovery of the twenty per cent. .
agreed to be paid by the subscribers, and his right to maintain su ch
action was upheld upon the ground that the subscribe rs h ad made an
express promise to pay it to him at a fixed date after th e filing of the
articles of incorpora tion. The only parties before the court were
West and some of the subscribers, and the ultimate righ t to the custody of the money was n ot involved in the actio n. For the purpose
of m eeting the argument of the appellants therein , th at the money belonged to the corporation, and could be collected only by it in the
manner provided b y statute for collecting assessm ents, it vvas stated
in the opinion that it did not appea r from the agreement that the corporation would ever be entitled to receive the money. It was not intended thereby to preclude the corporation from asserting its right to
the money, nor could any statement in the opinion h ave that effect.
The corporation was not before the court, and as its right to the money
had not been submitted by it to the court for determination, it could
not be estopped by any statement in the opinion from subsequently

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

500

WEST V. CRAWFORD.

asserting such right, and any statement in the opinion respecting its

500

right to the money would be only a dictum, and not binding either
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upon the court or the corporation.

asserting such right, and any statement in the opinion respecting its
right to the money would be only a dictum, and not binding either
upon the court or the corporation.
2. It was necessary that Shippee should have been made a party
defendant. The action was brought originally against West to recover
certain moneys which had been collected and were held by him for
the use and benefit of the plaintiff. This money was paid into the
court, and the appellants were substituted as de,fendants in the place
of West, and in their cross-complaint they asked that the money be
paid to them alone. Inasmuch as West held the money for the use
and benefit of the plaintiff, he could not, by paying that money into
court, change or diminish the right of the plaintiff to receive it, nor
was its right in any respect affected by the substitution of the appellants as defendants in the place of West. The appellants, after
having repudiated their agency, can not claim that Shippee's presence
in court was essential to
determination of the plaintiff's right.
Shippee and the appellants are in no respect tmstees under the instrument for the purposes of carrying into effect any of its provisions.
There was no trust created by the inst1ument other than such a trust
as always exists between a principal and his agent, nor do the moneys
in question constitute a trust fund to be disposed of under the directions of a court of equity. They are simply moneys belonging to
the plaintiff, and which it has the right at any time to demand from
its agent.
The judgment and order are affirmed.
GAROUTTE, J., and DE HAVEN, J., concurred.

2. It was necessary that Shippee should have been made a party

defendant. The action was brought originally against West to recover

certain moneys which had been collected and were held by him for

the use and benefit of the plaintiff. This money was paid into the

court, and the appellants were substituted as defendants in the place

of West, and in their cross-complaint they asked that the money be

paid to them alone. Inasmuch as West held the money for the use

and benefit of the plaintiff, he could not, by paying that money into

court, change or diminish the right of the plaintiff to receive it, nor

was its right in any respect affected by the substitution of the appel-

lants as defendants in the place of West. The appellants, after

having repudiated their agency, can not claim that Shippee's presence

in court was essential to a determination of the plaintiff's right.

Shippee and the appellants are in no respect trustees under the instru-

ment for the purposes of carrying into effect any of its provisions.

There was no trust created by the instrument other than such a trust

a
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as always exists between a principal and his agent, nor do the moneys

in question constitute a trust fund to be disposed of under the direc-

tions of a court of equity. They are simply moneys belonging to

the plaintiff, and which it has the right at any time to demand from

its agent.

The judgment and order are affirmed.

Garouttk, J., and De Haven, J., concurred.

Note. See note, p. 482.

Sec. 112. Same.

Works, J. Extracts from opinion in West v. Crawford, 8o Cal.

19, on pp. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32.

The action is not brought by a corporation, nor is this an attempt

to enforce an assessment made by a corporation. The contract sued

on is two-fold—it amounts to a subscription to the stock of a corpora-

Note.

tion, to be thereafter organized; and in addition, it is an express

See note, p. 482.

promise to pay to the plaintiff in this action twenty per cent, of the

amount of such subscription. The simple question, then, is, whether

or not this promise to pay the plaintiff can be enforced. The subse-

Sec. 112.

quent incorporation of the company named in the contract was a mat-

Same.

ter of no consequence, except that it fixed the time when the money

WoRKS,

should become due and payable, the agreement being to pay five days

after the articles of incorporation should be filed. The subsequent

J.

Extracts from opinion in West v. Crawford, 8o Cal.

19, on pp. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32.

action of the board of directors ordering the collection of twenty per

The action is not brought by a corporation, nor is this an attempt
to enforce an assessment made by a corporation. The contract sued
on is two-fold-it amounts to a subscription to the stock of a corporation, to be thereafter organized; and in addition, it is an express
promise to pay to the plaintiff in this action twenty per cent. of the
amount of such subscription. The simple question, then, is, whether
or not this promise to pay the plaintiff can be enforced. The subsequent incorporation of the company named in the contract was a m11tter of no consequence, except that it fixed the time when the money
should become due and payable, the ag-reement being to pay five days
after the articles of incorporation should be filed. The subsequent
action of the board of directors ordering the collection of twenty per
cent. of the money subscribed was wholly unimportant. If this action
is maintainable at all, it is not by reason of any such action on the

cent, of the money subscribed was wholly unimportant. If this action

is maintainable at all, it is not by reason of any such action on the
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It is true, as contended by counsel for the appellants, that the mere

signing of this agreement to subscribe to the stock of the corporation

did not make the defendants members of such corporation. To do so

the statute must have been complied with by the signing of the articles

of incorporation, or otherwise complying with its provisions. (Troy

and Boston Railroad Co. v. Tibbits, 18 Barb. 297; Erie and New

York City Railroad Company v. Owen, 32 Barb. 616; Dorris v.

Sweeney, 64 Barb. 639.)

But it seems to us that the question whether they thereby became

members of the corporation or not is immaterial to this controversy.

The right to recover here, as we have said, depends wholly upon

their express promise to pay the money to the plaintiff in this action,

and if the suit can not be maintained on that ground, it is quite clear

to us that the judgment of the court below is erroneous. * * *

It is insisted that the agreement sued upon was not binding until all

the capital stock had been subscribed for, but we see nothing in the

agreement indicating such an intention on the part of the signers, nor
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does any reason occur to us for so holding. There are authorities to

the effect that a party agreeing to subscribe to a certain number of

shares of a corporation to be organized can not be held liable to pay

assessments on his subscription until the whole of the stock is taken.

(Steamboat Co. v. Seawell, 78 Maine 176; Oldtown and Lincoln R.

Co. v. Veazie, 39 Maine 571; Atlantic Cotton Mills v. Abbott, 9

Cush. 423; Stoneham Branch R. Co. v. Gould, 2 Gray 277; Hughes

v. Antietam Mfg. Co., 34 Md. 316.)

But the contract under consideration bears evidence of a different

intention on the part of its signers. They contract to pay a sum of

money to a third party and not to the corporation. We must presume

that they contracted with knowledge of the fact that a valid incorpo-

ration of the company mentioned might take place under our code

without the whole of the stock being subscribed. Therefore, it can

not be presumed that their promise to pay was on condition that the

whole of the stock should be taken. If this was their intention, it

should have been expressed in the agreement.

The parties mutually agreed with each other, that is, with those

who signed the contract, to pay a certain sum of money to the plaint-

iff. He was thereby made a trustee of an express trust and author-

ized to collect the money agreed to be paid. (Code Civ. Proc,

§ 369; Winters v. Rush, 34 Cal. 136; Considerant v. Brisbane, 22

N. Y. 389.)

The parties, by their mutual agreement, made the plaintiff their

trustee to collect and receive the money to be paid. He was not in

any sense the trustee of the corporation. There is nothing to indicate

that the money was ever to go to the corporation. On the contrary,

the contract shows on its face that it was not. 'When collected by the

plaintiff it was to go into the hands of the other trustees, to be used

by them in the purchase of water rights. How these water rights are

part of the corporation, but by virtue of the mutual! promise of these
parties to pay to the plaintiff the amount of money named. • • •
It is true, as contended by counsel for the appellants, that the mere
signing of this agreement to subscribe to the stock of the corporation
<lid not make the defendants members of such corporation. To do so
the statute must have been complied with by the signing of the articles
of incorporation, or otherwise complying with its provisions. (Troy
and Boston Railroad Co. v. Tibbits, 18 Barb. 297•; Erie and New
York City Railroad Company v. Owen, 32 Barb. 616; Dorris v.
Sweeney, 64 Barb. 639.)
But it seems to us that the question whether they thereby became
members of the corporation or not is immaterial to this controversy.
The right to recover here, as we have said, depends wholly upon
their express promise to pay the money to the plaintiff in this action ,
and if the suit can not be maintained on that ground, it is quite clear
to us that the judgment of the court below is erroneous. • • •
It is insisted that the agreement sued upon was not binding until all
the capital stock had been subscribed for, but we s•ee nothing in the
agreement indicating such an intention on the pa1t of the signers, nor
does any reason occur to us for so holding. There are authorities to
the effect that a party agreeing to subscribe to a certain number of
hares of a corporation to be organized can not be held liable to pay
assessments on his subscription until the whole of the stock is taken.
(Steamboat Co. v. Seawell, 78 Maine 176; Oldtown and Lincoln R.
Co. v. Veazie, 39 Maine 571; Atlantic Cotton Mills v. Abbott, 9
Cush. 423; Stoneham Branch R. Co. v. Gould, 2 Gray 277; Hughes
v. Antietam Mfg. Co., 34 Md. 316.)
But the contract under consideration bears evidence of a different
intention on the part of its signers. They contract to pay a sum of
money to a third party and not to the corporation. ·we must presume
that they contracted with knov.·ledge of the fact that a valid incorporation of the company mentioned might take place under our code
without the whole of the stock being subscribed. Therefore, it can
not be presumed that their promise to pay was on condition that the
whole of the stock should be taken. If this was their intention, it
should have been expressed in the agreement.
The parties mutually agreed with each other, that is, with those
who signed the contract, to pay a certain sum of money to the plaintiff. He was thereby made a tnistee of an express trust and authorized to collect the money agreed to be paid. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 369; Winters v. Rush, 34 Cal. 136; Considerarnt v. Brisbane, 22
N. Y. 389.)
The parties, by their mutual agreement, made 1the plaintiff thet'r
trustee to colle"ct and receive the money to be paid. He was not in
any sense the trustee of the corporation. There is Jrlothing to indicate
that the money was ever to go to the corporation. On the contrary,
the contract shows on. its face that it was not. 'When collected by the
plaintiff it was to go' into the hands of the other trustees, to be used
by them in the purchase of water rights. How these water rights are
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to be transferred to the corporation, if at all, is not stated, but this

omission can not affect the liability of the parties to pay their debt.

502

Their mutual promise, one to the other, was a sufficient consideration

IN RE LICENSED VICTUALLEH.S

1
,

ETC., ASSOCIATION.

§

I I3

for the promise of each, and the contract was valid and binding.

to be transferred to the corporation, if at all, is not stated, but this
omission can not affect the liability of the parties to pay their .dcht.
Their mutual promise , one to the other, was a sufficient consideration
for the promise of each, and the contract was va lid and binding.
(Twin Creek and Turnpike Co. v. Lancaster, 79 Ky. 552; Christia n
College v . Hendley, 49 Cal. 347; George v. Harris, 4 N. H. 533,
I7 Am. Dec. 446; Amh~rst Academy v. Cowls, 6 Pick. 427, 17
Am. D ec. 387; Funk v. Hough, 29 Ill. 145.)
Note . Compare Lake Ontario, etc., R. Co. v. Curtiss, 80 N. Y. 219; Qui<'k

(Twin Creek and Turnpike Co. v. Lancaster, 79 Ky. 552: Christian

College v. Hendley, 49 Cal. 347; George v. Harris, 4 N. H. 533,

17 Am. Dec. 446; Amherst Academy v. Cowls, 6 Pick. 427, 17

Am. Dec. 387; Funk v. Hough, 29 111. 145.)

Note. Compare Lake Ontario, etc., R. Co. v. Curtiss, 80 N. Y. 219; Quick

v. Lemon, 105 111. 578.

See 23 Am. & E. Encvc, p. 800; Beach, § 519; Clark, p. 5272; Cook, §§ 57-C9;

Elliott, § 347; Morawetz, §§ 47, 66; I Thompson, § 1245.

Sec. 113. (4) Underwriting.

IN RE LICENSED VICTUALLERS' MUTUAL TRADING ASSOCIA-

v. Lemon, 105 Ill. 578.
See 23 Am. & E. Encyc., p. 800; Beach,§ 519; Clark. p. 272; Cook, §§ 57-W;
Elliott, § 347; Morawetz, §§ 47, 66; I Thompson, § 1245.

TION. Ex Parte AUDAIN.1

1889. In the English Court of Appeal. L. R. 42 Chancery

Division, i-S, 26 A. & E. C. C. 217.

After a company called the Licensed Victuallers' Mutual Trading

Association, Limited, had been formed, but before its shares had been

Sec. 113. (4)

fully offered to the public, George Rudall, an agent of the company,

Underwriting.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:16 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

applied on its behalf to Claude Audain, a stock broker and financial

IN RE LICENSED VICTUALLERS' MUTUAL TRADING ASSOCIA·
TION. Ex PARTE AUDAIN. 1

agent, who traded as Holloway & Co., to "underwrite" a portion of

its shares, which were of the nominal value of £1 each, and an agree-

ment was entered into between them, which was embodied in two

1889.

letters dated the 19th of March, 1888.

The first of these letters was written to Holloway & Co. by George

IN THE E:-tGLISH CouRT OF APPEAL. L. R. 42 Chancery
Division, 1-8, 26 A. & E. C. C. 217.

Rudall, and was as follows:

After a company called the Licensed Victuallers ' Mutual Trading
Association, Limited, had been formed, but before its shares had been
fully offered to the public, George Rudall , an agent of the company,
applied on its behalf to Claude Audain , a stock broker and financial
agent, who traded as Holloway & Co., to "underwrite" a portion of
its shares, which were of the nominal value of £1 each, and an agreement was entered into between them, which was embodied in two
letters dated the 19th of March, 1888.
The first of these letters was written to Holloway & Co. by Georg e
Rudall, and W:lS as follows:
"GENTLEMEN-In con sideration of your underwriting £10,000
'A' shares in the Licensed Victuallers' Mutual Trading Association,
Limited, at 15 per cent. discount, I, acting on behalf of the company,
undertake that all the applications which have been received up to
the present time, or may be received within one week of the closing of
the li sts, ·hall be allotted in full from the said 10,000 shares underwritten by yo u.
Yours truly,
GEORGE R uoALL."
The second letter was written to George Rudall by Auda in , a nd
was as follows:
"DEAR Sm-Referring to your fa,·or of even date, copy of which
we inc lose, w e hereby agree to underwrite £10 1000 'A' shares in the
Licensed Victuallers' Mutual Trading Associntion, Limited. on the
terms therein named. Yours faithfully,
HoLLo\vAY & Co.''
"P. S. We furth er agree to pay the appli cation money upon any
balance of shares required to make up the lO,ooo within one w eek's
date.
·
HOLLOWAY & Co."

"Gentlemen—In consideration of your underwriting ^10,000

'A' shares in the Licensed Victuallers' Mutual Trading Association,

Limited, at 15 per cent, discount, I, acting on behalf of the company,

undertake that all the applications which have been received up to

the present time, or may be received within one week of the closing of

the lists, shall be allotted in full from the said 10,000 shares under-

written by you. Yours truly, George Rudall."

The second letter was written to George Rudall by Audain, and

was as follows:

"Dear Sir—Referring to your favor of even date, copy of which

we inclose, we hereby agree to underwrite ^10,000 'A' shares in the

Licensed Victuallers' Mutual Trading Association, Limited, on the

terms therein named. Yours faithfully, Holloway & Co."

"P. S. We further agree to pay the application money upon any

balance of shares required to make up the 10,000 within one week's

date. Holloway & Co."

■Statement of facts abridged; arguments and opinions of Lindley and

Bowen, L. JJ., omitted.

1 Statement of facts abridged; arguments and opinions of Lindley and
Bowen, L. JJ., omitted.
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On the 14th of April, 1888, the company proceeded to allotment,

and 8,555 snares were, in pursuance of the agreement thus constituted,

§
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3

UNDERWRITING.

503

and without any further application for them being made, allotted to

Claude Audain under the name of Holloway & Co. Notice of such

allotment was given to him on the same day.

On the 17th of April Claude Audain returned to the company the

notice of allotment which had been sent to him, and at the same

time wrote to the secretary declining to take the shares.

On the 23d of May a resolution was passed for the voluntary wind-

ing-up of the company, and on the 16th of July an order was made

that the voluntary winding-up of the company should be continued

under the supervision of the court.

On the 17th of August, 1S88, the liquidator settled the name of

Holloway & Co. on the list of contributories in respect of these 8,555

shares.

Claude Audain then applied to be removed from the list of contrib-

utories, and his motion for that purpose came on before Mr. Justice

Chitty on the 20th of December, 1888.

Mr. Justice Chitty considered that the letter (Mr. Audain's letter of

the 19th of March, 188S) must be treated as an application for so
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many of the 10,000 shares to which the underwriting agreement ex-

tended as might not be applied for by the public, i. e., for the 8,555,

and that whatever question might have been raised at the time, the

case was merely the common case struck at by the 25th section of the

Companies Act, 1867. The parties, his lordship said, were appar-

ently not aware of the fact that issuing shares at a discount of 15 per

cent, was beyond the powers of the company; and he held that the

application, not having been made until after the winding up, must be

refused with costs.

From this decision Claude Audain appealed.

Cotton, L. J. This is an appeal from the refusal of Mr. Justice

Chitty to relieve the appellant from liability in respect of a number of

shares which had been allotted to him in a company now being wound

up, as the balance required to make up a certain number of 10.000

shares. The substantial question is whether the appellant is or is not

under any liability at all in respect to the shares so allotted to him.

That question turns upon the contract, and the contract, if any, is to be

found in the underwriting agreement which was entered into between

the appellant and the agent of the Licensed Victuallers' Mutual

Trading Association. From the evidence which has been given as

to the meaning of the expression "underwriting" as applied to shares,

it appears that an "underwriting" agreement means an agreement en-

tered into before the shares are brought before the public, that in the

event of the public not taking up the whole of them, or the number

mentioned in the agreement, the underwriter will, for an agreed com-

mission, take an allotment of such part of the shares as the public has

not applied for. That is what is meant when it is said that a person

has agreed to "underwrite" a certain number of shares in a company,

and that is, in my opinion, what was meant by the term "underwrite"

On the 14th of April, 1888, the company proceeded to allotment,
and 8,555 shares were, in pursuance of the agreement thus constituted,
and without any further application for them being made, allotted to
Claude Audain under the name of Holloway & Co. Notice of such
allotment was given to him on the same day.
On the I 7th of April Claude Audain returned to the company the
notice of a llotment whi ch had been sent to him, and at the same
time wrote to the secretary declining to take the shares.
On the 23d of May a resolution was passed for the voluntary winding-up of the company, and on the 16th of July an order was made
that the voluntary winding-up of the company should be continued
under the s upervision of the court.
On the 17th of August, 1888, the liquidator settled the name of
Holloway & Co. on the list of contributories in respect of these 8,555
shares.
Claude Audain then applied to be removed from the list of contributories, and his motion for that purpose came on before Mr. Justice
Chitty on the 20th of December, 1888.
Mr. Justice Chitty considered that the. letter (Mr. Audain's letter of
the 19th of March, 1888) must be treated as an application for so
many of the 101 000 shares to w·hich the undenvriting agreement extended as might not be applied for by the public, £. e., for the 8 ,555,
and that whatever question might have been raised at the time, the
t:ase was merely the common case struck at by the 25th section of the
Companies Act, 1867. The parties, his lordship said, were apparently not aware of the fact that iss uing shares at a di scount of 15 per
cent. was beyond the powers of the company; and he he ld that the
application, not having been made until after the winding up, must be
refu sed with costs.
From this decision Claude Audain appealec~.
CoTToN, L. J. This is an appeal from the refusal of Mr. Justice
Chitty to relieve the appellant from liability in respect of a number of
shares \vhich had been allotted to him in a company now being wound
up , as the balance required to make up a certain number of 10,000
shares. The substantia l question is whether the appellant is or is not
under any liability at all in respect to the shares so allotted to him.
That question turns upon the contract, and the contract, if any , is to be
found in the underwriting agreement which was entered into between
the appell ant and the agent of the Licensed Victuallers' Jlfutual
Tradi"ng Assodatz"on. From the evidence which has been given as
to the meaning of the expression "underwriting" as applied to shares ,
it appears that an "underwriting" agreement means an agreement entered into before the shares are brought hefore the public , that in the
event of the public not taking up the whole of them, or the number
mentioned in the agreement, the underwriter will, for an agreed commission , take an allotment of such part of the shares as the public has
not applied for. That is what is meant when it is said that a person
has agreed to "underwrite" a certain number of shares in a company,
and that is, in my opinion, what was meant by the term "underwrite»
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in the present agreement. "Underwriting" is a well-known thing in
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connection with the formation of companies. The appellant, in agreeing

§
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to "underwrite" a certain number of shares, has agreed to do this par-

in the present agreement. "Underwriting" is a well-known thing in
connection with the formation of companies. The appellant, in agreeing
to "underwrite" a certain number of shares, has agreed to do this particular thing, and, in my opinion, he is just as much bound in equity as
if the thing which he was to do had been set out at length in the contract which was entered into. (His lordship then read the letters of
19th March, 1888, and continued): It appears to be the usual course
that some formal application should be made for the shares, and it is
said that there should have been some formal application made for
allotment of the shares in the present case. But the postscript to the
letter writtten by the appellant shows that he considered that what he
had done amounted to an application, and that he himself treated the
letter not only as a guarantee, but as an application to take the balance
of the shares required to make up the £ ro,ooo.
A further question arises as to the meaning of the expression underwriting "at 15 percent. discount." It appears from the evidence
that the expression "discount" is an unusual term in connection '''ith
the underwriting of shares, and that it is not a term to which any me::ming of art can be given; and it fu1ther appears that under an underwriting agreement a commissi"on is paid on all the shares to which the
agreement applies, whether taken by the public or by the underwriter
himself. But the court must put a construction on the word. And
I think that upon the fair construction of the words used, they mean
not "discount" in the proper sense of the term, but merely "commission," the amount to be pai<l to the underwriter in respect of the
shares which he underwrote. It is not really a sum to be deducted
from the nominal amount of the shares when they are appl ied for and
allotted, but a sum to be paid on all the shares underwritten. "That
being so, it was not an agreement to allot shares at r 5 per cent. discount, but to pay r 5 per cent. commission to the appellant in consideration of his having made the contract with the company. I think,
therefore, that the decision of Mr. Ju stice Chitty was right in not removing the appellant's name from the register in respect of these
shares. The appeal must accordingly be dismissed.
Note . See Cook, § 15.

ticular thing, and, in my opinion, he is just as much bound in equity as

if the thing which he was to do had been set out at length in the con-

tract which was entered into. (His lordship then read the letters of

19th March, 1888, and continued): It appears to be the usual course

that some formal application should be made for the shares, and it is

said that there should have been some formal application made for

allotment of the shares in the present case. But the postscript to the

letter writtten by the appellant shows that he considered that what he

had done amounted to an application, and that he himself treated the

letter not only as a guarantee, but as an application to take the balance

of the shares required to make up the ^10,000.

A further question arises as to the meaning of the expression un-

derwriting "at 15 percent, discount." It appears from the evidence

that the expression "discount" is an unusual term in connection with

the underwriting of shares, and that it is not a term to which any mean-

ing of art can be given; and it further appears that under an under-

writing agreement a commission is paid on all the shares to which the
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agreement applies, whether taken by the public or by the underwriter

himself. But the court must put a construction on the word. And

I think that upon the fair construction of the words used, they mean

not "discount" in the proper sense of the term, but merely "commis-

sion," the amount to be paid to the underwriter in respect of the

shares which he underwrote. It is not really a sum to be deducted

from the nominal amount of the shares when they are applied for and

allotted, but a sum to be paid on all the shares underwritten. "That

being so, it was not an agreement to allot shares at 15 per cent, dis-

count, but to pay 15 per cent, commission to the appellant in consid-

eration of his having made the contract with the company. I think,

therefore, that the decision of Mr. Justice Chitty was right in not re-

moving the appellant's name from the register in respect of these

shares. The appeal must accordingly be dismissed.

Note. See Cook, § 15.

Sec. 114. (5) Application, allotment and notice.

In re FLORENCE LAND AND PUBLIC WORKS COMPANY, NICOL'S

CASE.1

1885. In the English Court of Appeal. L. R. 29 Chancery

Division, 421—447.

[The Florence Land and Public Works Company, Limited, was in-

corporated on the 25th of January, 1866, under the Companies Act,

1 Statement abridged. Only part of opinion of Chitty, J., of the Chancery

Division is given. Arguments and the opinions of Baggallay, Bowen and

Sec. 114. ( 5) Application, allotment and notice.

Fry, L. JJ. of Appeal, affirming Chitty's decision, are omitted.

IN RE

1885.

FLORENCE LAND AND PUBLIC WORKS COMPANY, NICOL'S
CA8E. 1

IN

THE

ENGLISH Coun1· OF APPE~L.
DiYision, 421-447 .

L. R. 29 Chancery

[The Florence Land and Public Works Company, Limited , was incorporated on the 25th of January, 1866, under the Companies Act,
1 Statement abridged.
Only part of opinion of Chitty, J ., of the Chancery
Division is given . Arguments and the opinions of Baggallay, Bowen and
Fry, L. JJ. of Appeal, affirming Chitty's decision , are omitted.
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1S62, with a nominal capital of ^500,000, divided into 25,000 shares

of .£20 each. The object of the company was to purchase a conces-

sion granted to Mr. H. D. Davies by the municipal corporation of the

§

114

APPLICATION AND ALLOTMENT.

505

city of Florence.

Negotiations having been commenced with the Agra and Master-

man's Bank to open a credit for the company for a large sum of money,

the bank consented to the proposal on condition that a certain number

of shares were bona jide subscribed for. In consequence of this a

memorandum of agreement was prepared in the following terms:

''We, the undersigned, hereby consent and agree to take the num-

ber of shares in the capital of the above company set opposite to

our names, and to pay the sum of per share into the hands of

the bankers of the company on or before the 1st of February, 1867,

and we further agree to sign the articles of association when required.

"25th January, 1S66."

This memorandum was signed by seventy-one persons, among whom

Mr. Tufnell signed for 250 shares, Mr. Ponsonby for 250, and

Mr. Joseph Wilkinson (who was not a subscriber of the memorandum

of association) for 100. The solicitor of the company having advised

that this memorandum of agreement would not be sufficient to consti-
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tute the subscribers shareholders without an allotment of shares to

them, a letter of allotment, signed by the secretary of the company,

was sent by order of the board on the 12th of April, 1866, to each

subscriber in the following form:

"Sir,

"I beg to inform you that the directors have allotted you shares

in this company.

''In accordance with the memorandum of agreement signed by you,

you will have to pay to the Agra and Masterman's Bank, Limited,

the bankers of the company, on or before the 1st day of February,

1867, the sum of j£ ."

The total number of shares thus allotted was 20,220.

The names of the allotees, however, were not entered on the reg-

ister of members, and no share certificates were issued to them; nor

was any money paid by them in respect of the shares.

In June, 1866, the Agra and Masterman's Bank stopped payment,

and the above mentioned memorandum and letters of allotment ap-

pear to have been treated as inoperative.

By an indenture, dated the 23d of March, 1869, and made be-

tween the company of the one part and H. D. Davics and J. T. Camp-

bell of the other part, an arrangement was made under which it

was agreed that the company should pay Davics and Campbell

,£80,000, and should allot them or their nominees 24,350 shares,

on which £10 each should be taken as paid, and that Davies and

Campbell should release the company from all claims upon them.

This deed was registered on the 21st of April, 1869. In accordance

with this agreement the board of directors, on the 6th of April, 1869,

1862, with a nominal capital of £soo,ooo, divided into 25,000 shares
of £20 each. The object of the company was to purchase a concession granted to Mr. H. D. Davies by the municipal corporation of the
city of Florence.
Negotiations having been commenced with the Agra and Masterman's Bank to open a credit for the company for a large sum of money,
the bank consented to die proposal on condition that a certain number
of shares were bona fide subscribed for. In consequence of this a
memorandum of agreement was prepared in the following terms:
'•We, the undersigned, hereby consent and agree to take the number of shares in the capital of the above company set opposite to
our names, and to pay the sum of £8 per share into the hands of
the bankers of the company on or before the 1st of February, 1867,
and we further agree to sign the articles of association when required.
"z5th January, 1866."
This memorandum was signed by seventy-one persons, among whom
Mr. Tufnell signed for 250 shares, Mr. Ponsonby for 250, and
~fr. Joseph Wilkinson (who was not a subscriber of the memorandum
of association) for 100. The solicitor of the company having advised
that this memorandum of agreement would not be sufficient to constitute the subscribers shareholders without an allotment of shares to
them, a letter of allotment, signed by the secretary of the company,
was sent by order of the .board on the 12th of April, 1866 1 to each
subscriber in the following form:
11
Sir 1
"I beg to inform you that the directors have allotted you - - shares
in this company.
"In accordance with the memorandum of agreement signed by you,
you will have to pay to the Agra and Masterman's Bank, Limited,
the bankers of the company, on or before the rst day of February,
i867 1 the sum of£--."
The total number of shares thus allotted was 20,220.
The names of the allotees, however, were not entered on the register of members, and no share certificates were issued to them; nor
was any money paid by them in respect of the shares.
In June, 1866 1 the Agra and Masterman's Bank stopped payment,
and the above mentioned memorandum and letters of allotment appear to have been treated as inoperative.
By an indenture, dated the 23d of March, 1869 1 and made between the company of the one part and l;I. D. Davies and J. T. Campbell of the other part, an arrangement was made under which it
was agreed that the company should pay Da\'ies and Campbell
£80,000 1 and should allot them or their nominees 24,350 shares,
on which £ro each should he taken as paid, and that Davies and
Campbell should release the company from all claims upon them.
This deed was registered on the 21st of April, 1869. l!l accordance
with this agreement the board of directors, on the 6th of April, 1869,
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passed a resolution cancelling the allotment of 20,200 shares, and

IN RE FLORENCE LAND, ETC., CO.

§

114

allotted 24,350 to Davies and Campbell and their nominees.

On the 21st of April, 1869, a return was made for the first time to

passed a resolution cancelling the allotment of 20,200 shares, and
allotted 24,350 to Davies and Campbell and their nominees.
On the 21st of April, 1869, a return was made for the first time to
the registration office of the 25,000 shares in accordance with this allotment, and similar returns were made in each year until the winding
up of the company. On the r6th of November, 1877, an order for
winding up of the company was made on a petition presented in the
month of July previous. At that time the register of shares comprised the whole capital of 25,000 shares, with £10 paid on each
share, which were divided between fifteen persons.
Wilkinson's
name did not appear on the register.
Wilkinson died in October, 1868, having appointed J. Nicol his
executor.
The official liquidator now applied to the court to rectify the register by striking out 100 of the shares of H. D. Davies, and entering
them as the shares of \Vilkinson.
The summons was heard before Mr. Justice Chitty on the 26th of
~ovember, 1883.]
CHITTY, J. This is an application by the official liquidator to
pla ce the executor of Mr. Wilkinson upon the list of contributories for
100 shares. Mr. Wilkinson's name had never been on the register of
the members of the company; from the year 1869 downwards, the
register of members has been filled up, and all the shares of the company appear to be held by members of whom Mr. Wilkinson is not
one. The liquidator has proved to my satisfaction that, in the year
1866, there was a complete contract to tnke shares on the part of Mr.
vVilkinson. The contract is shown in this way: There is what was
termed an "agreement" signed by Mr. Wilkinson and other gentlemen by which they consented and agreed to take a number of shares
in the company set opposite their names. That, of itself, of course,
was not an agreement. In point of law thnt was only an offer, and
the offer required acceptance on the part of the company. Beyond all
question the company accepted it; they accepted it possibly by their
having handed the document itself to the Agra and Masterman's
Bank, who '"'·ere able to make ad,· an~es. However that may be, the
company clearly accepted the offer in the manner I am about to mention. In the usual way the directors met, and they resolved to allot
the shares to the persons mentioned in what I haYe already called the
"offer," including Mr. vVilkinson, and they notified that to Mr. Wilkinson. Accordingly there was a complete contract on the part of
Mr. Wilkinson, also binding on the company, to take 100 shares.
The form of the resolution ·was, that the directors allotted 100 shares
to him, and the argument before me has proceeded to a great extent
on the meaning of the word "allot." There is no diffe1ence, as has
been often pointed out, between a contract to take shares and any
other contract.
What is termed "allotment" is generally neither
more or less than the acceptance by the company of the offer to take
shares. To take the common case, . the offer is to take a certain number of shares, or such a less number of shares as may be allotted.

the registration office of the 25,000 shares in accordance with this al-

lotment, and similar returns were made in each year until the winding

up of the company. On the 16th of November, 1877, an order for

winding up of the company was made on a petition presented in the

month of July previous. At that time the register of shares com-

prised the whole capital of 25,000 shares, with ^10 paid on each

share, which were divided between fifteen persons. Wilkinson's

name did not appear on the register.

Wilkinson died in October, 1S68, having appointed J. Nicol his

executor.

The official liquidator now applied to the court to rectify the regis-

ter by striking out 100 of the snares of H. D. Davies, and entering

them as the shares of Wilkinson.

The summons was heard before Mr. Justice Chitty on the 26th of

November, 1SS3.]

Chitty, J. This is an application by the official liquidator to
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place the executor of Mr. Wilkinson upon the list of contributories for

100 shares. Mr. Wilkinson's name had never been on the register of

the members of the company; from the year 1869 downwards, the

register of members has been filled up, and all the shares of the com-

pany appear to be held by members of whom Mr. Wilkinson is not

one. The liquidator has proved to my satisfaction that, in the year

1866, there was a complete contract to take shares on the part of Mr.

Wilkinson. The contract is shown in this way: There is what was

terined an "agreement" signed by Mr. Wilkinson and other gentle-

men by which they consented and agreed to take a number of shares

in the company set opposite their names. That, of itself, of course,

was not an agreement. In point of law that was only an offer, and

the offer required acceptance on the part of the company. Beyond all

question the company accepted it; they accepted it possibly by their

having handed the document itself to the Agra and Masterman's

Bank, who were able to make advances. However that may be, the

company clearly accepted the offer in the manner I am about to men-

tion. In the usual way the directors met, and they resolved to allot

the shares to the persons mentioned in what I have already called the

"offer," including Mr. Wilkinson, and they notified that to Mr. Wil-

kinson. Accordingly there was a complete contract on the part of

Mr. Wilkinson, also binding on the company, to take 100 shares.

The form of the resolution was, that the directors allotted 100 shares

to him, and the argument before me has proceeded to a great extent

on the meaning of the word "allot." There is no diffeience, as has

been often pointed out, between a contract to take shares and any

other contract. What is termed "allotment" is generally neither

more or less than the acceptance by the company of the offer to take

shares. To take the common case, the offer is to take a certain num-

ber of shares, or such a less number of shares as may be allotted.
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That offer is accepted by the allotment either of the total number

mentioned in the offer, or a less number, to be taken by the person

who made the offer. This constitutes a binding contract to take that

§ I 14

APPLICATION A:-,rl.> ALLOT'.\!El\T.

number according to the offer and acceptance. To my mind there is

no magic whatever in the term "allotment" as used in these circum-

stances. It is said that the allotment is an appropriation of a speci-

fied number of shares. It is an appropriation, not of specific shares,

but of a certain number of shares.

It does not, however, make the person who has thus agreed to take

the number of shares a member from that moment; all that it does is

simply this—it constitutes a binding contract under which the com-

pany is bound to make a complete allotment of the specified number

of shares, and under which the person who has made the offer and is

now bound by the acceptance is bound to take that particular number

of shares. In most cases the act of placingthe person who has agreed

to become a member on the register is a mere matter of form, and

may be described as a mere ministerial act; but it appears to me that

in point of law, all that is done by the process I have indicated, and

all that was done in this case, was to make a complete and binding

contract.
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As Lord Justice Baggallay said in In re Scottish Petroleum Com-

pany,1 "to constitute a binding contract to take shares in a com-

pany when such contract is based upon application and allotment, it

is necessary that there should be an application by the intending share-

holder, an allotment by the directors of the company of the shares ap-

plied for, and a communication by the directors to the applicant of

the fact of such allotment having been made." There Lord Justice

Baggallay used the term "allotment" in what appears to me to be the

proper sense of the term. It is only as constituting one of the steps

which go to form a complete contract. There have been other cases

in which the term has been used by judges, but I am satisfied that all

they meant was that there had been, in the particular case before

them, complete allotment; that is, that the name of the person who

had "agreed to become a member," to use the language of the 23d

section of the act, had been entered upon the register. Where the

contract exists and no question of delay or acquiescence arises, I re-

peat that the placing of the name of the person who has agreed to be-

come a member upon the register is a mere formal act, and it maybe

performed at some considerable interval of time. In most cases it is,

of course, the duty of the directors immediately after the so-called

allotment, that is to say, the notification of the acceptance of the

offer, to place the person's name on the register of members.

In this case, as I have said, the register, since the year 1869, has

been filled in so as to exhaust the total number of shares which could

be taken in the company, and Mr. Wilkinson's name is not to be

found on the register. What apparently was done was this: In 1869

the directors resolved to cancel the former allotment, and made new

allotments to the extent I have mentioned; and they made a complete

'23 Ch. D. 413, 430.

That offer is accepted by the allotment either of the total number
mentioned in the offer, or a less number, to be taken by the person
who made the offer. This comtitutes a bind ing contract to take that
num ber according to the offer and acceptance. To my mind there is
no magic whatever in the term "allotment" as used in these circumstances. It is said that the allotment is an appropriation of a specified number of shares. It is an appropriation, not of specific shares,
but of a certain number of shares.
It does not, however, make the person who has thus agreed to take
the number of !'hares a member from that moment; all that it does is
simply this-it constitutes a binding contract under which the company is bound to make a complete allotment of the specified number
of shares, and under which the person who has made the offer and is
now bound by the acceptance is bound to tak e that particular number
of share" In most cases the act of placing the person who has agreed
to become a member on the register is a mere matter of form, and
may be described as a mere mini sterial act; but it appears to me that
in point of law, all that is done by the process I have indicated, and
all that was done in this case, was to make a complete and binding
contract.
A-; Lord Justice Baggallay said in In re Scottish Petroleum Comp:i ny, 1 "to constitute a binding contract to take shares in a company when such contract is based u;)on application and allotment, it
i~ necessary that there should be an application by the intending shareholder, an allotment by the directors of the company of the· shares applied for, and a communication by the directors to the applicant of
the fact of such allotment having heen made." There Lord Justice
Ba'!gallay used the term ";illotment" in what appears to me to be the
proper sense of the term. It is only as constituting one of the steps
whi ch go to form a complete contract. There have been other cases
in which the term has been used by judges, but I am sati sfied that all
they meant was that there had been, in the patticular case before
them, complete allotment; that is, that the name of the person who
hacl "agreed to become a member," to use the language of the 23d
section of the act, had been entered upon the reg ister. Where the
contract exists and no question of delay or acquiescence arises, I repeat that the placing of the name of the person who has agreed to become a member upon the register is a mere forma l act, and it may be
performed at some considerable interval of time. In most cases it is,
o{ course, the duty of the directors immediately after the so-called
allotment, that is to say, the notification of the acceptance of the
offer. to place the person's name on the regi ster of me mbers.
In this case, as I have said, the register, since the year 1869, has
been filled in so as to exhaust the total number of shares which could
be taken in the company, and Mr. Wilkinson's n<1me is not to be
found on the register. What apparently was done was this: Jn r865)the directors re~olvcd to cancel the former allotment, and made n ew
allotments to the extent I have .mentioned; and they made a complete
1

23 Ch. D. 413, 430.
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The question really turns upon the act of parliament. I may state

allotment by entering upon the register the names of the persons who
had thus agreed in 1869 to become members in respect of the whole
of the shares.
The question really turns upon the act of parliament. I may state
that, according to my recollection, the term "allotment" is not even
mentioned in the act anywhere. The term "allotment" is a popular
term; it is not a technical term occurring in the act of parliament
itself. The 23d section says: "The subscribers of thP. memorandum
of association of any company under this act shall be deemed to have
agreed to become members of the company whose memorandum they
have subscribed, and upon the registration of the company shl\ll be
entered as members on the register of members hereinafter mentioned."
Now, stopping there, the decisions are quite clear that, where a
person has signed the memorandum, and afterward the company have
made a complete allotment of all the shares in the company by entering on the register the names of other persons who also agreed to become members, in the winding up the court will not place even the
person who has signed the memorandum on the list of contiibutories.
vVhy is that? Because the portion of the section which I have read
makes the signing of the memorandum the agreement, and then requires the further proceeding of placing that person's name upon the
register as a member. That is the construction which has been
adopted by the courts, and is settled law, with reference to the earlier
part of the 23d section. The second part of the section is this: "And
every other person who has agreed to become a member of the company under this act:, and whose name is entered on the register of
members, hall be deemed to be a member of the company." The
e ffect of the legislation in this part of the section is identical with the
legislation in the earlier part, the only difference being that the signing of the memorandum is by statutory enactment to be deemed to be
a contract to take shares, ""hereas in the case of other persons you
mu st have an actual contract to take the shares; and in both cases the
name is to he entered upon the register of members.
It seems to me that all the decisions in the earlier part of the session
apply with full force to the case which is now before me. If anything, this is an a fo1'1iori case, seeing that the eigtheenth section of
the act enacts that "the subscribers of the memorandum of associfltion : together with such other persons as may from time to time become members of the company , shall thereupon be a body corporate."
The persons who have subscribed the memorandum do at once constitute a corporate hody. Again, the language of that section tallies
with that of the twenty-third section. It is not "together with such
other persons as may from time to time agree to become m embers,''
but "together with such other persons as may from time to time become members."
The result, therefore, appears to me to be quite clear that the liquidator is in the position in which the company wou ld have found itself
if there had been no winding- up. and the company were endeavoring
to enforce specifi c performance of this contract. The answer, of

that, according to my recollection, the term "allotment" is not even

mentioned in the act anywhere. The term "allotment" is a popular

term; it is not a technical term occurring in the act of parliament

itself. The 23d section says: "The subscribers of the memorandum

of association of any company under this act shall be deemed to have

agreed to become members of the company whose memorandum they

have subscribed, and upon the registration of the company sha,ll be

entered as members on the register of members hereinafter mentioned."

Now, stopping there, the decisions are quite clear that, where a

person has signed the memorandum, and afterward the company have

made a complete allotment of all the shares in the company by enter-

ing on the register the names of other persons who also agreed to be-

come members, in the winding up the court will not place even the

person who has signed the memorandum on the list of contributories.

Why is that? Because the portion of the section which I have read

makes the signing of the memorandum the agreement, and then re-
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quires the further proceeding of placing that person's name upon the

register as a member. That is the construction which has been

adopted by the courts, and is settled law, with reference to the earlier

part of the 23d section. The second part of the section is this: "And

every other person who has agreed to become a member of the com-

pany under this act, and whose name is entered on the register of

members, shall be deemed to be a member of the company." The

effect of the legislation in this part of the section is identical with the

legislation in the earlier part, the only difference being that the sign-

ing of the memorandum is by statutory enactment to be deemed to be

a contract to take shares, whereas in the case of other persons you

must have an actual contract to take the shares; and in both cases the

name is to be entered upon the register of members.

It seems to me that all the decisions in the earlier part of the session

apply with full force to the case which is now before me. If anv-

thing. this is an a fortiori case, seeing that the eigtheenth section of

the act enacts that "the subscribers of the memorandum of associa-

tion, together with such other persons as may from time to time be-

come members of the company, shall thereupon be a body corporate."

The persons who have subscribed the memorandum do at once con-

stitute a corporate body. Agrain, the language of that section tallies

with that of the twenty-third section. It is not "together with such

other persons as may from time to time agree to become members,"

but "together with such other persons as may from time to time be-

come members."

The result, therefore, appears to me to be quite clear that the liqui-

dator is in the position in which the company would have found itself

if there had been no winding up, and the company were endeavoring

to enforce specific performance of this contract. The answer, of
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APPLICATION AND ALLOTMENT.

course, would be plain: • there has been such delay before the wind-

ing up—eight years or more having been allowed to elapse, and this

application not having been made until within a recent period—that

the court would refuse to enforce specific performance. On that

ground alone this application fails. If the persons who had agreed

to become members had acted as shareholders the consideration would

have been entirely different; but both parties, that is to say, the com-

pany on the one side and Mr. Wilkinson on the other, have acquiesced

in this state of things, that Mr. Wilkinson should not be treated as a

member. He has never on any occasion attempted to assert his

right, and he seems in the year 1869, when the act of cancellation

took place, to have submitted to it; but whether he submitted to it or

not, it is quite plain, since then, that he has acquiesced, and that if he

or his executor were to come now and say, "I am a member; put me

on the list of contributories, because there will be a surplus to be di-

vided in the winding up of this company," his application would be

refused, just as much as I think the application of the liquidator ought

to be refused now.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:16 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

I should say, that, to avoid any technical question, I allowed the

summons to stand over in order to serve the other persons whose

names appear upon the register. They do appear; they have argued

that there is no case against them made for rectifying the register;

they claim to be allowed to hold the shares which they purport to

hold for the long period I have mentioned, namely, from 1869; and

therefore it is impossible for me to exercise the power which is con-

ferred upon the court in the winding-up, to rectify the register of

members as against them, or, indeed, as I think, against Mr. Wilkin-

son. The result is that the application fails.

I ought to say this, that, although these directors have not power to

accept a surrender of the shares, yet they were the managers of the

company, and if the company itself have, just as in the case of any

ordinary individual corporation that has entered into a contract of

which specific performance is sought either by them or against them,

created an equity against themselves; and this is an equity in which

Mr. Wilkinson, by resisting what is in substance a suit for specific

performance, is setting up, and it appears to me successfully. There-

fore, no question arises as to the act of the directors being ultra vires,

because they have no power to accept surrenders. It appears to me

that Mr. Wilkinson's executor has succeeded, and I therefore refuse

the application.

Note. See 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. p. 791; Beach, § 514; Cook, §§ 23-66; El-

liott, §351. Re London and Northern Bank, 81 L. T. R. 512.

course, would be plain:· there has been such delay before the winding up-eight years or more having been allowed to elapse, and this
application not having been made until within a recent period-that
the court would refuse to enforce specific performance. On that
ground alone this application fails. If thf; persons who had agreed
to become members had acted as shareholders the consideration would
have been entirely different; but both parties, that is to say, the company on the one side and Mr. Wilkinson on the other, have acquiesced
in this state of things, that Mr. Wilkinson should not be treated as a
member. He has never on any occasion attempted to assert his
right, and he seems in the year 1869, when the act of cancellation
took place, to ha,·e submitted to it; but whether he submitted to it or
not, it is quite plain, since then, that he has acquiesced, and that if he
or his executor were to come now and say, "l am a member; put me
on the list of contributories, because there will be a surplus to be divided in the winding up of this company," his application would be
refused, just as much as I think the application of the liquidator ought
to be refused now.
I should say, that, to avoid any technical question, I allowed the
summons to stand over in order to serve the other persons whose
names appear upon the register. They do appear; they have argued
that there is no case against them made for rectifying the register;
they claim to be allowed to hold the shares which they purport to
hold for the long period I ha,·e mentioned, namely, from 1869; and
therefore it is impossible for me to exercise the pO\•ver which is conferred upon the court in the winding-up, to rectify the register of
members as against them, or, indeed, as I think, against Mr. Wilkinson. The result is that the application fails.
I ought to say this, that: although these directors h<tve not power to
accept a surrender of the shares, yet they were the managers of the
company, and if the company itself have, just as in the case of any
ordinary .individual corporation that has entered into a contract of
which specific performance is sought either by them or against them ,
created an equity against themselves; and this is an equity in which
Mr. Wilkinson, by resisting what is in substance a suit for specific
performance, is setting up, and it appears to me successfully. Therefore, no question arises as to the act of the directors being ultra vires,
because they have no power to accept surrenders. It appears to me
that Mr. Wilkinson's executor has succeeded, and I therefore refuse
the application.
Note. See 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. p. 791; Beach,§ 514; Cook,§§ 23-06; Elliott, §351. Re London and Northern Bank, 81 L. T. R. 512.
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ESTOPPEL. FORM OF CONTRACT. § I I 5

Sec. 115. (6) Estoppel. (See McCarthy v. LaVasche, 89 111.

270, 31 Am. Rep. 83, supra, p.253.)

Note. Voting alone is not sufficient to estop. 1882, Burgess v. Seligman,

107 TJ. S. 20; 1887, Union Sav. Ass'n v. Seligman, 92 Mo. 636, 1 Am. St. Rep.

776.

FORM OF SUBSCRIPTION TO STOCK IN A CORPORATION TO BE FORMED.

The following is suggested as a form for such subscription:

This agreement entered info among the parties whose names are under-

signed witnesseth:

That for and in consideration of the advantages arising to each of us from

concert of action through the form of a corporate organization, and of the

mutual promises and agreements herein contained, made each for himself and

with each of the others who have heretofore or who do hereafter sign this

agreement, subscribing for shares of stock in the corporation to be hereafter

formed, and of the further consideration of the efforts made and to be made

by [John Smith, and, etc.,] in procuring signatures hereto subscribing for

stock in said proposed corporation, upon the terms herein contained, and aid-

ing in incorporating and organizing the same, and of the further considera-

tion of $1 by each of us paid to each of the others, the receipt whereof is ac-
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knowledged,1 do hereby covenant and agree to form a corporation such as here-

inafter indicated, and do hereby, under our hands and seals' (hereby sev-

erally agreeing that one seal shall be the seal of each), subscribe to the

stock of such corporation the amounts set opposite our names, and do hereby

constitute and appoint the said [John Smith, etc.,] our agents and attorneys

to procure such subscriptions, and aid in organizing such corporation (for

which services said Smith, et al., are to receive the sum of dollars, to

be borne by each of the parties hereto in the proportion the stock subscribed

by him bears to the total stock subscribed, or for which services said Smith,

etc., are to receive shares of the stock of such corporation, fully paid

up) agreeing hereby to pay to said Smith, etc., , or, at their request, to

said corporation, the sum of dollars upon each share subscribed, when

the sum of dollars shall be subscribed, or at such time thereafter as

they shall designate upon days' prior notice, for the purposes herein-

after set forth.

This agreement shall become operative only in case the sum of

dollars shall be subscribed.

The name of said corporation shall be;

The location of the principal office shall be;

The purpose of such corporation shall be;

The amount of capital stock shall be , in shares of dollars each,

to be paid for as follows: [ dollars upon request of agents herein

named as above set forth, the balance upon call of directors in such sums and

at such time as the directors of such corporation shall designate upon

days' previous notice].

Said corporation shall be organized under the laws of the state of .

1 It would seem that such a provision was useless, but Mr. Taylor, Law of

Private Corporations, § 94, does not think so. Hence its insertion here.

! Mr. Taylor, § 94, and Prof. Langdell, in Summary of Contracts, § 186,

think the agreement should be under seal.
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Names.

Seals.

I6

I

CONDITIONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS .

•

No. of Shares.

Names.

Amount.

I

Seals.

I

No. of Shares.

I

Amount.

For form of World's Fair subscription contract, see 1 Cook Corp. (4th ed.)

p. 190.

ARTICLE IV. FORMS. CONDITIONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS.

:::::: ::::::::: ::: :::::::::I:::::::::::::::::::::::::::I:::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::I::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

Sec 116. Conditions may be express or implied.

ANDERSON Et Ah. v. MIDDLE AND E. T. CENTRAL R. CO.1

1891. In the Supreme Court of Tennessee. 91 Tenn. 44, 17

For form of World's Fair subscription contract, see 1 Cook Corp. (4th ed.)
p. 190.

S. W. Rep. 803.

Appeal from chancery court.

Lurton, J. A number of subscribers to the original stock of the

ARTICLE

defendant company have joined in filing this bill for the purpose of

IV.

FORMS.

CONDITIONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS,

enjoining suits at law upon their several contracts of subscription.

The corporation, expressly waiving all questions of jurisdiction, an-

swers, and submits the liability of complainants to the judgment of

Sec. 116. Conditions may be express or implied.

the court, and by cross-bill seeks a recovery against each of them.

ANDERSON ET AL. v. MIDDLE AND E.T. CENTRAL R. C0. 1
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The learned chancellor was of opinion that no liability existed, and

perpetually enjoined suits at law, and dismissed the cross-bill. In

support of this decree a number of propositions have been urged.

1891.

*••

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF TENNESSEE.
S. W. Rep. 803.

91 Tenn. 44, 17

2. The capital stock was fixed by the corporators, at a meeting

held for purposes of organization, at $3,000,000. Something less

than $50,000 of this had been taken when this bill wras filed. Com-

plainants' contention is that, until the whole of the stock is taken,

they can not be made liable for calls on their subscriptions. It is well

settled that there is an implied condition that the amount of stock

specified in the charter, articles of association, or contract of subscrip-

tion, or fixed by the corporators when authorized to settle same, shall

be actually taken before the subscribers shall become liable. Read

v. Gas Co,, 9 Heisk. 545; Mor. Priv. Corp., § 156; Burt Priv.

Corp., § 535. This implication may, however, be rebutted by the

terms of the charter, or the provisions of the enabling act, articles of

association, action of stockholders or corporation fixing capital, or by

the conditions of the contract of subscription. So a subscriber may-

waive such condition, and this waiver may be either express or im-

plied. A waiver will generally be implied if the subscriber consents

to the letting of contracts, the creation of debt, or the doing of any

1 Part of opinion and arguments omitted.

Appeal from chancery court.
LuRTON, ]. A number of subscribers to the original stock of the
defendant company have joined in filing this bill for the purpose of
enjoining suits at law upon their several contracts of subscription.
The corporation, expressly waiving all questions of jurisdiction, answers, and submits the liability of complainants to the judgment of
the court, and by cross-bill seeks a recovery against each of them.
The learned chancellor was of opinion that no liability existed, and
perpetually enjoined suits at law, and dismissed the cross-bill. In
support of this decree a number of propositions have been urgeci.

• • •

z. The capital stock was fixed by the corporators, at a meeting
held for purposes of organization, at $3 1 000,000. Something less
than $50,000 of this had been taken when this bill was filed. Complainants' contention is that, until the \<vhole of the stock is taken,
they can not be made liable for calls on their subscriptions. It is wel!
settled that there is an implied condii:ion that the amount of stock
specified in the charter, articles of association, or contract of subscription, or fixed by the corporators when authorized to settle same, shall
be actually taken before the subscrihers shall b ecome liable. R ea d
v. Gas Co,, 9 Heisk. 545; Mor. Priv. Corp., § I56; Burt Priv.
Corp., § 535. This irbplication m ay, howeyer, be rebutted by the
terms of the charter, or the provisions of the enabling act, articles of
association , action of stockholders or corporation fixing capital, or by
the conditions of the contract of subscription. So a suhscriber may
waive such condition, and this waiYer may be either express or implied. A waiver will generally be implied if the subscriber consents
to the Jetting of contracts, the creation of debt, or the doing of any
1

Part. of opinion and arglllncnts omitted .
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corporate act involving the necessity of calling in the subscribed stock,
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unless the charter expressly forbid the doing of any corporate act until

ANDERSON V. MIDDLE, ETC., R. CO.

§

116

the-requisite capital is taken. Mor. Priv. Corp., § 156; Burt Priv.

corporate act involving the necessity of calling in the subscribed stock,
unless the charter expressly forbid the doing of any corporate act until
the·requisite capital is taken. Mor. Priv. Corp., § 156; Burt Priv.
Corp., § 535, and authorities cited. There is nothing in the charter
or resolution fixing the amount of capital stock, or in the original
contract of subscription, rebutting the usual implied conditions, and
taking their contract of subscription out of the general rule of law.
But, after the original subscription had been made, a majority of the
subscribers entered into the following agreement: ''For the purpose
of enabling the Middle and East Tennessee Central R. Co. to put
their road under construction from the Chesapeake and Nashville
~ailroad to Hartsville, Tenn., the undersigned subscribers to the capital stock of the said M. & E. T. C. R. Co. agree that they will pay
their said subscriptions as fast as the work progresses, pro.,.· ided that
not more than 25 p er cent. shall be called for in any one month. "
Upon the faith of this agreement the directors let out a contract for
the construction of the very p art of the projected line contemplated
by this agreement, being eleven and one-half miles, and c0Ye1ing the
route between the Chesapeake and Nashville road and the tovrn of
Hartsville. The contractors were shown this supplementary agreement, and, upon the faith of it, accepted a contract to construct o
much of the road as was agreed to by that paper, and had completed
about 70 per cent. of the work when this suit was begun. The obvious effect of assenting .to this agreement was to waive the implied
condition that the whole of the stock should be rais"ed, and ,..-as an
undoubted agreement that the work should begin at the Chesapeake
and Nashville Railroad instead of the town of Galla~in. Some of
the complainants did not sign this agreement, and are not shown to
have assented, by votes or otherwise, to the commencement of work
or the creation of debt. There is proof that at a meeting of subscribers it was unanimously resolved that the directors should let out
a contract for that part of the line between Gallatin and Carthage,
but it is not shown that the complainants who failed or refused to sign
the agreement above set out in any way participated in this meeting,
or that their stock was represented. We therefore decide that such of
complainants as did not sign the agreement assenting to the beginning
of the work between the Chesapeake and Nashville Railroad and the
village of Hartsville are not now liable to have their stock called.
The remainder of the complainants have expressly agreed to the beginning of construction and to the pay ment of their stock as work
progressed, and as to them this implied condition has been waived.
3. Certain other positions remain to be considered as to those of
complainants who have waived the condition that the full capital stock
should be raised. It is said that the defendant company is now insolvent, and that the original scheme for a route from Gallatin to Knoxville can not be carri ed out, and that the enterprise has been dwarfed
to a short link , beginning eight and one-half miles from Gallatin. and
terminating at Hartsvill e. It is urged that the charter provided for a
road beginning at Gallatin , and not at a point on the Chesapeake and

Corp., § 535, and authorities cited. There is nothing in the charter

or resolution fixing the amount of capital stock, or in the original

contract of subscription, rebutting the usual implied conditions, and

taking their contract of subscription out of the general rule of law.

But, after the original subscription had been made, a majority of the

subscribers entered into the following agreement: "For the purpose

of enabling the Middle and East Tennessee Central R. Co. to put

their road under construction from the Chesapeake and Nashville

Railroad to Hartsville, Tenn., the undersigned subscribers to the cap-

ital stock of the said M. & E. T. C. R. Co. agree that they will pay

their said subscriptions as fast as the work progresses, provided that

not more than 25 per cent, shall be called for in any one month."

Upon the faith of this agreement the directors let out a contract for

the construction of the very part of the projected line contemplated

by this agreement, being eleven and one-half miles, and covering the

route between the Chesapeake and Nashville road and the town of
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Hartsville. The contractors were shown this supplementary agree-

ment, and, upon the faith of it, accepted a contract to construct so

much of the road as was agreed to by that paper, and had completed

about 70 per cent, of the work when this suit was begun. The obvi-

ous effect of assenting to this agreement was to waive the implied

condition that the whole of the stock should be raised, and was an

undoubted agreement that the work should begin at the Chesapeake

and Nashville Railroad instead of the town of Gallatin. Some of

the complainants did not sign this agreement, and are not shown to

have assented, by votes or otherwise, to the commencement of work

or the creation of debt. There is proof that at a meeting of sub-

scribers it was unanimously resolved that the directors should let out

a contract for that part of the line between Gallatin and Carthage,

but it is not shown that the complainants who failed or refused to sign

the agreement above set out in any way participated in this meeting,

or that their stock was represented. We therefore decide that such of

complainants as did not sign the agreement assenting to the beginning

of the work between the Chesapeake and Nashville Railroad and the

village of Hartsville are not now liable to have their stock called.

The remainder of the complainants have expressly agreed to the be-

ginning of construction and to the payment of their stock as work

progressed, and as to them this implied condition has been w'aived.

3. Certain other positions remain to be considered as to those of

complainants who have waived the condition that the full capital stock

should be raised. It is said that the defendant company is now insolv-

ent, and that the original scheme for a route from Gallatin to Knox-

ville can not be carried out, and that the enterprise has been dwarfed

to a short link, beginning eight and one-half miles from Gallatin, and

terminating at Hartsville. It is urged that the charter provided for a

road beginning at Gallatin, and not at a point on the Chesapeake and
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Nashville road, eight and one-half miles from Gallatin, and that it

should terminate at Knoxville, and not at the town of Hartsville; that

complainants are business men and property owners in Gallatin, and

§ 116

CONDITIONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS.

513

that the scheme into which they entered contemplated a great through

road, passing through the coal-fields of the Cumberland Mountains,

and connecting their city with other lines of railway and with the

flourishing city of Knoxville. They further insist that to procure

their subscriptions the officers and agents of the company represented

that no calls would be made upon their subscriptions until the com-

pany had secured a contract whereby, if it should build to Carthage,

it could consolidate with a road thence to Knoxville, to be built by a

Mr. Crawford, and that no call should be made until the Chesapeake

and Nashville road was constructed into Nashville, and a running ar-

rangement made by which the trains of the defendant company should

be carried into Nashville over the track of the Chesapeake and Nash-

ville; that none of these things have been done, or are now possible;

and that, therefore, they should not be held liable. The company,

for answer to the objection as to the beginning point of the road under

construction, interpose an alleged amendment to the charter, fixing

the beginning point at the Chesapeake and Nashville Railroad, near
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Gallatin. This amendment was obtained in 1884, upon application

of the directors, as provided by the act of 1875, as amended by the

act of 1883, ch. 163. It was duly registered in Sumner county, but

appears never to have been registered with the secretary of state.

This neglect makes the amendment, even if otherwise valid, ineffect-

ual and void. An amendment must be registered as the original,

and, until this is done, is subject to the same objection which renders

void a defectively registered charter. Brewer v. State, 7 Lea 682.

Another amendment was obtained pending this suit, changing the

termini to the Chesapeake and Nashville Railroad near Gallatin, and

the town of Carthage in Smith county. This amendment seems to

have been in all respects properly registered. By it the capital stock

was reduced to $350,000. This reduction does not help the case, in-

asmuch as it is not shown that even this has been taken, to say noth-

ing of other objections not necessary to consider. Without passing

upon the validity of this second amendment, we are of opinion that,

whether valid or invalid, the complainants are estopped to question

their liability as subscribers. They expressly agreed that, to enable

the company to put under construction the line between the Chesa-

peake and Nashville Railroad and town of Hartsville, they would

pay their subscriptions as that work progressed, in calls of 25 per

cent, monthly. It is too late now to say that the line has not been

l>egun at Gallatin, or that it can not be carried beyond Hartsville.

We know of no reason why this company might not have begun the

work of construction at any point on the line between Gallatin and

Knoxville. If its finances should prove insufficient to connect the

part so constructed with the charter termini, this ought not, in law or

equity, to relieve the subscribers who assented to the beginning of so

33—Wil. Cases.

~ashville

road, eight and one-half miles from Gallatin, and that it
:-.bould terminate at Knoxville, and not at the town of Hartsville; that
complainants are business men and property owners in Gallatin, and
that the scheme into which they entered contemplated a great through
road, passing through the coal-fields of the Cumberland Mountains,
and connecting their city with other lines of railway and with the
flourishing city of Knoxville. They further insist that to procure
their subscriptions the officers and agents of the company represented
that no calls would be made upon their subscriptions until the company hacl secured a contract whereby, if it should build to Carthage,
it could consolidate with a road thence to Knoxville, to be built by a
Mr. Crawford, and that no call should be made until the Chesapeake
and ~ashville road was constructed into Nashville, and a running ar•
rangement made by which the trains of the defendant company should
be carried into Nashville over the track of the Chesapeake and Nash,·ille; that none of these things h~n: e been done, or arc now possible;
and that, therefore, they should not be held liable. The company,
£or answer to the objection as to the beginning point of the road under
construction, interpose an alleged amendment to the charter, fixing
the beginning point at the Chesapeake and Nashville Railroad, near
Gallatin. This amendment was obtained in 1884, upon application
of the directors, as proYided .by the act of 1875, as amended by the
act of 1883, ch. 163. It was duly registered in Sumner county , but
appears never to have been registered with the secretary of state.
Thi neglect makes the amendment, even if otherwise valid , ineffectual and Yoid. An amendment must be registered as the original ,
and , until this is done, is subject to the same objection which renders
,·oi<l a defectively registered charter. Brewer v. State, 7 Lea 682.
Another amendment was obtained pending this suit, changing the
termini to the Chesapeake and Nash ville Railroad near Gallatin , and
the town of Carthage in Smith county. This amendment seems to
have been in all respects properly registered. By it the capital stock
was reduced to $350,000. This reduction does not help the case, ina ·much as it is not showrt that even this has been taken, to say nothing of other objections not necessary to consider. Without passing
upon the validity of this second amendment, we are of opinion that,
whether valid or invalid, the complainants are estopped to question
their liability as subscribers. They expressly agreed that, to enable
the company to put under construction the line between the Chesapeake and Nashville Railroad and town of Hartsville, they would
pay their subscriptions as that work progressed, in calls of 25 per
cent. monthly. It is too late now to say that the line has not been
begun at Gallatin , or that it can not be carried beyond Hartsville.
We know of no reason why this company might not have begun the
work of con truction at any poi nt on the line between Gallatin and
Knox\'ille. If its finances should prove insufficient to connect the
part so constructed v•ith the charter termini , this ought not, in law or
equity, to r elieve the subscribers who assented to the beginning of se>
33- Wu ..
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great an enterprise upon so insufficient a capital. The representations

514

made to induce subscriptions were all made antecedent to the written

TAGGART V . WESTERN

~IARYLAND

R . CO .

contract of subscription, and upon this ground, as tending to contra-

great an enterprise upon so insufficient a capital. The r epresentations
made to induce subscriptions were all made antecedent to the written
contract of subscription, an<l upon this ground, as tending to contradict the written contract, were excluded. This ruling was doubtless
correct. • • • Decree reversed as to all complainants, except
Anderson, Miller and Thompson.

dict the written contract, were excluded. This ruling was doubtless

correct. » * « Decree reversed as to all complainants, except

Anderson, Miller and Thompson.

Note. See Denny Hotel Co. v. Schram, 6 Wash. 134, 36 Am. St. R. 137,

Mfra, p. 553; Angell & Ames, §§ 146, 543; Beach, §§ 531-41; Boone, § 110;

Clark, §§ 107-9; Cook, §§ 77-89; Elliott, §S 352-9; Morawetz, §§ 78-93; Tay-

lor, §§ 517, 518-21; I Thompson, §§ 1235-42; VII lb., § 8(512.

Note. See Denny Hotel Co. v. Schram, 6 Wash. 134, 36 Am. St. R. 137,
i1tfm, p. 553 ; Angell & Ames,§~ 1-1-6. 543; Beach.§§ 531--41; Boone,§ 110;
Clark,§§ 107- 9; Cook, §§ 77-89; Elliott, §§ 352-9; Morawetz, §§ 78-P3; Taylor, §§ :)17, 518-21; I Thompson,§§ 1235--12; VII lb.,§ 8612.

That all stock must be subscribed before any subscriber, who is not

estopped by bis own acts, sball be called upon to pay anything except for

preliminary or organization expenses, see 1827, Salem Mill Dam Corp. v.

Ropes, (i Pick. (Mass.) 23; 1854, Stoneham Branch R. Co. v. Gould, 2Uray

That all stock must be subscribed before any subscriber, who is not
estoppecl hy his own acts, shall be called upon to pay anything except for
preliminary or organization expenses, see 1827, Salem Mill Dam Corp. v.
Ropes, 6 Pick. (Mass.) ~3; 1854, Stoneham Brandt R. Co. v. Goul d, 2 Gray
(Mass. ) 277; 1872, P eoria & R. I. R. Co. v. Preston, 35 Iowa 115; 1876, Warwick R. Co. v. Catly, 11 R. I. 131; 1878, Allman v. Havana R. & E. Co.,~
Ill. 521; 187!>, Banty v. Buckles, 68 Ind . 49; 1885 . Halsey Fire Eng. Go. v.
Donovan , 57 Mich. 318; 1886, Rockla nd Mt. D. & S. S. Co. v. Sewall, i
Maine 167; 1887, Haskell v. Worthington, 94 Mo. 560; 1889, Anvil Mining
Co. v. Sherman, 74 Wis. 226; 1891, Association v. Walker, 88 Mich. 62, 49 N.
W. 1086; 18\)4, Stearn s v. Sopri s, 4 Ct)lo. App. 191; 1895, McKay v. Elwood,
12 Wash . 579; 1898, Cusick v. Bartlet, 91 Maine 1.53; 1898, McFarland v.
West Side [mp. Assn., 56 Neb. 277, 76 N. W . 584. Bnt Sfle 1855, York, etc., R.
v. Pratt, 40 Maine 447; 1878, Cheraw, etc., R . v. White, 10 S. C. 155; 1891,
Hamilton v. Clarion, etc. , R., 144 Pa. St. 34.
This rule, however, does not apply to s ubscriptions to authorized increases
of stock. 1856, Nutter v. Lexington, etc., R., 72 Mass. 85; 1877, Clarke v.
Thomas, 34 0. S. 46; 1886, Delano v. Entler, 118 U.S. 634; 1889, Avegnov.
Citizens' Bonk, 40 La. Ann. 799; 1891, Bank v. Eaton, 141 U. S. 227; 1891,
Port Edwards, etc. R. v. Arpin, 80 Wis. 214.

(Mass.) 277; 1872, Peoria & R. I. R. Co. v. Preston, 35 Iowa 115; 1876, War-

wick R. Co. v. Cady, 11 R. I. 131; 1878, Allman v. Havana R. & E. Co., 88

111.521; 1879, Bantv v. Buckles, 68 Ind. 49; 1885. Halsev Fire Eng. Co. v.

Donovan, 57 Mich. 318; 1886, Rockland Mt. D. & S. S. Co. v. Sewall, 78

Maine 167; 1887, Haskell v. Worthington, 94 Mo. 560; 1889, Anvil Mining
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Co. v. Sherman, 74 Wis. 226; 1891, Association v. Walker, 88 Mich. 62, 49X.

W. 1086; 1894, Stearns v. Sopris, 4 Colo. App. 191; 1895, McKav v. Elwood,

12 Wash. 579; 1898, Cusick v. Bartlet, 91 Maine 153; 1898, McFarland v.

West Side Imp. Assn., 56 Neb. 277, 76 N. W. 584. But see 1&55, York, etc., R.

v. Pratt, 40 Maine 447; 1878, Cheraw, etc., R. v. White, 10 S. C. 155; 1891,

Hamilton v. Clarion, etc., R., 144 Pa. St. 34.

This rule, however, does not apply to subscriptions to authorized increases

of stock. 1856, Nutter v. Lexington, etc., R., 72 Mass. 85; 1877, Clarke v.

Thomas, 34 O. S. 46; 1886, Delano v. Butler, 118 U. S. 634; 1889, Avegnov.

Citizens' Bank, 40 La. Ann. 799; 1891, Bank v. Eaton, 141 U. S. 227; 1891,

Port Edwards, etc. R. v. Arpin, 80 Wis. 214.

Set*. 117. Express conditions may be attached to subscriptions

made (i) before, or (2) after incorporation. Payment of

deposits.

TAGGART v. THE WESTERN MARYLAND R. COMPANY.1

See. 117.

1866. In the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 24 Md. Re-

Express conditions may be attached to subscriptions
made ( 1 ) before, or ( 2 ) after incorporation. Payment of
deposits .

ports, 563-597, 89 Am. Dec. 760.

Action by railroad company to enforce stock subscriptions.

Bowie, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The general assembly, at January session, 18^2, incorporated "The

TAGGART v. THE WESTERN MARYLA.ND R. COMPANY.1

Baltimore, Carroll and Frederick Railroad Company." with a clause

prescribing certain preliminaries usually observed in opening the

1866.

books and taking subscriptions for stock, prior to the organization of

IN THE Cou RT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.

24 Md. Re·

ports, 563-597, 89 Am. Dec. 76o.

a company, among others, the prepayment of $1 per share on every

share subscribed; also, requiring the road therein contemplated to be

Action by railroad company to enforce stock subscriptions.
B owrn, C . J. , delivered the opinion of the court.
The general assembly, at Janunn· session , 1852, incorporated " The
Baltimore, Carroll and Frederick Rail road C ompany," \·vith a cl:rnsc
prescribino- certain preliminarier-; usually obsen·ed in opening the
books anl'taking subscriptions for stock, prior to the organization of
a company , among others, the prepayment of ~ 1 per sh are on every
share subscribed : also. requiring the rond therem contemplated to be
commenced within three years and fini sh ed within ten from the pHssage of the act, otherwise the same should l;>e null and void. Books

commenced within three years and finished within ten from the pas-

sage of the act, otherwise the same should be null and void. Books

1 Arguments omitted; statement of facts, except as appears in opinion of

court, omitted. Part of opinion relating to other points, omitted.

1 Arguments omitted; st!lt~ment o~ facts, except !1S appel!-rs in opinion of
court, omitted. Part of opm1on relat mg to other pomts, omitted.
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were opened by the commissioners, the requisite number of shares

s ibscribed, a board of directors and a president were elected and the

CONDITIONAL SUBSC RIPTIONS.

company fully organized.

After this organization the appellant, on the 28th of April, 1853,

were opened hy the commissioners, the requi::.ite number of shares
s 1bscribed, a board of directors and a president were electeJ and the
com pany fully organized.
After this organization the appellant, on the 28th of April, 1853,
subscribed for ten shares, in one of the subscription books, held by
Mr. Johnson, upon the terms a.n d conditions prescribed therein and
the charter, with this condition annexed: '' Prov ided, The said contemplated road should be built on the then present track of the then
existing branch to 'Green Spring,' of the Baltimore and Susquehanna
Railroad," but did not pay the sum of $1 per share , required by the
charter to be paid to the commissioners, at the time of subscribing.
The name of the corporation was subsequentl y changed, by· act of
assembly, to that of "The Western l\faryland Railroad Company."
The defendant's subscription, with other:;, was returned to the !'.tockholders, and classified :imong the conditional subscription s. The construction of the road not having been commenced within the time
prescribed by the original charter, the act of 1856, ch. 289. was passed,
waiving all claims of forfeiture, by reason of the company's failure to
comply with any of the provisions of the act of incorporation, and
allowing six years for the commencement, and twelve from the passage of the act for the completion of the road.
The "Green Spring" branch of the Baltimore and Susquehanna
Railroad was adopted by the appellee on the 31 st of March, 1857,
and the road put under contract for construction. No calls were made
for payment of subscriptions until the 25th of June, 1857. The appellee never indicated, affirmatively, any intention of abancloning the
work of the appellant; never affirmatively v ..·ithdrcw his subscription,
or attended any meeting of the stockholders or subscribers to the
stock.
Several calls for installments having been made and refused. this
action was brought on the 1st of February, 1861. The prayers offered
by the plaintiff (now appellee), and granted by the court, present
three negative propositions:
r. That the change in the corporate name of the appellee by the
act of 1853, ch. 37, is not a bar to the present action.
2. That upon the finding of the facts therein before specified, the
non-payment of $1 p er share by the defendant, at the time of his supposed subscription , £s not of itself a bar to the present action.
3. That the failure to commence the work within three years from
the act of incorporation (1852, ch. 304), the act of 1856, ch. 289, being duly passed and accepted by the stockholders of the pla in tiff, is
not a bar to this suit.
The first proposition is admitted, but the second and third propositions ar~ specially deni ed by the prayers of the defendant, which
were rejected by the court, and constitute the ground of this appe;il.
The first and third prayers of the appellant are the converse of the
appellee's second; the appellant' s second praye r, of the appcllec's
third.
The learned counsel differ as to the range of the first and third

subscribed for ten shares, in one of the subscription books, held by

Mr. Johnson, upon the terms and conditions prescribed therein and

the charter, with this condition annexed: "Provided, The said con-

templated road should be built 011 the then present track of the then

existing branch to 'Green Spring,' of the Baltimore and Susquehanna

Railroad," but did not pay the sum of $1 per share, required by the

charter to be paid to the commissioners, at the time of subscribing.

The name of the corporation was subsequently changed, by act of

assembly, to that of ''The Western Maryland Railroad Company."

The defendant's subscription, with others, was returned to the stock-

holders, and classified among the conditional subscriptions. The con-

struction of the road not having been commenced within the time

prescribed by the original charter, the act of 1S56, ch. 2S9, was passed,

waiving all claims of forfeiture, by reason of the company's failure to

comply with any of the provisions of the act of incorporation, and

allowing six years for the commencement, and twelve from the pas-
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sage of the act for the completion of the road.

The "Green Spring" branch of the Baltimore and Susquehanna

Railroad was adopted by the appellee on the 31st of March, 1857,

and the road put under contract for construction. No calls were made

for payment of subscriptions until the 25th of June, 1857. The ap-

pellee never indicated, affirmatively, any intention of abandoning the

work of the appellant; never affirmatively withdrew his subscription,

or attended any meeting of the stockholders or subscribers to the

stock.

Several calls for installments having been made and refused, this

action was brought on the 1st of February, 1861. The prayers offered

l
I

by the plaintiff (now appellee), and granted by the court, present

three negative propositions:

1. That the change in the coqoorate name of the appellee by the

act of 1853, ch. 37, is not a bar to the present action.

2. That upon the finding of the facts therein before specified, the

non-payment of $1 per share by the defendant, at the time of his sup-

posed subscription, is not of itself a bar to the present action.

3. That the failure to commence the work within three years from

the act of incorporation (1852, ch. 304), the act of 1856, ch. 289, be-

ing duly passed and accepted by the stockholders of the plaintiff, is

not a bar to this suit.

The first proposition is admitted, but the second and third propo-

sitions art specially denied by the prayers of the defendant, which

were rejected by the court, and constitute the ground of this appeal.

The first and third prayers of the appellant are the converse of the

appellee's second; the appellant's second prayer, of the appellee's

third.

The learned counsel differ as to the range of the first and third
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prayers. The appellee contends they present only the question of the

516

effect of the non-payment of the cash installment of $i at the time of

TAGGART V. WESTERN MARYLAND R. CO.

§ I 17

the subscribing; on the other hand, it is insisted they embrace the

conditional character of the subscription, and the validity of such. It

prayers. The appellee contends they present only the question of the
effect of the non-payment of the cash installment of $1 at the time of
the subscribing; on the other hand, it is insisted they embrace the
conditional character of the subscription, and the validity of such. It
is observable that these prayers refer specifically to the subscription, in
the following terms: "And that the defendant made the subscrip#on
offered in evidence by the plaintiff,''. etc., as one of the facts upon
which the proposition of the defendant was based. This specific reference in each of the prayers under consideration was not merely
introductory to the other facts connected with it, but called for an examination of the subscription itself, its character and conditions.
The subscription of the appellant is not set out in terms in the bill
of exceptions, but referred to as a conditional subscription. In the
narr. and appellee's brief, it is set out "in totidem verbis," as therein1before cited.
Assuming that the evidence, offered by the plaintiff (and refused to
the defendant in his prayer), corresponds with the subscription set out
in the narr., the legal sufficiency of such subscription was necessarily
brought before the court by the first and third prayers of the defendant, whether the right of action depended on the prepayment of the
deposit or the conditional character of the subscription itself. The
supposed contract being in '"'riting, its validity was a question for the
court, and however the latter view may have been overlooked in the
discussion of the former, it seems necessarily involved at the disposal
of these prayers.
The first point presented by the prayers arises under the third section of the act of 1852, ch. 304, incorporating the appellee, which directs that "upon every subscription, there shall be paid at the time of
subscribing, to the company or their agents, appointed to receive such
subscription, the sum of $1 on every share subscribed." As there
are other cases involving the construction of this section, we are requested to interpret it, not only as it may operate upon the facts in
this case, but upon subscriptions made to commissioners or their
agents, prior to the organization of the company. It is contended
that this clause applies peculiarly and solely to the latter class of subscriptions, as to which, it is only directory and not indispensable. The
class of cases maintaining th e contrary, it is insisted, originated in the
decision of the case of Jenkins v. The Union Turnpike Company, I
Caine' s Cases in Error 86, by the court of errors in N e w York, which
was contrary to the better opinion (as it said) of the supreme court of
New York, and make only a "sut'te d'erreurs." The defect or
vice of the original decision is not pointed out, but it is impeached as
emanating from a court, constituted of laymen, as well as lawyers,
and of less authority than the tribunal whose decision it reviewed and
reversed. A decision not universally adopted, but questioned,
doubted and overruled. We nre invoked not to follow such precedents, upon a mere comparison of facts, but to apply the judicial
mind to a consideration of the principles of law applicable to them.

is observable that these prayers refer specifically to the subscription, in

the following terms: "And that the defendant made the subscription

offered in evidence by the plaintiff" etc., as one of the facts upon

which the proposition of the defendant was based. This specific ref-

erence in each of the prayers under consideration was not merely

introductory to the other facts connected with it, but called for an ex-

amination of the subscription itself, its character and conditions.

The subscription of the appellant is not set out in terms in the bill

of exceptions, but referred to as a conditional subscription. In the

narr. and appellee's brief, it is set out totidem verbis'' as therein-

before cited.

Assuming that the evidence, offered by the plaintiff (and refused to

the defendant in his prayer), corresponds with the subscription set out

in the narr.. the legal sufficiency of such subscription was necessarily

brought before the court by the first and third prayers of the defend-

ant, whether the right of action depended on the prepayment of the
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deposit or the conditional character of the subscription itself. The

supposed contract being in writing, its validity was a question for the

court, and however the latter view may have been overlooked in the

discussion of the former, it seems necessarily involved at the disposal

of these prayers.

The first point presented by the prayers arises under the third sec-

tion of the act of 1852, ch. 304, incorporating the appellee, which di-

rects that "upon every subscription, there shall be paid at the time of

subscribing, to the company or their agents, appointed to receive such

subscription, the sum of $1 on every share subscribed." As there

are other cases involving the construction of this section, we are re-

quested to interpret it, not only as it may operate upon the facts in

this case, but upon subscriptions made to commissioners or their

agents, prior to the organization of the company. It is contended

that this clause applies peculiarly and solely to the latter class of sub-

scriptions, as to which, it is only director)'and not indispensable. The

class of cases maintaining the contrary, it is insisted, originated in the

decision of the case of Jenkins v. The Union Turnpike Company, 1

Caine's Cases in Error 86. by the court of errors in New York, which

was contrary to the better opinion (as it said) of the supreme court of

New York, and make only a "■suite d'erreurs." The defect or

vice of the original decision is not pointed out, but it is impeached as

emanating from a court, constituted of laymen, as well as lawyers,

and of less authority than the tribunal whose decision it reviewed and

reversed. A decision not universally adopted, but questioned,

doubted and overruled. We are invoked not to follow such prece-

dents, upon a mere comparison of facts, but to apply the judicial

mind to a consideration of the principles of law applicable to them.
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CONDITIONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS.

With the earnest exhortation in view, we have examined the series of

~ 117

CONIJITIONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS.

cases referred to, and will concisely state the result.

The controlling principle, on which those cases are founded is, that

all charters or acts under which highways are erected, and franchise

and privileges conferred, are deputations of public power or authority

to be strictly construed. The subscription for stock must be founded

on a valid consideration, and constitute a contract binding on both

parties "<.'<? ifistanti." The promise of the subscriber being based

on the promise or expectation of becoming a stockholder, if the right

to the stock is not consummated by payment of the deposit, the obliga-

tion to pay the subscription is not binding.

Chancellor Lansing, treating the act under which the subscription

was made in that case as a public law, the provisions of which he

must notice officially, whether pleaded or not, thus defines the duties

of the commissioners:

"From the ;erord it appears that commissioners were appointed by

the statute to perform certain duties particularly described. They

were to receive subscriptions and to receive for the benefit of the de-
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fendants (in error) $10 on each share of the stock of their company.

The plaintiff (in error) subscribed, but it does not appear that he

paid. At the time these steps were taken the corporation described

in the act was not in existence. It was incapable of contracting. The

acts to be performed by the commissioners were merely preparatory

to its creation. To give effect to their acts, their power must be

strictly pursued. * * * They were directed to exact from the

persons who were to be admitted members of the corporation, both

subscription and payment, as a condition precedent to their admis-

sion. If they omitted either to subscribe or to pay, they did not come

within the terms of admission." 1 Caine's Cases in Error 94.

Tilghman, C. J., in the case of The Hibernia Turnpike Company

v. Henderson, 8 Serg. & Rawle 219 1 (which was a subscription to

commissioners before the organization of the corporation), enlarged

upon the principles of public policy, which required a rigid adher-

ence to the letter of the law and strict compliance with the requisi-

tion of prepayment in all subscriptions made to commissioners.

"If (he says) persons are permitted to subscribe without the previous

payment of $5 a share, large subscriptions may be made, which could

not otherwise have been made, by those who are anxious to give a

direction to the road, which may benefit themselves at the expense of

the public. » * * The case will be reduced to this simple question:

Can a contract be enforced in a court of justice which was made in

violation of an act of assembly? It is not the first time this question

has been asked in this court, and it has received but one answer: it

can not be enforced." He refers to the decision of the court of errors

in New York, 1 Caine's Cases in Error, as settling the law in that state.

Gibson, J., concurred, replying to the argument (which has been

urged in this case), that prepayment was a condition which might be

waived, it being intended only for the benefit of the corporation. He

111 Am. Dec. 593.

With the earnest exhortation in view, we have examined the series of
cases referred to, and will concisely state the result.
The controlling principle, on which those cases are founded is, that
all charters or acts under which highways are erected , and franchise
.and privileges conferred, are deputations of public power or authority
to be strictly construed. The subscription for stock must be founded
on a valid consideration, and constitute a contract binding on both
parties "eo instant£." The promise of the subscriber being based
on the promise or expectation of becoming a stockholder, if the right
to the stock is not consummated by payment of the deposit, the obligation to pay the subscription is not binding.
Chancellor Lansing, treating the act under which the subscription
was made in that case as a public law, the provisions of which he
must notice officially, whether pleaded or not, thus defines the duties
of the commissioners:
"From the ;·ecord it appears that commissioners were appointed by
the statute to perform certain duties particularly described. They
were to receive subscr~ptions and to receh·e for the benefit of the defendants (in error) $ro on each share of the stock of their company.
The plaintiff (in error) subscribed, but it does not appear that he
paid. At the time these steps were taken the corporation described
in the act was not in existence. It was incapable of contracting. The
acts to be performed by the commissioners were merely preparatory
to its creation. To give effect to their acts, their power must be
strictly pursued.
•
•
•
They were directed to exact from the
p ersons who were to be admitted members of the corporation, both
subscription and payment, as a condition precedent to their admission. If they omitted either to subscribe or to pay, they did not come
within the terms of admission." I Caine's Cases in Error 94.
Tilghman, C. ]., in the case of The Hibernia Turnpike Company
v. Henderson, 8 Serg. & Rawle 219 1 (whi ch was a subscription to
commissioners before the organization of the corporation) , enlarged
upon the principles of public policy, which required a rigid adherence to the letter of .the _law and strict compliance with the requisition of prepayment in all subscriptions made to commissioners.
"If (he says) per, ons are permitted to subscribe without the previous
payment of $5 a share, large subscriptions may be made, which could
not otherwise have been made, by those ·who are anxious to give a
direction to the road, wh ich may benefit themselves at the expense of
the public. • • • The case will be reduced to this simple que tio n:
Can a contract be enforced in a court of justice which was made in
violation of an act o"f assembly? It is not the first time thi s question
has been asked in this court, and it has received hut one answer: it
can not be enforced ." He refers to the decision of the court of errors
in New York, 1 Caine's Cases in Error, as settling the law in that state.
Gibson, J., concun·ed, replying to the argument (which has heen
urged in this case), that prepayment was a condition which mig ht be
waived, it being intended only for the benefit of the corporation. He
1 11 Am. Dec. 593.
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asks, "What was the consideration for the charter? Undoubtedly the

§

117

benefit which was expected to result to the public, not the profit that

asks, "\\That was the consideration for the charter? Undoubtedly the
benefi t which was expected to result to the public, not the p rofit tha t
mig ht be m ade by the stockholders . The state, the refore, was a
p a rty, and bad an interest in pre venting the scheme from being
turne d into a bubble," etc., Hibernia Turnpike C o. v . Henderson,
8 Serg. & R. p. 225 . "The design of the d eposit w as to preYent th e
subscripti on li st from being filled with the nam es of no minal tockholde rs and the creatures of others." Id. 226. • • •
"Every contract, where the consideratio n is promise- for promises
must be obligatory on both parti es, or both will be at l iberty to rececleand the promise which is the consideratio n of that o n which the action is
broug ht, must be such as th e plaintiff had power by law to p erform. I
do not say there was an express promi ->e he re that the tlefc ndant should
enjoy the rights and privileges of a corporator; but ce rtainly that was
understood as being the consideration on which he subscribed. But
the company could introduce no one as a member· in any oth e r way
than that pointed out in the act of incorporation." id. p. 227; " if they
could, it wo uld be requisite that the defendant's title i-h o uld have
been good when he subscribed; otherwise the contract would be w ithout mutuality; and if he acquired no rig ht which he cou ld e n force
against the will o f the plaintiffs, he in curred no responsib ility," id. 228.
In Crocker v. Crane, 21 W end. 211 , the question being whether the
commissioners, appointed to open books to receive subscripti ons,
were authorized to receive checks of subscribers in pay m e nt of the
sum required to be p a id at the time of s ubscription, C o w a n, ]. , said:
"I am, therefore, strongly inclined to the opinion that the check in
question was void, as contrary to the policy of the statute . Nor can
th ere be any doubt, I imagine, that the contemplated corporation , if I
am ri ght as to the facts, fail ed of going into existe nce for w a nt of the
prope r payme nts as a condition precedent." Such is the doctrine
laid down hy Chancellor Lansing, in J e nkins v. Union Turnpike Comp any: 1 Caine's Cases in Error 94, and recogni~ed by this court in
Goshen Turnpike C o. v. Hurtin, 9 Johns. R ep. 217, and Hig hl a nd
Turnpike Co. v. McKean, 11 Johns. Rep. 98·; Dutchess Cotton
Manf'y v. Dav is, 14Johns. R ep. 238.
These cases go further; each subscriber must p ay as a co ndition to
hi s own liability attaching . P aym e nt was a requi!--ite which the commissioners could not w a ive. Starr v. Scott, 8 Conn . R "P· 483 .
The case in 21 Vt. R ep. 30, 1 cited by the ~1ppe llce , to the contrary ,
has several peculiar fea tures which di tinguish it from the clas of
cases requiring prepayment of the deposit , as essential to the contract. The defend ant, in th a t case, was o n e of th e original as. ociators, and had sig ned an instrument prior to the act of incorporation ,.
by which the subscribers agreed to take, and did lake, the numbe r of
shares affixed to their respective names. The defendant su b scribed
for fifty <;hares of the stock. The note in qu estion was given for the
first $5 payable on each respective share , which was received in settlement of the first installment; by the subscription paper it appears

might be made by the stockholders. The state, therefore, was a

party, and had an interest in preventing the scheme from being

turned into a bubble," etc., Hibernia Turnpike Co. v. Henderson,

8 vSerg. & R. p. 225. "The design of the deposit was to prevent the

subscription list from being filled with the names of nominal stock-

holders and the creatures of others." Id. 226. * * *

"Every contract, where the consideration is promise—for promises

must be obligatory on both parties, or both will be at liberty to recede—

and the promise which is the consideration of that on which the action is

brought, must be such as the plaintiff had power by law to perform. I

do not say there was an express promise here that the defendant should

enjoy the rights and privileges of a corporator; but certainly that was

understood as being the consideration on which he subscribed. But

the company could introduce no one as a member in any other way

than that pointed out in the act of incorporation." id. p. 227; "if they

could, it would be requisite that the defendant's title should have

been good when he subscribed; otherwise the contract would be with-
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out mutuality; and if he acquired no right which he could enforce

against the will of the plaintiffs, he incurred no responsibility." id. 228.

In Crocker v. Crane, 21 Wend. 211, the question being whether the

commissioners, appointed to open books to receive subscriptions,

were authorized to receive checks of subscribers in pavment of the

sum required to be paid at the time of subscription, Cowan, J., said:

"I am, therefore, strongly inclined to the opinion that the check in

question was void, as contrary to the policv of the statute. Nor can

there be any doubt, I imagine, that the contemplated corporation, if I

am right as to the facts, failed of going into existence for want of the

proper payments as a condition precedent." Such is the doctrine

laid down by Chancellor Lansing, in Jenkins v. Union Turnpike Com-

pany. I Caine's Cases in Error 94, and recognized by this court in

Goshen Turnpike Co. v. Hurtin, 9 Johns. Rep. 217, and Highland

Turnpike Co. v. McKean, n Johns. Rep. 98; Dutchess Cotton

Manf'y v. Davis, i4johns. Rep. 238.

These cases go further; each subscriber must pay as a condition to

his own liability attaching. Payment was a requisite which the com-

missioners could not waive. Starr v. Scott, 8 Conn. Rep. 483.

The case in 21 Vt. Rep. 30,1 cited by the appellee, to the contrary,

has several peculiar features which distinguish it from the class of

cases requiring prepayment of the deposit, as essential to the con-

tract. The defendant, in that case, was one of the original associa-

tors, and had signed an instrument prior to the act of incorporation,,

by which the subscribers agreed to take, and did take, the number of

shares affixed to their respective names. The defendant subscribed

for fifty shares of the stock. The note in question was given for the

first $5 payable on each respective share, which was received in set-

tlement of the first installment; by the subscription paper it appears

1 Vermont C. R. Co. v. Clayes.
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there were several subscribers for stock prior to the defendant, and by

the act of incorporation each subscriber -per se became a corporator.
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These facts were deemed sufficient to show the corporation was "*'»

esse at the time of taking the note, and capable of taking the promise

through their agents, the commissioners." Upon all these peculiar

circumstances, it was held the action on the note was maintainable.

The learned judge delivering the opinion of the court, though ques-

tioning whether the opinion of the supreme court or court of errors,

in the case 1 Caine's Cases 86, was the better opinion, distinguishes

that case from the one under his consideration.

The case in 16 B. Monroe 5,1 declaring prepayment of the deposit

to the commissioners, is not essential to the validity of the subscrip-

tion, presents the anomaly of a decision founded on a case previously

and notoriously reversed without apparent knowledge of the reversal.

The judge in delivering the opinion says: "The decision of the court

in the case of the Union Turnpike Company v. Jenkins, 1 Caine's

Rep. 381, sustains the views expressed in this opinion, and it is only

the opinion of the dissenting judge that is cited in Angell & Ames on

Corporations, and referred to by the counsel for the appellants." He

seems wholly unaware that the opinion of the dissenting judge had
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been affirmed by the court of errors, and that of the majority of the

supreme court on which he relied, overruled.

The 20th 111. 656,2 deciding in the same way, relies only on 16 B.

Monroe 5 and 21 Vt. Rep. 30, which we have before shown was

marked by very peculiar features, distinguishing it from the Union

Turnpike Company v. Jenkins, and therefore not in point.

The case in 17th Ohio 191 3 cited to the same point by the appellee

is a mere dictum, sustained by neither authority nor reason.

It would appear from this comparison of the cases cited, that Jen-

kins v. the Union Turnpike Companv, 1 Caine's Cases 86, has not

been overruled, or abandoned in principle, in succeeding cases within

the same category; but it has been questioned, criticised and departed

from, where the facts would warrant a departure.

It is still recognized as a leading case, not only in the state of New

York, but in several other states, with such weight of authority and

reason as commands our respect in similar cases.

If not expressly adopted in this state, it has been referred to in

terms which recognized the principles on which it was decided as

properly applied under the circumstances.

In the case of Elysville Manufacturing Co. v. Okisko Company 4 it

was objected that the appellant had no power under its charter to

subscribe to the stock of the appellee, and if it had, the one before the

court was not binding, because at the time of the subscription, the

cash payment was not made. In support of the latter proposition the

case 1 Caine's Rep. 381 5 was relied on, This court said that case is

'Wight v. Shelby R. Co., 63 Am. Dec. 522, infra, p.536.

'Illinois R. Co. v. Zimmer.

3 Henrv v. Vermillion & A. R.

* 5 Md" 161.

4 Union Tump. Co. v. Jenkins.

there were several subscribers for stock prior to the defendant, and by
the act of incorporation each subscriber p er se became a corporator.
These facts were deemed sufficient to show the corporation was "t'n
esse at the time of taking the note, and capable of taking the promise
through their agents, the commissioners." Upon all these peculiar
circumstances, it was held the action on the note was maintainable.
The learned judge delivering the opinion of the court, though questioning whether the opinion of the supreme court or court of errors,
in the case I Caine's Cases 86, was the better opinion, distinguishes
that case from the one under ~is consideration.
The case in 16 B. Monroe 5, 1 declaring prepayment of the deposit
to the commissioners, is not essential to the validity of the subscription, presents the anomaly of a d ecision found ed on a case previously
and notoriou sly reversed without apparent knowledge of the reversa l.
The judge in delivering the opinion says: "The decision of the court
in the case of the Union Turnpike Company v. Jenkins , I Caine's
Rep. 38 I , sustains the views expressed in this opinion, am! it is only
the opinion of the dissenting judge that is cited in Angell & Ame'> on
Corporations, and referred to by the coun sel for the appellants." He
seems wholly unaware that the opinion of the di ssenting judge had
been affirmed by the court of errors, and that of the majority of the
supreme court on which he relied, overruled.
The 20th III. 656, 2 deciding in the same way, relies only on 16 B.
Monroe 5 and 21 Vt. Rep. 30, which we h ave before shown was
marked by very p eculiar features, distinguishing it from the Union
Turnpike Company v. Jenkins, and therefore not in point.
The case in 17th Ohio 191 3 cited to the same point by the appellee
is a mere dictum, sustained by neither authority nor reason .
It would appear from thi s cmmparison of the cases cited, that Jenkins v. the Union Turnpike Company, l Caine's C ases 86, has not
been overmled, or abandoned in principle, in succeeding cases within
the same category; but it has been questioned, criticised and departed
from , where the facts would warrant a departure.
It is still recognized as a leading case, not only in the state of New
York, but in several other states, with such weight of authority and
reason as commands our respect in similar cases.
If not-expressly adopted in this state, it has been referred to in
term s which recognized the principl es on \'vhich it was decided a!>
properly applied under the circumstances.
In the case of Elyw ille Manufacturing Co. v. Okisko Company • it
was objected that the appellant had no power under its charter to
subscribe to the stock of the appellee, and if it had, the one before the
court was not binding, because at the time of the subscription, the
cash payment was not made. In support of the latter proposition the
case I Caine's Rep. 381 $ was relied on . This court said that case is
1 Wight v. Shelby R . Co., 63 Am. Dec. 522, infra, p.536.
'Jllinois R. Co. v. Zimmer.
3
HP11ry v. Vermillion & A. R.
' 5 Md. 151.
~Union
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clearly distinguishable from the one before us. There, no payment
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was made either at the time of subscription or thereafter by the per-
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son whom it was attempted to make responsible on his subscription,

clearly distinguishable from the one before us. There, no payment
was made either at the time of subscription or thereafter by the per"
son whom it was attempted to make responsible on his subscription,
while here the whole amount of the subscription was paid; in other
words, it is a completely executed contract. In the case referred to,
the court evidently founded their decision on the want of mutuality.
"The subscriber, not having paid in conformity with the authorized
terms of the subscripti on, could not have compelled the transfer of the
stock to himself, he not having in any way, in part or in whole, performed the contract." 5 Md . Rep. r 59.
The preponderance of author£ty £n favor of a str£ct complt'ance
w£th the provisions of the charter, £n cases of subscrzpt£on, prior lo
the organ£zation of the company, is such as t's not to be dt'sregarded.,
This court has said, "there is no doubt that in general a strict compliance must be show n with the provisions of the charter, but in some
cases a compliance w£ll be presumed and in others £t may be waived."
I6 1vfd. Rep. 444. 1 The distinction between subscrt'ptions prior and
subseq1teut to organ£zat£on £s clearly recogn£zed t'n 9 llfd. Rep. 568,1
in tltt's language:
"Commissioners are appointed to recet've subscrtptt'ons to stock for
the purpose of g£v£ng the subscr£bers a rt'ght to organ£ze as a corporati'on under the charter. So soon, however, as the organization
takes place, the autliort'ty ofthe commisst'oners ceases; and all corporate powers conferred by the charter, vest £n the body polt'ti'c. Suc/1 ,
at least, is the general rule, applying t'n every case where tlzere is no
spect'al provis£on to tlte contrary. It was further held, that in that
case there were no provt'sions requfring tile corporat£on after organization , to lzave subscrzpt£ons taken by comm£sst'oners and in no other
111ode. ''
Hence, in this case the corporati'on being organi'zed by tlze subscription of the necessary proportion of stock, and elect£on of officers, succeeded to tlze power previously vested in the commt'ssioners, to sell and
dispose of tlte remain£ng shares, without r egard to tlte conditions imposed on them. Tlze act of tlte agent taking the subscription, being
recognized by the corporatz'on by r eceiving and registering tlte sub·
scription , among the conditional subscriptions, was equivalent to a
prevt'ous appointment of the age11t for tltat purpose.
·
The objection that the subscription was void because conditional
and contrary to public policy is strongly supported by the authority
cited by the appellant. I Hill 518 ; 8 18 Barbour 318. • But these cases
turn upon the provisions of the local statutes, and the subscriptions
were made to commissioners prior to the formation of the companies,
for the most part. The first ground upon which the validity of conditional subscriptions has been impeached in the cases before cited,
viz., that a contract to be binding must be ''concurrent and obligatory upon each at the same time" (asdecided in 18 Barb. 318,supra,
1 Maltby v. Northwestern Va. R.
·
1 Plank R. Co. v. Hoffman.
3
Butternuts T . Co. v. North, infra, p. 525.
6 Macedora P. R. Co. v. Lepham.

while here the whole amount of the subscription was paid; in other

words, it is a completely executed contract. In the case referred to,

the court evidently founded their decision on the want of mutuality.

"The subscriber, not having paid in conformity with the authorized

terms of the subscription, could not have compelled the transfer of the

stock to himself, he not having in any way, in part or in whole, per-

formed^ the contract." 5 Md. Rep. 159.

The preponderance of authority in favor of a strict compliance

with the provisions of the charter, in cases of subscription, prior to

the organization of the company, is such as is not to be disregarded.,

This court has said, "there is no doubt that in general a strict com-

pliance must be shown with the provisions of the charter, but in some

cases a compliance ■will be presumed and in others it may be waived,"

16 Md. Hep. 444-1 The distinction bet-ween subscriptions prior and

subsequcut to organization is clearly recognized in Q Md. Rep. j68,'

in this language:

"Commissioners are appointed to receive subscriptions to stock for
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the purpose of giving the subscribers a right to organize as a cor-

poration under the charter. So soon, however, as the organization

takes place, the authority of the commissioners ceases; and all corpo-

rate powers conferred by the charter, vest in the body politic. Such,

at least, is the general rule, applying in every case where there is no

special provision to the contrary. It was further held, that in that

case there were no provisions requiring the corporation after organi-

zation, to have subscriptions taken by commissioners and in no other

mode.''

Hence, in this case the corporation being organized by the subscrip-

tion of the necessary proportion of stock, and election of officers, suc-

ceeded to the power previously vested in the commissioners, to sell and

dispose of the remaining shares, without regard to the conditions im-

posed on them. The act of the agent taking the subscription, being

recognized by the corporation by receiving and registering the sub-

scription, among the conditional subscriptions, was equivalent to a

■previous appointment of the agent for that purpose.

The objection that the subscription was void because conditional

and contrary to public policy is strongly supported by the authority

cited by the appellant. 1 Hill 518 ;3 18 Barbour 31S.4 But these cases

turn upon the provisions of the local statutes, and the subscriptions

were made to commissioners prior to the formation of the companies,

for the most part. The first ground upon which the validity of con-

ditional subscriptions has been impeached in the cases before cited,

viz., that a contract to be binding must be "concurrent and obliga-

tory upon each at the same time" (asdecidedin 18 Barb. 318, supra,

1 Maltbv v. Northwestern Va. R.

•Plank'R. Co. v. Hoffman.

s Butternuts T. Co. v. North, infra, p. 525.

4 Macedora P. R. Co. v. Lepham.
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and 21 Wend. 139 ') has been in more recent cases abandoned, and it
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is said that such a subscription is a continuing offer until withdrawn.

521

But when the offer was accepted the minds of the parties met, and

the contract was complete. There was then the meeting of the minds

of the parties, which constitutes and is the definition of a contract.

The acceptance by the plaintiff constituted a sufficient legal consider-

ation for the engagement on the part of the defendants. There was

then nothing wanting in order to perfect a valid contract on the part

of the defendants. It was precisely the same as if the parties had

met at the time of the acceptance, and the offer had then been made

and accepted, and the bargain completed at once. Boston & Maine

R. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 227; Conn. & Pass. R. v. Baily, 24 Vt. Rep.

478; Troy Academy v. Nelson, 24 Vt. Rep. 189.

The second objection, that conditional subscriptions are contrary to

public policy, is said to be peculiar to New York, and not followed

in other states. Vide Pierce on Railways, p. 71. In 15 B. Monroe,

235,' the court finds the power of the corporation to accept such con-

ditional subscriptions under the clause of the charter of the company

in that case, authorizing the president and directors to dispose of their
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unsubscribed stock for the benefit of the company, and declares it does

not seem to be prohibited by sound policy; that such construction is

sanctioned by general usage under similar provisions in other charters.

Vide also, 16 B. Monroe 364/ to the same effect. This conclusion

seems to follow necessarily, from the doctrine that a conditional sub-

scription is but a continuing offer, which is final and absolute when

accepted; all subscriptions becoming thus ultimately unconditional

and absolute.

If the corporation after organization may dispose of their stock

ivithout limitation, except so far as expressly restrained by their

charter, and a conditional agreetnent when accepted is equivalent

to an absolute contract, it would seem a necessary consequence that all

contracts for stock in consideration of a particular location, when

complied with by the company, would be as binding on both parties

as if the contract had been absolute and unconditional.

For however adverse to public policy such conditions prior to the

formation of the corporation, the location and construction of the

road is the peculiar province and duty of the president and directors,

and a contract made by them in execution of their corporate power

must be presumed to be made in promotion of the public interest, un-

less shown to the contrary. * * *

Judgment affirmed.

Note. As to theories in regard to payment of deposits, see Boyd v. Peach

Bottom R. Co., 90 Pa. St. 109, infra, p. 522; Wight v. Shelbv R. Co., 16 B. Mon.

(Ky.) 4, infra, p. 536; Webb v. B. & E. R., 77 Md. 92, infra, p. 528. There is

much conflict as to the necessity of paying the statutory deposit upon sub-

scriptions at the time the subscriptions are made. One line of authorities,

and perhaps the best, holds that payment is unnecessary, the theory being that

1 Utica & R. R. Co. v. Brickerhoff.

and 21 vVend. 139 1 ) has been in more recent cases abandoned, and it
is said that such a subscription is a continuing offer until withdrawn.
But when the offer was accepted the minds of the p arties met, and
the contract was complete. There was then the meeting of the minds
of the p a rties, which constitutes and is the definition of a contract.
The acceptance by the plaintiff constituted a sufficient legal consideration for the engagement on the part of the defendants. There was
then nothing wanting in order to p erfect a valid contract on the part
of the defendants. It was precisely the same as if the p a rties had
met at the time of the acceptance, and the offer had then been made
and accepted, and the barga in completed at once. Boston & Maine
R. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 227; Conn. & Pass. R. v. Baily, 24 Vt. R ep.
478; Troy Academy v. Nelson, 24 Vt. R ep. 189.
The second objection, that conditional subscriptions are contrary to
public policy, is said to be peculiar to New York, and not followed
jn other states. Vide Pierce on Railways, p. 7r. In I 5 B. Monroe,
235, 2 the court find s the power of the corporation to accept such conditional subscriptions under the clause of the charter of the company
in that case, authorizing the president and directors to dispose of their
unsubscribed stock for the benefit of the company, and declares it does
not seem to be prohibited by sound policy; th at such construction is
san ctioned by general usage under similar provisions in other charters.
Vide also, 16 B. Monroe 364, 8 to the same effect. This conclusion
seems to follow necessarily, from the doctrine that a conditional subscription is but a continuing offer, which is final and absolute when
accepted; all subscriptions becoming thus ultimately unconditional
and absolute.
If th e corporation after organization may dispose of thet'r stock
w ithout l£111itation, except so far as expressly r estrained by tlwfr
charter, and a conditional agreem ent wlwn accepted is equivalent
to an absolute contract, t't would seem a necessary conse9uence that all
contracts for stock in consideration of a particular l ocation, w/1en
compli"ed with by the company , would be as binding on both parties
as if tlte contract !tad been absolute and unconditional.
For however adverse to public policy such conditions prior to the
formation of the corporation, the location and construction of the
road is the peculiar province and duty of the presid e nt and directors,
and a contract made by them in execution of their corporate power
must be presumed to be made in promotion of the public interest , unless shown to the contrary. • • •
Judgment affirmed.

! McMillan v. Maysville & L. R. Co., 61 Am. Dec. 181.

* Henderson & N. R. Co. v. Leavell.

Note. As to theories in regard to payment of deposits, see Boyd v. Peach
Bottom R. Co., 90 Pa. St. }()!l, infra, p. 52t; Wight v. Shelby R. Co., 16 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 4, infra, p. 536; Webb v. B. & E. R., 77 Md. 92, infra, p. 528. There is
much conflict as to the necessity of paying the statutory deposit upon i<ubscriptions at the time the suhscript.ions flre made. One line of authorities,
anrl perhaps the best, h olrls th::it payment is unnecessary , the theory being that

Utica & S. R . Co. v. Brickerhoff.
McMillan v. Maysville & L. R. Co., 61 Am. Dec. 181.
a Henderson & N. R. Co. v. Leavell.
1
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the provision is for the benefit of the corporation onlv, and so mav be waived

th e prov is io n is fo rt.h e be n efit of the corpo ration only, anrl so may be waived
by it: 1843, Red Ri\'Cr C11. v. Young, ti Rob. ( L a.l 39; 18'18, Jllin oi~ H. Co.
v. Zimllle r . 20 111. l).54; 186-1, C h a rnherla in v. Painesv illl', etc., R Co., 15 O.
S. ~:!.); 1874, l\Iinnesota & "'t. L. R . v. BHS!'et t, 20 l\linn . .5:'i5; 1882, J>itt sLurgh
W . & K. R. Go. v. Applegate, 2 1 W. Va. li2; 1893, Bihb v. Hall. 101 Ala.
7H; 1893, U nio n Wate r Co. v. Kean, 52 N. J . Eq. Ill ; 18\.1.'), Albright v. Texas,
e tr. ., R. 8 N . M. 110, 422, 42 Pac. 73; 1 8~18, Yonk e rA GazPtle Go. v. Ta y lor, 30
A pp. Div. (N. Y. ) 3:~4. On the o ther haud, nrnny u t he r authoriti es h o ld that paym ent i8 llPCP.~Ml1'!1, o n the theory that t.he provis ion is for the prot.el't ion uf the
pul~lic from " bubble'', schemes by irrP~po n s ibl e parties. 1 8~4 , J e nki~s v.
Union T. P. Co., 1 Carnes Cas. IN. Y. 8b; 1814, H1ghln11d T . Co. v. l\lt·Kean,
11 .Jo hns. tN. Y. l 98; 1822, Hibe rnia T R. Co. v . H e nderson, 8 Rerg. & R.
219, 11 Am. D . 593; 18-5t), Fii;;er v. l\fois. & T . R. Co., :~2 l\lii-s . 3.3!); lRlil . Wood
v. Coosa, t'!tc., R. Co., 32 (~n. 273; 1880, State Ins. Co . v. R P<lm ond, 3 Fed .
R . 7<>4; 1887, Perry v. H oa dley , 19 Abh. N. C. (N. Y .) 76; 18!!2, Bnrling-ton
v . Rnr. W . Co .. 86 Tnwn 2WI; 189H, Gen'I Elec. Co. v. \\'iuhtrnan. 3 A1tp. DiY.
(N. Y ) 118; l!<!lf\, Firs t Nat'l B11 nk v. Corn e ll, 8 App . Div. cN. Y. • 427 . See,
also, BPac h, § ·5 15; Boone,§ 112 ; Clark, § 116; Cook,~§ 172-5; E lliott , § :3'15;
Morawetz, §§ 71-2, 739, 742-3; Taylor, §§ 98, 516; I Thompson, §§ 1216-32.

bv it: 1843, Red River (Jo. v. Young, H Rob. (La.) 39; 1858, Illinois R. Co.

v. Zimmer, 20 111.(554; 1864, Chamberlain v. Painesville, etc., R Co., 15 O.

S. 225; 1874, Minnesota & St. L. R. v. Bassett, 20 Minn. 535; 1882, Pittsburgh

W. & K. R. Co. v. Applcgate, 21 W. Va. 172; 1893, Bibb v. Hall, 101 Ala.

7!); 1893, Union Water Co. v. Kean, 52 N. J. Kq. Ill ; 1895, Albright v. Texas,

etc., R. 8 N. M. 110, 422, 42 Pac. 73; 1898, Yonkers Gazette Co. v. Taylor, 30

App. Div. (N. Y.)334. On the other hand, many ot her authorities hold that pay-

ment 18 necessary, on the theory that the provision is for the protection of the

public from "bubble" schemes by irresponsible parties. 180-1, Jenkins v.

Union T. P. Co., 1 Gaines Cas. (N. Y. 86; 1814, Highland T. Co. v. McKean,

11 Johns. iN. Y.i 98; 1822. Hibernia T R. Co. v. Henderson, 8 Serg. & R.

219, 11 Am. D. 593; 1856, Fiser v. Miss. & T. R. Co., 32 Miss. 3.59; 18<il. Wood

v. Coosa, etc., R. Co., 32 Ga. 273; 1880, State Ins. Co. v. Redmond, 3 Fed.

R. 764; 1887, Perrv v. Hoadlev, 19 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 76; 1892, Burlington

v. Bur. W. Co., 86 Iowa 266; 1896, Gen'l Flee Co. v. Wiehtman, 3 App. Div.

(N. Y ) 118; 1896, First Nat'l Hank v. Cornell, 8 App. Div. (N. Y. ■ 427. See,

also, Beach, $ 515; Boone, § 112; Clark, $ 116; Cook, 172-5; Elliott, §355;
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Morawetz, §§71-2, 739, 742 3; Taylor, §§ 98, 516; I Thompson, §§ 1216-32.

Sec. 118. Same, (i) Prior to incorporation, theories:

(a) Subscription valid, condition void.

Sec. 118. Same.

BOYD v. PEACH BOTTOM RAILWAY CO."

( 1) Prior to incorporation , theories:

1879. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 90 Pa. St.

(a) Subscription valid , condition void.

Rep. 169-172.

May 6, 1879. Before Sharswood, C. J.; Mercur, Gordon,

BOYD v. PEACH BOTTOM RAILWAY C0. 1

Paxson, Woodward, Turnkey and Sterrett, JJ.

Error to the court of common pleas of Lancaster county, of May

1879.

term, 1879, No. 58.

IN

THE

SUPREME

Assumpsit by the Petich Bottom Railway Co. v. Samuel Boyd,

on a subscription to the capital stock of said company. The cozn-

pany was incorporated by the act of March 24, 1868, Pamph. L. 77S,

CounT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
R ep. 169-172.

90

Pa. St.

6, 1879. Before SHARS WOOD , C. J. ; MERCUR, GonDoN ,
WoooWARD, TURNKEY and STERRETT, JJ.
Error to th e court of common pleas of Lanca ster county, of ~fay
term , 1879, No. 58.
Assumpsit by the Pe"'ach Bottom Railway Co. v. Samuel Boyd,
on a subscription to the capital stock o ~ said company. The company was incorporated by the act of M arch 24! 1868, Pamph. L. 778,
with all th e powers and subject to all the restrictions prescribed by the
act regul ating railroad ., enacted February 19, 1849. The prov i o
to th e first section of the latter act is ;1s folio\\' :
"Provided , always. That no s ubsc ription for such stock shall be
valid unless the party or parties making the same shall, at the time of
subscribing, pay to the said comrn i,.;sioners $5 on each and every share
sub-;cribed, for the use of the com pany."
C o mmi ss ioners were named in the act of incorporation to op en
boo ks. receive subscr ipti ons and organize the co mpany. At the trial
the plaintiff o ffered in evidence a suh;.cription book , in form as follows:
"We, th e undersigned, agi·ee with one and another and hind ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators to the Peach Bottom
Railroad Company to the number of shares of stock set opposite our
respective names in the capital stock of said company , provided the
May

with all the powers and subject to all the restrictions prescribed by the

PAXSON,

act regulating railroads, enacted February 19, 1849. The proviso

to the first section of the latter act is as follows:

'■•Provided, always, That no subscription for such stock shall be

valid unless the party or parties making the same shall, at the time of

subscribing, pay to the said commissioners $5 on each and every share

subscribed, for the use of the company."

Commis.sioners were named in the act of incorporation to open

books, receive subscriptions and organize the company. At the trial

the plaintiff offered in evidence a subscription book, in form as follows:

"We, the undersigned, agree with one and another and bind our-

selves, our heirs, executors and administrators to the Peach Bottom

Railroad Company to the number of shares of stock set opposite our

respective names in the capital stock of said company, provided the

1 Arguments omitted.

1
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road be constructed upon \vh;it is known as the Northern route, con-
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necting with Philadelphia and Baltimore Central Railroad at Oxford,

Chester county, and passing near Hopewell. Pine Grove, White Rock,

King's Bridge, Smedley's Mill, Centreville, Chestnut Level and along

Fishing creek to its mouth, and provided these subscriptions be spent

on the east side of the Susquehanna river. * * * Samuel Boyd,

two shares."

There was no evidence to show that the defendant had signed his

name thereto. The signature produced was in ink.

John A. Alexander, the treasurer of the company, called by the

plaintiff, testified: "The name, as it first appeared there, was in

leadpencil: there was a number of names written in leadpencil, and

thev were becoming defaced by carrying the book in my pocket, and

I afterward wrote them in ink over the pencil marks." He further

said: "I went to Mr. Boyd's on the 29th of October, 1870, and told

him that, to secure our letters-patent, it was necesary for the commis-

sioners to certify to the governor that 10 per cent, of the subscriptions

were paid in; that we, not collecting any money, and, as the work

had not yet begun, were taking demand notes; Mr. Boyd gave
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me his demand note for 10 per cent, of his two shares of stock, and I

gave him a receipt for the same.

This note was delivered, by Mr. Alexander, to the commissioners,

and they afterward certified to the governor a list of subscribers,

including the name of Samuel Boyd for two shares. Letters-patent

were issued to the company, in which he appeared for two shares.

Whether Samuel Boyd wrote the leadpencil name or not was not

shown.

He never paid any money on this alleged subscription, nor did he

ever pay said note or any part of it. The subscription produced con-

tained a condition that the road should be built on a particular route.

It was not built on this route, but on an entirely different one. The

original route would have been of great advantage to Boyd, while the

one on which the road was built was of no benefit to him.

The defendants offered no evidence, but asked for a nonsuit, which

the court, Patterson, J., refused and directed a verdict for plaintiff.

The defendant took this writ, alleging that the court erred: First, in

overruling the motion for a nonsuit, and, second, in directing the jury

to find for plaintiff.

Mr. Justice Sterrett delivered the opinion of the court, June 16,

.879. •

The commissioners appointed to open books and receive subscrip-

tions to the capital stock of the defendant in error were public agents,

clothed with limited powers and duties of a purely ministerial charac-

ter, clearly defined by law. By the act of March 24, 1868, incorpo-

rating the company, it was invested with all the powers, and made

subject to all the provisions and restrictions prescribed by the general

road be constructed upon what is known as the Northern route, connecting with Philadelphia a nd Baltimore Central Railroad at Oxford,
Che ter county, and passing near Hopewell. Pin e Grove, White R ock,
King' Bridge, Sn~edley's Mill, C e ntrevi lle, Chestnut L eYel and along
Fishing creek to its mouth, and provided these subscriptions be sp ent
on the ea t side of the Susquehanna river. • • • Samuel Boyd,
two share . ''
There was no evidence to show that th e defendant had signed his
name thereto. The signature produ ced was in ink.
John A. Alexander, the treasurer of the company, called b y the
plaintiff, testified: "The name, as it first appeared there , was in
leadpencil; there was a number of names written in leadpencil, and
they were becoming defaced by carrying the book in my pocket, and
I afterward wrote them in ink over the pencil marks." H e furth er
s:i id: "I went to Mr. Boyd 's on the 29th of Octoher, 1870, and told
him that, to secure our letters-patent, it was necesary for the commissioners to certify to the governor that IO per cent. of the subscriptions
were paid in; that we, not collecting any money, and, as the work
had not yet begun, were taking dem:rnd notes; Mr. Boyd gave
me his dema nd note for 10 per cent. of his two shares of stock , and I
ga\'e him a rece ipt for the same.
·
This note was delivered , by Mr. Alexander, to the commissio ners,
and they afterward certifi ed to the governor a list of subscribers,
including the name of Samuel Boyd for two shares. Le tter~-pate nt
were issued to the company, in which he appeared for two shares.
Whether Samuel Boyd wrote the leadpencil name or not was not
shown.
He ne,·e r paid any money on this alleged subscription , nor did he
ever pay said note or any part of it. The s ubscription produced contained a condition th a t the road should be built on a p articul ar route.
It was not built on this ro ute, but on an entirely diffe rent one. The
original route would have been of g reat advantage to Boyd , while the
one on which th e road was built was of no benefi t to him.
The defendants offered no evide nce, but asked for a nonsuit, which
the court, P atterson , J. , refused and directed a verdict for plaintiff.
The defe nd a nt took this writ, alleging that th e court erred : First, in
O\'erruling the m otion for a nonsuit, and, second, in directing the jury
to find for pl:iintiff.
MR. Ju stice STERRETT delivered the opinion of the court, June 16,

r879. .

act of 1849, regulating railroad companies. One of these provisions

is that no subscription shall be valid unless the party making the same

shall, at the time of subscribing, pay the commissioners $5 on each

The commissioners appointed t o open books and receive subscriptions to the capital stock of the defe nda nt in e rror were puhlic agents,
clothed w ith limited powers and duties of a purely mini steria l character, clearly defined by law. By the act of March 24, 1868, incorporating the company, it was invested with all the powers, and m ade
subject to all the provisions and restriction s prescribed by the general
act of 1849, regulating ra il road companies. One of these provi sions
i that no s ubscription sh all be valiri unless the p arty m akin g the :-;a me
shall , at the time of subscribing, pay the commissioners $5 on each
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and every share, for the use of the company. The language is plain

BOYD V . PEACH BOTTOM R. CO.

§

I I8

and emphatic, and the manifest object of the requirement was to pro-

and every share, for the use of the company. The language is plain
and emphatic, and the manifest object of the requirement was to protect the public against fictitious corporations, with capital stock subscribed perhaps by irresponsible pers~ns, and not a dollar thereof paid
or intended to be paid in. The commissioners, acting as ministerial
agents of the public, before the issuing of letters patent, had no authority whatever to dispense ·with the actual payment of the required
sum. Giving a note for the amount was not payment within the
meaning of the law. In Leighty v. The Turnpike Co., 14 S. & R.
434, under a similar charter, it "''as held that actual payment in money
was required. The doctrine of that case, for reasons given at length
in the opinion, is spund, and should be adhered to. A demand note,
such as was given by the plaintiff in error in this case, is not money;
it is on ly a promise to pay money at a future time, and perhaps may
never be complied with.
The testimony was quite suffici ent to establish the fact of defendant's subscription, on which the su it was based. Afterwards, when
the book was presented to him by Mr. Alexander, he impliedly admitted the subscription, by giving his note for the IO per cent. which
should have been paid in cash, but this was before the letters-patent
were obta ined.
The conditional feature of the subscription furnished no ground
of defense. It is scarcely necessary to r epeat what has been so often
said that a subscription to the stock of a public corporation, made before letters-patent are issued and an organization effected, must be
considered absolute and unqualified , and any condition attached
thereto void. Commissioners !tave no authori'ty to receive co1lditionol
subscriptions. If th ey do, the subscription itself t"s valt'd and binding, and tl1e condition null and void. Caley v. The Railroad Co.,
30 P. F. Smith 367.
The only available defense presented in the court below was the
non-payment of the IO per cent. required by the act; and it was technical, rathe r than m eritorious. Aside from making the subscription,
in the first in stance, and afterward giving hi s note for the 10 per cent.
when ca lled on by the collector, the plaintiff in error appears to have
been entirely passive. If he had acted as commi%ioncr or director,
or participated in stockholders' meeting, or performed any act recognizing his membership of the company, or tending to fasten li ability
on other subscribers, he should be held to the payment of his subscription, notwithstanding the failure of the commissioners to exact the
payment required by law to make it valid and binding; but heappears to have stood aloof and did nothing, by which he was estoppcd
from insisting on the technical defense which he has seen fit to interpose. Legally, he is entitled to tbe benefit of it; and the second
.and third assignments of error must be sustained
Judgment reversed.

tect the public against fictitious corporations, with capital stock sub-

scribed perhaps by irresponsible persons, and not a dollar thereof paid

or intended to be paid in. The commissioners, acting as ministerial

agents of the public, before the issuing of letters patent, had no au-

thority whatever to dispense with the actual payment of the required

sum. Giving a note for the amount was not payment within the

meaning of the law. In Lcighty v. The Turnpike Co., 14 S. & R.

434, under a similar charter, it was held that actual payment in money

was required. The doctrine of that case, for reasons given at length

in the opinion, is spund, and should be adhered to. A demand note,

such as was given by the plaintiff in error in this case, is not money;

it is only a promise to pay money at a future time, and perhaps may

never be complied with.

The testimony was quite sufficient to establish the fact of defend-

ant's subscription, on which the suit was based. Afterwards, when

the book was presented to him by Mr. Alexander, he impliedly ad-
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mitted the subscription, by giving his note for the 10 per cent, which

should have been paid in cash, but this was before the letters-patent

were obtained.

The conditional feature of the subscription furnished no ground

of defense. It is scarcely necessary to repeat what has been so often

said that a subscription to thestock of a public corporation, made be-

fore letters-patent are issued and an organization effected, must be

considered, absolute and unqualified', and any condition attached

thereto void. Commissioners have no authority to receive conditional

subscriptions. If they do, the subscription itself is valid and bind-

ing, and the condition null and void. Caley v. The Railroad Co.,

30 P. F. Smith 367.

The only available defense presented in the court below was the

non-payment of the 10 per cent, required by the act; and it was tech-

nical, rather than meritorious. Aside from making the subscription,

in the first instance, and afterward giving his note for the 10 percent,

when called on by the collector, the plaintiff in error appears to have

been entirely passive. If he had acted as commissioner or director,

or participated in stockholders' meeting, or performed any act recog-

nizing his membership of the company, or tending to fasten liability

on other subscribers, he should be held to the payment of his subscrip-

tion, notwithstanding the failure of the commissioners to exact the

payment required by law to make it valid and binding; but he ap-

pears to have stood aloof and did nothing, by which he was estopped

from insisting on the technical defense which he has seen fit to inter-

pose. Legally, he is entitled to the benefit of it; and the second

and third assignments of error must be sustained

Judgment reversed.
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Sec. lit). Same. Prior to incorporation:

§

SONDITIONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS.

119

(6) Subscription and condition both void.

BUTTERNUTS AND OXFORD TURNPIKE COMPANY v.'NORTH.

1841. In the Supreme Court of New York, i Hill's (N. Y.)

Reports 518-519.

See. 119. Same.

Prior to incorporation:

Error from the Chenango common pleas. The action was upon a

\

( b) Subscription and condition both void.

subscription for stock of the plaintiffs, containing an engagement to

take stock "upon condition that said road shall be laid by Fayette

village and Guildford Centre." The commissioners for receiving

BUTTERNUTS AND OXFORD TURNPIKE COMPANY v.· NORTH.

subscriptions had obtained several signatures to this, and also to an-

other absolute in its terms. The court below held that the defendant's

signature to the subscription in question did not bind him, and non-

1841.

bl

THE SUPREME CouRT OF

Reports

suited the plaintiffs. They excepted, and after judgment in the court

NEW

YoRK.

1 Hill's (N.

Y.)

5 r 8-5 r 9.

below, sued out a writ of error.

By the court, Cowen, J. Subscriptions for stock under the turnpike

act (1 R. S. 581, 2ded.) to which the plaintiffs were subject, Sess.

L. of 1834, p. 137,1 must be absolute. This act confers no power to

make conditions, and to allow such a thing would be contrary to pub-

lic policy. Divers men would, perhaps, have their divers routes, and
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endeavor improperly to influence the course of the road. If the gen-

eral subscription should contain a condition of this kind, there would

be no stockholders till the road should lie laid out accordingly, and

separate subscriptions containing various conditions might work a

fraud upon those who subscribed absolutely. The court below de-

cided correctly.

Judgment affirmed.

Note. To same effect. 1871, People v. Chambers et al., 42 Cal. 201. (Pay-

ment by check insufficient, must be by cash.)

'The act provided: Sec. 2. Each of the persons, who shall be named

* * * as a commissioner for receiving subscriptions, shall furnish himself

with a book for that purpose, which shall be kept open for two vears, unless

one-sixth of the whole number of shares shall be sooner subscribed. Sec. 3.

Each subscriber shall pay to the commissioners receiving his subscription,

and at the time, on each share that he shall subscribe one-tenth of the sum

fixed in the act of incorporation as the amount of one share. * * * Sec. 4.

Provided that as soon as one-sixth of the whole number of shares shall have

been subscribed, the commissioners shall call a meeting for election of di-

rectors. Sec. 5. That commissioners should preside, and the subscribers

Error from the Chenango common pleas. The action was upon a
subscription for stock of the plaintiffs, containing an engagement to
take stock " upon condition that said road shall be laid by Fayette
village and Guildford Centre." The commissioners for receiving
subscriptions had obtained several signatures to this, and also to another absolute in its terms . The court below held that the defondant's
ignature to the subscription in question did not bind him , and nonsuited the plaintiffs. They excepted, and after judgment in the court
below, sued out a writ of error.
By the court, CowEN, J. Subscriptions for stock under the turnpike
act ( 1 R. S. 581, 2d ed.) to which the plaintiffs were subj ect , 'Sess.
L. of 1834, p. 137, 1 mu st be absolute. This act confers no power to
make conditions. and to allow such a thing would be contrary to public policy. Divers men would, perhaps, have their divers routes, and
endeavor improperly to influence the course of the road. If the general subscription should contain a condition of this kind, there would
be no stockholders till the road sho uld be bid out accordingly, and
separate subscriptions containing various conditions might work a
fraud upon those who subscribed absolutely. The court below decided correctly.
Judgment affirmed.

present, or their proxies, by plurality of votes shall elect directors. See. 6.

The commissioners shall then deliver subscription books to directors and pay

Note. To same effect. 18il, People v. Chambers et al., 42 Cal. 201. (Payment by check insufficient, must be by cash.)

over money.

1

The act provided: Sec. 2. Each of the persons, who shall be named
as a commissioner for receiving subscriptions, s hall furnish himself
with a book for that purpol:le, which shall be kept open for two years, unless
one-sixth of the whole number of shares shall be sooner subscribed. Sec. 8.
Each subscriber shall pay to the commissio ners receiving his subscription,
and at the time, on each share that he shall subscribe one-tenth of the sum
fixed in the act of incorporation as the amount of one share. * * * Sec. 4.
Provided that as soon as one-sixth of the whole number of shares sh a ll have
been subscribed, the commissioners shall call a meeting fo r electio n of directors. Sec. 5. That commissioners should preside, an<l the subscribers
present, or their proxies, by plurality of votes shall elect directors. Sec . 6.
The commissioners shall then deliver subscription books to directors and pay
over money.

• • *
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ARMSTRONG V. KARSHNER.

Sec. 120. Same. (2) After incorporation. Theories:'

§ 120

ARMSTRONG V. KARSHNER.

(a) Valid, contract, to await time of performance.

ARMSTRONG v. KARSHNER.1

Sec. 120. Same. (2) After incorporation. Theories:
(a) Valid. contract, to await time of performance.

1890. In the Supreme Court of Ohio. 47 Ohio St. Rep.

276-30

[Suit by Karshner to enforce payment of a subscription which had

·

been assigned to plaintiff for construction of the railroad mentioned

ARMSTRONG v. KAR8HNER. 1

in the subscription. The subscription was as follows:

"We, the undersigned, agree to pay the number of shares annexed

1890.

IN THE SUPREME CounT

to our respective names, of fifty dollars each, to the capital stock of

the Cincinnati, Hocking Valley and Huntington Railway Company,

Omo.

47 Ohio St. Rep.

[Suit by Karshner to enforce payment of a subscription which had
been assigned to plaintiff for construction of the railroad mentioned
in the subscription. The subscription ·was as follows:
"\¥e, the undersigned, agree to pay the number of shares annexed
to our respective names, of fifty dollars each, to the capital stock of
the Cincinnati, Hocking Valley and Huntington Railway Company,
and we hereby bind ourselves, our heirs, executors or administrators
to pay the same to the authorized agent of said company; but it is
expressly provided as follows: That no part of said subscription
shall be due until a railroad track shall be laid ready for the running
of cars from some point of the Scioto Valley Railroad to a point at
or near Adelphi, in Ross county, and when said railroad track is o
laid, we, the undersigned , mutually agree that we will each, on demand, pay the amounts set opposite our respective names to such
authorized agent of said company in full payment for such shares of
capital stock.
"Names. --October, 1881 , - - No. of shares. Amount.
"It is distinctly agreed and understood that all the within stock subscriptions are binding, providing the road is built on the north of
Adelphi, otherwise they are void.
"Ten shares, $so each , $500.
MILTON ARMSTRONG."]
WILLIAMS, J. • • • The principal question in the case ari es from
the second defense , the substance of which is, that the defendant's subscription is a conditional one , and, at the time it was made, the capi·
tal stock of the company had been increased, and actual bona fide
subscriptioi1s to the amount of 20 per centum of the capital stock,
so increased, had not then been obtained, nor had 10 per centum
of such capital stock been expended in the construction of the road.
The claim is, that the railroad company had no corporate power to
receive the defendant's subscription, becau se it had not then obtained
unconditional subscriptions to the amount of 20 p er centum of its capital stock, or expended 10 per centum of its authorized capital in the
construction of its road. This claim is based upon section 3298 of the
Revised Statutes, which provides: "The directors of a company which
has expended in the construction of it road 10 per centum of its au·
thorized capital and has obtained actual bona fide subscriptions to it.
capital stock ·to the amount of at least 20 per centum thereof, may
receive subscriptions to its capital stock, payable in such installments,
dependent upon the completion of the whole or any part of its road so
that cars may pass over the same, as its directors may deem expedi1 Only so much of the opinion is given as relates to the character of the
subscription.

and we hereby bind ourselves, our heirs, executors or administrators

to pay the same to the authorized agent of said company; but it is

expressly provided as follows: That no part of said subscription

shall be due until a railroad track shall be laid ready for the running

of cars from some point of the Scioto Valley Railroad to a point at

or near Adelphi, in Ross county, and when said railroad track is so

laid, we, the undersigned, mutually agree that we will each, on de-

mand, pay the amounts set opposite our respective names to such

authorized agent of said company in full payment for such shares of
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2 76-30'

capital stock.

"Names. October, 1881, No. of shares. Amount.

"It is distinctly agreed and understood that all the wjthin stock sub-

scriptions are binding, providing the road is built on the north of

Adelphi, otherwise they are void.

"Ten shares, $50 each, $500. Milton Armstrong."]

Williams, J. * * * The principal question in the case arises from

the second defense, the substance of which is, that the defendant's sub-

scription is a conditional one, and, at the time it was made, the capi-

tal stock of the company had been increased, and actual bona jide

subscriptions to the amount of 20 per centum of the capital stock,

so increased, had not then been obtained, nor had 10 per centum

of such capital stock been expended in the construction of the road.

The claim is, that the railroad company had no corporate power to

receive the defendant's subscription, because it had not then obtained

unconditional subscriptions to the amount of 20 per centum of its cap-

ital stock, or expended 10 per centum of its authorized capital in the

construction of its road. This claim is based upon section 329S of the

Revised Statutes, which provides: "Thedirectors of a companywhich

has expended in the construction of its road 10 per centum of its au-

thorized capital and has obtained actual bona Jide subscriptions to its

capital stock to the amount of at least 20 per centum thereof, may

receive subscriptions to its capital stock, payable in such installments,

dependent upon the completion of the whole or any part of its road so

that cars may pass over the same, as its directors may deem expedi-

'Only so much of the opinion is given as relates to the character of the

subscription.
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ent, and upon full payment thereof may issue certificates of stock

§
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therefor."

Unless restrained by statute, corporations may receive conditional

subscriptions to their stock at any time after their actual incorpora-

tion. "A conditional subscription to stock, taken and accepted by a

corporation after its incorporation, is legal by the common law of all

the states." Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § S2. And it is said by

White, J., in Ashtabula and New Lisbon R. Co. v. Smith, 15 Ohio

St. 336, that, "Except in New York, conditional subscriptions, in the

absence of a special prohibition, so far as we have observed, have been

sustained, as authorized, and not in conflict with public policy.

No special prohibition is found in section 3298 against a railroad

corporation receiving conditional subscriptions. The most that can

be claimed from the section is that, it having specified the cases in

which such conditional subscriptions may be received, there is want

of authority to receive them otherwise than as therein provided. If

this be admitted, does it necessarily follow that a subscription not in

all respects in conformity to the statute may not be enforced? "The
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rule seems well established," says Boynton, J., in Hays v. Galena

Gaslight and Coal Co., 29 Ohio St. 340, "that where a contract has

been executed and fully performed, on the part either of the corpora-

tion or of the other contracting party, neither will be permitted to

insist that the contract and such performance by one party were not

within the corporate power of the company."

Generally, after the acceptance by the corporation of a conditional

subscriptioti which it is authorized to take, the subscriber is bound

until performance of the condition to await such performance; he

can not withdraw the subscription unless the performance is unrea-

sonably delayed. Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 84. But a con-

ditional subscription, which is not a present valid contract, may be a

continuing offer to subscribe upon the specified conditions, and when

those conditions are performed, if the offer be not before withdrawn,

it may then become an absolute and unconditional subscription. The

difference between the two classes of subscriptions is that the former

becomes binding when accepted, and the latter only when the condi-

tion is performed, and it may, at any time before then, be withdrawn.

If not so withdrawn, it becomes an absolute subscription. In Ash-

tabula and New Lisbon R. Co. v. Smith, supra. White, J., speaking

of the conditional subscription to the capital stock of the railroad com-

pany involved in that case, and the effect of the performance of the

conditions by the company, said: "The subscription was designed as,

and was in fact, a standing or continuing proposition, upon which the

plaintiff was not expected to act until the time arrived for the final

location of its road. Having been delivered for this purpose, and

acted on by the plaintiff, after the condition has been complied with,

it became an absolute subscription." In the case of The Mansfield,

Coldwater and Lake Michigan R. Co. v. Stout, 26 Ohio St. 254, it

is said by Mcllvaine, J.: "There has been some contention whether

the instrument sued on is to be regarded as a subscription of stock,

ent, and upon full payment thereof may issue certificates of stock
therefor."
Unless restrained by statute, corporations may receive conditional
subscriptions to their stock at any time after their actual incorporation. "A conditional subscription to stock, taken and accepted by a
corporation after its incorporation , is legal by the common law of all
the states.'' Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 82. And it is said by
White, J., in Ashtabula and New Lisbon R . Co. v. Smith, 15 Ohio
St. 336 1 that, "Except in New York , conditional subscriptions, in the
absence of a special prohibition, so far as we have observed, have been
sustained , as authorized, and not in conflict with public policy.
No special prohibition is found in section 3298 _against a railroad
corpora tion receiving conditional subscriptions. The most that can
be claimed from the section is that, it having specified the cases in
which such conditional subscriptions may be received , there is want
of authority to receive them otherwise than as therein provided. If
this be admitted, does it necessarily follow that a subscription not in
all respects in conformity to the statute may not be enforced? "The
rule seems well established," says Boy nton, J., in -Hays v. Galena
Gaslight and Coal Co. , 29 Ohio St. 340, "that where a contract has
been executed and fully perfo1med, on the part either of the corporation or of the other contracting pnrty, n either will be permitted to
insist that the contract and such perform ance by one party were not
within the corporate power of the company."
Generally, after the acceptance by the corporation of a conditional
subscription wht'ch. it is autlwrized to take, th e subscriber is bound
until performance of the conditt'on to await such perfonnance; lte
can not withdraw the subscrtptt'on unless the performance is unreasonably delayed. Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 84. But a conditional subscription, which is not a present valid contract, may be a
continuing offer to subscribe upon the specified conditions, and when
those conditions are performed, if the offer be not before withdrawn,
it may then become an absolute and unconditional subscription. The
difference between the two cla~ses of subscriptions is that the former
becomes binding when accepted, and the latter only when the condition is performed, and it may, at any time before then, be withdrawn.
If not so withdrawn, it becomes an absolute subscription. In Ashtabula and New Lisbon R. Co. Y. Smith, sup1·a, \Vhite, J., speaking
of the conditiQnal subscription to the capital stock of the railroad company involved in that case, and the effect of the performance of the
conditions by the company, saicl: "The subscription was designed as,
and was in fact, a standing or continuing proposition, upon \·v hich the
plaintiff was not expected to act until the time arriYed for the final
location of its road. Having been deliYercd for this purpose, and
acted on by the plaintiff, after the condition h<ts been complied with,
it became an absolute subscription." In the case of The Mansfield,
Coldwater and Lake Michigan R. Co. v. Stout, 26 Ohio St. 254, it
is said by Mcilvaine, J.: " There ha s been some contention whether
the instrument sued on is to b e regarded as a subscription of stock,
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subject to a condition precedent, or as a mere offer to subscribe, when

the conditions named might be performed. This question we deem to

be immaterial in this case, as there is no pretense that the offer, if a

subject to a condition precedent, or as a mere offer to subscribe, when
the conditions named might be performed. This question we deem to
be immaterial in this case, as there is no pretense that the offer, if a
mere offer it be, was at any time withdrawn. The important question
is, have the conditions .been performed?"
The conditions expressed in the defendant's subscription, it is alleged in the petition, were fully performed, and upon this no issue is
raised by the answer. If it be conceded, therefore, that the instrument executed by the defendant was not, by reason of the provisions
of the statute, a valid and binding subscription to the capital stock
when subscribed and delivered to the company, it was, at least, a
continuing offer to pay the amount stipulated upon the performance
of the conditions therein specified; and, while the defendant at any
time before such performance might have withdrawn his offer, he did
not, and the conditions having been fully complied with by the railroad
company, he can not now, we think, defend against the payment of
the subscription on that ground that the company was without corporate authority to receive it. It is not important whether the subscription is enforced on the ground that on the performance of the conditions it became an unconditional subscription, or on the ground of estoppel. The legal result is the same.
Affirmed .
Note . See citations supra,§ 116, p. 514.

mere offer it be, was at any time withdrawn. The important question

is, have the conditions been performed?"

The conditions expressed in the defendant's subscription, it is al-

leged in the petition, were fully performed, and upon this no issue is

raised by the answer. If it be conceded, therefore, that the instru-

ment executed by the defendant was not, by reason of the provisions

of the statute, a valid and binding subscription to the capital stock

when subscribed and delivered to the company, it was, at least, a

continuing offer to pay the amount stipulated upon the performance

of the conditions therein specified; and, while the defendant at any

time before such performance might have withdrawn his offer, he did

not, and the conditions having been fully complied with by the railroad

company, he can not now, we think, defend against the payment of

the subscription on that ground that the company was without corpo-

rate authority to receive it. It is not important whether the subscrip-

tion is enforced on the ground that on the performance of the condi-
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tions it became an unconditional subscription, or on the ground of es-

toppel. The legal result is the same.

Affirmed.

Note. See citations supra, § 116, p. 514.

Sec. 121. Same. After incorporation.

(3) Mere offer until performance.

WEBB v. THE BALTIMORE AND EASTERN SHORE R. CO.

1893. In the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 77 Md. Rep.

92-99, 39 Am. St. Rep. 396, 26 Atl. Rep. 113.

Appeal from the circuit court of Dorchester county.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Sec. 121. Same.

The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Robinson, Bryan,

After incorporation .

Fowler, Page, McSherry and Briscoe, JJ.

( b)

Alvey, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court.

M ere offer until performance.

This action was brought to recover of the defendant for certain

WEBB v. THE BALTIMORE AND EASTERN SHORE R. CO.

stock subscribed in the plaintiff company. The declaration contains

1893.

several of the common indebitatus counts, but the fifth count is special,

IN

THE

CouRT

OF

APPEALS

OF

MARYLAND.

77 Md. Rep.

92-99, 39 Am. St. Rep. 396, 26 A.ti. Rep. 113.

and it alleges that the defendant subscribed for and agreed to take

twenty shares of the capital stock of the plaintiff company, and to

Appeal from the circuit court of Dorchester county.
·The case is stated in the opinion of the court.
The cause was argued before ALVEY, C. J., ROBINSON, BRYAN,
FOWLER, PAGE , McSHERRY and BmscoE, JJ.
ALVEY, C. J. , delivered the opinion of the court.
Thi s nction was brought tc recove r of the defendant for certain
stock subscribed in the plaintiff company . The declaration contains
several of the commo n t'ndebt'tatus counts, but the fifth count is special,
and it alleges that the defend ant subscribed for a nd agreed to take
twenty shares of the capital stock of the plaintiff company, and to
pay $ r ,ooo th e refor on the completion of the railro nd of the company
to the town of Vienna, Md., and that, althoug h the said railroad has
lon g since been completed to the said town of Vienna, and that the
said subscriptio n is due a nd de mand able, the defenda nt has not paid
the sa m e, or any part thereof. By the pleas, the defendant denied
the legal existence of th e contract a lleged , or that h e \.Vas in any manner bound the reb y.

pay $1,000 therefor on the completion of the railroad of the company

to the town of Vienna, Md., and that, although the said railroad has

long since been completed to the said town of Vienna, and that the

said subscription is due and demandable, the defendant has not paid

the same, or any part thereof. By the pleas, the defendant denied

the legal existence of the contract alleged, or that he was in any man-

ner bound thereby.
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The questions presented on this appeal are simply as to the admis-

sibility of evidence and are presented by two bills of exception taken

by the defendant.

§ I 21
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At the trial it was admitted that the plaintiff was a corporation,

duly organized and existing under the laws of the state, and that the

plaintiff had constructed its railroad from Easton Bay, in Talbot

county, to the town of Vienna, in Dorchester county, before the ist

of January, 1891; and that, in the construction of its road the plaint-

iff had expended large sums of money, and created a large indebted-

ness, still outstanding at the time of this suit brought, to wit, the 12th

day of August, 1891. It was also admitted that before this was

brought, the defendant received from the secretary of the plaintiff, a

letter calling on him to pay the money alleged to be clue on the stock,

and, further, that before the bringing of this suit neither the plaintiff,

nor any one on its behalf, ever offered or tendered the certificates for

the stock subscribed for by the defendant. The plaintiff then offered

in evidence a subscription book, purporting to be a subscription book

for the stock of the plaintiff, and proved by an agent of the company,

to whom the book had been intrusted to procure subscriptions, that it

was the subscription book of the plaintiff, and that the entry in that
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book, to which the name of the defendant was subscribed, was made

and signed by the defendant. In that book there is this heading:

"We, the undersigned, agree to subscribe to and pay for the number

of shares of the capital stock of the Baltimore and Eastern Shore

Railroad Company, set opposite our names, provided the said road

shall be built on the Vienna route; said shares of stock to be of the

par value of $50, and the same to be paid for on installments of twenty

per cent, as any ten miles of road are completed." This heading had

appended to it about sixty signatures; and then follows this entry:

"I hereby agree to take twenty shares of the Baltimore and Eastern

Shore Railroad Company stock when completed to Vienna.

"$1,000.00. Albert Webb."

To the offer of this subscription book, with the entry therein signed

by the defendant, the latter objected, and in support of his objection

has assigned several grounds: First, that there was no evidence of a

tender of certificates of stock to the defendant, and that this suit could

not be maintained without such tender, and that the subscription was

invalid because the statutory installment was not paid. Secondly,

The questions presented on this appeal are simply as to the admissibility of evidence and are presented by two bills of exception taken
by the defendant.
At the trial it was admitted that the plaintiff was a corporation,
duly organized and existing under the laws of the state, and that the
plaintiff had constructed its railroad from Easton Bay, in Talbot
county, to the town of Vienna, in Dorchester county, before the 1st
of January, 1891; and that, in the construction of its road the plaintiff had expended large sums of money, and created a large indebtedness, still outstanding at the time of this suit brought, to wit, the 12th
day of August, 1891. It was also admitted that before thi s was
brought, the deiendant received from the secretary of the plaintiff, a
letter calling on him to pay the money alleged to be due on the stock,
and, further, that before the bringing of this suit neither the plaintiff,
nor any one on its behalf, ever offered or tendered the certificates for
the stock subscribed for by the defendant. The plaintiff then offered
in evidence a subscription book, purporting to be a subscription book
for the stock of the plaintiff, and proved by an agent of the company,
to whom the book had been intrusted to procure subscriptions, that it
was the subscription book of the plaintiff, and that the entry in that
book, to which the name of the defendant was subscribed, was made
and signed by the defendant. In that book there is this heading:
"We, the undersigned, agree to subscribe to and pay for the number
of shares of the capital stock of the Baltimore and Eastern Shore
Railroad Company, set opposite our names, provided the said road
shall be built on the Vienna route; said shares of stock to be of the
par value of $50, and the same to be paid for on installments of twenty
per cent. as any ten miles of road are completed." This heading had
appended to it about sixty signatures; and then follows this entry:
"l hereby agree to take twenty shares of the Baltimore and Eastern
Shore Railroad Company stock when completed to Vienna.

that there was no contract of a present subscription for stock, but, at

most, nothing more than a mere promise to subscribe when the road

was completed to Vienna. Thirdly, that if the entry signed by the

defendant be treated as a present subscription to stock, the contract is

within the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 11, ch. 3, § 17,

and that it is fatally defective in omitting to name the vendor of the

stock, and that there is no sufficient consideration for the defendant's

undertaking shown on the face of the subscription paper. There is

also a general objection taken to the admissibility of the subscription

34—Wil. Cases.

"$1,000.00.

ALBERT WEBB."

To the offer of this subscription book, with the entry therein signed
by the defendant, the latter objected, and in support of his objection
has assigned several grounds: First, that there was no evidence of a
tender of certificates of stock to the defendant, and that thi s suit could
not be maintained without such tender, and that the subscription was
invalid because the statutory installment was not paid. Secondly,
that there was no contract of a present subscription for stock , but, at
most, nothing more than a mere promise to subscribe when the road
was completed to Vienna. Thirdly , that if the entry signed by the
defendant be treated as a present subscription to stock, the conb·act is
within the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 11, ch. 3, § 1 7,
and that it is fatally defective in omitting to name the vendor of the
stock, and that there is no sufficient consideration for the defendant's
undertaking shown on the face of the subscription paper. There is
also a general objection taken to the ad missibility of the subscription
34-WIL. CASES.
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book in evidence. The objection to the admissibility of the evidence
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was overruled.

WEBB V. BALTIMORE, ETC., R. CO.

§ 12 I

In the opinion of this court none of the grounds assigned in support

book in evidence. The objection to the admissibility of the evidence
was overruled.
In the opinion of this court none of the grounds assigned in support
of the objection taken can be sustained.
l. There is clearly no valid ground for the objection that the ce.r·
tificates for the stock should have been tendered to the defendant as a
condition precedent to the right to maintain this action for the money
due on the subscription. This would seem to be well settled. r
Mor. on Corp.,§ 61, and cases there cited. Scarlett v. Academy of
Music, 43 Md. 203. Nor is the objection well taken that the subscrip·
tion is not binding upon the defendant because it is not hown that an
installment of $5 in cash on each share of stock subscribed had been
paid· at the time of making the subscription, under section 163 of article
23 of the code. The omission of such payment does not invalidate
the subscription. That construction of this provision of the statute
has been settled by the decision of this court, in the case of Oler v.
Baltimore and Randallstown Railroad Co., 41 "Md. 583. And with
respect to the necessity for showing that the amount of the subscription had been called for by the directors of the company, before suit
brought, it was admitted that the defendant had received a letter, be·
fore suit brought, purporting to be from the secretary of the plaintiff,
calling upon him to pay the money due on the stock, as being then
due, but that payment was refused. Whether that call or demand
was made by the authority of the directors of the company, was a
question of fact for the jury, upon all the evidence in the case.
2. The subscription in the form in whic:h it was made was inchoate
and conditional. It was such, however, as the company had a right
to accept. Taggart v. The West Maryland Railroad Company, 24
Md. 595; Phil. & West Chester Railroad Co. v. Hickman, 28 Pa.
St. 318. It was simply a conditional o_ffer by the defendant to be·
come a stockliolder after tlte condition specified had been performed
by tlte company. The performance of the condition precedent on the
part of tlie company was n ecessary to a valt"d acceptance of the offer
thus made by the subscriber; and before this acceptance , by tl1e per·
formance of the condition precedent. the dcfe12dant did not, by vir·
tue of sucli subscription, become a member of the company. His s11b·
scrt"ption was a mere offer, and unless w£tlzd1·awn before the condition p erformed by tlze company, t"t became final and absolute immediately upon the performance of tlte conditt"on; or, as was said by this
court in Taggart v. West 1lfary land Railroad Co., supra, such con·
ditional subscription, upon tlte p erformance o_f the condition, thus
became ultimately an unconditional and absolute subscription. And
that being the effect and operati on of the subscription made by the de·
fendant, it is quite clear that no other or further act of suhscription was
necessary, or contemplated by the pa1ties in order to convert the original
conditional subscription into an unconditional and absolute subscription.
The defendant appears to have declined the conditional terms em·
braced in the heading of the preceding subscriptions, which required
the amount of the subscriptions to be paid in installments of twenty

of the objection taken can be sustained.

1. There is clearly no valid ground for the objection that the cer-

tificates for the stock should have been tendered to the defendant as a

condition precedent to the right to maintain this action for the money

due on the subscription. This would seem to be well settled. I

Mor. on Corp., § 61, and cases there cited. Scarlett v. Academy of

Music, 43 Md. 203. Nor is the objection well taken that the subscrip-

tion is not binding upon the defendant because it is not shown that an

installment of $5 in cash on each share of stock subscribed had been

paid at the time of making the subscription, under section 163 of article

23 of the code. The omission of such payment does not invalidate

the subscription. That construction of this provision of the statute

has been settled by the decision of this court, in the case of Oler v.

Baltimore and Randallstown Railroad Co., 41 Md. 583. And with

respect to the necessity for showing that the amount of the subscrip-

tion had been called for by the directors of the company, before suit
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brought, it was admitted that the defendant had received a letter, be-

fore suit brought, purporting to be from the secretary of the plaintiff,

calling upon him to pay the money due on the stock, as being then

due, but that payment was refused. Whether that call or demand

was made by the authority of the directors of the company, was a

question of fact for the jury, upon all the evidence in the case.

2. The subscription in the form in which it was made was inchoatt

and conditional. It was such, however, as the company had a right

to accept. Taggart v. The West Maryland Railroad Company, 24

Md. 595; Phil. & West Chester Railroad Co. v. Hickman, 28 Pa.

St. 318. It zvas sitnfly a conditional offer by the defendant to be-

come a stockholder after the condition specified had been performed

by the company. The performance of the condition precedent on the

part of the company -was necessary to a valid acceptance of the offer

thus made by the subscriber; and before this acceptance, by the per-

formance of the condition precedent, the defendant did not, by vir-

tue of such subscription, become a member of the company. His sub-

scription was a ?nere offer, and unless withdrawn before the condi-

tion performed by the company, it became fnaland absolute immedi-

ately upon the performance of the condition; or, as zvas said by this

court in Taggart v. West Maryland Railroad Co., supra, such con-

ditional subscription, upon the performance of the condition, thin

became ultimately an unconditioned and, absolute subscription. And

that being the effect and operation of the subscription made by the de-

fendant, it is quite clear that no other or further act of subscription was

necessary, or contemplated by the parties in order to convert the original

conditional subscription into an unconditional and absolute subscription.

The defendant appears to have declined the conditional terms em-

braced in the heading of the preceding subscriptions, which required

the amount of the subscriptions to be paid in installments of twenty
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per cent, as anv ten miles of the road should be completed; and he-

preferred to make his subscription separate, and to make it depend

§
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upon the completion of the road to Vienna; and when the road was

so made, which is admitted to have been done before this action was

brought, the subscription of the defendant for the twenty shares of

stock became absolute, and the price therefor thence became payable

on demand of the directors of the company. This is the clear import

of the subscription of the defendant. No particular form of subscrip-

tion is made essential, and the present subscription is not of a

formal character, yet there is enough in the paper, when read in con-

nection with what precedes it in the same book, to show what was

really intended by the parties to the contract.

3. The contention that this contract of subscription is within the

statute of frauds, 29 Chas. II, ch. 3, § 17, is not maintainable, either

upon reason or authority. A subscription for shares of stock in an

ordinary corporation, is not a contract for the safe of '■•goods, wares

and merchandise''; -words -which comprehend only corporeal movable

property. Shares of stock are but choscs inaction, and are not within

statute; and this is the established construction of the statute by the
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English courts, as shown by the collection of cases by Mr. Benjamin

in his admirable work on Sales, pp. 90-91; and the same construction

has been adopted by decisions of high authority in this country,

(Browne on Statutes of Frauds, § 29S; Ang. & Ames on Corp., § 563;

Clark v. Burnham, 2 Story C. C. Rep. 15) though there are some de-

cisions, especially of an earlier date, entitled to great respect, to the

contrary. In the absence of a binding authority, such as an express

decision of this court, we are not disposed to adopt and follow the de-

cisions of the American courts, holding that the statute does apply in

such cases, being as they are in conflict with the English courts upon

this subject. We think the English decisions furnish the better and

more reasonable construction of the statute.

In the case of Colvin v. Williams, 3 H. & J. 38,1 the only case in

this state supposed to give any support to the contention of the de-

fendant, the question presented was quite different from that presented

in this case. In that case there was a sale of bank stock by a broker,

and the broker became the agent of both seller and buver, and in

whose name as vendor a memorandum of sale was made out and de-

livered to the defendant, who filled up the blank in the memorandum

with the number of shares he desired, and accepted the same as pur-

chaser of the number of shares sold. Upon this memorandum the

court below held the plaintiff to be entitled to recover; and upon ap-

peal, this court held the court below right in its ruling, and affirmed

the judgment. There was no opinion delivered; but it is stated at the

conclusion of the case, whether by the authority of the court or by the

reporters of the case without such authority, does not appear, that it

was said by the court "that the sale of bank stock is within the statute

of frauds; and that the broker was the common agent of both the ap-

pellee and appellant." If such was the case, as we must take it to

'5 Am. Dec. 417.

per cent. as any ten miles of the road should be completed; and he
preferred to make his subscription separate, and to make it deprnd
upon the completion of the road to Vienna; and when the road was
so made, which is admitted to have been done before this action was
brought, the subscription of the defendant for the twenty shares of
stock became absolute, and the price therefor thence became payable
on demand of the directors of the company. This is the clear impo rt
of the subscription of the defendant. No particular form of subscription is made essential, and the present subscription is not of a
formal character, yet there is enough in the paper, v.·hen read in connection with what precedes it in the same book, to show what was
really intended by the parties· to the contract.
3. The contention that this contract of subscription is within the
statute of frauds, 29 Chas. II, ch. 3, § 17, is not maintainable, either
upon reason or authority. A subscrip'tion for shares of stock in an
ordinary corporation, is not a contract for the sale of "goods, wares
and merchandise''; words which comprehend only corporeal movable
property. Shares of stock are but choses in action, and are not within
statute; and this is the established construction of the statute by the
English courts, as shown by the collection of cases by Mr. Benjamin
in his admirable work on Sales, pp. 90o-91 ; and the same construction
has been adopted by decisions of high authority in this country,
(Browne on !::)Latutes of Frauds,§ 298; Ang. & Ames on Corp., § 563;
Clark v. Burnham, 2 Story C. C. Rep. 15) though there are some decisions, especially of an earlier date, entitled to great respect, to the
contrary. In the absence of a binding authority, such as an express
decision of this court, we are not disposed to adopt and follow the decisions of the American courts, holding that the statute does apply in
such cases, being as they are in conflict with the English courts upon
this subject. We think the English decisions furnish the better and
more reasonable construction of the statute.
In the case of Colvin v. 'Williams, 3 H. & J. 38, 1 the only case in
this state supposed to give any support to the contention of the defendant, the question presented was quite different from that pre entecl
in this case. In that case there was a sale of bank stock by a broke r,
and the broker became the agent of both seller and buyer, and in
whose name as vendor a memorandum of sale was made out and delivered to the defendant, who filled up the blank in the memorandum
with the number of shares he desired , and a.ccepted the sam e a~ pu rchaser of the number of shares sold. Upon this memorandu m t he
court below held the plaintiff to be entitled to recover; and upon appeal, this court held the court below right in its ruling , and affirmed
the judgment. There was no opinion delivered; but it is sta ted at the
conclusion of the case, ·whether by the authority of the court or by the
reporters of the case without such authority, does not appear, th at it
was said by the court "that the sale of bank stock is within th e tatute
of frauds; and that the broker was the common agent of both th e appellee and appellant." If such was the case, as we must take it to
15

Am. Dec. 417.
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be, it is very clear that the declaration made at the conclusion of the

122

case, "that the sale of bank stock was within the statute of frauds,"

be, it is very clear that the declaration made at the conclusion of the
case, "that the sale of bank stock was within the statute of frauds,"
was wholly unnecessary to the decision of the case, and was purely a
dictum, if in fact it be assumed to have emanated from the court at
all. The statute did not avail as a defense to the defendant, if it was
in fact relied on as a defense, which does not appear to have been the
case. There have been many cases since that decision in which such
defense could have been taken, if the statute was applicable in such
cases as this, but which passed without question as to the application
of the statute.
Upon both exceptions, therefore, we are of opinion that the court
below was correct in its rulings, and that the judgment appealed from
should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Note. See citations, supra, § 116, p. 514. As to statute of frauds, see 1898,
Rogers v. Burr. 105 Ga. 432, 70 Am. St. Rep. 50, and note, supra, p.459.

was wholly unnecessary to the decision of the case, and was purely a

dictum, if in fact it be assumed to have emanated from the court at

all. The statute did not avail as a defense to the defendant, if it was

in fact relied on as a defense, which does not appear to have been the

case. There have been many cases since that decision in which such

defense could have been taken, if the statute was applicable in such

cases as this, but which passed without question as to the application

of the statute.

Upon both exceptions, therefore, we are of opinion that the court

below was correct in its rulings, and that the judgment appealed from

should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Note. See citations, supra, § 116, p. 514. As to statute of frauds, see 1898,

Rogers v. Burr. 105 Ga. 432, 70 Am. St. Rep. 50, and note, supra, p.459.

Sec. 122. Subscriptions may be upon conditions precedent or sub-

sequent.
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RAILROAD (Paducaii and Memphis) v. PARKS.1

1888. In the Supreme Court of Tennessee. 86 Tenn. Rep.

554-565, 8 S. W. Rep. 842.

Sec. 122. Subscriptions may be upon conditions precedent or sub-

Appeal in error from circuit court of Dyer county, T. J. Flip-

sequent.

pin, J.

Lurton, J. These four suits at law against subscribers to the stock

RAILROAD (PADUCAH AND

of the Paducah and Memphis Railroad Company were tried by con-

MEMPHIS)

v. PARKS. 1

sent together, and, a jury being waived, the issues of law and fact

1888.

were submitted to the circuit judge, who has filed his special findings

IN THE SUPREME CouRT

OF

TENNESSEE.

86 Tenn. Rep.

554-565, 8 S. W. Rep. 842.

of fact and law as part of the record. There was a judgment in favor

of each of the defendants, and an appeal by the plaintiffs.

Appeal in error from circuit court of Dyer county, T. J. Flippin, J.
LuRTON, J. These four suits at law against subscribers to the stock
of the Paducah and Memphis Railroad Company were u·ied by consent together, and, a jury being waived, the issues of law and fact
were submitted to the circuit judge, who has filed his special findings
of fact and law as part of the record. There was a judgment in favor
of each of the defendants, and an appeal by the plaintiffs.
The contract of subscription upon which the suit was brought was
as follows:
"July 31, 1872.-Wc, the subscribers, agree and bind ourselves,
our heirs and legal representatives, to pay to the Paducah and Memphis Railroad Company the sums by us subscribed, to be stock in said
railroad company, upon the following terms and conditions, to wit:
One-fourth to be paid when the road is completed to the north or
south line of Dyer county, the remainder of the amount subscribed to
be paid in four equal installments of four months, as the work progresses through the county: Provided, The company establish a depot
on said road within fifteen hundred feet of G. B. Tinsley's corner store,
supposed to be the center of Newbern. It is further provided that
certificates of stock issue to said subscribers as tt"> other stockholders
in said company, upon the payment of their s11bsc1iption."
The proof shows that there was a gap in the line of a road projected between Paducah, Ky., and Memphis, Tenn., each end of the
1 Part of opinion, upon other points, omitted.

The contract of subscription upon which the suit was brought was

as follows:

"July 31, 1872.—We, the subscribers, agree and bind ourselves,

our heirs and legal representatives, to pay to the Paducah and Mem-

phis Railroad Company the sums by us subscribed, to be stock in said

railroad company, upon the following terms and conditions, to wit:

One-fourth to be paid when the road is completed to the north or

south line of Dyer county, the remainder of the amount subscribed to

be paid in four equal installments of four months, as the work pro-

gresses through the county: Provided, The company establish a depot

on said road within fifteen hundred feet of G. 13. Tinsley's corner store,

supposed to be the center of Newbern. It is further provided that

certificates of stock issue to said subscribers as to other stockholders

in said company, upon the payment of their subscription."

The proof shows that there was a gap in the line of a road pro-

jected between Paducah, Ky., and Memphis, Tenn., each end of the

1 Part of opinion, upon other points, omitted.

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

CONDITIONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS.

50 1

§

33

I 22

COND1TIO~AL

.T ilSCR I PTIONS .

533

road being in operation and owned by different companies. The new

company was the result of the consolidation of the two old companies,

and it undertook the completion of the missing link. Dyer county,

of which Newbern is a flourishing village, would be crossed by the

finished road.

The assignments of errors are so defective as to raise no question

of fact, but the second assignment is sufficient to raise a question of

law. We have, therefore, treated the facts as found by the circuit

judge as the facts of the case, and will test the soundness of the result

he reached by the law applicable. The facts necessary to be stated,

as found by his Honor, are as follows:

'■That work was commenced on said unfinished part of the road

early in 1872, and the Dyer county line was reached on the north in

April, 1S73, and on the 28th of that month it ran its train of cars into

Trimble Station, in said county. On the 15th of May thereafter, the

company made a call for one-fourth of the subscription, according to

contract." This call, together with the second and third calls, were

likewise paid by each of the defendants. "The company did work
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on the road in Dyer county until the last of July or first of August,

1S74, at which time it ceased operations and work of all sort. The

work principally done in Dyer county w:as between Dyersburg and

Trimble .Station; the road was mostly graded, or a great deal of it,

from Trimble Station to Newbern, and between Newbern and Dyers-

burg, and in places bridges were constructed, and cross-ties were col-

lected in one or more places to be placed on the road. The road was

widened at the place where the depot now stands (in Newbern) as if

for side track, but the company owned no property or land outside

of the right of way upon which a depot could be located."

He further held that the proof did not show any further prepara-

tions for the establishment of a depot at Newbern than the widening

of the grade at that point for side-track purposes. lie further found

that shortly after cessation of work in August, 1874, foreclosure pro-

ceedings were instituted by bond creditors, and the property and fran-

chises of the corporation sold at public sale, and acquired by the

Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company, and this company, being

an entirely new and independent organization, has since finished the

projected road through Dyer county. That to induce location of depot

at Newbern, citizens of that place had been compelled to make a new

contract with the successor company, who had assumed none of the

contracts or liabilities of the old company. He further found that the

old corporation was utterly insolvent at the time it abandoned work,

and that at the time of trial it had no property, franchises, and prac-

tically no existence.

The subscription list was accepted by the Paducah and Memphis

Railroad Company, and on the 12th of September, 1873. after pay-

ment of first call by subscribers, was assigned to Childs. Stephens &

Co., contractors for work in Dyer county, in part payment for work

done and to be done by them. The suit is by these assignees and

creditors of the insolvent company. Three of the suits are for the

road being in operation and owned by diffe rent companies. The new
company \\'as the result of the consolidation of the two old companies,
and it undertook the completion of the missing link. Dyer county,
of \Vhich N ewbern is a flourishing village, would b e crossed by the
fini!'hed road.
The a ·signments of errors are so defective as to raise no question
of fact, bur the second assignment is sufficient to raise a question of
lav,,·. v\' e have , therefore, treated the facts as found by the circuit
judge as the fact!> of the case , and will test the soundness of the result
he reached by the law applicable. The facts necessary to be stated,
as found by his Honor, are as follows :
'·That work was commenced on said unfinished part of the road
early in 1872, and the Dyer county line was reached on the north in
Apri l, 1873, and on the 28th of that month it ran its train of cars into
Trimble Station , in said county. On the 15th of May thereafter, the
company made a call for one-fourth of the subscription, according to
contract." This call, together with the second and third calls, were
likewise paid by each of the defendants . "The company did work
on the road in Dyer county until the last of July or first of August,
187.f, at which time it ceased operations and work of all sort. The
work principally done in Dyer county was between Dyersburg and
Trimble Station; the road was mostly graded, or a great deal of it,
from Trimble Station to Newbern, and between Newbern and Dyersburg, and in places bridges were constructed, and cross-ties were collected in one or more places to be placed on the road. The road was
widened at the place where the depot now stands (in Newbern) as if
for side track, but the company owned no property or land outside
of the right of way upon which a depot could be located."
He further held that the proof did not show any further preparations for the establishment of a d epot at Newbern than the widening
of the grade at that point for side-track purposes. He further found
that shortly after cessation of work in August, 1874, foreclosu1·e proceedings were instituted by bond creditors, and the property and francbi es of the corporation sold at public sale, and ::icquircd by the
Che apeake and Ohio Railroad Company, and this company, b e ing
an entirely new and independent organization, has since finish ed the
projected road throug h Dyer county. That to induce location of d epot
at "Newbern, citizens of that place had been compelled to m ake a new
contract with the successor company, who had assumed none of the
contracts or liabilities of the old company. He further found that the
old corporation was utterly insolvent at the time it abandoned work,
and that at the time of trial it had no property , franchi ses, and practically no existence.
T he subscription list was accepted by the Paducah a nd Memphis
Railroad C ompany, and on the 12th of September, 1873, after payment of first call by subscribers, was assigned to Child s, Stephens &
Co. , contractors for work in Dyer county, in part p ayment for w ork
done and to be done by th em. The suit is by these assig nees and
creditors of the insolvent company. Three of the suits are for the
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fourth call, which matured in May, 1S74, and before work had ceased,
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and the fourth defendant is sued alone upon the fifth and last call,

fourth call, which matured in May, 1874, and before work had ceased,
and the fourth defendant is sued alone upon the fifth and last call,
which did not mature, in point of time, until September, 1874, which
was after all effort to complete the road had been abandoned. The
question is as to whether defendants are liable for any of the unpaid
calls. His honor, the circuit judge, was of opinion that the construction of the road to the line of the county was a conditioh precedent
to any liability, and that this condition had been met. He was furthe r
of opinion that the stipulation requiring the establishment of a depot
at Newbern was an independent provision, and not a condition precedent to liability upon the contract of subscription. This latter provision, he held, required and meant the erection of a depot building,
with reasonable facilities for freight and passengers. Upon these
facts, and upon the contract as thus construed, the circuit judge held
that, although the stipulation as to a depot was not a condition precedent, yet it was a part of the agreement of the corporation which, at
some reasonable time, it was bound to carry out, and that as it was
now obvious that the utter insolvency of the company, and the sa le
of its property and franchises, had rendered the performance of thi s
contract impossible, that it, therefore, followed that the defendants
were released from liability upon their stock, both as to calls accruing
before and after the abandonment of work upon the road.
In this conclusion we think he erred. If it be conceded that the
proviso concerning a depot at Newbern is not a condition precedent,
as his honor does, then it must follow that a breach of an independent covenant will not discharge the other party of th e contract, but
that the party damaged by such breach must rely upon his re medy at
law for damages, or his remedy in equity, by bill for a sp ecific performance. Such breach will not de feat a right of action upon those
patts of the contract not dependent upon it. Before such rig ht of
action for a breach of this covenant arose the stock list w as as ·igned
to creditors of the company, and hence such breach can not, as against
such assignees, be set up to defea t or abate their lega l ri ght of recove ry .
If the construction of a depot had been mad e a condition precedent to
the subscription, or to liability for calls upon stock, then it would devolve upon plaintiff to show performance o f s uch precedent condition:
but , on the other hand, if the parties have not chosen to m ake r esponsibility depend upon perform ance of thi s stipulation , then , clearly, defendants must rely upon their independent remedy against the co mpany.
We agree with his ho nor that this proviso a s to a depot was not a
condition precedent, but a mer e independent stipul ation.
The capital of stock compan ies consist of their stock subscriptions.
This is the basis of credit, and an essential to organization. Thi. i
a trust-fund for the benefit of creditors in case of insolvency. Conditional subscriptions to the stock of corporations arc 111iusual. and
often operate to defeat subscribers who become such abso!utdy and
upon the faith that all the stock is equally bound to contribute to the
hazards of the enterprise. It misleads creditors, and is the fruit-

which did not mature, in point of time, until September, 1874, which

was after all effort to complete the road had been abandoned. The

question is as to whether defendants are liable for an}' of the unpaid

calls. His honor, the circuit judge, was of opinion that the con-

struction of the road to the line of the county was a condition precedent

to any liability, and that this condition had been met. He was further

of opinion that the stipulation requiring the establishment of a depot

at Newbern was an independent provision, and not a condition prece-

dent to liability upon the contract of subscription. This latter pro-

vision, he held, required and meant the erection of a depot building,

with reasonable facilities for freight and passengers. Upon these

facts, and upon the contract as thus construed, the circuit judge held

that, although the stipulation as to a depot was not a condition prece-

dent, yet it was a part of the agreement of the corporation which, at

some reasonable time, it was bound to carry out, and that as it was

now obvious that the utter insolvency of the company, and the sale

of its property and franchises, had rendered the performance of this
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contract impossible, that it, therefore, followed that the defendants

were released from liability upon their stock, both as to calls accruing

before and after the abandonment of work upon the road.

In this conclusion we think he erred. If it be conceded that the

proviso concerning a depot at Newbern is not a condition precedent,

as his honor does, then it must follow that a breach of an independ-

ent covenant will not discharge the other party of the contract, but

that the party damaged by such breach must rely upon his remedy at

law for damages, or his remedy in equity, by bill for a specific per-

formance. Such breach will not defeat a right of action upon those

parts of the contract not dependent upon it. Before such right of

action for a breach of this covenant arose the stock list was assigned

to creditors of the company, and hence such breach can not, as against

such assignees, be set up to defeat or abate their legal right of recovery.

If the construction of a depot had been made a condition precedent to

the subscription, or to liability for calls upon stock, then it would de-

volve upon plaintiff to show performance of such precedent condition;

but, on the other hand, if the parties have not chosen to make respon-

sibility depend upon performance of this stipulation, then, clearly, de-

fendants must rely upon their independent remedy against the com-

pany.

We agree with his honor that this proviso as to a depot was not a

condition precedent, but a mere independent stipulation.

The capital of stock companies consist of their stock subscriptions.

This is the basis of credit, and an essential to organization. This is

a trust-fund for the benefit of creditors in case of insolvency. Condi-

tional subscriptions to the stock of corporations arc unusual, and

often operate to defeat subscribers who become such absolutely and

upon the faith that all the stock is equally bound to contribute to the

hazards of the enterprise. It misleads creditors, and is the fruit-
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ful source of litigation and disaster. Tending to the ensnarement

of creditors, and contrary to a sound public policy, conditional sub-

scriptions to corporate shares ought not to be encouraged. Their va-

lidity, however, is too firmly fixed by a long line of decisions, to be

now overturned, yet the courts will not strain^ where creditors are

concerned, to convert independent covenants into conditions precedent.

If a subscriber desires to make his liability depend upon the perfor-

mance of some stipulation by the corporation, it is very easy for him

to do so in express terms. In the case now under consideration, it is

obvious that the subscribers did not intend to make the building of a

depot at Nevvbem.a condition upon which their liability should de-

pend. They expressly provide that one-fourth of their subscriptions

shall fall due when the line of the road is completed to the county line.

JVow. this was a condition precedent, but when it was complied

with the subscription became absolute, and one-fourth payable at once,

and the remainder as the work progressed through the county, in four

installments, four months apart. Now, a depot at Newbern would

be folly without a railroad in operation, and every installment might
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fall due by lapse of time and continued work within the county, before

a depot would be of any practical value. The fact that the first call

became payable when the road reached the county line, settles the

meaning attached to this stipulation. The acts stipulated to be done

are to be done at different times. Hence they are independent of

each other, and the remedy of the subscriber for breach of such a stip-

ulation is in damages. Goldsborough v. Orr, 8 Wheat. 217.

The defendants have pressed upon us the case of Railroad v. Curtis,

80 N. Y. 219, s. c. 1 Eng. and Am. Railroad Cases, as sustaining

the conclusion of the circuit judge.

This case has been carefully examined, and we are of opinion that

it in no way supports the contention of defendants. The contract in

that case was one between subscribers, whereby they agreed to become

subscribers to the stock of the railroad company upon certain condi-

tions. They did not, as held by the court in that case, become share-

holders in prccsenti, but only pledged themselves to one another to

thereafter subscribe, and upon condition that the road should be actu-

ally constructed by the Lake Shore Company through the town of

Parmer. The court held that the actual building of the road by the

Lake Shore Company was a condition precedent, and that this condi-

tion had never been complied with.

The case of N. & N. W. R. Co. v. Jones, 2 Cold. 574, is likewise

relied upon. It decides nothing that is in conflict with our view of

this case. That case was action by the company against the sub-

scriber who had subscribed upon the express stipulation that his sub-

scription should be void unless the road was constructed upon a cer-

tain line. The directors did locate the road upon the agreed line, but

afterwards abandoned this line and constructed the road upon a to-

tally different line. This court properly held that, by the very terms

of the subscription, it became void by this action of the company.

The view we have taken as to the construction of this contract, and

ful source of litigati'on and disaster. Tending to the ensnarement
of creditors, and contrary to a sound publt'c policy, conditional subscriptions to corporate shares ought 11ot to be encouraged. Th e£r validity, however, is too firmly fixed by a; long lz'ne of decisions, to be
now overtu1·ned, yet tlte courts will not strain, where creditors are
concerned, to convert independent covenants into conditions precedent.
If a subscriber dt·sires to make his liability depend upon the performance of some stipulation by the corporation, it is very easy for him
to do so in express terms. In the case now under consideration, it is
obvious that the subscribers did not intend to make the building of a
depot at Newbern.a condition upon which their liability should depend. They expressly provide that one-fourth of their subscriptions
shall fall due when the line of the road is completed to the county line .
.JVow. this was a condition precedent, but when it was complied
with the subscription became absolute, and one-fourth payable at once,
and the remainder as the work progressed through the county, in four
installments, four months apart. Now, a depot at Newbern would
be folly without a railroad in operation, and every installment might
fall due by lapse of time and continued work within the county, before
a depot would be of any practical value. The fact that the first call
became payable when the road reached the county line , settles the
meaning attached to this stipulation. The acts stipulated to be done
are to be done at different times. Hence they are independent of
each other, and the remedy of the subscriber for breach of such a stipulation is in damages. Goldsborough v. OIT, 8 Wheat. 217.
The defendants have pressed upon us the case of Railroad v. Curtis,
80 N . Y. 219, s. c. 1 Eng. and Am. Railroad Cases, as sustaining
tbe conclusion .of the circuit judge.
This case has been carefully examined, and we are of opinion that
it in no way supports the contention of defendants. The contract in
that case was one between subscribers, whereby they agreed to become
subscribers to the stock of the railroad company upon certain conditions. They did not, as held by the court in that case, become shareh olders in pra:senti, but only pledged themselves to one another to
ther eafter subscribe, and upon condition that the road should be actually constructed by the Lake Shore Company through the town of
Parmer. The court held that the actual building of the road by the
Lake Shore Company was a condition precedent, and that this condition had never been complied with.
The case of N. & N . W. R. Co. v . Jones, 2 Cold. 574, is likewise
relied upon. It decides nothing that is in conflict with our view of
this case. That case was action by the company against th e subscriber who had subscribed upon the express stipulation th at hi s subscription should be void unless the road was constructed upon a certain line. The directors did locate the road upon the agreed line, but
afterwards abandoned this line and constructed the road upon rt totally different line. This court properly held that, by the very terms
of the ubscription, it b ecame void by thi action of the company.
The view we have taken as to the construction of this contract, and
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the effect of the insolvency of the company upon the stipulation as to
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a depot at Newbern, is supported by a number of well-considered

the effect of the insolvency of the company upon the stipulation as to
a depot at Newbern, is supported by a number of well-considered
cases in the courts of other states.
Berryman v. Trustees, Southen~ Railway, 14 Bush 755; Winkler
v . Railroad , 29 Mo. ~18; Mc.Millen v. Railroad, l.) B. Monroe 218;
Swartwout v. Railroad, 24 Mich. 389; Miller v. Railroad, 40 Pa. St.
237; Chamberiain v. Railroad, 15 Ohio St. 225.
This brings us to a consideration of the question as to whether a
suit for the last installment of these stock subscriptions can be now
maintained. The subscription provided for the maturity of the calls
subsequent to the first in the following language: •
"The remainder of the amount subscribed to be paid in four equal
installments of four months, as the work on the road progressed
tltrouglt the county." The work was progressing at the time the
second, third and fourth calls were made, and there can be no doubt
but that they were rightfully called and properly demanded. But
when the last installment was called all \vork had been abandoned and
has never been since resumed. We are of opinion that this last installment has never matured. The requirement that the calis subsequent to the first should be made in equal installments "as the work
progressed through the county," is a condition precedent to the matt11ity of each installment; and the abandonment of the work before
it was finished, and before, in a point of time, the last call could
have been made if the work had been carried on in good faith, defeats the action of this installment. No right to call for or sue upon
this installment exists by reason of the failure of the company to sho\Y
that the road was finished , or work going on, within the county at the
time it was demanded. The objection is made by defendants that
these suits can not be maintained because no tender of stock ce1tificates has been made.
This assignment of error is not tenable. This is not a case of the
purchase of stock certificates as nego tiable securities. The tender in
such a case might be necessary to maintain suit for the price. But no
tender is necessary to maintain suit upon an ordinary subscription for
stock. Morawetz on Corporations,§ § 6r and 148 (2d ed.). • • •
Judgments as to Parks and Harris reversed.
Note. See citations, §116, supra, p. 014.

cases in the courts of other states.

Berryman v. Trustees, Southern Railway, 14 Bush 755; Winkler

v. Railroad, 29 Mo. 21S; McMillen v. Railroad, 15 B. Monroe 218;

Swartwout v. Railroad, 24 Mich. 389; Miller v. Railroad, 40 Pa. St.

237; Chambenain v. Railroad, 1^ Ohio St. 225.

This brings us to a consideration of the question as to whether a

suit for the last installment of these stock subscriptions can be now

maintained. The subscription provided for the maturity of the calls

subsequent to the first in the following language: •

"The remainder of the amount subscribed to be paid in four equal

installments of four months, as the work on the road progressed

through the county." The work was progressing at the time the

second, third and fourth calls were made, and there can be no doubt

but that they were rightfully called and properly demanded. But

when the last installment was called all work had been abandoned and

has never been since resumed. We are of opinion that this last in-

stallment has never matured. The requirement that the calls subse-
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quent to the first should be made in equal installments "as the work

progressed through the county," is a condition precedent to the ma-

turity of each installment; and the abandonment of the work before

it was finished, and before, in a point of time, the last call could

have been made if the work had been carried on in good faith, de-

feats the action of this installment. No right to call for or sue upon

this installment exists by reason of the failure of the company to show

that the road was finished, or work going on, within the county at the

time it was demanded. The objection is made by defendants that

these suits can not be maintained because no tender of stock certifi-

cates has been made.

This assignment of error is not tenable. This is not a case of the

purchase of stock certificates as negotiable securities. The tender in

such a case might be necessary to maintain suit for the price. But no

tender is necessary to maintain suit upon an ordinary subscription for

stock. Morawetz on Corporations, §§ 61 and i48(2ded.). * * *

Judgments as to Parks and Harris reversed.

Note. See citations, §116, supra, p. 614.

Sec. 123. Conditional delivery of subscriptions. Escrows, the-

ories of:

(a) Delivery can not be to company's agent.

WIGHT v. SHELBY RAILROAD COMPANY.1

1855. In the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 16 B. Mon.

(Ky.) Reports, 4-S, 63 Am. Dec. 522.

Judge Simpson delivered the opinion of the court.

Sec. 123.

As the same questions are involved in both these cases, and as the

Conditional delivery of subscriptions. Escrows, theories of:
(a) Delivery can not be to company's agent.

'Part of opinion on other points omitted.

WIGHT v. SHELBY RAILROAD COMPANY.1

1855.

CouRT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY. 16 B. Mon.
(Ky.) Reports, 4-8, 63 Am. D ec. 522.

IN THE

Judge S1MPSO~ delivered the opinio n of the court.
A s the same questions arc involved in both these cases, and as the
1 Part of opinion on other points omitted.
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validity of the defense presented in both, has to be examined in each

case, we will proceed to consider and decide such questions as arise

upon the record in either case.

The defense relied upon by Wight, that the subscription of stock

made by him was left with one of the commissioners in the nature of

an escrow, is wholly invalid. The commissioners were the persons

appointed by the charter to receive and accept subscriptions of stock,

a subscription received by them, even if such a writing could, under

any circumstances, be made to assume the nature and attributes of an

escrow, could not take that character, inasmuch as, when it was re-

ceived by them, it became just as obligatory on the party making it

as a promissory note would be upon the maker who left it with the

payee, or his agent. The well-settled doctrine is that to make a writ-

ing an escrow merely, it must be placed in the hands of a third per-

son by the party making it, to be delivered to the other party* on the

happening of a specified contingency. Here the subscribers were the

parties on one side, and the commissioners on the other. A sub-

scription when made atid received by the commissioners could not,
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therefore, be a mere escrow, but became in law an absolute under-

taking for the payment of the stock subscribed according to the pro-

visions of the charter.

So far as the defendants, or either of them, alleged that their sub-

scription was conditional, and was not to be obligatory upon them,

unless the road was located on a certain route, it is only necessary to

remark that, the contract being in writing, parol proof is inadmis-

sible to alter its terms or to shoxv that, instead of being absolute,

as it purports to be, it was in reality conditional. The subscribers

might have annexed a condition to the terms of their subscriptions, if

they had thought proper to do so, and it would then have been with

the commissioners to determine whether such conditional subscrip-

tions of stock would be received; but, not having done so, they can

not, according to the well-established doctrine on the subject, allege

or prove that the contract was different from that which is evidenced

by the writing, unless they can establish fraud or mistake in its execu-

tion. * * *

The failure to pay the sum of $i on each share of stock subscribed

can not certainly be relied upon by the subscribers as exonerating

them from their liability for their subscriptions. It was their duty to pay

it at the time the stock was subscribed, but they should not be allowed

to take advantage of their oxvn wrong, and release themselves from

their whole obligation by a failure to perform a part of it. Even

if the commissioners might have refused to receive the stock, unless

the payment had been made, yet, as they did not do it, the contract

was, after the stock had been received without the payment, binding

upon both sides.

The decision of the court in the case of the Union Turnpike v. Jenkins,

i Caine's Reports 381, sustains the views expressed in this opinion,

and it is only the opinion of the dissenting judge that is cited in Angell

& Ames on Corporations, and referred to by the counsel for the ap-

pellants.

validity of the defense presented in both, has to be examined in each
c ase, we will proceed to consider and decide such questions as arise
upon the record in either case.
The defense re lied upon by \'Vight, that the subscription of stock
made by him was left with one of the commissioners in the nature of
an escrow, is wholly invalid. The commissioners were the persons
appointed by the charter to receive and accept subscriptions of stock,
a subscription received by the m, even if such a writing could, under
any circumstances, be macle to assume the nature and attributes of an
escrow, could not take that character, inasmuch as, when it was received by them , it became just as obligatory on the party making rt
as a promissory note would be upon the maker who left it with the
p ayee, or his agent. Th e well-settled doctrille is tlzat to mai·e a writing an escrow m erely, it must be placed in th e hands of a third person by th e party maki'ng it, to be delt"vered to the qilter party, on tlte
happening of a specified contingency. ./Iere th e subscribers were the
partt"es on one side, and the commissioners on th e other. A subscription w lten made and rece£ved by the commissioners could not,
therefore, be a mere escrow, but becam e in law an absolute undertaking for the payment of th e stock subscribed according to the provisions of th e charter.
So far as the defendants, or either of them, alleged that their subscription was conditional, and was not to be obligatory -upon them,
unless the road was located on a certain route, it is only necessary to
remark that, the contract being in wn'ting, parol proof is inadmissible to alter its terms or to show that, instead of being absolute,
as it purports to be, it was in reality conditional. The subscribers
might have annexed a condition to the terms of their subscriptions, if
they had thought proper to do so, a nd it would then have been with
the commi ssioners to determine whether such conditional subscriptions of stock would be received; but, not having done so, they can
not, according to -the well-established doctrine on the s ubject , allege
or prove that the contract was different from that v..·hich is evidenced
by the writing, unless they can establish fraud or mistake in its execution. • • •
The failure to pay the sum of $1 on each share of stock subscribed
can not certainly be r.e lied upon by the subscribers as exonerating
them from their liability for their s uhscriptions. It was th eir duty to pay
it at the time th e stock was subscribed, but they should not be allowed
to take advantage of the£r own wrong, and release themselves from
the£r whole obligation by a failure to p erform a part of it. Even
if the commissioners might have refused to receive the stock, unless
the payment had been made, yet, as they did not do it, the contract
was, after the stock had been received without the payment, binding
upon both sides.
The decision of the court in the case of the Union Turnpike v .Jenkins,
1 Caine's R eports 381, sustains the views expressed in this opinion ,
and it is only the opinion of the dissenting judge that is cited in A ngell
& Ames on Corporations, and referred to by the counsel for the app ellants.
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CASS V. PlTT SD{.; RG H, ETC ., R. CO.

The decisions of the Massachusetts courts, on some of the questions

124

involved in these cases, have not been followed by this court.

Th e d ecisions of the Massachusetts co urts, on some of the questions
involved in these cases, have no t bt:e n followed b y thi s court.
In our opini o n none of the de fen ~t:s p resented by e ither of the appellants was a sufficient answer to the plaintiff's a ction.
Whe refore , the judg m e nt in both cases is affirmed.

In our opinion none of the defenses presented by either of the ap-

pellants was a sufficient answer to the plaintiff's action.

Wherefore, the judgment in both cases is affirmed.

Note. See note at end of next case.

Sec. 124. Same.

(b) Delivery may be to company's agent.

Nole.

CASSv. PITTSBURGH, VIRGINIA AND CHARLESTON RAIL-

See note at end of next case.

WAY CO. 1

1875. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 80 Pa. St. Rep.

Sec. 124. Same.

Mr. Justice Sharswood delivered the opinion of the court May

29, 1876.

(b) Delivery may be to company's agent.

The subscription of the plaintiff in error to the stock of the defend-

ants was upon condition "that in the judgment of the board of di-

CASS v. PITTSBURGH, VIRGINIA AND CHARLESTON RAIL-

rectors of said company a sufficient amount is subscribed to the cap-

WAY

ital stock of said company on or before the first day of April, 1871, to

co. 1

grade and bridge the road, including the right of way from South

1875. IN

Pittsburgli to West Brownsville." The board of directors, on the

THE

SUP.R nfE CouRT
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OF PENNSYLVANIA.

8o

Pa.

St. Rep.

31-38.

first day of April, 1871, passed a resolution, "that, in the judgment

of this board, the conditions named are fully complied with; that suf-

Ma. JUSTICE SHARSWOOD delivered the opinion of the court May

ficient stock has been subscribed to grade and bridge the road, includ-

29, 1876.

ing the right of way from South Pittsburgh to West Brownsville." • * *

The subscription of the plaintiff in error to the stock of the defendants w as upon condition "tha t in the judgment of the board of directors of s aid company a sufficient amount is subscribed to the capital stock of said co mpany on or before the firs t d ay of April , 1871, to
grade and bridge the ro ad , including the right o f way fro m S outh
Pittsburg h to West Brownsville." The board o f dire ctors , on th e
first d ay o f April , 1871, p assed a resolution, "that, in the judg ment
of this board, the condition · n a m e d ar e fully complie d with; that suffici ent sto ck h as been subscribed to g rade and bridg e the road , including the rig ht of w ay from S outh Pittsburg h to West Brow nsville." • • •
The third assig nm e nt of e n-or is to the rejection of an offe r to prove,
in substance, th at the agent o f the defe ndants by whom the subscriptio n h ad been procured b efore it was reported t o or accepted by the
compa ny, at the r equest of the pla intiff, ag reed to hold b ac~ the subscri p ti on until h e sh ould authorize him to hand it to the company , and
tha t afterward a third p erson , not a m embe r of the b oard, ob tained
possession o f the paper , unde r pretense of merely wishing to look at
it, put it into hi s p ocke t, a nd ·w ithout consent o f th e agent or d e fe ndant, d elive re d it to the com p any . ' Ve think t h is eY iden ce oug ht to
h ave been received. It is t ru e, as a ge neral rul e, th at d elive ry o f a
bon d or d eed as an escrow can n ot be m ad e to the obligee or g rantee.
That princ iple, h ow e \'e r, d oes n ot apply in thi s case . Whe n a deli\' e ry of an absolute deed is mad e to the p arty, hi s acce ptan ce is
p resumed prima facic, h e cau!-.e it is fo r h is benefi t. T hen su bseq ue nt acceptance relates to the fi rst d e live ry. So it mig h t h ave heen
n ow, had th e Sllbscriptio n been abso lute, h ut it is d iffe r e nt w hen th e
cond it ion impo-;c s a b urden upon the o ther p arty. H e m ust then exp ressly or impliedly accept be fo re the contract becomes completely
b inding on both p artie s. W"/u•n such contract i s made w £th a1t agen t

The third assignment of error is to the rejection of an offer to prove,

in substance, that the agent of the defendants by whom the subscrip-

tion had been procured before it was reported to or accepted by the

company, at the request of the plaintiff, agreed to hold back the sub-

scription until he should authorize him to hand it to the company, and

that afterward a third person, not a member of the board, obtained

possession of the paper, under pretense of merely wishing to look at

it, put it into his pocket, and without consent of the agent or defend-

ant, delivered it to the company. We think this evidence ought to

have been received. It is true, as a general rule, that delivery of a

bond or deed as an escrow can not be made to the obligee or grantee.

That principle, however, does not apply in this case. When a de-

livery of an absolute deed is made to the party, his acceptance is

presumed prima facie, because it is for his benefit. Then subse-

quent acceptance relates to the first delivery. So it might have been

now, had the subscription been absolute, but it is different when the

condition imposes a burden upon the other party. He must then ex-

pressly or impliedly accept before the contract becomes completely

binding on both parties. When such contract is made with an agent

'Only the part of opinion relating to the one point given.

lQnly the pa rt of opi ni on r elating to th e one poin t given .
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he may well agree to hold it as an escrow. Until both sides agree, if

irrevocable by one it must be also by the other. Martin, the agent,

§

12 5
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had no authority to accept the conditions, and was not incapacitated

from making* such an agreement by his relation to the company.

Reversed.

Jfote. See, also, 1889, Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Davis, 40

Minn. 11J, supra, p. 492; 1897, Gilman v. Gross, 97 Wis. 224; 23 Am. & Eng.

En.-v., p. 790; Beach, §510; Clark, §113; Cook, §60; Elliott, § 357; Mora-

wetz, §§ 69, 851; II Thompson, § 1253.

ARTICLE V. FRAUD AND MISTAKE IN SUBSCRIPTIONS.

See. 125. Fraud.

MARTIN Et Al. v. SOUTH SALEM LAND Co. Et Al.1

1896. In the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 94 Va.

he may well agree to lwld it as an escrow. Until both sides agree, if
irreYocable by one it must be also by the other. Martin, the agent,
had no authority to accept the conditions, and was not incapacitated
from making such an agreement by his relation to the company.
Reversed.
Null'.. See, also, 1889, Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Davis, 40
Minn. llJ, .~upra, p. 492; 1897, Gilman v. Gross, 97 Wis. 224; ~3 Am. & Eng.
Eni·y., p. 790; Beach,§ 510; Clark,§ 113; Cook,§ 60; Elliott,§ 357; Morawetz, §§ 69, 851; II Thompson,§ 1253.

Rep. 28-59, 6 Am- & Eng- CorP- Cas. (N. S.) 312.

[Suit by various parties against the land company, among others

ARTICLE V.

being one by the Bank of Salem, a judgment creditor suing on behalf

FRAUD AND MISTAKE IN SUBSCRIPTIONS.

of itself and others, the land company and its stockholders to en-

force their stockholders' liability for unpaid stock. Many of the

Sec. 125. Fraud.

stockholders answered that their subscriptions had been obtained

MARTIN ET AL. v. SOUTH SALEM LAND Co. ET AL. 1

fraudulently, and they had promptly repudiated them, and asked to
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have them rescinded. Decree of a pro rata assessment against the

stockholders to pay the debts was rendered, from which an appeal

1896. IN

THE SUPREME CounT OF APPEALS OF VIRGIN1A.

94

Va.

Rep. 28-59, 6 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. (N. S.) 312.

was taken.]

Buchanan, J. * * * Another ground on which the appellants

claim that they are not liable for their subscription contracts is, that they

were induced to become subscribers by the false and fraudulent rep-

resentations of the company or its agents. One of the false and

fraudulent representations which it is alleged was made to certain of

the appellants was, that there was no promoter's fund except $10,000

of the paid-up stock of the company, when, in fact, two of the pro-

moters of the scheme, CraMree and Bowman, were to receive the sum

of $20,000 additional, in money, and that they did receive the greater

part thereof. To others it was represented that among the subscrib-

ers to the stock of the company were two well-known business men, of

much experience and large wealth, when, in fact, one of them had

made no subscription at all, and the other had subscribed for a much

less sum than was represented. And to others still both these repre-

sentations were made.

If it be assumed that these representations were made and relied

on; that they were not true, and were sufficient to entitle the appel-

lants to have their contracts rescinded, and the money paid by them

refunded, as between themselves and the Land Company, did they

1 Statement of facte abridged, arguments omitted and the part of the opin-

ion relating to the one point only given.

[Suit by various parties against the land company, among others
b e ing one by the Bank of Salem, a judgment creditor suing on behalf
of itself and others, the land company and its stockholders to enforce their stockholders' liability for unpaid stock. Many of the
stockholders answered that their subscriptions had been obtained
fraudulently, and they had promptly repudiated them, and asked to
ha,·e them rescinded. Decree of a pro rata assessment against the
stockholders to pay the debts was rendered, from which an appeal
wa s taken.]
BucHANAN, J. • • • Another ground on which the appellants
claim that they are not liable for their subscription contracts is, that they
were induced to become subscribers by the false and fraudulent representations of the company or its agents. One of the fal se and
fraudulent representations which it is alleged was made to ce1tain of
the appellants was, that there was no promoter's fund except $10,000
of the paid-up stock of the company, when, in fact, two of the promoters of the scheme, Crahtree and Bowman, were to receive the sum
of $zo.ooo additional, in money. and that they did receive the greater
part thereof. To others it was represented that among the subscribers to the stock of the company '"'ere two well-known business men, of
much experience and large wealth, when, in fact, one of them had
mtlde no subscription at all, and the other had subscribed for a much
less sum than was represented. And to others still both these representations were made.
If it be assumed that these representations were made and relied
on; that they were not true, and were sufficient to entitle the appellants to have their contracts rescinded, ancl the money paid by th e m
refunded, as between themselves and the Land Company, di<l they
1 Statement of facts nbridgerl, arguments omitted and the part of the opinion relating to the one point only given.
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show themselves entitled to such relief as against the creditors of the

Land Company, whose debts were decreed to be paid in the court

below?

It appears that a meeting of the stockholders had been called for

the 17th of May, 1892, to consider the affairs of the company. A

majority of the stock not being l'epresented on that day, a committee

was appointed to prepare a statement in regard to its affairs, and the

secretary was instructed to send a copy of that statement to each stock-

holder, and urge him to be present at an adjourned meeting of the

company, to be held on the 9th of June, following. Pursuant to that

resolution, the following statement was prepared and sent to the

stockholders:

"A CIRCULAR OF INFORMATION FOR STOCKHOLDERS OF THE SOUTH

SALEM LAND COMPANY."

"The following is a copy of the prospectus under which the stock

to the South Salem Land Company was subscribed:

"The South Salem Land Company, of Salem, Virginia, owns 306

acres of land, lying on the east side of the Salem Development Com-

pany, south of the Salem Improvement Company, and southwest of

the Riverside Land Company, and is known as the Colonel Jack
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farm.

"This land cost the company $81,200 in cash, and $10,000 in

paid-up stock. The capital stock of the company is $300,000, di-

vided into shares of $10 each, only $250,000 of which shall be issued

unless necessary for the special betterment of the land in the future,

and $10,000 of which is the paid-up stock referred to above. It is

proposed to sell $240,000 of the stock on the following terms: Ten

per cent, payable on March 20, and ten per cent, on April 20, 1890,

and ten per cent, payable on March 20, 1891. It is guaranteed that

only the above-named assessments will be made.

"We, the undersigned, subscribe to the amounts opposite our

names upon the above-named conditions.

"Under the above prospectus subscription lists were sent by the sev-

eral agents for the whole amount of the $240,000 stock, but only on

19,541 shares have the three assessments been nearly all paid. On

the remaining 5,08s shares on the list nothing has been paid, and the

stock advertised and offered for sale was withdrawn for want of bid-

ders. While every effort will be made to collect, it is found that a

large per cent, of the lists is insolvent. If we had $3 per share on

those shares, this amount, $15,440, would be sufficient for our neces-

sities, and enable us to carry on the affairs of the company suc-

cessfully.

"We now absolutely need about $12,000 for present pressing

dues. If this amount can not be raised now, a forced trustee's sale

of the property will be the inevitable result.

"The stockholders can not be further assessed by the company, un-

less the stockholders themselves vote to make the assessment.

■'A single ten per cent, assessment would relieve the condition of

things now and secure the stockholders further advantages.

SUBSCRIPTIONS INDUCED BY FRAUD.

541

"Be sure to come or send your proxy to the meeting.

§ 125

SUBSCRIPTIONS INDUCED BY FRAUD.

"Salem, Va., June 1, 1892."

541

The indebtedness of the land company at that time was more than

$40,000. Its assets, independent of its stock subscriptions, consisted

of the tract of land mentioned in the prospectus, which, it seems, had

never been assessed for the purposes of taxation at more than $18,000,

and which, when sold in December, 1893, only brought $10,000, and

upon a resale in February, 1894, $9,000. Upon its stock subscrip-

tions, on which no part of the 30 per cent, called for had been paid,

there was a little over $15,000 due, but the larger part of it was due

from insolvent parties. There was also a small balance due from

stockholders belonging to the class who had made payments on their

stock subscriptions. The land company was not only unable to meet

its debts as they became due, but assets were altogether insufficient to

pay its liabilities. Unless the stockholders were willing to make ad-

ditional payments upon their stock, which the company admitted it

had no right to call for under its guarantee to them, the land of

the company, which was its principal asset, and the development and

sale of which was the chief object of its creation, would be sold at a
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trustee's sale for the residue of the purchase price.

No provisions having been made by the company or its stockholders

to meet the indebtedness, the trustee gave notice that he would, on

the 18th day of August, 1892, sell the land. On the 10th of that

month the sale was enjoined by an order entered in the case of the

South Salem Land Co. v. Hansbrough, Trustee, etc. The bill in

that case did not claim that the debt for which the land was adver-

tised to be sold was not just, due or unpaid, but alleged that there

were clouds upon its title which ought to be removed before sale, and

that the notice of sale was not in conformity with the provisions of the

deed of trust.

At the October term following of the circuit court, two judgments

were rendered against the land company, one in favor of the Bank of

Salem, and the other in favor of the Pittsburg Bridge Company, for

sums-aggregating more than $11,000. Upon these judgments execu-

tions were issued and returned "no property found."

In December of the same year the Bank of Salem and the bridge

company instituted suit against the land company and its stockholders

for the purpose of subjecting its assets, including the unpaid subscrip-

tion of its stockholders, to the payment of their debts and the debts

of the other creditors of the company who would come in and con-

tribute to the expenses of the suit.

In that case the appellants (except in three cases, which will be

hereafter considered) for the first time took steps to have their sub-

scription contracts rescinded.

A party who has been induced to subscribe for stock in a corpo-

ration by false or fraudulent representations as to a material fact upon

which he had the right to rely, and did rely, is entitled to have the

contract rescinded in the same manner as if the question had arisen

between two natural persons, provided the question arises between

"Be sure to come or send your proxy to the meeting.
"Salem, Va., June 11 1892."
The indebte(lness of the land company at that time was more than
$40,000. Its assets, independent of its stock subscriptions, consisted
of the tract of land mentioned in the prospectus, which, it seems, had
never been assessed for the purposes of taxation at more than $18 1000,
and which, when sold in December, 1893, only brought $10,000, and
upon a resale in February, 1894, $9 1000. Upon its stock subscriptions, on which no part of the 30 per cent. called for had been paid ,
there was a little over $15,000 due, but the larger part of it was due
from insolvent parties. There was also a small balance due from
stockholders belonging to the class who had made payments on their
1;tock subscriptions. The land company was not only unable to meet
its debts as they became due, but assets were altogether insufficient to
pay its liabilities. Unless the stockholders were willing to make additional payments upon their stock, which the company admitted it
had no right to call for under its guarantee to them, the land of
the company, which was its principal asset, and the development and
sale of which was the chief object of its creation, would be sold at a
trustee's sale for the residue of the purchase price.
No provisions having been made by the company or its stockholders
to meet the indebtedness, the trustee gave notice that he would, on
the 18th day of August, 1892, sell the land. On the 10th of that
month the sale was enjoined by an order entered in the case of the
South Salem Land Co. v. Hansbrough, Trustee, etc. The bill in
·that case did not claim that the debt for which the land was advertised to be sold was not just, due or unpaid , but alleged that there
were clouds upon its title which ought to be removed before sale, and
that the notice of sale was not in confonnity with the provisions of the
deed of trust.
At the October term following of the circuit court, two judgments
were rendered against the land company, one in favor of the Bank of
Salem, and the other in favor of the Pittsburg Bridge Company, for
sums·aggregating more thari $11 ,ooo. Upon these judgments executions were issued and returned "no prope1ty found."
In December of the same year the Bank of Salem and the bridge
company instituted suit against the land company and its stockholders
for the purpose of subjecting its assets, including the unpaid subscription of its stockholders, to the payment of their debts and the debts
of the other creditors of the company who would come in and contribute to the expenses of the suit.
In that case the appellants ( except in three cases , which will be
hereafter considered) for the first time took steps to have their subscription contracts rescinded.
A party who has been induced to subscribe for stock in a corporation by false or fraudulent representations as to a material fact upon
which he had the right to rely, and did rely, is entitled to have the
contract rescinded in the same manner as if the question had arisen
between two natural persons , provided the question ari cs hetv.-ecn
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Corporations, § 1361; 1 Cook on Stock and Stockholders, etc.,

§§ 151-161.

tile contracting padt'es and the rights of third persons are not involved.
1 Morawetz on Corporations, § 108;
2 Thompson on
Corporations, § 1361; 1 Cook on Stock and Stockholders, · etc.,
§§ 151-161.
A contract procured by a fraud is not void, but voidable only, at the
option of the party defrauded. It is binding upon him until rescinded,
and, if before he exercises the option to rescind, innocent third parties have, in reliance of the fraudulent contract, acquired rights which
would be prejudiced by its rescission, they may generally have it enforced for their benefit, although the party by whose fraud it was procured could not do so. Oakes v. Turquand, etc. (House of Lords),
2 English and Irish Appeal Cases, L. R. 325; Tennent v. City of
Glascow (House of Lords), 4 Appeal Cases, L. R. 615; 2 Thompson on Corporations, § 1363; 2 Morawetz on Corporations, § 839.
This principle is founded in reason and justice. If one of two innocent persons must suffer from the misconduct of a third, the burden
must fall upon the one whose conduct enabled the third person to
perpetuate the wrong complained of.
If a person is induced by fraud to sell his property, and it passes
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for vnlue before his contract
by which he sold has been rescinded, he must bear the loss rather than
the innocent purchaser.
In an ordinary partnership it is impossible for one partner to retire
from or to repudiate the partnership to the prejudice of the partnership creditors. He may have been induced to enter into the partnership by the false or fraudulent representations of the other partners,
and this may be a sufficient ground for relief against them, but it is
no ground for getting rid of the firm's liabilities to its creditors.
The shareholders in a corporation are the real parties in interest.
They furni sh the capital and receive the profits. As was said by Mr.
Justice Miller, in Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 610, the corporation "is
but the representative of its stockholders, and exists mainly for their
benefit, and is governed and controlled by them through officers
whom they elect, and the interest and power of legal control of• each
shareholder is in exact proportion to his amount of stock."
In the case of Oakes v. Turquand, etc., cited above, it was held
by the House of Lords that, after the winding up of a joint stock company had commenced, a stockholder could not have his contract rescinded for fraud in its procurement. The decision was based upon
the ground that innocent third parti es acquired rights which would be
d efeated by the resci sion. Jn that case the d ecision of Lord Campbell , in Henderson v. Royal British B ank (7 E. & B. 356) , was approved. Lord Campbell said in that case: "This is an appli<,:ation by
a creditor, who, upon the faith of the party who was then a shareho lde r , and who held him self out to the world a s a shareholder , nnrl,
bei ng one, gave credit to the b ank.
H e hns obtained judgment
against the bank. There was no assets of the bank as a company,
and the application now is that ex.e cution m ay issu e against the pa1ty
individually. It would be monstrous to say that he , ha,·ing becom e a

A contract procured by a fraud is not void, but voidable only, at the

option of the party defrauded. It is binding upon him until rescinded,

and, if before he exercises the option to rescind, innocent third par-

ties have, in reliance of the fraudulent contract, acquired rights which

would be prejudiced by its rescission, they may generally have it en-

forced for their benefit, although the party by whose fraud it was pro-

cured could not do so. Oakes v. Turquand, etc. (House of Lords),

2 English and Irish Appeal Cases, L. R. 325; Tennent v. City of

Glascow (House of Lords), 4 Appeal Cases, L. R. 615; 2 Thomp-

son on Corporations, § 1363; 2 Morawetz on Corporations, § 839.

This principle is founded in reason and justice. If one of two in-

nocent persons must suffer from the misconduct of a third, the burden

must fall upon the one whose conduct enabled the third person to

perpetuate the wrong complained of.

If a person is induced by fraud to sell his property, and it passes

into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value before his contract
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by which he sold has been rescinded, he must bear the loss rather than

the innocent purchaser.

In an ordinary partnership it is impossible for one partner to retire

from or to repudiate the partnership to the prejudice of the partner-

ship creditots. He may have been induced to enter into the partner-

ship by the false or fraudulent representations of the other partners,

and this may be a sufficient ground for relief against them, but it is

no ground for getting rid of the firm's liabilities to its creditors.

The shareholders in a corporation are the real parties in interest.

They furnish the capital and receive the profits. As was said by Mr.

Justice Miller, in Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 610, the corporation "is

but the representative of its stockholders, and exists mainly for their

benefit, and is governed and controlled by them through officers

whom they elect, and the interest and power of legal control of* each

shareholder is in exact proportion to his amount of slock."

In the case of Oakes v. Turquand, etc., cited above, it was held

by the House of Lords that, after the winding up of a joint stock com-

pany had commenced, a stockholder could not have his contract re-

scinded for fraud in its procurement. The decision was based upon

the ground that innocent third parties acquired rights which would be

defeated by the rescission. In that case the decision of Lord Camp-

bell, in Henderson v. Royal British Bank (7 E. & B. 356), was ap-

proved. Lord Campbell said in that case: "This is an application by

a creditor, who, upon the faith of the party who was then a share-

holder, and who held himself out to the world as a shareholder, and,

being one, gave credit to the bank. He has obtained judgment

against the bank. There was no assets of the bank as a company,

and the application now is that execution may issue against the party

individually. It would be monstrous to say that he, having become a
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as such, and having so remained until the concern stopped payment,

could, by repudiating the shares on the ground that he had been de-

frauded, make himself no longer a shareholder, and thus get rid of

his liability to the creditors of the bank, who had given credit to it

upon the faith that he was a shareholder. It would be a monstrous

injustice, and contrary to all principle." Tennent v. City of Glascow

Bank, 4 Appeal Cases (H. L.) 615; Stone v. City and County

Bank, 3 C. P. Div. 282; Wright's Case, L. R. 7 Chy. 60; Pugh &

Sharman's Case, L. R. 13 Eq. 572; 2 Thompson on Corp., §§ 1441,

1442; 1 Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 163.

In this country, in the absence of statutory provisions upon the sub-

ject, the rule seems to be, says Morawetz, in his work on Corpora-

tions, "that a shareholder whose contract of subscription was obtained

bv fraud would be liable to contribute his share of the capital upon

the insolvency of the company, so far as- this may be required, in

order to satisfy those creditors whose claims attached before he elected

to disaffirm the contract." Section 840.
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Thompson says: "It may be concluded from a number of Ameri-

can cases that no rescission will be allowed after the bankruptcy or in-

solvency of the corporation has supervened unless under very excep-

tional circumstances, if at all; and further, that the fact that the

stockholder was induced to take stock by false representations is no

defense in an action by judgment-creditors of the corporation on his

statutory liability." 2 Thompson on Corp., § 1450.

Cook says upon this subject: "In this country the effect of corpo-

rate insolvency upon the right of a subscriber to rescind his contract

for fraud has not been passed upon as often as in England. The de-

cisions, however, clearly hold that corporate insolvency is a bar to

such rescission." 1 Cook on Stocks & Stockholders, §§ 163, 164.

The decisions of the courts, we think, sustain the doctrine laid

down in the text-books, that a person who has, to all external appear-

ances, become a stockholder, can not, as to creditors who may have

trusted the company upon the faith of his membership, have his con-

tract of subscription rescinded upon the ground of fraud, where he did

not repudiate the contract and take steps to have it rescinded before

the company stopped payment and became actually insolvent; cer-

tainly not, where it does not appear that he was diligent in discovering

the fraud, and prompt in repudiating his contract after it was discov-

ered. Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45; Webster v. Upton, 91 U. S.

65; Sanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56; Chubb v. Upton, 95 U. S. 665;

Ogilvie v. Knox Ins. Co., 22 How. 380; Tennent v. City of Glascow

Bank, 4 Appeal Cases (II. L.), 615; Turner v. Granger, etc.,

(Ga.), 38 Am. Rep. 801; Howard v. Glenn (Ga.), 11 S." E. 610;

Saffold v. Barnes, 39 Miss. 399; Duffield v. Barnum, 59 Mich. 272.

Before the appellants had repudiated their contracts the land com-

pany was insolvent. It was insolvent, whether that word be used in

its restricted sense to indicate the inability of an individual to pay his

debts as they become due in the ordinary course of business, <Jr in its

partner and a shareholder, and having held himself out to the world
a!> such, and having so remained until the concern stopped payment,
cou Id, by repudiating the shares on the ground that he had been defrauded, make himself no longer a shareholder, and thus get rid of
hi liability to the creditors of the bank, who had given credit to it
upon the faith that he was a shareholder. It would be a monstrous
injustice, and contrary to all principle." Tennent v. City of Glascow
Bank, 4 Appeal Cases (H. L.) 615; Stone v. City and County
Bank, 3 C. P. Div. 282; W1ight's Case, L. R. 7 Chy. 6o; Pugh &
Sharman's Case, L. R. 13 Eq. 572; 2 Thonipsonon Corp.,§§ 1441,
144.?; 1 Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 163.
In this cotintry, in the absence of statutory provisions upon the subject, the rule seems to be, says Morawetz, in his work on Corporations, "that a shareholder whose contract of subscription was obtained
by fraud would be liable to contribute his share of the capital upon
the insolvency of the company, so far as this may be required, in
order to satisfy those creditors whose claims attached before he elected
to d isaffirm the contract." Section 84-o.
Thompson says: "It may be concluded from a number of American cases that no rescission will be allowed after the bankruptcy or insolvency of the corporation has supervened unless under very ·exceptional circumstances, if at all; and further, that the fact that the
stockholder was irrducecl to take stock by false representations is no
defense in an action by judgment-creditors of the corporation on his
statutory liability." 2 Thompson on Corp., § 1450.
Cook says upon this subject: "In this country the effect of corporate insolvency upon the right of a subscriber to rescind his contract
for fraud has not been passed upon as often as ii:i England. The decisions, however, clearly hold that corporate insolvency is a bar to
such rescission." 1 Cook on Stocks & Stockholders, §§ 163, 164.
The decisions of the courts, we think, sustain the doctrine laid
down in the text-books, that a person who has, to all external appearances, become a stockholder, can not, as to creditors who may have
trusted the company upon the faith of his membership, have his contract of subscription rescinded upon the ground of fraud, where he did
not repudiate the contract and take steps to have it rescinded before
the company stopped payment and became actually insolvent; certajnJy not, where it does not appear that he was diligent in discovering
the fraud, and prompt in repudiating his contract after it was di scoverecl. Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45; \Vebstcr v. Upton, 91 U.S.
65; Sanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56; Chubb v . Upton, 95 U. S. 665;
Ogilvie v. Knox Ins. Co. , 22 How. 38o; Tennent v. City of Glascow
Bank, 4 Appeal C ases (H. L. ), 615; Turner v. Granger, etc. ,
(Ga.), 38 Am. Rep. Sor; Howard v. Glenn (G a. ) , 11 S. E . 610;
Saffold v. Barnes, 39 Miss. 399: Duffield v. Barnum, 59 Mich. 272.
Before the appellants had repudiated their conh·acts the land company was insolvent. It was insolvent, whether that word be usecl in
its restricted sense to indicate the inab ility of an individual to pay his
debt as they become due in the ordinary course of h11 ~ iness, 6r in its
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40. Not only was this true, but its real estate had been advertised

general or popular meaning, to denote that the entire assets of a
debtor are insufficient to pay his debts. Toof v. Martin, 13 Wall.
40. Not only was this true, but its real estate had been advertised
for sale for the purchase-money yet due upon it, which was more than
it was worth. Judgments had been obtained against the company,
as before stated, executions issued and returned "no property found,"
and a creditor's bill filed to subject its assets to the payment of its
debts, in which it was alleged that independent of its unpaid stock
subscriptions (which the company admitted it had no right to collect,
except so much of the thirty per cent. called for as remained unpaid)
the company \Vas insolvent. This was more than two years and a
half after their subscriptions had been made. The excuse given for
this delay is that they did not discover the fraud complained of earlier. There is nothing in the evidence to show that any diligence was
exercised by them to discover whether the alleged false representations made to them were true or not.
It is not sufficient in a case like this, where the rights of creditors
are involved, that a stockholder should be prompt in repudiating his
contract of subscription and in seeking to have it rescinded after the
fraud had been discovered, but he must be diligent also in discovering the fraud. Where a party has the means of knowledge or discovery in his power, he will be deemed to know all that with ordinary care and diligence he might have obtained knowledge of. A
delay which might be of no consequence in an ordinary case, may be
amply sufficient to bar the title to relief where the property is of a
speculative character, or is subject to contingencies, or where the
rights and liabilities of third parties have been in the meantime varied.
Parties, it is said, who are in the position of shareholders in companies, if they come to the court to be relieved from their shares on the
ground of fraud, must come with the utmost diligence and promptitude. Kerr on Fraud & Mistake, 3o6, etc.; Morawetz on Corp.,
§§ 1o8, 839; Chubb v. Upton, 95 U. S. 665; Upton v. Tribilcock.
91 U. S. 45; II Thompson on Corp., § 1438, etc. • • •
Affirmed.

for sale for the purchase-money yet due upon it, which was more than

it was worth. Judgments had been obtained against the companv,

as before stated, executions issued and returned "no property found,"

and a creditor's bill filed to subject its assets to the payment of its

debts, in which it was alleged that independent of its unpaid stock

subscriptions (which the company admitted it had no right to collect,

except so much of the thirty per cent, called for as remained unpaid)

the company was insolvent. This was more than two years and a

half after their subscriptions had been made. The excuse given for

this delay is that they did not discover the fraud complained of ear-

lier. There is nothing in the evidence to show that any diligence was

exercised by them to discover whether the alleged false representa-

tions made to them were true or not.

It is not sufficient in a case like this, where the rights of creditors

are involved, that a stockholder should be prompt in repudiating his

contract of subscription and in seeking to have it rescinded after the
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fraud had been discovered, but he must be diligent also in discover-

ing the fraud. Where a party has the means of knowledge or dis-

covery in his power, he will be deemed to know all that with ordi-

nary care and diligence he might have obtained knowledge of. A

delay which might be of no consequence in an ordinary case, may be

amply sufficient to bar the title to relief where the property is of a

speculative character, or is subject to contingencies, or where the

rights and liabilities of third parties have been in the meantime varied.

Parties, it is said, who are in the position of shareholders in compan-

ies, if they come to the court to be relieved from their shares on the

ground of fraud, must come with the utmost diligence and prompti-

tude. Kerr on Fraud & Mistake, 306, etc.; Morawetz on Corp.,

§§ 108, 839; Chubb v. Upton, 95 U. S. 665; Upton v. Tribilcock.

91 U. S. 45; II Thompson on Corp., § 1438, etc. * * *

Affirmed.

Note. As to subscriptions obtained by fraud, see, 1852, Connecticut, etc.,

R. Co. v. Bailev, 24 Vt. 465; 1856, Hester v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 32 Miss.

378; 1859, Anderson v. New Castle, etc., R. Co., 12 Ind. 376, 74 Am. Dec.

218; 1867, Central R. Co. v. Kisch, L. R. 2 H. L. 99; 1867, Oakes v. Tur-

qnand, L. R. 2 H. L. 325; I860, Smith v. Reese River Co., L. R. 4 H. L. 64; 1874,

Upton v. Englehart, 3 Dill. (C. C. U. S.) 496; 1875, Upton v. Tribilcock, 91

U. S. 45; 1877, Getty v. Devlin, 70 N. Y. 504; 1878; Vreeland v. N. J. Stone

Note. As to subscriptions obtained by fraud, <Jee, 1852, Connecticut, etc.,
R. Co. v. Bailey, 24 Vt. 465; 1856, Hester v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 32 Miss.
378; 1859, Anderson v. New Castle, etc., R. Co., 12 Ind. 376, 74 Am. Dec.
218; 1867, Central R. Co. v. Kisch, L . R. 2 H. L . 99; 1867, Oakes v. Tur·
qlland, L. R. 2 H. L. 325; 1869, Smith v. Reese River Co., L. R. 4 H. L. 64; 18i4,
Upton v. Englehart, 3 Dill. (C. C. U. S.) 496; 1875, Upton v. Tribilcock, 91
U.S. 45; 1877, Getty v. Devlin, 70 N. Y. 504; 1878; Vreeland v. N. J. Stone
Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 188; 1878, Jewett v. R. Co., 34 Ohio St. 601; 1883, City
Rank v. Bartlett, 71 Ga. 797; 1884. 1\font. S. R. Co. v. Matthews, 77 Ala. 35i;
1893, Howard v. Turner, 155 Pa. St. 3-19; 1893, Ramsey v. Mfg. Co., 116 llfo.
313; 1896, Hunterv. French, etc., C,o ., 96 Iowa573; 18!l6, Newton Nat'! Bank v.
Newzegin, 74 Fed. Rep. 135, 33 L. R. A. 727; 18!l7, Chicago Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v.
Summerour, 101 Ga. 820; 1897, Garrison v. Electrical Works, 55 N. J . Eq.
708; 1898, Barcus v. Gates, 89 Fed. Rep. 783, 32 C. C. A . 337; 1898, Franey
v. Park Co., 9!) Wis. 40; 1898, Reyener v. Hubbard, 56 N . Y. Sup. 173; 1898,
Re Internation al Soc., etc., 1 Ch. 110, 77 L. T. R. 523. Com}lare, 1849, Dodg·
son's Case, 3 De G. & S. 85; 1865, J<'elgate's Case, 2 De G . .J. & S. 4.56; 1869,
Custar v. Titusville Gas & W. Co., 63 Pa. bt. 881; 1880, Turner v. Ins. Co.,

Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 188; 1878, Jewett v. R. Co., 34 Ohio St. 601; 1883, City

Bank v. Bartlett, 71 Ga. 797; 1884. Mont, S. R. Co. v. Matthews, 77 Ala. 357;

1893, Howard v. Turner, 155 Pa. St. 349; 1893, Ramsev v. Mfg. Co., 116 Mo.

313; 1896, Hunter v. French, etc., Co., 96 Iowa573; 1896, Newton Nat'l Bank v.

Newzegin, 74 Fed. Rep. 135,33 L. R. A. 727; 1897, Chicago Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v.

Snmmerour, 101 Ga. 820; 1897. Garrison v. Electrical Works, 55 N.J. Eq-

708; 1898, Barcus v. Gates, 89 Fed. Rep. 783, 32 C. C. A. 337; 189S, Franey

v. Park Co., 99 Wis. 40; 1898, Revener v. Hubbard, 56 N. Y. Sup. 173; 1898,

Re International Soc, etc., 1 Ch. 110, 77 L. T. R. 523. Compare, 1849, Dodjt-

son's Case. 3 I)e G. & S. 85: 1865, Felgate's Case, 2 De G. J. & S. 456; 1869,

Custar v. Titusville Gas & W. Co., 63 Pa. St. 381; 1880, Turner v. Ins. Co.,
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65 Ga. 649; 1895, St. John's, etc., Co. v. Manger, 106 Mich. 90; 1897, Trades-

man's Nat'l Bank v. Looney, 99 Tenn. 278, 38 L. R. A. 837.

§

SUBS~RIPTION

126

545

MADE BY MISTAKE.

See, also, Boone, § 111; Beach, §§ 109, 163; Clark, § 101; Cook, §§ 136-170;

Elliott, §§ 369-376; Morawetz, §§94-117; Taylor, §§ 103,523-26; II Thomp-

son, §§ 1360-1506; VII Thompson, §§ 8635-40.

Sec. 126. Mistake.

ROCKFORD, ROCK ISLAND AND ST. LOUIS R. CO. v. SHUNICK.1

65 Ga. 649; 1895, St. John's. etc., Co. v. Munger, 106 Mich. 90; 1897, Tradesman's Nat'! Bank v. Looney, 99 Tenn. 278, 38 L. R. A. 837.
See, also, Boone, § Ill; Beach, §§ 109, 163; Clark, § 101; Cook, §§ 136-170;
Elliott, §§ 369-376; Morawetz, §§ 94-117; Taylor, §§ 103, 523-26; II Thompson,§§ 1360-1506; VII Thompson, §§ 8635-40.

1872. In the Supreme Court of Illinois. 65 111. Rep. 223-230.

Mr. Justice McAllister. This was a proceeding instituted by

appellant to condemn the lands of the appellee for the uses of a rail-

road. The land was situated in the township of Spring Grove, War-

Sec. 126.

Mistake.

ren county, and this appeal is from the judgment of the circuit court

of that county in favor of appellee for compensation and damages on

ROCKFORD, ROOK ISLAND AND ST. LOUIS R. CO. v. SHUNICK.1

account of land taken and damaged.

To defeat appellee's right to compensation and damages, appel-

1872.

IN

THE

SUPREME

CouRT OF ILLINOIS.

65 Ill. Rep.

223-230.

lant introduced in evidence on the trial a certain instrument in writ-

ing, to which appellant was only a beneficial party, if any, purport-

ing to have been executed by fifty-seven persons, including the ap-

pellee, and embracing two distinct subjects: (1) That of conditional
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subscription to the stock of appellant's corporation. (2) That of

securing to appellant the right of way through said township.

The part of the instrument relating to subscription has no relevancy

whatever to this controversy. But it is claimed by appellant's coun-

sel that the other part of the supposed agreement cut off appel-

lee's entire claim for either compensation or damages, and this is

urged upon the ground of estoppel in pais.

The terms of this part of the agreement are in substance: That in

order that the right of way might be made secure to said company,

free of all charge and expense, and that the company might not be

delayed in the construction of its line through said township, in con-

sideration of one dollar to the undersigned paid, the receipt thereof

acknowledged, they, the undersigned, jointly and severally agree to

secure to the company, free of charge and expense to the same, the

right of way on, over, and across the lands in said township, such

right of way to include a strip of land one hundred feet in width, to

be described as a strip of land fifty feet in width on each side of the

center line of the established surv ey of said railroad, on, over, and

across the lands in said township of Spring Grove. * * *

The appellant's road was so located as to run through appellee's

orchard and a part of his dwelling-house. Appellee, as appears,

without controversy, is an unlettered man, being unable to either read

or write. While at work in his field he was approached by a man

1 Only so much of the report is given as relates to the single point.

35—Wil. Cases.

MR. JusTICE McALLISTER. This was a proceeding instituted by
appellant to condemn the lands of the appellee for the uses of a railroad. The land was situated in the township of Spring Grove, Warren county, and this appeal is from the judgment of the circuit comt
of that county in favor of appellee for compensation and damages ,on
account of land taken and damaged.
To defeat appellee's right to compensation and damages, appellant introduced in evidence on the trial a certain instrument in writing, to which appell.ant was only a beneficial party, if any, purporting to have been executed by fifty-seven persons, including the app ellee, and embracing two distinct subjects: ( 1) That of conditional
subscription to the stock of appellant's corporation. (2) That of
securing to appellant the right of way through said township.
The part of the instrument relating to subscription has no relevancy
whatever to this controversy. But it is claimed by appellant's counsel that the other part of the supposed agreement cut off appellee's entire claim for either compensation or damages, and this is
urged upon the ground of estoppel in pat's.
The terms of this part of the agreement are in substance: That in
order that the right of way might be made secure to sa id company,
free of all charge and expense, and that the company might not be
delayed in the construction of its line through said township, in consideration of one dollar to the undersigned paid, the receipt thereof
acknowledged , they, the undersigned, jointly and severally agree to
secure to the company, free of charge and expense to the sa me, the
right of way on, over, and across the lands in said tow11ship, su ch
right of way to include a strip of land one hundred feet in width, to
b e described as a strip of land fifty feet in width on each side of the
center line of the established survey of said railroad, on, over, and
across the lands in said tovmship of Spring Grove. * • •
The appellant's road was so located as to run throug h appellee's
orchard and a part of his dwelling-house. Appellee, as appears,
without controversy, is an unlettered man, being unable to either read
or write. While at work in his field he was approached by a m an
1
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of the name of Holloway w.ith this paper. Holloway knew that the

§ 126

man was unlettered. He did not read the paper to him, and stated

only that part which related to the subscription. He not only did not

of the name of Holloway w.ith thi!' paper. Holloway knew that the
man was unlettered. He did not read the p aper to him, and stated
only that part which related to the subscription. He no t only dicl not
read or state that part of the instrument relating to the right of
way, but assured appellee that he could obtain compensation for his
land if taken. Holloway testifies that he signed appellee's name to
the paper by his diorection. From thi s fact appellant's counsel insi t
that Holloway was appellee's agent, and that being so, appellee could
not avail himself of the misrepresentations of his own agent to avoid
the instrument. On this ground the court below made an indefinite
exclusion of the evidence showing the circumstances under which the
paper was executed, but refused to give an instruction asked by appellant directing the jury to disregard it, and appellant now complains
of such refusal. Holloway does not state when or where he signed
appellee's name; but only that he did it by his direction. It must have
been done then and there in the presence of appellee, the latter merely
using Holloway's hand, as it were, to write his own name, or at some
other time and place, in the absence of appellee, Holloway acting in
that behalf upon an alleged authority to make a contract for appellee.
If he so acted in executing it, and the instrument itself amount to a
contract with appellant, it was one virtually for the sale of an interest
in land, and the authority to execute it as agent of appellee should
have been in writing. If the name was signed by Holloway in appellee's presence and at his request, then the only reason which could
be urged why it was not within the statute of frauds requiring the au·
thority of the agent to be in writing, would be that appellee merely
employed the hand of HolJoway to write his name, and that in such
case the doctrine of agency in its legal sense would not apply. But
assuming that to be the case, would anybody be heard to contend that
although Holloway was not an agent in such sense as would require
his authority to be in writing, yet he mast be regarded as one to the
extent of precluding appellee from setting up his misrepresentation
for the purpose of avoiding the instrument in the hands of appellant ?
We think not. Such a rule would snatch the shield of law from the
wronged and bestow it upon the wrong-doer; would take it from the
unlettered, who need it most, and give it to those against whom it
ought to be used. The appellant could not seek to take the fruits of
the contract without adopting the means by which it was obtained.
Besides, if the execution of the instrument was obtained in the man·
ne r disclosed by the evidence, it was void ab in£tio. It is laid down
in Pigot's case, 11 Rep. 27, that if three distinct bonds are written
upon one piece of p archment, and one of them only is read to the
ohligor, and he, being a man not lettered, seals and delivers this deed.
it is good for that which was read, and ab in£t£o void for the others:
and it is further said , " that every deed ought to ha,·e writing, sealing
and de livering, and when anything shall pass from them who had not
understanding but by hearing only, it ought to be read also: anc it is
true that he who is not lettered is reputed in law as he who can not
sec, but hea r onl?, and nil his unclcrstanding is hy hearing; and so a

read or state that part of the instrument relating to the right of

way, but assured appellee that he could obtain compensation for his

land if taken. Holloway testifies that he signed appellee's name to

the paper by his direction. From this fact appellant's counsel insist

that Holloway was appellee's agent, and that being so, appellee could

not avail himself of the misrepresentations of his own agent to avoid

the instrument. On this ground the court below made an indefinite

exclusion of the evidence showing the circumstances under which the

paper was executed, but refused to give an instruction asked by ap-

pellant directing the jury to disregard it, and appellant now complains

of such refusal. Holloway does not state when or where he signed

appellee's name; but only that he did it by his direction. It must have

been done then and there in the presence of appellee, the latter merely

using Holloway's hand, as it were, to write his own name, or at some

other time and place, in the absence of appellee, Holloway acting in

that behalf upon an alleged authority to make a contract for appellee.
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If he so acted in executing it, and the instrument itself amount to a

contract with appellant, it was one virtually for the sale of an interest

in land, and the authority to execute it as agent of appellee should

have been in writing. If the name was signed by Holloway in ap-

pellee's presence and at his request, then the only reason which could

be urged why it was not within the statute of frauds requiring the au-

thority of the agent to be in writing, would be that appellee merely

employed the hand of Holloway to write his name, and that in such

case the doctrine of agency in its legal sense would not apply. But

assuming that to be the case, would anybody be heard to contend that

although Holloway was not an agent in such sense as would require

his authority to be in writing, yet he must be regarded as one to the

extent of precluding appellee from setting up his misrepresentation

for the purpose of avoiding the instrument in the hands of appellant?

We think not. Such a ruie would snatch the shield of law from the

wronged and bestow it upon the wrong-doer; would take it from the

unlettered, who need it most, and give it to those against whom it

ought to be used. The appellant could not seek to take the fruits of

the contract without adopting the means by which it was obtained.

Besides, if the execution of the instrument was obtained in the man-

ner disclosed by the evidence, it was void ab initio. It is laid down

in Pigot's case, 11 Rep. 27, that if three distinct bonds are written

upon one piece of parchment, and one of them only is read to the

obligor, and he, being a man not lettered, seals and delivers this deed,

it is good for that which was read, and ab initio void for the others:

and it is further said, "that every deed ought to have writing, sealing

and delivering, and when anything shall pass from them who had not

understanding but by hearing only, it ought to be read also: anc it is

true that he who is not lettered is reputed in law as he who can not

sec, but hear only, and all his understanding is by hearing: and so a
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man who is lettered and can not see, is, as to this purpose, taken in

law as a man not lettered; and therefore if a man is lettered and is

§

SUBSCRIPTION BY INFANTS.
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blind, if the deed is read to him in any other manner, he shall avoid

the deed, because all his understanding in such case is by hearing."

There is nothing in the evidence upon which to predicate negligence

on the part of the appellee. The mind of the signer did not accom-

pany the signature, and the agreement in the particular in question,

at least, was void. Leach v. Nichols, 55 111. 273.

We are of the opinion that the supposed agreement was not suffi-

cient in any view to cut off appellee's right to compensation and dam-

ages; that substantial justice has been done and that the judgment

should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Nott. As to mistake of fact, generally, see: 1431,2 Rolle's Abr. 28,1.5,9 H. 6,

596; 1506, Keilway's Reports, 70; 1584, Throughgood's Case, 2 Co. Rep. 96,

1 And. 129, Moore 148; 1808, Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass. 45; 1819, Taylor

v. King, 6 Munf. 1 Va.1 358: 1829, Salem M. D. Co. v. Ropes, 9 Pick. (Mass.)

man who is lettered and can not see, is, as to this purpose, taken in
l aw as a man not lettered; and therefore if a man is lettered and is

b lind, if the deed is read to him in any other manner, he shall a\'oid
the deed, because all his understanding in such case is by hearing."
There is nothing in the evidence upon which to predicate neglige nce
on the part of the appellee. The mind of the signer did not accompany the signature, and the agreement in the particular in question,
at least , was void. Leach v. Nichols, 55 Ill. 273.
\Ve are of the opinion that the supposed agreement was not sufficient in any view to cut off appellee' s right to compensation and damages; that s ubstantial justice has been done and that the judgment
should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

187, 19 Am. D. 363; 1858, Cunningham v. Edgefield, etc., R. Co., 2 Bead (39

Tenn.l 23; 1858, Diman v. Providence, etc., R. Co., 5 R. I. 130; 1*63, Swan
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v. North B. A. Co., 2 Hurls. & C. 175, 32 L. J. R. (N. S.) Exch. 273; 1868,

Four Mile Valley R. Co. v. Bailey, 18 Ohio St. 208; 1869, Foster v. McKisson,

L. R. 4 C. P. 704, 38 L. J. R. (N. S.) 310; 1870, Leach v. Nichols, 55 111. 273;

1871, Countv of Schuylkill v. Copley, 67 Pa. St. 386; 1871, Rovegno v. Def-

ferari, 40 Cal. 459; 1873, Payson v. Withers, 5 Biss. 269; 1877, Gibson v.

Pelkie, 37 Mich. 380; 1883, Shelton v. Ellis, 70 Ga. 297; 1885, Wood v. Boyn-

ton, 64 Wis. 265; 1887, Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568; 1888, Hechtv.

Batcheller, 147 Mass. 335; 1893, Brintnall v. Briggs, 87 Iowa 538; 1898, Keene

v. Demelman, 172 Mass. 17; 1898, Deseret Nat'l Bank v. Burton, 17 Utah 43;

1898, Gaffney Mercantile Co. v. Hopkins, 21 Mont. 13; 1898, Rogers v. Pattie,

96 Va. 498; 1899, Hochstein v. Berghauser, 123 Cal. 681.

As to mistakes of law, see: 1822, Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.)

166, 10 Am. D. 316; 1828, Hunt v. Rousmaniere, 1 Pet. (26 U. S.) 1; 1838,

Bank of U. S. v. Daniel, 12 Pet. (37 U. S.) 32; 1845, Trigg v. Read, 5 Humph.

fTenn.t 529, 42 Am. D. 447; 1858, New Albanv & S. R. Co. v. Fields, 10 Ind.

187; 1860, Goodenow v. Ewer, 16 Cal. 461, 76 Am. D. 540; 1872, Bailev v.

Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 17 Wall. (U. S.) 96; 1876, Selma, etc., R. Co. v. Ander-

son, 51 Miss. 829; 1895, Loftus v. Fischer, 106 Cal. 616; 1898, Deseret Nat'l

Bank v. Burton, 17 Utah 43,53 Pac. 215. See, also. Beach, § 105; Clark,

§196; Cook, §196; Morawetz, §97; Taylor, §527; II Thompson, §§ 1379,

1393, 1719.

ARTICLE VI. PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT.

Sec. 127. Infants.

Note. As to mistake of fact, generally, see: 1431, 2 Rolle's Ahr. 28, 1. 5, 9 H. 6,
o9b ; 1506, Keil way's Reports, 70; 1584, Throughgood's Case, 2 Co. Rep. 9b,

1 And . 129, Moore 148; 1808. ·Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass. 45; 1819, Taylor
v. King, 6 Munf. (Va.) 358; 1829, Salem M. D. Co. v. Ropes, 9 Pick . (Mass.)
I87, 19 Am. D. 363; 1858, Cunningham v. Edgefield, etc., R . Co., 2 Head <39
Tenn. ) 23; 1858, Diman v. Providence, etc., R. Co., 5 R. I. 130; l!-i63, Swan
v. North B. A. Co., 2 Hurls. & C. 175, 32 L. J . R. (N. S.) Exch. 273; 1868,
Fonr Mile Valley R. Co. v. Bailey, 18 Ohio St. 208; 1869, Foster v. McKisson,
L. R. 4 C. P . 704, 38 L. J. R. (N. S.) 310; 1870, Leach v. Nichols, 55 Ill. 273;
1871, County of Sclmylkill v. Copley 67 Pa. St. 386; 1871, Ro,·egno v. Defferari, 40 Cal. 459; 1873, Payson v. Withers, 5 Biss. 269; 1877, Gibson v.
Pelkie,37 Mich. 380; 1883, Sbelt.on v. Ellis, 70 Ga. 297; 1885, Wood v. Boynton. 64 Wis. 265; 188~, Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich . 568 ; 1888, He<' ht v.
Batcheller, 147 Mass. 335; 1893, Brintnall v. Bri~R, 87 Iowa 538; 1898, Keene
v. Demel man, li2 Mass. 17; 1898, Deseret Nat'! Bank v. Burton, 17 Utah 43;
1898, Gaffney Merrant.i le Co. v. Hopkins, 21 Mont. 13 ; 1898, Rogers V'. Pattie,
96 Va. 498; 1899, Hochstein v. Berghauser, 123 Cal. 681.
As to mistakes of law, see: 1822, Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns. Ch. (N . Y.)
166, 10 Am . D. 316; 1828, Hunt v. Rousmirniere, 1 Pet. (26 U. S.) 1; 1838,
Bankof U.S. v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 137 U.S.) 32; 1845, Trigiz v. Re8:d, 5 Humph.
(Tenn .) 529, 42 Am. D. 447; 1858, New Albany & S. R. Co. v. Fi eld~ 10 Ind.
187; 1860, Goodenow v. Ewer, 16 Cal. 461, 76 Am. D. 540; 1872, .tSailey v.
Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 17 Wall. (U.S.) 96; 1876, Selma, etc .. R . Co. v. Anderson, 51 Miss. 829; 1895, Loftus v. Fischer, 106 Cal. 616; 1898, Deseret Nat']
Bank v. Burton, 17 Utah 43, 53 Pac. 215. See, also. Beach,§ 105; Clark,
§ 196; Cook, § 196; Morawetz, § 97; Taylor, § 527; II Thompson, §§ 1379,
1393, 1719.

FOSTER v. CHASE Et Al.

1896. In the United States Circuit Court, District of Ver-

ARTICLE VI.

mont. 75 Fed. Rep. 797.

PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT.

This was a suit in equity by Edwin L. Foster against Henry Chase

and others to recover an assessment upon the stock of a national

See. 127.

Infants.

bank.

FOSTER v. CHASE ET AL.

1896.

IN

THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, DISTRICT OF
MONT.

VER-

75 Fed. Rep. 797·

This was a suit in equity by Edwin L. Foster against Henry Chase
and others to recover an assessment upon the stock of a national
bank.
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FOSTER V. CHASE.

Wheeler, District Judge. The defendant bought stock in the

names of his minor children in the First National Bank of Silver City,

N. M., of which the plaintiff is receiver, and this suit is brought for

an assessment upon it made by the comptroller of the currency. The

plaintiff claims that the defendant made himself liable for the assess-

ment because of the incapacity of his children to take the stock and

make themselves liable for it. He insists that they only are the share-

holders, and liable, if any one is. Assent is necessary to becoming a

shareholder, subject to this liability, in a national bank. Keyser v.

Hitz, 133 U. S. 138, 10 Sup. Ct. 290. Minors do not seem to have

anywhere the necessary legal capacity for that. The principles upon

which this disability rests are elementary and universal. 1 Bl. Comm.

492; 2 Kent Comm. 233. In buying and paying for this stock, and

having it placed on the books of the bank, the defendant acted for

himself; in having it placed there in the name of his children, as with

their assent, he assumed to act for them. As they could not them-

selves so assent as to be bound to the liabilities of a shareholder, they

could'not so authorize him to assent for them as to bind them. To

the extent that they could not be bound he acted without legal au-
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thority, and bound only himself. Story Ag., § 280. This liability

has been sought for defendant to be likened to that of married women

becoming shareholders; but that has been incurred where, and be-

cause, the law of the place authorized them to become such. Keyser

v. Hitz, supra; Bundy v. Cocke, 128 U. S. 185, 9 Sup. Ct. 242.

No law confers that capacity upon infants, but the banking law seems

to refer this liability to their estates in the hands of their guardians.

Rev. Stat. U. S., § 5152.

Decree for plaintiff.

Note. Infants as shareholders. In the case of Foster v. Wilson, 75 Fed.

Rep. 797, it was held that where the father of a minor had subscribed in the

minor's name, the father remained liable upon an assessment made before the

minor came of age, though suit for its collection was not begun till after he had

become of age and assented to holding the stock. See, 1847, Cork, etc., R. v.

Cazenove, 10 Q. B. 935; 1849, Newrv, etc., R. v. Coombe, 3 Ex. 505; 1850, North-

western R. Co. v. McMichael, 5 Ex. 114; 1852, Dublin, etc., R." Co. v. Black, 8

Ex. 181; 1868, Robinson v. Weeks, 50 Maine 102; 1808, Eumsden's Case, L. R. 4

Ch. 31; 1808, Hart's Case, L. R. 0 Eq. 512; 1809, Castello's Case, L. R. 8 Eq.

Cas. 504; 1870, Mitchell's Case, L. R. 9 Eq. Cas. 303; 1870, Symon's Case,

L. R. 5 Ch. App. 298; 1870, Weston's Case, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 614; 1870,

Ebbett's Case, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 302; 1871, Baker's Case, L. R. 7 Ch. 115;

1872, Gooch's Case, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 266; 1870, Re Nassau Phos. Co., L. R. 2

Ch. D. 610; 1877, Indianapolis Chair Co. v. Wilcox, 59 Ind. 429; 1880, Crum-

mey v. Mills, 40 Hun. (N. Y.) 370; 1880, Hamilton, etc., R. v. Townsend, 13

Ont. App. 534, 10 Am. & E. C. C. 645; 1889, Chicago, etc.. Assn. v. Hunt, 127

111. 257; 1892, Re Globe Mut. Ben. Assn., 03 Hun. (N. Y.) 203; 1892, Re

Laxon, etc., Co., 3 Ch. D. 555. See, also, 10 Am. and Eng. Ency., 634, n. 2;

Beach, 5* 128, 138, 303; Clark, $98; Cook, §§ 03, 250; Elliott, $306; Mora-

wetz, $855; Tavlor, §$95, 515 n., 586; I Thompson, § 1095; II Thompson,

§§ 1238, 2307, 2493; III Thompson, §§ 3271-4; VII Thompson, §§ 8162, 8708; n.

18 Am. St. Rep. 615.

SUBSCRIPTION OF MARRIED WOMEN.

549

Sec. 128. Married women.

§

128

SUBSCRIPTION OF MARRIED WOMEN.

549

HAHNS & BROS'. APPEAL.1

1S86. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 15 Am. &

Eng. Corp. Cas. 537, 18 Weekly Notes of Cases 294.

[Appeal by complainants from a decree of the common pleas court

Sec. 128.

Married women.

dismissing a bill in equity to charge defendant Arndt upon unpaid

HAHNS & BROS'. APPEAL. 1

subscription to the stock of an iron company. The iron company being

authorized to increase its capital stock, called for subscriptions upon

IN

t886.

the express condition that none were to be binding unless $175,000

THE

SUPREME

CouRT

OF

'
PENNSYLVANIA.

15

Eng. Corp. Cas. 537, 18 Weekly Notes of Cases 294.

Am.

&
•

were subscribed. This sum was subscribed, but $1,350 of it were by

married women. Dr. Arndt had subscribed for twenty shares, but

had paid nothing and attended no meetings.]

Trunkey, J. * * * In this case no fraud is alleged. The subscriptions

of the married women were carelessly accepted as valid by those who

were active, but Mr. Arndt in no instance was an active party. It does

not appear that he knew that the amount of the subscriptions of the mar-

ried women was necessary to make up the requisite sum prior to the

beginning of this suit. Married women can hold stock and transfer

it, but the statute does not empower them to contract to pay for stock.
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Their subscriptions create no obligations on their part. As to them

the contracts are void. * * *

Affirmed.

yote. See note to next case, p. 552.

Sec. 129. Same.

NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK v. McDONNELL.2

1890. In the Supreme Court of Alabama. 92 Ala. Rep. 387-

399, 9 So. Rep. 149.

Appeals from the chancery court of Mobile.

There are four appeals embraced in this one record—all involve

similar questions, are included in one cause of action, and arc de-

[Appeal by complainants from a decree of the common pleas court
diMnissing a bill in equity to charge defendant Arndt upon unpaid
subscription to the stock of an iron company. The iron company being
authorized to increase its capital stock, called for subscriptions upon
the express condition that none were to be binding unless $175,000
were subscribed. This sum was subscribed, but $1,350 of itwere by
married women. Dr. Arndt had subscribed for twenty shares, but
had paid nothing and attended no meetings. J
TRUNKEY, J. • • • In this case no fraud is alleged. The subscriptions
of the married women were carelessly accepted as valid by those who
were active, but 1fr. Arndt in no instance was an active party. It does
not appear that he knew that the amount of the subscriptions of the married women was necessary to make up the requisite sum prior to the
beginning of this suit. Married women can hold stock and transfer
it, but the statute does not empower them to contract to pay for stock.
Their subscriptions create no obligations on their part. As to them
the contracts are void. • • •
Affirmed.

cided by one decree of the chancellor.

The bill was filed by the appellees as creditors, and sought to sub-

Note.

See note to next case, p. 552.

ject the stockholders of the Alabama Gold Life Insurance Company,

an insolvent corporation that had made a general assignment, to a

personal liability to the extent of the stock owned by them in s:iid in-

Sec. 129. Same.

solvent corporation. The answers, contentions and accompanying

NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK v. McDONNELL.2

facts, as well as the effect of the decree rendered, are sufficiently

shown in the opinion. The chancellor held in his decree that the

complainants were entitled to the relief prayed for, and so ordered.

1890. IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA.

399, 9

■Only so much as refers to the single point is given.

So.

92

Ala.

Rep. 387-

Rep. 149.

* Only the part of the opinion relating to the one point is given.

Appeals from the chancery court of Mobile.
There are four appeals embraced in this one record-all involve
similar questions, are included in one cause of action, and arc decided by one decree of the chancellor.
The bill was filed by the appellecs as creditors, and sought to subject the stockholders of the Alabama Gold Life Insurance Company,
an insolvent corporation that had made a general assignment, to a
personal liability to the extent of the stock owned by them in said inolvent corporation. The answers, contentions and accompanying
facts, as we ll as the effect of the decree rendered, are sufficiently
shown in the opinion. The chancellor held in his decree that the
complainants were entitled to the relief prayed for, and so ordered.
1 Only
2

so much as refers to the single point is gi\•en.
Only the part of tl.Je opinion relating to the one point is given.
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It is from this decree that the present appeal is prosecuted, and the
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same is here assigned as error.

NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK V. M'DO.N'NELL.

§ 129

Clopton, J. * * * In the cases of A. P. Bush and L. C. Dorgan.

the facts are substantially alike, and the questions raised are identical.

It is from this decree that· the present appeal is prosecuted, and the
same is here assigned as error.
CLOPTON, J. • • • In the cases of A. P. Bush and L. C. Dorgan,
the facts are substa.ntially alike, and the questions raised are identical.
The amendment of the bill, filed September 5, 1887, exhibited a list
of the stockholders on October 6, 1886. In this list Mrs. Bush, wife
of A. P. Bush, and Mrs. Dorgan, wife of L. C. Dorgan , appear a
the holders of twenty shares each; and they were made parties to tbe
amended bill. Having filed pleas of coverture, the bill was di. mi ed
as to them, and amended so as to aver that the wife of the appellant,
Bush, did not own any of the property as her equitable separate estate, and did not personally subscribe for or purchase any of the
shares; but that her husband subscribed for or purchased them , and
caused them to be placed on the books of the· company in her name.
The amendment of the bill makes substantially the same allegations
as to the shares in the na111e of Mrs. Dorgan. The answers of appellants, which are sworn to, deny that they ever owned the stock
held by their wives, or furnished the money to pay for them, and al o
that the stock was purchased with funds belonging to the wife's statutory separate estate. It will be observed that the bill fails to allege
that the wives had no statutory separate estate. The evidence shows
that a certificate for ten shares of stock was issued December 11
1868 1 and certificates for the other ten shares were issued February
18 1 1882, to Mrs. Bush; and a certificate for twenty shares was issued April 19, 1875, to Mrs. Dorgan; which stood thereafter on the
books of the company in their names, respectively. Bush and Dorgan each owned thirty-five shares, for which certificates were issued
in their names, and the books showed that they were the holders of
such shares. On the pleadiRgs and evidence, the chancellor rendered
a decree against each of the appellants for the aggregate amount of
the stock held in his own name, and that which stood in the name of
his wife. What follows will be understoo<l as the expression of my
individual views as to the personal liability of the husbands.
It is conceded that, at common law, when the husband subscribes
for stock in the name of his wife, he will be held liable for the subscription as the real owner. The rule rests on the incapacity of a
married woman to subscribe for stock, an<l as she can not make a
binding contract, ·whoever subscribes in her name becomes per onally
liable. At common law a married woman has no material right :i
regards shares of stock subscribed for or purchased by her. The
statutes in force at the time of the purchase of the stock in que tion
abrogated the marital rights of the hu sband as to the wife's tatutory
separate e tate. By the statute her property was vested in him. not
as husband, but as her trustee, and as s uch he was clothed with large
di scretiona ry powe rs to invest her funds as he deemed most benefi cial
for her, and if he purchased personal property with her money, taking
the title in her nam e, while as tmstce he was entitled t o the posse ::~i on
and income, she was the legal owner. Evans v. English, 61 Al a.
416; Daniel v. Hardwick, 88 Ala. 557. The hu sband may invest

The amendment of the bill, filed September 5, 18S7, exhibited a last

of the stockholders on October 6, 1886. In this list Mrs. Bush, wife

of A. P. Bush, and Mrs. Dorgan, wife of L. C. Dorgan, appear as

the holders of twenty shares each; and they were made parties to the

amended bill. Having filed pleas of coverture, the bill was dismissed

as to them, and amended so as to aver that the wife of the appellant,

Bush, did not own any of the property as her equitable separate es-

tate, and did not personally subscribe for or purchase any of the

shares, but that her husband subscribed for or purchased them, and

caused them to be placed on the books of the company in her name.

The amendment of the bill makes substantially the same allegations

as to the shares in the name of Mrs. Dorgan. The answers of ap-

pellants, which are sworn to, deny that they ever owned the stock

held by their wives, or furnished the money to pay for them, and also

that the stock was purchased with funds belonging to the wife's stat-

utory separate estate. It will be observed that the bill fails to allege

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:16 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

that the wives had no statutory separate estate. The evidence shows

that a certificate for ten shares of stock was issued December I,

1868, and certificates for the other ten shares were issued February

18, 1882, to Mrs. Bush; and a certificate for twenty shares was is-

sued April 19, 1875, to Mrs. Dorgan; which stood thereafter on the

books of the company in their names, respectively. Bush and Dor-

gan each owned thirty-five shares, for which certificates were issued

in their names, and the books showed that they were the holders of

such shares. On the pleadings and evidence, the chancellor rendered

a decree against each of the appellants for the aggregate amount of

the stock held in his own name, and that which stood in the name of

his wife. What follows will be understood as the expression of my

individual views as to the personal liability of the husbands.

It is conceded that, at common law, when the husband subscribes

for stock in the name of his wife, he will be held liable for the sub-

scription as the real owner. The rule rests on the incapacity of a

married woman to subscribe for stock, and as she can not make a

binding contract, whoever subscribes in her name becomes personally

liable. At common law a married woman has no material rights as

regards shares of stock subscribed for or purchased by her. The

statutes in force at the time of the purchase of the stock in question

abrogated the marital rights of the husband as to the wife's statutory

separate estate. By the statute her property was vested in him, not

as husband, but as her trustee, and as such he was clothed with large

discretionary powers to invest her funds as he deemed most beneficial

for her. and if he purchased personal property with her money, taking

the title in her name, while as trustee he was entitled to the possession

and income, she was the legal owner. Evans v. English, 61 Ala.

416; Daniel v. Hardwick, 88 Ala. 557. The husband may invest
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her money in the stock of incorporated companies, which thus be-

551

comes her separate estate, as well as other personal property.

The supreme court of the United States, in a recent case, held that

a married woman, in the District of Columbia, may become a holder

of stock in a national banking association, assuming all the liabilities

of a shareholder, though the consideration may have proceeded from

the husband, and that coverture does not prevent the recovery of a

judgment against her for the amount of an assessment levied upon the

shareholders to pay the corporate debts. Keyzer v. Hitz, 133 U. S.

138. This conclusion is based on the fact that the statute imposing

liability on the stockholders makes no exception in favor of married

women. Whether, under our statutes, the rules of the common law

are displaced so far as to render a married woman individually liable

for the debts of the corporation and authorize a personal judgment

against her, are questions not before us and as to which we express no

opinion. In Simmons v. Dent, 15 Mo. App. 288, it was held that,

under a statute whereby a married woman may become a stockholder,

a transfer of stock from the husband to the wife is valid and relieves
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him from liability on the stock the same as though he had transferred

it to another person.

That a married woman may become, by a purchase of shares, a

stockholder in an incorporated company under our statute, can not

well be questioned. The liability of the shareholders, additional to

the common law liability for unpaid subscriptions, is statutory. Im-

posing a liability which did not exist at common law, the statute will

not be extended by construction so as to include persons who are not

the equitable or real owners of the stock, or in whom the legal title is

not vested—who are not stockholders, neither equitably nor legally.

Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 214. When money of the wife's

statutory separate estate is invested by her husband as a trustee in the

purchase of stock, he is not the owner, has no beneficial interest therein,

and enters into no contractual relations, express or implied, with the

corporation. It is true that, under the statutes in force at the time of

the purchase of the stock, a married woman had no capacity to

make contracts subjecting her to personal liability, or charging her stat-

utory separate estate. But whether the husband, subscribing for

stock in the name of his wife, would be liable for the unpaid sub-

scriptions, is not the question presented for decision. It may be that

he would be liable, under the rule laid down in Wilder v. Abernethy,

54 Ala. 644, that no title to property purchased on her credit passes

to her, the contract of purchase not being a charge on her separate

estate, and if purchased by the husband on the credit of the wife, it

becomes his property. A different question arises where property is

purchased with the separate money of the wife, paid for a real in-

vestment of her funds by the husband as her statutory trustee. In

such case the contract of purchase, the investment, bound the wife.

It appearing that, in each case, the stock was purchased by the husband

for the wife in his capacity of trustee tinder his statutory powers, paid

for with the moneys of her separate estate, the certificates issued in

her money in the stock of incorporated companies, which thus becomes her separate estate, as well as other personal property.
The supreme court of the United States, in a recent case, held that
a married woman, in the District of Columbia, may become a holder
of stock in a national banking association, assuming all the liabilities
of a shareholder, though the consideration may have proceeded from
the husband, and that coverture does not prevent the recovery of a
judgment against her for the amount of an assessment levied upon the
shareholders to pay the corporate debts. Keyzer v. Hitz, 133 U. S.
138. This conclusion is based on the fact that the statute imposing
liability on the stockholders makes no exception in favor of married
women. Whether, under our statutes, the rules of the common law
are displaced so far as to render a married woman individually liable
for the debts of the corporation and authorize a personal judgment
against her, are questions not before us and as to which we express no
opinion. In Simmons v. Dent, 15 Mo. App. 288, it was held that,
under a statute whereby a married woman may become a stockholder,
a transfer of stock from the husband to the wife is valid and relieves
him from liability on the stock the same as though he had transferred
it to another person.
That a married woman may become, by a purchase of shares, a
stockholder m an incorporated company under our statute, can not
well be questioned. The liability of the shareholders, additional to
the common law liability for unpaid subscriptions, is statutory. Imposing a liability which did not exist at common law, the statute will
not be extended by construction so as to include persons who are not
the equitable or real owners of the stock, or in whom the legal title is
not vested-who are not stockholders, neither equitably nor legally.
Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 214. When money of the wife's
statutory separate estate is invested by her husband as a trustee in the
purchase of stock, he is not the owner, has no beneficial interest therein,
and enters into no contractual relations, express or implied, with the
corporation. It is true that, under the statutes in force at the time of
the purchase of the stock, a married woman had no capacity to
make contracts subjecting her to personal liability, or charging her statutory separate estate.
But whether the husband, subscribing for
stock in the name of his wife, would be liable for the unpaid subscriptions-, is not the question presented for decision. It may be that
he would be liable, under the rule laid down in Wilder v. Abernethy,
54 Ala. 644, that no title to property purchased on her credit passes
to her, the contract of purchase not being a charge on her separate
estate, and if purchased by the husband on the credit of the wife. it
becomes his property. A different question arises where property is
purchased with the separate money of the wife, paid for a real investment of her funds by the husband as her statutory tm tee. In
such case the contract of purchase, the investment, bound the wife.
It appearing that, in each case , the stock was purchased by the hnsha11d
for the wife in his capacity of trustee under his statutory po,,v ers, paid
for with the moneys of her separate e~tate , the certificates issued in
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her name, standing on the books of the company as the owner hold-
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ing the legal title, and the husband's name not appearing on the

1
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§ 130

books as the owner, or as holding the stock in trust, he can not be re-

her name, standing on the bdoks of the company as the owner holding the legal title, and the husband ' s name not appearing on the
books as the owner, or as holding the stock in trust, he can not be regarded, in my opinion, as a stockholder, in the meaning of the constitutional and statuto,.y provisions imposing the additional individual
liability. But ns to this conclusion , the other m embers of the court
differ with m e, holding that, as a married woman was incapable un·
der the statute of making a contract binding her personally, or charg·
ing her statutory separate estate, the common law rule , which makes
the husband, when he subscribes for stock in the name of his wife,
personally li able on the subscription, applies, and subjects him to the
additional liability imposed by the statute on the stockholders to the
extent of the ir stock.
As to Bush and Dorgan , affir1,11ed.

garded, in my opinion, as a stockholder, in the meaning of the consti-

tutional and statutory provisions imposing the additional individual

liability. But as to this conclusion, the other members of the court

differ with me, holding that, as a married woman was incapable un-

der the statute of making a contract binding her personally, or charg-

ing her statutory separate estate, the common law rule, which makes

the husband, when he subscribes for stock in the name of his wife,

personally liable on the subscription, applies, and subjects him to the

additional liability imposed by the statute on the stockholders to the

extent of their stock.

As to Bush and Dorgan, affirmed.

Note. Married women as shareholders. See, 1847, Porter v. Bank of Rutland,

19 Vt. 410; 1849, Angas' Case, 1 De G. & Sm. 560; 1849, Slaymaker v. Bank

of Gettysburg, 10 Pa. St. 373; 1850, White's Case, 3 De G. & Sm. 157; 1853,

Dalton v. Midland, etc., R., 13 C. B. 474; 1800, Luard's Case, 1 De G.,

F. &J.533; 1860, In matter of Reciprocity Bank, 22 N. Y. 9; 1864. Hill v.

Pine River Bank, 45 N. H. 300; 1866, Matthewman's Case, L. R. 3 Eq. Cas. 781;

Note. Married women as shareholders. See, 1847, Porter v. Bank of Rutland,
19 Vt. 410; 1849, Angas' Case, 1 De G. & Sm. 560; 1849, Slaymaker v. Bank
of Gettysburg, 10 Pa. St. 373; 1850, Wbite's Case , 3 De G. & Sm . 157; 1&53,
Dalton v . Midland. etc., R ., 13 C. B . 474; 1860, Lua rd's Case, 1 De G.,
F. & J . 533; 1860, In matte r of Reciprocity Bank, 22 N. Y. 9; 1864, Hill v.
Pine River Hank, 45 N. H. 300; 1866, Mattbewman's Case, L . R. 3 Eq. Cas. i81;
1868, Bntl,er '.'.· Curnpston, L . R. 7 Eq. Cas. rn; 1872, Pugh & Sharman's C:ise.
L. R. 13 Eq. 066; 1879, Brown v. Bokee, 53 Md. 155; 1880, Anderson v. Lme,
14 F ed. Rep. 405; 1886, Sayles v. Bates, 15 R. I. 342; 1887, Witters v. Sowles,
32 Fed. Rep. 767; 1890, Keyser v . Hitz, 133 U . S. 138; 18H4, Robinson v. Turrentine , 59 Fed . Rep. 554; 1896, Re Married Women's, etc., 18 Pa. Co. Ct. 492.
See, also, 14 Am . & Eng. Ency. 680; Beach, § 139; Cook, §§ 66, 2.50, 319,
396, .538; Clark, § 98; Elliott, § 346; I Thompson, §§ 1096-7; II lb., § 2493;
III Ib., §§ 3103, 3211, 3275; VII Ib., §§ 8163, 8708.
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1868. Butler v. Cumpston, L. R. 7 Eq. Cas. 16; 1872, Pugh & Sharnian's Case,

L. R. 13 Eq. 566; 1879, Brown v. Bokee, 53 Md. 155; 1880, Anderson v. Line,

14 Fed. Rep. 405; 1886, Sayles v. Bates, 15 R. I. 342; 1887, Witters v. Sowles,

32 Fed. Rep. 767; 1890, Kevser v. Hitz, 133 U. S. 138; 1894, Robinson v. Tur-

rentine, 59 Fed. Rep. 554; 1896, Re Married Women's, etc., 18 Pa. Co. Ct. 492.

See, also, 14 Am. & Eng. Encv. 680; Beach, § 139; Cook, $§66, 250, 319,

396, 538; Clark, §98; Elliott, §"346; I Thompson, §§ 1096-7; 1116., § 2493;

III lb., §§ 3103, 3211, 3275; VII lb., §§ 8163, 8708.

Sec. 130. Aliens. See Regina v. Arnaud, 9 Adolpl. & E. 886,

supra, p. 58.

Notes. Aliens as shareholders. See, 1806, Ex parte Boussmaker, 13 Ves. Jr.

71; 1844, Cammever v. U. G. L. Churches, 2 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 186; 1847,

Commw. v. O'Donnell, Brightly N. P. (Pa.) Ill; 1869, Hobbs v. Manhattan

Ins. Co., 56 Maine 417, 96 Am. Dec. 472; 1871, In re Journalist's Fund, etc.,

8 Phila. (Pa.) 272; 1873, In re Charter, etc., 10 Phila. (Pa.) 19; 1879. In re

Sec. 130. Aliens . See Regina v. Arnaud, 9 Adolpl. & E. 886,

Charter, etc., 1 Leg. Rec. (Pa.) 133; 1880, Humphreys v. Moonev, 5 Colo. 282;

1890, Commw. v. Hemmingwav,etc., 131 Pa. St. 614, 7 L. R. A."357; 1895, Be

supra, p. 58.

Italian Mat. Ben. Assn., 15 Pa. Co. Ct, 644; 1897, Re Charter St. Ladislaus,

19 Pa Co. Ct. 25; 1899, Blien v. Rand. 79 N. W. (Minn.) 606.

Notes. Aliens as shareholders. See, 1806, Ex parte Boussmaker, 13 Ves. Jr.
71; 1844, Cammeyer v. U. G. L. Churches, 2 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y. J 186; 1847,
Commw. v. O'Donnell, Brightly N. P. (Pa. ) 111 ; 1869, H obbs v. Manhattan
Ins. Co., .56 Maine 417, 96 Am. Der. 472; 1871, Jn re Journalist's Fund , etc.,
8 Pbila. (Pa. ) 272; 1873, I n re Charter, etc. , JO Phila. (Pa. ) 19; 1879, Jn re
Charter, etc. , 1 Leir. Rec. (Pa. ) 133; 1880, Humpbreysv. Mooney, 5Colo. 282;
1890, Commw. v. H e mmin gway, etc., 131 Pa. St. 614, 7 L . R. A . 357; 1895, Re
I talian Mut. Ben. Assn ., 15 Pa. Co. Ct. fi44; 1897, Re Ch arte r St. Ladislaus,
19 Pu. Co. Ct. 2i); 1899, Blien v. Rand. 79 N. W . ( Minn.) 606.
State s tatutes freque ntl y provide that i ncorporators, or a part of them, shall
be citizens o f the state gran ting the ch arter . Such provisions are undoubtedly Ya lid, for the state can grant or withholtl its corporate franchises at its
pleasure. It, however, perhaps is questionable whether a state can confine
the stork h olders or subscr ibers to th e stock to r esiden ts or r itizens of the
state creating the corporation, with out violating sectio n 2. article iv, of the
U uited States con stitution, providing t hat "the citize ns of each state shall be
e ntitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizen s in the several
states."
Rut see, 18VO, Com mw. v . H emmingway, 131 Pa. St. 614 ; 1898, State v.
Travelers' Ins. Co ., 70 Conn. 590; 1899, Blien v. Rand , 77 Minn. 110, ill
N. W. 606.

State statutes frequently provide that incorporators, or apart of them, shall

be citizens of the state granting the charter. Such provisions are undoubt-

edly valid, for the state can grant or withhold its corporate franchises at its

pleasure. It, however, perhaps is questionable whether a state can confine

the stockholders or subscribers to the stock to residents or citizens of the

stale creating the corporation, without violating section 2. article iv, of the

United States constitution, providing that "the citizens of each state shall be

entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several

states."

But see, 1890, Commw. v. Hemmingwav, 131 Pa. St. 614; 1898, State v.

Travelers' Ins. Co., 70 Conn. 590; 1899, Blien v. Rand, 77 Minn. 110, 711

N. W. 606.
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Sec. 131. Private corporations.

THE DENNY HOTEL CO., Appellant, v. JOHN SCHRAM, Respondent."

§ 13 [
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SUBSCRIPTION BY PRIVATE CORPORATIONS.

1893. In the Supreme Court of Washington. 6 Wash. Rep.

W-i&i 36 Am- St- ReP- r3°'

Dunbar, C. J. * * * Second. Can a corporation under the laws

Sec. 131.

Private corporations.

of this state become an incorporator by subscribing for shares in

another corporation? * * *

THE DENNY HOTEL co.,

APPELLANT,

v. JOHN

SCHRAM, RESPONDENT. 1

As to the second proposition, a corporation can only be formed in

the manner provided by law, and has only such powers, as the law

specially confers upon it. We do not think that a corporation was

1893. IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF VI/ ASHINGTON.
134-138, 36 Am. St. Rep. 130.

6 Wash. Rep.

within the contemplation of the legislature when they used the ex-

pression, "two or more persons," in § 1498, Gen. Stat. It is true

that § 1709, Code Proc, provides that the term "person" may be

construed to include the United States, this state, or any state or ter-

ritory, or any public or private corporation, as well as an individual.

But it does not follow, by any means, that the term ''person" is al-

ways to be construed as a private corporation, any more than it is

always to be construed as the United States.

Morawetz on Private Corporations, § 433, says: "A corporation
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can not, in the absence of express statutory authority, become an in-

corporator by subscribing for shares in a new corporation; nor can it

do this indirectly through persons acting as its agents or tools;" cit-

ing Central R. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 31 N. J. Eq. 475. The

author, continuing, says, "The right of forming a corporation is con-

ferred by the incorporation laws only upon persons acting individu-

ally, and not upon associations."

This, it seems to us, for manifest and manifold reasons, is in accord-

ance with public policy, and we therefore decide that under the ex-

isting laws of this state one corporation can not subscribe to the capi-

tal stock of another corporation. And, in any event, in this case the

amount of the capital stock of the building company was so exceed-

ingly small, compared with the amount of the liability which it sought

to assume (its subscribed stock being $64,000 and its capital stock

only $54,000), that there was no apparent ability to pay the amount

subscribed; and while it may be true that a party's contract will not

be held void if it is not apparent that he is worth the entire amount of

money necessary to carry it out at the time it is made, yet the disparity

here is too great, and there is not only not "an apparent ability to

pay," but there is an apparent inability to pay.

We find no error in the proceedings in the court below, and the

judgment is therefore affirmed.

Stiles, Anders and Scott, JJ., concur.

Hoyt, J., disqualified.

iVbte. See, infra, under Powers of Corporations, p. 1051, et seq.

'Only that part of opinion relating to the one point given.

DUNBAR, C. J. • • • Second. Can a corporation under the laws
of this state become an incorporator by subscribing for shares in
another corporation? • • •
As to the second proposition , a corporation can only be formed in
the manner provided by law, and h as only such powers. as the law
speci a lly confers upon it. We do not think that a corporation was
within the contemplation of the legislature when they used the express ion, "two or more persons," in § 1498, Gen. Stat. It is true
tha t § 1709, Code Proc., provides that the term "person" may be
construed to include the United States, this state, or any state or territory, or any public or private corporation, as well a s an individual.
But it does not follow, by any means, that the term ' fperson" is always to be construed as a private corporation, any more than it is
always to be construed as the United States.
Morawetz on Private Corporations, § 433, says: "A corporation
can not, in the absence of express statutory authority, become an incorporator by subscribing for shares in a n e w corporation; nor can it
do this indirectly through persons acting as its agents or tools;" citing Central R. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 31 N. J. Eq. 475. The
author, continuing, says, "The right of forming a corporation is conferred by the incorporation laws only upon persons acting individually, and not upon associations."
This, it seems to us, for manifest and manifold reasons, is in accordance with public policy, and we therefore decide that under the existing laws of this state one corporation can not subscribe to the capital stock of another corporation. And, in any event, in this case the
amount of the capital stock of the building company was so exceedingly small, compared with the amount of the liability which it soug ht
to assume (its subscribed stock being $64,000 and its capital stock
only $54 ,000) , that there was no apparent ability to pay the a mount
subscribed; and while it may be true that a party 's contract will not
be held void if it is not apparent that he is worth the entire amount of
money necessary to carry it out at the time it is made, yet the disparity
here is too great, and there is not only not " an apparent ability to
pay , " but there is an apparent inability to pay.
\Ve find no error in the proceed it~gs in the cou1t below, and the
judgment is therefore affirmed.
STILES, ANDERS and ScoTT, JJ., concur.
HoYT, J., disqualified.
Note.
10oly
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Sec. 132. Municipal corporations.
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COLE v. LA GRANGE.1

1884. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 113 U.S.

COLE V. LA GRANGE.

Rep. 1-9.

Sec. 132. Municipal corporations.

This was an action to recover the amount of coupons for interest

from January 1, 1873, to January 1, 1880, attached to twenty-five

bonds, all exactly alike, except in their numbers, and one of which

COLE v. LA GRANGE.1

was as follows:

"United States op America. 1

1884. IN

State of Missouri, City op La Grange. J

THE

SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED

STATRS.

113 u. s.

Rep. I-9·

"No. 23. $1,000

"Know all men by these presents, that the city of La Grange doth,

This was an action to recover the amount of coupons for interest
from January 1, 1873, to January 1, 188o, attached to twenty-five
bonds, all exactly alike, except in their numbers, and one of which
was as follows:

for a good, sufficient and valuable consideration, promise to pay to

the La Grange Iron and Steel Company, or bearer, the sum of $1,000

in current funds, thirty years after the date thereof, at the Third Na-

tional Bank, city of New York, together with interest thereon, at the

.

rate of eight per cent, per annum, payable annually in current funds

on the first day of each January and July ensuing the date hereof, on

"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
}
STATE OF MISSOURI, CITY OF LA GRANGE.

presentation and surrender of the annexed interest coupons at said

Third National Bank.

"No. 23.
$1 ,000
"Know all men by these presents, that the city of La Grange doth,
for a good, sufficient and valuable con sideration, promise to pay to
the La Grange Iron and Steel Company, or bearer, the sum of $1,000
in cu1Tent fumJs, thirty years after the date thereof, at the Third National Bank, city of New York, together with interest thereon, at the
rate of eight per cent. per annum, payable annually in current funds
on the first day of each January and July ensuing the date hereof, on
presentation and surrender of the annexed interest coupons at said
Third National Bank.
"This bond is issued under an ordinance of the city council of the
said city of La Grange, passed and approved September 22, 1871,
under and in pursuance of an act of the legislature of the state of
Missouri, entitled 'An act to amend an act entitled an act to incorporate the city of La Grange,' approved March 9, 1871 , which became
a law and went into force and effect from and after its said approval.
"This bond to be negotiable and transfetTable by delivery thereof.
"In testimony whereof, the city council of the city of La Gr:inge
hath hereunto caused to be affixed the corporate sea! of said city, and
these presents to be signed by the mayor and countersigned by the
clerk of the city council of said city this 14th day of December, 1871.
l]
"J. A. HAY, .iVayor.
ea
"R. McCHESNEY, Clerk."
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"This bond is issued under an ordinance of the city council of the

said city of La Grange, passed and approved September 22, 1871,

under and in pursuance of an act of the legislature of the state of

Missouri, entitled 'An act to amend an act entitled an act to incorpo-

rate the city of La Grange,' approved March 9, 1871, which became

a law and went into force and effect from and after its said approval.

"This bond to be negotiable and transferrable by delivery thereof.

"In testimony whereof, the city council of the city of La Grange

hath hereunto caused to be affixed the corporate seal of said city, and

these presents to be signed by the mayor and countersigned by the

clerk of the city council of said city this 14th day of December, 1871.

rSeall A< HaY' Ma>'or-

L° J "R. McChesney, Clerk."

The petition alleged that the city of La Grange, on the 14th of De-

cember, 1871, executed the twenty-five bonds, and delivered them to

the La Grange Iron and Steel Company, under and by virtue of the

authority contained in section 1 of article vi of the city charter, as

amended by an act of the legislature of Missouri, approved March 9.

iS^r (which section, as thus amended, was set forth in the

petition), and under and by virtue of an ordinance of the .city,

dated September 22, 1871, by which an election was author-

ized to be held in the city on October 4, 1871, to test the sense

of the people of the city upon the question of issuing bonds;

[s

'Arguments omitted.

The petition alleged that the city of La Grange, on the 14th of De·
cember, 1871, executed the twenty-five bonds, and deliYered them to
the La Grange Iron and Steel Company, under and by virtue of the
authority contained in section 1 of article vi of the city charter, as
amended by an act of the leg islature of Missouri, approved March 9.
r 871 (which st> ct ion , as thus amended, was set forth in the
petition), and under and by vi1tuc of an or<linance of the city,
tlatecl September 22 , 1871 , by which an election wns author·
ized to be held in the city on October 4, 1871, to tt>st the sense
of the people of the city upon the question of issuing bonds;
1Arg11me11ts omitted.
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that in compliance with the ordinance and with the city charter, an

election was held, at which the proposition was adopted by a two-
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thirds vote of the qualified voters; and that on September i, 1872,

the plaintiff bought the twenty-five bonds, for value, relying upon the

recitals on their face, and without knowledge of any irregularity or

defect in their issue; of all which the defendant had notice, by means

whereof the defendant became liable and promised to pay to the

plaintiff the sum specified in the coupons, according to their tenor

and effect.

The answer denied all the allegations of the petition; and for

further answer averred that the act of the legislature mentioned in

the petition, approved March 9, 1871, attempted to give, and in

terms did give, to the city authority to make gifts and donations to

private manufacturing associations and corporations; that the city

council, purporting to act under such authority, by an ordinance

adopted September 22, 1871 (which was referred to in the answer), did

submit to a vote of the citizens a proposition to give or donate to the

La Grange Iron and Steel Company, a private manufacturing company,

formed and established for the purpose of carrying on and operating a
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rolling-mill, the sum of $200,000; that, in accordance with that ordi-

nance, the bonds of the city were issued to said manufacturing com-

pany, which was a strictly private enterprise, formed and prosecuted

for the purpose of private gain, and which had nothing whatever of

a public character; and that it was incompetent for the legislature to

grant authority to cities or towns to make donations and issue bonds

to mere private companies or associations having no public functions

to perform, and the act of the legislature and the ordinance of the

city were void; wherefore, the bonds and coupons were issued with-

out any legal authority, and were wholly void.

To this answer the plaintiff filed a general demurrer, which was

overruled by the court, and the plaintiff electing to stand by his de-

murrer, judgment was entered for the defendant. 19 Fed. Rep.

871. The plaintiff sued out this writ of error.

Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court. He recited

the facts as above stated and continued:

The general grant of legislative power in the constitution of the

state does not enable the legislature, in the exercise either of the right

if eminent domain or in the right of taxation, to take private prop-

erty, without the owner's consent, for any but a public object. Nor

can the legislature authorize counties, cities or towns to contract for

private objects debts which must be paid by taxes. It can not, there*

fore, authorize them to issue bonds to assist merchants or manufactur-

ers, whether natural persons or corporations, in their private business.

These limits of the legislative power are now too firmly established

by judicial decisions to require extended argument upon the subject.

In Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, bonds of a city,

issued, as appeared on their face, pursuant to an act of the legislature

of Kansas, to a manufacturing corporation, to aid it in establishing

shops in the city for the manufacture of iron bridges, were held by

that in compliance with the ordinance and with the city charter, an
el ection was held, at which the proposition was adopted by a twothirds vote of the qualified voters; and that on September 1, 1872,
the plaintiff bought the twenty-five bonds, for value, relying upon the
recitals on their face, and without knowledge of any irregularity or
defect in their issue; of all which the defendant had notice, by means
whereof the defendant became liable and promised to pay to the
plaintiff the sum specified in the coupons, according to their tenor
and effect.
The answer denied all the allegations of the petition; and for
further answer averred that the act of the legislature mentioned in
the petition, approved March 9, 1871 , attempted to give, and in
terms did give, to the city authority to make gifts and donations to
pri vate manufacturing associations and corporations; that the city
council, purporting to act under such authority, by an ordinance
adopted September 22, 1871 (which was referred to in the answer), did
submit to a vote of the citizens a proposition to give or donate to the
La Grange Iron and Stee l Company, a private manufacturing company,
formed and established for the purpose of carrying on and operating a
rolling-mill, the um of $zoo,ooo; that, in accordance with that ordinance, the bonds of the city were issued to said manufacturing company, which was a strictly pr~vate enterprise, formed and prosecuted
for the purpose of private gain, and which had nothing whatever of
a public character; and that it was incompetent for the legislature to
grant authority to cities or towns to make donations and issue bonds
to mere private companies or associations having no public functions
to perform, and the act of the legislature and the ordinance of the
city were void; wherefore, the bonds and coupons were issued without any legal authority, and were wholly void.
To this answer the plaintiff filed a general demurrer, which was
overruled by the court, and the plaintiff electing to stand by his demurrer, judgme nt was entered for the defendant.
19 Fed. Rep.
871. The plaintiff sued out this writ of error.
Mr. Justice GRAY delivered the opinion of the court. He recited
the facts as above stated and continued:
The general grant of legislative power in the constitution of the
stat e does not enable th e legislature, in the exercise either of the right
Jf em inent domain or in the rig ht of taxation, to take private propert~· , without the owner's consent, for any but a public object.
Nor
can the legislature authorize counties, cities or towns to contract for
private objects debts which must be paid b y taxes. It can not, therefore, authorize them to issue bonds to assist merchants or manufacturers. whether natural persons or corporations, in their private business.
These limits of the legi slative power are now too firmly established
by judicial decisions to require extended argu ment upon the subject.
In Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, bonds of a city,
i~su ed, as appeared on their face , pursuant to an act of the legislature
of Kansas, to a manufacturing corporation. to aid it in establishing
shops in the city for the manufacture of iron bridges, were hdd by
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this court to be void, even in the hands of a purchaser in good faith
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and for value. A like decision was made in Parkersburg v. Brown,

106 U. S. 4S7. The decisions in the courts of the states are to the

this court to be void, even in the hands of a purchaser in good faith
and for value. A like decision was made in Parkersburg v. Brown,
106 U. S. 487. The decisions in the courts of the states are to the
same effect. Allen v.Jay,6o Maine 124; Lowell v.Boston, III
Mass. 454; Weismer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91; In re Eure ka Co. ,
96 N. Y. 42; Bissell v. Kankakee, 64 Ill. 249: English v. People,
96 Ill. 566; C e ntral Branch Union Pacific Railroad v. Smith, 23
Kan. 745·
.
Vv e have been referred to no opposing decision. The cases of
Hnckett v. Ottawa, 99 U. S. 86, and Ottawa v. National Bank, 105
U. S. 342, were decided, as the chief justice pointed out in Ottawa
v. Carey, 108 U. S. 110, 118, upon the ground that the bonds in
suit appeared on their face to have beein issued for municipal purposes , and wt:re therefore valid in the hands of bona fide holders. In
Livingston v. Darlington, IOI U. S. 407, the town subscription was
toward the establishment of a state reform school, \vhich was undoubtedly a public purpose, and the question in controversy was
whether it was a corporate purpose, within the meaning of the constitution of Illinois. In Burlington v. Beasley, 94 U.S. 310, the grist
mill held to be a work of internal improvement, to aid in constructing
which a town might issue bonds under the statutes of Kansas, was a
public mill which ground for toll for all customers. See Osborne v.
Adams County, 106 U.S. 181, and 109 U.S. 1; Blair v. Cuming
County, III U.S. 363. Subscriptions and bonds of towns and cities,
under legislative authority, to aid in establishing railroads, have been
sustained on the same ground on which the delegation to railroad corporations of the sovereign right of eminent domain has been justified,
the accommodation of public travel. Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall.
654; Queensbury v. Culvt:r, 19 Wall. 8;~; Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 661, 662; Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U.S. 6o. Statutes authorizing to\vns and cities to pay bounties to soldiers have been
upheld because the raising of soldiers is a public duty. MiddJeton v.
Mullica, r 12 U. S. 433; Tay lor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9: Hilbish v.
Catherman, 64 Pa. St. I 54; State v. Richland, 20 Ohio St. 362;
Ag::n·v am v. Hampde n, i30 Mass . 528, 534.
The express provisions of the constitution of Missouri tend to the
same conclusion. It begins with the D edaration of Rights, the sixteenth a1ticle of which declares that " no private property ought to be
ta kC'n or applied to public u se without just compensation." This
clearly presupposes that private propc1ty can not be take n for private
u ~ c . St. Louis County Court v. Griswold , 58 Mo. I7'5 • 193; 2 K ent
Com.· 339 note, 340. Otherwise, as it makes no provi sion for compensation except whe n the use is public, it would permit private prope1ty to be taken or appropriated for private use without any compe n·ation whatever. It is true that this a rticle regards the right of eminent ciom:-iin, and not the power to tax; for the taking of property hy
tax:ttion requires no other compensation than the tax-payer. rece i,·es
in being protected hy the gm·ern ment. to t:he support of which he contributes. But, so far as respects the use,, the taking of private prop-

same effect. Allen v. Jay, 60 Maine 124; Lowell v. Boston, m

Mass. 454; Weismer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91; In re Eureka Co.,

96 N. Y. 42; Bissell v. Kankakee, 64 111. 249; English v. People,

96 111. 566; Central Branch Union Pacific Railroad v. Smith, 23

Kan. 745.

We have been referred to no opposing decision. The cases of

Ilackett v. Ottawa, 99 U. S. 86, and Ottawa v. National Bank, 105

U. S. 342, were decided, as the chief justice pointed out in Ottawa

v. Carey, 108 U. S. no, 118, upon the ground that the bonds in

suit appeared on their face to have been issued for municipal pur-

poses, and were therefore valid in the hands of bona Jide holders. In

Livingston v. Darlington, 101 U. S. 407, the town subscription was

toward the establishment of a state reform school, which was un-

doubtedly a public purpose, and the question in controversy was

whether it was a corporate purpose, within the meaning of the con-

stitution of Illinois. In Burlington v. Beasley, 94 U. S. 310, the grist
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mill held to be a work of internal improvement, to aid in constructing

which a town might issue bonds under the statutes of Kansas, was a

public mill which ground for toll for alj customers. See Osborne v.

Adams County, 106 U. S. 181, and 109 U. S. 1; Blair v. Cuming

County, in U. S. 363. Subscriptions and bonds of towns and cities,

under legislative authority, to aid in establishing railroads, have been

sustained on the same ground on which the delegation to railroad cor-

porations of the sovereign right of eminent domain has been justified,

the accommodation of public travel. Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall.

654; Queensbury v. Culver, 19 Wall. 83; Loan Association v. To-

peka, 20 Wall. 661, 662; Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U. S. 60. Stat-

utes authorizing towns and cities to pay bounties to soldiers have been

upheld because the raising of soldiers is a public duty. Middleton v.

Mullica, 112 U. S. 433; Taylor v. Thompson, 42 111. 9; Hilbish v.

Catherman, 64 Pa. St. 154; State v. Richland, 20 Ohio St. 362;

Agawam v. Hampden, 130 Mass. 528, 534.

The express provisions of the constitution of Missouri tend to the

same conclusion. It begins with the Declaration of Rights, the six-

teenth article of which declares that "no private property ought to be

taken or applied to public use without just compensation." This

clearly presupposes that private property can not be taken for private

use. St. Louis County Court v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175, 193; 2 Kent

Com. 339 note, 340. Otherwise, as it makes no provision for com-

pensation except when the use is public, it would permit private prop-

erty to be taken or appropriated for private use without any compen-

sation whatever. It is true that this article regards the right of emi-

nent domain, and not the power to tax; for the taking of property by

taxation requires no other compensation than the tax-payer, receives

in being protected by the government, to the support of which he con-

tributes. But. so far as respects the use, the taking of private prop-
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erty by taxation is subject to the same limit as the taking by the right
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of eminent domain. Each is a taking by the state for the public use,

557

and not to promote private ends.

The only other provisions of the constitution of Missouri having

any relation to the subject, are the following sections of the eleventh

article:

'•Sec. 13. The credit of the state shall not be given or loaned in

aid of any person, association or corporation, nor shall the state here-

after become a stockholder in any corporation or association, except

for the purpose of securing loans heretofore extended to certain rail-

road corporations in the state.

"Sec. 14. The general assembly shall not authorize any county,

city, or town to become a stockholder in, or loan its credit to, any

company, association or corporation, unless two-thirds of the quali-

fied voters of such county, city or town, at a regular or special elec-

tion, to be held therein, shall assent thereto."

Both these sections are restrictive and not enabling. The thirteenth

section peremptorily denies to the state the power of giving or lending

its credit to or becoming a stockholder in any corporation whatever.
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The aim of the fourteenth section is to forbid the legislature to au-

thorize counties, cities or towns, without the assent of the tax-payers,

to become stockholders in or to lend their credit to any corporation

however public its object; State v. Curators State University, 57 Mo.

178; not to permit them to be authorized, under any circumstances,

to raise or- spend money for private purposes.

It is averred in the answer, and admitted by the demurrer, that the

La Grange Iron and Steel Company, to which the bonds were issued,

was "a private manufacturing company, formed and established for

the purpose of carrying on and operating a rolling-mill," and "was a

strictly private enterprise, formed and prosecuted for the purpose of

private gain, and which had nothing whatever of a public character."

The ordinance referred to shows that the mill was to manufacture

railroad iron; but that is no more a public use than the manufacture

of iron bridges, as in the Topeka case, or the making of blocks of

stone or wood for paving streets. There can be no doubt, therefore,

that the act of the legislature of Missouri is unconstitutional, and that

the bonds expressed to be issued in pursuance of that act are void

upon their face.

As for this reason the action can not be maintained, it is needless

to dwell upon the point that the answer demurred to, besides the spe-

cial defense of the unconstitutionality of the act, contains a general

denial of the allegations in the petition. That point was mentioned

and passed over in the opinion of the circuit court, and was not

alluded to in argument here, the parties in effect assuming the general

denial in the answer to have been withdrawn or waived, and the case

submitted for decision upon the validity of the special defense.

Judgment affirmed.

Note. Subscriptions by municipal corporations. There is no implied authority

to subscribe. 1863, Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 175; 1873, State v.

erty by taxation is subject to the same limit as the taking by the right
of eminent domain. Each is a taking by the state for the public use ,
and not to promote private ends.
The only other provisions of the constitution of Missouri having
any relation to the subject, are the following sections of the eleventh
article:
"Sec. 13. The credit of the state shall not be given or loaned in
aid of any person, association or corporation, nor shall the state hereafter become a stockholder in any corporation or association, except
for the purpose of securing loans heretofore extended to certain railroad corporations in the state.
"Sec. 14. The general assembly shall not authorize any county,
city, or town to become a stockholder in, or loan its credit to, any
company, association or corporation, unless two-thirds of the qualified voters of such county, city or town, at a regular or special election , to be held therein , shall assent thereto."
Both these sections are restrictive and not enabling. The thirteenth
section peremptorily denies to the state the power of giving or lending
it credit to or becoming a stockholder in any corporation whatever.
The aim of the fourteenth section is to forbid the leg islature to authorize counties, cities or towns, without the assent of the tax-payers,
to become stockholders in or to lend their credit to any corporation
however public its objecl; State v. Curators State University, 57 Mo.
178; not to permit them to be authorized , under any circumstances,
to raise OP spend money for private purposes.
It is averred in the answer, and admitted by the demurrer, that the
La Grange Iron and Steel Company, to which tile bonds were issued,
was "a private manufacturing company, formed and established for
the purpose of carrying· on and operating a rolling-mill ," and "was a
trictly private enterprise, formed and prosecuted for the purpose of
private gain, and which had nothing whatever of a public character."
The ordinance referred to shows that the mill was to manufacture
railroad iron; but that is no more a public use than the manufacture
of iron bridges, as in the Tope ka case, or the making of blocks of
stone or wood for paving streets. There can be no doubt, therefore,
that the act of the legislature of Missouri is unconstitutional , and that
the bonds expressed to be issued in pursuance of that act are void
upon their face.
As for this reason the action can not be maintained, it is needle s
to dwell upon the point that the answer d emurred to, besides the special defense of the unconstitutionality of the act, contains a general
denial of the allegations in the petition. That point was mentioned
and passed over in the opinion of the circuit court, and was not
alluded to in argument here: the parties in effect assuming the general
denial in the answer to have been withdrawn or waived, and the case
submitted for d ecision upon the validity of the special defense.
Judgment affirmed.
Note. Subscriptions by municipl1l corpol'ations. There is no implied authority

to subscribe. 1863, Gel peke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. (U.S. ) 175; 1873, State v.
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Saline Co. Ct., 51 Mo. 350; 1880, Weight man v. Clark, 103 U. S. 256; 1883,

City of Joneaboro v. Cairo, etc., 110 U. S. 192; 1888, Kellev v. Milan, 127

U. 8. 139.

The legislature may authorize the municipal corporation to subscribe.

1837, Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh (Va.) 120; 1852, Slack v. Mavsville & L. R.,

13 B. Mon. iKy.) 1; 1853, Sharpleas v. Mavor, etc., 21 P;i. St. 147, 59 Am.

D. 759; 1858, Knox Co. v. Aspinwall. 21 How. (U.S.) 539; 1871, Leaven-

worth Co. v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479; 1871, Walker v. Cincinnati, etc., 21 Ohio

St. 14, 8 Am. Rep. 24; 1871, Ex, parte. Selma. etc., 45 Ala. 696, 6 Am. Rep. 722;

1873, Harcourt v. Good, 39 Tex. 456; 1873, Pine Grove Tp. v. Talcott. 19

Wall. (86 U. S.) 666; 1874, Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (87 U.S. 655;

1876, Williams v. Duanesburg, 66 N. Y. 129; 1877, Quincy, etc., R. v. Morris,

84 111. 410; 1882, Lyons v. Chamberlain, 89 N. Y. 578; 1892, Doon Tp. v.

Cummins, 142 U. S. 366; 1893, Barnum v. Okolona, 148 U. S. 393; 1895, Fol-

som v. Ninetv Six, 159 U. S. 611.

But see, contra, 1868, McClure v. Owen, 26 Iowa 243; 1870, People v.

Salem, etc., 20 Mich. 452; 1871, People v. State Treas., 23 Mich. 499.

Sec. 133. State or national government.

BANK OF THE UNITED STATES v. PLANTER'S BANK OF GEORGIA.1
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1824. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 9 Wheat.

(U. S.) Rep. 904-91^.

[Suit by plaintiff upon promissory notes of defendant payable to a

person named or bearer and duly transferred to plaintiff. The de-

fendant bank pleads to the jurisdiction of the United States Circuit

Court of Georgia (where the case was tried and certified to the

supreme court on a division of opinion), alleging that the state of

Georgia was a stockholder, and raising the question as to whether the

state was therefore a party defendant in the case.]

Marshall, C. J. * * * It is, we think, a sound principle that when

a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests

itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its

sovereign character and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of

communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it

descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and

takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business

which is to be transacted. Thus, many states of this Union, who

have an interest in banks, are not suable even in their own courts,

yet they never exempt the corporation from being sued. The state of

Georgia, by giving to the bank the capacity to sue and be sued, vol-

untarily strips itself of its sovereign character so far as respects the

transactions of the bank, and waives all the privileges of that char-

acter. As a member of a corporation, a government never exer-

cises its sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator and exercises no

other power in the management of the affairs of the corporation than

are expressly given by the incorporating act.

1 Only so much of opinion given as relates to the character of a state as a

stockholder.
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The government of the Union held shares in the old Bank of the
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United States; but the privileges of the government were not im-

559

parted by that circumstance to the bank. The United States was not

a party to suits brought by or against the bank in the sense of the

constitution. So with respect to the present bank. Suits brought by

or against it are not understood to be brought by or against the United

States. The government, by becoming a corporator, lays down its

sovereignty so far as respects the transactions of the corporation and

exercises no power or privilege which is not derived from the charter.

We think, then, the Planter's Bank of Georgia is not exempted from

being sued in the federal courts by the circumstance that that state is
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a corporator.

The government of the Union held shares in the old Bank of the
United States; but the privileges of the government were not imparted by that circumstance to the bank. The United States was not
a party to suits brought by or against the bank in the sense of the
constitution. So with respect to the present bank. Suits brought by
or against it are not un<lerstood to be brought by or against the United
States. The government, by becoming a corporator, lays down its
sovereignty so far as respects the transactions of the corporation and
exercises no power or privilege which is not derived from the chartn.
We think, then, the Planter's Bank of Georgia is not exempted from
being sued in the federal courts by the circumstance that that state is
a corporator.
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Title III. The Body Corporate, Its Birth and Organization.

CHAPTER 7.

ORGANIZATION AND COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS.1

ARTICLE I. SCHEMES OF ORGANIZATION.

Sec. 134. (i) Under the Kings Charter: This usually provides

the original organization in the charter itself. See supra, The

Charter of Dartmouth College, p. 426, and infra, p. 711.

Sec. 135. (2) In special acts:

(a) The act itself provides the original organization: Illustra-

tion,—Charter of Michigan Central R. Co.

"Sec. 1. Be it enacted, etc., That William Sturgess (and twenty-five other

TITLE

persons named) and such other persons as shall associate with them for that

III.

THE Bonv CoRPORATE 1 !Ts BIRTH AND ORGANIZATION.

purpose, are hereby made and constituted a body corporate and politic by the

name and style of the Michigan Central Railroad Company, with perpetual

succession, etc. (enumerating various powers conferred).

CHAPTER 7.

"Sec. 22. The corporate stock * * * shall be $5,000,000 * * * divided

into shares of $100 each. * * * Provided, The company may commence

business whenever $2,000,000 of stock shall have been subscribed.

ORGANIZATION AND COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITI<)NS.1
"Sec. 23. The nine persons first named in the first section * * * shall be

the first directors of said company; and at their first, meeting they shall elect

ARTICLE I.

by ballot one of their number to be president, a majority of whom shall be

SCHEMES OF ORGANIZATION.
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competent to manage the affairs of the company; such first meeting of the

( I) Under t!te King's Cliarter: This usually provides
the original organization in the charter itself. See sup1·a, The
Charter of Dartmouth College, p . 426, and £nfra, p. 711.

Sec. 134.

directors shall be held at a time and place to be fixed by a written agreement

signed by all of said directors. * * *

"Sec. 24. Said directors, or a majority of them, may open books to receive

subscriptions to the capital stock, * .* * at such times and places as they or

a majority of them may appoint, etc. * * *

"Sec. 25. To continue the succession of president and directors, nine di-

Sec. 135.

rectors shall be chosen annually, on the second Monday in June, at such

time and place as may be appointed by the directors. * * »

( 2) In spedal acts:

"Sec. 27. A general meeting of the stockholders of said company shall be

(a) The act itself provides the original organization:
tion ,-Charter of Michigan Central R . Co.

•See Angell & Ames, ch. 2 and 3; Beach, §§9-16, 159-162; Boone, §§ 26-

34; Clark/§§ 19-27, 41-45; Cook, §§ 5, 183-6, 231-5; Elliott, §§ 21-50; Field,

Illustra-

§ 29; 1 Kyd, ch. 3; Morawetz, ch. 2 and 9; Taylor, §§ 72-90; Thompson, ch.

"Sec. 1. Be it enacted, etc., That William Sturgess (and twenty-five other
persons named) and such other persons as shall associate with them for that
purpose, are h e reby made and constitnt.ed a body corporate and politic by the
name and style of t he l\lichigan Centrnl Railroad Company, "'ith perpetual
succession, etc. (enume rating various powers conferred).
"Sec. 22. The corporate stock • • • sbnll be $5,000,000 • • • divided
into s ha res of $ 100 each . • • • Pro1•ided, The company may commence
business whe neve r $2,000,000 of stock shall have been subscribed.
"Sec. 23. The nine persons first named in the first section • • • shall be
the first directors of said company; and at their first meeting they shall elect
by ballot one of their number to be president, 11. majority of whom shall be
competent to manage the affairs of the company; such first meeting of the
directors sh all be h eld at a time and place to be fixed by a written agreement
signed by all of said directors. • "' •
"Sec. 24. Said directors, or n majority of them , may open books to receive
subscriptions to the capit.al stock, • . • • at such times and places as they or
u majority of th em may appoint. et{). * • •
"Sec. ~5. To continue the succession of president and directors, nine directors shall be chosen annually, on th e i;econd Monda,.Y in June, at such
time and place as .m ay be appointed by the directors. •
•
"Sec. 27. A general meeting of the stockholders of Baid company shal l be

1-18.

(560)

1
See Angell & Ames, ch . 2 and 3; Beach, §§ 9- 16, lll9- l62; Boone, §§ 2634; Clark,§§ 19-27, 41-45; Cook,§§ 5, 183-6, 231-.5; Elliott,§§ 21-.50; Field,
§ 29; 1 Kyd, ch. 3; Morawetz, ch. 2 and 9; Taylor,§§ 72-90; Thompson, ch.

1-18.

(5 60)
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holden annually at the time and place appointed for the election of direct-

ors. * * *

§ 136

SCHEMES OF ORGANIZATION.

561

"Sec. 31. The directors shall have full power to conduct the affairs of said

company, and to exercise any powers which said company might exercise,

except where provision is made by this act for the exercise of such powers by

the stockholders at their annual or special meetings, or where the powers of

the directors may be restrained by the by-laws of said company. * * * See 6

Laws of Mich. (1846) No. 42, p. 37, et seq.

Sec. 136.

(b) The law provides for the organization to be made by the

holden annually at the time and place appointed for the election of directors. • • •
"Sec. 31. The directors shall have full power to conduct the affairs of said
company, and to exercise any powers whic h said company might exercise,
except where provision is made by this act for the exercise of snch powers by
the stockholders at their annual or special meetings, or where the rowers of
the directors may be restrained by the by-laws of said company. * * See 6
Laws of Mich. (1846) No. 42, p. 37, et seq.

persons subscribing for the stock. See supra, the charter of the

Baltimore and Ohio R. Co., p. 427.

Sec. 137. (3) Under general incorporation laws:

(a) By deed of settlement; this method, when used, provided

Sec. 136.

the organization in the deed itself. See forms in 2 Coke's Inst.

720, and Wordsworth, Stock Companies, Part II.

Sec. 138. Same.

(i) License plan: Illustration,—The Illinois law.

( b) The law provides for the organization to be made by the
persons subscribing for the stock. See supra, the charter of the
Baltimore and Ohio R. Co., p. 427.

This provides that "whenever any number of persons, not less than three
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nor more than seven, Bhall propose to form a corporation * * * they shall

make a statement to that effect, under their hands, and duly acknowledged,

* * * setting forth name, » * * object, * * * capital stock," shares,

See. 137. ( 3) Under general incorporation laws:

location of office and duration, not exceeding ninety-nine years, which state-

ment shall be filed with the secretary of state, "who shall issue to Buch per-

sons a license as commissioners to open books for subscription to the capital

stock of said corporation at such times and places as they may determine.

(a) By deed of settlement; this method, when used, provided
the organization in the deed itself. See forms in 2 Coke's Inst.
720, and Wordsworth, Stock Companies, Part II.

* * *" As soon as the capital stock shall be fully subscribed, "the com-

missioners shall convene a meeting for subscribers for the purpose of electing

directors or managers and the transaction of such other business as shall

come before them." Certain notice of election is to be given, and voting may

Sec. UJB.

Same.

be by proxy or cumulative. "The commissioners shall make a full report of

their proceedings, including therein a copy of the notice, * * * a copy of

( b) License plan:

Illustration,-The Illinois law.

the subscription list, * * * the names of the directors or managers elected,

and their respective terms of office, which report shnll be sworn to by at least

a majority of the commissioners, and shall be filed in the office of the secre-

tary of state. The secretary of state shall thereupon issue a certificate of the

complete organization of the corporation, making a part thereof a copy of all

papers filed in his office in and about the organization of the corporation, and

duly authenticated under his hand and seal of the state, and the same shall

he recorded in a book for that purpose, in the office of the recorder of deeds

of the county where the principal office of such company is located. Upon

the recording of said copy, the corporation shall be deemed fully organized,

and mav proceed to business." Revised Statutes of Illinois, 1895, act of April

18, 1872, in force July 1, 1872, §§ 2, S and 4.

36— Wil. Cases.

This provides that "whenever any number of persona, not less than three
nor more than seven, shall propose to form a corporation * • • they shall
make a statement to that effect, under their hands, and duly acknowledged,
* * • setting forth name • • • object • * • capital stock1 " shares
location of office and durati~n, not exceeding ninety-nine years, wb ich state:
ment shall be fil ed with the secretary of state, "who s hall issue to such persons a license as commissioners to open books for subscription to the capital
stock of said corporation at such times and places as they may determine.
• * *" As soon as the capital stock shall be fully subscribed, "the commissioners shall convene a meeting for snbscribers for the purpose of electing
directors or mana9ers and the transaction of such other business as shall
come before them. ' Certain noti ce of election is to be given, and voting may
be by proxy or cumulative. "The commissioners shn 11 make a full report of
their proceedings, including therein n copy of the notice, • * • a copy of
the subscription list, * * * the names of the directors or managers elected,
and their respective terms of office, which re port sh all be sworn to by at least
a majority of the commissioners, and shall be filed in the office of the secretary of state. 1.'he secretary of state shall th ereupon issue a certificate of the
complete organization of the corporati,rn, making a part thereof a copy of a11
papers filed in his office in and about the orga nization of the corporation, and
duly authenticated under his hand anti sea l of the state , and the same shall
be recorded in a book fo r that purpose, in th e office of the recorder of deeds
of the county where the principal office of su ch company is !orated. Upon
the recording of said copy, the corporation shall be deemed fully organized,
and may proceed to business." Revised Statutes of Illinois, 1895, act of April
18, 1872, m force July 1, 1872, §§ 2, 8 and 4.
36-WIL. CASES.
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Sec. 139. Same.

562

The new Kansas law (Laws of 1898, ch. 10, approved January 7, 1899)

SCHDtES OF ORGANIZATION.

§ 139

creates a charter board, composed of the attorney-general, the secretary oi

state and the state bank commissioner, to whom application (on blanks to be

Sec. 139. Same.

furnished) shall be made. "The board shall make a careful investigation of

each application with reference to the character of the business in which the

The n eto Ka111Jas law (Laws of 1898, ch. 10, approved January 7, 1899)
creates a charter board. composed of the attorney-gen.era!, the serretary of
state and the state bank commissioner, to whom application Con blanks to be
furnished l shall be made. "The board shall make a ca reful investigation of
each application with reference to the character of the business in which the
proposed corporation is to engage, and if the board shall determine that the
business is one for which a corporation may lawfully be formed , and tiiat applicants are actiny i1I (/ood faith, the application shall be granted, and the ecretary of the board (the secretary of state 1 shall issue a certificate setting
forth the fact that the persons named in the application have been author·
ized by the chMter board to form a private corporation, as set forth in tbe
applicatiou, reciting the proposed name and character thereof." §§ 3a-3j. A
charte r must be prepnred stating name, purpose, place of busine s, term or
existence, number of it.~ directors or trustees and the names and residen<'e of
those who are appointed for the first year, amount of capital stock, number of
shares, names and addresses of shareholders and number of shares held by
each. lb. Charter must be subscribed and acknowledged by five perRons,
three t-0 be citizens of the state, and shall then be filed with the secretary
of state, and be recorded by him. See, also, Alabama Civil Code, §§ 11311-42.

proposed corporation is to engage, and if the board shall determine that the

business is one for which a corporation may lawfully be formed, and ihrt ap-

plicants are acting in good faith, the application shall be granted, and the sec-

retary of the board (the secretary of state) shall issue a certificate setting

forth the fact that the persons named in the application have been author-

ized by the charter board to form a private corporation, as set forth in the

application, reciting the proposed name and character thereof." §§3a-3j. A

charter must be prepared stating name, purpose, place of business, term of

existence, number of its directors or trustees and the names and residences of

those who are appointed for the first year, amount of capital stock, number of

shares, names and addresses of shareholders and number of shares held by

each. Ib. Charter must be subscribed and acknowledged by five persons,

three to be citizens of the state, and shall then be filed with the secretary
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of state, and be recorded by him. See, also, Alabama Civil Code, §§ 1139-42.

Sec. 140. Same.

(c) Organization completed before application made: Illustra-

tion,—Massachussets law.

Any number of persons may associate by an agreement "which shall set

forth the fact that the subscribers thereto associate * * * with the intention

Sec. 140. Same.

of forming a corporation," name, purpose, location, capital stock, and num-

ber of shares. The first meeting shall be called by a notice signed by one or

( c) Organization completed before application made: Illustration ,-Massachussets law.

more of the subscribers, stating time, place and purpose, served seven days

before time fixed for meeting. At such meeting "an organization shall be

effected by the choice by ballot of a temporary clerk, who shall be sworn,

and by the adoption of by-laws and the election (by ballot for one year) of

Any number of persons may associate by an agreement "which shall set
forth the fact that the subscribers thereto associate • • • with the intention
of forming a corporation," name, purpose, location, capital stock, and oum·
ber of shares. The first meeting shall be called by a notice signed by one or
more of the subscribers, stating time, place and purpose, served seven days
before time fixed for meeting. At such meeting "an organization shall be
effected by the choice by ballot of a temporary clerk, who shall be sworn,
and by the adoption of by-laws aml the election (by ballot for one year) or
direct.ors, treasurer, clerk and such otber officers as the by-laws may prol"ide;
but at such first meeting no per:;on shall be eligible as a director who has not
subscribed the agreement of association. The temporary clerk shall make
and attest a reco rd of th e proceedings until the clerk bas been chosen nnd
.13worn, including a record of such choice and qualification.'' "The pre ident, treasurer and a majority of the directors, shall forthwith make. sign
and s wear to a certificate setting forth a true copy of the agreement of association with the names of the subscribers thereto, tbe date of the first meeting • • • and shall submit. such certificate and also the records of the
corporation to the commissioner of corporations, who shall examine the
same, and who may require such other evidence as to the focls of the ra..<e a~
h e may judp necessary. The comm issiC?ner, if it 11pp~ars tha t the reqniz:
me nts •
• h ave b<>e n complietl with, shall rert11}· th at fact and bis
approv11l of the certificate hy inrlorsement thereo n . Fiurh certifkate ~hnll
th ereupo n be fil ed by said officers in the office of th 2 Rec re t n r~· of therom·
monwealth, who • * * shall issne a certificate," in a form prescribed.
under his s ignature :m rl the seal of the commonweal th, a n rl " surh rertifi1'llte
shall h ave the forC'e and effect of a special charter. an<! s hnll be conclusive
evidence of th e ex iRtenre of such corporation . H e Ahall Rl!'o canse a recorrl
of rmr lt certificate to be made, anrl a certifie1l copy of such recortl may be
give n in e vide nce with like effect as the original certificnte." Public Stat. of
Mass. 1882, cli. 10(), §§ 16- 21.

directors, treasurer, clerk and such other officers as the by-laws may provide:

but at such first meeting no person shall be eligible as a director who has not

subscribed the agreement of association. The temporary clerk shall make

and attest a record of the proceedings until the clerk has been chosen and

.sworn, including a record of such choice and qualification." "The presi-

dent, treasurer and a majority of the directors, shall forthwith make, sign

and swear to a certificate setting forth a true copy of the agreement of asso-

ciation with the names of the subscribers thereto, the date of the first meet-

ing * * * and shall submit such certificate and also the records of the

corporation to the commissioner of corporations, who shall examine the

same, and who may require such other evidence as to the facts of the case as

he may judge necessary. The commissioner, if it appears that the require-

ments » * * have been complied with, shall certify that fact and his

approval of the certificate by indorsement thereon. Such certificate shall

thereupon be filed by said officers in the office of the secretary of the com-

monwealth, who * * * shall issue a certificate," in a form prescribed,

under his signature and the seal of the common wealth, and "such certificate

shall have the force and effect of a special charter, anil shall be conclusive

evidence of the existence of such corporation. He shall also cause a record

of such certificate to be made, and a certified copy of such record may be

given in evidence with like effect as the original certificate." Public Stat, of

Mass. 1882, ch. 10fi, §§ 16-21.
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In many of the states it is required or customary for the organization for

PROOF OF ORGANIZATION.

the first year, or at least the first directorate, to be provided for in the

articles of association, when they are filed with the required officer.

See forms in American Corp. Legal Manual for 1899, Arkansas, California,

Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,

Maine, Maryland, Michigan (Mining Companies!, Minnesota, Missouri,

Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Penn-

sylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming,

Dominion of Canada, Prince Edward's Island.

Sec 141. Same.

(d) Organization by subscribers to stock after the articles of

incorporation are filed.

In rnany of the states it is required or customary for the organization for
the first year, or at least the first direetorate, to be provided for in the
articles of association, wben they are filed with the required officer.
See forrns in American Corp. Legal Manual for 1899, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
.i\laine, Maryland, Michiiran (Mining Companies\, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylva nia, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wyomiug,
Dominion of Canada, Prince Edward's Island.

See note to State v. Fidelity, etc., Ins. Co., 49 Ohio St. 440, supra, p. 406. In

the following states, it seems from the approved forms in use that the organ-

ization is to take place after the stock is subscribed, and is to be determined

by the subscribers: Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii (§ 2028, Civil Code),

Sec. 141. Same.

Louisiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,

Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, West Virginia, Wisconsin. See forms

in the American Corporation Legal Manual for 1899; Appendix, infra, Char-

( d) Organization by subscribers to stock after the articles of
incorporation are filed.
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ter of U. S. Steel Corp.

ARTICLE II. PROOF OF ORGANIZATION.

Sec 142. General presumption of regularity.

PACKARD Et Al. v. OLD COLONY RAILROAD COMPANY.1

1897. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 168

Mass. Rep. 92-99.

[In 1848 the ancestor of plaintiff executed a deed conveying the land,

for the taking of which damages were asked, to Perkins and constitut-

ing "a committee .of and in behalf of Village Cemetery, a corpora-

See note to State v. Fidelity, etc., Ins. Co., 49 Ohio St. 440, supra, p. 406. In
the following states, it seems from the Rpproved forms in use that the organization is to take place after the stock is subscribed, and is to be d etermined
by the subscribers: Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii(§ 2028, Civil Code),
Louisiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jerser, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Rh~e Is_land, South Carolina, West Virginia, Wisconsin. See forms
in the American Corporation Legal Manual for 1899; Appendix, infra, Charter of U. S. l::lteel Corp.

tion," for the use and behoof of said corporation, "except that the

ground shall never be used for other purposes than as a cemetery."

Respondent introduced the corporation record book showing that in

ARTICLE II.

1848 eleven persons desirous of forming a cemetery corporation untler

PROOF OF ORGANIZATION.

the act of 1841, had a meeting called according to the statute, at which

a secretary, president and treasurer were chosen and a committee ap-

Sec. 142.

General presumption of regularity.

pointed to draft a constitution and by-laws; the record did not show

how many were present. In 1S48 the name was chosen, and sixteen

PACKARD ET AL. v. OLD COLONY RAILROAD COMPANY.I

meetings in all were held prior to 1854, when the corporation seemed

to become dormant. In 1883 a meeting of the proprietors was called

to elect officers and adopt by-laws, and several meetings followed, at

1897. IN

THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

168

Mass. Rep. 92-99·

1 Statement of facts abridged. Only part of opinion relating to the one

point given.

[In 1848 the ancestor of plaintiff executed a deed conveying the land,
for the taking of which damages were asked, to Perkins and constituting "a committee .of and in behalf of Village Cemetery, a corporation," for the use and behoof of said corporation, "except that the
ground shall never be used for other purposes than as a cemetery.''
Respondent introduced the corporation record book showing that in
1848 eleven persons desirous of forming a cemetery corporation under
the act of 18.p, had a meeting called according to the statute, at which
a secretary, president and treasurer were chosen and a committee appointed to draft a constitution and by-laws; the record did not show
how many were present. In 1848 the name was chosen, and sixteen
meetings in all were held prior to 1854, when the corporation seemed
to become dormant. In 1883 a meeting of the proprietors was called
to elect officers and adopt by-laws, and several meetings followed, at
1 Statement of facts abridged.
point given.
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§ 142

PACKARD V. OLD COLONY R. CO.

PACKARD V. OLD COLONY R. CO.

one of which it was suggested that the original corporation was illegal

§

142

because the records did not show the number present at the organiza-

one of which it was suggested that the original corporation was illegal
because the records did not show the number present at the organization meeting, and at a subsequent meeting it was suggested that the
legislature be petitioned to re-establish the corporation, but nothing
was done. Records showed that twenty-nine burial "Jots had been
deeded between 1849 and 1854. The act of 1841 provided that:
''Any teh or more may organize a corporation for the purpose,'' etc.,
ancl, "When such persons are organized, etc. , they shall become a
corporation." Plaintiff claimed there had been no valid corporate
organization.]
ALLEN, J. It will be seen that there is no provision in the statute
requiring the presence of any particular number of persons at the first
meeting. Eleven persons signed the application, and thus expressed
their wish and intention to be members of the corporation. This was
a proceeding analogous to the signing of the articles of agreement,
which was deemed essential mostly relied on by the petitioners. Utley
v. Union Tool Co., I 1 Gray 139. Having done this, it was not necessary that all should attend the first meeting.
Moreover, even if it were necessary for ten to be present, there would
be a presumption that this requirement had been complied with. The
presumption of regularity extends to the proceedings in the organization
of corporations. In Narragansett Bank v. Atlantic Silk Co., 3 Met. 282,
287, it was said: "The maxim of law is, that all things shall be presumed
to have been rightly and corrcctJy done, until the contrary is proved.
This maxim is stated and explained, and many instances given of its
application to corporations, and to acts and doings of their members,
officers and agents, in Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 12 \Vheat.
64, 70. As the corporation could not proceed lawfully until duly
organized, and as they did proceed to act as a corporation, this presumption has its effect." This doctrine is often applied, and it is to
be assumed tl1at ten persons were present at the first meeting, if that
number was necessary. Wallace v. First Parish in Townsend, 109
Mass. 263; Platt v. Grover, 136 Mass. 115; Commonwealth v. Carr,
143 Mass. 84; Commonwealth v. Woelper, 3 S. & R. 29; Graves v.
Lynchburg & Salem Turnpike Co., 4 Rand. 378; Lauderdale Peerage, IO App. Ca!'i. 692.
Petition dismissed.

tion meeting, and at a subsequent meeting it was suggested that the

legislature be petitioned to re-establish the corporation, but nothing

was done. Records showed that twenty-nine burial lots had been

deeded between 1849 and 1S54. The act of 1841 provided that:

"Any ten or more may organize a corporation for the purpose," etc.,

and, "When such persons are organized, etc, they shall become a

corporation." Plaintiff claimed there had been no valid corporate

organization.]

Allen, J. It will be seen that there is no provision in the statute

requiring the presence of any particular number of persons at the first

meeting. Eleven persons signed the application, and thus expressed

their wish and intention to be members of the corporation. This was

a proceeding analogous to the signing of the articles of agreement,

which was deemed essential mostly relied on by the petitioners. Utley

v. Union Tool Co., 11 Gray 139. Having done this, it was not neces-

sary that all should attend the first meeting.
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Moreover, even if it were necessary for ten to be present, there would

be a presumption that this requirement had been complied with. The

presumption of regularity extends to the proceedings in the organization

of corporations. In Narragansett Bank v. Atlantic Silk Co., 3 Met. 282,

287, it was said: "The maxim of law is, that all things shall be presumed

to have been rightly and correctly done, until the contrary is proved.

This maxim is stated and explained, and many instances given of its

application to corporations, and to acts and doings of their members,

officers and agents, in Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat.

64, 70. As the corporation could not proceed lawfully until duly

organized, and as they did proceed to act as a corporation, this pre-

sumption has its effect." This doctrine is often applied, and it is to

be assumed that ten persons were present at the first meeting, if that

number was necessary. Wallace v. First Parish in Townsend, 109

Mass. 263; Piatt v. Grover, 136 Mass. 115; Commonwealth v. Carr,

143 Mass. 84; Commonwealth v. Woelper, 3 S. & R. 29; Graves v.

Lynchburg & Salem Turnpike Co., 4 Rand. 378; Lauderdale Peer-

age, 10 App. Cas. 692.

Petition dismissed.

Note. 1827, United States Bank v. Dandridge, 25IT. 8. (12 Wheat.) 64,70, in-

fra, p.R">4;1841, Weseott v. Silk Co., 3 Metcalf (Mass.) 282, 287; 1844, Sasser v.

State, 13 Ohio 453 (criminal suit); 1858, President and Trustees, etc., v.

Thompson, 20 111. 197 (charter and user); 1804, Holmes v. Gilliland, 41 Barb.

(N. Y.) 508 (general reputation); 1872, Wallace v. First Parish, 109 Mass.

263; 1883, Piatt v. Grover, 136 Mass. 115; 1886, Commonwealth v. Carr, 143

Mass. 84; 1888, Braintrce Water Supply Co. v. Inhabitants of Braintree,

Note. 1827, United States Bank v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 70, infra, p.RI)~ ;1841 , Wescott v. Silk Co., 3 Metcalf (Mass. ) 282, 287; 1844, Sasser v.
Atate, 13 Ohio 453 (criminal suit); 1858, President and Trustees, etc., v.
Thompson. 20 Ill. 197 (charter and user ); 1864, Holmes v. Gilliland, 41 Barb.
( N. Y.) 5G8 lgenernl reputation \ ; 1872, Wallace v. First Parish, 109 Mass.
2o3; 1883, Platt v. Grover, 136 Mass. 115; 1886, Commonwealth v. Carr, 143
Mass. 8.J.; 1888, Braintree Water Supply Co. v. Inbabitants of Braintree,
146 MaAS . 482, on 488; 1891, J cffries Neck Pasture Propr's v. Ipswich, 153
l\f ass. 42.
Ree, also, Angell & Ames, §~238-241, 284; Beach, §§873--4; Boone, §34;
Clark, pp. 34, 31i, 51, 129; Cook, §§ 606-7; Elliott, §§ 49--50 , l\1orawetz, §§ 25.
3ti, 324, 775; 'l'aylor, §§ 128, 203--6, 251, 263; I Thompson, §§ 495-500; III
Thompson, § 3927; IV Thompson, § 5029; VI Thompson, §§ 7689-7713; VII
Thompson, § 8214.

110 Mans. 482, on 488; 1891, Jeffries Neck Pasture Propr's v. Ipswich, 153

Mass. 42.

See, also, Angell & Ames, §5 238-241, 284; Beach, §§ 873-4; Boone, §34;

Clark, pp.34, 30, 51, 129; Cook, §§ 006-7; Elliott, §§ 49-50, Morawetz, §§ 25.

30, 324, 775; Tavlor, §§ 128, 203-0, 251, 203; I Thompson, §§ 495-500; III

Thompson, § 3927; IV Thompson, § 5029; VI Thompson, §§ 7089-7713; VII

Thompson, § 8214.
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ARTICLE III. WHEN' DOES CORPORATE BIRTH OCCUR? THEORIES:

Sec. 143. («) Only upon complete organization.

WALTON v. OLIVER.1

1892. In the Supreme Court of Kansas. 49 Kan. Rep. 107-

114. 33 Am. St. Rep. 355, 38 Am. & Eng. C. C. 342.

Opinion by Green, C. This action was commenced in the dis-

trict court of Cowley countv by the defendants in error, to recover

the sum of $295 debt, and $45.40 costs, from the plaintiffs in error,

who were alleged to be the directors of the Arkansas City Athletic

Association. The petition charged that, after making and filing a

charter in the office of the secretary of state, the defendants never

perfected the organization of the corporation by opening the books

for the purpose of receiving subscriptions; that they did not levy and

collect any money from themselves, nor adopt any by-laws or other

rules for the government of the corporation; that no meeting had

ever been called for the election of directors or other officers; that

the defendants had failed to comply with any of the requirements of

the law for the government of corporations after the articles of incor-

poration had been filed; that on the 18th day of January, 1889, the

plaintiffs recovered a judgment against such corporation for the sum

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:17 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

of $295 and $45.40 costs; that an execution was issued upon such

judgment and returned "no property found." It was further al-

leged—

"That after the filing of the said act of incorporation, the defend-

ants assumed to act as such corporation, and for that purpose leased

real estate and purchased of the plaintiffs material and lumber, with

which they erected a grand stand or amphitheater upon said leased

ground to the amount and value of several hundred dollars, and paid

to the plaintiffs thereon all but the amount represented by the afore-

said judgment, and in all their dealings with the plaintiffs, dealt in the

name of said judgment defendant hereinbefore referred to, and the

plaintiffs aver that, knowing of the filing of the aforesaid articles of

incorporation, and believing that said defendants were acting in good

faith, and that they were complying with the provisions of the laws

of Kansas, in such cases made and provided, in all things, and having

no cause to think otherwise, on the faith and credit of these men they

sold said lumber and building material to them and charged it to said

corporation of which they were the proprietors and incorporators, by

their direction and instruction; that but for all of which the plaintiffs

would not have furnished them with said materials and credit; that

after said execution had been issued and returned unsatisfied, the

plaintiffs applied to these defendants for the names of the officers and

stockholders of said corporation, and these defendants declined to

'Arguments omitted.
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furnish cither the names or the places of residence, and insolently in-

§ 143

WALTON V. OLIVER.

formed the plaintiffs that there were no officers, no books, no direc-

furnish either the names or the places of residence, and insolently informed the plaintiffs that there were no officers, no books, no directors, no stockholders, and no sMbscriptions, and that if the pl a intiff!'
thought they had any remedy looking to the collection of said judgment, interest and costs they were mistaken, etc., and now refu se to
give the plaintiffs any information of any kind relative thereto \·v hatsoever; the plaintiffs only learned the foregoing facts after the rendition of the aforesaid judgment."
The defendants filed a demurrer to this petition, which was overruled by the court, and judgment was rendered for the amount prayed
for in the petition. The defendants elected to stand upon the demurrer, and bring the case here for review.
It is first urged by the plaintiffs in error that the petition did not
state a cause of action; that the petition did not show that the goods
furnished, for which the original judgment was rendered, were furnished at the request of the plaintiffs in error before the Arkansas City
Athletic Association hecame a body corporate; but that the petition
showed upon its face that the goods were sold upon the credit of the
corporation, and that part of the purchase price of the goods was paid
by the corporation. It is further insisted that the Arkan!'as City
Athletic Association was legally incorporated, an<l that the organization became complete upon the filing of the charter with the secreta1y
of state. This contention is not sound. The statute only provides
that the existence of the corporation shall date from the time of filing
the charter, and the certificate of the secretary of state shall be evidence of the ti1ne of such filing. (Gen. Stat. of 1889, ~ JJ66.) The
statute is silent as to the organization. 1 The rule is well establt's!ted that a corporation must liave a full and complete organizatt'on
and existence as an entz"ty, and in accordance witli t!te law to wlzich
it owes its origin, before it can assume its franclii'se or enter £nto
any ki'nd of contract or transact any busi'ness; and whatever be the
mode prescribed by the act of incorporation, a substanti'al compliance
wit!t all the provisions of the law under whidi it is created is requt'red before the corporatz'on can be said to ltave such an exi'stence as
will entitle t't to do busi'ness. (4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 197,

tors, no stockholders, and no subscriptions, and that if the plaintiffs

thought they had any remedy looking to the collection of said judg-

ment, interest and costs they were mistaken, etc., and now refuse to

give the plaintiffs any information of any kind relative thereto what-

soever; the plaintiffs only learned the foregoing facts after the rendi-

tion of the aforesaid judgment."

The defendants filed a demurrer to this petition, which was over-

ruled by the court, and judgment was rendered for the amount prayed

for in the petition. The defendants elected to stand upon the demur-

rer, and bring the case here for review.

It is first urged by the plaintiffs in error that the petition did not

state a cause of action; that the petition did not show that the goods

furnished, for which the original judgment was rendered, were fur-

nished at the request of the plaintiffs in error before the Arkansas City

Athletic Association became a body corporate; but that the petition

showed upon its face that the goods were sold upon the credit of the

corporation, and that part of the purchase price of the goods was paid
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by the corporation. It is further insisted that the Arkansas City

Athletic Association was legally incorporated, and that the organiza-

tion became complete upon the filing of the charter with the secrctary

of state. This contention is not sound. The statute only provides

that the existence of the corporation shall date from the time of filing

the charter, and the certificate of the secretary of state shall be evi-

dence of the time of such filing. (Gen. Stat, of 1889, H 1166.) The

statute is silent as to the organization.1 The rule is well estab-

lished that a corporation must have a full and complete organization

and existence as an entity, and in accordance ivith the law to which

it owes its origin, before it can assume its franchise or enter into

any kind of contract or transact any business; and whatever be the

mode prescribed by the act of incorporation, a substantial compliance

with all the provisions of the law under which it is created is re-

quired before the corporation can be said to have such an existence as

will entitle it to do business. (4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 197,

1 The statutes under which this apparent corporation was formed pro-

vided: "Sec. 1155. Private corporations may be created by the volun-

tary association of five or more persons, * * * in the manner mentioned

in the following sections. Sec. J161. A charter prepared setting forth name,

purpose, place of business, term of existence, the number of directors or

trustees and the mimes and residences of those, mho are appointed for the first

year, capital stock, if any, and the number of shares. Sec. 1164. Charter

1
The statutes under which this apparent corporation was formed provided : "Sec. 1155. Private corporations may be created by tbe voluntary association of five or more perRons, • • • in the manner mentioned
in the foJlowiug sections. Sec. 1161. A charter prepared setting forth name,
purpose, place of busineRs, term of ex istence, the number of directors or
truf:!tees and the names and i·esidmccs of those who are appointed for the first
year, capital stock, if any, and the numbe r of suares. S ec. 1164. Charter
must be subsrribecl and acknowledged. Sec. 1165. Such charte r shall thereupon Le filed in the office of the secretary of state, who shall record the
same at length in a book kept for that purpose, and retain the original on file
in his office. A copy of the ch1trter, or of the record thereof, duly certified by
the secretary of state, under the great seal of the state, shall be evidence of
the creation of the co rpo ration. S ec. 17 66. Period of existence. Sec. 10.
The existence of the corporati on shall date from the time of filing the charter, and the certificate of the serrf:'tary of stnte shall be evidence of the time
of s uch filing. [ G. S. 18G8, ch. 23, § 10, October 31.]"

must be subscribed and acknowledged. Sec. 1165. Such charter shall there-

upon be filed in the office of the secretary of state, who shall record the

same at length in a book kept for that purpose, and retain the original on file

in his office. A copy of the charter, or of the record thereof, duly certified by

the secretary of state, under the great seal of the state, shall he evidence of

the creation of the corporation. Sec. 1166. reriod of existence. Sec. 10.

The existence of the corporation shall date from the time of filing the char-

ter, and the certificate of the secretary of state shall be evidence of the time

of such filing. [G. S. 1808, ch. 23, § 10, October 31.]"
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and authorities-- there cited.) Now it is conceded in this case that

nothing was done to perfect the organization after the charter was

§ 143
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filed. A corporation can not act without officers and agents, and it

is powerless to do anything until its incorporators or promoters give it

the means whereby it can act. ■ The words "organize" or '■•organiza-

tion" have a well understood meaning; and as we construe them

they mean the election of officers, providing for the subscription and

payment of the capital stock, the adoption of by-laws, and such other

steps as are necessary to endow the legal entity with the capacity to

transact the legitimate business for which it was created. In this

sense the corporation was not fully organized. While it had an ex-

istence, the organization was never completed so that the corporation

could do business.

In the case of Hurt v. Salisbury, 55 Mo. 310, which was an action

brought upon a note purporting to have been executed by the directors

of an agricultural association, the suit was brought against the direct-

ors, upon the ground that the association was not incorporated at the

time the note was given, and that the directors were, therefore, indi-

vidually liable. It appeared that the association was not fully incor-

porated when the note was executed. The law required the charter
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to be filed with the recorder of the county where the corporation was

located, and also in the office of the secretary of state. The char-

ter was only filed with the recorder. The court held that the

officers of the corporation had no power to issue the note, and that a

note issued and signed by them would bind them personally, and not

the corporation. The court said, in speaking of the attempted or-

ganization of that corporation:

"It had organized under section 2, chapter 69, General Statutes of

1865, page 367, by signing and acknowledging, and recording in the

recorder's office of the proper county the articles of association. This

step being taken, it was an organized corporation, not for the trans-

action of business, but for the purpose of taking the next and last step

to complete its authority to transact business and give date to its legal

existence. Until the officers took this final and necessary step by de-

positing and filing in the office of the secretary of state a copy of the

articles of association, as they stood recorded in the county, this cor-

poration had no power to issue the note sued upon. As it had no

power to issue this note, the defendants are undoubtedly liable."

"If a corporation be illegally formed, its members or stockholders

are liable as partners for its acts and contracts, and directors, officers

and agents acting and contracting in its name render themselves per-

sonally liable." (Beach Priv. Corp., § 16; Marshall v. Harris, 55

Iowa 182; Kaiser v. Savings Bank, 56 Iowa 104; Coleman v. Cole-

man, 78 Ind. 344.)

While, in this case, the charter was filed with the secretary of state,

the corporation had no officers outside of the directors named for the

first year. No portion of the capital stock had been subscribed and

no books opened, as required by f 1173 of the General Statutes of

1889. In fact, nothing had been clone to complete the preliminary

and authoritie1' there cited.) Now it is conceded in this case that
nothing was done to p erfect the orgimization after the chatter was
filed. A corporation can not act without ojJice'f's and agents, and it
is powerless to do anything until its incorporator·s or promoters give it
th e means whereby it can act. · The words ''organize" or "organization'' have a well understood meaning; and as we construe them
they mean the election of officers, providing for the subscription and
payment of the capital stock, the adoption of by-laws, and sucli otlter
steps as are necessary to endow the legal entity with tlte capacity to
transact the legiti'mate business for which it "Was created. In this
sense the corporation was not fully organized. While it had an existence, the organization was never completed so that the corporation
could do business.
In the case of Hurt v. Salisbury, SS Mo. 310,, which was an action
brought upon a note purpo1ting to have been executed by the directors
of an agricultural association, the suit was brought against the directors, upon the ground that the association was not incorporated at the
time the note was given, and that the directors were, therefore, individually liable. It appeared that the association was not fully incorporated when the note was executed. The law required the charter
to be filed with the recorder of the county whene the corporation was
located, and also in the office of the secretary of state. The charter was only filed with the recorder. The court held that the
officers of the corporation had no power to issue the note, and that a
note issued and signed by them would bind them personally, and not
the corporation. The court said, in speaking of the attempted organization of that corporation:
"It had organized under seccion 2, chapter 69, General Statutes of
r86s, p age 367, by signing and acknowledging, and recording in the
recorder's office of the proper county the articles of a~sociation. This
step being taken, it \Vas an organized corporation, not for the transaction of business, but for the purpose of taking the next and last step
to complete its authority to transact business andl give date to its legal
existence. Until the officers took this final and necessary step by depositing and filing in the office of the secretary of state a copy of the
articles of association, as they stood recorded in the county, this corporation had no power to issue the note sued upon. As it had no
power to issue this note, the defendants are undoubtedly liable."
" If a corporation be illegally formed, its members or stockholders
are liable as partners for its acts and contracts, and directors, officers
and agents acting and contracting in its name riencler themselves personally liable." (Beach Priv. Corp. , § 16; Marshall v. Harris, SS
Iowa 182; Kaiser v. Savings Bank, s6 Iowa 104; Coleman v. Coleman, 78 Ind. 344.)
While, in this case, the charter was filed with the secretary of state,
the corporation had no officers outside of the directors named for the
first year. No portion of the capital stock had been subscribed and
no books opened, as required by ~ I r73 of the General Statutes of
1889. In fact, nothing had been done to complete the preliminary
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business of organizing the corporation. We do not inderstand that a
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corporation can proceed to the transaction of business without any

GENT V. MANUFACT'L'RERS', ETC., INSURANCE CO.
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portion of its capital stock being subscribed or paid. It may have

been the English rule, but in the United States it is otherwise. (Boone

business of organizing the corporation. We do n ot · mderstand that a
corporation can proceed to the transaction of business without any
portion of its capital' stock being subscribed or paid. It may have
been the English rule, but in the United States it is otherwise. (Boone
Corp., § 113). The corporation has no means or capacity to act until
some portion of the capital stock named in the cha1ter has b een subscribed and paid. Some states have, by a leg islative rule, made directors of certain corporations jointly and severally liable for all the
debts of the corporation, until the whole amount of the capital stock
has been p a id in. (Rev. Stat. of Wis. 1878, § 1901.)
It is unnecessary for us to consider the other assignments of error,
as the view we take of the liability of the plaintiffs in error is not
that of stockholders , and hence the rule laid down in the case of Abbey v. Dry Goods Company, 44 Kan. 415, has no application in this
case .
The question as to whether or not two of the defendants below
were served with summons is not properly raised by the record. The
summons is not in the record, and we can not say whether these two
defendants were served or not.
We advise an affirmance of the judgment.
B y the court: It is so ordered.
All the justices concurring.

Corp., § 113). The corporation has no means or capacity to act until

some portion of the capital stock named in the charter has been sub-

scribed and paid. Some states have, by a legislative rule, made di-

rectors of certain corporations jointly and severally liable for all the

debts of the corporation, until the whole amount of the capital stock

has been paid in. (Rev. Stat, of Wis. 1878, § 1901.)

It is unnecessary for us to consider the other assignments of error,

as the view we take of the liability of the plaintiffs in error is not

that of stockholders, and hence the rule laid down in the case of Ab-

bey v. Dry Goods Company, 44 Kan. 415, has no application in this

case.

The question as to whether or not two of the defendants below

were served with summons is not properly raised by the record. The

summons is not in the record, and we can not say whether these two

defendants were served or not.

We advise an affirmance of the judgment.
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By the court: It is so ordered.

All the justices concurring.

Note. See note to next case, and also to State v. Fidelity Ins. Co., 49 Ohio

St. 440, supra, p. 406.

Sec. 144. Same.

GENT v. MANUFACTURERS' AND MERCHANTS' MUTUAL INSUR-

ANCE COMPANY.1

1883. . In the Supreme Court of Illinois. 107 111. Rep. 652-660,

8 Am. and Eng. Corp. C. 306.

Note. See note to next case, and also to State v. Fidelity Ins. Co., 49 Ohio
St. 440, supra, p. 406.

[The insurance law under which defendant was incorporated pro-

vided that those desiring to incorporate should file with the auditor of

public accounts a declaration signed by them declaring their inten-

tion to form an insurance company, and that no mutual company

Sec. 144. Same.

should commence business until agreements had been entered into

with at least 200 applicants, the premiums on which should be not

GENT v. MANUFACTURERS' AND MERCHANTS' MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.1

less than $100,000, of which $20,000 should be paid in cash, and

notes of solvent parties, founded on bona fide applications for insur-

ance, should have been received for the remainder, no note to be con-

1883 . . IN

sidered as capital stock unless a policy for one year was issued upon

Cou n.T OF ILLINOIS. 107 IJI. Rep. 652-66o,
8 Am. and Eng. Corp. C. 306.

THE SUPREME

the same within thirty days after organization. Under this law a

number of parties, in July, 1SS0, met, determining to form such a

1 Statements of facts abridged. Arguments omitted. Only so much of the

[The insurance law unde r which defendant was incorporated provided that those desiring to incorporate should file with the auditor of
public accounts a declaration signed by them declaring their intention to form an insurance company, and that no mutual company
should commence business unt il agreements had been entered into
with at least 200 applicants, the premiums on which should be not
less than $100,000, of which $zo,ooo should be paid in cash , a nd
notes of solve nt patties, founded on bona fide applications for in urance, should have heen received for the remainder, no note to be considered as capital stock unless a policy for one year was issu ed upon
the same within thirty days after organization. Under this law a
number of parties , in July, 1880 1 met, determining to form such a

opinion as relates to the one point given.

1 Statements of facts a.bridged.
Arguments omitted. Only so much of the
opinion as relates to the one point given.
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company, published the notice required, filed the declaration with

the auditor, with copy of proposed charter; this was approved and

COMMENCEMENT OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE.

certified to the auditor by the attorney-general on July 7, and certain

persons were designated to solicit insurance. Gent agreed to take

$1,000 insurance, accepted a draft drawn by the secretary of the

company, dated Aug. 10, for $30 payable on demand, and gave his

note for $150 February 3, 1SS1; application was made to the auditor

to have the notes examined; this was done and some of the notes were

found informal and rejected by the auditor; immediately they pro-

ceeded to obtain others, and on the 9th of February filed the list with

the auditor, received his certificate, and filed it with the county clerk

February 11 ; on the 5th of February plaintiff's property burned, and

he notified the secretary February 7. Plaintiff's note was among

those upon which the company secured the final certificate of approval

of the auditor; on Febniary 11 the company canceled the note, draft

and application of plaintiff, who sues for the loss.]

Mr. Justice Walker. * * * That a corporation should have a full

and complete organization and existence as an entity before it can enter

into any kind of a contract or transact any business would seem to be

self-evident. This is unconditionally true, unless the act of incorpo-
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ration authorizes the corporators to perform acts and enter into con-

tracts to bind the company when it shall be organized. As well say

a child in ventre sa mere may enter into a contract, or that its parents

may bind, it by contract. A corporation, until organized, has no

being, franchises or faculties. Nor do those engaged in bringing it

into being have any power to bind it by contract, unless so authorized

by the charter. Until organized as authorized by the charter there is

not a corporation, nor does it possess franchises or faculties for it or

others to exercise until it acquires a complete existence. By its birth,

so to speak, it for the first time acquires its faculties to transact its busi-

ness and perform its functions. Then, do these sections authorize the

corporations to issue policies to individuals who apply for insurance,

and give their premium notes? They are authorized to take such ap-

plications and notes as a fund or capital to authorize the granting of the

charter, and to enable the company to transact its business when or-

ganized. This is manifestly the true construction, as the statute pro-

vides that if a policy of insurance running at least twelve months is

not issued in thirty days after the organization of the company, the

premium note shall not represent a portion of the capital stock of the

company. If it was intended that the application for the policy and

the giving of the premium note should constitute a contract to insure,

such a provision would not have been enacted; but by its adoption it

is manifest that the general assembly intended that the application and

note should be held simply to be acted upon after the organization

should be completed. If such was the purpose, and of it we have no

doubt, then there can be no claim that there was a contract of insur-

ance, but simply that if the property was still in existence when the com-

pany should be organized, the applicant would be entitled to a policy

on the terms proposed. It was simply a proposition or an application

company, published the notice required, filed the declaration with
tht! auditor, with copy of proposed charter; this was approved and
certified to the auditor by the attorney-general on July 7, and certain
persons were designated to solicit insurance. Gent agreed to take
$1 ,000 insurance, accepted a draft drawn by the secretary of the
company, dated Aug. 10, for $30 payable on demand, and gave his
note for $150 February 3, 1881; application was made to the auditor
·to have the notes examined; this was done and some of the notes were
found informal and rejected by the auditor; immediately they proceeded to obtain others, and on the 9th of February filed the list with
the auditor, received his certificate, and filed it with the county clerk
February 1 I; on the 5th of February plaintiff's property burned, and
he notified the secretary February 7. Plaintiff's note was among
tho e upon which the company secured the final ce1tificate of approval
of the auditor; on February 1I the company can celed the note, draft
and application of plaintiff, who sues for the loss. J
MR. JUSTICE vVALKER • • • • That a corporation should have a full
and complete organization and existence as an entity before it can enter
into any kind of a contract or transact any business would seem to be
self-evident. This is unconditionally true, unless the act of incorporation authorizes the corporators to perform acts and enter into contracts to bind the company when it shall be organized. As well say
a child £n ventre sa mere may enter into a contract, or that its parents
may bind, it by contract. A corporation, until organized, has no
being, franchises or faculties. Nor do those engaged in bringing it
into being have any power to bind it by contract, unless so authorized
by the charter. Until organized as authorized by the charter there is
not a corporation, nor does it possess franchises or faculties for it or
others to exercise until it acquires a complete existence. By its birth,
So to speak, it for the first time acquires its faculties to transact its business and perform its functions. Then, do these sections authorize the
corporations to issue policies to individuals who apply for insurance,
and give their premium notes? They are authorized to take such applications and notes as a fund or capital to authorize the granting of the
charter, and to enable the company to transact its business when organized. This is manifestly the true construction, as the statute provides that if a policy of insurance running at least twelve months is
not issued in thirty days after the organization of the company , the
premium note shall not represent a portion of the capital stock of the
company. If it was intended that the application for the policy and
the giving of the premium note should constitute a contract to in~ure,
such a provision would not have been enacted; but by its adoption it
is manifest that the general assembly intended that the application and
note should be held simply to be acted upon after the organization
should be completed. If such was the purpose, and of it we have no
doubt, then there can be no claim that there was a contract of insurance, but simply that if the property was stil I in existence when the company should be organized, the applicant would b e entitled to a policy
on the terms proposed. It was simply a proposition or an application
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for a policy after the organization should be had, and the company

570

authorized to take risks and issue policies. Beyond that the company

GENT V. MANUFACTU RERS', ETC., INSURANCE CO.

§ 144

had no power to bind the future company. Nor does the statute

for a policy after the organization should be had, and the company
authorized to take risks and issm: policies. Beyond that the company
had no power to bind the future company. Nor does the statute
authorize the corporators to contract for and issue policies. Had they
issued a policy in form, would any one claim that a suit could be
maintained on it against the company? Surely not, because no power
to do so is conferred by the statute. And if a formal written policy
would be invalid, how can it be said that a mere verbal agreement for .
insurance can be held binding?
In the case of Rockford, Rock I sland and St. Louis R. Co. v. Sage,
65 Ill. 328, it was held that a railroad incorporation was not liable for
services rendered before its organization, unless the company promised
to pay after it was organized. In Stowe v. Flagg, 72 Ill. 397, it was
held that the agreement of pa1ties intending to an<l engaged in forming a manufacturing corporation to put in property as stock, but v..·hich
never was subscribed, did not bind the 'corporation, nor did the property become that of the corporation, although it was used by the company. In the case of vVestern Screw and Manufacturing Co. v.
Cousley, 72 Ill. 531 1 it was held where the corporators, before the
organization of the company was completed, employed a superintendent, and he entered upon the duties of the place, and rendered services for the inchoate company, it, when organized, was not liable to
pay for such services.
This statute only authorizes the company to transact bu siness upon
filing the certificate of the auditor of public accounts with the proper
county clerk. The transaction of business in the name of the corporation before that certificate shall be thus filed is unauthorized. But
in this case no policy was issued, or intended to be issued, v.. hen the
application and note were executed. and the case falls within the
principles announced in the cases above referred to, and they are conclusive of the question.
We perceive no error in the record, and the judgment of the appellate court is therefore affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

authorize the corporators to contract for and issue policies. Had they

issued a policy in form, would any one claim that a suit could be

maintained on it against the company? Surely not, because no power

to do so is conferred by the statute. And if a formal written policy

would be invalid, how can it be said that a mere verbal agreement for

insurance can be held binding?

In the case of Rockford, Rock Island and St. Louis R. Co. v. Sage,

65 111. 32S, it was held that a railroad incorporation was not liable for

services rendered before its organization, unless the company promised

to pay after it was organized. In Stowe v. Flagg, 72 111. 397, it was

held that the agreement of parties intending to and engaged in form-

ing a manufacturing corporation to put in property as stock, but which

never was subscribed, did not bind the corporation, nor did the prop-

erty become that of the corporation, although it was used by the com-

pany. In the case of Western Screw and Manufacturing Co. v.

Cousley, 72 III. 531, it was held where the corporators, before the

organization of the company was completed, employed a superintend-
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ent, and he entered upon the duties of the place, and rendered serv-

ices for the inchoate company, it, when organized, was not liable to

pay for such services.

This statute only authorizes the company to transact business upon

filing the certificate of the auditor of public accounts with the proper

county clerk. The transaction of business in the name of the corpo-

ration before that certificate shall be thus filed is unauthorized. But

in this case no policy was issued, or intended to be issued, when the

application and note were executed, and the case falls within the

principles announced in the cases above referred to, and they are con-

clusive of the question.

We perceive no error in the record, and the judgment of the appel-

late court is therefore affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Note. See, 1891, McVicker v. Cone, 21 Ore. 353; 1894, Nemaha Coal & M.

Co. v. Settle, 54 Kan. 424; 1894, Aspen Water Co. v. City of Aspen, 5 Colo.

App. 12, 1 A. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 12; 1894, Owen v. Shepard, 19 U. S. App.

336; 1896, Loverin v. McLaughlin, 161 111. 417. See Elliott, § 44; I Thompson,

§§ 40, 217.

Note. See, 1891, McVicker v. Cone, 21 Ore. 353; 1894, Nemaha Coal & M.
Co. v. Settle, 54 Kan. 424; 1894, Aspen Water Co. v. City of Aspen, 5 Colo.
App. 12, 1 A. & E. C. C. ( N. S. l 1~; 1894, Owen v . Shepard, I9 U. S. App.
336 ; 1896, Loverin v . McLaughlin, 161 Ill. 417. See Elliott, § 44; I Thompson,
§§ 40, 217.
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Sec. 145. Same.

(b) Immediately upon filing articles of incorporation, without

§ 145

COMMENCEMENT OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE.
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stock subscription or organization.

SINGER MANUFACTURING CO. v. PECK.1

1896. In the Supreme Court of South Dakota. 9 S. Dak. 29,

Sec. 145. Same.

4 Am. & Eng. C. C. (N. S.) 591, 67 N. W. Rep. 947-48.

[Appeal from the circuit court, Minnehaha county; Joseph W.

Jones, Judge.

Action by the Singer Manufacturing Company against Porter P.

( b) Immediately upon filing articles of incorporation, without
stock subscription or organization.

Peck. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint,

SINGER MANUFACTURING CO. v. PECK. 1

plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.]

Corson, P. J. This is an appeal from an order sustaining a de-

murrer to the complaint. The allegations in the complaint are in

substance as follows: That the plaintiff is a corporation; that the

Wohlgemouth Shirt Company is a duly organized corporation of the

1896. IN.THE SUPREME CouRT OF SouTH DAKOTA. 9 S. Dak. 29,
4 Am. & Eng. C. C. ( N . S.) 591, 67 N. W. R ep. 947-48.

state of South Dakota ; that said last named corporation was organized

and incorporated by five persons named, of whom the defendant was

one; that said corporation was one de facto only, and had no legal

rights to transact business or obtain credit; that it did obtain a large

amount of credit, and that it purchased of the plaintiff a large num-
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ber of sewing machines, of the value of six hundred dollars ($600);

that said corporation had no capital, and none of its capital stock was

paid for, and that said defendant Peck was the treasurer of said cor-

poration; that an action was duly commenced by this plaintiff, and

prosecuted to judgment, against the said Wohlgemouth .Shirt Company,

execution issued thereon, and the same returned unsatisfied, "and

that said corporation has no property, and is totally and wholly in-

solvent. (4) And the said plaintiff further complains and alleges

that said corporation never had any funds, * * * and that the

holding out of said corporation as a legal corporation, and one that

had complied with the law by the said corporators, was a fraud upon

the persons from whom they obtained goods upon credit, and espe-

cially upon this plaintiff, all of which was well known to the incorpo-

rators and organizers of said company, and especially to the above

named defendant. (5) And the plaintiff further alleges that it has

no way of collecting said indebtedness unless the incorporators of said

company shall be made to pay such indebtedness. Plaintiff, there-

fore, demands judgment against the defendant, Porter P. Peck, for

the amount due on plaintiff's judgment against the Wohlgemouth

Shirt Company, together with the costs and disbursements of this ac-

tion, and such other and further relief as to the court may seem just

and equitable."

1 Arguments omitted.

[Appea l from the circuit court, Minnehaha county; Joseph \V.
Jones, Judge.
Action by the Singer Manufacturing Company against Porter P.
Peck. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint,
plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. J
CoRSON, P. J. This is an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint. The allegations in the complaint are in
substance as follows: That the plaintiff is a corporation; that the
\ Vohlgemouth Shirt Company is a duly organized corporation of the
state of South Dakota; that said last named corporation was organized
and incorporated by five persons named, of whom the defendant was
one; that said corporation was one de facto only, and had no legal
rights to transact business or obtain credit; that it did obtain a large
amount of credit, and that it purchased of the plaintiff a large number of sewing machines, of the value of six hundred dollars ( $600) ;
that said corporation had no capital, and none of its capital stock was
paid for, and that said defendant Peck was the treasurer of said corporntion; that an action was duly commenced by this plaintiff, and
prosecuted to judgment, against the said Wohlgemouth Shirt Company,
execution issued thereon, and the same returned unsatisfied, "and
that said corporation has no property, and is totally and wholly insolvent. (4) And the said plaintiff further complains and alleges
that said corporation never had any funds, • • • and that the
holding out of said corporation as a legal corporation, and one that
had complied \yith the law by the said corporators, was a fraud upon
the persons from whom they obtained goods upon credit, and especially upon this plaintiff, all of which was well known to the incorporators and organizers of said company, and especially to the above
named defendant. (S) And the plaintiff further alleges that it has
no way of collecting said indebtedness unless the incorporators of said
company shall be made to pay such indebtedness. Plaintiff, therefore, demands judgment against the defendant, Porter P. Peck, for
the amount due on plaintiff's judgment against the Wohlgemouth
Shirt Company, together with the costs and disbursements of this action, and such other and further relief as to the court may seem just
and equitable."
1
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Only the substance of such part of the complaint as we deem ma-
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terial under the stipulation hereinafter referred to has been given. To

SINGER MANUFACTURING CO. V. PECK.

the complaint a demurrer was inteq^osed by the defendant, one of the

Only the substance of such part of the complaint as we deem ma·
terial under the stipulation hereinafter referred to h as been given. To
the complaint a demurrer was interposed by the defendant, one of the
grounds of which was that the complaint did not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action. The parties in the court below en·
tered into a stipulation , the material patt of which is as follows: •·On
saiJ appeal the question on which th e case shall be decided i the
question as to whether the complaint states facts sufficient to consti·
tute a ca use of action again st said defendant, on the ground that he
was one of the in corpora tors of the W ohlgemouth Shirt Company,
and that the said complaint shall be construed solely as attempting to
constitute a cause of action against him; not upon contract for liability
upon an unpaid stock subscription, but upon his being one of said in·
corporators, and upon his alleged liability, on the ground that the
h olding out of said corporation as a legal corporation was a fraud upon
the plaintiff." Section 2905, Comp. Laws,1 provides: "Upon the
filing of articles of incorporation with the secretary of the territory
he s hall issue to the corporation, over the great seal of the territory,
a certificate that the articles containing the required statement of facts
have been filed in his office; and thereupon the persons signing the
a1ticles, and their associates and successors, shall be a body politic
and corporate by the name and for th e purposes stated in said articles."
Wh en th e certificate specified in tltis section i's issued, the corporatiq,1
w ould seem to be p erfected, and possess all th e powers of a corpora·
tt'on. Th ere seems to be no provision in tlte statutes of this stale requfring any part of tl1e capt'tal stock to be pat'd t'n or subscribed as a
condition pr'ecedent upon wh icli tlte corporation is authorized to trans·
act business.
In m ost of the 5tates their incorporation acts provide for the subscription and p ayment of a cettain proportion of the capital stock as a
condition to the right of the corporation to transact business. When
such is the case, incorporators who proceed to incur debts in the name
of th e corporation before such funds are provided have been held lia·
ble for su ch debts. In W echselberg v. Bank, 12 C. C. A. 56, 64 Fed.
90, and Burns v. Beck (Ga.), ro S. E. 121 , incorporators were held
liab le. In the former case the court says, in the m ajority opinion:

grounds of which was that the complaint did not state facts sufficient

to constitute a cause of action. The parties in the court below en-

tered into a stipulation, the material part of which is as follows: "On

said appeal the question on which the case shall be decided is the

question as to whether the complaint states facts sufficient to consti-

tute a cause of action against said defendant, on the ground that he

was one of the incorporators of the Wohlgcmouth Shirt Company,

and that the said complaint shall be construed solely as attempting to

constitute a cause of action against him; not upon contract for liability

upon an unpaid stock subscription, but upon his being one of said in-

corporators, and upon his alleged liability, on the ground that the

holding out of said corporation as a legal corporation was a fraud upon

the plaintiff." Section 2905, Comp. Laws,1 provides: ''Upon the

filing of articles of incorporation with the secretary of the territory

he shall issue to the corporation, over the great seal of the territory,

a certificate that the articles containing the required statement of facts

have been filed in his office; and thereupon the persons signing the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:17 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

articles, and their associates and successors, shall be a body politic

and corporate by the name and for the purposes stated in said articles."

When the certificate specified in this section is issued, the corporation

would seem to be perfected, a?id possess all the powers of a corpora-

tion. There seems to be no provision in the statutes of this state re-

quiring any part of the capital stock to be paid in or subscribed as a

condition precedent upon which the corporation is authorized' totrans-

act business.

In most of the states their incorporation acts provide for the sub-

scription and payment of a certain proportion of the capital stock as a

condition to the right of the corporation to transact business. When

such is the case, incorporators who proceed to incur debts in the name

of the corporation before such funds are provided have been held lia-

ble for such debts. In Wechselberg v. Bank, 13 C. C. A. 56, 64 Fed.

90, and Burns v. Beck (Ga.), 10 S. E. 121, incorporators were held

liable. In the former case the court says, in the majority opinion:

1 Section 2902 of the Civil Code of Dakota Territory (still in force in South

Dakota when above case was decided) provides that the articles of incorpo-

ration shall state the name, purpose, place of business, terms, number of

directors, names and residences of such of them who are to serve until 1 he

election of such otficers and their qualifications, and if there l« a capital

stock, its amount and the number of shares. Section 2904 requires the

articles to be subscribed by three or more, and acknowledged. Section 2905

is given in the ease above. Section 2907 makes a certified copy of the articles

1
Section 2902 of the Civil Code of Dakota Territory (still in force in South
Dakota wh e n above case was decided) provides that the a1ticles of inr.orpo·
ration sh all slute the name, purpose, place of business, terms, number of
dirf'ctors, names a nd resid ences of such of them who are to serve until the
e lection of such officers and their qualifications, and if there be a capital
~to1·k, its amou nt and the number of shares. Section 2904 reqnires the
artirles to he subscri bed by three or more , a nd acknowledged. Section '.?905
is gh·en in thf' case a hove. Section 2907 makes a certifi ed copy of the articles
pl'inUJ facie e vidence of the existence of the corporat ion. 8ection 2913 provides that after the secretary of the te rritory issues the certificate of incorp?ration, "the dirPrt ors named in th e articles of incorporatio n must proceed m
th e mannel' spPcifie<l or provided by their by-l aws. o r if none, then in F.urh
mann e r a8 t hey mny hy order adopt, to open hooks of snhscription to thl'
t·apital stock then unsubscri be<l and to secure su bseri ptions to the full amount
of the fixed capital, and to levy asseRsments and installments thereon, etc."

prima facie evidence of the existence of the corporation. Section 2913 pro-

vides that after the secretary of the territory issues the certificate of incorpo-

ration, "the directors named in the articles of incorporation must proceed in

tlie manner specified or provided by their by-laws, or if none, then in such

manner as they may by order adopt, to open books of subscription to the

capital stock then unsubscribed and to secure subscriptions to the full amount

of the fixed capital, and to levy assessments and installments thereon, etc."
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"By the common law there was no individual liability of the members

of a corporation for corporate debts beyond the enforcement of their

§ 145

THE COMMENCEMENT OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE.

573

agreed contributions to the capital stock. * * * Therefore, if

complete corporate existence was obtained and perfected by the act of

filing the articles of association without compliance with any of the

requirements of § 1773, the associates are not subject to common law

liability. On the other hand, it is well settled that an attempted or

pretended incorporation, not perfected as the enabling act requires,

does not confer this immunity, and all who are parties to the simulated

corporation as associates or shareholders are held liable at common

law for debts contracted under the corporate guise. While the courts

have differed in naming this liability—whether in the nature of co-part-

ners or resting 'upon the ordinary principles of contract and agency,' or

upon fraud—they agree in holding liable in some form all who are

engaged in the defective corporate enterprise." The court then pro-

ceeds to discuss the various provisions of the Wisconsin statute and

arrives at the conclusion that the incorporators, having proceeded to

contract the debt before the fund required by the statute to perfect the

corporation had been provided, were liable, as the act provided that

the corporation should not exercise corporate functions, that is, "the
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transaction of business with any others than its members, until it should

have provided a capital stock in conformity with §1773."

In the case of Burns v. Beck, supra, two of -the corporators held

the corporation out to the world as being duly organized, while ac-

cording to the allegations of the complaint all the stock had not been

subscribed and 10 per cent, paid in, as required by the statute of

Georgia, as conditions precedent to the right to the transaction of

business by the corporation. Neither these nor any other conditions

precedent to the corporation transacting business in this state have

been imposed. The credit, therefore, in the two cases cited—and they

seem to be all the cases bearing upon this question that the researches

of counsel have been able to bring to our attention—was obtained by

the wrongful acts of the corporators in holding out the corporation as

authorized to transact business as a corporation, when, in fact, the

corporation was not so authorized. The corporators in these cases

committed a fraud upon the creditors. But in the case at bar it does

not appear that the corporators did any act that they were not fully

authorized to do under the statute, or that they, by act or word, made

any representations they were not legally authorized to make. This

being so, we can discover no principle of law by which the defend-

ant would be liable under the allegations of the complaint. In holding

out the corporation as legally incorporated, the defendant committed

no fraud, as the plaintiff alleges, and correctly, that the corporation

was duly organized. It is true, it is further alleged that it was only

a de facto corporation, but that is a mere conclusion of law. The

fact that our statute does not require of corporations the subscription

to and payment of a certain per cent, of its capital stock before the cor-

poration can transact business imposes upon persons dealing with cor-

porations organized under the laws of this state greater caution and

"By the common law there was no individual liability of the members
of a corporation for corporate debts beyond the enforcement of their
agreed contributions to the capital stock. • • • Therefore, if
complete corporate existence was obtained and perfected by the act of
filing the articles of association without compliance with any of the
requirements of§ 1773, the associates are not subject to common law
liability. .On the other hand, it is well settled that an attempted or
pretended incorporation, not perfected as the enabling act requires,
does not confer this immunity, and all who are parties to the simulated
corporation as associates or shareholders are held liable at common
law for debts contracted under the corporate guise. While the courts
have differed in naming this liabil ity-whether in the nature of co-partne~ or resting 'upon the ordinary principles of contract and agency,' or
upon fraud-they agree in holding liable in some form all who are
engaged in the defeGtive corporate enterprise.'' The court then proceeds to discuss the various provisions of the Wisconsin statute and
arrives at the conclusion that the incorporators, having proceeded to
contract the debt before the fund required by the statute to perfect the
corporation had been provided, were liable, as the act provided that
the corporation should not exercise corporate functions, that is, ' 'the
transaction of business with any others than its members, until it should
have provided a capital stock in conformity with §I 773."
In the case of Burns v. Beck, supra, two of ·the corporators held
the corporation out to the world as being duly organized, while according to the allegations of the complaint all the stock had not been
subscribed and 10 per cent. paid in, as required by the statute of
Georgia, as conditions precedent to the right to the transactio n of
business by the corporation. N either these nor any other conditions
precedent to the corporation transacting business in this state have
been imposed. The credit, therefore, in the two cases cited-and they
seem to be all the cases bearing upon this question that the researches
of counsel have been able to bring to our attention-was obtained by
the wrongful acts of the corporators in holding out the corporation as
authorized to transact business as a corporation, when, in fact, the
corporation was not so authorized. The corporators in these cases
committed a fraud upon the creditors. But i'n tl1e case at bar i't does
not appear that tlte corporators di'd any act tltat tlzey were not fully
authort'zed to do under the statute, or that tltey, by act or word, made
any representations tltey were not legally authorized to make. This
.being so, we can discover no principle of law by which the d~fe nd
ant would be liable under the allegations of the complaint. In holding
out the corporation as legally incorporated, the defendant committed
no fraud, as the plaintiff alleges, and correctly, that the corporation
was duly organized. It is true, it is further alleged that it was only
a de facto corporation, but that is a mere conclusion of law. The
fact that our statute does not require of corporations the subscription
to and payment of a certain per cent. of its capital stock before the corporation can tran sact business imposes upon persons dealing with corporations organized under t~e laws of this state greater caution and
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574 WECHSELBERG V. FLOUR CITY NATIONAL BANK. § 146

vigilance, but this court can not impose upon corporations a greater

574

liability than is imposed upon them by law, and the law not having

WECHSELBERG V. FLOUR CITY NATIONAL BANK.

§ 146

specially prescribed that corporators shall be liable in such a case as

that described by the complaint, and no actual fraud or misrepresen

vigilance, but this court cnn not impose upon corporations a greater
liability than is imposed upon them by law, ancl the law not having
specially prescribed that corporators shall be liable in such a case as
that described by the complaint, and no actual fraud or misrepresen·
talion being alleged, this court can not discover any ground upon
which the defendant can be held liable. He can not be held liable at
common law. He can not be he ld liable on the ground of misrepresentations, as he has made n one, nor upon the ground of fraud, as
none is alleged. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the court
properly sustained the demurrer to the complaint, and the order of the
circuit court appealed from is affirmed.

tation being alleged, this court can not discover any ground upon

which the defendant can be held liable. He can not be held liable at

common law. He can not be held liable on the ground of misrepre-

sentations, as he has made none, nor upon the ground of fraud, as

none is alleged. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the court

properly sustained the demurrer to the complaint, and the order of the

circuit court appealed from is affirmed.

Note. See, also, 1889, National Bank of Jefferson v. Texas Investment Co.,

74 Tex. 421, 27 A. & E. C. C. 358; 1890, Vanneman v. Young, 52 N. J. tow

403, 32 A. & E. C. C. 8; 1894, State of Missouri, ex rel., etc., v. American

Med. Col., 59 Mo. App. 264.

Sec. 146. Same.

Note. See, also, 1889, National Bank of Jefferson v. Texas Invest.ment Co.,
74 Tex. 421, 27 A. & E. C. C. 358; 1890, Vanneman v. Young, 52 N. J. ltaw
403, 32 A. & E. C. C. 8; 1894, State of Missouri, ex rel., etc., v . .American
Med. Col., 59 Mo. App. 264.

(c) At the time of filing the articles of association with the

proper officer, but perfect or adult corporate capacity does not ex-

ist until the capital stock is provided as required.

WECHSELBERG v. FLOUR CITY NATIONAL BANK.1
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1894. In the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, East-

Sec. 146. Same.

ern District of Wisconsin. 24 U. S. Appeals Rep. 308-330.

Before Woods, circuit judge, and Bunn and Seaman, district

judges.

( c) At the time of filing the articles of association with the
proper officer, but perfect or adult corporate capacity does not exist until the capital stock is provided as required.

This was an action at law by the Flour City National Bank against

Julius Wechselberg, the plaintiff in error, Ernest S. Moe and Clar-

ence H. Williams, as defendants below, for the recovery of the

amount due upon a promissory note for $3,000, dated September 18,

1889. made by the Northwestern Collection Company to the North-

WECHSELBERG v. FLOUR CITY NATIONAL BANK.1

western Collection, Loan and Trust Association, and indorsed to said

bank. The alleged liability of the defendants below is based upon

1894. IN THE U. S. Crncu1T CouRT OF APPEALS, 7th Circuit, Eastern District of Wisconsin. 24 U. S. Appeals Rep. 3o8-330.

their acts in the incorporation of the Northwestern Collection Com-

pany as a corporation under the laws of Wisconsin, and the transac-

tion at large of business thereunder, without having capital paid in

Before Wooos, circuit judge, and BUNN and SEAMAN, district
judges.
This was an action at law by the Flour City National Bank against
Julius Wechselberg, the plaintiff in error, Ernest S. Moe and Clarence H. Williams, as defendants below, for the recovery of the
amount due upon a promissory note for $3 ,0<X>, dated September 18,
1889, made by the Northwestern Collection Company to the Northwestern Collection, Loan and Trust Association, and indorsed to said
bank. The alleged liability of the defendants below is based upon
their acts in the incorporation of the Northwestern Collection Company as a corporation unde r the laws of \Visconsin, and the transaction at large of business thereunder, without having capital paid in
as required by the statute, whereby it is asserted that they became
p ersonally obligated to pay the ind cbtedne~s so conb·acted. • • •
SEAMAN, Distri ct Judge, after stati ng the case as above, delivered
the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff in error was held by the circuit court to be jointly liaable with the other defendants below for the indebtedness contracted
by their assumed corporation, th e No1thwestern Collection Company,
in the absence of any capital stock. This liability was based upon

as required by the statute, whereby it is asserted that thev became

personally obligated to pay the indebtedness so contracted. * * *

Seaman, District Judge, after stating the case as above, delivered

the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error was held bv the circuit court to be jointly lia-

able with the other defendants below for the indebtedness contracted

by their assumed corporation, the Northwestern Collection Company,

in the absence of any capital stock. This liability was based upon

1 Statement of facts abridged. Dissenting opinion of Woods, J., omitted.
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the facts found, in his relation and conduct as a corporator, and the

court did not undertake to determine at the trial whether it arose un-
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der the statute or at common law.

Corporations are entirely the creatures of statute, and when duly

formed, one of their chief characteristics, distinguishing them from part-

nerships and other joint ventures, is the exemption of the individual asso-

ciates from liability for the corporate obligations, except as the enabling

act may impose liability. This immunity, which is an important ad-

vantage of membership, can only be secured by compliance with the

statutory requirements for incorporation. In the case of corporations

organized for a purpose, and under a law requiring capital stock, the

capital becomes a fund to which creditors must look for satisfaction

of debts; it is a substitute for individual liability, and constitutes a

trust fund for the benefit of the creditors. Upton, Assignee, v. Tribil-

cock, 91 U. S. 45; Alder v. The Milwaukee Patent Brick Manufact-

uring Company, 13 Wis. 57; 1 Beach on Private Corporations (1891),

§ 116. Capital stock is, therefore, the vital requirement of every busi-

ness corporation, and its actual existence is usually placed by enabling

statutes as a condition precedent to corporate existence.
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It is found and conceded in this case that there was no capital stock

in fact, and no capital paid in or subscribed; that the articles of in-

corporation which were entered into by the plaintiff in error with the

other defendants below prescribed $5,000; that these articles were

duly executed by the three parties, and duly filed and recorded; that

without capital and without the actual taking of any further steps

toward organization, business was opened by Moe and Williams as

actors in the name of the assumed corporation; that this was known

to the plaintiff in error, but that he did not take part in their opera-

tions, or receive any profit or emolument; that printed matter was

used and distributed, wherein the plaintiff in error was named as its

vice-president; and while "the evidence does not establish that he had

actual knowledge" of this use of his name, it is found that "under

the circumstances, if he did not know it, he could have ascertained

the fact by merely slight attention to the matter, and was guilty of

negligence in not knowing it." Furthermore, it is recited in the ar-

ticles which were entered into that "the corporators should compose

the first board of directors," and, although such a provision would

not control an organization effected by stockholders, who are em-

powered by the statute to elect directors, it may be considered as a

fact tending to show intention or knowledge. The debt in question

was incurred in the business so carried on, and in the line apparently

contemplated by the articles of incorporation.

The statute which authorizes incorporation for the purposes stated

in these articles in chapter 86, in title 19 of the Revised Statutes of

Wisconsin, contained, with amendments, in 1 Sanboni & Berryman's

Annotated Statutes, 1052. Section 1771 provides that "three or more

adult persons, residents of this state, may form a corporation in the

manner provided in this chapter," for objects there named. Section

1772 provides that "in order to form such a corporation, the persons

the facts found, in his relation and conduct as a corporator, and the
court did not undertake to determine at the trial whether it arose under the statute or at common la·w.
Corporations are entirely the creatures of statute, and when duly
formed, one of their chief characteristics, distinguishing them from partnerships and other joint ventures, is the exemption of the individual associates from liability for the corporate obligations, except as the enabling
act may impose liability. This immunity, which is an important advan~age of membership, can only be secured by compliance with the
statutory requirements for incorporation. In the case of corporations
organized for a purpose, and under a law requiring capital stock, the
capital becomes a fund to which creditors must look for satisfaction
of dehts; it is a substitute for individual liability, and constitutes a
trust fund for the benefit of the creditors. Upton, Assignee, v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45; Alder v. The Milwaukee Patent Brick Manufacturing Company, 13 \Vis. 57; 1 Beach on Private Corporations ( 1891 ),
§ 1I6. Capital stock is; therefore, the vital requirement of every business corporation, and its actual existence is usually placed by enabling
statutes as a condition precedent to corporate existence.
It is found and conceded in this case that there was no capital stock
in fact, and no capital paid in or subscribed; that the articles of incorporation which were entered into by the plaintiff in error with the
other defendants below prescribed $5 ,ooo; that these articles were
duly executed by the three parties, and duly filed and recorded; that
without capital and without the actual taking of any further steps
toward organization, business was opened by Moe and Williams as
actors in the name of the assumed corporation; that this was known
to the plaintiff in error, but that he did not take part in their operations, or receive any profit or emolument; that printed matter was
used and distributed, wherein the plaintiff in error was named as its
vice-president; and while "the evidence does not establish that he had
actual knowledge" of this use of his name, it is found that "under
the circumstances, if he did not know it, he could have ascertained
the fact by merely slight attention to the matter, and was guilty of
negligence in not knowing it." Furthermore, it is recited in the articles which were entered into that "the corporators should compose
the first board of directors," and , although such a provision would
not control an organization effected by stockholders, who are empowered by the statute to elect directors, it may be considered as a
fact tending to show intention or knowledge. The debt in question
was incurred in the business so carried on, and in the line apparently
contemplated by the articles of incorporation.
The statute which authorizes incorporation for the purposes stated
in these articles "in chapter 86, in title 19 of the Revised Statutes of
Wisconsin, contained, with amendments, in I Sanborn & Berryman's
Annotated Statutes, rn5 2 . Section 1 77 r provides that "three or more
adult persons, residents of this state, may form a corporation in the
manner provided in this chapter," for objects there named. Section
1772 provides that "in order to form such a corporation, the persons
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desiring so to do shall make, sign and acknowledge written articles,"
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with declarations of (1) purpose, (2) name and location, (3) capital

WECIJSELBERG V . FLOU R CITY NATIONAL BANK.

stock, if any, and number and amount of shares thereof, (4) desig-

desiring so to do shall make, sign and acknowledge written articles,,,
with declarations of ( 1) purpose, ( 2) name and location , (3) capital
stock, if any , and number and amount of shares thereof, (4) designation of general officers and number of directors, (5) duties of
officers, (6) conditions of membership, (7) "such other provisions or
articles, if any, not inconsistent with law, as they may deem proper."
The section further provitles that the original articles, or a true, ve1;fied
copy thereof, must be filed for record with the register of deeds of the
county, "and no corporation shall , until such articles be so left for record, have legal existence." It also declares that " in stock corporations,
persons holding stock, according to the regulations of the co1·poration,
and they only, shall be members." A verified copy of the articles
must also be filed with the secretary of state, or penalty is incurred.
There was in this case formal compliance with the foregoing requirements, but entire failure to complete incorporation under the succeeding section.
.
By section I 773 it is prescribed that until tlirectors are elected the
signers of the articles shall " have direction of the affairs of the corporation, and make such rules as may be necessary for perfecting its
organization, accepting members or regulating the subscription to the
capital stock," and that in stock corporations the first meeting may be
held when half of the capital stock is subscribed, and may be called
by any two o f the signers of the articles upon certain notice , or be held
without notice when all subscribers for stock are present. It then further
provides: '·No such corporation shall transact business with any
others than its members, until at least one-half of its capital shall have
been duly subscribed, and at least 20 per centum thereof actual ly paid
in; and it any obligation shall be contracted in violation hereof, the
corporation offending shall have no right of action thereon; but the
stockholders then e.xisting of such corporation shall be personally liable
upon the same."
Section r 775 declares that "every such corporation, when so organized, shall be a body corporate," and have "the powers of a corporation conferred by these statutes," etc.
The question of common-law liability presents itself at the threshold
of this inquiry, whether con ·idered as a primary ground or for the
purpose of interpreting the statute. As a primary ground the plaintiff
in error contends that it must be excluded here for two reasons, ( 1)
hccause the complaint is manifestly based upon the statute and intends
a charge of statutory liability, and ( 2) because the re is a finding by
the trial court of the existence of incorporation. It is ufficient answer to
the first objection that it is r aised here in the first instance, that the
ev idence wa all received without exception for variance;:, and that the
fac~s are clearly established b y the findings.
Under the rule stated
in Wasatch Mining Company v. Crescent Mining Co., 148 U.S. 293,
approving the rule pronounced under the New Y ork Code of Procedure, in Tyng '" The Commercial Warehouse Company of New
York, 58 N. Y. 308, 313 1 the objection can not now stand "to shut
out from consideration the case, a proved." In Wisconsin, section

nation of general officers and number of directors, (5) duties of

officers, (6) conditions of membership, (7) "such other provisions or

articles, if any, not inconsistent with law, as they may deem proper."

The section further provides that the original articles, or a true, verified

copy thereof, must be filed for record with the register of deeds of the

county, "and no corporation shall, until such articles be so left for rec-

ord, have legal existence." It also declares that "in stock corporations,

persons holding stock, according to the regulations of the corporation,

and they only, shall be members." A verified copy of the articles

must also be filed with the secretary of state, or penalty is incurred.

There was in this case formal compliance with the foregoing require-

ments, but entire failure to complete incorporation under the succeed-

ing section.

By section 1773 it is prescribed that until directors are elected the

signers of the articles shall "have direction of the affairs of the cor-

poration, and make such rules as may be necessary for perfecting its

organization, accepting members or regulating the subscription to the
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capital stock," and that in stock corporations the first meeting may be

held when half of the capital stock is subscribed, and may be called

by any two of the signers of the articles upon certain notice, or be held

without notice when all subscribers for stock are present. It then further

provides: "No such coqjoration shall transact business with any

others than its members, until at least one-half of its capital shall have

been duly subscribed, and at least 20 per centum thereof actually paid

in; and if any obligation shall be contracted in violation hereof, the

corporation offending shall have no right of action thereon; but the

stockholders then existing of such corporation shall be personally liable

upon the same."

Section 1775 declares that "every such corporation, when so organ-

ized, shall be a body corporate," and have "the powers of a corpora-

tion conferred by these statutes," etc.

The question of common-law liability presents itself at the threshold

of this inquiry, whether considered as a primary ground or for the

purpose of interpreting the statute. As a primary ground the plaintiff

in error contends that it must be excluded here for two reasons, (1)

because the complaint is manifestly based upon the statute and intends

a charge of statutory liability, and (2) because there is a finding by

the trial court of the existence of incorporation. It is sufficient answer to

the first objection that it is raised here in the first instance, that the

evidence was all received without exception for variance, and that the

facts are clearly established by the findings. Under the rule stated

in Wasatch Mining Company v. Crescent Mining Co., 148 U. S. 293,

approving the rule pronounced under the New York Code of Pro-

cedure, in Tyng v. The Commercial Warehouse Company of New

York, 58 N. Y. 308, 313, the objection can not now stand "to shut

out from consideration the case, as proved." In Wisconsin, section
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2669 of the Revised Statutes provides that no "variance between the

allegation in a pleading and the proof shall be deemed material,

§ 146 THE COM;\IENCEMENT OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE.
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unless it shall actually mislead," and the decisions under it, in accord

with the doctrine above stated, hold that "the variance may be wholly

disregarded," and that "the pleadings may at any time be amended

to conform with the issue really tried," or will be regarded on appeal

as so amended. Stetler v. The Chicago and Northwestern Railway

Company, 49 Wis. 609, 613. With reference to the force of the finding,

all of the facts are clearly stated, and it remains for the court of re-

view to determine their legal effect. An expression of opinion by the

trial court has suggestive value, but is not conclusive, where the facis

are undisputed. The case is, therefore, open for any liability which

may result from the facts established, and the only question on the

writ of error is, t)o the facts found support the judgment?

By the common law there was no individual liability of the mem-

bers of a corporation for corporate debts, beyond the enforcement of

their agreed contributions to the capital stock. Terry v. Little, 101

U. S. 216; United States v. Knox, 102 U. S. 422; 1 Beach on Pri-

vate Corporations (1891), § 143. Therefore, if complete corporate

existence was obtained and perfected by the act of filing the articles
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of association, without compliance with any of the requirements of

§ 1773, the associates are not subject to common law liability. On

the other hand, it is well settled that an attempted or pretended in-

corporation, not perfected as the enabling act requires, does not con-

fer this immunity, and all who are parties to the simulated corpo-

ration as associates or shareholders are held liable at common law

for debts contracted under the corporate guise. While the courts

have differed in naming this liability, whether in the nature of co-

partners, or resting "upon the ordinary principles of contract and

agency," or upon fraud, they agree in holding liable, in some form,

all who are engaged in the defective corporate enterprise. Fuller v.

Rowe, 57 N. Y. 23; Pettis v. Atkins, 60 111. 454; Hill v. Beach,

12 N. J. Eq. 31; Coleman v. Coleman, 78 Ind. 344; Abbott v.

Omaha Smelting and Refining Company, 4 Neb. 416; Kaiser v.

Lawrence Savings Bank, 56 Iowa 104; Lawler v. Murphy, 58 Conn.

294, 313; Johnson v. Corser, 34 Minn. 355; Hospes v. Northwestern

Manuf'g & Car Co., 48 Minn. 172.

This statute does not, in terms, declare that compliance with § 1773

shall be a condition precedent to corporate existence. If there were

a decision by the supreme court of Wisconsin construing the statute

with reference to the time or event, in the proceeding upon which the

incorporation is perfected, that construction would be controlling;

but the only case called to our attention in that view is Harrod v.

Hamer, 32 Wis. 162. That arose under a previous act (act of April

2, 1853, Rev. Stat, of 1858, ch. 73, §17), which differs essentially

from the instant statute in its method of incorporation and in the status

of the incorporators (who are thereby constituted stockholders), and

therefore is not applicable here.

37—Wil. Cases.

2669 of the Revised Statutes provides that no ''variance between the
allegation in a pleading and the proof shall be deemed material ,
unless it shall actually mislead , " and the decisions under it, in accord
with the doctrine above stated, hold that "the variance may be wholly
disregarded," and that "the pleadings may at any time be amended
to conform with the issue really tried," or will be regarded on appeal
as so amended. Stetler v. The Chicago and Northwestern Raihv11y
Company, 49 Wis. 609, 613. With reference to the force of the finding,
all of the facts are clearly stated, and it remains for the court of review to determine their legal effect. An expression of opinion by tb e
trial court has suggestive value, but is not conclusive, where the fact s
are undisputed. The case is, therefore, open for any liability which
may result from the facts established, and the only question on the
writ of error is, bo the facts found support the judgment?
By the common law there was no individual liability of the members of a corporation for corporate debts, beyond the enforcement of
their agreed contributions to the capital stock. Terry v. Little, 101
U. S. 216; United States v. Knox, 102 U. S. 422; 1 Beach on Private Corporations ( 1891 ) , § 143. Therefore, if complete corporate
existence was obtained and perfected by the act of filing the articles
of association, without compliance with any of the requirements of
§ 1773, the associates are not subject to common law liability. On
the other hand, it is well settled that an attempted or pretended incorporation, not perfected as the enabling act requires, does not confer this immunity, and all who are parties to the simulated corporation as associates or shareholders are held liable at common law
for debts contracted under the corporate guise.
While the courts
have differed in naming this liability, whether in the nature of copartners, or resting "upon the ordinary principles of contract and
agency," or upon fraud, they agree in holding liable, in some form,
all who are engaged in the defective corporate enterprise. Fuller v.
Rowe, 57 N . Y. 23; Pettis v. Atkins, 6o Ill. 454; Hill v. Be ach ,
12 N. J. Eq. 31; Coleman v. Coleman, 78 Ind. 344; Abbott v.
Omaha Smelting and Refining Company, 4 Neb. 416; Kaiser v.
Lawrence Savings·Bank, 56 Iowa 104; Lawler v. Murphy, 58 Conn.
294, 313; Johnson v. Corser, 34 Minn. 355; Hospes v. Northwestern
Manuf'g & Car Co., 48 Minn. 172.
This statute does not, in terms, declare that compliance with § 1773
shall be a condition precedent to corporate exi stence. If there were
a decision by the supreme court of Wisconsin construing the statute
with reference to the time or event, in the proceeding upon which the
incorporation is perfected, that construction would be controlling;
but the only case called to our attention in that view is Harrod v.
Hamer, 32 Wis. 162. That arose under a previous act (act of April
2, 1853, Rev. Stat. of 1858, ch. 73, §17), which differs essentially
from the instant statute in its method of incorporation and in the status
of the incorporators (who are thereby constituted stockholders), and
therefore is not applicable her~.
37-WIL. CASES.
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The statute must be considered in its entirety to ascertain its mean-

578

ing, and that exposition ought to be adopted, as stated by Mr. Justice

Story, in Minor v. The Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria, 1 Pet. 46,

WECHSELBERG V. FLOUR CITY NATIONAL BANK .

63, ''which carries into effect the true intent and object of the legis-

The statute must be considered in its entirety to ascertain its meaning, and that exposition ought to be adopted, as stated by Mr. Justice
Story, in l\1inor v. The Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria, I Pet. 46,
63, "which carries into effect the true intent and object of the legi lature in the enactment." The purpose is clear, that corporate being
shall be dated from and conferred through the act of filing the executed article& of incorporation for record, as one of the conditions
precedent , but while the statute refers to it as a corporation at that
stage, a li mitation is added that it shall not exercise corporate fun ctions, viz., "the transaction of business with any others than its members ," until it shall have provided capital stock in conformity with
section 1773. Such is the view recognized in Am·il Mining Company v. Sherman, 74 Wis. 226, 232 , where it is said that this statute
"provides for the prelimin ary organization of the corporation, and
then limits its power to enter upon its general business" by § 1773.
The corporation has obtained the right to exist, but can only be said
to have existence in a qualified sense, for it is n ot possessed of the
attribute · or privileges of perfected incorporation; and § 1775, which
declare these powers and privil eges, vests them only when organized
as required by the preceding sections. A quotation from the brief of
one of the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error, argl.ting against
liability as a stockholder, well defines this embryonic status, and is
adopted here. It reads, including italics, as follows: '' T/1e truth
is that no corporation was form ed except in a very limited and
qualified sense. It is true th e statute uses the word 'corporati'o1l.'
It is, however, a bare, legal entity, which through organization may
become a corporatt'on, having members and capable of transacting
business. • • • It may be likened to tlie hull of a sltij>, with.out rudder or masts or gearings." The public are authorized to
treat it as a corporation from the recording of the articles, and may
look to the recorded articles for its purposes and objects. Compliance with § 1773 is imposed upon the corporators in the first instance,
and when they have provided for stockholders the duty devolves upon
the latter, whose action is matter only of corpora!e record and not of
general public record. Until that provision of capital is furnished
as a fund to take tli.e place of p ersonal liabi'lity, the intention t's apparent to withhold th e special privt'lege of complete £ncorporat£on
wlticli exempts the members from mch !t'ab£li'ty. The inhibition is, in
effect, against any transactions except such as tend to organization,
i. e., perfecting incorporation, and the purpose is to protect those
who may be imposed upon by premature assumption of corporate
functions, and not to save the corporation or its projectors from just
liability. Anvil Mining Company v. Sherman, supra. This is not
like the technical requirement placed by a Michigan statute upon the
officers to file their articles of association in a certain place, simply
forbidding business until compliance, without declaring any effect for
non-compliance, of which it was held, in Whitn ey v. Wyman, 10r
U. S. 392, that the provision was not made a con<lition precedent to
incorporation, and it is not like the technical requirement found in

lature in the enactment." The purpose is clear, that corporate being

shall be dated from and conferred through the act of filing the exe-

cuted article* of incorporation for record, as one of the conditions

precedent, but while the statute refers to it as a corporation at that

stage, ;i limitation is added that it shall not exercise corporate func-

tions, viz., "the transaction of business with any others than its mem-

bers," until it shall have provided capital stock in conformity with

section 1773. Such is the view recognized in Anvil Mining Com-

pany v. Sherman, 74 Wis. 226, 232, where it is said that this statute

"provides for the preliminary organization of the corporation, and

then limits its power to enter upon its general business" by § 1773.

The corporation has obtained the right to exist, but can only be said

to have existence in a qualified sense, for it is not possessed of the

attributes or privileges of perfected incorporation; and § 1775, which

declares these powers and privileges, vests them only when organized

as required by the preceding sections. A quotation from the brief of
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one of the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error, arguing against

liability as a stockholder, well defines this embryonic status, and is

adopted here. It reads, including italics, as follows: "77/e truth

is that no corporation was formed except in a very limited and

qualified sense. It is true the statute uses the word '■corporation.'

It is, however, a bare, legal entity, which through organization may

become a corporation, having members and capable of transacting

business. * * * It may be likened to the hull of a ship, with-

out rudder or masts or gearings." The public are authorized to

treat it as a corporation from the recording of the articles, and may

look to the recorded articles for its purposes and objects. Compli-

ance with § 1773 is imposed upon the corporators in the first instance,

and when they have provided for stockholders the duty devolves upon

the latter, whose action is matter only of corporate record and not of

general public record. Until that provision of capital is furnished

as a find to take the place of personal liability, the intention is ap-

parent to withhold the special privilege of complete incorporation

which exempts the members from such liability. The inhibition is, in

effect, against any transactions except such as tend to organization,

:. e., perfecting incorporation, and the purpose is to protect those

who may be imposed upon by premature assumption of corporate

functions, and not to save the corporation or its projectors from just

liability. Anvil Mining Company v. Sherman, supra. This is not

like the technical requirement placed by a Michigan statute upon the

officers to file their articles of association in a certain place, simply

forbidding business until compliance, without declaring any effect for

non-compliance, of which it was held, in Whitney v. Wyman, 101

U. S. 392, that the provision was not made a condition precedent to

incorporation, and it is not like the technical requirement found in
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the former Wisconsin statute that the officers should file a certificate

of incorporation before transacting business, held in Harrod v. Hamer,

supra, not a condition precedent; but the demand here is of the very

§ 146 THE COMMENCEMENT OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE.
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essence of incorporation, that there shall be capital stock and stock-

holders. A corporation can not come into existence without members,

and stockholders are the only members of a stock corporation.

In the light of the evident purposes of this enactment and of these

distinctions, and considering that the requirements imposed by section

1773 are of the essence of corporate organization, and are followed by

the declaration in section 1775 of complete incorporation, "when so

organized," we are of opinion that it was the legislative intent that

full effect as a corporation should not obtain until compliance, and

that the common-law liability is preserved up to that event. While sec-

tion 1773 provides that any obligations contracted before compliance

shall not give a right of action to the corporation, "but the stockhold-

ers then existing" shall be personally liable, this imposition is not in

derogation of the common law, but is rather declaratory of or sup-

plements it. Even as a statutory liability, it may be remarked in pass-

ing that this is not penal in its nature, and does not call for the strict

construction which is claimed in another branch of the argument for
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the plaintiff in error, but it is one of contract which the members take

upon themselves in forming a corporation, and is primary and abso-

lute. Flash v. Conn, 109 U. S. 371; Coleman v. White, 14 Wis.

700; Day v. Vinson, 78 Wis. 198. For the consideration here, the

statute must be taken in its entirety as an enactment granting privi-

leges; when privileges are asserted under it the interpretation of the

statutory prerequisites should be reasonable, and the legislative intent

should be given effect and not thwarted.

So construed, the parties who entered into the assumed corporate

undertaking will be held to liability for obligations which have been

incurred under that assumption. Is the plaintiff in error within that

rule? He executed the agreement of articles by which he engaged

with the other defendants "to form a corporation," which should have

a capital stock of $5,000; he was party to every step which was taken

under the statute; without his participation (or that of some third

party) even the semblance of corporate existence could not have been

obtained for the venture. This act, followed by the filing of the

instrument, was a solemn acceptance, by the parties jointly, of the

privileges of incorporation. In the argument for the plaintiff in

error it is insisted that these corporators are merely nominal par-

ties, and should not be regarded as contractors in any sense; that it

has become common practice to take, for the time being, any per-

son who may be convenient for the purpose, leaving the real project-

ors to come in with the subscription for stock? Such view or

practice is entirely foreign to the manifest intent of the statute, as

the organization is placed entirely within control of the signers,

and without their action to that end strangers can not obtain ad-

mission as stockholders. They occupy a contract relation. It is

true that the relation is absolved or a new one formed when organ-

the former Wisconsin statute that the officers should file a certificate
of incorporation before transacting business, held in Harrod v. Hamer,
supra, not a condition precedent; but the demand here is of the very
essence of incorporation, that there shall be capital stock and stockholders. A corporation can not come into existence without members,
!Znd stocklwlders are the only members of a stock corporation.
In the light of the evident purposes of this enactment and of these
distinction s, and considering that the requirements imposed by section
r773 are of the essence of corporate organization, and are followed by
the declaration in sectio n 1775 of complete incorporation, "when so
organized," we are of opinion that it was the legislative intent that
full effect as a corporation should not obtain until compliance, and
that the common-law liability is preserved up to that event. While section 1773 provides that any obligations contracted before complia nce
shall not give a right of action to the corporation, "but the stockholders then existing" shall be person ally liable, this imposition is not in
derogation of the common law, but is rather de~laratory of or supplements it. E ven as a statutory liability, it may be rema1"ked in passing that this is not penal in its nature, and does not call for the strict
con truction which is claimed in another branch of the argument for
the plaintiff in error, but it is one of contract which the members take
upon themselves in forming a corporation, and is prim ary and absolute. Flash v. Conn, 109 U.S. 371; Coleman v. White, 14 Wis.
700; Day v. Vinson, 78 Wis. 198. For the consideration here, the
statute must be taken in its entirety as an enactment granting privileges; when privileges are asserted under it the interpretation of the
statutory prerequisites should be reasonable, and the legislative intent
should be given effect and not thwarted.
So construed, the parties who entered into the assumed corporate
undertaking will be held to li ability for obligations which have been
incurred under that assumption. Is the plaintiff in error within that
rule? He executed the agreement of articles by which he engaged
with the other defendants "to form a corporation," which should have
a capital stock of $5 ,000; he was party to every step which was take n
under the statute; without his participation (or that of some third
party) even the semblance of corporate existence could not have been
obtained for the venture. Thi's act, followed by the filing of the
instrument, was a solemn acceptance, by the parties joi'ntly, of tile
privileges of incorporation. In tlie argument for the plaintiff in
error it is insisted that these corporators are merely nominal parties, and should not be regarded as contractors in any sense; that it
lias become common practice to take, for the time being, any p erson who may be convenient for the purpose, leaving the real projectors to come in with the subscription for stock.2 Such view or
practi'ce is entirely foreign to the manifest £ntent of the statute, as
the organizatt'on is placed enti'rely within control of the signers,
and without th eir action to that end strangers can not obtain admiss£on as stockholders. They occupy a contract relatt'on. It is
true that the relation i's absolved or a new one formed when organ-
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ization is effected; that the office of corporator disappears when

that of stockholder is taken on. It is also true that there may be an
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abandonment of the venture without any liability resting upon the
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corporators, but upon the condition imposed by the common law that

t'zation is effected; that the office of corporator disappears when
that of stockholder is taken on. It is also true that there may be an
abandonment of the venture without any liability resting upon the
corporators, but upon the condition imposed by the common law that
no obligation shall have been incurred in the name of that relation,
viz. : by "assuming to act in a corporate capacity." Fuller v. Rowe,
57 N. Y. 23, 26. Had these articles read that the signers agreed to
form a partnership with $5,ooo capital, instead of a corporation, there
would have been no doubt of joint liability for contracts entered into
by either in the co-partnership name and within its scope. The agreement here is to form a corporation, with capital stock of $),ooo; it is
made a public record, as the statute requires. So far as the public is
concerned, this record is the only evidence of incorporation which
comes to notice. The corporate capacity there promised was forthwith assumed, as the plaintiff in error well knew, and he can not be
heard to evade liability upon the plea that they failed to put in the
capital and perfect· organization. McHose & Co. v. Wheeler, 45 Pa.
St. 32, 40. · On behalf of the plaintiff in error it is contended that he
is not liable, because he did not participate in the business which was
undertaken, and it is not found that he had actual knowledge of the
use of his name as an officer. But it is found that "under the circumstances, if he did not know it, he could have ascertained the fact by
merely slight attention to the matter, and was guilty of negligence in
not knowing it." This imputes knowledge. If he remained ignorant of the use of his name in the face of such circumstances, where he
had given its use for the inception of the enterprise, and where slight
attention would have brought him knowledge, he is chargeable with
notice. The culpable negligence bars the excuse of ignorance.
Upon this record all of the signers of the articles of incorporation
have made themselves parties to the assumption of corporate powers,
and they are jointly bound for the indebtedness which was therein
contracted. Their liability is of the same nature which would be imposed "if the original plan had been to form a partnership." Cook
on Stock and Stockholders (3d ed.) , § 235. The agreement which
gave color to the assumed corporate action is the foundation. The
reason for holding the liability is well stated in Fredendall v. Taylor,
26 Wis. 286, 290, as springing "from the fact that there was no responsible body or corporation behind them;" having no principal they
bound themselves individually. Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa 220, is· to
the same effect.
·
It is not essential that parties dealing with the assumed corporation
should have acted with knowledge or upon the faith of W ecbselberg's
relation to it. The rule stated in Thompson v. First National Bank
of Toledo, I I I U. S. 529, is not applicable. There it was sought to
recover upon a co-partnership debt from one who was not a partner
in fact, but had been held out as such, without credit being given on
the faith or with knowledge of such holding out. Recovery was denied because there was no contract relation and no ground for estoppel.
In the case at bar there is primary contract Jiability, and it is not

no obligation shall have been incurred in the name of that relation,

viz.: by "assuming to act in a corporate capacity." Fuller v. Rowe,

57 N. Y. 23, 26. Had these articles read that the signers agreed to

form a partnership with $5,000 capital, instead of a corporation, there

would have been no doubt of joint liability for contracts entered into

by either in the co-partnership name and within its scope. The agree-

ment here is to form a corporation, with capital stock of $5,000; it is

made a public record, as the statute requires. So far as the public is

concerned, this record is the only evidence of incorporation which

comes to notice. The corporate capacity there promised was forth-

with assumed, as the plaintiff in error well knew, and he can not be

heard to evade liability upon the plea that they failed to put in the

capital and perfect organization. McHose & Co. v. Wheeler. 45 Pa.

St. 32, 40. ' On behalf of the plaintiff in error it is contended that he

is not liable, because he did not participate in the business which was

undertaken, and it is not found that he had actual knowledge of the
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use of his name as an officer. But it is found that "under the circum-

stances, if he did not know it, he could have ascertained the fact by

merely slight attention to the matter, and was guilty of negligence in

not knowing it." This imputes knowledge. If he remained igno-

rant of the use of his name in the face of such circumstances, where he

had given its use for the inception of the enterprise, and where slight

attention would have brought him knowledge, he is chargeable with

notice. The culpable negligence bars the excuse of ignorance.

Upon this record all of the signers of the articles of incorporation

have made themselves parties to the assumption of corporate powers,

and they are jointly bound for the indebtedness which was therein

contracted. Their liability is of the same nature which would be im-

posed "if the original plan had been to form a partnership." Cook

on Stock and Stockholders (3d ed.), § 235. The agreement which

gave color to the assumed corporate action is the foundation. The

reason for holding the liability is well stated in Fredendall v. Taylor,

26 Wis. 286, 290, as springing "from the fact that there was no re-

sponsible body or corporation behind them ;" having no principal they

bound themselves individually. Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa 220, is'to

the same effect.

It is not essential that parties dealing with the assumed corporation

should have acted with knowledge or upon the faith of Wechselberg's

relation to it. The rule stated in Thompson v. First National Bank

of Toledo, in U. S. 529, is not applicable. There it was sought to

recover upon a co-partnership debt from one who was not a partner

in fact, but had been held out as such, without credit being given on

the faith or with knowledge of such holding out. Recovery was de-

nied because there was no contract relation and no ground for estoppel.

In the case at bar there is primary contract liability, and it is not
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dependent upon the knowledge or understanding of tbose dealing

with the purported corporation. Pullman v. Upton, 96 U. S. 328,

citing Adderly v. Storm, 6 Hill 624; Pierce v. Bryant, 5 Allen
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(Mass.) 91.

In view of this determination of liability at common law we are of

opinion that judgment was properly entered against the plaintiff in

error, and it is unnecessary to consider the question of statutory lia-

bility, which is well presented in the briefs and oral arguments.

The judgment will be affirmed.

Note. Compare, 1864, Ashtabula and New Lisbon R. Co. v. Smith, 15 Ohio

St. 328; 1897, Badger Paper Co. v. Rose, 95 Wis. 145; 1898, Schofield Q. & P.

Co. v. Schofield, 71 Conn. 1.

Sec. 147. Same.

(d~) As soon as its first meeting has been held and officers

chosen, if not immediately upon signing the articles of association;

but until the division into shares, the associated members hold the

whole capital stock in common.

dependent upon the knowledge or understanding of those dealing
with the purported corporation. Pullman v. Upton, 96 U. S. 328,
citing Adderly v. Storm, 6 Hill 624; Pierce v. Bryant, 5 Allen
(Mass.) 91.
In view of this determination of liability at common law we are of
opinion that judgment was properly entered against the plaintiff in
error, and it is unnecessary to consider the question of statutory liability, which is well presented in the briefs and oral arguments.
The judgment will be affirmed.
Note. Compare, 1864, Ashtabula and New Lisbon R. Co. v. Smith, 15 Ohio
St. 328; 1897, Badger Paper Co. v. Rose, 95 Wis. 145; 1898, Schofield G. & P.
Co. v. Schofield, 71 Conn. 1.

HAWES Et Al. v. ANGLO-SAXON PETROLEUM COMPANY Et Al."

1869. In the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, ioi Mass.

Sec. 147. Same.

Rep. 385-398.
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[Bill in equity, filed February 2, 1867, to charge individual de-

fendants as members or stockholders in a manufacturing corporation,

under the statute of 1862, ch. 218, which declares, in section 2, that

"the members or stockholders" in such a corporation shall be jointly

and severally liable for such of its debts as may be contracted before

( d) As soon as its first meeting has been held and officers
chosen, if not immediately upon signing the articles of association;
but until the division into shares, the associated members hold the
whole capital stock in common.

the capital is fully paid in and certificate thereof duly recorded.

On March 16, 1865, the defendants signed certain articles bearing

HAWES ET AL. v. ANGLO-SAXON PETROLEUM COMPANY ET AL.1

that date, certifying that the subscribers "hereby associate themselves

together as a corporation under the provisions of the Gen. Stat.,ch. 61,

1869.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

101 Mass.

Rep. 385-398.

and the several acts in addition thereto, for the purpose of carrying on

the business of mining oil, coal and other minerals; and agree,"

third, that "the amount of capital stock of said corporation is hereby

fixed and limited at $500,000;" fourth, that "the said corporation

shall be established and have its principal place of business in Bos-

ton, and may prosecute its business without and beyond the limits of

the commonwealth, as the corporation elect." On April 1, 1865, the

subscribers of these articles held their first meeting and chose officers.

In the superior court in Suffolk, at October term, 1866, the plaint-

iffs recovered judgment against the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Com-

pany, by the default of the corporation, after filing an affidavit of

merits and an answer, for $4,231.71 damages and $24.07 costs, in an,

action begun March 17, 1866, on an account dated March 29, 1865,

for the price of three steam-engines and boilers. On this judgment

1 Statement of facts abridged. Arguments and part of opinion omitted.

[Bill in equity, filed February 2, 1867, to charge individual defendants as members or stockholders in a manufacturing corporation,
under the statute of 1862, ch. 218, which declares, in section 2, that
"the members or stockholders" in such a corporation shall be jointly
and severally liable for such of its debts as may be contracted before
the capital is fully paid in and certificate thereof duly recorded.
On March 16, 1865, the defendants signed certain articles bearing
that date, certifying that the subscribers "hereby associate themselves
together as a corporation under the provisions of the Gen. Stat. ,ch. 61,
and the several acts in addition thereto, for the purpose of carrying on
the business of mining oil, coal and other minerals; and agree,"
third, that "the amount of capital stock of s.a id corporation is hereby
fixed and limited at $500,000;" fourth, th~t "the said corporation
shall be established and have its principal place of business in Boston, and may prosecute its business without and beyond the limits of
the commonwealth, as the corporation elect." On April 1, 1865, the
subscribers of these articles held their first meeting and chose officers.
In the superior court in Suffolk, at October term, 1866, the plaintiffs recovered judgment against the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company, by the default of the corporation, after filing an affidavit of
merits and an answer, for $4, 231.71 damages and $24.07 costs, in an.
action begun March 17, 18661 on an account dated March 29, 1865,
for the price of three steam-engines and boilers. On this judgment
1 Stat~ment
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execution was issued November 16, 1866, and returned wholly un-

satisfied January 15, 1867.

582

"The stock of said Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company was never
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divided into shares, and never divided or apportioned among said

execution was issued November 16, 1866 1 and returned wholly unsatisfied January r5, 1867.
"The stock of said Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company was never
divided into shares, and never divided or apportioned among said
subscribers. No capital was ever paid in, and no certificate of any
payment of capital was ever recorded. No part of the amount due
on said judgment has ever been paid, and no change has occurred
among said subscribers to said articles." ]
GRAY, J. All that is necessary to constitute a corporation aggregate is the grant of a franchise by the government, assented to by the
grantees. In the case of the creatio~ of a private corporation by
special charter, indeed, an acceptance is ordinarily required in order
to give it effect. Angell & Ames on Corporations, §§ 81, 82. Bui
an act of the legislature, incorporatt"ng certain persons wlto have applied for a cltarter, and their assodates, may constitute tile persons
named a co1·poration at once wt"thout furtlier action on their part,
either in tlie admission of associates, the choi"ce of officers, or the division of the capital stock. Frost v. Frostburg Coal Co., 24 How.
278; Day v. Stetson, 8 Green I. 365; P enobscot Boom Co. v. Lamson, 16 Maine 224; New York Fire Department v. Kip, 10 Wend.
266; Narragansett Bank v. Atlantic Silk Co., 3 Met. 282; Walworth
v. Brackett, 98 Mass. 98; Gen. Stat. ch. 68, § 3.
Dy the Gen. Stat., ch. 61, § 1, "three or more persons who shall
have associated themselves together by articles of agreement in writing, for the purpose of carrying on any m echanical, mining, quarrying
or manufacturing business, except th at of distilling or manufacturing
intoxicating liquors, and shall have complied with the provisions of this
chapter, shall be and remain a corporation under any n ame indicated in
their articles of association, and which is not previously in use by any
other corporation or company.'' The meaning and extent of the clause
which requires that the associates "shall have complied with the provisions of this chapter'' may be better understood by referring to the statute
of 1851, ch. 133, the first general law which authorized such corporations to be formed by voluntary association, and the intervening acts
in addition thereto, of all which the sixty-first chapter of the General
Statutes is substantially a re-enactment. By section 1 of Statute 1851,
ch. 133 1 persons who should "associate themselves together according
to the provisions of this act" under any name by them assumed, for
either of the purposes specified, and who should "comply with all
the provisions of this act'' were declared to be a body politic and
corporate. All the provisions of that act, which such a corporation
was required by its terms to comply with at any time, were, that the
articles of association should state the name of the corporation , fix
and limit the amount of its capital stock, and state the purpose for
which and the town or city in which the corporation should be estab•lished and located; that, before the corporation should commence
business, its officers should make, publish and file a certificate of
those and other facts; and that the name of the corporation should
indicate its corporate character, and not be the name of any other cor-

subscribers. No capital was ever paid in, and no certificate of any

payment of capital was ever recorded. No part of the amount due

on said judgment has ever been paid, and no change has occurred

among said subscribers to said articles."]

Gray, J. All that is necessary to constitute a corporation aggre-

gate is the grant of a franchise by the government, assented to by the

grantees. In the case of the creation of a private corporation by

special charter, indeed, an acceptance is ordinarily required in order

to give it effect. Angell & Ames on Corporations, §§ 81, 82. But

an act of the legislature, incorporating certain persons who have ap-

plied for a charter, and their associates, may constitute the persons

named a corporation at once without further action on their pari,

either in the admission of associates, the choice of officers, or the di-

vision of the capital stock. Frost v. Frostburg Coal Co., 24 How.

278; Day v. Stetson, 8 Greenl. 365; Penobscot Boom Co. v. Lam-

son, 16 Maine 224; New York Fire Department v. Kip, 10 Wend.
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266; Narragansett Bank v. Atlantic Silk Co., 3 Met. 282; Walworth

v. Brackett, 98 Mass. 98; Gen. Stat. ch. 68, § 3.

By the Gen. Stat., ch. 61, § 1, "three or more persons who shall

have associated themselves together by articles of agreement in writ-

ing, for the purpose of carrying on any mechanical, mining, quarrying

or manufacturing business, except that of distilling or manufacturing

intoxicating liquors, and shall have complied with the provisions of this

chapter, shall be and remain a corporation under any name indicated in

their articles of association, and which is not previously in use by any

other corporation or company." The meaning and extent of the clause

which requires that the associates "shall have complied with the provis-

ions of this chapter" maybe better understood by referring to the statute

of 185X9 ch. 133, the first general law which authorized such corpo-

rations to be formed by voluntary association, and the intervening acts

in addition thereto, of all which the sixty-first chapter of the General

Statutes is substantially a re-enactment. By section 1 of Statute 1851,

ch. 133, persons who should "associate themselves together according

to the provisions of this act" under any name by them assumed, for

either of the purposes specified, and who should "comply with all

the provisions- of this act" were declared to be a body politic and

corporate. All the provisions of that act, which such a corporation

was required by its terms to comply with at any time, were, that the

articles of association should state the name of the corporation, fix

and limit the amount of its capital stock, and state the purpose for

which and the town or city in which the corporation should be estab-

lished and located; that, before the corporation should commence

business, its officers should make, publish and file a certificate of

those and other facts; and that the name of the corporation should

indicate its corporate character, and not be the name of any other cor-
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poration or company. Stat. 1851, ch. 133, §§ 1-6. And it was held

that even an irregularity in the articles of association, such as the
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adoption of a name already belonging to another company, would not

enable the corporation to defeat an action against it by a creditor.

Dooley v. Cheshire Glass Co., 15 Gray 494. The direction contained

in the Gen. Stat., ch. 61, § 3, as to the mode of calling the first meet-

ing of such a corporation, was not in the original statute, but was first

inserted in the statute of 1855, ch. 478, section 2, and is as consistent

with holding the corporation to be already organized as with treating

the first meeting as necessary to its organization. The first section of

the General Statutes, ch. 61, is certainly not to be construed literally

as requiring a compliance with all the provisions of the chapter as a

condition precedent to the existence of a corporation; for many of

them necessarily assume a corporation to have been already created,

such, for instance, as making the officers of the corporation liable for

its debts until they have signed and filed certain certificates. Sec-

tions 8—12, Merrick v. Reynolds Engine & Governor Co.1 The

manifest intent of the first section, viewed in connection with the

rest of the chapter, is, that a corporation shall exist at least as soon

as the first meeting has been held and officers have been elected, if not
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immediately upon the signing of the fundamental articles of associa-

tion, by which the intention of the associates to avail themselves of

the privileges conferred by the legislature is manifested, the name of

the corporation determined, the amount of capital stock fixed, and the

place in which and the purpose for which the corporation is estab-

lished are specified. Utley v. Union Tool Co., 11 Gray 139; Perkins v.

Union Button-Hole & Embroidery Machine Co., 12 Allen 273; New-

comb v. Reed, 12 Allen 363.

When a corporation has been once created according to law, the

incorporated associates who hold the corporate franchise are members

of the corporation, and a subscriber for shares, although he has re-

ceived no certificate of stock, or the stock has not even been divided

into shares, is a member of the corporation, and a stockholder within

the meaning of a statute making the stockholders of the corporation

personally liable for its debts. Chester Glass Co. v. Dewey, 16 Mass.

94; Narragansett Bank v. Atlantic Silk Co., 3 Met. 288, 289; Spear

v. Crawford, 14 Wend. 20.

The statute of 1S62, ch. 218, entitled "An act to define and'regulate

the enforcement of the liabilities of officers and stockholders of manu-

facturing corporations," contains the following provisions, upon the

construction and effect of which this case depends.

By section 2, "the members or stockholders in such corporation

shall be jointly and severally liable for its debts or contracts in the fol-

lowing cases, and not otherwise: First, for such as may be contracted

before the capital is fully paid in, and a certificate thereof duly re-

corded."

By section 3, no stockholder in such corporation shall be held liable

for its debts or contracts, unless a judgment is recovered against the

1 101 Maes. 381.

poration or company. Stat. 1851, ch. 133, §§ 1-6. And it was held
that even an irregularity in the articles of association, such as the
adoption of a name already belonging to another company, would not
enable the corporation to defeat an action against it by a creditor.
Dooley v. Cheshire Glass Co., 15 Gray 494. The direction contained
in the Gen. Stat., ch. 61, § 3, as to the mode of calling the first meeting of such a corporation, was not in the original statute, but was first
inserted in the statute of 1855, ch. 478, section 2, and is as consistent
with holding the corporation to be already organized as with treating
the first meeting as necessary to its organization. The first section of
the General Statutes, ch. 61, is certainly not to be construed literally
as requiring a compliance with all the provisions of the chapter as a
condition precedent to the existence of a corporation; for many of
them necessarily assume a corporation to have been already created,
such, for instance, as making the officers of the corporation liable for
its debts until they have signed and filed certain certificates. Sections 8-12, Merrick v. Reynolds Engine & Governor Co. 1
The
manifest intent of the first sectt'on, vt'ewed t'n connection wt'th the
rest of the chapter, i's, that a corporatt'on shall exist at least as soon
as tlte first meetz'ng has been held and ojficers have been elected, zf not
immediately upon the signing of the fundamental artt'clcs of assoct'ation, by which the intention of the associates to avail themselves of
the privileges conferred by the legislature is manifested, the name of
the corporation determined, the amount of capital stock fixed, and the
place in which and the purpose for which the corporation is established are specified. Utley v. Union Tool Co., 1 it Gray 139; Perkins v.
Union Button-Hole & Embroidery Machine Co .., 12 Allen 273; Ne\\'comb v. Reed, 12 Allen 363.
When a corporation has been once created accordil)g to .law, the
incorporated associates who hold the corporate franchise are members
of the corporation, anJ a subscriber for shares, although he has received no certificate of stock, or the stock has not even been divided
into shares, is a member of the corporation, and a stockholder within
the meaning of a statute making the stockholders of the corporation
personally liable for its debts. Chester Glass Co. v. Dewey, 16 Mass.
94; Narragansett Bank v. Atlantic Silk Co., 3 Met. 288, 289; Spear
v. Crawford, 14 \i\Tend. 20.
The statute of 1862, ch. 2 18, entitled "An act to define and · regulate
the enforcement of the liabilities of officers and stockholders of manufacturing corporations," contains the following provisions, upon the
construction and effect of which this case depends.
By section 2, '•the members or stockholders in such corporation
shall be jointly and severally liable for its debts or contracts in the following cases, and not otherwise: First, for such as may be contracted
before the capital is fully paid in~ and a certiificate thereof duly r ecorded."
By section 3, no stockholder in such corporation shall be held liable
for its debts or contracts, unless a judgment is recovered against the
1

101 Maas. 381.
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corporation, demand for payment made upon the corporation and not

HA WES V. ANGLO-SAXON PETROLEUM CO.
complied with for thirty days, and the execution returned unsatisfied.

§ 147

By section 4, "after the execution shall be so returned, the judg-

corporation, demand for payment made upon the corporation and not
complied with for thirty days, and the execution returned unsatisfied.
By section 4 1 ''after the execution shall be so returned, the judgment creditor, or any other creditor, may file a bill in equity in behalf
of himself and all other creditors of the corporation, against it, and
all persons who were stockholders therein at the time of the commencement of the suit in which such judgment was recovered,'' for
the recovery of the sums due from said corporation to himself and
such other creditors, for which the stockholders may be personally liaable, by reason of any act or omission on the part of the corporation
or its officers.
By section 5, "such sums as may be decreed to be paid by the stockholders in such suit in equity shall be assessed upon them in proportion
to the amounts of stock by them respectively held at the time when the
suit in which said judgment was recovered was begun; but no stockholder shall be liable to pay a larger sum than the amount of stock
held by him at that time at its par value."
Among the purposes for which the defendants incorporated themselves were "refining oil, coal and other minerals," and "preparing
them for use." They were, therefore, strictly a manufacturing corporation, and equally within the statutes of 1862 1 ch. 218, as a similar
corporation established by special charter would be. Peele v. Phillips, 8 Allen 86; Bond v. Morse, 9 Allen 471.
The bill was held to be sufficient when this cause was before us
upon the demurrer. All questions of variance between the pleadings
and evidence have been waived by submitting the case to our decision
upon an agreed statement of facts. Russell v. Loring, 3 Allen 121;
Folger v. Columbian Insurance Co. , 99 Mass. 267.
It is admitted that no part of the capital stock of the corporation has
ever been paid in, and no certificate thereof recorded ; and that the
plaintiffs have recovered a judgment in an action against the corporation , and had the execution issued thereon duly served upon the corporation, and returned unsatisfied.
That action was brought on the 17th day of March, 1866, a year
after the signing of the defendants' articles of association, and almost
a year after the associates had held their first meeting and elected
officers.. Upon any construction of the statutes, the corporation had
thus, long before the bringing of that action, been called into existence and made a legal person, capable of holding property and of
suing and being sued, and had a board of officers competent to bind
the corporation by a new agreement or by ratification of an old one,
made before the corporation was capable of contracting. The corporation, thus fully organized and represented, filed an affidavit of
merits, and afterwards submitted to a default and judgment thereon.
That judgment, if not conclusive in this suit, is at least prima facie
evidence that the debt sued on was a debt for which the corporation
was liable. The mere fact that the account annexed to the declaration bears date three days before such election of officers is not suffi-.

ment creditor, or any other creditor, may file a bill in equity in behalf

of himself and all other creditors of the corporation, against it, and

all persons who were stockholders therein at the time of the com-

mencement of the suit in which such judgment was recovered," for

the recovery of the sums due from said corporation to himself and

such other creditors, for which the stockholders may be personally lia-

able, by reason of any act or omission on the part of the corporation

or its officers.

By section 5, "such sums as may be decreed to be paid by the stock-

holders in such suit in equity shall be assessed upon them in proportion

to the amounts of stock by them respectively held at the time when the

suit in which said judgment was recovered was begun; but no stock-

holder shall be liable to pay a larger sum than the amount of stock

held by him at that time at its par value."

Among the purposes for which the defendants incorporated them-

selves were "refining oil, coal and other minerals," and "preparing
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them for use." They were, therefore, strictly a manufacturing cor-

poration, and equally within the statutes of 1862, ch. 218, as a similar

corporation established by special charter would be. Peele v. Phill-

ips, 8 Allen 86; Bond v. Morse, 9 Allen 471.

The bill was held to be sufficient when this cause was before' us

upon the demurrer. All questions of variance between the pleadings

and evidence have been waived by submitting the case to our decision

upon an agreed statement of facts. Russell v. Loring, 3 Allen 121;

Folger v. Columbian Insurance Co., 99 Mass. 267.

It is admitted that no part of the capital stock of the corporation has

ever been paid in, and no certificate thereof recorded; and that the

plaintiffs have recovered a judgment in an action against the corpora-

tion, and had the execution issued thereon duly served upon the cor-

poration, and returned unsatisfied.

That action was brought on the 17th day of March, 1866, a year

after the signing of the defendants' articles of association, and almost

a year after the associates had held their first meeting and elected

officers.. Upon any construction of the statutes, the corporation had

thus, long before the bringing of that action, been called into exist-

ence and made a legal person, capable of holding property and of

suing and being sued, and had a board of officers competent to bind

the corporation by a new agreement or by ratification of an old one,

made before the corporation was capable of contracting. The cor-

poration, thus fully organized and represented, filed an affidavit of

merits, and afterwards submitted to a default and judgment thereon.

That judgment, if not conclusive in this suit, is at least prima facie

evidence that the debt sued on was a debt for which the corporation

was liable. The mere fact that the account annexed to the declara-

tion bears date three days before such election of officers is not suffi-.
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cient to rebut the evidence of liability afforded by the judgment

itself.

The amount of capital stock of the corporation was fixed and lim-

ited in accordance with the General Statutes, ch. 61, section 6. The

stock not having been divided into shares or certificates issued, the

associated members of the corporation were the holders of the whole

capital stock in common, and would seem, upon the facts agreed, to

be liable in equal proportions for such sums as may be decreed to be

paid by them in this suit. But as the question of the amount to be

assessed upon each has not been argued by them, but only the ques-

tion whether they are liable at all, any additional facts and considera-

tions, bearing upon the question of the amounts and proportions in

which they are to be charged, may be submitted to the master, and,

on the coming in of his report, to the court.

Decree for the plaintiffs, case referred to a master.

Note. See Katavna Land Company v. Holley, 129 Mass. 640; Schofleld G.

& P. Co. v. Schofleld, 71 Conn. 1.

Sec. 148. Same.
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(e) Under special acts, either immediately upon acceptance of

charter, or only after organization by the subscribers to the stock,

depending upon the wording of the acts.

For example, it is sometimes said that where an act provides that A, B, C,

etc. (who have applied for a charter), and their successors and assigns "be

and the same are hereby incorporated," there is created ipso facto et eo in-

stanti a corporation, and there is no condition precedent to the coming into

existence of the corporation. See, 1853, Judah v. The Am. Live Stock Ins.

Co., 4 Ind. 333; 1857, Stoops v. The Greenburgh & B. P. Co., 10 Ind. 47; 1859,

Hammett v. L. R. & N. R. Co., 20 Ark. 204; 1880, The L. R. & N. R. Co. v. L.

R., M. & T. R., 36 Ark. 663. Also, Penobscot Boom Corp. v. Lamson, supra,

p. 283; Hawes v. Petroleum Co., supra, p. 581, and illustrations in §§ 135, 136,

137, supra.

ARTICLE IV. COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS. DE JURE EXISTENCE.

Sec. 149. (i) As to de jure existence, conditions are

(a) Precedent, with which there must be a substantial, but not

necessarily a literal, compliance, in order to make a corporation de

jure.

MOKELUMNE HILL MINING CO. v. WOODBURY.1

14 Cal. 424, 73 Am. Dec. 658, supra, p. 296.

1 See, also, cases below, on pp. 590-613.
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Sec. 150. Same.

(b) Subsequent, with which compliance is not necessary in or-

Sec. 150. Same.

der to create a valid corporation, though necessary legally to ex-

ercise corporate functions and powers.

HARROD v. HAMER Et Al.1

( b) Subsequent, with which compliance is not necessary in ord er to create a valid corporation, though necessary legally to exercise corporate functions and powers.

1873. In the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 32 Wis. Rep.

162-168.

Appeal from the circuit court for Outagamie county.

Section 17, ch. 73 of the Rev. Stat., entitled "of joint stock com-

HARROD v. HAMER ET AL.1

panies," provides that before any corporation, organized thereunder,

shall commence business, the president and directors shall cause the

1873.

articles of association to be published in the papers, make a certificate

IN THE

SUPREME

of the purposes for which the corporation is formed, the amount of

holders, the number of shares by each respectively owned, and de-

32 Wis. Rep.

Appeal from the circuit court for Outagamie county.
Section i7, ch. 73 of the Rev. Stat., entitled "of joint stock companies," provides that before any corporation, organized thereunder,
shall commence business, the president and directors shall cause the
articles of association to be published in the papers, make a certificate
of the purposes for which the corporation is formed, the amount of
capital stock, the amount actually paid in, the names, of the shareholders, the number of shares by each respectively owned, and deposit the same with the secretary of state, and a duplicate with the
clerk of the town , city or village where the business is to be carried
on. Section 25 of the same chapter provides as follows: The stockholders of any corporation organized under th e provisions of this
chapter shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts that may be
due or owing to all their laborers, servants and apprentices, for sen·ice performed by them for such corporation, within six months preceding the demand made for any such debt, " etc.
Harrod brought his action against the defendants, who were stockholders in the Appleton Manufacturing Company, incorporated under
ch. 73, R. S., to hold them liable individually for any indebtedness
again st the company. Plaintiff was the owne r of a planing mill, and
the indebtedness g rew out of certain planing done at plaintiff' s mill
for the building of the factory of the corporation. Judgment had been
obtained against the company for the amount due, and execution was
returned unsatisfied. Plaintiff thereupon sued the d efendants for the
amount of such judgment and interest. It was admitted that section 17 was not complied with by the filing of the required statement
until March 25, 1870, and it appeared in evidence that the company
erected a building, ran a saw-mill, and transacted other busines ,
some months previous to thi date. Finding and judgment for plaintiff; from which judgment the defendants Hamer and Schneider appealed.
DIXON, C. J.
The theory upon which this action is prosecuted is,
that the subscribers to the articles of agreement and association did
not, by the steps and proceedings taken, become or constitute a body
politic and corporate, under the name assumed by them in their articles, but that they failed altogether of organizing and establishing a

posit the same with the secretary of state, and a duplicate with the

clerk of the town, city or village where the business is to be carried

on. Section 25 of the same chapter provides as follows: The stock-

holders of any corporation organized under the provisions of this
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capital stock, the amount actually paid in, the names of the share-

chapter shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts that may be

due or owing to all their laborers, servants and apprentices, for serv-

ice performed by them for such corporation, within six months pre-

ceding the demand made for any such debt," etc.

Harrod brought his action against the defendants, who were stock-

holders in the Appleton Manufacturing Company, incorporated under

ch. 73, R. S., to hold them liable individually for any indebtedness

against the company. Plaintiff was the owner of a planing mill, and

the indebtedness grew out of certain planing done at plaintiff's mill

for the building of the factory of the corporation. Judgment had been

obtained against the company for the amount due, and execution was

returned unsatisfied. Plaintiff thereupon sued the defendants for the

amount of such judgment and interest. It was admitted that sec-

tion 17 was not complied with by the filing of the required statement

until March 25, 1870, and it appeared in evidence that the company

erected a building, ran a saw-mill, and transacted other business,

some months previous to this date. Finding and judgment for plaint-

iff: from which judgment the defendants Hamer and Schneider ap-

pealed.

Dixon, C. J. The theory upon which this action is prosecuted is,

that the subscribers to the articles of agreement and association did

not, by the steps and proceedings taken, become or constitute a body

politic and corporate, under the name assumed by them in their arti-

cles, but that they failed altogether of organizing and establishing a

'Arguments omitted.

1
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corporation under the provisions of the statute, as they attempted and

intended to do. The supposition is that no corporation was created,

§

150

CONlJlTIONS OF DE JURE EXISTENCE,

and hence that the subscribers, who were shareholders or owners of

the supposed capital stock, became a sort of unincorporated joint

stock company, or quasi firm or partnership, and so liable in their in-

dividual capacity, either jointly or severally, directly to the creditors

of the company or association. We are of opinion that this view of

the transaction is entirely erroneous, and that a corporation was or-

ganized and set in motion with which creditors and others must deal

as a corporation, and against which and against the stockholders in

which claims and demands must be enforced, as in case of other like

corporate bodies.

The corporation was organized under the provisions of chapter 73

of the Revised Statutes. 1 Tay. Stats. 982 to 987, sections 1 to 29,

inclusive. It is not objected or shown that any requirement of the

statute was omitted or not complied with, except only that the certi-

ficate prescribed by section 17 (section 19, Tay. Stats.) was not made

and deposited with the secretary of state, and a duplicate with the

town, village or city clerk, as therein directed. The only question,
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therefore, is, whether this failure of the president and directors to

make and deposit the certificate and duplicate operated to defeat the

organization or to annul the proceedings by which the corporation

had been brought into existence. The very words of the section are

a sufficient answer. "Before any corporation, formed and established

by virtue of the provisions of this law, shall commence business, the

president and directors thereof shall cause their articles of association

to be published," etc., and "shall make a certificate," etc. It would

not be easy by any words to recognize the existence of the corpora-

tion without the publication and without the certificate, or before

they are made, more clearly than has been done here. The corpo-

rate existence is clearly acknowledged, and intended so to be, and the

prohibition is only against its commencing business until the require-

ments of the section are complied with. It is spoken of as a corpora-

tion formed and established by virtue of the provisions of law, and

having officers such as the law prescribes, namely, a president and a

board of directors, capable of acting for the corporation, and upon

whom, in their official capacity, certain duties are therein specifically

imposed, and their performance commanded.

But, if anything further be needed upon this point, it will be found

in the provisions of section 23 of the same chapter. That section

reads: "If the president, directors or secretary of any such corpora-

tion shall intentionally neglect or refuse to comply with the provisions

of, and to perform the duties required of them respectively by, the

seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth sections of this chapter, such of

them so neglecting or refusing shall jointly and severally be liable, in an

action founded on this chapter, for all debts of such corporation con-

tracted during the period of any such neglect and refusal." The inten-

tion that the corporation should not be affected, or its powers or exist-

ence destroyed, by reason of any failure to comply with the requirements

corporation under the provisions of the statute, as they attempted and
intended to do. The supposition is that no corporation was created,
and hence that the subscribers, who were shareholders or owners of
the supposed capital stock, became a sort of unincorporated joint
stock company, or quasi firm or partnership, and so liable in their individual capacity, either jointly or severally, directly to the creditors
of the company or association. We are of opinion that this view of
the transaction is entirely erroneous, and that a corporation was organized and set in motion with which creditors and others must deal
as a corporation, and against which and against the stockholders in
which claims and demands must be enforced, as in case of other like
corporate bodies.
The corporation was organized under the provisions of chapter 73
of the Revised Statutes. 1 Tay. Stats. 982 to 987, sections 1 to 29,
inclusive. It is not objected or shown that any requirement of the
statute was omitted or not complied with, except only that the certificate prescribed by section 17 (section 19, Tay. Stats.) was not made
and deposited with the secretary of state, and a duplicate with the
town, village or city clerk, as therein directed. The only question,
therefore, is, whether this failure of the president and directors to
make and deposit the certificate and duplicate operated to defeat the
organization or to annul the proceedings by which the corporation
had been brought into existence. The very words of the section are
a sufficient answer. "Before any corporation, formed and established
by virtue of the provisions of this law, shall commence business, the
president and directors thereof shall cause their articles of association
to be published," etc., and " shall make a certificate," etc. It would
not be easy by any words to re cognize the existence of the corporation without the publication and without the certificate, or before
they are made, more clearly than has been done here. The co1·porate existence is' clearly acknowledged, and intended so to be, and the
prohi'biti'on is only against i'ts commenct'ng business untt'l the requi'rcm ents of the section are complied with. It is spoken of as a corporation formed and established by virtue of the provisions of law, and
having officers such as the law prescribes, namely, a president and a
board of directors, capable of acting for the corporation, and upon
whom, in their official capacity, certain duties are therein specifically
imposed, and their performance commanded.
But, if anything further be needed upon this point, it will be found
in the provisions of section 23 of the same chapter. That section
reads: "If the president, directors or secretary of any such corpora- tion shall intentionally neglect or refuse to comply with the provisions
of, and to perform the duties required of them respectively by, the
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth sections of this chapter, such of
them so neglecting or refusing shall jointly and severally be liable, in an
action founded on this chapter, for all debts of suclz corporatt'on contracted during the period of any ·such neglect and refusal." The intention that the corporation should not be affected, or its powers or existence destroyed, by reason of any failure to comply with the requirements
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of section 17, is here again very plainly manifested. It is again spoken
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of and treated as a corporation lawfully organized and still continuing,

§ I 5I

NEWCOMB V. REED.

notwithstanding such failure. It is regarded as a corporation fully

of section 1 7, is here again very plainly manifested. It is again spoken
of and treated as a corporation lawfully organized and still continuing,
notwithstanding such failure. It is regarded as a corporation fully
capable of contracting debts, and having officers, of whom the performance of certain duties has been and still may be lawfully required.
And to the like effect are the provisions of section 24, and, perhaps,
others. The views here expressed are sustained by the case of Holmes
v. Gilliland, 41 Barb. 568.
It follows from these views that the plaintiff has misconceived his
remedy, and that this action can not be maintained against the appellants as stockholders, and who hold no other relation to the corporation. The remedy of the plaintiff to enforce payment of his judgment,
in addition to that given by the statute against the president and
directors of the corporation, will probably be found by consulting the
case of Adler v. Milwaukee Patent Brick Manufacturing Co. , 13
Wi s. 57.
The complaint alleges that the debt, for the non-payment of which
the plaintiff recovered judgment against the corporation, accrued and
became due to the plaintiff for work and labor performed by him for
the corporation, but it is nevertheless not claimed that the cause of
action falls within the provisions of section 25 of the statute, or that
the pla intiff is pursuing the remedy given by that section. It does not
distinctly appear that the debt was one of the kind therein provided
for, or that the plaintiff was a "laborer." It is not shown that any
d emand was made, as prescribed by that section.
The judgment against the defendants Hamer and Schneider, who
bring this appeal, must be reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded,
with direction that it be dismissed as to them.
By the court.-It is so ordered.

capable of contracting debts, and having officers, of whom the per-

formance of certain duties has been and still may be lawfully required.

And to the like effect are the provisions of section 24, and, perhaps,

others. The views here expressed are sustained by the case of Holmes

v. Gilliland, 41 Barb. 568.

It follows from these views that the plaintiff has misconceived his

remedy, and that this action can not be maintained against the appel-

lants as stockholders, and who hold no other relation to the corpora-

tion. The remedy of the plaintiff to enforce payment of his judgment,

in addition to that given by the statute against the president and

directors of the corporation, will probably be found by consulting the

case of Adler v. Milwaukee Patent Brick Manufacturing Co., 13

Wis. 57.

The complaint alleges that the debt, for the non-payment of which

the plaintiff recovered judgment against the corporation, accrued and

became due to the plaintiff for work and labor performed by him for
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the corporation, but it is nevertheless not claimed that the cause of

action falls within the provisions of section 25 of the statute, or that

the plaintiff is pursuing the remedy given by that section. It does not

distinctly appear that the debt was one of the kind therein provided

for, or that the plaintiff was a "laborer." It is not shown that any

demand was made, as prescribed by that section.

The judgment against the defendants Hamer and Schneider, who

bring this appeal, must be reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded,

with direction that it be dismissed as to them.

By the court.—It is so ordered.

Note. See Beach, § 13; Clark, pp. 69, 87; Elliott, §§38-44; Morawetz,

§§ 744-746; 1 Thompson, §§ 215-249.

Sec. 151. Same. (2) Conditions may be also:

(c) Directory merely.

NEWCOMB v. REED.

1866. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 12

Allen's (Mass.) Rep. 362-364.

Note . See Beach , § 13; Clark, pp. 59, 87; Elliott, §§ 38-44; Morawetz,
§§ 744-746; 1 Thompson, §§ 215-249.

Contract, in which the plaintiff sought to charge the officers of the

Boston Mechanical Bakery Company with a debt contracted in the

name of the corporation, in consequence of their neglect to file cer-

tificates and statements of the condition of the corporation. At the

Sec. 151. Same.

trial in the superior court, before Ames, J., without a jury, the judge

( 2) Conditions may be also:

found for the defendants upon facts which are stated in the opinion;

( c) Directory merely.

and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.

NEWCOMB v. REED.

1866.

IN

THE

SuPREME Juo1c1AL CouRT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Allen's (Mass.) Rep. 362-364.

u

Contract, in which the plaintiff sought to charge the officers of the
Boston Mechanical Bakery Company with a debt contracted in the
name of the corporation , in consequence of their neglect to file certificates and statements of the condition of the corporation. At the
trial in the superior court, b efore Ames, J. , without a jury, the judge
found for the defendants upon facts which are stated in the opinion;
and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.
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Hoar, J. The defense to this action rests wholly upon the as-

sumption that the corporation, whose officers the plaintiff seeks to

§ I 5I

CONDITIONS OF DE JURE EXISTENCE.

589

charge with a statute liability for its debts, never had a legal existence.

The only defect suggested in the organization of the corporation is,

that the call for the first meeting was signed by only one of the per-

sons named in the act of incorporation, and not by a majority of them,

as required by Statutes 1855, ch. 140.

The case of Utely v. Union Tool Company, 11 Gray 139, is the

authority on which the defendants chiefly rely. That case decided

that in order to charge as stockholders of a manufacturing corporation

persons who had been summoned in an action against it under Statutes

1851, ch. 315, the plaintiff must prove the legal existence of the cor-

poration.

The alleged corporation had no charter or act of incorporation

from the legislature, but was an association which had undertaken to

assume corporate powers under a general act for the formation of

joint stock companies. Statutes of 1851, ch. 133. That statute au-

thorized three or more persons who had entered into "articles of

agreement in writing'' for the transaction of certain kinds of business
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to organize in a manner prescribed, and thereby to become a corpo-

ration; and the court were of opinion that written articles of agree-

ment were essential to constitute a corporation, and that these articles

must fix the amount of the capital stock, and set forth distinctly the

purpose for which and the place in which the corporation was estab-

lished. The court say, "There is an obvious reason for making such

organization by written articles of agreement a condition precedent to

the exercise of corporate rights. It is the basis on which all the sub-

sequent proceedings are to rest, and is designed to take the place of a

charter or act of incorporation, by which corporate rights and privi-

leges are usually granted." And they add that "it is not a case of a

defective organization under a charter or act of incorporation, nor of

erroneous proceedings after the necessary steps were taken to the as-

sumption of corporate powers, but there is an absolute want of proof

that any corporation was ever called into being which had the power

of contracting debts or of rendering persons liable therefor as stock-

holders."

We think these reasons have no application to the case now before

us. In this, there was an act of incorporation from the legislature.

There is no question that the corporate powers which it conferred

were assumed by the persons by whom it was intended that they

should be enjoyed, so far as they chose to avail themselves of them.

The organization was not strictly regular, but can hardly be consid-

ered even as defective.

And if the object of the statute is regarded, by -which it is required

that the first meeting shall be called by a majority of the -persons

named in the act of incorporation, it will be evident that it is direc-

tory merely, and only designed to secure the rights conferred by the

charter to those to whom it was granted, among themselves, by pro-

viding an orderly method of organization. Thus, if all the persons

HoAR, J. The defense to this action rests wholly upon the a ssumption that the corporation, whose officers the plaintiff seeks to
charge with a statute liability for its debts, never had a legal existence.
The only defect suggested in the organization of the corporation is,
that the call for the first meeting was signed by only one of the persons named in the act of incorporation, and not by a majority of them,
as required by Statutes 1855, ch. 140.
The case of Utely v. Union Tool Company, r 1 Gray 139, is the
authority on which the defendants chiefly rely. That case decided
that in order to charge as stockholders of a manufacturing corporatioq
persons who had been summoned in an action against it under Statutes
1851, ch. 315, the plaintiff must prove the legal existence of the corporation.
The alleged corporation had no charter or act of incorporation
from the legislature, but was an association which had undertaken to
assume corporate powers under a general act for the formation of
joint stock companies. Statutes of 1851, ch. 133. That statute authorized three or more persons who had entered into "articles of
agreement in writing'' for the transaction of certain kinds of business
to organize in a manner prescribed, and thereby to become a corporation; and the court were of opinion that written articles of agreement were essential to constitute a corporation, and that these articles
must fix the amount of the capital stock, and set forth distinctly the
purpose for which and the place in which the corporation was established. The court say, "There is an obvious reason for making such
organization by written articles of agreement a condition prect!dent to
the exercise of corporate rights. It is the basis on which all the subsequent proceedings are to rest, and is d esigned to take the pl ace of a
charter or act of incorporation, by which corporate rights and privileges are usually granted." And they add that "it is not a case of a
defective organization under a charter or act of incorporation, nor of
erroneous pr<?ceedings after the necessary steps were taken to the assumption of corporate powers, but there is an absolute want of proof
that any corporation was ever called into being which had the power
of contracting debts or of rendering persons liable therefor a s stockholders."
We think these reasons have no application to the case now before
us. In this, there was an act of incorporation from the legislature.
There is no question that the corporate powers which it conferred
were assumed by the persons by whom it was intended that they
should be enjoyed, so far as they chose to avail themselves of them.
The organization was not strictly regular, but can hardly be considered even as defective.
And' if the object of the statute i's regarded, by whi"ch £ti's requfred
that the first meetz"ng shall be called by a major#y of the persons
named in the act of incorporatz"on, £twill be evident that it i's dfrectory merely, and only des£gned to secure the rights conferred by the
charter to those to whom it was granted, among themselves, by provt"ding an orderly method of organizatt"on. Thus, if all the persons
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interested should come together without any notice or call -whatever,

and proceed to accept the charter, and do the other necessary acts to

§ I 52

HOLMAN V. THE STATE .

590

constitute the corporation, we can not doubt that their action would

be valid, and that neither the public, nor any persons not belonging

interested should come together without any no#ce or call whatever,
and proceed to accept the charter, and do the other necessary acts to
constitute the corpo1'att'on, we can not doubt that their action would
be vali'd, and that net'ther the public, nor any persons not belonging
to the associatt'on, would have any interest to question their proceedings.
The purpose of the statute was probably to avoid such difficulties
as were disclosed in the case of Lech mere Bank v . Boynton, 11 Cush.
369, where two parties had attempted to organize separately under
the same charter, each claiming to be the corporation.
' There is nothing in the facts found and reported to show that all
persons interested were not actually notified of the meeting for organization. On the contrary, it would seem that they were. No one
.has questioned the regularity of the proceedings, or claimed, as in
Lechmcre Bank v. Boynton, a right to organize in a different manner.
The evidence was ample to show that the persons named in the act
of incorporation, with their associates, or at least all of them who
desired to do so, have accepted the act, organized under it, issued
stock, elected officers who have acted and served in that capacity,
carried on business, contracted d ebts, and exercised all the functions
of corporate existence. It is therefore too late to deny that the corporation ever had any legal existence, or for these officers to avoid
the liabilities which the statutes of the commonwealth impose.
The defendant, Brackett, who was treasurer in February, i861, appears to have been liable with the directors, under the provisions of
Gen. Stat., ch. 6o, sections 18, 20, 31.
Exceptions sustained.

to the association, would have any interest to question their proceed-

ings.

The purpose of the statute was probably to avoid such difficulties

as were disclosed in the case of Lechmere Bank v. Boynton, n Cush.

369, where two parties had attempted to organize separately under

the same charter, each claiming to be the corporation.

There is nothing in the facts found and reported to show that all

persons interested were not actually notified of the meeting for organ-

ization. On the contrary, it would seem that they were. No one

has questioned the regularity of the proceedings, or claimed, as in

Lechmere Bank v. Boynton, a right to organize in a different manner.

The evidence was ample to show that the persons named in the act

of incorporation, with their associates, or at least all of them who

desired to do so, have accepted the act, organized under it, issued

stock, elected officers who have acted and served in that capacity,

carried on business, contracted debts, and exercised all the functions
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of corporate existence. It is therefore too late to deny that the cor-

poration ever had any legal existence, or for these officers to avoid

the liabilities which the statutes of the commonwealth impose.

The defendant, Brackett, who was treasurer in February, 1861, ap-

pears to have been liable with the directors, under the provisions of

Gen. Stat., ch. 60, sections 18, 20, 31.

Exceptions sustained.

Sec. 152. Same.

Or mandatory, which may be,

(1) Implied—good faith in securing corporate privileges from

the state.

HOLMAN v. THE STATE.

1885. In the Supreme Court of Indiana. 105 Ind. Rep. 569-574.

From the Huntington circuit court.

Mitchell, J. The state, by an information in the nature of a quo

warranto, charged that William J. Holman and ten others were as-

Sec. 152. Same.

suming to act as a corporation under the name of the Fort Wayne,

Warren and Brazil Railway Company; that, as such corporation, they

( d) Or mandatory, which may be,

were making contracts, incurring debts, soliciting aid from townships,

towns and cities, making surveys, appropriating lands, etc., without

( 1) Implied-good faith in securing corporate privileges from
the state.

any warrant or authority of law. They were challenged to Show by

what authority they assumed so to act.

By a special answer the defendants admitted that they were acting

HOLMAN v. THE STATE.

1885.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF INDIANA.

105 Ind.

Rep.

569--574.

From the Huntington circuit court.
MITCHELL, J.
The state, by an information in the nature of a quo
warranto, charged that William J. Holman and ten others were assuming to act as a corporation under the name of the Fort Wayne,
Warren and Brazil Railway Company; that, as such corporation, they
were making contracts , incurring debts, soliciting aid from townships,
towns and cities, making surveys, appropriating lands, etc., without
any warrant or authority of law. They were challenged to ~how by
what authority they assumed so to act.
By a special answer the defendants admitted that they were acting
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as a railway corporation, and alleged that they were duly organized

and incorporated under the law. With their answer they exhibited a

copy of their articles of association, which they averred had been duly
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filed in the office of the secretary of state. Upon the articles thus ex-

hibited, it appeared that fifteen persons had each subscribed for $3,400

of the capital stock, the whole amount of which was fixed at $60,000.

The reply was filed admitting the signing and filing of the articles

of association and the subscription to the stock. It was, however,

averred that many of the subscribers to the stock were, at the time of

making such subscriptions, wholly and notoriously insolvent, and

made no pretense of being able to pay their subscriptions, and that

others of such subscribers were not worth half the amount subscribed

by them; that the solicitor of the subscriptions and promoter of the

corporation was a subscriber to the stock, was wholly and notoriously

insolvent himself, and knew of the insolvency of many of the other

subscribers; that one of the subscribers, in addition to being insolvent

at the time of making his subscription, was also a minor, which was

known to the promoters of the scheme. It was further charged that

the capital stock had not been subscribed in good faith, but that the

subscriptions were received for the purpose of securing a colorable
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organization to be made on paper. Evidence was offered tending to

prove the averments contained in the reply. A judgment of forfeiture

was rendered.

The statute providing for the organization of railroad corporations

enacts, in substance, that whenever stock to the amount of at least

$50,000, or $1,000 for each and every mile of the proposed road shall

have been subscribed, any number of the subscribers, not less than

fifteen, may, under certain regulations prescribed, form a railroad

corporation.

The question presented for consideration is, must the $50,000 of

stock, which is required to be subscribed as a condition precedent to

the organization, be subscribed in good faith by persons who had a

reasonable expectation that they will be able to pay, or will sub-

scriptions, some of which are merely simulated, fulfill the purposes of

the statute?

Where the information is against the corporation eo nomine, an in-

quiry such as that proposed can not be made. In such a case, the

bringing of the suit against the corporation in its corporate name is

an admission of its corporate existence, and it is not necessary for the

corporation to show that it had performed the conditions precedent to

its corporate existence. High Extra., L. Rem., section 661. So,

also, where the question of the regularity of the organization is made

in collateral proceeding, it is not admissible to show the insolvency

of the subscribers to the stock. It was accordingly held, in Miller v.

Wild Cat Gravel Road Co., 52 Ind. 51, that, in a suit upon an uncon-

ditional subscription of stock, evidence of the insolvency of some of

the subscribers was immaterial.

There are cases which hold that an assessment against a subscriber

to stock can not be collected until, at least, the minimum amount

as a railway corporation, and alleged that they were duly organized
and incorporated under the law. With their answer they exhibited a
copy of their articles of association, which they averred had been duly
filed in the office of the secretary of state. Upon the articles thus exhibited, it appeared that fifteen persons had each subscribed for $3 1400
of the capital stock, the whole amount of wh1ch was fixed at $6o,ooo.
The reply was filed admitting the signing and filing of the articles
of association and the subscription to the stock. It was, however,
averred that many of the subscribers to the stock were, at the time of
making such subscriptions, wholly and notoriously insolvent, and
made no pretense of being able to pay their subscriptions, and that
others of such subscribers were not worth half the amount subscribed
by them; that the solicitor of the subscriptions and promoter of the
corporation was a subscriber to the stock, was wholiy and notoriously
insolvent himself, and knew of the insolvency of many of the other
subscribers; that one of the subscribers, in addition to being insolvent
at the time of making his subscription, was also a minor, which was.
koown to the promoters of the scheme. It was further charged that
the capital stock had not been subscribed in good faith, but that the
subscriptions were received for the pmpose of securing a colorable
organization to be made on paper. Evidence was offered tending to
prove the averments contained in the reply. A judgment of forfeiture
was rendered.
·
The statute providing for the organization of railroad corporations
enacts, in substance, that whenever stock to the amount of at least
$50,000, or $ 1 ,ooo for each and every mile of the proposed road shall
have been subscribed. any number of the subscribers, not less than
fifteen, may, under certain regulations prescribed, form a railroad
corporation.
The question presented for consideration is, must the $50,000 of
stock, which is required to be subscribed as a condition precedent to
the organization, be subscribed in good faith by persons who had a
reasonable expectation that they will be able to pay, or will subscriptions, some of which are merely simulated, fulfill the purposes of
the statute?
Where the information is against the corporation eo nomine, an inquiry such as that proposed can not be made. In such a case, the
bringing of the suit against the corporation in its corporate name is
an admission of its corporate existence, and it is not necessary for the
corporation to show that it had performed the conditions precedent to
itc; corporate existence. High Extra., L. Rem., section 661. So,
also, where the question of the regularity of the organization is made
in collateral proceeding, it is not admissible to show the insolvency
of the subscribers to the stock. It was accordingly held , in Miller v.
Wild Cat Gravel Road Co., 52 Ind. 5 1, that, in a suit upon an unconditional subscription of stock, evidence of the insolvency of some of
the subscribers was immaterial.
There are cases which hold that an assessment against a subscriber
to stock can not be collected until, at least, the minimum amount

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

592

HOLMAN V. THE STATE.

592

required by the statute has been subscribed by persons apparently

HOLMAN V. THE STATE.

§ 15z

able to pay for the shares subscribed. In such cases, the subscrip-

required by the statute has been subscribed by persons apparently
able to pay for the shares subscribed. In such cases, the subscrip·
tions of insolvent persons, infants and married women, are not
counted. Lewey's Island R. Co. v. Bolton, 48 Maine 4s1; Phillips
v. Covington, etc., Bridge Co., 2 Met. (Ky.) 219; Morawetz, Corp.,
§ 279; Pierce, Railroads, p. SS and notes.
The fact that some of the subscribers to the stock of a corporation
became insolvent after such subscriptions were made , will not of itself support an information in the nature of a quo warranto. State,
ex rel., v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46.
The case before us is an information by the state challenging the
right of certain individuals to act as a corporation, and. asserting that
by reason of the colorable character of the subscriptions they never
became an incorporation. It is therefore a direct inquiry on behalf
of the state, calling upon the individuals named to show by what
authority they assume to act as a corporation.
In such a case, while it may be sufficient, prima facie, to show the
filing of articles of association and a subscription of the mini um amount
of stock required by law, we do not think such showing is conclusi\'e
upon the state. It is true tlte statute does not in terms prescribe that
.tlie subscriptt'ons must have been made in good fat'th , or that the s1,IJ.
scribers must have been at the time of making their subscriptifms
solvent, and apparently able to pay.
But t't must be implied that, at least between the state and the
persons to wlzom the privilege of erecting themselves into a corpora·
tion is granted, good faith and fai·r d ealt'ng should be observed.
Merely simulated subscriptions, made by persons who are neither
actually nor apparently able to pay the amount subscribed, can not
answer the purpose of the statute. Such subscriptions are shams, and
are to be denounced as a fraud upon the law. They are an attempt
to acquire corporate functions , not by a compliance with the law. but
by a disingenuous evasion of it. J ersey City Gas Co. v. Dwight, 29
N. J. Eq. 242.
Such subscriptions must stand upon the same basis, and be deter·
mined upon the same considerations that govern any other business
transaction.
It can not be doubted that a person may in good faith become a
subscriber to the stock of a corporation, as he may become the pur·
chaser of goods, for a sum larger than he is then able to pay, and
more than he is at the time actually worth in property. But such a
subscriber must have subscribed in good faith, with a reasonable ex·
pectation and apparent prospect of being able to pay assessments on
his stock as they might thereafter be called for.
Where, however, a subscriber is both insolvent and has no prospect
or expectation of being able to pay, and such subscription is taken
with knowledge , it can not be counted in making up the minimum
required by statute.
When the articles of association were tendered with a subscription
of $so,ooo to the capital stock by fifteen persons, it was a represent·

tions of insolvent persons, infants and married women, are not

counted. Lewey's Island R. Co. v. Bolton, 48 Maine 451; Phillips

v. Covington, etc., Bridge Co., 2 Met. (Ky.) 219; Morawetz, Corp.,

§ 279; Pierce, Railroads, p. 55 and notes.

The fact that some of the subscribers to the stock of a corporation

became insolvent after such subscriptions were made, will not of it-

self support an information in the nature of a quo warranto. State,

ex rel., v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46.

The case before us is an information by the state challenging the

right of certain individuals to act as a corporation, and asserting that

by reason of the colorable character of the subscriptions thev never

became an incorporation. It is therefore a direct inquiry on behalf

of the state, calling upon the individuals named to show by what

authority they assume to act as a corporation.

In such a case, while it may be sufficient, prima facie, to show the

filing of articles of association and a subscription of the minium amount

of stock required by law, we do not think such showing is conclusive
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upon the state. It is true the statute does not in terms prescribe that

the subscriptions must have been made in good faith, or that the sub-

scribers must have been at the time of making their subscriptions

solvent, and apparently able to pay.

But it must be implied that, at least between the state and the

persons to whom the privilege of erecting themselves into a corpora-

tion is granted, good faith and fair dealing should be observed.

Merely simulated subscriptions, made by persons who are neither

actually nor apparently able to pay the amount subscribed, can not

answer the purpose of the statute. Such subscriptions are shams, and

are to be denounced as a fraud upon the law. They are an attempt

to acquire corporate functions, not by a compliance with the law. but

by a disingenuous evasion of it. Jersey City Gas Co. v. Dwight, 29

N. J. Eq. 242.

Such subscriptions must stand upon the same basis, and be deter-

mined upon the same considerations that govern any other business

transaction.

It can not be doubted that a person may in good faith become a

subscriber to the stock of a corporation, as he may become the pur-

chaser of goods, for a sum larger than he is then able to pay, and

more than he is at the time actually worth in property. But such a

subscriber must have subscribed in good faith, with a reasonable ex-

pectation and apparent prospect of being able to pay assessments on

his stock as they might thereafter be called for.

Where, however, a subscriber is both insolvent and has no prospect

or expectation of being able to pay, and such subscription is taken

with knowledge, it can not be counted in making up the minimum

required by statute.

When the articles of association were tendered with a subscription

of $50,000 to the capital stock by fifteen persons, it was a represent-
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ation that that amount was pledged and available as necessity might

CONDI!IONS OF DE JURE EXISTENCE.

require. Upon the faith of that representation the state authorized
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the persons making it to assume the functions and franchises of a cor-

poration.

On the same principle that one individual may reclaim his prop-

erty which has been sold to another, who is insolvent, and who had

at the time no intention to pay, or prospect of being able to pay for

it, the state may reclaim the privilege granted by it under like circum-

stances.

Standing by until important interests were acquired by the corpora-

tion might estop the state, or lapse of time might cure the defect in

the organization. State, ex rel., v. Gordon, 87 Ind. 171. Nothing'

of that kind is either pleaded or proved in this case.

It is abundantly established by the evidence that most of the sub-

scribers to the stock had not only neither the ability, actual or appar-

ent, at the time they subscribed, to pay any calls; but it appears

further that they had no purpose or expectation that they would be

called upon to pay, or that they could pay anything if called upon.

As a condition to its assent to the grant of corporate powers to a
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railway company, the state requires that an available capital of at

least $50,000 shall be provided as a security for persons with whom

the corporation proposes to transact business, and as a guaranty that

it will prosecute the proposed work. If obtaining merely feigned sub-

scriptions puts it beyond the power of the state to withdraw its assent,

then it is within the power of designing persons to obtain the franchise

of a corporation by a merely pretended compliance with the law, and

by that means exclude others who might execute a beneficial public

improvement, while the existing corporation is wholly unable to do

anything except to harass those who may be induced to deal with it.

We think the evidence sufficiently shows that the defendants held

themselves out as a corporation.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Zollars, J., did not participate in the decision of this case.

Filed March 12, 1886.

Note. See, 1863, Pateraon v. Arnold, 45 Pa. St. 410; 1878, Jersey City Gas

Co. v. Dwight, 29 N. J. Eq. 242; 1888, Williams v. Evans, 87 Ala. 725; 1892,

State v. Webb, 97 Ala. Ill, 38 Am. St. Rep. 151. But see, 1898, Bristol Bank &

T. Co. v. Jonesboro B. & T. Co., 101 Tenn. 545, 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas.

(N. S.) 790. See, also, Clark, pp. 86-94; Elliott, §§ 38-44; Thompson, §§ 226,

227.

38—Wil. Casbs.

ation that that amount was pledged and available as necessity might
require. Upon the faith of that representation the state authorized
the persons making it to assume the functions and franchises of a corporation.
On the same principle that one individual may reclaim his property which has been sold to another, who is insolvent, and who had
at the time no intention to pay, or prospect of being able to pay for
it, the state may reclaim the privilege granted by it under like circumstances.
Standing by until important interests were acquired by the corporation might estop the state, or lapse of time might cure the defect in
the organization. State, ex rel., v. Gordon, 87 Ind. 171. Nothing'
of that kind is either pleaded or proved in this case.
It is abundantly established by the evidence that most of the subscribers to the stock had not only neither the ability, actual or apparent, at the time they subscribed, to pay any calls; but it appears
further that they had no purpose or expectation that they would be
called upon to pay, or that they could pay anything if called upon.
As a condition to its assent to the grant of corporate powers to a
railway company, the state requires that an available capital of at
least $50,000 shall be provided as a security for persons with whom
the corporation proposes to transact business, and as a guaranty that
it will prosecute the proposed work. If obtaining merely feigned subscriptions puts it beyond the power of the state to withdraw its assent,
then it is within the power of designing persons to obtain the franchise
of a corporation by a merely pretended compliance with the law, and
by that means exclude others who might execute a beneficial public
improvement, while the existing corporation is wholly unable to do
anything except to harass those who may be induced to deal with it.
We think the evidence sufficiently shows that the defendants held
themselves out as a corporation.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
ZoLLARS, J., did not participate in the decision of this case.
Filed March 12, 1886.
Note. See, 1863, Paterson v. Arnold, 45 Pa. St. 410; 1878, Jersey City Gae
Co. v. Dwight, 29 N . J. Eq. 242; 1888, Williams v. Evans, 87 Ala. 725; 1892,
St.ate v. Webb, 97 Ala. 111, 38 Am. St. Rep. 151. But see, 1898, Bristol Bank &
T. Co. v. Jonesboro B. & T . Co., 101 Tenn. 545, 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Caa.
(N. S .) 790. See, also, Clark, pp. 86-94; Elliott, §§ 38--44; Thompson, §§ 226,
227.
38-WIL. CAB.BS.
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Sec. 153. Same. (2) Express.

(a) A certain number of incorporators.

MONTGOMERY and Another v. FORBES.

Sec. 153. Same.

1889. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 148

( 2) Express.

Mass. Rep. 249-253, 19 N. E. Rep. 342.

(a) A certain number of incorporators.

Contract to recover the price of goods sold and delivered.

At the trial in the superior court, before Dewey, J., the only ques-

MONTGOMERY

tion was whether the goods were sold to a corporation called the

AND ANOTHXR

v. FORBES.

Forbes Woolen Mills, or to the defendant doing business under that

name. The plaintiffs introduced evidence tending to show that sub-

1889.

IN

sequently to May, 1885, they received an order for the goods by a

THE SUPREME JumcIAL CouRT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

1"8

Mass. Rep. 249-253, 19 N. E. Rep. 342.

letter, written upon paper with the printed heading, "Incorporated

1885. Forbes Woolen Mills. George E. Forbes, Treasurer,"

Contract to recover the price of goods sold and delivered.
At the trial in the superior court, before Dewey, J., the only question was whether the goods were sold to a corporation called the
Forbes Woolen Mills, or to the defendant doing business under that
name. The plaintiffs introduced evidence tending to show that subsequently to May, 1885, they received an order for the goods by a
letter, written upon paper with the printed heading, "Incorporated
1885. Forbes Woolen Mills. George E. Forbes, Treasurer,' '
signed "Forbes Woolen Mills, by George E. Forbes, Treasurer:"
that they thereupon shipped the goods to the Forbes Woolen Mills
and received in payment thereof three promissory notes, together
equal to the price of the goods, signed "Forbes Woolen Mills, by
George E. Forbes, Treasurer;" that when they sold the goods and
took the notes, they understood from their correspondence with the
defendant, as well as from information gained from a commercial
agency, that the Forbes Woolen Mills were a corporation, and made
all charges on their books against them as a corporation, and took the
notes from the defendant as the notes of a corporation; and that
after they sold the goods and received the notes they became satii:.fied
that there was no such a corporation as the Forbes Woolen Mills;
and contended that they were entitled to recover the price of the goods
from the defendant personally.
The defendant contended that the Forbes Woolen Mills was a
corporation, and testified that he purchased the goods as treasurer of
the Forbes Woolen Mills, but admitted that they had not been paid
for except by the notes, which themselves had not been paid: that in
May, 1885, for the purpose of limiting his personal responsibility,
and because the tax laws of New Hampshire were more favorable to
corporations than the Massachusetts laws, he went to Nashua, N. H.,
to form a corporation for the manufacture of woolen goods; that he
employed an attorney at law of Nashua to incorporate the company
in a legal and proper manner, under the laws of the state, and sub equently paid him for his services and disbursements in the premises;
that he went to Nashua again, and, with the attorney and three other
persons, selected and secured by the attorney, signed and executed an
agreement of association, which was dated May 6, 1885 , and was
duly recorded in the office of the secretary of state of New Hamp$hire
on May 12 , 1885, and in the office of the clerk of the city of Nashua
on May 13, 1885, and recited that the subscribers associated them·

signed "Forbes Woolen Mills, by George E. Forbes, Treasurer:"

that they thereupon shipped the goods to the Forbes Woolen Mills

and received in payment thereof three promissory notes, together

equal to the price of the goods, signed "Forbes Woolen Mills, by

George E. Forbes, Treasurer;" that when they sold the goods and
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took the notes, they understood from their correspondence with the

defendant, as well as from information gained from a commercial

agency, that the Forbes Woolen Mills were a corporation, and made

all charges on their books against them as a corporation, and took the

notes from the defendant as the notes of a corporation; and that

after they sold the goods and received the notes they became satisfied

that there was no such a corporation as the Forbes Woolen Mills;

and contended that they were entitled to recover the price of the goods

from the defendant personally.

The defendant contended that the Forbes Woolen Mills was a

corporation, and testified that he purchased the goods as treasurer of

the Forbes Woolen Mills, but admitted that they had not been paid

for except by the notes, which themselves had not been paid: that in

May, 1885, for the purpose of limiting his personal responsibility,

and because the tax laws of New Hampshire were more favorable to

corporations than the Massachusetts laws, he went to Nashua, N. H.,

to form a corporation for the manufacture of woolen goods; that he

employed an attorney at law of Nashua to incorporate the company

in a legal and proper manner, under the laws of the state, and subse-

quently paid him for his services and disbursements in the premises;

that he went to Nashua again, and, with the attorney and three other

persons, selected and secured by the attorney, signed and executed an

agreement of association, which was dated May 6, 1885. and was

duly recorded in the office of the secretary of state of New Hampshire

on May 12, 1885, and in the office of the clerk of the city of Nashua

on May 13, 1885, and recited that the subscribers associated them-

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 153 CONDITIONS OF DE JURE EXISTENCE. 595

selves for the purpose of forming a corporation, to be called the

Forbes Woolen Mills, the amount of the capital stock to be twenty

thousand dollars, divided into four hundred shares of fifty dollars

§ I 53
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each; and that the object of the corporation was to manufacture and

sell woolen and other goods, and the places of business were Nashua,

in New Hampshire, and East Brookfield, in Massachusetts.

The defendant further testified that, subsequently to the execution

of the agreement of association, one or more meetings were held by

the signers, at which he was elected president and treasurer of the

corporation, and such other officers and directors were elected

as were necessary under the laws of New Hampshire; that the attor-

ney had been recommended to him as a reputable and reliable man

and attorney, and he left everything in his hands, and supposed he

did everything necessary and proper to establish the corporation in a

legal manner; that records of the meetings were kept by the attorney,

and that there was a stock-book, and certificates of stock were issued;

that all the stock was issued to the defendant, and that no other per-

son was interested in it; that fifty per cent, of the capital stock of the

corporation was actually paid in by him in cash and supplies; that

after the organization of the corporation he hired, as treasurer of the
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corporation, a mill in East Brookfield belonging to his mother, Rox-

anna Forbes, and himself, and began the manufacture of woolen goods;

that he purchased the necessary supplies, including those named in

the plaintiff's account, and placed them under the direction of a

superintendent, employed to supervise the manufacture of the goods;

that there was no manufacturing done in Nashua, nor any other business

except the holding of corporate meetings, and possibly the sale now

and then of a bill of goods in the ordinary course of business; and

that the principal place of business of the corporation was in East

Brookfield; that he, as president and treasurer of the corporation,

continued to manufacture woolen goods for about four months, and

sent the goods to commission houses in New York to be sold; and

that at the end of said four months he was unable to continue the

•business and gave it up, and no further business was done by him or

by the corporation.

The following sections of chapter 152 of the General Laws of New

Hampshire of 1878 were introduced in evidence:

"Section 1. Any five or more persons of lawful age may, by written

articles of agreement, associate themselves together for agricultural,

educational or charitable purposes, or for carrying on any lawful busi-

ness, except banking and the construction and maintenance of a rail-

road; and when such articles have been executed and recorded in the

office of the clerk of the town in which the principal business is to be

carried on, and in that of the secretary of state, they shall be a corpora-

tion, and such corporation, its officers and stockholders, shall have all

the rights and powers and be subject to all the duties and liabilities

of similar corporations, their officers and stockholders, except so far

as the same are limited or enlarged by this chapter.

"Sec. 2. The object for which the corporation is established, the

selves for the purpose of forming a corporation, to be called the
Forbes \¥ oolen Mills, the amount of the capital stock to be twt:nty
thousand dollars, divided into four hundred shares of fifty dollars
each; and that the object of the corporation was to manufacture and
sell woolen and other goods, and the places of business were Nashua,
in New Hampshire, and East Brookfield, in Massachusetts.
The defendant further testified that, subsequently to the execution
of the agreement of association, one or more meetings were held by
the signers, at which he was elected president and treasurer of the
corporation, and such other officers and directors were elected
as were necessary under the laws of New Hampshire; that the attorney had been recommended to him as a reputable and reliable man
and attorney, and he left everything in his hands, and supposed he
did everything necessary and proper to establish the corporation in a
legal manner; that records of the meetings were kept by the attorney,
and that there was a stock-book, and certificates of stock were issued;
that all the stock was issued to the defendant, and that no other person was interested in it; that fifty per cent. of the capital stock of the
corporation was actually paid in by him in cash and supplies; that
after the organization of the corporation he hired, as treasurer of the
corporation, a mill in East Brookfield belonging to his mother, Roxanna Forbes, and himself, and began the manufacture of woolen goods;
that he purchased the necessary supplies, including those named in
the plaintiff's account, and placed them under the direction of a
superintendent, employed to supervise the manufacture of the goods;
that there was no manufacturing done in Nashua, nor any other business
except the holding of corporate meetings, and possibly the sale now
and then of a bill of goods in the ordinary course of business; and
that the principal place of business of the corporation was in East
Brookfield; that he, as president and treasurer of the corporation,
continued to manufacture woolen goods for about four months, and
sent the goods to commission houses in New York to be sold; and
that at the end of c;aid four months he was unable to continue the
.business and gave it up, and no further business was done by him or
by the corporation.
The following sections of chapter 152 of the General Laws of New
Hampshire of 1878 were introduced in evidence:
"Section 1. Any five or more persons of lawful age may, by written
articles of agreement, associate themselves together for agricultural,
educational or charitable purposes, or for carrying on any lawful business, except banking and the construction and maintenance of a railroad ; and when such articles have been executed and recorded in the
office of the clerk of the town in which the principal business is to be
carried on, and in that of the secretary of state, they shall be a corporation, and such corporation, its officers and stockholders, shall have all
the rights and powers and be subject to all the duties and liabilities
of similar corporations, their officers and stockholders, except so far
as the same are limited or enlarged by this chapter.
"Sec. 2. The object for which the corporation is established, the
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place in which its business is to be carried on, and the amount of cap-
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ital stock to be paid in, shall be distinctly set forth in its articles of

agreement."

place in which .its business is to be carried on, and the amount of capital stock to be paid in, shall be distinctly set forth in its articles of
agreement.''
_
Upon this evidence the defendant asked the judge to rule that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to recover, that the account in question had
been paid by the notes of the Forbes Woolen Mills as a corporation,
and that there was no evidence to authorize the jury to find for the
plaintiffs.
The judge declined so to rule, and submitted the following questions to the jury: "1. Did the Forbes Woolen Mills and the members of the said alleged corporation, including said Forbes, at the time
of its attempted organization, intend to carry on its business as a
manufacturing corporation (other than holding meetings of its members and officers) in whole or in part, in the city of Nashua, N. H.?
2. Was there any attempt in good faith on the part of the defendant,
Forbes, to organize the corporation of the Forbes Woolen Mills?
3d. Did said Forbes at and prior to the time the goods in controversy
were ordered, namely, at all times after May 12, 1885, during his
dealings with the plaintiff, believe that the organization of said Forbes
Woolen Mills was a valid corporation?"
.
The jury answered the first two questions in the negative and the
third in the affirmative.
The judge, being of the opinion that, upon the findings of the jury
and the uncontradicted evidence in the case, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, directed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiffs,
and reported the case for the determination of this court.
C. Ar.LEN, J. The apparent corporation was not a corporation.
Tlte statute of New Hampshfre requires five assoc£ates, and the
arti'cles of agreement must be recorded in the town in which the principal business i's to be carried on, and tlte place in which the business
is to be carri'ed on must be dt'stinctly stated in the articles; otherwt'se
tltere i's no corporatt'on. The defendant's pretended assoc£ates were
assoc£ates only in name; he alone was interested t'n the enterprise.
The articles of agreement were recorded in Nashua, and stated thatthe business was to be carried on there; but it was not in fact carried
on there, and was not intended to be. The defendant took all the
shares of the capital stock, and pai~ into himself as treasurer only
50 per cent. of the amount thereof. This t's not a case where there
has been a defective organizatt'on of a corporatt'on which has a legal
existence tender a valt'd charter. Here there was no corporatt'on. It
was just the same as if the defendant had done nothing at all in the
way of establt'shing a corporati'on, but had conducted his business
ttnder the name of the Forbes Woolen Mills, callt'ng it a corporation.
The business was his personal business, which he transacted under
that name. Fuller v. Hooper, 3 Gray 334, 341. Bryant v. Eastman,
7 Cush. r r 1.
The jury found that he did not, in good faith, attempt to organize the
corporation, but that he believed it to be a valid corporation. Bis
belief, in view of the facts of the case, is immaterial. Under this

Upon this evidence the defendant asked the judge to rule that the

plaintiffs were not entitled to recover, that the account in question had

been paid by the notes of the Forbes Woolen Mills as a corporation,

and that there was no evidence to authorize the jury to find for the

plaintiffs.

The judge declined so to rule, and submitted the following ques-

tions to the jury: "i. Did the Forbes Woolen Mills and the mem-

bers of the said alleged corporation, including said Forbes, at the time

of its attempted organization, intend to carry on its business as a

manufacturing corporation (other than holding meetings of its mem-

bers and officers) in whole or in part, in the city of Nashua, N. H.?

2. Was there any attempt in good faith on the part of the defendant,

Forbes, to organize the corporation of the Forbes Woolen Mills?

3d. Did said Forbes at and prior to the time the goods in controversy

were ordered, namely, at all times after May 12, 1885, during his

dealings with the plaintiff, believe that the organization of said Forbes
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Woolen Mills was a valid corporation?"

The jury answered the first two questions in the negative and the

third in the affirmative.

The judge, being of the opinion that, upon the findings of the jury

and the uncontradicted evidence in the case, the plaintiffs were en-

titled to recover, directed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiffs,

and reported the case for the determination of this court.

C. Allen, J. The apparent corporation was not a corporation.

The statute of New Hampshire requires Jive associates, and the

articles of agreement must be recorded in the town in which the prin-

cipal business is to be carried on, and the place in which the business

is to be carried on must be distinctly stated in the articles; otherwise

there is no corporation. The defendant''s pretended associates were

associates only in name; he alone was interested in the enterprise.

The articles of agreement were recorded in Nashua, and stated thatr

the business was to be carried on there; but it was not in fact carried

on there, and was not intended to be. The defendant took all the

shares of the capital stock, and paid into himself as treasurer only

50 per cent, of the amount thereof. This is not a case where there

has been a defective organization of a corporation which has a legal

was just the same as if the defendant had done nothing at all in the

way of establishing a corporation, but had conducted his business

under the name of the Forbes Woolen Mills, calling it a corporation.

The business was his personal business, which he transacted under

that name. Fuller v. Hooper, 3 Gray 334, 341. Bryant v. Eastman,

7 Cush. in.

The jury found that he did not, in good faith, attempt to organize the

corporation, but that he believed it to be a valid corporation. His

belief, in view of the facts of the case, is immaterial. Under this
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state of things, the defendant bought goods of the plaintiffs for his
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own sole benefit, adopting the name of the apparent corporation,

which had no real existence, and which represented nobody but him-

self. He can not escape responsibility for his purchases by the device

of putting such a mere name between himself and the plaintiffs. The

purchase was in substance by and for himself alone. The plaintiffs

might have repudiated the transaction, and maintained replevin, if

they had learned the facts in time. They may also treat the transac-

tion as a sale to the defendant personally. Fay v. Noble, 7 Cush.

188, 194; Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. 174, 183, 185; 2 Kent

Com. (13th ed.) 630.

Since the notes represented nothing, the plaintiffs were at liberty to

treat them as void and recover on the original contract for goods sold.

Melledge v. Boston Iron Co., 5 Cush. 158, 171.

Verdict to stand.

Sec. 154. Same.

(6) Written articles of agreement.

UTLEY v. UNION TOOL COMPANY.

state of things, the defendant bought goods of the plaintiffs for his
own sole benefit, adopting the name of the apparent corporation,
which had no real existence, and which represented nobody but himself. He can not escape responsibility for his purchases by the device
-0f putting such a mere name between himself and the plaintiffs. The
purchase was in substance by and for himself alone. The plaintiffs
might have repudiated the transaction, and maintained replevin, if
they had learned the facts in time. They may also treat the transaction as a sale to the defendant personally. Fay v. Noble, 7 Cush.
188, 194; Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. 174, 183, 185; 2 Kent
Com. (13th ed.) 630.
Since the notes represented nothing, the plaintiffs were at liberty to
treat them as void and recover on the original contract for goods sold.
Melledge v. Boston Iron Co., 5 Cush. 158, 171.
Verdict to stand.
·
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1858. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, ii

Gray's (Mass.) Rep. 139-142.

Actions of contract against the Union Tool Company, described in

the writs as "a corporation established according to law, in Goshen,"

Sec. 154. Same.

in the county of Hampshire. The principal defendants were de-

( b) Written articles of agreement.

faulted, and several persons were summoned in as stockholders, pur-

suant to the statute of 1851, ch. 315, and filed answers, upon which

UTLEY v. UNION TOOL COMPANY.

trials were had in the court of common pleas in Hampshire.

The plaintiffs proposed to prove by the records of the Union Tool

IN

Company that the respondents were stockholders therein. The re-

THR SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

spondents objected to the admission of this evidence before the exist-

II

Gray's (Mass.) Rep. 139-142.

ence of the corporation had been shown, and unless it was shown that

it was a manufacturing corporation whose stockholders might become

liable as such for its debts. Morris, J., ruled that it was not necessary for

the plaintiffs to prove the existence of the corporation, that being ad-

mitted by the default, but that it was necessary to show that it was such a

corporation that its stockholders might become individually liable, and

admitted evidence that the company had made by-laws and done other

acts as a corporation, and the respondents had attended meetings as

stockholders, without proof that the company had ever been incorpo-

rated by the legislature, or by articles of association in writing, setting

forth the amount of the capital stock, and the purpose of their estab-

lishment, as required by the statute of 1851, ch. 133, §§ 1-3. Verdicts

were taken for the plaintiffs, and the respondents alleged exceptions.

The other facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.

Actions of contract against the Union Tool Company, described in
the writs as "a corporation established according to law, in Goshen,"
in the county of Hampshire. The principal defendants were defaulted, and several persons were summoned in as stockholders, pursuant to the statute of 1851, ch. 315, and filed answers, upon which
trials were had in the court of common pleas in Hampshire.
The plaintiffs proposed to prove by the records of the Union Tool
Company that the respondents were stockholders therein. The respondents objected to the admission of this evidence before the exist~nce of the corporation had been shown, and unless it was shown that
it was a manufacturing corporation whose stockholders might become
liable as such for its debts. Morris, J., ruled that it was not necessary for
the plaintiffs to prove the existence of the corporation, that being admitted by the default, but that it was necessary to show that it was such a
corporation that its stockholders might become individually liable, and
admitted evidence that the company had made by-laws and done other
acts as a corporation, and the respondents had attended meetings as
stockholders, without proof that the company had ever been incorporated by the legislature, or by a1ticles of association in writing, setting
forth the amount of the capital stock, and the purpose of their establishment, as required by the statute of 1851 , ch. 133, §§ 1-3. Verdicts
were taken for the plaintiffs, and the respondents alleged exceptions.
The other facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.
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These cases were argued at Northampton in September, 1858, and

UTLEY V. UNION TOOL CO.

decided at Boston in April, i860.

§ 154

Bigklow, J. There can be no doubt that the burden of proof was

These cases were argued at Northampton in September, 1858, and
decided at Boston in April, 186o.
BIGELOW, J.
There can be no doubt that the burden of proof was
on the plaintiffs, to show the legal existence of a corporation, of
which the persons summoned in the action were members, and for
the debts of which they were personally liable. This is the precise
issue which, by statute 1851 1 ch. 315, § 2, it was intended should be
open to a stockholder on his being admitted to defend the action as
therein provided. It is to be made to appear that he is liable in the
action; otherwise, he is entitled to judgment in his favor "upon the
issues joined." It has already been determined that under this provision an alleged stockholder can not he allowed to make a general
defense to an action against a corporation, by calling in question the
validity of the debt which is sought to be recovered, or disputing the
amount averred to be due, but that he has a right to a hearing and
adjudication on the question whether he is a member of a corporation
and liable as such for its debts. Holyoke Bank v. Goodman Paper
Mfg. Co., 9 Cush. 582. It is obvious that the trial of the issue which
is thus opened to an alleged stockholder necessarily involves the
question of the legal existence of the corporation, for the debt of
which he is sought to be charged, because his liability depends on the
nature of the corporate body and of the powers and duties with which
it was clothed by law. Until these are shown, it can not be known
whether the stockholder is legally chargeable or not. Doubtless there
may be cases where the existence of a corporation, and the character
and description of its functions and prh:ileges, may be shown by prescription or long user. In such case a charter or legislative grant of
co1porate powers may be presumed. But no such inference or presumption can exist in the present cases, nor do the plaintiffs attempt
to maintain their claims to charge the persons summoned on any such
ground. On the contrary, the whole case rests on the allegation that
the respondents are liable as stockholders in a corporation created and
established under the recent statute, entitled "an act relating to joint
stock ~ompanies." Statue 1851, ch. 133.
But it seems to us that the evidence offered at the trial fails to show
that the alleged corporation ever had any legal existence. By reference to the first section of the statute, it will be found that, in order
to establish a corporation under it, it is necessary that not less than
three persons should enter into "articles of agreement in writing,"
for the purpose of carrying on business of the nature specified in the
statute. By these articles it is provided, in sections 2 and 3, the
amount of capital stock shall be fixed and limited, and the purpose
for which and the place in which the corporation is to be established
shall be distinctly and definitely set forth. By section 4 1 it is further
provided that, before commencing business, a certificate shall be
made of the name, purpose, capital stock and other particulars concerning the constitution and objects of the corporation, to be published
and recorded as therein required. And by section 5 it is provided
th:1t, ""'·hen such persons are organized as aforesaid"-that is, by

on the plaintiffs, to show the legal existence of a corporation, of

which the persons summoned in the action were members, and for

the debts of which they were personally liable. This is the precise

issue which, by statute 1851, ch. 315, § 2, it was intended should be

open to a stockholder on his being admitted to defend the action as

therein provided. It is to be made to appear that he is liable in the

action; otherwise, he is entitled to judgment in his favor "upon the

issues joined." It has already been determined that under this pro-

vision an alleged stockholder can not be allowed to make a general

defense to an action against a corporation, by calling in question the

validity of the debt which is sought to be recovered, or disputing the

amount averred to be due, but that he has a right to a hearing and

adjudication on the question whether he is a member of a corporation

and liable as such for its debts. Holyoke Bank v. Goodman Paper

Mfg. Co., 9 Cush. 582. It is obvious that the trial of the issue which

is thus opened to an alleged stockholder necessarily involves the
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question of the legal existence of the corporation, for the debt of

which he is sought to be charged, because his liability depends on the

nature of the corporate body and of the powers and duties with which

it was clothed by law. Until these are shown, it can not be known

whether the stockholder is legally chargeable or not. Doubtless there

may be cases where the existence of a corporation, and the character

and description of its functions and privileges, may be shown by pre-

scription or long user. In such case a charter or legislative grant of

coiporate powers may be presumed. But no such inference or pre-

sumption can exist in the present cases, nor do the plaintiffs attempt

to maintain their claims to charge the persons summoned on any such

ground. On the contrary, the whole case rests on the allegation that

the respondents are liable as stockholders in a corporation created and

established under the recent statute, entitled "an act relating to joint

stock companies." Statue 1851, ch. 133.

But it seems to us that the evidence offered at the trial fails to show

that the alleged corporation ever had any legal existence. By refer-

ence to the first section of the statute, it will be found that, in order

to establish a corporation under it, it is necessary that not less than

three persons should enter into "articles of agreement in writing,"

for the purpose of carrying on business of the nature specified in the

statute. By these articles it is provided, in sections 2 and 3, the

amount of capital stock shall be fixed and limited, and the purpose

for which and the place in which the corporation is to be established

shall be distinctly and definitely set forth. By section 4, it is further

provided that, before commencing business, a certificate shall be

made of the name, purpose, capital stock and other particulars con-

cerning the constitution and objects of the corporation, to be published

and recorded as therein required. And by section 5 it is provided

that, "when such persons are organized as aforesaid"—that is, by
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restrictions and liabilities set forth in the thirty-eighth and forty-fourth

chapters of the Revised Statutes." There can be no doubt of the

construction which ought to be given to these provisions. The im-

plication is clear and unavoidable that, until the organization is

completed according to the requirements of the statute, the associa-

tion does not become a corporation, and does not possess corporate

rights or privileges, nor is it subject to the duties and liabilities of

a manufacturing corporation, among which is the liability of the

stockholders for the corporate debts, if certain provisions of law are

not complied with. There is an obvious reason for making such

organization by written articles of agreement a condition precedent

to the exercise of corporate rights. It is the basis on which all sub-

sequent proceedings are to rest, and is designed to take the place of

a charter or act of incorporation, by which corporate privileges are

usually granted. If there were no such requirement, there would be

an absence of any provisions by which the right to exercise corporate

power could be definitely fixed and established, and there would be
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no means of ascertaining the rights of stockholders or of persons

dealing with such associations.

Upon an examination of the evidence adduced at the trial, there is

nothing to show that any articles of agreement were ever entered into

for the formation of a corporation under the statute. That some or-

ganization took place with a view to establish a corporation is abun-

dantly shown. But the essential fact is wanting to show that the

persons engaged in the enterprise ever complied with the condition

precedent to their right to assume the name and functions of a corpora-

tion. It is not a case of a defective organization under a charter or

act of incorporation, nor of erroneous proceedings after the necessary

steps were taken to the assumption of corporate powers, but there

is an absolute want of proof that any corporation was ever called into

being which had the power of contracting debts or of rendering per-

sons liable therefor as stockholders.

We are not called on now to say whether the plaintiffs have any

remedy for the collection of their debt against those who participated

in the transactions connected with the attempted organization of the

supposed corporation. It is sufficient for the decision of this case

that the respondents can not be held liable in the action for the debts

of a corporation which has never had any legal existence.

Exceptions sustained.

articles of agreement as above set forth-' •they shall become a corporation , with all the powers and privileges and subject to all duties,
restrictions and liabilities set forth in the thirty-eighth and forty-fourth
chapters of the Revised Statutes." There can be no doubt of the
construction which ought to be given to these provisions. Tile i'mplicatz'on i's clear and unavoi'dable that, untz'l the organi'zatz'on is
completed accordi'ng to the requi'rements of the statute, the assodation does not become a corporati'on , and does not possess corporate
rig/its or pri'vileges, nor i's i't subject to the duti'es and lt'abi'lt'tz'es of
a manufacturi'ng corporati'on, among whi'ch i's tlte liab£lt'ty of the
stockholders for the corporate debts, if certai'n provi'si'ons of law are
not compli'ed with. There is an obvious reason for maki'ng such
organization by written articles of agreement a condt'tion preced ent
to the exerct'se of corporate rigMs. It i's the bast's on whiclt all subsequent proceedings are to rest, and is designed to take the place of
a charter or act of t'ncorporatz'on, by which corporate pri'vt'leges are
usually granted. If there were no such requfrement, there would be
an absence of any provt'st'ons by wliz"ch the right to exercise corporate
power could be dejint'tely fixed and established, and there would be
no means of ascertaining the rights of stockltolders or of p ersons
dealing wt'th such assocz'ations.
Upon an examination of the evidence adduced at the trial, there is
nothing to show that any articles of agreement were ever entered into
for the formation of a corporation under the statute. That some organization took place with a view to establish a corporation is abundantly shown. But the essential fact is wanting to show that the
persons engaged in the enterprise ever complied with the condition
precedent to their right to assume the name and functions of a corporation. It is not a case of a defective organization under a charter or
act of incorporation, nor of erroneou s proceedings after the necessary
steps were taken to the assumption of corporate powers, but there
is an absolute want of proof that any corporation was ever called into
being which had the power of contracting debts or of rendering persons liable therefor as stockholders.
We are not called on now to say whether the plaintiffs have any
remedy for the collection of their debt against those who participated
in the transactions connected with the attempted organization of the
supposed corporation. It is sufficient for the decision of this case
that the respondents can not be held liable in the action for the debts
of a corporation which has never had any legal existence.
Exceptions sustained.
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{c) Names and residence of subscribers to stock.

BUSENBACK V. ATTICA, ETC., GRAVEL ROAD CO.

§ I 55

BUSENBACK Et Al. v. THE ATTICA AND BETHEL GRAVEL ROAD

COMPANY.

Sec. 155. Same.

1873. In the Supreme Court of Indiana. 43 Ind. Rep.

265-271.

( c) Names and residence of subscribers to stock.

From the Fountain common pleas.

Buskirk, J. This was an action by the appellants to enjoin the

collection of certain assessments made for the construction of the At-

BUSENBACK ET AL. v. THE ATTICA AND BETHEL GRAVEL ROAD
COMPANY.

tica and Bethel Turnpike Company, upon the ground that the said

company had never been legally organized.

The single question presented by the record in this case is whether

1873.

it is essential to the legal existence of a corporation organized under

IN

THR

SuPREMR

CouRT

OF

INDIANA.

43 Ind. Rep.

265-271.

the act of May 12, 1852, "authorizing the construction of a plank,

macadamized and gravel roads," that its articles of association shall

From the Fountain common pleas.
BUSKIRK, J. This was an action by the appellants to enjoin the
collection of certain assessments made for the construction of the Attica and Bethel Turnpike Company, upon the ground that the said
company had never been legally organized.
The single question presented by the record in this case is whether
it is essential to the legal existence of a corporation organized under
the act of May 12, 1852, "authorizing the construction of a plank,
macadamized and gravel roads," that its articles of association shall
set forth the residence of each and every subscriber thereto.
The first section of said act, as amended by the act of 1859, reads
as follows:
"Be £t enacted by the general assembly of the state of Indiana,
That any number of persons may form themselves into a corporation
for the purpose of constructing or owning a plank, macadamized,
gravel, clay and dirt roads, by complying with the following requirements: They shall unite in articles of association, setting forth the
name which they assume, the line of the route, and the place to and
from which it is proposed to construct the road, the amount of capital
stock, and the number of shares into which it is divided, the names
and places of residence of the subscribers, and the amount of stock
taken by each shall be subscribed to said articles of association.
Whenever the stock subscribed amounts to the sum of $500 per mile
of the proposed road, copies of the articles of association shall be filed
in the office of the recorder of ·each county through which the road is
to pass, and shall from that time be a corporation, known by the name
• assumed in (its) articles of association." I G. & H. 474.
In the present case, every requirement of the above section was
fully complied with, except setting forth "the places of residence of
the subscribers ." There were twenty-seven subscribers to the articles
of association, and the places of the residence of only two of them
are set forth.
It is insisted by counsel for appellants that setting forth the places
of residence of the subscribers is imperatively required by the statute,
and is absolutely. essential to the legal existence of the corporation,
and that if one of the requirements of the statute may be dispensed
with, all may be; that it has not been left to construction, but that the
legislature bas prescribed the terms an<l conditions, upon a compliance
with which a corporation may be organized, as is shown by the use of

set forth the residence of each and every subscriber thereto.

The first section of said act, as amended by the act of 1859, reads

as follows:

"Be it enacted by the general assembly of the state of Indiana,

That any number of persons may form themselves into a corporation
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for the purpose of constructing or owning a plank, macadamized,

gravel, clay and dirt roads, by complying with the following require-

ments: They shall unite in articles of association, setting forth the

name which they assume, the line of the route, and the place to and

from which it is proposed to construct the road, the amount of capital

stock, and the number of shares into which it is divided, the names

and places of residence of the subscribers, and the amount of stock

taken by each shall be subscribed to said articles of association.

Whenever the stock subscribed amounts to the sum of $500 per mile

of the proposed road, copies of the articles of association shall be filed

in the office of the recorder of each county through which the road is

to pass, and shall from that time be a corporation, known by the name

assumed in (its) articles of association." 1 G. & H. 474.

In the present case, every requirement of the above section was

fully complied with, except setting forth "the places of residence of

the subscribers." There were twenty-seven subscribers to the articles

of association, and the places of the residence of only two of them

are set forth.

It is insisted by counsel for appellants that setting forth the places

of residence of the subscribers is imperatively required by the statute,

and is absolutely essential to the legal existence of the corporation,

and that if one of the requirements of the statute may be dispensed

with, all may be; that it has not been left to construction, but that the

legislature has prescribed the terms and conditions, upon a compliance

with which a corporation may be organized, as is shown by the use of
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the following words: "By complying with the following require-

6o1

ments."

On the other hand, it is argued that the failure to affix to the names

of the subscribers their places of residence, is a mere formal defect of

a very technical character. It does not go to the existence or consti-

tution of the corporation. It goes only to the description of the per-

sons who compose it. When their names are given, the subscribers

are sufficiently identified, and the statute is substantially complied

with.

It is further contended by counsel for appellee, that while a strict

construction will be adopted as to questions relating to the power of

dealing in a corporate capacity, a liberal construction will be adopted

as to questions relating to the mere manner of getting into operation

or acquiring a corporate existence.

Counsel for appellee refer to and rely upon the case of Eakright v.

The Logansport, etc., R. Co., 13 Ind. 404, as establishing the prop-

osition that the requirement to state the place of the residence of the

subscribers is only directory.
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The question in that case was, whether the setting forth, in the ar-

ticles of association, of the names of the directors was essential to the

legal existence of the corporation. The court say: "Here the di-

rectors are not named in the articles of association; but it appears that

they were elected at a meeting of the subscribers after the stock was

subscribed and the articles were constructed; and further, at the same

meeting at which they were elected, the same articles of association

were expressly adopted by the subscribers. Indeed, all the require-

ments of the statute have, in this instance, been literally pursued,

save that of naming the directors in the articles of association, and

that, it seems to us, has, in effect, been done by the adoption of the

articles when the directors were elected."

The court held that there had been a substantial compliance with

the requirements of the statute, as the names of the directors had been,

in substance and effect, set forth. But the court, after having de-

cided the real question involved, proceeded to express an opinion upon

a point that did not arise in the record, as the statute had been in

effect complied with. The court say: "At all-events, the require-

ments that they be named in the articles maybe held merely direc-

tory, and not, in view of the facts stated in the complaint, essential to

the validity of the corporation." The facts referred to as having

been stated in the complaint, were those showing that the names of

the directors had, in effect, been given. In our opinion, that portion

of the above decision which held the requirements merely directory is

not entitled to much weight or consideration, because the point was

really not before the court, and the statement is made with a qualifi-

cation that greatly weakens its force.

The cases of Piper v. Rhodes, 30 Ind. 309, and Rhodes v. Piper,

40 Ind. 369, are much in point. In such cases we held that the re-

quirements of the above section of the statute were not merely direc-

tory, but were imperative, and should be substantially complied with.

the following words: '•By complying with the following requirements."
On the other hand, it is argued that the failure to affix to the names
of the subscribers their places of residence, is a mere formal defect of
a very technical character. It does not go to the existence or constitution of the corporation. It goes only to the description of the persons who compose it. Whe~ their names are given: the subscribers
are sufficiently identified, and the statute is substantially complied
with.
It is further contended by counsel for appellee, that while a strict
construction will be adopted as to questions relating to the power of
dealing in a corporate capacity, a liberal construction will be adopted
as to questions relating to the mere manner of getting into operation
Qr acquiring a corporate existence.
Counsel for appellee refer to and rely upon the case of Eakright v.
The Logansport, etc., R. Co., 13 Ind. 404, as establishing the prop-osition that the requirement to state the place of the residence of the
subscribers is only directory.
The question ·in that case was, whether the setting forth, in the articles of association, of the names of the directors was essential to the
legal existence of the corporation. The court say: "Here the directors are not named in the articles of association; but it appears that
they were elected at a meeting of the subscribers after the stock was
subscribed and the articles were constructed; and further, at the same
meeting at which they were elected, the same articles of association
were expressly adopted by the subscribers. Indeed, all the requirements of the statute have, in this instance, been literally pursued,
save that of naming the directors in the articles of association, and
that, it seems to us, has, in effect, been done by the adoption of the
articles when the directors were elected."
The court held that there had been a substantial compliance with
the requirements of the statute, as the names of the directors had been,
in substance and effect, set forth. But the court, after having decided the real question involved , proceeded to express an opinion upon
a point that did not arise in the record, as the statute had been in
effect complied with. The court say: "At all -events, the requirements that they be named in the articles may be held merely directory, and not, in view of the facts stated in the complaint, essential to
the validity of the corporation." The facts referred to as having
been stated in the complaint, were those showing that the names of
the directors had, in effect, been given. In our opinion, that portion
of the above decision which held the requirements merely directory is
not entitled to much weight or consideration , because the point was
really not before the court, and the statement is made with a qualification that greatly weakens its force.
The cases of Piper v. Rhodes , 30 Ind. 309, and Rhodes v. Piper,
40 Ind. 369, are much in point. In such cases we held that the requirements of the above section of the statute were not merely directory, but were imperative, and should be substantially complied with.
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The omission was the failure to set forth in the articles of the associa-

6o2

tion the name of such association. The one requirement is, under

BUSENBACK V. ATTICA, ETC., GRAVEL ROAD CO.

the statute, as imperative and essential as the other.

§ I 55

The case of The State, cx rel. O'Brien, v. The Bethlehem, etc., G.

The omission was the failure to set forth in the articles of the association the name of such association. The one requirement is, under
the statute, as imperative and essential as the other.
The case of The State, ex rel. O'Brien, v. The Bethlehem, etc., G.
R. Co., 32 Ind. 357, involved a construction of the above quoted
section of the statute. It is plainly inferrible, from the language used
by the court, that it was intended to hold that there must be a substantial compliance with all the requirements of the statute. The
court say: "The information is unskillfully drawn, is uncertain in
many of its averments, and contains much useless matter; but we
think that the matters·alleged in the first specification are sufficient, if
true, which the demurrer admits, to show that the association has
failed to comply with several of the requirements of the statute which
are essential to a legal 01·ganization as a corporation."
The omissions complained of were as follows: "The first charge
alleges that the pretended articles of association did not set forth the
name assumed by the company; that the articles of association do
not contain an intelligent description of the line of the route and the
place from and to which it is proposed to construct the road; nor
does it contain the amount of the capital stock of the company or
the number of shares into which it is divided, or the names and places
of residence of the subscribers and the amount 'o f stock subscribed
by each."
The precise question involved in the case under consideration was
involved in the above case, and the court held that it was essential to
the legal organization of the corporation that the names and places of
the residence of the subscribers must be set forth in the articles of the
association. Such is the plain requirement of the statute. The requirements enumerated t"n the first section of the act are plainly and
dt'stt'nctly set forth, and it is expressly declared in such section that
a corporation may be organt'zed by complyt'ng with the re<Juiremcnts
tlierein specified. We are now asked to hold tltat tlie co1-poration
was legally organized by complyt'ng witli a part of such requirements.
The legi'slature has made no di'scrt'mt'nation between the retptt'rements
by makt'ng some of them dz'rectory and others imperative, and we
possess no power to do so. The legt'slature had declared, £n plain
and unambt'guous language, tliat ''the names and places of residence
of the stockholders" shall be set forth t'n tlie artt'cles of associatt'on ,
and the effect of the failure to make suclt allegatt'on i's not left to
construction, but it is made a condition precedent to the legal organization of the corporati'on.
In Garrigus v. The Board of Commissioners of Parke County, 39
Ind. 66, we laid down certain rules of construction as applicable to
corporations, to which we adhere.
The learned counsel for appellee have pressed upon our consideration the inconvenience and loss which would result from our holding
the organization of the corporation incomplete, by reason of the failure to set forth in the articles of association the places of residence of
the stockholders. There is no hardship or injustice in requiring those

R. Co., 32 Ind. 357, involved a construction of the above quoted

section of the statute. It is plainly inferrible, from the language used

by the court, that it was intended to hold that there must be a sub-

stantial compliance with all the requirements of the statute. The

court say: "The information is unskillfully drawn, is uncertain in

many of its averments, and contains much useless matter; but we

think that the matters'alleged in the first specification are sufficient, if

true, which the demurrer admits, to show that the association has

failed to comply with several of the requirements of the statute which

are essential to a legal organization as a corporation."

The omissions complained of were as follows: "The first charge

alleges that the pretended articles of association did not set forth the

name assumed by the company; that the articles of association do

not contain an intelligent description of the line of the route and the

place from and to which it is proposed to construct the road; nor

does it contain the amount of the capital stock of the company or
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the number of shares into which it is divided, or the names and places

of residence of the subscribers and the amount of stock subscribed

by each."

The precise question involved in the case under consideration was

involved in the above case, and the court held that it was essential to

the legal organization of the corporation that the names and places of

the residence of the subscribers must be set forth in the articles of the

association. Such is the plain requirement of the statute. The re-

quirements enumerated in the first section of the act are -plainly and

distinctly set forth, and it is expressly declared in such section that

a corporation may be organized by complying with the requirements

therein specified. We are now asked to hold that the corporation

was legally organized by complying with a part of such requirements.

The legislature has made no discrimination between the requirements

by making some of them directory and others imperative, and we

possess no power to do so. The legislature had declared, in plain

and unambiguous language, that '-the names and places of residence

of the stockholders" shall be set forth in the articles of association,

and the effect of the failure to make such allegation is not left to

construction, but it is made a condition precedent to the legal organ-

ization of the corporation.

In Garrigus v. The Board of Commissioners of Parke County, 39

Ind. 66, we laid down certain rules of construction as applicable to

corporations, to which we adhere.

The learned counsel for appellee have pressed upon our considera-

tion the inconvenience and loss which would result from our holding

the organization of the corporation incomplete, by reason of the fail-

ure to set forth in the articles of association the places of residence of

the stockholders. There is no hardship or injustice in requiring those
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who seek to be clothed with the power of imposing taxes upon the

property and burdens upon the shoulders of others to comply with

the plain, unambiguous and undoubted requirements of the statute

which confers the power. The legislature has prescribed the conditions

upon which these corporate and extraordinary powers may be exercised,

and it is but reasonable and just that those who accept the benefits con-

ferred should comply with the conditions imposed. If loss and incon-

venience result, it may have a tendency to iyiduce persons getting up

such organizations to secure the services of persons possessed of sufficient

knowledge and skill to perfect an association in conformity with the law,

and thus relieve corporations from expensive litigation and the courts

from being crowded with unnecessary suits. The gravel road and ditch-

ing associations have been a fruitful source of vexatious and expensive

litigation, the most of which could have been prevented by the exer-

cise of care and skill. The disastrous consequences of the want of

care, skill and prudence should teach wisdom to those engaged in

organizing and managing such associations.

In the case in judgment the capital stock was $12,000. The two
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stockholders whose places of residence are given subscribed for $1,500

of stock, a sum wholly insufficient to authorize the organization of the

corporation. In legal effect, the case, therefore, stands as though

none of the places of residence of the stockholders were set forth.

In our opinion, the court below erred in sustaining the demurrer to

the complaint.

The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause is remanded,

with directions to the court below to override the demurrer to the

complaint, and for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Note. Necessary to state names and residences of directors. 1875, Reed v.

Richmond Street R. Co., 50 Ind. 342.

Sec. 156. Same.

Place of business.

HARRIS and STICKLE v. McGREGOR.1

who seek to be clothed with the power of imposing taxes upon the
property and burdens upon the shoulders of others to comply with
the plain, unambiguous and undoubted requirements of the statute
which confers the power. The legislature has prescribed tlze conditt"ons

upon which these corporate and extraordinary powers may be exercised,
and it is but reasonable and just that those who accept the benefits con- /erred should comply with tlze conditions imposed. If loss and inconvenience result, it may lzave a tendency to induce persons getting up
such organizations to secure the services ofpersons possessed of sufficient
knowledge and skill to perfect an association in conformity with tlt.e law,
and thus relieve corporations from expensive lt'tigation and the courts
from being crowded with unnecessary suits. The gra,·el road and ditching associations have been a fruitful source of vexatious and expensive
litigation , the most of which could have been prevented by the exercise of care and skill. The disastrous consequences of the want of
care, skill and prudence should teach wisdom to those engaged in
organizing and managing such associations.
In the case in judgment the capital stock was $12 1000. The two
stockholders whose places of residence are given subscribed for$ r 1 500
of stock , a sum wholly insufficient to authorize the organization of the
corporation. In legal effect, the case, therefore, stands as though
none of the places of residence of the stockholders were set forth .
In our opinion, the court below erred in sustaining the demurrer to
the complaint.
The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause is remanded,
with directions to the court below to overrule the demurrer to the
complaint, and for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

1865. In the Supreme Court of California. 29 Cal. Rep.

124-128.

Note. Necessary to state names and residences of directors. 1875, Reed v.
Richmond Street R. Co., 50 Ind. 342.

Appeal from the district court, Eleventh district, Calaveras county.

This was action to recover the sum of $600 damages for the diver-

sion by the defendant of waters of the middle fork of the Mokelumne

river, in Calaveras county, away from the ditch or canal known as

Sec. 156. Same.

Sandy Gulch or Harris' Ditch, and for an injunction to prevent further

( d) Place of business.

diversion during the pendency of the action, and for a perpetual in-

junction upon final hearing.

1 Arguments omitted. Only part of opinion relating to the one point given.

HARRIS
1865.

IN

A.VD

STICKLE v. McGREGOR.1

THE SUPREME CouaT

OF

CALIFORNIA.

29 Cal. Rep.

124-128.
- Appeal from the district court, Eleventh district, Calaveras county.
This was action to recover the sum of $600 damages for the diversion by the defendant of waters of the middle fork of the Mokelumne
river, in Calaveras county, away from the ditch or canal known as
Sandy Gulch or Harris' Ditch, and for an injunction to prevent further
diversion during the pendency of the action, and for a perpetual injunction upon final hearing.
1

Arguments omitted. Only part of opinion relating to the one point given.
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By the court, Sanderson, C. J. We pass the question as to the right

of the defendant to prove the title to the Sandy Gulch or Harris' Ditch

By the court, SANDERSON, C. J. We pass the question as to the right
of the defendant to prove the title to the Sandy Gulch or Harris' Ditch
to be outstanding in the Bunker Hill Canal and Mining Company, alleged by the defendant to be a corporation, for the reason that in our
judgment the evidence fails to establish the existence of any such corporation. The certificate offered in evidence, for the purpose of proving the existence of such a corporation, fails to comply with the provisions of the act under which the alleged corporation was attempted to
be formed, in an essential particular rendering it null and void. That
act prescribes with particularity the terms and conditions upon which
ptrsons seeking its benefits. and their successors, may become a body
politic and corporate, and there must be at least a substantial compliance with each and all of those conditions before the c~rporation
can be considered in esse. (Mokelumne Hill Mining Company v.
Woodbury, 14 Cal. 424.)
Essentials of a certificate of incorporation.
By express terms of the statute the certificate of incorporation must
state the following particulars:
I. The corporate name.
2. The objects for which the corporation is formed. 3. The amount of its capital stock. 4. The term
of existence not to exceed fifty years. 5. The number of shares into
which the stock is divided. 6. The number of trustees and the names
of those who are to manage the affairs of the corporation for the first
three months. 7. The names of the city or town and county in
which the principal place of business is to be located. With the last
of the foregoing provisions of the statute, the certificate in question
fails to show a substantial compliance. All that is stated in the certificate in that respect is as follows: "The operations of the company are to be carried on in the county of Calaveras, state of California." This language in no sense, either expressly or by ~mplica
tion, can be held to designate the principal place of business of the
corporation. It simply designates the county and state where the
"operations of the company are to be carried on." But the "operations'' of a corporation may be carried on in one county and their
principal place of business, within the meaning of the statute, be in
another and distant county; or the former may be in one state and
the latter in another. But could we understand the language in question as fixing the principal place of business of the corporation in
Calaveras county, the failure to comply with the statute would only
be less in degree, for there is no specification of the "city" or
"town," which is no less essential than the designation of the county,
for it is so expressly provided. The "principal place of business"
contemplated and intended by the statute is the principal office of
the corporation at which the books of the corporation are kept, and
its officers usually and ordinarily meet for the purpose of managing
the affairs and transacting the business of the corporation , and the
statute requires that the city or town, as the case may be, at which
such office is to be located shall be stated in the certificate, for reasons
which are obviou s. But whether for reasons or not is immate rial ,

to be outstanding in the Bunker Hill Canal and Mining Company, al-

leged by the defendant to be a corporation, for the reason that in our

judgment the evidence fails to establish the existence of any such corpo-

ration. The certificate offered in evidence, for the purpose of prov-

ing the existence of such a corporation, fails to comply with the provis-

ions of the act under which the alleged corporation was attempted to

be formed, in an essential particular rendering it null and void. That

act prescribes with particularity the terms and conditions upon which

persons seeking its benefits, and their successors, may become a body

politic and corporate, and there must be at least a substantial com-

pliance with each and all of those conditions before the corporation

can be considered in esse. (Mokelumne Hill Mining Company v.

Woodbury, 14 Cal. 424.)

Essentials of a certificate of incorporation.

By express terms of the statute the certificate of incorporation must

state the following particulars:

1. The corporate name. 2. The objects for which the corpora-
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tion is formed. 3. The amount of its capital stock. 4. The term

of existence not to exceed fifty years. 5. The number of shares into

which the stock is divided. 6. The number of trustees and the names

of those who are to manage the affairs of the corporation for the first

three months. 7. The names of the city or town and county in

which the principal place of business is to be located. With the last

of the foregoing provisions of the statute, the certificate in question

fails to show a substantial compliance. All that is stated in the cer-

tificate in that respect is as follows: "The operations of the com-

pany are to be carried on in the county of Calaveras, state of Cali-

fornia." This language in no sense, cither expressly or by implica-

tion, can be held to designate the principal place of business of the

corporation. It simply designates the county and state where the

"operations of the company are to be carried on." But the "opera-

tions" of a corporation may be carried on in one county and their

principal place of business, within the meaning of the statute, be in

another and distant county; or the former may be in one state and

the latter in another. But could we understand the language in ques-

tion as fixing the principal place of business of the corporation in

Calaveras county, the failure to comply with the statute would only

be less in degree, for there is no specification of the "city" or

"town," which is no less essential than the designation of the county,

for it is so expressly provided. The "principal place of business"

contemplated and intended by the statute is the principal office of

the corporation at which the books of the corporation are kept, and

its officers usually and ordinarily meet for the purpose of managing

the affairs and transacting the business of the corporation, and the

statute requires that the city or town, as the case may be, at which

such office is to be located shall be stated in the certificate, for reasons

which are obvious. But whether for reasons or not is immaterial,
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for the same will which alone can confer corporate privileges can

prescribe the conditions of the grant, and it is sufficient to say that

§ I 57

6o5
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such and such are the conditions.

In view of the judgment of nonsuit the order dissolving the injunc-

tion was proper; the latter followed the former as a matter of course.

Upon the return of the case to the court below the plaintiff will be

entitled to a renewal of the injunction upon a proper application. * * *

Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings.

See Pacific Bank v. DeRo, 37 Cal. 538, on542. Also, 1893, Finnegan v. Noer-

enberg, 52 Minn. 239, 38 Am. St. 552, infra, p. 614.

Sec. 157. Same.

(e) Purpose of incorporation.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Ex Rbl. MINOR, v. LORMAN Et Al.'

1886. In the Supreme Court of Michigan. 59 Mich. Rep.

for the same will which alone can confer corporate privileges can
prescribe the conditions of the grant, and it is sufficient to say that
such and such are the conditions.
In view of the judgment of nonsuit the order dissolving the injunction was proper; the latter followed the former as a matter of course.
Upon the return of the case to the court below the plaintiff will be
entitled to a renewal of the injunction upon a proper application. • • •
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings.
See Pacific Bank v. De Ro, 37 Cal. 538, on542. Also, 1893, Finnegan v. Noer·
enberg, 52 Minn. 239, 38 Am. St. 552, infra, p. 614.

i57"l65-

Champlin, J. This is a proceeding by information in the nature

of a quo warranto to determine the rights of respondents to exercise

the franchises of a corporation organized under "an act to authorize

the formation of corporations for mining, smelting or manufacturing

Sec. 15 7. Same.
( e) Purpose of incorporation.
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iron, copper, mineral, coal, silver, or other ores or minerals, and for

other manufacturing purposes," approved February 5, 1853. * * *

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Ex REL. MINOR, v. LORMAN ET AL.'

It appears by the articles of association set up in the plea of respond-

ents that the respondents, with others, are associated and incorporated

1886.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF MICHIGAN.

59

Mich.

Rep.

157-165.

under the act aforesaid, as declared in such articles, for the purpose

of putting up, packing and manufacturing for market, Detroit river and

lake ice, and distributing and selling the same. The law requires the

articles of association to state distinctly and definitely the purpose for

which the same is formed. If it does not state a purpose for which

the statute authorized a corporation to be formed, it would not be

legally incorporated, and its articles would afford no warrant for the

exercise of corporate action. If it does state such a purpose, and if

the other requirements of the law are complied with, it is a legal cor-

poration, and authorized to act as such. In either case the articles

themselves are the sole criterion to ascertain the purpose for which it

was formed, and the intent must be gathered alone from the' written

instrument, and can not be aided or varied or contradicted by testi-

mony or averments aliunde the instrument itself. The question,

therefore, is, is the purpose set forth in the articles such as the statute

authorizes the formation of corporations to carry on? We think it

is. Its expressed purpose is to manufacture for market Detroit river

and lake ice. It was not necessary for the articles to state the means

or methods of manufacture, nor are we to presume that the undertak-

ing would be impossible of accomplishment. * » »

Arguments omitted. Only part of opinion given.

CHAMPLrN, J.
This is a proceeding by information in the nature
of a quo warranto to determine the rights of respondents to exercise
the franchises of a corporation organized under "an act to authorize
the formation of corporations for mining, smelting or manufacturing
iron, copper, mineral, coal, silver, or other ores or minerals, and for
other manufacturing purposes," ·approved February 5, I853. • • •
It appears by the articles of association set up in the plea of respondents that the respondents, with others, are associated and incorporated
under the act aforesaid, as declared in such articles, for the purpose
of putting up, packing and manufacturing for market, Detroit river and
lake ice, and distributing and selling the same. The law requires the
articles of association to state distinctly and definitely the pm1Jose for
which the same is formed. If it does not state a purpose for which
the statute authorized a corporation to be formed, it would not be
legally incorporated, and its articles would afford no warrant for the
exercise of corporate action. If it does state such a purpose, and if
the other requirements of the law are complied with, it is a legal corporation, and authorized to act as such. In either case the articles
themselves are the sole criterion to ascertain the purpose for which it
was formed, and the intent must he gathered alone from the' written
instrument, and can not be aided or varied or contradicted by testimony or averments ali"unde the instrument itself. The question,
therefore, is, is the purpose set forth in the articles such as the statute
authorizes the formation of corporations to carry on? We think it
is. Its expressed purpose is to manufacture for market Detroit river
and lake ice. It was not necessary for the articles to state the means
or methods of manufacture, nor are we to presume that the undertaking would be impossible of accomplishment. • • •

Arguments omitted.
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The replication (of the attorney-general) sets forth the manner in

ATTORNEY GENERAL V. LORMAN .

which the Belle Isle Ice Company conducts its business, as follows:

"Said company owns and leases various river and lake fronts upon

The replication (of the attorney-general) sets forth the manner in
which the Belle Isle Ice Company conducts its business, as follows:
"Said company owns and leases various river and lake fronts upon
the Detroit river and Lake St. Clair during the winter months. When
the ice is formed by a natural process, without the aid of any artificial
means whatsoever, and of a thickness sufficient for use, it is cut precisely as it is formed by the n atural process of freezing on said lake or
river, and stored in ice-houses owned by the company. The manner
of cutting said ice is, and has been, as follows: Any snow which
may have fallen upon the ice is scraped and shoveled off by means
of scrapers drawn by horses, and by hand shovels u sed by men. · The
ice is then marked off into squares of twenty-two inches in width, a
hand-marker being first used to lay out the lines, after which a marker
drawn by horses is used, which cuts lines from two to four inches in
depth into the ice. Ice-plows, also drawn by horses, follow in these
lines, cutting the ice to a depth of from six to fourteen inches, and the
remaining thickness of ice is sawed through by means of long saws
operated by hand, or is broken off by breaking bars, and separated
from the solid mass of ice. The ice thus cut is floated to the foot of
inclined slides or elevators leading to the ice-houses where it is to be
stored, and is hoisted up by tackle operated by steam or horse-power,
and conducted to the ice-houses, where it is packed in layers, and
covered with some non-conducting material, such as marsh hay or
sawdust. As the ice is required for use, it is transported to large ice·
barges built for the purpose, and capable of holding 100 tons of ice,
each taken to proper distributing points in the city of Detroit, where
the ice is cut into smaller pieces suitable for consumption, and placed
in covered wagons and delivered to customers. In the course of
the business, as conducted by said Belle I sle Ice Company, a large
number and variety of tools are necessary for clearing, marking, sawing, chopping and handling the ice, as heretofore fully stated, before
it is in proper shape to be delivered to customers, and also ice-houses,
ice-barges, wagons and other implements, and a large force of men. "
Worcester defines "manufacturing" as follows:
"( 1) The process of making anything by art, or of reducing ma·
terials into form fit for use by hand or by machinery; as an 'establishment for the manufacture of cloth.'
"( 2) Anything made or manufactured by hand, or manual dexterity,
or by machinery."
The same word, as a verb, he defines:
"(1) To form by manufacture, or workmanship, by the handorby
machinery; to make by art and labor."
The process described in the replication certainly does show that
the ice is reduced into form fit for use, both by hand and by the use
of machinery, and the answer of the respondents shows that this is
done by the outlay of the capital, at least of $50,000, and the quantity
thus manufactured annually is about 30,000 tons. It is very likely
that the garnering and preparation of ice fit for consumers of the
article falls very near the line. '.frue, its natural condition is not

the Detroit river and Lake St. Clair during the winter months. When

the ice is formed by a natural process, without the aid of any artificial

means whatsoever, and of a thickness sufficient for use, it is cut pre-

cisely as it is formed by the natural process of freezing on said lake or

river, and stored in ice-houses owned by the company. The manner

of cutting said ice is, and has been, as follows: Any snow which

may have fallen upon the ice is scraped and shoveled off by means

of scrapers drawn by horses, and by hand shovels used by men. The

ice is then marked off into squares of twenty-two inches in width, a

hand-marker being first used to lay out the lines, after which a marker

drawn by horses is used, which cuts lines from two to four inches in

depth into the ice. Ice-plows, also drawn by horses, follow- in these

lines, cutting the ice to a depth of from six to fourteen inches, and the

remaining thickness of ice is sawed through by means of long saws

operated by hand, or is broken off by breaking bars, and separated

from the solid mass of ice. The ice thus cut is floated to the foot of
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inclined slides or elevators leading to the ice-houses where it is to be

stored, and is hoisted up by tackle operated by steam or horse-power,

and conducted to the ice-houses, where it is packed in layers, and

covered with some non-conducting material, such as marsh hay or

sawdust. As the ice is required for use, it is transported to large ice-

barges built for the purpose, and capable of holding 100 tons of ice,

each taken to proper distributing points in the city of Detroit, where

the ice is cut into smaller pieces suitable for consumption, and placed

in covered wagons and delivered to customers. In the course of

the business, as conducted by said Belle Isle Ice Company, a large

number and variety of tools are necessary for clearing, marking, saw-

ing, chopping and handling the ice, as heretofore fully stated, before

it is in proper shape to be delivered to customers, and also ice-houses,

ice-barges, wagons and other implements, and a large force of men."

Worcester defines "manufacturing" as follows:

"(i) The process of making anything by art, or of reducing ma-

terials into form fit for use by hand or by machinery; as an 'estab-

lishment for the manufacture of cloth.'

"(2) Anything made or manufactured by hand, or manual dexterity,

or by machinery."

The same word, as a verb, he defines:

"(1) To form by manufacture, or workmanship, by the hand or by

machinery; to make by art and labor."

The process described in the replication certainly does show that

the ice is reduced into form fit for use, both by hand and by the use

of machinery, and the answer of the respondents shows that this is

done by the outlay of the capital, at least of $50,000, and the quantity

thus manufactured annually is about 30,000 tons. It is very likely

that the garnering and preparation of ice fit for consumers of the

article falls very near the line. True, its natural condition is not
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changed. The article itself is a natural product, as described in the
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replication. It is ice when it is taken from the river, and it is ice

when delivered to the consumers. The form alone is changed. It is

reduced in size and delivered in quantities to suit the convenience of

the patrons of the company. But it is not necessary, to constitute

the commodity a manufactured article, that a chemical change should

be wrought in the thing manufactured. Iron manufactured from iron

ore remains iron. Cotton gathered from the boll, and, by means of

complicated machinery manufactured, becomes the cotton of com-

merce. Lumber is manufactured from logs or timber simply by

changing its form. And it had been held that grinding bones to pro-

duce bone dust of commerce was manufacturing, within the meaning

of the revenue laws of the United States. Schriefer v. Wood, 5

Blatchf. 215. So it was held by the supreme court of the United

States that timber split into staves, or into long pieces designed for

shovel handles, was "manufactured," and not covered by the reci-

procity treaty of 1854. United States v. Hathaway, 4 Wall. 404,

408. * * *

Demurrer to replication sustained.
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Note. What are or are not manufacturing corporations: Water companies are

not. 1868, Dudley v. Jamaica P. Aqueduct, 100 Mass. 183. Mining compa-

nies are not. 1870, Byersv. Franklin Coal Co., 106 Mass. 131; 1892, Horn

Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 IJ. S. 305. Gas companies are not. 1880,

Williams v. Rees, 2 Fed. Rep. 882; 1886, Covington Gas L. Co. v. Covington,

84 Ky. 94; but see, contra, 1882, Nassau Gas Light Co. v. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 409.

Electric light and power companies are not. 1891, Commonwealth v. Northern

Elec. L. Co., 145 Pa. St. 105; 1891, Commonwealth v. Edison Elec. L. Co.,

145 Pa. St. 131; 1898, Evanston Elec. 111. Co. v. Kochersperger, 175 111. 26, 9

Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 224; but contra, 1892, People, ex ret., etc., v. Wemple,

129 N. Y. 543, 664; 1892, Beggs v. Edison Elec. I. Co., 96 Ala. 295.

And see, generally, as to what is manufacturing, 1885, Engle v. Sohn, 41 Ohio

St. 691, 52 Am. Rep. 103 and note.

The purposes for which a corporation is formed are to be determined by an in-

spection of its articles of association. 1896, Detroit Driving Club v. Fitzgerald,

109 Mich. 670, 4 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 546, 67 N. W. 899; 1898, Evanston E.

I. Co. v. Kochersperger, 175 111. 26, and extrinsic evidence as to the unlawful

intentions of the promoters will not be received to defeat an action by such

corporation against a subscriber upon the stock subscription contract. 1894,

United States Vinegar Co. v. Schlegel, 143 N. Y. 537; 1895, United States Vin-

egar Co. v. Foehrenbach, 148 N. Y. 58, 3 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 164.
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changed. The article itself is a natural product, as described in the
replication. It is ice when it is taken from the river, and it is ice
when delivered to the consumers. The form alone is changed. It is
reduced in size and delivered in quantities to su it the convenience of
the patrons of the company. But it is not necessary, to constitute
the commodity a manufactured article, that a chemica l change should
be wrought in the thing m anufactured. Iron m anufactured from iron
ore remains iron. Cotton gathered from the boll, and, by means of
complicated machinery manufactured, becomes the cotton of comme rce. Lumber is manufactured from logs or timber simply by
changing its form. And it had been held that grinding bones to produce bone dust of commerce was m anufacturing, within the meaning
of the revenue laws of the United States. Schriefer v. Wood, 5
Blatchf. 215. So it was held by the supreme couti of the United
States that timbe r split into staves, or into long pieces designed for
shovel handles, was "manufactured," and not covered by the reciprocity treaty of 1854·. United States v. Hathaway, 4 Wall. 404,
408. • • •
Demurrer to replication sustained.
Note. What are or are not mamifacturing corporations: Water companies are
not. 1868, Dudley v. Jamaica P. Aqueduct, 100 Mass. 183. Mining companies are not. 1870, Byers v. Franklin Coal Co., 106 Mass. 131; 1892, Horn
Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U.S . 305. Gas companies are not.. 1880,
Williams v. Reas, 2 Fed. Rep. 882; 1886, Covington Gas L. <Jo. v. Covington,
84 Ky. 94; but see, contra, 1882, Nassau Gas Light Co. v. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 409.
Electric light and power companies are not. 1891, Common'!ealth v. Northern
Elec. L. Co., 145 Pa. St. 105; 1891, Commonwealth v. E ch son Elec. L. Co.,
145 Pa. St. 131; 1898, Evanston Elec. Ill. Co. v. Kochersperger, 175 Ill . 26, 9
Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 224; but contra, 1892, People, ex rel., etc., v. Wemple,
129 N. Y. 543, 664; 1892, Beggs v. Edison Elec. I. Co., 96 Ala. 295.
And see, generally, as to what is manufacturing, 1885, Engle v. Sohn, 41 Ohio
St. 691, 52 Am. Rep. 103 and note.
The pttrposes f or tohich a corporation i.9 formed are to be determined by an inspection of it.a articles of association. 1896, Detroit Driving Club v. Fitzgerald,
109 Mich. 670, 4 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 546, 67 N. W. 899; 1898, Evanston E.
I. Co. v. Kocbersperger, 175 Ill. 26, and extrinsic evidence as to the unlawful
intentions of the promoters will not be received to defeat an action by such
corporation against a subscriber upon the stock subscription contract. 1894,
United States Vinegar Co. v. Schlegel, 143 N. Y. 537; 1895, U nited States Vinegar Co. v. Foehrenbach, 148 N. Y. 58, 3 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 164.

1881. In the Supreme Court of Iowa. 56 Iowa Rep. 104—III.

The plaintiff, in April, 1877, became a creditor of the Lawrence
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Savings Bank by reason of a deposit of money made by him in the
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bank, which bank was located and doing business in the city of Law-

rence, Kan. As such creditor he seeks to recover of the defendant,

KAISER v. LA WRENCE SAVIN GS BANK ET AL.1

1 Only so much of the case as relates to the one point is given.

1881.

IN

THE SUPREME

CouRT

OF IowA.

56 Iowa Rep.

104-111.

The plaintiff, in April, 1877, became a creditor of the Lawrence
Savings Bank by reason of a deposit of money made by him in the
bank, which bank was located and doing business in the city of Lawrence, Kan. As such creditor he seeks to recover of the defendant,
1
Only eo much of the caee as relates to the one point is given.
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Hoag, upon the ground that the Lawrence Savings Bank was a part-

KAISER V. LA WR ENCE SAVINGS

BAN~.

nership or unincorporated company, and that Hoag was a member of

Hoag, upon the ground that the Lawrence Savings Bank was a partnership or unincorporated company, and that Hoag was a member of
it. Hoag does not deny his ownership, but denies that the Lawrence
Savings Bank was an unincorporated company or partnership, and.
avers that the same ·was duly incorporated under the laws of Kansas,
by reason whereof he was exempt from personal liability for the debts.
of the bank. There was a trial without a jury, and judgment for the
plaintiff. ~he defendant Hoag appeals.
ADAMS, C. J. The evidence tends to show that certain individuals
attempted in good faith to become incorporated under the laws of
K ansas for the purpose of doing business as a savings bank, and subscribed for shares in the supposed corporation. For several years
they did business as a savings bank, under the supposition that they
were duly incorporated. Prior to the time that plaintiff became a
creditor of the bank, the defendant Hoag purchased an interest in the
bank, and remained the owner of such interest from that time forward.

it. Hoag does not deny his ownership, but denies that the Lawrence

Savings Bank was an unincorporated company or partnership, and

avers that the same was duly incorporated under the laws of Kansas,

by reason whereof he was exempt from personal liability for the debts,

of the bank. There was a trial without a jury, and judgment for the

plaintiff. The defendant Hoag appeals.

Adams, C. J. The evidence tends to show that certain individuals

attempted in good faith to become incorporated under the law's of

Kansas for the purpose of doing business as a savings bank, and sub-

scribed for shares in the supposed corporation. For several years

they did business as a savings bank, under the supposition that they

were duly incorporated. Prior to the time that plaintiff became a

creditor of the bank, the defendant Hoag purchased an interest in the

bank, and remained the owner of such interest from that time forward.

»«•

The general incorporation law of Kansas constitutes chapter 23 of
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the statutes of Kansas. Section 8 provides that "the charter of an

• • •

intended corporation must be subscribed by five or more persons,

three of whom, at least, must be citizens of this state, and must be

The general incorporation law of Kansas constitutes chapter 23 of
the statutes of Kansas. Section 8 provides that "the charter of an
intended corporation must be subscribed by five or more persons,
three of whom, at least, must be citizens of this state, and must be
acknowledged by them before an officer duly authorized to take acknowledgment of deeds." Section 9 provides that " such charter shall
thereupon be filed in the office of the secretary of state."
A certificate of the secretary of state of the state of Kansas was introduced in evidence, showing what papers, and what only, had been
filed in his office pertaining to the incorporation of the Lawrence Savings Bank. The certificate shows that there were filed in his office
what are denominated articles of association. The statute requires
that a ch arter 'shall be filed. We are inclined to think , however, that
the fact that the paper filed is denominated articles of association, instead of a charter, is not sufficient to invalidate it. We proceed, then,
to inquire whether the paper complies with the statute in other respects, and we conclude that it does not. The statute requires that it
shall be subscribed and acknowledged by five or more persons. The
paper purporting to be articles of association is so informally drawn
and executed that we can not say it is subscribed by any one. The
paper consists of eight articles. The first six articles purport to be
subscribed by twenty-three persons, but the seventh and eighth articles
are not s ubscribed, and the seve nth article is, under the statute, material. But if the articles had all been subscribed they would be fatally
defective for want of acknowledgment by the subscribers, or a sufficient number thereof to comply with the statute. • • •
The defendant insists, however, that in order to establish the corporate existence of the Lawrence Savings Bank as against plaintiff
it is sufficient to show authority to create the corporation , a bona
fide attempt on the part of the corporators to become incorporated.
and the doing of bu siness as a corporation. In support of this proposition the defendant cites the Buffalo and Allegany R. Co. v. Carey,

acknowledged by them before an officer duly authorized to take ac-

knowledgment of deeds." Section 9 provides that "such charter shall

thereupon be filed in the office of the secretary of state."

A certificate of the secretary of state of the state of Kansas was in-

troduced in evidence, showing what papers, and what only, had been

filed in his office pertaining to the incorporation of the Lawrence Sav-

ings Bank. The certificate shows that there were filed in his office

what are denominated articles of association. The statute requires

that a charter shall be filed. We are inclined to think, however, that

the fact that the paper filed is denominated articles of association, in-

stead of a charter, is not sufficient to invalidate it. We proceed, then,

to inquire whether the paper complies with the statute in other re-

spects, and we conclude that it does not. The statute requires that it

shall be subscribed and acknowledged by five or more persons. The

paper purporting to be articles of association is so informally drawn

and executed that we can not say it is subscribed by any one. The

paper consists of eight articles. The first six articles purport to be

subscribed by twenty-three persons, but the seventh and eighth articles

are not subscribed, and the seventh article is, under the statute, ma-

terial. But if the articles had all been subscribed they would be fatally

defective for want of acknowledgment by the subscribers, or a suf-

ficient number thereof to comply with the statute. * * *

The defendant insists, however, that in order to establish the cor-

porate existence of the Lawrence Savings Bank as against plaintiff

it is sufficient to show authority to create the corporation, a bona

fide attempt on the part of the corporators to become incorporated,

and the doing of business as a corporation. In support of this prop-

osition the defendant cites the Buffalo and Allegany R. Co. v. Carey,
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26 X. Y. 77. In that case the court said, "that if the papers filed

are colorable, but so defective that, in a proceeding on the part of

the state against it, it would for that reason be dissolved, yet by the

§ 159

CONDITIONS OF DE JURE EXISTENCE.

acts of user under such organization it becomes a corporation de facto,

and no advantage can be taken of such defect in its constitution col-

laterally by any person." Substantially the same doctrine was

enunciated in Kurtz v. The Paola Town Co., 20 Kan. 403, and Pope

v. The Capital Bank, 20 Kan. 440. It should be observed, however,

that in those cases the defendant set up a want of incorporation of

the plaintiff and sought to escape liability upon that ground. In the

case at bar the defendant sets up exemption, averring that the attempt

to become incorporated and the doing of business under a claim of

incorporation were sufficient to create the exemption.

It will be seen at once that the principle involved in those cases is

essentially different from that in the case at bar.

It is hardly necessary to say that where incorporation has once taken

place no act of forfeiture can be set up in a collateral action, until

forfeiture has been judicially declared in an action brought for that

purpose. See Angell & Ames on Corporations, § 636, and cases

cited. But the principle involved in those cases is essentially differ-
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ent from that in the case at bar.

In Humphrey v. Mooney, 1 Colo. 193, a creditor of an assumed

corporation sought to hold a member as a partner. It was held that

as his right of action was based upon an express contract with the as-

sumed corporation he was estopped to deny that it was in fact a cor-

poration. The doctrine of that case is substantially that relied upon

by the defendant. But it seems to us that it is not sustained by the

weight of authority. The court cited in support of the decision Eaton

v. Aspinwall, 19 N. Y. 121, and Buffalo v. Carey, 26 N. Y. 77,

but neither of these cases, it appears to us, is in point. * * *

Affirmed.

Sec. 159. Same.

(g) Acknowledging articles.

THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. THE MONTECITO WATER CO., Er Al.,

Respondent.1

1893. In the Supreme Court of California. 97 Cal. Rep.

276-281.

Appeal from a judgment of the superior court of Los Angeles

26 N. Y. 77. In that case the court said, "that if the papers filed
are colorable, but so defective that, in a proceeding on the part of
the state against it, it would for that reason be dissolved, yet by the
acts of user under such organization it becomes a corporation de facto,
and no advantage can be taken of such defect in its constitution collaterally by any person."
Substantially the same doctrine · was
enunciated in Kurtz v. The Paola Town Co., 20 Kan. 403 1 and Pope
v. The Capital Bank, 20 Kan. 440. It should be observed, however,
that in those cases the defendant set up a want of incorporation of
the plaintiff and sought to escape liability upon that ground. In the
case at bar the defendant sets up exemption, averring that the attempt
to become incorporated and the doing of business under a claim of
incorporation were sufficient to create the exemption.
It will be seen at once that the principle involved in those cases is
essentially different from that in the case at bar.
It is hardly necessary to say that where incorporation has once taken
place no act of forfeiture can be set up in a collateral action, until
forfeiture has been judicially declared in an action brought for that
purpose. See Angell & Ames on Corporations, § 636, and cases
cited. But the principle involved in those cases is essentially different from that in the case at bar.
In Humphrey v. Mooney, 1 Colo. 193 1 a creditor of an assumed
corporation sought to hold a member as a partner. It was held that
as his right of action was based upon an express contract with the assumed corporation he was estopped to deny that it was in fact a corporation. The doctrine of that case is substantially that relied upon
by the defendant. But it seems to us that it is not sustained by the
weight of authority. The comt cited in support of the decision Eaton
v. Aspinwall, 19 N. Y. 121! and Buffalo v. Carey, 26 N. Y. 77,
but neither of these cases, it appears to us, is in point. • • •
Affirmed.

county.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Temple, C. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered upon de-

murrer to complaint.

Sec. 159. Same.
(g) Acknowledging articles.

The demurrer was general, and on the ground of insufficiency of

the facts. It is a proceeding taken by the attorney-general of the state

THE PEOPLE,

APPELLANT,

1 Only so much of the case as relates to the one point given.

39—Wil. Cases.

v. THE MONTECITO WATER CO., ET
RESPONDENT •1

AL.,

CALIFORNIA.
97 Cal. Rep.
276-281.
Appeal from a judgment of the superior court of Los Angeles
county.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
TEMPLE, C.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered upon demurrer to complaint.
The demurrer was general, and on the ground of insufficiency of
the facts. It is a proceeding taken by the attorney-general of the state
1 Only so much of the case as relates to the one point given.
IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF

39-WIL. CASES.
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in the nature of a quo warranto to deprive the defendant corporation
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of its corporate charter, and procure its dissolution on two grounds:

PEOPLE V. MONTECITO WATER CO .

§ 159

1. For want of a substantial compliance with the statutory require-

ments in its formation. * * *

in the nature of a quo warranto to deprive the defendant corporation
of its corporate charter, and procure its dissolution on two grounds:
1 . For want of a substantial compliance with the statutory requirements in its formation . • • •
It i. contended that the c'o rporation is not rightfully such, because
while five incorporators signed the articles of incorporation, only four
acknowledged the same.
S ection 292 of the civil code reads as follows: "The articles of incorpor:1tion must be s uhscribed by fiv,e or more persons, a majority of
whom mul:it be residents of thi state, and acknowledged by each before some officer authorized to take a nd ·certify acknowledgments of
convey ance of rea l property. ' '
It was ha id in People v. Selfridge, 52 Cal. 331: "The right to be
a corporation is in itself a franchise : and to acquire a franchi e under
a general law , the prescribed statutory conditions must be complied
with." Still, a uhstantial rather tha n a literal compliance will suffice. (People v. Stockton, etc., R. Co:, 45 Cal. 313; 13 Am.
Rep. I 78.) vV ns there a substantial compliance in thi case?
Because a substantial complian ce will do, it docs not fo llow that
any positive statutory requirements can be omitted on the ground that
it is unimportant. They are conditions precedent to acquiring a statutory right, and none can be di l'pensed with by the court.
What is a substantial rath er than a literal compliance may be illustrated from the cases. In I::x pa rte Spring Valley W ater-W or ks, 17
Cal. 1 32, the certificate stated the pla ce of business, but did not describe it a the "principal p iace of busines ,"as required. The court
said: "The statement that San Francisco was tile place of bui.iness
would seem to imply that it was not only the principal but the only
place of business."
In P eople v. Stockton, etc., R. Co., 45 Cal. 306, 13 Am. R ep . 178,
the <tffidavit required in such cases 1to be attached to the certificate
stated that 10 per cent. of the amount: subscribed had been actually
paid in, omitting the words "in good faith," which the statute required. In the certificate it was stated that more than 10 per cent.
had been actually in good faith paid in. It was held sufficient; and
it would seem that if it was actually paid in cash, it must have been
paid in good faith.
And it was further held that payment by checks drawn against suffi·
cient funds in a bank, which was ready to accept and pay checks, was
substantially payment in cash.
In People v. Cheeseman, 7 Colo. 376, the acknowledgment taken
by the notary omitted to state that the persons whose acknowledgments were taken were personally known to the notary. The certificate did state that the persons who signed appeared before him and
acknowledged it. The statute did niot prescribe what the acknowledgment should contain, and it was held a substa ntial compliance
with the requirement, although the form prescribed for acknowledgments to deeds was not followed. It was acknowledged.
In all these cases it will be seen th.at the thing required was done,

It is contended that the corporation is not rightfully such, because

while five incorporators signed the articles of incorporation, only four

acknowledged the same.

Section 292 of the civil code reads as follows: "The articles of in-

corporation must be subscribed by five or more persons, a majority of

whom must be residents of this state, and acknowledged by each be-

fore some officer authorized to take and certify acknowledgments of

conveyances of real property."

It was said in People v. Selfridge, 52 Cal. 331: ''The right to be

a corporation is in itself a franchise; and to acquire a franchise under

a general law, the prescribed statutory conditions must be complied

with." Still, a substantial rather than a literal compliance will suf-

fice. (People v. Stockton, etc., R. Co., 45 Cal. 313; 13 Am.

Rep. 178.) Was there a substantial compliance in this case?

Because a substantial compliance will do, it does not follow that

any positive statutory requirements can be omitted on the ground that
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it is unimportant. They are conditions precedent to acquiring a stat-

utory right, and none can be dispensed with by the court.

What is a substantial rather than a literal compliance may be illus-

trated from the cases. In Ex parte Spring Valley Water-Works, 17

Cal. 132, the certificate stated the place of business, but did not de-

scribe it as the "principal piace of business," as required. The court

said: "The statement that San Francisco was the place of business

would seem to imply that it was not only the principal but the only

place of business."

In People v. Stockton, etc., R. Co., 45 Cal. 306, 13 Am. Rep. 178,

the affidavit required in such cases to be attached to the certificate

stated that 10 per cent, of the amount subscribed had been actually

paid in, omitting the words "in good faith," which the statute re-

quired. In the certificate it was stated that more than 10 per cent,

had been actually in good faith paid in. It was held sufficient; and

it would seem that if it was actually paid in cash, it must have been

paid in good faith.

And it was further held that payment by checks drawn against suffi-

cient funds in a bank, which was ready to accept and pay checks, was

substantially payment in cash.

In People v. Cheeseman, 7 Colo. 376, the acknowledgment taken

by the notary omitted to state that the persons whose acknowledg-

ments were taken were personally known to the notary. The certifi-

cate did state that the persons who signed appeared before him and

acknowledged it. The statute did not prescribe what the acknowl-

edgment should contain, and it was held a substantial compliance

with the requirement, although the form prescribed for acknowledg-

ments to deeds was not followed. It was acknowledged.

In all these cases it will be seen that the thing required was done,
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but not literally, as directed. But there was no omission of any re-
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quirement. No case has been cited where the entire omission of a

thing prescribed has been excused, unless it be the case of Larabee

v. Baldwin, 35 Cal. 155. That was not an action instituted by the state

to disincorporate on the ground of non-compliance. As we have seen,

unless the state complains, ixdejacto corporation must be considered,

under our code, as possessing a corporate character, and the stock-

holders, when sued upon their individual liability, should not be

allowed to make the point that they did not comply with the law.

In that case the certificate was signed by five directors, but two

failed to acknowledge it. Other questions are discussed at great length

in the opinion, but in regard to the point made on the certificate it was

simply remarked: "It is not clear that any fatal defect exists in the

certificate of incorporation. If so, it is cured by the act of April 1,

1864." Plainly, it was unnecessary to consider the question. * * *

Section 292 of the Civil Code required the articles to be subscribed

and acknowledged by each. As this is an express condition precedent

to a valid incorporation, it is not of consequence to the court whether
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it be a wise or necessary requirement or not. Still, it is easy to see

a reason for it. The certificate secures the state and all concerned

against the possibility of any fictitious names being subscribed to the

articles, and furnishes proof of the genuineness of the signatures.

If the acknowledgment can be dispensed with as to one, why not as

to two, or three, or all?

Ordinarily, no doubt, the state would not be expected to institute a

proceeding of this character for such a defect alone, and we must pre-

sume that the attorney-general would not have instituted this inquiry,

if he were not convinced that there were reasons sufficient to justify

it. Other reasons are alleged, but as the statute authorizes a proceed-

ing to forfeit the charter where the statute has not been complied with,

although the corporation is acting in good faith, and is a dc facto cor-

poration, the complaint must be held to state a cause of action, and

the demurrer should be overruled.

The judgment should be reversed, and the cause remanded, with

directions to overrule the demurrer.

Sec. 160. Same.

(/*) Filing articles.

BERGERON, Respondent, v. HOBBS and Others, Appellants.'

1897. In the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 96 Wis. Rep.

641-658, 65 Am. Stat. Rep. 85.

Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Bayfield county;

bu t not li te ra lly, as dire cte d. But there was no omission of a ny req ui rement. No case has b een cited where the e ntire o mission of a
thi ng p rescribe d has been excused , unless it b e the case o f L a rabee
Y. B aldwin, 35 C a l. I SS· Tha t w as not a n a ction instituted by the ~tate
to disincorpo ratc on the g round of non-co mplia nce . As we have seen ,
unless the state complains, a d e facto corporatio n must b e cons ide re d ,
under our code, as possessing a corpo rate characte r , a nd the stoc khold ers, whe n sue d upon the ir individu al liabili ty, sho uld not be
allowed to m a ke th e p o int that they did n ot co mply with the law .
In that case the certificate w as sig ned by fi ve directors , b u t two
fa iled to ackno wled ge it. Othe r questio ns a re discussed a t g reat k ngth
in the opinion , b ut in r egard t o the point m a de on t he certificate it was
imply rema rked: " It is n ot clear that any fatal defect exists in the
certificate of incorpo ra tio n. If so , it is cured by the act of Apri l r ,
186.f . " P lainly, it w as unnecessary to cons ider the q uestion. • • •
Sectio n 292 o f the Ci vil C ode requi red the articles to be subscribed
and acknowled ged by each. A s this is a n e xpress condi tion preced e nt
to a valid in corpora tion , it is no t of conseque nce to the co urt whethe r
it be a -.,·ise or necessary require m ent or no t. S till , it is e asy to see
a reason for it. Th e ce rti ficate secures th e state a nd a ll co nce rn ed
aga in t the p ossibility of any fi cti tious na m es being subscribe d to the
articles, a nd furni shes p roof of the g enuineness of the s ig natures .
If the ackn o wl ed g m ent can be dispensed with as to one , w hy no t as
to two, or three, or all ?
Ord ina rily, no d oubt, the sta te wo uld no t be expected to insti tute a
proceed ing of this ch aracte r for such a d e fect alo n e, a nd we must presume that the a tto rney-genera l would not h ave in stituted this inquiry,
if he were not con vinced that there w ere reasons sufficient to justify
it. Other reason s a re alleged, but as th e st atu te autho ri zes a proceeding to fo rfeit the cha rte r where the statute has not b een complied with,
a lthoug h the corpora tio n is acting in goo d faith, and is a de f acto corporatio n , the complaint must b e held to sta te a ca use of a ction, and
the de muner . ho uld be overrule d.
The judg me nt should b e re versed, and the cause remanded, with
di rections to ove rrule the demurrer.

John K. Parish, C. J. Affirmed.

1 Arguments omitted. The strong dissenting opinion of Marshall, J., hold-

Sec. 160. Same.

ing there was a corporation de facto, though not de jure, and that the plaintiff

should be estopped, is omitted.

( h) Filing articles.
BERGERON,
18;)7.

RESPONDENT,

v. HOBBS

AND 0rHERS, APPELLA.NTS.1

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF W1scoNSIN.
641-6s8, 6S Am. Stat. Rep. 85.

96 Wis. Rep.

Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Bayfield county;
John K. Parish , C. J. Affirmed.
1
Arguments omitted. The strong dissenting opinion of Marshall, J. holding there was a corporation de f acto, though not de jure, and that the pfaintiff
should be estopped, is omitted.
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BERGERON V. HOBBS.

The defendants, under the name of Bayfield Agricultural Associ-

612

ation, employed several persons to perform labor in improving their

BERGERON V . HOBBS.

§ 16o

grounds and in erecting fences and buildings. Time checks given by

The defendants, under the name of Bayfield Agricultural Association, employed several persons to perform labor in improving their
grounds and in erecting fences and buildings. Time checks given by
the defendants to such laborers, for such labor, were assigned to the
plaintiff, who brings this action to recover their amount, alleging that
the defendants were a co-partnership. The defendants alleged that
they were members of a corporation, and denied that they were copartners, or liable as such. This was the issue which was tried. It
appeared upon the trial that aiticles of organization of the defendants.
as the Bayfield County Agricultural· Association, and a certificate
showing the election of officers, had been recorded in the office of the
regi1'ter of deeds of Bayfield county, but were not on file there. They
had been deposited with instruction to record and return them,
which had been complied with. When the testimony on both sides
was in, the court directed a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount of
the time checks. From a judgment on that verdict the defendants
appeal.
NEWMAN, J.
There are two questions raised on this appeal: I.
Vv as the mere recording of the articles of incorporation , with the cer·
tificate of the election of officers, without the intention or fact of the
papers themselves remaining in the office, a sufficient compliance with
the statute, so that the organization of the corporation became complete, as upon a proper filing of the papers themselves? And 2. If
the recording was not sufficient for that purpose, are the defendants
liable to the plaintiff only as a de facto corporation, or are they liable
as co-partners?
1. The statute (sec. 146o, R. S.) provides that, upon the filing of
"a certificate of organization, • • • with a copy of the consti·
tu ti on," in the office of the register of deeds of the county, "such ociety shall have all the powers of a corporation necessary to promote
the objects thereof." It can not be doubted that the filing of the
proper paper in the proper office is made, by the statute, a condition
precedent to the Yesting of corporate powers. The court may not be
able to clearly define the respect wherein the mere recording and removal of the papers from the office fails to serve the full purpose
which the legislature intended to accomplish by the filing of them.
The legislature, no doubt, had good and sufficient reasons for its
choice of means to promote its purpose. For the court it is not a
question of equivalents. A literal filing of the papers is necessary because it is so written in the law. The term "filing" and the verb " to
file," as related to in this subject, include the idea that the paper is to
remain in its proper order on file in the office. A paper is said to be
filed when it is delivered to the proper officer, and by him recei\'ed,
to be kept on file. Bouv. Law Diet. The statute is plain and easy
of observance. Valuable rights and exemptions from personal liability are to be secured by its observance. It is no undue severity to
require its strict observance. The defendants had not observed it.
and had not secured corporate powers.

the defendants to such laborers, for such labor, were assigned to the

plaintiff, who brings this action to recover their amount, alleging that

the defendants were a co-partnership. The defendants alleged that

they were members of a corporation, and denied that they were co-

partners, or liable as such. This was the issue which was tried. It

appeared upon the trial that articles of organization of the defendants

as the Bayfield County Agricultural' Association, and a certificate

showing the election of officers, had been recorded in the office of the

register of deeds of Bayfield county, but were not on file there. They

had been deposited with instruction to record and return them,

which had been complied with. When the testimony on both sides

was in, the court directed a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount of

the time checks. From a judgment on that verdict the defendants

appeal.

Newman, J. There are two questions raised on this appeal: i.

Was the mere recording of the articles of incorporation, with the cer-
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tificate of the election of officers, without the intention or fact of the

papers themselves remaining in the office, a sufficient compliance with

the statute, so that the organization of the corporation became com-

plete, as upon a proper filing of the papers themselves? And 2. If

the recording was not sufficient for that purpose, are the defendants

liable to the plaintiff only as a de facto corporation, or are they liable

as co-partners?

1. The statute (sec. 1460, R. S.) provides that, upon the filing of

"a certificate of organization, * * * with a copy of the consti-

tution," in the office of the register of deeds of the county, "such so-

ciety shall have all the powers of a corporation necessary to promote

the objects thereof." It can not be doubted that the filing of the

proper paper in the proper office is made, by the statute, a condition

precedent to the vesting of corporate powers. The court may not be

able to clearly define the respect wherein the mere recording and re-

moval of the papers from the office fails to serve the full purpose

which the legislature intended to accomplish by the filing of them.

The legislature, no doubt, had good and sufficient reasons for its

choice of means to promote its purpose. For the court it is not a

question of equivalents. A literal filing of the papers is necessary be-

cause it is so written in the law. The term "filing" and the verb "to

file," as related to in this subject, include the idea that the paper is to

remain in its proper order on file in the office. A paper is said to be

filed when it is delivered to the proper officer, and by him received,

to be kept on file. Bouv. Law Diet. The statute is plain and easy

of observance. Valuable rights and exemptions from personal lia-

bility are to be secured by its observance. It is no undue severity to

require its strict observance. The defendants had not observed it.

and had not secured corporate powers.
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2. Had the defendants secured immunity from individual liability?

613

No doubt, as a general rule, where an attempt to organize a corpora-

tion fails by omission of some substantial step or proceeding required

by the statute, its members or stockholders are liable as partners for

its acts and contracts. Beach Priv. Corp., §§ 16, 162; I Thompson

Corp., §§ 239, 416, 417. But the defendants' contention is that they

are not within this rule, because they are at least de facto a cor-

poration, and their right to be a corporation can not be inquired into in

a collateral action, but only in a direct action for that purpose, by the

state. The infirmity of the defendant's contention is in the assump-

tion that they are de facto a corporation. In order to secure this im-

munity from inquiry into its right to be a corporation in a collateral

action, its action as a corporation must be under a color, at least, of

right. It is immaterial that they have carried on business, under the

supposed authority to act as a body corporate, in entire good faith. If

they had not color of legal right, they have obtained no immunity

from individual liability for the debts of the supposed corporation.

Until the articles of incorporation are filed in the office of the register
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of deeds of the county, there is no color of legal right to act as a cor-

poration. The filing of such paper is a condition precedent to the

right to so act. So long as an act, required as a condition precedent,

remains undone, no immunity from individual liability is secured. I

Thompson Corp., §§ 226, 508.

The defendants are not a corporation either de jure or de facto, but

are liable for the plaintiffs' claim as partners. It is not necessary to

prove a co-partnership by evidence. That was established by impli-

cation of law. Nor was it necessary to prove that the debt was un-

paid. There was no presumption that it had been paid to be rebutted.

The judgment of the circuit court is right, and must be affirmed.

By the court—The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Note. To same effect, see, 1859, Mokelumne Hill C. & M. Co. v. Wood-

bury, 14Cal. 425, supra, p.2W>;1874, Indianapolis M. Co. v. Herkimer, 46 Ind.

142; 1876, First National Bank v. Davies, 43 Iowa 424; 1876, Abbott v. Omaha

Smelting Co., 4 Neb. 416; 1879, Doyle v. Mizner, 42 Mich. 332, infra, p.632;

1879, Garnett v. Richardson, 35 Ark. 144; 1889, Childs v. Hurd, 32 W. Va.

2. Had the defendants secured immunity from individual liability?
No doubt, as a general rule, where an attempt to organize a corporation fails by omission of some substantial step or proceeding required
by the statute, its members or stockholders are liable as partners for
its acts and contracts. Beach Priv. Corp., §§ 16, 162; I Thompson
Corp., §§ 239, 416, 417. But the defendants' contention is that they
are not within this rule, because they are at least de facto a corporation, and their right to be a corporation can not be inquired into in
a collateral action, but only in a direct action for that purpose, by the
state. The infirmity of the defendant's contention is in the assumption that they are de facto a corporation. In order to secure this immunity from inquiry into its right to be a corporation in a collateral
action, its action as a corporation must be under a color, at least, of
right. It is immaterial that they have carried on business, under the
supposed authority to act as a body corporate, in entire good faith. If
they had not color of legal right, they have obtained no immunity
from individual liability for the debts of the supposed corporation.
Until the articles of incorporation are filed in the office of the register
of deeds of the county, there is no color of legal right to act as a corporation. The filing of such paper is a condition precedent to the
right to so act. So long as an act, required as a condition precedent,
remains undone, no immunity from individual liability is secured. I
Thompson Corp., §§ 226, 508.
The defendants are not a corporation either de jure or de facto, but
are liable for the plaintiffs' claim as partners. It is not necessary to
prove a co-partnership by evidence. That was established by implication of law. Nor was it necessary to prove that the debt was unpaid. There was no presumption that it had been paid to be rebutted.
The judgment of the circuit court is right, and must be affirmed.
By the court-The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

66; 1893, Guckert v. Hacke, 159 Pa. St. 303; 1894, Martin v. Deetz, 102 Cal.

65, 41 Am. St. Rep. 151; 1896, New York National Ex. Bk. v. Crowell, 177

Pa. St. 313. But compare, 1896, Supreme Court of Independent Order of For-

esters v. Sup. Ct. U. O. of F., 94 Wis. 234; also, 1890, Vanneman v. Young,

52 N. J. L. 403, and 1897, Johnson v. Okerstrom, 70 Minn. 303; 1900, Slocum

v. Head, 105 Wis. 431, 50 L. R. A. 324; 1901, Clausen v. Head, 110 Wis. 405,

84 Am. St. Rep. 933, 85 N. W. 1028, contra.

As to filing amendments of charter see, 1899, Jackson v. Crown Point Min-

ing Co., 21 Utah 2, 81 Am. St. Rep. 651, 59 Pac. 238; 1900, Hoeft v. Kock,

123 Mich. 171, 81 Am. St. Rep. 159, 81 N. W. 1070.

Note. To same effect, see, 1859, Mokelumne Hill C. & M. Co. v. Woodbury, 14 Cal. 425, supra, p.~6;1874, Indianapolis M. Co. v. Herkimer, 46 Ind.
142; 1876, First National Bank v. Davies, 43 Iowa 424; 1876, Abbott v. Omaha
Smelting Co., 4 Neb. 416; 1879, Doyle v. Mizner, 42 Mich. 332, infra, p.632;
1879, Garnett v. Richardson, 35 Ark. 144; 1889, Childs v. Hurd, 32 W. Va.
66; 1893, Guckert v. Hacke, 159 Pa. St. 30~; 1894, Martin v. Deetz, 102 Cal.
55, 41 Am. St. Rep. 151; 1896, New York National Ex. Bk. v. Crowell, 177
Pa. St. 313. But compare, 1896, Supreme Court of Independent Order of Foresters v. Sup. Ct. U. 0. of F., 94 Wis. 234; also, 1890, Vanneman v. Young,
ii2 N. J. L. 403, and 1897, Johnson v. Okerstrom, 70 Minn. 303; 1900, Slocum
v. Head, 105 Wis. 431, 50 L. R. A. 324; 1901, Clausen v. Head, 110 Wis. 405,
84 Am. St. Rep. 933, 86 N. W . 10'.l8, contra.
As to filing amendments of charter see, 1899, Jackson v. Crown Point Mining Co., 21 Utah 2, 81 Am. St. Rep. 651, 59 Pac. 238; 1900, Hoeft v. Kock,
123 Mich. 171, 81 Am. St. Rep. 159, 81 N. W. 1070.
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ARTICLE V. CONDITIONS OF DE FACTO EXISTENCE.

FINNEGAN V. NOERENBERG.

Sec. 161. (i) Conditions precedent.

161

FINNEGAN v. NOERENBERG.1

1893. In the Supreme Court of Minnesota. 52 Minn. Rep.

ARTICLE V .

239~245' 38 Am- St- ReP- 552-

CONDITIONS OF DE FACTO EXISTENCE.

Gilfili.an, C. J. Eight persons signed, acknowledged and caused

Sec. 161. ( 1)

to be filed and recorded in the office of the city clerk in Minneapolis,

articles assuming and purporting to form, under laws of 1870, ch. 29,

Conditions precedent.

a corporation, for the purpose, as specified in them, of "buying, own-

FINNEGAN v. NOERENBERG. 1

ing, improving, selling and leasing of lands, tenements and heredita-

ments, real, personal and mixed estates and property, including the

IN

construction and leasing of a building in the city of Minneapolis,

THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA.

Minn., as a hall to aid and carry out the general purposes of the

52 Minn. Rep.

239-245, 38 Am. S t. Rep. 552.

organization known as the 'Knights of Labor.'" The association re-

ceived subscriptions to its capital stock, elected directors and a board

GILFILLAN, C. J. Eight persons sign ed, acknowledged and cau sed
to be filed and recorded in the office of the city clerk in Minneapolis,
articles a ssuming and purpotting to form, under laws of 1870, ch. 29,
a corporation , for the pu1·pose, as sp ecifi ed in them, of "buying, owning, improying, se lling and leasing of lands, tenements and hereditaments, real, person al and mixed estates and property. including the
construction and leasing of a huilding in the city of Minneapolis,
Minn., as a hall to aid and carry out the general purposes of the
organization known as the 'Kn ights of Labor.' '' The association received subscription s to its capital stock. elected directors and a hoard
of managers, adopted by-l aws, bought a lot, erected a building on it,
and, when completed, rented different parts of it to diffe rent parties.
The plaintiff furni shed plumbing for the building during its construction , amounting to $599.50, for whi ch he brin gs this action against
several subscri bers to the stock, as co-partners, doing bu siness under
the firm n a me of the " K. of L. Building Association." The theory
upon which the action is broug ht is that, the association baYing failed
to become a corporation, it is in law a partnership , and the members
liahle as partners for the debts incurred by it.
It is claimed that the association wa s not an in corporation because
- first, the act under which it attempted to become incorporated. to
wit . Laws 1870, ch. 29, is void, b ecau se its subject is not propc.'rly
expressed in the title; second, the act does not authorize the formation of corporations for the purpose or to transact the business ~tatcd
in the articles: tlifrd, the place where the business was to be can;cd
on was not di stinctly stated in the articles, and they had , perhap ,
some other minor defects.
It is unnecessary to con sider whether this was a de Jure corporation, so that it could defend against a quo warranto, or an action in
the nature of a quo warranto, in hehalf of the state; for although
an association may not be able to justify itself when called 011 by
the state to show by what authority it assumes to be and act as a
corporation, it may be so far a corporation that, for reasons of
public policy, no one but the state wiJI he permitted to ca ll in question the lawfulness of its org-anization. Such is what is termed a
corporation d e facto , that is, a corporation from the fact of its act-

of managers, adopted by-laws, bought a lot, erected a building on it,

and, when completed, rented different parts of it to different parties.

The plaintiff furnished plumbing for the building during its construc-

tion, amounting to $599.50, for which he brings this action against
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several subscribers to the stock, as co-partners, doing business under

the firm name of the "K. of L. Building Association." The theory

upon which the action is brought is that, the association having failed

to become a corporation, it is in law a partnership, and the members

liable as partners for the debts incurred by it.

It is claimed that the association was not an incorporation because

—-first, the act under which it attempted to become incorporated, to

wit Laws 1870, ch. 29, is void, because its subject is not properly

expressed in the title; second, the act does not authorize the forma-

tion of corporations for the purpose or to transact the business stated

in the articles; third, the place where the business was to be carried

on was not distinctly stated in the articles, and they had, perhaps,

some other minor defects.

It is unnecessary to consider whether this was a de jure corpora-

tion, so that it could defend against a quo warranto, or an action in

the nature of a quo warranto, in behalf of the state; for although

an association may not be able to justify itself when called on by

the state to show by what authority it assumes to be and act as a

coqjoration, it may be so far a corporation that, for reasons of

public policy, no one but the state will be permitted to call in ques-

tion the lawfulness of its organization. Such is what is termed a

corporation de facto, that is, a corporation from the fact of its act-

1 Arguments omitted; also statement ot facts, except as given in the opinion.
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essential to constitute a body of men a de facto corporation is stated

6I 5

by Selden, J., in Methodist, etc., Church v. Pickett, 19 N. Y. 482,

as "(1) the existence of a charter or some law under which a corpora-

tion with the powers assumed might lawfully be created; and (2) a

user by the party to the suit of the rights claimed to be conferred by

such a charter or law." This statement was apparently adopted by

this court in East Norway Church v. Froislie, 37 Minn. 447, 35 N.

W. Rep. 260, but as it leaves out of account any attempt to organize

under the charter or law, we think the statement of what is essential

defective. The definition in Taylor on Private Corporations (page 145)

is more nearly accurate: "When a body of mc?i are acting as a cor-

poration, under color of apparent organization, in pursuance of some

charter or enabling act, their authority to act as a corporation can

not be questioned collaterally."

To give a body of men assuming to act as a corporation, where

there has been no attempt to comply with the provisions of any law

authorizing them to become such, the status of a de facto corporation

might open the door to frauds upon the public. It would certainly be

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:17 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

impolitic to permit a number of men to have the status of a corpora-

tion to any extent merely because there is a law under which they

might have become incorporated, and they have agreed among them-

selves to act, and they have acted, as a corporation. That was the

condition in Johnson v. Corser, 34 Minn. 355, 25 N. W. Rep. 799,

in which it was held that what had been done was ineffectual to limit

the individual liability of the associates. They had not gone far

enough to become a de facto corporation. They had merely signed

the articles, but had not attempted to give them publicity by filing for

record, which the statute required.

"Color of apparent organization under some charter or enabling

act" does not mean that there shall have been a full compliance with

what the law requires to be done, nor a substantial compliance. A

substantial compliance will make a corporation de jure, but there

must be an apparent attempt to perfect an organization under the law.

There being such apparent attempt to perfect an organization, the

failure as to some substantial requirement will prevent the body being

a corporation de jure; but, if there be user pursuant to such attempted

organization, it will not prevent it being a corporation de facto.

The title to chapter 29 is "an act in relation to the formation of co-

operative associations." Appellant's counsel argues that the body of

the act does not contain a single element of "co-operation," as that

term is generally understood. But how it is generally understood he

does not inform us. In a broad sense, all associations, whether cor-

porations or partnerships, are co-operative, for all the members,

either by their labor or capital, or both, co-operate to a common pur-

pose. There is undoubtedly, in popular use of the terms, a more

limited sense, though the precise limits are not well defined. There

is no legal, as distinguishable from their popular signification. In

the Century Dictionary the term "co-operative society" is defined,

ing as such, though not in law or of right a corporation. What is
e · e ntial to constitute a body of men a de facto corporation is stated
by Selden, J., in Methodist, etc., Church v. Pickett, 19 N. Y. 482,
as · ' ( l) tile existence of a charter or some law under which a corporation w ith tlw powers assumed migllt lawfully be created; and (2) a
user by th e party to th e su£t of tile rights cla£med lo be conferred by
suc/l a charter or law." This statement was apparently adopted by
this court in East Norway Church v. Froislie, 37 Minn. 447, 35 N.
\V. Rep. 260, but as it !"eaves out of account any attempt to organize
under the charter or law, we think the statement of what is essential
defectiYe. The definition in Taylor on Private Corporations (page 145)
is more nearly accurate: "Wilen a body of men are acting as a corporat£on, under color of apparent organ£zation, £n pursuance of some
charter or enabling act, tltez'r authority to act as a corporat£on can
not be quest£oned collaterally.''
To give a body of men assuming to act as a corporation, where
there has been no attempt to comply with the provisions of any law
authorizing them to become such, the status of a de facto corporation
might open the door to frauds upon the public. It would certainly be
impolitic to permit a number of men to have the status of a corporation to any extent merely because there is a law under which they
might have become incorporated, and they have agreed among themelves to act, and they have acted, as a corporation. That was the
condition in Johnson v. Corser, 34 Minn. 355, 25 N. W. Rep. 799,
in which it was held that v.·hat had been done was ineffectual to limit
the individual liability of the associates. They had not gone far
enough to become a de facto corporation. They had merely signed
the articles, but had not attempted to give them publicity by filing for
record. which the statute required.
·'Color of apparent organz'zation under some charter or enabling
act" does not mean that there shall have been a full compNance w ith
what tile law requires to be done, nor a substant£al complz"ance. A
substanti'al compliance wi'll make a co1-porat£on d e jure, but /lure
11111st be an apparent attempt to perfect an organization under tlte law.
There being such apparent attempt to perfect an organi'zatz'on, the
failure as to some substantial requirement will prevent th ebody bez'ng
a corporati'on de jure; but, if tllere be user pursuant lo sucll attempted
organization, it wz'll not prevent £t bez'ng a corporati'on de facto.
The title to chapter 29 is "an act in relation to the formation of cooperative associations. " Appellant's counsel argues that the body of
the act does not contain a single element of "co-operation," as that
term is generally understood. But how it is generally understood he
does not inform us. In a broad sense, all associations, whether corporations or partnerships, are co-operative, for all the members,
either by their labor or capital, or both , co-operate to a common purpo e. There is undoubtedly, in popular use of the terms, a more
limited sense, though the precise limits are not well defined. There
is no legal , as di stinguishable from their popular signification. In
the C entury Dictionary the term "co-operative society" is defined,
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formed • • * for the prosecution in common of a productive

enterprise, the profits being shared in accordance with the amount of

"a union of individuals, commonly laborers or small capitalists,
formed • • • for the prosecution in common of a productive
enterprise, the profits being shared in accordance with the amount of
capital or labor contributed by each member." Taking the distinctive
feature of a co-operative society to be that it is made up of laborers
or small capitalists, it is manifest that the chapter intends to deal with
just that sort of associations. Not only does it contemplate that the
operations of the corporations shall be local, but the capital stock is
limited to $30,000, the stock which one member may hold to $1 ,ooo.
No one can become a shareholder without the consent of the managers, and no one is entitled to more than one vote.
The provisions in the body of the act are in accord with the title,
and it is therefore not open to the objection made against it.
The purposes for which, under the act, corporations may be formed,
are "of trade, or of carrying on any lawful mechanical, manufacturing or agricultural business.'' The main purpose of the act being to
enable men of small capital, or of no capital but their labor and their
skill in trades, to form corporations, for the purpose of giving employment to such capital or labor and skill, the language expressing the
purposes for which such corporations may be formed ought not to be
narrowly construed. Giving a reasonably liberal meaning to the
word "trade" in the act, it would include the buying and selling of
real estate, and, upon a similar construction, the word "mechanical"
would include the erection of buildings. The doing ot the mason,
or brick, or carpenter, or any other work upon a building is certainly
mechanical. There can be little question that corporationli might be
formed to do either of those kinds of work on buildings, and, that being so, there is no reason why they may not be formed to do all of
them. There is no reason to claim that such a corporation must do
its work as a contractor for some other person. It may do it for itself,
and, as the act authorizes the corporation to "take, hold and convey
such real and personal estate as is necessary for the purposes of its organization," it may, instead of working for others as a contractor,
make its profit by buying real estate, erecting buildings on it, and
either selling or holding them for leasing.
The omission to state distinctly in the articles the place within
which the business is to be carried on, though that might be essential
to make it a de jure corporation, would not prevent it becoming one

capital or labor contributed by each member." Taking the distinctive

feature of a co-operative society to be that it is made up of laborers

or small capitalists, it is manifest that the chapter intends to deal with

just that sort of associations. Not only does it contemplate that the

operations of the corporations shall be local, but the capital stock is

limited to $50,000, the stock which one member may hold to $1,000.

No one can become a shareholder without the consent of the man-

agers, and no one is entitled to more than one vote.

The provisions in the body of the act are in accord with the title,

and it is therefore not open to the objection made against it.

The purposes for which, under the act, corporations may be formed,

are "of trade, or of carrying on any lawful mechanical, manufactur-

ing or agricultural business." The main purpose of the act being to

enable men of small capital, or of no capital but their labor and their

skill in trades, to form corporations, for the purpose of giving employ-

ment to such capital or labor and skill, the language expressing the
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purposes for which such corporations may be formed ought not to be

narrowly construed. Giving a reasonably liberal meaning to the

word "trade" in the act, it would include the buying and selling of

real estate, and, upon a similar construction, the word "mechanical"

would include the erection of buildings. The doing of the mason,

or brick, or carpenter, or any other work upon a building is certainly

mechanical. There can be little question that corporations might be

formed to do either of those kinds of work on buildings, and, that be-

ing so, there is no reason why they may not be formed to do all of

them. There is no reason to claim that such a corporation must do

its work as a contractor for some other person. It may do it for itself,

and, as the act authorizes the corporation to "take, hold and convey

such real and personal estate as is necessary for the purposes of its or-

ganization," it may, instead of working for others as a contractor,

make its profit by buying real estate, erecting buildings on it, and

either selling or holding them for leasing.

The omission to state distinctly in the articles the place within

which the business is to be carried on, though that might be essential

to make it a de jure corporation, would not prevent it becoming one

de facto.

The foundation for a de facto corporation having been laid by the

attempt to organize under the law, the user shown was sufficient.

Judgment affirmed.

Note. See note at end of Cochran v. Arnold, infra, p. 629; 1902, Tulare

Irrigation Dist. v. Shepard, — U. S. —, Adv. Sh. May 1, 1902, p. 631.

Compare, 1900, Slocum v. Head, 106 Wis. 431, 50 L. B. A. 324.

de facto.
The foundation for a de facto corporation having been laid by the
attempt to organize under the law, the user shown was sufficient.
Judgment affirmed.
Note. See note at end of Cochran v. Arnold, infra, p. 629; 1902, Tulare
Irrigation Dist. v. Shepard, - U. S. -, Adv. Sh. May 1, 1902, p. 631.
Compare, 1900, Slocum v. Head, 105 Wis. 431, 50 L. R. A. 324.

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 162 CONDITIONS OF DE FACTO EXISTENCE. 617

Sec. 162. Same.

SOCIETY PERTJN v. CLEVELAND,1

CONDITIONS OF DE FACTO EXISTENCE.

1885. In the Supreme Court of Ohio. 43 Ohio State Rep.
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481-499.

Error to the district court of Cuyahoga county.

On the 28th of January, 1874, the city of Cleveland conveyed

See. 162. Same.

to Perun (an incorporated school and library society) certain real

SOCIETY PERUN v. CLEVELAND.1

estate situated in that city, and to secure the unpaid purchase-money

therefor, Perun, on the same date, executed and delivered to the city

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF Omo.
48r-499.

four promissory notes and a mortgage upon the premises conveyed.

The city neglected to file this mortgage for record until the 21st

day of October, 1879. In February, 1874, certain persons attempted

43 Ohio State Rep.

to organize a mutual benefit association under an act supplementary

to an act to provide for the creation and regulation of incorporate

companies, passed May I, 1852 (S. & C. Stat. 271), passed April

20, 1872 (69 Ohio L. 82), under the corporate name of Society

Perun. Thereafter, in May, 1874, Perun delivered to Society Perun

its deed purporting to convey to the latter the premises theretofore

mortgaged to the city. From that time forward, and prior to the

filing of the city's mortgage for record, Society Penin, acting in its
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supposed corporate capacity, from time to time, executed and deliv-

ered deeds, mortgages and executory contracts of sale, purporting to

convey, incumber and sell parcels of these mortgaged premises to va-

rious parties, who were made defendants in the action below, and

some of whom (including Amasa Stone, a mortgagee, and who had

paid taxes upon the premises mortgaged to him), are cross-petitioners

in error. Thereafter, in June, 1880, in a proceeding in quo -warranto,

in this court, instituted by the attorney-general, Society Perun was

adjudged not to have become incorporated in conformity to the laws of

this state, but that its pretended incorporation was in violation thereof;

and it was accordingly ousted of all rights and franchises to be a cor-

poration.

These proceedings in quo warranto were had pending and prior to

the final judgment in the action below, which was brought by the city

to foreclose her mortgage, and also to foreclose her supposed vendor's

lien on the mortgaged premises, as against these subsequent grantees,

mortgagees and purchasers.

The cause was appealed from the court of common pleas to the

district court, wherein it was tried upon the issues, the court finding,

among other things, that, as to the city of Cleveland, Society Perun

was not a corporation, either in law or in fact, and that the convey-

ance to it by Perun was void as against the city, and that the mort-

gages and other liens and claims of all the defendants (except the lien

of Amasa Stone for taxes, and the claims of certain defendants for

1 Arguments omitted.

Error to the district court of Cuyahoga county.
On the 28th of January, 1874, the city of Cleveland conveyed
to Perun (an incorporated school and library society) certain real
estate situated in that city, and to secure the unpaid purchase-money
therefor, Perun, on the same date, executed and delivered to the city
four promissory notes and a mortgage upon the premises conveyed.
The city neglected to file this mortgage for record until the 21st
day of October, 1879. In February, 1874, certain persons attempted
to organize a mutual ben~fit association under an act supplementary
to an act to provide for the creation and regulation of incorporate
companies, passed May 1, 1852 (S. & C. Stat. 271 ), p assed April
zo , 1872 (69 Ohio L. 82), under the corporate name of Society
Perun. Thereafter, in May, 1874, Pemn delivered to Society Perun
its deed purporting to convey to the latter the premises theretofore
mortgaged to . the city. From that time forward , and prior to the
fi1ing of the city's mortgage for record, Society Pemn, acting in its
supposed corporate capacity, from time to time, executed and delivered deeds, mortgages and executory contracts of sa le, purporting to
convey, incumber and sell parcels of these mortgaged premises to various parties, who were made defendants in the action below, and
some of whom (including Amasa Stone, a mortgagee, and who had
paid taxes upon the premises mortgaged to him) , are cross-petitioners
in error. Thereafter, in June , 1880, in a proceeding in quo warranto,
in this court, instituted by the attorney-general, Society Perun was
adjudged not to have become incorporated in conformity to the laws of
this state, but that its pretended incorporation was in violation thereof;
and it was accordingly ousted of all rights and franchises to be a corporation.
·
These proceedings in quo warranto were had pending and prior to
the final judgment in the action below, which was brought by the city
to foreclose her mortgage, and also to foreclose her supposed vendor's
lien on the mortgaged premises, as against these subsequent grantees,
mortgagees and purchasers.
The cause was appealed from the court of common pleas to the
district court, wherein it was tried upon the issues, the court finding,
among other things, that, as to the city of Cleveland, Society Perun
was not a corporation, either in law or in fact, and that the conveyance to it by Perun was void as against the city, and that the mortgages and other 1iens and claims of all the defendants ( except the lien
of Amasa Stone for taxes, and the claims of certain defendants for
1
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improvements on the premises) were subsequent and inferior to the

lien of the city, in whose favor the court adjudged the second lien,

improYements on the premises) were subsequent and inferior to the
lien of the city, in whose favor the court adjudged the second lien.
and subsequent only to the lien of Amasa Stone for taxes paid by him,
but of equal rank and merit with the holders of liens for expenditures
on account of improvements above mentioned.
By the judgment in the quo warranto proceeding it was by this
court in form 'adjudged that the defendants (the pretended incorporators), ever since their pretended incorporation , had unlawfully
and without authority exercised the franchi ses of, and usurped the
right to be, a body corporate; that the pretended organization of these
defendants as a corporation was wholly void and of no effect, and
vested in them no corporate rights, powers, privileges, or franchi es
of any description \Vhatever.
Tt \\':lS fmther in form adjudged that the defendants never had. nor
had any of them, the authority or lawful right to be a body corporate
or to exercise or hold any of the po\\'ers , rig hts and liberties, privileges, function s or franchises of a body corporate, hut that they and
each of them in 'the u se and exercise of the same were and ha<l ever
been usurpers th ereof. Th e sole ground upon which this judgment
of ouster was rendered was that, while the statute required that th ey
should set forth in their certificate of incotporation ( amo ng other
things ) the manner of canying on the business of the association. the
attempted compliance with this requirement was in these words:
'· Tltird. That the manner of carrying on the business of said association shall be i-;uch as may he from time to time prescribed by the
by-laws of such association; prodded that the same shall not b e inconsistent with the laws of the state of Ohio."
Upon the trial below the plaintiff gave in evidence, against the
obj ection of defendants, the record of the quo warranlo proceedings.
The defendants offered in evidence the writing which was fil ed
with the secretary of state as the certificate of incorporation of Society
Pcnrn.
They also offered to prove that the pretended incorporators pro~
ceeded to comply strictly with the requirements of the statutes, that
they elected tru-;tee , prepared a certificate of incorporation stating
explicitly the manne r of carrying on the business ; that this was forwarded to the secretary of state, who submitted it to the attomeygeneral for examin ation and approval; that the secretary of state returned this paper with another form of certificate which had been
approved hy the attorney-general and secretary of state, and which
was the identical certificate actually filed with the secretary of state,
and under the supposed authority of which an organization was in
good faith attempted, and that they proceeded in good faith to act
and transact its business under the supposed authority of such incorporation.
All this was excluded, and the defendants excepted. To reverse
this judgment the present proceeding is prosecuted. • • •
OWEN, J. The "defendants below, conceding that Society Perun
had never been a corporation d e jurc , maintain that the court below

and subsequent (inly to the lien of Amasa Stone for taxes paid by him,

but of equal rank and merit with the holders of liens for expenditures

on account of improvements above mentioned.

By the judgment in the quo warranto proceeding it was by this

court in form adjudged that the defendants (the pretended incor-

porators), ever since their pretended incorporation, had unlawfully

and without authority exercised the franchises of, and usurped the

right to be, a body corporate; that the pretended organization of these

defendants as a corporation was wholly void and of no effect, and

vested in them no corporate rights, powers, privileges, or franchises

of any description whatever.

It was further in form adjudged that the defendants never had, nor

had any of them, the authority or lawful right to be a body corporate

or to exercise or hold any of the powers, rights and liberties, privi-

leges, functions or franchises of a body corporate, but that they and

each of them in the use and exercise of the same were and had ever
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been usurpers thereof. The sole ground upon which this judgment

of ouster was rendered was that, while the statute required that they

should set forth in their certificate of incorporation (among other

things) the manner of carrying on the business of the association, the

attempted compliance with this requirement was in these words:

'■ Third. That the manner of carrying on the business of said as-

sociation shall be such as may be from time to time prescribed by the

by-laws of such association; provided that the same shall not be incon-

sistent with the laws of the state of Ohio."

Upon the trial below the plaintiff gave in evidence, against the

objection of defendants, the record of the quo -warranto proceedings.

The defendants offered in evidence the writing which was filed

with the secretary of state as the certificate of incorporation of Society

Perun.

They also offered to prove that the pretended incorporators pro.-

ceeded to comply strictly with the requirements of the statutes, that

they elected trustees, prepared a certificate of incorporation stating

explicitly the manner of carrying on the business; that this was for-

warded to the secretary of state, who submitted it to the attorney-

general for examination and approval; that the secretary of state re-

turned this paper with another form of certificate which had been

approved by the attorney-general and secretary of state, and which

was the identical certificate actually filed with the secretary of state,

and under the supposed authority of which an organization was in

good faith attempted, and that they proceeded in good faith to act

and transact its business under the supposed authority of such incor-

poration.

All this was excluded, and the defendants excepted. To reverse

this judgment the present proceeding is prosecuted. * * *

Owen, J. The defendants below, conceding that Society Perun

had never been a corporation de jure, maintain that the court below
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corporation; that it attempted, in good faith, to become a body cor-

porate; proceeded to act and transact business in good faith under

the supposed authority of incorporation, and that its acts ought not to

have been declared to be wholly void as against the city of Cleveland.

The judgment of ouster was an adjudication between the state

and the society upon the right of the latter to exercise corporate fran-

chises. For the purposes of such adjudication it was competent for

this court to consider and determine what had been its status from its

first attempt to incorporate. But it had no power to pass upon or

determine the rights of parties not before it.

It was not competent for this court to determine in that proceeding

that Society Perun had never been a corporation de facto, or that its

acts and business transactions, under the color of its supposed charter

powers, were void. The authority of the court in that behalf was

derived from section 6774 (Rev. Stat.), which provides: "When a

defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully

holding or exercising an office, franchise or privilege, judgment shall
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be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded

therefrom, and that the relator recover his costs."

When the court had excluded the society from its franchises to be a

corporation, it exhausted its jurisdiction over the subject-matter. It

had no power to speak concerning whatever rights may have been ac-

quired by the society as a corporation da facto, or by third parties in

their transactions with it as an acting corporation.

It is conceded by the city that parties who had recognized the ex-

istence of the society by their transactions with it as a supposed cor-

poration are estopped to deny its corporate existence. But it is main-

tained that the citv, having engaged in no transactions with it, is free

to challenge its existence as a corporation de facto, as well as de jure.

The argument is that: "No case can be found where it is held that

there is a corporation de facto against persons who have in no way

recognized its existence as a corporation," and that: "The notion of

a de facto corporation is based on the doctrine of estoppel; when es-

toppel can not be invoked there can be no de facto corporation."

The theory that a de facto corporation has no real existence, that it is

a mere phantom, to be invoked only by that rule of estoppel which

forbids a party who has dealt with a pretended corporation to deny its

corporate existence, has no foundation, either in reason or authority.

A de facto corporation is a reality. It has an actual and substantial

legal existence. It is, as the term implies, a corporation.

"It is a self-evident proposition that a contract can not be made

with a corporation unless the corporation be in existence at the time.

A real contract with an imaginary corporation is as impossible, in the

nature of things, as a real contract with an imaginary person. It is

essential, therefore, in order to establish the existence of a contract

with a corporation, to show that the corporation was in existence, at

least de facto, at the time the contract was made." Morawetz Pri-

vate Corporations, § 137.

sho uld have p ermitted them to prove that such society was a de facto
corporation; that it attempted, in good faith, to become a body corporate; proceeded to act and transact business in good faith under
the supposed authority of incorporation, and that its acts ought not to
have been declared to be wholly void as against the city of Cleveland.
The judg ment of ouster was an adjudication between the state
and th e society upon th e right of the latter to exercise corporate franchises. F or t he purposes of such adjudi cation it was compete nt for
this court to consider and determine what had b een its status from its
first att empt to incorpornte. But it had no power to pass upon or
determine the rig hts of parties not b efore it.
It was not competent for thi s court to determine in that proceeding
that Society P erun had never been a corporation de f acto, or that its
acts and business transactions, under the color of its supposed charter
powers, were void. Th e authority of the court in that behalf was
derived from section 6774 (Rev. Stat. ) , which provides : " \ Vhen a
defend ant is found g uilty of usurping , intrudin g into , or unlawfully
hold ing or exercising an office , franchise or privilege, judgment slwll
be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded
therefrom , and th at the relator r ecover his costs."
When the court had excluded the society from its franchi ses to be a
corporation, it exhausted its jurisdiction over the subject-matter. It
had no power to speak concerning whatever rights may h ave been acguirec.I by the society as a corporation de facto , or by third parties in
the ir tran actions with it as an acting corporation.
It is conceded by the city that parties who had recognized the exi:.tencc of the society by th eir transactions with it as a supposed corporation are estopped to deny its corporate existen ce. But it is maintained that the city, having engaged in no transactions with it, is free
to challenge its existence as a corporation de facto, as well as de ju re.
The argument is that: "No case can he fo und where it is hcl~I that
there is a corporation de fa cto again st p ersons who have if1 no way
recognized its existence as a corporation , " and th at: " The notion of
a de facto corporation is based on the doctrine of estoppel ; when estoppel can not be invoked there can be no de f acto corporation."
The theory that a d e facto corporation h as no rea l existence, that it is
a m ere phantom, to be invo ked only by th at rule of estoppe l which
forbids .a party who h as clealt with a pretended corporation to deny its
corporate existence, has no found ation, e ither in reason or authority.
A de facto corporation is a reality. It h as an actual and substantial
lega l existence. It is, as the term implies, a corporation.
" It is a self-e:vident proposition that a contract can n ot be made
·with a corporation unless the corporation be in existence at the time.
A real contract with an imaginary corporation is a impossible, in the
nature of things, a s a real contract with an imag inary person. It is
essential , therefore, in order to establish the existence of a contract
with a corporation , to show that the corporation was in existence, at
least de facto , at the time the contract was made." Morawetz Private Corporations, § r 37.
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poration de jure. Where it has attempted in good faith to assume

corporate powers; "where its proceedings in that behalf are colorable,

It is bound by all such acts as it might rightfully perform as a corporation de jure. Wllere it has attempted i·n good fat'th to assume
corporate powers; where its proceedings in that behalf are colorable,
and are approved by those officers of the state wlio are autliorized to
act in tliat r egard; where it has honestly proceeded for a number of
years, wit/tout interference from the state, to transact business as a
corporation; has been reputed and dealt with as a duly i"ncorporated
body, and valuable rights and t'nterests have been acqu£red and transferred by i't, no substantial reason i's suggested why i'ts corporate exi'stence, in a sui't involvi'ng suclt transactt'ons, sliould be subject to attack by any otl1 er party tl1an the state, and then only when it is called
upon, t'n a direct proceedi'ng for that purpose, to show by wliat authority it assumes to be a corporation.
Proof was offered upon the trial below to show ( 1) that the persons seeking to incorporate first filed with the secretary of state a certificate which fully complied with the requirements of the statutes,
and free from the defects which finally proved fatal to its existence,
but which was disapproved by the attorney-general; (2) that the certificate of incorporation which was finally filed with the secretary of
state recited that "said association has been formed and organized
for the mutual protection and relief of its members, and for the payment of stipulated sums of money to the families or heirs of the deceased members of said association; that the officers of said association have been duly chosen; that for the purpose of becoming a body
corporate under an act passed by the general assembly of the state of
Ohio, entitled an act supplementary to an act, entitled an act to provide for the creation and regulation of incorporated companies in the
state of Ohio, passed May 1, 1852, passed April 20, 1872;" (3) that this
certificate was approved by the secretary of state, and also by the
attorney-general, as provided by the statutes (69 Ohio L. •50); (4)
that it proceeded in good faith to transact business peculiar to corporations provided for by the act under which it attempted to incorporate.
All thi s was excluded, and the decision of the court below practically rested on the proof offered by the city, that Socie~y Perun had
been ousted of its franchises, which was evidently construed as determining that such society had from the first no corporate existence,
either de jure or de facto , and consequently no capacity to receive
or impart any interest in or title to real estate, except as against such
parties as were by reason of their recognition of or dealings with it,
estopped to deny its incorporate existence.
Did the court err? This fairly presents the controlling and very
important question: Was it competent to show, as against a party
who was not estopped to deny its corporate existence, as Society
Perun was, at the time of the transactions involved in controversy, a
corporation de factoP
In Attorney-General, ex rel. Pettee, v. Stevens, Saxton (N. J. Eq.)
369, the relntor sought to enjoin the Camden and Amboy Railroad
and Transportation Company and others acting under its authority

and are approved by those officers of the state who are authorized to

act in that regard; where it has honestly proceeded for a number of

years, without interference from the state, to transact business as a

corporation; has been reputed and dealt with as a duly incorporated

body, and valuable rights and interests have been acquired and trans-

ferred by it, no substantial reason is suggested why its corporate ex-

istence, in a suit involving such transactions, should be subject to at-

tack by any other party than the state, and then only when it is called

upon, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, to show by what au-

thority it assumes to be a corporation.

Proof was offered upon the trial below to show (i) that the per-

sons seeking to incorporate first filed with the secretary of state a cer-

tificate which fully complied with the requirements of the statutes,

and free from the defects which finally proved fatal to its existence,

but which was disapproved by the attorney-general; (2) that the cer-

tificate of incorporation which was finally filed with the secretary of
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state recited that "said association has been formed and organized

for the mutual protection and relief of its members, and for the pay-

ment of stipulated sums of money to the families or heirs of the de-

ceased members of said association; that the officers of said associa-

tion have been duly chosen; that for the purpose of becoming a body

corporate under an act passed by the general assembly of the state of

Ohio, entitled an act supplementary to an act, entitled an act to pro-

vide for the creation and regulation of incorporated companies in the

stateofOhio, passed May 1, 1852, passed April 20, 1872 ;" (3) that this

certificate was approved by the secretary of state, and also by the

attorney-general, as provided by the statutes (69 Ohio L. *^o); (4)

that it proceeded in good faith to transact business peculiar to cor-

porations provided for by the act under which it attempted to incor-

porate.

All this was excluded, and the decision of the court below prac-

tically rested on the proof offered by the city, that Society Perun had

been ousted of its franchises, which was evidently construed as de-

termining that such society had from the first no corporate existence,

either de jure or de facto, and consequently no capacity to receive

or impart any interest in or title to real estate, except as against such

parties as were by reason of their recognition of or dealings with it,

estopped to deny its incorporate existence.

Did the court err? This fairly presents the controlling and very

important question: Was it competent to show, as against a party

who was not estopped to deny its corporate existence, as Society

Pcrun was, at the time of the transactions involved in controversy, a

corporation de facto?

In Attorney-General, ex rel. Pettee, v. Stevens, Saxton (N. J. Eq.)

369, the relator sought to enjoin the Camden and Amboy Railroad

and Transportation Company and others acting under its authority
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from erecting a bridge over a navigable stream. The claim was that

the act authorizing the corporation had been perverted and disre-

garded, and that there was no legal incorporation. The relators were
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in no manner estopped to attack the corporate existence of the re-

spondent. The court held:

■ 'Where a set of men claiming to be a legally incorporated com-

pany under an act of the legislature, have done everything necessary

to constitute them a corporation, colorably at least, if not legally, and

are exercising all the powers and functions of a corporation, they are

a corporation, de facto, if not de jure; and this court will not inter-

fere, in an incidental way, to declare all their proceedings void, and

treat them as a body having no rights or powers."

The chancellor speaking for the court said:

'■Here, then, is a set of men claiming to be a legally incorporated

company under the act of the legislature, exercising all the powers

and functions of a corporation. They are a corporation de facto, if

not de jure. Everything necessary to constitute them a corporation

has been done, colorably at least, if not legally; and I do not feel at

liberty, in this incidental way, to declare all their proceedings void, and

treat them as a body having no rights or powers. It has been seen
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that the court will not do this where a corporation properly organized

has plainly forfeited its privileges; and there is but little difference in

principle between the two cases. In both the corporation is actually

in existence, but whether legally and rightfully so is the question. And

it appears to me that if the court can take cognizance of the matter in

this case, it must in all others where it can be brought up, not only

directly, but incidentally."

This case is approved and followed in National Docks R. Co. v.

Central R. Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 755, which held: "When a corporation

exists de facto, the court of chancery can not, at the instance of pri-

vate parties, restrain its operations upon the ground that its organiza-

tion is not de jure. In such case the proper remedy is by quo

■warranto, or information in the nature thereof, instituted by the attor-

ney-general." The rule of estoppel found no place in this case.

In S. & L. G. R. Co. v. S. & C. R. Co., 45 Cal. 6S0, it was held

that: "If the corporation de facto is in the actual possession of a pub-

lic highway, under a grant of a franchise to improve and collect tolls

on the same, a mere trespasser can not justify his entry thereon on the

ground that it was only a corporation de facto, and was not de jure

entitled to the franchises."

In Williams v. Kokomo B. & L. Association, 89 Ind. 339, one

Leach gave to an acting corporation his mortgage on real estate. Sub-

sequent to the execution and recording of it he executed another

mortgage on the same land to Williamson. In a proceeding to fore-

close the junior mortgage, Williamson maintained that the pretended

corporation had no legal existence, by reason of defects and omissions

in the proceedings to incorporate, and that the senior mortgage was

void. He was in no manner estopped, by dealings with, or recog-

nition of, the first mortgagee, to deny its corporate existence. The

from erecting a bridge over a navigable stream. The claim was that
the act authorizing the corporation had been perverted and disregarded, and that there was no legal incorporation. The rel a tors were
in no manner estopped to attack the corporate existence of the respondent. The court held :
~ 'Where a set of men claiming to be a legally incorporated company under an act of the legislature, have done everything necessary
to constitute them a corporation, colorably at least, if not legally, and
are exercising all the powers and functions of a corporation, they are
a corporation, de facto, if not de jure; and this court will not interfere, in an incidental way, to declare all their proceedings void, and
treat them as a body having no rights or powers."
The chancellor speaking for the court said:
"Here, then, is a set of men claiming to be a legally incorporated
company under the act of the legislature, exercising all the powers
and functions of a corporation. They are a corporation de facto , if
not de jure. Everything necessary to constitute them a corporation
has been done, colorably at least, if not legally; and I do not feel at
liberty, in this incidental way, to declare all their proceedings void, and
treat them as a body having no rights or powers. It has been seen
that the court will not do this where a corporation properly organized
has plainly forfeited its privileges; and there is but little difference in
principle between the two cases. In both the corporation is actually
in existence, but whether legally and rightfully so is the question. And
it appears to me that if the court can take cognizance of the matter in
this case, it must in all others where it can be brought up, not only
directly, but incidentally. "
This case is approved and followed in National Docks R. Co. v.
Central R. Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 755, which held: "When a corporation
ex1sts de facto, the court of chancery can not, at the instance of private parties, restrain its operations upon the ground that its organization is not de Jure. In such case the proper remedy is by quo
warranto, or information in the nature thereof, instituted by the attorney-general." The rule of estoppel found no place in this case.
In S. & L. G. R. Co. v. S. & C. R. Co., 45 Cal. 680, it was held
that: "If the corporation de facto is in the actual possession of a public highway, under a grant of a franchise to improve and collect tolls
on the same, a mere trespasser can not justify his entry thereon on the
ground that it was only a corporation de facto, and was not de jure
entitled to the franchises."
In Williams v. Kokomo B. & L. Association, 89 Ind. 339, one
Leach gave to an acting corporation his mortgage on real estate. Subsequent to the execution and recording of it he executed another
mortgage on the same land to Wil!iamson. In a proceeding to foreclose the junior mortgage, Williamson maintained that the pretended
corporation had no legal existence, by reason of defects and omissions
in the proceedings to incorporate, and that the senior mortgage was
void. He was in no manner estopped, by dealings with, or recognition of, the first mortgagee, to deny its corporate existence. The
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court held that: "A junior mortgagee can not defeat a senior mort-
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gage by showing that the corporation to which the senior mortgage

was executed was defectively organized, if it be a corporation de

comt held that: "A junior mortgagee can not defeat a senior mortgage by showing that the corporation to which the senior mortgage
was executed was defectively organized, if it be a corporation de
facto." Elliott, J., said: "Where persons assume to incorporate
under the laws of the state, and in part comply with their requirements, assume corporate functions and transact business as a corporation, private persons can not collaterally question the right of such
an association to a corporate existence, although there has not been a
full compliance ·with the provisions of the statute. Baker v. Neff, 73
Ind. 68. Tltis rule is not limited to cases where one by contract admits corporate ext'stence, but is a rule of general appli'cation." It is
not easy to distinguish the principle of this case from that of the case
at bar.
In Pape v. Capitol Bank, 20 Kan. 440, Pape and wife gave their
notes to "James M. Spencer or bearer," and their mortgage on real
estate to secure them. Spencer transfen-e<l the notes to the Capitol
Bank of Topeka, an acting corporation, with this indorsement:
"Pay the bearer, without r ecourse on me, James M. Spencer." The
mortgage was also transferred to the bank, which proceeded by suit
to collect the notes and foreclose the mortgage. Pape and wife interposed the defense that the bank was not, and never had been , a
body corporate, by reason, a mong others, of a defecti\·e organization.
The bank hnd assurnecl corporate functions after an attempt, in good
faith , to incorporate , and for a number of years ·w as in the actual and
notorious exercise of corporate franchises. Pape had transacted banking business with the plaintiff prior to the purchase of the notes and
mortgage, but such business was wholly unconnected with the notes
and mortgage in su it. His wife, however, had not in any manner
recognized the existence of the bank as a corporate body, and the
doctrine of estoppel was not in voked to aid the court in sustaining a
judgment of foreclosure against Pape and wife. Brewer, J. , says:
"The corporation is one de facto, and only the state can inquire , and
that in a direct proceeding, whether it be one de Jure. * • •
There must, in such cases, be a law under which the in corporation
can be had; there must also be an attempt, in good faith, on the part
of the corporators, to incorporate under such law; and when, after
this, there has been for a series of years, an actual, open and notorious exercise, unchalle nged by the state, of the pov.-ers of a corporation, one who is sued on a note held by such corporation will not be
permitted to question the validity of the incorporation as a defense to
the action. No mere matters of technical omission in the incorporation, no acts of forfeiture from misuser after the incorponition, are subjects of inquiry in such an action. Tliis is not upon the ground of
equitable estoppel but upon the grounds of public polt'cy. If the state,
which alone can grant the authority to incorporate, remains silent during the open and notorious assertion and exercise of corporate powers,
an individual will not, unless there be some powerful equity on his
side, be permitted to raise the inquiry.''
In Thompson v. Candor, 60 Ill. 244, Willetts, in February, 1858,

facto." Elliott, J., said: "Where persons assume to incorporate

under the laws of the state, and in part comply with their require-

ments, assume corporate functions and transact business as a corpora-

tion, private persons can not collaterally question the right of such

an association to a corporate existence, although there has not been a

full compliance with the provisions of the statute. Baker v. Neff, 73

lnd. 68. This rule is not limited to cases -where one by contract ad-

mits corporate existence, but is a rule of general application." It is

not easy to distinguish the principle of this case from that of the case

at bar.

In Pape v. Capitol Bank, 20 Kan. 440, Pape and wife gave their

notes to "'James M. Spencer or bearer," and their mortgage on real

estate to secure them. Spencer transferred the notes to the Capitol

Bank of Topeka, an acting corporation, with this indorsement:

"Pay the bearer, without recourse on me, James M. Spencer." The

mortgage was also transferred to the bank, which proceeded by suit
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to collect the notes and foreclose the mortgage. Pape and wife in-

terposed the defense that the bank was not, and never had been, a

body corporate, bv reason, among others, of a defective organization.

The bank had assumed corporate functions after an attempt, in good

faith, to incorporate, and for a number of years was in the actual and

notorious exercise of corporate franchises. Pape had transacted bank-

ing business with the plaintiff prior to the purchase of the notes and

mortgage, but such business was wholly unconnected with the notes

and mortgage in suit. His wife, however, had not in any manner

recognized the existence of the bank as a corporate body, and the

doctrine of estoppel was not invoked to aid the court in sustaining a

judgment of foreclosure against Pape and wife. Brewer, J., says:

"The corporation is one dc facto, and only the state can inquire, and

that in a direct proceeding, whether it be one de jure. » * *

There must, in such cases, be a law under which the incorporation

can be had; there must also be an attempt, in good faith, on the part

of the corporators, to incorporate under such law; and when, after

this, there has been for a series of years, an actual, open and noto-

rious exercise, unchallenged by the state, of the powers of a corpora-

tion, one who is sued on a note held by such corporation will not be

permitted to question the validity of the incorporation as a defense to

the action. No mere matters of technical omission in the incorpora-

tion, no acts of forfeiture from misuser after the incorporation, are sub-

jects of inquiry in such an action. This is not upon the ground of

equitable estoppel but upon the grounds of public policy. If the state,

which alone can grant the authority to incorporate, remains silent dur-

ing the open and notorious assertion and exercise of corporate powers,

an individual will not, unless there be some powerful equity on his

side, be permitted to raise the inquiry."

In Thompson v. Candor, 60 111. 244, Willetts, in February, 1858,
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deeded to "Mercer Collegiate Institute," a body pretending to be a
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CONDITIO!liS OF DE FACTO EXISTENCE .

corporation, the tract of land in controversy. He died in March,

1S58. In 186S his heirs quitclaimed their interest in the land to Thomp-

son, who filed a bill in chancery for the cancellation of the deed from

Willetts to the "institute," alleging, as one of the grounds of relief,

that the named grantee was not legally incorporated, had no capacity

to take the title, and that the deed was void. The court held:

■'Where parties endeavor to organize a corporation for educational

purposes under the general law, adopt a name, elect trustees, and

organize by electing a president and officers, and the trustees had

acted for years in managing the property, had leased and mortgaged

it, and expended large sums of money in its improvement, these acts

constitute it a corporate body de facto, and the regularity of its

organization can not be questioned collaterally. Such irregularity

can only be questioned by quo warranto or scire facias."

Thornton, J., says: "In 1856 an attempt was made to organize

a corporation under the general incorporation law. A corporate

name was selected, trustees were appointed, and an organization

effected by the election of a president and proper officers. The trust-
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ees thus appointed acted for years in the general management of the

property, leased and mortgaged it, and expended a large sum of

money. Here then was a corporate body de facto, which had been

engaged in an undertaking involving important interests. The regu-

larity of its organization can not be questioned collaterally. Any

alleged non-compliance with the law can only be inquired into by the

writ of quo warranto or scire facias."

There is no suggestion throughout the entire case of the rule of

estoppel as an element affecting its disposition.

In Paper Works v. Willett, 1 Robertson (N. Y. Sup.) 131, it is

held that formal defects in proceedings to organize a corporation are

not available to defeat an action brought by a corporation for trespass

in wrongfully taking property out of its possession.

See, also, illustrating the principle under discussion: Smith v.

Sheeley, 12 Wall. 361 ; Grand Gulf Bank v. Archer, 8 S. & M. 151,

173; Dunning v. R. Co., 2 Carter (Ind.) 437; Danneborge Mining

Co. v. Aliment, 26 Cal. 286; Searsburg Turnpike Co. v. Cutler, 6

Vt. 315; Mitchell v. Deeds, 49 111. 416; Eliz. Academy v. Lindsey,

6 Ired. 476; Darst v. Gale. 83 III. 136; Rondell v. Fay, 32 Cal. 354;

DeWitt v. Hastings, 40 N. Y. (Superior Court) 463; Rice v. R. Co.,

21 111. 93; Douglas County v. Bolles, 94 U. S. 104; The Banks v.

Poitiaux, 3 Randolph (Va.) 136; Goundie v. Northampton Water

Co., 7 Pa St. 233; Baker v. Backus, 32 111. 79; Tarbell v. Page, 24

111. 46; Thornburg v. R. Co., 14 Ind. 499; Tar River Nav. Co. v.

Neal, 3 Hawks, 520; Bear Camp River Co. v. Woodman, 2 Maine

404.

In Jones v. Dana, 24 Barb. 395, it was held that if a company has

in form a charter authorizing it to act as a body corporate, and is in

fact in the exercise of corporate powers at the time of taking a note

from an individual, it is, as to him and all third persons, a corpora

deeded to " M ercer Collegiate Institute ," a body pretending to be a
corporation, the tract of land in controversy. He died in March,
1858. In 1868 his heirs quitclaimed their interest in the land to Thompon. who fil ed a bill in chancery for the cancellation of the deed from
Willetts to the " institute," alleging, as one of the grounds of relief,
that the named grantee was not legally incorporated, had no capacity
to take the title, and that the deed was void. The court held:
· 'Where patti es endeavor to organize a corporation for educational
pu rposes und er the general law, adopt a name, elect trustees , and
organize by electing a president and officers, and the trustees had
acted for years in managing the property, had leased and mortgaged
it, and expended large sums of money in its improvement, these acts
·constitute it a corporate body de facto, and the regularity of its
organization can not be questioned collaterally. Such irregularity
can only be questioned by quo warranto or scire facias."
Thornton, J., says: " In 1856 an attempt was made to organize
a corporation under the general incorporation law. A corporate
n a me was selected, trustees were appoi nted, and an organization
effected by the election of a president and proper officers. The trustees thus appointed acted for years in the general management of the
property, leased and mortgaged it, and expended a large sum of
money. Here then was a corporate body d e facto, which had been
engaged in an undertaking im·olving important interests. The regularity of its organization can not be questioned collaterally. Any
alleged non-compliance with the law can only be inquired into by the
writ of quo warranto or sdre facias."
Th ere is no suggestion throughout the entire case of the rule of
estoppel as an element affecting its disposition.
In Paper Works v. \\Tillett, l Robertson (N. Y. Sup.) 131, it is
held that formal defects in proceedings to organize a corporation are
not available to defeat an action brought by a corporation for trespass
in wrongfully taking property out of its possession.
See, also, illustrating the principle under discussion: Smith v .
Sheeley, 12 Wall. 36r; Grand Gulf Bank v. Archer, 8 S. & M. 151,
173; Dunning v. R. Co., 2 Ca1ter (Ind.) 437; Danneborge Mining
Co. v. Allment, 26 Cal. 286; Searsburg Turnpike Co. v. Cutler, 6
Vt. 315; Mitchell v. Deeds, 49 Ill. 416; Eliz. Academy v. Lindsey,
6 Ired. 476; Darstv. Gale, 83 Ill. 136; Rondell v. Fay,32Cal.354;
De Witt v. Hastings, 40 N. Y. (Superior Court) 463; Rice v. R. Co.,
21 Ill. 93; Douglas County v. Bolles, 94 U. S. 104; The Banks v.
Poitiaux, 3 Randolph (Va.) r 36; Gounclie v. Northampton Water
Co., 7 Pa St. 233; Baker v. Backus, 32 Ill. 79; Tarbell v. Page, 24
Ill. 46; Thornburg v. R. Co., 14 Ind. 499; Tar River Nav. Co. v.
Neal, 3 Hawks, 520; Bear Camp River Co. v. Woodman, 2 Maine

404·

In Jones v. Dana, 24 Barb. 395, it was held that if a company has
in form a charter authorizing it to act as a body corporate, and is in
fact in the exercise of corporate powers at the time of taking a note
from an individual, it is, as to him and all third persons, a corpora
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tion de facto, and the validity of its corporate existence can only be
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tested by proceedings on behalf of the people.

In the case at bar the certificate which was last filed by the society

tion de facto, and the validity of its corporate existence can only be
tested by proceedings on behalf of the people.
In the case at bar the certificate which was last filed by the society
embraced a full statement of the objects of incorporation, and indi·
cated what the nature of its business must necessarily be, and was
strongly suggestive of the manner in which it must necessarily be
transacted; and while it is not our purpose to call in question the ac·
tion of this court in the quo warranto proceedings, we have no hesi·
tation in saying that if we were now called upon to determine whether
the corporate life of Society Perun should be taken, the question,
upon the facts offered in proof at the trial below, would not be free
from doubt and difficulty. It is very clear that the proceedings to in·
corporate were colorable; and so far as this fact is a test of the existence
of a corporation de facto , it is most amply established. That there
was proof of user is manifest from the evidence, which was received
without objection.
That the judgment of ouster did not and could not have a retroact·
ive effect upon the rights of the society, and of parties who have
dealt with it during its de facto existence, is suggested by the opinion
of Wright, J., in Gaff v. Flesher, 33 Ohio St. l 15.
The evidence which was offered and excluded would, if credited,
have shown Society Perun capable of holding and transferring the
legal title to the lands in controversy. Walsh v. Barton, 24 Ohio St.
43; Darst v. Gale, 83 Ill. 136; Shewalter v. Pirner, 55 Mo. 218;
Nat. Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 628; Goundie v. Northampton
Water Co., 7 Pa. St. 233; Barrow v . Nashville Tum. Co., 9 Humph.
304; Kelly v. People's Trans. Co., 3 Ore. 189; Bogardus v. Trin·
ity Church, 4 Sand£. Ch. 758.
.
The public and all persons dealing with this society were justified
in assuming that the certificate filed with the secretary of state. and
by him admitted to record in his office, had been approved by him,
and also by the attorney-general, as required by statute (69 Ohio L.
150), and that it so far conformed to all legal requirements that, as
provided in section 2 of the act of incorporation (69 Ohio L. 83), "a
copy, duly certified by the secretary of state, under the great seal of
the state of Ohio, shall be evidence of the existence of such association."
It would seem that such approval, record and certificate, followed
by uninterrupted and unchallenged user for nearly six years, of all of
which proof was tendered, would constitute a corporation de fado , if
such a body is, under any circumstances, entitled to legal recognition.
The highest considerations of public policy and fair dealings protest
against treating such an organization as a nullity, and all of its transactions void.
The principle of the above cases is to be distinguished from a case
where a mere corporation de facto attempts to assert the power of
eminent domain by the appropriation of private property to public
use. It has been held that the exercise of this right (which is but a
delegation of the sovereign power of the state) depends upon the

embraced a full statement of the objects of incorporation, and indi-

cated what the nature of its business must necessarily be, and was

strongly suggestive of the manner in which it must necessarily be

transacted; and while it is not our purpose to call in question the ac-

tion of this court in the quo warranto proceedings, we have no hesi-

tation in saying that if we were now called upon to determine whether

the corporate life of Society Perun should be taken, the question,

upon the facts offered in proof at the trial below, would not be free

from doubt and difficulty. It is very clear that the proceedings to in-

corporate were colorable; and so far as this fact is a test of the existence

of a corporation de facto, it is most amply established. That there

was proof of user is manifest from the evidence, which was received

without objection.

That the judgment of ouster did not and could not have a retroact-

ive effect upon the rights of the society, and of parties who have

dealt with it during its de facto existence, is suggested by the opinion
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of Wright, J., in Gaff v. Flesher, 33 Ohio St. 115.

The evidence which was offered and excluded would, if credited,

have shown Society Perun capable of holding and transferring the

legal title to the lands in controversy. Walsh v. Barton, 24 Ohio St.

43; Darst v. Gale, 83 III. 136; Shewalter v. Pirner, 55 Mo. 218;

Nat. Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 628; Goundie v. Northampton

Water Co., 7 Pa. St. 233; Barrow v. Nashville Turn. Co., 9 Humph.

304; Kelly v. People's Trans. Co., 3 Ore. 189; Bogardus v. Trin-

ity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. 758.

The public and all persons dealing with this society were justified

in assuming that the certificate filed with the secretary of state, and

by him admitted to record in his office, had been approved by him,

and also by the attorney-general, as required by statute (69 Ohio L.

150), and that it so far conformed to all legal requirements that, as

provided in section 2 of the act of incorporation (69 Ohio L. 83), "a

copy, duly certified by the secretary of state, under the great seal of

the state of Ohio, shall be evidence of the existence of such associa-

tion."

It would seem that such approval, record and certificate, followed

by uninterrupted and unchallenged user for nearly six years, of all of

which proof was tendered, would constitute a corporation de facto, if

such a body is, under any circumstances, entitled to legal recognition.

The highest considerations of public policy and fair dealings protest

against treating such an organization as a nullity, and all of its trans-

actions void.

The principle of the above cases is to be distinguished from a case

where a mere corporation de facto attempts to assert the power of

eminent domain by the appropriation of private property to public

use. It has been held that the exercise of this right (which is but a

delegation of the sovereign power of the state) depends upon the
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sufficiency and legal validity of the certificate of incorporation and

public record of its organization. Railroad Co. v. Sullivant, 5 Ohio

St. 276; Atkinson v. R. Co., 15 Ohio St. 21.
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The case of Raccoon River Nav. Co. v. Eagle, 29 Ohio St. 238, is

relied upon by the defendant in error. It was an action to recover

upon a stock subscription. A plea of nul tiel corporation was inter-

posed. The plaintiff claimed to be organized under an act to author-

ize the incorporation of companies "for the purpose of improving any

stream of water * * * declared navigable by any law of the

state of Ohio." On the trial the plaintiff offered in evidence a certifi-

cate by which it appeared that the company was formed for the pur-

pose of improving, etc., Big Raccoon river. Unfortunately there was

no navigable stream in Ohio by that name. No other testimony was

offered. There was no proof of user. There was no defect in the

form of the proceedings to incorporate, but an attempt to organize

and incorporate for a purpose impossible of accomplishment. There

was neither a de jure nor de facto corporation. Judgment was prop-

erly rendered for defendant.

In excluding proof of what was actually done looking to the incor-

poration of Society Perun, and of the subsequent acts of user, which
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was offered in 'evidence, there was error, for which the judgment in

the first entitled case (as well as that in the same plaintiff against

Hay et at., which was tried with it and involved the same general

questions) is reversed. Numerous other questions are presented by

the voluminous records in these cases, but as they all depend upon

the one central and controlling question discussed above, and as the

disposition here made of the cases must lead to a retrial in the light

of the principles indicated in this opinion, they are not separately

considered.

Judgment reversed.

Note. See note at end of Cochran v. Arnold, infra, p. 629.

Sec. 163. (2) Reasons for not allowing a private party to attack

successfully the validity of de facto corporate organization.

COCHRAN Et Al. v. ARNOLD Et Al.'

1868. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 58 Pa. St.

Rep. 399-408.

Strong, J. * * * The action was assumpsit brought against

sufficiency and legal validity of the certificate of incorporation and
public record of its organization. Railroad Co. v. Sullivant, 5 Ohio
St. 276; Atkinson v. R. Co., 15 Ohio St. 21.
The case of Raccoon River Nav. Co. v. Eagle, 29 Ohio St. 238, is
relied upon by the defendant in error. It was an action to recover
upon a stock subscription. A plea of nzel tie! corporati"on was interposed. The plaintiff claimed to be organized under an act to authorize the incorporation of companies "for the purpose of improving any
stream of water • • • declared navigable by any law of the
state of Ohio." On the trial the plaintiff offered in evidence a certificate by which it appeared that the c~mpany was formed for the purpose of improving, etc., Big Raccoon river. Unfortunately there was
no navigable stream in Ohio by that name. No other testimony was
offered. There was no proof of user. There was no defect in the
form of the proceedings to incorporate , but an attempt to organize
and incorporate for a purpose impossible of accomplishment. There
was neither a de jure nor de facto corporation. Judgment was properly rendered for defendant.
In excluding proof of what was actually done looking to the incorporation of Society Perun , and of the subsequent acts of user, which
was offered in 'evidence, there was error, for which the judgment in
the first entitled case (as yvell as that in the sa me plaintiff against
Hay et al., which was tried with it and involved the same general
questions) is reversed. Numerous other questions are presented by
the voluminous records in these cases, but as they all depend upon
the one central and controlling question discussed above, and as the
disposition here made of the cases must lead to a retrial in the light
o f the principles indicated in this opinion, they are not separately
considered.
Judgment reversed.

a large number of persons, charging them as partners in the purchase of

cotton alleged to have been sold and delivered. The defendants were

Note. See note at end of Cochran v. Arnold, infra, p . 629.

'Argument omitted. Only part of opinion given.

40—Wil. Casks.

Sec. 163. ( 2) Reasons for not allowing a private party to attack
successfully the validity of de facto corporate organization.
COCHRAN ET AL. v. ARNOLD ET AL. 1

1868.

IN THE SUPREME

CouRT OF P ENNSYLVANIA.
R ep. 399-408.

58 Pa. St.

STRONG, J. • • • The action was assumpsit brought against
a large number of persons, charging them as partners in the purchase of
cotton alleged to have been sold and delivered. The defendants were
1

Argument omitted.

Only part of opinion given.
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stockholders of a company called Conestoga Steam Mills, which

claimed to have become a corporation in 1849, under the general

manufacturing law of that year. In 1849 a certificate of association

stockholders of a company called Conestoga Steam Mills, which
claimed to have become a corporation in 1849, under the general
manufacturing law of that year. In 1849 a certificate of association
for corporate purposes was made out and recorded. It set forth all
that the law required. It was entirely regular on its face. A certified
copy of it was filed in the office of the secretary of the commonwealth.
O stensibly, the requirements of the law were fully met. From that
time until after the cotton was sold, the corporation had, if not a legal,
at least a de facto existence, and it carried on business as such. In
November, 1856, the plaintiff sold a quantity of cotton to it and took
the promissory notes of the co,rporation for the price, with a full
knowledge of the mode of its constitution, and of what is now alleged
to have been a failure to comply with the requisitions of the manufacturing la,.,· for the procurement of a charter. They now sue those
who were stockholders of the company at the time the cotton was
pu1·chased, and claimed to recover against them individually, upon the
ground that the original certificate for incorporation, though apparently regular, was illegal and void, because it did not set forth that
the capital paid in was at the time invested in mills, machinery and
other property adapted to the purposes for which the corporation was
propo sed to be organized. This they contend renders the charter a
nullity, and justifies them in treating the s~le as having been made to
the defendants as partners. The case rests therefore upon the assumption that, because the corporation was so irregularly constituted that
the commonwealth might have called in question its legal existence,
the plaintiffs may attack it and disprove its lawful being.
But the assumption is unwarranted. The plaintiffs are not at liberty to assert in this action that the corporation was riot lawfully
formed. Though formed under a general law, it is as against all the
world, but the commonwealth, as completely and effectively a corporate body as if it had been created by a special act of assembly and
by letters-patent. The act of April 7, 1849, prescribes \.vhat shall be
the legal proof of the existence of such a corporation. That proof is
a certificate of certain things made out as required, recorded in the
proper county, with a certified copy of the ce1tificate filed in the office
of the secretary of the commonwealth, indorsed by him and then retained by the company. The law declares that when the certificate
has been thus recorded and filed, the persons who have signed and
acknowledged it, and their successors, shall be a body politic and corporate, in fact and in law. No distinction is made between the effect
of such a mode of incorporation and the effect of any other mode. If
the certificate recorded and fil ed is false, or if the law has in any particular been violated, the commonwealth has a remedy by writ of 9uo
warranto, as it would have in any other case where corporate pri,·ileges have h een obtained by fraudulent means or in an illegal mannei-.
But until the franchise claimed and used has been directly adjudged
not to exist, there is a corporation de facto at least. If there is anything settled it is that the corporate existence of a corporation de facto
can not be inquired into collaterally. Upon this subject the authorities

for corporate purposes was made out and recorded. It set forth all

that the law required. It was entirely regular on its face. A certified

copy of it was filed in the office of the secretary of the commonwealth.

Ostensibly, the requirements of the law were fully met. From that

time until after the cotton was sold, the corporation had, if not a legal,

at least a de facto existence, and it carried on business as such. In

November, 1856, the plaintiff sold a quantity of cotton to it and took

the promissory notes of the corporation for the price, with a full

knowledge of the mode of its constitution, and of what is now alleged

to have been a failure to comply with the requisitions of the manu-

facturing law for the procurement of a charter. They now sue those

who were stockholders of the company at the time the cotton was

purchased, and claimed to recover against them individually, upon the

ground that the original certificate for incorporation, though appar-

ently regular, was illegal and void, because it did not set forth that

the capital paid in was at the time invested in mills, machinery and
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other property adapted to the purposes for which the corporation was

proposed to be organized. This they contend renders the charter a

nullity, and justifies them in treating the sale as having been made to

the defendants as partners. The case rests therefore upon the assump-

tion that, because the corporation was so irregularly constituted that

the commonwealth might have called in question its legal existence,

the plaintiffs may attack it and disprove its lawful being.

But the assumption is unwarranted. The plaintiffs are not at lib-

erty to assert in this action that the corporation was riot lawfully

formed. Though formed under a general law, it is as against all the

world, but the commonwealth, as completely and effectively a corpo-

rate body as if it had been created by a special act of assembly and

by letters-patent. The act of April 7, 1849, prescribes what shall be

the legal proof of the existence of such a corporation. That proof is

a certificate of certain things made out as required, recorded in the

proper county, with a certified copy of the certificate filed in the office

of the secretary of the commonwealth, indorsed by him and then re-

tained by the company. The law declares that when the certificate

has been thus recorded and filed, the persons who have signed and

acknowledged it, and their successors, shall be a body politic and cor-

porate, in fact and in law. No distinction is made between the effect

of such a mode of incorporation and the effect of any other mode. If

the certificate recorded and filed is false, or if the law has in any par-

ticular been violated, the commonwealth has a remedy by writ of quo

■warranto, as it would have in any other case where corporate privi-

leges have been obtained by fraudulent means or in an illegal manner.

But until the franchise claimed and used has been directly adjudged

not to exist, there is a corporation de facto at least. If there is any-

thing settled it is that the corporate existence of a corporation de facto

can not be inquired into collaterally. Upon this subject the authorities
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are too numerous to admit of citation. The plaintiffs do not deny

the principle as a general rule, but they contend that it is not appli-
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cable to corporations of this character, to those organized by the cor-

porators themselves under a general law, and for support in this

position they relv upon Patterson v. Arnold, 9 Wright 410. Such is

the doctrine advanced in that case. But the decision then made was

that of a bare majority of the court. It does not profess to rest on a

single authority. It is sustained by none, for it is in conflict with the

steady course of decisions elsewhere, wherever statutes exist similar to

ours of 1849. Very little attempt was made to sustain it by reason,

and if it is the law it must work great confusion and lead to intoler-

able mischiefs. Happily, if it was mistakenly made, we may now

correct the mistake without harm to any one.

There is no reason that can be given for such a distinction as is

claimed between a charter obtained under the act of 1S49 and one ob-

tained under a special act of assembly. In each case corporate power is

obtained by act of the corporators, under restrictions imposed by law.

When an act authorizes letters-patent to issue after a certificate by

commissioners appointed to receive subscriptions to the capital stock

that a certain amount has been subscribed, and a certain proportion
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paid in, the certificate may be false, but nobody ever supposed that

the charter obtained by the false certificate is void, or that it may be

attacked collaterally. Why, then, should it not be so in case of a

charter under the act of 1849?

How much more is a charter secured under that act the work of the

corporators than this one obtained in the other mode? How much

less is the organization under the conduct of the state? Yet that it is

less is the only reason attempted to be given in Patterson v. Arnold

why the charter in the one case should be open to collateral attack,

and in the other assailable only directly by the commonwealth.

If we look at the consequences of permitting one who deals with a

corporation formed under the general manufacturing law to deny that

it ever had any legal existence, or to call in question its rights to ex-

ercise corporate powers or enjoy corporate privileges, we shall find

them to be no less mischievous than such as would follow the doc-

trine that any corporation may be collaterally attacked by one who

has given credit to it, that it is not immunity to its shareholders. In-

deed, the mischiefs of such a doctrine are the same, whatever may be

the mode of obtaining corporate existence. By one jury a charter may

be set aside. By another it may be sustained. One creditor may sue

the corporation as such, obtain a judgment and sell its land, himself

becoming the purchaser. Another creditor may sue the corporators,

alleging that their charter is null, furnishing no immunity to them. ,

He may obtain a judgment and sell the same land to another pur-

chaser, as the property, not of the corporation, but of the stockhold-

ers. In such a case which purchaser would hold the title?

Again, new stockholders may come in, totally ignorant of any fraud

or mistake in making out the certificate. Are they to be charged in-

dividually because there was a secret vice in obtaining corporate be-

are too numerous to admit of citation. The plaintiffs do not deny
the principle as a general rule, but they contend that it is not applicable to corporations of this character, to those organized by the corporntors themselves under a general law, and for support in this
position they rely upon Patterson v. Arnold, 9 Wright 410. Such is
the doctrine advanced in that case. But the decision then made was
that of a bare majority of the court. It does not profess to rest on a
single authority. It is sustained by none, for it is in conflict with the
steady course of decisions elsewhere, wherever statutes exist similar to
ours of 1849. Very little attempt was made to sustain it by reason,
and if it is the Jaw it must work great confusion and lead to intolerable mischiefs. Happily, if it was mistakenly made, we may now
correct the mistake without harm to any one.
There is no reason that can be given for such a distinction as is
claimed between a charter obtained under the act of 1849 and one obtained under a special act of assembly. In each case corporate power is
obtained by act of the corporators, under restrictions imposed by law.
When an act authorizes letters-patent to issue after a certificate by
commissioners appointed to receive subscriptions to the capital stock
that a certain amount has been subscribed, and a certain proportion
paid in, the certificate may be false, but nobody ever supposed that
the chatter obtained by the false certificate is void, or that it may be
attacked collaterally. Why, then, should it not be so in case of a
charter under the act of I 849?
How much more is a cha1ier secured under that act the work of the
corpora tors than this one obtained in the other mode? How much
less is the organization under the conduct of the state? Yet that it is
less is the only reason attempted to be given in Patterson v. Arnold
why the charter in the one case should be open to collateral attack,
and in the other assailable only directly by the commonwealth.
If we look at the consequences of permitting one who deal s with a
corporation formed under the general manufacturing law to deny that
it ever had any legal existence, or to call in question its rights to exercise corporate powers or enjoy corporate privileges, we shall find
them to be no less mischievous than such as would follow the doctrine that any corporation may be collaterally attacked by one who
has given credit to it, that it is not immunity to its shareholders. Indeed, the mischiefs of such a doctrine are the same, whatever may be
the mode of obtaining corporate existence. By one jury a charter may
be set aside. By another it may be sustained. One creditor may sue
the corporation as such, obtain a judgment and sell its land , himse lf
becoming the purchaser. Another creditor may sue the corporators,
alleging that their charter is null, furnishing no immunity to the m.
He may obtain a judgment and sell the same land to another purchaser, as the property, not of the corporation , hut of the stockholders. In such a case which purchaser would hold the title?
Again, new . stockholders may come in , totally ig norant of any fraud
or mistake in making out the certificate . Are they to be charged -individually because there was a secret vice in obtaining corporate be-
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ing? That would be monstrous. It would render the manufacturing

COCHRAN V. ARNOLD.

I

law a thing to be avoided, though it expresses a cherished policy of

the legislature. Yet, if a charter can be shown invalid by a collateral

ing? That would be monstrous. It would render the manufacturing
law a thing to be avoided, though it expresses a cherished policy of
the legislature. Yet, if a charter can be shown invalid by a collateral
attack at the suit of a creditor, why are not new stockholders who
have come in after the birth of the corporation equally liable as partners, or joint contractors, with all the original stockholders? Can the
charter be effective and yet not effective? In Patterson v. Arnold it
seems to have been thought a charter may be good as to some stockholders and a nullity as to others. What confusion must this produce?
Some may be sued as partners, and others through the corporation,
and under judgments obtained execution be levied upon the same
property. Or all the original stockholders may go out and give place
to successors. Then that which was incurably vicious, because an
usurpation upon the commonwealth, has become good. It is impossible, however, that a charter can be good as to some stockholders and
bad as to others. Every one has an interest in the property of his
associates invested in the common stock. Such is his corporate right.
If that property can be withdrawn by action against his associates individually, the charter ceases to be to him all that it purports to be.
It is said that those who certify fal sely for the purpose of obtaining
a charter are guilty of fraud. Doubtless this is so. There is a fraud
upon the state. If it be also a fraud upon creditors, the law furnishes
a remedy. An action will lie for the fraud. But to deny the corporate existence of a de facto corporation, and to hold as partners those
who were guilty of fraud in obtaining the cha1ter, is to confound an
action ex contractu with one essentially for a tort.
It has already been said that Patterson v. Arnold is unsustained by
authority. General la\\'S, much like our act of r849, exist in many of
the states, and whenever the question has come up it has been ruled
that corporations formed under them, like all others, are to be regarded as such until their right is questioned by the state. The question can not be raised collaterally whether they are lawfully such. In
Jones v. Dana, 24 Barb. Sup. C. Rep. 402, the oourt said: "The
statute is explicit and leaves no room for construction. It makes the
copies of the charter and certificates filed in the office of the county
clerk the authority of the corporation to commence business and issue
policies, and makes them evidence for and against the company; that
is, evidence of the authority to act as a corporation. The legislature
having sa id what acts shall give the company corporate powers, and
what shall be the evidence of those acts, as well for as against the
company, courts can not, at the instance of third persons, go behind
those acts, and the pre cribed eYidence of them, for the purpose of
determining the validity of the corporation, and make the decision,
perhaps, depend upon some mistake or accident from which no one
has received or can receive any injury." And again: "The only
remainin g question is, whether the plaintiffs have shown the Utica
Insurnn ce Company, acting under a charter. or an authority app:irently val id, and really !'O, unlec;s impeached by something outside of
the record evidence of the corporate existence, and depending upon

attack at the suit of a creditor, why are not new stockholders who

have come in after the birth of the corporation equally liable as part-

ners, or joint contractors, with all the original stockholders? Can the

charter be effective and yet not effective? In Patterson v. Arnold it

seems to have been thought a charter may be good as to some stock-

holders and a nullity as to others. What confusion must this produce?

Some may be sued as partners, and others through the corporation,

and under judgments obtained execution be levied upon the same

property. Or all the original stockholders may go out and give place

to successors. Then that which was incurably vicious, because an

usurpation upon the commonwealth, has become good. It is impossi-

ble, however, that a charter can be good as to some stockholders and

bad as to others. Every one has an interest in the property of his

associates invested in the common stock. Such is his corporate right.

If that property can be withdrawn by action against his associates in-

dividually, the charter ceases to be to him all that it purports to be.
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It is said that those who certify falsely for the purpose of obtaining

a charter are guilty of fraud. Doubtless this is so. There is a fraud

upon the state. If it be also a fraud upon creditors, the law furnishes

a remedy. An action will lie for the fraud. But to deny the corpo-

rate existence of a de facto corporation, and to hold as partners those

who were guilty of fraud in obtaining the charter, is to confound an

action ex contractu with one essentially for a tort.

It has already been said that Patterson v. Arnold is unsustained by

authority. General laws, much like our act of 1849, exist in many of

the states, and whenever the question has come up it has been ruled

that corporations formed under them, like all others, are to be re-

garded as such until their right is questioned by the state. The ques-

tion can not be raised collaterally whether they are lawfully such. In

Jones v. Dana, 24 Barb. Sup. C. Rep. 402, the court said: "The

statute is explicit and leaves no room for construction. It makes the

copies of the charter and certificates filed in the office of the county

clerk the authority of the corporation to commence business and issue

policies, and makes them evidence for and against the company; that

is, evidence of the authority to act as a corporation. The legislature

having said what acts shall give the company corporate powers, and

what shall be the evidence of those acts, as well for as against the

company, courts can not, at the instance of third persons, go behind

those acts, and the prescribed evidence of them, for the purpose of

determining the validity of the corporation, and make the decision,

perhaps, depend upon some mistake or accident from which no one

has received or can receive any injury." And again: "The only

remaining question is, whether the plaintiffs have shown the Utica

Insurance Company, acting under a charter, or an authority appar-

ently valid, and really so, unless impeached by something outside of

the record evidence of the corporate existence, and depending upon
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proof aliunde. If they have, and have thus furnished prima facie

evidence of the incorporation, they can not go behind that evidence

to show that it was got up in fraud or mistake, or irregularly brought
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into existence." All this was said in reference to a corporation that

came into being under an act very similar to ours. To the same

effect is Sedman v. Eveleth, 6 Metcalf 114, and Baker v. Backus, 32

111. in. I know of no case, except Patterson v. Arnold, in which a

different doctrine has been advanced. It was not then competent for

the plaintiffs in this action, after having contracted with the Conestoga

Steam Mills as a corporation, to deny its corporate existence. To all

the stockholders its charter furnished an immunity against its credit-

ors. The plaintiffs, therefore, would have had no cause of action

against any of the defendants had their amendment been allowed.

There is another reason why there could have been no recovery.

If the certificate for the incorporation was erroneous or fraudulent,

the plaintiffs knew it when they sold the cotton. It was not for them

afterward to say it was a wrong done to them. It is needless, how-

ever, to enlarge upon this. It is enough that they were not at liberty

to call in question the validity of the charter.

The judgment is affirmed.
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Note. De tacto corporations: See also,' Clopton, J., in Snider's Sons'

Oo. v. Troy, 91 Ala. 224, infra, p. 656, and particularly as to de facto corpora-

tions, 1847, Brouwer v. Appleby, 1 Sandf. (N. Y. Superior Ct.) 158; ia59,

Eaton v. Aspinwall, 19 N. Y. 119; 1862, Buffalo & A. R. Co. v. Carv, 26 N. Y.

75; 1872, Swartwout v. R. Co., 24 Mich. 390; 1881, Butchers' & D. Bank v.

McDonald, 130 Mass. 264; 188-5, People v. La Rue, 67 Cal. 526, 8 Pac. Rep. 84;

proof aliunde. If they have, and have thus furnished prima facie
evidence of the incorporation, they can n'Ot go behind that evidence
to show that it was got up in fraud or mi&take, or itTegularly brought
into existence." All this was said in reference to a corporation that
came into being under an act very similar to ours. To the same
effect is Sedman v. Eveleth, 6 Metcalf 114 1 and Baker v. Backus, 32
Ill. 111. I know of no case, except Patterson v. Arnold, in which a
difterent doctrine has been advanced. It was not then competent for
the plaintiffs in this action, after having contracted with the Conestoga
Steam Mills as a corporation, to deny its corporate existence. To all
the stockholders its charter furnished an immunity against its creditors. The plaintiffs, therefore, would have had no cause of action
against any of the defendants had their amendment been allowed.
There is another reason why there could have been no recovery.
If the certificate for the incorporation was erroneous or fraudulent,
the plaintiffs knew it when they sold the cotton. It was not for them
afterward to say it was a wrong done to them. It is needless, however, to enlarge upon this. It is enough that they were not at liberty
to call in question the validity of the charter.
The judgment is affirmed .
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pp. 1122-1130, on necessity of pleading and proving corporate existence, in

suite by and against a corporation.

There is great confusion among the oases as to the doctrines concerning

de facto corporate existence, and estoppel to deny corporate existence; many

cases call an apparent corporation adefacto corporation, when there is 110 suf-

Note. De facto corporations: See. also, · Clopton, J., in Snider's Sons'
Oo. v. Troy, 91Ala.22-l, infm, p . 656,and particularly as to de facto eorporntions, 1847, Brouwer v. Appleby, l Sandf. (N. Y. Superior Ct.) 158; 18.59,
Eaton v. Aspinwa ll , 19 N. Y. 119; 1862, Buffalo & A. R . Co. v. Cary, 26 N. Y.
75; 1872, Swartwout v. R. Co., 24 Mieh. 390; 1881, Butche rs' & D. Bank v.
Mr Donald, 130 Mass. 2&l; 18&5, People v. La Rue, 67 Cal. 526, 8 Pac. R t>p. 84;
18 6, Stout v. Zulick, 48 N. J . L. 599, 7 Atl. Rep. 362; 1889, Eaton v. Walke r,
76 ~li ch. 579, 43 N. W. Rep. 638, 27 J\. & E. C. C. 310; 1890, Snider's Sons'
Co. v. Troy, 91 Ala. 224, 24 Am. St. Rep. 887, infra, p. 6.56; 1891, American
Salt Co. v. Heidenheimer, 80Texas 344, 26 Am. St. Rep. 743; 1891, Allen v.
Long, 80 Texas 261, 2ti Am. St. Rep. 73.5 ; 1893, Gibbs' Estate, 157 PH. St. 59,
s11pra, P· 244; 1894, ~'farlin v. Deetz. 102 Cal. 55, 41 Am. St. Rep. 151, 36 P!1c.
Rep. 368; IS!f4, :\fcTighe v. Maoon Const. Co., 94 Ga. 306, 47 Am. St. Re p. 1'>3;
1894, State Bank Buiiding Co. v. Pie rce, 92 Iowa 668; 1895, Coxe v. State,
H4 N . Y. 396, 39 N. E. Rep. 400; 1895, American Loan nnd TrnAt Co. v.
Minn. & N. W. R . 0-, 157 Ill. ()41; 1895. Greenbrier Indus. Ex. v. Sqnires, 4.0
W. Va. 307, 52 Am. 8t. Rep. 884; 1895. Jones v. Hardware Co., 21 Colo. 2ft'l,
52 Am. St. Rep. 220, 29 L. R. A. 143, infra, p . ti37; 1896, Bradley v. Heppell,
133 Mo. 545, 54 Am. St. R ep. 685, in.fra, p. 868; 1895, American Mirror Co. v.
Bulkley, 107 Mich. 447; 1896, TuckRsegee Mining Co. v. Goodhue, 118 N. C.
981; 1896, Duke v. Taylor, 37 Fla. 64, 53 Am. St. Re p. 232; 1897, Martin v.
South Salem Land Co., 9-1. Va. 28, 26 S . E. Rep. 5!)]; 1897, Continental Trnst
Co . v. T.,St. L. & K. R. Co. (C. C. N. D. Ohio I, 82 Fed. Rep. 642; 1897, Johnson
v. Okerstroru, 70 Mi nu. 303, 73 N. W . Re p. 147; 1898, Mary land Tube and Iron
Works v.West End Imp. Co., 87 Md. 207. 39L. R. A. 810; 1898, Jones v. H a le, 32
Ore. 465, 8 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 150; 1899, Calkins v. Bump, 120 Mich. 335,
79 N. W. Rep. 41:11; 1899, Marsh v. Mathias, 19 Utah 350, 56 Pac. Rep. 1014;
1 99, City of Wilmington v. Addicks, - - Del. - -, 43 Atl. Rep. 297; 18\19,
Christian & Craft Grocery Co. v. Fruitdale Lumber Co., 121 Ala. 340, 25 f..\o.
Rep. 566; 1899, Commonwealth v. Yetter, 190 Pa. St. 488. See, also. infra,
pp. 1122-1130, on necessity of pleading and proving corporate exi&te ncc, in
suita by and against n corporation.
There is great confusion among the cases as to the doctrines concerning
de faclfJ corporate existence, and estorpel to deny corporate existe nce; mnny
cases call an apparent corporation a de facto corporation, when there is no suf-
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ficient reason for so designating it, but abundant reason for holding the per-

son who questioned the existence of the corporation estopped from doing so.

On tlie other hand, many cases are decided on grounds of estoppel, when, in

fact, there are sufficient reasons for holding the corporation to be a de facto

one, and hence, there is no necessity of invoking the doctrine of estoppel.

Much of the confusion undoubtedly arises also from the variety of opinion as

to the necessity of pleading and proving corporate existence in suits by or

against corporations. See infra, pp. 1122-1130. For example, in Williams v.

Bank, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 539 (1831), it is said "A contract made with a corpo-

ration by name is not an admission or any evidence that the corporation is en-

titled to sue bv that name." And again, in Welland Canal Co. v. Hathawav,

8 Wend. (N. Y.) 480, 24 Am. Dec. 51 (1832), it is said: "Vt hen a corporation

sues, if they have not the powers and privileges assumed » * » it is their

own fault, not his. Whether they had * * * or not must be known to

themselves, not to the defendant, and no act of his could legally add to or

detract from them. Why, then, should he be estopped from denying their

corporate capacity, or they be excused from establishing it by legal evidence,

when they are endeavoring to enforce their rights in a manner and before a

tribunal which can entertain their suit only on proof or assumption that they

are a corporate body, duly constituted by competent authority?" So, too, iii
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Maryland Tube and Iron Works v. West End Improvement Co., 87 Vd. 207,

39 L. R. A. 810 (1898), where the question was as to whether there was cause

for estoppel before the franchise tax was paid, it was said that the doctrine 0)

estoppel can not be invoked nnless the corporation has at least a de facto txistrnrt.

A similar holding was made in Jones v. Hardware Co., 21 Colo. 263, infra,

p. 637, and Duke v. Taylor, 37 Fla. 64, but it is submitted that the foregoing

views are not according to the weight of authority. On the contrary: "A

corporation de facto may legally do and perform every act and thing which the

same entity could do or perform were it a de jure corporation. As to all the

world, except the paramount authority under which it arts and from which it

receives its charter, it occupies the same position as though in all respects

valid, and even as against the state, except in direct proceedings to arrest its

usurpation of power, its acts are binding." People v. La Rue, 67 Cal. 526

(1885). Even the state in a quo warranto to test the right to a corporate office

can not question the corporate existence. Commonwealth v. Yetter, 1!*0 Vs.

St. 488 (1899). See, also, Beach, 5§ 13, 14, 16; Clark, S<>41.42; Cook,§§ 183-

186, 231-235, 637; Elliott, 69-80; Morawetz, §§ 735-778; Taylor, §§145-157;

I Thompson, §§ 495-513; VII Thompson, § 8212.

ARTICLE VI. CONDITIONS OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE BY ESTOPPEL.

Sec. 164. (A) Theories:

"An examination of the cases in which the doctrine of estoppel to

deny corporate existence has been applied will show that most of them

rest on some basis of conduct, or of benefit obtained, or other cause

rendering it inequitable to allow such denial. The doctrine is an

equitable one, and should be applied only where there are equitable

grounds for applying it. It should never be applied where it would

be inequitable to do so. Nor should it be applied unless it would be

inequitable not to do so." Clark on Corps., § 43, p. 103.

( I ) The doctrine is one of equity.

§ 164 CORPORATIONS BY ESTOPPEL. 631

(a) Will be applied where it would be inequitable not to

apply it.

CORPORATIONS BY ESTOPPEL.
ESTEY MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. RUNNELS.1

1884. In the Supreme Court of Michigan. 55 Mich. Rep.

Champlin, J. This action was commenced before a circuit court

commissioner to recover the possession of certain land described in

(a) Will be applied where it would be inequitable not to
apply it.

the complaint, and averring that the defendant holds the same unlaw-

ESTEY MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. RUNNELS. 1

fully and against the rights of the Estey Manufacturing Company.

December 3, 1883, was the return day, when the defendant appeared

and pleaded not guilty. The cause was then tried and judgment

1884.

rendered in favor of the plaintiff; and on the 8th day of December,

1883, the defendant appealed the suit to the circuit court for the county

of Shiawassee. The cause was tried in the circuit, April 3, 1884,

when the plaintiff again had a verdict, whereupon the defendant brings

the suit to this court by writ of error. * * »

Defendant also introduced and read in evidence a duly certified

copy of the articles of association of the plaintiff corporation, from

which it appeared that there were but three corporators, two of whom

resided in Michigan and one in Vermont. The acknowledgment of

Jacob W. Estey was taken before a person styling himself a notary
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public, but his official character and authority to take acknowledg-

ments was not authenticated in accordance with the requirements of

our statutes. The defendant's counsel requested the court to charge

the jury as follows: * * •

'■•Fourth. That the articles of association filed in said cause and

read therein are void under the law." * * *

The third and fourth requests refer to the same point, and may be

considered together. Where a body assumes to be a corporation and

acts under a particular name, a third party dealing with it under such

assumed name is estopped to deny its corporate existence. Such is the

general rule, founded upon equitable principles, and if any exceptions

exist, it is only where "there are no facts which make it legally unjust

to forbid its denial." Doyle v. Mizner, 42 Mich. 337. In this case

the defendant introduced in evidence the execution upon which the

sale was made. From this it appears that it was issued upon a judg-

ment rendered for damages for the non-performance of certain prom-

ises and undertakings made by this defendant to the Estey Manufac-

turing Company, which shows that the defendant had had dealings

with the plaintiff as a corporation in the name assumed by it. He

was therefore estopped, not only by having dealt with it as a corpora-

tion, but by the judgment in the case, to deny its corporate existence.

The execution, sale and sheriff's deeds all result from the contract

relation voluntarily entered into between the defendant and this cor-

porate body, and it would be manifestly unjust and inequitable to

1 Arguments omitted. Only part of opinion relating to the one point given.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF MtcHIGAN.
i30-i33.

55

Mich. Rep.

CHAMPLIN, J. . This action was commenced before a circuit court
commissioner to recover the possession of certain land described in
the complaint, and averring that the defendant bolds the same unlawfully a nd against the rights of the Estey Manufacturing Company.
December 3, I883, was the return day, when the defendant nppeared
and pleaded not guilty. The cause was then tried and judgment
rendered in favor of the plaintiff; and on the 8th day of December,
I883, the defendant appealed the suit to the circuit court for the county
of Shiawassee. The cause was tried in the circuit, April 3, 1884,
when the plaintiff again had a verdict, whereupon the defendant brings
the suit to this court by writ of ei-ror. • • •
Defendant also introduced and read in evidence a duly certified
copy of the articles of association of the plaintiff corporation, from
which it nppeared that there were but three corporators, two of whom
resided in Michigan and one in Vermont. The acknowledgment of
Jacob W. Estey was taken before a person styling himse lf a notnry
public, but his official character and authority to take acknowledgments was not authenticated in accordance with the requirements of
our statutes. The defendant's counsel requested the court to charge
the jury as follows: • • •
''Fourth. That the articles of association filed in said cause and
read therein are void under the law.'' * • •
The third and fourth requests refer to the same point, and may be
considered together. vVhere a hotly a ssumes to be a corporation and
acts under a particular name, a third party denling with it under such
assumed name is estopped to deny its corporate existence . Such is the
general mle, founded upon equitable principles, and if any exceptions
exist, it is only where "there are no facts which make it legally unjust
to forbid its denial." Doyle v . Mizner, 42 Mich . 337. In this case
the defendant introduced in evidence the execution upon which the
sale was made. From this it appears that it was issued upon a judgment rendered for damages for the non-performance of certain promi es and undertakings made by this defendant to the E stey Manufacturing Company, which shows that the defendant had had denlings
with the plaintiff as a corporation in the name assumed hy it. He
was therefore estoppcd, not only by having <lealt with it as a corporation, but by the judgment in the case , to deny its corporate existence.
The execution, sale and sheriff's deeds all result from the contract
relation voluntarily entered into between the defendant and this corporate body, and it would be manifestly unjust and inequitable to
0
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permit the defendant to question the legal corporate existence of the

632

plaintiff in this collateral proceeding.

§ 165

DOYLE V. MIZNER.

For these reasons the requests were properly refused, and the judg-

ment is affirmed.

permit the defendant to question the legal corporate existence of the
plaintiff in this collateral proceeding.
For these reasons the requests were properly refused, and the judgment is affirmed.
The other justices concurred.

The other justices concurred.

Note. See note at the end of this article, on extent of doctrine.

Sec. 165. Same.

(£) Will be applied only where it is equitable to do so.

DOYLE v. MIZNER, GRAY AND KANE.1

1879. In the Supreme Court of Michigan. 42 Mich. Rep.

Note.

332-34

See note at the end of this article, on extent of doctrine.

Error to superior court of Detroit. Trover. Plaintiff brings error.

Sec. 165. Same.

Campbell, C. J. Doyle brought suit to recover for the forcible

removal and disposal of certain goods claimed to be his property, and

( b) Will be applied only

taken from his possession by defendant Kane under color of a chattel

where it is equitable to do so.

mortgage purporting to be made by Mizner and Gray, as president

DOYLE v. MIZNER, GRAY AND KANE.1

and secretaiy of the Detroit Chemical Works. * * *

January 27, 1875, an agreement was signed by Doyle, Mizner and

1879.

Gray to organize a joint-stock company, to be known as the Detroit

Chemical Works, with a capital of $50,000, in 2,000 shares of $25

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF M1cH1GAN.
33 2-341.

42 Mich. Rep.
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each. The paid-in capital was fixed at $14,000; the estimated assets

Error to superior court of Detroit. Trover. Plaintiff brings error.
CAMPBELL, C. J. Doyle brought suit to recover for the forcible
removal and disposal of certain goods claimed to be his property, and
taken from his possession by defendant Kane under color of .a chattel
mortgage purporting to be made by Mizner and Gray , as president
and secretary of the Detroit Chemical Works. • • •
January 27, 1875, an agreement was s igned by Doyle, Mizner and
Gray to organize a joint-stock company, to be known as the D e b·oit
Chemical Works, with a capital of $50,000, in 2,000 shares of $2)
each. The paid-in capital was fixed at $14,000; the estimated assets
of the Detroit Manufacturing Company, of which $10,000 as paid-up
stock was to go to Doyle , and $2,000 each to Gray and Mizner, who
were therein stated to ha\'e purchased that interest. But there is nothing to indicate that they gave orwere to give any consideration. The
remaining $36,ooo was to be sold for working capital, after allowing
Doyle $4,000 to be sold for D oyle's benefit in payment for ce1tain
claims sold to the company, and for which he was to turn in $4,ooo
of his stock. The first $500 raised was to go towards paying the
chattel mortgage . Without som e further showing it would seem that
under this arrangement Doyle furnished the entire original capital, and
Gray and Mizner got their share out of him for nothing. • • •
On the I 1th of February, 1875, a transfer in writing was signed
by the three parties of all the property of the Detroit Manufacturing
Company to the chemical works for the expressed consideration of
$ 14,000, "subject to a claim of about $500, held by Kane & Hibbard
(or their client) , of Detroit, Mich." • • •
Doyle's g round of action is based on the claim that he never transferred his rights to any one, and that the paper in question was not to
become operative until b e received consideration by payment for his
goods. His testimony, if believed, shows that the paper was never
delivered in such a way as to belong to the Detroit Chemical Works
or to pass any title until paid for.
1 Arguments omitted.
Only part of opinion given.

of the Detroit Manufacturing Company, of which $10,000 as paid-up

stock was to go to Doyle, and $2,000 each to Gray and Mizner, who

were therein stated to have purchased that interest. But there is noth-

ing to indicate that they gave or were to give any consideration. The

remaining $36,000 was to be sold for working capital, after allowing

Doyle $4,000 to be sold for Doyle's benefit in payment for certain

claims sold to the company, and for which he was to turn in $4,000

of his stock. The first $500 raised was to go towards paying the

chattel mortgage. Without some further showing it would seem that

under this arrangement Doyle furnished the entire original capital, and

Gray and Mizner got their share out of him for nothing. » * »

On the nth of February, 1875, a transfer in writing was signed

by the three parties of all the property of the Detroit Manufacturing

Company to the chemical works for the expressed consideration of

$14,000, "subject to a claim of about $500, held by Kane & Hibbard

(or their client), of Detroit, Mich." * * *

Doyle's ground of action is based on the claim that he never trans-

ferred his rights to any one, and that the paper in question was not to

become operative until he received consideration by payment for his

goods. His testimony, if believed, shows that the paper was never

delivered in such a way as to belong to the Detroit Chemical Works

or to pass any title until paid for.

1 Arguments omitted. Only part of opinion given.
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It is claimed for the defense that Doyle, having dealt with it and

acted with Gray and Mizner, is estopped from denying its corporate

§ 165

CORPORATIONS BY ESTOPPEL.

existence. There are certainly many cases in which a recognition

of corporate existence by dealing -with the corporation, •will estop

from questioning it. But this doctrine rests on the ground that

such action creates relations and encourages conduct which there

may be difficulty in undoing. In ordinary cases such recognitions

have been considered as binding.

But this rule is one originating in equitable principles, and can

not be applied universally. There -would be no sense in applying it

■where ?io new rig/its have intervened, and -where such recognition

has itself been brought about by fraudulent dealings carried on for

the very purpose of entrapping a party into the action on -which

such recognition rested. If there was no corporation in fact, and

if there arc no facts which make it legally unjust to forbid its de-

nial, it is difficult to understand what room there is for an estoppel.

And inasmuch as facts were asserted by plaintiff tending to show

good reasons why he should not be estopped, and that testimony was

open to the jury, the rulings upon the proof of corporate existence
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are fairly open to review.

The incorporation was sought to be shown by asking Doyle on

cross-examination concerning the signing of the paper purporting to

be articles of incorporation, which had been filed in the Detroit city

clerk's office, April 6, 1875. This paper was not acknowledged, and

was not filed in the county clerk's office. A copy of the same paper

was certified by the secretary of state; but his certificate did not give

a copy of any acknowledgment, but merely said the paper was ac-

companied by an acknowledgment in the usual form. The original

paper had an unsigned certificate of acknowledgment.

Under our present constitution no charters can be granted, and all

private corporations must be organized under general laws, and can

only be valid when strictly conforming to all the conditions imposed

upon their completion. The statute concerning manufacturing cor-

porations expressly requires that the articles shall be "acknowledged

before some person authorized by the laws of this state to take ac-

knowledgments of deeds." Comp. L., § 2839.

There was, therefore, no incorporation shown, and, therefore, for

the purposes of this case, none exists as a matter of fact. The only

way in which, under these circumstances, any question of corporate

action could arise would be by way of estoppel. And it is important

to see how far relations existed which might create it, and whether

any one shows a right to rely on it.

By the contract of January 27, 1875, Doyle agreed to transfer his

assets to the company as soon as it should become incorporated. The

whole consideration of that agreement rested on the creation of stock,

which was to be in part apportioned and in part sold as agreed. Noth-

ing but the stock of such a nature as to be lawfully transferable as

such could satisfy the agreement. And until provision was made

which secured this no consideration existed for the transfer, and there

It is claimed for the defense that Doyle, having dealt with it and
acted with Gray and Mizner, is estopped from denying its corporate
existence. There are certainly many cases in which a recogniti'on
of corporate existence by dealing with the corporation, will estop
from questioning it. But th i's doctrz'ne rests on the ground that
such acti'on creates relations and encourages conduct which there
may be difficulty in undoing. In ordinary cases sucli recognitions
have been considered as bindi?1g.
But this rule t's one ort'ginatt'ng t'n equiUible principles, and can
not be applied universally. Tltere would be no sense t'n app!yt'ng £t
where no new rights liave £ntervc11ed, and wltere sttch recogn.t'tt'on
has t'tself been broug!tt about by fraudulent dealings carrt'ed on for
the very purpose of entrapp£11g a party into tlte action on wldcli
such recognt'tt'on rested. If there was no corporatt'on in fact, and
if tltere are no facts wlti'clt make it legally unjust to forbid z'ts dent'al, t't t's difficult to understand what room tltere t's for an estoppel.
And inasmuch as facts were asserted by plaintiff tending to show
good reasons why he should not be estopped, and that testimony was
open to the jury, the rulings upon the proof of corporate existence
are fairly open to review.
The incorporation was sought to be shown by asking Doyle on
cross-exa.mination concerning the signing of the paper purporting to
be articles of incorporation, which had been filed in the Detroit city
clerk's office, April 6, r875. This paper was not acknowledged, and
was not filed in the county clerk's office. A copy of the same paper
was certified by the secretary of state; but his certificate did not give
a copy of any acknowledgment, but merely said the paper was accompanied by an acknowledgment in the usual form. The original
paper had an unsigned certificate of acknowledgment.
Under our present constitution no charters can be granted, and all
pri\'ate corporations must be organized under general laws, and can
only be valid when strictly conforming to all the conditions imposed
upon their completion. The statute concerning manufacturing corporations expressly requires that the articles shall be "acknowledged
before some person authorized by the laws of thi s state to take acknowledgments of deeds." Comp. L., § 2839.
There was, therefore, no incorporation shown, and, therefore, for
the purposes of this case, none exists as a matter of fact. The only
way in which, under these circumstances, any question of corporate
action could arise would be by way of cstoppel. And it is important
to see how far relations existed which might create it, and whether
any one shows a right to rely on it.
By the contract of January z7, 1875, Doyle agreed to transfer his
assets to the company as soon as it should become incorporated. The
whole consideration of that agreement rested on the creation of stock,
which was to be in part apportioned and in part sold as agreed . Not!Joing but the stock of such a nature as to be lawfully trans ferable as
such could satisfy the agreement. And until provision was made
which secured this no consideration existed for the transfer, and there
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was no promise to make it. This becomes material in another point

of view, which will be referred to presently.

was no promise to make it. This becomes material in another point
of view, which will be referred to presently.
To what extent, if any, tLe act10.n of those parties on the assumption there was a corporation would estop them as against third parties dealing with them, can only be decided when such cases arise.
As between themselves then can be no suclt estoppel where .il-Eizner
and Gray are not injured by any honest reliance on Doyle's action to
thet"r prejudt'ce. Each of them knew what was done, and was bound
in law to know there wgs no incorporation. If a mistake of law
would exonerate them from tltis rule, it would also exonerate Doyle,
amt 7!-'ould still bind him by no estoppel extending beyond such results
as came from an honest reliance on his acts. They could claim no
interest in his property for which no consideration passed, and they
could claim no rights against him except to the extent of their damage
by a justifiable reliance on what had been don~ to their prejudice by
his procurement or encouragement.
If it was understood the bill of sale was not to take immediate
effect, then no title could pass to the concern either corporation or unincorporated. And, as already seen, there was no state of things
which formed any lcgaf consideration f0r the transfer under the agreement of January, 1875. We think the court erred in connecting the
transfer with that agreement, if there was no actual incorporation.
In the absence of an actual incorporation the transfer must be regarded
as a new and distinct arrangement, resting on its own consideration.
It could not be valid unless delivered, and where the same persons
are grantors and n:presentatives of the grantees, there must be distinct evidence that it was intended to be operative, which its signature alone would not give. And if there was no corporate existence,
not only does the consideration of the transfer expressed on its face
utterly fail, but the further difficulty arises that there is absolute identity between grantors and grantees, with nothing to distinguish it from
any other grant of a party to himself. From such a document no new
rights could arise as between the parties. • • •
Reversed.

To what extent, if any, the action of those parties on the assump-

tion there was a corporation would e.stop them as against third par-

ties dealing with them, can only be decided when such cases arise.

As between themselves there can be jio such estoppel where A/izner

and Gray are not injured by any honest reliance on Doyle's action to

their prejudice. Each of them knew what was done, and was bound

in law to know there was no incorporation. If a mistake of law

would exonerate them from this rule, it would also exonerate Doyle,

and would still bind him by no estoppel extending beyond such results

as came from an honest reliance on his acts. They could claim no

interest in his property for which no consideration passed, and they

could claim no rights against him except to the extent of their damage

by a justifiable reliance on what had been done to their prejudice by

his procurement or encouragement.

If it was understood the bill of sale was not to take immediate

effect, then no title could pass to the concern either corporation or un-
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incorporated. And, as already seen, there was no state of things

which formed any legal consideration for the transfer under the agree-

ment of January, 1875. We think the court erred in connecting the

transfer with that agreement, if there was no actual incorporation.

In the absence of an actual incorporation the transfer must be regarded

as a new and distinct arrangement, resting on its own consideration.

It could not be valid unless delivered, and where the same persons

arc grantors and representatives of the grantees, there must be dis-

tinct evidence that it was intended to be operative, which its signa-

ture alone would not give. And if there was no corporate existence,

not only does the consideration of the transfer expressed on its face

utterly fail, but the further difficulty arises that there is absolute iden-

tity between grantors and grantees, with nothing to distinguish it from

any other grant of a party to himself. From such a document no new

rights could arise as between the parties. * * *

Reversed.

Sec. 166.

(2) Estoppel arises on matter of fact only, and not of law.
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1862. In the Supreme Court of Indiana. 19 Ind. Rep. 462-466.

Appeal from the Wells Circuit Court.

Worden, J. This was an action by Snyder against Studebaker

to recover possession of a certain tract of land. Judgment for the

Sec. 166.

defendant.

The same question is presented by the pleadings and the evidence.

( 2) Estoppel arises on matter of fact only, and not of law.

It appears that, in March, 1853, the plaintiff, who was then the

SNYDER v. STUDEBAKER.

1862.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF INDIANA.

19 Ind. Rep. 462-466.

Appeal from the Wells Circuit Court.
WoRnEN, J. This was an action by Snyder against Studebaker
to reco,·er possession of a certain tract of land. Judgment for the
defendant.
The same question is presented by the pleadings and the evidence.
It appears that, in March, 1853, the plaintiff, who was then the
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This conveyance was made on account of a stock subscription.

Afterward, in November, 1855, the railroad company, for a valua-

ble consideration, conveyed the premises to the defendant.

The Fort Wayne and Southern Railroad Company was chartered

bv act of the legislature, passed in 1849; and it appears that the cor-

porators named in the act in question met in the town of Bluffton, in

said county of Wells, on the 19th day of November, 1851, and then

and there accepted the act of incorporation, and organized the com-

pany pursuant to the provisions of said act.

If the corporation was not created before the 1st of November,

1851, when the new constitution took effect, it could have no existence

at all, as that instrument prohibits the creation of corporations other

than banking, by special act. The State v. Dawson, 16 Ind. .40.

Harriman v. Southam, 16 Ind. 190.

The plaintiff claims that, inasmuch as there was no acceptance of

the charter, or organization under it, until after the adoption of the

constitution of 1851, there was no such corporation as The Fort Wayne
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and Southern Railroad Company at the time he executed the convey-

ance, and, hence, that no title passed from him. But is he in a con-

dition to dispute the existence of the corporation at the time he made

his conveyance to it?

It has been held, in numerous cases in this state, that a party who

has contracted with a corporation, as such, is, as a general proposi-

tion, estopped by his contract to dispute the existence of the corpora-

tion at the time of the contract. The following cases may be cited,

though there are, perhaps, others reported and some not reported as

yet: Judah v. The American Live Stock Insurance Company, 4 Ind.

333; The Brookville and Greensburg Turnpike Company v. McCarty,

8 Ind. 392; Ensey v. The Cleveland and St. Louis Railroad Com-

pany, 10 Ind. 178; Fort Wayne and Bluffton Turnpike Company v.

Deam, 10 Ind. 563; Jones v. The Cincinnati Type Foundry Com-

pany, 14 Ind. 89; Hubbard v. Chappell, 14 Ind. 601; The Evans-

ville, etc., Railroad Company v. The City of Evansville, 15 Ind.

395; Meikel v. The German Savings Fund Society, 16 Ind. 181;

Heaston v. T|ie Cincinnati and Fort Wayne Railroad Company, 16

Ind. 275.

The doctrine is by no means confined to the state, but prevails

elsewhere. The Dutchess Cotton Manufactory v. Davis, 14 Johns.

238; All Saints' Church v. Lovett, 1 Hall 191 ; Palmer v. Lawrence,

3 Sand. Sup. C. R. 161; Eaton v. Aspinwall, 6 Duer 176; Jones

v. Bank of Tennessee, 8 B. Mon. 122; Worcester Medical Institu-

tion v. Harding, 11 Cush. 285; The Congregational Society v. Perry,

6 N. H. 164; People's Savings Bank, etc., v. Collins, 27 Conn. 142;

West Winsted Savings Bank v. Ford, 27 Conn. 282; Angell and

Ames on Corp., § 94.

The estoppel arises upon matter of fact only, and not upon matter

of law. Hence, if there be no law which authorized the supposed

owner of the land , conveyed the same to the Fort Wayne and Southern Railroad Company, by deed, duly executed and delivered.
This conveyance was made on account of a stock subscription.
Afterward, in November, 1855, the railroad company, for a valuable consideration, conveyed the premises to the defendant.
The Fort Wayne and Southern Railroad Company was chartered
by act of the legislature, passed in 1849; and it appears that the corporators named in the act in question met in the town of Bluffton , in
said county of Wells, on the 19th day of November, 1851, and then
and there accepted the act of incorporation, and organized the company pursuant to the provisions of said act.
If the corporation was not created before the 1st of. November,
185 1, when the new constitution took effect, it could have no existence
at all, as that instrument prohibits the creation of corporations other
than banking, by special act. The State v. Dawson, 16 Ind .. 40.
Harriman v. Southam, 16 Ind. 190.
The plaintiff claims that, inasmuch as there was no acceptance of
the charter, or organization under it, until after the adoption of the
constitution of 1851, there was no such corporation as The Fort Wayne
and Southern Railroad Company at the time he executed the conveyance, and, hence , that no title passed from him. But is he in a condition to dispute the existence of the corporation at the time he made
his conveyance to it?
It has been held. in numerous cases in this state, that a party who
has contracted with a corporation, as such, is, as a general proposition , estopped by Ms contract to dispute the existence of the corporation at the time of the contract. The following cases may be cited,
though there are, perhaps, others reported and some not reported as
yet: Judah v. The American Live Stock In surance C ompany, 4 Ind.
333; The Brookville and Greensburg Turnpike Company v. McCarty,
8 Incl. 392; En sey v. The Cle\·eland and St. Louis Railroad Company, 10 Ind. 178; Fort Wayne and Bluffton Turnpike Company v.
Deam, 10 Ind. 563; Jones v. The Cincinnati Type Foundry Company, r4 Ind. 89; Hubbard v. Chappell, 14 Ind. 6o1; The Evansville, etc., Railroad Company v. The City of Evansville, 15 Ind.
395; Meikel v. The German Savings Fund Society, 16 Ind. 181;
H easton v. Tpe Cincinnati and Fort Wayne Railroad Company, 16
Ind. 275.
The doctrine is by no means confined to the state, but preva ils
elsewhere. The Dutchess Cotton Manufactory v. D avis, 14 Johns.
238; All Saints' Church v. Lovett, 1 Hall 191; Palmer v. Lawrence,
3 Sand. Sup. C. R. 161; Eaton v. Aspimvall, 6 Duer 176; Jones
v. Bank of T ennessee, 8 B. Mon. 122; Worcester Medical In stitution v. Harding, 11 Cush. 285; The Congregational Society v. Perry,
6 N. H. 164; People's Savings Bank, etc., v. Collin~, 27 Conn. 142;
West Winste<l Savings Bank v. Ford, 27 Conn. 282; Angell and
Ames on Corp., § 94.
The estoppel arises upon matter of fact only, and not 11pon matter
of law. Hence, tf there be no law which authorized the supposed
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corporation, or if the statute authorizing it be unconstitutional and

§ 166

void, the contract does not estop the party making it to dispute the

corporation, or if the statute authorizing it be unconstt"tutional and
void, the contract does not estop the party making £t to dispute the
ex£stence of the co1-poration. But if, on the other hand, tlzere be a
law which authorized the corporation, then, whether the corporaiors
/1ave complied wt"th z't, so as to become duly z'ncorporated, is a ques·
tion offact, and tlw partymakz'ng the contract z's estopped to dispute
t/1 e orga11£zatz'on or th e legal exi'stence of the corpora/£011. This proposition is substantially stated in the cases of Jones v. The Cincinnati
T ype Foundry Company, Meikel v. The German Savings Fund
Society, and Heaston v. The Cincinnati and Fort \Vayne Railroad
Company, supra.
Let us apply the doch·ine to the case before us. The corporators named in the act to establish the Fort Wayne and Southern
Railroad Company had a right, at any time before the offer of the
frai;ichises was withdrawn, that is, before the constitution of 185 r was
adopted, to accept the charter, and organize under it. If they did so
accept the charter, and organize, the corporation was legitimately
created, and the new constituti on did not destroy it.
Whether they did so accept the charter, and organize, was a question
of fact, and the plaintiff, by his conveyance, is estopped to deny such
acceptance and organization.
That the corporntors accepted the charter, and organized under it,
within the time when it was competent to do so, was as fully admitted
by the contract as was any other step necessary to an organization.
The conclusion necessarily follows that the plaintiff is estopped to
dispute the existence of the corporation at the time of his conveyance
to it.
This point was ruled the other way in the case of Harriman'"·
Southam, 16 Ind. 190; but, upon more mature reflection, we are satis·
fied that the decision upon this point was wrong, and should be over·
rulecl.
\Ve may remark, also, that th e doctrine of estoppel was erroneously
applieJ in the case of The Evansville, etc., Railroad Co. v. The City
of Evansville , 15 Ind. 395. There the point made was that the law
under which the corporation was organized was unconstitutional :md
void. A party, we have seen , does not, by his contract, estop himself to deny that there is any law, or any valid law, by v.·hich the cor·
poration was authorized.
Some further obscn·ation, in respect to the case before us, will not
he out of place. The doctrine of estoppel, as applied to the case,
d oes not rest upon a m ere techni c<1 l rule of law. It has its foundation
in the clearest equity, and the prin cipl es of natural justice. The doctrine of estoppel in pat's is of comparatively recent growth. but is
firmly and clearly est ablished. " The recent decisions of the courts,
both in this country and in Eng land, appear to have given a much
broader sweep to the doct rine of estoppel i'n pat's than that which
formerly existed, ancl to h;1ve establisherl that, in all cases w/1ere an
act z's d one, or a statement m ade, by a party, tl1e truth or ejficacy of
wh£ch z't would be a fraud on hz's part to controvert or impafr, there

existence of the corporation. But if, on the other hand, there be a

law which authorized the corporation, then, whether the corporators

have complied with it, so as to become duly incorporated, is a ques-

tion of fact, and the party making the contract is estopped to dispute

the organization or the legal existence of the corporation. This prop-

osition is substantially stated in the cases of Jones v. The Cincinnati

Type Foundry Company, Meikel v. The German Savings Fund

Society, and Heaston v. The Cincinnati and Fort Wayne Railroad

Company, supra.

Let ns apply the doctrine to the case before us. The corpo-

rators named in the act to establish the Fort Wayne and Southern

Railroad Company had a right, at any time before the offer of the

franchises was withdrawn, that is, before the constitution of 1851 was

adopted, to accept the charter, and organize under it. If they did so

accept the charter, and organize, the corporation was legitimately

created, and the new constitution did not destroy it.

Whether they did so accept the charter, and organize, was a question
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of fact, and the plaintiff, by his conveyance, is estopped to deny such

acceptance and organization.

That the corporators accepted the charter, and organized under it,

within the time when it was competent to do so, was as fully admitted

by the contract as was any other step necessary to an organization.

The conclusion necessarily follows that the plaintiff is estopped to

dispute the existence of the corporation at the time of his conveyance

to it.

This point was ruled the other way in the case of Harriman v.

Southam, 16 Ind. 190; but, upon more mature reflection, we are satis-

fied that the decision upon this point was wrong, and should be over-

ruled.

We may remark, also, that the doctrine of estoppel was erroneously

applied in the case of The Evansville, etc., Railroad Co. v. The City

of Evansville, 15 Ind. 395. There the point made was that the law

under which the corporation was organized was unconstitutional and

void. A party, we have seen, does not, by his contract, estop him-

self to deny that there is any law, or any valid law, by which the cor-

poration was authorized.

Some further observation, in respect to the case before us, will not

be out of place. The doctrine of estoppel, as applied to the case,

does not rest upon a mere technical rule of law. It has its foundation

in the clearest equity, and the principles of natural justice. The doc-

trine of estoppel in pais is of comparatively recent growth, but is

firmly and clearly established. i;The recent decisions of the courts,

both in this country and in England, appear to have given a much

broader sweep to the doctrine of estoppel in pais than that which

formerly existed, and to have established that, in all cases where an

act is done, or a statement made, by a party, the truth or efficacy of

which it would be a fraud on his part to controvert or impair, there
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the character of an estoppel will be given to what would otherwise be

637

mere matter of evidence, and it will, therefore, become binding upon

a jury, even in the presence of proof of a contrary nature." 2

Smith Lead. Cas., p. 531, 1 Am. ed. See, also, upon this subject,

Kinney v. Farnsvvorth, 17 Conn. 355; Middleton Bank v. Jerome, 18

Conn. 443; Laney v. Laney, 4 Ind. 149. In Doe ex dem. Richard-

son v. Baldwin, 1 Zabriskie, 397, it was said that "The doctrine of

estoppel rests upon the principle, that when one has done an act, or

made a statement, which it would be a fraud, on his part, to contro-

vert or impair, and such act or statement has so influenced any one

that it has been acted upon, the party making it will be cut off from

the power of retraction. It must appear, 1. That he has done some

act, or made some admission incofisislent with his claim; 2. That

the other party has acted upon such conduct or admission; 3. That

such party will be injured by allowing the conduct or admission to be

withdrawn." Here the plaintiff, by his conveyance to the corpora-

tion, admitted that it had an existence, and could receive the title.

Upon this act and admission of the plaintiff the defendant has acted

in purchasing the land of the company. If the plaintiff had not con-
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veyed to the corporation, the defendant would not have purchased from

it. The law will not now permit the plaintiff to withdraw the admission

made by him in conveying to the corporation a/id deprive the defend-

ant of the land which he purchased on the faith of such admission.

In our opinion the judgment below is right, and must be affirmed.

Per Curiam.—The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Note. See following cases, and those cited to Cochran v. Arnold, supra,

p. 629.

Sec. 167.

(3) Estoppel applies only in cases where there is at least a de

facto existence.

the character of an estoppel wi'll be gi'ven to wlzat would otherwise be
mere matter of evidence, and it wt'll, therefore, become bi'nding upon
a jury, even in tlie presence of proof of a contrary nature." 2
Smith Lead. Cas., p. 531, l Am. ed. See, also, upon this subject,
Kinney v. Farnsworth, 17 Conn. 355; Middleton Bank v. Jerome, 18
Conn. 443; Laney v. Laney, 4 Ind. 149· In Doe ex dem. Richardson v. Baldwin, I Zabriskie, 397, it was said that "The doctrine of
estoppel rests upon the principle, that when one has done an act, or
made a statement, which it would be a fraud, on his part, to controvert or impair, and such act or statement has so influenced any one
that it has been acted upon, the party making it will be cut off from
the power of retraction. It must appear, r. Tliat lze has done some
act, or made some admission i'nconst'stent with /it's claim; 2. Tliat
tlte other party lzas acted upon sucli conduct or admt'ssion; 3·. That
such party will be t'njured by allowing the conduct or admisst'on to be
withdrawn." Here the plaintiff, by his conveyance to the corporation, admitted that it had an existence, and could receive the title.
Upon this act and admission of the plaintiff the defendant has acted
in purchasing the land of the company. If the plaintiff had not conveyed to the corporation, the defendant would not have purchased from
it. The law will not now permit the plaintiff to withdraw the admission
made by him in conveying to the corporation qrd deprive the defendant of the land which he purchased on the faith of such admission.
In our opinion the judgment below is right, and must be affirmed.
Per Curiam.-The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

JONES v. THE ASPEN HARDWARE COMPANY.

1895. In the Supreme Court of Colorado. 21 Colo. Rep.

263-271, 52 Am. St. Rep. 220.

Note.

See following cases, and those cited to Cochran v. Arnold, supl'a,

p. 629.

The Aspen Hardware Company instituted this suit in the court be-

low for the purpose of recovering a stock of goods seized by the United

Sec. 167.

States marshal under a writ of attachment issued out of the circuit

court of the United States at the suit of Joseph A. Thatcher, plaintiff,

against one A. B. Eads. The only question in the case has reference

( 3) Estoppel applies only in cases where there is at least a de
. facto existence.

to the corporate capacity of defendant in error, it not having filed,

JONES v. THE ASPEN HARDWARE COMPANY.

prior to the attachment levy, its certificate of incorporation with the

secretary of state, as required by the statute. Session Laws of 1887,

p. 406. In the district court judgment was entered in favor of the

1895.

IN

THE

SUPREME CouRT

OF

CoLORAno.

21

Colo. Rep.

company. The statute reads as follows:

263-271, 52

"Every corporation, joint-stock company or association incorporated

Am. St. Rep.

220.

The Aspen Hardware Company instituted this suit in the court below for the purpose of recovering a stock of goods seized by the United
States marshal under a writ of attachment issued out of the circuit
court of the United States at the suit of Joseph A. Thatcher, plaintiff,
against one A. B. Eads. The only question in the case has reference
to the corporate capacity of defendant in error, it not having filed,
prior to the attachment levy, its certificate of incorporation with the
secretary of state, as required by the statute. Session Laws of 1887,
p. 406. In the district cou1t judgment was entered in favor of the
company. Tbe statute reads as follows:
"Every corporation, joint-stock company or association incorporated
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by or under any general or special law of this state, or by or under

any general or special law of any foreign state or kingdom, or of any

by or under any general or special law of this state, or by or under
any general or special law of any foreign state or kingdom, or of any
state or territory of the United States beyond the limits of this state,
having capital stock divided into shares, shall pay to the secretary of
state for the u se of the state a fee of ten dollars, in case the capital
stock which said cOJ·poration, joint-stock company or association, is
authorized to have, does not exceed one hundred thousand dollar ;
but, in case the capital stock thereof is in excess of one hundred thousand dollars, the secretary of state shall collect the further sum of ten
(IO) cents on each and every thousand dollars of such excess, and a
like fee of ten cents on each thousand of the amount of each subsequent increase of stock. The said fee shall be due and payable upon the
filing of the certificate of incorporation, articles of association or char·
ter of said corporation, joint-stock company or association, in the office
of the secretary of state; and no such corporation, joint-stock company or association s/iall have or exercise any corporate powers or be
permitted to do business in this state until the said fee shall have been
paid; and the secretary of state shall not file any certificate of incor·
poration, articles of association, charter or certificate of the increase
of capital stock, or certify or give any certificate to any such corpora·
tion, joint-stock company or association, until said fee shall have been
paid to him. But thi$ act shall not apply to corporations not for
pecuniary profit, or corporations organized for religious, educational
or benevolent purposes." Section 1, Acts of 1887, p. 4o6.
CHIEF JusTICE HAYT delivered the opinion of the court.
In November, A. D. 1889, Shepard & Bowles, as co-partners. were
doing a general hardware business in the city of Aspen , and, during
that month made a sale of their business, stock in trade, good-will,
etc., to A. B. Eads, the consid~ration for this transfer being certain
real estate and the assumption of certain indebtedness of the firm of
Shepard & Bowles. Eads being unable to comply with the terms of the
agreement, a new arrangement was made between the parties, and an .
organization known as the Aspen Hardware Company was formed by
Bowles, Eads and one Kettler. The a1ticles of incorporation provided that the affairs of the company should be managed by a board
of three directors, naming Bowles, Eads and Kettler as such directors
for the first year. It was the evident intention of the parties that the
company should be duly and legally incorporated, and to this end they
caused to be executed a1ticles of incorporation on the 16th day of
November, 1889, in due form, and immediately filed the same with
the clerk and recorder of Pitkin county. For some reasons not ex·
plained by the evidence, the articles w e re not filed in the office of the
secretary of state until after the levy of the writ of attachment hereinafter referred to, and not until the day upon which this suit in replevin was instituted, hut whether before or after the commencement
of this action does not clearly appear from the evidence.
After the articles were filed with the county clerk, the board of
directors held a meeting, elected officers, caused capital stock to be
issued, etc., Eads being present and participating in this meeting, at

state or territory of the United States beyond the limits of this state,

having capital stock divided into shares, shall pay to the secretary of

state for the use of the state a fee of ten dollars, in case the capital

stock which said corporation, joint-stock company or association, is

authorized to have, does not exceed one hundred thousand dollars;

but, in case the capital stock thereof is in excess of one hundred thou-

sand dollars, the secretary of state shall collect the further sum of ten

(10) cents on each and every thousand dollars of such excess, and a

like fee of ten cents on each thousand of the amount of each subse-

quent increase of stock. The said fee shall be due and payable upon the

filing of the certificate of incorporation, articles of association or char-

ter of said corporation, joint-stock company or association, in the office

of the secretary of state; and no such corporation, joint-stock com-

pany or association shall have or exercise any corporate powers or be

permitted to do business in this state until the said fee shall have been

paid; and the secretary of state shall not file any certificate of incor-

poration, articles of association, charter or certificate of the increase
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of capital stock, or certify or give any certificate to any such corpora-

tion, joint-stock company or association, until said fee shall have been

paid to him. But this act shall not apply to corporations not for

pecuniary profit, or corporations organized for religious, educational

or benevolent purposes." Section I, Acts of 1887, p. 406.

Chief Justice Hayt delivered the opinion of the court.

In November, A. D. 18S9, Shepard & Bowles, as co-partners, were

doing a general hardware business in the city of Aspen, and, during

that month made a sale of their business, stock in trade, good-will,

etc., to A. B. Eads, the consideration for this transfer being certain

real estate and the assumption of certain indebtedness of the firm of

Shepard & Bowles. Eads being unable to comply w ith the terms of the

agreement, a new arrangement was made between the parties, and an

organization known as the Aspen Hardware Company was formed by

Bowles, Eads and one Kettler. The articles of incorporation pro-

vided that the affairs of the company should be managed by a board

of three directors, naming Bowles, Eads and Kettler as such directors

for the first year. It was the evident intention of the parties that the

company should be duly and legally incorporated, and to this end they

caused to be executed articles of incorporation on the 16th day of

November, 1889, in due form, and immediately filed the same with

the clerk and recorder of Pitkin county. For some reasons not ex-

plained by the evidence, the articles were not filed in the office of the

secretary of state until after the levy of the writ of attachment here-

inafter referred to, and not until the day upon which this suit in re-

plevin was instituted, but whether before or after the commencement

of this action does not clearly appear from the evidence.

After the articles were filed with the county clerk, the board of

directors held a meeting, elected officers, caused capital stock to be

issued, etc., Eads being present and participating in this meeting, at
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which Bowles was elected president, Eads vice-president, and Kettler

secretary and treasurer. Thereupon, Eads, for a valuable considera-

tion, sold and transferred the property to the new organization, and

Mr. Bowles, from that time forward, conducted the business for the

Aspen Hardware Company, selling goods and purchasing new goods

in the corporate name. Eads, soon after the sale, left the town of

Aspen and did not return, nor personally take part in the business at

that point, but continued as a director and vice-president of the com-

pany, and retained a portion of his stock, although he had sold a part

of it prior to the levy of the writ of attachment.

The business was thus continued until July 31, 1890, when a suit

was commenced by Thatcher, plaintiff, against A. B. Eads, and the

property in question levied upon as the property of the defendant in

that suit, and this action of replevin was immediately instituted to re-

cover possession of the property, or its value.

The controversy in this case is narrowed to the single question of

the capacity of defendant in error to take title to the property in con-

troversy as a corporation at the time of the attempted transfer by

Eads, it not having at that time filed its articles of incorporation with
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the secretary of state, or paid the fee for such a filing, as provided by

the statute of 1887, p. 406.

This is the first time the effect of this statute has been before this

court for consideration, although in Edwards v. D. & R. G. R. Co.,

13 Colo. 59, the constitutionality of a somewhat similar act was under

review. That act was attacked upon several grounds, among which

was that it was void because the subject was not clearly expressed in

the title, the title being "An act to provide for the formation of cor-

porations," and it was held that this title was sufficient to cover legis-

lation requiring a fee to be paid for filing the certificate of incorpora-

tion, under the principle that the same was germane to the general

subject expressed in the title, and that legislation fixing the amount of

such fee, time of payment, etc., was not obnoxious to the constitu-

tional provision with reference to titles. The act of 1SS7, now under

consideration, is entitled "An act to fix the fees to be collected by the

secretary of state for incorporation and certain other privileges." The

body of the act, however, relates entirely to the fee to be charged and

collected for filing certificates of incorporation, articles of association,

charters, or increase of capital stock of joint-stock companies, and in

addition thereto provides that no such corporation, joint-stock company

or association "shall have or exercise any corporate powers or be per-

mitted to do any business in this state until the said fee shall have

been paid." » * * This provision is so closely allied to the gen-

eral subject, which is the fixing of fees for filing certificates of incor-

poration, etc., that under the uniform rule of decisions in this state it

must be held to be a proper matter for legislation under the title se-

lected. Golden Canal Co. v. Blight, 8 Colo. 144; People, ex rel.

Thomas, v. Goddard, 8 Colo. 432 ; People, exrel. Thomas, v. Scott, 9

Colo. 422; Dallas v. Redman, 10 Colo. 297; Edwards v. D. & R.

t. R., supra; In re, Pratt, 19 Colo. 138.

which Bowles was elected president, Eads vice-president, and Kettler
secretary and treasurer. Thereupon, Eads, for a valuable consideration, sold and transferred the property to the new organization, and
Mr. Bowles, from that time forward, conducted the business for the
A spen Hardware Company, selling goods and purchasing new goods
in the corporate na me. Eads, soon after the sale, left the town of
Aspen and did not return, nor personally take part in the business at
that point, but continued as a director and vice-president of the company, and retained a portion of his stock, although he had sold a part
of it prior to the levy of the writ of attachment.
The business was thus continued until July 3r, 1890, when a suit
was commenced by Thatcher, plaintiff, against A. B. Eads, and the
property in question levied upon as the property of the defendant in
that suit, and this action of replevin was immediately instituted to recover possession of the property, or its value.
The controversy in this case is narrowed to the single question of
the capacity of defendant in error to take title to the property in controversy as a corporation at the time of the attempted transfer by
Eads, it not having at that time filed its articles of incorporation with
the secretary of state, or paid the fee for such a filing, as provided by
the statute of 1887 , p. 406.
This is the first time the effect of this statute has been before this
court for consideration, although in Edwards v. D. & R. G. R. Co.,
13 Colo. 59, the constitutionality of a' somewhat similar act was under
review. That act ~as attacked upon several grounds, among which
was that it was void because the subject was not clearly expressed in
the title, the title being "An act to provide for the formation of corporations," and it was held that this title was sufficient to cover legislation requiring' a fee to be paid for filing the ce1tificate of incorporation, under the principle that the same was germane to the general
subject expressed in the title, and that legislation fixing the amount of
such fee, time of payment, etc., was not obnoxious to the constitutional provision with reference to titles. The act of 1887, now under
consideration, is entitled "An act to fix the fees to be collected by the
secretary of state for incorporation and certain other privileges." The
body of the act, however, relates entirely to the fee to be charged and
collected for filing certificates of in corporation, articles of association,
charters, or increase of capital stock of joint-stock companies, and in
addition thereto provides that no such corporation, joint-stock company
or association "shall have or exercise any corporate powers or be permi'tted to do any business i'n thi's state untz'l tl1 e saz'd fee sliall have
heen pat'd." • • • This provision is so closely allied to the general subject, which is the fixing of fees for filing certificates of incorporation, etc., that under the uniform rule of decisions in this state it
must be held to be a proper matter for legislation under the title selected. Golden Canal Co. v. Bright, 8 Colo. 144; People, ex r el.
Thomas, v. Goddard , 8 Colo. 432; People, ex rel. Thomas, v. Scott, 9
Colo. 422; Dallas v. Redman, 10 Colo. 297; Edwards v. D. & R.
1. R., supra; In re, Pratt, 19 Colo. 138.
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In this case the Aspen Hardware Company claims title to the prop-

§ 167

erty in dispute in its corporate capacity and not as a co-partnership.

In this case the Aspen Hardware Company claims title to the property in dispute in its corporate capacity and not as a co-partnership.
It is admitted that the fee for filing the certificate of incorporation
with the secretary of state was not paid prior to the levy of the writ
of attachment, and that the certificate was not filed in the office of the
secretary of state until about the time of the bringing of the present
action, the evidence leaving the exact time uncertain.
It is to be remembered that in this case the corporation is the party
plaintiff, and it may be stated, as a general rule, that when a com..
pany relies on its corporate capacity it assumes the burden of establishing such capacity.
The language of the act is plain and unambiguous. It reads:
"No such corporation • • • shall have or exercise any corporate
powers • • • .' '
The taking of title to property was ce1tainly the exercise of a corporate power, and as such prohibited by the express terms of the
statute. This is not controverted by counsel for appellee, but it is
contended that Eads, having assisted in the organization of the corporation, and having sold to it the hardware stock, is estopped from
denying the corporate existence of the company, and that the attaching creditor took the property subject to the same estoppel.
Th e doctrine of estoppel can not be successfully invoked. we think, ·
unless tlte corporation /ias at least a de facto existence. The mle is
stated as follows by Morawetz on Private Corporations, § 750, it ha,·ing been first announced in the case of Brouwer v . Appleby, 1 Sand£.
I 58 :
"A defendant who has contracted with a corporation de facto
is never permitted to allege any defect in its organization as affecting
its capacity to contract or sue, but that all such objections, if valid,
are only available on behalf of the sovereign power of the state."
It is also well settled that to constitute a de facto corporation there
must be either a charter or a law authorizing the creation of such a
corporation, with an attempt in good faith to comply with its terms,
and also a user or attempt to exercise corporate powers under it. Duggan v. The Colorado Mortgage and Inve.stment Co .. 1 l Colo. I 13;
Bates et al. v. Wilson et al., 14 Colo. 140.
A de facto corporation can never be recognized in violation of a
positive law. This principle, which seems to be supported by all the
authorities, is thus stated in Morawetz on Private Corporations, § 758:
"If the formation of a corporate association is not only prohibited by
this genera l rule of the common law , but is also in violation of some
principle of morality or public policy, or a post'ti·ve statutory prolt£bt't£on, the parties forming such association will not be legally bound
by their agreement of membership, a nd the courts will not recognize
the association, either as among its members or against third parties."
To recogn ize the defendant as a de facto corporation would, as we
have seen, be in direct con fli ct with the express language of the act,
which declares that without the payment of the fee the corporation
shall have no corporate power.
One object of this statute is to re trict the organization of "wild-

It is admitted that the fee for filing the certificate of incorporation

with the secretary of state was not paid prior to the levy of the writ

of attachment, and that the certificate was not filed in the office of the

secretary of state until about the time of the bringing of the present

action, the evidence leaving the exact time uncertain.

It is to be remembered that in this case the corporation is the party

plaintiff, and it may be stated, as a general rule, that when a com-

pany relies on its corporate capacity it assumes the burden of estab-

lishing such capacity.

The language of the act is plain and unambiguous. It reads:

"No such corporation * * » shall have or exercise any corporate

powers * * *."

The taking of title to property was certainly the exercise of a cor-

porate power, and as such prohibited by the express terms of the

statute. This is not controverted by counsel for appellee, but it is

contended that Eads, having assisted in the organization of the cor-

poration, and having sold to it the hardware stock, is estopped from
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denying the corporate existence of the company, and that the attach-

ing creditor took the property subject to the same estoppel.

The doctrine of estoppel can not be successfully invoked, we think,

unless the corporation has at least a de facto existence. The rule is

stated as follows by Morawetz on Private Corporations. § 750, it hav-

ing been first announced in the case of Brouwer v. Appleby, 1 Sandf.

158: "A defendant who has contracted with a corporation dc facto

is never permitted to allege any defect in its organization as affecting

its capacity to contract or sue, but that all such objections, if valid,

are only available on behalf of the sovereign power of the state."

It is also well settled that to constitute a de facto corporation there

must be either a charter or a law authorizing the creation of such a

corporation, with an attempt in good faith to comply with its terms,

and also a user or attempt to exercise coqjorate powers under it. Dug-

gan v. The Colorado Mortgage and Investment Co.. 11 Colo. 113;

Bates et al. v. Wilson et al., 14 Colo. 140.

A de facto corporation can never be recognized in violation of a

positive law. This principle, which seems to be supported by all the

authorities, is thus stated in Morawetz on Private Corporations, § 758:

"If the formation of a corporate association is not only prohibited by

this general rule of the common law, but is also in violation of some

principle of morality or public policy, or a positive statutory pro-

hibition, the parties forming such association will not be legally bound

by their agreement of membership, and the courts will not recognize

the association, either as among its members or against third parties."

To recognize the defendant as a de facto corporation would, as we

have seen, be in direct conflict with the express language of the act,

which declares that without the payment of the fee the corporation

shall have no corporate power.

One object of this statute is to restrict the organization of "wild-
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cat" corporations, it being supposed that the increased fee required

by the act would, in a measure, at least, prevent the overcapitalization

of companies. The legislature being of the opinion that this purpose

§ 167
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would be advanced by requiring the fee to be paid as a condition pre-

cedent to the exercise of any corporate power, it is the duty of the

courts to give effect to this intent as the same is manifest from the

plain language of the act.

The taking of title to the property in controversy being the exercise

of a corporate power, and, as such, forbidden until the fee for filing

has been paid, it follows that the title of The Aspen Hardware Com-

pany as a corporation can not be upheld. Having failed to comply

■with the statute, The Aspen Hardware Company at the time of the

transfer was neither a de jure ?ior a de facto corporation, but simply

a voluntary association of individuals-in the nature of a co-partner-

ship.

There is a broad distinction between those acts made necessary by

the statute as a prerequisite to the exercise of corporate powers and

those acts required of individuals seeking incorporation, but not made

prerequisites to the exercise of such powers.

"In respect to the former, any material omission will be fatal to
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the existence of the corporation, and may be taken advantage of col-

laterally, in any form in which the fact of incorporation can properly

be called in question. In respect to the latter, the incorporation is

responsible only to the government in a direct proceeding to forfeit

the charter." Abbott v. Omaha Smelting and Refining Company, 4

Neb. 416. The omission in this case is of acts of the former class,

and consequently there was no corporation in esse at the time of the

levy of the writ, while the evidence leaves it in doubt if this omission

had been supplied prior to the institution of the present action.

But although it could not at the time exercise any corporate power,

this did not prevent The Aspen Hardware Company from taking title

to the property as a co-partnership. In other words, under the con-

ceded facts, the company was not at the time a corporation, but this

will not preclude it from maintainitig the action as a co-partnership.

The plaintiff sues as The Aspen Hardware Company, and the facts

alleged show that such company was a co-partnership and not a cor-

poration. There is nothing in the name of the association to conflict

with this, as at common law partners may carry on business under

any name they choose. They are bound rather by their acts than by

the style which they give to themselves. Cook on Stock and Stock-

holders, § 233; Chaffee v. Ludeling, 27 La. Ann. 607.

This principle has been applied in many cases where parties have

set up the defense of individual non-liability by reason of having di-

rected an incorporation to be had, but where none in fact was con-

summated. Cook on Stock and Stockholders. §§ 233, 234; Abbott

v. Omaha Smelting and Refining Co., supra; Empire Mills v. Al-

ston Grocery Co., 15 S. W. Rep. 505 (Texas).

The law having cast this liability upon the members of the associa-

41—Wil. Cases.

cat" corporations, it being supposed that the increased fee required
by the act would, in a measure, at least, prevent the overcapitalization
of companies. The legislature being of the opinion that this purpose
would be advanced by requiring the fee to be paid as a condition precedent to the exercise of any corporate power, it is the duty of the
courts to give effect to this intent as the same is manifest from the
plain language of the act.
The taking of title to the prope1ty in controversy being the exercise
of a corporate power, and, as such, forbidden until the fee for filing
has been paid, it follows that the title of The A spen Hardware Company as a corporation can not be upheld. Having failed to comply
witll the statute, Tile Aspen Hardware Company at tile time of the
transfer was nei'ther a de jure 11or a de facto corporation, but simply
a voluntary assoc£at£on of indiv iduals· in the nature of a co-partners/zip.
There is a broad distinction between those acts made necessary by
the statute as a prerequisite to the exercise of corporate powers and
those acts required of individuals seeking in corporation, but not made
prerequisites to the exercise of such powers.
"In respect to the former, any material omission will be fatal to
the existence of the corporation, and may be taken advantage of collaterally, in any form in which the fact of incorporation can properly
be called in question. In respect to the latter, the incorporation is
responsible only to the government in a direct proceeding to forfeit
the charter." Abbott v. Omaha Smelting and Refining Company, 4
Neb. 416. The omission in thi s case is of acts of the former class,
and consequently there was no corporation in esse at the time of the
levy of the writ, while the evidence leaves it in doubt if this omission
had been supplied prior to the institution of the present action.
But altlzough it could not at tlie time exercise any corporate power,
this did not prevent The Aspen I-fardware Company from taki'ng title ·
to the property as a co-partnership . In ot/1er words, under the conceded facts , the company was not at the time a corporation, but this
wi'll not preclude it from maintaini11g tlte acti'on as a co-partnerslttp.
The plaintiff sues as Tlte Aspen Hardware Company, and the facts
alleged show that suclt company was a co-partnership and not a corporati'on. There is nothing in the name of the association to conflict
with this, as at common law partners may carry on business under
any name they choose. They are bound rather by their acts than by
the style which they g ive to themselves. Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 233; Chaffee v . Ludeling, 27 La. Ann. 6o7.
This principle has been applied in many cases where parties have
set up the defense of individual non-liability by reason of having directed an incorporation to be had, but where none in fact was consummated. Cook on Stock and Stockholders, §§ 233, 234; Abbott
v. Omaha Smelting and Refining Co ., supra; Empire Mills v. Alston Grocery Co., 15 S. \V. R ep. 505 (Texas).
The law having cast this liability upon the members of the associa41- WiL. CASES.
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tion, we think they must be given the advantages accorded a co-part-

nership. So, in this case, while we feel compelled, under the statute,

642

to deny plaintiff's right of recovery as a corporation, we think they

BOYCE V. TRUSTEES TOWSONTOWN STATION, ETC.

§ 168

may maintain the action as a co-partnership. The cause will accord-

tion, we think they must be given the advantages accorded a co-part•
nership. So, in this case, while we feel compelled, under the statute,
to deny plaintiff's right of recovery as a corporation, we think they
may maintain the action as a co-partnership. The cause will accordingly be reversed and remanded, with directions to the district court
to allow parties to amend their pleadings as they may he advised.
Reversed.
Note. To same effect: 1898, Maryland Tube & Iron Works v. West End

ingly be reversed and remanded, with directions to the district court

to allow parties to amend their pleadings as they may be advised.

Reversed.

Note. To same effect: 1898, Maryland Tube & Iron Works v. West End

Imp. Co., 87 Md. 207, 39 L. R. A. 810.

See, hIbo, cases following and those cited in note to Cochran v. Arnold,

supra., p. 629.

Sec. 168.

(4) Public policy forbids the creation or recognition of corpo-

Imp. Co., 87 Md. 207, an L. R. A. 810.
See, also, cases following and those cited in note to Cochran v. Arnold,
supra, p. 629.

rations by estoppel.

BOYCE v. THE TRUSTEES OF TOWSONTOWN STATION OF THE M.

E. CHURCH.1

1876. In the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 46 Md. Rep.

Sec. 168.

359-374-

[Action of assumpsit by appellant against appellee. Plea there

( 4) Public policy forbids the creation or recognition of corporations by estoppel.

never was a corporate body as alleged. Plaintiff offered evidence to
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show corporate existence, by way of user, by reading a mortgage exe-

cuted by the church to certain persons, a deed to the church for its

property, an application by the church for a loan, a mortgage given

BOYCE v. THE TRUSTEES OF TOWSONTOWN STATION OF THEM.
E. CHURCH.1

by it for its property to secure bonds issued by it; byway of authority

to exist, a certificate of incorporation, setting forth name, officers,

1876.

location, powers, purposes, acknowledged before one justice of the

IN THE CounT OF APPEALS

of

MARYLAND.

46 Md. Rep.

35~374·

peace (the statute requiring the acknowledgment to be before two

justices), all of which was objected to, and excluded by the court;

[Action of assumpsit by appellant against appellee. Plea there
never was a corporate body as alleged. Plaintiff offered evidence to
show corporate ex istence, by way of user, by reading a mortgage executed by the church to certain persons, a deed to the church for its
property, an application by the church ·for a loa n, a mortgage given
by it for its property to secure Londs issued by it; byway of autliority
to exist, a certificate of incorporation, setting forth name, officers,
location, powers, purposes, acknowledged before one justice of the
peace (the statute requiring the acknowledgment to he before t\'\'O
justices), all of which was objected to, and excluded by the court;
this exclusion of evidence is assigned as enor, and appeal taken.]
Arthur W. Machen, for appellee, contended:
The proposition contended for by the appeJlant' s counsel would be
as inconvenient in practice as it is illogical and unsound. If, whenever ce1tain individuals choose to call themselves a corporation, and
conduct business in the name of the supposed corporation, a corporation de facto is thereby created, a high attribute of sovereignty becomes unnecessary , all statutory restrictions and guards become nugatory, and any partnership may practically become a corporation.
But what kind of a corporation is it, if it has no powers? No principle is bette r established than that all the corporate powers must be
found expressed in the charter. or necessarily incident to those powers
which are expressed. How would it advance the plaintiff to hold that
a corporation may be considered as existing, if it is impossible that
any cause of action can be established against it for want of charter
conferring power to make the contract out of which it is to arise?
1 Statement of facts abridged.
Arguments for appellants omitted; only

this exclusion of evidence is assigned as error, and appeal taken.]

Arthur W. Machen, for appellee, contended:

The proposition contended for by the appellant's counsel would be

as inconvenient in practice as it is illogical and unsound. If, when-

ever certain individuals choose to call themselves a corporation, and

conduct business in the name of the supposed corporation, a corpora-

tion de facto is thereby created, a high attribute of sovereignty be-

comes unnecessary, all statutory restrictions and guards become nuga-

tory, and any partnership may practically become a corporation.

But what kind of a corporation is it, if it has no powers? No prin-

ciple is better established than that all the corporate powers must be

found expressed in the charter, or necessarily incident to those powers

which are expressed. How would it advance the plaintiff to hold that

a corporation may be considered as existing, if it is impossible that

any cause of action can be established against it for want of charter

conferring power to make the contract out of which it is to arise?

■Statement of facts abridged. Arguments for appellants omitted; only

part of argument for appellee given.

part of argument for appell ee given.
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There is no room for presumption or estoppel, for, the plaintiff

having produced the alleged instrument of incorporation, the truth ap-

§ 168

CORPORATIONS BY ESTOPPEL.

pears, and it is manifest that the provisions of the law have not been

complied with, and that no incorporation was effected.

Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

From a careful consideration of the case, we find no error in the

rulings of the circuit court, in the four exceptions taken by the ap-

pellant.

The controlling question to be determined under the first plea of

the appellee of nul tiel corporation is, whether any or all of the evi-

dence offered on the part of the appellant in the said exception, and

refused by the court, was sufficient to show that the appellant could

be held to be a corporation de jure or de facto, or to estop the ap-

pellee from disputing its liability as a corporation.

The act of 1868, ch. 471, in its fourteenth section, provides, amongst

other things, for the incorporation of religious societies, and by sec-

tions 151, 162, 163 and 164 for religious corporations.

These last provisions are more especially applicable to the organiza-

tion of a church, religious society or congregation, of whatever denom-
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ination which the appellee professes to be, and it is to be presumed

were intended for such purpose.

Amongst other requisites to constitute a religious corporation,

church, religious society or corporation under these last sections, it was

necessary that the agreement for that purpose should be acknowledged

by the trustees or a majority of them, before two justices of the peace

of the county or city in which the church, congregation or society, or

the greatest number of the members shall reside, or before a judge of

the circuit court, or of the supreme bench of Baltimore, and certified

by the said justices or judge according to the directions of section 163.

No authority having been given to the judge by these provisions, to

determine that the law had been complied with, his certificate is not

sufficient evidence that the defendant is a corporation.

But the appellant has undertaken to offer evidence of certain acts

and proceedings of the appellee, referred to in the exceptions, to show

that it held itself out as a corporation, and treated with the appellant

as such, and is estopped from denying its liability as a corporation.

We think it would be extending the doctrine of estoppel to an ex-

tent not justified by the principles of public policy, to allow it to op-

erate through the conduct of parties concerned, to create substantially

a de facto corporation, with just such powers as the parties may by

their acts give to it.

This would be substituting the dealings of the parties for compli-

ance with the requirements of the law, and giving to them the same

effect through the aid of the courts. Thus, virtually, through the

courts, recognizing the existence of the corporation, in manifest dis-

regard of the written law.

It has been determined by this court that a corporation can not bind

itself in excess of its powers. Pennsylvania Steam Navigation Co. v.

Dandridge, 8 G. & J. 319.

There is no room for presumption or estoppel, for," the plaintiff
having produced the alleged instrument of incorporation, the truth appears. and it is manifest that the provisions of the law have not been
complied with, and that no incorporation was effected.
STEWART, J., deliYered the opinion of the court.
From a careful consideration of the case, we find no error in the
rulings. of the circuit court, in the four exceptions taken by the appellant.
The controlling question to be determined under the first plea of
the appellee of nul ti'el corporation is, whether any or all of the evidence offered on the part of the appellant in the said exception, and
refused by the court, was sufficient to show that the appellant could
be held to be a corporation de Jure or de facto, or to estop the appellee from disputing its liability as a corporat:ion.
The act of 1868, ch. 471, in its fourteenth section, provides, amongst
other things, for the incorporation of religious societies, and by sections 151 , 162, 163 and 164 for religious corporations.
These last provisions are more especially applicable to the organization of a church, religious society or congregation, of whatever denomination which the appellee professes to be, and it is to be presumed
were intended for such purpose.
Amongst other requisites to constitute a religious corporation,
church, religious society or corporation under these last sections, it was
necessary that the agreement for that purpose should be acknowledged
by the trustees or a majority of them, before two justices of the peace
of the county or city in which the church, congregation or society, or
the greatest number of the members shall reside, or before a judge of
the circuit court, or of the supreme bench of Baltimore, and certified
by the said justices or judge according to the directions of section 163.
No authority having been given to the judge by these provisions, to
determine that the law had been complied with, his certificate is not
sufficient evidence that the defendant is a corporation.
But the appellant has undertaken to offer evidence of certain acts
and proceedings of the appellee, referred to in the exceptions, to show
that it held itself out as a corporation, and treated with the appellant
as such, and is estopped from denying its liability as a corporation.
We think it would be extendi'ng the doctrt"r.ie of estoppel to an extent not juslijied by tlte prt'ndples of publt'c p oli'cy , to allow i't to operate tlzrouglt tlze conduct of parties concerned', to create substantt'ally
a de facto corporation, wt'tlz just such powers as the partt'es may by
thet'r acts give to it.
This would be substituti'ng the deali'ngs of t/1e parti'e.s for compliance with the reqttt'rem ents of the law, and gt'ving to them tlze same
effect tl1rough the at'd of the courts. Thus , virtually, tltroug/1 the
courts, rccognt'zing the existence of tlie corporation, t'n manifest disregard ofthe wri'tten law.
It has been determined by this court that a corporation can not bind
itself in excess of its powers. Pennsylvania Steam Navigation Co. v.
Dandridge, 8 G., & J. 319.
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Whilst denying its capacity upon any principle of estoppel to make

§ 169

FITZPATRICK V. RliTTER.

contracts, ultra vires, to bind itself, it would not be consistent with

that theory to recognize its existence ad libitum, according to the con-

Whilst denying its capacity upon any principle of estoppel to make
contracts, ultra vircs, to bind itself, it would not be consistent with
that theory to recognize its ex£stence ad l£b£tum, according to the conduct of the parties concerned. ·
Such a pr£nczj>le would seem to affix no other limit to the exz"stence
of the corporatt'on de facto or the extent of its power _than the dealz'ngs of the partz'es, through the recognz'tion of the courts, m£ght
upon the doctrine of estoppel prescribe.
·
It would be more reasonable to hold corporations to their contracts,
though ultra vires, of which they have received the benefit, or to
prevent parties who have contracted with them, and receive the benefit therefrom, from defeating their liability, on the ground of want
of power in the co1poration, as is held in quarters of high authority
(see note and references in 2d Kent 35 I), than to hold that corporations should be deemed to have existence because they had so held
themselves out.
The statute law of the state, expressly requiring certain prescribed
acts to be done to constitute a corporation, to permit parties indirectly,
or upon the principle of estoppel, virtually to create a corporation for
any purpose, or to have acts so construed, would be in manifest opposition to the ~tatute law and clearly against its policy, and justified
upon no sound principle in the administration of justice.
Judgment affirmed.

duct of the parties concerned.

Such a principle -would seem to affix no other limit to the existence

of the corporation dc facto or the extent of its poiver than the deal-

ings of the parties, through the recognition of the courts, might

upon the doctrine of estoppel prescribe.

It would be more reasonable to hold corporations to their contracts,

though ultra vires, of which they have received the benefit, or to

prevent parties who have contracted with them, and receive the ben-

efit therefrom, from defeating their liability, on the ground of want

of power in the corporation, as is held in quarters of high authority

(see note and references in 2d Kent 351), than to hold that corpora-

tions should be deemed to have existence because they had so held

themselves out.

The statute law of the state, expressly requiring certain prescribed

acts to be done to constitute a corporation, to permit parties indirectly,

or upon the principle of estoppel, virtually to create a corporation for
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any purpose, or to have acts so construed, would be in manifest op-

position to the statute law and clearly against its policy, and justified

upon no sound principle in the administration of justice.

Judgment affirmed.

Sec. 169. (B) Parties estopped.

(1) The pretended corporation itself.

FITZPATRICK, Rkckiver, v. RUTTER.1

1896. In the Supreme Court of Illinois. 160 111. 282-7.

Mr. Justice Wilkin delivered the opinion of the court:

On November 20, 1S93, George Rutter filed in the circuit court of

Cook county his declaration in assumpsit against the Switchmen's

Sec. 169.

Mutual Aid Association of North America, of which he was a mem-

(B) Parties estopped.

ber, to collect an indemnity of $1,000, claimed to be due him, under

the rules of the association, for injuries sustained in a railroad acci-

( x) The pretended corporation itself.

dent. Summons was issued and served upon the officers of the asso-

ciation, but the declaration was not filed ten days prior to the first day

FITZPATRICK, RECEIVER, v. RUTTER. 1

of the January term, 1894. By agreement of counsel, however, it was

stipulated that the association would take no advantage of the failure

to file the declaration in the proper time. The declaration was filed

1896.

IN

THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

ILLINOIS.

16o

Ill. 28z-7.

on the first day of the January term, 1894, and on March 13, follow-

ing, no plea being on file, judgment by default was taken against the

MR. JUSTICE \Vu.KIN delivered the opinion of the court:
On November 20, 1893, George Rutter filed in the circuit court of
Cook county his declaration in assump ·it against the Switchmen's
Mutual Ai<l As ociation of North America, of which he was a member, to collect an indemnity of $1 ,ooo, claimed to be due him, under
the mies of the association, for injuries sustained in a railroad accident. Summons was issued and served upon the officers of the association, but the declaration was not fileci ten days prior to the first day
of the January term, 1894. By agreement of counsel, however, it was
stipulated that the association w o uld take no advantage of the failure
to file the declaration in the proper time. The d eclaration was filed
on the first day of the J a nuary term, 1894, and on March 13, following, no plea being on file, judgment hy default was taken again t the •
defendant association. Execution having been i sued thereon and returned no property found, Rutter, on June 18, i894, filed a creditor's

defendant association. Execution having been issued thereon and re-

turned no property found. Rutter, on June 18, 1894, filed a creditor's

1 Arguments omitted. Only part of opinion given.
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bill in the superior court of Cook county, based on the judgment of
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March 13, to discover and reach moneys in the hands of the association.

The defendant was served with summons, just as it was in the suit at

law. No answer being made, it was defaulted. The officers of the

association answered1 for themselves and the other members of the

association, and upon their answer being replied to, the cause was re-

ferred to a master, and proofs were taken upon the issue thus formed.

The decree of the court was in favor of complainant. Defendants

severally prayed an appeal, but afterward withdrew their prayer for

appeal, and John E. Fitzpatrick, as receiver of the association, hav-

ing been appointed by the circuit court on July 21, 1S94, made him-

self a party to the cause and perfected the appeal. The cause was

taken to the appellate court for the First district, and is brought here

to reverse the decision of affirmance in that court.

The first ground upon which appellant relies for reversal here is

that the circuit court had no jurisdiction over the person of the defend-

ant association, as it was sued as a corporation, summons being issued

and served upon its officers only, instead of each of the members, as

should have been done, to bring a voluntary association within the

jurisdiction of the court. If a court has proceeded without jurisdic-
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tion, its judgment is absolutely void for every purpose, and will be

so declared in any court in which it may be presented, and that ques-

tion is, therefore, proper to be considered here. But we think, from

an examination of the record, the appellate court and the trial court

were justified in finding, from the evidence, that the association was a

dc facto corporation, and properly served with process. The Switch-

men's Mutual Aid Association of North America had an organization,

consisting of directors, a president, secretary and other officers. Its

name implied a corporate body. It authenticated its acts by a com-

mon seal and exercised corporate powers, and it is thus estopped from

denying its corporate existence. United States Express Co. v. Bed-

bury, 34 111. 459. * • »

Judgment affirmed.

Note. See, 1695, Knight v. Corporation of Wells, 1 Lutw. f. 508; 1729,

Henriques v. Dutch West India Co., 2 Ld. Raym. 1532; 1842, Stone v. Berk-

shire Congregational Society, 14 Vt. 80; 1848, Johnston v. South West

R. Bank, 3 Strob. Eq. (S. C.) 263; 1851, Stoddard v. Onondaga Conference,

12 Barb. (N. Y.) 573; 1857, Abbott v. Aspinwall, 2(5 Barb. (N. Y.) 202; 1858,

Kennedv v. Cotton, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 59; 18(50, Doolev v. Cheshire Glass

Co., 15 "Gray (Mass.) 494; 18*50, Calender v. Painesville, etc., R. Co., 11

Ohio St. 516; 1864, The United States Express Co. v. Bedbury, 34 111. 459,

holding that the name "The United States Express Co." imported a corpora-

tion; 1871, McCullough v. Talladega Ins. Co., 46 Ala. 376; 1874, Grape Sugar

and Vinegar Mfg. Co. v. Small, 40 Md. 395; 1879, Humphrey v. Patrons

Mercantile Assn., 50 Iowa 607; 1881, Empire Mfg. Co. v. Stuart, 46 Mich.

1 This answer, as stated in the report of the case in 58 111. App.532, on 533,

alleged that "it was a voluntary association havingseveral thousand members

throughout the United States and Canada; that it was not incorporated under

the laws of this or any other state or country; that it did not hold itself out

to the public or to its members as a corporation, and that it was not a corpo-

ration de facto." The master found these allegations to be substantially true.

bill in the superior court of Cook county, based on the judgment of
13, to disco,· er and reach moneys in the hands of the association.
The d efendant was served with summons, just as it was in the suit at
law. No answer being m ade , it was d efaulted. The officers of the
association :111swered 1 for themselves and the other m embevs of the
association, and upon the ir anS'v\'er being replied to, the cause was referred to a master , and proofs were taken upon the issue thu s formed.
The decree of the court was in favor of complainant. D efend ants
severally prayed an appeal, but afterward withdrew their prayer for
appeal, and J ohn E. Fitzpatrick, as receiver of the association, having been appointed by the circu it court on July 21, 1894, made himself a patty to the cause and perfected the appeal. The cause was
taken to the appellate court for the First district, and is brought here
to reverse the decision of affirmance in that court.
The first ground upon which appellant relies for reversal here is
that the circuit court had no juri9diction over the person of the defendant association, as it was sued as a corporation , summons being issued
and served upon its officers only , instead of each of the members, as
should have been done, to bring a Yoluntary association within the
jurisdiction of the court. If a court has proceeded without jurisdiction, its judgment is absolutely void for every purpose, and will be
so decl~red in any court in which it may be presented, a nd that question is, therefore, proper to be considered here. But we think, from
an examination of the record, the appellate court and the trial court
were justified in finding, from the evidence, that the association was a
d e facto corporation, and properly served with process. The Switchmen's Mutual Aid A ssociation of North America had an organization,
consisting of directors, a president, secretary and other officers. Its
name implied a corporate body. It authenticated its acts by a common seal and exercised corporate powers, and it is thus e topped from
denying its corporate existence. United States Express Co. v. Bedbury, 34 Ill. 459· • • •
Judgment affirmed.
Note. See, 16!'15, Knight v. Corporation of W ells, 1 Lutw. f. 508; 1729,
~larch

Henriques v. Dutch W est India Co., 2 Ld. R ay m. 1532 ; 1842, Stone v. Berkshire Congregational Society, 14 Vt. 86; 1848, J ohnsto n v. South West
R. Bank, a Stroh. Eq. (H. C.) 263: 1851, Stoddard v. Onondaga Co nference,
12 Barb. (N. Y. ) 573; 1857, Abbott v. Aspinwall, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 202; 1858,
K ennedy v. Cotton, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 59; 1860, Dooley v. Cheshire Glass
Co., 15 Gray IMass.) 494; 1800, Calender v . Painesvi lle, etc., R. Co .. 11
Ohio St. 516; 1864, The Uniterl Stntes Express Co. v . Beclbury, ~4 Jll . 459,
holding that the name "The United St.ates Express Co." imported a corporntion ; 1871, McCullough v. Talladega Ins. Co., 46 Ala. 3i6; 1874, Gnqw .'ugar
and Vinegar }ffg. Co. v. Small, 40 Mr!. 395; 187H, Hump hrey v . Patrons
Mercantile Assn., .50 Iowa 607; 1881, Empire l\lfg. Co. v. Stuart, 46 l\lich.

See 58 III. App. 534.

1 This answe r, as stated in the report of the case in 58 Ill. A pp. 532, on 5~3 ,
alleged that "it was a voluntary aseociatio n havin g several thonsancl 111en1lH-' rs
throughout the U ni ted States and Cn nada; thnt it was not inror pornted und er
th e Jaws of this o r any other state or country: that it cli<i not hold ihielf ont
to the public o r to its memberf! as a corporation, and that. it was n ot a corporation de f acto." The master found theiie allegations to be substantially true •
.See 58 Ill. App. 534.
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482; 1882, Dobson v. Simonton, 86 N. C. 492; 1886, Kelly v. Newburvport &

482; 1882, Dobson v. Simonton, 86 N. C. 4H2; 1886, Kelly v. Newburyport & .
A. H. R., 141 Mass. 496, 6 N. E. 745; 1888, Williauis v. Stevens Point Lumber Co., 72 Wis. 487; 1891, Scheufler v. Grnnd Lodge A. 0. U. W., 45 l\linn.
256; 1892, Roll v. St. Louis, etc., Smelting & M. Co., 52 Mo. App. 00; 1893,
Stewart Paper Mfg. Co. v. Rau, 92 Ga. 511, 17 S. E. 748; 1893, Meneer v. Detroit Mut. Benev. & P. Assn., 95 Mich. 451; 1898, Bisbop v. Kent & Stanley
Uo., ~o R. I. 680, 9 Am. & E. C. C. (N. 8.) 718.

A. H. R., 141 Mass. 496, 6 N. E. 745; 1888, Williams v. Stevens Point Lum-

ber Co., 72 Wis. 487; 1891, Scbeufler v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W., 45 Minn.

2.56; 1892, Roll v. St. Louis, etc., Smelting & M. Co., 52 Mo. App. 60; 18('3,

Stewart Paper Mfg. Co. v. Rau, 92 Ga. 511, 17 S. E. 748; 1893, Meneer v. De-

troit Mut. Benev. & P. Assn., 95 Mich. 451; 1898, Bishop v. Kent & Stanley

U>., 20 R. I. 680, 9 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 718.

Sec. 170.

(2) The associates.

Sec. 170.

(a) Among themselves.

FOSTER v. MOULTON.

( 2) The associates .

1886. In the Supreme Court of Minnesota. 35 Minn. Rep.

458-460.

(a) Among themselves.

Appeal by defendant, E. H. Moulton, from an order of the district

court for Blue Earth county, Severance, J., presiding, overruling his

FOSTER v. MOULTON.

separate demurrer to the complaint.

1886.

Berry, J. The complaint in this action sets out what purports to

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF MINNESOTA.

35 Minn. Rep.

458-46o.

be the articles of incorporation of a mutual benefit association, which
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appears to have been intended to be a sort of mutual insurance com-

Appeal by defendant, E. H. Moulton, from an order of the district
court for Blue Earth county, Severance, J., presiding, overruling his
separate demurrer to the complaint.
BERRY, J. The complaint in this action sets out what purports to
be the articles of incorporation of a mutual benefit association, '"'hich
appears to ha\'e been intended to be a SOit of mutual insurance company, and alleges that said articles were duly executed by defCndants,
and duly recorded with the register of deeds and secretary of state; that
one McCarthy became a member of the association, paid his dues and
received a certifi cate of membersh ip; that he sustained bodily injury,
entitling him, as such member, to pecuniary benefit; that the amount
<lue him under the terms of his membership has not been paid, and
that he has duly assigned his right to such benefit to the plaintiff.
The association did not comply with the statute so as to become an
insurance corporation de Jure. The appellant (one of the defendant ) contends that it was duly incorporated as a bene\'olent society
under Gen. Stat. 1878, ch. 34, title iii. This can not be so, for .it is
no more a benevolent society than any mutual insurance compimy. or
other mutual company, or imy partnership of which one member undertakes to do something for the pecuniary advantage of another
member in consideration of the undertaking of the latter to do a like
thing for him. The undertaking is not in any proper sense benevolen!,
but it is for a quid pro 9tto it paid for. People v. Nelson, 46 N . Y.
477. The association involved in the case at bar is, in substance. for
purposes of mutual insurance. State v. :M erchants' Exch. Mut.
Benev. Soc., 72 Mo. 146; State v. Benefit Assn. 6 Mo. App. 163;
Commonwealth v . Wetherbee, IOS Mass. 149; May Ins.,§ 550, a.
But notwithstanding it is not a corporation de Jure, we think it
must at least, as between its members, be regarded as a corporation
de facto. It is manifest t,hat the understanding between the members
and the basis upon which certificates of membership were issued was
that the association was a corporation in fact as it was in form. Morawetz Priv. Corp., § 139. It never could ltave been iuteuded or ez-

pany, and alleges that said articles were duly executed by defendants,

and duly recorded with the register of deeds and secretary of state; that

one McCarthy became a member of the association, paid his dues and

received a certificate of membership; that he sustained bodily injury,

entitling him, as such member, to pecuniary benefit; that the amount

due him under the terms of his membership has not been paid, and

that he has duly assigned his right to such benefit to the plaintiff.

The association did not comply with the statute so as to become an

insurance corporation de jure. The appellant (one of the defend-

ants) contends that it was duly incorporated as a benevolent society

under Gen. Stat. 1878, ch. 34, title iii. This can not be so, for it is

no more a benevolent society than any mutual insurance company, or

other mutual company, or any partnership of which one member un-

dertakes to do something for the pecuniary advantage of another

member in consideration of the undertaking of the latter to do a like

thing for him. The undertaking is not in any proper sense benevolent,

but it is for a quid f ro quo it paid for. People v. Nelson, 46 N. Y.

477. The association involved in the case at bar is, in substance, for

purposes of mutual insurance. .State v. Merchants' Exch. Mut.

Benev. Soc, 72 Mo. 146; State v. Benefit Assn. 6 Mo. App. 163;

Commonwealth v. Wetherbee, 105 Mass. 149; May Ins., § 550, a.

But notwithstanding it is not a corporation de jure, we think it

must at least, as between its members, be regarded as a corporation

de facto. It is manifest that the understanding between the members

and the basis upon which certificates of membership were issued was

that the association was a corporation in fact as it was in form. Mor-

awetz Priv. Corp., § 139. It ?iever could have been intended or ex-
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bected that the members of the association, whether original founders

§ 171

CORPORATIONS BY ESTOPPEL.

—members like defendants—or those who should become members by

joining at any time, should or would be liable as individuals, either

jointly or severally, to any particular member who should, by virtue of

and under the terms of his membership, become entitled to pecuniary

relief or benefit. On the contrary, the intention and the real contract

was that the association, as a corporation in the contemplation of the

parties, i, e., the members, should be liable, and the association only.

In such a state of facts, though the association is not a corporation

de jure, and perhaps not for every purpose a corporation de facto,

it is as between the members themselves to be treated as a corpora-

tion de facto (for that is the way in which the contract of the parties

treats it), and the right of a member to pecuniary benefit from the

/Jected that the members of the association, wlutlzer original founders
-members like defendants-or those who should become members by
joining at any time, should or would be liable as individuals, either
jointly or severally, to any particular member who slzould, by virtue oj
and 'ztnder tlze terms of kis members/zip, become entitled to pecuniary
relief or benefit. On the contrary, the intention and the real con/rad
was that the association, as a corporation in tlie contemplation of tlze
parties, i, e., tlze members, should be liable, and the association only.
In uch a state of facts, though the association is not ~· corporation
de Jure, and perhaps not for every purpose a corporation de facto,

association by virtue of his membership must stand upon the basis

that it is a corporation de facto. Being presumed to know the signifi-

cance of his membership, its rights and liabilities (Coles v. Iowa State

Mut. Ins. Co., iS Iowa 425), he is estopped to take any other posi-

tion. This is not only intrinsically just and fair, but it is in accord-

ance with the principles of the authorities. Morawetz Priv. Corp.,
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§§ 131, 132, 134-137; Buffalo & A. R. Co. v. Cary, 26 N. Y. 75,

followed in 57, 64, 67 N. Y., and 95 U. S.; White v. Ross, 4 Abb.

Dec. 589; Aspinwall v. Sacchi, 57 N. Y. 331; Eaton v. Aspinwall,

19 N. Y. 119; Sands v. Hill, 46 Barb. 651; Sanger v. Upton, 91

U. S. 56; Chubb v. Upton, 95 U. S. 665.

It is important to bear in mind that no fraud is alleged against de-

fendant; and, further, that this is a case in which a member of the

association is seeking relief by virtue of his membership. If the ac-

tion were between a purported or pretended corporation, which was

wholly unauthorized and invalid, and a stranger, different rules and

principles might, in some circumstances, be involved.

The application of the foregoing views is that, the action having

been brought against defendants as individuals merely, the general

demurrer of the appellant, who was one of the defendant members of

the association, was erroneously overruled. The overruling order is

accordingly reversed.

Note. See note to next case, infra, p. 649.

Sec. 171. Same.

(6) As to the corporation or its creditors.

I. Upon subscription liability.

CANFIELD v. GREGORY.1

1895. In the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. 66

Conn. Rep. 9-23.

Baldwin, J. * * ,* The plaintiff sues as trustee in insolvency of a

it is as bt:tween the members themselves to be treated as a corporation de facto (for that is the way in which the contract of the parties
treats it), and the right of a mel'.lber to pecuniary benefit from the
association by virtue of his membership must stand upon the basis
that it is a corporation de facto. Being presumed to know the significance of his membership, its rights and liabilities (Coles v. Iowa State
Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Iowa 425), he is estopped to take any other position. This is not only intrinsically just and fair, but it is in accordance with the principles of the authorities. Morawetz Priv. Corp.,
§§ 131, 132, 134-137; Buffalo & A. R. Co. Y. Cary, 26 N. Y. 75,
followed in 57, 64, 67 N. Y., and 95 U.S.; 'White v. Ross, 4 Abb.
Dec. 589; A pinwall v. Sacchi, 57 N. Y. 331; Eaton v. Aspinwall,
19 N. Y. I 19; Sands v. Hill, 46 Barh. 65 r; Sanger v. Upton, 91
U. S. 56; Chubb v. Upton, 95 U. S. 665.
It is important to bear in mind that no fraud is alleged against defendant; and, further, that this is a case in which a member of the
association is seeking relief by virtue of his membership. If the action were between a purported or pretended corporation , which was
wholly unauthorized and im·alid, and a stranger, different rnles and
principles might, in some circumstances, be involve<l.
The application of the foregoing views is that, the action having
been brought against defendants as individuals merely, the general
demurrer of the appellant, who was one of the defendant members of
the association, \:o;as erroneously overrnled. The overruling order is
accordingly reversed.
Note. See note to next case, infra, p. 64\J.

joint-stock corporation, upon an assessment which it has called in upon

1 Only part of the opinion is given.

Sec. 171. Same.
(b) As to the corporation or its creditors.
Upon subscription liability.

1.

CANFIELD v. GREGORY.1

1895.

IN

THR SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT.

66

Conn. Rep. 9-23.
BALDWIN, J. • •: The plaintiff sues as trnstee in insolvency of a
joint-stock corporation, upon an assessment which it has called in upon
1 Only part of the opinion is given.
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the defendant's stock, and the only answer is nultie/ corporation. The

§ I 7I
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second reply is that, however this may be, the defendant is estopped

from making such a defense, because the debts, whose existence have

made the company insolvent, are due to creditors who trusted it as a

the defendant's stock, and the only answer is nu! tie! corporati'on. The
second reply is that, however this may be, the defendant is estopped
from making such a defense, because the debts, whose existence have
made the company insolvent, are due to creditors who trusted it as a
corporation, because they were led to believe that it was such by the
acts of the defendant, in promoting its organization, publishing its articles of association, acting as a director and as its president, and contracting in its name and behalf these very liabilities.
It is claimed that these avennents were not sufficient, because no
bad faith, willful \\ rong or gross carel1essness is charged. No such
charges were necessary. The plaintiff represents the rights of the
creditors of an insolvent company, who contracted with it as being a
corporation. Vlhatever rights they formerly had against those who
were its mem hers he now has. They were led to believe in the existence of such a corporation by the acts of the defendant, as a promoter, stockholder, director and president of the company, which are
set out in the reply. It was natural that such acts should induce that
belief. He had means of knowledge as to the manner in which
the company was organized which were not possessed by the public
in general. Had he in fact known that its organization was so defective that the corporation, in whose name he was contracting, had
no existence, or was incapable of transacting business, his acts would
have been no more prejudicial to the other contracting parties. It is
not his intent, so much as the result of his conduct, which determines
his liability.
The modem estoppel in pais is of equitable origin, though of equal
application in courts of law. It is much more than a rule of evidence.
It establishes rights; it determines remedies. An equitable estoppel
does not so much shut out the truth as !let in the truth, and the whole
truth. Its office is not to support some strict rule of 1aw, but to show
what equity and good conscience require, under the particular circumstances of the case, irrespecth·e of what might otherwise be the legal
rights of the parties. The key to its application is not infrequently
to be found in the rule that in matters of trust and confidence, when
one of two innocent persons must suffer, in consequence of the acts
of one of them, the loss must generally be borne by him 'vvho thus occasioned it. Horn v. Cole, 51 N. H. 287, 12 Am. Rep. I I I ; Stevens
v. Dennett, ibid. 324, 330; 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris., § 802.
This rule clearly governs the case at bar. It is true that it does not
extend to acts or representations not naturally calculated to mislead,
and on which others had no right to rely. Danforth v. Adams, 29
Conn. 107. But those of the defendant were addressed to the public
and to the parties injured. They came from one who was in a position to know what he affirmed. They gained credit to an organization
in which he was interested. The company was a d e facto corporation. Its credi~ors, who contracted "·ith it as a corporation. could not
hold the individuals who had :issociated to form~ person:tlly liable as
co-partners , for with them no contract had been made . 2 l\1orawetz
on Private Corporations, § 748. The defendant was thus shielded from

corporation, because they were led to believe that it was such by the

acts of the defendant, in promoting its organization, publishing its ar-

ticles of association, acting as a director and as its president, and con-

tracting jn its name and behalf these very liabilities.

It is claimed that these averments were not sufficient, because no

bad faith, willful wrong or gross carelessness is charged. No such

charges were necessary. The plaintiff represents the rights of the

creditors of an insolvent company, who contracted with it as being a

corporation. Whatever rights they formerly had against those who

were its members he now has. They were led to believe in the ex-

1

istence of such a corporation by the acts of the defendant, as a pro-

moter, stockholder, director and president of the company, which are

set out in the reply. It was natural that such acts should induce that

belief. He had means of knowledge as to the manner in which

the company was organized which were not possessed by the public

in general. Had he in fact known that its organization was so de-
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fective that the corporation, in whose name he was contracting, had

no existence, or was incapable of transacting business, his acts would

have been no more prejudicial to the other contracting parties. It is

not his intent, so much as the result of his conduct, which determines

his liability.

The modern estoppel in pais is of equitable origin, though of equal

application in courts of law. It is much more than a rule of evidence.

It establishes rights; it determines remedies. An equitable estoppel

does not so much shut out the truth as let in the truth, and the whole

truth. Its office is not to support some strict rule of law, but to show

what equity and good conscience require, under the particular circum-

stances of the case, irrespective of what might otherwise be the legal

rights of the parties. The key to its application is not infrequently

to be found in the rule that in matters of trust and confidence, when

one of two innocent persons must suffer, in consequence of the acts

of one of them, the loss must generally be borne by him who thus oc-

casioned it. Horn v. Cole, 51 N. H. 287, 12 Am. Rep. 111 ; Stevens

v. Dennett, ibid. 324, 330; 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris., § 802.

This rule clearly governs the case at bar. It is true that it does not

extend to acts or representations not naturally calculated to mislead,

and on which others had no right to rely. Danforth v. Adams, 29

Conn. 107. But those of the defendant were addressed to the public

and to the parties injured. They came from one who was in a posi-

tion to know what he affirmed. They gained credit to an organization

in which he was interested. The company was a dc facto corpora-

tion. Its creditors, who contracted with it as a corporation, could not

hold the individuals who had associated to form it personally liable as

co-partners, for with them no contract had been made. 2 Morawetz

on Private Corporations, § 748. The defendant was thus shielded from
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partnership liability by his representations as to its corporate charac-

§ 171

CORPORATIONS BY ESTOPPEL.

ter, and on these representations those with whom he dealt as one of

its officers had a right to rely. Northrop v. Bushnell, 38 Conn. 498,

511; West Winsted Savings Bank v. Ford, 27 Conn. 282, 289. * * *

It was not in dispute between the parties to this cause that the

articles of association and organization certificate were sufficient in

form, and that they were duly published and filed for record. The

only issue tendered by the answer was upon the allegation that there

was not and never had been any such corporation as that of which the

plaintiff claimed to be a trustee, but the estoppel set up in the reply had

a broader reach, and was invoked to preclude the defendant from deny-

ing that the corporation ever existed, and that it was capable of con-

tracting debts and making calls on stock subscriptions.

As the case was tried in the court below in this broader aspect, and

as if turning on the right of the defendant to rely on the falsity of ma-

terial statements in the organization certificate, we have treated it

from the same point of view, although it may be that, in strictness,

the answer was disproved by the admitted facts, which went to show

that a corporation was organized, although it never became legally
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competent to commence business. If this be so, the plaintiff would

no less have been entitled to a verdict on the issues closed.

There is no error in the judgment appealed from.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

Note. 1. As,to subscription liability. 1819, Chester Glass Co. v. Dewey, 16

Mass. 94, 8 Am. Dec. 128; 1850, Oswego & S. P. R. Co. v. Rust, 5 How. Pr.

(N. Y.) 390; 1856, Eaton v. Aepinwall, 13 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 184; 1857, Stoops

v. Greensburgh P. R. Co., 10 Intl. 47; 1859, Rice v. Rock Island & A. R. Co.,

21 111. 93; 1862, Buffalo & A. R. Co. v. Cary, 26 N. Y. 75; 1873, Mont-

partnership liability by his representations as to its corporate character, and on these representations those with whom he dealt as one of
its officers had a right to rely. Northrop v. Bushnell, 38 Conn. 498.
511 ; West \i\Tinsted Savings Bank v. Ford, 27 Conn. 282, 289. • • •
It was not in dispute between the parties to this cause that the
articles of association and organization certificate w ere sufficient in
form, and that they were duly publi shed and filed for record . The
only iss ue tendered by the answer was upon the allegation that there
was not and never had been any such corporation as that of which the
plaintiff claimed to be a trustee, but the estoppel set up in the reply had
a broader reach, and was inYoked to preclude the defendant from denying that the corporation ever existed, and that it was capable of contracting debts and making calls on s tock subscriptions.
As the case was tried in the court below in this broader aspect, and
as if turning on the right of the defendant to rely on the falsity of material statements in the organization certificate, we have treated it
from the same point of view, although it may be that, in st,ictness,
the answer was disproved by the admitted facts, which went to show
that a corporation was organized, although it neve r became legally
competent to commence business. If this be so, the plaintiff would
no less have been entitled to a verdict on fbe issues closed.
There is no error in the judgment appealed from.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

pelier & W. R. Co. v. Langdon, 46 Vt. 284; 1873, Upton v. Hansbrough,

3 Bisg. 417, Fed. Cas. 16,801; 1874, Ossipee Hosiery & W. Mfg. Co. v. Canney,

54 N. H. 295; 1875, Parker v. North Cent. M. R.Co.. 33 Mich. 23; 1877, Bade

v. Calvert Ed. Soc, 47 Md. 117; 1878, Dows v. Naper, 91 111. 44; 1880, Home

Ins. Co. v. Sherwood, 72 Mo. 461; 1885, Thompson v. Reno Sav. Bank, 19

Nev. 103, 3 Am. St. Rep. 797, with note, p. 806; 1888, Aultman v. Waddle, 40

Kan. 195, 19 Pao. Rep. 730; 1890, National Com. Bank v. McDonnell, 92 Ala.

387; 1894, American Homestead Co. v. Linigan,4fi La. Ann. Ills, 15 So. Rep.

369; 1893, Building & L. Assn. v. Chamberlain, 4 80. Dak. 271,56 N. W. Rep.

897; 1895, Greenbrier Tndus. Ex. v. Squires, 40 W. Va. 307, 52 Am. St. Rep.

884; 1898, In re Davis Estate v. Watkins, 56 Neb. 288, 76 N. W. Rep. 575.

2. But preliminary subscriptions to the stock of a corporation to be formed are

presumed to be made with the understanding that a de jure corporation will

be formed, and hence if there is no other ground of estoppel than the mere

subscription, the subscriber is not estopped from denying that th^re is a valid

corporation. 1874, Indianapolis F. & M. Co. v. Herkimer, 40 Ind. 142; 1879,

Rickhoff v. Brown's R. S. S. M. Co.,68 Ind. 388; 1.S94, Capps v. Hastings Pros.

Co., 40 Neb. 470, 42 Am. St. Rep. 677, 24 L. R. A. 259, 58 N. W. Rep. 956,

supra, p. 239. But see Dorris v. French, 4 Hun (N. Y.) 292 (1875).

3. What acts will raise an estoppel.

(a) Payments on calls estop: 18G4, Ohio, etc., It. v. McPherson, 35 Mr>.

13, 86 Am. Dec. 128; 1866, Boggs v. Olcott, 40Til. 303; 1879, Rickhoff v. Ma-

chine Co.. 68 Tnd. 388; 1880, Mnserave v. Morrison. 54 Md. 161; 1886, Bell's

Appeal, 115 Pa. St. 88, 2 Am. St. Rep. 532; 1891, Minnesota Gaslight Ec. Co.

v. Denslow. 46 Minn. 171, 48 N. W. Rep. 771 ; 1895, Greenbrier Indus. Ex. v.

Squires, 40 W. Va. 307. 52 Am. <■"' "»». 884.

Note. 1. As. to subscription liability. 1819, Chester Glass Co. v. Dewey, 16
Mass. 94, 8 Am. Dec. 128; 1850, Oswego & S. P.R. Co. v. Rust, 5 How. Pr.
(N. Y.) 390 ; 1856, Eaton v. Aspinwall, 13 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 184; 1857, Stoops
v. Greensburgh P . R. Co., 10 Ind . 47; 1859, Rice v . Rock Island & A. R. Co.,
21 Ill. 93; 1862, Buffalo & A. R. Co. v . Cary, 26 N. Y. 75; 1873, Montpelier & W . R. Co. v. Langdon, 46 Vt. 284; 1873, Upton v. Hansbrough,
3 Biss. 417, ~Fed. Cas. 16,801; 1874, Ossipee Hosiery & W. ~fg. Co. v. Cannt;y,
54 ~ . H. 29a; 1875, Parker v. North Ce nt. M. R. Co., 33 Mich. 23; 1877, Baile
v. Calvert Ed. Soc., 47 Md. 117; 1878, Dows v. Naper, 91 lll . 44; 1880, Home
Ina. Co. v. Sherwood, 72 Mo. 461; 1885, Thompson v. Reno Sav. Bank, 19
Nev. 103, 3 Am. St. Rep. 797, with note, p. 806; 1888, Aultman v. Waddle, 40
Kan. 195, 19 Pac. Rep. 730; 1890, National Com. Bank v. McDonnell, 92 Ala.
387; 1894, American Homestead Co. v. Linigan, 46 La. Ann. 111 8, 15 So. Rep.
369; 1893, Building & L. Assn. v. Chamberlain, 4 So . Dak. 271,56 N. W. R ep.
897; 1895, Greenbrier Indus. Ex. v. Rquires, 40 \V. Va. 307, 52 Am. St. Rep.
884; 1898, In re Davis Ei;tate v. W atkins, 56 JI' eb. 288, 76 N. W. Rep. 575.
2. But preliminary subllcriptions to the stock of a corporation to be formed are
presumed to he made with the und erst1rnding thnt a de jure corporati on will
be formed, and hence if there is no oth~r grouud of estoppel than the mere
subscription, the subscriber is not estopped from denying that thPre is a valid
corporation. 1874, Indian apolis F. & "M. Co. v. Herkimer, 46 In<l. J.1 2; 1879,
Rickhotl v. Brown's R. S.S. M. Co., 68 In<l . 388; 1894, Capps v. Hast.ings Pros.
Co., 40 Neb. 470, 42 Am. St. Rep. 677, 24 L. R. A. 259, 58 N. W. Rep. 956,
aupra, p. 239. But see Dorris v. French, 4 Huu (N. Y.) i92 (1875).
3. What acts will raise an estoppel.
'
( a) Payments on calls estop: 1864, Ohio, etc. , R. v. McPherson, 35 Mo.
13. 86 Am. Dec. 128; 1861\, Bo!?gS v. Olcott, 40 Tll. 303; 1879, Rick ho ff v. Machine Co., 68 Tnd . 388; 1880, '.\lusgornve v. Morrison, M Mr!. 161; 1886, Bell's
Appeal, 115 Pa. St. 88, 2 Am. Rt. R<>p . .'132; 1891. Minnesota GaA ligh t. Ee. Co.
v. Denslow, 46 Minn. 171, 48 "N. W . Rep. i71; 1895, Greenbrier Indus. Ex. v.
Squires, 40 W. Va. 307. 5!! Am . <.·. P" " · R84.
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16) Voting at meetings estops: 1864, Railroad Company v. Bowser, 48 Pa.

St. 29; 1890, Association v. Walker, 83 Mich. 386; 1895, Greenbrier Indus.

1b1 Voting at meetings estops: 1864, Railroad Company v. Bowser, 48 Pa.
Rt. 29; 1890, Assoeiation v. Walker, 83 Mich. 386; 1895, Greenbrier Indus.
Ex. v. 8qnirefl, 40 \V. Va. 307.
( c) Attending and partici paling in organization me1•tin~. or acquiescing in
corporate aets, and reeeiving benPtits t>stop: 1824, Rockville & W. T. R. C-0.
v.VanNeRs,2Crancll(U. C. 4·Hl, Fed.Cas.11,986; 1849,South Bayl'II. D.
Co. v. Gray, 30 Maine 547; lS.10, Bridge Co. v. Chapin, 6 Cush. I !\lass.) 50, on
53; 1858, Haynes v. Brown, 36 N. H. 545; 1888, Schloss v. Trade Co.,87 Ala.
411, on 414, 13 Am: St. Rep. 01; 1894, Ogden Clay Co. v. Harvey, 9 Utah
497, 35 Pac. Rep. 510; 1895, Greenbrier Indus. Ex. v. Squires, 40 W. Va.

Ex. v. Squires, 40 VV. Va. 307.

(c) Attending and participating in organization meeting, or acquiescing in

corporate acts, and receiving benefits estop: 1824, Roekville & W. T. R.Co.

v. Van Ness, 2 Crancb (C. 0. 449, Fed. Cas. 11,986; 1849, South Bay M. D.

Co. v. Gray, 30 Maine 547; 1850, Bridge Co. v. Chapin, 6 Cush. 1 Mass.) 50, on

63; 1858, Haynes v. Brown, 36 N. H. 545; 1888, Scldosa v. Trade Co., 87 Ala.

411, on 414, 13 Am. St. Rep. 51; 1894, Ogden Clay Co. v. Harvev, 9 Utah

497, 35 Pac. Rep. 510; 1895, Greenbrier Indus. Ex. v. Squires, 40 W. Va.

307.

307.
(d) Accepting office from corporation. See note below, onderCnrtis, En.,

{d) Accepting office from corporation. See note below, under Curtis, Ext.,

v. Tracy, infra, p. 650.

v. Tracy, iiifra, p. 650.

Sec. 172. Same.

2. Upon statutory liability.

Sec. 172. Same.

McCarthy v. lavasche.

1878. S9 111. 270, 31 Am. Rep. 83, supra,,253.

Note. To same effect, see, 1859, Eaton v. Aspinwall, 19 N. Y. 119; 1871.

2.

Upon statutory liability.

Sloeum v. Providence Steam & Gas R. Co., 10 R. I. 112, 116; 1872, Pevchand
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v. Lane, 24 La. Ann. 404; 1873, Upton v. Hansbrough, 3 Biss. 417, Fed. Cas.

McCARTHY v. LAVASCHE.

1(5,801; 1876, Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673; 1883, Keyser v. Hitz, 2 Mackev

(D. C.) 473; 1886, Bell's Appeal, 115 Pa. St. 88, 8 Atl. 177. As to what acts

1878.

will raise an estoppel, see supra, note, § 171.

89 Ill. 270, 31 Am. Rep. 83, supra, ,253.

Sec, 173.

Note. To same effect, see, 1859, Eaton Y. Aspinwall, 19 N. Y. 119; !Sil,
Slocum v. Providence Steam & Gas R. Co., 10 R. I. 112, 116; 1872, Peychnnd
v. Lane, 24 La. Ann. 404; 1873, Upton v. Hansbrough, 3 Biss. 417, Fed. Cas.
16,801; 1876, Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673; 1883, Keyser v. Hitz, 2 Mackey
(D. C. l 473; 1886, Bell's Appeal, 115 Pa. St. 88, 8 Atl. 177. As to what acts
will raise an estoppel, see supra, note,§ 171.

(3) The promoters and officers of the apparent corporation.

CURTIS, Exr., v. TRACY, Et Al.1

1897. In the Supreme Court of Illinois. 169 111. Rep. 233-238.

Affirming same case, 62 111. App. 49.

Mr. Justice Magruder delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action brought to the July term, 1895, of the superior

court of Cook county, against appellees, seeking to hold them liable

Sec. 173.

as partners upon four promissory notes, executed by the Central Illi-

nois Coal Company, all dated April 16, 1884, amounting altogether

to $20,000. * » «

( 3)

The contention of the plaintiff, arising upon exceptions to the ad-

The promoters and officers of the apparent corporation.

mission of evidence and upon the refusal of propositions of law sub-

CURTIS, Exa., v. TRACY, ET AL. 1

mitted to the court, is, that, as the notes sued upon were made in the

name of the corporation on April 16, 1884, and the certificate of or-

1897. IN

ganization was not recorded until June 5, 1885, the defendants, as

directors, assumed to exercise corporate powers without complying

THE

SUPREME CouRT OF ILLINOIS. I69 Ill. Rep. 233-238.
Affirming same case, 62 Ill. App. 49·

with the provisions of the incorporation act, and are, therefore, liable

MR. JUSTICE MAGRUDER de livered the opinion of the court:
This is an a ction brought to the July term, 1895, of the superior
court of Cook county, against appellees, seeking to hold them liable
as partners upon four promissory notes, executed by the Central Illinois Coal Company, all dated April 16, 1884, amounting altogether
to $zo,ooo. • • •
The contention of the plaintiff. arising upon exceptions to the admission of evidence and upon the refusal of propositions of law submitted to the court, is, that, as the notes sued upon were made in the
name of the corporation on April 16, 1884, ancl the certificate pf organization was not recorded until June 5, 1885, the defendants, as
directors, assum ed to exercise corporate powers without complying
with th e provisions of the incorporation act, and are, therefore, liable

1 Statement of facts much abridged.

1
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to pay the notes as partners under sections 4 and 18 of that act. (1

§ 173

CORPORATIONS BY ESTOPPEL.

Starr & Cur. Stat. 610, 617).

We have recently considered the liability of officers and directors of

a corporation, under said sections 4 and iS, to creditors who are third

persons. (Loverinv. McLaughlin, 161 111. 417.) In the Loverin case

a distinction was said to exist between cases where a stockholder is a

party to the suit, and cases where the contest is between third persons

and the officers or directors assuming to exercise corporate powers. In

the case at bar, C. H. Curtis, plaintiff's testator, was a stockholder

in the company at or near the time when he became the owner of the

notes sued upon, and not only so, but he was elected as a director of

the company and transacted business for the company as such director

before the certificate of organization was recorded as required by sec-

tion 4. While acting as a director of the company, he accepted 400

shares of the capital stock as security for the very debt here sought to

be recovered. It is true that the notes were not made while he was

director, but after he became director he recognized the debt as an

obligation of the corporation by taking part in proceedings by the

board of directors by which the debt was further secured. Being al-
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ready a stockholder and director he accepted additional certificates of

stock, issued to him as security for these notes. This was done on

October 22, 1884, and the certificate of organization was not recorded

until June 5, 1885. It was as much his duty to see to it that the cer-

tificate was recorded as it was the duty of the original board of direc-

tors, elected by the first meeting of the subscribers. (Bushnell v.

Consolidated Ice Machine Co., 138 III. 67.) By acting with the

other directors in the meeting of October 22, 1884, he assumed to exer-

cise corporate functions before that provision of the act, which required

the certificate to be recorded, had been complied with. He is estopped

by his conduct from seeking to enforce the liability provided for in

section 18 against the defendants. He can not enforce against others

a penalty which he has himself incurred by his own conduct.

It is well settled that a stockholder can not defend against a liability

which rests upon him for the benefit of corporate creditors, upon the

ground that the corporation was not legally organized by reason of

non-compliance with the terms of the statute providing for such an in-

corporation. (Hickling v. Wilson, 104 111. 54.) He is estopped by

the act of subscribing for the stock from setting up such defense.

Upon principle there can be no difference between such a case and a

case where a stockholder, who is also a director, seeks to enforce a

claim resting for its validity upon the fact that the corporation in

which he is such stockholder and director was not organized in accord-

ance with the statute. Where a man has acted as a director of a cor-

poration and participated in the management of its affairs, and at-

tended its business meetings and voted upon questions affecting its

interests, before the certificate of its organisation has been recorded as

required by law, he should be estopped from enforcing against others a

liability based exclusively upon their failure to record the same certificate

which he failed to have recorded.

to pay the notes as partners under sections 4 and 18 of that act. ( 1
Starr & Cur. Stat. 610, 617).
We have recently considered the liability of officers and directors of
a corporation, under said sections 4 and 18, to creditors who are third
persons. (Loverin v. McLaughlin, 161 Ill. 417.) In the Loverin case
a distinction was said to exist between cases where a stockholder is a
party to the suit, and cases where the contest is between third persons
an<l the officers or directors assuming to exercise corporate powers. In
the case at bar, C.H. Curtis, plaintiff's testator, was a stockholder
in the company at or near the time when he became the owner of the
notes sued upon, and not only so, but he was elected as a director of
the company and transacted business for the company as such director
before the certificate of organization was recorded as required by section 4. While acting as a director of the company, he accepted 400
shares of the capital stock as security for the very debt here sought to
be recovered. It is true that the notes were not made while he was
director, but after he became director he recognized the debt as an
obligation of the corporation by taking part in proceedings by the
board of directors by which the debt was further secured. Being already a stockholder and director he accepted additional ce1tificates of
stock, issued to him as security for these notes. This was done on
October 22, 1884, and the certificate of organization was not recorded
until June 5, 1885. It was as much his duty to see to it that the certificate was recorded as it was the duty of the original board of directors, elected hy the first meeting of the subscribers. (Bush!Jell v.
Consolidated ~ce Machine Co., 138 Ill. 67.) By acting with the
other directors in the meeting of October 22, 1884, he assumed to exercise corporate functions before that provision of the act, which required
the certificate to be recorded, had been complied with. He is estopped
by his conduct from seeking to enforce the liability provided for in
section 18 against the defendants. He can not enforce against others
a penalty which he .has himself incurred by his own conduct.
It is well settled that a stockholder can not defend against a liability
which rests upon him for the benefit of corporate creditors, upon the
ground that the corporation was not legally organized by reason of
non-compliance with the terms of the statute providing for such an incorporation. (Hickling v. Wilson, 104 Ill. 54.) He is estopped by
the act of subscribing for the stock from setting up such defense.
Upon principle there can be no difference between such a case and a
case where a stockholder, who is also a director, seeks to enforce a
claim resting for its validity upon the fact that the corporation in·
which he is such stockholder and director was not organized in accordance with the statute. Where a man has acted as a director ef a corporation and participated in the management ef its affairs, and attended its business meetings and voted upon questions affecti11g its
interests. before the certificate ef its org anizal£on has been recorded as
required by law, he should be estopped .from e11/orci11g against others a
liability based exclusi11ely upon their.failure to record the same certificate
which lie .failed to have recorded.
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Under the facts as herein recited, we think that the judgments of

the superior court of Cook county and of the appellate court were cor-

rect. Those judgments are accordingly affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Note. See, 1828, All Saints Church v. Lovett, 1 Hall (N. Y.) 191; 1843,

Selina & T. R. R. v. Tipton, 5 Ala. 787, 39 Am. Dec 344; 1853, Daubury & N.

R. Co. v. Wilson, 22 Conn. 435; 1858, Hayes v. Brown, 36 N. H. 545; 1867,

Mason v. Nichols, 22 Wis. 3713; 1870, Ramsey v. Peoria M. & F. Ins. Co., 55

111. 311; 1871, Parrott v. Byers, 40 Cal. 614; 1876, Phoenix W. Co. v. Badger,

(17 N. Y. 294; 1882, Close v. Glcnwood Cemetery, 107 U. S.466; 1885, Thomp-

son v. Reno Sav. Bank, 19 Nev. 103,3 Am. St. Rep. 797, and note; 1888,

Marshall Foundry Co. v. Killian, 99 N. C. 501. 6 Am. St. Rep. 539; 1888,

Weinman v. Wilkinsbnrg & E. L. Pass. Rv., 118 Pa. St. 192, 12 Atl. Rep. 288;

1889, Corey v. Morrill, 61 Vt. 598; 1890, Bates v. Wilson, 14 Colo. 140, 24 Pac.

Rep. 99; 1894, State Bank Building Co. v. Pierce, 92 Iowa 668,61 N. W.

Rep. 426.

Sec. 174.

(4) Dealers with knowledge of claim of corporate capacity.

(a) Who seek to evade liability to the apparent corporation.
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WEST WINSTED SAVINGS BANK and BUILDING ASSOCIATION

v. FORD.1

1858. 'In the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. 27

Conn. Rep. *282-29i.

Ellsworth, J. It appears in March, 1852, the respondent, with

twenty-five others, took measures to form a corporation in West Win-

sted, under the act of 1850 authorizing the establishment of savings

and building associations. The corporators prepared and signed the

articles of association, and caused a copy to be left with the clerk of

the town, in all respects complete except that the names of the corpo-

rators were not appended. They commenced and ever since have

continued to prosecute their business (somewhat extensively) under

their corporate name, "The West Winsted Savings Bank and Building

Association." In July, 1S54, the respondent applied to and received

from the company a loan of $1,000, from which a bonus of 2S per

cent, was deducted, leaving the amount actually received $720. For

this loan of $1,000 he executed his note to the company, and agreed

to secure it by good and perfect deed of land described in the peti-

tioners' bill. It is found that he did execute and deliver to them a

deed as agreed, except that one of the witnesses to it was a member of

the company, and therefore, not a good witness, as this court has re-

cently decided. In consequence of this the deed is not good, and the

debt is not secured. The company have now brought their bill to ob-

tain a good and perfect deed. All the facts stated in the bill are

'Statement of facts, except as given in the opinion, and arguments omitted.
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found to be true except what is said about the corporators having
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signed the copy of the articles left with the town clerk. Our advice

is asked as to the company's right to demand and have such deed, to-

gether with a decree of foreclosure; and whether the bonus is legal,

and may be enforced, or should be rejected, in ascertaining the sum

which is now due on the note.

We think the company are entitled to the relief they ask for,

including in the debt the bonus of twenty-eight per cent.

It is objected to any decree in favor of the petitioners, that they are

not a body corporate as they have alleged, and can not bring suit, in-

asmuch as the corporators did not comply with the fifth section of

the act, which says a copy of the articles shall first be left with the

town clerk.

On the one hand it is claimed that the statute requires that a copy

shall be left and nothing more, and that the court has no power or

right to superadd any other prerequisite; on the other hand, it is

claimed that the paper is not a copy without the names of the stock-

holders which are appended to the original. We have not thought it

important to examine or decide this point, because we are all satis-

case.
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fied for several reasons that no such objection ought to prevail in this

In the first place, the objection to the existence of a corporation

plaintiff can not be raised upon the general issue. It is preliminary

in its character, like all objections to the person or character in which

a plaintiff sues, and should be pleaded in an earlier stage of the

cause. The existence of a corporation and its capacity to sue are ad-

mitted by a plea to the merits. The authorities on this point are

very numerous. Phoenix Bank of N. Y. v. Curtis, 14 Conn. 437;

Champlin v. Tilley, 3 Day 303; Sutton v. Cole, 3 Pick. 232, 245;

Penobscot Boom Corporation v. Lampson, 16 Maine 224; Bank of

Manchester v. Allen, 11 Verm. 302; School District v. Blaisdell, 6

N. H. 197; Bank of Utica v. Smally, 2 Cow. 770.

In the second place, the respondent is estopped by matter in pais.

We have seldom met with a case to which this kind of equitable

estoppel is more properly applicable than the present. In 1852 the

respondent, with others, united and formed this association, and pro-

claimed themselves a corporation under the act of 1850. They

unitedly took what were supposed to be the necessary measures to

perfect their organization according to law, and if it has not been ex-

actly done, the omission was through their mutual mistake and mis-

apprehension. They intended that it should be considered as done,

and so we must now treat them, not only as possessing a corporate

existence, but as having a corporate existence under the statute, and

having, as to and among themselves certainly, the attributes of such a

corporation. The respondent has influenced persons to become mem-

bers of the company, some by subscribing and some by purchasing

from those who have subscribed, and to deposit their moneys and

form contracts with the company as duly incorporated and qualified

to act as a corporation under the provisions of the statute. Besides,

found to be true except what is said about the corporators having
signed the copy of the articles left with the town clerk. Our advice
is asked as to the company's right to demand and have such deed , together with a decree of foreclosure; and whether the bonus is legal,
and may be enforced, or should be rejected, in ascertaining the sum
which is now due on the note .
·
We think the company are entitled to the relief they ask for,
including in the debt the bonus of twenty-eight per cent.
It is objected to any decree in favor of the petitioners, that they are
not a body corporate as they have alleged, and can not bring suit, inasmuch as the corporators did not comply with the fifth section of
the act, which says a copy of the articles shall first be left with the
town clerk.
On the one hand it is claimed that the statute requires that a copy
shall be left and nothing more, and that the court has no power or
right to superadd any other prerequisite; on the other hand, it is
claimed that the paper is not a copy without the names of the stockholders which are appended to the original. We have not thought it
important to examine or decide this point, because we are all satisfied for several reasons that no s_uch objection ought to prevail in this
case.
In the first place, the objection to the existence of a corporation
plaintiff can not be raised upon the general issue. It is preliminary
in its character, like all objections to the person or character in which
a plaintiff sues, and should be pleaded in an earlier stage of the
cause. The existence of a corporation and its capacity to sue are admitted by a plea to the merits. The authorities on this point are
very numerous. Phrenix Bank of N. Y. v. Curtis, 14 Conn. 437;
Champlin v. Tilley, 3 Day 303; Sutton v. C ole, 3 Pick. 232, 245;
Penobscot Boom Corporation v. Lampson, r6 Maine 224; Bank of
Manchester v. Allen, r 1 Verm. 302; School Di strict v. Blaisdell, 6
N. H. 197; Bank of Utica v. Smally, 2 Cow. 770.
In the second place, the respondent is estopped by m atter z'n paz's.
We have seldom met with a case to which this kind of equitable
estoppel is more properly applicable than the present. In r852 the
respondent, with others, united and formed this association, and proclaimed themselves a corporation under the act of 1850. They
unitedly took what were supposed to be the necessary measures to
perfect their organization according to law, and if it has not been exactly done, the omission was through their mutual mistake and misapprehension. They intended that it should be considered as done,
and so we must now treat them, not only as possessing a corporate
existence, but as having a corporate existence under the statute, and
having, as to and among th emselves certainly, the attributes of such a
corporation. The respondent has influenced persons to become mem bers of the company, some by subscribi ng and some by purchasing
from those who have subscribed, and to deposit their moneys and
form contracts with the company as duly incorporated and qualified
to act as a corporation under the provisions of the statute. Besides,
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the company has, during all this time, with the concurrence and co-
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operation of the respondent, been carrying on business as a corpora-

-
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tion, admitting new members, choosing officers and agents, borrowing

the company has, during all this time, with the concurrence and cooperation of the respondent, been carrying on business as a corporation, admitting new members, choosing officers and agents, borrowing
and loaning money, receiving money on deposit and tbe like, until the
rights and duties of the corporators and the corporation have become
exceedingly multiplied and important, and, which ought to be conclusive upon the respondent, he has borrowed this very money and
given his note and deed for it to the company by its corporate name.
It would be a reproach to the law if, after this, he can be allowed to
call in question the existence of the corporation or its capacity to loan
the money. Of what particular importance was the leaving a copy
of the articles of association to the members of the company? How
did the omission affect or injure them? Their relations between themselves or with the company did not grow out of that circumstance, and
we can not allow it to have any effect on these parties, however it may
be as to the right of the government to complain, if it see fit, and prosecute the company by a writ of quo warranto.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is of so common application
here and elsewhere at this day, and has been so often discussed, and
shown to be founded in such 9bvious. propriety and necessity, that we
need not spend time in discussing it, and it will be sufficient if we
merely state the general principles pertaining to it. At the common
law estoppels arc founded on deeds and records of court, but estopples in equity art: estopples in pat's. The doctrine of this kind of
estoppels was at first administered as a branch of equity jurisprudence,
but is now incorporated into the law. The rule with regard to common law estoppels is a precise and technical one, though supposed to
be founded in principles of truth and justice, such as the statement
of material facts in specialties or as found by verdicts or judgments
upon trials in courts of record. The common law rule is obviously
too narrow and inadequate for the attainment of equity in the multiplied transactions of modem times, and hence the equitable estoppel
of the present day.
Estoppel t'n pais is founded in the obligation which eyery man is under to speak and act according to the truth of the case, and in the
policy of the law to prevent the great mischiefs resulting from uncertainty, confusion and want of confidence in the intercourse of men , if
they were permitted to deny that which they have deliberately and
solemnly asserted and received as true. But the mere acts, statements, or admissions of a party when not performed or made under
seal or of record, or in some of those acts to wh.ich peculiar authority
is attached by law, were not at common law considered as estoppels,
and had no other weight than that of evidence, more or less important, hut which might be explained or rebutted. By the recent decisions of the courts in this country and in England , a much wider
scope is given to the doctrine of estoppels in pais, and it is now held
and established, that wherever an act is done or a settlement made by
a party which can not be contravened or contradicted without fraud,
or gross misconduct, which is akin to it, on his part, an injury to oth-

and loaning money, receiving money on deposit and the like, until the

rights and duties of the corporators and the corporation have become

exceedingly multiplied and important, and, which ought to be con-

clusive upon the respondent, he has borrowed this very money and

given his note and deed for it to the company by its corporate name.

It would be a reproach to the law if, after this, he can be allowed to

call in question the existence of the corporation or its capacity to loan

the money. Of what particular importance was the leaving a copy

of the articles of association to the members of the company? How

did the omission affect or injure them? Their relations between them-

selves or with the company did not grow out of that circumstance, and

we can not allow it to have any effect on these parties, however it may

be as to the right of the government to complain, if it see fit, and pros-

ecute the company by a writ of quo -warranto.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel is of so common application

here and elsewhere at this day, and has been so often discussed, and
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shown to be founded in such obvious- propriety and necessity, that we

need not spend time in discussing it, and it will be sufficient if we

merely state the general principles pertaining to it. At the common

law estoppels are founded on deeds and records of court, but estop-

ples in equity are estopples in pais. The doctrine of this kind of

estoppels was at first administered as a branch of equity jurisprudence,

but is now incorporated into the law. The rule with regard to com-

mon law estoppels is a precise and technical one, though supposed to

be founded in principles of truth and justice, such as the statement

of material facts in specialties or as found by verdicts or judgments

upon trials in courts of record. The common law rule is obviously

too narrow and inadequate for the attainment of equity in the multi-

plied transactions of modern times, and hence the equitable estoppel

of the present day.

Estoppel in pais is founded in the obligation which every man is un-

der to speak and act according to the truth of the case, and in the

policy of the law to prevent the great mischiefs resulting from uncer-

tainty, confusion and want of confidence in the intercourse of men, if

they were permitted to deny that which they have deliberately and

solemnly asserted and received as true. But the mere acts, state-

ments, or admissions of a party when not performed or made under

seal or of record, or in some of those acts to which peculiar authority

is attached by law, were not at common law considered as estoppels,

and had no other weight than that of evidence, more or less impor-

tant, but which might be explained or rebutted. By the recent de-

cisions of the courts in this country and in England, a much wider

scope is given to the doctrine of estoppels in pais, and it is now held

and established, that wherever an act is done or a settlement made by

a party which can not be contravened or contradicted without fraud,

or gross misconduct, which is akin to it, on his part, an injury to oth-
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ers whose conduct has been influenced by the act or omission, or, as

was said in Middleton Bank v. Jerome, 18 Conn. 449, where a per-

son by his acts or his words intentionally induces another to believe
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in the truth of a fact and thereby change his situation or commit his

interests, the character of an estoppel will attach to what would oth-

erwise be mere matter of evidence, and will become binding upon a

party and decisive with a jury even in opposition to proof of a con-

trary nature. Equitable estoppels, therefore, only arise when the

conduct of the party estopped is fraudulent in its purpose, or unjust in

its result, which forms the material distinction between the common

law doctrine of estoppel and that which has grown up under the influ-

ence of equity in modern times. This entire doctrine has been exam-

ined and settled in this court in repeated instances as may be seen by

the cases in our books. Kinney v. Farnsworth, 17 Conn. 360; Mid-

dleton Bank v. Jerome, 18 Conn. 450; Noyes v. Ward, 19 Conn.

250; Whitaker v. Williams, 20 Conn. 98; Emmons v. Gibbings, 24

Conn. 538. Let this doctrine be applied to the respondent and his

course of conduct, and we must see that it is not for him, with his

money in his pocket, to call in question the character of the party who

has loaned him the money and taken his mortgage. If further author-
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ity is wanted we refer to Worcester Medical Society v. Harding, 11

Cush. 285, which is exactly this case, and in which the court promptly

overruled this objection. Stow v. Wyse, 7 Conn. 214; Narraganset

Bank v. Atlantic Silk Co., 3 Met. 282; Congregational Society in

Troy v. Perry, 6 N. H. 164; Dutchess Cotton Manufacturing Co. v.

Davis, 14 Jones, 238; Eaton v. Aspinwall, 6 Duer 176; McFarlon

v. Triton Ins. Co., 4 Denio 392; Schenectady & Saratoga Plank-

road Co. v. Thatcher, 1 Kern 108; Palmer v. Lawrence, 3 Sandf.

161; All Saints Church v. Lovett, 1 Hall Sup. Ct. 191.

It has been claimed that the respondent is estopped under the com-

mon law rule, by the statement in his deed that there is such a corpo-

ration as the plaintiff's from whom he has borrowed the money and

to whom he has executed his mortgage deed. But passing this, we

decide that this fact, with the others to which we have alluded are

sufficient to constitute a good equitable estoppel, which is sufficient

for the present case. It is stronger than the common case of land-

lord and tenant where rent has been paid, which is a good estoppel.

There is still another ground of objection to the claim of the re-

spondents, to which allusion has previously been made, to wit, that

this corporation, having enjoyed its franchises so long, can be called

in question only by the government, and can be reached only by quo

warranto, if the government feel that here has been an unwarrantable

exercise of corporate power. There is perhaps force in this objection,

but it is not necessary for us to consider it.

Our conclusion is that the petitioners are entitled to a good and

perfect deed from the respondent and a decree for a foreclosure for

the whole note; and this is our advice.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

Decree advised for plaintiffs.

ers whose conduct has been influenced by the act or omission, or, as
was said in Middleton Bank v. Jerome, 18 Conn. 449, where a person by his acts or his words intentionally induces another to believe
in the tmth of a fact and thereby change his situation or commit his
interests, the character of an estoppel will attach to what would otherwise be mere matter of evidence, and will become binding upon a
party and decisive with a jury even in opposition to proof of a contrary nature. Equitable estoppels, therefore, only arise when the
conduct of the party estopped is fraudulent in its purpose, or unjust in
its result, which forms the material distinction between the common
law doctrine of estoppel and that which has grown up under the influence of equity in modern times. This entire doctrine has been examined and settled in this court in repeated instances as may be seen by
the cases in our books. Kinney v. Farnsworth, 17 Conn. 360; Middleton Bank v. Jerome, 18 Conn. 450; Noyes v. Ward, 19 Conn.
250; Whitaker v. Williams, 20 Conn. 98; Emmons v. Gibbings, 24
Conn. 538. Let this doctrine be applied to the respondent and his
course of conduct, and we must see that it is not for him, with his
money in his pocket, to call in question the character of the party who
has loaned him the money and taken his mortgage. If further authority is wanted we refer to Worcester Medical Society v . Harding, 11
Cush. 285, which is exactly this case, and in which the court promptly
overmled this objection. Stow v. Wyse, 7 Conn. 2 r 4; N arraganset
Bank v. Atlantic Silk Co., 3 Met. 282; Congregational Society in
Troy v. Perry, 6 N. H. 164; Dutchess Cotton Manufacturing Co.,.,
Davis, 14 Jones, 238; Eaton v. Aspinwall, 6 Duer 176; McFarlon
v. Triton Ins. Co., 4 Denio 392; Schenectady & Saratoga Plankroad Co. v. Thatcher, 1 Kern 108; Palmer v. Lawrence, 3 Sanclf.
161; All Saints Church v. Lovett, 1 Hall Sup. Ct. 191.
It has been claimed that the respondent is estopped under the common law rule, by the statement in his deed that there is such a corporation as the plaintiff's from whom he has borrowed the money and
to whom he has executed his mortgage deed. But passing this, we
decide that this fact, with the others to which we have alluded are
sufficient to constitute a good equitable estoppel, which is sufficient
for the present case. It is stronger than the common case of landlord and tenant where rent has been paid, which is a good estoppel.
There is still another ground of objection to the claim of the respondents, to which allusion has previously been made, to wit, that
this corporation, having enjoyed its franchises so long, can be called
in question only by the government, and can be reached only by quo
warranto, if the government feel that here has been an unwarrantable
exercise of corporate power. There is perhaps force in this objection,
but it is not necessary for us to consider it.
Our conclusion is that the petitioners are entitled to a good and
perfect deed from the respondent and a decree for a foreclosure for
the whole note; and this is our advice.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Decree advised for plaintiffs.
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Note. See, 1829, Hamtramck v. Bank of Edwardsville, 2 Mo. 169; 1833, The
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Congregational Society v. Perry, 6 N. H. 164; 1839, Bank v. Allen, 11 Vt. 302;

1843, Proprietors of Quincy Canal v. Newcomb, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 276; 1863,

Note. See, 1829, Hamtramck v. Bank of Edwardsville, 2 Mo. 169; 1833, The
Congregational Societr v. Perry, 6 N. H. 164; 1839, Bank v. Allen, 11 Vt. 302;
1843, Proprietors of Q11incy Canal v. Newcomb, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 276; 1853,
Worcester Med. Inst. v. Harding, 11 Cush. (65 MasR.) 285; 1855, Henderson
R. Co. v. Leavell, 55 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) 358; 1860, Jones v. Cincinnati Type
Foundry Co., 14 Ind. 89; 1861, Wood v. Coosa & C.R. Co., 32 Ga. 273; 1862,
Washin2ton ColleR"e v. Duke. 14 Iowa 14: 1868, Cochran v. Arnold, 58 Pa. St.
399, supra, p. 625; 1878, Cab all v. Citizens' Mut. B. Assn., 61 Ala. 232; 1880,
Humphreys v. Mooney, 5 Colo. 282; 1881, St. Louis Gas L. Co. v. St. Louie,
11 Mo. App. 55; 1881, Central Ag. & Mecb. Assn. v. Alabama G. L. Ins. Co.,
70 Ala. 120; 1883, Imboden et al. v. The Etowah & B . B. M. Co., 70 Ga. 86,
on 107; 1883, Whitford v. Laidler,94 N. Y.145; 1886,Town of Searcyv. Yarnell, 47 Ark. 269; 1886, Singer Mfg. Co. v. Bennett, 28 W. Va.16; 1887, Fresno
Canal & I. Co. v. Warner, 72 Cal. 379, 14 Pac. Rep. 37; 1889, McCord & N.
1\1. Co. v. Glenn, 6 Utah 139, 21 Pac. Rep. 500; 1889, Cravens v. Eagle Cotton
Mills Co., 120 Ind. 6, 21 N. E. Rep. 981; 1891, Bon Aqua Imp. Co. v. Standard F. I. Co., 34 W. Ya. 764, 12 S. E. Rep. 771; 1892, Perine v. Grand Lodge
A. 0. U. W., 48 Minn. 82, 50 N. W. Rep. 10~2; 1895, Johnston v. Gumbel, 19
South. 100; 1896, LivingAton Loan & B. Assn. v. Drummond, 49 Neb. 200,
68 N. W. Rep. ~75; 1896, Tuckasegee Min. Co. v. Goodhue, 118 N. C. 981;
1898, Carroll v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 19 Wash. 639, 9 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 202,
holding that a dealer with an apparent corporation will be estopped from denying the corpora~~ existence. if it would prejudice third parties;. 1898, Jones
v. Hale, 32 Ore. 460, 52 Pac. Rep. 311; 1898, Grande Ronde L. Co. v. Cotton,
12 Colo. App. 375, oo Pac. Rep. 610. But compare Jones v. Aspen Hardware
Co., mpra, p. 637.

Worcester Med. Inst. v. Harding, 11 Cush. (65 Mass.) 285; 1855, Henderson

R. Co. v. Leavell, 55 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) 358; 1860, Jones v. Cincinnati Type

Foundry Co., 14 Ind. 89; 1861, Wood v. Coosa & C. R. Co., 32 Ga. 273; 1862,

Washington Colleee v. Duke. 14 Iowa 14; 1868, Cochran v. Arnold, 58 Pa. St.

399, supra, p. 625; 1878, Cahall v. Citizens' Mut. B. Assn., 61 Ala. 232; 1880,

Humphreys v. Mooney, 5 Colo. 282; 1881, St. Louis Gas L. Co. v. St. Louis,

11 Mo. App. 55; 1881, Central Ag. & Mech. Assn. v. Alabama G. L. Ins. Co.,

70 Ala. 120; 1883, Imboden et al. v. The Etowah & B. B. M. Co., 70 Ga. 86,

on 107; 1883, Whitford v. Laidler, 94 N. Y. 145; 1886, Town of Searcy v. Yar-

nell, 47 Ark. 269; 1886, Singer Mfg. Co. v. Bennett, 28 W. Va. 16; 1887, Fresno

Canal & I. Co. v. Warner, 72 Cal. 379, 14 Pac. Rep. 37; 1889, McCord & N.

M. Co. v. Glenn, 6 Utah 139, 21 Pac. Rep. 500; 1889, Cravens v. Eagle Cotton

Mills Co., 120 Ind. 6, 21 N. E. Rep. 981; 1891, Bon Aqua Imp. Co. v. Stand-

ard F. I. Co., 34 W. Va. 764, 12 S. E. Rep. 771; 1892, Perine v. Grand Lodge

A. O. U. W., 48 Minn. 82, 50 N. W. Rep. 1022; 1805, Johnston v. Gambel, 19

South. 100; 1896, Livingston Loan & B. Assn. v. Drummond, 49 Neb. 200,
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68 N. W. Rep. 375; 1896, Tuckasegee Min. Co. v. Goodhue, 118 N. C. 981;

1898, Carroll v. Pacific Nafl Bank, 19 Wash. 639, 9 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 202,

holding that a dealer with an apparent corporation will be estopped from de-

nying the corporate existence, if it would prejudice third parties; 1898, Jones

v.' Hale, 32 Ore. 465, 52 Pac. Rep. 311; 1898, Grande Ronde L. Co. v. Cotton,

12 Colo. App. 375, 55 Pac. Rep. 610. But compare Jones v. Aspen Hardware

Co., supra, p. 637.
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(3) Who seek to hold members of the corporation liable as

partners, or individually liable.

SNIDER'S SONS' CO. v. TROY.1

(b) Who seek to hold members of the corporation liable as
partners, or individually liable .

1890. In the Supreme Court of Alabama. 91 Alabama

Rep. 224-233.

This action was brought by the Louis Snider's Sons' Company, a

SNIDER'S SONS' CO. v. TROY.1

corporation created under the laws of Ohio, against D. S. Troy, and

was commenced on the 15th of February, 1890. The complaint

189<>.

contained a single count, which claimed $827.92 for goods con-

sisting of paper and other printing materials, sold by plaintiffs in

IN THE SUPREME CounT OF
Rep. 224-233.

ArJ ABAMA.

91

Alabama

March, April, May and July, 1888, to or on the order of the Dispatch

This action was brought by the Louis Snider's Sons' Company, a
corporation created under the laws of Ohio, against D. S. Troy, and
was commenced on the 15th of Febniary, 1890. The complaint
contained a single count, which claimed $827.92 for goods consisting of paper and other printing material s, sold by plaintiffs in
March, April, May and July, r888, to or on the order of the Dispatch
Puhlishing Company, then publishing a newspaper in the city of
Montgomery. The compl::tint alleged that said publishing company
was at the time a partnership , and defendant was one of the partners;
that the company claimed to be a corporation under the laws of Alabama, but was never, in fact, incorporated; that it was insolvent when
plaintiff's account matured, and has ceast;:d to do business.
The defendant filed a special plea, alleging that on the 2d day of
O ctober, 1885, he and two other persons named, filed in the office o{
the judge of probate of Montgomery county a declaration in writing

Publishing Company, then publishing a newspaper in the city of

Montgomery. The complaint alleged that said publishing company

was at the time a partnership, and defendant was one of the partners;

that the company claimed to be a corporation under the laws of Ala-

bama, but was never, in fact, incorporated; that it was insolvent when

plaintiff's account matured, and has ceased to do business.

The defendant filed a special plea, alleging that on the 2d day of

October, 1885, he and two other persons named, filed in the office of

the judge of probate of Montgomery county a declaration in writing

'Arguments omitted.

1

Digitized by

Arguments omitted.

Go gle

Origi11al from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 175

657

CORPORATIONS BY ESTOPPEL.

for the formation of a coiporation under the name of the Dispatch

§ 175

CORPORATIONS BY ESTOPPEL.

657

Publishing Company, stating the substance of the declaration, "all of

which will more fully appear by reference to the same, a copy of

which, with the indorsements thereon, is hereto attached as an ex-

hibit, and made a part of this plea; that this defendant and his asso-

ciates, immediately after the filing of said declaration as aforesaid,

proceeded to organize said Dispatch Publishing Company, by elect-

ing a board of directors consisting of three members, as by law pro-

vided, and, on the organization of said company as aforesaid, com-

menced doing business under the name and style of the Dispatch

Publishing Company, by the publication of a newspaper in said city of

Montgomery; that the debt now sued for was contracted by said com-

pany as such corporation, and not otherwise; that plaintiffs knew that

said company was doing business as a corporation, and made said

contract with it as a corporation, and not as a partnership or asso-

ciation of individuals, and dealt with it as a corporation, and sold

said bill of goods to it as a corporation, and not in any other capacity

whatsoever."
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The court overruled a demurrer to this plea, and its judgment is

assigned as error.

Clopton, J. A corporation de facto exists, when from irregularity

or defect in the organization or constitution, or from some omission

to comply with the conditions precedent, a corporation de jure is not

created, but there has been a colorable compliance with the require-

ments of some law under which an association might be lawfully in-

corporated for the purposes and powers assumed, and a user of the

rights claimed to be conferred by the law—when there is an organiza-

tion with color of law and the exercise of corporate franchises. Mcth.

E. Un. Church v. Pickett, 48 N. J. L. 599.

The enabling law, under which a corporation for the purposes and

objects of the Dispatch Publishing Company, and with the powers

assumed, might have been lawfully created at that time, is contained

in sections 1803-1812 of the Code of 1S76, and the amendatory acts,

which authorize and provide for the incorporation of two or more

persons desirous of forming a private corporation for the purpose of

carrying on any industrial or other lawful business not otherwise spe-

cially provided for by law. Acts 1882-3, p. 40. The plea avers

that defendant and two other named persons filed, September 2, 1885,

with the judge of probate of Montgomery county a written declara-

tion, signed by themselves, setting forth substantially the matters re-

quired by the statute, except the residences of the persons; that they

organized by the election of three directors, and commenced and

continued to do business in a corporate capacity, and were so doing

business when the debt sued for was contracted. If the averments of

the plea be true, the truth of which is admitted by the demurrer, the

Dispatch Publishing Company was an association having capital stock

divided into shares, organized by the election of officers, transacting

business and exercising franchises, functions and powers, after an at-

42—Wil. Cases.

for the formation of a corporation under the name of the Dispatch
Publishing Company, stating the substance of the declaration, "all of ·
which will more fully appear by reference to the same, a copy of
which, with the indorsements thereon, is hereto attached as an exhibit, and made a part of this plea; that this defendant and his associates, immediately after the filing of said declaration as aforesaid,
proceeded to organize said Dispatch Publishing Company, by electing a board of directors consisting of three members, as by law pro 7
vided, and, on the organization of said company as aforesaid, commenced doing business under the name and style of the Dispatch
Publishing Company, by the publication of a newspaper in said city of
~fontgomery; that the deht now sued for was contracted by said company as such corporation, and not otherwise; that plaintiffs knew that
said company was doing business as a corporation, and made said
contract with it as a corporation, and not as a partnership or asso..
ciation of individuals, and dealt with it as a corporation, and sold
said bill of goods to it as a corporation, and not in any other capacity
whatsoever."
.
The court overruled a demurrer to this plea, and its judgment is
assigned as error.
CLOPTON, J. A corporation de facto exists, when from irregularity
or defect in the organization or constitution, or from some omission
to comply with the conditions precedent, a corporation de Jure is not
created, but there has been a colorable compliance with the requirements of some law under which an association might be lawfully in..
corporated for the purposes and powers assumed, and a user of the
rights claimed to be conferred by the law-when there is an organization with color of law and the exercise of corporate franchises. Meth.
E. Un. Church v. Pickett, 48 N. J. L. 599·
The enabling law, under which a corporation for the purposes and
objects of the Dispatch Publishing Company, and with the powers
assumed, might have been lawfully created at that time, is contained
in sections 1803-1812 of. the Code of 1876, and the amendatory acts,
which authorize and provide for the incorporation of two or more
persons desirous of forming a private corporation for the purpose of
carrying on any industrial or other lawful business not otherwise spe.cially provided for by law. Acts 1882-3, p. 40. The plea avers
that defendant and two other named persons filed, September 2, 1885,
with the judge of probate of Montgomery county a written declaration, signed by themselves, setting forth substantially the matters required by the statute, except the residences of the persons; that they
organized by the election of three directors, and commenced and
continued to do business in a corporate capacity, and were so doing
bus iness when the debt sued for was contracted. If the averments of
the plea be true, the truth of which is admitted by the demurrer: the
l)ispatch Publishing Company was an association having capital stock
divided into shares, organized by the election of officers, transacting
b usiness and exercising franchises, functions and powers, after an at~
42-WIL. CASES.
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law, and user of the rights claimed to be conferred thereby—the essen-

tempted incorporation-as if it were a corporation de Jure-a colorable compliance with the req!Jirements of an existing and enabling
law, and user of the rights claimed to be conferred thereby-the essential elements of a corporation de facto. Cen. Agr. & Mech. Assn.
v. Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co., 70 Ala. 1 20.
Appellant seeks by the action to hold defendant, who was a member, liable as a partner for paper and other supplies sold to the Dispatch Publishing Company. Whether the shareholders in a corporation
de facto are individually liable for the corporate debts, in the absence of
fraud or a statute, is a question as to which the authorities are in direct
antagonism. In Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 233, tbe doctrine
asserted is: "A corporate creditor, seeking to enforce the payment of
his debt, may ignore the existence of the corporation, and may proceed against the supposed stockholders as partners by proving that
the prescribed method of becoming incorporated was not complied
with by tbe company in question." The leading cases supporting
this doctrine are Bigelow v. Gregory, 73 Ill. 197; Abbott v. Omaha
Smelt. Co., 4 Neb. 416; Garrett v. Richardson, 35 Ark. 144; Ferris
v. Thaw, 72 Mo. 446; Richardson v. Mayo, 40 Ohio St. 9; Coleman v. Coleman, 78 Ind. 344. \Ve have omitted reference to a few
cases sometimes cited, for the reason, either the question on liability
as partners was not before the court, as in Blanchard v. Kaull, 44
Cal. 440, or the debt was contracted before any steps were taken,
other than the mere filing of a certificate, toward organization, as in
Porpoise Fish Co. v. Bergen, 13 Amer. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 1, or it
was contracted after the expiration. of the charter by its own limitation, without reorganization, as in Nat. Bank v. Landon, 45 N. Y.
410. In the case last cited the shareholders entered into a special
agreement which by its terms created a partnership as to third persons.
In 2 Morawetz on Corporations, § 748, the doctrine is stated as follows: "If an association assumes to enter into a contract in a corporate capacity, and the party dealing with the association contracts
with it as if it were a corporation, the individual members can not be
charged as patties to the contract, either severally or jointly, or as
pattners." The follov.·ing cases maintain the doctrine that the members of a corporation de facto can not be held liable as partners for
the corporate debts: Fay v. Noble, 7 Cush. 188; First Nat. Bank ·
v. Avery, I 17 Mass. 476; Stout v. Zulick, 48 N. J. L. 599: Plan.
Bank v. Padgett, 69 Ga. 164; Mer. & Man. Bank v. Stone, 38 Mich.
779; Humphrey v. Mooney, 5 Cal. 282; Cen. City Sav. Bank v.
Walker, 66 N. Y. 424; Gartside Coal Co. v. Maxwell, 22 Fed. Rep.
197; Whiting v. Wyman, IOI U.S. 392.
The plea :ind demurrer do not raise the question of the liability of the
supposed stockholders as partners, where there has been no intention
or attempt lo incorporate; where they are acting as a body corporate,
without even color of legislative authority-sheer usurpat1on. The
plea avers that the debt sued for was contracted hy the Dispatch Publishing Company, which is alleged to hav.e been a de facto corporation, and that plaintiff sold the goods to and contracted with the com-

tial elements of a corporation de facto. Cen. Agr. & Mech. Assn.

v. Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co., 70 Ala. 120.

Appellant seeks by the action to hold defendant, who was a mem-

ber, liable as a partner for paper and other supplies sold to the Dis-

patch Publishing Company. Whether the shareholders in a corporation

de facto arc individually liable for the corporate debts, in the absence of

fraud or a statute, is a question as to which the authorities are in direct

antagonism. In Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 233, the doctrine

asserted is: "A corporate creditor, seeking to enforce the payment of

his debt, may ignore the existence of the corporation, and may pro-

ceed against the supposed stockholders as partners by proving that

the prescribed method of becoming incorporated was not complied

with by the company in question." The leading cases supporting

this doctrine are Bigelow v. Gregory, 73 111. 197; Abbott v. Omaha

Smelt. Co., 4 Neb. 416; Garrett v. Richardson, 35 Ark. 144; Ferris

v. Thaw, 72 Mo. 446; Richardson v. Mayo, 40 Ohio St. 9; Cole-
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man v. Coleman, 78 Ind. 344. We have omitted reference to a few

cases sometimes cited, for the reason, either the question on liability

as partners was not before the court, as in Blanchard v. Kaull, 44

Cal. 440, or the debt was contracted before any steps were taken,

other than the mere filing of a certificate, toward organization, as in

Porpoise Fish Co. v. Bergen, 13 Amer. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 1, or it

was contracted after the expiration of the charter by its own limita-

tion, without reorganization, as in Nat. Bank v. Landon, 45 N. Y.

410. In the case last cited the shareholders entered into a special

agreement which by its terms created a partnership as to third persons.

In 2 Morawetz on Corporations, § 748, the doctrine is stated as fol-

lows: "If an association assumes to enter into a contract in a cor-

porate capacity, and the party dealing with the association contracts

with it as if it were a corporation, the individual members can not be

charged as parties to the contract, either severally or jointly, or as

partners." The following cases maintain the doctrine that the mem-

bers of a corporation de facto can not be held liable as partners for

the corporate debts: Fay v. Noble, 7 Cush. 188; First Nat. Bank-

v. Avery, 117 Mass. 476; Stout v. Zulick, 48 N. J. L. 599; Plan.

Bank v. Padgett, 69 Ga. 164; Mer. & Man. Bank v. Stone. 38 Mich.

779; Humphrey v. Mooney, 5 Cal. 282; Cen. City Sav. Bank v.

Walker, 66 N. Y. 424; Gartside Coal Co. v. Maxwell, 22 Fed. Rep.

197; Whiting v. Wyman, 101 U. S. 392.

The plea and demurrer do not raise the question of the liability of the

supposed stockholders as partners, where there has been no intention

or attempt to incorporate; where they are acting as a body corporate,

without even color of legislative authority—sheer usurpation. The

plea avers that the debt sued for was contracted by the Dispatch Pub-

lishing Company, which is alleged to have been a de facto corpora-

tion, and that plaintiff sold the goods to and contracted with the com-
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pany as a corporation, knowing that it was doing business as such.

The question before us, and the only question we propose to decide,
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is, whether, there being no fraud alleged nor statute making the

stockholders individually liable, a creditor who has dealt with a de

facto corporation as a corporation, who has entered into contractual

relations with it in its corporate name and capacity, can disregard the

existence of the corporation, and, electing to treat it as a partnership,

enforce the collection of his debt from the stockholders individually?

The conflicting authorities afford aid in the solution of this question

only so far as their opinions may be in accord with settled principles

and sustained by reason. Though it is an undecided question in this

state, principles have been well settled which materially bear upon

the inquiry, and mark the way to a correct conclusion.

Corporations may exist either de jure or de facto. If of the latter

class, they are under the protection of the same law and governed by

the same legal principles as those of the former, so long as the state

acquiesces in their existence and exercise of corporate functions. A

private citizen, whose rights are not invaded, who has no cause of

complaint, has no right to inquire collaterally into the legality of its
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existence. This can only be done in a direct proceeding on the part

of the state, from whom is derived the right to exist as a corporation,

and whose authority is usurped. This principle was clearly and em-

phatically declared in Lehman v. Warner, 61 Ala. 455, in the fol-

lowing language: "The corporation must of necessity be presumed

to be rightfully in possession of the franchise, and rightfully to exer-

cise the power which the legislative grant confers. Individual right

is not invaded, if the negative is true in fact, and there is usurpation.

It is the state—the sovereign—whose rights are invaded and whose

rights are usurped. The individual could not create the corporation,

could not grant, define, limit its powers, and no grant of these by

the sovereign can lessen his rights. There can consequently be no

cause of complaint by the citizen, and no right to inquire whether the

corporate existence is rightful—de jure or merely colorable." Tay-

lor on Corp., § 145; 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law 198. The creditor

can not proceed against the stockholders as partners without proving

non-compliance with prescribed conditions precedent, thus inquiring

collaterally, not into the fact, but the legality of its existence.

It is also an established rule of general application that a party who

contracts with a corporation exercising corporate powers and perform-

ing corporate functions—existing as a de facto corporation—in its

corporate name and capacity, will not be permitted, in a suit on the

contract, to deny and disprove the rightfulness of its existence. 4

Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 198. In Swartwout v. Michigan Air

Line R. Co., 24 Mich. 390, Cooley, J., declares the rule as follows:

"Where there is thus a corporation de facto, with no want of legis-

lative power to its due and legal existence, when it is proceeding in

the performance of corporate functions, and the public are dealing

with it on the supposition that it is what it professes to be, and the

questions are only whether there has been exact regularity and strict

pany as a corporation, knowing that it was doing business as such.
The question before us, and the only question we propose to decide,
is, whether, there being no fraud alleged nor statute making the
stockholders individually liable, a creditor who has dealt with a de
facto corporation as a corporation, who has entered into contractual
relations with it in its corporate name and capacity, can disregard the
existence of the corporation, and, electing to treat it as a partnership,
enforce the collection of his debt from the stockholders individually?
The conflicting authorities afford aid in t11e solution of this question.
only so far as their opinions may be in accord with settled principles
and sustained by reason. Though it is an undecided question in this
state, principles have been well settled which materially bear upon
the inquiry, and mark the way to a correct conclusion.
Corporations may exist either de Jure or de facto. If of the latter
class, they are under the protection of the same law and governed by
the same legal principles as those of the former, so long as the state
acquiesces in their existence and exercise of corporate functions. A
private citizen, whose rights are not invaded, who has no cause of
complaint, has no right to inquire collaterally into the legality of its
existence. This can only be done in a direct proceeding on the part
of the state, from whom is derived the right to exist as a corporation,
and whose authority is usurped. This principle was clearly and emphatically declared in Lehman v. Warner, 61 Ala. 455, in the following language: "The corporation must of necessity be presumed
to be rightfully in possession of the franchise, and rightfully to exercise the power which the legislative grant confers. Individual right
is not invaded, if the negative is true in fact, and there is usurpation.
It is the state-the sovereign-whose rights are invaded and whose
r .ghts are usurped. The individual could not create the corporation,
could not grant, define, limit its powers, and no grant of these by
the sovereign can lessen his rights. There can consequently be no
cause of complaint by the citizen, and no right to inquire whether the
corporate existence is rightful-de Jure or merely colorable.'' Taylor on Corp., § 145; 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law 198. The creditor
can not proceed against the stockholders as partners without proving
non-compliance with prescribed conditions precedent. thus inquiring
collaterally, not into the fact, but the legality of its existence.
It is also an established rule of general application that a party who
contracts with a corporation exercising corporate powers and performing corporate functions-existing as a de facto corporation-in its
corporate name and capacity, will not be permitted, in a suit on the
contract, to deny and disprove the rightfulness of it existence. 4
Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 198. In Swartwout v. Michigan Air
Line R. Co., 24 Mich. 390, Cooley, J., declares the rule as follows :
"\Vbere there is thus a corporation de facto, with no want of leg islative power to its due and legal existence, when it is proceedin g in
the performance of corporate functions, and the public are dealing
with it on the supposition that it is what it professes to be, and the
questions are only ' 'v hether there has been exact regularity and strict
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is plainly a dictate alike of justice and public policy, that in contro-
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versies between the de facto corporation and tbose who have entered

compliance with the (JrOYisions of the law relating to corporation, it
is plainly a dictate alike of justice and public policy, that in controversies between the de facto corporation and those who have entered
into contract relations with it, as corporators or otherwise, that such
questions should not be suffered to be raised."
The general ntle is thus stated in Brickell, C. J.: "Whoever
contracts with a corporation in the use of corporate powers and franchises, and within the scope of such powers, is estopped from denying the existence of the corporation, or inquiring into the regularity
of the corporate organization, when an enforcement of the contract,
or of rights arising under it, is sought." Cahall v. Citizens' M. B.
Assn., 61 Ala. 232; Central Agr. & Mech. Assn. v. Alabama Gold Life
Ins. Co., 70 Ala. 120; Schloss v. Montg. Trade Co., 87 Ala. 41r.
It is conceded that the rule has been invoked and applied most
frequently in suits against the stockholders or corporation, or persons
who have contracted with it, where the stockholder, corporation or person is seeking to avoid a liability by denying the legality of the corporate organization. But why should it not be applicable in other
cases? W!ty s/wuld a stocklwlder be estopped in a suit by a creditor
of an insolvent corporation to requfre payment of his unpaid subscription, and the creditor allowed to ignore tlie existence of the corporation, and proceed against th e stockholder as a partner.~ Why
should not tl1e estoppel be mutua!P Taylor, in !tis work on Corporations, section I48, ltav£ng stated the general rule, that a corporatt"on
when sued on its contract, and the person w/10 , contracted with it,
when sued on his co1tlract, is each estopped to deny its legal £ncorporat£on, adds: "Furthermore, persons who have contracted witli
.a corporation as suclt, and /1ave acqufred claims against it, are estopped from denying £ts corporate ex£s~ence for lite purpose of holding its shareholders hable as partners." And the same rule was
applied in several of the cases cited above, in which a corporate creditor was seeking to hold the stockholder liable as a partner for a corporate debt. The abrogation of the foregoing well-established rule is
the logical sequence of maintaining a suit by a creditor of a de facto
corporation, charging the stockholders as partners.
Another consideration. Section 8 of article xiv of the constitution
declares: "In no case shall any stockholder be individually liable,
othe1wise than for the unpaid stock owned by him or her." Exemption from liability, other than for unpaid stock, is the declared policy
of the state. It can not be imposed by legislation, or by the judgment
of court. In view of the constitutional provision, it is manifest tha+the shareholders of the Dispatch Publi shing Company intended, by
the attempt to incorporate, to avoid individual liability for the debts
co1:1tracted by the corporation. When a party deals and contrncts
with a corporation as corporator ·, exemption from individual liability
enters as an e lement of the contract. It is true that the liabilitv of
persons associated in an enterprise or adventure is not dctermin~1hle
by the name they assume, }:Jut by the legal consequences of their acts.
A partnership may arise as to third persons, by mere operation of

into contract relations with it, as corporators or otherwise, that such

questions should not be suffered to be raised."

The general ride is thus stated in Brickell, C. J.: "Whoever

contracts with a corporation in the use of corporate powers and fran-

chises, and within the scope of such powers, is estopped from deny-

ing the existence of the corporation, or inquiring into the regularity

of the corporate organization, when an enforcement of the contract,

or of rights arising under it, is sought." Cahall v. Citizens' M. B.

Assn.,6i Ala. 232 ; Central Agr. & Mech. Assn. v. Alabama Gold Life

Ins. Co., 70 Ala. 120; Schloss v. Montg. Trade Co., 87 Ala. 411.

It is conceded that the nile has been invoked and applied most

frequently in suits against the stockholders or corporation, or persons

who have contracted with it, where the stockholder, corporation or per-

son is seeking to avoid a liability by denying the legality of the cor-

porate organization. But why should it not be applicable in other

cases? Why should a stockholder be estopped in a suit by a creditor
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of an insolvent corporation to require payment of his unpaid sub-

scription, and the creditor allowed to ignore the existence of the cor-

poration, and proceed against the stockholder as a partner? Why

should fiot the estoppel be mutual? Taylor, in his work on Corpora-

tions, section 148, having stated the general rule, that a corporation

when sued on its contract, and the person who, contracted with it,

when sued on his contract, is each estopped to deny its legal incorpo-

ration, adds: •'■/furthermore, persons who have contracted with

.a corporation as such, and have acquired claims against it, are es-

topped from denying its corporate existence for the purpose of hold-

ing its shareholders liable as partners." And the same rule was

applied in several of the cases cited above, in which a corporate cred-

itor was seeking to hold the stockholder liable as a partner for a cor-

porate debt. The abrogation of the foregoing well-established rule is

the logical sequence of maintaining a suit by a creditor of a de facto

corporation, charging the stockholders as partners.

Another consideration. Section 8 of article xiv of the constitution

declares: "In no case shall any stockholder be individually liable,

otherwise than for the unpaid stock owned by him or her." Exemp-

tion from liability, other than for unpaid stock, is the declared policy

of the state. It can not be imposed by legislation, or by the judgment

of court. In view of the constitutional provision, it is manifest tha*-

the shareholders of the Dispatch Publishing Company intended, by

the attempt to incorporate, to avoid individual liability for the debts

contracted by the corporation. When a party deals and contracts

with a corporation as corporators, exemption from individual liability

enters as an element of the contract. It is true that the liability of

persons associated in an enterprise or adventure is not determinable

by the name they assume, but by the legal consequences of their acts.

A partnership may arise as to third persons, by mere operation of
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effect, the elements essential to constitute a partnership as to third per-

sons must exist. A corporation de facto has an independent status,

recognized by the law as distinct from that of its members. A partner-

ship is not the necessary legal consequence of an abortive attempt at

incorporation. As said in Fay v. Noble, supra: "Surely, it can not

be, in the absence of all fraudulent intent, that such a legal result fol-

lows as to fasten on parties involuntarily, for such a cause, the enlarged

liability of co-partners, a liability neither contemplated nor assented to

by them. The statement of the proposition carries with it a sufficient

refutation."

Maintenance of suck suit involves judicial nullification of

franchises and powers enjoyed and exercised by a de facto corpora-

tion, as a distinct entity recognized by the law, acquiesced in by the

state; defeats the corporate character of the contract; changes the re-

lation from that of stockholders to that of partners; substitutes other

and new parties to the contract, and effects the imposition of an en-

larged liability, which they did not assume, but intended to avoid;

so understood by the creditor when he contracted the debt with the
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corporation as such. The contract is valid and binding on the cor-

poration, which the creditor trusted. No injustice is done him, for

all his rights and remedies are preserved by the principle that the

corporation and the shareholder are estopped from denying its legal

existence as against him. It will not answer to say that he isnot repu-

diating, but enforcing the contract. He repudiates the party—the

corporation—with which he made the contract, and seeks its enforce-

ment against parties who never entered into contractual relations with

him.

The doctrine that a creditor who has dealt with a de facto corpora-

tion in its corporate capacity can not charge the stockholders as

partners with the corporate debt, there being no fraudulent intent al-

leged and proved, seems to us to be sustained by the weight of au-

thority, maintained by stronger reasoning, consistent with well settled

principles, and in harmony with the policy of the state.

Affirmed.

Note. See, 1882, Planters' and Miners' Bank v. Padgett, 69 Ga. 159; 1886,

Stout v. Zulick, 48 N. J. L. 599, 7 Atl. Rep. 362; 1889, Larned v. Beal, 65 N.

H. 184, 23 Atl. Rep. 149; 1892, Thornton v. Balcom, 85 Iowa 198, 52 N. W.

Rep. 190; 1896, Hoeue v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 47 Neb. 929, 66 N. W. Rep. 1036;

1896, American Mirror and Glass Bev. Co. v. Bulkley, 107 Mich. 447, 65 N.

W. Rep. 291. See, also, cases, infra, p. 667. But see contra, 1886, Glenn v.

law, aqd contrary to the intention of the parties; but, to have this
effect, the elements essential to constitute a partnership as to third person, must exist. A corporation de facto has an independent status,
recognized by the law as distinct from that of its members. A partnership is not the necessary legal consequence of an abortive attempt at
incorporation. As said in Fay v. Noble, supra: ' ' Surely, it can not
be, in the absence of all fraudulent intent, that such a legal result follows as. to fasten on parties involuntarily, for such a cause, the enlarged
liability of co-partners, a lia'bility neither contemplated nor assented to
by them. The statement of the proposition carries with it a sufficient
refutation."
Maintenance of such suit t'nvolves judt'cial nullification of
franchises and powers enjoyed and exerdsed by a de facto corporation, as a disti"nct entity recognized by the law , acquiesced in by the
state; defeats the corporate character of the contract; changes the relation from that of stockholders to that of partners; substitutes otller
and ne-.v parties to the contract, and effects the impositz"on of an enlarged liabt'lity, which they did not assume, but intended to avoid;
so understood by the creditor when he contracted the debt with the
corporati"on as such. The contract is valt'd and bindt'ug on the corporation, wlti'ch the creditor trusted. No injustice is done ltim , for
all his rights and remedies are preserved by the prindple that tile
corporation and tlte shareholder are estopped from denying its legal
existence as agat'nst ht'm. It will not answer to say that he is not r epudiating, but enforcing the contract. He repudiates tile party-the
corporation-wt'th wht'ch he made tlte contract, and seeks its enforcement agat'nst parties who never entered into contractual relatz'ons wt'th
him.
The doctrine that a creditor who has dealt with a de facto corporation in its corporate capacity can not charge the stockholders as
partners with the corporate debt, there being no fraudulent intent alleged and proved, seems t o us to be sustained by the weight of aut!'iority, maintained by stronger reasoning, consistent with well settled
principles, and in harmony with the policy of the state.
Affirmed.

Bergmann, 20 Mo. App. 343; 1891, Stivers v. Carmichael, 83 Towa 759, 49 N.

W. Rep. 983; 1892, Bradley Fertilizer v. South. Pub. Co., 17 N. Y. Supp. 587;

1895, Williams v. Hewitt, 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 So. Rep. 496; 1901, Owensboro

Wagon Co. v. Bliss, — Ala. —, 31 So. 81; 1901, Clausen v. Head, 110 Wis.

405, 84 Am. St. Rep. 933, 85 N. W. 1028. See, also, cases below, pp. 664, 676.

N ote. See, 1882, Planters' e.nd Miners' Bank v. Padgett, 69 Ge.. 159; 1886,
Stout v. Zulick, 48 N. J . L. 599, 7 At!. Rep. 362; 1889, Le.med v. Beal, 65 N.
H . 184, 23 Atl. R ep. 149 ; 1892, Thornton v. Balcom, 85 Iowa 198, 52 N. W.
Rep. 190; 1896, Hoguev. Capital Nat'l Bank,47 Neb. 929,66N. W. Rep. 1036 ;
1896, American Mirror and Glass Bev. Co. v. Bulkley, 107 Mich . 447, 65 N.
W. Rep. 291. See, also, cases, infra, p. 667. Bnt see cont1·a, 1886, Glen n v.
Bergmann, 20 Mo. App. 343; 1891, Stivers v. Carmichael, 83 Iowa 7.'l9, 49 N.
W. Rep. 983; 1892, Bradley Fertilizer v. South. Pub. Co., 17 N. Y. Supp. 587;
1895, Willie.ms v. Hewitt, 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 So. Rep. 496; 1901, Owensuoro
Wagon Co. v. Blh;s, - Ala.-, 31 So. 81; 1901, Clausen v. Head, 110 Wis.
40.5, 84 Am. St. Rep. 933, 85 N. W. 1028. See, also, cases below, pp. 664, 676.
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Sec. 176.

§ 176

GUCKERT V. HACKE.

(c) But dealers with a pretended corporation, without knowledge

that it, at the time, claims to be such, are not estopped to deny it

Sec. 176.

is a corporation.

GUCKERT v. HACKE Et Al., Appellants."

1893. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 159 Pa. St.

(c) But dealers with a pretended corporation, without knowledge
that it, at the time, claims to be such, are not estopped to deny it
is a corporation.

Rep. 303-307.

Assumpsit against incorporators for the debt of a corporation.

At the trial before Porter, J., it appeared that plaintiff entered

into a contract to make some alterations and repairs in a building oc-

cupied by the Hughes & Gawthrop Co. In October, 1890, a certifi-

GUCKERT v. HACKE ET AL., Ai>PELLANTS.1

cate of incorporation in proper form was presented by the Hughes &

Gawthrop Co. to the governor asking for a charter. The certificate

1893.

was approved and letters-patent were duly issued. All the details

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

159

Pa. St.

Rep. 303-307.

required by the act of April 29, 1874, P. L. 77, were complied with,

excepting only the recording of the certificate in the recorder's office

Assumpsit against incorporators for the debt of a corporation.
At the trial before PoRTER, J., it appeared that plaintiff entered
into a contract to make some alterations and repairs in a building occupied by the Hughes & Gawthrop Co. In October, 1890, a certificate of incorporation in proper form was presented by the Hughes &
Gawthrop Co. to the governor asking for a charter. The certificate
was approved and letters-patent were duly issued. All the details
required by the act of April 29, 1874 1 P. L. 77, were complied with,
excepting only the recording of the certificate in the recorder's office
of Allegheny county. The certificate was not recorded until June,
189r. In the meantime, plaintiff, without knowledge of the incorporation, made the contract with Gawthrop, upon which he sued. Subsequently, he .accepted a note for the debt, signed with the corporate
name.
Defendant's points were as follows:
"1. The provisions of section 3 of the act of April 29, 1874, which
provides that 'original certificates with all inclorsements thereon shall
then be recorded in the office of the recorder of deeds in and for the
county where the chief operations are to be carried on,' arc merely
directory, and a failure to so record does not render ~he charter void
or render the subscribers thereto individually liable for d ebts contracted by the corporation. Answer. The failure to record as stated
will not of itself render the stockholders individually liable."
"2. ':\hat from the moment the letters-patent were issued by the
governor of the commonwealth of Penn syh·ania to the Hughes &
Gawthrop Co., the subscribers to the articles of association became a
corporation for every practical purpo e, and :my one dealing with
them as a corporation is estopped from impeaching the charter in a
collateral proceeding by showing that a condition precedent to the
existence of the corporation has not been complie<l "vith." Affirmed.
"3· If the jury find from the evidence that letters-patent were issued to the defendants by the governor of this commonwealth to act
as a corporation under the name of the Hughes & Ga·wthrop Co.,
and they were actually engaged in carrying on business unclcr such letters-patent or charter, and that the contract sued on was made by E.

of Allegheny county. The certificate was not recorded until June,

1891. In the meantime, plaintiff, without knowledge of the incorpo-

ration, made the contract with Gawthrop, upon which he sued. Sub-

name.
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sequently, he accepted a note for the debt, signed with the corporate

Defendant's points were as follows:

"1. The provisions of section 3 of the act of April 29, 1874, which

provides that 'original certificates with all indorsements thereon shall

then be recorded in the office of the recorder of deeds in and for the

county where the chief operations are to be carried on,' arc merely

directory, and a failure to so record does not render the charter void

or render the subscribers thereto individually liable for debts con-

tracted by the corporation. Answer. The failure to record as stated

will not of itself render the stockholders individually liable."

"2. "That from the moment the letters-patent were issued by the

governor of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania to the Hughes &

Gawthrop Co., the subscribers to the articles of association became a

corporation for every practical purpose, and any one dealing with

them as a corporation is estopped from impeaching the charter in a

collateral proceeding by showing that a condition precedent to the

existence of the corporation has not been complied with." Affirmed.

"3. If the jurv find from the evidence that letters-patent were is-

sued to the defendants by the governor of this commonwealth to act

as a corporation under the name of the Hughes & Gawthrop Co.,

and they were actually engaged in carrying on business under such let-

ters-patent or charter, and that the contract sued on was made by E.

1 Arguments omitted.

1
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B. Gawthrop, general manager of the Hughes-Gawthrop Co., and
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that the plaintiff received the promissory note of IIughes-Gawthrop

Co., as a corporation, in payment of the amount clue on said con-

tract, he can not now recover from Paul H. Hacke and J. B. George,

two of the defendants, as individuals." Affirmed.

Verdict and judgment against defendant, E. B. Gawthrop, and in

favor of Paul H. Hacked al., the other defendants. Plaintiff ap-

pealed.

Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Sterrett, December, 30, 1893:

It is essential to the creation of a corporation under an enabling

statute that all material provisions should be substantially followed;

and, exemption from personal liability being one of the chief charac-

teristics distinguishing corporations from partnerships and unincorpo-

rated joint stock companies, it follows that those who transact business

upon the strength of an organization which is materially defective are

individually liable, as partners, to those with whom they have dealt.

What provisions are material must be gathered from the relation of

each to the purpose and scope of the act; and when, therefore, suc-

cessive steps are prescribed for the creation of corporations, these
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must obviously be regarded as imperative. Enabling statutes, on the

principle of cxpressio unius est exclusio alterius, impliedly prohibit

any other mode of doing the act which they authorize; they must be

strictly construed. Sutherland on Stat. Construction, section 454.

Hence it has been uniformly held that requirements in respect of fil-

ing charters are imperative. Childs v. Smith, 55 Barb. 45 ; Smith v.

Warden, 86 Mo. 382; Abbott v. Smelting Co., 4 Neb. 416; Beach

on Corporations, section 162.

It is plain, even from a cursory reading of the act of April 29, 1874,

P. L. 77, that recording of the certificate "in the office for the recording

of deeds, and in and for the county where the chief operations are to be

carried on," was intended to be made one of the conditions precedent

to corporate existence. That was the last of successive steps re-

quired to be taken, and the right to begin the transaction of corporate

business was made to depend upon the taking of that step. "From

thenceforth," the act expressly declares, the subscribers and their as-

sociates and successors "shall be a corporation for the purposes and

upon the terms named in the said charter." One of the purposes

of the act being exemption from personal liability in the transaction

of business, it is obviously material that the public should have no-

tice, and notice by record was accordingly prescribed. Failure to re-

cord was failure to comply with one of the express conditions of in-

corporation, and consequently of exemption from liability.

It may be conceded that had plaintiff dealt with defendants as a

corporation he -would have been estopped from claiming against them

in any other capacity, even though they failed to record their charter.

Spahr v. Bank, Q4. Pa. 42Q. But it is not pretended that he had

any knowledge of the existence of the charter; arid there was cer-

tainly nothing, either in the name under which they did business or

in their conduct, which should have put him upon inquiry. In

B. Gawthrop, general manager of the Hughes-Gawthrop Co., and
that the pl:.iintiff received the promissory note of IIughes-Gawthrop
Co., as a corporation, in payment of the amount due on said contract, he can not now recover from Paul H. Hacke and J. B. George,
two of the defendants, as individuals.'' Affirmed.
Verdict and judgment against defendant, E. B. Gawthrop, and in
favor of Paul H. Hacke et al., the other defendants. Plaintiff appealed.
Opinion by MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STERRETT, December, 30, 1893:
It is essential to the creation of a corporation under an enabling
statute that all material provisions should be substantially followed;
and, exemption from personal liability being one of the chief characteristics distinguishing corporations from partnerships and unincorporated joint stock companies, it follows that those who transact business
upon the strength of an organization which is materially defective are
individually liable, as partners, to those with whom they have dealt.
What provisions are material must be gathered from the relation of
each to the purpose and scope of the act; and when, therefore, successive steps are prescribed for the creation of corporations, these
mui;t obviously be regarded as imperative. Enabling statutes, on the
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, impliedly prohibit
any other mode of doing the act which they authorize; they must be
strictly construed. Sutherland on Stat. Construction, section 4S4·
Hence it has been uniformly held that requirements in respect of filing charters are imperative. Childs .v. Smith, SS Barb. 4S; Smith v.
Warden, 86 Mo. 382; Abbott v. Smelting Co., 4 Neb. 416; Beach
on Corporations, section 162.
It is plain, even from a cursory reading of the act of April 29, 1874,
P . L. 77, that recording of the certificate "in the office for the recording
of deeds, and in and for the county where the chief operations are to be
carried on," was intended to be made one of the conditions precedent
to corporate existence. That was the last of successive steps required to be taken, and the right to begin the transaction of corporate
bu!oiness was made to depend upon the taking of that step. "From
thencefo1th," the act expressly declares, the suhscribers and their a ssociates and successors "shall be a corporation for the purposes and
\1pon the terms named in the said charter." One of the purposes
of the act being exemption from personal liability in the transaction
of business, it is obviously material that the public should have notice, and notice by record was accordingly prescribed. Failure to record was failure to comply with one of the express conditions of incorporation, and consequently of exemption from liability.
It may be conceded tliat l1ad plaintiff d ealt with defendants as a
corporatt'on lie would have been estopped from claiming against tliem
in any other capacity, even though they failed to r ec01-d their c/1 arter.
Spahr v. Bank, 94 Pa. 429. But t't is not pretend ed that he had
any knowledge of the existence of th e cit arter; and th ere was certainly nothing, either in th e name under which tliey did business or
in their conduct, whicli s/1ould have put him upon inquiry. In
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these circumstances he was amply justified in dealing with them as

664

partners. It was through their default—not his—that they were so

CINCINNATI, ETC., R. CO. V. DANVILLE, ETC., R . CO.
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treated; and it would be manifest injustice that he should lose his ad-

mittedly honest claim.

these circumstances he was amply justified £n deah"ng witli them as
partners. It was tlirough thefr default-not his-that they were so
treated; and it would be manifest injustice that he should lose his admittedly honest claim.
In the absence of an express agreement the acceptance of a note
from the defendants as a corporation, after plaintiff harl performed
his part of the contract, can not operate by way of election or estoppel. The relation of the parties was fixed by their status when the
original contract was made and can not be changed by gratuitous inference. The members of the alleged corporation were the defendants,
and were not injured by the acceptance of the note. The principle
which treats the acceptance of a note as additional security to and not
as satisfaction of a mechanic's lien (Jones v. Shawhan, 4 \V. & S.
257) is, with even more justice, applicable here.
It follows from what has been said that the instructions complained
of are erroneous.
Judgment reversed and a venire fadas de novo awarded.

In the absence of an express agreement the acceptance of a note

from the defendants as a corporation, after plaintiff had performed

his part of the contract, can not operate by way of election or estop-

pel. The relation of the parties was fixed by their status when the

original contract was made and can not be changed by gratuitous infer-

ence. The members of the alleged corporation were the defendants,

and were not injured by the acceptance of the note. The principle

which treats the acceptance of a note as additional security to and not

as satisfaction of a mechanic's lien (Jones v. Shawhan, 4 W. & S.

257) is, with even more justice, applicable here.

It follows from what has been said that the instructions complained

of are erroneous.

Judgment reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded.

Note. To same efiect, 1889, Eaton v. Walker, 76 Mich. 579, 6 L. R. A. 102;

1896, N. Y. Nat'l Ex. Bank v. Crowell et al., 177 Pa. St. 313; 1899, Christian

& C. G. Co. v. FruiUlale L. Co., 121 Ala. 340, 25 So. Rep. 566.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:17 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Sec. 177. (5) Non-dealers who injure the corporation are es-

topped to deny corporate existence.

(a) In case of torts against the corporation.

Note. To snme effect, 1889, Eaton v. Walker, 76 Mich. 579, 6 L. R. A. 102;
1896, N. Y. Nat'I Ex. Bank v. Crowell eta!., 177 Pa. St. 313; 1899, Christian
& C. G. Co. v. Fruitdale L. Co., 121 Ala. 340, 25 So. Rep. 566.

THE CINCINNATI, LAFAYETTE AND CHICAGO RAILROAD CO. v.

THE DANVILLE AND VINCENNES RAILWAY CO.

1874. In the Supreme Court of Illinois. 75 Illinois Reports

113-118.

Appeal from the circuit court of Iroquois county, the Hon. Charles

H. Wood, J., presiding.

Sec. 177.

( S) Non-dealers who injure the corporation are estopped to deny corporate existence.

This was a bill for an injunction, filed by the appellant against -the

appellee to restrain the latter taking possession of the railroad and

right of way of the complainant under certain fraudulent proceedings

for the condemnation of the same.

(a) In case of torts against the corporation.

Mr. Justice McAllister delivered the opinion of the court:

In the year 1871, certain persons, purporting to be twenty-five in

THE CINCINNATI, LAFAYETTE AND CHICAGO RAILROAD CO. v.
THE DANVILLE AND VINCENNES RAILWAY CO.

number, proceeded to organize themselves, under the general railroad

law of 1849, into the appellant corporation, for the purpose of sup-

plying a portion in this state of what was necessary to constitute a

complete line of railway between the cities of Cincinnati, O., and

1874.

Chicago, in this state. The amount of stock was fixed, was sub-

IN

THE

SUPREME CouRT
I

scribed and paid; directors were elected, articles of association pre-

OF

ILLINOIS.

75 Illinois Reports

13-118.

Appeal from the circuit court of Iroquois county, the Hon. Charles
H. Wood, J ., presiding.
This was a bill for an injunction, filed by the appellant against ..the
appellee to restrain the latter taking possession of the railroad and
right of way of the complainant under certain fraudulent proceedings
for the condemnation of the same.
Mn.. J usTICE McALLISTER delivered the opinion of the court:
In the year 1871, certain persons, purporting to be twenty-five in
number, proceeded to organize themselves, under the general railroad
law of 1849, into the appellant corporation, for the purpose of supplying a po1tion in this state of what was necessary to constitute a
complete line of railway between the cities of Cincinnati, 0., and
Chicago, in this state. The amount of stock was fixed, was subscribed and paid; directors were elected, articles of association pre-
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pared, subscribed, certified and filed with the secretary of state, and

the usual certificate given by that officer.

The portion of the line to be constructed was from a point on the

§ 177
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line between this state and Indiana, about three miles southeast of

Sheldon, in Iroquois county, thence running northeasterly through

that county and a portion of Kankakee county to the village of St.

Anne.

Appellant did not assume to exercise the right of eminent domain,

but obtained the right of way, so far as it was obtained, by purchase

or contract. It located the road between the points stated, and, by

about the middle of December, 1871, had it constructed, so that about

the 1st of May, 1S72, the through line, including the portion in ques-

tion, was opened for public use as a railroad, and appellant has not

only been in the exercise of its franchises as a railroad corporation,

but the same has been open, public and notorious. In November,

1872, this company reorganized under the general railroad act of this

state, which went into force March 1, 1872.

It appears, also, that about the 13th of November, 1872, the ap-

pellee was organized under the last mentioned act as a railroad cor-

poration, to construct a road, in part at least, upon a route similar to
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that of appellant. On the 22d of November, 1872, appellee, having

caused a survey of this line and a plat to be made, presented a petition

to the county court of Iroquois county for the purpose, ostensibly, of

condemning land through that county for its right of way. Numer-

ous tracts and parcels are described and the names of owners or pre-

tended owners given. Appellant is not named or described in the

petition. Nor was any notice to appellant given or contemplated.

Such proceedings were had upon this petition that a jury was sum-

moned to ascertain the compensation. About this time appellant dis-

covered that although it was in the actual possession and use of the

right of way before mentioned as a common carrier, and this fact

must have been known to the agents and attorneys of appellee, yet

the land that appellee was about to have condemned was, in fact, the

very right of way of which appellant was in actual and open posses-

sion for public purposes, and to this circumstance there was not the

remotest allusion in appellee's petition. It appearing that there was

no necessity or even plausible excuse for thus interfering with appel-

lant's right of way, then, in view of the circumstances of appellant's

open and notorious possession of it, and the studious exclusion of all

these facts from appellee's petition, and the failure to make appellant

a party, with notice, the inference is irresistible that this proceeding

in the county court was designed for the fraudulent purpose of sur-

reptitiously gaining possession of appellant's right of way. The actors

in the formation of the scheme, as would seem from their positions

in argument on this appeal, reasoned in this wise: "Now, there are

defects in the organization of the Cincinnati, Lafayette and Chicago

Railroad Company; they have made a slip in some particulars, and if

we can so manage as to get a condemnation proceeding through the

court without notice to that company, and thereby get into possession,

pared, subscribed, certified and filed with the secretary of state, and
the u sual certificate given by that officer.
The portion of the line to be constructed was from a point on the
line between this state and Indiana, about three miles southeas~ of
Sheldon, in ·Iroquois county, thence running northeasterly through
that county and a portion of Kankakee county to the village of St.
Anne.
Appellant did not assume to exercise the right of eminent domain ,
but obtained the rig ht of way, so far as it was obtained, by purchase
or contract. It located the road between the points stated, and, by
about the middle of D ecember, 1871, had it constructed, so that about
the 1st of May, 1872 , the through line, including the portion in question, was opened for public u se as a railroad, and appellant has not
only been in the exercise of its franchises as a railroad corporation,
but the same has been open, public and notorious. In November,
18ri, this company reorganized under the general railroad act of this
state, which went into force March 1, 1872.
It appears, also, that about the 13th of November, r872, the appellee was organized under the last mentioned act as a railroad corporation, to construct a road, in part at least, upon a route similar to
that of appellant. On the 22d of November, 1872, appellee, having
caused a survey of this line and a plat to be made, presented a petition
to the county court of Iroquois county for the purpose, ostensibly, of
condemning land through that county for its right of way. Numerous tracts and parcels are described and the names of owners or pretended owners given. Appellant is not named or described in the
petition. Nor was any notice to appellant given or contemplated.
Such proceedings were had upon thi s petition that a jury was summoned to ascertain the compensation. About this time appellant discovered that although it was in the actual possession and use of the
right of way before mentioned as a common carrier, and this fact
must have been known to the agents and attorneys of appellee, yet
the land that appellee was about to have condemned was, in fact, the
very right of way of which appellant was in actual and open possession for public purposes, and to this circumstance there was not the
remotest allusion in appellee's petition. It appearing that there was
no necessity or even plausible excuse for tlius interfering with appellant's right of way, then, in view. of the circumstances of appeHant's
open and notorious possession of it, and the studious exclusion of all
these facts from appellee's petition, and the failure to make appellant
a party, with notice, the inference is irresistible that this proceeding
in the county cou1t was designed for the fraudulent purpose of su rrepti tiou sly gaining possession of appellant's right of way. The actors
in the formation of the scheme, as would seem from their positions
in argument on this appeal, reasoned in thi s wise: "Now, th ere are
defects in the organization of the Cincinnati, Lafayette and Chicago
R ailroad Company; they have made a slip in som e p articul ars, and if
we can so manage as to get a condemnation proceeding through the
court without notice to that company, and thereby get into possession,
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we can then assail their organization, convince the court that they can

666

have no standing in court on account of those defects, and thus keep
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that possession, no matter how acquired." That is the very argu-

we can then assai l their organization, convince the court that they can
ha \'e no standing in court un accou11t of those ddects, and thus. keep
that posses~io n , no matter how acquired." That is the very argument they urge here to ustain the decree of the court below dismissing appellant's bill to restrain them from thus ohtaining possession, on
the ground of fraud a nd want of jurisdiction in the proceedings to
condemn. It is apparent from the fact of those proceedings, when
con iderecl with the surrounding circumstances , that the former,
though ostensibly for the ordinary purpose of condemning land not appropriated to the railroad uses, for appellee's rights of way, were, in
reality, but in the execution of a scheme devised for the fraudulent
and inequitable purpose of getting possession of appellant's right of
"vay without making compensation, sind then to seize upon alleged
defects in appellant's organization as a means of retaining it against
justice and right. The morality of the act is supported by the same
reasoning which would be resorted to in justification of a contemplated
theft from one non compo<; m entis, "He is incapable of appearing in
court to vindicate his rig hts."
An elaborate printed argument has been presented by appellee's
counsel to show that appellant was not rightfully organized, and that
therefore it could acquire no right of way, and especially that it can
have no standing in court in its claim for protection against this contempl ated invasion of its p ossession. Ile says the act of 1849 was repealed ·by the constitution of 1870.
There is, in our opinion, no basis for the position that the sections
of the act of 1849, so for as they provide for the formation of such
corporations, are abrogated by the constitution . They are not incons iste nt with any of its provisions. Then , there being such a law authorizing the formation of railroad corporations, and articles of association having been prepared and filed with the secretary of state, and
he having given the certificate provided for, and there having been a
user of the franchi ses purporting to be invested in the association, the
latte r became a de facto corporation, and under the settled law of this
court neither the eligibility of the directors nor the rightfuln ess of the
existence of the corporation could be inquired into collaterally in this
suit. Tarbell v. Page, 24 Ill. 46; Mitchel et al. v. Deeds, 49 Ill.
416; Thompson v. Candor, 60 Ill. 244.
Jn Mitchell v. Deeds, before cited , the court, page 422, said: "The
law is well settl.ed in this state , that, under the plea of nut t£el corporation, the plaintiff need only show an organization in fact and a user
of corporate franchises."
So, by parity of reasoning, such organization in fact, and user, are
all that is necessary to maintain a bill in equity against a mere stranger
seeking to interfere with the property of such de facto corporation.
Here it w as indisputably shown that there was such an organization
in fact , followed hy user of corporate franchises. Tha t was sufficient.
So, a lso, it was shown that the directors were elected unde r color of
authority and were acting as such. They were, there fore, de facto
officers of the corporation. Their title to the office could not be

ment they urge here to sustain the decree of the court below dismiss-

ing appellant's bill to restrain them from thus obtaining possession, on

the ground of fraud and want of jurisdiction in the proceedings to

condemn. It is apparent from the fact of those proceedings, when

considered with the surrounding circumstances, that the former,

though ostensibly for the ordinary purpose of condemning land not ap-

propriated to the railroad uses, for appellee's rights of way, were, in

reality, but in the execution of a scheme devised for the fraudulent

and inequitable purpose of getting possession of appellant's right of

way without making compensation, and then to seize upon alleged

defects in appellant's organization as a means of retaining it against

justice and right. The morality of the act is supported by the same

reasoning which would be resorted to in justification of a contemplated

theft from one non compos mentis, "He is incapable of appearing in

court to vindicate his rights."

An elaborate printed argument has been presented by appellee's

counsel to show that appellant was not rightfully organized, and that
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therefore it could acquire no right of way, and especially that it can

have no standing in court in its claim for protection against this con-

templated invasion of its possession. lie says the act of 1849 was re-

pealed by the constitution of 1870.

There is, in our opinion, no basis for the position that the sections

of the act of 1849, so far as they provide for the formation of such

corporations, are abrogated by the constitution. They are not incon-

sistent with any of its provisions. Then, there being such a law au-

thorizing the formation of railroad corporations, and articles of associ-

ation having been prepared and filed with the secretary of state, and

he having given the certificate provided for, and there having been a

user of the franchises purporting to be invested in the association, the

latter became a de facto corporation, and under the settled law of this

court neither the eligibility of the directors nor the rightfulness of the

existence of the corporation could be inquired into collaterally in this

suit. Tarbell v. Page, 24 111. 46; Mitchel et a/, v. Deeds, 49 111.

416; Thompson v. Candor, 60 111. 244.

In Mitchell v. Deeds, before cited, the court, page 422, said: "The

law is well settled in this state, that, under the plea of nul ticlcorpo-

ration, the plaintiff need only show an organization in fact and a user

of corporate franchises."

So, bv parity of reasoning, such organization in fact, and user, are

all that is necessary to maintain a bill in equity against a mere stranger

seeking to interfere with the property of such de facto corporation.

Here it was indisputably shown that there was such an organization

in fact, followed by user of corporate franchises. That was sufficient.

So, also, it was shown that the directors were elected under color of

authority and were acting as such. They were, therefore, de facto

officers of the corporation. Their title to the office could not be
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al. v. Kolbenson et al., 61 111. 418, and authorities there cited.

Appellee had authority to exercise the right of eminent domain,

but, by the statute prescribing the mode of its exercise, it could not

brought in question and decided collaterally in this suit.

Lawson et

al. v. Kolbenson et al., 61 Ill. 418, and authorities there cited.

have appellant's right of way condemned for even a qualified or con-

joint use without describing it in the petition as such right of way,

and alleging inability to agree as to compensation. This proceeding,

which might, perhaps, have been lawful and proper but for circum-

stances which were studiously concealed, was for an inequitable pur-

pose. It was designed and carried forward for the purpose of getting

possession of the right of way, of which appellant was in quiet pos-

session as owner, without making appellant a party or paying to it

any compensation. No other object was intended by, and no other

result could follow, the carrying the proceeding through to a finality.

It was, in this view, a proper case for an injunction. In Goodenough

v. Sheppard, 28 111. 81, it was held that a person in the quiet pos-

session of real estate as owner may obtain an injunction to restrain

others from dispossessing him by means of process growing out of

litigation to which he was not a party. does not He -with appellee
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to say, in justification of this inequitable proceeding, that the ap-

pellant -Mas not so far rightfully organized or authorized to con-

struct the railroad in question as to be capable of holding lands for

the purposes of a right of way. This is a question solely between

appellant and the persons from whom title was obtained, or between

appellant and the people of the state, when proper proceedings shall

arise to require its decision.

It is obvious, from the record, that the court below made inquisition

into the rightfulness of appellant's corporate existence, and dismissed

the bill for defects in its organization. This was error. The decree

will be reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings not in-

consistent with this opinion.

Decree reversed.

Note. See, also, 1843, Quincy Canal v. Newcomb, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 276; 1846,

Elizabeth Citv Academy v. Lindsey, 28 N. C. (6 Ired.) 476. 45 Am. Dec. 500;

1873, Stockton & L. G. R. Co. v. Stockton & R. Co., 45 Cal. 680; 1878, Alder-

man v. School Directors, etc., 91 111. 179; 1889, Golden Gate M. & M. Co. v.

Joshua H. M. W., 82 Cal. 184; 1893, Crenshaw v. Tillman, 113 Mo. 633, 20 S.

W. Rep. 1077. But see, 1885, Doboy & U. I. Tel. Co. v. D. E. Magathias, 25

Appellee had authority to exercise the right of eminent domain,
but, by the statute prescribing the mode of its exercise, it could not
have appellant's right of way condemned for even a qualified or conjoint use without describing it in the petition as such right of way,
and alleging inability to agree as to compensation. This proceeding,
which might, perhaps, have been lawful and proper but for circumstances which were studiously concealed, was for an inequitable purpose. It was designed and can-ied forward for the purpose of getting
possession of the right of way, of which appellant was in quiet possession as owner, without making appellant a party or paying to it
any compensation. No other object was intended by, and no other
result could follow, the carrying the proceeding through to a finality.
It was, in this view, a proper case for an injunction. In Goodenough
v. Sheppard, 28 Ill. 81, it was held that ~ person in the quiet posse sion of real estate as owner may obtain an injunction to restrain
others from dispossessing him by means of process growing out of
litigation to which he was not a party. It does not li'e with appellee
to say, in justification of this inequitable proceeding, that tlie app ellant was not so far rightfully organ£zed or authorized to construct the railroad in question as to be capable of holding lands for
the purposes of a r£ght of way. Tht's is a question solely between
appellant and tlte persons from wliom title was obtai·ned, or between
appellant and the people of tlie state, when proper proceedings shalt
arise to require its decision.
It is obvious, from the record, that the court below made inquisition
into the rightfulness of appellant's corporate existence, and dismissed
the bill for defects in its organization. This was error. The decree
will be reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings not incon istent with this opinion.
Decree reversed.

Fed Rep. (U. S. C. C.) 697.

Note'. See, also, 1843, Quinc.Y Canal v. Newcomb, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 276; 1846.
Elizabeth City Academy v. Lmdsey, 28 N. C. (6 Ired.) 476. 45 Am. Dec. fiOO;
1873, Stockton & L. G. R. Co. v. Stockton & R. Co., 45 Cal. 680; 1878, Alderman v. School Directors, etc., 91 tll. 179; 1889, Golden Gate M. & M. Co. v.
Joshua H. M. W., 82 Cal. 184; 1893, Crenshaw v. Ullman, 113 Mo. 633, 20 S.
W. Rep. 1077. But see, 1885, Doboy & U. I. Tel. Co. v. D. E. Magathias, 25
Fed Rep. (U.S. C. C.) 697.
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SASSER V. STATE OF QHIO.

(6) Or crimes affecting the corporation.

SASSER v. THE STATE OF OHIO.1

Sec. 178.

1S44. In the Supreme Court of Ohio. 13 Ohio Rep. 453-489.

[These are writs of error to the court of common pleas of the

county of Hamilton.

( b) Or crimes affecting the corporation.

In the first of these cases the plaintiff was indicted for "having in

his possession, and secretly keeping, a bank-note plate, for the pur-

SASSER'· THE STATE OF OHIO.t

pose of striking and printing false and counterfeited bank-notes, to

wit, false and counterfeited bank notes in the likeness and similitude

1844.

of true and genuine bank notes of the Bank of Tennessee, of the

IN THE SUPREME CouRT

OF

Omo.

13 Ohio Rep. 453-4-89.

denomination of $20," etc. The second count was the same, with

the addition that the possession was for the purpose of printing coun-

[These are writs of error to the court of common pleas of the
county of Hamilton.
In the first of these cases the plaintiff was indicted for ''having in
his possession, and secretly keeping, a bank-note plate, for the pur·
pose of striking and printing false and counterfeited bank-notes, to
wit, false and counterfeited bank notes in the likeness 'and similitude
of true and genuine bank notes of the Bank of Tennessee, of the
denomination of $zo," etc. The second count was the same, with
the addition that the possession was for the purpose of printing coun·
tcrfeited bank notes. At the October term, 1844, he was found guilty
on the second count, and not guilty on the first, and sentenced, upon
the second count, to imprisonment in the penitentiary for fiye year.
A bill of exceptions was taken dudng the trial, from which it appears
that the prosecuting attorney proved , by parol, that there was suc)l a
bank as the one named in the indic'tment, and that its bills, of the denomination specified, were current in Ohio. The plaintiff objected
to this proof, and insisted that the act incorporating the Bank of Ten·
nessee was the only evidence that could be introduced; which objec·
ti on was overruled.]
BrncHARD, J. • • • Did the court err in admitting the testimony ob·
jccted to? This presents a question not free from difficulty, and yet the
<leci ion below is believed to be consistent with the uniform and oft·
repeated adjudications upon similar questions since the first organiz:i·
tion of the state. The general rule is, that the best evidence must be
given which the nature of the case admits of. The rule does not re·
quire that the strongest possible assurance of the point in que>tion
shall be given, but that no evidence shall be received of a character
which presupposes that better an<l higher evidence is in the possession
or power of the party offering it. Were these banks suitors in court.
claiming the exercise of corporate rights, the offer by them of parol
proof to maintain the right, unless it were a right acqujred by pre·
scription, would be within the rule, for it would carry a prcsump~ion
against them, that, if p1:oducecl, their charters would show th at the
franchise in question was not confened. Hence the rule in Lewis '"
Bank of K entucky, 12 Ohio R ep . l)I: ''The corporators ha,·efull
knowledge of their pov,rers and ca pacity, and the means of establi hing
them." When they exercise powers under the authority of a written
charter, the non-production of that charter and the attempt to supply

terfeited bank notes. At the October term, 1844, he was found guilty

on the second count, and not guilty on the first, and sentenced, upon

the second count, to imprisonment in the penitentiary for five years.

A bill of exceptions was taken during the trial, from which it appears

that the prosecuting attorney proved, by parol, that there was such a

bank as the one named in the indictment, and that its bills, of the de-
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nomination specified, were current in Ohio. The plaintiff objected

to this proof, and insisted that the act incorporating the Bank of Ten-

nessee was the only evidence that could be introduced; which objec-

tion was overruled.]

Birchard, J. * * * Did the court err in admitting the testimony ob-

jected to? This presents a question not free from difficulty, and yet the

decision below is believed to be consistent with the uniform and oft-

repeated adjudications upon similar questions since the first organiza-

tion of the state. The general rule is, that the best evidence must be

given which the nature of the case admits of. The rule does not re-

quire that the strongest possible assurance of the point in question

shall be given, but that no evidence shall be received of a character

which presupposes that better and higher evidence is in the possession

or power of the party offering it. Were these banks suitors in court,

claiming the exercise of corporate rights, the offer by them of parol

proof to maintain the right, unless it were a right acquired by pre-

scription, would be within the rule, for it would carry a presumption

against them, that, if produced, their charters would show that the

franchise in question was not conferred. Hence the rule in Lewis v.

Bank of Kentucky, 12 Ohio Rep. 151: "The corporators have full

knowledge of their powers and capacity, and the means of establishing

them." When they exercise powers under the authority of a written

charter, the non-production of that charter and the attempt to supply

1 Statement of facts abridged. Argumenta omitted, and part of opinion

emitted.

1
Statement of facts abridged. Arguments omitted, and part of opinion
:Omitted.
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it by parol evidence is an indirect admission that the charter is suffi-

cient, and that, if they can not make out by parol a better one than

exists on paper, they must fail. An analogous point was ruled by

Lord Mansfield, in Roe v. Harvey, 7 Burr. 24S4. No such implica-

tion necessarily arises when parol proof of the actual existence of a

bank in a sister state is offered by a third party, and especially when

offered by the public prosecutor against a person charged with coun-

terfeiting the bills or plates of such bank, because the act of counter-

feiting implies, on his part, an admission that there is such a bank,

and that its genuine issues and plates are authorized and of value. It

is irrational to presume that men will take the trouble to counterfeit

paper which is wholly worthless. All men are presumed to act ac-

cording to their interest. No one could have any interests in forging

valueless notes. Rules of law are never founded upon unnatural

premises. On the contrary, it is, in general, safe to abolish a rule,

when the sound reason upon which it was established has ceased to

exist.

Admitting the proposition, that if the bank notes in question were
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issued by an unauthorized bank they would be nullities, and that, in

that case, the plates might be secretly kept without incurring the pen-

alty of the law, it does not follow that the evidence offered below was

incompetent. The rules of presumptive evidence apply to corpora-

tions as well as individuals, and a charter may be presumed from the

long exercise of corporate rights. U. S. Bank v. Dandridge, 12

Wheat. 70. The proof offered in this case showed that paper of the

description alleged to be counterfeited was current in Ohio, and reputed

to be the paper of legally established institutions of Virginia and Ten-

nessee. Proof that their paper had obtained general circulation and

acquired universal confidence in a state like this, at a time when pub-

lic attention is turned towards all corporations, both foreign and

domestic, with eager and jealous scrutiny, certainly raised a violent

presumption that the banks had a legitimate existence, and lawfully

possessed the powers which they had exercised. Coupled with the

other legal presumption, that no one will counterfeit the valueless

paper of an unauthorized bank, and we think the proof, unrebutted,

sufficient for the prosecution. This made out a prima facie case,

and was ample to cast upon the accused the burden of proving that

the laws of Virginia and Tennessee restricted banking generally, or

by these institutions in particular. The People v. Davis, 21 Wend.

309, is a case in point. Davis was indicted for having in his pos-

session a counterfeit note of the Morris Canal and Banking Company,

and the question was whether the prosecution were bound to prove

the existence of the company by the production of the charter, and it

was held they were not—that they might prove it in the ordinary way,

and "that secondary evidence, such as the acts and operations of the

company, and the like, had been invariably received at the oyer and

terminer." Is there any real danger in continuing this rule of evi-

dence? It may be presumed that, if it were palpably mischievous,

or, even by possibility, occasionally dangerous in practice, it would

it by parol evidence is an indirect admission that the charter is sufficient, and that, if they can n ot make out by parol a better one thnn
exi. ts on paper, they must fail. An analogous p oint wa s ruled by
Lord :\ilansfield, in Roe v. Harvey, 7 Burr. 2+84. No such impli cation necessarily arises ·when parol proof of the actual exi tence of a
ba nk in a sister state is offered by a third party, and especially when
~ffered by the public prosecutor against a person charged with counterfe iting the bills or plates of such bank, because the act of counterfeiting implies, on his part, an admission that there is such a bank,
and that its genuine issues and plates are authorized and of value. It
is irrational to presume that men will take the trouble to counterfeit
pape r which is wholly worthless. All men are presumed to act according to their interest. No one could have any interests in forging
valueless notes. Rules of law are never founded upon unnatural
premises. On the contrary, it is, in general, safe to abolish a rule,
when the sound reason upon which it was establi shed has ceased to
exi st.
Admitting the proposition, that if the bank notes in question were
i ued by an unauthorized bank they would be nullities , and that, in
tha t case, the plates might be secretly kept without incurring the penalty of the law, it does not follow that the evidence offered below was
incompetent. The rules of presumptive evidence apply to corporations as well as individuals, and a charter may be presumed from the
long exercise of corporate rights. U. S. Bank v. Dandridge, 12
Wheat. 70. The proof offered in this case showed thnt paper of the
description alleged to be counterfeited was current in Ohio, and reputed
to be the paper of legally established institutions of Virginia and T e nnessee. Proof that their paper had obtained general circulation and
acquired universal confidence in a state like this, at a time when public attention is turned towards all corporations, b oth foreign and
domestic, with eager and jealous scrutiny, certainly raised a violent
presumption that the banks had a legitimate existence, arid lawfully
possessed the powers which they had exercised. Coupled with the
other legal presumption , that no one will counterfeit the valueless
paper of an unauthorized bank, and we think the proof, unrebutted,
sufficient for the prosecution. This made out a prima fade case,
and was ample to cast upon the accused the burden of proving that
the laws of Virginia and Tennessee restricted banking generally, or
by these institutions in particular. The People v. Davis, 21 vVend.
309, is a case in point. Davis was indicted for having in his posse sion a counterfeit note of the Monis Canal and B anking Company,
and the question was whether the prosecution were bound to prove
the existence of the company b y the production of the charter, and it
was held they were not-that they might prove it in the ordinary w ay,
and ''that secondary evidence, such as the acts and operation s of the
company, and the like, h ad been invariably r ece ived at the oyer and
terminei-." Is there any real danger in continuing this rnl e of evidence? It may he presumed that, if it were palpably mischievous,
or, even by pos5ibility, occasionally dangerous in practice, it would
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not have stood without question for forty years in Ohio, and in

many of our sister states for a still longer period. But this case even
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does not show that injustice has been caused by its application. We

SASSER V. STATE OF OHIO.

know, as a matter of fact, that each of the two institutions is legally

not have stood without question for forty years in Ohio, and in
many of our sister states for a still longer period. But this case even
does not show that injustice has been caused by its application. We
know, as a matter of fact, that each of the two institutions is legally
constituted, and recognized as such, by the courts of Virginia and
Tennessee. No actual wrong was committed by the decision complained of, because the proof offered established nothing that wa · ul\r
true. It is attacked, not for the individual wrong it has wrought in
this case, but for the public good, lest, peradventure, it may work
harm hereafter to somebody if allowed to stand as a precedent.
In argument, it is admitted that parol proof has hitherto "always
been held sufficient in similar cases; but, it is said, this is because
counsel have not objected that it was secondary evidence, and that omissions of counsel should not be allo·wed to establish a rule of practice,
in opposition to the paramount principles of law." If the argument
be sound that this kind of evidence, when offered by a third party,
does not raise the inference that higher evidence, in the possession of
the party, is withheld, and if the act of forgery implies a confession,
by the forger, that the instrument which it purports to imitate is valid,
it can not well be said to be secondary evidence, because it does not
fall \vithin the reason that distinguishes the two classes of proof. Is
it always within the power of the prosecutor to prove the charters of
banks incorporated by our sister states? That they may be procured
by taking sufficient pains and ample time is not doubted. Certified
copies of any legislative act may be had on application to the executives of the states of Virginia and Tennessee. But under our constitution, an aq:used person is entitled to "a speedy public trial." He
can not lawfully be detained, and committed for trial, without e\'idence. Nor is that evidence, on a question of commitment, which is
no evidence on a final trial. What, then, would be the effect of a
rule that would, indispensably, require the production of the act incorporating a foreign and distant bank in like cases ? It would afford
immunity to crime in innumerable cases. It would be as fatal to the
success of many necessary prosecutions for counterfeiting as a rule
that would permit the forged signature of the officer of a bank to be
disproved by him alone-a rule \\·hi ch has long since ceased to be recognized by the most enlightened tribunals of this country, and, at this
day, is not law in England. Hess v. The State, 5 Ohio Rep. 7;
Commonwealth v. Cary, 2 Pick. 47.
Some courts still consi<ler the testimony of experts touching the
genuineness of the handwriting as secondary and inferior evidence to
the testimony of the supposed writer; others avoid the general rule
by as mning that the testimony of each is primary evidence, while all
alike admit the evi<lence and avoid the application of the rule which
would exclude it. So, in cases of many public officers, proof of official character is permitted by parol when third parties make the
issue, and even when the officer is a party. Thus one may show himself to be a constable by proving his own acts in that capacity, and by
general reputation; Johnson v. Stedman, 3 Ohio Rep. 94. That he

constituted, and recognized as such, by the courts of Virginia and

Tennessee. No actual wrong was committed by the decision com-

plained of, because the proof offered established nothing that was un.

true. It is attacked, not for the individual wrong it has wrought in

this case, but for the public good, lest, peradventure, it may work

harm hereafter to somebody if allowed to stand as a precedent.

In argument, it is admitted that parol proof has hitherto "always

been held sufficient in similar cases; but, it is said, this is because

counsel have not objected that it was secondary evidence, and that omis-

sions of counsel should not be allowed to establish a rule of practice,

in opposition to the paramount principles of law." If the argument

be sound that this kind of evidence, when offered by a third party,

does not raise the inference that higher evidence, in the possession of

the party, is withheld, and if the act of forgery implies a confession,

by the forger, that the instrument which it purports to imitate is valid,

it can not well be said to be secondary evidence, because it does not
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fall within the reason that distinguishes the two classes of proof. Is

it always within the power of the prosecutor to prove the charters of

banks incorporated by our sister states? That they may be procured

by taking sufficient pains and ample time is not doubted. Certified

copies of any legislative act may be had on application to the execu-

tives of the states of Virginia and Tennessee. But under our consti-

tution, an accused person is entitled to "a speedy public trial." He

can not lawfully be detained, and committed for trial, without evi-

dence. Nor is that evidence, on a question of commitment, which is

no evidence on a final trial. What, then, would be the effect of a

rule that would, indispensably, require the production of the act in-

corporating a foreign and distant bank in like cases? It would afford

immunity to crime in innumerable cases. It would be as fatal to the

success of many necessary prosecutions for counterfeiting as a rule

that would permit the forged signature of the officer of a bank to be

disproved by him alone—a rule which has long since ceased to be rec-

ognized by the most enlightened tribunals of this country, and, at this

day, is not law in England. Hess v. The State, 5 Ohio Rep. 7;

Commonwealth v. Cary, 2 Pick. 47.

Some courts still consider the testimony of experts touching the

genuineness of the handwriting as secondary and inferior evidence to

the testimony of the supposed writer; others avoid the general rule

by assuming that the testimony of each is primary evidence, while all

alike admit the evidence and avoid the application of the rule which

would exclude it. So, in cases of many public officers, proof of offi-

cial character is permitted by parol when third parties make the

issue, and even when the officer is a party. Thus one may show him-

self to be a constable by proving his own acts in that capacity, and by

general reputation; Johnson v. Stedman, 3 Ohio Rep. 94. That he
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is a collector of taxes; Eldred v. Sexton, 5 Ohio Rep. 215. The rea-

son of the decision in these cases is applicable here. "It is more con-

sistent with the ends of justice than to establish a contrary rule." It

§ 178

CORPORATIONS BY ESTOPPEL.

is not conclusive evidence, but is so prima facie, and, unless contra-

dicted, must be conclusive. The character of a bank, indeed, whose

paper is in general circulation, performing the offices of money in a

business community like ours, becomes as well known as the official

character of a constable or tax-gatherer who resides amongst us. The

people in general are as well informed upon the subject as upon many

matters of public history. There is no county in the state where men of

integrity can not be found competent to state whether paper, the money

in general circulation among the people, is the paper of a real or unau-

thorized institution. The continuance of the rule that has obtained

is, therefore, perfectly consistent with the security of individual right;

and, while it subserves public convenience, the mere fact it is at war

with a technical rule, if it be so at war, furnishes no good reason for

changing the practice. • * *

Judgment affirmed.

Note. See, also, 1886, Stultz v. Turnpike Co., 48 N. J. L. 596; 1893, Canal

Street G. R. Co. v. Paas, 95 Mich. 372. But compare, 1888, Plank-road Co. v.
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Hilton, 69 Mich. 115; 1899, James v. State, 77 Miss. 370, 78 Am. St. Rep. 527.

Ab to injuries to non-dealers generally by the apparent corporation, it

would seem that if they have done nothing to recognize the corporate exist-

ence there could be no estoppel; yet if the corporation shows it is a de facto

is a collector of taxes; Eldred v. Sexton, 5 Ohio R ep. 2 15. The reason of the decision in these case~ is applicable here. "It is more consi tent . with the ends of justice than to establish a contrary rule." It
is not conclusive evidence, but is so prt'ma fade, and, unless contradicted, must be conclusive. The character of a bank, indeed, whose
paper is in general circulation, performing the offices of money in a
business community like ours, b ecomes as well known as the official
character of a constable or tax-gatherer who resides amongst us. The
p eople in general are as well informed upon the subject as upon many
matters of public history. There is no county in the state where men of
integrity can not be found competent to state whether paper, the money
in general circulation among the people, is the paper of a real or unauthorized institution. The continuance of the rule that has obtained
is, therefore, perfectly consistent with the security of individual right;
and, while it subserves public convenience, the mere fact it is at war
with a technical rule, if" it be so at war, furnishes no good reason for
cha nging the practice. • • •
Judgment affirmed.

one, the logic of the cases would seem to be that a non-dealer who is not

estopped could not hold members individually liable, or successfully impeach

the corporate existence, even if he is injured by such de facto corporation;

however, if the apparent corporation can not show that it has acquired a de

facto existence by being organized under a valid law, in good faith, followed

by corporate acts", a non-dealer could ignore the apparent corporate existence.

NOTE TO ART VI. EXTENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL.

It is usual to say that in order to obtain a de facto corporate existence there

must be a valid law under which to organize, an apparent compliance with the

law, a bona fide attempt to organize, under the law, and a user of corporate

franchises. See Elliott on Corporations, § 72; Clark on Corporations,

§§ 41, 42, and Pinnegan v. Noerenberg, supra, p. 614, and Society Perun v.

Note. See, also, 1886, Stultz v. Turnpike Co., 48 N. J. L. 596; 1893J Canal
Street G. R. Oo. v. Paas, 95 Mich. 372. But compare, 1888, Plank-roaa Co. v.
Hilton, 69 Mich. 115; 1899, James v. State, 77 Miss. 370, 78 Am. St. ReJ>.527.
As to injuries to non-dealers generally by the apparent corporation, it
would eeem that if they have done not.bing to recognize the corporate existence there could be no estoppel; yet if the corporation shows it is a de fa cto
one, the logic of the cases would seem to be that a non-denier who is not
estopped could not bold members individually linble, or successfully impeach
the corporate existence, even if he is injured by such cle facto corporation;
however, if the apparent corporation can not show that it has acquired a di!
facto existence by being orJ;!:anized under a valid law, in good faith, followed
by corporate acts, a non-dealer could ignore the apparent corporate e::dstence.

Cleveland, supra, p. 617. Tf, therefore, any of these elements' are wanting

NOTE TO ABT VI.

EXTENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL.

there can be no de, facto corporation, and the only ground for holding a pre-

tended corporation, where one or more of these elements is wanting, to be

such must be upon grounds of estoppel, or something analogous thereto. It

seems, however, that there is no perfect basis for an estop|iel except against

the pretended corporation itself or its members, for it or they only have mis-

led others to believe it to be a eorporaton. No one who contracts with such

a pretended corporation as a corporation, has misled it or its members as to

its real nature, for they know as much about it as he. The most that can be

said is that the party so contracting is willing to accept the corporate security

for the performance of the contract, and should not afterward be allowed to

insist upon a different security, such as the individual or partnership liability

of the members. The fact is, he has not misled the corporation, but it has

misled him—yet, perhaps, not to his damage, when he willingly accepted the

corporate security. Hence it would not be equitable to claim a greater secu-

rity, when, upon being offered a certain security, viz., the corporate security,

he accepted it. This is hardly an estoppel, but rather a mere term of the

It is nsunl to say that in order to obtain a de facto corporate existence thMe
must be a 11alid law under whicli to orgauize, an app<1re11t complia11ce with the
law, a bona fide attempt to organize un<ler the law, and a wier of corporate
franchises. See Elliott on Corporations, § 72; Clark on Corporations,
§§ 41, 42, and Finnegan v. Noerenberg, sttpra, p. 614, and Society Perun \".
Cleveland, supra, p. 617. Tf, therefore, any of these elementA are wanting
there can be no _de facto corporation, and the only ground for holding a pretended oorporation, where one or more of these elements is wanting to be
such must be upon grounus of estoppel, or something analogous ther~to. It
seems, however, that there is no perfect basis for an estoppel except against
the pretended co.rpon.ltion itself or its members, for it or they only have misled others to believe 1t to be a corporaton . No one who contracts with sur:h
a pretended corporation as a corporation, llas misled it or its members as to
its real nature, for they know as much about it as he. The mo t that can ue
said is that tbe party so contruct.ing is willing to accept the corporate security
for the performance of the contract, and should not afterward be allowe<l to
ineist llp<>n a different security, such RR the imlividual or parlnPrship liability
of. the m~mbers. The fact is, he haR not misled the corporation, but it has
IDJsled him-yet, perhaps, not to his da111age, when he willingly accepted the
c~rporate security. Hence it woul<l not be equitable to claim a g reater sccunty, when, upon being offered a certain security, viz., the corporate secu rit v.
be accepted it. This is hardly an estoppel, but rather a mere term of tlie
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NOTES TO ARTICLE VI.

contract, upon which the minds of the parties met, although it was false in

fact, and known to he so bv the pretended corporation at the time.

contract, upon which the minds of thP. parties met,_ although i~ was false in
fact and known to be so bv the pretended corporation at, the time.
A~ to the validity of the law under which the corpo ration _claims to be ?~n
izect, there are three couceivnble conditions: (1) A lnw 1 ~1 f~ct proh1b1ting
E'tll"h a r.orporntion. (2) Ko law at all.
(3l An unconst1tntional law: ~t
would seem there could be no de far.to corporation in either case, and i t 1
generally so held. Can there be a corporation by estoppel? According t-0the
decision iu Boyce v. The Trustee, etc., supra, p. 642; Jones v. Aspen Hardware Uo., .mpra, p. 637, and Snyder v. Studebaker, supra, p. 634, there could
not be a corporation und e r any circumstances of estoppel, either in favor
of or agllinst the pretended corporation; but it would seem that eirtoppels
might arise in all of th ese cases, as well as others; yet in the first tw<r
a prohibitory law, and no law at all-public policy might override all grounds
of estoppel and say, in such cases, no corporate existence should be recog·
nized. See Wright v. Lee, 2 S. D. 596: Empire Mills v. Alston Grocery Co.,
15 S. W. Rep. (Tex. App.) 200, 505; Building and Loan Assn. v. Chamberlain, 4 S. D. 271, 56 N. W. Rep. 897; Oregonian R. Co. v. Oregonian R. & N.
Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 233; but compare, 1870, Smith v. Sheeley, 12 Wall. CL. F:.)
358, and 1883, Saunders v. Farmer, 62 N. H . 572; 1898, Carroll v. National
Bank, 19 Wash. 639, M Puc. Rep. 32.
But in the third cuse-the unconstitutional law-manv cases bold there can
be corporations by estoppel (many erroneouslv calling them de fa cto corporations). See, 1870, Smith v. Sheeley, 12 Walf. (U. S.J 358; 1876, St. Louis v.
Shields, 62 Mo. 247; 1878, McCarthy v. Lavasche, 89 Ill. 270, Sttpra, p. 2ii3;
1878, Dows.v. Naper, 91Ill.44; 1880, Freeland v.1nsurance Co.~ 94"'Fa. St:
50-l; 1881, McClinch v. Sturgis, 72 Maine 288; 1883, Saunders v. Farmer, 62 N.
H. 572; 1884, Catholic Clmrch v. Tobbein, 82 Mo. 418, on 4.2 4; 1887, Fresno, etc.,
Irrigation Company v. Warner, 72 Cal. 379, 17 A. & E . Corp. Cas. Si: 1889,
Winget v. 911incy B. & H. Assn ..• 1~8 Ill. 67; 1892, Wright v. L~e, 2 S.D.~~·
37 Am. & E. C. C. 588; 1893, Bmldmg & L. Assn. v. Chamberlam, 4 RD. _iJ ,
4-1 Am. & E. C. C. 49; 1893, Rlack River Improvement Co. v. Holway, 8.5
Wif-l. 344; 1894, Georgia R. & F. R. Co. v. Mercantile T . & D. Co., 94 Ga. 306;
1895, Coxe v. St.ate, 144 N. Y. 396; 1898, Gardner v. Minn. & S. L. R. Co.•
73 Minn.517, 76N. W. Rep. 282; 1899, Richards v. Minn. Sav. Bank, 75 Minn.
196, 77 N. W . Re p. 822; but compare, 1889, Eaton v. Walker, 76 Mich. 5i\i,

As to the validity of the law under which the corporation claims to be organ-

ized, there are three conceivable conditions: (1) A law in fact prohibiting

such a corporation. (2) No law at all. (3) An unconstitutional law. It

would seem there could be no de facto corporation in either ease, and it is

generally no held. Can there be a corporation by estoppel? According tothe

decision in Boyce v. The Trustee, etc., supra, p. 642; Jones v. Aspen Hard-

ware Co., supra, p. 637, and Snyder v. Studebaker, supra, p. 634, there count

not be a corporation under any circumstances of estoppel, either in favor

of or against the pretended corporation; but it would seem that estoppels

might arise in all of these cases, as well as others; yet in the first two—

a prohibitory law, and no law at all—public policy might override all grounds

of estoppel and say, in such cases, no corporate existence should be recog-

nized. See Wright v. Lee, 2 8. D. 596: Empire Mills v. Alston Grocery Co.,

15 S. W. Rep. (Tex. App.) 200, 605; Building and Loan Assn. v. Chamber-

lain, 4 S. D. 271, 56 N. W. Rep. 897; Oregonian R. Co. v. Oregonian R & N.

Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 233; but compare, 1870, Smith v. Sheeley, 12 Wall. (U. P.)

358, and 1883, Saunders v. Farmer, 62 N. H. 572; 1898, Carroll v. National
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Bank, 19 Wash. 639, 54 Pac. Rep. 32.

But in the third case—the unconstitutional law—many cases hold there can

be corporations by estoppel (many erroneously calling them de facto corpora-

tions). See, 1870, Smith v. Sheeley, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 358; 1876, St. Louie v.

Shields, 62 Mo. 247; 1878, McCarthy v. Lavasche, 89 111. 270, supra, p. 253;

1878, Dows v. Naper, 91 111. 44; 1880, Freeland v. Insurance Co., 94"Pa. St!

504; 1881, McClinch v. Sturgis, 72 Maine 288; 1883, Saunders v. Farmer, 62 X.

H. 572; 1884, Catholic Church v. Tobbein, 82 Mo. 418,on 424; 1887, Fresno, etc..

Irrigation Company v. Warner, 72 Cal. 379, 17 A. & E. Corp. Cas. 37: 1889,

Winget v. Quincv B. & H. Assn., 128 111. 67; 1892, Wright v. Lee, 2 S.D.596.

37 Am. & E. C. C. 588; 1893, Building & L. Assn. v. Chamberlain, 4 S. D. 271,

44 Am. & E. C. C. 49; 1893, Black River Improvement Co. v. Holwav, 85

Wis. 344; 1894, Georgia S. & F. R. Co. v. Mercantile T. & D. Co., 94 Ga.'SOfi;

1895, Coxe v. State, 144 X. Y. 396; 1898, Gardner v. Minn. & S. L. R. Co.,

73 Minn. 517, 76 N. W. Rep. 282; 1899, Richards v. Minn. Say. Bank, 75 Minn.

contra .

196, 77 N. W. Rep. 822; but compare, 1889, Eaton v. Walker, 76 Mich. 579,

.As to the next two requisites of de fa.cto existence-apparent compliance
with the law, and bona fide attempt to organize-both bein~ questions of fact,
it would seem that estoppels should be allowed to arise as m other cases. But
in both of these cases it should be r emembered that the Jaw will not allow its
privileges to be used, even if literRlly fo11owed, as an engine for accomplish·
mg frauds (see Metcalf v. Arnold, supra, p. 97), or without anv effort in good
faith to comply with it (as, see Montgomery v. Forbes, supra, p. 594, and
Walton v. Oliver, supra, p. 565) .
. A~ to_user, it.seems that meeting, subscribing stock and completing organ·
1zat1011 1s sufficient user to make a de facto existence, if the other elemenra are
present. See, 1893, Union Water Co. v. Kean, 52 N. J. Eq. 111, 44 Am. & E.
C. C. 13. But no organization, though corporate powers nre claimed, is not
such user as makes a corporation defacto See W' alton v. Oliver, supra, p.565,
and Montgomery v. Forbes, supra, p. 594. In Euton v. Walker, 76 Mich.579,
it was held that organizatio;1 under an unconstitutional Jaw, and assuming to
1wt a" a rorporat.ion, was not such user as made a de facto exietence, nnd, on·
dt>r the facts of that case, it was h elcl that no estoppel arose. See Angell &
Ames.§§ 83, 172, 635-{) ; Beach,§§ 13, 14, 866, 871; Boone, §§ 104, JlS, 121,
239: Clark. §§ 43. 44: Cook. § 637; Elliott, §§ 81-88; Morawetz, §§ 750, 774,
778 n; Taylor,§§ 146-151, 1)37-9, 739; I Thom pson,§§ 518-533; VII Thompson,
§ 8213. 'l'he matter is closely allied to the subject of pleading and proof, upon
which the cases are in much conflict. See, illfra, §§ 327-333.

contra.

As to the next two requisites of de facto existence—apparent compliance

with the law, and bona fide attempt to organize—both being questions of fact,

it would seem that estoppels should be allowed to arise as in other cases. But

in both of these cases it should be remembered that the law will not allow its

privileges to be used, even if literally followed, as an engine for accomplish-

ing frauds (see Metcalf v. Arnold, supra, p. 97), or without any effort in good

faith to comply with it (as, see Montgomery v. Forbes, supra, p. 594, and

Walton v. Oliver, supra, p. 565).

As to user, it seems that meeting, subscribing stock and completing organ-

ization is sufficient user to make a de facto existence, if the other elements are

present. See, 1893, Union Water Co. v. Kean, 52 N. J. Eq. Ill, 44 Am. & E.

O. C. 13. But no organization, though corporate powers are claimed, is not

such user as makes a corporation de facto See Walton v. Oliver, supra, p. 565,

and Montgomery v. Forbes, supra, p. 594. In Eaton v. Walker, 76 Mich. 579,

it was held that, organization under an unconstitutional law\ and assuming to

act as a corporation, was not such user as made a de facto existence, and. un-

der the facts of that case, it was held that no estoppel arose. See Angell &

Ames, §§ 83, 172, 635-6: Beach, §§ 13, 14, 866, 871; Boone, §§ 104, 118. 121,

239: Clark. §S 43. 44: Cook. § 637; Elliott, $5 81-88; Morawetz, §§ 750, 774,

778n; Taylor, §§146-151,537-9,739; I Thompson, §§518-533; VII Thompson,

§ 8213. The matter is closely allied to the subjectof pleadingand proof, upon

which the cases are iu much conliict. See, infra, §§ 327-333.
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ARTICLE VII. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CONDITIONS,

AND NO ESTOPPEL, UPON THE LIABILITY OF MEMBERS OF THE
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PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY.

PRETENDED CORPORATION; THEORIES.

Sec. 179. (1) Makes the associates partners (if the pretended

corporation was for a business purpose) and liable as such, or

with the rights of such.

MARTIN Et Al., Appellants, v. FEWELL.1

ARTICLE VII. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CONDITIONS,
AND NO ESTOPPEL, UPON THE LIABILITY OF MEMBERS OF THE
PRETENDED CORPORATION j THEORIES.

1883. In The Supreme Court of Missouri. 79 Missouri Rep.

401-412.

Hough, C. J. This is an action of assumpsit by plaintiffs as

Sec. 179. (I ) Makes the associates partners

(if the pretended
corporation was for a business purpose) and liable as such, or
with the rights of such.

partners against defendants as partners. There are three counts in

the petition. The first is to recover judgment for goods alleged to

have been sold by plaintiffs to defendants, March 30, 1877, amount-

MARTIN ET

ing to $553.89; the second count is for goods sold August 14, 1877,

AL., APPELLA..NTS,

v. FEWELL. 1

amounting to $72.09, and the third is for goods sold October9, 1877,

amounting to $422.40. In addition to the usual averments as to the

1883.

sale and delivery of goods, each count contains substantially the fol-

lowing allegations: That at the time of said sales the defendants

were partners in the retail mercantile business in Calhoun, Henry
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county; that one M. Woods was the general agent of defendants, and

was by them authorized to conduct, manage and superintend said

business, to buy and sell goods and merchandise, and to do all things

in and about said business as fully as if he were himself sole owner

thereof, and to do all things usual and customary to be done by mer-

chants carrying on that sort of business; that M. Woods, as such

agent, and with the knowledge and approbation of these defendants,

carried on said business under the name "M. Woods," and the de-

fendants had no other partnership designation; that prior to Decem-

ber, 1876, plaintiffs had had dealings with said defendants, and had

sold and delivered to them goods and merchandise, through Woods as

defendant's agent; that plaintiffs had at no time business transactions

with Woods in any other capacity than as agent for defendants.

The answer contains a general denial, and also alleges that the

goods in the petition mentioned were sold and delivered by plaintiffs

to the "Calhoun Grange Store Company," a duly organized corpora-

tion of Missouri, and not the defendants; that the certificate of incor-

poration was duly filed in the recorder's office of Henry county, on

the — day of , 1876, and on May 18, 1877, a similar certificate

was filed with the secretary of state, and on the same day the said

secretary executed to said Calhoun Grange Store Company a certifi-

cate of incorporation as provided by law. The replication is a gen-

eral denial of the new matter pleaded in the answer. * * •

1 Only part of the opinion given.

43—Wil. Cases.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF M1ssouR1.
401-412.

79 Missouri Rep.

'

HouGH, C. J. This is an action of assumpsit by plaintiffs as
partners against defendants as partners. There are three counts in
the petition. The first is to recover judgment for goods alleged to
have been sold by plaintiffs to defendants, March 30, 1877, amounting to $553.89; the second count is for goods sold August 14, 1877,
amounting to $p.09, and the third is for goods sold October9, 1877,
amounting to $422.40. In addition to the usual averments as to the
sale and delivery of goods, each count contains substantial ly the following allegations : That at the time of said sales the defendants
were partners in the retail mercantile business in Calhoun, Henry
county; that one M. Woods was the general agent of defendants, and
was by them authorized to conduct, manage and superintend said
business , to buy and sell goods and merchandise, and to do all things
in and about said business as fully as if he were himself sole owner
thereof, and to do all things usual and customary to be done by merchants carrying on that sort of business; that M. Woods, as such
agent, and with the knowledge and approbation of these defendants,
carried on said business under the name "M. Woods," and the defendants bad no other partnership designation ; that prior to December, !876, plaintiffs had had dealings with said defendants, and had
sold and delivered to them goods and merchandise, through Woods as
defendant's agent; that plaintiffs had at no time business transactions
with Woods in any other capacity than as agent for defendants.
The answer contains a general denial, and also alleges that the
goods in the petition mentioned were sold and d elivered by plaintiffs
to the "Calhoun Grange Store Company," a duly organized corporation of Missouri, and not the defendants; that the certificate of incorporation was duly filed in the recorder's office of Henry county, on
the - day of--, 1876, and on May 18, 1877, a similar certificate
was filed with the secretary of state, and on the same day the said
ecretary executed to said Calhoun Grange Store Company a certificate of incorporation as provided by law. The replication is a general denial of the new matter pleaded in the answer. • • •
1

Only part of the opinion given.
43-WIL. CASES.
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At the request of the defendants, the court gave the following in-

§ 179

:.\fARTIX V. FEWELL.

structions:

At the request of the defendants, the court gave the following instructions:
r. If the jury believe from the evidence that prior to the sale of
any goods by the plaintiffs to vVoods for the grange store in question,
the defendants had, for the purpose of organizing a business corporation for running and conducting what is commonly known as a grange
store, agreed to subscribe and pay shares of stock to such organization,
and did take such stock w ith such understanding and for such purpose, and took initiative measures for the incorporation of said business, and organized as if incorporated, and elected directors for the
management and control of said association , and designated said
Woods to conduct and superintend said store for such directors, and
did make and acknowledge the mticles of association read in evidence,
and at the time of the first sale of any goods by plaintiffs to said
Woods, said defendants, through directors, were acting under the
said atticles of association as a corporation, and not otherwise, and
the said vVoods had no authority from them to buy goods except as
·the agent of said association, then, although said articles of incorporation may not have been filed and recorded as by statute provided,
the defendants arc not liable as partners to the plaintiffs for any goods
bought of them by said Woods.
2. Even though the articles of association read in evidence were
not filed with the secretary of state, yet, if defendants were acting
alone under such articles of association, claiming to be a corporation,
su ch omission to file the same with the secretary of state did not, of
it. elf, make the defendants liable as partners for any goods bought for
the store after said a1ticles were actually drawn up, signed and acknowledged. • • •
The court, of its own motion, gave the following instruction to the
jury:
If you believe from the evidence that the defendants, or some of
them, in the fall of 1875, or in the spring of 1876, made an agreement
with each other to contribute money or capital for the purpose of carrying on the business of buying and selling merchandise for their
mutual profit, and that they did so contribute and carry on said bu incss, either personally or by their agent, then such of defendants as
did the e things became and were partners in such business, and each
partner was individually liable for all the partnership debts, provided
that it does not further appear from the evidence that they did not
intend to act and carry on business as partners, but that they intended
to do business as an incorporated company and each one to be liable
only for the amonnt of his stock.
Upon the giving of these instructions the plaintiffs took a nonsuit,
and on the refusal of the court to set the same aside, they appealed to
this court. • • •
The only question remaining to be determined is whether, on the
fact!-\ stated in the first and second instructions given at the instance of
the defrnclants, and in the instructions given by the court of its own
motion, the defe ndants are liahle as co-partners. Neither tht· ca e of
Hurt v. Salisbury, SS Mo. 311, nor that of Richardson v . Pitt 71

1. If the jury believe from the evidence that prior to the sale of

any goods by the plaintiffs to Woods for the grange store in question,

the defendants had, for the purpose of organizing a business corpora-

tion for running and conducting what is commonly known as a grange

store, agreed to subscribe and pay shares of stock to such organization,

and did take such stock with such understanding and for such pur-

pose, and took initiative measures for the incorporation of said busi-

ness, and organized as if incorporated, and elected directors for the

management and control of said association, and designated said

Woods to conduct and superintend said store for such directors, and

did make and acknowledge the articles of association read in evidence,

and at the time of the first sale of any goods by plaintiffs to said

Woods, said defendants, through directors, were acting under the

said articles of association as a corporation, and not otherwise, and

the said Woods had no authority from them to buy goods except as

•the agent of said association, then, although said articles of incorpo-
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ration may not have been filed and recorded as by statute provided,

the defendants are not liable as partners to the plaintiffs for any goods

bought of them by said Woods.

2. Even though the articles of association read in evidence were

not filed with the secretary of state, yet, if defendants were acting

alone under such articles of association, claiming to be a corporation,

such omission to file the same with the secretary of state did not, of

itself, make the defendants liable as partners for any goods bought for

the store after said articles were actually drawn up, signed and ac-

knowledged. * * *

The court, of its own motion, gave the following instruction to the

jury:

If you believe from the evidence that the defendants, or some of

them, in the fall of 1875, or in the spring of 1876, made an agreement

with each other to contribute money or capital for the purpose of car-

rying on the business of buying and selling merchandise for their

mutual profit, and that they did so contribute and carry on said busi-

ness, either personally or by their agent, then such of defendants as

did these things became and were partners in such business, and each

partner was individually liable for all the partnership debts, provided

that it does not further appear from the evidence that they did not

intend to act and carry on business as partners, but that they intended

to do business as an incorporated company and each one to be liable

only for the amonnt of his stock.

Upon the giving of these instructions the plaintiffs took a nonsuit,

and on the refusal of the court to set the same aside, they appealed to

this court. * * *

The only question remaining to be determined is whether, on the

facts stated in the first and second instructions given at the instance of

the defendants, and in the instructions given by the court of its own

motion, the de fendants are liable as co-partners. Neither the case of

Hurt v. Salisbury, 55 Mo. 311, nor that of Richardson v. Pitts, 71
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Mo. 128, relied upon by the counsel for the plaintiffs, furnishes a dis-

tinct answer to this inquiry. The first case was a suit upon a note
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executed by certain individuals as directors assuming to represent a

corporation which had no legal existence, and this court held that the

parties who signed the note were liable thereon. In the case last

named certain members of an inchoate corporation, whose incorpora-

tion was incomplete by reason of a failure to file the articles of associa-

tion with the secretary of state, advanced money for the benefit of the

joint enterprise under obligations incurred by them upon the supposi-

tion that the association was duly incorporated, and they were ad-

judged to be entitled to contribution from their associate members

beyond the amount of stock severally subscribed for by such associ-

ates. The effect of this decision is to create the relation and liability

of partners as between the members of an unincorporated association,

so far as the debts of the association contracted in good faith and paid

by any of its members are concerned, and to establish a different rule

from that laid down in Ward v. Brigham, 127 Mass. 24. The de-

cision of this court is supported by the cases of Hill v. Beach, 12 N.

J. Eq. 31; Hodgson v. Baldwin, 65 111. 532; Flagg v. Stowe, 85 111.
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164. Vide, also, Ferris v. Thaw, 72 Mo. 446.

In Pettis v. Atkins, 60 111. 454; Bigelow v. Gregory, 73 111. 197;

Abbott v. Smelting Co., 4 Neb. 416; Frost v. Walker, 60 Maine

468; Wells v. Cates, 18 Barb. 554; National Union Bank v. Lan-

don, 45 N. Y..410, and Tappan v. Bailey, 4 Met. 529, it is held that

members of an unincorporated association, notwithstanding their sub-

scription and payment for a specified number of shares of the capital

stock of the association, are liable as co-partners for the debts of the

association. These decisions we regard as applicable to the case at

bar. By reference to the testimony it will be seen that in 1875, more

than a year before the articles of association were signed by the de-

fendants, the store was established and shares of stock were subscribed

for and Woods was appointed to make the purchases and superintend

the sales. All this was done, it is true, with the understanding that

the promoters of the enterprise were to become a corporation, and the

purpose of the promoters undoubtedly was to limit their liability to

the amounts severally subscribed by them.

If by reason of an unexecuted intention to become a corporation

the defendants could carry on the business of merchandising from

1875 until May, 1S77, without incurring in the meantime the liability

of partners, we do not see why they could not have continued so to

act as a corporation for a much longer period, buying and selling

through an agent, and enjoying all the privileges of a corporation

without being liable to be sued as such. No mere intention o?i the

part of the members of an unincorporated association to be a corpo-

ration will suffice to restrict their individual liability to that imposed

by the statute upon corporate shareholders. Not being a corporation,

their liability can not be a corporate liability, but must be that of a

joint-stock company, unless the provisions of the statute in relation

to limited partnerships shall have been complied with, of which

Mo. 128, relied upon by the counsel for the plaintiffs, furnishes a dis·
tinct answer to this inquiry. The first qse was a suit upon a note
executed by certain individuals as directors assuming to represent a
corporation which ha<l no legal existence, and this court held that the
parties who signed the note were liable thereon. In the case last
named certain members of an inchoate corporation, whose incorporation was incomplete by reason of a failure to file the articles of associ;ition with the secretary of state, advanced money for the benefit of the
joint enterprise under obligations incurred by them upon the supposition that the association was duly incorporated, and they were adjudged to be entitled to contribution from their associate members
beyond the amount of stock severally subscribed fo r by such associates. The effect of this decision is to create the relation and liability
of partners as between the members of an unincorporated association,
so far as the debts of the association contracted in good faith and paid
by any of its members are concerned, and to establish a different rule
from that laid down in Ward v. Brigham, 127 Mass. 24. The decision of this court is supported by the cases of Hill v . Beach, 12 N.
]. Eq. 3 r: Hodgson v. Baldwin, 65 Ill. 532; Flagg v. Stowe, 85 Ill.
164. Vide, al o, Ferris v. Thaw, 72 Mo. 446.
In Pettis v. Atkins, 6o Ill. 454; Bigelow v. Gregory, 73 Ill. 197;
Abbott v. Smelting Co., 4 Neb. 416; Frost v. Walker, 60 Maine
468; Wellsv. Cates, 18 Barb. 554; National Union Bankv. Landon, 45 N. Y.,410, and Tappan v. Bailey, 4 Met. 529, it is held that
members of an unincorporated association, notwithstan<ling their subscription and payment for a specified number of shares of the capital
stock of the association, are liable as co-partners for the debts of the
association. These decisions we regard as applicable to the case at
bar. By reference to the testimony it will be seen that in r 875, more
than a year before the articles of association were signed by the defendants, the store was established and shares of stock were subscri bed
for and Woods was appointed to make the purchases and superintend
the sales. All this was clone, it is true, with the understanding that
the promoters of the enterprise were to become a corporation. and the
purpose of the promoters undoubtedly was to limit their liability to
the amounts severally subscribed by them.
If by reason of an unexecuted intention to become a corporntio n
the defendants cou ld carry on the business of merchandising from
1875 until May, 1877, without incurring in the meantime the liability
of partners, we do not see why they could not have continued so to
act as a corporation for a much longer period, buying and selling
through an agent, and enjoying all the privileges of a corporation
without being liable to be sued as such. 11/0 mere intention 011 tlte
part of tlte members of an unt'ncorporated association to be a corporation will suffice to restrict tltei'r individual liabil£ty to tlwt imposed
by tlte statute upon corporate share/1olders. Not being a corporation,
llzeir· li'ab't'lity can not be a corporate liabi'lity, but must be t/1al of a
joint-stock company, unless the P.rovisions of the statute in rclatio11
to limited partnerships shall have been compli'ed with, of which.
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there is not even the slightest intimation in this case. Tliere is no

question but that the goods xvere purchased by Woods of the plaintiffs

tl1 ere is not even the slt"ghtest iut£mat£on in th£s case. Tlze1·e is no
question but that tlt e goods were purchased by Woods of tlte plaintiffs
for the defendants, and went into the store of the defendants, and
were sold by Woods for tlteir benefit, and a rult'ng wltich would turn
tlt e plaintiffs out of court, and compel them to collect the wlwle
amount of tltcir claims from Woods, or the directors in clwrge, who
could £n turn go agaillst the defendants for contribution under the
decision of this court in Richardson v. Pitts, supra, would be uot
only manifestly unjust, but utterly indefenst'ble. U nder the logic of
the case last cited, the defendants are liable as partn ers directly to the
plaintiffs for the debts of the association incurred before they became
incorporated.
For the deots incurred after they became a corporation, their liability will depend upon the fact of actual notice of their incorporation to tlie plaintiffs at the time such debts were incurred. vVhen
partner have dealt as such with a seller, and after becoming incorporated , continued to deal as before, having their bills made in the
same way, without giving any notice of their altered condition, they
will continue to be liable as partners, unless the seller have knowledge thereof derived from some other source. Whether the plaintiffs
had su..:h notice or knowledge is a question of fact for the jury.
For the reasons given, the judgment will be reversed, and the cause
remanded. All the judges concur.

for the defendants, and went into the store of the defendants, and

■were sold by Woods for their benefit, and a ruling which would turn

the plaintiffs out of court, and compel them to collect the xvliolc

amount of their claims from Woods, or the directors in charge, ivho

could in turn go against the defendants for contribution under the

decision of this court in Richardson v. Pitts, supra, would be not

only manifestly unjust, but utterly indefensible. Under the logic of

the case last cited, the defendants are liable as partners directly to the

plaintiffs for the debts of the association incurred before they became

incorporated.

For the deDts incurred after they became a corporation, their lia-

bility will depend upon the fact of actual notice of their incorpora-

tion to the plaintiffs at the time such debts were incurred. When

partners have dealt as such with a seller, and after becoming incor-

porated, continued to deal as before, having their bills made in the

same way, without giving any notice of their altered condition, they
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will continue to be liable as partners, unless the seller have knowl-

edge thereof derived from some other source. Whether the plaintiffs

had such notice or knowledge is a question of fact for the jury.

For the reasons given, the judgment will be reversed, and the cause

remanded. All the judges concur.

Note. See, 1857, Abbott v. Aspinwall, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 202; 1858, Hill v.

Beach, 12 N. J. Eq. 31; 1866, Medill v. Collier, 16Ohio St. 599; 1874, Stowe v.

Flagg, 72 111. 397; 1874, Whipple v. Parker, 29 Mich. 369; 1877, Flagg v.

Stowe, 85 111. 164; 1878, Jessup v. Carnegie, 12 Jones & S. (N. Y.) 260; 1880,

Ferris v. Thaw, 72 Mo. 446; 1881, Coleman v. Coleman, 78 Ind. 344; 1881,
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Stowe, 85 Ill. 164; 1878, J el:l1mp v. Carnegie, 12 Jones & S. (N. Y.) 260; 1880,
Ferris v.'Thaw, 72 l\lo. 446; 1881, Coleman v. Coleman, 78 Ind. 344; 1881,
Kaiser v. Lawrence Sav. Bank, 56 Iowa 104, 41 Am. Rep. 85; 1883, Clegg v.
Hamilton & W. Co. G. Co., 61 Iowa 121; 1884, Robinson v. Harris, 5 Ky. L
R. 928; 1884, Bamberger v. White; 6 Ky. L. R . 292; 1880, Smith v. Warden, 86
Mo. 382; 1891, Empire Mills v. Alston Grocery Co., 4 Texas App. 346, 12 L. R.
A. 366; 1895, Taylor v. Branham, 35 Fla. 297, 17 So. Rep. 552; 1895. Jones v.
Aspen Hardware Co., 21 Colo. 263, 62 Am. St. Rep. 220, 11upra. p. 637; 1896,
Lehman v. Knaf.p, 48 La. Ann. 1148, 20 So. Rep. 674; 1896, New York Nat' I Ex.
Bank v. Crowel, 177 Pa. St. 313, 35 Atl. Rep. 613; 1897, Liebold v. Green, 69
Ill. App. 527; 1898, Weir Furnace Co. v. Bodwell, 73 Mo. App. 389; 1899.
Hequembourg v. Edwards, 155 Mo. 514, 50 S. W. Rep. 908; 1899, Christian &
C. G. Co. v. Fruitdale L. Co., 121 Ala. 340, 25 So. Rep. 566. But see, supra,
p. 625. Beach, § 162; Clark, § 45; Elliott, § 83; .l\forawetz, § 748; Taylor,
§§ 148, 739; I Thompson, §§ 218, 506 ; III Thompson, §§ 2940, 2968-2993.
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180

any liability, either a corporate one, or one resting only upon

those who have participated in the acts, or authorized them

to be done, or ratified them.

FAY and Another v. NOBLE and Others.

1851. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 7

Cushing's (Mass.) Rep. 188-194.

This was a replevin for seventy-two tons of pig iron. The defend-

Sec. 180.

( 2) Does not result in a partnership liability; but if
any liability, either a corporate one, or one resting only upon
those who have participated in the acts, or authorized them
to be done, or ratified them.

ants pleaded the general issue, and specified in defense a title in them-

selves under a mortgage from the West Boston Iron Company.

FAY

At the trial in the court of common pleas, before Wells. C. J.,

AND ANOTHER

v. NOBLE

AND

OTHERS.

the following facts were in evidence: "Prior to May, 1848, Leonard

IN

Fuller and one Kendall owned and carried on at Boston a machine

THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Cushing's (Mass.) Rep. 188-194.

shop and an establishment for making iron castings. On the 22(1 of

7

March, 184S, they, with others, were incorporated as a manufactur-

ing corporation, under the name of the West Boston Iron Company,

for the purpose of carrying on the same business (St. 1848, ch. 70, 8

Special Laws 879); and in May, 1848, attempted to and supposed

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:17 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

they did organize as such corporation; and Fuller and Kendall then

transferred the real and personal estate employed by them in said

business to the corporation, receiving payment therefor in shares of

stock in the corporation. The shares so received by Fuller amounted

to more than three-fourths of the whole number of shares into which

the capital stock purported to have been divided. From the time of

this supposed organization until November, 184S, Fuller acted as the

general agent of the company, and, on the 25th of September, 1848,

purporting to act in that capacity, borrowed money of the plaintiffs,

gave the note of the company therefor, and conveyed the pig iron in

question to the plaintiffs as collateral security for its payment.

The plaintiffs put into the case the records of said supposed organ-

ization and of the proceedings under the same, and contended that, from

an inspection of these records, it appeared the company had not been

legally organized as a corporation; and so the court rules against the

objection of the defendants. Two witnesses, called by the plaintiffs,

testified, in answer to questions by the defendants, that the proceed-

ings therein recorded were truly set forth. To this evidence the

plaintiffs objected, but the judge admitted it as evidence of the actual

agreement of the associates among themselves whether they were to

be regarded as corporators, as partners or otherwise, as to the manner

in which the business should be transacted and of the extent of the

authority given to Fuller as their agent.

In November, 1S48, a reorganization of the company as a corpo-

ration took place, and on the 14th of that month the corporation so

reorganized conveyed all their property to the defendants by the mort-

This was a replevin for seventy-two tons of pig iron. The defendants pleaded the general issue, and specified in defense a title in themselves under a mortgage from the vVest Boston Iron Company.
At the trial in the court of common pleas, before Wells, C. J.,
the following facts were in evidence: "Prior to May, 1848, Leonard
Fuller and one Kendall owned and carried on at Boston a machine
shop and an establishment for making iron castings. On the 22d of
March, 1848, they, with others, were incorpornted as a manufacturing corporation, under the name of the West Boston Iron Company,
for the purpose of carrying on the same business (St. 1848, ch . 70, 8
Special Lav.-·s 879); and in May, 1848, attempted to and supposed
they <lid organize as such corporation; and Fuller and Kendall then
transferred the real and personal estate employed by them in said
business to the corporation, receiving payment therefor in shares of
stock in the corporation. The shares so received by Fuller amounted
to more than three-fourths of the whole number of shares into which
the capital stock purported to ha\·e been divided. From the time of
this supposed organization until November, 1848, Fuller acted a s the
general agent of the company, and, on the 25th of September, 1848,
purporting to act in that capacity, borrowed money of the plaintiffs ,
gave the note of the company therefor, and conveyed the pig iron in
que tion to the plaintiffs as collateral security for its payment.
The plaintiffs put into the case the records of said supposed organ,ization and of the proceedings under the same , and contended that, from
an inspection of these records, it appeared the company had not been
legally organized as a corporation; and so the court rules against the
objection of the defendants. T\>\'O \·v itnesses, called by the plaintiffs,
te tified, in answer to questions by the defendants, that the proceedings therein recorded were truly set forth. To this evidence the
plaintiffs objected, but the judge admitted it as evid ~ nce of the actual
agreement of the as ociates among themselves whether they were to
be regarded as corporators, as partners or otherwise, as to the manner
in which the business should be transacted and of the extent of the
authority given to Fulfer as their agent.
In November, 1848, a reorgani zation of the company as a corporation took place, and on the 14th of that month the corporation so
reorganized conveyed all their property to the defendants by the mort-
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gage relied on by the defendants, who took possession under this mort-

gage relied on by the defendants, who took possession under this mortgage of the iron in controversy.
The plaintiffs requested the judge to insb·uct the jury, among other
things, that, as there had been no legal organization of the corporat10n at the time of the conveyance to the plaintiffs, the parties then
holding shares therein and conducting the business for their common
benefit were in law to be deemed partners, and could not, by any
agreement among themselves limit the power of the members as such
so as to affect the plaintiffs, unless knowledge of such limitation was
brought home to the plaintiffs, the burden of proving which was on
the defendants; that Fuller, as one of the partners and the managing
partner and principal owner, had full powers to give the notes of the
company to raise money and pledge their property for the payment
thereof; and that although Fuller dealt with the plaintiffs as agent,
they were not estopped to show and avail themselves of the fact that
he was actually a partner and principal owner.
The presiding judge submitted the case to the jury, with instructions upon this point, of which the following is the material part:
"The proceedings, prior to November, 1848, did not prove a legal
organization of the corporation, and consequently no corporate acts
were done prior to November, 1848, when the new organization was
effected. But, although not acting as a corporation, the individual associates were acting as an a<;sociation connected together for the purpose of carrying on business; this association was not necessarily a
partnership, with the usual powers and liabilities of a partnership,
but it was a question of fact what were the terms of this agreement of
association; and it being testified and proved that the writings offered
as records of the corporation contained a true statement of the acts of
the associates, these writings were admissible evidence to prove the
actual agreement of the associates as between themselves; and it was
for the jury, from this and other evidence, to determine what this
agreement of association was. If it was a partnership without any
limitation as to the powers of the individual members, each partner
had a right to bind the partnership by a contract made for partnership
purposes; and among other powers, bad a ri ght to borrow money in
the name of the partnership, and pledge the partnership property as
security for repayme nt. It was, however, competent for partners to
limit the powers of individual m embers of th e company by an ag-reem ent that the conduct of the business should be confided vvholly to
the management of agents chosen for that purpose ; and where this
was done, a partner not sele cted aR agent could not hind the company
by an agreement with an individual \•vho knew the fac;t that the power
of transacting the busin.ess of the concern h ad been delegated to these
agents."
The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the plaintiffs
excepted.
BIGELOW, J. Upon the evidence introduced at the trial of this case
in the court below, the presiding judge ruled that prior to November,
1848, there was no legal organization of the corporation called the

gage of the iron in controversy.

The plaintiffs requested the judge to instruct the jury, among other

things, that, as there had been no legal organization of the corpora-

tion at the time of the conveyance to the plaintiffs, the parties then

holding shares therein and conducting the business for their common

benefit were in law to be deemed partners, and could not, by any

agreement among themselves limit the power of the members as such

so as to affect the plaintiffs, unless knowledge of such limitation was

brought home to the plaintiffs, the burden of proving which was on

the defendants; that Fuller, as one of the partners and the managing

partner and principal owner, had full powers to give the notes of the

company to raise money and pledge their property for the payment

thereof; and that although Fuller dealt with the plaintiffs as agent,

they were not estopped to show and avail themselves of the fact that

he was actually a partner and principal owner.

The presiding judge submitted the case to the jury, with instruc-

tions upon this point, of which the following is the material part:
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"The proceedings, prior to November, 184S, did not prove a legal

organization of the corporation, and consequently no corporate acts

were done prior to November, 1848, when the new organization was

effected. But, although not acting as a corporation, the individual as-

sociates were acting as an association connected together for the pur-

pose of carrying on business; this association was not necessarily a

partnership, with the usual powers and liabilities of a partnership,

but it was a question of fact what were the terms of this agreement of

association; and it being testified and proved that the writings offered

as records of the corporation contained a true statement of the acts of

the associates, these writings were admissible evidence to prove the

actual agreement of the associates as between themselves; and it was

for the jury, from this and other evidence, to determine what this

agreement of association was. If it was a partnership without any

limitation as to the powers of the indivjdual members, each partner

had a right to bind the partnership by a contract made for partnership

purposes; and among other powers, had a right to borrow money in

the name of the partnership, and pledge the partnership property as

security for repayment. It was, however, competent for partners to

limit the powers of individual members of the company by an agree-

ment that the conduct of the business should be confided wholly to

the management of agents chosen for that purpose; and where this

was done, a partner not selected as agent could not bind the company

by an agreement with an individual who know the faqt that the power

of transacting the business of the concern had been delegated to these

agents."

The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the plaintiffs

excepted.

Bigelow, J. Upon the evidence introduced at the trial of this case

in the court below, the presiding judge ruled that prior to November,

1848, there was no legal organization of the corporation called the
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done prior to that time. The whole case was tried and submitted to

679

the jury on this assumption. As this point was so ruled at the request

of the plaintiffs, and as the verdict was in favor of the defendants, no

exception was taken thereto, and we are not called upon to determine

its correctness.

The plaintiffs contended and asked the court to rule that inasmuch

as there had been no legal organization of said corporation prior to

November. 184S, the parties holding shares in said unorganized cor-

poration were in law to be deemed co-partners and subject to all lia-

bilities as such. The court did not give this precise instruction to the

jury, but directed them in substance that said parties, by virtue of

their being subscribers for and holders of stock in said company, were

either general co-partners, with the usual powers and liabilities as

such, or co-partners acting under certain restrictions and limitations

as to the rights and duties of individual members and through an

agent with limited authority, and it was left to the jury to determine

upon the nature and character of this co-partnership, and also the au-

thority of Fuller as agent or co-partner to act in its behalf.
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It seems to us, upon careful consideration of the case, that these

instructions were not warranted by the facts proved, and although

they do not form the precise ground of the exceptions taken by the

plaintiffs, yet we think them so erroneous as to render it necessary to

order the case to a new trial.

We are not aware of any authority, certainly none was cited at the

argument, to warrant the instruction that in consequence of an omis-

sion to comply with the requisitions of law in the organization of a

corporation, by which its proceedings were rendered void, persons

who had subscribed for and taken stock in the company thereby be-

came co-partners. The doctrine seems to us to be quite novel and

somewhat startling. Surely it can not be, in the absence of all fraud-

ulent intent (and none was proved or alleged in this case), that such

a legal result follows as to fasten on parties involuntarily, for such a

cause, the enlarged liability of co-partners; a liability neither contem-

plated nor assented to by them. The very statement of the proposi-

tion carries with it a sufficient refutation. No such result can follow

unless a principle of law be established, founded on no authority, and

required by no public exigency. Corporations are known and recog-

nized legal entities, with rights and powers clearly defined and well

understood, and wholly distinct and different from those of individuals

and co-partnerships. Persons who subscribe for and take stock in them

are subject to certain fixed and limited liabilities, which they volunta-

rily assume, and these liabilities are not to be extended and enlarged

so as to affect innocent parties beyond the letter of the law. A co-

partnership can not take upon itself the functions of a corporation,

nor can a corporation or its members be made subject to the liabilities

of a copartnership, in the absence of all statutory provisions imposing

such liabilities. The personal liability of the members of a joint-

stock company or co-partnership is inconsistent with the character ana

West Boston Iron Company, and therefore no corporate acts were
done prior to that time. The whole case was tried and submitted to
the jury on this assumption. As this point was so ruled at the request
of the plaintiffs. and as the verdict was in favor of the d efendants, no
exception was taken thereto, and we are not called upon to determine
its correctness.
The plaintiffs contended and asked the court to rule that inasmuch
as there had been no legal organization of said corporation prior to
November. 18-tS, the parties holding shares in said unorganized corporation were in law to be deemed co-partners and subject to all liabilities as such . The court did not give this precise instruction to the
jury, but directed them in substance that said parties, by virtue of
their being subscribers for and holders of stock in said company, were
either general co-partners, with the usual powers and liabilities as
such, or co-partners acting under certain restrictions and limitations
as to the rights and duties of individual members and through an
agent with limited authority, and it was left to the jury to determine
upon the nature and character of this co-partnership, and also the authority of Fuller as agent or co-partner to act in its behalf.
It seems to us, upon careful consideration of the case, that these
instructions were not warranted by the facts proved, and although
they do not form the precise ground of the exceptions taken by the
plaintiffs, yet we think them so erroneous as to render it necessary to
order the case to a new trial.
We are not aware of any authority, certainly none was cited at the
argument, to warrant the instruction that in consequence of an omission to comply with the requisitions of law in the organization of a
corporation, by which its proceedings were rendered void, p ersons
who had subscribed for and taken stock in the company thereby became co-partners. The doctrine seems to us to be quite novel and
somewhat startling. Surely it can not be, in the absence of all fraudulent intent (and none was proved or alleged in this case), that such
a legal result follows as to fasten on parties involuntarily, for such a
cause, the enlarged liability of co-partners; a liability neither contemplated nor assented to by them. The very statement of the proposition carries with it a sufficient refutation. No such result can follow
unless a principle of law be established, founded on no authority , and
required by no public exigency. Corporations are known and recognized legal entities, with rights and powers clearly de fined and well
understood , and wholly distinct and different from those of individual s
and co-partnerships. Persons who subscribe for and trike stock in them
are subject to certain fixed and limited liabilities, which they voluntarily assume, and these liabilities are not to be extended and enlargecl
so as to affect innocent parties beyond the letter of the law. A copartnership can not take upon it elf the fun ctions of a corporation,
nor can a corporation or its members be made subject to the liabilities
of a copartnership, in the absence of a ll statutory provis ion s imposing
such liabilities. The personal liability of the members of a jointstock company or co-partnership is inconsistent with the character and
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nature of a corporation, of which the law properly recognizes only

the creature of the charter, and knows not the individuals. Ang. &

nature of a corporation, of which the law properly recognizes only
the creature of the charter, and knows not the individuals. Ang. &
Ames on Corp., 535, 536. On looking into Revised Statutes, ch.
38 and 44, to the provisions of which the corporation in question was
made subject, we find various enactments by which officers and members are made individually liable for debts contracted by corporations
in case of non-compliance with certain requisitions; but no pr-OVi.sion
is made hy which such individual liability attaches by reason of any
omi ssion to organize in the manner prescribed by law. The statute,
it is true, prescribes the mode of organization, but it annexes no penalty or liability to the neglect or omission to comply with it. We are
unable to see, therefore, any principle of law upon which the instructions given to the jury on this point can rest.
It follows, as a necessary consequence of what we have already
said, that the records of the corporation were improperly admitted and
submitted to the jury as evidence of an agreement or understanding
among the shareholders in the corporation as to their own rights and
liabilities as members of a co-partnership, and of the extent of authority given to Fuller as agent of such co-partnership. They were not
made or kept for any such purpose. They were only the records and
by-laws of a corporation, not the agreements of individuals, in the nature of articles of co-partnership; and they could have no legitimate
tendency to prove the facts for which they were offered and used at
the trial.
Without examining at greater length the rulings of the court set out
in the bill of exceptions, we think it manifest that the whole trial proceeded under a misapprehension. If the court were correct t'n deciding that th ere was no organization of the corporatt'on, and that all £ts
proceedings were void, the case resolved itself into a few s£111ple elements. B eing unorgant'zed, and t'ncompetent to act as a c01·poration,
it could not create agents, or confer any authority on any one to act in
t'ts behalf, and therefore all those who acted or purported to act as its
agents were acting without autlwri'ty. Th ere was no prindpal to
appoint an agent. It i's a familiar prt'nciple of law tl1at a person
who acts as agent wi'thout authority or without a principal 1's ht'mself regarded as a principal, and has all the rights and ts subject to
all the l£abt'l£ties of a principal. Story on Agency, section 264. If a
person, purporting to act as agent of a corporation which had no
vaft'd existence, makes contracts and does other acts as t'ts agent. he
becomes the principal, and is personally liable therefor. If he purchases property, as agent, without authority, the title vests in him, so
far at least as regards third persons, and he has the sole right to dispose of it to others. Story on Agen cy, section 264a, note; Hampton
v. Speckenagle, 9 S. & R. 212. Applying this principle to the case
at bar, it is very clear that Fuller was not the agent of a co-partnerslttp, for none ex£sted; he was not the agent of individuals, as such,
because he was not authorized to act; lie was not the agent of the
W est Boston Irou Company, because tf tlze court were right i'n decidt'ng that it liad never organized, and that its proceedings were void,

Ames on Corp., 535, 536. On looking into Revised Statutes, ch.

38 and 44, to the provisions of which the corporation in question was

made subject, we find various enactments by which officers and mem-

bers are made individually liable for debts contracted by corporations

in case of non-compliance with certain requisitions; but no provision

is made by which such individual liability attaches by reason of any

omission to organize in the manner prescribed by law. The statute,

it is true, prescribes the mode of organization, but it annexes no pen-

alty or liability to the neglect or omission to comply with it. We are

unable to see, therefore, any principle of law upon which the instruc-

tions given to the jury on this point can rest.

It follows, as a necessary consequence of what we have already

said, that the records of the corporation were improperly admitted and

submitted to the jury as evidence of an agreement or understanding

among the shareholders in the corporation as to their own rights and

liabilities as members of a co-partnership, and of the extent of author-
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ity given to Fuller as agent of such co-partnership. They were not

made or kept for any such purpose. They were only the records and

by-laws of a corporation, not the agreements of individuals, in the na-

ture of articles of co-partnership; and they could have no legitimate

tendency to prove the facts for which they were offered and used at

the trial.

Without examining at greater length the rulings of the court set out

in the bill of exceptions, we think it manifest that the whole trial pro-

ceeded under a misapprehension. If the court were correct in decid-

ing that there was no organization of the corporation, and that all its

proceedings were void, the case resolved itself into a few simple ele-

ments. Being unorganized, and incompetent to act as a corporation,

it could not create agents, or confer any authority on anyone to act in

its behalf, and therefore all those who acted or purported to act as its

agents were acting without authority. There was no principal to

appoint an agent. It is a familiar principle of law that a person

who acts as agent without authority or without a priricipal is him-

self regarded as a principal, and has all the rights and is subject to

all the liabilities of a principal. Story on Agency, section 264. If a

person, purporting to act as agent of a corporation which had no

valid existence, makes contracts and does other acts as its agent, he

becomes the principal, and is personally liable therefor. If he pur-

chases property, as agent, without authority, the title vests in him, so

far at least as regards third persons, and he has the sole right to dis-

pose of it to others. Story on Agency, section 264a, note; Hampton

v. Speckenagle, 9 S. & R. 212. Applying this principle to the case

at bar. it is very clear that Fuller was not the agent of a co-partner-

ship, for none existed; he was not the agent of individuals, as such,

because he was not authorized to act; he was not the agent of the

West Boston Iron Company, because if the court were right in decid-

ing that it had never organized, and that its proceedings zvcre void,
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it never had the power to appoint him agent. Clearly, then, he

acted without authority from any one. If he purchased, he pur-

chased for himself. In him only did the property vest, and as
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against all but the vendors he had the sole right to dispose of it to

others. In this view, the question of co-partnership which was sub-

mitted to the jury was wholly immaterial, and diverted their atten-

tion from the real point in issue. We are therefore of opinion that

there was a mistrial, and that the verdict must be set aside and a new

trial had at the bar of this court.

To same effect, 1879, Ward v. Brigham, 127 Mass. 24; First National Bank

v. Almy, 117 Mass. 476; Trowbridge v. Scudder, 11 Cush. 83; 1892, Ruther-

ford v. Hill, 22 Ore. 218, 29 Am. St. R. 596; Humphreys v. Mooney, 5 Colo.

282; Gartside Coal Co. v. Maxwell, 22 Fed. Rep. 197.

See the following oases holding there is not necessarily a partnership liabil-

£t never had the power to appoint him agent. Clearly, then, he
acted witlwu.t .autliority from any one. If he purchased, he purcluzsed for himself. In him only did the prope1•ty vest, and as
against all but the vendors he had the sole right to dt'spose of t't to
others. In this view, the question of co-partnership which was submitted to the jury was wholly immaterial, and diverted their attention from the real point in issue. We are therefore of opinion that
there was a mistrial, and that the verdict must be set aside and a new
trial had at the bar of this court.

ity; many, however, are cases of estoppel. 1846, State v. How, 1 Mich.

(1 Man.) 512; 1872, Blanchard v. Kaull, 44 Cal. 440; 1874, Fuller v. Rowe, 57

N. Y. 23; 1880 Humphreys v. Mooney, 5 Colo. 282; 1884, Gartside Coal Co.

v. Maxwell, 22 Fed. Rep. (U. S. C. C.) 197; 1885, Johnson v. Corser,34 Minn.

355; 1890, Snider's Sons' Co. v. Troy, 91 Ala. 224, sitpra, p.656; 1890, Cory v.

Lee, 93 Ala. 468,8 So. Rep. 694; 1892, Rutherford v. Hill, 22 Ore. 218, 29 Am.
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St. R. 596; 1894, Railroad Gazette v. Wherry, 58 Mo. App. 423; 1894, Wilson

Cotton Mills v. C. C. R. Cotton Mills, 115 N. C. 475; 1895, Clark v. Richard-

son, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 514, 31 S. W. Rep. 878; 1895, First National Bank v. Harper,

61 Minn. 375, 63 N. W. Rep. 1097; 1805, American Mirror & G. B. Co. v.Bulk-

lev, 107 Mich. 447, 65 N. W. Rep. 291; 1896, First Nat'l Bank v. Dovetail B.

& G. Co., 143 Ind. 534, 42 N. E. Rep. 924; 1896, Gow v. Collen & P. L. Co., 109

Mich. 45, 66 N. W. Rep. 676; 1896, Hogue v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 47 N. B. 929,

66 N. W. Rep. 1036; 1897, Sentell v. Hewitt, 50 La. Ann. 3, 22 So. Rep. 970;

1898, Cole v. Great B. L. & L. Co., 8 Kan. App. 860, 54 Pac. Rep. 920; 1899,

Richards v. Minn. Sav. Bk., 75 Minn. 196, 77 N. W. Rep. 822. See, also,

supra, p. 625; text-book references, supra, p. 672.

To same effect, 1879, Ward v. Brigham, 127 Mase. 24; Finit National Bank
v. Almy, 117 Maes. 476; Trowbridge v. Scudder, 11 Cush. 83; 1892, Ruther.ford v. Hill, 22 Ore. 218, 29 Am. St. R. 596; Humphreys v. Mooney, 5 Colo.
282; Gartside Coal Co. v. Maxwell, 2'.l Fed. Rep. 197.
See the following oases holding there is not necessarily a partnership liability; many, however, are cases of estoppel. 1846, State v. How, 1 Mich.
(1 Man.) 512; 1872, Blanchard v. Kaull, 44 Cal. 440; 1874, Fuller v. Rowe, 57
N. Y. 23; 1880 Humphreys v. Mooney, 5 Colo. 282; 1884, Gartside Coal Co.
v. Maxwell, 22 Fed. Rep. (U.S. C. C.) 197; 1885, Johnson v. Corser, 34 Minn.
355; 1890, Snider's Sons' Co. v. Troy, 91 Ala.. 224, sttpra, p.656; 1890, Cory v.
Lee, 93 Ala. 468, 8 So. Rep. 694; 1892, Rutherford v. Hill, 22 Ore. 218, 29 Am.
St. R. 596; 1894, Railroad Gazette v. Wherry, 58 )fo. App. 423~ 1894, Wilson
Cotton Mills v. C. C.R. Cotton Mills, 115 N. C. 475; 1895, Clark v. Richardson, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 514, 31 S. W. Rep. 878; 1895, First National Bank v. Harper,
61 Minn. 375, 63 N. W. Rep.1097; 1805, American Mirror & G. B. Co. v.BulkJey, 107 Mich. 447, 65 N. W . Rep. 291. ; 1896, First Nat'l Bank v. Dovetail B.
& G. Co., 143 Ind. 534, 42 N. E. Rep. 924; 1896, Gow v. Collen & P. L. Co., 109
Mich. 45, 66 N. W. Rep. 676; 1896, Hogue v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 47 N. B. 929,
66 N. W. Rep. 1036; 1897, Sentell v. Hewitt, 50 La. Ann. 3, 22 So. Rep. 970;
1898, Cole v. Great B. L. & L. Co., 8 Kan. App. 860, 54 Pac. Rep. 920; 1899,
Richards v. Minn. Sav. Bk., 75 Minn. 196, 77 N. W. Rep. 822. See, also,
supra, p. 625; text-book references, supra, p. 672.
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Title IV. The Body Corporate, Its Anatomy, Internal

Structure and Constitution.

CHAPTER 8.

MEMBERS, PARTS, ORGANS OF ACTION, WITH THEIR FUNC-

TIONS AND MUTUAL RELATIONS.

Subdivision I. Members, Integral Parts and Organs of

Action.

article i. members.

TITLE IV.

Sec. 181. Necessity of members.

"It is plain that a joint-stock company or trading corporation can

not possibly exist without stockholders or members. It would be a

THE BoDY CORPORATE, ITs ANATOMY,
STRUCTURE AND CONSTITUTION.

INTRRNAL

contradiction in terms to speak of an association existing without as-

sociates composing it." I Morawetz, § 33.

Note. See, also, supra, §§ 96, 97.

CHAPTER 8.

Sec. 182. Acquisition of membership.

(1) Non-stock companies.

MEMBERS, PARTS, ORGANS OF ACTION, WITH THEIR FUNCTIONS AND MUTUAL RELATIONS.

THE AMERICAN LIVE STOCK COMMISSION COMPANY v. THE

CHICAGO LIVE STOCK EXCHANGE.1

1892. In the Supreme Court of Illinois. 143 111. Rep. 210-

SUBDIVISION I. MEMBERS, INTEGRAL p ARTS AND
ACTION.

241, 36 Am. St. Rep. 385.

[Bill by commission company against stock exchange for an in-

ORGANS OF
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junction.]

Mr. Chief Justice Bailey. » * * The live stock exchange is a cor-

poration, not for pecuniary profit, organized March 13, 1884, under the

ARTICLE

laws of this state, the objects for which it was organized, as declared

I.

MEMBERS.

by its articles of incorporation, being: "To establish and maintain

Sec. 181. Necessity of members.

a commercial exchange; to promote uniformity in the customs and

1 Statement of facts abridged and rearranged. Arguments omitted, and

only so much of opinion given as relates to the single point.

"It is plain that a joint-stock company or trading corporation can
not possibly exist without stockholders or members. It would be a
contradiction in terms to speak of an association existing without associates composing it." 1 Morawetz, § 33.

(682)

Note. See, also, supra, §§ 96, 97.

Sec. 182. Acquisition of membership.
( 1) Non-stock companies.
THE AMERICAN LIVE STOCK COMMISSION COMPANY v. THE
CHICAGO LIVE STOCK EXCHANGE.1

1892.

IN THE SUPREME CounT OF !LLJNOJS. 143 Ill. Rep.
241, 36 Am. St. Rep. 385.

21~

[Bill by commission company against stock exchange for an in·
junction.]
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BAILEY. • • • The live stock exchange isa c.or·
poration, not for pecuniary profit , organized March 13, 1884, under the
laws of this state, the objects for which it was organized, as declared
by its articles of incorporation, being: "To establish and maintain
a commercial exchange; to promote uniformity in the customs and
1

Statement of facts abridged arnl rearranged.

Argnment.s omitted, and

only so much of opiuion given as relates to tbe single point.

(682)
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usages of our merchants; to provide for the speedy adjustment of all

§

182
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683

disputes between its members; to facilitate the receiving of live stock,

as well as provide for good management and the inspection thereof,

thereby guarding against the sale or use of unsound or unhealthy

meats; to secure to members a corporation in furtherance of their

legitimate purposes." Said corporation has no capital stock, and is

itself engaged in no commercial business, but limits its corporate en-

terprise to furnishing to its members facilities for carrying on, each

for himself, the business of buying, selling and dealing in live stock,

meats and other like commodities, and to adopting and enforcing by-

laws, rules and regulations by which the business of its members shall

be conducted and governed [pp. 225—6].

The complainant is a joint-stock corporation, organized May 3, 1889,

under the laws of this state, with a capital stock of $100,000, divided

into shares of $100 each, the shareholders consisting principally, if

not exclusively, of persons and firms engaged in the business of ship-

ping live stock to the Union Stock Yards at Chicago for sale. The

principal office of said corporation is located at the stock yards, and

the objects for which said corporation was formed, as declared by its
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articles of incorporation, are as follows:

'•To engage in the business of buying, selling and handling live

stock upon commission at the Union Stock Yards, state of Illinois, and

at such other points throughout the United States as may be deemed

advisable, and also to encourage the stockholders of said corporation

to raise, improve, feed and ship to market live stock; and in order to

better effectuate said latter object, it is hereby expressly stipulated and

agreed by and between the parties hereto, that the net earnings of

said corporation shall be distributed among the stockholders thereof

annually in the following-manner, to wit: Sixty-five per cent, of said

net earnings shall be distributed to said stockholders in the ratio of

the number of stock shipped by each stockholder to the said corpora-

tion for sale during the current year for which said dividend shall be

declared, and the remaining 35 per cent, of said net earnings shall be

distributed to the shareholders in said corporation in the ratio of the

amount owned by each shareholder in said corporation. It is hereby

further expressly agreed and stipulated that no one person shall have

the right to subscribe for or own more than twenty-five shares of stock

in said corporation at any time during the existence of said proposed

corporation."

Said corporation, on being organized, appointed Rogers as its man-

ager, and he applied for admission as a member of the exchange,

and was admitted a member thereof, his initiation fee being paid by

the presentation of an outstanding certificate of membership which

had been purchased with the money of the complainant. The evi-

dence shows, and upon this point there seems to be no dispute, that

when Rogers applied for membership no disclosure was made by him

as to the plan upon which the complainant corporation was organ-

ized, and particularly the obligation which it assumed by its articles

of incorporation, to distribute annually among its shareholders sixty-

usages of our merchants; to provide for the speedy adjustment of all
disputes between its members; to facilitate the receiving of live stock,
as well as provide for good management and the inspection thereof,
thereby guarding against the sale or use of unsound or unhealthy
meats; to secure to members a corporation in furtherance of their
legitimate purposes.'' Said corporation has no capital stock, and is
itself engaged in no commercial business, but limits its corporate enterprise to furnishing to its members facilities for carrying on, each
for himself, the business of buying, selling and dealing in live stock,
meats and other like commodities, and to adopting and enforcing bylaws, rules and regulations by wliich the business of its members shall
be conducted and governed [pp. 225-6].
The complainant is a joint-stock corporation, organized May 3, 1889,
under the laws of this state, with a capital stock of $100,000, divided
into shares of $100 each, the shareholders consisting principally, if
not exclusively, of persons and firms engaged in the business of shipping live stock to the Union Stock Yards at Chicago for sale. The
principal office of said corporation is located at the stock yards, and
the objects for which said corporation was formed, as declared by its
articles of incorporation, are as follows:
'·To engage in the business of buying, selling and handling live
stock upon commission at the Union Stock Yards, state of Illinois, and
at such other points throughout the United States as may be deemed
advisable, and also to encourage the stockholders of said corporation
to raise, improve, feed and ship to market live stock; and in order to
better effectuate said latter object, it is hereby expressly stipulated and
agreed by and between the parties hereto, that the net earnings of
sai<l corporation shall be distributed among the stockholders thereof
annually in the following- manner, to wit: Sixty-five per cent. of said
net earnings shall be distributed to said stockholders in the ratio of
the number of stock shipped by each stockholder to the said corporation for sale during the current year for which said dividend shall he
declared, and the remaining 35 per cent. of said net earnings shall be
distributed to the shareholders in said corporation in the ratio of the
amount owned by each shareholder in said corporation. It is hereby
further expressly agreed and stipulated that no one person shall have
the right to subscribe for or own more than twenty-fiye shares of stock
in said corporation at any time during the existence of said proposed
corporation.''
Said corporation, on being organized, appointed Rogers as its manager, and he applied for admission as a member of the exchange,
and was admitted a mt>mher thereof, his initiation fee being paid by
the presentation of an outstanding certificate of membership which
had been purchased with the money of the complainant. The evidence shows, and upon this point the re seems to he no di!'ipute, that
when Rogers applied for membe rship no disclosure \'ms made by him
as to the plan upon which the complainant corporation was organized, and particularly the obligation which it assumed by its articles
of incorporation, to distribute annually among its- shareholders sixty-
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five per cent, of its net earnings, in the proportion of the number of

live stock shipped by each to said corporation for sale. Rogers was
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admitted to membership upon investigation by the exchange of his

own personal character and credit, and in ignorance of this peculiar

five per cent. of its net earnings, in the proportion of the number of
live stock shipped by each to said corporation for sale. Rogers was
admitted to membership upon investigation by the exchange of his
own personal character and cre<lit, and in ignorance of this peculi ar
feature of the sc:1eme upon which the corporation represented by him
was organized.
The co mplainant thereupon emLarked in the business of receiving
con sig nments of live stock, both from its shareholders and others, and
in selling the same on commission at the stock yards, the rates of
commission charged by it in all cases being in conformity to the
schedule of rates established by the exchange. Said business was
managed by Rogen:;, who, being a member of the exchange, was enabled to avail him self in the management of said business of all the
privileges which such membership afforded.
In November, 1889 , the complainant having realized a considerable
sum of money as the net profits of its business up to that time, distributed such net profits to its shareholders as required by its articles
of incorporation, and the exchange being informed of such distribution, and regarding it as a virtual evasion of its rules establishing minimum rates of commissions, instituted proceedings against the complainant and its manager for a violation of its rules. Rogers set up,
in defense of these charges, in substance, that the complainant was not
a m ember of the exchange nor subject to its jurisdiction; that so far
as his action as a member of the exchange was concerned he had
strictly conformed to said rules by charging and collecting the rates of
commissions thereby established, and having collected them, he had
accounted for and paid the same over to his principal, the complainant, as it was his legal duty to do, and that he had no responsibility
for the disposition which the complainant had subsequently seen fit to
m ake of the same. These suggestions seem to have been acquiesced
in by the exchange, as the proceedings against both the complainant
and its manager appear to have been thereupon abandoned.
The exchange, h owever, for the purpose, as may well be presumed,
of protecting itself against similar evasions of its rules in the future,
amended its eighth rule so as to provide, in substance, that no p erson
should be recei\·ed for m embership in the exchange who, in any manm:r, acts for or represents any other live stock corporation whose charter, regulations, rules or by-l::iws provided for discrimination in rates
or charges for commissions b etween stockholders and other patrons
or customers, whether under the guise of dividends, drawbacks or any
other scheme or device whatever, and that no member of the exchange
should a ct as agent or othenvise for any live stock corporation whose
charter, regulations, rul es or by-laws provide for such discrimination,
and subjecting a member thus offending to suspension or expulsion.
At the same time rule nine was so amend ed as to prohibit all members of the exchange from buying any live stock or cau~ing the same
to be bought, at the stock ya rds from any corporation or lh·e stock
company wlii ch is or may be reg ularly selling live stock for non-residents on commission, unle s some one or more of the stockholders of

feature of the scheme upon which the corporation represented by him

was organized.

The complainant thereupon embarked in the business of receiving

consignments of live stock, both from its shareholders and others, and

in selling the same on commission at the stock yards, the rates of

commission charged by it in all cases being in conformity to the

schedule of rates established by the exchange. Said business was

managed by Rogers, who, being a member of the exchange, was en-

abled to avail himself in the management of said business of all the

privileges which such membership afforded.

In November, 1889, the complainant having realized a considerable

sum of money as the net profits of its business up to that time, dis-

tributed such net profits to its shareholders as required by its articles

of incorporation, and the exchange being informed of such distribu-

tion, and regarding it as a virtual evasion of its rules establishing min-

imum rates of commissions, instituted proceedings against the com-
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plainant and its manager for a violation of its rules. Rogers set up,

in defense of these charges, in substance, that the complainant was not

a member of the exchange nor subject to its jurisdiction; that so far

as his action as a member of the exchange was concerned he had

strictly conformed to said rules by charging and collecting the rates of

commissions thereby established, and having collected them, he had

accounted for and paid the same over to his principal, the complain-

ant, as it was his legal duty to do, and that he had no responsibility

for the disposition which the complainant had subsequently seen fit to

make of the same. These suggestions seem to have been acquiesced

in by the exchange, as the proceedings against both the complainant

and its manager appear to have been thereupon abandoned.

The exchange, however, for the purpose, as may well be presumed,

of protecting itself against similar evasions of its rules in the future,

amended its eighth rule so as to provide, in substance, that no person

should be received for membership in the exchange who, in any man-

ner, acts for or represents any other live stock corporation whose char-

ter, regulations, rules or by-laws provided for discrimination in rates

or charges for commissions between stockholders and other patrons

or customers, whether under the guise of dividends, drawbacks or any

other scheme or device whatever, and that no member of the exchange

should act as agent or otherwise for any live stock corporation whose

charter, regulations, rules or by-laws provide for such discrimination,

and subjecting a member thus offending to suspension or expulsion.

At the same time rule nine was so amended as to prohibit all mem-

bers of the exchange from buying any live stock or causing the same

to be bought, at the stock yards from any corporation or live stock

company which is or may be regularly selling live stock for non-resi-

dents on commission, unless some one or more of the stockholders of
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such company are members of the exchange in good standing [pp.
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230-2].

The case sought to be made by the complainant is presented under

two aspects: First, it is claimed that, either by itself or through its

general manager, the complainant is or is entitled to be admitted a

member of the exchange, and it accordingly prays for an injunction

restraining the exchange from taking any steps to try the complainant

for a violation of its rules, or to impose upon the complainant's privi-

leges as a member any illegal or unreasonable restraints, and it

also prays that the certificate of membership in Roger's hands be is-

sued to the complainant. Secondly, it claims that if it is not a mem-

ber and entitled to the privileges of membership, the exchange should

be restrained from putting in force certain rules it has adopted for the

government of its own members, and particularly its amendments to

rules 8 and 9.

We are unable to see upon what principle it can be justly claimed

that the complainant is a member of the exchange or entitled to the

privileges of membership, or that it is in a position where it can insist

upon being admitted to membership as a matter of right. Whatever
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may have been its rights while Rogers, its manager, was a member,

those rights no longer exist, as by its own admission Rogers is no

longer its manager, and is no longer a member of the exchange. Nor

can there be any just pretense that the complainant itself is a member

or has ever applied for membership. The exchange is a corporation,

having rules or by-laws determining the qualifications for member-

ship and prescribing the mode in which members may be admitted,

and there is no pretense that the complainant has ever brought itself

within the terms of said rules or by-laws, so as to be entitled to mem-

bership. Rule 8 of the exchange provides as follows:

"On and after May 1, 1884, any person of good character and

credit and of legal age, whose interests arc centered at the Union Stock

Yards, on presenting a written application indorsed by two members,

and stating the name and business avocation of the applicant, after

ten days' notice of such application shall have been posted on the bul-

letin of the exchange, may be admitted to membership in the associa-

tion upon approval by at least seven affirmative ballot-votes of the

board of directors, and upon payment of an initiation fee of $500, or

on presentation of a certificate of unimpaired or unforfeited member-

ship duly transferred, and by signing an agreement to abide by the

rules, regulations and by-laws of the association, and all amendments

that may in due form be made thereto."

Said association had an undoubted right to adopt this rule, and as

it prescribes the mode and the only mode in which membership in the

exchange can be obtained, no one can justly claim to be a member who

has not been admitted in the mode thus prescribed.

It may well be questioned whether, under this rule, a corporation

in its corporate character can be admitted to membership in the ex-

change, as said rule seems to contemplate only the admission of nat-

ural persons. But even if that were otherwise, there is no pretense

such company are members of the exchange in good standing [pp.

230-2].
The case sought to be made by the complainant is presented under
two aspects: First, it is claimed that, either by itself or through its
general manager, the complainant is or is entitled to be admitted a
member of the exchange, and it accordingly prays for an injunction
restraining the exchange from taking any steps to try the complainant
for a violation of its rules, or to impose upon the complainant's privileges as a member any illegal or unreasonable restraints, and it
also prays that the certificate of membership in Roger's hands be issued to the complainant. Secondly, it claims that if it is not a member and entitled to the privileges of membership, the exchange should
be restrained from putting in force certain rules it has adopted for the
government of its own members, and particularly its amendments to
rules 8 and 9.
\Ve are unable to see upon what principle it can be justly claimed
that the complainant is a member of the exchange or entitled to the
privileges of membership, or that it is in a position where it can insist
upon being admitted to membership as a matter of right. Whatever
may have been its rights while Rogers, its manager, was a member,
those rights no longer exist, as by its own admission Rogers is no
longer its manager, and is no longer a member of the exchange. Nor
can there be any just pretense that the complainant itself is a member
or has ever applied for membership. The exchange is a corporation,
having rules or by-laws determining the qualifications for membership and prescribing the mode in which members may be admitted,
and there is no pretense that the complainant has ever brought itself
within the terms of said rules or bv-laws, so as to be entitled to membership. Rule 8 of the exchange" provides as follows:
"On and after May I, 1884, any person of good character and
credit and of legal age, whose interests are centered at the Union Stock
Yards, on presenting a written application indorsed by two members,
and stating the name and business avocation of the applicant, after
ten days' notice of such application shall have been posted on the bulletin of the exchange, may be admitted to membership in the association upon approval by at least seven affirmative ballot-votes of the
board of directors, and upon payment of an initiation fee of $)00, or
on presentation of a certificate of unimpaired or unforfeited membership duly transferred, and by signing an agreement to abide by the
rules, regulations and by-laws of the association, and all amendments
that may in due form be made thereto."
Said association had an undoubted right to adopt this rule, and as
£t prescribes the mode and tlie only mode in whicli m embership £n the
exchange can be obtained, no one canjustly claim to be a member who
has not been admitted £n the mode thus prescribed.
It may well be questioned whether, under this rule, a corporation
in its corporate character can be admitted to membership in the exchange, as said rule seems to contemplate only the admission of natural persons. But even if that were otherwise, there is no pretense
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that the complainant itself has ever made application for membership,

686

or that any of the subsequent steps necessary to vest an applicant
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with the character and rights of membership have been taken, or that

they have resulted favorably to the complainant. Nor is it pretended

that the complainant itself has ever made application for membership,
or that any of the subsequent steps necessary to vest an applicant
with the character and rights of membership have been taken, or that
they have resulted favorably to the compl.ainant. Nor is it pretended
that since Rogers ceased to be the complainant's manager, and thereby
ceased to be its representative on the exchange, any formal application for membership has been made by Titus, its general manager, or
by any other person in its behalf, but the evidence, on the other-hand,
is clear and undisputed that no such application has been made. Tbe
fact alleged in the bill, if it be a fact, that the complainant bas requested the exchange to issue the certificate of membership formerly
held by Rogers to Titus avails the complainant nothing, as the exchange is under no obligation to admit a member upon such request,
but can, in conformity with its rules, admit to membership only upon
formal application duly presented and approved in the manner in
said rules prescribed. The equitable or even legal ownership of the
unimpafred or unforfcited certificate of memberslizp form erly £ssued
to Rogers and duly tran~fcrred to it, does not constz'tute it a member,
or entt"tle i"t to any rights as such. The only way i"n whi'ch the complaz"nant can avail z'tself of such certijicatc, i"s by tendering it in lieu
of the prescribed in£tiat£on fee in case the complainant or z'ts representati've, on proper appNcation, shall be admt'tted to membership,
or, in case such appli'cati'on s!wuld not be granted, then by selli'ng
it for a consideration to some other person who may dest're to become
a member.
It may also be noticed, in immediate connection with the point now
under consideration, that a court of chancery has no po"ver to order
the exchange to issue the certificate of membership formerly held by
Rogers to the complainant or its general manager, so as to constitute
it or him a member. Before an applicant can become a member his
application must, among other things, be indorsed by two members,
and must receive the approval of at least seven members of the board
of directors, voting by ballot. Members and directors of such corporations, in acting upon applications for membership, are necessarily
entitled to a freedom which is not subject to judicial compulsion. No
two members can be compelled to indorse an application, nor can any
seven members of the board of directors be compelled to vote in its
favor, but both are entitled to act upon their own judgment and ac·
cording to their own choice. In other words, a court of chancery will
not undertake to force upon a corporation of this character a member
against the will of those whose duty it is to pass upon applications for
membership.
The complainant then, not being a member of said exchange, nor
entitled, either directly or indirectly, to any of the rights arising from
membership therein, the question is presented whether it can complain
of any of the rules adopted by the exchange for the government of tbe
conduct of its own members, or invoke the aid of a court of equity to
restrain their enforcement [pp. 227-230]. • • •
Held, it can not.
Judgment affirmed.

that since Rogers ceased to be the complainant's manager, and thereby

ceased to be its representative on the exchange, any formal applica-

tion for membership has been made by Titus, its general manager, or

by any other person in its behalf, but the evidence, on the other hand,

is clear and undisputed that no such application has been made. The

fact alleged in the bill, if it be a fact, that the complainant has re-

quested the exchange to issue the certificate of membership formerly

held by Rogers to Titus avails the complainant nothing, as the ex-

change is under no obligation to admit a member upon such request,

but can, in conformity with its rules, admit to membership only upon

formal application duly presented and approved in the manner in

said rules prescribed. The equitable or even legal ownership of the

unimpaired or u?iforfcited certificate of membership formerly issued

to Rogers and duly transferred to it, does not constitute it a member,

or entitle it to any rights as such. The only way in which the com-

plainant can avail itself of such certificate, is by tendering it in lieu
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of the prescribed initiation fee in case the complainant or its repre-

sentative, on proper application, shall be admitted to membership,

or, in case such application should not be granted, then by selling

it for a consideration to some other person who may desire to become

a member.

It may also be noticed, in immediate connection with the point now

under consideration, that a court of chancery has no power to order

the exchange to issue the certificate of membership formerly held by

Rogers to the complainant or its general manager, so as to constitute

it or him a member. Before an applicant can become a member his

application must, among other things, be indorsed by two members,

and must receive the approval of at least seven members of the board

of directors, voting by ballot. Members and directors of such corpo-

rations, in acting upon applications for membership, are necessarily

entitled to a freedom which is not subject to judicial compulsion. No

two members can be compelled to indorse an application, nor can any

seven members of the board of directors be compelled to vote in its

favor, but both are entitled to act upon their own judgment and ac-

cording to their own choice. In other words, a court of chancery will

not undertake to force upon a corporation of this character a member

against the will of those whose duty it is to pass upon applications for

membership.

The complainant then, not being a member of said exchange, nor

entitled, either directly or indirectly, to any of the rights arising from

membership therein, the question is presented whether it can complain

of any of the rules adopted by the exchange for the government of the

conduct of its own members, or invoke the aid of a court of equity to

restrain their enforcement [pp. 227-230]. * * *

Held, it can not.

Judgment affirmed.
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Sec 183. Same. (2) Stock companies.

687

INTEGRAL PARTS.

(A.) By subscription.

(1) Statutory contract.

See Sedalia, etc., Co. v. Wilkerson, supra, p. 459; Philadelphia Savings

Institution, supra, p. 464; Coppage v. Hutton, supra, p. 469.

Sec. 183. Same.

( 2) Stock companies.

Sec. 184. Same. (2) Common law contracts.

(A.) By subscription.

1. Agreements to subscribe.

See Thrasher v. Pike, supra, p. 471; Strasburgh v. Echternacht, supra, p. 473.

(I ) Statutory contract.

2. Agreements subscribing.

Bryant's Pond, etc., v. Felt, supra, p. 474; Hudson Real Estate Co. v. Tower,

supra, p. 478; Peninsular Co. v. Duncan, supra, p. 482; Tonica, etc., Ry. v.

McNeely, supra, p. 491; Minneapolis Co. v. Davis, supra, p. 492.

See Sedalia, etc., Co. v. Wilkerson!.sttpra, p. 459; Philadelphia Savings
Institution, supra, p. 464; Coppage v. Hutton, supra, p. 469.

3. Agreement with promoter.

Minneapolis Co. v. Davis, supra, p. 492; San Joaquin Land Co. v. West,

supra, p. 497; West v. Crawford, supra, p. 500.

4. Underwriting.

Sec. 184. Same. ( 2) Common Jaw contracts.

In re Licensed Victuallers, supra, p. 502.

Agreements to subscribe.

I.

5. Application, allotment, etc.

In re Florence Land & Pub. Works Co., supra, p. 504.
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See. 185. Same. (B.) Transfer, see infra, p. 1654, et seq.

See Thrasher v. Pike, supra, p. 471; Strasburgh v. Ecbternacht, wpra, p. 473.

Sec. 186. Same. (C) Estoppel, see supra, p. 510.

ARTICLE II. INTEGRAL PARTS.

2.

Agreements subscribing.

Sec. 187. In general.

"Many aggregate corporations are composed of distinct parts,

which are called integral parts, without any one of which the cor-

Bryant's Pond, etc., v. Felt, supra, p. 474; Hudson Real Estate Co. v. Tower,
supra, p. 478; Peninsular Co. v. Duncan, supra, p. 482; Tonica, etc., Ry. v.
McNeely, supra, p. 491; Minneapolis Co. v. Davis, supra, p . 492.

3. Agreement with promoter.
Minneapolis Co. v. Davis, supra, p. 49~; San Joaquin Land Co. v. West,
attpra, p. ,497; West v. Crawford, supra, p. 500.

4 . Underwriting.
In re Licensed Victuallers, supra, p. 502.

5. Application, allotment, etc.
111 re Florence Land & Pub. Works Co., supra, p. 504.

Sec. 185.

Same. (B.) Transfer, see infra, p. 1654, et seq.

Sec. 186. Same. (C.) Estoppel, see supra, p. 510 .

ARTICLE II.

tNTEGRAL PARTS,

Sec. 187. In general.
''Many aggregate corporations are composed of distinct parts,
which are called integral parts, without any one of which the cor-
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ROSE V. TCRNl'IKE CO.

poration would not be complete, although none of them are by

themselves a corporation. Thus, where a corporation consists of

poration would not be complete, although none of them are by
themselves a corporation. Thus, where a corporation consists of
a mayor, alderman and commonalty, the mayor, the alderman
and the commonalty are three integral parts; but neither of them
has any corporate capacity distinct from the other two, and, therefore, the mayor can not, in his political character of mayor , take
in succession anything as a sole corporation; nor the aldermen, as
a select body, take anything to them and their successors as an aggregate corporation . In many aggregate corporations there is
one particular person, who is called the head, and who forms one
of the integral parts; such is the mayor of a city corporation, and
the chancellor in the general corporations of the English universities. The corporation of St. Mary's church, in Philadelphia, consisting of three clerical and eight lay members, was considered by
the court to be a corporation, composed of two distinct classes or
integral parts. i>' Angell and Ames, Corporations, § 97.

a mayor, alderman and commonalty, the mayor, the alderman

and the commonalty are three integral parts; but neither of them

has any corporate capacity distinct from the other two, and, there-

fore, the mayor can not, in his political character of mayor, take

in succession anything as a sole corporation; nor the aldermen, as

a select body, take anything to them and their successors as an ag-

gregate corporation. In many aggregate corporations there is

one particular person, who is called the head, and who forms one

of the integral parts; such is the mayor of a city corporation, and

the chancellor in the general corporations of the English universi-

ties. The corporation of St. Mary's church, in Philadelphia, con-

sisting of three clerical and eight lay members, was considered by

the court to be a corporation, composed of two distinct classes or

integral parts.1" Angell and Ames, Corporations, § 97.

Sec. 188. Same.

"A corporation was founded by the name of Brothers and Sisters,
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and all the Sisters are dead, and the Brothers make lease, and held

void, for then it was no corporation." Manwood v. Lovelace,

Time of Queen Eliz., 6 Viner's Abr. 282, 12.

Sec. 189. Same. Directors are not integral parts.

ROSE v. TURNPIKE C0.«

Sec. 188. Same.

1834. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 3 Watts (Pa.)

Rep. 46-49.

''A corporation was founded by the name of Brothers and Sisters,
and all the Sisters are dead, and the Brothers make lease, and held
void, for then it was no corporation." Manwood v. Lovelace,
Time of Queen Eliz., 6 V iner' s Abr. 282, 1 2 .

[Action of assumpsit by the Turnpike Company against Rose. By

the act of incorporation a president, six managers and a treasurer were

to be elected for one year and until such other officers should be

chosen; and meetings were to be held on the first Monday of June

of each year for that purpose, "and at such other times as they shall be

summoned by the managers, in such manner and form as shall be

prescribed by their by-laws." The first election was held September

4, 1827: the next August 28, 1S28; the next September 8, 1829, and

afterward on the first Monday of June, 1S30, 1S31 and 1832. and suit

Sec. 189. Same. Directors are not integral parts.

was brought after the last date. The defendant contended that in

consequence of the neglect to elect officers on the day fixed by the

ROSE v. TURNPIKE CO.'

1 7 Serg. & R. 517.

'Statement of facts abridged. Arguments and parts of opinion omitted.

1834.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

3 Watts

(Pa.)

Rep. 46-49.
[Action of assumpsit by the Turnpike Company against Rose. By
the act of incorporation a president , six managers and a treasurer were
to be elected for on·e year and until such other officers should be
chosen; and meetings were to be held on the first Monday of June
of each year for that purpose, "and at such other times as they shall be
summoned by the managers, in such manner and form as shall be
presc ribed by their by-laws." The first election was held September
4, 1827; the next August 28, 1828; the next September 8, 1829, and
afterward on the first Monday of June , 1830, r831 and 1832, and suit
was brought after the last date . The defendant contended that in
consequence of the neglect to elect officer. on the day fixed by the
1
2
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charter previous to 1830, dissolved the corporation and the suit could

INTEGRAL PARTS.

not be maintained.]

Sergeant, J. The principle seems to be settled in England that

a corporation is dissolved when an integral part is gone and the re-

maining parts are incapable of restoring it or of doing any corporate

act. The question seems chiefly to have arisen in relation to munici-

pal corporations composed of mayor, alderman and burgesses, insti-

tuted for the government of towns in their judicial concerns, police

or trade. When these corporations have fallen into such a state by

the loss of an integral part that they are incapacitated from continu-

ing their succession or accomplishing the purpose for which they

were created, the crown has treated them as dissolved and granted a

new charter. To prevent the occurrence of a dissolution, when the

mayor or head officer was an integral part, and there was a failure to

elect, the statute 11 Geo. 1, ch. 4, was passed, providing for an elec-

tion on another day.

Our corporations bear little resemblance to the English municipal

corporations, either in design or constitution. The present, like many

of our corporations for civil purposes, either by special act of assem-
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bly or under the act of 1791, is not a corporation composed of several

integral parts. The stockholders constitute the company, and the

managers and officers are their agents, necessary for the conduct and

management of the affairs of the company, but not essential to its

existence as such nor forming an integral part. The corporation ex-

ists per se, so far as is requisite to the maintenance of perpetual suc-

cession and holding and preserving its franchises. The non-existence

of the managers does not imply the non-existence of the corporation.

The latter is dormant during that time; its functions are suspended

for want of the means of action, but the capacity to restore its func-

tionaries by means of elections remains.

The total dissolution of a body politic, its political death and reso-

lution into its original elements, would be attended with such moment-

ous consequences that it ought not lightly to happen. Not only would

it affect its property right and responsibilities, but the beneficial pur-

poses for which it was created would be frustrated, and the com-

munity as well as individuals holding stock be injured. No class

of corporations would be exempt. Whether religious, charitable

or literary; whether for turnpikes, bridges, banks, insurances, canals,

railroads or any other purpose, all must be embraced within the rule,

and if by accident, inadvertence or design there is one omission to

elect managers on the day appointed, or the election made is void,

the whole edifice of the corporation falls into ruins, and can only be

constructed by legislative interference; even then, perhaps, after a

lapse of time, and with some doubts as to its power to revest former

rights and to restore its identity. I see no reason why the company

may not retain all their rights, powers and privileges, though there be

a suspension of the power of action; nor why this power of action,

though dormant for a time, may not be revived by a new election of

44—Wil. Cases.

charter previous to 1830, dissolved the corporation and the suit could
not be maintained.]
SERGEANT, J.
The principle seems to be settled in England that
a corporation is dissolved when an integral part is gone and the remaining parts are incapable of restoring it or of doing any corporate
act. The question seems chiefly to have arisen in relation to municipal corporations composed of mayor, alderman and burgesses, instituted for the government of towns in their judicial concerns, police
or trade. When these corporations have fallen into such a state by
the loss of an integral part that they are incapacitated from continuing their succession or accomplishing the purpose for which · they
were created, the crown has treated them as dissolved and granted a
new charter. To prevent the occurrence of a dissolution, when the
mayor or head officer was an integral part, and there was a failure to
elect, the statute 1 r Geo. 1, ch. 4, was passed, providing for an election on another day.
Our corporations bear little resemblance to the English municipal
corporations, either in design or constitution. The present, like many
of our corporations for civil purposes, either by special act of assembly or under the act of 179r, is not a corporation composed of several
integral parts. The stockholders constitute the company, and the
managers and officers are their agents, necessary fo,r the conduct and
management of the affairs of the company, but not essential to its
existence as such nor forming an integral part. The corporation exists per se, so far as is requisite to the maintenance of perpetual succession and holding and preserving its franchises. The non-existence
of the managers does not imply the non-existence of the corporation.
The latter is dormant during that time; its functions are suspended
for want of the means of action, but the capacity to restore its functionaries by means of elections remains.
The total dissolution of a body politic, its political death and resolution into its original elements, would be attended with such momentous consequences that it ought not lightly to happen. Not only would
it affect its property right and responsibilities, but the beneficial purposes for which it was created would be frustrated, and the community as well as individuals holding stock be injured. No class
of corporations would be exempt.
Whether religious, charitable
or literary; whether for turnpikes, bridges, banks, insurances, canals,
railroads or any other purpose, all must be embraced within the rule,
and if by accident, inadvertence or design there is one omission to
elect managers on the day appointed, or the election made is void,
the whole edifice of the corporation falls into ruins, and can only be
constnicted by legislative interference; even then, perhaps, after a
lapse of time, and with som e doubts as to its power to revest former
right~ and to restore its identity .
I see no reason ·w hy the compa ny
may not 1·et ain all their rights, powers a nd privil eges, though there be
a suspension of the power of action; nor why this povYer of action,
though dormant for a time, may not be revived by" a new election of
44-WIL. CASES.
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§ I90

ORGAN'S OF ACTION.

§ 190

ORGAN'S OF ACTION.

the managers and officers competent to carry on its affairs conform-

ably to the directions of the charter. That may be done on the day

the managers and officers competent to carry on its affairs conformably to the directions of the charter. That may be done on the day
appointed by the act, it not being required that the managers, officers
or any other persons should preside at or do any act in reference to
the election which is conducted entirely under the control of the stockholders. • • •

appointed by the act, it not being required that the managers, officers

or any other persons should preside at or do any act in reference to

the election which is conducted entirely under the control of the stock-

holders. * * *

ARTICLE HI. ORGANS OF ACTION.

Sec. 190. In general.

"As has been stated by Kyd, there are three different kinds of

assemblies in corporations, which he styles legislative, electoral

and administrative. 1. The legislative assembly possesses the

ARTICLE III.

power of making laws; such as the court of common council in

ORGANS OF ACTION.

London, the court proprietors of the Bank of England and of the

Sec. 190. In general.

East India and South Sea Companies. [Also the convocation in

the University of Oxford, and the congregation or senate in the

University of Cambridge.] 2. The electoral assembly is that

"As has been stated by Kyd, there are three different kinds of
assemblies in corporations, which he styles legislative, electoral
and administrative. I. The legislative assembly possesses the
power of making laws; such as the court of common council in
London, the court proprietors of the Bank of England and of the
East India and South Sea Companies. [Also the convocation in
the University of Oxford, and the congregation or senate in the
University of Cambridge. J 2. The electoral assembly is that
which is authorized to elect officers; such are, in general, the proprietors in stock companies; and the body at large of every corporation, when the power of election has not been vested in a minor
body. 3. The administrative have the management of particular
affairs, such as the courts of assistants in the city companies of Europe, the court of directors of a bank and other stock companies.
The same body of men may, therefore, and frequently do, possess
distinct powers. • • • In private corporations (which, to
some extent, may be said to be towns in miniature ) the electoral
power is generally in the body at large, though it may be vested in
a body selected solely to make elections, or in the legislative or
administrative assembly. The qualification of persons to exercise
the above powers must, of course, depend upon the charter and
the by-laws. By the constitution of the railway companies in
England, the proper organs through which they may act are
threefold: I . The general assembly of the company. 2. Th e
board of directors; and 3. A duly constituted agent. "-Angell and
Ames on Corporations, § 98.
''The various classes of persons by whom the affairs of a corporation are practically conducted are: I. Officers, be ing those
who are parts of the organization; 2. Agents, who are not
parts of the organization, but represent it to the public; and
3. Servants, who do not even represent it, but only labor to advance its objects:"-1 Abbott's Digest oi Corporation Law, p . 2.

which is authorized to elect officers; such are, in general, the pro-

prietors in stock companies; and the body at large of every corpo-
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ration, when the power of election has not been vested in a minor

body. 3. The administrative have the management of particular

affairs, such as the courts of assistants in the city companies of Eu-

rope, the court of directors of a bank and other stock companies.

The same body of men may, therefore, and frequently do, possess

distinct powers. * * * In private corporations (which, to

some extent, may be said to be towns in miniature) the electoral

power is generally in the body at large, though it may be vested in

a body selected solely to make elections, or in the legislative or

administrative assembly. The qualification of persons to exercise

the above powers must, of course, depend upon the charter and

the by-laws. By the constitution of the railway companies in

England, the proper organs through which they may act are

threefold: 1. The general assembly of the company. 2. The

board of directors; and 3. A duly constituted agent."—Angell and

Ames on Corporations, § 98.

"The various classes of persons by whom the affairs of a corpo-

ration are practically conducted are: 1. Officers, being those

who are parts of the organization; 2. Agents, who are not

parts of the organization, but represent it to the public; and

3. Servants, who do not even represent it, but only labor to ad-

vance its objects."—1 Abbott's Digest cf Corporation Law, p. 2.
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§191 ORGANS OF ACTION. 691

Sec. 191. Same.

THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH v. SHERMAN.1

1874. In the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 36 Wis. 404-409.

§

ORGANS OF ACTION.

191

[Suit by the church to recover on an alleged agreement by the de-

fendant to pay one hundred dollars necessary to complete the church

edifice. The Rev. Dr. Hatfield was engaged to conduct the services

Sec. 191.

Same.

at the dedication, and he was requested by an informal meeting of the

trustees, pastor and class leaders to solicit subscriptions during the

THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH v. SHERMAN.1

dedication exercises, but was not appointed agent to receive such by

any vote of either trustees or the corporation. He called for subscrip-

tions and named a person to write down names and amounts as sub-

1874.

IN

THE SUPREME

CouRT

OF

W1sc0Ns1N.

36 Wis. 404-409.

scribed. Defendant agreed to take or be put down for the Jast

hundred dollars necessary, and his name was so put down. A few

days later, and before any meeting had been held, one of the trustees

called on the defendant to perform his agreement, at which time he

undertook to revoke his promise. Judgment below was for the plaint-

iff and defendant appealed.]

Ryan,C.J. * * * The respondent is a corporation aggregate, having

a board of trustees to manage its affairs. We need not stop to consider

how far the power to contract is in the aggregate body or in the select
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body. It must be wholly in the one or the other, or partly in both.

There mav be a doubt whether it can contract by parol, except through'

an agent authorized by vote. A. & M. Turnpike Co. v. Hay, 7 Mass.

107. But, pretermitting that question, it could certainly contract

only through the aggregate body by vote, or through the select body

by vote, or through an agent authorized by vote of one body or the

other, or both. Angell and Ames, §§ 231, 232.

It does not appear in the record that Dr. Hatfield was appointed

agent to receive subscriptions by vote of either body. On the con-

trary, it does appear by the evidence of one of the trustees that his

only show of authority was a request at an informal meeting of the

trustees, pastor and class leaders. This gave him no authorty for the

corporation.

He solicited subscriptions, during a religious service, for a religious

purpose. Manifestly there was present no formal meeting of the cor-

poration aggregate or of the select body. The appellant then made

the offer when there was present no body or agent authorized to ac-

cept it for the corporation. It remained a mere offer, which the

appellant might retract until accepted by the corporation. Addison

on Con., 36. * * *

Judgment reversed.

Note. In Cammeyer v. United German Lutheran Church, 2 Sandf. Ch. (N.

Y.) 186 (1844), it was held that "where the exercise of corporate acts ia vested

'Statement of facts abridged. Arguments and part of the opinion omitted.

[Suit by the church to recover on an alleged agreement by the defendant to pay one hundred dollars necessary to complete the church
edifice. The Rev. Dr. Hatfield was engaged to conduct the services
at the dedication, and he was requested by an informal meeting of the
trustees, pastor and class leaders to solicit subscriptions during the
dedication exercises, but was not appointed agent to receive such b y
any vote of either trustees or the corporation. He called for subscriptions and named a p erson to write down names and amounts as subscribed. Defendant agreed to take or be put down for the Ja st
hundred dollars necessary, and his name was so put down. A few
days later, and before any meeting had been held, one of the tru stees
called on the defendant to perform his agreement, at which time he
undertook to revoke his promise. Judgment below was for the plaintiff and defendant appealed.]
RYAN,C. J. • • • The respondent is a corporation aggregate, having
a board of trustees to manage its affairs. We need not stop to consider
how far the power to contract' is in the aggregate body or in the select
body. It must be wholly in the one or the other, or pa1tly in both.
There may be a doubt whether it can contract by parol, except through '
an agent authorized by vote. A. & M. Turnpike Co. v. Hay, 7 Mass.
107. But, pretermitting that question, t't could certai'nly contract
only through tlie aggregate body by vote, or through the select body
by vote, or tlirough an agent authot:i'zed by vote of one body or the
other, or both. Angell and Ames,§§ 231, 232.
It does not appear in the record that Dr. Hatfield was appointed
agent to receive subscriptions by vote of either body . On the contrary, it does appear by the evidence of one of the trustees that hi s
only show of authority was a request at an informal meeting o f the
trustees, pastor and class leaders. This gave him no authorty for the
corporation.
He solicited subscriptions, during a religious service , for a relig ious
purpose. Manifestly there was present no formal meeting of the corporation aggregate or of the select body . The appellant then mad e
the offer when there was present no body or agent authori zed to accept it for the corporation . It remained a .mere offer, which the
appellant might retract until accepted by the corporation. Addison
on Con., 36. • • •
Judgment reversed.
Note. In Carnmeyer v. United German Lutheran Church, 2 Sandf. Cb. (N.
Y.) 186 (1844), it was held that "where the exercise of corporate acts is vested
'Statement of facts abridged.
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WIGHT V. SPRINGFIELD, ETC., R. CO. § 192

in a select body, an act done by the persons composing that, body, in a mass

692

meeting of all the corporators, or in union, or amalgamated with other like

WIGHT V. SPRINGFIELD, ETC., R. CO.

§ 192

bodies, parts of the corporation, is not a valid corporate act." See, also, cases

in a select body, an act done by the persons composing that bo<ly, in a masa
meeting of all the corporators, or in union, or amalgamated with other like
bodies, parts of the corporation, is not a valid corporate act." See, also, cases
tnfra, modes of action, pp. 833-854.
.
.
As to who is a corporate officer, see. 1825, Dedham Bank v. Cb1ckenng,
3 Pick. (Mass.) 335; 1827, Union Bank v. Ridgely, 1 Harr. & G. [Jld.)
324; 1843, Commonwealth v. Cuyler. 5 ·w. & S. (Pa.) 275; 1844, Com·
monwealth v. Wyman, 49 Mass. (8 l\Iet.) 247; l&W. Burr v. ?tlcDonalrl,
3 Gratt. (Va. ) 215; 1853, Union Co. v. James, 21 Pa. St. 525; 1854, Ef
parte Bailey, 27 Eng. L. & Bq. 190; 1857, Commonwealth v. Tuckerman, 76
~lass. (10 Gray) 173; 1872, Commonwealth v. Christian, 9 Phi la. (Pa.\556; 1890,
Brand v. Godwin, 8 N. Y. Supp. 339.
As to how officers differ from mere agents, see 8alem v. Gloucester Bank,
171\Iass. 1; Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479; Ehrenzeller v. Union Canal
Co., 1 Rawle (Pa.) 181, 188; Weatherby v. Saxony, etc., Co., 29 Atl. Rep.
326 (N. J.)
As to difference between officers and servants, emploves, etc., see, 186fi,
Hovey v. Ten Broek, 3 Rob. (N. Y.) 316; 1868, Coffin v. Reynolds, 37 N. Y.
640; 1874, Hill v. Spencer, 61 N. Y. 274; 1875, Adams v. Goodrich, 55 Ga.233;
1882, Wakefield v. Fargo, 90 N. Y. 213; 1882, Gordon v. Jennings, L. R. 9 Q.
B. Div. 45; 1887, Sleeper v. Goodwin, 67 Wis. 577; 1889, Vane v. Newcombe,
132 U.S. 220; 1890, Pen~e~ast v. Yandes, 124 Ind; 159; 1890, Hand v.Cole,
88 Tenn . 400; 1891, Lomsv1lle, etc., R. Co. v. Wilson, 138 U.S. 501; 1894,
Clark's Appeal, 100 Mich. 448; 1897, Palmer v. Van Santvoord, 153 N. Y. 612;
1898, Cocking \'. Ward, - Tenn. Ch. App. - , 48 S. W. Rep. 287; 1899, Bris·
tor v. Smith, 158 N. Y. 157.

infra, modes of action, pp. 833-854.

As to who is a corporate officer, see, 1825, Dedham Bank v. Chickering,

3 Pick. (Mass.) 335; 1827, Union Bank v. Ridgely, 1 Harr. & G. (Md.)

324; 1843, Commonwealth v. Cuyler. 5 W. & S. (Pa.) 275; 1844, Com-

monwealth v. Wvman, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 247; 1846, Bnrr v. McDonaM,

3 Gratt. (Va.) 215; 1853, Union Co. v. James, 21 Pa. St. 525; 1854, Es

parte. Bailey, 27 Eng. L. & Eq. 190; 1857, Commonwealth v. Tuckerman. 76

Mass. (lOGray) 173; 1872, Commonwealth v. Christian, 9 Phila. (Pa. 1556; 1890,

Brand v. Godwin, 8 N. Y. Supp. 339.

As to how officers differ from mere agents, see Salem v. Gloucester Bank.

17 Mass. 1; Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479; Ehrenzeller v. Union Canal

Co., 1 Rawle (Pa.) 181, 188; Weatherby v. Saxonv, etc., Co., 29 Atl. Rep.

326 (N. J.)

As to difference between officers and servants, emploves, etc., see, I860,

Hovey v. Ten Broek, 3 Rob. (N. Y.) 316; 1868, Coffin v. Reynolds, 37 N. Y.

640; 1874, Hill v. Spencer, 61 N. Y. 274; 1875, Adams v. Goodrich, 55 Ga.233;
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1882, Wakefield v. Fargo, 90 N. Y. 213; 1882, Gordon v. Jennings, L. R. 9Q.

B. Div. 45; 1887, Sleeper v. Goodwin, 67 Wis. 577; 1889, Vane v. Newcombe,

132 U. S. 220; 1890, Pendergast v. Yandes, 124 Ind. 159; 1890, Hand v. Cole,

88 Tenn. 400; 1891, Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Wilson, 138 U. S. 501; 1894,

Clark's Appeal, 100 Mich.448; 1897,Palmer v. Van Santvoord, 153 N.Y.612;

1898, Cocking v. Ward, — Tenn. Ch. App. , 48 S. W. Rep. 287; 1899, Blis-

ter v. Smith, 158 N. Y. 157.

Sec. 192. Qualification of agents and officers.

WIGHT v. SPRINGFIELD AND NEW LONDON RAILROAD

Sec. 192.

COMPANY.1

Qualification of agents and officers.

1875. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 117

Mass. Rep. 226-228, 19 Am. Rep. 412.

WIGHT v. SPRINGFIELD AND NEW LONDON RAILROAD
COM:PANY. 1

[Petition for mandamus to compel respondent to admit petitioner to

act as one of its directors. The city of Springfield was the lawful

owner of 1,500 of the 2,000 shares of stock of the railroad company;

1875.

at a duly called meeting of the shareholders of the railroad company,

IN

the city of Springfield was represented by five persons properly se-

lected for that purpose, one of whom was the petitioner. At this

THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Mass. Rep . 226-228, 19 Am. Rep. 412.

117

[Petition for mandamus to compel respondent to admit petitioner to
ad as one of its directors. The city of Springfield was the lawful
owner of 1,500 of the 2,000 shares of stock of the railroad company;
at a duly called meeting of the shareholders of the railroad company,
the city of Springfield was represented by five persons properly selected for that purpose, one of whom was the petitioner. At this
meeting the petitioner received a large majority of the votes of the
shares of stock for director, but he not heing himself a shareholder,
the president of the meeting refused to declare him elected, and the
corporation, by its officers, have since refused to recognize him as a
director, or allow him to act as such. J
GnAY, C. J. Although the directors of a railroad corporation are
usually chosen by the stockholders from their own number. there i
no rule of law that makes the holding of stock an indispensable qu:ilification of a director, unle s prescribed by some act of the legislature
or by-law of the corporation. The only adjudication upon the sub·
ject cited at the arg ument supports this view. State Y. McDanit'I ,
22 Ohio St. 354.
And the statutes expressly requiring directors of
banks and insurance companies to be members of the corporation. and
the firs t directors of a rnilroad corporation incorporated under the gen·
1 Statements of faf'ts abridged, and only part of opinion given.

meeting the petitioner received a large majority of the votes of the

shares of stock for director, but he not being himself a shareholder,

the president of the meeting refused to declare him elected, and the

corporation, by its officers, have since refused to recognize him as a

director, or allow him to act as such.]

Gray, C. J. Although the directors of a railroad corporation are

usually chosen by the stockholders from their own number, there is

no rule of law that makes the holding of stock an indispensable qual-

ification of a director, unless prescribed by some act of the legislature

or by-law of the corporation. The only adjudication upon the sub-

ject cited at the argument supports this view. State v. McDaniel,

22 Ohio St. 354. And the statutes expressly requiring directors of

banks and insurance companies to be members of the corporation, and

the first directors of a railroad corporation incorporated under the gen-

1 Statements of facts abridged, and only part of opinion given.
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eral law to be associates, strengthens the conclusion that the legisla-

§

192

QUALIFICATION OF OFFICERS.

ture intended to leave the qualifications of directors in the permanent

organization of such a corporation to the determination of the stock-

holders. * * *

Mandamus to issue.

Note. 1. Unless statute or charter prevents, a corporation can selectwhom-

soever it pleases to be its officers, agents or servants: 1847, Hoyt v. Bridge-

water C. M. Co., 6 N. J. Eq. (2 Halst.) 253, on 275; 1847, Sargent v. Webster, 54

eral law to be associates, strengthens the conclusion that the legislature intended to leave the qualifications of directors in the permanent
organization of such a corporation to the determination of the stockholders. • • •
Mandamus to issue.

Mans. (13 Mete.) 497, 40 Am. Dec. 743; 1870, Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore,

64 Pa. St. 43; 1872, State v. McDaniel, 22 Ohio St. 354; 1870, British Provi-

dent Life, etc., Assn., L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 300; I08O, Opinion of Attorney-Gen-

eral, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 178.

2. In general the corporation may by by-laws prescribe qualifications of

its officers or directors: 1841, Dispatch Line of Packets v. Bellamy Mfg. Co.,

12 N. H. 205, 37 Am. Dec. 203; 1844, Cammeyer v. United Church, 2 Sandf

Ch. 180; 1802, Richards v. Merrimac & C. R. Co., 44 N. H. 127; 1870, Peo-

ple v. Northern R. Co.,42N. Y.217, on 230; 1871, Hazelhurst v. Savannah G. &

N. A. R. Co., 43 Ga. 13; 1892, Cross v. West Virginia Cent. & P. R. Co., 37 W.

Va. 342, 18 L. R. A. 582, 16 S. E. Rep. 587. But not contrary to statutory
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provisions: 1870, British Provident Life, etc., Assn., L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 300.

3. As to residence and citizenship, there is no rule, unless by statute or

charter provision, that requires an officer or director to be a resident or citi-

zen of the state creating the corporation. Statutes, however, frequently pro-

vide that a part of the directors shall be residents of the state creating the

corporation. 1827, McCall v. Bvram Mfg. Co., 0 Conn. 428; 1850, Conant v.

Millaudon, 5 La. Ann. 542; 1808, Matthews v. Theological Sem. R. P. Ch.,

etc., 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 541 ; 1887, State v. Smith, 15 Ore. 98, 15 Pac. Rep. 137, 386;

1890, Commonwealth v. Detwiler, 131 Pa. St. 614, 18 Atl. Rep. 990, 992; 1892,

Horton v. Wilder, 48 Kan. 222, 29 Pac. Rep. 500; 1893, Hulings v. Lumber

Co., 38 W. Va. 351, 18 S. E. Rep. 620.

4. Neither is an officer or director required to be a shareholder, unless the

statute, charter, or a by-law so provides: 1841, Dispatch line of Packets v.

Bellamy Mfg. Co., 12 N. H. 205. 37 Am. Dec. 203; 1847, Hovt v. Bridgewater

Copper M. Co., 6 N. J. Eq. 253; 1872, State v. McDaniel, 22 Ohio St. 354;

1889, Fey .v. Peoria Watch Co., 32 111. App. 618; 1898, Bristol Bank & T. Co.

v. Jonesboro B. & T. Co., 101 Tenn. 545. But statute, charter or by-law

frequently so requires, and then generally they must be holders in their

own right and in good faith: 1841, Dispatch Line, etc.. v. Bellamy, etc., 12 N.

H. 205; 1852, Bartholomew v. Bentlev, 1 Ohio St. 37; 1889, Bainbridge v.

Smith, 41 Ch. Div. 462, 33 Am. & E. C. C. 172, n. 182; 1891, In re Neweomb,

18 N. Y. Supp. (N. Y.) 16; 1892, Chemical National Bank v. Colwell, 132 N.

Y. 250; 1893, State v. Mfs. Assn., 50 Ohio St. 145, 24 L. R. A. 252; 1894,

Frank v. Lewis Foundry & M. Co., 24 Pittsburg L. J. (N. S.) 33. But see,

1891, In re Argus Printing Co., 1 N. Dak. 434, 20 Am. St. Rep. 039, 36 Am.

& E. Corp. C. 101, 48 N. W. Rep. 347,12 L. R. A. 781, and 1894, Greenough v.

Alabama G. S. R. Co., 64 Fed. Rep. (C. C.) 22; 1898, Haines v. Kinderhook

Note. 1. Unless statute or charter prevents, a corporation can select whomsoever it pleases to be its officers, agents or servants: 1847, Hoyt v. Bridgewater C. M. Co., 6 N. J. Eq. (2 Haist.) 253, on 275; 1847, Sargent v. Webster, 54
Mass. ( 13 Mete.) 497, -16 Am. Dec. 743; 1870, Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore,
6-l Pa. St. 43; 1872, State v. McDaniel, 22 Ohio St. 354; 1876, British l'rovide nt Life, etc., Assn., L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 306; lu80, Opinion of .Attorney-General, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 178.
2. In general the co rporation may by by-laws prescribe qualifications of
its officers or directors: 18-ll, Dispatch Line of Packets v . Bellamy Mfg. Co.,
12 N. H. 205, 37 Am. Dec. 203; 1844, Cammeyer v. United Church, 2 Snndf.
Cb.186; 1862, Richards v. Merrimac & C.R. Co., 44 N. H. 127; 1870, People v. Northern R. Co., -12 N. Y. 217, on 230; 1871, Hazelhurst v. Savannah G. &
N. A. R . Co., 43 Ga. 13; 1892, Cross v. \Yest Yirginia Cent. & P. R . Co., 37 W.
Va. 342, 18 L. R. A. 582, 16 8. E. Rep. 587. Bnt not contrnry to s tatutory
provisions: 1876, British Provident Life, etc., Assn., L . R. 5 Ch. Div. 306.
3. As to residence and citizenship, tuere is no rule, unless by statute or
chartt'r provision, that requires an officer or director to Le a resident or citizen of the staLe creating the corporation. Statutes, howev~r. frequently provide that a part of the directors shall be residents of the state crenting the
corporation. 1827, McCall v. Byram Mfg. Co., 6 Conn. 428; 1850, Conant v.
Millaudon, 5 La. Ann. 542; 1868, Matthews v. Theological Sem. R. P. Ch.,
etc., 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 541; 1887, State v. Smith, 15 Ore. 98, 15 Pac. Rep. 137, 386;
1890, Commonwealth v. Detwiler, 131 Pa. St. 614, 18 At!. Rep. 990, 992; 1892,
Horton v. Wilder, 48 Kan. 222, 29 Pac. Rep. 566; .1893, Hulings v. Lumber
Co., 38 W. Va. 351, 18 S. E. Rep. 620.
4. Neither is an officer or director required to be a shareholder, unless the
statute, charter, or n by-law RO provides: 1841, Dispatch Line of Packets v.
Bellamy Mfg. Co., 12 N. H. 205. 37 Arn. Dec. 203; 1847, Hoyt v. Bridgewater
Copper M. Co., 6 N. J. Eq. 253; 1872, State v. McDaniel, 22 Ohio Rt. 35-l;
1889, Fey .v. Peoria Watch Co., 32 Ill. A pp. 618; 1898, Rristol Bank & T. Co .
v. Jonesboro B . & T. Co., 101 Tenn. 545. But statute, charter or by-law
frequently so requires, and then generally they must be holders in th ei r
own rightand in good faith: 1841, Dispatch Line, et<'., v. Bellnmy, ctr., 12 "N.
H. 205; 1852, Bartholomew v. Bentlev, 1 Ohio St. 37; 1889, Bninbridge v.
Smith, 41 Ch. Div. 462, 33 Ar.n . & E. C. C. 172, n. 182; 1891, bl rP Newc·omh,
18 N. Y. Supp. (N. Y.) 16; 1892, Chemical National Bank v. Colwell, 132 N.
Y. 250; 1893, State v. Mfs. Assn., 50 Ohio St. 145, 24 L. R. A. 252; 18!l4,
Frank v. Lewis Foundry & M. Co., 24 Pittsburg L. J. (N. S.) 33. But see,
1891, J11 re Argus Printing Co., 1 N. Dak. 434, 26 Am. St. Rep. 639, 36 Am.
& E. Corp. C. 101, 48 N. W. Rep. 347, 12 L. R. A. 781, and.1894, Grt;en.o ugh v.
Alabama G. 8. R. Co., 64 Fed. Rep. (C. C.) 22; 1898, Harnes v. Kinderhook
& H. Ry. Oo., 33 App. Div. (N. Y.) 154.

& H. Ry. Co., 33 App. Div. (N. Y.) 154.
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694 METROPOLITAN R. CO. V. MANHATTAN R. CO. § 193

Subdivision II. Functions of Members, Directors and Of-

METROPOLITAN R. CO. V. MANHATTAN R. CO.

ficers.

§ 193

ARTICLE I. MEMBERS AND DIRECTORS.

Sec. 193. The members of the corporation wield such powers as

SUBDIVISION II.

are extraordinary or unusual in their nature, whereas the

directors manage the ordinary business of the corporation;

FUNCTIONS OF MEMBERS, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS.

and fundamental changes in the character or business usually

require action by both the shareholders and the executive and

administrative officers.

METROPOLITAN ELEVATED R. CO. v. MANHATTAN ELEVATED

ARTICLE

R. CO.1

J,

MEMBERS AND DIRECTORS.

1884. In the Court of Common Pleas, City and County of

See. 193.

The members of the corporation wield such powers as
are extraordinary or unusual in their nature, whereas the
directors manage the ordinary business of the corporation;
and fundamental changes in the character or business usually
require action by both the shareholders and the executive and
administrative officers.

New York.2 ii Daly's (N. Y. Com. Pleas) Rep. 373-528,

14 Abb. New Cas. 103-316, 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 1-94.

[Action to set aside a tripartite agreement made between the New

York Elevated Railroad Company, the Metropolitan Elevated Rail-

way Company and the Manhattan Elevated Railway Company,

wherebv the first two were to lease their roads to the latter, which as-

sumed the performance of certain contracts and the payment of cer-

tain bonds of the former; the Manhattan Company being unable to
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perform its part of the agreements, after much litigation, and by way

METROPOLITAN ELEVATED R. CQ. v. MANHATTAN ELEVATED
R. co.1

of settlement, supplementary agreements were entered into which

would enable the Manhattan Company to continue in the control of

the roads on the basis of concessions made by the other companies.

1884.

IN THE CouRT OF COMMON PLEAS, CITY AND Com<TY OF
NEW YoRK. ~ 1 l Daly's (N. Y. Com. Pleas) Rep. 373-528,
14 Abb. New Cas. 103-316, IS Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 1-94·

These supplemental agreements were executed by the Metropolitan

Company, by authority of its directors, without the assent or ratifica-

tion of the shareholders. New directors of this company being elected,

it brought suit to set aside the supplemental agreements on the ground

[Action to set aside a tripartite agreement made behveen the New
York Elevated Railroad Company, the Metropolitan Elevated Railway Company and the Manhattan Elevated Railway Company,
whereby the first two were to lease t~eir roads to the l~tter , which assumed the performance of ce rtain contracts and the payment of certain bonds of the former; the Manhattan Company being unable to
perform its part of the agreements, after much litigation, and by way
of settlement, supplementary agreements were entered into which
would enable the Manhattan Company to continue in the control of
the roads on the basis of concessions made by the other companies.
These supplemental ag reements were executed by the M etropolitan
Company, b y authority of its directors, without the assent or ratification of the shareholders. New directors of thi s company being e lectl·d,
it brought suit to set aside the supplemental agreements on the ground
of fraud. breach of trust, etc., on the part of the former directors. J
VAN BRUNT, J. • • • That the directors of a corporation are
agents seems to be clearly recognized in all the cases in which the
relations of directors and shareholders to their corporation have been
discussed.
It is said in Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury (91 U.S. 587, 589)
that the directors are the officer5 or agents of the corporation, and

of fraud, breach of trust, etc., on the part of the former directors.]

Van Brunt, J. * * * That the directors of a corporation are

agents seems to be clearly recognized in all the cases in which the

relations of directors and shareholders to their corporation have been

discussed.

It is said in Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury (91 U. S. 587, 589)

that the directors are the officers or agents of the corporation, and

1 Statement of facts greatly abridged. Only so much of the opinion as re-

lates to the authority of directors is given. Copies of all agreements and

leases are given in 14 Abb. N. C, pp. 125, 130 and 1(56, and are valuable as

forms.

'No appeal was taken. All parties accepted this as a correct exposition of

the law. The most eminent counsel in New York were engaged in the case.

1 Statement of facts greatly abridged.
Only so much of the opinion as relntes to the authority of directors is given. Copies of all agreemeotP and
leases are given in 14 Abb. N. C., pp. 125, 130 and 166, and are valuable as
form s.
~No appeal was t.aken.
All parties aC'repterl this as n corrert t>Xposition of
the law . The most eminent counsel in New York were eugaged in the case.
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represent the interests of that abstract legal entity, and of those who

own the shares of its stock.

§ 193

FUNCTIONS OF MEMBERS AND DIRECTORS.

In Cumberland Coal, etc., Co. v. Sherman (30 Barb. 553, 571)

the court says: "There can be no question at the present time that a

director of a corporation is the agent or trustee of the stockholders."

In Angell & Ames on Corporations, § 771, it is stated that "The

stockholders compose the company, and the managers, directors or

officers are their agents, necessary for the management of the affairs

of the company, but they are not essential to its existence as such, not

forming one of the integral parts."

In Abbott v. American Hard Rubber Co. (33 Barb. 578) the court

says, at the foot of page 591: "Boards of directors are agents of the

corporation to manage its affairs and carry out the purpose and ob-

ject of its formation."

The directors thus being the agents of the corporation, what are

their powers and from whence are they derived, and how must cor-

porate powers residing in the corporation, the right to exercise which

is not vested in the directors, be brought into operation? These ques-

tions are so intimately connected that they must be disposed of to-

gether.
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The powers of directors are such as are conferred by the charter of

their corporation and the laws pertaining thereto, and such corporate

powers as are npt conferred by law upon the directors remain in the

corporation to be exercised, or at least set in motion by its component

parts, the shareholders.

In the case at bar the charter provided that the directors were to

manage the business and affairs of the company; and the question in-

volved in this branch of the case is whether this language conferred

the right to exercise every corporate power possessed by the corpora-

tion or merely to manage the ordinary business and affairs of the com-

pany for the carrying on of which it was organized, leaving the right

remaining in the shareholders composing the company to set in motion

or confirm corporate action within the limits of its powers, but ex-

traordinary and unusual in its nature.

Within the sphere of their duties the right of the directors is un-

doubtedly exclusive, and, further, all corporate acts must be done

through them, as they are exclusive executive and administrative

authority, but, nevertheless, all corporate powers do not reside in the

board of directors.

It is true that the court says, in McCullough v. Moss (5 Denio 567,

575), that: "When a charter invests a board with the power to man-

age the concerns of a corporation the power is exclusive in its charac-

ter. The corporators have no right to interfere with it, and courts

will not, even on a petition of a majority, compel the board to do an

act contrary to its judgment."

That case was an action to recover upon a promissory note, which

the corporation in the exercise of its legitimate business could have

made, and the question presented was whether execution was proved.

The note was signed by the president and secretary of the company,

represent the interests of that abstract legal entity, and of those who
own the sharts of its stock.
In Cumberland Coal, etc., Co. v. Sherman (30 Barb. 553, 57 1)
the court says: ''There can be no question at the present time that a
director of a corporation is the agent or trustee of the stockholders."
In Angell & Ames on Corporations, § 77 I, it is stated that "The
stockholders compose the company, and the managers, directors or
officers are their agents, necessary for the management of the affairs
of the company, but they are not essential to its existence as such, not
forming one of the integral parts."
In Abbott v. American Hard Rubber Co. (33 Barb. 578) the court
says, at the foot of page 591: "Boards of directors are agents of the
corporation to manage its affairs and carry out the purpose and object of its formation.''
The directors thus being the agents of the corporation, what are
their powers and from whence are they derived, and how must corporate powers residing in the corporation, the right to exercise which
is not vested in the directors, be brought into operation? These questions are so intimately connected that they must be disposed of together.
The powers of directors are such as are conferred by the charter of
their corporation and the laws pertaining thereto, and such corporate
powers as are ·npt conferred by law upon tpe directors remain in the
corporation to be exercised, or at least set in motion by its component
pa1ts, the shareholders.
In the case at bar the charter provided that the directors were to
manage the business and affairs of the company; and the question involved in this branch of the case is whether this language conferred
the right to exercise every corporate power possessed by the corporation or merely to manage the ordinary business and affairs of the company for the carrying on of which it was organized, leaving the right
remaining in the shareholders composing the company to set in motion
or confirm corporate action within the limits of its powers, but extraordinary and unusual in its nature.
Within the sphere of their duties the right of the directors is undoubtedly exclusive, and, further, all corporate acts must be done
through them, as they are exclusive executive and administrative
authority, but, nevertheless, all corporate powers do not reside in the
board of directors.
It is _true that the court says, in McCullough v. Moss (5 Denio 567,
575), that: "When a charter invests a board with the power to manage the concerns of a corporation the power is exclusive in its character. The corporators have no right to interfere with it, and courts
will not, even on a petition of a majority, compel the board to do an
act contrary to its judgment."
That case was an action to recover upon a promissory note, which
the corporation in the exercise of its legitimate bu siness could have
made, and the question presented was whether exec11tion was proved.
The note was signed by the president and secretary of the company,
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but no authority from the board of directors, who, by the charter,

METROPOLITAN R. CO. V. MANHATTAN R. CO.

were to conduct the affairs of the company, to the president and sec-

retary, was shown. Some resolution of the shareholders was shown,

but no authority from the board of directors, who, by the charter,
were to conduct the affairs of the company, to the president and sec·
retary, was shown. Some resolution of the shareholders was shown,
but it had no relation to this question, and then the court uses the language above quoted. This case nowhere decides that the directors
are clothed with all the corporate powers. It may be cited as an authority for the proposition that the shareholders can not compel the
directors to act in any manner against their judgment in the exercise
of a corporate power which remains in the corporation.
For example, if the power to lease was vested in the corporation,
but the directors could not, because of the limitation in the charter, exercise this power, the shareholders could not cause the lease to be executed and delivered, nor could they compel the directors to execute and
deliver the same against their own judgment; all that the shareholders
could do would be to authorize the directors to act or confirm an act
of the directors which would be incomplete without such ratification.
The case of Hoyt v. Thompson ( 19 N. Y. 207) is also claimed to
be an authority against the suggestion made above; but upon an examination it will be seen that much is said in respect to the relation
of directors to the ir corporation, and their rights and powers, and the
sources from which they are derived, which was not at all necessary
to the decision of the question involved, and is directly contrary to the
principles announced in the United States Supreme Court in a case
where the direct question was presented.
The adjudication in the case of Hoyt v. Thompson had necessarily
to be put upon the ground that the act under inYestigation was "ordinary business, " and in that case a distinction was plainly recognized
between "ordinary business" and such as was within the corporate
powers, but unusual and not coming within the general business of
the corporation. The court held that although the charter of the corporation declared that its powers should be exercised by a board of
directors, consisting of a specified number, yet the board might delegate its authority to agents or to a quorum of less than a majority of
the number.
The court further held that when a by-law of the corporation <le·
dared that five directors should be a quorum for the tram•action of
"ordinary business," the general business of the corporation was em·
braced in the authority thus delegated, including as incident thereto
the power of pledging or assigning assets of the corporation for the
purpose of securing a debt, it appearing that such pledge wa~ made
for the purpose of enabling the corporation to continue its business;
and this is all that this case decides vvhich is pertinent to the quegtions
involved in the case at bar.
It is true that the learned judge who wrote the opinion in the case
of Hoyt v. Thompson uses the following language:
"The board of directors of a corporation do not stand in the snme
relation to the corporate body which a private agent holds tow<1rd his
principal. In the strict relation of principal and agent, all the
authority of the latter is derived by delegation from the former, and

but it had no relation to this question, and then the court uses the lan-

guage above quoted. This case nowhere decides that the directors

are clothed with all the corporate powers. It may be cited as an au-

thority for the proposition that the shareholders can not compel the

directors to act in any manner against their judgment in the exercise

of a corporate power which remains in the corporation.

For example, if the power to lease was vested in the corporation,

but the directors could not, because of the limitation in the charter, exer-

cise this power, the shareholders could not cause the lease to be exe-

cuted and delivered, nor could they compel the directors to execute and

deliver the same against their own judgment; all that the shareholders

could do would be to authorize the directors to act or confirm an act

of the directors which would be incomplete without such ratification.

The case of Hoyt v. Thompson (19 N. Y. 207) is also claimed to

be an authority against the suggestion made above; but upon an ex-

amination it will be seen that much is said in respect to the relation

of directors to their corporation, and their rights and powers, and the
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sources from which they are derived, which was not at all necessary

to the decision of the question involved, and is directly contrary to the

principles announced in the United States Supreme Court in a case

where the direct question was presented.

The adjudication in the case of Hoyt v. Thompson had necessarily

to be put upon the ground that the act under investigation was "ordi-

nary business," and in that case a distinction was plainly recognized

between "ordinary business" and such as was within the corporate

powers, but unusual and not coming within the general business of

the corporation. The court held that although the charter of the cor-

poration declared that its powers should be exercised by a board of

directors, consisting of a specified number, yet the board might dele-

gate its authority to agents or to a quorum of less than a majority of

the number.

The court further held that when a by-law of the corporation de-

clared that five directors should be a quorum for the transaction of

"ordinary business," the general business of the corporation was em-

braced in the authority thus delegated, including as incident thereto

the power of pledging or assigning assets of the corporation for the

purpose of securing a debt, it appearing that such pledge was made

for the purpose of enabling the corporation to continue its business;

and this is all that this case decides which is pertinent to the questions

involved in the case at bar.

It is true that the learned judge who wrote the opinion in the case

of Hoyt v. Thompson uses the following language:

"The board of directors of a corporation do not stand in the same

relation to the corporate body which a private agent holds townrd his

principal. In the strict relation of principal and agent, all the

authority of the latter is derived by delegation from the former, and
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if the power of substitution is not conferred in the appointment, it can

not exist at all. But in corporate bodies the powers of the board of

§ 193
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directors are, in a very important sense, original and undelegated. The

stockholders do not confer, nor can they revoke, these powers. They

are derivative only in the sense of being received from the state in the

act of incorporation. The directors convened as a board are the

primary possessors of all the powers which the charter confers."

The whole of this argument was devoted to establishing the power

of the board of directors to delegate the authority to manage the ordi-

nary business of the corporation to five of their number, and had no

other purpose.

That the directors convened as a board are not the primary pos-

sessors of all the powers which the charter confers is expressly held

by the United States Supreme Court in the case of the Railway Com-

pany v. Allerton, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 2331. In that case the charter

provided as follows:

"Section 3. The capital stock of said corporation shall be one

hundred thousand dollars, and may be increased from time to time at

the pleasure of said corporation.

"Section 4. All the corporate powers of said corporation shall be
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vested in and exercised by a board of directors, and such officers and

agents as said board shall appoint."

An increase of the capital stock of the corporation by the direc-

tors, without the assent of the stockholders, was held to be void, as

beyond the power of the board of directors, although the charter

provided that all the corporate powers of the corporation should be

vested in and exercised by a board of directors, etc., and that the

powers thus granted to the directors refer only to the ordinary busi-

ness transactions of the corporation. The necessary conclusion to be

drawn from the reasoning employed in that case is, that the board of

directors are the managers of the business which the corporation is

chartered to carry on, and they have the control and management of

that business; but that they have no power to effect organic and fun-

damental changes in the corporation or its business without the con-

sent of the corporation. The Metropolitan Company was chartered

for the purpose of making, constructing, maintaining and operating

a railway upon certain streets, avenues, thoroughfares and places in

the city of New York. This was its business, and this was all the

business upon the execution of which it entered. Could it be im-

agined that a change more fundamental could possibly be made than

that a corporation, chartered for the above purpose, -should lease its

road and properties to another corporation and deliver possession of

the same for all time, and thus change its business from that of mak-

ing, constructing, maintaining and operating a railroad to that of re-

ceiving rent for the use of such road?

In considering this question, it is not at all improper to look for a

moment at the result arising from a rule that the directors are the

primary possessors of all the powers which tne charter confers. If

1 Supra, p. 442.

if the power of substitution is not conferred in the appointment, it can
not exist at all. But in corporate bodies the powers of the board of
directors are, in a very important sense, original and undelegated. The
stockholders do not confer, nor can they revoke, these powers. They
are derivative only in the sense of being received from the state in the
act of incorporation. The directors convened as a board are the
primary possessors of all the po\.vers which the charter confers."
The whole of this argument was devoted to establishing the power
of the board of directors to delegate the authority to manage the ordi- .
nary business of the corporation to five of their number, and had no
other purpose.
That the directors convened as a board are not the primary posse sors of all the powers which the charter confers is expressly held
by the United States Supreme Court in the case of the Railway Company v. Allerton, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 233 1 • In tlrntcasethe charter
provided as follows:
"Section 3. The capital stock of said corporation shall be one
hundred thous:md dollars, and may be increased from time to time at
the pleasure of said corporation.
·
"Section 4. All the corporate powers of said corporation shall be
vested in and exercised by a board of directors, and such officers and
agents as said board shall appoint."
An increase of the capital stock of the corporation by the directors, without the assent of the stockholders, was held to he void, as
beyond the power of the board of directors, although the charter
provided that all the corporate powers of the corporation should be
vested in and exercised by a board of directors, etc., and that the
powers thus granted to the directors refer only to the ordinary business transactions of the corporation. The necessary conclusion to be
drawn from the reasoning employed in that case is, that the board of
directors are the managers of the business which the corporation is
chartered to carry on, and they have the control and management of
that business ; but that they have no power to effec.t organic and fundamental changes in the corporation or its business without the consent of the corporation. The Metropolitan Company was chartered
for the purpose of making, constructing, maintaining and operating
a railway upon ce1tain streets, avenues, thoroughfares and places in
the city of New York. This was its business, and this was all the
business upon the execution of whi ch it entered. Could it he imagined that a change more fundamental could possibly be made than
that a corporation, chartered for the above purpose , -should lease its
road and properties to another corporation and deliver possession of
the same for all time, and thus chang e its business from that of making, constructing, maintaining and operating a railroad to that of receiving rent for the use of such road?
In considering this question. it is not at all improper to look for a
moment at the result arising from a rule that the directors aTe the
primary possessors of all the powers which tne charter confers. If
1

Supra, p. 442.
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the board of directors have the power, without the assent of the share-

METROPOLITAN R. CO. V. MANHATTAN R. CO.

holders, to lease the properties of the corporation for all time, then

§ 193

the shareholders may be deprived of, not only the administration of

the board of dir.:!ctors have the power, without the assent of the shareholders, to lease the properties of the corporation for all time, then
the shareholders may be deprived of, not only the administration of
their property through its agents, the directors, but its very possession,
without a moment's warning. A board of directors are elected for one
year to manage the business and affairs of the corporation , such business being the operating and maintaining a railroad. At the time of
their election the shareholders have no intimation that anything else
is to be done by the directors, and the expectation is that such directors, at the end of their year in office, will turn over the property
committed to them to their successors in office, with an account of
their stewardship. Can it be possible that this board, elected for only
one year, without any notice or warning, has the power to terminate
the business of the corporation and transfer all the properties to :mother corporation? It seems to me clearly not. This is not the
management of the business of the corporation. It is terminating
the business, to carry on which it was incorporated. It is just as fundamental. an<l radical a change as an increase of its capital stock, or
the ·entering upon a new business by a corporation authorized by its
charter can possibly be. Although I have not intended to quote as
authority any decision except those of our own state, or of the United
States Supreme Court, I must refer to the language used by the learned
court in the case of Cass v. Manchester, 13 Rep. 167, in which it
was held that directors had no power to make a lease, even for five
years, without the consent of the shareholders. The court says:
'·But if this conclusion is the result of too strict a construction of
the charter, we are of the opinion that the power in question is not
exercisable in<lependently of the judgments of the stockholders. The
directors and officers of a corporation are its exclusive executive
agents, and, as it can only act by ancl through them, the powers vested
in the corporation are deemed to be conferred upon its representati,·es,
but they are, nevertheless, trustees for tbe stockholders. The law
recognizes tbe stockholders as the ultimately controlling power in the
corporation, because they may, at each authorized election, entirely
change the organization, and may at any time keep the trustees \.vithin
the line of faithful administration, by an appeal to a court of equity.
Hence, it has been held that the directors of a corporation can not
alone increase its capital stock, where such incteasc was authorized
by its charter 'at the pleasure of said corporation,' and where it was
provided tbat 'all powers of such cqrporation shall be vested in and
exerci sed by a hoard of directors,' etc. ; and this for the reason that
the general power to perform all corporate acts, refrrs to the ordinary
business tran~acti9ns of 'the corporation,' and not to a change so fundamental and organic. (18 Wall. 234.)
"The change proposed is not organic, but it is thorough and fundame ntal , a!' it affects the administration of the company's affairs. It
im·olves a withdrawal from the control and management of the stockholders of the entire property of the corporation for at least five years;
it will preclude, for a like period, the exercise by the stockholders 0£

their property through its agents, the directors, but its very possession,

without a moment's warning. A board of directors are elected for one

year to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, such busi-

ness being the operating and maintaining a railroad. At the time of

their election the shareholders have no intimation that anything else

is to be done by the directors, and the expectation is that such direc-

tors, at the end of their year in office, will turn over the property

committed to them to their successors in office, with an account of

their stewardship. Can it be possible that this board, elected for only

one year, without any notice or warning, has the power to terminate

the business of the corporation and transfer all the properties to an-

other corporation? It seems to me clearly not. This is not the

management of the business of the corporation. It is terminating

the business, to carry on which it was incorporated. It is just as fun-

damental and radical a change as an increase of its capital stock, or

the entering upon a new business by a corporation authorized by its

charter can possibly be. Although I have not intended to quote as
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authority any decision except those of our own state, or of the United

States Supreme Court, I must refer to the language used by the learned

court in the case of Cass v. Manchester, 13 Rep. 167, in which it

was held that directors had no power to make a lease, even for five

years, without the consent of the shareholders. The court says:

'•But if this conclusion is the result of too strict a construction of

the charter, we are of the opinion that the power in question is not

exercisable independently of the judgments of the stockholders. The

directors and officers of a corporation are its exclusive executive

agents, and, as it can only act by and through them, the powers vested

in the corporation are deemed to be conferred upon its representatives,

but they are, nevertheless, trustees for the stockholders. The law-

recognizes the stockholders as the ultimately controlling power in the

corporation, because they may, at each authorized election, entirely

change the organization, and may at any time keep the trustees within

the line of faithful administration, by an appeal to a court of equity.

Hence, it has been held that the directors of a corporation can not

alone increase its capital stock, where such increase was authorized

by its charter 'at the pleasure of said corporation,' and where it was

provided that 'all powers of such corporation shall be vested in and

exercised by a board of directors,' etc.; and this for the reason that

the general power to perforin all coqiorate acts, refers to the ordinary

business transactions of 'the corporation,' and not to a change so fun-

damental and organic. (18 Wall. 234.)

"The change proposed is not organic, but it is thorough and fun-

damental, as it affects the administration of the company's affairs. It

involves a withdrawal from the control and management of the stock-

holders of the entire property of the corporation for at least five years;

it will preclude, for a like period, the exercise by the stockholders of
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their judgment as to the particular character and method of conduct-
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ing the business affairs of the corporation; and it denies to the stock-

holders any. right of suggestion or disapproval of the conditions, when

such relinquishment of important corporate faculties may be conceded.

Surely a power which will be attended with such consequences does

not relate 'to the ordinary business transactions,' nor 'to the orderly

and proper administration of the affairs' of the company; and hence

can not be exercised by the directors without express authority to

them."

In opposition to this view is cited by the learned counsel for the de-

fendants the case of The Excelsior Fire Ins. Co. (16 Abb. Pr. 8,

14), in which it was said:

"The statute says 'the company is authorized to reduce the number

of its directors,' etc. It makes no provision for a meeting of the

stockholders for that purpose. In the absence of any provision of that

character the power is vested in the board of directors. Stockhold-

ers, as such, possess no powers in the management of a corporation,

except specially authorized so to do by their charter. Their power

ends with the election of the directors."
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Also, in Elwell v. Dodge (33 Barb. 336, 339), the court says:

"A general resolution of the directors delegating the power to trans-

fer property or choses in action to meet the exigencies of the com-

pany, or a ratification of this particular transfer, by act or resolution

of the board, or acceptance and appropriation of the fruits of the

transaction, if a special resolution authorizing the transfer and use of

this note was wanting, would be sufficient to sustain the indorsement

as the act of the company, even as against the company, and might

have been proved had the precise point now made been then taken."

The language of Judge Selden, in the case of Robertson v. Bullions

(11 N. Y. 243, 250), is also referred to. He says:

''What, then, are the powers, rights and obligations of this class of

corporate officers, and to what extent has this court jurisdiction over

them? * * • These officers are trustees in the same sense with

the president and directors of a bank or of a railroad company. They

are the officers of the corporation, to whom is delegated the power of

managing its concerns for the common benefit of themselves and all

other corporators, and over whom the bodv corporate retains control

through its power to supersede them at every recurring election."

In the Matter of St. Ann's Church (23 How. Pr. 285), Judge

Emott says:

"The officers thus chosen are not trustees in the sense in which an

individual becomes or is made a private trustee; they are simply of-

ficers of the corporation. As such officers they represent the cor-

poration; they are its managing agents, and they may act for the

corporation as fully as the directors or agents of an ordinary corpora-

tion may act in its behalf. A corporation ordinarily acts through its

officers, and through them onlv. The power of managing its con-

cerns is delegated to its officers, and they are to manage them for the

common benefit of themselves and all the other corporators. These

their judgmedt as to the particul ar character and method of conducting the business affairs of the corporation; and it denies to the stockholders any. right of suggestion or disapproval of the conditions , when
such re linqui shment of important corporate faculties may b~ conceded.
Surely a p ower which will be attended with such consequences does
not relate 'to the ordinary business transactions,' nor 'to the orderly
and proper administration of the affairs' of the company; and hence
can not be exercised by the directors without express authority to
them."
In opposition to this view is cited by the learned counsel for the defendants the case of The Excelsior Fire Ins. Co. (16 Abb. Pr. 8,
14), in which it was said: .
"The statute says 'the company is authorized to reduce the number
of its directors,' etc. It makes no provision for a meet4.ng of the
stockholders for that purpose. In the absence of any provision of that
character the power is vested in the board of directors. Stockholders, as such, possess no powers in the management of a corporation,
except specially authorized so to do by their charter. Their power
ends with the election of the directors."
Also, in Elwell v. Dodge (33 B arb. 336, 339), the court says:
'·A general resolution of the directors delegating the power to transfer property or choses in action to meet the exigencies of the company, or a ratification of this particular transfer, by act or resolution
of the board , or acceptance and appropriation of the fruits of the
transaction, if a special resolution authorizing the transfer and u se of
this note was wanting, would be sufficient to sustain the indorsement
as the act of the company, even as against the company, and might
have been proved had the precise point now made been then taken."
The language of Judge Selden, in the case of Robertson v. BuJlions
(11 N. Y. 243, 250), is also referred to.
He says:
'·What, then, are the powers, rights and obligations of this class of
corporate officers, and to what extent has this court jurisd iction over
them?
• • •
These officers are trustees in the sa me sense with
the president and directors of a bank or of a railroad company. They
are the officers of the corporation, to w hom is delegated the power of
mapaging its concerns for the common benefit of themselves and all
oth er corporators, and over whom the body corporate retains control
through its power to supersede the m at every recurring election."
In the Matter of St. Ann's Church (23 How. Pr. 285), Judge
Em ott says :
"The officers thus chosen are not trustees in the sense in which an
individual becomes or is made a private trustee ; they arc simply officers of the corporation. A such officers they represent the corporation; they are its managing agents, and they may act for the
corporation as fully as the directors or agents of an ord in ary corporation may act in its behalf. A corporation ordinarily acts through its
officers, and throug h them only. The po"ver of managing its concerns is delegated to its officers, and they are to mannge them for the
common benefit of themselves and all the other corporators. These
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officers are liable, it may be, to judicial proceedings to control their
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action where it is fraudulent or destructive of the rights and interests

.

of the corporation. They are responsible, however, more directly

and practically, to the corporate body itself, through the power of the

officers are liable, it may be, to judicial proceedings to control their
action where it is fraudulen t or destructiye of the rights and interests
of the corporation. They are responsible, however, more directly
and practically, to the corporate body itself, through the power of the
corporators to supersede them at their elections."
In the case of Dana v. The Bank of the United States, 5 Watts &
S. (Pa.) 223, 246, the following passage occurs:
"This, I take it (that is to say, the election), is the utmost that the
stockholders can do according to the tenor and design of the act under
which they must all act until an election of the directors shall come
around, when the former, if dissatisfied with the conduct of the latter
in managing the affairs of the bank, rnay turn any one, or more,
or the whole of them, out of the direction, and place it in other
hands."
The claim made by virtue of these decisions is that the stockholders have no power to do anything in relation to any matter whatever
pertaining to their corporation, except that if dissatisfied ·with the
conduct of their directors in managing the affairs of the corporation
they may turn them out at the next e lection; and this is certainly the
language of all the above decisions. But how inapplicable is such
remedy to an act of the directors which has terminated the business
of the corporation and placed all its property in other hands for a
thousand years; will that give back the property to the corporation;
will that set right any maladministration if the directors had the po\l\•er
to thus act? Clearly not, and the language was intended to apply to
cases where the action taken was neither radical nor fundamental in
its character. For mismanagement of the ordinary business of the
company, the turning out of the directors is a reasonably adequate
redress; but when the directors have divested the company of all its
property, it is difficult to sc-e how any remedy is afforded by turning
them out. Further, the courts of this state, as has already been seen,
expressly recognize the fact, notwithstanding the decision above mentioned, that the shareholders have certain other rights and privileges
beside that of electing directors, viz.: The right to be consulted in
respect to change of business, increase of capital stock, dissolving
ancl winding up the affairs of the corporation, sale of any portion of
its property necessary for the transaction of its business, etc.
It need hardly, therefore, be necessary, in view of the principles
which have controlled the decisions already quoted, to discuss further
the question that there arc powers reserved to the corporation which
can not be exercised by the directors without the assent of the shareholders, and that the shareholders, under some circumstances, at least,
may exercise other functions than simply those of electing their board
of directors. Nor is it necessary now to dwell upon the scope of the
a ct of 1839, or to attempt to show that by this act the Metropolitan
Railway Company had the power to lease its road and properties.
That such power existed is now conceded by the counsel for the
plaintiff, in view of the decision of the court of appeals in the case of
Woodruff v. The Erie R. Co., 93 N. Y. 609.

corporators to supersede them at their elections."

In the case of Dana v. The Bank of the United States, 5 Watts &

S. (Pa.) 223, 246, the following passage occurs:

"This, I take it (that is to say, the election), is the utmost that the

stockholders can do according to the tenor and design of the act under

which they must all act until an election of the directors shall come

around, when the former, if dissatisfied with the conduct of the latter

in managing the affairs of the bank, may turn any one, or more,

or the whole of them, out of the direction, and place it in other

hands."

The claim made by virtue of these decisions is that the stockhold-

ers have no power to do anything in relation to any matter whatever

pertaining to their corporation, except that if dissatisfied with the

conduct of their directors in managing the affairs of the corporation

they may turn them out at the next election; and this is certainly the

language of all the above decisions. But how inapplicable is such

remedy to an act of the directors which has terminated the business
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of the corporation and placed all its property in other hands for a

thousand years; will that give back the property to the corporation;

will that set right any maladministration if the directors had the power

to thus act? Clearly not, and the language was intended to apply to

cases where the action taken was neither radical nor fundamental in

its character. For mismanagement of the ordinary business of the

company, the turning out of the directors is a reasonably adequate

redress; but when the directors have divested the company of all its

property, it is difficult to see how any remedy is afforded by turning

them out. Further, the courts of this state, as has already been seen,

expressly recognize the fact, notwithstanding the decision above men-

tioned, that the shareholders have certain other rights and privileges

beside that of electing directors, viz.: The right to be consulted in

respect to change of business, increase of capital stock, dissolving

and winding up the affairs of the corporation, sale of any portion of

its property necessary for the transaction of its business, etc.

It need hardly, therefore, be necessary, in view of the principles

which have controlled the decisions already quoted, to discuss further

the question that there are powers reserved to the corporation which

can not be exercised by the directors without the assent of the share-

holders, and that the shareholders, under some circumstances, at least,

may exercise other functions than simply those of electing their board

of directors. Nor is it necessary now to dwell upon the scope of the

act of 1S39, or to attempt to show that bv this act the Metropolitan

Railway Company had the power to lease its road and properties.

That such power existed is now conceded by the counsel for the

plaintiff, in view of the decision of the court of appeals in the case of

Woodruff v. The Erie R. Co., 93 N. Y. 609.
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It is claimed by the counsel for the defendants that as far as this

state is concerned, at least, the power of a board of directors to lease

§ 193
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701

without the assent of shareholders has been expressly recognized by

the legislature of this state, and various acts of the legislature are

cited, in which leases of railroads and consolidations of railroads are

authorized to be made as the directors shall determine. It seems to

me, that instead of these acts being an evidence of a legislative con-

struction that, under the act of 1839, directors had the power to lease

without the assent of shareholders, it was only because such acts could

not be performed by the directors alone that it was thought necessary

to confer express powers upon the directors. If the power was con-

ferred upon the corporation the directors alone could not exercise it,

and, therefore, the legislature conferred the power expressly upon the

directors.

Attention has also been called to various cases where the assent of

stockholders is provided for as a condition of corporate action.

It will be seen that in every case it is a limitation upon corporate

action by requiring more than a majority of stockholders to assent, or

the conferring of a new power upon corporations and affixing the con-

ditions upon which such power is to be exercised.
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I fail to see that legislation of this character in any way aids us in

the determination of this question. If, however, a solution of the

problem is to be reached by the light of legislative interpretation,

chapter 349 of the Laws of 1880 seems to clearly indicate the neces-

sity of stockholders' assent, given at a stockholders' meeting, to the

leasing of the property of a railroad corporation; otherwise, what

necessity for legislative intervention in the terms of the act re-

ferred to?

The cases of Fisher v. New York Central, etc., R. Co., 46 N. Y.

644, and The Central Cross Town R. Co. v. The Twenty-third Street

R. Co., 54 How. Pr. 183, are cited as deciding that a lease may be

made without the assent of the shareholders. I have failed to find

any such adjudication in either of those cases. All that can be claimed

for those cases is that they decide that a lease of its road, made by a

railroad corporation, is not ultra vires, and they decide nothing more

upon the question of power.

No question is raised or discussed as to the manner of the exercise

of its power by the corporation. There was no person before the

court seeking to impeach the lease, who could be heard upon the ques-

tion of stockholders' assent. The only question was whether the lease

was not actually void, not voidable.

There is no question but that, admitting that a board of directors

alone have no power to lease the property of their corporation, and

if such lease is executed by the directors without the assent of the

stockholders, such stockholders may accept the lease or repudiate it,

and that if they allow the parties to the lease to go on under the lease

without any action being taken in respect thereto, within a reasonable

time, they will be held to have acquiesced in the lease and ratified it.

Therefore, conceding that the corporation has the power to lease,

It is claimed by the counsel for the defendants that as far as this
state is concerned, at least, the power of a board of directors to lease
without the assent of shareholders has been expressly recognized by
the legislature of this state, and various acts of the legislature are
cited, in which leases of railroads and consolidations of railroads are
authorized to be made as the directors shall determine. It seems to
me, that instead of these acts being an evidence of a legislative construction that, under the act of 1839, directors had the power to lease
without the assent of shareholders, it was only because such acts could
not be performed by the directors alone that it was thought necessary
to confer express powers upon the directors. If the power was conferred upon the corporation the directors alone could not exercise it.,
and, therefore, the legislature conferred the power expressly upon the
directors.
Attention has also been called to various cases wh.ere the assent of
stockholders is provided for as a condition of corporate action.
It will be seen that in eyery case it is a limitation upon corporate
action by requiring more than a majority of stockholders to assent, or
the confe1Ting of a new power upon corporations and affixing the conditions upon which such power is to be exerc ised.
I fail to see that legislation of this character in any way aids us in
the determination of this question. If, however, a solution of the
problem is to be reached by the light of lc~gislative interpretation,
chapter 349 of the Laws of 1880 seems to clearly i'n dicate the necessity of stockholders' assent, given at a stockholders' meeting, to the
leasing of the property of a railroad corporation; otherwise, what
necessity for legislative intervention in tht! terms of the act referred to?
The cases of Fisher v. New York Central, etc., R. Co., 46 N. Y.
644, and The Central Cross Town R. Co. v. The Twenty-third Street
R. Co., 54 How. Pr. 183, are cited as deciding that a lease may be
made without the assent of the shareholders. I have failed to find
any such adjudication in either of those cases. All that can be claimed
for those cases is that they decide that a lease of its road, made by a
railroad corporation, is not ultra vires, and they decide nothing more
upon the question of power.
No question is rafsed or discussed as to the manner of the exercise
of its power by the corporation. There wns no person before the
court seeking to impeach the lease, who could! be heard upon the question of stockholders' assent. The only questiion was whether the lease
was not actually void, not voidable.
There is no question but that, admitting that a board of directors
alone have no power to lease the property of their corporation, and
if such lease is executed by the directors without the assent of the
!itockholders, such stockholders may accept the lease or repudiate it,
and that if they allow the parties to the lease to go on under the lease
without any action being taken in respect thereto , within a reasonable
time, they will be held to have acquiesced in the lease and ratified it.
Therefore, conceding that the corporation has the power to lease,
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when the action is taken and the stockholders have acquiesced, no

third party can raise the objection that the stockholders have not

702
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formally assented.

In the cases cited the leases had long been in operation, and the

when the action is taken and the stockholders have acquiesced, no
third party can raise the objection that the stockholders have not
formally assented.
In the cases cited the leases had long been in operation, and the
time for dissent had long passed, and, therefore, the only question
that could be raised was the power of the corporation to act at all.
After an examination of the reasoning in all the adujdicated cases
(which has been by no mean~ cursory), after a consideration of the
principles governing the relations of shareholders of a corporation and
its directors, conceding that a corporation can do no act unless specially authorized thereto, except through its board of directors, I am
irresistibly brought to the conclusion that acts making organic or fundamental changes in the character or business of the corporation, can
not be done either by the directors alone, or by the shareholders alone;
but that both the executive .and administrative officers of the corpora-·
tion mu st unite with the shareholders of the corporation, who confer
the right to act upon the individuals intru sted with the office of directors; that directors are m erely temporary officers of the corporation,
by virtue of their office entitled to manage the business and affairs of
the corporation during their term of office, without interference from
the stockholders, but they can not say that a new board of directors,
although duly elected by the stockholders, ~hall never thereafter interfere with the management of the properties of the corporation, becau se they have placed their possessions and management into other
hands forever. • • •
Judgment for plaintiff.

time for dissent had long passed, and, therefore, the only question

that could be raised was the power of the corporation to act at all.

After an examination of the reasoning in all the adujdicated cases

(which has been by no means cursory), after a consideration of the

principles governing the relations of shareholders of a corporation and

its directors, conceding that a corporation can do no act unless spe-

cially authorized thereto, except through its board of directors, I am

irresistibly brought to the conclusion that acts making organic or fun-

damental changes in the character or business of the corporation, can

not be done either by the directors alone, or by the shareholders alone;

but that both the executive and administrative officers of the corpora-

tion must unite with the shareholders of the corporation, who confer

the right to act upon the individuals intrusted with the office of di-

rectors; that directors are merely temporary officers of the corporation,

by virtue of their office entitled to manage the business and affairs of

the corporation during their term of office, without interference from
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the stockholders, but they can not say that a new board of directors,

although duly elected by the stockholders, shall never thereafter inter-

fere with the management of the properties of the corporation, be-

cause they have placed their possessions and management into other

hands forever. « * «

Judgment for plaintiff.

Note. Functions of shareholders.—In general shareholders have the

right to:

(1) Elect directors. 1865, Mottu v. Primrose, 23 Md. 482; 1881, State v.

Merchant, 37 O. S. 251.

(2) Pass on amendments to the charter. 1818, Marlborough Manufactur-

ing Co. v.Smith, 2 Conn. 579; 1850, Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13 Pa. St. 133.

53 Am. Dec. 450, supra, p. 417; 1854, Stark v. Burke, 9 La. Ann. 341; 1870,

Note. Functions of sbareholders.-In general shareholders have tbe
right to:
( 1) Elect directors. 1865, Mottu v. Primrose, 23 Md. 482; 1881, State v.
Merchant, 37 0. S. 251.
(2) Pass on amendments to the charter. 1818, Marlborough Manufacturiniz Co. v. Smith, 2 Conn. 579; 1850, Commomvealtb v. Cullen, 13 Pa. St. 133.
53 Am. Dec. 450, supra, p. 417; 1854, Stark v. Burke, 9 La.. Ann. 341; 18i0,
Hope v. Mut. F. Ins. Co., 47 Mo. 93; 1873, Railwny Co. v. Allerton, 85 U.S.
23:~, supra, p. 442; 18&5, Baker's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 461; 1886, Venner v.
Atchison, etc., R., 28 Fed. Rep. 581; 1899, In1·e Election of Directorsof Newark Lib. ABBn., 64 N. J. L . 217, 265, 43 A.ti. Rep. 435; 1899, Alexander v. Atr
lantic & W. P.R. Co., 108 Ga. 449, 33 8. E. Rep. 866. •But see contra, US55,
Day.ton & C. R. Co. v. Hatch, 1 Disn. (Ohio) 84; 1858, Illinois River R. Co.
v. Zimmer, 20 Ill. 61>4.
(3) Increase or reduce st.ock. 1860, New York & N. H. R. v. Schuyler. 38
Barb. 534; 1871, Eidmnn v. Bowman, 58 Ill. 444, 11 Am. Rep. 90; 18i3,
Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Allerton, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 233, supra, p. 442; 1897,
McNulta. v. Corn Belt Bank, 164 Ill. 427.
(4) Make by-laws. 1766, Rex. v. Spencer, 3 Burr. 1837; 1868, Stevens v.
Davison, 18 Gratt. (Va. ) 819, fl8 Am. Dec. 692; 187.5, Morton Gravel Co. v.
Wyso ng, 51 Ind. 4; 1876, People v. Sterling B. C., 82 Ill. 457, contra· 18i6
Thayer v. Herri~k, Fed. Cas. 1?868; 1877, United Fire Assn. v. Bense~an, 4
Weekly N. C. (Pa.) l; 189~, Bnnkerhoff v. Lumber Co., 118 Mo. 447, infra,
p. 1162; 1894, Wat.son v. 81<lney, F. W. P. Co., 56 Mo. App. 14.5.
(5 ) Control the issue of stock. 186i, Curry v. Scott, 54 Pa. St. 270; 1868,
McManns v. P . & R. Co., 58 Pa. St. 330; 1883, Jones v . Morrison 31 Minn.
140; 1891, Arkansas V . Ag. Soc. v. Eicboltz, 45 Kan. 164.
'

Hope v. Mut. F. Ins. Co., 47 Mo. 93; 1873, Railway Co. v. Allerton, 85 U. S.

233, supra, p. 442; 1885, Baker's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 461; 1886, Venner v.

Atchison, etc., R., 28 Fed. Rep. 581; 1899, In re Election of Directors of New-

ark Lib. Assn., 64 N. J. L. 217 , 265, 43 Atl. Rep. 435; 1899, Alexander v. At-

lantic & W. P. R. Co., 108 Ua. 449, 33 S. E. Rep. 866. » But see contra, 1855,

Davton & C. R. Co. v. Hatch, 1 Disn. (Ohio) 84; 1858, Illinois River R. Co.

V. Zimmer, 20 111. 654.

(3) Increase or reduce stock. 1860, New York & N. H. R. v. Schuvler. 38

Barb. 534; 1871, Eidman v. Bowman, 58 111. 444, 11 Am. Rep. 90"; 1873,

Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Allerton, 85 U. 8. (18 Wall.) 233, supra, p. 442; 1897,

McNulta v. Corn Belt Bank, 164 111. 427.

(4) Make by-laws. 1766, Rex v. Spencer, 3 Burr. 1837; 1868, Stevens v

Davison, 18 Gratt. (Va.) 819, 98 Am. Dec. 692; 1875, Morton Gravel Co. v

Wysong, 51 Ind. 4; 1876, People v. Sterling B. C, 82 111. 457, contra; 1876,

Thaver v. Herrick, Fed. Cas. 13868; 1877, United Fire Assn. v. Benseman 4

Weekly N. C. (Pa.) 1; 1893, Brinkerhoff v. Lumber Co., 118 Mo. 447, infra

p. 1162; 1894, Watson v. Sidney, F. W. P. Co., 56 Mo. App. 145.

(5) Control the issue of stock. 1867, Currv v. Scott, 54 Pa. St. 270- 1868

McManus v. P. & R. Co., 58 Pa. St. 330; 1883, Jones v. Morrison, 31 Minn'

140: 1891, Arkansas V. Ag. Soc. v. Eicholtz, 45 Kan. 164.
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(6) Investigate the management. 1880, Star Line v. Van Vliet, 43 Mich.

§ 194

FUNCTIONS OF OTHER OFFICERS.

364.

(6) Investigate the management.

(7) Check ultra vires acts, and in this case a single dissenting shareholder

can enjoin such act. 1850, Bagshaw v. Eastern, etc., R., 19 L. J. (Ch.) 410;

1851, Beeman v. Rufford, 1 Sim. N. S. 550; 1867, Hoole v. Great Western R.,

L. R. 3 Ch. App. 262; 1895, Pollock v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 157 U. S. 429.

(8) Prevent the sale of the corporate property, unless the corporation is a

failing one. 1861, Abbott v. Hard RubberCo., 33 Barb. 578; 1874, Middlesex,

etc., R. v. Boston, etc., R., 115 Mass. 347; 1892, People v. Ballard, 134 N.

Y. 269.

19) Provide for the admission of members. 1837, Comw. v. Gill, 3 Whart.

228.

(10) Remove members or officers. 1758, Rex. v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517;

1865, Evans v. Philadelphia Club, 50 Pa. St. 107, infra, p. 1166; 1882, Imperial

Hydropathic Hotel Co., L. R. 23 Ch. Div. 1; 1898, In re Griffing Iron Co., 41

Atl. Rep. (N. J.i 931.

(11) Dissolve the corporation or surrender the corporate franchises. 1813,

Smith v. Smith, 3 Dessau. Eq. (S. C.)557; 1843 State v. Atch. R. Co., 5 Rob.
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(La.) 63; 1870, Wilson v. Proprietors of Central Bridge, 9 R. I. 590; 1897,

Pringle v. Eltringham C. Co., 49 La. Ann. 301, 6 A. & E. C. C. (N. 8.) 385;

1898, Forrester et al. v. B. & M. C. C. & S. M. Co., 21 Mont. 544, 55 Pac.

Rep. 229.

Functions of directors. These are usually stated to be to select the inferior

officers, agents and servants of the corporation, fix their compensation and

direct their actions. 1880, Batchelor v. Planters' National Bank, 78 Kv. 435;

1891. Sheridan Elec. L. Co. v. Chatham National Bank, 127 N. Y. 517" 28 N.

E. Rep. 467; 1898, Granger v. Am. Brew. Co., 25 Miscl. (N. Y.) 302. Also to

control in the ordinary business affairs of the corporation, such as policy of

management, expediency of acting or contracting, accepting consideration for

corporate property, or service, or appropriation of corporate funds to advance

the corporate enterprise. And in these particulars, if they act in good faith,

the stockholders can not control their acts. 1840, Burrill v. Pres. and Dir.

of Nahant Bank, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 163, 35 Am. Dec. 395; 1850, Gillis v. Bailev,

21 N. H. 149; 1850, Coraniw. v. Cullen, 13 Pa. St. 133, 53 Am. Dec. 450; 1863,

Miller v. Rutland, etc., R. Co., 36 Vt. 452; 1880, Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65, 37

Am. Rep. 546; 1881, Cleveland & M. R Co. v. Himrod Furnace Co., 37 Ohio

St. 321; 1884, Louisville, E. & St. L. Rv. Co. v. McVav, 98 Ind, 391; 1885,

Donohoe v. Mariposa L. & M. Co., 66 Cal. 317; 1891. "Ellerman v. Chicago

J. R., 49 N. J. Eq. 217, 35 Am. & E. C. C. 388; 1892, Wheeler v. Pullman I.

& S. Co., 143 111. 197; 1896, Blood v. La Serena, 113 Cal. 221, 4 Am. & E. C.

C. (N. S.) 451 (this case holding that stockholders can not direct certain

1880, Star Line v. Van Vliet, 43 Mich.

364.

(7) Chtick ultra vires acts, and in this case a single dissenting shareholder
1850, Bagshaw v. Eastern, etc., R., J9 L. J. 1Ch.) 410;
1851, Beeman v. Rufford, l Sim. N. S. 5'l0; 1867, Boole v. Great Western R.,
L. R. 3 Ch. App. 262; 1895, Pollock v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 157 U.S. 429.
(81 Prevent t.he sale of the corporate property, unless t.he corporation is a
failing one. 1861, Abbott v. Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578; 1874, Micidlesex,
etc., R. v. Boston, etc., R., 115 Maas. 347; 1892, People ,v. Ballard, 134 N.
Y . 269.
191 Provide for the admission of members. 1837, Comw. v. Gill, 3 Whart.
228.
(10) Remove members or officers. 1758, Rex. v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517;
1865, Evans v. Philadelphia Club, 50 Pa. St. 107, infra, p.1166; 1882, Imperial
Hydropatbic Hotel Co., L. R. 23 Ch. Div. 1; 1898, In re Griffing Iron Co., 41
Atl. Rep. ( N. J.1 931.
(11) Dissolve the corporation or surrender the corporate franchises. 1813,
Smith v. Smith, 3 Dessau. Eq. IS. C.) 557; 1843 State v. Atch. R. Co., 5 Rob.
(La. l 63; 1870, Wilson v. Proprietors of Central Bridge, 9 R. I. 590; 1897,
Pringle v. Eltringham C. Co., 49 La. Ann. 301, 6 A. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 38.J;
1898, Forrester et al. v. B. & M. C. C. & S. M. Co., 21 Mont. 544, 55 Pac.
REp. 229.
Functions of directors. These are usually stated to be to select the inferior
officers, ~e nt.s and servant.a of the corporation, fix their compensation and
direct their actions. 1880, Batchelor v. Planters' National Bank, 78 Ky. 435 ;
1891, Sheridan Elec. L. Co. v. Chatham National Bank, 127 N. Y. 517, 28 N.
E. Rep. 467; 1898, Granger v. Am. Brew. Co., 2.5 Miscl. (N. Y.) 302. Also to
control in the ordinary business affairs of the corporation, such as policy of
management, expediency of acting or contracting, accepting consideration for
corporate property, or service, or appropriation of corporate funds to advance
the corporate enterprise. And in these particulars, if they act in good faith,
the stockholders can not l'!Ontrol their acts. 1840, Burrill v. Pres. and Dir.
of Nahant Bank, 2 Mete. (:~lass.) 163, 35 Am. Dec. 395; 1850, Gillis v. Bailey,
21 N. H . 149; 18.50, Commw. v. Culle n, 13 Pa. St. 133, 53 Am. Dec. 450; 1863,
Miller v. Rutland, etc., R. Co., 36 Vt. 452; 1880, Hun v . Cary, 82 N. Y. 65, 37
Am. Rep. 546; 1881, Cleveland & M. R Co. v. Hirnrod .Furnace Co., 37 Ohio
St. 321; 1884, Louisville, E. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Mc Vay, 98 Ind, 391; 1885,
Donohoe v. Mariposa L. & M. Co., 66 Cal. 317; 1891. Ellerman v. Chical?O
J. R. , 49 N. J. Eq. 217, 35 Am. & E. C. C. 388; 1892, Wheeler v. Pullman I.
& S. Co., 143 Ill. 197; 1896, Blood v. La Serena, 113 Cal. 221, 4 Am. & E. C.
C. (N. S.) 451 (this case holding that stockholders can not direct certain
officers to do acts of ordinary business by resolution, unless the directors
authorize such acts also); 1899, Cupit v. Park City Bank, 20 Utah 292, 58 Pac.
Rep. S.'39.

can enjoin such act.

officers to do acts of ordinary business by resolution, unless the directors

authorize such acta also); 1899, Cupit v. Park City Bank, 20 Utah 292,58 Pac,

Rep. 839.

ARTICLE It.

OTHER OFFICERS.

ARTICLE II. OTHER OFFICERS.

Sec. 194. The president, etc.

Sec. 194. The president, etc.

NATIONAL STATE BANK v. VIGO COUNTY NATIONAL BANK.1

NATIONAL STATE BANK v. VIGO COUNTY NATIONAL BANK.1

1895. ^N THE Supreme Court of Indiana. 141 Ind. Rep. 352-

357> 5° Am- St- ReP- 33°-

[Action to set aside two mortgages held by Vigo Bank, purporting

1895.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF INDIANA.

141

Ind. Rep. 352-

357, 50 Arn. St. Rep. 330.

to have been executed by Sanford Tool Company by its president,

"on his own motion and without any authority or permission to him

1 Statement of facts abridged. Only part of opinion given.

[Action to set aside two mortgages held by Vigo Bank, purporting
to have been executed by Sanford Tool Company by its president,
"on his own motion and without a ny authority or permission to him
1
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given by said tool company, or its directors or stockholders," and
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without their consent or subsequent ratification. The Vigo Bank de-

murred; demurrer sustained and exceptions reserved. Sustaining the
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demurrer is the error assigned.]

given by said tool company, or its directors or stockholders," and
without their consent or subsequent ratification. The Vigo Bank demurred; demurrer sustained and exceptions reserved. Sustaining the
demurrer is the error assigned.]
MONKS, J. • • • The statute under which the tool company was
organized provides that the business of the corporation shall be managed by a board of directors, a majority of whom shall constitute a
quorum. Sectioi1 3854, R. S. 1881; section 5054, R. S. 1894.
Under this statute the directors have full authority to act for the corporation, and represent it in all the matters relating to the corporate
business. Brooklyn Gravel Road Co. v. Slaughter, 33 Ind. 185; Board,
etc., v. Lafayette, etc., R. Co., 50 Ind. 85.
The president of a corporation, by virtue of his office merely, has
very little authority to act for the corporation; his powers depend
upon the nature of the company's business and the authority giYen
him by the board of directors. The board of directors may invest
him with authority to act as the chief executive officer of the company;
this may be done by resolution or by acquiescence in the course of
dealing and manner of transacting the business of the corporation.
Taylor Corp., §§ 202, 236, 2'38, and notes; Martin v. Webb, 110 U.
S. 7; Northern, etc., R. C o. v. Bastian, 15 Md. 494; Doughertyv.
Hunter, S4 P a. St. 38o; Stokes v. New Jersey Pottery Co., 46 N. J.
Law 240; Loui sville, etc., R. W. Co. v. McVay, 98 Ind. 391; 17
Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, pp. 13s, ~36 , 137, and notes; Jones
Chat. Mort., § 51.
When a contract is made in the name of a corporation by the president, in the u sual course of business, which the directors have the
power to authorize him to make, or to ratify after it is made, the
presumption is that the contract is binding on the corporation until it
is shown that the sam e was not authoriized or ratified. Patterson v.
Robinson , 116 N. Y. 193; Eureka Iron and Steel Works v. Bresnahan, 6o Mich. 332; 1 l\forawetz Corp., § S38; 1 Beach Corp. , § 203;
17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 124.
One dealing with the president of a corporation, in the usual course
of business, and within the powers which the president has been accustomed to exercise without objection from the directors, has the
right to assume that the president has been invested with those powers.
I Morawetz Corp.,§ s38; I Beach Corp.,§ 203; First Nat'! Bank
v. Kimberlands, 16 W. Va. SSS; Eureka Iron and Steel Works v.
Bresnahan, supra.
.
Each paragraph of the complaint, however, alleges that said mortgages were executed without any authority whatever, and were never
ratified after they were executed, and we are of the opinion that the
second , third and fouith paragraphs were sufficient to withstand the
demurrer. • • •
Judgment reversed.

Monks, J. * * * The statute under which the tool company was

organized provides that the business of the corporation shall be man-

aged by a board of directors, a majority of whom shall constitute a

quorum. Section 3854, R. S. 1881; section 5054, R. S. 1894.

Under this statute the directors have full authority to act for the cor-

poration, and represent it in all the matters relating to the corporate

business. Brooklyn Gravel Road Co. v. Slaughter, 33 Ind. 185; Board,

etc., v. Lafayette, etc., R. Co., 50 Ind. 85.

The president of a corporation, by virtue of his office merely, has

very little authority to act for the corporation; his powers depend

upon the nature of the company's business and the authority given

him by the board of directors. The board of directors may invest

him with authority to act as the chief executive officer of the company;

this may be done by resolution or by acquiescence in the course of

dealing and manner of transacting the business of the corporation.

Taylor Corp., §§ 202, 236, 23S, and notes; Martin v. Webb, 110U.
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S. 7; Northern, etc., R. Co. v. Bastian, 15 Md. 494; Dougherty v.

Hunter, 54 Pa. St. 380; Stokes v. New Jersey Pottery Co., 46 N. J.

Law 240; Louisville, etc., R. W. Co. v. McVay, 98 Ind. 391; 17

Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, pp. 135, 136, 137, and notes; Jones

Chat. Mort., § 51.

When a contract is made in the name of a corporation by the presi-

dent, in the usual course of business, which the directors have the

power to authorize him to make, or to ratify after it is made, the

presumption is that the contract is binding on the corporation until it

is shown that the same was not authorized or ratified. Patterson v.

Robinson, 116 N. Y. 193; Eureka Iron and Steel Works v. Bresna-

han, 60 Mich. 332; 1 Morawetz Corp., § 538; 1 Beach Corp., § 203;

17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 124.

One dealing with the president of a corporation, in the usual course

of business, and within the powers which the president has been ac-

customed to exercise without objection from the directors, has the

right to assume that the president has been invested with those powers.

1 Morawetz Corp., § 538; 1 Beach Corp., § 203; First Nat'l Bank

v. Kimberlands, 16 W. Va. 555; Eureka Iron and Steel Works v.

Bresnahan, supra.

Each paragraph of the complaint, however, alleges that said mort-

gages were executed without any authority whatever, and were never

ratified after they were executed, and we are of the opinion that the

second, third and fourth paragraphs were sufficient to withstand the

demurrer. * * *

Judgment reversed.

Note. See, also, as to functions and powers of president. 1872, Smith v.

Smith, 62 111.493; 1S74, Titus v. Cairo, etc., R. Co., 37 N. J. L. 98; 1881,

Note. See, also, as to fnnctions and poioers of presiMnt. 1872, Smith v.
Smith, 62 Ill. 493; 1874, Titus v. Cairo, e1tc., R. Co., 37 N. J. L. 98; 1881,
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Mining Co. v. Anglo-Cal. Bank, 104 TJ. 8. 192; 1801, Wait v. Nashua Armory

§ 195

INTERNAL RELATIONS GE;\ERALLY.

705

Assn., 66 N. H. 581, 49 Am. St. Rep. 630, 14 L. R. A. 356; 1895, Merrill v.

Hurlev, 6 S. D. 592, 55 Am. St. Rep. 859; 1896, Board of Trade v. Nelson, 162

III. 431, 53 Am. St. Rep. 312; 1896, Ford v. Hill, 92 Wis. 188, 53 Am. St. Rep.

902; 1897, Swasey v. Emerson, 168 Mass. 118,60 Am. St. Rep. 368; 1897,

White v. Taylor, 113 Mich. 543; 1897, Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 61 Am.

St. Rep. 436, 37 L. R. A. 682; 1897, Brush, etc., Co. v. Montgomery, 114 Ala.

433 , 21 So. Rep. 960; 1898, Pacific Bank v. Stone, 121 Cal. 202; 1899, Cham-

bers v. Lancaster, 160 N. Y. 342, 54 N. E. Rep. 707; 1899, Moore Mercantile

Co. v. Arnold, 108 Ga. 449, 34 S. E. Rep. 176; 1899, White v. Elgin Creamer.

Co., 108 Iowa 522, 79 N. W. Rep. 283.

As to functions and powers of rice-president, see: 1872, Smith v. Smith, 62

111. 493; 1890, Huse v. Ames, 104 Mo. 91; 1891, Wait v. Nashua Armory

Assn., 66 N. H. 581, 49 Am. St. Rep. 630, 14 L. R. A. 356; 1892, Shaffer v.

Harm, 111 N. C. 1; 1895, Missouri, etc., Co. v. Faulkner, 88 Tex. 649; 1897,

Pond v. Nat'l Mtg. & D. Co., 6 Kan. A pp. 750.

As to powers of secretary, see: 1889, Read v. Buffuui, 79 Cal. 77; 1893,

Hastings v. Brooklyn, etc., Co., 138 N. Y. 473; 1895, Wolf & Gaines v. Daven-

port, etc., R. Co., 93 Iowa 218; 1899, Colorado S. Co. v. Am. Pub. Co., 97 Fed.
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Rep. 843.

As to functions and powers of treasurer, see: 1881, Mining Co. v. Anglo-Cal.

Bank, 104 TJ. S. 192; 1889, Craft v. South Boston R. Co., 150 Mass. 207, 5 L.

R. A. 641; 1893, Merchants' National Bank v. Citizens', etc., Co., 159 Mass.

505; 1894, Appeal of Philler, 161 Pa. St. 157; 1898, Chicago, etc., Co. v. Chi-

cago National Bank, 176 III. 224; 1899, Colorado S. Co. v. Am. Pub. Co., 97

Fed. Rep. 843; 1899, First National Bank v. Garretson, 107 Iowa 196.

As to functions and powers of general managers, general superintendents, gen-

eral agents, eashiers, road-master, division superintendent, station-master, yard-

master, station agent, foreman, conductor, etc., see: 1884, The Louisville, Evans-

ville & St. L. R. Co. v. McKay, 98 Ind. 391, where the cases are collected

and discussed.

Further as to powers of general manager, see: 1898, Helena National Bank

v. Rockv, etc., Co., 20 Mont. 379, 63 Am. St. Rep. 628; 1898, Butte & B. Con.

M. Co. v. Mont. Ore. P. Co., 21 Mont. 589, 10 Am. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 415, note

419; 1899, New South Brewing, etc., Co. v. Shuck, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 2005, 10 A.

:\fining Co. v. Anglo-Cal. Bank, 104 U .• S. 192; 18fll, Wait~- Nas~uaAr~ory
..\.ssn., 66 N. H. 581, 49 Am. St. Rep. 630, 14 L. R. A. 350; 1890, Mernll v .
Hurley, 6 S. D. 592, 55 Am. St. Rep. 859; 1896, Board of Trade v. Nelson, 162
Ill. 431, 53 Am. St. Rep. 312; 1896, Ford v. Hill, 92 Wis. 188, 53 Am. St. Rep.
902; 1897, Swasey v. E~erson, 168 Mass. 118, 60. A.m. St. Rep. 368; 1897,
White v. Taylor, 113 Mich. 543; 1897, Jones v. W1lhams, 139 Mo. 1, 61 Am.
St. Rep. 436, 37 L . R. A. 682; 1897, Brush, etc., Co. v. Montgomery, 114 Ala.
433, 21 So. Rep. 960; 1898, Pacific Bank v. Stone. 121 Cal. 202 ; 1899, Cba~
bers v. Lancaster, 160 N. Y. 342, 54 N. E. Rep. 707; 1899, Moore Mercantile
Co. v. Arnold, 108 Ga. 449, 34 S. E . Rep. 176; 1899, While v. Elgin Creumer_.
Co., 108 Iowa 522, 79 N. W. Rep. 283.
As to f11nctio1is mid powers of vice-president, see: 1872, Smith v. Smith, 62
Ill. 493; 1890, Huse v. Ames, 104 Mo. 91; 1891, Wait v. Nashua Armory
Assn., 66 N. H. 581, 49 Am. St. H.ep. 630, 14 L. R. A. 356; 1892, Shaffer v.
Hahn, 111 N. C. 1; 1895, Missouri, etc., Co. v. Faulkner, 88 Tex. 649; 1897,
Pond v. Nat'l Mtg. & D. Co., 6 Kan . App. 750.
As to poioers of secretary, see: 1889. Read v. Buffum, 79 Cal. 77; 1893,
Hastings v. Brooklyn, etc., Co., 138 N. Y. 4.73 ; 1895, Wolf & Gaines v. Davenport, etc., R. Co., 93 Iowa 218; 1899, Colorado S. Co. v. Am. Pub. Co., 97 Fed.
Re p . 843.
As to functions and powers of treasurer, SP.e: 1881, Mining Co. v. Ai;iglo-Cal.
Bank, 104 U.S. 192; 1889, Craft v. South Boston R. Co., 150 Mass. 207, .5 L.
R. A. 641; 1893, Merchants' National Bank v . Citizens', etc., Co., 159 Mass.
505; 1894, Appeal of Philler, 161 Pa. St. 157; 18!l8, Chi'cago, etc., Co. v. Chicago National Bank, 176 Ill. 224; 1899, Colorado S. Co. v. Am . Pub. Co., 97
Fed. Rep. 843; 1899, First National Bank v. Garretson, 107 Iowa 196.
As to functions and powers of gene1·al managers, general superintendents, general agents, aa.•hiers, road-master, divi.•ion superintendent, station-master, yardmaster, station agent, foreman, conductor, etc., see: 1884, The Louisville, Evansville & St. L. R. Co. v. McKay, 98 Ind . 391, where the cases are collected
and discussed .
Further as to powers of general manager, see: 1898, Helena National Bank
v . Rocky, etc., Co., 20 Mont. 379, 63 Am. St. Rep. 628; 1898, Butte & B . Con.
M. Co. v. Mont. Ore. P. Co., 21Mont.539, 10 Arn. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 415, note
419; 1899, New South Brewing, etc., Co. v. Shuck, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 2005, 10 A.
& E. C. C. (N. S.) 423.

& E. C. C. (N. S.) 423.

Subdivision III. Internal Relations and Constitution.

ARTICLE I. THE CORPORATE FRANCHISES.

SUBDIVISION III.

INTERNAL RELATIONS

AND

CONSTITUTION.

Sec. 195. The franchises of the corporation itself. "A cor-

poration aggregate is an artificial body of men, composed of

ARTICLE I.

divers constituent members, adinstar corporis humani, the lig-

THE

CORPORATE FRANCHISES.

aments of which body politic or artificial body are the fran-

chises and liberties thereof, which bind and unite all its mem-

bers together; and the whole frame and essence of the corpora-

Sec. 195. The franchises of the corporation itself.

''A corporation aggregate is an artificial body of men, composed of
divers constituent members , ad instarcorporis ltumani, the ligaments of which body politic or artificial body are the franchises and liberties thereof, wlziclt bind and u11ite all its members together; and the whole frame and essence of the corporation consists therein. '' Argument of Sergeant Pemberton in
King v. London, Carth. 2 r 7 ( r 692 ) .

tion consists therein." Argument of Sergeant Pemberton in

King v. London, Carth. 217 (1692).

See, also. People v. Utica Insurance Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 358, supra, p.

113; Spring Valley Water-Works v. Schottler, 62 Cal. 69, supra, p. 120, on pp,

45—Wil. Cases.

See, also, People v. Utica Insurance Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y .) 358, supra, p .
113; Spring Valley Water-Works v. Schottler, 62 Cal. 69, supra, p.120, on pp,
45-WIL. CASES.

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

yo6

INTERNAL RELATIONS GENERALLY.

INTERNAL RELATIONS GENERALLY.

7o6

121, 123,129; State, ex rel. Waring, v. Me<lical Society, 38 Ga. 608, supra, p.

136, on p. 137; Fietsam v. Hay, 122 111. 293, supra, p. 141, on pp. 141-142;

121, 12.'~, 12?; St.at~. ex rel. Wnring, v. Me<lical Society, 38 Ga. 608, 1rupra, p.
136, on p. 137; Fietsam v. Hay, J22 Ill. 293, :mpra p. 141, on pp. 141-; 142;
Memphis & L. R. Co. v. Railroatl Commrs., l.12 U.S. 60!:}, sttpra, p. H.3, on
pp. Ht>-147; Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143, supra, p. 150, on p. 151; Higgin_s
v. Downward, 8 Hous. tl>el.) 227, supra, p. 152, on pp.155-156. Note to article iv, sup1·a, p. 157.

Memphis & L. R. Co. v. Railroad Commrs., 112 U. S. 609, supra, p. 143, on

pp. 146-147; Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143, supra, p. 150, on p. 151; Higgius

v. Downward, 8 Hous. ^Del.) 227, supra, p. 152, on pp. 165-156. Note to arti-

cle iv, supra, p. 157.

Note. It has been said that "All the functions of a corporation are in one

sense franchises. The right to hold property in the corporate name, to sue

and be sued in that capacity, to have and use a corporate seal, and by that to

Note. It has been said that "A 11 the fnnctions of a corporation are in one
sense franchises . The right to hold property in the corporate nnme, to sue
and be sued in that capacity, to have and t1se a corporate seal, and by that to
contract, and some others perhnps, are frallchisf.'s, which constitute the very
definition of a corporation ."--Ch ief Justice RedfiE'ld, in State v. Boston, etc.,
R.Co., 25 Vt. 442(1853). Also Perley, C. J., in Piercev. Emery, 32 N. H .
507 (185G), says: "A corporation is itself a franchise belonging to the members of the corporation ; and a corporation, being itself a frnncbise, may l1old
othe r franchises, as rights and franchises of the co rporntfon , • • • and
being itself a franchise, consists and is made up of its rights and franchise ."
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a fr1111C'hise and a mere
license. Many of the courts hold that the right of wny of a street railroad
company or the right to lay gas or water pipes, o r erect telegraph or telephone poles in the streets of a city granted by th e city council is a .fra11chi.,e.
See, 1883, Hovelmun v. Kansas City R. Co., 79 Mo. 632, on 64:J; 1885, New
. Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Delnmore, 114 U.S. 501; 1888, State. v. l\fadi!'on, etc.,
R. Co., 72 Wis. 612;' 1888, People v.O'Brien , 111 N. Y. 1, 7 Am. St. Rep. 684,
2 L. R. A. 255; 1894, Detroit Citizens' S. R C'.o. v. Detroit, 64 Fed. Rep. 628,
26 L. R . A. 667; 1896, Stevens.v. City of Muskegon, 111 Mich. 72; 189[ 1 .Tower
v. Tower & S.S. R. Co., 68 l\hnn. 500, 64 Am. St. Rep. 493; 1897, "right v.
Milwaukee, ek, ~ -Co ., 95 Wis. _29, 60 Am. St., Rep. 74; 1897, ~ilwaukee
Elec. R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 39, 601 Am . St. Rep. 81; 1891 , State v.
East Fifth St. R. Co., 140 Mo. 539, 62 Am. St. Rep. 742,38L. R. A. 218; 1898,
Suburban etc., Co. v. Inhabitants, etc., 41 At!. Rep. 865 (N. J. Ch); 1898,
Ghee v. Northern Union Gas Co., J,58 N. Y. 510; 1899, People v. Suburban R.
Co .. 178 Ill. 594; 1899, East St.LC. R. Co. v. E. St. L., 182 Ill. 433; 1899.
Township of Hamtramck v. Rapid R., 122 Mich. 472, 81 N. W. Rep. 337.
Other cases hold such grants to be licenses only . See, 1878, People v. Mutual. etc., Co., 38 Mich. 154; 1885, Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Gulf City, etc.,
R. Co., 63 Texas 529; 1888, Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Nave, 38 Kan. 744, 5.
Am. St. Rep. 800, note 804; 1893, Lake Roland El. Co. v. Baltimore, 77 l\1rl .
352, 20 L. R. A. I 26; 1894, City of Belleville v. Citizens', etc., R. Co., 152 Ill.
171, 26 L. R. A. 681.

contract, and some others perhaps, are franchises, which constitute the very

definition of a corporation."—Chief Justice Redfield, in State v. Boston, etc.,

R. Co., 25 Vt. 442 (1853). Also Perley, C. J., in Pierce v. Emery, 32 N. H.

507 (1856), says: "A corporation is itself a franchise belonging to the mem-

bers of the corporation; and a corporation, being itself a franchise, may hold

other franchises, as rights and franchises of the corporation, * * * an,l

being itself a franchise, consists and is made up of its rights and franchises."

It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a franchise and a mere

license. Many of the courts hold that the right of way of a street railroad

company or the right to lay gas or water pipes, or erect telegraph or tele-
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phone poles in the streets of a city granted bv the city council is a franchise.

See, 1883, Hovelman v. Kansas Citv R. Co., 79 Mo. 632, on 643; 1885, New

Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Delamore, 114 U. S. 501 ; 1888, State v. Madison, etc.,

R. Co., 72 Wis. 612;' 1888, People v.O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 7 Am. St. Rep. 684,

2 L. R. A. 255; 1894, Detroit Citizens' S. R. Co. v. Detroit, 64 Fed. Rep. 628,

26 L. R. A. 667; 1896, Stevens v. City of Muskegon, 111 Mich. 72; 1897, Tower

v. Tower & S. S. R. Co., 68 Minn. 500, 64 Am. St. Rep. 493; 1897, Wright v.

Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 95 Wis. 29, 60 Am. St. Rep. 74; 1897, Milwaukee

Elec. R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 39, 60 Am. St. Rep. 81; 1897, State v.

East Fifth 8t. R. Co., 140 Mo. 539, 62 Am. St. Rep. 742, 38 L. R. A. 218; 1898,

Suburban etc., Co. v. Inhabitants, etc., 41 Atl. Rep. 865 (N. J. Ch ) ; 1898,

Ghee v. Northern Union Gas Co., 158 N. Y. 510; 1899, People v. Suburban R.

Co.. 178 111. 594; 1899. East St. L. C. R, Co. v. E. St. L., 182 111. 433; 1899.

Township of Hamtramck v. Rapid R., 122 Mich. 472, 81 N. W. Rep. 337.

Other cases hold such grants to be licenses onlv. See, 1878, People v. Mu-

tual, etc., Co., 38 Mich. 154; 1885, Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Gulf City, etc.,

R. Co., 63 Texas 529; 1888, Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Nave, 38 Kan. 744, 5.

Am. St. Rep. 800, note 804; 1893, Lake Roland El. Co. v. Baltimore, 77 Md.

352, 20 L. R. A. 126; 1894, City of Belleville v. Citizens', etc., R. Co., 152 111.

171, 26 L. R. A. 681.

Sec. 196. Franchises of the members. "It is likewise a fran-

chise for a number of persons to be incorporated and subsist

Sec. 196. Franchises of the members.

''It is likewise a franchise for a number of persons to be incorporated and s ubsist
as a body politic; with power to maintain perpetual succession, and do other corporate acts; and eac!t i11divid~1al member of sucli c01-pomtio1t is also said to !tave a franchise or
freedom." Blackstone's Comm ., Bk. II , p . •37.

as a body politic; with power to maintain perpetual succes-

sion, and do other corporate acts; and each individual mem-

ber of such corporation is also said to have a franchise or

freedom." Blackstone's Comm., Bk. II, p. "37.

See, also, State, ex rel. Waring, v. Medical Society, 38 Ga. 608, supra, p. 136;

Fietsam v. Hay, 122 III. 293, supra, p. 141; Memphis & L. R. Co. v. R. Com-

missioners, 112 U. S. 609, supra, p. 143.

Note. In Board of Trade of Chicago v. The People, 91 111. 80, it was held

See, also, State, e:r. rel. "\Vnring, v. Medical Society, 38 Ga. 608, supra, p. 136;
Fietsam v. Hay, 122 Ill. 293, :mpra, p . 141; Memphis & L . R. Co. v. R. Commissioners, 11:.! U.S. 609, supra, p. 143.
Note. In Board of Trade of Chicago v. The People, 91 Ill. 80, it was held
that a member d id not have a fran chise in his membership suffi cie nt to give
a court of appeals jurisdiction in appea l, under a statute authorizing appeals
in cases involving a franchise. The comt's argument is given above in note
on pp. 161, 162. See cases infra on the right of corporations to expel members, p.1165.

that a member did not have a franchise in his membership sufficient to give

a court of appeals jurisdiction in appeal, under a statute authorizing appeals

in cases involving a franchise. The court's argument is given above in note

on pp. 161, 162. See cases infra on the right of corporations to expel mem-

bers, p. 1165.
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ARTICLE II. CONTRACTS CONTAINED IN THE CHARTER OF A COR-

PORATION.

Sec. 197. (i) In general. '' The charter of a corporation having a

capital stock is a contract between three parties, and forms

the basis of three distinct contracts. The charter is a contract

between the state and the corporation; second, it is a con-

tract between the corporation and the stockholders; third, it

is a contract between the stockholders and the state." Cook

Stock and Stockholders, 3d ed., § 492.

"The contracts which are ordinarily found in the charter of a pri-

vate corporation fall into three classes: (1) Those between

the state and the incorporators. * * * (2) Contracts

between the corporation and the stockholders. * * * (3)

Contracts between the corporation and persons dealing with

the corporation, such as statements in the charter or law, that

the capital stock shall be a certain amount.'' Elliott Corpora-

tions, § 98; Beach Corp., §§ 22-24.

By incorporation for business purposes, the corporators acquire

from the state a franchise to employ certain methods of acting (which

they could not otherwise lawfully exercise), and certain designated
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funds or property, in attaining or furthering certain specified objects.

It is the dedication of certain funds, by the mutual and express con-

sent of the state and the corporators, to the attainment of certain pur-

poses, in a certain way. Because the state believes the purposes de-

sirable, it authorizes the peculiar method; because the corporators

deem the method necessary or desirable, and the end profitable, they

contribute the funds. The peculiar method is by the state authoriz-

ing a changing body of persons, through a specified form of organiza-

tion, and under a designated name, to act and be considered as one

person in whom are vested the funds contributed, and upon whom is

placed the duty of applying them to the purposes named. The state

has the right to have the funds so applied; so does the corporation;

so do the members; so do those who are selected to act in the corpo-

rate name; so do those who become creditors in the performance of

the corporate functions. In this way there arise many implied con-

tracts or grants of franchises, as to the purposes to be accomplished,

the method of accomplishing them, and the application of the funds

thereto, protected under the national constitutional provision that "no

state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." (Art.

i, § 10, ch. 1.

708 DARTMOUTH COLLEGE V. WOODWARD. § 198

Sec. 198. Same.

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE V . WOODWARD.

708

TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE v. WOODWARD.1

1819. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 4 Wheatcra

(17 U. S.) Rep. 518-715.

Sec. 198. Same.

February 2, 1819. The opinion of the court was delivered by

Marshall, Ch. J. This is an action of trover, brought by the trust-

TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE v. WOODWARD.1

ees of Dartmouth College against William H. Woodward, in the state

court of New Hampshire, for the book of records, corporate seal and

1819. IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF THE UNITED STATES. 4 Wheaton
(17 U.S.) Rep. 518-715.

other corporate property, to which the plaintiffs allege themselves to

be entitled. A special verdict, after setting out the rights of the par-

ties, finds for the defendant, if certain acts of the legislature of New-

Hampshire, passed on the 27th of June, and on the iSth of December,

1819. The opinion of the court was delivered by
Ch. J. This is an action of trover, brought by the trustees of Dartmouth College against William H. Woodward, in the state
court of New Hampshire, for the book of records, corporate seal and
other corporate property, to which the plaintiffs allege themseh·es to
be entitled. A special verdict, after setting out the rights of the parties, finds for the defendant, if certain acts of the legislature of ~ew
Hampshire, passed on the 27th of June, and on the 18th of December,
18161 be valid and binding on the trustees, without their assent, and
not repugnant to the constitution of the United States; othemise, it
finds for the plaintiffs. The superior court of judicature of ~e''
Hampshire rendered a judgment upon this verdict for the defendant,
which judgment has been brought before this comt by ,.,Tit of error.
The single question now to be considered is, do the acts to which the
verdict refers violate the constitution of the United States ?
This court can be insensible neither to the magnitude nor delicacy
of this question. The validity of a legislative act is to be examined;
and the opinion of the highest law tribunal of a state is to be revised
-an opinion which carries with it intrinsic evidence of the dil igence.
of the ability and the integrity with which it was formed. On more
than one occasion this court has expressed the cautious circumspection
with which it approaches the consideration of such questions; and
has declared that in no doubtful case would it pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution. But the American people
have said, in the constitution of the United States, that " no state shall
p ass any bill of atta inder,· ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts." In the same instrument, they have also aid,
"that the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity
arising un<ler the constitution." On the judges of this court, then, is
imposed the hig h and solemn <luty of protecting, from even legislatfre
violation, those contracts which the constitution of our country has
placed beyond legislative control; and, however irksome the task may
be, this is a <luty from which we d are not shrink.
February

1816, be valid and binding on the trustees, without their assent, and

finds for the plaintiffs. The superior court of judicature of New

Hampshire rendered a judgment upon this verdict for the defendant,

which judgment has been brought before this court by writ of error.

The single question now to be considered is, do the acts to which the

verdict refers violate the constitution of the United States?

This court can be insensible neither to the magnitude nor delicacy

of this question. The validity of a legislative act is to be examined;
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2,

MARSHALL,

not repugnant to the constitution of the United States; otherwise, it

and the opinion of the highest law tribunal of a state is to be revised

—an opinion which carries with it intrinsic evidence of the diligence,

of the ability and the integrity with which it was formed. On more

than one occasion this court has expressed the cautious circumspection

with which it approaches the consideration of such questions; and

has declared that in no doubtful case would it pronounce a legisla-

tive act to be contrary to the constitution. But the American people

have said, in the constitution of the United States, that "no state shall

pass any bill of attainder,' ex post facto law, or law impairing the ob-

ligation of contracts." In the same instrument, they have also said,

"that the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity

arising under the constitution." On the judges of this court, then, is

imposed the high and solemn duty of protecting, from even legislative

violation, those contracts which the constitution of our country has

placed beyond legislative control; and, however irksome the task may

be, this is a duty from which we dare not shrink.

1 Facts are sufficiently stated in the opinions, and supra, p. 426. Arguments,

and parts of the opinions of Story and Washington, JJ., omitted. The case

was argued in the state court by Mason, Smith and Webster, for plaintiffs,

and by Sullivan and Bartlett, for defendants; in the United States Supreme

Court by Webster and Hopkinson, for plaintiff in error, and by Holmes and

William Wirt, attorney-general, for defendants in error. The decision of the

state court is reported (without the arguments of counsel 1 in 1 N. H. Ill, and

reprinted (with the arguments of counsel) in 66 N. H. 473. Farrar's Report

(1817, 1819) contains decisions of both courts. The original charter and the

acts of the state legislature are given in full in 4 Wheat. 519-551.

1
FactR a re snffi ciently stated in the opinions, and supra, p. 426. Argument~,
and parts of the opinions of Story and Washington, JJ., omitted. The case
was argued in the state court by Mason, Smith and Webster, for plaintiffs,
a nd by Sulliva n and Bartlett, for defendants; in the U nited States Supreme
Court by Webster a nd Hopkinson, for plaintiff in error, and by Holmes and
Will iam Wirt, attorn ey-general, for defendants in error . The decision of the
state court is reported (without t he arguments of counsel\ in l N. H . Il l, and
reprinterl (with t he arguments of counsel) in 65 N. H. 473. Farrar's Report
(1817, 1819) contain s decisions of both conrts. The origin al charter and the
acts of the state legislature are given in full in 4 Wheat. 519-551.
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The title of the plaintiffs originates in a charter dated the 13th day

of December, in the year 1769, incorporating twelve persons therein

CO:-.ITRACTS 1:-.1 THE CORPORATE CHARTER.

mentioned by *the name of "The Trustees of Dartmouth College,"

granting to them and their successors the usual corporate privileges

and powers, and authorizing the trustees, who are to govern the col-

lege, to fill up all vacancies which may be created in their own body.

The defendant claims under three acts of the legislature of New

Hampshire, the most material of which was passed on the 27th of

June, 1S16, and is entitled "an act to amend the charter and enlarge

and iinprove the corporation of Dartmouth College." Among other

alterations in the charter, this act increases the number of trustees to

twenty-one, gives the appointment of the additional members to the

executive of the state, and creates a board of overseers, with power

to inspect and control the most important acts of the trustees. This

board consists of twenty-five persons. The president of the senate,

the speaker of the house of representatives of New Hampshire, and

the governor and lieutenant-governor of Vermont, for the time being,

are to be members ex officio. The board is to be completed by the

governor and council of New Hampshire, who are also empowered to

fill all vacancies which may occur. The acts of the iSth and 26th of
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December are supplemental to that of the 27th of June, and are prin-

cipally intended to carry that act into effect. The majority of the

trustees of the college have refused to accept this amended charter,

and have brought this suit for the corporate property, which is in pos-

session of a person holding by virtue of the acts which have been

stated.

[The circumstances constituted a contract.] It can require ?io argu-

ment to prove, that the circumstances of this case constitute a

contract. Atl application is made to the crown for a charter to in-

corporate a religious and literary institution. In the application, it

is stated, that large contributions have been made for the object, which

will be conferred on the corporation, as soon as it shall be created.

The charter is granted, and on its faith the property is conveyed.

Surely, in this transaction every ingredient of a complete and legiti-

mate contract is to be found. The points for consideration are: 1.

Is this contract protected by the constitution of the United States? 2.

Is it impaired by the acts under which the defendant holds?

1. [Character of contracts protected by the constitution.] On the

first point it has been argued that the word "contract," in its broadest

sense, would comprehend the political relations between the govern-

ment and its citizens; would extend to offices held within a state, for

state purposes, and to many of those laws concerning civil institutions,

which must change with circumstances, and be modified by ordinary

legislation; which deeply concern the public, and which, to preserve

good government, the public judgment must control. That even mar-

riage is a contract, and its obligations are affected by the laws respect-

ing divorces. That the clause in the constitution, if construed in its

greatest latitude, would prohibit these laws. Taken in its broad, un-

limited sense, the clause would be an unprofitable and vexatious inter-

The title of the plnintiffs originates in a charter dated the 13th day
of D ecl'm her, in the year x769 , incorporating twelve persons therein

mentioned by \he name 0 £ "The Trustees of D a rtmouth College,"
granting to the m and their successors the usual corporate privileges
and powers, and authorizing the trustees, who are to govern the college, to fill up a ll vacancies which may be created in their own body.
The defendant claims unde r three act of the legislature of New
Hampshire, the most rnateria l of which was p assed on the 27th of
June, 1816, and is entitled "an act to amend the charter a nd enlarge
and improve the corporation of Dartmouth C oll ege." Among other
alterations in the chaiter, this act increases the number of trustees to
twenty-one, gives the appointment of the additional membe rs to the
executive of the state, and creates a board of oyerseers, with p ower
to insp ect and control the most important acts of the trustees. This
board consists of twenty-five persons. The president of the senate,
the peaker of the house of representatives of New Hampshire, and
the governo r and lieutenant-governor of Vermout, for the time being,
are to be members ex ojfido. The board is to be completed by the
governor and council of New Hampshire, who are also empowered to
fi ll all vacancies which may occur. The acts of the 18 th and 26th of
D ecember are supplemental to that of the 27th of ] une, and are principa lly intended to carry that act into effect. The majo rity of the
tru tees 0£ the college have refused to accept this amended charter,
and have brought this s uit for the corporate property, which is in posses ion of a person holding by virtue of the acts which have been
stated .
[The circumstances constituted a contract.] It can requfre no argument to prove, that the circumstances of this case constitute a
contract. An appli"cation is made to th e crown for a charter to incorporat e a religious and literary institution: In th e application , it
is stat ed , tliat large contributions have been made for tlze object, whiclt
.-u.:£11 be conf erred on the co1-poration, as soon as it shall be created.
T/1e charter is granted, and on its f aith th e property is conveyed.
Sur ely, in tlzis transaction every ingredt'ent of a complete and legit£111ate contract is to be found. The points for considerntion are: I.
Is this contract protected by the constitution of the United States? 2.
Is it impaired by the acts under which the defendant holds ?
1. [Character of co11tracts protected by the constitution.] On the
first point it has heen argued that the word "contract," in its broadest
sense, would comprehend the p olitical relations between the government and its citize ns; would extend to offices held within a sta te. for
state pu.r poses, and to many of those laws concerning civil institutions,
which must change with circumsta nces, and b e modified by o rdinary
legi lation; which deeply concern the public , and which, to preserve
good government, the public judgme nt must control. Th at even nw rriage is a contract, and its obligations are affected by the laws re~p e ct
ing divorces. That the clau se in the constitution, if construed in its
greate t la titude, would proh ibit these laws. Taken in its hroad, 1111limited sense, the clause would be an unprofitable and ve xatiou5 inter-
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ference with the internal concerns of a state, would unnecessarily and

710

DARTl\JOlJTH COLLEGE V. WOODWARD.

unwisely embarrass its legislation and render immutable those civil

institutions which are established for purposes of internal government,

ference with the internal concerns of a state, would unnecessarily and
umviscly embarrass its legislation and render immutable those civil
institutions which are established for purposes ot internal government,
and which, to subserve those purposes, ought to vary with varying
circumstances. That as the framers of the constitution could never
have intended to inse1t in that instrument a provision so unnecessary,
so mischievous and so repugnant to its general spirit, the term ''contract" must be understood in a more limited sense. That it must be
understood as intended to guard against a power of at least doubtful
utility, the abuse of which had been extensively felt, and to restrain
the legislature in future from violating the right to property. That
anterior to the formation of the constitution a course of legislation had
prevailed in many, if not in all, of the states which weakened the
confidence of man in man, and embarrassed all transactions between
individuals by dispensing with a faithful performance of engagement..
To correct this mischief by restraining the power which produced it
the state legislatures were forbidden "to pass any law impairing the
obligation of contracts," that is, of contracts respecting property under which some individual could claim a right to something bendicial
to himself, and that since the clause in the constitution must in construction receive some limitation, it may be c,onfined, and ought to be
confined, to cases of this description, to cases within the mischief it
was intended to remedy.
The general correctness of these observations can not be controverted. That the framers of the constitution did not intend to restrain the states in the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted for
internal government, and that the instrument they have given u. is
not to be so construed, may be admitted. The pro\·i!>ion of the constitution never has been understood to embrace other contracts than
those which respect property, or some object of value, and confer
rights which may be asserted in a court of justice. It has never been
understood to restrict the general right of the legislatnre to legislate
on the subject of divorces. Those acts enable some tribunals, not to
impair a marriage contract, but to libernte one of the parties because it
has been broken by the other. \.\Then any state legislature shall pass an
act annulling all marriage contracts, or allowing either party to annul
it without the consent of the other, it will be time enough to inquire
whether such an act be constitutional.
The pa1ties in this case differ less on general principles, less on true
construction of the constitution in the ahstrnct, than on the application
of those principles to this case, and on the true constniction of the
charter of 1769. This is the point on which the cau se essentially depends. If the act of incorporation be a grant of political power, if it
create a civil institution to be employed in th e administration of the
governm ent, or if the funds of the college be public property, or if
the state of New Hampshire, as a government , be alone interested in
its transa ctions, the s ubject is one in which the legi slature of the state
may act according to its own judgment, unrestrained by any limitation of its power imposed by the constitution of the United States.

and which, to subserve those purposes, ought to vary with varying

circumstances. That as the framers of the constitution could never

have intended to insert in that instrument a provision so unnecessary,

so mischievous and so repugnant to its general spirit, the term "con-

tract" must be understood in a more limited sense. That it must be

understood as intended to guard against a power of at least doubtful

utility, the abuse of which had been extensively felt, and to restrain

the legislature in future from violating the right to property. That

anterior to the formation of the constitution a course of legislation had

prevailed in many, if not in all, of the states which weakened the

confidence of man in man, and embarrassed all transactions between

individuals by dispensing with a faithful performance of engagements.

To correct this mischief by restraining the power which produced it

the state legislatures were forbidden "to pass any law impairing the

obligation of contracts," that is, of contracts respecting property un-

der which some individual could claim a right to something beneficial
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to himself, and that since the clause in the constitution must in con-

struction receive some limitation, it may be confined, and ought to be

confined, to cases of this description, to cases within the mischief it

was intended to remedy.

The general correctness of these observations can not be contro-

verted. That the framers of the constitution did not intend to re-

strain the states in the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted for

internal government, and that the instrument they have given us is

not to be so construed, may be admitted. The provision of the con-

stitution never has been understood to embrace other contracts than

those which respect property, or some object of value, and confer

rights which may be asserted in a court of justice. It has never been

understood to restrict the general right of the legislature to legislate

on the subject of divorces. Those acts enable some tribunals, not to

impair a marriage contract, but to liberate one of the parties because it

has been broken by the other. When any state legislature shall pass an

act annulling all marriage contracts, or allowing either parly to annul

it without the consent of the other, it will be time enough to inquire

whether such an act be constitutional.

The parties in this case differ less on general principles, lesson true

construction of the constitution in the abstract, than on the application

of those principles to this case, and on the true construction of the

charter of 1769. This is the point on which the cause essentially de-

pends. If the act of incorporation be a grant of political power, if it

create a civil institution to be employed in the administration of the

government, or if the funds of the college be public property, or if

the state of New Hampshire, as a government, be alone interested in

its transactions, the subject is one in which the legislature of the state

may act according to its own judgment, unrestrained by any limita-

tion of its power imposed by the constitution of the United States.
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But if this be a private eleemosynary institution, endowed with a

capacity to take property for objects unconnected with government,

whose funds are bestowed bv individuals, on the faith of the charter;

§ 198

CONTRACTS IN THE CORPORATE CHARTER

if the donors have stipulated for the future disposition and manage-

ment of those funds in the manner prescribed by themselves, there

may be more difficulty in the case, although neither the persons who

have made these stipulations, nor those for whose benefit they were

made, should be parties to the cause. Those who are no longer in-

terested in the property may yet retain such an interest in the preser-

vation of their own arrangements as to have a right to insist that those

arrangements shall be held sacred. Or, if they have themselves dis-

appeared, it becomes a subject of serious and anxious inquiry, whether

those whom they have legally empowered to represent them forever

may not assert all the rights which they possessed while in being;

whether, if they be without personal representatives, who may feel

injured by a violation of the compact, the trustees be not so completely

their representatives, in the eye of the law, as to stand in their place,

not only as respects the government of the college, but also as respects

the maintenance of the college charter. It becomes then the duty of

the court most seriously to examine this charter and to ascertain its
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true character.

[Provisions of the charter.] From the instrument itself, it appears

that about the year 1754 the Rev. Eleazer Wheelock established, at

his own expense and on his own estate, a charity school for the in-

struction of Indians in the Christian religion. The success of this

institution inspired him with the design of soliciting contributions in

England for carrying on and extending his undertaking. In this pious

work he employed the Rev. Nathaniel Whitaker, who, by virtue of a

power of attorney from Dr. Wheelock, appointed the Earl of Dart-

mouth and others trustees of the money which had been and should

be contributed; which appointment Dr. Wheelock confirmed by a

deed of trust, authorizing the trustees to fix on a site for the college.

They determined to establish the school on Connecticut river, in the

western part of New Hampshire; that situation being supposed favor-

able for carrying on the original design among the Indians, and also

for promoting learning among the English; and the proprietors in the

neighborhood having made large offers of land on condition that the

college should there be placed. Dr. Wheelock then applied to the

crown for an act of incorporation; and represented the expediency of

appointing those whom he had, by his last will, named as trustees in

America to be members of the proposed corporation. "In consid-

eration of the premises, for the education and instruction of the youth

of the Indian tribes," etc., "and also of English youth, and any

others," the charter was granted, and the trustees of Dartmouth Col-

lege were, by that name, created a body corporate, with power, for

the use of the said college, to acquire real and personal property, and to

pay the president, tutors and other officers of the college such salaries

as they shall allow.

The charter proceeds to appoint Eleazer Wheelock, "the founder of

But if this be a private eleemosynary institution, endowed with a
capacity to take property for objects unconnected with government,
whose funds are bestowed bv individuals, on the faith of the charter;·
if the donors have stipulated for the future disposition an<l management of those fonds in the manner prescribed by th em selves, there
may be more difficulty in the case, although neither th e persons who
have made these st:ipulations, nor those for whose benefit th ey were
made, should be parties to the cause. Those who are no longer interested in the property may yet retain such an interest in the preservation of their own arrangements as to have a right to insist that those
arrangements shall be held sacred. Or, if they have themselves disappeared, it becomes a subject of serious and anxious inquiry, whether
those whom they have legally empowered to represent them forever
may not assert all the rights which they possessed while in being;
whether, if they be without personal representatives, who may feel
injured by a violation of the compact, the trustees be not so completely
their representatives, in the eye of the law, as to stand in their place,
not only as respects the government of the college, but also as respects
the maintenance of the college charter. It becom es then the duty of
the court most seriously to examine this charter and to ascertain its
true character.
[Provisions of the charter.] From the instrument itself, it appean
that about the year 1754 the Rev. Eleazer Wheelock established, at
his own expense and on his O\.vn estate, a charity school for the instruction of Indians in the Christian religion. The success of this
institution inspired him with the design of soliciting contributions in
England for carrying on and extending his undertaking. Jn this pious
work he employed the Rev. Nathaniel Whitaker, who, by virtu e of a
power of attorney from Dr. Wheelock, appointed the Earl of Dartmouth and others trustees of the money which had been and should
be contributed; which appointment Dr. Wheelock confirmed by a
deed of trust, authorizing the tnistees to fix on a site for the college.
They determined to establish the school on Connecticut river, in the
western part of New Hampshire; that situation being supposed favorable for carrying on the original d esign among the Indians, and also
for promoting learning among the English; and the proprietors in the
neighborhood having made large offers of land on condition that the
college should there be placed . Dr. 'Vheelock then applied to the
crown for an act of incorporation ; and represented the expedie ncy of
appointing those whom he had, by hi s last will, named as trustees in
America to be members of the proposed corporation. "In consideration of the prem ises, for the edu cation and instmction of the youth
of the Indian tribes, " etc., "and also of English youth , and any
others," the charter wns granted, and the trustees of Dartm outh College were, by th at name, created a hody corporate, with power, for
.the use of the said college , to acquire real and personal property, and to
pay the president, tutors and other officers of the college such salaries
as thev shalJ allow.
Th~ charter proceeds to appoint Eleazer 'Vheelock, "the founder of
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said college," president thereof, with power, by his last will, to ap-

point a successor, who is to continue in office until disapproved by
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the trustees. In case of vacancy the trustees may appoint a president,
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and in case of the ceasing of a president, the senior professor or tutor,

said college," president thereof, with power, by his last will, to appoint a successor, who is to continue in office until disapproved by
the trustees. In case of vacancy the trustees may appoint a president,
an<l in case of the ceasing of a president, the senior professor or tutor,
being one of the tmstees, shall exercise the office until an appointment shall be made . The tmstees have power to appoint and displace professors, tutors and other officers, and to supply any vacancies
which may be created in their own body by death, resignation,
removal or disability; and also to make orders, ordinances and laws
for the government of the college, the same not being repugnant to
the laws of Great Britain , or of New Hampshire, and not excluding
any person on account of his speculative sentiments in religion, or his
being of a religious profession differ1ent from that of the trustees.
This charter was accepted, and the property, both real and personal,
which had been contributed for the benefit of the college, was conveyed to, and vested in, the corporate !body.
From this brief review of the most essential parts of the charter, it
is apparent that the funds of the college consisted entirely of private
donations. It is, perhaps, not very important who were the donors.
The probability is, that the Earl of Dartmouth and the other trustees
in England were, in fact, the largest contributors. Yet the legal conclusion, from the facts recited in the clharter, would probably be that
Dr. Wheelock was the founder of the college. The origin of the
institution was undoubtedly the Indian charity school, established by
Dr. Wheelock, at his· own expense. It was at his instance, and to
enlarge this school, that contributions were solicited in England. The
person soliciting these contributions \.Vas his agent; and the trustees
who received the money were appointed by, and act under, his authority. It is not too much to say that the funds were obtained by him in
trust, to be applied by him to the purposes of his enlarged school.
The charter of incorporation was granted at his instance. The persons named by him in his last will as the trustees of his charity school
compose a part of the corporation, and he is declared to be the
founder of the college, and its president for life. W ere the inqu iry
material, we should feel some hesitation in saying that Dr. Wheelock
was not, in law, to be considered as the founder (1 Bl. Comm.481)0£
this institution, and as possessing all the rights appertaining to that
character. But be this as it may, Dartmouth College is really endowed by private individuals, who have bestowed their funds for the
propagation of the Christian religion a mong the Indians. and for the
promotion of piety and learning generally. From these funds the salaries of the tutors are drawn, and these salaries lessen the expense of
erlucation to the students. It is then an eleemosynary ( 1 Bl. Comm.
471), and so far as respects its funds, a private, corporation.
[Character of the corporation created.] Do its objects stamp on it a
different character? Are the tmstees and professors public officers,
invested with any porti on of political power, partaking in any degree
in the administration of civil government, and performing duties which
flow from the sovereign authority? That education is an object of

being one of the trustees, shall exercise the office until an appoint-

ment shall be made. The trustees have power to appoint and dis-

place professors, tutors and other officers, and to supply any vacancies

which may be created in their own body by death, resignation,

removal or disability; and also to make orders, ordinances and laws

for the government of the college, the same not being repugnant to

the laws of Great Britain, or of New Hampshire, and not excluding

any person on account of his speculative sentiments in religion, or his

being of a religious profession different from that of the trustees.

This charter was accepted, and the property, both real and personal,

which had been contributed for the benefit of the college, was con-

veyed to, and vested in, the corporate body.

From this brief review of the most essential parts of the charter, it

is apparent that the funds of the college consisted entirely of private

donations. It is, perhaps, not very important who were the donors.

The probability is, that the Earl of Dartmouth and the other trustees
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in England were, in fact, the largest contributors. Yet the legal con-

clusion, from the facts recited in the charter, would probably be that

Dr. Wheelock was the founder of the college. The origin of the

institution was undoubtedly the Indian charity school, established by

Dr. Wheelock, at his- own expense. It was at his instance, and to

enlarge this school, that contributions were solicited in England. The

person soliciting these contributions was his agent; and the trustees

who received the money were appointed by, and act under, his author-

ity. It is not too much to say that the funds w:ere obtained by him in

trust, to be applied by him to the purposes of his enlarged school.

The charter of incorporation was granted at his instance. The per-

sons named by him in his last will as the trustees of his charitv school

compose a part of the corporation, and he is declared to be the

founder of the college, and its president for life. Were the inquiry

material, we should feel some hesitation in saying that Dr. Wheelock

was not, in law, to be considered as the founder (i Bl. Comm. 481) of

this institution, and as possessing all the rights appertaining to that

character. But be this as it may, Dartmouth College is really en-

dowed by private individuals, who have bestowed their funds for the

propagation of the Christian religion among the Indians, and for the

promotion of piety and learning generally. From these funds the sala-

ries of the tutors are drawn, and these salaries lessen the expense of

education to the students. It is then an eleemosynary (1 Bl. Comm.

471), and so far as respects its funds, a private, corporation.

[Character of the corporation created.] Do its objects stamp on it a

different character? Are the trustees and professors public officers,

invested with any portion of political power, partaking in any decree

in the administration of civil government, and performing duties which

flow from the sovereign authority? That education is an object of
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national concern, and a proper subject of legislation, all admit. That

there maybe an institution, founded by government, and placed en-
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tirely under its immediate control, the officers of which would be pub-

lic officers, amenable exclusively to government, none will deny. But

is Dartmouth College such an institution? Is education altogether

in the hands of government? Does every teacher of youth become

a public officer, and do donations for the purpose of education nec-

essarily become public property, so far that the will of the legisla-

ture, not the will of the donor, becomes the law of the donation?

These questions are of serious moment to society, and deserve to be

well considered.

Doctor Wheelock, as the keeper of his charity school, instructing

the Indians in the art of reading and in our holy religion, sustaining

them at his own expense, and on the voluntary contributions of the

charitable, could scarcely be considered as a public officer, exercising

any portion of those duties which belong to government; nor could

the legislature have supposed that his private funds, or those given by

others, were subject to legislative management, because they were ap-

plied to the purposes of education. When, afterwards, his school

was enlarged, and the liberal contributions made in England and in
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America enabled him to extend his care to the education of the

youth of his own country, no change was wrought in his own character

or in the nature of his duties. Had he employed assistant tutors with the

funds contributed by others, or had the trustees in England established

a school, with Dr. Wheelock at its head, and paid salaries to him and

his assistants, they would still have been private tutors; and the fact

that they were employed in the education of youth could not have

converted them into public officers, concerned in the administration

of public duties, or have given the legislature a right to interfere in

the management of the fund. The trustees, in whose care that fund

was placed by the contributors, would have been permitted to exe-

cute their trust, uncontrolled by legislative authority.

Whence, then, can be derived the idea that Dartmouth College has

become a public institution, and its trustees public officers exercising

powers conferred by the public for public objects? Not from the source

whence its funds were drawn; for its foundation is purely private and

eleemosynary—not from the application of those funds; for money

may be given for education, and the persons receiving it do not, by

being employed in the education of youth, become members of the

civil government. Is it from the act of incorporation? Let this sub-

ject be considered.

A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and ex-

isting only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of

laiv, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its crea-

tion confers upon it. either expressly or as incidental to its very exist-

ence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the

object for which it was created. Among the most important are im-

jnortaiity', and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality;

properties by which a perpetual succession of many persons are con-

national concern, and a proper subject of legislation, all admit. That
there may be an institution, founded by government, and placed entirely under its immediate control, the officers of which would be public officers, amenable exclusively to government, none will deny. But
i s Dartmouth College such an institution? Is education altogether
in the hands of government? Does every teacher of youth become
a public officer, and do donations for the purpose of education nece -. arily become public property, so far that the will of the legislature, not the will of the donor, becomes the law of the donation?
These questions are of serious moment to society, and deserve to be
well considered.
Doctor Wheelock, as the keeper of his charity school, instn1cting
the Indians in the art of reading and in our holy religion, sustaining
them at his own expense, and on the voluntary contributions of the
charitable, could scarcely be considered as a public officer, exercising
any portion of those duties which belong to government; nor could
the legislature have supposed that his private funds, or those given by
others, were subject to legislative management, because they were applied to the purposes of education. When, afterwards, his school
was enlarged, and the liberal contributions made in England and in
America enabled him to extend his care to the education of the
youth of his own country, no change was wrought in his own character
or in the nature of his duties. Had he employed assistant tutors with the
funds contributed by others, or had the trustees in England established
a school, with Dr. Wheelock at its head, and paid salaries to him and
his assistants, they would still have been private tutors; and the fact
that they were employed in the education of youth could not have
converted them into public officers, concerned in the administration
of public duties, or have given the legislature a right to interfere in
the management of the fund. The trustees, in '""hose care that fund
\Vas placed by the contributors, would have been perm_itted to execute their trust, uncontrolled by legislative authority.
Whence, then , can be derived the idea that Dartmouth College has
become a public institution, and its trustees public officers exercising
powers conferred by the public for public objects? Not from the source
whence its funds were drawn; for its foundation is purely private and
eleemosynary-not from the application of those funds; for money
may be given for education, and the persons r eceiving it do not, by
being employed in the education of youth, become members of the
ci,·il government. Is it from the act of incorporation? Let this subject be considered.
A corporation is an artificial bet'ng, t'nv isible, t'ntangible, and existing only t'n contemplatt'on of law. Bet'ng the mere creature of
law, t't possesses only those propertt'es whi'ch the cltarter of £ts creaHon confers upon it. et'tlzer expressly or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to e_tfed tlze
object for wht'clz t't was created. Among the most t'111porta11t are t'm;nortality, and, if the expression may be allowed , £nd£-.;idualt'ty;
properties by wht"ch a perpetual successi'on of many persons are con-
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sidercd as the same, and may act as a single individual. They enable

a corporation to manage its own affairs and to hold property without

sidered as tlte same, and may act as a single indiv£dual. They enable
a corporatz"on to manage its own affa£rs and to lzold property without
the perplexing intrt"cades, tlte liazardous and endless necessity of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting £t from hand ta
hand. It £s cliicjly for the purpose of clotlzi"ng the bodies of men
in success£on witlz tltese qualities and capacities that co1·porafions
were i1tvcnted and are in use. By tltese means a perpetual succession
of individuals are capable of acting for tlie promotion of the particular object, li"ke one immortal being. But this being does not ~hare
in the civil government of the country, unless that be the purpose for
which it was created. Its immortality no more confers on it political
power or a political chara<;ter than immortality v•ould confer such
power or character on a natural person. It is no more a state instrument than a natural person exercising the same powers would be. If,
then. a natural person employed by individuals in the education of
youth or for the government of a seminary in which youth is educated
would not become a public officer or be considered as a member of
the civil government, how is it that this artificial being. created by
law for the purpose of being employed by the same individuals for
the same purposes, should become a part of the civil government of
the country? Is it because its existence, its capacities, its powers, are
given by law? Because the government has given it the power to
take and to hold property in a particular form and for particular pur·
poses, has the government a consequent right substantially to change
that form or to vary the purposes to which the property is to be applied? This principle has never been asserted or recognized, and is
supported by no authority. Can it derive aid from reason?
The objects for which a corporation is created are universally such
as the government wishes to promote. They are deemed beneficial
to the country; and this benefit constitutes the consideration, and in
most cases the sole consideration of the grant. In most eleemosynary
institutions, the object would be difficult, perhaps unattainable, without the aid of a charter of incorporation. Charitable or public-spirited
individuals, desirous of making permanent appropriations for charitable or other useful purposes, find it impossible to effect their design
securely and certainly without an incorporating act. They apply to
the government, state their beneficent object, and offer to atlnnce the
money necessary for its accomplishment, provided the government
will confer on the instrument which is to execute their designs the
capacity to execute them. The proposition is considered and approved. The benefit to the public is considered as an ample com·
pensation for the faculty it confers, and the corporation is created. If
the advnntages to the public constitute a full compensation for the
faculty it gives, there can be no reason for exacting a further compensation, by claiming a right to exercise over this artificial being a
power which changes its nature, and touches the fund for the security
and application of which it was created. There can be no reason for
implying in a charter, given for a valuable consideration, a power

the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity of per-

petual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to

hand. It is chiefly for the purpose of clothing the bodies of men

in succession with these qualities and capacities that corporations

■were invented and are in use. By these means a perpetual succession

of individuals are capable of acting for the promotion of the par-

ticular object, like one immortal being. But this being does not share

in the civil government of the country, unless that be the purpose for

which it was created. Its immortality no more confers on it political

power or a political character than immortality would confer such

power or character on a natural person. It is no more a state instru-

ment than a natural person exercising the same powers would be. If,

then, a natural person employed by individuals in the education of

youth or for the government of a seminary in which youth is educated

would not become a public officer or be considered as a member of

the civil government, how is it that this artificial being, created by
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law for the purpose of being employed by the same individuals for

the same purposes, should become a part of the civil government of

the country? Is it because its existence, its capacities, its powers, are

given by law? Because the government has given it the power to

take and to hold property in a particular form and for particular pur-

poses, has the government a consequent right substantially to change

that form or to vary the purposes to which the property is to be ap-

plied? This principle has never been asserted or recognized, and is

supported by no authority. Can it derive aid from reason?

The objects for which a corporation is created are universally such

as the government wishes to promote. They are deemed beneficial

to the country; and this benefit constitutes the consideration, and in

most cases the sole consideration of the grant. In most eleemosynary

institutions, the object would be difficult, perhaps unattainable, with-

out the aid of a charter of incorporation. Charitable or public-spirited

individuals, desirous of making permanent appropriations for chari-

table or other useful purposes, find it impossible to effect their design

securely and certainly without an incorporating act. They apply to

the government, state their beneficent object, and offer to advance the

money necessary for its accomplishment, provided the government

will confer on the instrument which is to execute their designs the

capacity to execute them. The proposition is considered and ap-

proved. The benefit to the public is considered as an ample com-

pensation for the faculty it confers, and the corporation is created. If

the advantages to the public constitute a full compensation for the

faculty it gives, there can be no reason for exacting a further compen-

sation, by claiming a right to exercise over this artificial being a

power which changes its nature, and touches the fund for the security

and application of which it was created. There can be no reason for

implying in a charter, given for a valuable consideration, a power
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which is not only not expressed, but is in direct contradiction to its
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express stipulations.

From the fact, then, that a charter of incorporation has been

granted, nothing can be inferred which changes the character of the

institution, or transfers to the government any new power over it.

The character of civil institutions docs not grow out of their incorpo-

ration, but out of the manner in which they are formed, and the objects

for which thev are created. The right to change them is not founded

on their being incorporated, but on their being the instruments of

government, created for its purposes. The same institutions, created

for the same objects, though not incorporated, would be public insti-

tutions, and, of course, be controllable by the legislature. The in-

corporating act neither gives nor prevents this control. Neither, in

reason, can the incorporating act change the character of a private

eleemosynary institution.

We are next led to the inquiry for whose benefit the property given

to Dartmouth College was secured? The counsel for the defendant

have insisted that the beneficial interest is in the people of New

Hampshire. The charter, after reciting the preliminary measures
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which had been taken, and the application for an act of incorpora-

tion, proceeds thus: "Know ye, therefore, that we, considering the

premises, and being willing to encourage the laudable and charitable

design of spreading Christian knowledge among the savages of our

American wilderness, and also that the best means of education be

established in our province of New Hampshire, for the benefit of

said province, do of our special grace," etc. Do these expressions

bestow on New Hampshire any exclusive right to the property of the

college, any exclusive interest in the labors of the professors? Or do

they merely indicate a willingness that New Hampshire should enjoy

those advantages which result to all from the establishment of a semi-

nary of learning in the neighborhood? On this point, we think it im-

possible to entertain a serious doubt. The words themselves, unex-

plained by the context, indicate that the "benefit intended for the

province" is that which is derived from "establishing the best means

of education therein," that is, from establishing in the province

Dartmouth College, as constituted by the charter. But if these

words, considered alone, could admit of doubt, that doubt is com-

pletely removed by an inspection of the entire instrument.

The particular interests of New Hampshire never entered into the

minds of the donors, never constituted a motive for their donation.

The propagation of the Christian religion among the savages, and the

dissemination of useful knowledge among the youth of the country,

were the avowed and the sole objects of their contributions. In these

New Hampshire would participate, but nothing particular or exclu-

sive was intended for her. Even the site of the college was selected,

not for the sake of New Hampshire, but becacse it was "most sub-

servient to the great ends in view," and because liberal donations of

land were offered by the proprietors, on condition that the institution

should be there established. The real advantages from the location

which is not only not expressed, but is in direct contradiction to its
express stipulations.
From the fact, then, that a charter of incorporation has been
granted, nothing can be inferred which changes the character of the
institution, or transfers to the government any new power over it.
The character of civil institutions does not grow out of their incorporation, but out of the manner in which they are formed, and the objects
for which they are created. The right to change them is not founded
on their being incorporated, but on their being the instruments of
government, created for its purposes. The same institutions, created
for the same objects, though not incorporated, would be public institutions, and, of course, be controllable by the legislature. The incorporating act neither gives nor prevents this control. Neither, in
reason, can the incorporating act change the character of a private
eleemosynary institution.
vVe are next led to the inquiry for whose benefit the property given
to Dartmouth College was secured? The counsel for the defendant
have insisted that the beneficial interest is in the people of New
Hampshire. The charter, after reciting the preliminary measures
which had been taken, and the application for an act of incorporation, proceeds thus: "Know ye, therefore, that we, considering the
premises, and being willing to encourage the laudable and charitable
design of spreading Christian knowledge among the savages of our
American wilderness, and also that the best means of education be
established in our province of New Hampshire, for the benefit of
said province, do of our special grace," etc. Do these expressions
bestow on New Hampshire any exclusive right to the property of the
college, any exclusive interest in the labors of the professors? Or do
they merely indicate a willingness that New Hampshire should enjoy
those advantages which result to all from the establishment of a seminary of learning in the neighborhood? On this point, we think it impossible to entertain a serious doubt. The words themselves, unexplained by the context, indicate that the "benefit intended for the
province" is that which is derived from "establishing the best means
of education therein," that is, from establishing in the province
Dartmouth College, as constituted by the charter. But if these
words, considered alone, could admit of doubt, that doubt is completely removed by an inspection of the entire instrument.
The particular interests of New Hampshire never entered into the
minds of the donors, never constituted a motive for their donation.
The propagation of the Christian religion among the savages, and the
dissemination of useful knowledge among the youth of the country,
were the avowed and the sole objects of their contributions. In these
New Hampshire would participate, but nothing particular or exclusive was intended for her. Even the site of the college was selected,
not for the sake of New Hampshire, hut becacse it was "most subservient to the great ends in view," and because liberal donations of
land were offered hy the proprietors, on condition that the institution
should be there established. The real advantages from the location
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of the college are, perhaps, not less considerable to those on the west
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than to those on the east side of Connecticut river. The clause
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which constitutes the incorporation, and expresses the object for

which it was made, declares those objects to be the instruction of the

of the college are, perhaps, not less conside.r able to those on the west
than to those on the east side of Connecticut river. The clause
which constitutes the incorporation, and expresses the object for
which it was made, declares those objects to be the instruction of the
Indians, "and al o of English youth, and any others." So that the
objects of the contribu.tors, and the incorporating act, were the same;
the promotion of Christianity, and of education generally, not the interests of New Hampshire particularly.
From this review of the charter it appears that Dartmouth College
is an eleemosynary institution, incorporated for the purpose of per·
petuating the application of the bounty of the donors to the specified
objects of that bounty; that its trustees or governors were originally
named by the founder and invested with the power of perpetnating
themselves; that they are not public officers; nor is it a civil in titution, participating in the administration of government, but a charity
school, or a seminary of education, incorporated for the preservation
of its property and the perpetual application of that property to the
objects of its creation.
[Right of trustees to complain.] Yet a question remains to be considered, of more real difficulty, on which more doubt has been entertained
than on all that have been discussed. The founders of the college,
at least those whose contributions were in money, have parted with
the property bestowed upon it, and their representatives have no in·
tcrest in that property. The donors of land are equally without
interest so long as the corporation shall exist.
Could they be found, they are unaffected by any alteration in its
constitution, and probably regardless of its form, or even of its exist·
ence. The students are fluctuating, and no individual among our
youth h<1 s a vested interest in the institution which can be asserted in
a court of justice. Neither the founders of the college, nor the youth
for whose "benefit it was founded, complain of the alteration made in
its charter, or think themseh-es injured by it. The trustees alone
complain, an<l the trustees have no beneficial interesi: to be protected.
Can this be such a contract as the constitution intended to withdraw
from the power of state legislation? Contracts, the parties to which
have a vested beneficial interest, and those only, it has been said, are
the objects about which the constitution is solicitous, and to which its
protection is extended.
The court has bestowed on this argument the most deliberate con·
siderati on, and the result will be stated. Dr. Wheelock, acting for
himself and for those who, at his solicitation, had made contributions
to his school, applied for this charter, as the instrument ,.,·hich should
e nable him and them to perpetu<1te their beneficent intention. Itwas
granted. An artificial, immortal being was created by the crown.
capable of receiving and di stributing forever, according to the will of
the donors, the don <1tion s which should be made to it. On this being the
co ntributions whi ch had been collected '"''ere immediatelv bestowed.
These gifts were macle, not indeed to make a profit for the donors or
their posterity, but for something, in their opinion, of inestimable

Indians, "and also of English youth, and any others." So that the

objects of the contributors, and the incorporating act, were the same;

the promotion of Christianity, and of education generally, not the in-

terests of New Hampshire particularly.

From this review of the charter it appears that Dartmouth College

is an eleemosynary institution, incorporated for the purpose of per-

petuating the application of the bounty of the donors to the specified

objects of that bounty; that its trustees or governors were originally

named by the founder and invested with the power of perpetuating

themselves; that they are not public officers; nor is it a civil institu-

tion, participating in the administration of government, but a charity

school, or a seminary of education, incorporated for the preservation

of its property and the perpetual application of that property to the

objects of its creation.

[Right of trustees to complain.] Yet a question remains to be consid-

ered, of more real difficulty, on which more doubt has been entertained

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

than on all that have been discussed. The founders of the college,

at least those whose contributions were in money, have parted with

the property bestowed upon it, and their representatives have no in-

terest in that property. The donors of land are equally without

interest so long as the corporation shall exist.

Could they be found, they are unaffected by any alteration in its

constitution, and probably regardless of its form, or even of its exist-

ence. The students are fluctuating, and no individual among our

youth has a vested interest in the institution which can be asserted in

a court of justice. Neither the founders of the college, nor the youth

for whose benefit it was founded, complain of the alteration made in

its charter, or think themselves injured by it. The trustees alone

complain, and the trustees have no beneficial interest to be protected.

Can this be such a contract as the constitution intended to withdraw

from the power of state legislation? Contracts, the parties to which

have a vested beneficial interest, and those only, it has been said, are

the objects about which the constitution is solicitous, and to which its

protection is extended.

The court has bestowed on this argument the most deliberate con-

sideration, and the result will be stated. Dr. Wheelock, acting for

himself and for those who, at his solicitation, had made contributions

to his school, applied for this charter, as the instrument which should

enable him and them to perpetuate their beneficent intention. Itwas

granted. An artificial, immortal being was created by the crown,

capable of receiving and distributing forever, according to the will of

the donors, the donations which should be made to it. On this being the

contributions which had been collected were immediately bestowed.

These gifts were made, not indeed to make a profit for the donors or

their posterity, but for something, in their opinion, of inestimable
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value; for something which they deemed a full equivalent for the

CONTRACTS IN THE CORPORATE CHARTER.

money with which it was purchased. The consideration for which they

stipulated is the perpetual application of the fund to its object, in the

mode prescribed by themselves. Their descendants may take no in-

terest in the preservation of this consideration. But in this respect

their descendants are not their representatives; they are represented

by the corporation. The corporation is the assignee of their rights,

stands in their place, and distributes their bounty as they would them-

selves have distributed it had they been immortal. So, with respect

to the students who are to derive learning from this source, the cor-

poration is a trustee for them also. Their potential rights, which,

taken distributively, are imperceptible, amount collectively to a most

important interest. These are, in the aggregate, to be exercised, as-

serted and protected by the corporation. They were as completely

out of the donors, at the instant of their being vested in the corpora-

tion, and as incapable of being asserted by the students, as at present.

According to the theory of the British constitution, their parliament

is omnipotent. To annul corporate rights might give a shock to pub-

lic opinion which that government has chosen to avoid, but its power

is not questioned. Had parliament, immediately after the emanation
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of this charter and the execution of those conveyances which followed

it, annulled the instrument, so that the living donors would have wit-

nessed the disappointment of their hopes, the perfidy of the trans-

action would have been universally acknowledged. Yet then, as now,

the donors would have no interest in the property; then, as now,

those who might be students would have had no rights to be violated;

then, as now, it might be said that the trustees, in whom the rights of

all were combined, possessed no private, individual, beneficial in-

terests in the property confided to their protection. Yet the contract

would, at that time, have been deemed sacred by all. What has since

occurred to strip it of its inviolability? Circumstances have not

changed it. In reason, in justice and in law, it is now what it was

in 1769.

This is plainly a contract to -which the donors, the trustees and the

crown (to-whose rights and obligations New Hampshire succeeds)

■were the original parties. It is a contract made on a valuable con-

sideration. It is a contract for the security and disposition of prop-

erty. It is a contract on the faith of -which real and personal estate

has been conveyed to the corporation. It is, then, a contract -within

the letter of the constitution, and -within its spirit also, unless the

fact that the property is invested by the. donors in trustees for the pro-

motion of religion and education, for the benefit of persons who are

perpetually changing, though the objects remain the same, shall cre-

ate a particular exception, taking this case out of the prohibition

contained in the constitution.

[Method of interpreting the constitutional provision.] It is more than

possible that the preservation of rights of this description was not

particularly in the view of the framers of the constitution when the

clause under consideration was introduced into that instrument. It is

value; for something which they deemed a full equivalent for the
money with which it was purchased. The consideration for which they
stipulated is the perpetual application of the fund to its object, in the
mode prescribed by themselves. Their descendants may take no interest in the preservation of this consideration. But in this respect
their descendants are not their representatives; they are represented
by the corporation. The corporation is the assignee of their rights,
stands in their place, and distributes their bounty as they would themselves have distributed it had they been immortal. So, with respect
to the students who are to derive learning from this source, the corporation is a trustee for them also. Their potential rights, which,
taken distributively, are imperceptible, amount collectively to a most
impottant interest. These are, in the aggregate, to be exercised, asserted and protected by the corporation. They were as completely
out of the donors, at the instant of their being vested in the corporation, and as incapable of being asserted by the students, as at present.
According to the theory of the British constitution, their parliament
is omnipotent. To annul corporate rights might give a shock to pub1ic opinion which that government has chosen to avoid, but its power
is not questioned. Had parliament, immediately after the emanation
of this charter and the execution of those conveyances which followed
it, annulled the instrument, so that the living donors would have witnessed the disappointment of their hopes, the perfidy of the transaction would have been universally acknowledged. Yet then, as now,
the donors would have no interest in the property; then, as now,
those who might he students would have had no rights to be violated;
then, as now, it might be said that the trustees, in whom the rights of
all were combined, possessed no private, individual, beneficial interests in the property confided to their protection. Yet the contract
would, at that time, have been deemed sacred by all. What has since
occurred to strip it of its inviolability? Circumstances have not
changed it. In reason; in justice and in law, it is now what it was
in 1769.
This is plainly a contract to which tlie donors, the trustees and the
cro-.un (to whose rigltts and obligations New Hampshi're succeeds)
were the original parties. It is a contract made on a valuable considerati'on. It is a contract for the secur£ty and d£spost'tt'on of property. It is a contract on the fat'th of wht'ch real and personal estate
has been conveyed to tlie corporation. It i's, then, a contract wt'thin
the letter of tlie constt'tution, and wi'tltz'n its spt'rit also, unless the
fact that the property is invested by tlie donors in trustees for the promotion of religion and educati'on, for the benefit of persons who are
perpetually changing, though the objects remain the same, sl1all create a particular exceptt'on, taking this case out of tlie prohibition
contained in the constitution.
[Method of interpreting the constitutional provision.] It is more than
possible that the preservation of rights of this description was not
particularly in the view of the framers of the constitution when the
clause under consideration was introduced into that instrument. It is
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probable that interferences of more frequent occurrence, to which the
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temptation was stronger, and of which the mischief was more exten-
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sive, constituted the great motive for imposing this restriction on the

probable thflt interferences of more frequent occurrence, to which the
temptation was stronger, and of which the mischief was more extensive, constituted the great motive for imposing this restriction on the
state legislatures. But although a particular and a rare case may not,
in itself, be of sufficient magnit11<le to induce a rule, yet it mu st be
governed by the rule, when established, unless some plain and strong
reason for excluding it can be giYcn. It is not enough to say that this
particular case was not in the mind of the convention when the article
was framed, nor of the American p eople when it was adopted. It is
necessary to gp further and to say that had this particular case been
suggested the language would have been so varied as to exclude it, or
it would have been made a special exception. The case being within
the words of the rule must be within its operation likewise, unless
there be something in the literal construction so obviously absurd, or
mischievous, or repugnant to the general spirit of the instrument,
as to justify those who expound the constitution in making it an exception.
On what s:;ife and intelligible ground can this exception stand?
There is no expression in the constitution, no sentiment delivered by
its contemporaneous expounders, which would justify us in making it.
In the absence of all authority of this kind, is there, in the nature and
reason of the case itself, that which would sustain a construction of the
constitution not warrante<l by its words? Are contracts of this description of a character to excite so little interest that we must exclude
them from the provisions of the constitution as being unworthy of the
attention of those who framed the instmment? Or does public policy
so imperiously demand their remaining exposed to legislative alteration as to compel us, or rather permit us, to say that these words,
which were introduced to give stability to contracts, and which, in
their plain import comprehend this contract, must yet be so construed
as to exclude it?
Almost all eleemosynary corporations, those which are created for
the promotion of religion, of charity, or of education, arc of the same
character. The law of this case is the law of all. In every literary
or charitable institution, unless the objects of the bounty be themselves
incorporated, the whole legal interest is in trustees, and can be asserted only by them. The donors, or claimants of the bounty, if they
can appear in court at all, can appenr only to complain of the trustees.
In all other situations they are identified with, and personated by , the
tru stees; and their rights are to be defended and maintained by them.
Religion, charity and education are, in the law of England, legatees
or donees, capable of receiving bequests or donations in this form.
They appear in court and claim or defend by the corporation. Are
they of so little estimation in the United States that contracts for their
benefit must be excluded from the protection of words, ·which in their
natural import include them? Or do such contracts so necessarily
require new modeling by the authority of the legislature that the ordinary rules of construction must be disregarded in order to leave them
exposed to legislative alteration?

state legislatures. But although a particular and a rare case may not,

in itself, be of sufficient magnitude to induce a rule, yet it must be

governed by the rule, when established, unless some plain and strong

reason for excluding it can be given. It is not enough to say that this

particular case was not in the mind of the convention when the article

was framed, nor of the American people when it was adopted. It is

necessary to go further and to say that had this particular case been

•suggested the language would have been so varied as to exclude it, or

it woidd have been made a special exception. The case being within

the words of the rule must be within its operation likewise, unless

there be something in the literal construction so obviously absurd, or

mischievous, or repugnant to the general spirit of the instrument,

as to justify those who expound the constitution in making it an ex-

ception.

On what safe and intelligible ground can this exception stand?

There is no expression in the constitution, no sentiment delivered by

its contemporaneous expounders, which would justify us in making it.
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In the absence of all authority of this kind, is there, in the nature and

reason of the case itself, that which would sustain a construction of the

constitution not warranted by its words? Are contracts of this descrip-

tion of a character to excite so little interest that we must exclude

them from the provisions of the constitution as being unworthy of the

attention of those who framed the instrument? Or does public policy

so imperiously demand their remaining exposed to legislative altera-

tion as to compel us, or rather permit us, to say that these words,

which were introduced to give stability to contracts, and which, in

their plain import comprehend this contract, must yet be so construed

as to exclude it?

Almost all eleemosynary corporations, those which are created for

the promotion of religion, of charity, or of education, arc of the same

character. The law of this case is the law of all. In every literary

or charitable institution, unless the objects of the bounty be themselves

incorporated, the whole legal interest is in trustees, and can be as-

serted only by them. The donors, or claimants of the bounty, if they

can appear in court at all, can appear only to complain of the trustees.

In all other situations they are identified with, and personated by, the

trustees; and their rights are to be defended and maintained by them.

Religion, charity and education are, in the law of England, legatees

or donees, capable of receiving bequests or donations in this form.

They appear in court and claim or defend by the corporation. Are

they of so little estimation in the United States that contracts for their

benefit must be excluded from the protection of words, which in their

natural import include them? Or do such contracts so necessarily

require new modeling by the authority of the legislature that the ordi-

nary rules of construction must be disregarded in order to leave them

exposed to legislative alteration?
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AH feel that these objects are not deemed unimportant in the

United States. The interest which this case has excited proves that
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they are not. The framers of the constitution did not deem them un-

worthy of its care and protection. They have, though in a different

mode, manifested their respect for science by reserving to the govern-

ment of the Union the power "to promote the progress of science and

useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the

exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." They

have, so far, withdrawn science and the useful arts from the action of

the state governments. Why, then, should they be supposed so

regardless of contracts made for the advancement of literature, as to

intend to exclude them from provisions made for the security of ordi-

nary contracts between man and man? No reason for making this

supposition is perceived.

If the insignificance of the object does not require that we should

exclude contracts respecting it from the protection of the constitution;

neither, as we conceive, is the policy of leaving them subject to legis-

lative alteration so apparent as to require a forced construction of

that instrument in order to effect it. These eleemosynary institu-

tions do not fill the place which would otherwise be occupied by
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government, but that which would otherwise remain vacant. They

are complete acquisitions to literature. They are donations to educa-

tion; donations which any government must be disposed rather to

encourage than to discountenance. It requires no very critical exami-

nation of the human mind to enable us to determine that one great

inducement to these gifts is the conviction felt by the giver that the

disposition he makes of them is immutable. It is probable that no

man ever was, and that no man ever will be, the founder of a college,

believing at the time that an act of incorporation constitutes no

security for the institution; believing that it is immediately to be

deemed a public institution, whose funds are to be governed and ap-

plied, not by the will of the donor, but by the will of the legislature.

All such gifts are made in the pleasing, perhaps delusive, hope, that

the charity will flow forever in the channel which the givers have

marked out for it. If every man finds in his own bosom strong evi-

dence of the universality of this sentiment, there can be but little rea-

son to imagine that the framers of our constitution were strangers

to it, and that, feeling the necessity and policy cf giving permanence

and security to contracts, of withdrawing them from the influence of

legislative bodies, whose fluctuating policy and repeated interfer-

ences produced the most perplexing and injurious embarrassments,

they still deemed it necessary to leave these contracts subject to those

interferences. The motives for such an exception must be very

powerful to justify the construction which makes it.

[Reasons suggested for making an exception of such corporations.] The

motives suggested at the bar grow out of the original appointment of

the trustees, which is supposed to have been in a spirit hostile to the

genius of our government, and the presumption, that if allowed to

continue themselves, they now are, and must remain forever, what

All feel that these objects are not deemed unimportant in the
United States. The interest which this case has excited proves that
they are not. The framers of the constitution did not deem them unworthy of its care and protection. They have, though in a different
mode, manifested their respect for science by reserving to the government of the Union the power "to promote the progress of science and
u seful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclu&i ve right to their respective writings and discoveries." They
ha\·e, so far, withdrawn science and the useful arts from the action of
the state governments. Why, then, should they be supposed so
regardless of contracts made for the advancement of literature, as to
inte nd to exclude them from provisions made for the security of ordinary contracts between man and man? No reason for making this
supposition is perceived.
If the insignificance of the object does not require that we should
exclude contracts respecting it from the protection of the constitution;
neither, as we conceive, is the policy of leaving them subject to legislative alteration so apparent as to require a forced construction of
that instrument in order to effect it. These eleemosynary institutions do not fill the place which would otherwise be occupied by
government, but that which would otherwise remain vacant. They
are complete acquisitions to literature. They are donations to education; donations which any government must be disposed rather to
encourage than to discountenance. It requires no very critical examination of the human mind to enable us to determine that one great
inducement to these gifts is the conviction felt by the giver that the
disposition he makes of them is immutable. It is probable that no
man ev~r was, and that no man ever will be, the founder of a college,
believing at the time that an act of incorporation constitutes no
security for the institution; belie\'ing that it is immediately to be
deemed a public institution, whose funds are to be governed and applied, not by the will of the donor, but by the will of the legislature.
All such gifts are made in the plensing, perhaps delusive, hope, that
the charity will flow forever in the channel which the givers have
marked out for it. If every man finds in his own bosom strong evid ence of the universality of this sentiment , there can be but little reason to imagine that the framers of our constitution were strangers
to it, and that, feeling the necessity and policy cf giving permanence
and security to contracts, of withdrawing them from the influence of
legislative bodies, whose fluctuating policy and repeated interferences produced the most perplexing and injuriou s embarrassments, '
they still deemed it necessary to leave these contracts subject to those
interferences. The motives for such an exception must be very
powerful to justify the construction which makes it.
[Reasons suggested for making an exception of such corporations.] The
motives suggested at the bar grow out of the original appointment of
the trustees, which is supposed to have been in a spirit hostile to the
genius of our government, and the presumption, that if allowed to
continue themselves, they now are, and must remain forever, what
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they originally were. Hence is inferred the necessity of applying to

this corporation, and to other similar corporations, the correcting and

they originally were. Hence is inferred the necessity of applying to
this corporation, and to other similar corporations, the correcting and
improving hand of the legislature. It has been urged repeatedly 7
and certainly with a degree of earnestness which attracted attention?
that the trustees, deriving their power from a regal source, must?
necessarily, partake of the spirit of their origin; and that their first
principles, unimproved hy that resplendent light which has been shed
around them, must continue to govern the college and to guide the
students.
Before we inquire into the influence which this argument ought to
have on the constitutional question , it may not be amiss to examine
the fact on which it rests. The first trustees were undoubtedly
named in the charter by the crown; but at whose suggestion were
they named? By whom were they selecte<l? The charter informs us .
Dr. Wheelock had represented ''that for many \veighty reasons it
would be expedient that the gentlemen whom he had already nominated, in his last will, to he trustees in America should be of the corporntion now proposed. " When, aftenvards, the trustees are named
in the charter, C:\n it be doubted that the persons mentioned by Dr.
Wh eelock in his will were appointed? Some were probably added
by the crown, with the approbation of Dr. Wheelock. Among these
is the doctor himself. If any others were appointed at the instance of
the crown, they are the governor, three m embers of the council and
the speaker of the house of representatives of the colony of New
Hampshire. The stations filled by these per onsought to rescue them
from any other imputation than too great a dependence on the crown.
If, in the revolution that followed, they acted under the influence of
this sentiment, they must have ceased to Le trustees; if they _took part
with their countrymen, the imputation , which suspicion might excite, woul<l no longer attach to them. The original trustees, then, or
most of them, were named by Dr. Wheelock, and those who were
added to his nomination , most probably with his approbation, were
among the most eminent and respectable individuals in New Hampshire.
The only evidence which \\'e possess of the character of Dr. Wheelock is furnished by this charter. The judicious means employed for
the accomplishment of his object, and the success which attended his
endeavors, would lead to the opi'nion that he united a sound understanding to that humanity and benevolence which suggested his undertaking. It surely can no t be assumed that his trustees were selected
without judgment. ·w ith as little probability can it be assumed, that
while the lig ht of science and of liberal principles pen·ades the whole
community, these originally benighted trustee remain in utter d'a rkness, incapable of participating in the general improvement: that
while the human race is rapidly adyancing, they arc Rtationary . Reason ing a priori, we should believe, that learned and intelligent men ,
selected by its patrons for the government of a literary institution
would select learned and intelligent men for their !'Uccessors; men as
,.,·ell fitted for the government uf a college as those who might be

improving hand of the legislature. It has been urged repeatedly,

and certainly with a degree of earnestness which attracted attention,

that the trustees, deriving their power from a regal source, must,

necessarily, partake of the spirit of their origin; and that their first

principles, unimproved by that resplendent light which has been shed

around them, must continue to govern the college and to guide the

students.

Before we inquire into the influence which this argument ought to

have on the constitutional question, it may not be amiss to examine

the fact on w-hich it rests. The first trustees were undoubtedly-

named in the charter by the crown: but at whose suggestion were

they named? By whom were they selected? The charter informs us.

Dr. Wheelock had represented ''that for many weighty reasons it

would be expedient that the gentlemen whom he had already nomi-

nated, in his last will, to be trustees in America should be of the cor-

poration now proposed." When, afterwards, the trustees are named
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in the charter, ca,n it be doubted that the persons mentioned by Dr.

Wheelock in his will were appointed? Some were probably added

by the crown, with the approbation of Dr. Wheelock. Among these

is the doctor himself. If any others were appointed at the instance of

the crown, they are the governor, three members of the council and

the speaker of the house of representatives of the colony of New

Hampshire. The stations filled by these persons ought to rescue them

from any other imputation than too great a dependence on the crown.

If, in the revolution that followed, they acted under the influence of

this sentiment, they must have ceased to be trustees; if they took part

with their countrymen, the imputation, which suspicion might ex-

cite, would no longer attach to them. The original trustees, then, or

most of them, were named by Dr. Wheelock, and those who were

added to his nomination, most probably with his approbation, were

among the most eminent and respectable individuals in New Hamp-

shire.

The only evidence which we possess of the character of Dr. Whee-

lock is furnished by this charter. The judicious means employed for

the accomplishment of his object, and the success which attended his

endeavors, would lead to the opinion that he united a sound under-

standing to that humanity and benevolence which suggested his un-

dertaking. It surely can not be assumed that his trustees were selected

without judgment. With as little probability can it be assumed, that

while the light of science and of liberal principles pervades the whole

community, these originally benighted trustees remain in utter dark-

ness, incapable of participating in the general improvement: that

while the human race is rapidly advancing, they are stationary. Rea-

soning a priori, we should believe, that learned and intelligent men,

selected by its patrons for the government of a literary institution,

would select learned and intelligent men for their successors: men as

well fitted for the government of a college as those who might be
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chosen by other means. Should this reasoning ever prove erroneous,

in a particular case, public opinion, as has been stated at the bar,
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would correct the institution. The mere possibility of the contrary

72 I

would not justify a construction of the constitution which should ex-

clude these contracts from the protection of a provision whose terms

comprehend them.

The opinion of the court, after mature deliberation, is that this is a

contract, the obligation of which can not be impaired without violating

the constitution of the United States. This opinion appears to us to

be equally supported by reason and by the former decisions of this

court.

2. [Impairment of the obligation of this contract.] We next proceed

to the inquiry whether its obligation has been impaired by those acts

of the legislature of New Hampshire to which the special verdict re-

fers?

From the review of this charter which has been taken it appears

that the whole power of governing the college, of appointing and re-

moving tutors, of fixing their salaries, of directing the course of study

to be pursued by the students and of filling up vacancies created in

their own body, was vested in the trustees. On the part of the crown
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it was expressly stipulated that this corporation thus constituted should

continue forever, and that the number of trustees should forever con-

sist of twelve, and no more. By this contract the crown was bound,

and could have made no violent alteration in its essential terms with-

out impairing its obligation.

[Effect of the American revolution.] By the revolution the duties, as well

as the powers, of government devolved on the people of New Hamp-

shire. It is admitted that among the latter was comprehended the

transcendent power of parliament, as well as that of the executive de-

partment. It is too clear to require the support of argument that all

contracts and rights respecting property remained unchanged by the

revolution. The obligations then which were created by the charter

to Dartmouth College were the same in the new that they had been

in the old government. The power of the government was also the

same. A repeal of this charter, at any time prior to the adoption of

the present constitution of the United .States, would have been an ex-

traordinary and unprecedented act of power, but one which could

have been contested only by the restrictions upon the legislature to be

found in the constitution of the state. But the constitution of the United

States has imposed this additional limitation, that the legislature of a

state shall pass no act "impairing the obligation of contracts."

It has been already stated that the act to "amend the charter, and

enlarge and improve the corporation of Dartmouth College," in-

creases the number of trustees to twenty-one, gives the appointment

of the additional members to. the executive of the state, and creates a

board of overseers, to consist of twenty-five persons, of whom twenty-

one are also appointed by the executive of New Hampshire, who have

power to inspect and control the most important acts of the trustees.

46—Wil. Casks.

chosen by other means. Should this reasoning ever prove erroneous,
in a particular case, public opinion, as has been stated at the bar,
would correct the institution. The mere possibility of the contrary
would not justify a construction of the constitution which should exclude these contracts from the protection of a provision whose terms
comprehend them.
The opinion of the court, after mature deliberation, is that this is a
contract, the obligation of which can not be impaired without violating
the constitution of the United States. This opinion appears to us to
be equally suppo1ted by reason and by the former decisions of this
court.
2. [Impairment of the obligation of this contract.] We next proceed
to the inquiry whether its obligation has been impaired by those acts
of the legislature of N cw Hampshire to which the special verdict refers?
From the review of this charter which has been taken it appears·
that the whole power of governing the college, of appointing and removing tutors, of fixing their salaries, of directing the course of study
to be pursued by the students and of filling up vacancies created in
their own body, was vested in the trustees. On the part of the crown
it was expressly stipulated that this corporation thus constituted should
continue forever, and that the number of trustees should forever consist of twelve, and no more. By this contract the crown was bound,
and could have made no violent alteration in its essential terms without impairing its obligation.
[Effeetof the American revolution.] By the revolution the duties, as well
as the powers, of government devolved on the people of New Hampshire. It is admitted that among the latter was comprehended the
transcendent power of parliament, as well as that of the executive department. It is too clear to require the support of argument that all
contracts and rights respecting prope1ty remained unchanged by the
revolution. The obligations then which were created by the charter
to Dartmouth College were the same in the new that they had been
in the old government. The power of the government was also the
same. A repeal of this charter, at any time prior to the adoption of
the present constitution of the United States, would have been an extraordinary and unprecedented act of power, but one which could
have been contested only by the restrictions upon the legislature to be
found in the constitution of the state. But the constitution of the United
States has imposed this additional limitation, that the legislature of a
state shall pass no act "impairing the obligation of contracts."
It has been already stated that the act to "amend the charter, and
enlarge and improve the corporation of Dartmouth College," increases the number of trustees to twenty-one, gives the appointment
of the additional members to. the executive of the state, and creates a
board of overseers, to consist of twenty-five persons, of whom twentyone are also appointed by the executive of New Hampshire, who have
power to inspect and control the most important acts of the trustees.
46- WIL. OAS.ES.
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through the agency of trustees and overseers, no essential difference is

[EHectof an act to amend the charter.] On the effect of this law, two
opinions can not be entertained. Between acting directly, and acting
through the agency of trustees and overseers, no essential difference is
perceived. The whole power of governing the college is transferred
from trustees, appointed according to the will of the founder expressed in the charter, to the executive of New Hampshire. The
management and application of the funds of this eleemosynary institution, which are placed by the donors in the hands of trustees named
in the charter, and empowered to perpetuate themselves, are placed
by this act under the control of the government of the state. The will
of the state is substituted for the will of the donors in every essential
operation of the college. This is not an immaterial change. The
founders of the college contracted not merely for the pe1petual application of the funds which they gave to the objects for which tho~e funds
were given; they contracted also to secure that application by the con. stitution of the corporation. They contracted for a system which
should, so far as human foresight can provide, retain forever the government of the literary institution they had formed in the hands of
persons approved by themselves. This system is totally changed.
The charter of 1769 exists no longer. It is reorganized, and reorganized in such a manner as to convert a literary institution, molded
according to the will of its founders, and placed under the control of
private literary men , into a machine entirely subservient to the will of
government. This may be for the advantage of this college in particular, and may be for the advantage of literature in general; but it is
not according to the will of the donors, and is subversive of that contract on the faith of which their property was given.
In tlte view wllich ltas been taken i j this interesting case, the court
has confined t'tseif to the rights possessed by the trustees as the assignees and r epresentatives of the donors and founders for tl1e benefit
of religion and li'terature. Yet, it is not clear that the tnistees ought
to be considered as destitute of such beneficial interest in themselves
as the law may respect. In addition to their being the legal owners
of the property, and to their having a freehold right in the powers
confided to them, the charter itself countenances the idea that trustees
may also be tutors with salaries. The first president was one of the
original trustees ; and the charter provides that in case of vacancy in
that office, "the senior professor or tutor, being one of the trustees,
shall exercise the office of president until the trustees shall make
choice of and appoint a president." According to the tenor of the
charter, then, the trustees might, without impropriety, appoint a pre ident and other professors from their own body. This is ·a power not
entirely unconnected with an interest. Even if the proposition of the
counsel for the defendant were sustained; if it were admitted thnt
those contracts only are protected by the constitution, a beneficial interest in which is vested in the party who appears in court to a sert
that interest, yet it is by no means clear that the trustees of Dartmouth College have no beneficial interest in themselves. But the
court has deemed it unnecessary to investigate this particular point,

perceived. The whole power of governing the college is transferred

from trustees, appointed according to the will of the founder ex-

pressed in the charter, to the executive of New Hampshire. The

management and application of the funds of this eleemosynary insti-

tution, which are placed by the donors in the hands of trustees named

in the charter, and empowered to perpetuate themselves, are placed

by this act under the control of the government of the state. The will

of the state is substituted for the will of the donors in every essential

operation of the college. This is not an immaterial change. The

founders of the college contracted not merely for the perpetual appli-

cation of the funds which they gave to the objects for which those funds

were given; they contracted also to secure that application by the con-

stitution of the corporation. They contracted for a system which

should, so far as human foresight can provide, retain forever the gov-

ernment of the literary institution they had formed in the hands of

persons approved by themselves. This system is totally changed.
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The charter of 1769 exists no longer. It is reorganized, and reorgan-

ized in such a manner as to convert a literary institution, molded

according to the will of its founders, and placed under the control of

private literary men, into a machine entirely subserv ient to the will of

government. This may be for the advantage of this college in partic-

ular, and may be for the advantage of literature in general; but it is

not according to the will of the donors, and is subversive of that con-

tract on the faith of which their property was given.

In the view which has been taken of this interesting case, the court

has confined itself to the rights possessed by the trustees as the assign-

ees and representatives of the donors and founders for the benefit

of religion and literature. Yet, it is not clear that the trustees ought

to be considered as destitute of such beneficial interest in themselves

as the law may respect. In addition to their being the legal owners

of the property, and to their having a freehold right in the powers

confided to them, the charter itself countenances the idea that trustees

may also be tutors with salaries. The first president was one of the

original trustees; and the charter provides that in case of vacancy in

that office, "the senior professor or tutor, being one of the trustees,

shall exercise the office of president until the trustees shall make

choice of and appoint a president." According to the tenor of the

charter, then, the trustees might, without impropriety, appoint a pres-

ident and other professors from their own body. This is a power not

entirely unconnected with an interest. Even if the proposition of the

counsel for the defendant were sustained; if it were admitted that

those contracts only are protected by the constitution, a beneficial in-

terest in which is vested in the party who appears in court to assert

that interest, yet it is by no means clear that the trustees of Dart-

mouth College have no beneficial interest in themselves. But the

court has deemed it unnecessary to investigate this particular point,
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nary institutions, the body corporate, as possessing the whole legal

723

and equitable interest, and completely representing the donors, for the

purpose of executing the trust, has rights which are protected by the

constitution.

It results from this opinion, that the acts of the legislature of New

Hampshire, which are stated in the special verdict found in this cause,

are repugnant to the constitution of the United States; and that the

judgment on this special verdict ought to have been for the plaintiffs.

The judgment of the state court must, therefore, be reversed.

Washington, Justice. * * * 1. [What is a contract?] It may be

defined to be a transaction between two or more persons, in which each

party comes under an obligation to the other, and each reciprocally ac-

quires a right to whatever is promised by the other. Powell on Cont. 6.

Under this definition, says Mr. Powell, it is obvious that every feoff-

ment, gift, grant, agreement, promise, etc., maybe included, because

in all there is a mutual consent of the minds of the parties concerned

in them upon an agreement between them respecting some property

or right that is the object of the stipulation. He adds, that the ingre-
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dients requisite to form a contract are, parties, consent and an obliga-

tion to be created or dissolved; these must all concur, because the

regular effect of all contracts is, on one side, to acquire, and on the

other to part with, some property or rights; or to abridge, or to re-

strain natural liberty, by binding the parties to do, or restraining them

from doing something which before they might have done or omitted.

If a doubt could exist that a grant is a contract, the point was decided in

the case of Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, in which it was laid down that

a contract is either executory or executed; by the former, a party binds

himself to do, or not to do, a particular thing; the latter is one in

which the object of the contract is performed, and this differs in noth-

ing from a grant; but whether executed or executory, they both con-

tain obligations binding on the parties, and both are equally within

the provisions of the constitution of the United States, which forbids

the state governments to pass laws impairing the obligation of con-

tracts.

If, then, a grant be a contract, within the meaning of the constitu-

tion of the United States, the next inquiry is, whether the creation of

a corporation by charter be such a grant as includes an obligation of

the nature of a contract, which no state legislature can pass laws to

impair? A corporation is defined by Mr. Justice Blackstonc (2 SI.

Comm. 37") to be a franchise. It is. says he, "a franchise for a

number of -persons, to be incorporated and exist as a body politic, with

a power to maintain perpetual succession., and to do corporate acts,

and each individual of such corporation is also said to have a fran-

chise or freedom." This franchise, like other franchises, is an in-

corporeal hereditament, issuing out of something real or personal, or

concerning or annexed.to, and exercisable within a thing corporate.

To this grant, or this franchise, the parties are the king and the

■persons*for whose benefit it is created, or trustees for them. The

being of opinion, on general principles, that in these private eleemosynary institutions, the body corporate, as possessing the whole legal
and equitable interest, and completely representing the donors, for the
purpose of executing the trust, has rights which are protected by the
constitution.
It results from this opinion, that the acts of the legislature of New
Hampshire, which are stated in the special verdict found in this cause,
are repugnant to the constitution of the United States; and that the
judgment on this special verdict ought to have been for the plaintiffs.
The judgment of the state court must, therefore, be reversed.
WASHINGTON, Justice. • • • 1. [What is a coutriwt?] It may be
defined t{) be a transaction between two or more persons, in which each
party comes under an obligation to the other, and each reciprocally acquires a right to whatever is promised by the other. Powell on Cont. 6.
Under this definition, says Mr. Powell, it is obvious that every feoffment, gift, grant, agreement, promise, etc., may be included, because
in all there is a mutual consent of the minds of the parties concerned
in them upon an agreement between them respecting some property
or right that is the object of the stipulation. He adds, that the ingredients requisite to form a contract are, parties, consent and an obligation to be created or dissolved; these must all concur, because tht:
regular effect of all contracts is, on one side, to acquire, and on the:
~her to part with, some property or rights; or to abridge, or to re·
strain natural liberty, by binding the parties to do, or restraining them
from doing something which before they might have done or omitted.
If a doubt could exist that a grant is a contract, the point was decided in
the case of Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, in which it was laid down that
a contract is either executory or executed; by the former, a party binds
himself to do, or not to do, a particular thing; the latter is one in
which the object of the contract is performed, and this differs in nothing from a grant; but whether executed or executory, they both contain obligations oinding on the parties, and both are equally within
the provisions of the constitution of the Unitetl States, which forbids
the state governments to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts.
If, then, a grant be a contract, within the meaning of the constitution of the United States, the next inquiry is, whether the creation of
a corporation by charter be such a grant as includes an obligation of
the nature of a contract, which no state legislature can pass laws to
impair? A corporation i$ defined by .Afr. Justice Blackstone (2 Bl.
Comm. 37) to be a franchise. Ii zs, says he, "a francltise for a
number of persons, to be incorporated and exist as a body politi'c, with
a power to maintai'n perpetual successz"on~ and to do corpdrate acts,
and each t'ndt'vidual of such corporatt'on is also said to have a franchise or freedom." Thi's franchi'se, li'ke other franchises, is an z'ncorporeal heredz'tament, i'ssuingout of something real or personal, or
concernz'ng or annexed.to, and exerdsable wt'thi'n a tht'ng corporate.
To this grant, or this franchise, tlte parti'es are the king and tlie
personsifor whose benefit it i's created, or trustees for them. The
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assent of both is necessary. The subjects of the grant are not only

privileges and immunities, but property, or, which is the same thing,

assent of both is necessary. Tlte subjects of the grant are not only
pri"vi"leges and i"mmuni"#es, but property, or, whi"clt i"s tlie samethi"ng,
a capadty to acqui"re and to hold property in perpetut"ty. Certat"n
obligati"ons are created, bi"ndi"ng botli on the grantor and the grantees.
On the part of tlte former, i"t amounts to an extingui"skment of tlte
king's prerogatt"ve to bestow tlie same identt"cal franchise on another
corporate body, because i"t would prejudt"ce hi"s p1·ior grant. (2 Bl.
Comm. 37.) It implies, the1·efore, a contract not to reassert the riglzt
to grant the francht"se to another, or to impafr t"t. There is also an
implied contract that the founder of a private charity, or his heirs, or
other persons appointed by him for that purpose, shall have the right
to visit and to govern the corporation of which he is the acknowledged
founder and patron, and also, that in case of its dissolution the reversionary right of the founder to the property, with which he had
endowed it, should be preserved inviolate.
Tlte rig/its ac<Jufred by the other contracting party are those of
having perpetual succession, of sidng and bet"ng sued, of purchasing
lands for tlte benefit of themselves and their successors, and of having
a common seal and of making by-laws. The obligation i"mposed upon
tltem, and which forms tlte considera#on of the grant, is that of
acting up to tlie end or design for wlticlt they were created by tliefr
founder. Mr. Justice Buller, in the case of the King v. Pasmore, 3
T. R. 246, says that the grant of incorporation is a compact between
the crown and a number of persons, the latter of whom undertake, in
consideration of the privileges bestowed, to exert themselves for the
good government of the place. If they fail to perform their part of
it there is an end of the compact. The charter of a corporation, says
Mr. Justice Blackstone (2 Bl. Comm. 484), may be forfeited through
negligence or abuse of its franchises, in which case the law judges
that the body politic has broken the condition upon which it was incorporated, and thereupon the corporation is void. It appears to me,
upon the whole, that these principles and authorities prove, incontrovertibly, that a charter of incorporation is a contract.
2. [Impairment of this contraet.] The next question is, do the acts
of the legislature of New Hampshire of the 27th of June and 18th
and 26th of December, 1816, impair this contract within the true intent and meaning of the constitution of the United States? Previous
to the examination of this question, it will be proper clearly to mark
the distinction between the different kinda of lay aggregate corporations, in order to prevent any implied decision by this court of any
other case than the one immediately before it.
We are informed by the case of Philips v. Bury, I Ld. Raym. 5;
s. c. 2 T. R. 346, which contains all the doctrine of corporations connected with this point, that there are two kinds of corporations aggregate, viz., such as are for public government and such as are for private charity. The first are those for the government of a town, city
or the like; and being for public advantage, are to be governed
according to the law of the land. The validity and justice of their
private laws and constitutions are examinable in the king's conrts. Of

a capacity to acquire and to hold property in perpetuity. Certain

obligations are created, binding both on the grantor and the grantees.

On the part of the former, it amounts to an extinguishment of the

king's prerogative to bestow the same identical franchise on another

corporate body, because it would prejudice his prior grant. (2 Bl.

Comm. 37.) It implies, therefore, a contract not to reassert the right

to grant the franchise to another, or to impair it. There is also an

implied contract that the founder of a private charity, or his heirs, or

other persons appointed by him for that purpose, shall have the right

to visit and to govern the corporation of which he is the acknowledged

founder and patron, and also, that in case of its dissolution the re-

versionary right of the founder to the property, with which he had

endowed it, should be preserved inviolate.

The rights acquired by the other contracting party are those of

having perpetual succession, of suing and being sued, of purchasing

lands for the benefit of themselves and their successors, and of having
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a common seal and of making by-laws. The obligation imposed upon

them, and which forms the consideration of the grant, is that of

acting up to the end or design for which they were created by their

founder. Mr. Justice Buller, in the case of the King v. Pasmore, 3

T. R. 246, says that the grant of incorporation is a compact between

the crown and a number of persons, the latter of whom undertake, in

consideration of the privileges bestowed, to exert themselves for the

good government of the place. If they fail to perform their part of

it there is an end of the compact. The charter of a corporation, says

Mr. Justice Blackstone (2 Bl. Comm. 484), maybe forfeited through

negligence or abuse of its franchises, in which case the law judges

that the body politic has broken the condition upon which it was in-

corporated, and thereupon the corporation is void. It appears to me,

upon the whole, that these principles and authorities prove, incontro-

vertibly, that a charter of incorporation is a contract.

2. [Impairment of this contract.] The next question is, do the acts

of the legislature of New Hampshire of the 27th of June and 18th

and 26th of December, 1816, impair this contract within the true in-

tent and meaning of the constitution of the United States? Previous

to the examination of this question, it will be proper clearly to mark

the distinction between the different kinds of lay aggregate corpora-

tions, in order to prevent any implied decision by this court of any

other case than the one immediately before it.

We are informed by the case of Philips v. Bury, I Ld. Raym. 5;

s. c. 2 T. R. 346, which contains all the doctrine of corporations con-

nected with this point, that there are two kinds of corporations aggre-

gate, viz., such as are for public government and such as are for pri-

vate charity. The first are those for the government of a town, city

or the like; and being for public advantage, are to be governed

according to the law of the land. The validity and justice of their

private laws and constitutions are examinable in the king's conrts. Of
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CONTRACTS IN THE CORPORATE CHARTER.

visitor; there are no patrons of these corporations. But private and

particular corporations for charity, founded and endowed by private

persons, are subject to the private government of those who erect

them, and are to be visited by them or their heirs, or such other per-

sons as they may appoint. The only rules for the government of

these private corporations are the laws and constitutions assigned by

the founder. This right of government and visitation arises from the

property which the founder had in the lands assigned to support the

charity; and as he is the author of the charity, the law invests him

with the necessary power of inspecting and regulating it. The author-

ities are full to prove that a college is a private charity, as well as

an hospital, and that there is, in reality, no difference between

them except in degree, but they are within the same reason, and both

eleemosynary.

These corporations, civil and eleemosynary, which differ from each

other so especially in their nature and constitution, may very well dif-

fer in matters which concern their rights and privileges, and their

existence and subjection to public control. The one is the mere creat-
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ure of public institution, created exclusively for the public advantage

without other endowments than such as the king or government may

bestow upon it, and having no other founder or visitor than the king

or government, the fundator incipiens. The validity and justice of

its laws and constitution are examinable by the courts having juris-

diction over them; and they are subject to the general law of the

land. It would seem reasonable that such a corporation may be

controlled, and its constitution altered and amended by the govern-

ment, in such manner as the public interest may require. Such legis-

lative interferences can not be said to impair the contract by which

the corporation was formed, because there is, in reality, but one

party to it, the trustees or governors of the corporation being merely

the trustees for the public, the cestui que trust of the foundation.

These trustees or governors have no interest, no privileges or immuni-

ties, which are violated by such interference, and can have no more

right to complain of them than an ordinary trustee, who is called

upon in a court of equity to execute the trust. They accepted the

charter for the public benefit alone, and there would seem to be no

reason why the government, under proper limitations, should not

alter or modify such a grant at pleasure. But the case of a private

corporation is entirely different. That is the creature of a private

benefaction for a charity or private purpose. It is endowed and

founded by private persons, and subject to their control, laws and

visitation, and not to the general control of the government; and all

these powers, rights and privileges flow from the property of the

founder in the funds assigned for the support of the charity. Al-

though the king, by the grant of the charter, is, in some sense, the

founder of all eleemosynary corporations, because, without his grant

they can not exist, yet the patron or endower is the perficient founder,

to whom belongs, as of right, all the powers and privileges which

these there are no particular founders, and consequently no particular
visitor; there are no patrons of these corporations. But private and·
particular corporations for charity, founded and endowed by private
persons, are subject to the private government of those who erect
them, and are to be visited by them or their heirs, or such other persons as they may appoint. The only rules for the government of
these private corporati9ns are the laws and constitutions assigned by
the founder. This right of government and visitation arises from the
property which the founder had in the lands assigned to support the
charity; and as he is the author of the charity, the law invests him
with the necessary power of inspecting and regulating it. The authorities are full to prove that a college is a private charity, as well as
an hospital, and that there is, in reality, no difference between
them except in degree, but they are within the same reason, and both
eleemosynary.
These corporations, civil and eleemosynary, which differ from each
other so especially in their nature and constitution, may very well differ in matters which concern their rights and privileges, and their
existence and subjection to public control. The one is the mere creature of public institution, created exclusively for the public advantage
without other endowments ~han such as the king or government may
bestow upon it, and having no other founder or visitor than the king
or government, the fundator i'nctpi'ens. The validity and justice of
its laws and constitution are examinable by the courts having jurisdiction over them; and they are subject to the general law of the
land. It would seem reasonable that such a corporation may be
controlled, and its constitution altered and amen<le<l by the government, in such manner as the public interest may require. Such leg islati\'e interferences can not be said to impair the contract by which
the corporation was formed, because there is, in reality, but one
party to it, the trustees or governors of the corporation being merely
the trustees for the public, the cestui' que trust of the foundation.
These trustees or governors have no interest, no privileges or immunities, which are violated by such inte.rference, and can have no more
right to complain of them than an ordinary trustee, who is called
upon in a court of equity to execute the trust. They accepted the
charter for the public benefit alone, and there would seem to be no
reason why the government, under proper limitations, should not
alter or modify such a grant at pleasure. But the case of a private
corporation is entirely different. That is the creature of a private
benefaction for a charity or private purpose. It is endowed and
founded by private persons, and subject to their control, laws and
visitation, and not to the general control of the government; and all
these powers, rights and privileges flow from the property of the
founder in the funds assigned for the support of the charity. Although the king, by the grant of the charter, is, in some sense, the
founder of all eleemosynary corporations, because, without his grant
they can not exist, yet the patron or endower is the perficient founder,
to whom belongs, as of n ght, all the powers and privileges which
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have been described. With such a corporation, it is not competent

for the legislature to interfere. It is a franchise, or incorporeal here-

ditament, founded upon private property, devoted by its patron to a

ha\'e been described. With such a corporation, it is not competent
· for the legislature to interfere. It is a franchise, or incorporeal hereditament, founded upon private property, devoted by its patron to a
private charity, of a peculiar kind, the offspring of his own will and
pleasure, to be managed and visited by persons of his O\ovn appointment, according to such laws and regulations as he, or the persons so
selected, may ordain.
It has been shown that the charter is a contract on the part of the
government, that the property with which the charity is endowed shall
be forever vested in a certain number of persons and their successors,
to subserve the particular purposes designated by the founder and to
be managed in a particular way. If a law increases or diminishes
the number of the trustees, they are not the persons which the grantor
agreed should be managers of the fund. If it appropriate the fund
intended for the support of a particular charity to that of some other
charity, or to an entirely different charity, the grant is in effect set
aside, and a new contract substituted in its place, thus disappointing completely the intentions of the founder by changing the objects
of his bounty. And can it be seriously contended that a law which
changes so materially the terms of a contract does not impair it? In
sho1t, does not every alteration of a contract, however unimportant,
even though it be manifestly for the interest of the patty objecting to
it, impair its obligations? If the assent of all the parties to be bound
by a contract be of its essence, how is it possible that a new contract,
substituted for or engrafted on another without such assent, should
not violate the old charter? • • •
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the above acts of New Hampshire, not having received the assent of the corporate body of Dartmouth College, are not binding on them, an<l, consequently, that the
judgment of the state court ought to be reversed.
JOHNSON, Justice, concurred, for the reasons stated by the chief
justice.
L1v1NGSTON, Justice, concurred, for the reasons stated by the chief
justice, and Justices WASHINGTO!"' and STORY.
STORY, Justice. This is a cause of great importance, and as the
very learned discussions as well here as in the state court show, of no
inconsiderable difficulty. There are two questions to which the
appellate jurisdiction of this court properly applies. 1. Whether the
original charter of Dartmouth College is a contract within the prohibitory clause of the constitution of the United States, which declares
that no state shall pass any "law impairing the obligation of contracts?" 2. If so, whether the legislative acts of New Hampshire of
the 27th of June, and of the 18th and 27th of December, 1816, or any
of them, impair the obligations of that charter?
[Nature of an aggregate corporation at common law.] It will be necessary, however, before we proceed to discuss these questions, to institute an inquiry into the nature, rights and duties of aggregate corporations at common law; that we may apply the principles drawn from

private charity, of a peculiar kind, the offspring of his own will and

pleasure, to be managed and visited by persons of his own appoint-

ment, according to such laws and regulations as he, or the persons so

selected, may ordain.

It has been shown that the charter is a contract on the part of the

government, that the property with which the charity is endowed shall

be forever vested in a certain number of persons and their successors,

to subserve the particular purposes designated by the founder and to

be managed in a particular way. If a law increases or diminishes

the number of the trustees, they are not the persons which the grantor

agreed should be managers of the fund. If it appropriate the fund

intended for the support of a particular charity to that of some other

charity, or to an entirely different charity, the grant is in effect set

aside, and a new contract substituted in its place, thus disappoint-

ing completely the intentions of the founder by changing the objects

of his bounty. And can it be seriously contended that a law which
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changes so materially the terms of a contract does not impair it? In

short, does not every alteration of a contract, however unimportant,

even though it be manifestly for the interest of the party objecting to

it, impair its obligations? If the assent of all the parties to be bound

by a contract be of its essence, how is it possible that a new contract,

substituted for or engrafted on another without such assent, should

not violate the old charter? * * *

Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the above acts of New Hamp-

shire, not having received the assent of the corporate body of Dart-

mouth College, are not binding on them, and, consequently, that the

judgment of the state court ought to be reversed.

Johnson, Justice, concurred, for the reasons stated by the chief

justice.

Livingston, Justice, concurred, for the reasons stated by the chief

justice, and Justices Washington and Story.

Story, Justice. This is a cause of great importance, and as the

very learned discussions as well here as in the state court show, of no

inconsiderable difficulty. There are two questions to which the

appellate jurisdiction of this court properly applies, i. Whether the

original charter of Dartmouth College is a contract within the prohib-

itory clause of the constitution of the United States, which declares

that no state shall pass any "law impairing the obligation of con-

tracts?" 2. If so, whether the legislative acts of New Hampshire of

the 27th of June, and of the 18th and 27th of December, 1816, or any

of them, impair the obligations of that charter?

[Nature of an aggregate corporation at common law.] It will be neces-

sary, however, before we proceed to discuss these questions, to insti-

tute an inquiry into the nature, rights and duties of aggregate corpo-

rations at common law; that we may apply the principles drawn from
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this source to the exposition of this charter, which was granted

emphatically with reference to that law.

An aggregate corporation, at common law, is a collection of indi-

viduals, united into one collective body, under a special name, and

possessing certain immunities, privileges and capacities, in its col-

lective character, ■which do not belong to the natural persons compos-

ing it. Among other things, it possesses the capacity of perpetual

succession, and of acting by the collected vote or will of its compo-

nent members, and of suing and being sued in all things touching

its corporate rights and duties. It is, i?i short, ati artificial person,

existing in contemplation of law and endowed with certain powers

and franchises which, though they must be exercised through the

medium of its natural members, are yet considered as subsisting in

the corporation itself as distinctly as if it were a real personage.

Hence, such a corporation may sue and be sued by its own members,

and may contract with them in the same manner as with any stran-

gers. 1 Bl. Comm. 469, 475; 1 Kyd on Corp. 13, 69, 189; 1 Wooddes.

471, etc. A great variety of these corporations exist in every coun-

try governed by the common law, in some of which the corporate
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existence is perpetuated by new elections, made from time to time;

and in others, by a continual accession of new members, without any

corporate act. Some of these corporations are, from the particular

purposes to which they are devoted, denominated spiritual and some

lay; and the latter are again divided into civil and eleemosynary

corporations. It is unnecessary, in this place, to enter into any ex-

amination of civil corporations. Eleemosynary corporations are

such as are constituted for the perpetual distribution of the free-

alms and bounty of the founder, in such manner as he has directed;

and in this class are ranked hospitals for the relief of poor and im-

potent persons, and colleges for the promotion of learning and piety,

and the support of persons engaged in literary pursuits. 1 Bl. Comm.

469, 470, 471, 482; 1 Kyd on Corp. 25; 1 Wooddes. 474; Attorney-

General v. Whorwood, 1 Ves. 534; St. John's College v. Todington,

1 W. Bl. 84; s. c. 1 Burr. 200; Philips v. Bury, 1 Ld. Raym. 5; s.

c. 2 T. R. 346; Porter's Case, 1 Co. 22b, 23.

Another division of corporations is into public and private. Pub-

lic corporations are generally esteemed such as exist for public polit-

ical purposes only, such as towns, cities, parishes and counties, and

in many respects they are so, a/though they involve some private in-

terests; but, strictly speaking, public corporations are such only as arc

founded by the government for public purposes, where the whole in-

terests belong also to the government. If therefore, the foundation

be private, though under the charter of the government, the corpora-

tion is private, however extensive the uses may be to which it is

devoted, either by the bounty of the founder, or the nature and objects

of the institution. For instance, a bank created by the government

for its own uses, whose stock is exclusively owned by the government

is, in the strictest sense, a public corporation. So, an hospital cre-

ated and endowed by the government for general charity. But a

this source to the exposition of this charter, which was granted
emphatically with reference to that law.
An aggregate corporation, at common law, £s a collection of ind£viduals , united into one collec#ve body, under a spedal name, and
possessing certa£n immunit£es, privileges and capadties, in its collective character, wltich do not belong to tile natural persons composing it. Among otlter tilings, it possesses the capact'ty of perpetual
succession, and of acting by the collected vote or will of its component members, and of suing and being sued in all things touching
£ts corporate rights and duties. It is, in short, an artificial person,
existing £n contemplation of law and endowed with certain powers
and franchises which, though they must be exerdsed through the
medium .o f its natural members, are yet cons£dered as subsisting in
the corporation itself, as distinctly as if t't were a real p ersonage.
Hence, such a corporation may sue and be sued by its own members,
and may contract with them in the same manner as with any strangers. 1 Bl. Comm. 469, 475; 1 Kyd on Corp. 13, 69, 189; 1 Wooddes.
471, etc. A great variety of these corporations exist in every country governed by the common law, in some of which the corporate
existence is perpetuated by new elections, made from time to time;
and in others, by a continual accession of new members, without any
corporate act. Some of these corporations are, from the partt'cular
purposes to which they are devoted, denom£nated spfritual and some
lay; and the latter are again divided into civt'l and eleemosynary
corpora#ons. It is unnecessary, t'n tht's place, to enter into any examination of dvt'l corporations. Eleemosynary corporatt'ons are
such as are constt'tuted for the perpetual distributt'on of the fre ealms and bounty of the founder , in sucli manner as he has directed ;
and in this class are ranked hospitals for the relief of poor and impotent persons, and colleges for the promotion of learning and piety,
and the support of persons engaged in literary pursuits. 1 Bl. Comm.
469, 470, 471, 482; 1 Kyd on Co1·p. 25; 1 Wooddes.474; AttorneyGeneral v. Whorwood, 1 Ves. 534; St. John' s College v. Todington,
r W. Bl. 84; s. c. 1 Burr. zoo; Philips v. Bury, 1 Ld. Raym. 5; s.
c. z T. R. 346; Porter's Case, 1 Co. zzb, 23.
Another division of corporat£ons is t'nto publt'c and private. PubUc corporati'ons are generally esteemed such as exist for public political purposes only, such as towns, cities, parishes and count£es, and
t'n many respects they are so, although they t'nvolve some prt'vate interests; but, strictly speaking, publt'c corporat£ons are sucli only as are
founded by the government for publz'c purposes, where the whole interests belong also to the government. If, therefore, the foundation
be private, tlwugh under the charter of the government, the corporation is pr£vate, ltowever extensive the uses may be to wht'ch it is
devoted, either by the bounty of the founder, or the nature and objects
of the inst£tution. For instance, a bank created by the government
for its own uses, whose stock is exclusively owned by the government
is, in the strictest sense, a public corporation. So, an hospital created and endowed by the government for general charity. But a
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bank, whose stock is owned by private persons, is a private corpora-

§ 198

tion, although it is erected by the government, and its objects and

bank, whose stock is owned by private persons, is a private corporation, although it is erected by the government, and its objects and
operations partake of a public nature. The same doctrine may be
affirmed of insurance, canal, bridge and turnpike companies. In all
these cases the uses may, in a certain sense, be called public, but
the corporations are private, as much so, indeed, as if the franchises
were vested in a single person.
This reasoning applies in its full force to eleemosynary corporations. An hospital, founded by a private benefactor, is, in point of
law, a private corporation, although dedicated by its charter to general charity. So a college founded and endowed in the same manner, although being for the promotion of learning and piety, it may
extend its charity to scholars from every class in the commui;iity, and
thus acquire the character of a public institution. This is the unequivocal doctrine of the authorities, and can not be shaken but by undermining the most solid foundations of the common law. Philips v.
Bury, 1 Ld. Raym. 5, 9; s. c. 2 T. R. 346.
It was indeed supposed at the argument that if the uses of an eleemosynary corporation be for general charity, this alone would constitute it a public corporation. But the law is certainly not so. To be
sure, in a certain sense, every charity which is extensive in its reach,
may be called a public charity, in contradistinction to a charity
embracing but a few definite objects. In this sense the language was
unquestionably used by Lord Hardwicke in the case cited at the argument; Attorney-General v. Pearce, 2 Atk. 87, 1 Bae. Ahr. tit. Charitable Uses, E, 589; and in this sense a private corporation may well
enough be denominated a public charity. So it would be if the endowment, instead of being vested in a corporation , were assigned to a
private trustee; yet in such a case no one would imagine that the trust
ceased to be private, or the funds became public property. That the
mere act of incorporation will not change the charity from a private to
a public one is most distinctly assetted in the autho1ities. Lord Hardwicke, in the cni;e already alluded to, says "the charter of the crown can
not make a charity more or less public, but only more permanent than it
would otherwise be, but it is the extensiveness which will constitute it
a public one. A devise to the poor of the parish is a public charity.
Where testators leave it to the discretion of a trustee to choose out the
objects, though each particular object may be said to be private, yet
in the extensiveness of the benefit accruing from them, they may properly be called public charities. A sum to be disposed of by A. B.
and his executors at their discretion among poor-house keepers is of
this kind." The charity, then, may in this sense be public, although
it may be administered by private trustees, and for the same reason it
may thus be public, though administered by a private corporation.
The fact, then, that the charity is public, affords no proof that the
corporation is also public; and consequently the argument, so far as
it is built on this foundation, falls to the ground. If indeed the argument were correct, it would follow that almost every hospital and col-

operations partake of a public nature. The same doctrine may be

affirmed of insurance, canal, bridge and turnpike companies. In all

these cases the uses may, in a certain sense, be called public, but

the corporations are private, as much so, indeed, as if the franchises

were vested in a single person.

This reasoning applies in its full force to eleemosynary corpora-

tions. An hospital, founded by a private benefactor, is, in point of

law, a private corporation, although dedicated by its charter to gen-

eral charity. So a college founded and endowed in the same man-

ner, although being for the promotion of learning and piety, it may

extend its charity to scholars from every class in the community, and

thus acquire the character of a public institution. This is the un-

equivocal doctrine of the authorities, and can not be shaken but by un-

dermining the most solid foundations of the common law. Philips v.

Bury, i Ld. Raym. 5, 9; s. c. 2 T. R. 346.

It was indeed supposed at the argument that if the uses of an elee-

mosynary corporation be for general charity, this alone would consti-
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tute it a public corporation. But the law is certainly not so. To be

sure, in a certain sense, every charity which is extensive in its reach,

may be called a public charity, in contradistinction to a charity

embracing but a few definite objects. In this sense the language was

unquestionably used by Lord Hardwicke in the case cited at the argu-

ment; Attorney-General v. Pearce, 2 Atk. 87, 1 Bac. Abr. tit. Char-

itable Uses, E, 589; and in this sense a private corporation may well

enough be denominated a public charity. So it would be if the endow-

ment, instead of being vested in a corporation, were assigned to a

private trustee; yet in such a case no one would imagine that the trust

ceased to be private, or the funds became public property. That the

mere act of incorporation will not change the charity from a private to

a public one is most distinctly asserted in the authorities. Lord Hard-

wicke, in the case already alluded to, says "the charter of the crown can

not make a charity more or less public, but only more permanent than it

would otherwise be, but it is the extensiveness which will constitute it

a public one. A devise to the poor of the parish is a public charity.

Where testators leave it to the discretion of a trustee to choose out the

objects, though each particular object may be said to be private, yet

in the extensiveness of the benefit accming from them, they may prop-

erly be called public charities. A sum to be disposed of by A. B.

and his executors at their discretion among poor-house keepers is of

this kind." The charity, then, may in this sense be public, although

it may be administered by private trustees, and for the same reason it

may thus be public, though administered by a private corporation.

The fact, then, that the charity is public, affords no proof that the

corporation is also public; and consequently the argument, so far as

it is built on this foundation, falls to the ground. If indeed the argu-

ment were correct, it would follow that almost every hospital and col-

t

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 198 CONTRACTS IN THE CORPORATE CHARTER.

729

lege would be a public corporation; a doctrine utterly irreconcilable

§ 198

CONTRACTS IN THE CORPORATE CHARTER.

with the whole current of decisions since the time of Lord Coke.

When, then, the argument assumes that because the charity is pub-

lic the corporation is public, it manifestly confounds the popular with

the strictly legal sense of the terms. And if it stopped here it

would not be very material to correct the error. But it is on this

foundation that a superstructure is erected which is to compel a sur-

render of the cause. When the corporation is said at the bar to be

public, it is not merely meant that the whole community may be the

proper objects of the bounty, but that the government have the sole

right, as trustees of the public interests, to regulate, control and direct

the corporation, and its funds and its franchises, at its own good will

and pleasure. Now, such an authority does not exist in the govern-

ment, except where the corporation is in the strictest sense public;

that is, where its whole interests and franchises are the exclusive prop-

erty and domain of the government itself. If it had been otherwise,

courts of law would have been spared many laborious adjudications in

respect to eleemosynary corporations and the visitorial powers over them

from the time of Lord Holt down to the present day. Rex v. Bury,
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1 Ld. Raym. 5; s. c. Comb. 265; Holt 715; 1 Show. 360; 4 Mod.

106; Skin. 447, and Lord Holt's opinion from his own manuscript, in

2 T. R. 346. Nay, more, private trustees for charitable purposes

would have been liable to have the property confided to their care

taken away from them without any assent or default on their part,

and the administration submitted, not to the control of law and equity,

but to the arbitrary discretion of the government. Yet, whoever thought

before that the munificent gifts of private donors for general charity

became instantaneously the property of the government, and that

the trustees appointed by the donors, whether corporate or unincor-

porated, might be compelled to yield up their rights to vvhomsover

the government might appoint to administer them? If we were to

establish such a principle it would extinguish all future eleemosynary

endowments, and we should find as little of public policy as we now

find of law to sustain it.

[Foundation and visitation of corporations.] An eleemosynary corpo-

ration, then, upon a private foundation, being a private corporation,

it is next to be considered what is deemed a foundation and who is the

founder. This can not be stated with more brevity and exactness

than in the language of the elegant commentator upon the laws of Eng-

land: "The founder of all corporations (says Sir William Black-

stone), in the strictest and original sense, is the king alone, for he

only can incorporate a society; and in civil corporations, such as

mayor, commonalty, etc., where there are no possessions or endow-

ments given to the body, there is no other founder but the king; but

in eleemosynary foundations, such as colleges and hospitals, where

there is an endowment of lands, the law distinguishes and makes two

species of foundation, the one fundatio incipicns. or the incorpora-

tion, in which sense the king is the general founder of all colleges

and hospitals; the other fundatio perficiens, or the dotation of it.

lege would be a public corporation; a doctrine utterly irreconcilable
with the whole current of decisions since the time of Lord Coke.
When, then, the argument assumes that because the charity is public the corporation is public, it manifestly confounds the popular with
the shictly legal sense of the terms. And if it stopped here it
would not be very material to correct the error. But it is on this
foundation that a superstructure is erected which is to compel a surrender of the cause. When the corporation is said at the bar to be
public, it is not merely meant that the whole community may be. the
proper objects of the bounty, but that the government have the sole
right, as trustees of the public interests, to regulate, control and direct
the corporation, and its funds and its franchises, at its own good will
and pleasure. Now, such an authority does not exist in the government, except where the corporation is in the strictest sense public;
that is, where its whole interests and franchises are the exclusive property and domain of the government itself. If it had been otherwise,
courts of law would have been spared many laborious adjudications in
respect to eleemosynary corporations and the visitorial powers over them
from the time of Lord Holt down to the present day. Rex v. Bury,
1 Ld. Raym. 5; s. c. Comb. 265; Holt 715; 1 Show. 36o; 4 Mod.
106; Skin. 447 1 and Lord Holt's opinion from his own manuscript, in
z T. R. 346. Nay, more, private trustees for charitable purposes
would have been liable to have the property confided to their care
taken away from them without any assent or default on their pa1t,
and the administration submitted, not to the control of law and equity,
but to the arbitrary discretion of the government. Yet, whoever thought
before that the munificent gifts of private donors for general charity
became instantaneously the property of the government, and that
the trustees appointed by the donors, whether corporate or u.n incorporate d, might be compelled to yield up their rights to whomsover
the government might appoint to administer them? If we were to
establish such a principle it would extinguish all future eleemosynary
endowments, and we should find as little of public policy as we now
find of law to sustain it.
[Foundation and visitation of corporations.] An eleemosynary corporation, then, upon a private foundation, being a private corporation,
it is next to be considered what is deemed a foundation and who is the
founder. This can not be stated with more brevity and exactness
than in the language of the elegant commentator upon the laws of England: "The founder of all corporations (says Sir \Villiam Blackstone), in the strictest and original sense, is the king alone, for he
only can incorporate a society; and in civil corporations, such as
mayor, commonalty, etc., where there are no possessions or endowments given to the body, there is no other founder but the king; but
in eleemosynary foundations, such as ~olleges and hospitals , where
there is an endowment of lands, the law distinguishes and makes two
species of foundation, the one fundatt'o i'n cipiens~ or the incorporation, in which sense the king is the general founder of all colleges
and hospitals; the other fundati'o perfidens, or the dotation of it.
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in which sense the first gift of the revenues is the foundation, and he

730

who gives them is, in the law, the founder; and it is in this last sense
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we generally call a man the founder of a college or hospital." 1 Bl.

Comm. 480, 10 Co. 33.

in which sense the first gift of the revenues is the foundation, and he
who gives them is, in the Jaw, the founder; and it is in this last sense
we generally call a man the founder of a college or hospital." r Bl.
Comm. 480, ro Co. 33.
To all eleemosynary corporations a visitatorial power attaches as a
necessary incident; for these corporations being composed of in<iividunls subject to human infirmities are liable, as well as private persons,
to deviate from the end of their institution. The law, therefore, has
provided that there shall somewhere exist a power to visit, inquire
into, and correct all irregularities and abuses in such corporations, and
to compel the original purposes of the charity to be faithfully fulfilled.
I Bl. Comm. 48o.
The nature and extent of this visitatorial power has
been expounded with admirable fullness and accuracy by Lord Holt
in one of his most celebrated judgments. Philips v. Bury, I Ld.
Raym. 5; s. c. 2 T. R. 346. And of common right by the donation
the founder and his heirs are the legal visitors, unless the founder has
appointed and assigned another person to be visitor. For the founder
may, if he please, at the time of the endowment, part with his visitatorial power; and the person to whom it is assigned will, in that case,
possess it in exclusion of the founder's heirs. 1 Bl. Com. 482. This
visitatorial power is, therefore, an hereditament founded in property,
and valuable in intendment of lav. and stands upon the maxim that
he who gives his prope1ty has a right to regulate it in future. It
includes also the legal right of patronage, for, as Lord Holt justly
observes, "patronage and visitation are necessary consequents one
upon another." No technical terms arc necessary to assign or ve t
the ,·isi ta tori al power; it is sufficient if, from the nature of the duties
to be performed by particular persons under the charter, it can be
inferred that the founder meant to pa1t with it in their favor, and he
may divide it among various persons, or subject it to any modifi cations or control by the fundamental statutes of the corporation. But
where the appointment is given in general terms, the whole power
vest in the appointee. Eden v. Foster, 2 P. \Vms. 325; AttomeyGeneral v. Middleton, 2 Ves. 327; St. Johns College v. Todington,
I W. Bl. 84; s. c. 2 Burr. 200; Attorney-General v. Clare College,
3 Atk. 662; s. c. I Ves. 78. In the construction of charters, too. it is
a general rule that if the objects of the charity are incorporated, as, for
instance, the master and fellows of a college, or the master and poor
of a hospital, the visitatorial power, in the absence of any special
appointment, silently vests in the founder and his heirs. But where
trustees or governors are incorporated to manage the charity, the visitatorial power is deemed to belong to them in their corporate character. Philips v. Bury, I Ld. Raym. 5; s. c. 2 T. R. 346; Green v.
Rutherford, 1 Ves. 472; Attorney-General v. Middleton, 2 Ves. 327;
Case of Sutton Hospital, IO Co. 23, 31.
When a private eleemosynary corporation is thus created by the
charter of the crown, it is subject to no other control on the part of
the crown than what is expressly or implicitly reserved hy the charter
itself. Unless a power be reserved for this purpose, the crown can

To all eleemosynary corporations a visitatorial power attaches as a

necessary incident; for these corporations being composed of individ-

uals subject to human infirmities are liable, as well as private persons,

to deviate from the end of their institution. The law, therefore, has

provided that there shall somewhere exist a power to visit, inquire

into, and correct all irregularities and abuses in such corporations, and

to compel the original purposes of the charity to be faithfully fulfilled.

1 Bl. Comm. 480. The nature and extent of this visitatorial power has

been expounded with admirable fullness and accuracy by Lord Holt

in one of his most celebrated judgments. Philips v. Bury, 1 Ld.

Raym. 5; s. c. 2 T. R. 346. And of common right by the donation

the founder and his heirs are the legal visitors, unless the founder has

appointed and assigned another person to be visitor. For the founder

may, if he please, at the time of the endowment, part with his visita-

torial power; and the person to whom it is assigned will, in that case,

possess it in exclusion of the founder's heirs. 1 Bl. Com. 482. This
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visitatorial power is, therefore, an hereditament founded in property,

and valuable in intendment of law, and stands upon the maxim that

he who gives his property has a right to regulate it in future. It

includes also the legal right of patronage, for, as Lord Holt justly

observes, "patronage and visitation are necessary consequents one

upon another." No technical terms are necessary to assign or vest

the visitatorial power; it is sufficient if, from the nature of the duties

1 ,

to be performed by particular persons under the charter, it can be

inferred that the founder meant to part with it in their favor, and he

may divide it among various persons, or subject it to any modifica-

tions or control by the fundamental statutes of the corporation. But

where the appointment is given in general terms, the whole power

vests in the appointee. Eden v. Foster, 2 P. Wms. 325; Attorney-

General v. Middleton, 2 Ves. 327; St. Johns College v. Todington,

1 W. Bl. 84; s. c. 2 Burr. 200; Attorney-General v. Clare College,

3 Atk. 662; s. c. 1 Ves. 78. In the construction of charters, too, it is

a general rule that if the objects of the charity are incorporated, as, for

instance, the master and fellows of a college, or the master and poor

of a hospital, the visitatorial power, in the absence of any special

appointment, silently vests in the founder and his heirs. But where

trustees or governors are incorporated to manage the charity, the vis-

itatorial power is deemed to belong to them in their corporate charac-

ter. Philips v. Bury, 1 Ld. Raym. 5; s. c. 2 T. R. 346; Green v.

Rutherford, 1 Ves. 472; Attorney-General v. Middleton, 2 Ves. 327;

Case of Sutton Hospital, 10 Co. 23, 31.

When a private eleemosynary corporation is thus created by the

charter of the crown, it is subject to no other control on the part of

the crown than what is expressly or implicitly reserved by the charter

itself. Unless a power be reserved for this purpose, the crown can
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not, in virtue of its prerogative, without the consent of the corpora-

tion, alter or amend the charter, or divest the corporation of any of

its franchises, or add to them, or add to or diminish the number of
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the trustees, or remove any of the members, or change or control

the administration of the charity, or compel the corporation to receive

a new charter. This is the uniform language of the authorities, and

forms one of the most stubborn and well-settled doctrines of the com-

mon law.

But an eleemosynary, like every other corporation, is subject to

the general law of the land. It may forfeit its corporate franchises

by misuser or non-user of them. It is subject to the controlling

authority of its legal visitor, who, unless restrained by the terms of

the charter, may amend and repeal its statutes, remove its officers,

correct abuses and generally superintend the management of the trusts.

Where, indeed, the visitatorial power is vested in the trustees of the

charity, in virtue of their incorporation, there can be no amotion of

them from their corporate capacity. But they are not, therefore,

placed beyond the reach of the law. As managers of the revenues of

the corporation they are subject to the general superintending power

of the court of chancery, not as itself possessing a visitatorial power,
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or a right to control the charity, but as possessing a general jurisdic-

tion in all cases of an abuse of trust to redress grievances and sup-

press frauds. 2 Fonbl. Eq., B. 2, pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, note a; Coop.

Eq. PI. 292; 2 Kyd on Corp. 195; Green v. Rutherford, 1 Ves. 463;

Attorney-General v. Foundling Hospital, 4 Bro. C. C. 165; s. c. 2

Ves. Jr. 42; Eden v. Foster, 2 P. Wms. 325; 1 Wooddes. 476; At-

torney-General v. Price, 3 Atk. 108; Attorney-General v. Lock. 3

Atk. 164; Attorney-General v. Dixie, 13 Ves. 519; Ex parte Kirby

Ravensworth Hospital, 15 Ves. 304, 314; Attorney-General v. Earl

of Clarendon, 17 Ves. 491, 499; Bcrkhamstead Free School, 2 Ves.

& B. 134; Attorney-General v. Corporation of Carmarthen, Cooper

30; Mayor, etc., of Colchester v. Lowten. 1 Ves. & B. 226: Rex v.

Watson, 2 T. R. 199; Attorney-General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch.

371; Attorney-General v. Middleton, 2 Ves. 327. And where a cor-

poration is a mere trustee of a charity, a court of equity will go yet

further, and though it can not appoint or remove a corporator, it will

yet, in a case of gross fraud or abuse of trust, take away the trust from

the corporation and vest it in other hands. Mayor, etc., of Coventry

v. Attorney-General, 7 Bro. P. C. 235; Attorney-General v. Earl of

Clarendon, 17 Ves. 491, 499.

Thus much it has been thought proper to premise respecting the

nature, rights and duties of eleemosynary corporations growing out of

the common law. We mav now proceed to an examination of the

original charter of Dartmouth College.

(Stating facts as to recitals of charter and its terms as above.)

[Terms of the charter.] Such are the most material clauses of the

charter. It is observable, in the first place, that no endowment what-

ever is given by the crown, and no power is reserved to the crown or

government in any manner to alter, amend or control the charter. It

not, in vi1tue of its prerogative, without the consent of the corporation, alter or amend the charter, or divest the corporation of any of
its franchises, or add to them, or add to or diminish the number of
the trustees, or remove any of the members, or change or control
the administration of the charity, or compel the corporation to receive
a new charter. This is the uniform language of the authorities, and
forms one of the most stubborn and well-settled doctdnes of the common law.
But an eleemosynary, like every other corporation, is subject to
the general law of the land. It may forfeit its corporate franchises
by misuser or non-user. of them. It is subject to the controlling
authority of its legal visitor, who, unless restrained by the terms of
the charter, may amend and repeal its statutes, remove its officers,
correct abuses and generally superintend the management of the trusts.
Where, indeed, the visitatorial power is vested in the trnstees of the
charity, in virtue of their incorporation, there can be no amotion of
them from their corporate capacity. But they are not, therefore ,
placed beyond the reach of the la ...v. As managers of the revenues of
the corporation they are subject to the general superintending power
of the court of chancery, not as itself possessing a visitatorial power ,
or a right to control the charity, but as possessing a general jurisdiction in all cases of an abuse of trust to redress grievances and s11ppress frauds. 2 Fonbl. Eq., B. 2, pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, note a; Coop.
Eq.Pl. 292; 2KydonCorp.195; Greenv. Rutherford, r Ves.462;
Attorney-General v. Foundling Hospital , 4 Bro. C. C. 165; s . c. 2
Ves. Jr. 42; Eden v. Foster, 2 P. Wms. 325; 1 Wooddes. 476; Attorney-General v. Price, 3 Atk. 108; Attorney-General v. Lock. 3
Atk. 164; Attorney-General v. Dixie, 13 Ves. 519; Exparte Kirby
Ravensworth Hospital, 15 Ves. 304, 314; Attorney-General v. Earl
of Clarendon, 17 Ves. 491, 499; Berkhamstead Free School , 2 Ves.
& B. 134; Attorney-General v. Corporation of Carmarthen. Cooper
30; Mayor, etc., of Colchester v. Lowten. 1 Ves. & B . 2 26 ; Rex v.
Watson, 2 T. R. 199; Attorney-General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch.
371; Attorney-General v. Middleton, 2 Ves. 327. And where a corporation is a mere trustee of a charity, a court of equity will go yet
further, and though it can not appoint or remove a corporator, it will
yet, in a case of gross fraud or abuse of trust, take away the trust from
the corporation and vest it in other hands. Mayor, etc., of Coventry
v. Attorney-General, 7 Bro. P. C. 235; Attorney-General v. Earl of
Clarendon, 17 Ves. 491, .499·
Thus much it has been thought proper to premise respecting the
- nature , rights and duties of eleemosynary corporations growing out of
the common law. We may now proceed to an examination of the
original charter of Dartmouth College.
(Stating facts as to recitals of charter and its terms as above.)
[Terms of the charter.] Such are the most material clauses of the
charter. It is observable, in the first place, that no endowment whatever is given by the crown, and l1'0 power is reserved to the crown or
government in any manner to alter, amend or control the charter. It
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is granted upon his application, and that the trustees were in fact

is also apparent, from the very terms of the charter, that Dr. Wheelock is recognized as the founder of the college, and that the charter
is granted upon his application, and that the trustees were in fact
nominated by him. In the next place, it is apparent that the objects
of the institution are purely charitable, for the distribution of the private contributions of private benefactors. The charity was in the sense
already explained a public charity, that, is for the general promotion
of learning and piety, but in this respect it was just as much public
before as after the incorporation. The only effect of the charter was
to give permanency to the design, by enlarging the sphere of its action and granting a perpetuity of corporatt; powers and franchi ses,
the better to secure the administration of the benevolent donations.
As founder, too, Dr. Wheelock and his heirs would have been completely clothed with the visitatorial power, but the whole government and control, as well of the officers as of the revenues of the
college being with his consent assigned to the trustees in their corporate character, the visitatorial power, which is included in this authority, rightfully devolved on the trustees. As managers of the property
and revenues of the corporation, they were amenable to the jurisdiction of the judicial tribunals of the state, but as visitors, their di scretion was limited only by the charter, and liable to no supervision or
control. at least, unless it was fraudulently misapplied.
From this summary examination it follows that Dartmouth College
was, under its original charter, a private eleemosynary corporation,
endowed with the usual privileges and franchises of such corporations,
and among others, with a legal perpetuity, and was exclusively under
the government and control of twelve trustees, who were to be elected
and appointed, from time to time, by the existing board, as vacancies
or removals s hould occur.
[Is this charter a contract?] We are now led to the consideration of
the. first question in the cause, whether this charter is a contract within
the clause of the constitution prohibiting the states from passing any
law impairing the obligation of contracts. In the case of Fletcher v.
Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 136, this court laid down its exposition of the
word "contract" in this clause in the following manner: " A contract is a compact between two or more persons, and is either executory or executed. An executory contract is one in which a party
binds himself to do , or not to do, a particular thing. A contract executed is one in which the object of the contract is performed; and
this, says Blackstone, differs in nothing frqm a grant. A contract
executed, as well as one that is executory, contains obligations binding on the parties. A grant, in its own nature , amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the grantor, and implies a contract not
to reassert that right. A party is always estopped by his own grant."
This language is perfectly unambiguous, and was used in reference to
a grant of land by the governor of a state, under a legislative act.
It determines, in the most unequivocal manner, that the grant of a
state is a contract, within the clause of the constitution now in ques-

nominated by him. In the next place, it is apparent that the objects

of the institution are purely charitable, for the distribution of the pri-

vate contributions of private benefactors. The charity was in the sense

already explained a public charity, that, is for the general promotion

of learning and piety, but in this respect it was just as much public

before as after the incorporation. The only effect of the charter was

to give permanency to the design, by enlarging the sphere of its ac-

tion and granting a perpetuity of corporate powers and franchises,

the better to secure the administration of the benevolent donations.

As founder, too, Dr. Wheelock and his heirs would have been com-

pletely clothed with the visitatorial power, but the whole govern-

ment and control, as well of the officers as of the revenues of the

college being with his consent assigned to the trustees in their corpo-

rate character, the visitatorial power, which is included in this author-

ity, rightfully devolved on the trustees. As managers of the property

and revenues of the corporation, they were amenable to the jurisdic-
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tion of the judicial tribunals of the state, but as visitors, their discre-

tion was limited only by the charter, and liable to no supervision or

control, at least, unless it was fraudulently misapplied.

From this summary examination it follows that Dartmouth College

was, under its original charter, a private eleemosynary corporation,

endowed with the usual privileges and franchises of such corporations,

and among others, with a legal perpetuity, and was exclusively under

the government and control of twelve trustees, who were to be elected

and appointed, from time to time, by the existing board, as vacancies

or removals should occur.

[Is this charter a contract?] We are now led to the consideration of

the.first question in the cause, whether this charter is a contract within

the clause of the constitution prohibiting the states from passing any

law impairing the obligation of contracts. In the case of Fletcher v.

Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 136, this court laid down its exposition of the

word "contract" in this clause in the following manner: "A con-

tract is a compact between two or more persons, and is either execu-

tory or executed. An executory contract is one in which a party

binds himself to do, or not to do, a particular thing. A contract ex-

ecuted is one in which the object of the contract is performed; and

this, says Blackstone, differs in nothing from a grant. A contract

executed, as well as one that is executory, contains obligations bind-

ing on the parties. A grant, in its own nature, amounts to an ex-

tinguishment of the right of the grantor, and implies a contract not

to reassert that right. A party is always estopped by his own grant."

This language is perfectly unambiguous, and was used in reference to

a grant of land by the governor of a state, under a legislative act.

It determines, in the most unequivocal manner, that the grant of a

state is a contract, within the clause of the constitution now in ques-
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a fortiori, the doctrine applies to a charter or grant from the king.
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But it is objected that the charter of Dartmouth College is not a

contract contemplated by the constitution, because no valuable con-

sideration passed to the king as an equivalent for the grant, it pur-

porting to be granted ex mero motu, and further that no contracts,

merely voluntary, are within the prohibitory clause. It must be ad-

mitted that mere executory contracts can not be enforced at law,

unless there be a valuable consideration to sustain them, and the con-

stitution certainly did not mean to create any new obligations or give

any new efficacy to nude pacts. But it must, on the other hand, be

also admitted that the constitution did intend to preserve all the ob-

ligatory force of contracts which they have by the general principles

of law. Now when a contract has once passed bona Jide into grant,

neither the king nor any private person who may be the grantor can

recall the grant of the property, although the conveyance may have

been purely voluntary. A gift completely executed is irrevocable.

The property conveyed by it becomes, as against the donor, the abso-

lute property of the donee; and no subsequent change of intention of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the donor can change the rights of the donee. 2 Bl. Com. 441, Jenk.

Cent. 104. And a gift by the crown of incorporeal hereditaments,

such as corporate franchises, when executed comes completely within

the principle, and is, in the strictest sense of the terms, a grant. 2 Bl.

Com. 317, 346; Shep. Touch., ch. 12, p. 227. Was it ever imagined

that land, voluntarily granted to any person by a state, w-as liable to

be resumed at its own good pleasure? Such a pretension would,

under any circumstance, be truly alarming, but in a country like ours,

where thousands of land-titles had their origin in gratuitous grants of

the states, it would go far to shake the foundations of the best settled

estates. And a grant of franchise is not, in point of principle, dis-

tinguishable from a grant of any other property. If, therefore, this

charter were a pure donation, when the grant was complete, and ac-

cepted by the grantees, it involved a contract that the grantees should

hold and the grantor should not reassume the grant as much as if it

had been founded on the most valuable consideration.

But it is not admitted that this charter was not granted for what the

law deems a valuable consideration. For this purpose, it matters not

how trifling the consideration may be, a pepper-corn is as good as

a thousand dollars. Nor is it necessary that the consideration should

be a benefit to the grantor. It is sufficient if it import damage or

loss, or forbearance of the benefit, or any act done or to be done, on

the part of the grantee. It is unnecessary to state cases; they are

familiar to the mind of every lawyer. Pillans v. Van Mierop, per

Yates, J., 3 Burr. 1663; Forth v. Stanton, 1 Saund. 211; Williams'

note 2, and the cases there cited.

With these principles in view, let us now examine the terms of this

charter. It purports, indeed, on its face, to be granted "of the special

grace, certain knowledge and mere motion" of the king, but these

words were introduced for a very different purpose from that now

tion, and that it implies a contract not to reassume the rights granted;
a fortiori, the doctrine applies to a charter or grant from the king.
But it is objected that the charter of Dartmouth College is not a
contract contemplated by the constitution, because no valuable consideration passed to the king as an equivalent for the grant, it purporting to be granted ex m ero motu, and further that no contracts,
merely voluntary, are within the prohibitory clause. It must be admitted that mere executory contracts can not be enforced at law,
unless there be a valuable consideration to sustain them, and the constitution certainly did not mean to create any new obligations or give
any new efficacy to nude pacts. But it must, ·on the other hand, be
also admitted that the constitution did intend to preserve all the obligatory force of contracts which they have by the general principles
of law. Now when a contract has once passed bona fide into grant,
neither the king nor any private person who may be the grantor can
recall the grant of the property, although the conveyance may have
been purely voluntary. A gift completely executed is irrevocable.
The property conveyed by it becomes, as against the donor, the absolute property of the donee; and no subsequent change of intention of
the donor can change the rights of the donee. 2 Bl. Com. 441, Jenk .
Cent. 104. And a gift by the crown of incorporeal hereditaments,
such as corporate franchises, when executed comes completely within
the principle, and is, in the strictest sense of the terms, a grant. 2 Bl.
Com. 317, 346; Shep. Touch., ch. 12 1 p. 227. Was it ever imagined
that land, voluntarily granted to any person by a state, was liable to
be resumed at its own good pleasure? Such a pretension would,
under any circumstance, be truly alarming, but in a country like ours,
where thousands of land-titles had their origin in gratuitous grants of
the states, it would go far to shake the foundations of the best settled
estates. And a grant of franchise is not , in point of principle, distinguishable from a grant of any other property. If, therefore, this
charter were a pure donation, when the grant was complete , and accepted by the grantees, it involved a contract that the grantees should
hold and the grantor should not reassume the grant as much as if it
had been founded on the most valuable consideration.
But it is not admitted that this charter was not granted for what the
law deems a valuable consideration. For this purpo,se, it matters not
bow trifling the consideration may be, a pepper-com is as good as
a thou sand dollars. Nor is it necessary that the consideration should
be a benefit to the grantor. It is sufflcient if it import damage or
loss, or forbearance of the benefit, or any act done or to be done, on
the part of the grantee. It is unnecessary to state cases; they are
familiar to the mind of every lawyer. Pill ans v. Van Mierop , per
Yates, J., 3 Burr. 1663; Forth v. Stanton, 1 Saund. 211; Williams'
note 2, and the cases there cited.
\¥ith these principles in view, let us now examine the terms of this·
charter. It purports, indeed, on its face, to be granted "of the special
grace, certain knowledge and mere motion" of the king, hut these
words were introduced for a very different purpose from that now
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of that applied in ordinary cases) that a grant of the king, at the suit
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of the grantee, is to be construed most beneficially for the king and

contended for. It is a general rule of the common law (the reverse
of that applied in ordinary cases) th?t a grant of the king, at the suit
of the grantee, is to be construed most beneficially for the king and
most strictly llgainst the grantee. Wherefore, it is usual to insert in
the king's grants a clause that they are made , not at the suit of the
grantee, but of the special grace, certain knowledge and mere motion
of the king, and then they receive a more liberal construction. This
is the true object of the clause in question, as we are informed by the
most accurate authorities. 2 BJ. Comm. 347; Finch's Law 100; 10
Rep. 112; I Shep. Ahr. 136; Bull. N. P. 136. But the charter also.
on its face, purports to· be granted in consideration of the premises in
the introductory recitals.
(Stating recitals as to founding by Dr. Wheelock, at his own expense, contributions made by others, etc., and the location of the
college.)
[Implied contracts with the founder, trustees aQd benefaetors.] Can it
be truly said that these recitals contain no legal consideration of
benefit to the crown, or of forbearance of benefit on the other side?
Is there not an implied contract by Dr. \Vheelock, if a charter is
granted, that the schools shall be removed from his estate to New
Hampshire, and that he will relinquish all his control onr the
funds collected, and to be collected in England under his auspices
and subject to his authority? That he will yield up the management
of his charity school to the trustees of the college? That be will relinquish all the offers made by other American governments, and devote his patronage to this institution? It will scarcely be denied that
he gave up the right any longer to maintain the charity school already
established on his own estate; and that the funds collected for its u e
and subject to his management were yielded up by him as an endowment of the college. The very language of the charter supposes him
to be the legal owner of the funds of the charity school, and in virtue
of this endowment, declares him the founder of the college. It matters not whether the funds were great or small ; Dr. Wheelock had
procured them by his own influence, and they were under his control
to be applied to the support of his charity school; and when he relinquished his control he relinquished a right founded in property acquired by his lapors. Besides, Dr. Wheelock impliedly agreed to
devote his future services to the college, when erected, by becoming
president thereof, at a period when sacrifices must necessarily be
made to accomplish the great.design in view. If, indeed, a peppercorn be, in the eye of the law, of sufficient value to found a contract,
as upon a valuable consideration, are these implied agreements, and
these relinquishments of right and benefit, to be deemed wholly worthless? It has never been doubted that an agreement not to exercise
a trade in a particular place was a sufficient consideration to sustain
a contract for the payment of money; a fortiori', the relinquishment
of property which a person holds, or controls the use of as a trust, is
a sufficient consideration; for it is parting with a legal right. Even
a right of patronage (jus patronatus) is of great value in intendment

most strictly against the grantee. Wherefore, it is usual to insert in

the king's grants a clause that they are made, not at the suit of the

grantee, but of the special grace, certain knowledge and mere motion

of the king, and then they receive a more liberal construction. This

is the true object of the clause in question, as we are informed by the

most accurate authorities. 2 Bl. Comm. 347; Finch's Law 100; 10

Rep. 112; 1 Shep. Abr. 136; Bull. N. P. 136. But the charter also,

on its face, purports to be granted in consideration of the premises in

the introductory recitals.

(Stating recitals as to founding by Dr. Wheelock, at his own ex-

pense, contributions made by others, etc., and the location of the

college.)

[Implied contracts with the founder, trustees and benefactors.] Can it

be truly said that these recitals contain no legal consideration of

benefit to the crown, or of forbearance of benefit on the other side?

Is there not an implied contract by Dr. Wheelock, if a charter is
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granted, that the schools shall be removed from his estate to New

Hampshire, and that he will relinquish all his control over the

funds collected, and to be collected in England under his auspices

and subject to his authority? That he will yield up the management

of his charity school to the trustees of the college? That he will re-

linquish all the offers made by other American governments, and de-

vote his patronage to this institution? It will scarcely be denied that

he gave up the right any longer to maintain the charity school already

established on his own estate; and that the funds collected for its use

and subject to his management were yielded up by him as an endow-

ment of the college. The very language of the charter supposes him

to be the legal owner of the funds of the charity school, and in virtue

of this endowment, declares him the founder of the college. It mat-

ters not whether the funds were great or small; Dr. Wheelock had

procured them by his own influence, and they were under his control

to be applied to the support of his charity school; and when he re-

linquished his control he relinquished a right founded in property ac-

quired by his labors. Besides, Dr. Wheelock impliedly agreed to

devote his future services to the college, when erected, by becoming

president thereof, at a period when sacrifices must necessarily be

made to accomplish the great.design in view. If, indeed, a pepper-

corn be, in the eye of the law, of sufficient value to found a contract,

as upon a valuable consideration, are these implied agreements, and

these relinquishments of right and benefit, to be deemed wholly worth-

less? It has never been doubted that an agreement not to exercise

a trade in a particular place was a sufficient consideration to sustain

a contract for the payment of money; a fortiori, the relinquishment

of property which a person holds, or controls the use of as a trust, is

a sufficient consideration; for it is parting with a legal right. Even

a right of patronage (_/«J patronatus) is of great value in intendment
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and yet, in fact, it is but a mere trust, or right of nomination to a
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benefice, which can not be legally sold to the intended incumbent.

2 131. Comm. 22, Christian's note. In respect to Dr. Wheelock, then,

if a consideration be necessary to support the charter as a contract, it

is to be found in the implied stipulations on his part in the charter

itself. He relinquished valuable rights and undertook a laborious

office in consideration of the grant of the incorporation.

This is not all. A charter may be granted upon an executory as

■well as an executed or present consideration. When it is granted to

persons who have not made application for it until their acceptance

thereof, the grant is yet in fieri. Upon the acceptance there is an

implied contract on the part of the grantees, in co?isideration of the

charter, that they will perform the duties and exercise the authorities

conferred by it. This was the doctrine asserted by the late learned

Mr. Justice Buller, in a modern case. Rex v. Pasmore, 3 T. R. 199,

239, 246. He there said, "I do not know how to reason on this point

better than in the manner urged by one of the relator's counsel, who

considered the grant of incorporation to be a compact between the
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crown and a certain number of the subjects, the latter of whom under-

take, in consideration of the privileges which are bestowed, to exert

themselves for the good government of the place" (i. e., the place

incorporated). It will npt be pretended that if a charter be granted

for a bank, and the stockholders pay in their own funds, the charter

is to be deemed a grant without consideration, and therefore revocable

at the pleasure of the grantor. Yet here the funds are to be managed,

and the services performed exclusively for the use and benefit of the

stockholders themselves. And where the grantees are mere trustees

to perform services without reward, exclusively for the benefit of

others for public charity, can it be reasonably argued that these serv-

ices are less valuable to the government than if performed for the pri-

vate emolument of the trustees themselves? In respect, then, to the

trustees also there was a valuable consideration for the charter, the

consideration of services agreed to be rendered by them in execution

of a charity, from which they could receive no private remuneration.

There is yet another view of this part of the case which deserves

the most weighty consideration. The corporation was expressly

created for the purpose of distributing in perpetutity the charitable

donations of private benefactors. By the terms of the charter'the

trustees and their successors in their corporate capacity were to re-

ceive, hold and exclusively manage all the funds so contributed. The

crown then, upon the face of the charter, pledged its faith that the

donations of private benefactors should be perpetually devoted to

their orginal purposes without any interference on its own part, and

should be forever administered by the trustees of the corporation,

unless its corporate franchises should be taken away by due process of

law. From the very nature of the case, therefore, there was an im-

plied dontract on the part of the crown with every benefactor that if

he would give his money it should be deemed a charity protected by

of law. Nobody doubts that an advowson is a valuable hereditament;
and yet, in fact, it is but a mere trust, or right of nomination to a
benefice, which can not be legally sold to the intended incumbent.
2 Bl. Comm. 22, Christian's note. In respect to Dr. Wheelock, then,
if a consideration be necessary to support the charter as a contract, it
is to be found in the implied stipulations on his part in the charter
itself. He relinquished valuable rights and undertook a laborious
office in consideration of the grant of the incorporation.
This is not all. A charter may be granted upon an executory as
well as an executed or present consideration. When it is granted to
persons who have not made applicat£on for £t unt£l tl1et'r acceptance
thereof, the grant £s yet £n .fter£. Upon the acceptance there £s an
implied contract on the part of the grantees, in consideration of the
charter, that they w£ll perform the duties and exercise the authorities
conferred by £t. This was the doctrine asserted by the late learned
Mr. Justice Buller, in a modern case. Rex v. Pasmore, 3 T. R. 199,
239, 246. He there said, "I do not know how to reason on this point
better than in the manner urged by one of the relator's counsel , who
considered the grant of incorporation to be a compact between the
crown and a certain number of the subjects, the latter of whom undertake, in consideration of the privileges which are bestowed, to exert
them se lves for the good government of the place" (i. e., the place
incorporated). It will npt be pretended that if a charter be granted
for a bank, and the stockholders p ay in their own funds, the charter
is to be deemed a grant without consideration, and therefore revocable
at the pleasure of the grantor. Yet here the funds are to be managed,
and the services performed exclusively for the use and benefit of the
stockholders themselves. And where the grantees are mere trustees
to perform services without reward, exclusively for the benefit of
others for public charity, can it be reasonably argued that these services are less valuable to the government than if performed for the private emolument of the trustees themselves? In respect, then, to the
trustees also there was a valuable consideration for the charter, the
cons ideration of services agreed to be rendered by them in execution
of a charity, from which they could receive no private remuneration.
There is yet another view of this part of the case which deserves
the most weighty consideration. The corporation was expressly
created for the purpose of distributing in perpetutity the charitable
donations of private benefactors. By the terms of the charter · the
trustees and their successors in their corporate capacity were to receive, hold and exclusively manage all the funds so contributed. The
crown then, upon the face of the charter, pledged its faith that the
donations of private benefactors should be perpetually devoted to
their orginal purposes without any interference on its own part, and
should be forever administered by the trustees of the corporation,
unless its corporate franchises should be taken away by due process of
law. From the very nature of the case, therefore, there was an implied contract on the part of the crown with every benefactor that if
he would give his money it slzould be deemed a charity protected by
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the charter, and be administered by the corporation according to the
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general law of the land. As soon, then, as a donation was made to

the charter, and be administered by the corporation according to the
general law of the land. As soon, then, as a donation was made to
the corporatt"on, there was an implt"ed contract sprt"nging up and
founded on a valuable const"deratt"on that the crown would not revoke
or alter the cltarter or clia.nge £ts admt"nistration without the consent
of the corporatt"on. There was also an impUed contract between the
corporation t"tself and every benefactor upon l£ke const"deratt"on, that
t"t would admt"n£ster his bounty according to the terms and for tlie
objects stipulated t"n tlie charter.
In every view of the case, if a consideration were necessary (which
I utterly deny) to make the charter a valid contract, a valuable consideration did exist as to the founder, the trustees and the benefactors.
And upon the soundest legal principles the charter may be properly
deemed, according to the various aspects in which it is viewed, as a
several contract with each of these parties in virtue of the foundation
or the endowment of the college, or the acceptance of the charter or
the donations to the charity.
[Implied contra.et with the corporation itself.] And here we might
pause; but there is yet remaining another view of the subject, which
can not consistently be passed over without notice. It seems to be assumed by the argument of the defendant's counsel that there t"s no
contract whatsoever, in vt"rtue of the charter, between the crown and
tlte corporatt"on £/self. But it deserves consideration, whether this assumption can be su~tained upon a solid foundation.
If this had been a new charter, granted to an existing corporation,
or a grant of lands to an existing corporation, there could not have been
a doubt that the grant would have been an executed contract with the
corporation, as much so as if it had been to any private person. But it
is supposed that as the corporation was not then in existence, but was
created and its franchises bestowed, uno .ftatu, the charter can not be
construed a contract, because there was no person t"n rerum natura!
with whom it might be made.
Is this, however, a just and legal view of the subject? If the corporation had no existen.:e, so as to become a contracting party, neither
had it for the purpose of receiving a grant of the franchises. The
truth is that there may be a priority of operation of things in the same
grant, and the law distinguishes and gives such priority wherever it is
necessary to effectuate the objects of the grant. Case of Sutton Hospital, IO Co. 23; Buckland v. Fowcher, cited IO Co. 27-8, and
recognized in Attorney-General v. Bowyer, 3 Ves. Jr. 7I4, 726-7;
s. p. Highmore on Mort. zoo, etc. From the nature of things the
artificial person called a corporation must be created before it can be
capable of taking anything. Wh en, therefore, a charter t"s granted,
and t"t brt"ngs tlie corporatt"on £nto ext"stencc, without any act of the
natural persons who compose it, and gi"ves such corporation any priv£leges, francht"ses or property, tlze law deems the corporation to be first
brought t"nto ext"stence, and then clothes £t wt"th the granted liberties
and property. When, on tlie other ltand, the corporatt"on is to be
brought t"nto existence by some future acts of the corpora/ors, the

the corporation, there was an implied contract springing up and

founded on a valuable consideration that the crown would not revoke

or alter the charter or change its administration without the consent

of the corporation. There was also an implied contract between the

corporation itself and every benefactor upon like consideration, that

it would administer his bounty according to the terms and for the

objects stipulated in the charter.

In every view of the case, if a consideration were necessary (which

I utterly deny) to make the charter a valid contract, a valuable con-

sideration did exist as to the founder, the trustees and the benefactors.

And upon the soundest legal principles the charter may be properly

deemed, according to the various aspects in which it is viewed, as a

several contract with each of these parties in virtue of the foundation

or the endowment of the college, or the acceptance of the charter or

the donations to the charity.

[Implied contract with the corporation itself.] And here we might
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pause; but there is yet remaining another view of the subject, which

can not consistently be passed over without notice. // seems to be as-

sumed by the argument of the defendant's counsel that there is no

contract whatsoever, in virtue of the charter, between the crown and

the corporation itself. But it deserves consideration, whether this as-

sumption can be sustained upon a solid foundation.

If this had been a new charter, granted to an existing corporation,

or a grant of lands to an existing corporation, there could not have been

a doubt that the grant would have been an executed contract with the

corporation, as much so as if it had been to any private person. But it

is supposed that as the corporation was not then in existence, but was

created and its franchises bestowed, uno flatu, the charter can not be

construed a contract, because there was no person in rerum natures

with whom it might be made.

Is this, however, a just and legal view of the subject? If the cor-

poration had no existence, so as to become a contracting party, neither

had it for the purpose of receiving a grant of the franchises. The

truth is that there may be a priority of operation of things in the same

grant, and the law distinguishes and gives such priority wherever it is

necessary to effectuate the objects of the grant. Case of Sutton Hos-

pital, 10 Co. 23; Buckland v. Fowcher, cited 10 Co. 27-8, and

recognized in Attorney-General v. Bowyer, 3 Ves. Jr. 714, 726-7;

s. p. Highmore on Mort. 200, etc. From the nature of things the

artificial person called a corporation must be created before it can be

capable of taking anything. When, therefore, a charter is granted,

and it brings the corporation into existence, without any act of the

natural persons who compose it. and gives such corporation a?iy privi-

leges, franchises or property, the law deems the corporation to be first

brought into existence, and then clothes it with the granted liberties

and property. When, on the other hand, the corporation is to be

brought into existence by some future acts of the corporators, the
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the corporation is brought into life the franchises instantaneously
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attach to it. There may be, in intendment of law, a priority of time,

even in an instant, for this purpose. Highmore on Mort. 200, etc.

And if the corporation have an existence before the grant of its other

franchises attaches, what more difficulty is there in deeming the grant

of these franchises a contract with it than if granted by another instru-

ment at a subsequent period?

It behooves those also who hold that a grant to a corporation not then

in existence is incapable of being deemed a contract on that account,

to consider whether they do not at the same time establish that the grant

itself is a nullity for precisely the same reason. Yet such a doctrine

would strike us all as pregnant with absurdity, since it would prove

that an act of incorporation could never confer an)' authorities or

rights of property on the corporation it created. It may be admitted

that two parties are necessary to form a perfect contract, but it is

denied that it is necessary that the assent of both parties must be at

the same time. If the legislature were voluntarily to grant land in

fee to the first child of A. to be hereafter born, as soon as such child
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should be born the estate would vest in it. Would it be contended

that such a grant, when it took effect, was revocable, and not an exe-

cuted contract upon the acceptance of the estate? The same question

might be asked in a case of a gratuitous grant by the king or the legis-

lature to A. for life, and afterward to the heirs of B., who is then

living. Take the case of a bank, incorporated for a limited period

upon the express condition that it shall pay out of its corporate funds

a certain sum as the consideration for the charter, arid after the cor-

poration is organized a payment is duly made of the sum out of the

corporate funds; will it be contended that there is not a subsisting

contract between the government and the corporation by the matters

thus arising ex post facto that the charter shall not be revoked during

the stipulated period? Suppose an act declaring that all persons,

who should thereafter pay into the public treasury a stipulated sum,

should be tenants in common of certain lands belonging to. the state

in certain proportions; if a person, afterward born, pays the stipu-

lated sum into the treasury, is it less a contract with him than it

would be with a person in esse at the time the act passed? We must

admit that there may be future springing contracts in respect to per-

sons not now in esse, or we shall involve ourselves in inextricable dif-

ficulties. And if there may be in respect to natural persons, why not

also in respect to artificial persons created by the law for the very pur-

pose of being clothed with corporate powers? I am unable, to distin-

guish between the case of a grant of land or offranchises to an exist-

ing corporation and a like grant to a corporation brought into life for

the very purpose of receiving the grant. As soon as it is in esse,

and the franchises and property become vested and executed in it, the

grant is just as much an executed contract as if its prior existence

had been established for a century.

47—Wil. Cases. ,

franchises remain in abeyance until such acts are done, and wlten
the corporation is brought iuto life the franchises instantaneously
attach to it. There may be, in intendment of law, a priority of time,
even in an 'instant, for this purpose. Highmore on Mort. 200, etc.
And if the corporation have an existence before the grant of its other
franchises attaches, what more difficulty is there in deeming the grant
of these franchises a contract with it than if granted by another instrument at a subsequent period?
It behooves those also who hold that a grant to a corporation not then
in existence is incapable of being deemed a contract on that account,
to consider whether they do not at the same time establish that the grant
itself is a nullity for precisely the same reason. Yet such a doctrine
would strike us all as pregnant with absurdity, since it would prove
that an act of incorporation could never confer any authorities or
rights of property on the corporation it created. It may be admitted
that two parties are necessary to form a perfect contract, but it is
denied that it is necessary that the assent of both parties must be at
the same time. If the legislature were voluntarily to grant land in
fee to the first child of A. to be hereafter born , as soon as such child
should be born the estate would vest in it. Would it be contended
that such a grant, when it took effect, was revocable, and not an executed contract upon the acceptance of the estate? The same question
' might be asked in a case of a gratuitous grant by the king or the legislature to A. for life, and afterward .to the heirs of B., who is then
Jiving. Take the case of a bank, incorporated for a limited period
upon the ·express condition that it shall pay out of its corporate funds
a certain sum as the consideration for the charter, 1'nd after the corporation is organized a payment is duly ma.de of the sum out of the
corporate funds; will it be contended that there is not a subsisting
contract between the government and the corporation by the matters
thus arising ex post facto that the charter shall not be revoked during
the stipulated pedod? Suppose an act dedaring that all persons,
who should thereafter pay into the public treasury a stipulated sum,
should be tenants in common of certain lands belonging to, the state
in certain proportions; if a person, afterward born, pays the stipulated sum into the treasury, is it less a contract with him than it
would be with a person t'n esse at the ti me the act passed? We must
admit that there may be future springing contracts in respect to persons not now in esse, or we shall involve ourselves in inextricable difficulties. And if there may Le in respect to natural persons, why not
also in respect to artificial persons created hy the law for the very purpose of being clothed with corporate powers? I am unable to distinguish between the case of a grant of land or offrancltises to au existing corporation and a like gra1d to a corporation brougli.t into lzfe for
th e very purpose of receiving the grant. As soon as it i's in essc,
and the franchises and property become vested and executed in it, the
grant i's just as much an executed contract as if its prior existence
),ad been establ£slted for a century.
47-WIL. CASES.

Digitized by

Go gl

•
Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

733

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE V. WOODWARD.

D .\RTM OCTH COLLEGE V. WOODWARD.

[Arc these contracts protected by the constitution?] Supposing, how-

ever, that in cither of the views which have been suggested, the charter

[Arc these contraets prot~cted by the constitution~] Supposing, however, that in either of the views which have been sugge ted, the charter
of D artmouth College is to be deemed a contract, we are yet met with
several objections of another nature. It is, in the first place. conte nded that it is n ot a contract within the prohibitory clause of the
constitution, because that clause was never intended to apply to mere
contracts of ciYil institutions, such as the contract of m arriage, or to
grants of power to state officers, or to contracts r e lative to their offices,
or to g rants of tru st to be exercised for purposes m erely public, whi:n
the grantees take no beneficial interest.
[Offiet.~s.]
It is admitted that the state legislatures have power to
enlarge, r ep eal and limit the authorities of public officers in their official capacities, in all cases whe'r e the constitutions of the states respectively do not prohibit them; and thi s, among others, for the \'ery reason that there is n o express or implied_ contract that they shall alway .
during their continuance in office, exercise such authorities; they are
to exercise them only during the good pleasure of the legi lature.
But when the legislature makes a contract with a public officer, as in
the case of a stipulated salary for his services during a limited period,
this, during the limi~cd period, is just as much a contract, within the
purview of the constitutional prohibition, as a like contract v.·ould be
b etween two private citizens. Will it be contended that the legi~la
ture of a state can diminish the salary of a judge ho lding his office
during good behavior? Such an authority has never yet been asserted
to our kno\.vledge. It may also be admitted that corporations for mere
public government, such as towns, cities and counties, may in many
respects be subject to legislative control. But it will harcfly be contended that even in respect to such corporations, the legislative power
is so transcendent that it may at its will take awny the private property
of the corporation, or change the uses of its private funds acquired
under the publi c faith. Can the legislature confiscate to its O\vn use
the private funds which a municipal corporation bolds under its charter, without any default or consent of the corporntors? If a municipal corporation be capable of holding d evises and legacies to charit:i·
ble uses (as many municipal corporations are), does the legislature,
under our forms of limited government, possess the authority to ~eize
upon those funds a nd appropriate them to other u es, at it own
arbitrary .pleasure, against the will of the donors and donees? From
the very nature of our govern ments the publi c faith is pledged the
other way, and that pledge constitutes a valid compact, and that comp act is subject only to judicial inquiry, construction and abrogation.
This court have already had occasion in other causes to express their
opini on on this s ubj ect ; and there is not the slig htest inclination to
retract it. Terrett v. Tay lor, 9 Cranch 43; Town of Pawlet v. Clark.
9 Cranch 292.
[Marriage contracts.] As to the case of the contract of marriage,
whi ch the argument supposes not to be v.·ithin the reach of the pro·
hibitory clause because it is m atter of cidl institution, I profess not to
feel the weight of the reason assigned for the exception. In a legal

of Dartmouth College is to be deemed a contract, we are yet met with

several objections of another nature. It is, in the first place, con-

tended that it is not a contract within the prohibitory clause of the

constitution, because that clause was never intended to apply to mere

contracts of civil institutions, such as the contract of marriage, or to

grants of power to state officers, or to contracts relative to their offices,

or to grants of trust to be exercised for purposes merely public, when

the grantees take no beneficial interest.

[Offices.] It is admitted that the state legislatures have power to

enlarge, repeal and limit the authorities of public officers in their offi-

cial capacities, in all cases where the constitutions of the states respect-

ively do not prohibit them; and this, among others, for the very rea-

son that there is no express or implied, contract that they shall always,

during their continuance in office, exercise such authorities; they are

to exercise them only during the good pleasure of the legislature.

But when the legislature makes a contract with a public officer, as in

the case of a stipulated salary for his services during a limited period,
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this, during the limited period, is just as much a contract, within the

purview of the constitutional prohibition, as a like contract would be

between two private citizens. Will it be contended that the legisla-

ture of a state can diminish the salary of a judge holding his office

during good behavior? Such an authority has never yet been asserted

to our knowledge. It may also be admitted that corporations for mere

public government, such as towns, cities and counties, may in many

respects be subject to legislative control. But it will hardly be con-

tended that even in respect to such corporations, the legislative power

is so transcendent that it may at its will take away the private property

of the corporation, or change the uses of its private funds acquired

under the public faith. Can the legislature confiscate to its own use

the private funds which a municipal corporation holds under its char-

ter, without any default or consent of the corporators? If a munici-

pal corporation be capable of holding devises and legacies to charita-

ble uses- (as many municipal corporations are), does the legislature,

under our forms of limited government, possess the authority to seize

upon those funds and appropriate them to other uses, at its own

arbitrary pleasure, against the will of the donors and donees? From

the very nature of our governments the public faith is pledged the

other way, and that pledge constitutes a valid compact, and that com-

pact is subject only to judicial inquiry, construction and abrogation.

This court have already had occasion in other causes to express their

opinion on this subject; and there is not the slightest inclination to

retract it. Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43; Town of Pavvlet v. Clark.

9 Cranch 293.

[Marriage contracts.] As to the case of the contract of marriage,

which the argument supposes not to be within the reach of the pro-

hibitory clause because it is matter of civil institution, I profess not to

feel the weight of the reason assigned for the exception. In a legal
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sense, all contracts recognized as valid in any country may be prop-
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erly said to be matters of civil institution, since they obtain their obli-

gation and construction jure loci contractus. Titles to land, consti-

tuting part of the public domain, acquired by grants under the pro-

visions of existing laws by private persons, are certainly contracts of

civil institution. Yet no one ever supposed that when acquired bona

fide they were not beyond the reach of legislative revocation. And

so, certainly, is the established doctrine of this court. A general

law regulating divorces from the contract of marriage, like a law

regulating remedies in other cases of breaches of contracts, is not nec-

essarily a law impairing the obligation of such a contract. It may be

the only effectual mode of enforcing the obligations of the contract on

both sides. A law punishing a breach of a contract by imposing a for-

feiture of the rights acquired under it, or dissolving it because the

mutual obligations were no longer observed, is, in no correct sense, a

law impairing the obligations of the contract. Could a law compelling

a specific performance by giving a new remedy be justly deemed an

excess of legislative power? Thus far the contract of marriage has

been considered with reference to general laws regulating divorces
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upon breaches of that contract. But if the argument means to assert

that the legislative power to dissolve such a contract without such a

breach on either side, against the wishes of the parties, and without

any judicial inquiry to ascertain a breach, I certainly am not prepared

to admit such a power, or that its exercise would not entrench upon

the prohibition of the constitution. If, under the faith of existing

laws, a contract of marriage be duly solemnized, or a marriage settle-

ment be made (and marriage is always in law a valuable considera-

tion for a contract), it is not easy to perceive why a dissolution of its

obligations, without any default or assent of the parties, may not as

well fall within the prohibition as any other contract for a valuable

consideration. A man has just as good a right to his wife as to the

property acquired under a marriage contract. He has a legal right to

her society and her fortune; and to divest such right without his

default and against his will, would be as flagrant a violation of the

principles of justice as the confiscation of his own estate. I leave this

case, however, to be settled when it shall arise. I have gone into it

because it was urged with great earnestness upon us, and required a

reply. It is sufficient now to say, that as at present advised, the

argument derived from this source does not press my mind with any

new and insurmountable difficulty.

[Trustees.] In respect also to grants and contracts, it would be far

too narrow a construction of the constitution to limit the prohibitory

clause to such only where the parties take for their own private ben-

efit. A grant to a private trustee, for the benefit of a particular ces-

tui que trust, or for any special, private or public charity, can not lie

the less a contract because the trustee takes nothing for his own ben-

efit. A grant of the next presentation to a church is still a contract,

although it limit the grantee to a mere right of nomination or patron-

age. 2 Bl. Comm. 21. The fallacy of the argument consists in as-

sense, all contracts recognized as valid in any country may be properly said to be matters of civil institution, since they obtain their obligation and construction jure loci contractus. Titles to land, constituting part of the public domain, acquired by grants under the provisio11s of existing Jaws by private persons, are certainly contracts of
civil institution. Yet no one ever supposed that when acquired bona
fide they were not beyond the reach of legislative revocation. And
so, ce1tainly, is the established doctriT)e of this comt. A general
law regulating divorces from the contract of marriage, like a law
regulating remedies in other cases of breaches of contracts. is not necessarily a law impairing the obligation of such a contract. It may be
the only effectual mode of enforcing the obligations of the contract on
both sides. A law punishing a breach of a contract by imposing a forfeiture of the rights acquired under it, or dissolving it because the
mutual obligations .were no longer observed, is, in no correct sense, a
law impairing the obligations of the contract. Could a law compelling
a specific performance by giving a new remedy be justly deemed an
excess of legislative power? Thus far the contract of marriage has
been considered with reference to general laws regulating divorces
· upon breaches of that contract. But if the argument means to a~sert
that the legislative power to dissolve such a contract without such a
breach on either side, against the wishes of the parties, and without
any judicial inquiry to ascertain a breach, I certainly am not prepared
to admit such a power, or that its exercise would not entrench upon
the prohibition of the constitution. If, under the faith of existing
laws, a contract of marriage be duly solemnized, or a marriage settlement be made (and marriage is always in law a valuable consideration for a contract), it is not easy to perceive v,·hy a dissolution of its
obligations, without any <lefault or assent of the parties, may not as
well fall within the prohibition as any other contract for a valuable
consideration. A man has just as good a right to his wife as to the
property acquired under a marriage contract. He has a legal right to
her society and her fortune; and to divest such right without his
default and against his will, would be as flagrant a violation of the
principles of justice as the confiscation of his own estate. I lea,•e this
case, however, to be settled when it shall arise. I have gone into it
because it was urged with great earnestness upon us, and required a
reply. It is sufficient now to say, that as at present advised, the
argument derived from this source does not press my mind with any
new and insurmountable difficulty.
[Trustees.] In respect also to grants and contracts, it would be far
too narrow a construction of the constitution to limit the prohibito ry
clause to such only where the parties take for their own private benefit. A grant to a private trustee, for the benefit of a particular rcstui que trust, or for .any special, priYate or public charity, can not he
the less a contract because the trustee takes nothing for his own benefit. A grant of the next presentation to a church is still a contract,
although it limit the grantee to a mi::re right of nomination or patronage. 2 Bl. Comm. 21. The fallacy of the argument consi ·ts in as-
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cence. A private donation, vested in a trustee, for objects of a gen-

suming the very ground in controversy. It is not admitted that a
contract with a trustee is, in its own nature, revocable, whether it be
for special or general purposes, for public charity or particular beneficence. A private donation, vested in a trustee, for objects of a general nature, does not thereby become a public trust, which the gorernment may, at its pleasure, take from the trustee, and administer in
its own way. The truth is, that the government has no power to revoke a grant, even of its own funds, when given to a private person
or a corporation for special uses. It can not recall it& own endowments, granted to any hospital or college, or city or town , for the use
of such corporations. The only authority remaining to the go,·emment is judicial, to ascertain the validity of the grant, to enforce its
proper uses, to suppress frauds, and, if the uses are charitable, to secure their regular administration, through the means of equitable tribunals, in cases where there woul<l otherwise be ·a failure of justice.
[Property contracts.] Another objection growingoutof and connected
with that which we have been considering, is, that no grants are witbin
the constitutional prohibition, except such as respect property in the
strict sense of the term; that is to say, beneficial interests in lands;
tenements and h ereditaments, etc., which may be sold by the grantees
for their own benefit; and that grant of franchises, immunities aud
authorities not valuable to the parties as property are excluded from
its purview. No authority has been cited to sustain this distinction,
and no reason is perceived to justify its adoption. There are many
rights, franchi ses and authorities which are valuable in contemplation
of law, where no beneficial interest can accrue to the possessor. A
grant to the next presentation to a church, limited to a grantee alone,
has been already mentioned. A power of appointment, re erYed in a
m arriage settlement, either to a party or a stranger, to appoint uses in
favor of third persons, without compensation, is another instance. A
grant o{ lands to a trustee to .raise portions or pay d ebts, is, in law, a
valuable grant, and conveys a legal estate. Even a po\ver given by
will to executors to sell an estate for payment of debts is, by the better opinions and authority, coupled with a trust, and capable of ur·
vivorship. Co. Litt., 113a, Harg. & Butler's note 2; Sugden on
Powers 140; Jackson v. Jansen, 6 Johns, 73; Franklin v. 0 good.
2 John. Cas. 1; s. c. 14 J o hns. 527; Zebach v. Smith, 3 Binn. 69;
L es cc of Moody v. Vandyke, 4 Binn. 7, 31; Attorney-General v.
Gleg , 1 Atk. 356; 1 B ae. Ahr. 586 (Gwyllim's ed.). Many digni·
tics and offices existing at common law are merely ho norary and
without profit, and sometimes are onerous. Yet a grant of them ha
never been supposed the le s a contract on that account. Jn respect
to franchises, whether corporate or not, which include a pernancy of
profit , such as a rig ht of fi shery, or to hold a ferry , a market or a
fair, or to erect a turnpike , bank or bridge, there is no pretense to
say that grants o f them are not within the constitution . Yet they
may, in p oint of fact, be of no exchangeable value to the owne~.
Th ey may be worthl ess in the market. The truth. however. is, that
all incorporeal hereditaments, whether they be immunities, dignities,

eral nature, does not thereby become a public trust, which the gov-

ernment may, at its pleasure, take from the trustee, and administer in

its own way. The truth is, that the government has no power to re-

voke a grant, even of its own funds, when given to a private person

or a corporation for special uses. It can not recall its own endow-

ments, granted to any hospital or college, or city or town, for the use

of such corporations. The only authority remaining to the govern-

ment is judicial, to ascertain the validity of the grant, to enforce its

proper uses, to suppress frauds, and, if the uses are charitable, to se-

cure their regular administration, through the means of equitable tri-

bunals, in cases where there would otherwise be a failure of justice.

[Property contracts.] Another objection growingout of and connected

with that which we have been considering, is, that no grants are within

the constitutional prohibition, except such as respect property in the

strict sense of the term; that is to say, beneficial interests in lands,-

tenements and hereditaments, etc., which may be sold by the grantees

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

for their own benefit; and that grant of franchises, immunities and

authorities not valuable to the parties as property are excluded from

its purview. No authority has been cited to sustain this distinction,

and no reason is perceived to justify its adoption. There are many

rights, franchises and authorities which are valuable in contemplation

of law, where no beneficial interest can accrue to the possessor. A

grant to the next presentation to a church, limited to a grantee alone,

has been already mentioned. A power of appointment, reserved in a

marriage settlement, either to a party or a stranger, to appoint uses in

favor of third persons, without compensation, is another instance. A

grant of lands to a trustee to raise portions or pay debts, is, in law, a

valuable grant, and conveys a legal estate. Even a power given by

will to executors to sell an estate for payment of debts is, by the bet-

ter opinions and authority, coupled with a trust, and capable of sur-

vivorship. Co. Litt., 113a, Harg. & Butler's note 2; Sugdcn on

Powers 140; Jackson v. Jansen, 6 Johns, 73; Franklin v. Osgood.

2 John. Cas. 1; s. c. 14 Johns. 527; Zebach v. Smith, 3 Binn. 69;

Lessee of Moody v. Vandyke, 4 Binn. 7, 31; Attorney-General v.

Gleg, 1 Atk. 356; 1 Bac. Abr. 5S6 (Gwyllim's ed.). Many digni-

ties and offices existing at common law are merely honorary and

without profit, and sometimes are onerous. Yet a grant of them has

never been supposed the less a contract on that account. In respect

to franchises, whether corporate or not, which include a pernancy of

profits, such as a right of fishery, or to hold a ferry, a market or a

fair, or to erect a turnpike, bank or bridge, there is no pretense to

say that grants of them are not within the constitution. Yet they

may, in point of fact, be of no exchangeable value to the owners.

They may be worthless in the market. The truth, however, is, that

all incorporeal hereditaments, whether they be immunities, dignities,
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The owners have a legal estate and property'in them, and legal rem-

edies to support and recover them, in case of any injury, obstruction

or disseizin of them. Whenever they are the subjects of a con-

tract or grant, they are just as much within the reach of the constitu-

tion as any other grant. Nor is there any solid reason why a contract

for the exercise of a mere authority should not be just as much guarded

as a contract for the use and dominion of property. Mere naked

powers, which are to be exercised for the exclusive benefit of the

grantor, are revocable by him for that very reason. But it is other-

wise where a power is to be exercised in aid of a right vested in the

grantee. We all know that a power of attorney, forming a part

of a security upon the assignment of a chose in action, is not revoca-

ble by the grantor. For it then sounds in contract, and is coupled

with an interest. Walsh v. Whitcomb, 2 Esp. 565; Bergen v. Ben-

nett, 1 Caines' Cas. 1, 15; Raymond v. Squire, 11 Johns. 47. So,

if an estate be conveyed in trust for the grantor, the estate is irrevoca-

ble in the grantee, although he can take no beneficial interest forhim-

self. Many of the best settled estates stand upon conveyances of this
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nature; and there can be no doubt that such grants are contracts

within the prohibition in question.

[Franchises.] In respect to corporate franchises, they are, properly

speaking, legal estates vested in the corporation itself as soon as it is

in esse. They are not mere naked powers granted to the corporation,

but powers coupled with an interest. The property of the corpora-

tion rests upon the possession of its franchises, and whatever may be

thought as to the corporators, it can not be denied that the corpora-

tion itself has a legal interest in than. It may sue and be sued for

them. JVay, more, this very right is otic of its ordinary franchises.

"Tif is likenvise a fratickisc," says Mr. fustice Blackstone, "for a

number of persons to be incorporated and subsist as a body politic,

with power to maintain perpetual succession and do other corporate

acts; and each individual member of such corporation is also said to

havea franchise or freedom." 2 Bl. Comm. 37; 1 Kvd on Corp. 14,

16. In order to get rid of the legal difficulty of these franchises being

considered as valuable hereditaments or property, the counsel for the

defendant are driven to contend that the corporators or trustees are

mere agents of the corporation, in whom no beneficial interest subsists;

and so nothing but a naked power is touched by removing them from

the trust; and then to hold the corporation itself a mere ideal being,

capable indeed of holding property or franchises, but having no interest

in them which can be the subject of contract. Neither of these positions

is admissible. The former has been already sufficiently considered,

and the latter may be disposed of in a few words. The corporators are

not mere agents, but have vested rights in their character as corporators.

The right to be a freeman of a corporation is a valuable temporal

right. • It is a right of voting and acting in the corporate concerns,

which the law recognizes and enforces, and for a violation of which it

provides a remedy. It is founded on the same basis as the right of

offices or franchises, or othe r rights, are deemed \'aluable in law.
The own ers have a legal estate and property' in them, and legal remedies to support and recover them, in case of any injury, obstruction
or disseizin of thern. Whenever they are the subjects of a contract or grant, they are just as much within the reach of the constitution as any other grant. Nor is there any solid reason why a contract
for the exercise of a mere authority should not be just as much guarded
as a contract for the use and dominion of prope1ty. Mere naked
powers, which arc to be exercised for the exclusive benefit of the
grantor, are revocable by him for that very reason. But it is otherwise where a power is to be exerci sed in aid of a right \'estccl in the
grantee. We all know that a power of attorney, forming a part
of a security upon the assignment of a cl1ose £n act£011, is not revocab le by the grantor. For it then sounds in contract. and is coupled
with an interest. Walsh v. Whitcomb, 2 E sp. 565; Bergen v . Bennett, 1 Caines' Cas. 1, 15; Raymond v. Squire, 11 Johns. 47. So,
if an estate be conveyed in trust for the grantor, the estate is irrevocable in the grantee, although he can take no beneficial interest for himself. Many of the best settled estates stand upon conveyances of this
nature; and there can be no doubt that such grants are contracts
within the prohibition in question.
[Franchises.] In respect to corporate franc!t£ses, tlley are, properly
speaki"ng, legal estates vested £n tlze corporat£on £tself as soon as £t £s
in csse. Tiley are not mere naked powers granted lo the corporat£on,
out prnuers coupled w£th an £nterest. T!te property of the corporatt'on rests upon t!te possess£on of t'ts franclzises, and whatever may be
t!wught as to the corpora/ors, t't can not be d en£ed tliat th e corpora/ton itself lzas a legal £nte1·est t'n t!tem. It may sue and be sued for
th em. Nay, more, thz's very rt'ght £s one of £ts ordinary francldses.
"It is l£kewt'se a franch£se," says .'l fr. Just£ce Blackstone, "for a
number of persons to be t'ncorporated and subst'st as a body po!it£c,
w£th power to mat'ntat'n perpetual successt'on and do other corporate
acts; and each t'ndt'v t'dual member of such corporation i's also sat'd to
have a franclzt'se or freedom.'' 2 Bl. Comm. 37; 1 Kyd on Corp. 14,
16. In order to get rid of the legal difficulty of the!'e franchi ses being
considered as va lu ablP. hereditaments or property, the counsel for the
defendant are driven to contend that the corporators or tru stees are
mere agents of the corporation, in whom no beneficial interest subsists;
and so nothing but a naked power is touched by removing them from
the trust; and then to hold the corporation itself a mere ideal being,
capable indeed of holding property or franchi ses, but haYing no interest
in them which can be the subject of contract. Neither of these positions
is admissible . The former has been already sufficiently conside red,
and the latter may be disposed of in a few words . The corporntors are
not mere agents, but have ve ted rights in their character as corpora tors.
The right to be a freeman of a corporation is a valuable temporal
right .. It is a right of voting and acting in the corporate concerns,
which the law recognizes and enforces. and for a vio lation of which it
provides a remedy. It is founded on the same basis as the right of
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have been the prevalence of former doubts since the time of Lord

voting in public elections; it is as sacred a right, and whatever might
have been the prevalence of former doubts since the time of Lord
Holt, such a right has always been deemed a valuable franchise or
privilege. Ashby v. White, 2 L<l. Raym. 938; 1 Kyd on Corp. 16.
This reasoning, which has been thus far urged, applies with full
force to the case of Dartmouth College. The franchises granted by
the charter were vested in the trustees, in their corporate character. The
lands and other property subsequently acquired were held by them in the
same manner. They were the private demesnes of the corporation,
held by it, not, as the argument supposes, for the use and benefit of the
people of New Hampshire, but, as the charter itself declares, "for
the use of the Dartmouth College." There were not, and in the nature of things could not be, any other cestui' que use, entitled to claim
those funds. They were, indeed, to be devoted to the promotion of
piety and learning, not at large, but in that college and the establishments connected with it; and the mode in which the charity was to be
applied, and the objects of it, were left solely to the tru stees, who
were the legal governors and administrators of it. No particular person
in New Hampshire possessed a vested righ~ in the bounty; nor could
he force himself upon the trustees as a proper object. The legislature itself could not deprive the trustees of the corporate funds, nor
annul their discretion in the application of them, nor distribute them
among its own favorites. Could the legislature of New Hampshire
have seized the land given by the state of Vermont to the corporation,
and appropriated it to uses distinct from those intended by the charity,
against the will of the tmstees? This question can not be answered
in the affirmative, until it is established that the legislature may lawfully take the property of A. and give it to B.; and if it could not
take away or restrain the corporate funds, upon what pretense can it
take away or restrain the corporate franchises? Without the franchises, the funds could not be used for corporate purposes ; but v;ithout the funds, the possession of the franchises might still be of inestimable value to the college, and to the cause of religion and karning.
[Rights of the trustees.] Thus far the rights of the corporation itself
in respect to its property and franchises have been more immediately
considered; but there are other rights and privileges belonging to the
trustees collectively and severally which are desen·ing of notice. They
are intrusted with the exclusive power to manage the funds, to choose
the officers and to regulate the corporate concerns according to their
own discretion. The jus patronatus is vested in them. The vi!;itatorial power in its most enlarged extent also belongs to them. When
this power de,·olves upon the founder of a charity it is an hereditament, descendihle in perpetuity to his heirs, and in default of heirs it
escheats to the government. Rex v. St. Catherine's Hall , 4 T. R.
233. It is a valuable right, founded in property, as mu ch so as the
right of patronage in any other case. It is a right which partakes of
a judicial nature. May not the founder as justly contract for the possession of this right m return for his endowment, as for any other
equivalent? and if, instead of holding it as an hereditament, he as-

Holt, such a right has always been deemed a valuable franchise or

privilege. Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938; 1 Kyd on Corp. 16.

This reasoning, which has been thus far urged, applies with full

force to the case of Dartmouth College. The franchises granted by

the charter were vested in the trustees, in their corporate character. The

lands and other property subsequently acquired w ere held by them in the

same manner. They were the private demesnes of the corporation,

held by it, not, as the argument supposes, for the use and benefit of the

people of New Hampshire, but, as the charter itself declares, "for

the use of the Dartmouth College." There were not, and in the na-

ture of things could not be, any other cestui que use, entitled to claim

those funds. They were, indeed, to be devoted to the promotion of

piety and learning, not at large, but in that college and the establish-

ments connected with it; and the mode in which the charity was to be

applied, and the objects of it, were left solely to the trustees, who

were the legal governors and administrators of it. No particular person
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in New Hampshire possessed a vested right in the bounty; nor could

he force himself upon the trustees as a proper object. The legisla-

ture itself could not deprive the trustees of the corporate funds, nor

annul their discretion in the application of them, nor distribute them

among its own favorites. Could the legislature of New Hampshire

have seized the land given by the state of Vermont to the corporation,

and appropriated it to uses distinct from those intended by the charity,

against the will of the trustees? This question can not be answered

in the affirmative, until it is established that the legislature may law-

fully take the property of A. and give it to B.; and if it could not

take away or restrain the corporate funds, upon what pretense can it

take away or restrain the corporate franchises? Without the fran-

chises, the funds could not be used for corporate purposes; but with-

out the funds, the possession of the franchises might still be of inesti-

mable value to the college, and to the cause of religion and learning.

[Rights of the trustees.] Thus far the rights of the corporation itself

in respect to its property and franchises have been more immediately

considered; but there are other rights and privileges belonging to the

trustees collectively and severally which are deserving of notice. They

are intrusted with the exclusive power to manage the funds, to choose

the officers and to regulate the corporate concerns according to their

own discretion. The jus fatronatus is vested in them. The visita-

torial power in its most enlarged extent also belongs to them. When

this power devolves upon the founder of a charity it is an heredita-

ment, descendible in perpetuity to his heirs, and in default of heirs it

escheats to the government. Rex v. St. Catherine's Hall, 4 T. R.

333. It is a valuable right, founded in property, as much so as the

right of patronage in any other case. It is a right which partakes of

a judicial nature. May not the founder as justly contract for the pos-

session of this right in return for his endowment, as for any other

equivalent? and if, instead of holding it as an hereditament, he as-
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uable hereditament in their hands? The right is not merely a collect-
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ive right in all the trustees; each of them also has a franchise in it.

Lord Holt says, ''it is agreeable to reason and the rules of law, that a

franchise should be vested in the corporation aggregate, and yet the

benefit redound to the particular members, and be enjoyed by them in

their private capacities. Where the privilege of election is used by

particular persons, it is a particular right vested in each particular

man." Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 952: Attorney-General

v. Dixie, 13 Ves. 519. Each of the trustees had aright to vote in all

elections. If obstructed in the exercise of it, the law furnished him

with an adequate recompense in damages. If ousted unlawfully from

his office, the law would, by a mandamus, compel a restoration.

It is attempted, however, to establish that the trustees have no in-

terest in the corporate franchises, because it is said that they may be

witnesses in a suit brought against the corporation. The case cited

at the bar certainly goes the length of asserting that in a suit brought

against a charitable corporation for a recompense for services per-

formed for the corporation, the governors, constituting the corporation
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(but whether intrusted with its funds or not by the act of incorpora-

tion does not appear), are competent witnesses against the plaintiff.

Weller v. Governor of the Foundling Hospital, 1 Peake's Cas. 153.

But assuming this case to have been rightly decided (as to which,

upon the authorities, there may be room to doubt), the corporators

being technically parties to the record (Attorney-General v. City of

London, 3 Bro. C. C. 171; s. c. 1 Ves. J. 243; Burton v. Hinde, 5

T. R. 174; Nason v. Thatcher, 7 Mass. 398; Phillips on Evid. 42,

52, 57 and notes; 1 Kyd on Corp. 304, etc.; Highmore on Mortm.

514), it does not establish that in a suit for the corporate property

vested in the trustees in their corporate capacity, the trustees are

competent witnesses. At all events, it does not establish that in a

suit for the corporate franchises to be exercised by the trustees or to

enforce their visitatorial power the trustees would be competent wit-

nesses. On a mandamus to restore a trustee to his corporate or vis-

itatorial power, it will not be contended that the trustee is himself a

competent witness to establish his own rights, or the corporate rights.

Yet, why not, if the law deems that a trustee has no interest in the

franchise? The test of interest assumed in the argument proves noth-

ing in this case. It is not enough to establish that the trustees are

sometimes competent witnesses; it is necessary to show that they are

always so in respect to the corporate franchises and their own. It will

not be pretended that in a suit for damages for obstruction in the ex-

ercise of his official powers a trustee is a disinterested witness. Such

an obstruction is not a damnum absque injuria. Each trustee has a

vested right and legal interest in his office, and it can not be divested

but by due course of law. The illustration, therefore, lends no new-

force to the argument, for it does not establish that when their own

rights are in controversy the trustees have no legal interest in their

offices.

signs it in perpetuity to the trustees of the corporation, is it less a valuable hereditament in their hands? The right is not merely a collective right in all the trustees; each of them also has a franchise in it.
Lord Holt says, ·•it is agreeable to reason and the rules of law, that a
franchise should be vested in the corporation aggregate, and yet the
benefit redound to the particular members, and be enjoyed by them in
their private capacities. vVhere the privilege of election is used by
particular persons, it is a particular right vested in each particular
man." Ashby v. vVhite, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 952; Attorney-General
v. Dixie, 13 Ves. 519. Each of the trustees had a right to vote in all
elections. If · obstructed in the exercise of it, the law furnished him
with an adequate recompense in damages. If ousted unlawfully from
his office, the law would, by a mandamus, compel a restoration.
It is attempted, however, to establish that the trustees have no interest in the corporate franchises, because it is said that they may be
witnesses in a suit brought against the corporation. The case cited
at the bar certainly goes the length of asserting that in a suit brought
against a charitable corporation for a recompense for services performed for the corporation, the governors, constituting the corporation
(but whether intmsted with its funds or not by the act of incorporation does not appear), are competent witnesses against the plaintiff.
Weller v. Governor of the Foundling Hospital, 1 Peake's Cas. 153.
But assuming this case to have been rightly decided (as to which,
upon the authorities, there may be room to doubt) , the corporators
being technically parties to the record (Attorney-General v. City of
London, 3 Bro. C. C. 171; s. c. 1 Ves. J. 243; Burton v. Hinde, 5
T. R. 174; Nason v. Thatcher, 7 Mass. 398; Phillips on Evid. 42,
52, 57 and notes; 1 Kyd on Corp. 304, etc.; Highmore on· Mortm.
514), it does not establish that in a suit for the corporate property
vested in the trustees in their corporate capacity, the trustees are
competent witnesses. At all events, it does not establish that in a
suit for the corporate franchises to be exercised by the trustees or to
enforce their visitatorial power the trustees would be competent witnesses. On a mandamus to restore a trustee to his corporate or visitatorial power, it will not be contended that the trustee is himself a
competent witness to e~tablish his own rights, or the corporate rights.
Y ct, why not, if the law deems that a trustee has no interest in the
franchise? The test of interest assumed in the argument proves nothing in this case. It is not enough to establish that the trustees are
sometimes competent witnesses; it is necessary to show that they are
always so in respect to the corporate franchises and their own. It will
not be pretended that in a suit for damages for obstruction in the exercise of his official powers a tmstee is a disinterested witness. Such
an obstruction is not a damnum absque inJuria. Each trustee has a
vested right and legal interest in his office, and it can not be divested
but by due course of law. The illustration , therefore, lend s no new
force to the argument, for it does not establish that when their own
rights are in controversy the trustees have no legal interest in their
offices.
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The principal objections having been thus answered satisfactorily, at

The principal objections having been thus answered satisfactorily, at
least, to my own mind, it remains only to declare, that my opinion,
after the most mature deliberation, is that the charter of D:i.rtmouth
College, grante<l in 1769, is a contract within the purview of the constitutional prohibition.
[Effect of the revolution.] I might now proceed to the discussion of
the second question; but it is necessary previously to dispose of a doctrine which h as been very seriously urged at the bar, viz., that the
charter of Dartmouth College was dissolved at the revolution, and is,
therefore, a mere nullity. A case before Lord Thurlow has been
cited in support of this doctrine. Attorney-General v. City of London, 3 Bro. C. C. I 7 r; s. c. I Ve5. Jr. 243. The principal question
in that case was, whether the corporation of William and Mary College in Virginia (which had received its cliarter from King \Villiam
and Queen Mary), shoul<l still be permitted to administer the charity
under Mr. Boyle's will, no interest having passed to the college,
under the will, but it acting as an agent or trustee, under a decree in
chancery, or whether a new scheme for the administration of the
charity should be laid before the court. Lord Thurlow directed a
new scheme, because the college, belonging to an independent government, was no longer within the reach of the court. And he very
unnecessarily added, that he could not now consider the college as a
corporation, or as another report (1 Ves. Jr. 243) states that he
could not take notice of it, as a corporation, it not having proved its
existence as a corporation at all. If, by this, Lord Thurlow meant to
declare, that all charters acquired in America from the crown were
destroyed by the revolution, his doctrine is not law; and if it had been
true, it would equally apply to all other grants from the crown, which
would be monstrous. It is a principle of the common law, which
has been recognized as well in this, as in other courts, that the division of an emp ire works no forfeiture of previously veste<l rights of
property. And this maxim is equally consonant with the common
sense of mankind, and the maxims of eternal justice. Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, 50; Kelly v. Harrison, 2 Johns. Cas. 29; Jackson
v. Lunn , 3 Johns. Cas. 109; Calvin's Case, 7 Co. 27. This objection , therefore, may be safely dis missed without further comment.
[lmpitirment of the cbarte1·.] The remain ing .inquiry is, whether the
acts of the legislature of New Hampshire now in question , or any of
them, impair the obligations of the charter of Dartmouth College.
The attempt certainly is to force upon the corporation a n ew charter
against the will of the corporators. Nothing seems better settled at
the common law than the doctrine that th e crown can not force upon
a private corporation a new charter, or compel the old members to
give up their own franchises, or to admit new members into the corporation. Rex v. Vice-Chancellor of Cmnbridge, 3 Burr. 1656; Rex
v . Pasmore, 3 T. R. 240; 1 Kyd on Corp. 65; Rex v. Larwood,
Comb. 316. Neither can th e crown compel a man to become a memher of such corporation against his will. Rex v. Dr. Askew, 4 Burr.
2200.
As little has it been supposetl that under our limited govern-

least, to my own mind, it remains only to declare, that my opinion,

after the most mature deliberation, is that the charter of Dartmouth

College, granted in 1769, is a contract within the purview of the con-

stitutional prohibition.

[Effect of the revolution.] I might now proceed to the discussion of

the second question; but it is necessary previously to dispose of a doc-

trine which has been very seriously urged at the bar, viz., that the

charter of Dartmouth College was dissolved at the revolution, and is,

therefore, a mere nullity. A case before Lord Thurlow has been

cited in support of this doctrine. Attorney-General v. City of Lon-

don, 3 Bro. C. C. 171; s. c. 1 Ves. Jr. 243. The principal question

in that case was, whether the corporation of William and Mary Col-

lege in Virginia (which had received its charter from King William

and Queen Mary), should still be permitted to administer the charity

under Mr. Boyle's will, no interest having passed to the college,

under the will, but it acting as an agent or trustee, under a decree in

chancery, or whether a new scheme for the administration of the
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charity should be laid before the court. Lord Thurlow directed a

new scheme, because the college, belonging to an independent gov-

ernment, was no longer within the reach of the court. And he very

unnecessarily added, that he could not now consider the college as a

corporation, or as another report (1 Ves. Jr. 243) states that he

could not take notice of it, as a corporation, it not having proved its

existence as a corporation at all. If, by this, Lord Thurlow meant to

declare, that all charters acquired in America from the crown were

destroyed by the revolution, his doctrine is not law; and if it had been

true, it would equally apply to all other grants from the crown, which

would be monstrous. It is a principle of the common law, which

has been recognized as well in this, as in other courts, that the divis-

ion of an empire works no forfeiture of previously vested rights of

property. And this maxim is equally consonant with the common

sense of mankind, and the maxims of eternal justice. Terrett v. Tay-

lor, 9 Cranch 43, 50; Kelly v. Harrison, 2 Johns. Cas. 29; Jackson

v. Lunn, 3 Johns. Cas. 109; Calvin's Case, 7 Co. 27. This objec-

tion, therefore, may be safelv dismissed without further comment.

[Impairment Of the charter.] The remaining.inquiry is, whether the

acts of the legislature of New Hampshire now in question, or any of

them, impair the obligations of the charter of Dartmouth College.

The attempt certainly is to force upon the corporation a new charter

against the will of the corporators. Nothing seems better settled at

the common law than the doctrine that the crown can not force upon

a private corporation a new charter, or compel the old members to

give up their own franchises, or to admit new members into the cor-

poration. Rex v. Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge, 3 Burr. 1656: Rex

v. Pasmore, 3 T. R. 240; 1 Kyd on Corp. 65; Rex v. Larwood.

Comb. 316. Neither can the crown compel a man to become a mem-

ber of such corporation against his will. Rex v. Dr. Askew, 4 Burr.

■ 2200. As little has it been supposed that under our limited govern-
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merits the legislature possessed such transcendent authority. On one
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occasion, a verv able court held that the state legislature had no

authority to compel a person to become a member of a mere private

745

corporation, created for the promotion of a private enterprise, because

every man had a right to refuse a grant. Ellis v. Marshall, 2 Mass.

269. On another occasion, the same learned court declared that they

were all satisfied that the rights legally vested in a corporation, can

not be controlled or destroyed by any subsequent statute, unless a

power for that purpose be reserved to the legislature in the act of

incorporation. Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143, 146. These principles

are so consonant with justice, sound policy and legal reasoning that

it is difficult to resist the impression of their perfect correctness. The

application of them, however, does not, from our limited authority,

properly belong to the appellate jurisdiction of this court in this case.

(Stating facts as to acts of 1S16.)

It is apparent that in substance a new corporation is created, includ-

ing the old corporators with new powers, and subject to a new control;

or that the old corporation is newly organized and enlarged, and

placed under an authority hitherto unknown to it. The board of trust-

ees are increased from twelve to twenty-one. The college becomes
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a university. The property vested in the old trustees is transferred to

the new board of trustees, in their corporate capacities. The quorum

is no longer seven but nine. The old trustees have no longer the sole

right to perpetuate their succession by electing other trustees, but the

nine new tnistees are, in the first instance, to be appointed by the

governor and council, and the new board are then to elect other trust-

see from time to time as vacancies occur. The new board, too,

have the power to suspend or remove any member, so that a minority

of the old board, co-operating with the new trustees, possess the un-

limited power to remove the majority of the old board. The powers,

too, of the corporation are varied. It has authority to organize new

colleges in the "university and to establish an institute and elect fel-

lows and members thereof." A board of overseers is created (a board

utterly unknown to the old charter), and is invested with a general

supervision and negative upon all the most important acts and pro-

ceedings of the trustees. And to give complete effect to this new

authority, instead of the right to appoint, the trustees are in future

only to nominate, and the overseers are to approve, the president and

professors of the university.

If these are not essential changes, impairing the rights and authori-

ties of the trustees, and vitally affecting the interests and organization

of Dartmouth College under its old charter, it is difficult to conceive

what acts, short of an unconditional repeal of the charter, could have

that effect. If a grant of land or franchises be made to A., in trust for

special purposes, can the grant be revoked and a new grant thereof be

made to A., B. and C., in trust for the same purposes, without vio-

lating the obligation of the first grant? If property be vested by

grant in A and B., for the use of a college, or an hospital, of private

foundation, is not the obligation of that grant impaired when the

ments the legislature possessed such transcendent authority. On one
occasion, a very able court hehl that the state legislature had no
authority to compel a person to become a member of a mere private
corporation, created for the promotion of a private enterprise, because
every man had a right to refu se a grant. Ellis v. Marshall, 2 Mass.
269. On another occasion, the same learned court declared that they
were all satisfied that the rights legally vested in a corporation, can
not be controlled or destroyed by any subsequent statute, unless a
power for th at purpose be reserved to the legislature in the act of
incorporation. Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143, 146. These principles
are so consonant with justice, sound policy and legal reasoning that
it is difficult to resist the impression of their perfect correctness. The
application of them, however, does not, from our limited authority,
properly belong to the appellate jurisdiction of this court in this case.
(Stating facts as to acts of 1816.)
It is apparent that in substance a new corporation is created, including the old corporators with new powers, and subject to a new control;
or that the old corporation is newly organized and enlarged, and
placed under an authority hitherto unknown to it. The board of tmstees are increased from twelve to twenty-one. The college becomes
a university. The property vested in the old trustees is transferred to
the new board of trustees, in their corporate capacities. The quorum
1s no longer seven but nine. The old trustees have no longer the sole
right to perpetuate their succession by electing other trustees, but the
nine new tmstees are, in the first instance, to be appointed by the
governor and council, and the new board are then to elect other trustsee from time to time as vacancies occur. The new board, too,
have the po"ver to suspend or remove any member, so that a minority
of the ol<l board, co-operating with the new trustees, possess the unlimited power to remove the majority of the old board. The powers.
too, of the corporation are varied. It has authority to organize new
colleges in the "university and to establish an in stitute and elect fellows and members thereof." A board of overseers is created (a board
utterly unknown to the old charter), and is invested with a general
supervision and negative upon all the most important acts and proceedings of the trustees. And to give complete effect to this new
authority, instead of the right to appoint, the trustees are in future
only to nominate, and the overseers are to approve, the president and
professors of the university.
If these are not essential changes, impairing the rights and authorities of the trustees, and vitally affecting the interests and organization
of Dartmouth College under its old charter, it is difficult to conceive
what acts, short of an unconditional repeal of the ch'.1rter, could have
that effect. If a grant of land or franchi ses be made to A., in trnst for
pecial purposes, can th e grant be revoked ancl a new grant thereof be
made to A., B. and C., in trust for the same purposes, without violati ng the obligoation of the first grant? If property be vested by
grant in A and B., for the u se of a college, or an hospital, of private
foundation, is not the obligation of that grant impaired when the
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estate is taken from their exclusive management and vested in them in

common with ten other persons? If a power of appointment be given

DARTMO UT H COLLEGE \ · . W OODWARD.

to A. and 13., is it no violation of their right to annul the appointment,

unless it be assented to by five other persons, and then confirmed by

estate is take n from their exclusive managem ent and vested in them in
common with ten other persons? If a po·wer of appointment be g ive n
to A. and B., i · it no violation of their right to annul the appointment,
unless it be assented to by five other p ersons, and then confirmed by
a distinct body? If a bank or ins urance company, by the terms of its
charter, be under the management of directors, elected by the stockholders, woul<l not the rights acquired by the charter be impaire d , if
the legi slnture should take the right of election from the stockholders
and appoint directors unconnected with the corporation? These qu estio ns carry their own answ ers along with them. The common sense
of mankind will teach us that all these cases would be direct infringements of the lej:!;al obligations of the grants to which they refe r, and
yet they are, with no essential distinction, the same as the case now
at the har.
In my judgment it is perfectly clear that any act of a legislature
which takes away any powers or fran chises vested by its charter in a
private corporation, or its corporate officers, or which restrains or
controls the legitimate exercise of them, or transfers them to other
persoqs, without its assent, is a violation of th e ohligations of that
charter. If the legislature mean to claim such an authority, it must
be reserved in the grant. The charter of Dartmouth College contains no such reservation; and I am, therefore, bound to declare, that
the acts of the legislature of New Hampshire, now in question, do
impair the obligations of that charter and are, consequently, unconstitutional and void.
1
In pronouncing this judgment, it has not for one moment escaped
me, how delicate, difficult and ungracious is the task devolved upon
us. The predicament in which this court stands in relation to the nation at large is full of perplexities and embarrassments. It is called
to decide on causes between citizens of different states, between a
state and its citizens, and between different states. It stan~s, therefore in the midst of jealousies and rivalries of conflicting parties, with
the most momentous interests confided to its care. Under such circums tances, it never can have a motive to do m or e than its duty: and
I trust , it will always be found to possess firmne ss enoug h to do that.
Under these impressions, I have ponde red on the case before u s with
the most anxious deli berations . I enterta in great respect for the legislature, whose acts arc in questio n. I ente rtain no less re p cct for
the enlig htened tribunal whose decision \.Ve are called upon to review.
In the ex:lm inatio n, I have e ndeavored to keep my steps super antiquas
v£as of the law, uncier the guidance of a uthority and principle. It is not
for judges to li sten to the voice of p ersuasi,·e eloq uence or p opul a r
appeal. 'N c ha,·e nothing to <lo but to pronounce the law as we
find it; and ha ving done this , our justification mu st be left to the imparti a l judg m ent of our coun try.
D UVAL L , Justi ce, dissented.
Jmlg-mcnt· for $20,000 ( as agreed) fo r plaintiff in error.

a distinct body? If a bank or insurance company, by the terms of its

charter, be under the management of directors, elected by the stock-

holders, would not the rights acquired by the charter be impaired, if

the legislature should take the right of election from the stockholders

and appoint directors unconnected with the corporation? These ques-

tions carry their own answers along with them. The common sense

of mankind will teach us that all these cases would be direct infringe-

ments of the legal obligations of the grants to which they refer, and

yet they are, with no essential distinction, the same as the case now

at the bar.

In my judgment it is perfectly clear that any act of a legislature

which takes away any powers or franchises vested by its charter in a

private corporation, or its corporate officers, or which restrains or

controls the legitimate exercise of them, or transfers them to other

persons, without its assent, is a violation of the obligations of that

charter. If the legislature mean to claim such an authority, it must
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be reserved in the grant. The charter of Dartmouth College con-

tains no such reservation; and I am, therefore, bound to declare, that

the acts of the legislature of New Hampshire, now in question, do

impair the obligations of that charter and are, consequently, uncon-

stitutional and void. ,

In pronouncing this judgment, it has not for one moment escaped

me, how delicate, difficult and ungracious is the task devolved upon

us. The predicament in which this court stands in relation to the na-

tion at large is full of perplexities and embarrassments. It is called

to decide on causes between citizens of different states, between a

state and its citizens, and between different states. It stands, there-

fore in the midst of jealousies and rivalries of conflicting parties, with

the most momentous interests confided to its care. Under such cir-

cumstances, it never can have a motive to do more than its duty; and

I trust, it will always be found to possess firmness enough to do that.

Under these impressions, I have pondered on the case before us with

the most anxious deliberations. I entertain great respect for the leg-

islature, whose acts arc in question. I entertain no less respect for

the enlightened tribunal whose decision we arc called upon to review.

In the examination, I have endeavored to keep my steps super aniiquas

vias of the law, under the guidance of authority and principle. It is not

for judges to listen to the voice of persuasive eloquence or popular

appeal. We have nothing to do but to pronounce the law as we

find it; and having done this, our justification must be left to the im-

partial judgment of our country.

Duvat.i., Justice, dissented.

Judgment for $20,000 (as agreed) for plaintiff in error.

Note. Mr. Justice Miller, in his Lectures on Constitutional Law, p. 391,

says: "It may well be doubted whether any decision ever delivered by any

Nntf'. ;\fr . .T111~ti1 ·e l\Tiller, in his Lectures on Oonsti tntionnl J,nw, p. 391,
says: "It may well be doubted whether any decision eyer <lel i\·ererl by tm ~T
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court has had Bach a pervading operation and influence in controlling legisla-
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tion as this. The legislation, however, has been that of the states of the

747

Union. The decision is founded upon that clause of the constitution which

declares 'That no state shall make any law impairing the obligation of con-

tracts.'"

The case has been frequently and severely criticised, but notwithstanding

this, as Chief Justice Waite (himself an enemy of the decision) says in Stone

v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814: "The doctrines of Dartmouth College v. Wood-

ward, announced by this court more than sixty [now eighty] years ago, have

become so imbedded in the jurisprudence of the United States as to make

them to all intents and purposes a part of the constitution itself. In this con-

nection, however, it must be kept in mind that it is not the charter that is

protected, but only any contract which the charter may contain. If there is

no contract there is nothing in the grant on which the constitution can act;

consequently, the first inquiry in all this class of cases is whether a contract

has in fact been entered into, and if so, what its obligations are."

So. too, in 1894, Judge Gray, of the New York Courtof Appeals in Matter of

the City of Brooklyn, 143 N. Y. 596, on 609, says of the case: "The principle

enunciated has been steadily adhered to, despite criticisms, and is not ques-
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tioned here." And Mr. Justice Miller, in Pearsall v. Great Northern Railway,

161 U. S. 646, on 660, says: "The doctrine of this case has been subjected to

more or less criticism by the courts and the profession, but has been reaffirmed

and applied so often as to have become firmly established as a canon of

American jurisprudence." See infra, p. 1413.

The first case I have found in which the power of the state to modify a cor-

porate charter was discussed, is Currie's Administrators v. Mutual Assurance

Society, 4 Henning & M. (Va.) 315, decided by the supreme court of appeals

of Virginia in 1809—ten years before the decision of the Dartmouth College

Case by the United States Supreme Court. This case is not cited or com-

mented upon by the attorneys upon either side, or referred to in the decis-

ions of the judges either in the state or the supreme courts. This seems

str.inge when William Wirt, the attorney-general, himself a Virginian, was

counsel for the defendant.

Upon one side it was argued: "A charter is not a law, but a compact be-

tween the sovereign authority of the state and a citizen. In England, though

the parliament enacts every laic, yet it grants no charters. These are granted

by the king, who can not at his mere pleasure revoke them, but they remain

unalterable as fate, unless the corporation do some act, or are guilty of some

omission which, according to established rules and principles of law, pro-

duces a forfeiture. And then it is not competent for the king (one of the con-

tracting parties) to determine the question, but belongs exclusively to the

tribunals selected to decide all other controversies respecting charters." On

the other side it was said: "A charter is not a compact between the state and

the grantee of the charter. On the part of the state there is no contract, express

or implied. The state is not bound either to give to, or to receive, to do, or

to abstain from doing anything. On the part of the society there is no obliga-

tion to the state. On what ground, then, can it be said that there is a con-

tract, when neither of the parties enter into any sort of obligation. The idea

is absurd." Another view was: "That the constitution of the United States

prohibits the legislature from passing such an act without the consent of the

body corporate, I am not disposed to controvert, although it may well be

questioned whether it was intended to apply to such a case. The provision in

the constitution that 'no state shall pass a law impairing the obligation of con-

tracts,' can not be understood in the most extensive sense of the words so as

to embrace, for instance, laws for suppressing usurious or gaming contracts,

but must have a reasonable construction."

The court by Roane, J., said: "With respect to acts of incorporation, they

ought never to be passed but in consideration of services to be rendered to

court has had such a pervading operation and influence in controlling legislation as this. The legislation, 11oweve r, has been that of the states of tbe
Union. The decision is founded upon that clause of the constitution which
rleclares 'That no state shall make any law impairing the obligation of contracts.' "
The case bas been frequently and severely criticised, but notwithstanding
this, as Chief Justice Waite (himself an eneruy of the decisioul says in Stone
v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814: "The doctrines of Dartmouth Colle~e v. Woodward, announced by this court more than sixty [now eightyl years ago, have
bero rne so imbedded in tlie jurisprudence of the United States as to make
them to all intents and purposes a part of the constitution itself. In this connection, however, it must be kept in mind that it is not the charter that is
protected, but only any contract which the charte r may contain. If there is
no contract there 1s nothing m the grant on which the constitution can act;
consequently, the first inquiry in all this class of caioes is whether a contract
hits m fact been entered into, and if so, what its obligations are.''
So. too, in 1894. Judge Gray, oft.he New York Court of Appeals in Matter of
tbe City of Brooklyn, 143 N. Y. 596, on 609, says of the case: "The principle
enunciated has been steadily adhered to, despite criticisms, and is not questioned here.'' And Mr. Justice Miller, in Pearsall v. Great Northern Railway,
ltil U. S. 646, on 660, says: "The doctrine of this case has been subje<'tecl to
more or less criticism by the courts and the profession, but has been reaffirmed
and applied so often as to have become firmly established as a canon of
Ameri1!an jurisprudence.' ' See iltfrn, p . 1413.
The first case I have found in which the power of the state to modify a corporate charter was discussed, is Currie's Administrators v. Mutual Assurance
Society, 4 Henning & l\l. (Va.) 315, decided by the supreme court of appeals
oi Virginia in 1809-ten years b efore the decision of the Dartmouth College
Case by the Unitecl States Supreme Court. This case is not cited or com·
mented upon by the attorneys upon either side, or referred to in the clecis·
ions of the judges either in the state or the supreme courts. This seems
str.mge when William Wirt, the attorney-general, himself a Virginian, was
con 11sel for tbe defendant.
Upon one side it was argued: "A charter is not a law, but a compact be·
twee n the sovereign authority of the state and a citizen. In England, though
the parliament enacts every law, yet it grants no charters. These arc granted
hy the king, who can not at his mere pleasnre revoke them, but they remain
un:ilterable as fate, unless the corporation do some act, or are guilty of some
om ission which, according U> established rules and principles of law, produces a forfeiture. And then it is not competent fo r the king (on e of tlic contracting parties 1 to determine the question, but belongs exclusively U> the
tribunals selected to decide ull other controversies respecting charters.'' On
th e other side it was said: "A charter is not a compact between the state and
the grantee of the charter. On tl11'! part of the state there is no contr11ct,, express
or implied. The state is not bound eit her to give to, or to receive, to do, or
to ahstain from doing anything. On the ptnt of the soriety the re is noohligntion to the state. On what ground, th en, <'an it be said tlrnt there is a contract, when neither of the parties enter int.o nny Aort of obligation. The idea
is absurd.'' Another view was: "That tlrn constitution of the United States
prnhibits the legislature from passing RU<'h an act without the consent of the
body corporate, I am not disposed to controvert, although it may well be
qnestioned whether it wns inte nded to apply to such a cal'e. The provi!'ion in
the constitution that 'no stale shall pass a /at!l impoil'ing tltP obligation of contrar.ts,' can not be understood in the most exten!'ive sense of the words so as
to embr ace, for instance, laws for suppressing usurious or gaming contracts,
but must h ave a ·reasona ble construction.''
The court by Roane, J., said: "With respect to acts of incorporation, they
onght never to be passed but in conAideration of AervircH to he rendered to
the pnblic. • • • It. may he oftC'n conve11ient for a i:;et of n;oi:oori11terl individuals to have the privileges of a rorporation bestowed upon I hem; but if
their object is merely private or selfish, if it is detrimental to, or not promo-

the public. * * » ll may be often convenient for a set of associated indi-

viduals to have the privileges of a corporation bestowed upon them; but if

their object is merely private or selfish, if it is detrimental to, or not promo-
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tive of the public good, they have no adequate claim upon the legislature for

the privilege. Hut aH it is possible that the legislature may be imposed upon

tive of the public good, they have no adequate claim upon the legislature for
the privilege. But as it is possible that the legislature may be imposed upon
iu t he first instance, and as the public good and the interests of the associated
body may, in the pro!lress of time, by the gradual and natural working of
events, be thrown e ntire ly asunder, the question presents itself whether,
under such and s imil ar ci rcumstan<'es, the hands of a s ucceeding legislature
are tied up from revoking the privileges. :My answer is, that they are not.
In the first case, no consideration of public service ever existed and in the
l:1Rt, none continues to justify the privilege. It is the character of n legislative act to be r l'p!'rt/able by a succeeding legislature; nor can a precediniz ]Pg·
islature limit the power of its successor on the mere ground of volition on ly.
That effe<'t can only arise from a st.ate of t.hings involving public utility,
which includes the observance of justice and good faith toward all me n."
Cases and articles giving important facts r elating to or taking views opposed to the decisions of the supreme court are: 1817, Trustees of Dartmouth Collt>ge v. Woodward, l N. H.111, 6b N. H. 473; 1853, Toledo Bank v.
Bond, 1 Ohio Rt. 630; 1863, Chenango, etc., Co. v. Binghamton, 27 N . Y. 7,
on 119; l 873, President James A. Garfield, "The Future of the Republic," 5
Leg. Gaz..409, 2 vol. of his works, p. 46, 61, et seq.; 1874, Dnbuque , .. lllinois
Central R. Co., 39 Iowa 56, on 95; 1878, Ashuelot R. Co. v. Elliot, 58 ~ . H.
451; 188 1, East St. Lonis v. Gas Co., 98111. 415, on 443, by Walker, J . : 1882,
People v. Stephens, 62 Cul. 209. on 236; 1886, Tbe Dartmouth College Case
and Private Corporations by Wm. P . Wells, 9 Am. Bar. Assn. Rep. 229, et
seq.; 1886, Dow v. Nort.hern R. Co., 67 N. H. l, 36 At!. Rep. 525, 6 Harv. L.
R. 161, 213, 8 Harv. L. R. 295, 396, 27 Am. L. R. 71; 1892, Judge SeymoarD.
Thompson," Abuses.of Corporate Privileges," in 26 Am. L. R. 169, et seq.;
1893, E. A. Otis, in 27 Am. L. R. 525; 1894, G. P. Wanty, 4 Mich. L . J . 251;
1894, W. S. G. Noyes, 28 Am. L. R. 356, n. 440; 1895, Alfred Russell, Status and
Tendencies of, 30 Am. L. R. 321.
The inside history of the political and religious controversy, and its inflnence upon the decision, are set forth fully in Shirley's Dartmouth College
Causes; also a short and interesting sk etch of the same is found in 27 Am. L.
R., p. 525; the best reasoned legal attack upon it (in the writer's opinion) is tbe
opinion of Chief Justire Bartley, in Toledo Bank v. Bond, 1 Ohio St. 629 :. the
next best is that of Chief .Just.ice Doe, in Dow v. Northern R.., 67 N. H. I, 36
Atl. 525, 6 and 8 Harv. L. R. The most savnge attack is that of Judge Thompson, in 26 Am. L. R. 169, nnd t o which view, he says in his work on rorporations, he still adheres, 4 vol., § 5380, n. 4. The best statement of both its benefieial and evil effects is that of Wm. P. '\Veils, in 9 Am. Bar Assn. Rep., p.
22!). Perhaps the two views so ably expressed as follows, will continue t-0
en list the strongest minds of the country in upholding or destroying its doctri ne and effects. R::iid Ch rmcellor Kent in 1826: "The decision did more than
any ot her s in gle net proceeding from the authority of the United States to throw
an impregnable barrier around nil rights and franchises derived from thP 11rant
of J!Oi•ernment, nJ1(1 to ,:?ive solidity and .inviolability to the literary, charitable,
rel i:zions and commerdal i nstitutionR of our conn try," 1 Kent C'-0mm . 419. On
thP other h and, .lndge Cooley, in 1871, said : "It is under the protection (lf the
del'i sion in the Dartmont h Coll ege Case that the most enormous and threat·
eninir pownR in onr country hav e been created, some of the great and wealthy
corporationR having greater influe nce in t.he t•ountry at large, and upon the
l('gislation of the country t han th e states to which they owe their corp<lrate
exis tence ," Const. Lim., p. 279-80 n. (2d ed.).
:\ full statement of the various applications of the doctrines of the college
case and tlwir limitalions is given by Mr. Justice Brown in Pearsall v.Gregt
N. R. Co, 161 U. S. 646, on 6fi!-l, et S<'q., infra, p . 1413.
1. Th~ drn.rte.r contl':t<'t. The charter of a private C'>rporation. whirh con·
tnins a. <'Ont rad., can not be so modified by subsequent legish1tive act. unless
the power to re peal or aml:' nd is rPst>rved, as to impair the obligntion of the
chart Pr c·ontrnct: 1839, Crt>asP v . BahC'nrk, 23 Pick. tMass.) 334, 34 Am. Dec.
61; 1850, Commonwt>alth v. Cnll t>n, 1 :~ P21 . Rt. 133, Mtpra, p. 411: 1865. l\fnyor
of New York v. Second Ave. R., 32 N. Y. 261; 1872, Flint & F. P.R. Co. v.

in the first instance, and as the public good and the interests of the associated

body may, in the progress of time, by the gradual and natural working of

events, be thrown entirely asunder, the question presents itself whether,

under such and similar circumstances, the hands of a succeeding legislature

are tied up from revoking the privileges. My answer is, that they are not.

In the first case, no consideration of public service ever existed and in the

last, none continues to justify the privilege. It is the character of a legisla-

tive act to be repealable by a succeeding legislature; nor can a preceding leg-

islature limit the power of its successor on the mere ground of volition only.

That effect can only arise from a state of things involving public utility,

which includes the observance of justice and good faith toward all men.''

Cases and articles giving important facts relating to or taking views op-

posed to the decisions of the supreme court are: 1817, Trustees of Dart-

mouth College. v.Woodward, 1 N. H. Ill, 65 N. H. 473; 1853, Toledo Bank v.

Bond, 1 Ohio St. 630; 1863, Chenango, etc., Co. v. Binghamton, 27 N. Y.87,

on 119; 1873. President James A. Garfield, "The Future of the Republic,"5

Leg. Gaz. 409, 2 vol. of his works, p. 46, 61, et seq.; 1874, Dubuque v. Illinois
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Central R. Co., 39 Iowa 56, on 95; 1878, Ashuelot R. Co. v. Elliot, 58 K. H.

451; 1881, East St. Louis v. Gas Co., 98 111. 415, on 443, by Walker. J.; 1882,

People v. Stephens, 62 Cal. 209. on 236; 1886, The Dartmouth College Case

and Private Corporations by Win. P. Wells, 9 Am. Bar. Assn. Rep. 229, el

seq.; 1886, Dow v. Northern'R. Co., 67 N. H. 1, 36 Atl. Rep. 525, 6 Harv. L.

R. 161, 213, 8 Harv. L. R. 295, 396, 27 Am. L. R. 71 ; 1892, Judge Seymour D.

Thompson, "Abnses.of Corporate Privileges," in 26 Am. L. R. 169, et seq.;

1893, E. A. Otis, in 27 Am. L. R. 525; 1894, G. P. Wantv, 4 Mich. L. J. 251;

1894, W.S.G. Noves,28 Am.L. R. 356,n. 440; 1895, Alfred Russell, Statusand

Tendencies of, 30" Am. L. R. 321.

The inside history of the political and religious controversy, and its influ-

ence upon the decision, are set forth fully in Shirley's Dartmouth College

Causes; also a short and interesting sketch of the same is found in 27 Am. L

R., p. 525; the best reasoned legal attack upon it (in the writer's opinion) is the

opinion of Chief Justice Bartley, in Toledo Bank v. Bond,1 Ohio St. 629; the

next best is that of Chief Justice Doe, in Dow v. Northern R., 67 N. H. 1,36

Atl. 525, 6 and 8 Harv. L. R. The most savage attack is that of Judge Thomp-

son, in 26 Am. L. R. 169, and to which view, he says in his work on corpora-

tions, he slill adheres, 4 vol., § 5380, n. 4. The best statement of both its ben-

eficial and evil effects is that of Wm. P. WTells, in 9 Am. Bar Assn. Rep., p.

229. Perhaps the two views so ably expressed as follows, will continue to

enlist the strongest minds of the country in upholding or destroying itsdoc-

trine and effects. Said Chancellor Kent in 1826: "Thedecision did more than

any other single act proceeding from the authority of the United States to throw

an impregnable barrier around all rights and franchises derived from the grant

of government, and to give solidity and.inviolability to the literary, charitable,

religious and commercial institutions of our country," 1 Kent Comm. 419. On

the other hand, Judge Cooley, in 1871, said: "It is under the protection of the

decision in the Dartmouth College Case that the most enormous and threat-

ening powers in our country have been created, some of the great and wealthy

corporations having greater influence in the country at large, and upon the

legislation of the country than the states to which they owe their corporate

existence," Const. Lira., p. 279-80 n. (2d ed.).

A full statement of the various applications of the doctrines of the college

case and their limitations is given by Mr. Justice Brown in Pearsall v.Great

N. R. Co , 161 U. S. 646, on 659, et seq., infra, p. 1413.

1. The charter contract. The charter of a private corporation, which con-

tains a contract, can not be so modified by subsequent legislative act. unless

the power to repeal or amend is reserved, as to impair the obligation of the

charter contract: 1839, Crease v. Babcock, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 334, 34 Am. Dec.

61; 1850. Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13 Pa. St. 133, supra, p. 417: 1865, Mayor

of New York v. Second Ave. R., 32 N. Y. 261; 1872, Flint & F. P. R. Co. v.
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Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99, supra, p. 398; 1876, Hays v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. St.
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518; 1877, University v. North Carolina, etc., 76 N. C. 103, 22 Am. Rep. 671;

749

1888, People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 7 Am. St. Rep. 684; 1889, Grammar

School v. Bailey, 62 Vt. 467; 1892, Platte Co. v. Dowell, 17 Colo. 376; 1892,

Mayor, etc., v. Houston St. R., 83 Tex. 548, 29 Am. St. 679; 1893, Millburn v.

South Orange, 55 N. J. L. 254; 1894, Mathews v. St. Louis S. F. R. Co., 121

Mo. 298; 1894, Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 154 U. S. 362; 1894. Indian-

apolis v. Consumers' Gas Co., 140 Ind. 107, 49 Am. St. Rep. 183; 1896, Cov-

ington & L. Tump. R. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578; 1897, Railroad Co. v.

Harris, 99 Tenn. 684; 1898, State, ex rel., v. St. Louis, etc., 145 Mo. 551; 1898,

Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1. See, also, infra,

cases immediately following this note.

2. Consideration necessary. There must be some consideration moving

to the state in order to support the contract; but the implied agreement upon

the part of the corporation to perform the duties imposed upon it is a suffi-

cient consideration to support all contracts contained in the charter at the

time of its creation; a new consideration is essential to support subse-

quent contracts with the state. 1871, Salt Company v. East Saginaw, 80 U.

S. (13 Wall.) 373; 1874, Tucker v. Fergeson, 89 U. 8. (22 Wall.) 527; 1897,
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Grand Lodge v. New Orleans, 166 TJ. S. 143.

3. Unexecuted powers. But powers not acted upon, or unexecuted,

are in the nature of an offer only on the part of the state, and can be with-

drawn at any time before thev are acted upon. 1896, Pearsall v. Great North-

ern Railway", 161 U. S. 646, infra, p. 1413; 1896, Bank of Commerce v. Tennes-

see, 163 U. 8. 416; 1898, Galveston, H., etc., R. v. Texas, 170 U. S. 226.

4. Laws giving: new or different remedies. Laws reasonably affecting

the reinedv only, do not impair the contract obligation. 1829, Vanzant v.

Waddel, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 259; 1851, Carey v. Giles, 9 Ga. 253; 1881, Penniman's

Case, 103 U. S. 714.

5. Charitable and educational institutions. The constitutional protection

extends to public charitable and educational institutions: 1838, Regents of

Univ. of Md. v. Williams, 9 G. & J. (Md.) 365, 31 Am. Dec. 72; 1847, Brown

v. Hummel, 6 Pa. St. 86, 47 Am. Dec. 431; 1852, Vincennes Univ. v. State,

14 How. (55 U. S.) 268; 1887, Board of Education v. Bakewell, 122 111. 339;

1888, Liggett v. Ladd, 17 Ore. 89; 1889, Grammar School v. Bailev, 62 Vt. 467;

1894, Graded School District v. Trustees, 95 Ky. 436; 1895, Ohio v. Neff, 52

O. 8. 375.

6. Municipal charters. But charters of public, or municipal, corporations

may be changed or modified: 1835, People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325, supra,

p. 113; 1836, Armstrong v. Board, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 208; 1850, East Hartford v.

Bridge Co., 10 How. (51 U. S.) 511; 1856, Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29

Vt. 12, 67 Am. Dec. 748; 1860, Aspinwall v. Commissioners of Davies Co., 22

How. (63 U.S.) 364; 1879, Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548; 1886,

Portland R. Co. v. City, 14 Ore. 188, 58 Am. Rep. 299; 1891, New Orleans v.

N. O. W. W., 142 U. 8. 79.

7. Charter exemptions from taxation. Exemptions from taxation, if sus-

tained by a sufficient consideration, are contracts protected by the constitu-

tional provision ; but the later cases strictly require a sufficient consideration.

1853, Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. (57 U. S.) 369; 1869, Home of

Friendless and Washington Univ. v. Rouse, 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 430, 439; 1871,

Salt Company v. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. (80 IT. S.) 373; 1877, Farrington v.

Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679; 1881, Asylum v. New Orleans. 105 U. S. 362; 1883,

Worth v. Railroad Co., 89 N. C. 291, 45 Am. Rep. 679; 1892, Louisville Water

Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 1; 1892, Hamilton Gas L. Co. v. Hamilton, 146 U. 8.

258; 1897. Grand Lodge F. & A. Masons v. New Orleans, 166 TJ. S. 143; 1899,

Citizens' Savings Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 636, on 644; 1899, City of

Louisville v. Bank of Louisville, 174 U. S. 439.

Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99, rupra, p. 398; 1876, Hays v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. St.
518; 1877, University v. North Carolina, etc., 76 N. C. 103, 22 Am. Rep. 671;
1888, People v. O'Bnen, 111 N. Y. 1, 7 Am. St. Rep. 684; 1889, Grammar
School v. Bailey, 62 Vt. 467; 1892, Platte Co. v. Dowell, 17 Colo. 376; 1892,
Mayor, etc., v. Houston St. R., 83 Tex. 548, 29 Am. St. 679; 1893, Millburn v.
Son th Orange, 55 N. J. L. 2.54; 1894, Mathews v. St. L<mis S. F . R . Co., l 21
Mo. 298; 1894, Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 154 U.S. 362; 1894, Indianapolis v. Consumers' Gas Co., 140 Ind. 107, 49 Am. St. Rep. 183; 1896, Covington & L . Turnp. R. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578; 1897, Railroad Co. v.
Harris, 99 Tenn. 684; 1898, State, ex rel., v. St. Louis, etc., 145 Mo. 551; 1898,
Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S .. l. See, also, infra,
cases immediately following this note.
2. Consideration necessary. There must be some consideration moving
to the state in order to support the contract; but the implied agreement upon
the part of the corporation to perform the duties imposed upon it is a sufficient cousideration.to support all contracts contained in the charter at the
time of its creation; a new consideration is flSsential to support subsequent contracts with the state. 1871, Salt Company v. East Saginaw, 80 U.
S. (13 Wall.) 373; 1874, Tucker v. Fergeson, 89 U. S. (22 Wall .) 527; 1897,
Grand Lodge v. New Orleans, 166 U. S. 143.
3. Unexecuted powers. But powers not acted upon, or unexecuted,
are in the nature of an offer only on the part of the state, and can be withdrawn at any time before they are acted upon. 1896 Pearsall v. Great Northern Railway, 161 U.S. 646, infra, p. 1413; 189.6, Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 163 U.S. 416; 1898, Galveston, H., etc., R. v. Texas, 170 U.S. 226.
4. Laws giving new or different remedies. Laws reasonably affecting
the remedy only, do not impair the contract obligation . 1829, Vanzant v.
Waddel, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 259; 1851, Carey v. Giles, 9 Ga. 253; 1881, Penniman's
Case, 103 U.S. 714.
·
5. Charitable and educational institutions. The constitutional protection
extends to public charitable and educational institutions: 1838, Regen ls of
Uu iv. of Md. v. Williams, 9 G. & J. (Md.) 365, 31 Am. Dec. 72; 1847, Brown
v. Hummel, 6 Pa. St. 86, 47 Am. Dec. 431; 1852, Vincennes U niv. v. St.ate,
14 How. (55 U.S.) 268; 1887, Board of Education v. Bakewell, 122 Ill. 339;
1888, Liggett v. Ladd, 17 Ore. 89; 1889, Grammar School v. Bailey, 62 Vt. 467;
1894, Graded School District v. Trustees, 95 Ky. -!36; 1895, Ohio v. Neff, 52
0. s. 375.
6. Municipal charters. But charters of public, or municipal, corporations
may be changed or modified: 1835, People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325, supra,
~· 113; 1836, Armstrong v. Board, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 208; 1850, East Hartford v.
Bridge Co., 10 How. (51 U.S.) 511; 1856, Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29
Vt. 12, 67 Am. Dec. 748; 1860, Aspinwall v. Commissioners of Davies Co., 22
How. (63 U.S.) 364; 1879, Newton v. Commissioners, JOO U. S. 548; 1886,
Portland R. Co. v. City, 14 Ore. 188, 58 Am. Rep. 299; 1891, New Orleans v.
N. 0 . W.W., 142 U.S. 79.
7. Charter exemptions from taxation. Exemptions from taxation, if sustafoed by a · sufficient consideration, are contracts protected by the constitutional provision; but the later cases strictly require n s ufficient consideration.
1853, Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. (57 U. S.) 369; 1869, Home of
Friendless and Washington Univ. v. Rouse, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 430, 439; 1871,
Salt Company v. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 373; 1877, Farrington v.
Tennessee, 95 U.S. 679; 1881, Asylum v. New Orleans, lo.5 U.S. 362; 1883,
Worth v. Rai lroad Co., 89 N. C. 291, 45 Am . Rep. 679; 1892, Louisville Water
Co. v. Clark, 143 U. R. 1; 1892, Hamilton Gas L. Co. v. Hamilton , H 6 U. 8 .
258; 1897, Grand Lodge F . & A. Masons v. New Orleans, 166 U.S. 143 ; 1899,
Citizens' Savings Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 636, on 644; 1899, Uity of
Louisville v. Bank of Louisville, 174 U.S. 439.
8. Power to re~ulate rates . Unless th e re is a ct.e finite expre8f-I grant of the
power to regulate its own chnrgeA to a q11rrsi-pnblic corporation, th e state may
prescribe such rates as will permit a reasonable profit to the corporation
1876, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113; 1876, Cbicago, B. & Q . R. v. Iowa, 94 U.

8. Power to regulate rates. Unless there is .1 definite express grant of the

power to regulate its own charges to a (/u««'-public corporation, the state may

prescribe such rates as will permit a reasonable profit to the corporation

1876, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; 1876, Chicago, B. & Q. R. v. Iowa, 94 U.

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

75o

750

§ 199

YEATON V. BANK OF THE OLD DOMINION.

YEATON V. BANK OF THE OLD

DOMI~ION.

§ 199

S. 155; 1876, Peik v. C. & N. W. R., 94 U. S. 104; 1884, Laurel Fork R. Co.

8. 1~5; 1876, Peik v. C . & N. W.R. , !l4 U.S. 104; 1884, L aurel Fork R . Co.
v . West Virginia, 25 W. Va. 324; 1886, Railroarl Commission Cases, 116 U.S.
307; 1889, Chicago, M. & tit. P. R.v. Minn., 134 U. S. 418; 1892, Budd v. New
York, J.l3U. S. 5 17; 1894, Heaganv . Farmers' L.&T.Co., 154 U.8.3l12; 18!M,
Brass v. North Dakota, 1511 U.S. 391; 1896, Covington & L. Turnp. R. Co. v.
Sandford. lli4 U. 8. 578; 1898, Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466; s. c., 171 U.S.
3til; 1898. Nebraskit T.1. Co. v. State, .55 Neb. fi27; 1899, Lake S hore & 1\1. •.
R. Co . v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684, reve rs ing Smith v. L. S. R. Co .• 114 Mich. 4()0;
1899, City of Danville v. Danville Water Co., 180 Ill. 235; 1899, San Di Pgo
L . & T . Co. v. National City, 174 U.S. 789; 1899, Tolerlo v. N. W. 0. Natl.
Gas Co., 6 Ohio N. P . 631; 1899, Gould v. Edison El. Ill. Co., 29 l\fo!cl. ( N.
Y.) 51'>9; 1899, Bailey v. Fayette Gas-F. Co., }93 Pa. 175, 44 At!. R~p. 2l>~.
9. Bridge frane.hises. 8ee Pi1:1cataqua .Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge,
7 N. Ii. 35, on ti8, .mpm, p. 309, and uote, p. 320.
10. As to police power, eminent domaiu and taxation and power to repea l,
eee infra. pp. 1344, 1337, 1370.

v. West Virginia, 25 W. Va. 324; 1886, Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S.

307; 1889, Chicago, M. & St. P. R. v. Minn., 134 U. S. 418; 1892, Budd v. New

York, 143 U. 8. 517; 1894, Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 154 U. S.362; 1894,

Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. 8. 391; 1896, Covington & L. Tump. R. Co. v.

Sandford. 164 U. 8. 578; 1898, Smvth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466; s. c, 171 U. S.

361; 1898. Nebraska TW. Co. v. State, 55 Neb. 627; 1899, Lake Shore & M S.

R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684, reversing Smith v. L. S. R. Co., 114 Mich. 460;

1899, Citv of Danville v. Danville Water Co., 180 III. 235; 1899, San Diego

L. & T. Co. v. National Citv, 174 U. S. 739; 1899, Toledo v. N. W. 0. Natl.

Gas Co., 6 Ohio N. P. 631; 1899, Gould v. Edison El. III. Co., 29 Miscl. (N.

Y.) 559; 1899, Bailey v. Fayette Gas-F. Co., 193 Pa. 175, 44 Atl. Rep. 251.

9. Bridge franchises. See Piseataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge,

7 N. H. 35, 011 68, supra, p. 309, and note, p. 320.

10. As to police power, eminent domain and taxation and power to repeal,

see infra, pp. 1344, 1337, 1370.
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1872. In the Court of Appeals of Virginia. 21 Grattan's (Va.)

2.

Contract between the state and the corporation.

YEATON v. BANK OF THE OLD DOMINION.1

Rep. 593-603.

1872.

[Action of assumpsit by the bank against Yeaton to recover the

IN THE CounT

sum of $561.07, and interest; the defense was a tender of the amount

OF

APPEALS OF VIRGINIA.
Rep. 593--003.

21

Grattan's (Va.)

in notes issued by the branch bank at Pearisburg. The mother bank

[Action of assumpsit by the bank against Yeaton to recover the
sum of $561.07, and interest; the defense was a tender of the amount
in notes issued by the branch bank at Pearisburg. The mother bank
was located at Alexandria, and the legislature reserved the "right to
repeal, alter or modify the charter at its pleasure;" the branch bank
was subject to the charter of the mother bank, and its notes were to
"be received in payments of debts due the bank, whether contracted
at the parent bank or at the branch bank." During the war, while
Alexandria was in possession of the United States authorities, and
Peari sburg not, the Virginia legislature authorized the branch bank to
issue notes of smaller denomination than the original charter allowed;
these notes became greatly depreciated , and were the ones tendered
in payment of the debt. Neither the directors nor stockholders ever
accepted any amendment of the charter. Judgment below was for
the bank, and this is the error assigned.]
CHRISTIAN, J. • • • The power of the legislature "to repeal,
alter or modify the charter of any bank at its pleasure," must be held
to be limited to this extent. It may certainly repeal the charter of
any bank, but it can not compel a bank to accept an amendment or
modification of its charter. Nor is any such amendment or modifi cation of its charter binding upon the bank without its acceptance>.
Banks are private corporations, created by a charter or act of incorporation from the govern ment, which is in the nature of a contract,
and, therefore, in order to complete the creation of such corporation .
something more than the mere grant of a charter is required; that is,
in order to give to the charter the full force and effect of an executed
contract, it must he accepted. It is clear that the government can not
enforce the acceptance bf a charter upon a private corporation with-

was located at Alexandria, and the legislature reserved the "right to

repeal, alter or modify the charter at its pleasure;" the branch bank

was subject to the charter of the mother bank, and its notes were to

"be received in payments of debts due the bank, whether contracted

at the parent bank or at the branch bank." During the war, while

Alexandria was in possession of the United States authorities, and

Pearisburg not, the Virginia legislature authorized the branch bank to

issue notes of smaller denomination than the original charter allowed;

these notes became greatly depreciated, and were the ones tendered

in payment of the debt. Neither the directors nor stockholders ever

accepted any amendment of the charter. Judgment below was for

the bank, and this is the error assigned.]

Christian, J. * * * The power of the legislature "to repeal,

alter or modify the charter of any bank at its pleasure," must be held

to be limited to this extent. It may certainly repeal the charter of

any bank, but it can not compel a bank to accept an amendment or

modification of its charter. Nor is any such amendment or modifica-

tion of its charter binding upon the bank without its acceptance.

Banks are private corporations, created by a charter or act of incor-

poration from the government, which is in the nature of a contract,

and, therefore, in order to complete the creation of such corporations,

something more than the mere grant of a charter is required; that is,

in order to give to the charter the full force and effect of an executed

contract, it must be accepted. It is clear that the government can not

enforce the acceptance of a charter upon a private corporation with-

1 Statement abridged. Only part of opinion given.

1
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out its consent. * * * These well-settled principles are everywhere

recognized as applicable to the original charters of incorporation, and
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upon principle and authority they apply with equal force to anv amend-

ment or modification of the charter as well as to the original charter.

Though the legislature may have the reserved power to amend or

modify a charter of incorporation, it can no more force the corpora-

tion to accept such amendment or modification than it could have

forced upon them the acceptance of the original charter without their

consent. Under the reservation they can repeal or destroy the char-

ter, without any consent on the part of the corporators, but as long as

they remain in existence as a corporate body, they necessarily have the

power to reject an amendment or modification of their charter. The

power reserved by the legislature gives the right certainly to repeal or

destroy, but so far as the right to modify or alter is concerned, ''t is

nothing more than the ordinary case of a stipulation that one of the

parties to a contract may vary its terms with the consent of the other

contracting party. These principles grow out of the nature of char-

ters or acts of incorporation, which are regarded in the nature of

contracts. The amendment or modification must be made by the par-

ties to the contract, the legislature on the one hand and the corpora-
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tion on the other, the former expressing its intention by means of a

legislative act andihe latter assenting thereto by a vote of the majority

of the stockholders, according to the provisions of its charter, or by

other acts showing its acceptance.

The reservation of the right to alter, amend or repeal the act by

which the corporation is created may be prudent and salutary, but it

seems to be a necessary implication that if the legislature should

undertake to make what in their opinion is a legitimate alteration or

amendment, the corporation has the power to reject or accept it what-

ever may be the consequences. One consequence undoubtedly is,

that the corporation can not conduct its operations in defiance of the

power that created it; and if it does not accept the modification

or amendment proposed, must discontinue its operations as a corpo-

rate body. But such amendment or modification can not be forced

upon the corporation without its consent. Sage, etc., v. Dillard, etc.,

15 B. Mon. R. 340; Allen v. McKean, 1 Sumner's R. 277; Durfee

v. Old Colony and Fall River R. Co., 5 Allen's R. 230. Every

amendment or modification of a charter of incorporation is nothing

more than a new contract, which is not binding upon the corporate

body until accepted by them. Applying these doctrines, which seem

to be well settled, to the case before us, it is manifest that the Bank

of Old Dominion can not be held bound by the acts of 1862 as amend-

ments of its charter. * • •

It is no answer to this view that the branch bank at Pearisburg was

within the territorial jurisdiction of the Richmond government, and

subject to its authority. This bank was not an independent corpora-

tion. It had no charter; it was but a branch of its mother bank at

Alexandria, subject to its charter. It was but the agent, the mother

bank being its principal. It could do no act to bind its principal with-

out its consent. • • • These well-settled principles are everywhere
recognized as applicahle to the original charters of incorporation , and
upon principle and authority they apply with equal force to any amendment or modification of the charter as well as to the original cha rter.
Thougk the legislature may liave the reserved p<rWer to amend or
modify a charter of incorporati'on, it can no more force the corporation to accept such amendment or modification tlian it could hav e
forced upon them the acceptance of the original charter w itlwut th eir
consent. Under the reservatiott they can repeal or d estroy th e chart er, without any consent on the part of th e corporators, but as long as
tkey remain in existence as a corporate body, they n ecessarily have tl1e
power to r ej ect an amendment or. mod~fication of their charter. The
power reserved by the legislature gives the right certainly to repeal or
destroy, but so far as the right to modify or alter is concerned, it is
nothing more than the ordinary case of a stipulation that one of the
parties to a contract may vary its terms with the consent of the other
contracting party . These principles grow out of the nature of charters or acts of incorporation, which are regarded in the nature of
contracts. Th e amendment or modification must be made by the part£es to the contract, the l egislature on tlze one hand and tlze corporation on the other , the former expressing its £ntention by m eans of a
l egislatt've act and ihe latter assenting thereto by a vote of the majority
of the stockholders, according to the provisions of £ts charter, or by
other acts showing its acceptance.
The reservation of the right to alter, amend or repeal the act by
which the corporation is created may be prudent and salutary, but it
seems to be a necessary implication that if the . legislature should
undertake to make what in their opinion is a legitimate alteration or
amendment, the corporation has the power to reject or accept it whatever may be the consequences. One consequence undoubtedly is,
that the corporation can not conduct its operations in defiance of the
power that created it; and if it does not accept the modificatio n
or amendment proposed, mu st discontinue its operations as a corporate body. But such amendment or modification can not be forced
upon the corporation without its consent. S nge, etc., v. Dillard, etc.,
15 B. Mon. R. 340; Allen v. McKe an, 1 Sumner' s R. 277; Durfee
v. Old Colony and Fall River R. Co., 5 Allen's R. 230. Every
amendment or modification of a charter of incorporation is nothing
more than a new contract, which is not binding upon the corporate
body until accepted by them. Applying these doctrines, which seam
to be well settled, to the case before us , it is manifest that the R ank
of Old Dominion can not be held bound by the acts of 1862 as amendments of its charter. • • •
It is no answer to this view that the branch. bank at Pearisburg wns
·within the territorial jurisdiction of the Richmond government, and
subject to its authority . This bank was not an independent corporation. It had no ch arter; it was hut a branch of its mother bank at
Alexandria , subject to its charter. It was but the agent, the mothe r
bank being its principal. It could do no act to bind its principal with-
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out the consent and authority of that principal. Nor could the legis-
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lature authorize the branch bank which owed its existence to the
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charter of the mother bank to issue small notes, or to do any other act

out the consent and authority of that principal. Nor could the legi lature authorize the branch bank which owed its existence to the
charter of the mother bank to issue small notes, or to do any other act
as a bank without the consent of the mother bank. The only authority which the legislature could exercise was that which it reserved
under the power "to repeal, modify or alter" the charter of the
mother bank. I have already shown that this was not done by the
acts of 1862, which could not operate upon the Bank of the Old Dominion as a change or modification of its charter. • • •
Affirmed.

as a bank without the consent of the mother bank. The only author-

ity which the legislature could exercise was that which it reserved

under the power ''to repeal, modify or alter" the charter of the

mother bank. I have already shown that this was not done by the

acts of 1S62, which could not operate upon the Bank of the Old Do-

minion as a change or modification of its charter. * * *

Affirmed.

Note. See Commonwealth v. Cullen, supra, p. 417; Plank-Road v. Woodhull,

supra, p. 398; Railway Co. v. Allerton, supra, p. 442; Ashton v. Burbank, su-

pra, p. 87; and note to Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra, p. 746.

Sec. 200. 3. Contract between the state and corporate creditors,

and between stockholders and corporate creditors, in the case

Note. See Commonwealth v. Cullen, sttpra, p. 417; Plank-Road v. Woodhull,
sttpra, p. 398; Railway Co. v. A11erton, sttpra, p. 442; Ashton v. Burbank, supra, p. 87; and note to Dartmouth College v. Wood ward, supra, p. 746.

of statutory liability.

HAWTHORNE v. CALEF."

1864. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 2 Wall.

(69 U. S.) 10-23.
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The constitution of the United States ordains that "no state shall

pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." With this pro-

Sec. 200.

3. Contract between the state and corporate creditors,
and between stocklwlders and corporate creditors, in the case
of statutory liability.

vision in force, the state of Maine, on the 1st of April, 1836, incor-

porated a railroad company, the charter providing.that "the shares of

individual stockholders should be liable for the debts of the corpora-

tion." "And in case of deficiency of attachable corporate property or

estate," the provision went on to say, "the -individualproperty, rights

HAWTHORNE v. CALEF.1

and credits of any stockholder shall be liable to the amount of his

stock, for all debts of the corporation contracted prior to the transfer

1864.

thereof, for the term of six months after judgment recovered against

said corporation, and the same may be taken in execution on said judg-

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF THE UNITRD STATES.
(69 U.S.) 10-23.

2

Wall.

ment in the same manner as if said judgment and execution were

The constitution of the United States ordains that "no state shall
pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." With this provision in force , the state of Maine, on the tst of April, 1836, incorporated a railroad company, the charter providing.that "the skarts of
individual stockholders should be liable for the debts of th.e corpuration.'' ''And in case of deficiency of attacl1able corporate properly or
estate," the provision went on to say, "the ~"ndividttal property, nghts
and credits of any stockholder shall be liable to the amount of liis
stock, for all debts of the corporation contracted prior to the transfer
thereof, for the term of six months after judgment recovered against
said corporation, and the same may be taken in e.xecutionon saidjudgment in the same manner as if said judgment and execution were
against him individually, or said creditor, after said judgment, may
have his action on the case against said individual stockholder; but in
no case s hall the property, rights and credits of said stockholder be
taken in execution, or attached as aforesaid, beyond the amount of his
said stock." Another secti on provides that if sufficient corporate
property to satisfy the execution could not be found , the officer having
the execution shou ld certify the deficiency on the execution, and give
notice thereof to the stockholder whose properly he was about to take,
and if such stockholder shou Id how to the creditor or officer sufficient
attachable corporate property to satisfy the debt, "his individual prop-

against him individually, or said creditor, after said judgment, may

have his action on the case against said individual stockholder; but in

no case shall the property, rights and credits of said stockholder be

taken in execution, or attached as aforesaid, beyond the amount of his

said stock." Another section provides that if sufficient corporate

property to satisfy the execution could not be found, the officer having

the execution should certify the deficiency on the execution, and give

notice thereof to the stockholder whose property he was about to take,

and if such stockholder should show to the creditor or officer sufficient

attachable corporate property to satisfy the debt, "his individual prop-

1 Arguments and parts of opinion omitted.

1 Ar~uru ents
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erty, rights and credits shall thereupon be exempt from attachment and

execution."

§
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The plaintiff, Hawthorne, who had supplied the corporation, then

.-\~lJ

CREDITORS.

753

embarrassed and insolvent, with materials to build its road, having

obtained judgment as a creditor against it, and being unable to get

from it satisfaction (the company having, in fact, no property), sued

the defendant, Calef, who was a stockholder, both at the time when

the debt was contracted and when judgment for it was rendered, and

no transfer of whose stock had been made. A few months after the

debt was contracted, the legislature of Maine passed a statute repeal-

ing the "individual liability" clause of the charter.

On a question before the supreme court of Maine—the highest court

of law in that state—whether such repeal was or was not repugnant

to the clause above cited of the constitution, that court held that it

was not; that the original provision—not making the stockholder per-

sonally liable in any way—did not constitute a "contract" between

the creditor and him, within the meaning of the constitution^ and that

while, but for the repealing act, the plaintiff would have been entitled

to recover of the stockholder individually to the extent of his stock,

this repealing act had taken away and destroyed such right.
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Judgment being given accordingly by the said court in favor of the

state statutes, the correctness of such judgment was now on error be-

fore this court.

Nelson, J. The question upon the provisions of the charter of

the railroad company—in connection with the sale of the property by

the plaintiff to the corporation out of which this debt accrued—is

whether a contract, express or implied, existed between him and the

stockholder?

It is asserted in behalf of the latter that a contract existed only

between the creditors and the corporation; and that the obligation of

the stockholder rests entirely upon a statutory liability, destitute of

any of the elements of a contract.

Without stopping to discuss the question upon the clause of the

statute, we think that the case falls within the principle of Woodruff

v. Trapnal, 10 How. 190; and Curran v. State of Arkansas, 15 How.

304, heretofore decided in this court.

In the first of these cases the charter of the bank provided that the

bills and notes of the institution should be received in all payment of

debts due to the state. The bank was chartered 2d November, 1836. On

the 10th January, 1S45, this provision was repealed, and the question

was whether or not, after this repeal, the bills and notes of the bank

outstanding at the time were receivable for debts due to the state.

The court held, after a very full examination, that the clause in the

charter constituted a contract with the holders of the bills and notes on

the part of the stale, and that the repealing act was void as impairing

the obligation of the contract.

In the second case the charter of the bank contained a pledge or

assurance that certain funds deposited therein should be devoted to

48—Wil. Cases.

erfy, rights and credits sltall tltereupon be exempt from attachment and
execution."
The plaintiff, Hawthorne, who had s upplie<l the corporation, then
embarrassed and insolvent, with materials to build its road, having
obtained judgment as a creditor against it, and being unable to get
from it satisfaction (the company having, in fact, no property), sued
the defendant, Calef, who was a stockholder, both at the time when
the debt was contracted and when judgment for it was rendered, and
no transfer of whose stock had been made . A few months after the
debt was contracted, the legislature of Maine passed a statute repealing the "individual liability" clause of the charter.
On a question before the supreme court of Maine-the highest court
of law in that state-whether such repeal was or was not repugnant
to the clause above cited of the constitution , that court held that it
wa. not; that the original provision-not making the stockholder personally liable in any way-did not constitute a "contract" between
the creditor and him, within the meaning of the con ·titutior\,.. and that
while, but for the repea ling ad, the plaintiff would have been entitled
to recover of the stockholder indivic;lually to the extent of his stock,
this repealing act had taken away and destroyed uch right.
Judgment being given accordingly by the said court in favor of the
state statutes, the correctness of such judgment was now on error before this court.
NELSON, J. The question upon the provisions of the charter of
the railroad company-in connection with the sale of the property by
the plaintiff to the corporation out of which this debt accm cd-is
whether a contract, express or implied , existed between him and the
stock holder?
lt is asserted in behalf of the latter that a contract existed only
hetween the creditors and the corporation; and that the obligation of
the stockholder rests entirely upon a statutory liability, destitute of
any of the elements of a contract.
Without stopping to discuss the question upon the clause of the
statute, we think that the case falls within the principle of Woodn\ff
v. Trapnal, IO How. 190; and Curran v. State of Arkansas, 15 How.
30+, heretofore decided in this court.

In the first of tlzese cases the charier of the bank provided that the
bi.lls and notes of the instibi.lion sltould be received in all payment of
debts due to the slate. The bank was chartered 2d November, 1836. On
the 10th January, 1845, this provision was repealed, and the question
was whether or not, after this repeal , the hills and notes of the bank
outstanding at the time were receivable for debts due to the state.

The court held, after a very full examination, tlzat the clause in the
diarter consh"tuted a contract witlz the holders of the bills and notes on
lite part of the state, and tliat tlie repealing act was void as impairing
lite obligation oftlie contract.
In the second case the charter of the bank contained a pledge or
assurance that certain funds deposited therein should be devoted to
48-w IL.
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the payment of its debts. It was held by the court that this consti-

§ 201

TOMLINSON Y. JESSUP.

tuted a contract with the creditors, and that the acts of the legislature

withdrawing these funds were void, as impairing the obligation of the

the pay ment of its debts. It was held by the court that this constituted a contrnct with the creditors, and that the acts of the legislature
withdrawing these funds were void, as impairing the obligation of the
contract.
Now, it is quite clear that the personal liability clause in the charter in the present case pledges the liability or guarantee of the stockholders to the extent of their stock to the creditors of the company,
and to which pledge or guarantee the stockholders, by subscribing for
stock and becoming members of it, have assented. They thereby
virtually agree to become security to the creditors for the payment of
the debts of the company, which have been contracted upon the faith
of this liability. • • •
By the clause in the charter subjecting the property of the stockholder he becomes liable to the creditor, in case of the inability or
insolvency of the company for its debts, to the extent of his stock.
The creditor had this security wizen the debt was contracted witIt the

contract.

Now, it is quite clear that the personal liability clause in the char-

ter in the present case pledges the liability or guarantee of the stock-

holders to the extent of their stock to the creditors of the company,

and to which pledge or guarantee the stockholders, by subscribing for

stock and becoming members of it, have assented. They thereby

virtually agree to become security to the creditors for the payment of

the debts of the company, which have been contracted upon the faith

of this liability. * * *

By the clause in the charter subjecting the property of the stock-

holder he becomes liable to the creditor, in case of the inability or

insolvency of the company for its debts, to the extent of his stock.

The creditor had this security when the debt was contracted with the

company over and above its responsibility. This remedy the repeal-

ing act has not merely modified to the prejudice of the creditor, but has

altogether abolished, and thereby impaired the obligation of his con-
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tract with the company. * * *

company fVer and above its responsibility. Tlzis remedy the repealing act has not merely modified to the prejudice of the creditor, but ltas
altogether abolislzed, and thereby impaired the obligation of lzis contract with tlze company. • • •

Reversed.

Note. See generally: 1845, Freeland v. McCullough, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 414,

43 Am. D. 685, note, 694; 1847, Corning v. McCullough, 1 N. Y. 47, 49 Am. D.

287, note, 308; 1857, Conant v. Van Sliaick, 24 Barb. |N. Y.) 87; 1862, Story

v. Furman, 25 N. Y. 214; 1870, In re Telegraph C. Co., L. R. 10 Kq. Cas. 384;

Reversed.

1871, Norris v. Wrenschall, 34 Md. 492; 1871, Lowrv v. Inman, 46 N. Y. 119;

1873, Provident Sav. Inst. v. Jackson, etc., 52 Mo.*652; 1878. Sinking Fund

Note. See generally: 184.5, Freeland v. McCullough, 1 Denio (N. Y . ) 414,
43 Am. D. 685, note, 694; 1847, Corning v. McCnllougb, 1 N. Y. 47, 49 Am. D.
287, note, 308; 1857, Conant v. Van Shaick, 24 Barb. tN. Y.) 87; 1862, Story
v. Furman, 25 N. Y. 214; 1870, In re Telegn1ph C. Co., L . R. IO F.q. Cas. 384;
1871, Norris v. Wrenschall, 34 Md . 492; 1871, Lowry v. Inman, 46 N. Y. 119;
1873, Provide nt Sav. Inst. v. Jackson, etc ., 52 Mo. 552; 1878, Rinking Fond
Cases, 99 U.S. 700; 1881, Aultman's Appeal, 98 Pa. Stat. 505; 1883, Jerman v.
Benton, 79 Mo. 148; 1884, Ninnick v. Iron Works, 25 W. Va. 184; 1887, Fourth
National Bank v. Francklyn, 120 U. S. 747; 1888, Leavitt v. Lovering, 64 N. H.
607, 1 I~. R. A. 58; 1888, McDonnell v. Alabama, etc.,85 Ala. 401; 1892, Kennedy v. Bank, 97 Cal. 93; 1896, McGowan v. McDonald, 111 Cal. 57, 52 Am.
Stat. Rep. 149. But see, contm, 1858, Coffin v. Rich, 41l Maine 507, 71 Am. D.
559; 1867, Woodhouse v. Commw. Ins. Co., 54 Pa. Stat. 307.

Casew, 99 U.S. 700; 1881, Aultman's Appeal,98 Pa. Stat. 505; 1883, Jerman v.

Benton, 79 Mo.148; 1884,Ninniek v. Iron Works, 25 W.Va. 184; 1887, Fourth

National Bank v. Francklyn, 120 U. S. 747; 1888, Leavitt v. Covering, 64 N. H.

607, 1 L. R. A. 58; 1888, McDonnell v. Alabama, etc., 85 Ala, 401; 1892, Ken-

nedy v. Bank, 97 Cal.93; 1896, MeGowan v. McDonald, 111 Cal. 57, 52 Am.

Stat. Rep. 149. But see, contra, 1858, Coffin v. Rich, 45 Maine 507, 71 Am. D.

559; 1867, Woodhouse v. Commw. Ins. Co., 54 Pa. Stat. 307.

Sec. 201. 4. Contract between the state and the corporators or

members.

TOMLINSON v. JESSUP.'

1872. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 15

Wallace (82 U. S.) 454-459-

[Bill in equity by Jcssup, a stockholder of the Northeastern Rail-

road Company against Tomlinson and other officers of South Carolina

Sec. 201. 4. Contract between the state and the corporqtors or

to enjoin them from levying a tax on the propertv of the road. Lower

members.

court granted the injunction, and appeal taken.]

TOMLINSON v. JESSUP. 1

Field, J. The constitution of South Carolina, adopted in 1868,

declares that the property of corporations then existing or thereafter

x872.

1 Statement except as given in opinion omitted.
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Wa:Iacc (82 U.S.) 454-459.
[Bill in equity by Jessup , a stockholder of the Northeastern Railroad Company against Tomlinson and other officers of South Carolina
to enjoin them from levying a tax on the property of the road. Lower
court g ranted the injunction, and appeal taken. J
FrnLo, J. The constitution of South Carolina, adopted in 1868,
declares that the property of corporations then existing or thereafter
1
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created, shall be subject to taxation, except in certain cases, not ma-

terial to the present inquiry. The subsequent legislation of the state

carried out this requirement and provided for the taxation of the prop-
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erty of railroad companies; and the question presented is, whether the

act of December, 1855, to amend the charter of the Northeastern Rail-

road Company, exempted the property of that company from suGh

taxation. The company was incorporated in 1851, and at that time a

general law of the state was in existence, passed in 1841, which en-

acted that the charter of every corporation subsequently granted, and

any renewal, amendment or modification thereof, should be subject to

amendment, alteration or repeal by legislative authority, unless the act

granting the charter or the renewal, amendment or modification in

express terms excepted it from the operation of that law. The pro-

visions of that law, therefore, constituted the condition upon which

every charter of a corporation subsequently granted was held, and upon

which every amendment or modification was made. They were as

operative and as much a part of the charter and amendment as if in-

corporated into them.

The act amending the charter of the Northeastern Railroad Com-

pany, passed in December, 1855, provided that the stock of the com-
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pany, and the real estate it then owned, or might thereafter acquire,

connected with or subservient to the works authorized by its charter,

should be exempted from taxation during the continuance of the char-

ter. This act contained no clause excepting the amendment from the

provisions of the general law of 1841. It was, therefore, itself sub-

ject to repeal by force of that law.

It is true that the charter of the company -when accepted by the

corporators constituted a contract between them and the state, and

that the amendment, when accepted, formed a part of the contract

from that date and was of the same obligatory character. And it

may be equally true, as stated by counsel, that the exemption from

taxation added greatly to the value of the stock of the company, and

induced the plaintiff to purchase the shares held by him. But these

considerations can not be allowed any weight in determining the

validity of the subsequent taxation. The power reserved to the state

by the law of 1841 authorized any change in the contract as it origin-

ally existed, or as subsequently modified, or its entire revocation. The

original corporators, or subsequent stockholders, took their interests

with knowledge of the existence of this power, and of the possibility

of its exercise at any time in the discretion of the legislature. The

object of the reservation, and of similar reservations in other charters,

is to prevent a grant of corporate rights and privileges in a form which

will preclude legislative interference with their exercise if the public

interest should at any time require such interference. It is a pro-

vision intended to preserve to the state control over its contract with the

corporators, which without that provision would be irrepealable and

protected from anv measures affecting its obligation.

There is no subject over which it is of greater moment for the state

to preserve its power than that of taxation. It has nevertheless been

created, shall be subject to taxation, except in certain cases. not material to the present inquiry. The subsequent legislation of the state
carried out this requirement and provi9ed for the taxation of the property of railroad companies; and the question presented is, whether the
act of December, 1855, to amend the charter of the Northeastern Railroad Company, exempted the property of that company from suGh
taxation. The company was incorporated in 185 I, and at that time a
general law of the i,tate was in existence, passed in 1841, which enacted that the cha1ier of every corporation subsequently granted, and
any renewal, amendment or modification thereof, should be subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by legislative authority, unless the act
granting the charter or the renewal, amendment or modification in
express terms excepted it from the operation of that law. The provisions of that Jaw, therefore, constituted the condition upon which
every charter of a corporation subsequently granted was held, and upon
which every amendment or modification was made. They were as
operative and as much a part of the charter and amendment as if incorporated into them. ·
The act amending the charter of the Northeastern Railroad Company, passed in December, 1855, provided that the stock of the company, and the real estate it then owned, or might thereafter acquire, ·
connected with or subservient to the works authorized by its charter,
should be exempted from taxation during the continuance of the charter. This act contained no clause excepting the amendment from the
provisions of the general law of 1841. It was, therefore, itself subject to repeal by force of that law.
It i's true that the charter of tlze company when accepted by the
corporators constt'tuted a contract between them and the state, and
that the amendment, when accepted, formed a part of tlte contract
from that date and was of the same oblt'gatory character. And it
may be equally true, as stated by counsel, that the exemption from
taxation added greatly to the value of the stock of the company, and
induced the plaintiff to purchase the shares held by him. But these
considerations can not be allowed any weight in determining the
validity of the subsequent taxation. The power reserved to the state
by the law of 1841 authorized any change in the contract as it originally existed, or as subsequently modified, or its entire reyocation. The
original corporators, or subsequent stockholders, took their interests
with knowledge of the existence of this power, and of the possibility
of its exercise at any time in the discretion of the .legislature. The
object of the reservation, and of similar reservations in other charters ,
is to prevent a grant of corporate rights and privileges in a form which
will preclude legislative interference with their exercise if the pllhlic
interest should at any time require such interference. It is a provision intended to preserve to the state control O\'er its contract with the
corporators, which without that pro,·ision would be irrepealable and
protected from any measures affecting its obligation.
There is no subject over which it is of greater moment for the state
to preserve its power than that of taxation. It has nevertheless been
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held by tins court, not, however, without occasional earnest dissent

TOMLINSON V. JESSUP.

from a minority, that the power of taxation over particular parcels of

property, or over property of particular persons or corporations, may

held by tn1s coun, not, however, without occasional earnest dissent
from a minority, that the power of taxation over particular parcels of
property, or over property of particular persons or corporations, may
be surrendered by one legislative body, so as to bind its successors
and the state. It was so adjudged at an early day in New Jersey v.
Wilson, 7 Cranch 164; the adjudication was affirmed in Jefferson
Bank v . Skelly, 1 Black 436; and has been repeated in several cases
within the past few years, and notably so in the cases of The Home
of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wallace 430; and Wilmington Railroad v. Reed, 13 Wallace 264. In these cases, and in others of a
similar character, the exemption is upheld as being made upon considerations moving to the state which give to the transaction the character of a contract. It is thus that it is brought within the protection
of the federal constitution. In the case qf a corporation, the exemption,
if originally made in tlte ad of inco1poration, i's supported upo1l the
consideration of the duties and liabilit£es w/zick tlze corpora/ors assume

be surrendered by one legislative body, so as to bind its successors

and the state. It was so adjudged at an early day in New Jersey v.

Wilson, 7 Cranch 164; the adjudication was affirmed in Jefferson

Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black 436; and has been repeated in several cases

within the past few years, and notably so in the cases of The Home

of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wallace 430; and Wilmington Rail-

road v. Reed, 13 Wallace 264. In these cases, and in others of a

similar character, the exemption is upheld as being made upon con-

siderations moving to the state which give to the transaction the char-

acter of a contract. It is thus that it is brought within the protection

of the federal constitution, hi the case of a corporation, the exemption,

if originally made in the act of incorporation, is supported upon the

consideration of the duties and liabilities which the corporators assume

by accepting the charter. When made, as in the present case, by an

amendment of the charter, it is supported upon the consideration of the

greater efficiency with which the corporation will thus be enabled to dis-
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charge the duties originally assumed by the corporators to the public, or

by accepting tl~e c/zarter. Wizen made, as in the present case, by an
amendment of the charter, it is supported upon the consideration of llzt
greater efficiency with wliich the corporation will thus be enabled to dis·
charge the duties onginally assumed by the corpora/ors to t/ie public, or
of tlze greater facility with wlliclz it will support its liabilities and carry
out the purposes of its creation. Immunity from taxation, constituting
in these cases a part of the contract with the government, is, by the
. reservation of power such as is contained in the law of 1841 , subject

of the greater facility with which it will support its liabilities and carry

out the purposes of its creation. Immunity from taxation, constituting

in these cases a part of the contract with the government, is, by the

reservation of power such as is contained in the law of 1841, subject

to be revoked equally with any other provision of the charter when-

ever the legislature may deem it expedient for the public interests that

the revocation shall be made. The reservation affects the entire re-

lation between the state and the corporation, and places under legis-

lative control all rights, privileges and immunities derived by its charter

to be revoked equally with any other provision of the charter whenever the legislature may deem it expedient for the public interests that
the revocation shall be made. The reservation affects the entire relation between the state and the corporation, and places under legislative control all rights, privileges and immunities derived by its charter
directly from the state. Rights acquired by third parties, and which
have become vested under the charter, in the legitimate exercise of
its powers, stand upon a different footing; but of such rights it is unnecessary to speak here. The state only asserts in the present case Lite

directly from the state. Rights acquired by third parties, and which

have become vested under the charter, in the legitimate exercise of

its powers, stand upon a different footing; but of such rights it is un-

necessary to speak here. The state only asserts in the present case the

power under the reservation to modify its own contract with the corpo-

rators; it does not contend for a power to revoke the contracts of the

corporation with other parties, or to impair any vested rights thereby

acquired.

Reversed.

Note. See cases cited under Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra, p. 746,

power under the reservation to modify its own contract with the corpora/ors; it does not contend for a power to revoke the contracts of tlte
corporation witlt other parties, or to impair any vested rights thereby
acquired.

and Yeaton v. Bank; supra, p. 750. 1861, Stevens v. Rutland, etc., R., 29 Vt.

545; 1852, Bank of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. St. 144; 1856, Erie

R. Co. v. Casey, 26 Pa. St. 287; 1867, Zabriskie v. Hackensack R, 18 N.J.

Eq. 178; 1871, "Wilmington R. Co. v. Reid, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 264; 1873, Del-

aware R. Tax, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 206; 1875, Lothrop v. Stedman, 42 Conn.

583.

Reversed.
Note. See cases cited under Dartmouth College v. Woodward, .~11pra, p. 746,
and Yeaton v. Bank; supra, p. 750. 1851, Stevens v. Rutland, etc., R., 29 Yt.
545; 1852, Bank of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. St. 144: 1856, Erie
R. Co. v. Casey, 26 Pa. St. 287; 1867, Zabriskie v. Hackensack R., 18 N. J.
Eq. 178; 18'11, Wilmington R. Co. v. Reid , 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 264; 1873, Delaware R . Tax, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 206; 1875, Lothrop v. Stedman, 42 Conn.
583.
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Sec. 202. 5- Contract between the corporation and members, or

among the members themselves.

. (a) As to amount to be contributed.

§ 202

CONTRACT BETWEE~ CORPORATION ANL> ~IDIBERS.

7 57

IRELAND v. THE PALESTINE, Etc., TURNPIKE COMPANY.1

1869. In the Supreme Court of Ohio. 19 Ohio St. Rep. 369-375.

[Error to common pleas reserved in the district court. The Turn-

Sec. 202.

S. Contract between the corporation and members, or
among the members themselves.

pike Company was organized in 1852, under a law imposing no indi-

vidual liability upon stockholders beyond their subscription. Ireland

(a) As to amount to

was a subscriber to the stock and had fully paid up his subscription.

be contributed .

A later act (May 3, 1852) authorized those companies who should

accept its provisions to issue bonds to complete their roads or pay

IRELAND v. THE PALESTINE, ETc., TURNPIKE COMPANY.1

their debts, making the stockholders individually liable to the amount

of their stock on such bonds. The directors accepted this act, and

issued and sold the bonds. A later act provided that a majority of

1869. IN THE Su,PREME CouRT

OF

Omo. 19 Ohio St. Rep. 369-375·

shareholders at a meeting duly called could make an assessment fro

rata for the payment of such liability. At a meeting duly called

(Ireland not being present or represented) an assessment was ordered.

Upon Ireland's refusal to pay, the company brought suit and obtained

judgment in the lower court. Petition in error was brought to reverse

this].
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Welch, J. In our judgment the act of May 3, 1S52, in so far as

it authorizes assessments against stockholders who have paid the full

amount of their subscriptions, and who by the charter of the company,

or the laws under which it was organized, were not individually liable

for its debts, is unconstitutional. It impairs the validity of the contract

between the company and the stockholder. In a contract between the

company and a stockholder, or in an action by the former or its creditors

against the latter, the stockholder is to be regarded as an individual

person, separate and distinct from the corporation. He becomes a

stockholder by virtue of a contract with the company, and he has a

right to stand upon the terms of that contract, interpreted and lim-

ited by the laws under which it was made. By his contract with this

company Ireland agreed to pay a specified sum, and no more. This

sum he has fully paid, and to require him to contribute an additional

amount would be to violate the contract between the parties. Let it

be understood that the amount for whicli a stockholder becomes liable

to the company by his subscription is not limited by his contract, but

by the discretion of the directors, or the stockholders at large, and no

prudent man will subscribe for stock in a corporation. If such be

the law, it is of little importance to the subscriber whether the amount

of stock taken be large or small, because it can be indefinitely in-

creased at the pleasure of the company, whenever the legislature sees

proper to give the power to do so. If a subscriber contracts to pay a

1 Statement abridged. Arguments and part of opinion omitted.

[Error to common pleas reserved in the district court. The Turnpike Company was organized in 1852, under a law imposing no individual liability upon stockholders beyond their subscription. Ireland
was a subscriber to the stock and had fully paid up his subscription .
A later act (May 3, 1852) authorized those compnnies who should
accept its provisions to issue bonds to complete their roads or pay
their debts, making the stockholders individually liable to the amount
·of their stock on such bonds. The directors accepted this act, and
issued and sold the bonds. A later act provided that a majority of
shareholders at a meeting duly called could make an assessment pro
rata for the payment of such li ability. At a meeting duly called
(Ireland not being present or represented) an assessment was ordered.
Upon Ireland's refusal to pay, the company brought suit and obtained
judgment in the lower court. Petition in error was brought to reverse
this].
WELCH, J. In our judgment <the act of May 3 1 1852, in so far as
it authorizes assessments against stockholders who have paid the full
amount of their subscriptions, and who by the chatter of the company,
or the laws under which it was organized, were not individually linble
for its debts, is uncon stitutional. It impairs tlte val£d£ty of the contract
between the company and the stockholder. In a contract between the
company and a stockholder, or in an action by t/1e former or £ts creditors
against the latter, the stockholder is to be regarded as an i11dividual
person, separate and distinct f1·om the corporation. He becomes a
stock/wider by v£rtue of a contract wt'tlt tlte company, and h e has a
rigltt to stand upon the terms of that contract, interpreted and /£111i'ted by the laws under whicll it was made. By his contract with this
company Ireland agreed to pay a specified sum , and no more. This
sum he has fully paid , and to require him to contribute an additional
amount would be to violate the contract between the parties. Let it
be understood that the amount for which a stockholder becomes liable
to the company by his subscription is not limited by his contract, but
by the discretion of the director. , or the stockholders at large, and no
pnident man will subscribe for stock in a corporation. If su ch he
the law, it is of little importance to the subscriber whether the amount
of stock taken be large or small, because it can be indefinitely increased at the pleasure of the company, whenever the legislature sees •
proper to give the power to do so. If a subscriber contracts to pay a
1 Statement abridged.
Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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sum which he deems within his means of payment, he may be called

758

upon to contribute an amount utterly beyond those means, and which

WHITE :\10tINTAINS R. CO. V. EASTMAN.

§ 203

may render him bankrupt. No subscriber would be safe under such

sum which lie deems ·within his means of payment, he may be called
upon to contribute an amount utterly beyond those means, and which
may render him bankrupt. No subscriber would be safe under such
a law, or have any rule by which to determine the amount of stock
he could afford to take. In vain would he look to the charter of the
company, or to the provisions of the constitution and subsisting laws
of the state, to learn the nature and extent of the liability he was
about to incur, if that liability can, at the pleasure of the legislature,
be indefinitely increased or modified by retroactive laws. • • •
Reversed.

a law, or have any rule by which to determine the amount of stock

he could afford to take. In vain would he look to the charter of the

company, or to the provisions of the constitution and subsisting laws

of the state, to learn the nature and extent of the liability he was

about to incur, if that liability can, at the pleasure of the legislature,

be indefinitely increased or modified by retroactive laws. * * •

Reversed.

Note. See, 1806, Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143, supra, p. 150; 1820, Livings-

ton v. Lynch, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 573; 1824, Natuseh v. Irving, 2 Cooper

Ch. 358; 1843, Hartford & N. H. R. Co. v. Crosswell, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 383; 1851,

Stevens v. Rutland, etc., R., 29 Vt. 545; 1854, New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v.

Harris, 27 Miss. 517; 1860, Simpson v. Westminster, etc., Co., 8 H. L. Cas.

Note. See, 1806, Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143, supra, p.150; 1820, Livingston v. Lynch, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 573; 1824, Natusch v. Irving, 2 Cooper
Ch. 358; 1843, Hartford & N. H. R. Co. v. Crosswell, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 383; 1851,
Stevens v. Rutland, etc., R., 29 Vt. 545; 18-54, New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v.
Harris, 27 Miss. 517; 1860, Simpson v. Westminster, etc., Co., 8 H. L. Cas.
712; 1861, Abbott v. Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578; 1863, Clearwater v.
Meredith, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 25; 1867, Zabriskie v. Hackensack, etc., R. , 18
N. J. Eq. 178, 90 Am. Dec. 617: 1869, Central R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582,
on 624; 1873, Railway Co. v. Allerton, 85 U. S. (18 Wall. ) 2"23, supra, p. 442;
1879, Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159, infra, p. 700; 1880, Hoey v.
Henderson, 32 La. Ann. 1069; 1885, Academy of Music v. Flanders, 75 Ga.
14; 189'2. People v. Ballard, Ia4 N. Y. 269; 1893, ForreE.ter v. Boston & 1\1. C.
C. & S. Co., 2l! Mont. 430, 55 Pac. Rep. 2'..!9; 1899, Pronick v. Spirits Distrib.
Co., 58 N. J. Eq. 97, 42 Atl. Rep. 586; 1901, Bedford v. Eastern B. & L. Assn.,
181 u. 8. 227.

712; 1861, Abbott v. Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578; 1863, Clearwater v.

Meredith, 68 U. S. (1 Wall.) 25; 1867, Zabriskie v. Hackensaek, etc., R., 18

N. J. Eq. 178, 90 Am. Dec. 617; 1869, Central R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582,

On 624; 1873, Railway Co. v. Allerton, 85 TJ. S. (18 Wall.) 223, supra, p. 442;

1879, Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159, infra, p. 790; 1880, Hoey v.
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Henderson, 32 La. Ann. 1069; 1885, Academy of Music v. Flanders, 75 Ga.

14; 1892, People v. Ballard, 134 N. Y. 269; 1893. Forrester v. Boston & M. C.

C. & S. Co., 22 Mont. 430, 55 Pac. Rep. 229; 1899, Pronick v. Spirits Distrib.

Co., 58 N. J. Eq.97, 42 Atl. Rep. 586; 1901, Bedford v. Eastern B. & L. Assn.,

181 U. S. 227. .

Sec. 203. Same.

(£) That subscriptions are made in good faith.

WHITE MOUNTAINS RAILROAD CO. v. EASTMAN.1

1856. In the Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire.

Sec. 203. Same.

34 N. H. Rep. 124-147.

[Appeal from report of commissioner of insolvency upon Eastman's

estate, allowing the railroad company $2,642.12 upon a subscription

( b) That subscriptions are made in good faith.

made by decedent for thirty shares to the company's stock. The

original subscription was made in writing in the company's subscrip-

WHITE MOUNTAINS RAILROAD CO. v. EASTMAN.1

tion book, apparently upon the same terms as other subscriptions, but

at the time it was made the proper agents of the corporation agreed

1856.

in writing to release the decedent, at his or his administrator's elec-

IN

THE

SUPREME

tion, from all liability upon twenty-five shares. This was the defense

JUDICIAL COURT OF

NEW

HAMPSHIRE.

34 N. H. Rep. 124-I47.

made.]

Sawyer, J. * * * The two contemporaneous writings upon

[Appeal from report of commissioner of insolvency upon Eastman's
estate, allowing the railroad company $2,642. I 2 upon a subscription
made by decedent for thirty shares to the company's stock. The
original subscription was made in writing in the company's subscription book, apparently upon the same terms as other subscriptions, but
at the time it was made the proper agents of the corporation agreed
in writing to release the decedent, nt his or his administrator's election, from all liability upon twenty-fhe shares. This was the defen e
made.]
SAWYER, J.
• • • The two contemporaneous writings upon
the same subject, between the same parties, are to be considered together as one contract, unless upon other grounds the writing given
by the corporation is to be held void. Thus considered in connection, effect would be given to all the stipulations on both sides, con-

the same subject, between the same parties, are to be considered to-

gether as one contract, unless upon other grounds the writing given

by the corporation is to be held void. Thus considered in connec-

tion, effect would be given to all the stipulations on both sides, con-

Statement abridged. Only small part of opinion given.

1
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tained in both writings, as constituting together one agreement. If

no person were to be affected by the contract but the parties them-

selves, it would be competent for them to agree that the intestate

§

203

CONTRACT BETWEEN CORPORATION AND MEMBERS.

759

should take and pay for thirty shares, subject, however, to the condi-

tion that if within one year he should elect to reduce the number so

subscribed for to five, or any other number not less than five, he might

be at liberty so to do, and that the corporation, upon his paying for the

thirty or other reduced number of shares, would give him proper cer-

tificates therefor, constituting him the owner of them. * * * If they,

for the purpose of misleading and deceiving third persons having an

interest in the subject of their contract, held out the subscription of the

intestate, as shown upon their subscription book, as the contract be-

tween them and him, and concealed from those third persons the fact,

material for them to know, that there was a secret stipulation making the

contract an entirely different thing, the principles of common honesty

would require that they should be compelled to stand to the agreement

as they held it out to be. * * * That the proceeding is a fraud upon

third persons is clear from the relation in which subscribers for stock

in a corporation of this kind stand toward each other. In the sub-

scription of each person every other subscriber has a direct interest.
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Their respective subscriptions are contributions or advancements for a

common object. The action of each in his subscription may be supposed

to be influenced by that of the others, and every subscription to be based

upon the ground that the others are what upon their face they purport

to be. * * *

The fact that one man has bound himself to place a certain amount

of his money upon the risk involved in the enterprise is an induce-

ment to others to venture in like manner. Seeing who are his associ-

ates, and the extent of the liability which they have assumed, he reg-

ulates his own upon that consideration; and though in form and legal

effect the contract of each is with the corporation, yet among the subscrib-

ers themselves it is to be regarded as an agreement with every other sub-

scriber to bear that proportion of the common burthen to which he pro-

fesses to bind himself by the contract which he holds out to them as his

contract with the corporation. * * * To hold that the secret stipulation is

valid as between these parties would be to give full effect to the iraud

by relieving the estate of the intestate from a part of that burthen which

he held out to the other subscribers he had assumed, and throwing

upon them the necessity of providing for it. To hold that by fraud the

whole contract as between the parties is void would but increase the in-

justice as to the other subscribers, for it would throw upon them the

whole of that proportion of the common burthen which the intestate held

out to them he had assumed; while, on the other hand, by holding that

the contract which the parties held out to them as the true one, was

in fact the contract made by them—all secret stipulations rendering it

other than that being void as fraudulent toward third persons—the

contemplated fraud is defeated and perfect justice done to the other

tained in both writings, as constituting together one agreement. If
no person were to be affected by the contract but the parties themselves, it would be competent for them to agree that the intestate
should take and pay for thirty shares, subject, however, to the condition that if within one year he should elect to reduce the number so
suhscribed for to five, or any other number not less than five, he might
be at liberty so to do, and that the corporation, upon his paying for the
thi1ty or other reduced number of shares, would give him proper certificates therefor, constituting him the owner of them. • • • If they,
for the purpose of misleading and deceiving third persons having an
interest in the subject of their contract, held out the subscription of the
intestate, as shown upon their subscription book, as the contract between them and him, and concealed from those third persons the fact,
material for them to know, that there was a secret stipulation making the
contract an entirely different thing, the principles of common honesty
would require that they should be compelled to stand to the agreement
as they held it out to be. • • • That the proceeding is a fraud upon
third persons is clear from the relation in which subscribers for stock
in a corporation of this kind stand toward each other. In the subscription o.f each person every other subscriber has a direct interest.
Their respective subscnptions are conln.butions or advancements for a
common object. The action of each £n Ms subscription may be supposed
lo be influenced by that o.f tlie others, and every subscription to be based
upon the ground that the others are wliat upon tlieir face they purport
to be. • • •
The fact that on.e man has bound himself to place a certain amount
of his money upon the risk involved in the enterprise is an inrlucement to others to venture in like manner. Seeing who are his associates, and the extent of the liability which they have assumed, he re.gulates his own upon that consideration; and though in form and legal
effect the contract o.f each £s willt the corporation,yel amo11g the subscn'bers themselves it is lo be regarded as an agreement witlt every other subscriber lo bear that proportion o.f tlie common burthen to wltick he professes to bind himself by the contract wliich he holds out to them as his
contract w£tli the corporation. • • • TQ hold that the secret stipulation is
valid as between these parties would be to give foll effect to the rraud
by relieving the estate of the intestate from a part of that burthen which
he held out to the other subscribers he had assumed, and throwing
upon them the necessity of providing for it. To hold that by fraud the
whole contract as between the parties is void would but increase the injustice as to the other subscribers, for it would throw upon them the
whole of that proportion of the common burthen which the intestate held
out to them he had assumed; while, on the other hand, by holding that
the contract which the parties held out to them as the true one, was
in fact the contract made by them-all secret stipulations rendering it
other than that being void as fraudulent toward third persons-the
contemplated fraud is defeated and perfect justice done to the other
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subscribers, and at the same time in so holding no wrong is done to

760

the parties of which either has reason to complain. * * *

WHITE MOUNTAINS R. CO. V. EASTMAN:

§ 204

Affirmed.

subscribers, and at the same time in so holding no wrong is done to
the parties of which either has reason to complain. • • •
Affirmed.

Note. See, 1827, Center & K. Turnpike Co. v. McConabv, 16 S. & R. (Pa.)

140; 1858, Graff v. Pittsburg & S. R. Co., 31 Pa. St. 489; 1859, EaGrange & M.

Plank R. Co. v. Mavs, 20 Mo. 64; 1869, Custar v. Titusville Gas & W. Co., 63

Pa. St. 381; 1875, Melvin v. Lamar Ins. Co., 80 111. 446, 22 Am. Rep. 199;

Note. See, 1827, Center & K. Turnpike Co . v. McConaby, 16 S. & R. (Pa.)
140; 1858, Graff v. Pittsburg & S. R. Co., 31 Pa. St. 489 ; 1859, J_,aGrange & M.
Plank R . Co. v. Mays, 29 Mo. 64; 1869. Cusitar v. Titusville Gas & W. Co., 63
Pn. St. 381; 1875, Melvin v. Lamar In s. Co., 80 Ill. 446, 22 Am . Rep. 199;
1876, Phoenix Warehouse Co.,.. Badger, 67 N. Y. 294; 1878, Miller v. Hanover, J c. & S. R. Co., 87 Pa. St. 9ll, 30 Am. Rep. 349; 1886, Galena & S. ,\T.
R. Co. v. Ennor, 116 Ill. 55; 1888, Topeka l\1unufacturing Co. v. Hale, 39
Kan. 23; 1889, Morrow v . Iron & Steel Co., 87 Tenn. 262, 3 L. R. A. 37.
Compare, 1872, Burke ,._ Smith, 16 Wal I. 390; 1888, )forgau v. Strutbeni,
131 U.S. 246; 1888, Meyer v. Blair, 109 N. Y. 600, 4 Am. t4t. R ep. 500; 1889,
Winston v. Dorsett Pipe & P. Co., 129 Ill. 6-11, 4 L. R . A. 507.
But under oome circumstances conditional de hveries in escrow are valirl.
See, 1874, Bucher v. Dillsburg& M. R. Co., '76 Pa. St. 306 ; 1894, Great Western Tel: Co. v. L?ewentbnl, 15-1Ill.261. Also..!! MiuneapolisThr~shing Mac. Co.
v. Davis, 40 l\11110. 110, 12 Am. St. Rep. 101, 3 L . R. A. 796, stqira,
492;
Wight v. Shelby R. Co., 16 B. Mon. 4, supra , p . 536, and Cass v. P., \ . & C.
R. Co., 80 Pa. St. 31, :mpra, p. 538.

187(5, Phoenix Warehouse Co. v. Badger, 67 N. Y. 294; 1878, Miller v. Han-

over, Jc. & S. R. Co., 87 Pa. St. 95, 30 Am. Rep. 349; 1886, Galena & S. W.

R. Co. v. Ennor, 116 111. 55; 1888, Topeka Manufacturing Co. v. Hale, 39

Kan. 23; 1889, Morrow v. Iron & Steel Co., 87 Tenn. 262, 3 L. R. A. 37.

Compare, 1872, Burke v. Smith, 16 Wall. 390; 1888, Morgan v. Struthers,

131 U. S. 246; 1888, Meyer v. Blair, 109 N. Y. 600, 4 Am. St. Rep. 500; 1889,

Winston v. Dorsett Pipe & P. Co., 129 111. 64, 4 L. R. A. 507.

But under some circumstances conditional deliveries in escrow are valid.

See, 1874, Bucher v. Dillsburg& M. R. Co., 76 Pa. St. 306; 1894, Great West-

ern Tel. Co. v. lx»ewenthal, 154 111. 261. Also, Minneapolis Threshing Mac. Co.

v. Davis, 40 Minn. 110, 12 Am. St. Rep. 701, 3 L. R. A. 796, supra, p. 492;

Wight v. Shelby R. Co., 16 B. Mon. 4, snpra, p. 536, and Cass v. P., V. & C.

r·

R. Co., 80 Pa. St. 31, supra, p. 538.
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ARTICLE III. THE CORPORATE FUNDS CAPITAL STOCK.

Sec. 204. In general. "The legal relations resulting from incor-

poration subsist in respect of the object of incorporation spe-

cified in the charter or articles of association and the means of

attaining this object, i. e., the corporate funds and property.

Roughly speaking, the general result of these relations is that

ARTICLE III.

THE CORPORATE F UNDS-CAPITAL STOCK.

the corporate funds become a so-called trust fund, set apart

Sec. 204. In general.

for the attainment of the object of incorporation." * * *

''The legal irclations resulting from incorporation subsist in respect of the object of incorporation specified in the charter or articles of association and the means of
attaining this object, i. e., the corporate funds and property .
Roughly speaking, the general result of these relations is that
the corporate fund s become a so-called trust fund, set apart
for the attainment of the object 0 1f incorporation. ' ' • • •
' ' The general outline is this: The state has the power or
right to enforce the application olf these fund s to the objects
of incorporation, at least, so far as the pub Iic is interested in
their attainment; the shareholde rs have the right to apply
these funds to these objects; and the creditors of the corporation have the right to pr.event the diversion of these funds
from the objects of incorporation to the injury of creditors .
The result of the respecti\·e rights of these different classes of
persons is that corporate property becomes a fund set apart
for the attainment of certain purposes from which it can not
be diverted without the consent of all whose legally protected
interests would be injured by such diversion.' '-Taylor Private Corporations, §§ 32-34.

"The general outline is this: The state has the power or

right to enforce the application of these funds to the objects

of incorporation, at least, so far as the public is interested in

their attainment; the shareholders have the right to apply

these funds to these objects; and the creditors of the corpora-

tion have the right to prevent the diversion of these funds

from the objects of incorporation to the injury of creditors.

The result of the respective rights of these different classes of

persons is that corporate property becomes a fund set apart

for the attainment of certain purposes from which it can not

be diverted without the consent of all whose legally protected

interests would be injured by such diversion."—Taylor Pri-

vate Corporations, §§ 32-34.
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Sec. 205. Right to create a capital stock.

COOKE v. MARSHALL.1

1899. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 191 Pa. St.

ReP- 3I5-323-

Sec. 205.

Right to create a capital stock.

\_£>uo warranto to determine right to office of secretary of the Char-

COOKE v. MARSHALL.1

tiers Cemetery Company. This company was created by act of 1862,

with the usual corporate powers—nothing being said as to power to

have a capital stock. The corporators organized, passed a resolution

1899. IN

THK SUPREME CouRT oF PENNSYLVANIA.

191 Pa. St.

Rep. 315-323.

establishing the cemetery on the ground designated, "and for this

purpose" fixed the capital stock at "$8,000, divided into 160 shares of

the par value of $50 each." This was subscribed, and the corpora-

tion proceeded to business. Afterward increases were made, first to

$50,000, and later to $150,000. In 1893, at an informal meeting of

some of the shareholders, the board was increased from five to seven

members, and Cooke was elected secretary; to these acts Marshall

protested, and later he, in connection with other members, organized

a new board, wholly ignoring all idea of corporate stock, elected "as-

sociates" and officers, and Marshall has ever since claimed to be sec-
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retary, and obtained possession of the seal and books of the company.

The stock board, however, continued to control the management of

the cemetery. Cooke brought the suit and obtained judgment below.

Marshall appealed.]

Green, J. * * * The question then is, was the original creation

and issue of stock lawful, and if so, were the subsequent increases law-

ful? The issue was made for the purpose of performing the original

duty to establish a cemetery. It was necessary to acquire land in order

to create the cemetery, and the corporators adopted the method of ob-

taining the land by issuing stock in payment for it. It is not denied

that the corporation might have borrowed money for this purpose,

and made a mortgage on the property to secure the payment of it,

although no such power was expressly conferred by the charter. On

the question whether capital stock might be issued for the same pur-

pose where the charter has not specially authorized a capital stock,

not a single authority is cited for or against in the paper-books of

either party. There is no doubt that this particular corporation did

possess full corporate powers, and there is also no doubt that it was

not only authorized but expressly enjoined to create a cemetery of not

less than thirty acres in extent, and after that to lay it out into lots and

plots, and roads and walks, and to do various other things neces-

sary to its proper development as a cemetery. No method of raising

money to acquire the land and do these various things was provided in

the charter. The ordinary method in which such things are done is

by the creation and issue of capital stock, and it may be argued with

apparent reason that it is a necessary implication from the grant of

1 Arguments and part of opinion omitted. Statement abridged.

[ ~uo warranto to determine right to office of secretary of the Chartiers Cemetery Company. This company was created by act of 1862,
with the usual corporate powers-nothing being said as to power to
have a capital stock. The corporators organized, passed a resolution
establishing the cemetery on the ground d es ignated, "and for this
purpose" fixed the capital stock at " $8,CX>O, divid ed into l6o shares of
the par value of $so each." This was subscribed, and the corporation proceeded to business. Afterward increases were made, first to
$so,CX>O, and later to $ l 50,000. In 1893, at an informal meeting of
some of the shareholders, the board was increased from five to seven
members, and Cooke was elected secretarv; to these acts Marshall
protested, and later he, in connection with ~ther members, organized
a new board, wholly ignoring all idea of corporate stock, elected "associates" and officers, and Marshall has ever since claimed to be secretary, and obtained possession of the seal and books of the company.
The stock board , however, continued to control the management of
the cemetery. Cooke brought the suit and obtained judgment below.
Marshall appealed.]
GRERN. J. • • • The question then is, was the original creation
and issue of stock lawful, and if so, were the subsequent increases lawful? The issue was made for the purpose of performing the original
duty to establish a cemetery. It was necessary to acquire land in order
to create the cemetery, and the corporators adopted the m ethod of obtaining the land by issuing stock in payment for it. It is not denied
that the corporation might have borrowed money for this purpose,
and made a mortgage on the property to secure the payment of it,
although no such power was expressly conferred by the charter. On
the question whether capital stock might be issu ed for the same purpose where the charter has not specially authorized a capital stock,
not a single authority is cited for or against in the paper-books of
either party. There is no doubt that this particular corporation did
possess full corporate powers, and there is also no doubt that it was
not only authorized but expressly enjoined to create a cemetery of not
less than thirty acres in extent, and after that to lay it out into lots and
plots, and roads and walks, and to do various other things necessary to its proper development as a cemetery. No method of raising
money to acquire the land and do these various things was provided in
the charter. The ordinary method in which such things are done is
by the creation and issue of capital stock, and it may be argued with
apparent reason that it is a necessary implication from the grant of
1
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corporate existence and powers that a right to issuestock is conferred.

* * * In this case, however, the charter confers no power to issue

corporate existence and powers that a right to issue stock is conferred.
• • • In this case, however, the charter confers no power to issue
any stock, and for s uch a company as this no such power is needed. It is
remarkable that it is so difficult to find either text-book discu ssion of
this subject or adjudicated cases. Whether a corpora lio n without capital
provided for in its charter may creale and issue capital stock is certainly
a fundamental and radical matter in corporation law. In 1 Cook on
Stock, etc., § 279, it is said, "The capital stock of all incorporate d
companies is generally fixed by the charters which give them an existence." Section 281, "In the absence of express authority from the
state a corporation has no power whatsoeYer to increase or reduce the
amount of its stock, and any attempt on the part of the corporation,
either by the corporate officers or by the stockholders, to do so is
wholly illegal and void. • • • Where the attempted increase or
reduction of the stock is not authorized by the charter, not even the
unanimous assent and agreement of all the parties concerned will legalize it." • • •
(Citing Droitwich P. S. Co. v. Curzon, L. R. 3 Ex. 35 ; 1 Scovill v.
Thayer, 105 U.S. 143; Sutherland v. Olcott, 95 N. Y. 93 ; I Moraw etz, § 434, to the same effect.)
It follows , hence, that the increase of stock beingvoid, all the elections held there under since that time are void and confer no authority
upon the person s elected.
This niling would dispose of the present contention , but it is perhaps d esirable that the original creation of the $8,ooo of capital stock
should be considered. It is extremelv difficult to understand under
the foregoing d ecisions how any issue' of capital stock by this company can be regarded as valid. The company was chartered to establish a ce metery. While a ceme te ry company is not necessaril y a
religious or charitab le corporation, yet in many instances it is of that
character, and perhaps as a rule this is so ; yet they may be established
as merely private enterprises and carri ed on for profit. But, in either
case, if the charter confe1·s no right or power to create capital stock,
it is difficult to understand how any right to create and issue such
stock h as any exis tence. If capital stock m ay neither be in creased
nor diminished without an express power to that effect, how can any
stock be created or issued when the re is no .cnpital stock fixed by the
charter, and no powe r is g ive n to create it? In 1 Cook on C orporatio ns, § 8, the following definiti on of capital stock is g iven: "Capital
stock is the sum fixed by the corp orate charter as the amount paid in,
or to b e paid in, by the stockholders for th e prosecution of the
business of the corporation, and for the b enefit of corporate credito rs.'' • • •
(Citing B a rry v. Merchants' Ex~hange, 1 Sand£. Ch. 280; 2 America n Pi g I ron S . Co. v. State Bel., etc., 56 N. J. L. 389; Salem Mill
Dam C o . v . R opes , 6 Pic k. 23.)
Now, if the doctrine of the:-;e cases (and there are many more of
them) he true , and the act of increasing or decreasing the capital

any stock, and for such a company as this no such power is needed. It is

remarkable that it is so difficult to find either text-hook discussion of

this subject or adjudicated cases. Whether a corporation without capital

provided for in its charter may create and issue capital stock is certainly

a fundamental and radical matter in corporation law. In 1 Cook on

Stock, etc., § 279, it is said, "The capital stock of all incorporated

companies is generally fixed by the charters which give them an exist-

ence." Section 281, "In the absence of express authority from the

state a corporation has no power whatsoever to increase or reduce the

amount of its stock, and any attempt on the part of the corporation,

either by the corporate officers or by the stockholders, to do so is

whollv illegal and void. • * • Where the attempted increase or

reduction of the stock is not authorized by the charter, not even the

unanimous assent and agreement of all the parties concerned will le-

galize it." » * *

(Citing Droitwich P. S. Co. v. Curzon, L. R. 3 Ex. 35 ;1 Scovill v.
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Thayer, 105 U. S. 143; Sutherland v. Olcott, 95 N. Y. 93; 1 Mora-

wctz, § 434, to the same effect.)

It follows, hence, that the increase of stock being void, all the elec-

tions held thereunder since that time are void and confer no authority

upon the persons elected.

This ruling would dispose of the present contention, but it is per-

haps desirable that the original creation of the $8,000 of capital stock

should be considered. It is extremely difficult to understand under

the foregoing decisions how any issue of capital stock by this com-

pany can be regarded as valid. The company was chartered to es-

tablish a cemetery. While a cemetery company is not necessarily a

religious or charitable corporation, yet in many instances it is of that

character, and perhaps as a rule this is so; yet they may be established

as merely private enterprises and carried on for profit. But, in either

case, if the charter confers no right or power to create capital stock,

it is difficult to understand how any right to create and issue such

stock has any existence. If capital stock may neither be increased

nor diminished without an express power to that effect, how can any

stock be created or issued when there is no. capital stock fixed by the

charter, and no power is given to create it? In 1 Cook on Corpora-

tions, § S, the following definition of capital stock is given: "Capital

stock is the sum fixed bv the corporate charter as the amount paid in,

or to be paid in, by the stockholders for the prosecution of the

business of the corporation, and for the benefit of corporate cred-

itors." * * *

(Citing Barry v. Merchants' Exchange, 1 Sandf. Ch. 2So;J Amer-

ican Pig Iron S. Co. v. State Bd., etc., 56 N. J. L. 389; Salem Mill

Dam Co. v. Ropes, 6 Pick. 23.)

Now, if the doctrine of these cases (and there are many more of

them) be true, and the act of increasing or decreasing the capital

1 Infra, p. 764. «Infra, p. 766.

1
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stock of a corporation without specific charter power to do so is a

§ 206

THE CAPITAL STOCK.

void act because it is ultra vires, how can it be true that a corpora-

tion may issue any capital stock without having specific legislative

authority to do so? We can not see. If it is ultra vires to increase,

it is ultra vires to issue any stock where no power to do so is con-

ferred by the charter. The power to create corporate capital stock

is a legislative function, and, in any given case, in order that such-

stock may have a legal existence, the function must be exercised.

Reversed.

Sec. 206. Power to increase the capital stock.

See RAILWAY CO. v. ALLERTON, 85 U. 8. (18 Wall.) 233, supra, p. 442.

Note.. See, also: 1827, Salem Mill D. Corp. v. Ropes, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.)

23; 1854, People v. Parker Vein Coal Co., 10 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 543; 1856,

stock of a corporation withou~ specific charter power to do so is a
void act because it is ultra vires, how can it be true that a corporation may issue any capital stock without having specific legislative
authority to do so? We can not see. If £tis ultra vires to increase,
it is ultra vi'res to i"ssue any stock wliere no power to do so is conferred by tlte clzarter. The jOUJer to create corporate capital stock
is a legislati've function, and, in any given case, in order that suck
stock may have a legal existence, the function must be exercised.
Reversed.

Mechanics' Bank v. New York, etc., R., 13 N. Y. 599; 1856, Ferris v. Ludlow,

7 Ind. 517; 1865, New York & N. H. R. Co. v. Scluivler, 34 N. Y. 30; 1878,

Moses v. Ocoee Bank, 1 Lea iTenn.) 398; 1881, Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U. S.

Sec. 206. Power to increase the capital stock.

143; 1882. Grangers', etc., Ina. Co. v. Kamper. 73 Ala. 325; 1884, Sutherland

v. Oleott, 95 N. Y. 93; 1889, Cartwright v. Dickinson, 88 Tenn. 476; 1891,

See RAILWAY CO. v. ALLERTON, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 233, supra, p. 442.

Jones v. Railroad Co., 67 N. H. 119,234; 1895, Einstein v. Rochester Gas,
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etc., Co., 146 N. Y. 46; 1897, Peck v. Elliott, 47 U. S. App. 605, 79 Fed. Rep.

10, 24 C. C. A. 425, 38 L. R. A. 616, and note.

But it seems that if the charter or articles of association provides that the

stock mav be fixed bv the members, it may be changed from time to time by

the members. See, 1897, Peck v. Elliott, 47 U. S. App. 605, 38 L. R. A. 616.

Overissued shares are void, even in the hands of bona fide holders: 1854,

People v. Parker Vein Coal Co., 10 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 513; 1865, N. Y. & N.

H. R. v. Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 30; 1867, Bruff v. Mali, 36 N. Y. 200; 1808, Sewell's

Case, L. R. 3 Ch. App. 131, 138; 1882, People's Bank v. Kurtz, 99 Pa. St. 344;

1893, Hayden v. Charter Oak D. P., 63 Conn. 142.

But the corporation is liable to an innocent holder for the tort of the officer,

if he was clothed with the general power to issue stock for the corporation:

1842, Daly v. Thompson, 10 M. & VV. 309; 1857, Mandlebaum v. North Am.

Min. Co., 4 Mich. 465; 1865, New York & N. H. R. v. Schuvler, 34 N. Y. 30,

49, 60; 1867, Bruff v. Mali, 36 N. Y. 200; 1868, Re Bahia, etc., R. Co., L. R.

3 Q. B. 584, 595; 1873, Tome v. Parkersburg Br. R., 39 Md. 36; 1882, Peoples'

Bank v. Kurtz, 99 Pa. St. 344; 1889, Allen v. South Boston R., 150 Mass. 200;

1892, Ryder v. Bushwick R., 134 N. Y 83; 1893, Havden v. Charter Oak Driv.

Park, 63 Conn. 142; 1893, Fifth Avenue Bank v. Forty-Second St., etc., R. Co.,

137 N. Y. 231; 1897, Cincinnati, etc.. R. v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 56 Ohio St.

351, 47 N. E. Rep. 249, 43 L. R. A. 777.

Unless the stock is taken from such officer, as a part of a transaction in

which he is personally interested at the time: 1884, Moores v. Citizens' Na-

tional Bank, 111 U. S. 156; 1890, Farrington v. South Boston R., 150 Mass.

406; 1890, Wilson v. Metropolitan El. R., 120 N. Y. 145; 1891, Hill v. .Tewett

Pub. Co., 154 Mass. 172; 1893, Manhattan L. Ina. Co. v. Forty-Second, etc.,

R., 139 N. Y. 146.

Note. See, also : 1827, Salem Mill D. Corp. v . Ropes, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.)
23; 1854, People v. Parker Vein Coal Co., 10 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 543; 1856,
Mechanics' Bank v. New York, etc., R., 13 N. Y. 5!l!J; 1856, Ferris v. Ludlow,
7 Ind.•517; 1865, New York & N. H. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30; 1878,
Moses v. Ocoee Bank, 1 Lea \Tenn.) 398; 1881, Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U.S.
143; 1882. Grangers', etc., Ins. Co. v. Kamper. 73 Ala. 321); 1884, Sutherland
v. 01..:ott, 95 N. Y. 93; 1889. Cartwright v. Dickinson, 88 Tenn. 476; 1891,
Jones v. Railroad Co., 67 N. H. 119, 234; 1895, Einstein v. Rorheeter Gas,
etc., Co., 146 N. Y. 46; 1897, Peck v. Elliott, 47 U.S. App. 605, 79 Fed. Rep.
10, 24 C. C. A. 425, 38 L. R. A. 616, and riote.
But it seems that if the charter or articles of association provides that the
stock may be fixed by the members, it may be changed from time to time by
the members. See, 1897, Peck v. Elliott, 47 U.S. App. 605, 38 L. R. A. 616.
Overissued shares are void, even in the hands of bona fide holders: 1854,
People v. Parker V~in Coal Co ., 10 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 543; 1865, N. Y. & N.
H. R. v. Scbnyler, 34 N. Y. 30; 1867, Bruff v. Mali, 36 N. Y. 200; 1868, Sewell's
Case, L . R. 3 Ch. App. 131, 138; 1882, People's Bank v. Kurtz, 99 Pa. St. 344;
189~, H!l.yden v. Charter Oak D. P., 63 Conn. 142.
Bnt the corporation is li able to an innocent holder for the tort of the officer,
if he was clothed with the general power to issue stock for the corporation:
1842, Daly v. Thompson, 10 ~. & W. 309; 1857, Mandlchnum v. No rth Am.
Min. Co., 4 Mic·h. 465; 186.5, New York & N. H. R. v. Schuy ler, 34 N. Y. ao.
49, 60; 1867, Bruff v. Mnli, 36 N. Y. 200; 1868, Re Bahia, etc., R. Co., L. R.
3 Q. B. 58-l, 595; 1873, Tome v. Parkersburg Br. R., 39 Md. 36; 18 2, Peoples'
Bank v. Kurtz, 99 Pa. St. 344; 1889, Allen v. South Boston R., 150 Mass. 200;
l 892, Ryner v. Bush wick R., 134 N. Y. 8~; 1893, Hayden v. Charter Oak Dri v.
Park, 6il Conn. 142; 1893, Fifth Avenue Bank v. Forty-Seroml St., etc., R. Co.,
137 N. Y - 231; 1897, Cincinnati, et.c .. R. v. Citizens' Nat'! Bank, 56 Ohio St.
351, 47 N. E. Rep . 249, 43 L. R. A. 777.
Unless the stock is taken from such officer, as a part of a transaction in
which he is personally interesterl at the time : 1884, Moores v. Citizens' Nation:il Birnk, 111 U .S. 156; 1890, Farrington v. South Boston R., 150 Mass.
406; 1890, Wilson v. Metropolitan El. R. , 120 N. Y. 145; 1891, Hill v. Jewett
Pub. Co., 154 Mass. 172; 1893, Manhattan L. Ins. Co. v. Forty-Second, etc.,
R., 139 N. Y. 1.W.
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Sec. 207. Power to decrease the capital stock.

§

DROITWICH SALT CO. V. CURZON.

DROITWICH SALT CO. v. CURZON.1

207

1867. In the English Court of Exchequer. L. R. 3 Exch.

35-43-

Sec. 207.

Kelly, C. B. * * * The plaintiffs are a company which were in

Power to decrease the capital stock.

existence long before the passing of the companies act, 1862. At the

time of the passing of that act, or rather a short time afterward, when

DROITWICH SALT CO. v. CURZON.1

they called on the registrar to register them under the act, their nom-

inal capital was 250,000/. But this capital was then farther stated to

1867. bl

be "in 10,000 shares of 25/. each, all taken, 25/. having been paid on the

THE ENGLISH CouRT OF ExcHKQUER.

L. R. 3 Exch.

35-43.

first 5,000 shares, 15/. on the next 1,000 shares, and 5/. on the remaining

4,000 shares;" and it was also stated that the last 5,000 shares were

KELLY, C. B. • • • The pla intiffs are a company which were in
existence long before the passing of the companies act, 1862. At the
timt:: of the passing of that act, or rather a short time afterward, when
they called on the registrar to regi ter the m un<ler the act, their nominal capital was 250,oool. But this capital was then farther stated to
be "in 10,000 shares of 2 5l. each, all taken, 25!. having been paid on the
first 5,000 s hares, 15l. on the n ext 1 ,ooo shares, and 5l. on the remaining
4,000 shares;" and it \\"as also stated that the last 5,000 shares were
issued at 25/. each "for the sums abO\·e m entioned." This amounts
in substance to a declaration that the actual amount of capital had
been reduced from 250,oool. to 16o,oool., thus: there had been a new
issue of I ,ooo shares on the orig inal capital of 125 ,oool. at 15t. a
share, and two subsequent is ues of 4,000 shares at 5/. each. The
aggregate amount subscribed was, therefore, 16o,oool. , and this was
the real capital of the compt111y, although their nominal capital
amounted to 250 1000/. It is said that the words in the requi sition for
registration, "the last 5,000 shares were issued at 25/. each, for the
sums above m entioned, " amount to a statement that these shares were
to be considered as fully paid up. Probably this is so, and at all
events the registrar entered the company on the register, whether by
inadvertence or otherwise, under the act of 1862, in the manner
above d escribed. Subsequently he \\"as called upon to register · a
further change in the amount of capital. Resolution s were passed
re ducing the capital to 100,oool. in 10,000 fully paid-up shares of 1ol.
each. These resolutions w ere sent to the registrar and were recorded
by him. In fact, he ought to h ave refused to record them. H e did,
ho\vever, perha p s per incuriam, enter the reduction of capital. Th~n
he was called upon to register an increase of this reduced capital from
100,oool. to 125,oool. Notice was dul y given to him of the proposed
in crease, but he refused to record the notice or the amount of the
increase . Had he d o ne so, then taking all the entries together as representing the constitution and condition of the company, the entry of
125,oool. would ha., ·e amounted, in fact, to an entry, not of an increa e,
but of a reduction of the nominal capita 1 of 250,000/. , as orii:6nally
reg istered , to 125,oool. The .question , therefore, really is, \ vhether
the company were entitled to reduce their nominal capital and to call
upon the registrar to enter on the register a minute of that re duction?
Now, in the case of a co mpany formed under the act of 1862, and

issued at 25/. each "for the sums above mentioned." This amounts

in substance to a declaration that the actual amount of capital had

been reduced from 250,000/. to 160,000/., thus: there had been a new

issue of 1,000 shares on the original capital of 125.000/. at 15/. a

share, and two subsequent issues of 4,000 shares at 5/. each. The

aggregate amount subscribed was, therefore, 160,000/., and this was

the real capital of the company, although their nominal capital

amounted to 250,000/. It is said that the words in the requisition for
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registration, "the last 5,000 shares were issued at 25/. each, for the

sums above mentioned," amount to a statement that these shares were

to be considered as fully paid up. Probably this is so, and at all

events the registrar entered the company on the register, whether by

inadvertence or otherwise, under the act of 1862, in the manner

above described. Subsequently he was called upon to register' a

further change in the amount of capital. Resolutions were passed

reducing the capital to 100,000/. in 10.000 fully paid-up shares of 10I.

each. These resolutions were sent to the registrar and were recorded

bv him. In fact, he ought to have refused to record them. He did,

however, perhaps per incuriam, enter the reduction of capital. Then

he was called upon to register an increase of this reduced capital from

100,000/. to 125,000/. Notice was duly given to him of the proposed

increase, but he refused to record the notice or the amount of the

increase. Had he done so, then taking all the entries together as rep-

resenting the constitution and condition of the company, the entry of

125,000/. would have amounted, in fact, to an entry, not of an increase,

but of a reduction of the nominal capital of 250,000/.. as originally

registered, to 125,000/. The question, therefore, really is, whether

the company were entitled to reduce their nominal capital and to call

upon the registrar to enter on the register a minute of that reduction?

Now, in the case of a company formed under the act of 1862, and

1 Facts sufficiently stated in the opinion, part of which is omitted. Also

arguments, and concurring opinions of Bramwell, Channel! and Piggot,

Barons, are omitted.

1

1 Facts sufficiently stated in the opinion, part of which is omitted.
Also
arguments, and concurring opinions of Bramwell, Channell and Piggot,
Barons, are omitted.

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

THE CAPITAL STOCK.

765

also in the case t>f a company already formed, which afterwards is

§

207

THE CAPIT°AL STOCK.

registered under the act, it is imperative on the registrar to enter on

the register the amount of nominal capital. With regard to compa-

nies limited by shares formed under the act, section 8 enacts that the

memorandum of association shall, among other things, contain "the

amount of capital with which the company proposes to be registered,

divided into shares of a certain fixed amount,'' and before registration

the registrar (who has to give a certificate which is to be conclusive

evidence that all the requisites of the act in respect of registration

have been complied with) must satisfy himself that the matter to be

registered—the memorandum of association—contains all the elements

prescribed by the different clauses of section 8, and no alteration in

any one of these elements can be made unless expressly authorized

(section 12). The law is the same where an existing company ap-

plies for registration. Section 183 provides that, previous to registra-

tion, a statement of "the nominal capital of the company, and the

number of shares into which it is divided," is to be delivered to the

registrar, and his certificate of incorporation is to be conclusive evi-

dence (section 192) that all the requisitions in the act contained in
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respect of registration have been complied with. It is quite clear,

therefore, that the nominal amount of capital, and the number of

shares into which it is divided, must be stated to the registrar, by

vvhom that amount must then be entered on the register.

We next have to consider whether an existing company, when once-

registered, have any power under the act of 1S62 to give effect to a

provision contained in their original deed of settlement to reduce their

capital. Now, there is an express power given to increase capital

(section 12), but nowhere can there be found an express provision

pointing to a power to reduce, after once the nominal amount of cap-

ital has been registered. Is it then, the effect of the sixth clause of

section 196, to enable a company existing before the act, and register-

ing under it, to exercise the power of reducing their capital; or rather,

is it the effect of that article to legalize the continuance of a power

already possessed under the original deed of settlement or articles of

association? The language of the sixth clause is as follows (his lord-

ship read the clause), and as far as that language goes it is not con-

tended that there is anything in it to render lawful a reduction of

capital. But there follows a proviso in these terms: "Nothing herein

contained shall derogate from any power of altering its constitution

or regulations which may be vested in any company registering under

this act in pursuance of this part thereof by virtue of any act of par-

liament, deed of settlement, etc., constituting or regulating the com-

pany." Now, in construing this proviso, I take it that before the

word "power" we ought to introduce the word "lawful," and that

the proviso means that nothing in the act is to derogate from any

"lawful power" before possessed by any company.

Is this power of reduction, then, a lawful power, a power which

could be exercised consistently with justice, and with the objects of the

act? If it applies, we must remember, to a company where the whole

also in the case t>f a company already formed, which afterwards is
registered under the act, it is imperative on the registrar to enter on
the register the amount of nominal capital. With regard to companies limited by shares formed under the act, section 8 enacts that the
memorandum of association shall, among other things, contain "the
amount of capital with which the company proposes to be registered,
divided into shares of a certain fixed amount,q and before registration
the registrar (who has to give a certificate which is to be conclusive
evidence that all the requisites of the act in respect of registration
have been complied with) must satisfy himself that the matter to Le
registered-the memorandum of association-contains all the clements
prescribed by the different clauses of section 8, and no alteration in
any one of these elements can be made unless. expressly authorized
(section 12). The law is the same where an existing company applies for registration. Section 183 provides that, previous to registration, a statement of "the nominal capital of the company, and the
number of shares into which it is divided," is to be delivered to the
registrar, and his certificate of incorporation is to be conclusive evidence (section 192) that all the requisitions in the act contained in
respect of registration have been complied with. It is quite clear,
therefore, that the nominal amount of capital, and the number of
shares into which it is divided, must be stated to the registrar, by
whom that amount must then be entered on the register.
We next have to consider whether an existing company, \·v hen once
registered, have any power under the act of 1862 to give effect to a
provision contained in their original deed of settlement to reduce their
capital. Now, there is an express power given to increase capital
( section 1 2), but nowhere can there be found an express provision
pointing to a power to reduce, after once the nominal amount of capital has been registered. Is it then, the effect of the sixth clause of
section 196, to enable a company existing before the act, and registering under it, to exercise the power of reducing their capital; or rather,
is it the effect of that article to legalize the continuance of a power
already possessed under the original deed of settlement or articles of
association? The language of the sixth clause is as follows (his lordship read the clause), and as far as that language goes it is not contended that there is anything in it to render lawful a reduction of
capital. But there follows a proviso in these terms: "Nothing herein
contained shall derogate from any power of altering its constitution
or regulations which may be vested in any company registering under
this act in pursuance of this part thereof by virtue of any act of parliament, deed of settlement, etc., constituting or regulating the company." Now, in construing this proviso, I take it that before the
word "power" we ought to introduce the word "lawful," and that
the proviso means that nothing in the act is to derogate from any
"lawful power" before possessed by any company.
Is this power of reduction, then, a lawful power, a power which
could be exercised consistently with justice, and with the objects of the
act? If it applies, we must remember, to a company where the whole
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amount of the shares has been paid up, there is no reason why it
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should not apply to a company where a portion only of the nominal

amount of the shares has been paid up, there is no reason why it
should not apply to a company where a portion only of the nominal
amount registered has been paid up, and the shareholders are liable
to contribute for the remainder. Now, it is impossible to contend that
a company registered with a nominal capital of 250,000!., made up of
25l. shares, of which say only 15l. or 20/.. is paid, should have po\·v er
to enforce the regi&trar lo register resolutions reducing their capital to
the amount actually paid up. If such a proceeding were permitted ,
the shareholders' liability would be limited, not, as was intended. by
the amount of their shares, but by the amount of the already paid-up
portion of their shares. Justice, the language of the act and the intention of the legislature alike forbid an interpretation which would lead to
such a result. I, therefore, think that the nominal capital of this company having been registered at 250.oool., it was not competent to the
plaintiffs to reduce that capital. The registrar should not have registered the resolutions making that reduction, and when he was called
on to make a further entry which would have affirmed the previous
improper reduction of capital, he was justified in declining to make
it. The defendant, therefore, is entitled to our judgment.

amount registered has been paid up, and the shareholders are liable

to contribute for the remainder. Now, it is impossible to contend that

a company registered with a nominal capital of 250,000/., made up of

25/. shares, of which say only 15/. or 20/. is paid, should have power

to enforce the registrar to register resolutions reducing their capital to

the amount actually paid up. If such a proceeding were permitted,

the shareholders' liability would be limited, not, as was intended, by

the amount of their shares, but by the amount of the already paid-up

portion of their shares. Justice, the language of the act and the inten-

tion of the legislature alike forbid an interpretation which would lead to

such a result. I, therefore, think that the nominal capital of this com-

pany having been registered at 250.000/., it was not competent to the

plaintiffs to reduce that capital. The registrar should not have regis-

tered the resolutions making that reduction, and when he was called

on to make a further entrv which would have affirmed the previous

improper reduction of capital, he was justified in declining to make

it. The defendant, therefore, is entitled to our judgment.
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Note. See, also: 1856, Ferris v. Ludlow, 7 Ind. 517; 1896, Niagara Shoe

Co. v. Tobey, 71 111. App. 250; 1897, In re Colmer, 1 Ch. 524; 1897, Shoe-

maker v. Washburn L. Co., 97 Wis. 585; 1897, Peck v. Elliott, 47 U. S. App.

605, 38 L. R. A. 616; 1898, In re National Dwellings' Soc, 78 L. T. (N. S.) 144.
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Note. See, also: 1856, Ferris v. Ludlow, 7 Ind. 517; 1896, Niagara Shoe
Co. v. Tobey, 71 Ill. App. 250; 1897, In re Colmer, 1 Ch. 524; 1897, Shoemaker v. Washburn L. Co., 97 Wis. 585; 1897, Peck v. Elliott, 47 U.S. App.
605, 38 L. R. A. 616; 1898, 111 re National Dwellings' Soc., 78 L. T. (N. S.) 144.

BARRY v. MERCHANTS' EXCHANGE COMPANY.1

1844. In the Court of Chancery of New York, i Sandford's

Chancery (N. Y.) Rep. 280-318.

[The Merchants' Exchange was incorporated in 1823, with a capi-

tal stock not to exceed $1,000,000; it was authorized to purchase,

hold and convey so much real estate and to erect such buildings as

Sec. 208.

the body corporate might deem necessary or proper for the purpose,

and receive the rents and profits thereof, and divide the same amongst

the stockholders at such times as the company might deem expedient;

Nature, function and purpose of capital stock.

BARRY v. MERCHANTS' EXCHANGE COMPANY.1

power to make by-laws was given, and the act was to be favorably

IN

construed for all beneficial purposes; $230,000 of stock was subscribed

THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW YORK.

1 Sandford's

Chancery (N. Y.) Rep. 280-318.

and paid and the exchange built at a cost, including the lot, of

about $250,000. The building was destroyed in 1835 by fire; and it

was determined to build a new and much larger one; subscriptions

[The Merchants' Exchange was incorporated in 1823, with a capital stock not to exceed $1,000,000; it was authorized to purchase,
hold and convey so much real estate and to erect such buildings as
the body corporate might deem necessary or proper for the purpose,
and receive the rents and profits thereof, and divide the same aniong t
the stockholders at such times as the company might deem expedient;
power to make by-laws was given, and the act was to be favorably
construed for all beneficial purposes ; $230,000 of stock was subscribed
and paid and the exchange built at a cost, including the lot, of
about $250,000. The building was destroyed in 1835 by fire; and it
wM determined to build a new and much larger one; subscriptions
were called for the rest of the stock; this was soon taken, and the
amount received therefrom invested in more land; then it was determined to borrow money-in all $700,000-by the issue of bonds to
that extent, secured by mortgage upon the property; this was done anrl
the property conveyed by deed of trust to K., to hold for the bond-

were called for the rest of the stock; this was soon taken, and the

amount received therefrom invested in more land; then it was deter-

mined to borrow money—in all $700,000—by the issue of bonds to

that extent, secured by mortgage upon the property; this was done and

the property conveyed by deed of trust to K., to hold for the bond-

1 Statement greatly abridged; arguments and much of opinion omitted.

1
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holders. The company made default in payment of its debts and

its property was taken possession by K. Barry had performed work

in the construction of the new building to the amount of about $10,000

—of which $7,400 had been paid in cash, $1,000 in bonds, and $1,600

remained unpaid; for this he sued and obtained judgment, which could

not be paid. He brought his bill, alleging that the company had no

right to issue bonds, and asking that the trustees' title be set aside, the

bonds canceled, and a receiver be appointed, etc.]

Sandkord, V. C. * * * It was argued that the amount fixed

as the capital stock of the corporation was an absolute restriction

upon the amount and value of the property, both real and personal,

which they may hold permanently.

Some modifications of this position at once forced themselves upon

the attention of the counsel. If the capital were the limit of the prop-

erty of the corporation they could make no dividends or profits, for

those are beyond the capital. Again, in the ever-varying and fluctu-

ating values of all descriptions of property, a corporation that was

within its capital last year, may, without a single new purchase or
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expenditure, be worth this year twenty per cent, beyond its capital by

the increased value of the same property.

Hence the learned counsel were driven to rest their point upon a

designedly permanent increase of property beyond the capital of the

company. Still the rule encountered difficulties.

The object of corporators in all moneyed and business corporations

is to make greater profits than they can command by the separate use

of the same amount of capital. They put in their money, the capital

stock, for the very purpose of having it increase in value, and more

rapidly than in private adventures. And we have seen that unless

positively enjoined by their charters, there is nothing to require them

to divide the increase annually, or in any given time.

It was argued that in this particular case the design was one not

referring to profits for ultimate division, but it was a permanent and

solid investment of profits which never could be divided, and which

became an essential and integral portion of the real capital of the

company. That the exchange was an unit, indivisible, and composed

of the capital stock and nearly as much more; the latter being added

in anticipation of earnings or profits, and the whole incapable of par-

tition or division.

On this subject of the capital stock of a corporation, the elementary

treatises are comparatively barren.

It is the aggregate amount of the funds of the corporators, -which

are combined together under a charter for the attainment of some

common object of public convenience or private utility. This amount

is usually fixed in the act of incorporation, although we have seen in

the statutes of 1823, one exception to this practice. It is thus limited,

in reference to the convenience of the intended corporators, and for

the information and security of the public at large. To the corpo-

rators, it prescribes the amount and subdivisions of their respective

contributions to the common fund; the voice which each shall have in

holders. The company made default in payment of its debts and
its property was taken possession by K. Barry had performed work
in the construction of the new building to the amount of about $ro,ooo
--of which $7,400 had been paid in cash, $1,000 in bonds, and $1,6oo
remained unpaid; for this he sued and obtained judgment, which could
not be paid. He brought his bill, alleging that the co~pany had no
right to issue bonds, and asking that the trustees' title be set aside, the
bonds canceled, and a receiver be appointed, etc. J
SANDFORD, V. C.
• • • It was argued that the amount fixed
as the capital stock of the corporation was an absolute restriction
upon the amount and value of the property, both real and personal,
which they may hold permanently.
Some modifications of this position at once forced themselves upon
the attention of the counsel. If the capital were the limit of the property of the corporation they could make no dividends or profits, for
those are beyond the capital. Again, in the ever-varying and fluctuating values of all descriptions of property, a corporation that was
within its capital last year, may, without a single new purchase or
expenditure, be worth this year twenty per cent. beyond its capital by
the increased value of the same property.
Hence the learned counsel were driven to rest their point upon a
designedly permanent increase of property beyond the capital of the
company. Still the rule encountered difficulties.
The object of corporators in all moneyed and business corporations
is to make greater profits than they can command by the separate use
of the same amount of capital. They put in their money, the capital
stock, for the very purpose of having it increase in value, and more
rapidly than in private adventures. And we have seen that unless
positively enjoined by their charters, there is nothing to require them
to divide the increase annually, or in any given time.
It was argued that in this particular case the design was one not
referring to profits for ultimate division, but it was a permanent and
solid investment of profits which never could be divided, and which
became an essential and integral portion of the real capital of the
company. That the exchange was an unit, indivisible, and composed
of the capita! stock and nearly as much more; the latter being added
in anticipation of earnings or profits, and the whole incapable of partition or division.
On this subject of the capital stock of a corporation, the elementary
treatises are comparatively barren.
It is tlte aggregate amount of tile funds of tlte corporators, whi'cll
are combined together under a clzarter for the attai'nment of some
common object of public conveni'ence or private uti'li'ty. This amount
£.s usually fixed in the act of £ncorporation, a/tl1ough we have seen in
Ifie statutes of I823, one exception to tltt's practi'ce. It i's tit us lt'mt'ted,
£n reference to the convent'ence of tlte i'ntended corporators, and for
the informatt'on and security of tile publt'c at large. To tlte corporators, it prescribes tlte amount and subdt'vt'sions of their respecti've
contributions to tlte common fund; tile voice wllich each sltall have in
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the enterprise. To the community, it announces the extent of the

means contributed and forming the basis of the dealings of the cor-

its control and management; aud lite apportionment of the profits of
the enterprise. To the commuui'ty, £t announces the extent of ilze
means contri'buted and formt'ng the bast's of tlie dealings of the corporate body, and enables every man to judge of its ability to meet its
engagements and pe1form what it undertakes. And when, as in
most instances, the statute requires the stock to be paid in before the
corporation can transact business, security to those contracting with it
is thereby superadded to the information of its resources. These objects, for the public benefit, are sometimes defeated by fraud and deception, but they are such as the legislature have in view in limiting
the amount of capital stock, and requiring a specified sum or proportion to be paid in.
One further consideration dictates the amount thus fixed. This is
the probable and reasonable extent of the means requisite to the accomplishment of the end proposed, qualified in many cases by the
unwillingness of the legislature to create these artificial beings with
an undue amount of capital.
As no certain rule can be devised by which to estimate the means
necessary to effect all the purposes of a contemplated incorporation,
the amount of the capital in each case must be fixed in reference to
the considerations which I have just enumerated, without any intention or expectation in ordinary cases of limiting to that sum the aggregate property which the corporation, when its capital is paid in and its
operations commenced, shall frnm time to time possess or own. This
is peculiarly true of the numerous incorporations which have sprung
into being under the magic influence of the enterprise and ingenuity
of our citizens, and in which, from their boldness or novelty, it was
impracticable for human foresight to calculate the requisite means.
It is true that in one instance the authors of a most excellent treatise
on corporations have spoken of capital stock, and the amount of property which they shall hold, as if they were synonymous terms; but
they have said on a previous page, that every corporation aggregate
has incidentally at common law a right to take, hold and transmit in
succession, property real and personal to an unlimited extent or
amount. 1 Angell & Ames on Corp. 87, ch. 5, § I; 1 Kyd on Corp.
7f>, 78; 1 Black. Comm. 475; z Kent's Comm. 277, zd ed. , and a
host of authorities arc to the same effect. Angell & Ames also add
that "the statutes of mortmain make no mention of personal property,
and hence in England the power of corporations aggregate to take
such property remains in general unlimited, unless restrained by the
charters or acts of parliament establishing them." Treatise on Corp.,
90. 92. And sec r Kyd on Corp. 104.
The capital stock of a corporation is, lt'ke that of a co-partnership
or joz'nt stock company, the a111ou11t which the pm-tners or associates
put in as thet'r stake in tlte concern. To th i's they add upon tile credit
of lite rompany. from tile means a11d resources of othen, to such
extent as their o·wn prudence or the confidence of such other persons
wi'll p ermit. Such additi'ons c1·cate a d ebt; they do not form capi'tal.
And if successful in their cm-ee1' . the surplus over and above their

porate body, and enables every man to judge of its ability to meet its

engagements and perform what it undertakes. And when, as in

most instances, the statute requires the stock to be paid in before the

corporation can transact business, security to those contracting with it

is thereby superadded to the information of its resources. These ob-

jects, for the public benefit, are sometimes defeated by fraud and de-

ception, but they are such as the legislature have in view in limiting

the amount of capital stock, and requiring a specified sum or propor-

tion to be paid in.

One further consideration dictates the amount thus fixed. This is

the probable and reasonable extent of the means requisite to the ac-

complishment of the end proposed, qualified in many cases by the

unwillingness of the legislature to create these artificial beings with

an undue amount of capital.

As no certain rule can be devised by which to estimate the means

necessary to effect all the purposes of a contemplated incorporation,
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the amount of the capital in each case must be fixed in reference to

the considerations which I have just enumerated, without any inten-

tion or expectation in ordinary cases of limiting to that sum the aggre-

gate property which the corporation, when its capital is paid in and its

operations commenced, shall from time to time possess or own. This

is peculiarly true of the numerous incorporations which have sprung

into being under the magic influence of the enterprise and ingenuity

of our citizens, and in which, from their boldness or novelty, it was

impracticable for human foresight to calculate the requisite means.

It is true that in one instance the authors of a most excellent treatise

on corporations have spoken of capital stock, and the amount of prop-

erty which they shall hold, as if they were synonymous terms; but

they have said on a previous page, that every corporation aggregate

has incidentally at common law a right to take, hold and transmit in

succession, property real and personal to an unlimited extent or

amount, i Angell & Ames on Corp. 87, ch. 5, § 1; 1 Kyd on Corp.

76, 78; i Black. Comm. 475; 2 Kent's Comm. 277, 2d ed., and a

host of authorities are to the same effect. Angell & Ames also add

that "the statutes of mortmain make no mention of personal property,

and hence in England the power of corporations aggregate to take

such property remains in general unlimited, unless restrained by the

charters or acts of parliament establishing them." Treatise on Corp.,

90. 92. And see 1 Kyd on Corp. 104.

The capital slock of a corporatio?i is, like that of a co-partnership

or joint slock company, the amount which the partners or associates

put in as their slake in the concern. To this they add upon the credit

of the company, from the means and resources of others, to such

extetit as their o-vn prudence or the confidence of such other persons

■will permit. Such additions create a debt; they do not form capital.

And if successful in their career, the surplus over and above their
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partners and associates, or used still farther to extend their opera-

tions.

The proposition that a corporation is limited, even in its permanent

ownership of property, to the amount fixed as its capital, is entirely

new, and has not the sanction of authority or reason. The custom of

retaining the profits, which I have before mentioned, has been long

continued, and has worked in many of our corporations, and espe-

cially in banking institutions, an increase of their solid property and

estate, as permanent as any that has been inferred in this case. Not

that such increase has in those instances been so invested and mingled

with the fruits of the original capital as to become indivisible there-

from; but the increase has in many of the instances been as fixed and

permanent as the capital itself, and with no purpose or probability of

its being returned to the stockholders until the concern should be

wound up voluntarily, or by the expiration of the charters. Some

further illustration of this question will occur in connection with the

discussion of the power of borrowing after the payment of the
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capital.

Second. The second theory of the counsel for the complainant

was, that the power of borrowing money was limited to the extent

of the capital of the company; and when that capital was fully

paid, the power ceased, except for mere temporary objects, and for

short periods.

They therefore had no right to contract a permanent debt like these

mortgages. That if they did not expect to pay the mortgages, it is

still worse, because by the means used they created, or attempted to

create, a public stock or funded debt.

It was urged that on the latter hypothesis they were exceeding the

charter, because the direct consequence is, that they build at the ex-

pense of two millions, and out of the rents pay an interest to the bond-

holders, and a dividend to the stockholders; and the one to continue

as long as the other, being to all intents a capital of two millions.

This argument is specious, for if the building be worth the two mill-

ions, which it is assumed to have cost, and the company owes one

million, their clear property is but one million after all. Then as to the

funded debt or stock created and secured by these mortgages. The fifth

section of the act of incorporation was referred to as prohibiting this

mode of effecting a loan. That section declares that the act shall not

be construed to authorize the dealing or trading in, or the purchase or

sale of any stock or funded debt created, or to be created, under any

law of the United States, or of any particular state.

If the resemblance between these bonds and such stock or funded

debt were complete in all things, this section would have no applica-

tion to the borrowing of money upon their issue. But, in truth, the

resemblance is very faint. The bonds were printed or engraved, and

had coupons attached for convenience in the collection of interest.

There the likeness ceased. These bonds were sealed obligations of

49—Wil. Cases.

capi:tal and debts becomes pro.fits, and is e£ther divided among the
partners and associates, or used stt'll farther to extend tliefr operations.
The proposition that a corporation is limited, even in its permanent
ownership of property, to the amount fixed as its capital, is entirely
new, and has not the sanction of authority or reason. The custom of
retaining the profits, which I have before mentioned, has been long
continued, and has worked in many of our corporations, and especially in banking institutions, an increase of their solid property and
estate, as permanent as any that has been inferred in this case. Not
that such increase has in those instances been so invested and mingled
\·v ith the fruits of the original capital as to become indivisible therefrom; but the increase has in many of the instances been as fixed and
permanent as th.e capital itself, and with no purpose or probability of
its being returned to the stockholders until the concern should be
wound up voluntarily, or by the expiration of the charters. Some
further illustration of this question will occur in connection with the
discussion of the power of borrowing after the payment of the
capital.
Second. The second theory of the counsel for the complainant
was, that the power of borrowing money was limited to the extent
of the capital of the company; and when that capital was fully
paid, the power ceased, except for mere temporary objects, and for
short periods.
They therefore had no right to contract a permanent debt like these
mortgages. That if they did not expect to pay the mortgages, it is
still worse, because by the means used they created, or attempted to
create, a public stock or funded debt.
It was urged that on the latter hypothesis they were exceeding the
charter, because the direct consequence is, that they build at the expense of two millions, and out of the rents pay an interest to the bondholders, and a dividend to the stockholders; and the one to continue
as long as the other, being to all intents a capital of two millions.
This argument is specious, for if the building be worth the two millions, which it is assumed to have cost, and the company owes one
million, their clear property is but one million after all. Then as to the
funded debt or stock created and secured by these mortgages. The fifth
section of the act of incorporation was referred to as prohibiting this
mode of effecting a loan. That section declares that the act shall not
be construed to authorize the dealing or trading in, or the purchase or
sale of any stock or funded debt created, or to be created, under any
law of the United States, or of any particular state.
If the resemhlance between these bonds and such stock or funded
debt were complete in all things, this section would have no application to the borrowing of money upon their issue. But, in truth, the
resemblance is very faint. The bonds were printed or engraved, and
had coupons attached for convenience in the collection of interest.
There the likeness ceased. These bonds were sealed obligations of
49- WIL. CASES.
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not by the public faith, or the mere corporate liability, but by mort-
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But it was contended that the unrestricted power of borrowing,

the company, bonds, in the technical sense of the word, and secured
not by the public faith, or the mere corporate liability, but by mortgages on real estate.
But it was contended that the unrestricted power of borrowing,
which the company claims for effecting the purposes of its charter,
virtually confers upon the corporation unlimited power. That the
purposes of the charter would, in this instance at least, be no restraint,
because they could embrace accommodations for every description of
commercial business, and the extent of their credit would be equally
ineffectual, for there would be no limit to that, except in the prudence
of the lender, and finally, that no such extravagant authority was
granted to this corporation, expressly or by implication, and it is contrary to the spirit and policy of our laws and institutions.
This whole argument is, in my judgment, unsound. The danger
of inordinate accumulation of property and consequent overshadowing power is wholly fallacious. The whole extent of the corporate
cred:t, is, in truth, measured and controlled by its capital. Every addition to its means beyond its paid-up capital (leaving profits out of
view) must be by gift or contract, and if by contract, a debt en ues.
If a corporation with a million of capital succeeds in running into
debt two millions it has no more solid property, and is intrinsically worth
no more than before, unless the property obtained on credit is worth
more than it cost, and then the increase of property is only such excess of value. And if worth less than cost, then the company has by
the operation sunk a part of its capital.
All experience shows that the financial management of corporations
is, in general, less judicious and safe than that of individuals. Hence
losses are likely to ensue from expansions upon credit; and the farther such credit is pushed by any corporation, the greater the dauger
that such losses will impair and finally consume its capital. The
lenders of money are usually sagacious enough to protect their interests when dealing with corporations as well as with individuals; and
few would lend money to a company which already owed debts
greatly exceeding its whole capital stock, however flattering in appearance the investment might be. The laws of trade have placed
an impassable barrier to the power of corporate borrowing, in the tendency of such institutions to make an improvident use of exuberant
means, and in the caution and prudence of capitalists. It is utterly
impossi.b le for a corporation with a known limited capital to accumulate by means of its credit the gigantic property and power which
the imagination of the counsel portrayed. • • •
In this case, then, I am satisfied that the Merchants' Exchange
Company were authorized by law to borrow money for the completion of their building, to the extent adopted by them, and to secure its
repayment by their corporate obligations, and by mortgages on their
real estate.
I do not find that any limitation contained in their charter has been
thereby exceeded, nor that any condition annexed to the grant of their

which the company claims for effecting the purposes of its charter,

virtually confers upon the corporation unlimited power. That the

purposes of the charter would, in this instance at least, be no restraint,

because they could embrace accommodations for every description of

commercial business, and the extent of their credit would be equally

ineffectual, for there would be no limit to that, except in the prudence

of the lender, and finally, that no such extravagant authority was

granted to this corporation, expressly or by implication, and it is con-

trary to the spirit and policy of our laws and institutions.

This whole argument is, in my judgment, unsound. The danger

of inordinate accumulation of property and consequent overshadow-

ing power is wholly fallacious. The whole extent of the corporate

credKis, in truth, measured and controlled by its capital. Every ad-

dition to its means beyond its paid-up capital (leaving profits out of

view) must be by gift or contract, and if by contract, a debt ensues.

If a corporation with a million of capital succeeds in running into
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debt two millions it has no more solid property, and is intrinsically worth

no more than before, unless the property obtained on credit is worth

more than it cost, and then the increase of property is only such ex-

cess of value. And if worth less than cost, then the company has by

the operation sunk a part of its capital.

All experience shows that the financial management of corporations

is, in general, less judicious and safe than that of individuals. Hence

losses are likely to ensue from expansions upon credit; and the far-

ther such credit is pushed by any corporation, the greater the danger

that such losses will impair and finally consume its capital. The

lenders of money are usually sagacious enough to protect their inter-

ests when dealing with corporations as well as with individuals; and

few would lend money to a company which already owed debts

greatly exceeding its whole capital stock, however flattering in ap-

pearance the investment might be. The laws of trade have placed

an impassable barrier to the power of corporate borrowing, in the ten-

dency of such institutions to make an improvident use of exuberant

means, and in the caution and prudence of capitalists. It is utterly-

impossible for a corporation with a known limited capital to accumu-

late by means of its credit the gigantic property and power which

the imagination of the counsel portrayed. * * *

In this case, then, I am satisfied that the Merchants' Exchange

Company were authorized by law to borrow money for the comple-

tion of their building, to the extent adopted by them, and to secure its

repayment by their corporate obligations, and by mortgages on their

real estate.

I do not find that any limitation contained in their charter has been

thereby exceeded, nor that any condition annexed to the grant of their

Digitized by

gl

Origi11al from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 208

771

CAPITAL STOCK..

franchise has been broken, nor that they have failed to perform the

§

208

CAPITAL STOCK.

771

duties «njoined upon them by the law of their creation. » » *

Bill dismissed.

Note. Stock is generally used synonymously with "shares of stock" with us,

and indicates a definite proportional interest that the owner has in the manage-

franchise has been broken, nor that they have failed to perform the
duties enjoined upon them by the law of their creation. • • •
Bill dismissed.

ment, dividends and final distribution of the surplus assets of the corporation

upon dissolution. In England it seems that stock is a fund which can be

divided and held in irregular amounts, like the government stocks, which can

be bought in £99}4 sums, as well as any other sums, while a share, or de-

benture, is of a fixed amount, as £100, incapable of subdivision.—Rapalje &

L. Law Dictionary, 1224.

Common stock, or shares, are such as entitle all the owners thereof to equal

(in proportion to number of shares owned) participation in the management

of the corporation, and, in the absence of any preference shares, to a like

equal portion of the profits and assets. The common shares quite frequently

have a preference in the management of the corporation, though not in the

profits.

Preferred stock, or shares, are such as entitle the owners thereof to some
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preference in the distribution of the profits or assets of the corporation over

the owners of the common shares. There may be various classes of preferred,

such as first and second, etc., preferred, with different kinds of preferences as

the basis. But within each class the owners have equal rights in proportion

to their holdings. The preference may be either as to profits, or assets when

dissolved, or both. In the absence of special provisions, preferred share-

holders have the right to participate in the management, and are subject to

liabilities to the same extent as common shareholders.

Guaranteed stock, in the United States, is generally given the same meaning

as preferred—the words being used interchangeably—and both meaning that

the "preferred" or "guaranteed" shareholders shall not only receive divi-

dends in preference to the common shareholders, each year there are profits

to divide, but also that they will be entitled to arrears of dividends for the

years there are no profits earned, whenever subsequent profits are sufficient

to pay such dividends. 1860, Bates v. Androscoggin, etc., R., 49 Maine 491;

1866, Taft v. Hartford, etc., R., 8 R. I. 310; 1875, Lockhart v. Van Alstyne,

31 Mich. 76; 1881, Boardman v. Lake S. & M. S. R., 84 N. Y. 157; 1882, El-

kins v. Camden, etc., R., 36 N. J. Eq. 233. And the rule seems to be the

same in England. 1857, Henry v. Great Northern R., 1 De G. & J. 606; 1875,

Webb v. Earle L. R., 20 Eq. Cas. 556. Of course it can be made non-cumulatire

if so expressed. 1871, Bailey v. Hannibal, etc., R., 1 Dillon 174. And a few

cases hold it is non-cumulative, unless expressed to be cumulative. 1885, Bel-

fast, etc., R. v. Belfast, 77 Maine 445; 1887, Hazeltine v. Belfast, etc., R. Co.,

79 Maine 411. The term, however, is also applied so as to entitle the guaran-

teed shareholder to payment of arrears of dividends out of the property of

the company, before dividing it up among common shareholders upon disso-

lution. It is also sometimes applied to indicate the liability for dividends

without regard to there being any earnings from which to pay—such stock

then seems to be nothing but an interest-bearing loan.

Interest-bearing- stock. Rome attempts have been made to issue stock

upon condition that all sums paid in upon it shall bear interest until the im-

provement is completed and profits earned out of which to pay dividends;

such stock is designated interest-bearing stock. Since there are no earnings

out of which to pay dividends, it seems that the interest can come only out

<>f the capital, if it is to be paid before profits are earned, and would there-

fore, in effect, be a reduction of the capital to that extent, of which creditors

might complain; when the interest is to be paid as it accrues, and before

there are earnings, such stock provisions are generally held to be void.

Note. Stock is generally ul!ed synonymously with "shares of stock" with us,
and indicates a definite proportional interest that the owner bas in the management, dividends and final distribution of the surplus assets of the corporation
upon dissolution. In England it seems that stock is a fund which can be
divided and held in irregular amounts, like the government stocb, which can
be bought in £99~ sums, as well as any other sums, while a share, or debenture, is of a fixed amount, as £100, incapable of subdivision.-Rapalje &
L. Law Dictionary, 1224.
Common stock, or shares, are such as entitle all the owners thereof to equal
{in proportion to number of shares owned) participation in tbe management
of t he corporation, and, in tbe absence of any preference shares, to a like
equal portion of the profits and assets. The common shares quite frequent.ly
have a preference in the management of the corporation, though not in the
profits.
Preferred stock, or shares, are such as entitle the owners thereof to some
preference in the distribution of the profits or asset.'3 of the corporation over
th e ownel'S of the common shares. There may be various classes of preferred,
such as first and second, etc., preferred, with different kinds of preferences as
the basis. But within each class the owners have equal rights in proportion
to their holdings. The preference may be either as to profits, or assets when
dissolved , or both. In the absence of special provisions, preferred shareholders have the right to participate in the management, and are subject to
liabilities to the same extent as common shareholders.
Guaranteed stock, inthe United.States, is generally given the same meaning
as preferred- the words being used interchangeably-and both meaning that
the "preferred" or "guaranteed" shareholders shall not only receive dividends in preference to the common shareholders, each year there are profits
to divide, but also that they will be entitled to arrears of dividends for the
years there are n o profits earned, whenever subsequent profits are sufficient
tD pay snch dividends. 1860, Bates v. Androscoggin, etc., R., 49 Maine 491 ;
1866, Taft v. Hartford, etc., R ., 8 R . I. 310; 1875, Lockhart v. Van Alstyne,
31 Mich. 76; 1881, Boardman v. Lake S. & M. S. R., 84 N. Y. 157; 1882, Elkins v. Camden, etc., R., 36 N. J . Eq. 233. And the rule seems to be the
same in England. 1857, Henry v. Great Northern R., 1 De G. & J. 606; 1875,
Webb v. Earle L. R., 20 Eq. Cas. 556. Of course it can be made non-cumulative
if so expressed. 1871, Bailey v. Hannibal, etc., R., 1 Dillon 174. And a few
cases holrl it is non-cumulative, unless expressed to be ctimulative. 1885, Belfast, etc., R. v. Belfast, 77 Maine 445; 1887, Hazeltine v. Belfast, etc., R. Co.,
79 Maine 411. The term, however, is also applied so as to entitle the guaranteed shareholder to payment of arrears of dividends out of the property of
the company, before dividing it up amon~ common shareholders upon dissolution. It is also sometimes applied to mdicate the liability for dividends
without regard to there being any earnings from which to pay-such stock
then seems to be nothing but an interest-bearing loan .
Interest-bearing stoek. Some attempts have been made to issue st~k
11pon condition that all sums paid in upon it shall bear interest until the improvement is completed and profits earned out of which to pay dividends;
i;nch stock is designated interest-bearing stock. Since there are no earnings
out of which to pay dividends, it seems that the interest can come only out
of the capital, if it is to be paid before profit.El are earned, and would therefore, in effect, be a reduction of the capital to that extent, of which creditors
might complain; when the interest is to be paid as it accrues, and before
there ue earnings, such s~c~ provisions are generally held ~ be voi? .
1854, Troy & B. R. Co. v. Tibbitts, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 297, on 307, 1861, Miller v. Pitts. & C. R. Co., 40 Pa. St. 237, 80 Am . D. 570; 1867, Painesville & H.
R. Co. v . King, 17 Ohio St . 534; 1869, Pittsburgh & C.R. Co. v. Allegheny

1854, Troy & B. R. Co. v. Tibbitts, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 297,"on 307; 1861, Mil-

ler v. Pitts. & C. R. Co., 40 Pa. St. 237, 80 Am. D. 570; 1867, Painesville & H.

R. Co. v. King, 17 Ohio St 534; 1869, Pittsburgh & C. R. Co. v. Allegheny
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Co., 63 Pa. St. 126; 1887, Ohio College of Dental Surgery v. Rosenthal, 46
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Ohio St. 183; 1892, Re Sharpe, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 164.

Co., 68 Pa. St. 126; 1887, Ohio College of Dental Surgery v. Rosenthal, 45
Ohio St. 18.3; 1892, Re Sharpe, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 154.
But if the interest is not to be paid until there are earnings out of which to
pay, such provisions will be held valid, and if ~esible such construction
will be given to provisions of this kind: 1853J. Wright v. Vt. & M. R. Co., 12
Cush. (Mass.) 68; 1857, Waterman v. T. & u. R. Co., 8 Gray (Mass. ) 433;
1860, McLaughlin v. Det. & M. R. Co., 8 Mich. 100; 1860, Milwaukee & N. I.
R. Co. v. Field, 12 Wis. •340; 1863, Rutland & B. R. Co. v. Thrall,35 Vt. 536;
1872, Richardson v. Vt. & M. R. Co., 44 Vt. 613.
Special stock. "This is a peculiar kind of stock, now distinctly provided
for by statute, but unknown to the general laws of the commonwealth until
1800. Its characteristics are, that it is liruited in amount to two-fiftbs of the
actual capital; it is subject to redemetion by the corporation at par after a
fixed time, to be expressed in the certificates; the corporation is bound to pay
a fixed half-yearly sum or dividend upon it, as a debt; the holders of it are in
no event liable for the debts of the corporation beyond their stock ; and the
issue of special stock makes all the general stockholders liable for all d·e bts
and contracts of the corporation until the special stock is fully redeemed.
Statutes 185.5, ch. 290; 1870, ch . 224, §§ 25, 39, cl. 4; Pub. Stats., ch. 106, §§ 42,
61, cl. 3; Williams v. Parker, 136 Mase. 204, 207." Allen, J ., in 1885, American Tube Works v. Boston M. Co., 139 Mass. 5, on 9. Bee, also, 1886, Reed
v. Boston M. Co ., 141Mass.454. This sort of stock seems to be confined to Massachusetts, although other states have recognized redeemable stock. See
1875, Totten v. Tison, 54 Ga. 139; 1879, Culver v. Reno Real Estate Co., 91
Pa. St. 367.
For a valuable note upon the subject of Preferred, Guaranteed, Interest-Bearinfb and Special Stock, see 27 L. R. A. 136.
Treasury stock. This is a term used to designate that part of the authorized
stock left (after the required statutory amount for commencing business bas
been subscribed) in the possession of the corporation to be issued in the future
by sale by the corporation or upon further subscription; it. is also applied to
the stock that has once been issued, but surrendered or forfeited to the corporation, and which may be reissued. See, 1890, Alling v. Wenzel, 133 Ill. 264, on
269. When the holding of such stock by the corporation in this way is legal, it is
not merged, but lifeless; it can not be voted, nor draw dividends; but may
be sold at the face or the market value. See 1 Cook Corporations, § 314, and
cases cited.
Deferred stock, or bonds, are those upon which payment of dividends or
interest is expressly postponed until some other class of owners of stock,
bonds or other obligat10ns are paid. 1 Uook Corp., §§ 14, 762.
Founders' shares are such as are issued to the promoters or founders of
the corporation, and which entitle the holders to all the profits after certain
fixed maximum dividends are paid to the other shareholders; though deferred
until the ordinary divirlends are paid to the other shareholders, they sometimes become enormously valuable. For the usuaJ provisions of such , see 1
Cook Corp.,§ 14, pp. 52, 53, giving forms, and citing, 1893, Re MacDonald, etc.,
Co., 69 L. T. R. 567; 1895, Re London, etc., Corp., 73 L. T. R. 280; 1896, Re
New Transvaal Co., 75 L. T. R. 272; 1897, Re London, etc. , Ltd., 77 L . T. R.

But if the interest is not to be paid until there are earnings out of which to

pay, such provisions will be held valid, and if possible such construction

will be given to provisions of this kind: 1853, Wright v. Vt.& M. R. Co., 12

Cush. (Mass.) 68: 1857, Waterman v. T. & G. R. Co., 8 Gray (Mass.) 433;

1860, McLaughlin v. Det. & M. R. Co., 8 Mich. 100; 1860, Milwaukee & N. I.

R. Co. v. Field, 12 Wis. *340; 1863, Rutland & B. R. Co. v. Thrall, 35 Vt. 536;

1872, Richardson v. Vt. & M. R. Co., 44 Vt. 613.

Special stock. "This is a peculiar kind of stock, now distinctly provided

for by statute, but unknown to the general laws of the commonwealth until

1855. Its characteristics are, that it is limited in amount to two-fifths of the

actual capital; it is subject to redemption by the corporation at par after a

fixed time, to be expressed in the certificates; the corporation is bound to pay

a fixed half-yearly sum or dividend upon it, as a debt; the holders of it are in

no event liable for the debts of the corporation beyond their stock; and the

issue of special stock makes all the general stockholders liable for all debt*

and contracts of the corporation until the special stock is fully redeemed.
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Statutes 1855, ch. 290; 1870, ch. 224, §§ 25, 39, cl. 4; Pub. Stats., ch. 106, §§ 42,

61, cl. 3; Williams v. Parker, 136 Mass. 204, 207." Allen, J., in 1885, Amer-

ican Tube Works v. Boston M. Co., 139 Mass. 6, on 9 . See, also, 1886, Reed

v. Boston M. Co., 141 Mass. 464. This sort of stock seems to be confined to Mas-

sachusetts, although other states have recognized redeemable stock. See

1875, Totten v. Tison, 64 Ga. 139; 1879, Culver v. Reno Real Estate Co., 91

Pa. St. 367.

For a valuable note upon the subject of Preferred, Guaranteed, Interest-Bear-

ing, and /Special Stock, see 27 L. R. A. 136.

Treasury stock. This is a term used to designate thatpartof the authorized

stock left (after the required statutory amount for commencing business has

been subscribed) in the possession of the corporation to be issued in the future

by sale by the corporation or upon further subscription; it. is also applied to

the stock that has once been issued, but surrendered or forfeited to the corpo-

ration, and which may be reissued. See, 1890, Ailing v. Wenzel, 133 111.264, on

209. When the holding of such stock by the corporation in this way is legal, it is

not merged, but lifeless; it can not be voted, nor draw dividends; but may

be sold at the face or the market value. See 1 Cook Corporations, § 314, and

cases cited.

Deferred Stock, or bonds, are those upon which payment of dividends or

interest is expressly postponed until some other class of owners of stock,

bonds or other obligations are paid. 1 Cook Corp., §§ 14, 762.

Founders' shares are such as are issued to the promoters or founders of

the corporation, and which entitle the holders to all the profits after certain

fixed maximum dividends are paid to the other shareholders; though deferred

until the ordinary dividends are paid to the other shareholders, they some-

times become enormously valuable. For the usual provisions of such, see 1

146.

Cook Corp., § 14, pp. 52, 53, giving forms, and citing, 1893, Re MacDonald, etc.,

Debenture stock does not mean shares of stock , but is the English form of
bond, evidenced generally by a certificate representing a portion of a lump
debt, which may or may not be secured by mortga~e. A similar security is
issued in this country sometimes by a corporation ~JVing a bondholder acertificate entitling him alone to a certain sum with mterest on exchange for
coupon bonds delivered to the compan7- like the United States government
registered bond. For further deecriptrnns and forms see 1 Cook Corp., §§ 14
and 777.
Scrip, is a certificate that the owner is, or will be, upon the performance of
some condition, entitled to a share of something, as land, stock or other property . In England it certifies that the holder will be entitled to certain shares
of stock when unpaid installments are paid. 1 Cook Corp., § 14. <'it ing. U~i'!l,

Co., 69 L. T. R. 567; 1895, Re London, etc., Corp., 73 L. T. R. 280; 1896, Re

New Transvaal Co., 75 L. T. R. 272; 1897, Re London, etc., Ltd., 77 L. T. R.

146.

Debenture Stock does not mean shares of stock, but is the English form of

bond, evidenced generally by a certificate representing a portion of a lump

debt, which may or may not be secured by mortgage. A similar security is

issued in this country sometimes by a corporation giving a bondholder a cer-

tificate entitling him alone to a certain sum with interest on exchange for

coupon bonds delivered to the company -like the United States government

registered bond. For further descriptions and forms see 1 Cook Corp., §§ 14

and 777.

Scrip, is a certificate that the owner is, or will be, upon the performance of

some condition, entitled to a share of something, as land, stock or other prop-

erty. In England it certifies that the holder will be entitled to certain shares

of stock when unpaid installments are paid. 1 Cook Corp., § 14. citing, 1876,
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Goodwin v. Robarts, L. R. 1 App. Caa. 476. A form of stock scrip is given
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in full in, 1865, Brown et al. v. Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 49 Pa. St.

270, on p. 272; a form of scrip dividend issued by the New York Central and

Hudson R. Co. is given in full in, 1874, Baily v. Railroad Company, 89 U. S.

(22 Wall.) 604, on 608. See, also, 1884, Gordon v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 78

Va. 501, on 506. For a discussion of the natureof landscrip see, 1892, Rogers,

etc., v. N. Y. & T. Land Co., 134 N. Y. 197. See, also, 1 Cook Corp., § 535, and

Angell and Ames Corp., ch. vi., Proprietors of Common and Undivided

Lands.

Watered stock, is stock which upon its face purports to have been paid for

at its full face value, but which, in fact, has been issued without the corpora-

tion receiving, or having the right to demand, the full face value either in

money, property or service.

Spurious or overissued stock, is such as is issued in excess of the amount

authorized. Such stock is void. See note p. 763.

Goodwin v. Robarts, L. R. I App. Cas. 476. A form of stock scrip is given
in full in, 1865, Brown et al. v. Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 49 Pa. St.
270, on p. 272; a form of scrip divid1md issued by the New York Central and
Hudson R. Co. is given in full in, 1874, Baily v. Railroad Company, 89 U.S.
(22 Wall. ) 604, on 608. See, also, 1884, Gordon v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 78
Ya. 501, on 506. For a discussion of the nature of land .~c»ip see, 1892, Rogers,
etc. , v. N. Y. & T. Land Co., 134 N. Y. 197. See, also, 1 Cook Corp.,§ 535, and
Angell and Ames Corp., ch. vi., Proprietors of Common and Undivided
Lands.
Watered st-Oek, is stock which upon its face purports to have been paid for
at its full face value, but which, in fact, has been issued without the corporation receiving, or havin~ the right to demand, the full face value either in
money, property or service.
.
Spurious or overissued st-Oek, is such as is issued in excess of the amount
authorized., Such stock is void. See note p. 763.

Sec. 209. Same.

COMMERCIAL FIRE INSURANCE CO. v. BOARD OF REVENUE.1

1892. In the Supreme Court of Alabama. 99 Ala. Rep. 1-12,

See. 209. Same.
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42 Am. St. Rep. 17.

[Proceeding by the insurance company to be released from taxation

COMMERCIAL FIRE INSURANCE CO. v. BOARD OF REVENUE. 1

upon $51,000 worth of stock of the Montgomery Bank owned by it.

The law under which plaintiff was organized authorized insurance

1892:

IN

THE SUPREME

CouRT

OF ALABAMA.

99

Ala.

Rep.

1-12,

42 Am. St. Rep. 17.

companies "to invest their money in real and personal property, stocks

or choses in action and to sell the same." The tax law provided for

a tax upon the capital stock of corporations, except such portions as

may be invested in property which is otherwise taxed as property, but

when such corporation shall pay taxes on its shares, or the same is

paid by shareholders, such corporation shall pay taxes only on its real

and personal property. The insurance company claimed that $51,000

of its capital stock was invested in that much of the capital stock of

the bank, and the bank had already paid the taxes upon this sum.

The lower courts decided against this view, and this is the error as-

signed.]

Stone, C. J. * * * What is capital stock of corporations, and

why are they required to have a capital stock paid in?

••Capital stock is the sum fixed by the corporate charter as the

amount paid in, or to be paid in by the stockholders, for the prosecu-

tion of the business of the corporation, and for the benefit of cor-

porate creditors. The capital stock is to be clearly distinguished

from the amount of property possessed by the corporation. * * *

At common law the capital stock does not vary, but remains fixed,

although the actual property of the corporation may fluctuate widely

in value, and may be diminished by losses or increased by gains.'' —

Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 3.

"A stockholder has no legal title to the property or profits of the

corporation until a dividend is declared or a division made on the dis-

solution of the corporation." Ib., § 4a.

1 Statement abridged; arguments and much of opinion omitted.

[Proceeding by the insurance company to be released from taxation
upon $51 ,ooo worth of stock of the Montgomery Bank owned by it.
The Jaw under which plaintiff was organized authorized insurance
companies "to invest their money in real and personal property, stocks
or choses in action and to sell the same." The tax law provided for
a tax upon the capital stock of corporations, except such portions as
may be invested in property which is otherwise taxed as property, but
when such corporation shall pay taxes on its shares, or the same is
paid by shareholders, such corporation shall pay taxes only on its real
and p ersonal property. The insurance company claimed that $5 r ,ooo
of its capital stock was invested in that much of the capital stock of
the bank, and the bank had already paid the taxes upon this sum.
The lower courts decided against this view, and this is the error assigned.]
STONE, C. J. • • • What is capital stock of corporations, and
why are they required to have a capital stock paid in?

" Capital stock is the sum fixed by the corporate charter as the
amount paid in, or to be paid in by tlte stockltolders, for the prosecution of the business of the corporati'on, and for the benefit of corporate creditors. The capt'tal stock is to be clearly distinguished
from the amount of property possessed by the corporation. • • •
At common law tlte capital stock does not vary, but r emains fixed,
although the actual property of the corporation may .fluctuate widely
in value, and may be di111inisl1ed by losses or increased by gains.,. Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 3.
'' A stockholder has no legal title to the property or profits of the
corporation until a dividend is declared or a division made on the dissolution of the corporation." Ib., § 4a.
1
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"A stockholder in an insurance company has the same rights that a

stockholder in any other corporation has." Ib., § 4a.

774

"A share of stock may be defined as a right which its owner has

COMMERCIAL FIRE INS. CO. V . BOARD OF REVENUE.

§ 20<)

in the management, profits and ultimate assets of the corporation.

"A tockholder in an insurance company has the same rights that a
stockholder in any other corporation has." Ib., § 4a.
"A share of stock may be defined as a right which its owner has
in the management, profits and ultimate assets of the corporation.
By the court of appeals of New York it is said that 'the right which
a shareholder in a corporation has, by reason of his ownership of
shares, is a right to participate according to the amount of stock in
the surplus profits of the corporation on a division, and ultimately on
its dissolution, in the assets remaining after payment of its debts.' "

By the court of appeals of New York it is said that 'the right which

a shareholder in a corporation has, by reason of his ownership of

shares, is a right to participate according to the amount of stock in

the surplus profits of the corporation on a division, and ultimately on

its dissolution, in the assets remaining after payment of its debts.'"

lb., § 5-.

In Neiler'v. Kelly, 69 Pa. St. 403, Justice Sharswood said: "A

share of stock is an incorporeal, intangible thing. It is a right to a

certain proportion of the capital stock of a corporation—never real-

ized except upon the dissolution and winding up of the coiporation

Ib., § 5.

—with the right to receive, in the meantime, such profits as may be

In Neiler"v. Kelly, 69 Pa. St. 403, Justice Sharswood said: ''A
share of stock is an incorporeal, intangible thing. It is a right to a
certain proportion of the capital stock of a corporation-never realized except upon the dissolution and winding up of the corporation
-with the right to receive, in the meantime, such profits as may be
made and declared in the shape of dividends." • • •
(Citing 2 Morse on Banking, 66<)-72; 2 Morawetz Corp.,§§ 787-9;
Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 3o8; Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245.)
The foregoing quotations are made with a view of presenting
clearly and fully the nature and object of capital stock in a corporation. As property it has pecul£ar attributes. Collectively it is tlie
property of the corporation, wltt"le the ownership of the shares t's in
tlie shareholders. Sale and disposit£on of tlie shares by the several
owners i's free and untrammeled, save as the law or by-laws of the
corporation may have prescribed rules. JVot so with the capital
stock. That is a security or pledge the law exacts as a condit£on on
wht"ch it grants the corporate franchise-the rt'gM to incur liabi/£tt'es for the discharge ofwhich no responsibility rests on any natural
person. It t's the indispensable condition on wht"ch the law-making
power grants the franchise, because the law and publt"c polt"cy so d eclare. And the capital stock is a trust fund; a trust for the benrjit
and security of the corporation's cred£tors. The directory, or gov erning body of the corporation, are trustees, cllarged with the duty of
guarding the trust fund, and preserving it for the uses for which it
was placed in trust. The uses arc, .first, to meet and discharge any
liabilities and debts of the corporation which disaster may bring
upon it; and, second, to restore to the shareholders, when the corporation is wound up, whatever of the capital stock and accumulated
gains may remain on hand, after discharging the corporation's liabilities to creditors.
It is not intended to be affirmed that the governing board of the
corporation is required to keep the capital stock unemployed in its
locked vaults. It should be utilized with a view of making it productive in some line of investment or operation within the scope of its
corporate powers. There is this limitation to its authorized use. It
must be within the scope of the corporate powers, and must be done
with reference to the interest and success of the corporation whose
capital stock it is. When this is the case, there is fidelity in the execution of the trust.

made and declared in the shape of dividends." » * •

(Citing 2 Morse on Banking, 669-72; 2 Morawetz Corp., §§ 787-9;

Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308; Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245.)

The foregoing quotations are made with a view of presenting

clearly and fully the nature and object of capital stock in a corpora-
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tion. As property it has peculiar attributes. Collectively it is the

property of the corporation, while the ownership of the shares is in

the shareholders. Sale and disposition of the shares by the several

owners is free and untrammeled, save as the law or by-laws of the

corporation may have prescribed rules. Not so with the capital

stock. That is a security or pledge the law exacts as a condition on

which it grants the corporate franchise—the right to incur liabili-

ties for the discharge of which no responsibility rests on any natural

person. It is the indispensable condition on which the law-making

power grants the franchise, because the law and public policy so de-

clare. And the capital stock is a trust fund; a trust for the benefit

and security of the corporation s creditors. The directory, or gov-

erning body of the corporation, are trustees, charged with the duty of

guarding the trust fund, and preserving it for the uses for which it

was placed in trust. The uses am, first, to meet and discharge any

liabilities and debts of the corporation which disaster may bring

upon it; and, second, to restore to the shareholders, when the corpo-

ration is wound up, whatever of the capital stock and accumulated

gains may remain on hand, after discharging the corporation's liabili-

ties to creditors.

It is not intended to be affirmed that the governing board of the

corporation is required to keep the capital stock unemployed in its

locked vaults. It should be utilized with a view of making it pro-

ductive in some line of investment or operation within the scope of its

corporate powers. There is this limitation to its authorized use. It

must be within the scope of the corporate powers, and must be done

with reference to the interest and success of the corporation whose

capital stock it is. When this is the case, there is fidelity in the exe-

cution of the trust.
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If this trust fund be misapplied to objects or uses outside of the

scope of the corporate powers, this is a breach of trust, and fastens a

personal liability on those who perpetrate the wrong, commensurate

with the injury, if any, caused by the misapplication. And persons

receiving the trust fund so misapplied, knowing it to be such, make

themselves trustees in invitum, and render themselves liable to the

corporation whose funds are thus misapplied, or to the creditors of

the corporation, for any diminution the trust fund may suffer in the

transaction. * * *

What is meant by the language, "To invest their money in * * *

stocks or choses in action, and to sell the same?" Will it or can it

be contended that the authority to invest in stocks confers the power

to subscribe to the capital stock of another corporation in process of

organization? And if it confers the authority to subscribe for and

become a stockholder in another corporation, in what description of

corporation may the insurance company become a stockholder? The

statute employs only the generic word stocks; and that word, if it

include bank shares, applies equally to shares in all private corpora-
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tions. Can the insurance company invest its capital stock, and thus

become a stockholder in any and every description of private corpora-

tion, at the mere will and pleasure of its governing body? The vast

variety of corporations now in use and operation need not be referred

to, to show to what extreme results this interpretation would lead.

Railroads, telegraph lines, telephones, express companies, mining and

manufacturing enterprises, these are only a few of the numerous

subjects of incorporation under the law. Can an incorporated insur-

ance company under our statute subscribe for stock in the organiza-

tion of each, all, or any of the numerous corporations now so common

in human transactions? The statute has a different meaning.

Stocks—shares in corporations—have come to be, in a large degree,

subjects of commercial dealing and speculation. The newspapers

contain tables of the ruling prices of stocks, as their market value

fluctuates. These notices refer to the shares of stock in organized

corporations. Their sale neither increases nor diminishes the capital

stock in the corporation; it neither adds to, nor takes from the corpo-

ration one dollar of its stock. It simply changes its ownership pro

tanto. The capital remains in the corporation intact, and the security

it furnishes, and is intended to furnish, the creditors of the corporation

remains unimpaired.

When we speak of capital stock of a corporation, we are under-

stood to refer to the sum subscribed in its organization. When we

speak of stock, we mean the certificates issued by the corporation to

the shareholders, which certificates, like titles to property, furnish the

evidence of ownership of the shares of stock. Capital stock is the

aggregate of money or other valuable thing contributed, or paid into

the common treasury as a condition of the exercise of corporate func-

tions, and a security for their faithful and prudent exercise. It is

the property of the corporation, charged -with a trust, it is true;

but nevertheless, in its possession and under its control. The stock,

If this trust fund be misapplied to objects or uses outside of the
scope of the corporate powers, this is a breach of trust, and fastens a
personal liability on those who perpetrate the wrong, commensurate
with the injury, if any, caused by the misapplication. And persons
receiving the tnist fund so misapplied, knowing it to be such, make
themselves trustees in invitum, and render themselves liable to the
corporation whose funds are thus misapplied, or to the creditors of
the corporation, for any diminution the trust fund may suffer in the
transaction. • • •
What is meant by the language, "To invest their money in • • •
stocks or choses in action, and to sell the same?" Will it or can it
be contended that the authority to invest in stocks confers the power
to subscribe to the capital stock of another corporation in process of
organization? And if it confers the authority to subscribe for and
become a stockholder in another corporation, in· what description of
corporation may the insurance company become a stockholder? The
statute employs only the generic word stocks; and that word, if it
include bank shares, applies equally to shares in all private corporations. Can the insurance company invest its capital stock, and thus
become a stockholder in any and every description of private corporation, at the mere will and pleasure of its governing body? The vast
variety of corporations now in use and operation need not be referred
to, to show to what extreme results this interpretation would lead.
Railroads, telegraph lines, telephones, express companies, mining and
manufacturing enterprises, these are only a few of the numerous
subjects of incorporation under the law. Can an incorporated insurance company under our statute subscribe for stock in the organization of each, all, or any of the numerous corporations now so common
in human transactions? The statute has a different meaning.
Stocks--shares in corporations--have come to be, in a large degree,
subjects of commercial dealing and speculation. The newspapers
contain tables of the ruling prices of stocks, as their market value
fluctuates. These notices refer to the shares of stock in organized
corporations. Their sale neither increases nor diminishes the capital
stock in the corporation ; it neither adds to, nor takes from the corporation one dollar of its stock. It simply changes its ownership pro
tanto. The capital remains in the corporation intact, and the security
it furnishes, and is intended to furnish, the creditors of the corporation
remains unimpaired.
When we speak of capital stock of a corporation, we are understood to refer to the sum subscribed in its organization. When we
speak of stock, we mean the certificates issued by the corporation to
the shareholders, which certificates, like titles to property, furnish the
evidence of ownership of the shares of stock. Capital stock is the
aggregate of money or other valuable thing contributed, or paid into
the common treasury as a condition of the exercise of corporate functions, and a secur£ty for their faithful and prudent exerdse. It is
the property of the corporation, charged with a trust, it is true;
but nevertheless, in its possessi"on and under £ts control. The stock,
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stocks or shares of stock do not belong to the corporation. They
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belong to the shareholders and are exclusively under the individual

control of the several owners. The stocks -which the statute author-

stocks or sha1·es of stock do not belong to the corporati'on. Th ey
belong to the shareholders and are exclz,sively under the indi"vidual
control of the several owners. Tlze stocks which the statute authorizes insurance companies to invest their money £n can not mean capital stock owned and to be held by the corporation. Tlti"s, we have
seen, is a trust fund. It means the stock owned by stockholders,
usually evidenced by stock certificates. Stock, as a subject of commercial dealing, is what the legislature meant in the statute we are
interpreting. The very connection in which the word is used in the
statute confirms this interpretation. " To invest their money in
• • • stocks or choses in action, and to sell the same," is the
language employed. There i; not even a comma between the words
"stocks" and "choses in action," nor a shade of difference in the
powers conferred as to each. The power to invest in and to sell is
very appropriate language when applied to commercial dealings. It
is very inapt, if the intention was to confer authority to subscribe for
stock in the formation of another corporation. • • •
The tax is, by statute, levied on the capital stock of corporations.
In the corporation's petition to be relieved of a part of the tax thus
levied, it describes it as a tax on the capital stock. It avers "That
said capital stock is invested, • • • $5 1 ,ooo thereof in the capital
stock of the Bank of Montgomery.'• The corporation owned its
capital stock, and, presumptively at least, did not own the shares of
its capital stock. Hence the propriety and reasonableness of the averment that it was so invested, and not shares in it:; capital stock, pretermitting, for the sake of argument, its want of corporate power to
invest its capital stock. The exact and specific case made in the petition is that the capital stock of one corporation-the thing itself-is
invested in the capital stock of another corporation. And, it may be
added, this averment was necessary to give the petition a semblance
of merit. Capital stock-the insurance company' s capital stock-\vas
the subject of the tax, and in order to maintain the discount or deduction claimed, it was necessary to aver and show that that specific subject of taxation-the capital stock--or some portion of it, had been
"invested in property which is otherwise taxed as property." We
are thus confronted with the question, can one and the same sum of
money, at one and the same time, serve the purpose of capital stock
for two corporations?
We have shown by the highest .legal authority that the capital stock
of a corporation is a trust fund for the security and benefit of the creditors of the corporation, and that the managing board fills the relation
of trustee for its preservation and administration. Corporations acti"ng withi"n the scope of corporate powers, fix no Uab£1£ty on their
officers or on any one else. Tlzey charge only the corporation. Hence
the purpose and policy of requiring a capital stock as security and
£ndemn£ty of persons who become its creditors. The law-making
power confers on them privileges--a franchi"se, a right to make contracts in its artificial name without fastening a lialn'/ity on any natural p erson-and it exacts from them as a condition on whicll i"t

izes insurance companies to invest their money in can not mean capi-

tal stock owned and to be held by the corporation. This, we have

seen, is a trust fund. It means the stock owned by stockholders,

usually evidenced by stock certificates. Stock, as a subject of com-

mercial dealing, is what the legislature meant in the statute we are

interpreting. The very connection in which the word is used in the

statute confirms this interpretation. "To invest their money in

* * * stocks or choses in action, and to sell the same," is the

language employed. There n not even a comma between the words

"stocks" and "choses in action," nor a shade of difference in the

powers conferred as to each. The power to invest in and to sell is

very appropriate language when applied to commercial dealings. It

is very inapt, if the intention was to confer authority to subscribe for

stock in the formation of another corporation. * * *

The tax is, by statute, levied on the capital stock of corporations.

In the coiporation's petition to be relieved of a part of the tax thus
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levied, it describes it as a tax on the capital stock. It avers "That

said capital stock is invested, * * * $51,000 thereof in the capital

stock of the Bank of Montgomery." The corporation owned its

capital stock, and, presumptively at least, did not own the shares of

its capital stock. Hence the propriety and reasonableness of the aver-

ment that it was so invested, and not shares in its capital stock, pre-

termitting, for the sake of argument, its want of corporate power to

invest its capital stock. The exact and specific case made in the peti-

tion is that the capital stock of one corporation—the thing itself—is

invested in the capital stock of another corporation. And, it may be

added, this averment was necessary to give the petition a semblance

of merit. Capital stock—the insurance company's capital stock—was

the subject of the tax, and in order to maintain the discount or deduc-

tion claimed, it was necessary to aver and show that that specific sub-

ject of taxation—the capital stock—or some portion of it, had been

"invested in property which is otherwise taxed as property." We

are thus confronted with the question, can one and the same sum of

money, at one and the same time, serve the purpose of capital stock

for two corporations?

We have shown by the highest legal authority that the capital stock

of a corporation is a trust fund for the security and benefit of the cred-

itors of the corporation, and that the managing board fills the relation

of trustee for its preservation and administration. Corporations act-

ing within the scope of corporate powers, fix no liability on their

officers or on any one else. They charge only the corporation. Hence

the purpose and policy of requiring a capital stock as security and

indemnity of persons who become its creditors. The law-making

power confers on them privileges—a franchise, a right to make con-

tracts in its artificial name without fastening a liability on any nat-

ural person—and it exacts from them as a condition on which it
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capital stock in safe pledge for the security of their creditors. And

this capital stock is a permanent investment, with no power in the

shareholder to withdraw it until the corporation is wound up and all

its debts paid, and no power in the managing board to permit it to

be withdrawn at the expense of creditors. It is a trust fund in the

corporation's treasury, to be used only in its interest, and whatever

of profit or emolument it may yield belongs of right to the corpora-

tion, its creditors and shareholders. It must be kept within the cor-

poration and under its control to meet the purpose for which it was

required to be raised and paid in. It is not materially unlike any

other pledge that is placed as a guaranty of faithful performance of

debt or duty. It is a fixed pledge until the debt is paid, or the duty

performed.

Such being the nature, the status of capital stock in a corporation,

can one and the same fund supply this want and fill this condition for

two corporations? The law required $100,000 of capital stock as a

condition on which it granted the corporate franchise for that amount

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

of capital to the Commercial Fire Insurance Company, and the same

amount from the Bank of Montgomery as the condition on which it

conferred a similar franchise on it. Will a single sum of $100,000

meet and satisfy this double demand? The law does not grant

acts of incorporation in the undoubting faith and trust that they will be

profitably and successfully administered. If there was neither distrust

nor doubt, no guaranty, no pledge, no capital stock paid in should be

required. The law, basing its action on experience, requires this

guaranty, this security, because human enterprises often miscarry. Let

us suppose that in the case before us disaster should overtake both

corporations, and it should become necessary to exhaust the capital

stock of each in the payment of its liabilities. Is it not manifest that

the $100,000 the law required as a pledge and guaranty from each

company would not be forthcoming? Fifty-one thousand dollars of

the sum could not meet the double demand of that sum from the re-

spective creditors of the two companies. One dollar can not pay

two.

Let us take a further step. If corporation No. 1 can, of its $100,-

000 of capital stock, supply fifty-one of the $100,000 the law requires

of corporation No. 2, and yet retain its $100,000 of stock, no sound

argument can be formulated why it could not furnish the bank with

the whole $100,000 of capital with the same result. And if corpora-

tion No. 1 can, from its own capital, furnish the capital stock of cor-

poration No. 2, why can not corporation No 2 render the same service

to corporation No. 3? And why can not this process be carried on

indefinitely? Would not such proceedings be an utter subversion of

the purpose and policy which require that corporations, as a condition

of the franchise they ask to be clothed with, shall furnish this security

for those with whom they propose to have dealings? These ques-

tions can receive but one answer, and that answer is, that corporations

grants tit.i's francldse, thz"s privilege and puwer, that they place a
capital stock in safe pledge for tlze securt"ty of their creditors. And
tl1is capital stock is a permanent investment, with no power £n the
shareholder to withdraw it until the corporation is wound up and all
its debts paid, and no power t'n the managing board to permit t't to
be withdrawn at the expense of creditors. It is a trust fund in the
corporatio-n's treasury, to be used only in its t'nterest, and whatever
of profit or emolument t't may yield belongs of right to the corporatt'on, its credt"tors and shareholders. It must be kept within the corporation and under its control to meet the purpose for which t't was
requfred to be raised and paid t'n. It is not materially unlike any
other pledge that is placed as a guaranty of faithful performance of
debt or duty. It is a fixed pledge until the debt is paid, or the duty
performed.
· Such being the nature, the status of capital stock in a corporation,
can one and the same fund supply this want and fill this condition for
two corporations? The law required $ 100,000 of capital stock as a
condition on which it granted the corporate franchise for that amount
of capital to the Commercial Fire Insurance Company, and the same
amount from the Bank of Montgomery as the condition on which it
conferred a similar franchise on it. Will a single sum of $100,000
meet and satisfy this double demand? The law does not grant
acts of incorporation in the undoubting faith and trust that they will be
profitably and successfully administered. If there was neither distrust
nor doubt, no guaranty, no pledge, no capital stock paid in should be
required. The law, basing its action on experience, requires this
guaranty, this security, because human enterprises often miscarry. Let
us ruppose that in the case before us disaster should overtake both
corporations, and it should become necessary to exhaust the capital
stock of each in the payment of its liabilities. Is it not manifest that
the $100,000 the law required as a pledge and guaranty from each
company would not be forthcoming? Fifty-one thousand dollars of
the sum could not meet the double demand of that sum from the respective creditors of the two companies. One dollar can not pay
two.
Let us take a further step. If corporation No. 1 can, of its $100,000 of capital stock, supply fifty-one of the$ 100,000 the law requires
of corporation No. 2, and yet retain its $100,000 of stock, no sound
argument can be formulated why it could not furnish the bank with
the whole $ ioo,ooo of capital with the same result. And if corporation No. 1 can, from its own capital, furnish the capital stock of corpriration No. 2, why can not corporation No 2 render the same service
to corporation No. 3? And why can not this process be carried on
indefinitely? Would not such proceedings be an utter subversion of
the purpose and policy which require that corporations, as a condition
of the franchise they ask to be clothed with, shall furnish this security
for those with whom they propose to have dealings? These quest ions can receive but one answer, and that answer is, that corporations
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have no authority to subscribe their own capital stock in the capital

t 210

PEOPLE V. COLEMAN.

stock of another corporation in process of organization. * * *

have no authority to subscribe their own capital stock in the capital
stock of another corporation in process of organization. • • •
Affirmed. Walker and McClellan, JJ., dissent.

Affirmed. Walker and McClellan, JJ., dissent.

Sec. 210. Capital, capital stock, surplus and franchise distin-

guished.

PEOPLE, Ex Rbl. TJ. T. CO., v. COLEMAN.1

1891. In the Court of Appeals of New York. 126 N. Y.
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and the investments in the United States securities.]

[Appeal from judgment of supreme court, dismissing a writ of
certiorari" to review assessment of trust company's capital. The company claimed that all its capital stock and surplus were invested in
United States securities and exempt. The commissioners held that
the capital stock, the actual value of which they were to assess, was the
shares, and they ascertained such value by multiplying the nominal
capita.I by the market price of the shares, and deducted therefrom ten
per cent. of the nominal capital, the assessed value of the real estate
and the investments in the United States securities. J
FINCH, J.
The relator has been assessed upon an "actual value"
of its capital stock derived entirely from the market value of its shares.
These are selling at the large premium of something over five hundred
dollars for each share of one hundred dollars, and the assessors have
concededly taken that valuation, or the principal part thereof, as the
"actual value" of the company's stock liable to taxation, instead of
its own proved and established value. The relator challenges the assessment, and through all the proceeding has persistently raised and
pressed the inquiry, not so much as to the mode or manner of ascertaining value, but rather as to what is the precise thing to be valued. whether
the capital stock of the company or the capital stock held in shares hy
the corporators. If these are the same, or in any just sense equi\'alents, either might be valued without substantial error, but if they are
not such we must determine which is to be \'alued before we can solve
the problem of how to value it.
Now it is certain that the two things are neither identical nor equivale nts. The capital stock of a company is one thing. that of tlze shareholders is another and a different tlzing. Tlzat of th e company t"s
simply its capital. existing in money or property, or both; while that of
the shareholders is representati·ve, not m erely ofthat existing and tangt"ble capt"tal, but also of sw-plus. of dividend earning power, of franchise and the good will of an establ£s/zed and prosperous busi"ness.
The capital stock of the company is owned and field by the company
in its corporate character; the capital stock of th e shareholders t/1e_v
own and ho/cl in different proport£ons as i"ndi"viduals.
The one

Finch, J. The relator has been assessed upon an "actual value"
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of its capital stock derived entirely from the market value of its shares.

These are selling at the large premium of something over five hundred

dollars for each share of one hundred dollars, and the assessors have

concededly taken that valuation, or the principal part thereof, as the

"actual value" of the company's stock liable to taxation, instead of

its own proved and established value. The relator challenges the as-

sessment, and through all the proceeding has persistently raised and

pressed the inquiry, not so much as to the mode or manner of ascertain-

ing value, but rather as to what is the precise thing to be valued, whether

the capital stock of the company or the capital stock held in shares bv

the corporators. If these are the same, or in any just sense equiva-

lents, either might be valued without substantial error, but if they are

not such we must determine which is to be valued before we can solve

the problem of how to value it.

Now it is certain that the two things are neither identical nor equiv-

alents. The capital stock of a company is one thing, that of the share-

holders is another and a different thing. That of the company is

simply its capital, existing in money or property, or both ; while that of

the shareholders is representative, not merely of that existing and tang-

ible capital, but also of surplus, of dividend earning power, of fran-

chise and the. good will of an established and prosperous business.

The capital stock of the company is owned and held by the company

in its corporate character; the capital stock of the shareholders they

own and hold in different proportions as individuals. The one

1 Statement abridged; arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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§ 210

CA PlTAL STOCK.

779

chise of the company, which may be deemed its business opportunity

and capacity, is the property of the corporation, but constitutes no

part or element of its capital stock, while the same franchise does

enter into and form part, and a very essential part, of the share-

holder's capital stock. While the nominal or par value of the capi-

tal stock and of the share stock are the same, the actual value is often

widely different. The capital stock of the company may be wholly in

cash or in property, or both, which may be counted and valued. It

may have in addition a surplus, consisting of some accumulated and

reserved fund, or of undivided profits, or both, but that surplus is

no part of the company's capital stock, and, therefore, is not itself

capital stock. The capital can not be divided and distributed; the

surplus may be. But that surplus does enter into and fortn part of

the share stock, for that represents and absorbs into its own value

surplus as well as capital, and the franchise in addition. So that

the property of every company may consist of three separate and dis-

tinct things, which are its capital stock, its surplus, its franchise;
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but these three things, several in the ownership of the company, are

united in the ownership of the shareholders. The share stock covers,

embraces, represents all three in their totality, for it is a business

photograph of all the corporate possessions and possibilities. A com-

pany also may have no surplus, but, on the contrary, a deficiency

which works an impairment of its capital stock. Its actual value is

then less than its nominal or par value, while yet the share stock,

strengthened by hope of the future and the su,pport of earnings, may

be worth its par, or even more. And thus the two things—the com-

pany's capital stock and the shareholder's capital stock—are essen-

tially and in every material respect different. They differ in their

character, in their elements, in their ownership ana in their values.

How important and vital the difference is became evident in the

effort by the state authorities to tax the property of the national banks.

The effort failed, and yet the share stock in the ownership of individ-

uals was held to be taxable as against them. The corporation and its

property were shielded, but the shareholders and their property were

taxed.

Now some degree of confusion and trouble have come in because

these two different things are denominated alike capital stock, making

the expression sometimes ambiguous. It is the important and decisive

phrase in the law of 1857, under which the assessment here resisted

was made, and requires of us to determine at the outset in which

sense it was used.- The section reads thus: "The capital stock of

every company liable to taxation, except such part of it as shall have

been excepted in the assessment roll, or shall have been exempted by

law, together with its surplus profits or reserved funds exceeding 10

per cent, of its capital, after deducting the assessed value of its real

estate and all shares of stock in other corporations actually owned by

such company which are taxable upon their capital stock under the

laws of this state, shall be assessed at its actual value and taxed

belongs to tlt e co1-poration, the other to tlte corporators. The franchise of the company, which may be deemed its business opportunity
and capacity, is tlie property of the corporation, but constitutes no
part or element of its cap#al stock, while tile same franchise does
enter into and form pad, and a very essential part, of tlie shareholder's capital stock. While the nominal or par value of tlte capi- ta! stock and of the sltare stock are the same, tile actual value is often
widely different. The capital stock oftlze company may be wholly in
cash or in property, or both, which may be counted and valued. It
may have in addi't£on a surplus, consist£ng of some accumulated and
reserved fund , or of undivi'ded pro.fits, or both, but tllat surplus is
no part of tlte company's capi'tal stock, and, therefore, £s not itself
capital stock. The capital can not be divided and distr£buted; the
surplus may be. But that surplus does enter into and form part of
the share stock, for that represents and absorbs into i'ts own value
Slf.rplus as well as capi'tal, and the francht'se in addi'tt'on. So tltat
the property of every company may consi'st of tltree separate and di'st£nct things, which are i'ts capital stock, its surplus, i'ts franchise ;
but these three thi'ngs, several i'n the O"'.unerslii'p of the company, are
united in the ownershi'p of the shareholders. The sliare stock covers,
embraces, represents all three in thei'r totality, for i't is a business
photograph of all the corporate possessi'ons and possibi'liti'es. A company also may have no surplus, but, on the contrary, a deficiency
which works an impairment of its capital stock. .Its actual value is
then less than its nominal or par value, wki'le yet the share stock,
strengthened by hope of the future and the Stfpport of earnings, may
be worth its par, or even more. And thus the two thi'ngs-tlle company's capi'tal stock and tile sharelwlder' s capital stock-are essentially and in every material respect different. They differ in thez'r
character, in their elements, in tlzefr ownership and in their values.
How important and vital the difference is became evident in the
effort by the state authorities to tax the property of the national banks.
The effort failed, and yet the share stock in the ownership of individuals was held to be taxable as against them. The corporation and its
property were shielded, but the shareholders and their property were
taxed.
Now some degree of confusion and trouble have come in because
these two different things are denominated alike capital stock, making
the expression sometimes ambiguous. It is the important and decisive
phrase in the law of 1857, under which the assessment here resisted
was made, and requires of us to determine at the outset in which
- sense it was used.· The section reads thus: "The capital stock of
every company liable to taxation, except such part of it as shall have
been excepted in the assessment roll, or shall have been exempted by
law, together with its surplus profits or reserved funds exceeding 10
per cent. of its capital, after deducting the assessed value of its real
estate and all shares of stock in other corporations actually owned by
such company which are taxable upon their capital stock under the
laws of this state. shall be assessed at its actual value and taxed
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There are reasons in abundance for the conclusion that by the

in the same manner as the other real and personal estate of the
county."
There are reasons in abundance for the conclusion that by the
phrase "capital stock" the statute means not the share stock, but the
capital owned by the corporation; the fund required to be paid in and
kept intact as the basis of the business enterprise and the chief factor
in its safety. One ample reason is derived from the fact that the tax
is assessed against the corporation and upon its property and not
against the shareholders, and so upon their property. In theory every
tax is charged against some person, natural or artificial, resident or
non-resident, known or unknown. It is assessed, not upon property
irrespective of ownership, but against persons in respect to their property (23 N. Y. 215), and effects not merely a lien, but also a personal
liability. On the assessment rolls in this case appeared the name of
the relator as the person assessed, and the amount of the tax became
a charge against it. Of course, it could only be assessed and taxed
in respect to its own property, that which in its corporate character it
, owned and possessed, and so it follows inevitably that the statute concerns the company's capital stock, that is, its real and actual capital,
and not in any respect the share stock which it does not own and whose
possessors have not been assessed.
Another reason is founded on those terms of the statute which include and exclude respectively specific kinds or classes of property in
the corporate ownership. Thus the assessment is to be laid not
merely upon the capital stock of the corporation, but also upon its
surplus. No such expli,c it direction was necessary, except upon the
assumption that by the words "capital stock" was meant simply
"capital," which would not include surplus, and so required that it
be subjected by name to the valuation. If the share stock was meant
its value would include surplus and make its specification not only
needless but confusing. But while the statute includes surplus by
specific mention, it excludes franchise by omitting it. The omission
of franchise is emphasized by the careful inclusion of surplus. It is
fully and definitely settled that the tax imposed by the statute is not
upon franchise. (People v. Comrs. of Taxes, 2 Black. 620.) But
if that be so, it is not upon the share stock, for that represents the
value of the corporate franchise as a part of the total of the corporate
property. And so, both by what it specifically includes and silently
excludes, the statute itself informs us that by ''capital stock'' it means
and intends the company's actual capital paid in and possessed, and
not at all or in any sense the share stock. • • •
(Reviewing statutes and distinguishing the following cases: Oswego Starch Factory v. Dilloway, 21 N. Y. 449; People, ex rel., v .
Comrs. of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 192; People, ex rel., v. Dolan, 36 N. Y.
59; People, ex rel., v. Ferguson, 38 N. Y. 89; People, ex rel. , '"·
Bd. of Assrs., 39 N. Y. 81; People, ex rel., v. Comrs. of Taxes, 95
N. Y. 554; People, ex rel., v. Asten, 100 N. Y. 597; People, ex rel. ,

phrase "capital stock" the statute means not the share stock, but the

capital owned by the corporation; the fund required to be paid in and

kept intact as the basis of the business enterprise and the chief factor

in its safety. One ample reason is derived from the fact that the tax

is assessed against the corporation and upon its property and not

against the shareholders, and so upon their property. In theory every

tax is charged against some person, natural or artificial, resident or

non-resident, known or unknown. It is assessed, not upon property

irrespective of ownership, but against persons in respect to their prop-

erty (23 N. Y. 215), and effects not merely a lien, but also a personal

liability. On the assessment rolls in this case appeared the name of

the relator as the person assessed, and the amount of the tax became

a charge against it. Of course, it could only be assessed and taxed

in respect to its own property, that which in its corporate character it

1 owned and possessed, and so it follows inevitably that the statute con-

cerns the company's capital stock, that is, its real and actual capital,
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and not in any respect the share stock which it does not own and whose

possessors have not been assessed.

Another reason is founded on those terms of the statute which in-

clude and exclude respectively specific kinds or classes of property in

the corporate ownership. Thus the assessment is to be laid not

merely upon the capital stock of the corporation, but also upon its

surplus. No such explicit direction was necessary, except upon the

assumption that by the words "capital stock" was meant simply

"capital," which would not include surplus, and so required that it

be subjected by name to the valuation. If the share stock was meant

its value would include surplus and make its specification not onlv

needless but confusing. But while the statute includes surplus by

specific mention, it excludes franchise by omitting it. The omission

of franchise is emphasized by the careful inclusion of surplus. It is

fully and definitely settled that the tax imposed by the statute is not

upon franchise. (People v. Comrs. of Taxes, 2 Black. 620.) But

if that be so, it is not upon the share stock, for that represents the

value of the corporate franchise as a part of the total of the coiporate

property. And so, both by what it specifically includes and silently

excludes, the statute itself informs us that by "capital stock" it means

and intends the company's actual capital paid in and possessed, and

not at all or in any sense the share stock. * * *

(Reviewing statutes and distinguishing the following cases: Os-

wego Starch Factory v. Dilloway, 21 N. Y. 449; People, ex rel., v.

Comrs. of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 192; People, ex rel., v. Dolan, 36 N. Y.

59; People, ex rel., v. Ferguson, 38 N. Y. 89; People, ex rel., v.

Bd. of Assrs., 39 N. Y. 81; People, ex rel., v. Comrs. of Taxes. 95

N. Y. 554; People, ex rel., v. Asten, 100 N. Y. 597; People, ex rel.,
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v. Comrs. of Taxes, 104 N. Y. 240; People, ex re/., v. Coleman,
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107 N. Y. 541.)

Judgment reversed.

Note. See, 1861, State v. Morristown Fire Assn., 23 N. J. L. 195.

Capital stock, capital, shares, and property. Great confusion exists in the

v. Comrs. of Taxes, 104 N. Y. 240; People, ex rel., v. Coleman,
107 N. Y. 541.)
Judgment reversed.

use of these terms; sometimes capital stock is used to mean the amount of

stock a corporation is authorized to issue; sometimes the amount subscribed

and issued; sometimes the amount actually paid in, with which the company

proceeds to do business; sometimes the value (actual or nominal) of the sum

total of the shares in the hands of the shareholders; sometimes the value of

the property of the corporation, real and personal, including surplus and

franchise.

Statutes frequently provide that the articles of incorporation shall state the

amount of capital stock, and after 50 per cent, is subscribed, and 10 per cent,

thereof is paid in, the corporation may organize and commence business—

leaving it in the discretion of the corporation to call for further subscriptions

or further payment upon subscriptions made. For example, if, under such a

law, the articles of incorporation provide "the capital stock shall be $100,000,"
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the corporation may commence business with $60,000subscribed, upon which

only $5,000 were actually paid in; there would, however, exist the capacity

to call for the payment of $45,000 more, and also to issue $50,000 more by a

new subscription, and to call for its payment.

If the whole amount authorized was always subscribed and paid in there

would be little difficulty; the sums being the same, each could very properly be

designated capital stock; yet there is opportunity here for confusion with the

corporate property, for if the whole $100,000 were paid in and invested in

property which increased in value to $150,000, it might be and sometimes is

said that the capital stock is $150,000, instead of $100,000; approved usage,

however, says there is still only $100,000 capital stock, but a surplus of $50,000,

which, if it can be separated from the rest, can be paid to the shareholders as

dividends; on the other hand, if there should be a loss of $50,000, it would

seem wrong to say the capital stock is $100,000, yet approved usage still says

the capital stock is $100,000, though there is a deficit of $50,000, and the cor-

porate property is only $50,000, the corporation (at least for the protection of

creditors) being required to make up such deficit before distributing subse-

quent earnings as dividends.

More difficulty arises when the whole amount authorized is not subscribed,

and only a part of the latter is paid in; of course, in Biich event it could be

made clear in each case what was meant by using the terms: Authorized capi-

tal stock, $100,000; subscribed capital stock, $50,000; paid-up capital stock,

$5,000; and if such terms were always used in statutes, contracts, rules, etc.,

much confusion could be avoided. Unfortunately, however, capital stock and

capital are the only terms used, as "The capital slock shall not be increased or

decreased, except by consent of the state;" or, "The capital stock is a trust

fund for the security of creditors;" or, "Dividends shall not be paid out of

the capital of the company;" or, "The corporation shall be taxed only upon

its capital stock;" or, "The capital stock shall be exempt from taxation;" or,

"The shares of stock shall be taxed, or be exempt from taxation."

In the first case, increasing or decreasing the capital stock—the authorized

capital stock—the amount named in the charter or articles of association is

meant, not the property of the corporation, not the amount subscribed or

paid in; but no greater subscription than the authorized amount can

rightly be taken, and no payment, in the absence of a special statutory lia-

bility, can be required beyond the amount subscribed. The property, however,

may be increased to any extent, or diminished to any extent, that does not

interfere with the performance of its corporate functions or the payment of

Note. See, 1851, State v. Morristown Fire Assn., 23 N. J. L. 195.
Capital stock, capital, shares, and property. Great confusion exists in the
use of these terms; sometimes capital stock is used to mean the amount of
stock a corporation is authorized to issue; sometimes the amount subscribed
and issued; sometimes the amount actually paid in, with which the company
proceeds to do business; sometimes the value (actual or nominal l of the sum
total of the shares in the hands of the shareholders; sometimes t.he value pf
the property of the corpo:ration, real and personal, including surplus and
franchise.
Statutes frequently provide that the a.r ticles of incorporation shall state the
amount of capital stock, and after 50 per cent. is subscribed, and 10 per cent.
thereof is paid in, the corporation may organize and commence businessleaving it in the discretion of the corporation to call for further subscriptions
or further payment upon subscriptions made. For example, if, under such a.
law, the articles of incorporation provide "the capital stock shall be $100,000,"
the corporation may commence business with $00,000subscrihed, upon which
only $5,000 were actually paid in; there would, however, exist the capacity
to call for the payment of $45,000 more, and also to issue $50,000 more by a
new Sllbscription, and to call for its payment.
If the whole amount authorized was always subscribed and paid in there
would be little difficulty; the sums being the same, each could very properly be
designated capital stock; yet there is opportunity here for confusion with the
corporate property, for if the whole $100,000 we re paid in and invested in
property which increased in value to $150,000, it might be and sometimes is
said that the capital stock is $150,000, instead of fl00,000; approved usage,
however, says there is still only $100,000 capital stock, but a surplus of $50,000,
which, if it can be separated from the rest, can be paid to the shareholders as
dividends; on the other hand, if there should be a loss of $50,000, it would
seem wrong to say the capital stock is $100,000, yet approved usage still says
the capital stock is $100,000, though there is a deficit of $50,000, and the corporate property is only $S0,000, the corporation (at least for the protection of
creditors ) being required to make up such deficit before distributing subsequent earnings as dividends.
}fore difficulty arises when the whole amount authorized is not subscribed,
a.nd only a part of the latter is paid in; of course, in such event it could be
ma.de clear m each case what was meant by using the terms: Authorized capital stock, $100,000; subscribed capital stock, $50,000; paid-up capital stock,
$6,000; and if such terms were always used in statutes, contracts, rules, etc.,
much confusion could be avoided. Unfortunately, however, capital stock and
capital are the only terms used, as "The capital stock shall not be increased or·
decreased, except by consent of the state:" or, "The capital stock is a trust
fond for the security of creditors;" or, "Dividends shall not be paid out of
the capital of the company;" or, "The corporation shall be taxed only upon
its capital stock;" or, "The capital stock shall be exempt from taxation:" or,
"The shares of stock shall be taxed, or be exempt from taxation."
In the first case, increasing or decreasing the capital stock- the authorized
capital stock-the amount named in the charter or articles of association is
meant, not the property of the corporation, not the amount subscribed or
paid in; but no ~reater subscription than the authorized amount can
rightly be taken, and no payment, in the absence of a special statutory liability, can be required beyond the amount subscribed. The property, however,
may be increased to any extent, or diminished to any extent, that does not
interfere with the performance of its corporate functions or the payment of
creditors. See Barry v. Merchants' Exchange, supra, p. 766.
In the second case-the capital stock as a trust fund-which is meant, the
authorized, the subscribed, or the paid in amounts, or the property only of.

creditors. See Barry v. Merchants' Exchange, supra, p. 766.

In the second case—the capital stock as a trust fund—which is meant, the

authorized, the subscribed, or the paid in amounts, or the property only of
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the corporation? If all that is authorized is subscribed, paid in and invested
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in property, and there is no statutory liability, the creditor can not look

the corporation? If all that is authorized is subscribed, paid in and invested
in property, and there is no statutory liability, the creditor can not look
further than to the actual property of the corporation, though it is much less
than the capital stock named, if the loss is due to misfortune, and not fraud
or improper appropriation of corporate funds by officers or members; on the
other band, if this property is more than the capital stock named, and is
nnrlivide<l in the bands of the corporation, the creditor can have it applied,
if necessary, to the payment of bis debt; yet until a lien bas been acquired
or insolvency converted it into a trust fund, the surplus over the amount oi
stock named can be distributed as dividends. But if the whole amount
authorized is never subscribed, and the law allows business to be <lone with a
~mailer subscription, then as to a creditor, what is the capital stock? It is
universally conceded that the amount subscribed, and not the amount authorized, is the ccipital stock, for there is no way by which a corporation can be
required to secure additional subscriptions, or to compel any one to subscribe
in order to pay creditors; in other words, unissued shares are not part of the
crrpital stock, so far as creditors are concerned. Sturges v. Stetson, I Biss.
(U. S.) 246, on 248, 10 Myer's Fed. D., § 142; Christensen v. Eno, 106 N. Y. 97.
On the other hand, the creditor bas the right to have alJ the subscriptions
paid up, if necessary, for bis protection, and no part of the property returned
to t.h e shareholders that redl1ces it to a value less than the face value of the
amount subscribed, if necessary , to pay bis claims. Scovill v. Thayer , 105
U.S. 143; Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308. So here, too, the amount subscribed, and not the amount paid in is the capital stock that is the primary
basis of the company's credit; but this, too, is subject to the qualification made
above-the creditor has the protection of the surplus enrned until diYided,
and can claim no more than the actual property, if all subscribed has been
once paid in good faith, and not lost through negligence, fraud or misappropriation.
As to the next-"dividends shall not be paid out of the capital"-capital is
used to mean the amount of property of the company equal in value to the
face value of the stock subscribed; all above that is surplus, and may be distributed in dividends; and in this sense ropital is equivalent to capital stock
subscribed as above explained. Williams v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 N. Y.
162. The word capital is, however, more generally used to designate the
actual property of the company derived from what ' bas been paid in on the
shares with undivided accumulations, whether the total is less or greater than
the amount subscribed, and whether there have been losses or gains; in sho rt ,
to designate the actual sum with which bm1iness is being done at any particular time.
As to taxation, there are m~my conflicting views: Taxation is supposed to
be upon values withont duplication. If placed upon capital stock, and the authorized capital stock was assessed at its face value. in case all was not subscribed, it would amount to an assessruent upon a mere privilege, and would
be in the nature of a franchise tax; if plnced upon the face value of the
amount subscribed, regardless of the sum paid in, it would be uvon a mere
possibility or power to call for further payments (except so far ns pnid up ),
an<! would also be in the nature of a franchise tax; if, upon the market value,
this would be determined by the net amount of corporate property, the earning capacity and business opportunity exhibited by the corporation, and
would, therefore, be equivalent to the total value of all the shares in the bands
of the shareholders, and the tax so laid would be upon the same elements of
value charged against the corporation; if, in nddition to this, the corporate
property, its lands, chattels and credits, was taxed against the corporation
there would be double taxation to th at extent; and if the shares in the bands
of shareholders were also taxed at their market value there would be triple
taxation , in the sense that the same actual elements of value or part of them
would be taxed three times-twice to the corporation, and once to the shareholders.
Again, if capital stock is held to mean only the corporate property-lands,
chattels and credits-and these alone are taxed, it is evident that in many

further than to the actual property of the corporation, though it is much less

than the capital stock named, if the loss is due to misfortune, and not fraud

or improper appropriation of corporate funds by officers or members; on the

other hand, if this property is more than the capital stock named, and is

undivided in the hands of the corporation, the creditor can have it applied,

if necessary, to the payment of his debt; yet until a lien has been acquired

or insolvency converted it into a trust fund, the surplus over the amount of

stock named can be distributed as dividends. But if the whole amount

authorized is never subscribed, and the law allows business to be done with a

smaller subscription, then as to a creditor, what is the capital stock? It is

universally conceded that the amount subscribed, and not the amount author-

ized, is the capital stock, for there is no way by which a corporation can be

required to secure additional subscriptions, or to compel any one to subscribe

in order to pay creditors; in other words, unissued shares are not part of the

capital stock, so far as creditors are concerned. Sturges v. Stetson, 1 Biss.

(U. 8.) 246, on 248, 10 Myer's Fed. D., § 142; Christensen v. Eno, 106 N. Y. 97.
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On the other hand, the creditor has the right to have all the subscriptions

paid up, if necessary, for his protection, and no part of the property returned

to the shareholders that reduces it to a value less than the face value of the

amount subscribed, if necessary, to pay his claims. Scovill v. Thayer, 105

U. 8. 143; Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308. So here, too, the amount sub-

scribed, and not the amount paid in is the capital stock that is the primary

basis of the company's credit; but this, too, is subject to the qualification made

above—the creditor has the protection of the surplus earned until divided,

and can claim no more than the actual property, if all subscribed has been

once paid in good faith, and not lost through negligence, fraud or misappro-

priation.

As to the next—"dividends shall not be paid out of the capital"—capital is

used to mean the amount of property of the company equal in value to the

face value of the stock subscribed; all above that is surplus, and may be dis-

tributed in dividends; and in this sense capital is equivalent to capital stock

subscribed as above explained. Williams v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 N. Y.

162. The word capital is, however, more generally used to designate the

actual property of the company derived from what'has been paid in on the

shares with undivided accumulations, whether the total is less orgreater than

the amount subscribed, and whether there have been losses or gains; in short,

to designate the actual sum with which business is being done at any partic-

ular time.

As to taxation, there are many conflicting views: Taxation is supposed to

be upon values without duplication. If placed upon capital stock, and the au-

thorized capital stock was assessed at its face value, in case all was not sub-

scribed, it would amount to an assessment upon a mere privilege, and would

be in the nature of a franchise tax; if placed upon the face value of the

amount subscribed, regardless of the sum paid in, it would be upon a mere

possibility or power to call for further payments (except so far as paid upi,

and would also be in the nature of a franchise tax; if, upon the market value,

this would be determined by the net amount of corporate property, the earn-

ing capacity and business opportunity exhibited by the corporation, and

would, therefore, be equivalent to the total value of all the shares in the hands

of the shareholders, and the tax so laid would be upon the same elements of

value charged against the corporation; if, in addition to this, the corporate

property, its lands, chattels and credits, was taxed against the corporation

there would be double taxation to that extent; and if the shares in the hands

of shareholders were also taxed at their market value there would be triple

taxation, in the sense that the same actual elements of value or part of them

would be taxed three times—twice to the corporation, and once to the share-

holders.

Again, if capital stock is held to mean only the corporate property—lands,

chattels and credits—and these alone are taxed, it is evident that in many
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§ 210

CAPITAL STOCK.

tion are not taxed. When A. subscribes for a share of $100 face value, and

pays in that sura, the corporation is the owner of the $100 as tangible prop-

erty and A. is the ownerof the intangible share, entitling him to have this $100

(if all creditors are otherwise satisfied) with all its net earnings during the

corporate existence returned to him at the dissolution of the corporation, or

from time to time before, in the case of the surplus earnings; though it is not

considered a loan, itis in some respects similar, but without an obligation to re-

pay betore dissolution, or to pay interest in the meantime; these rights of the

shareholder are considered A.'s property, and, in general, if he receives more

in the way of dividends than he would receive as interest from a safe loan of

$100, these intangible rights would be considered worth more as property—

represented by a certificate of shares instead of a promissory note—than $100,

or if the income was less than from a safe loan the share would be considered

less valuable; the $100 that'the corporation has is only $100 as its property,

but because of its earning capacity, A.'s intangible rights arising from it, hit

property in it is worth more than $100; a valuation, therefore, of the cor-

porate property alone as property does not reach all the elements of value in

connection with the $100; its earning capacity does not add to the corporate
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property, but does add to A.'s property.

But inasmuch as the $100 A. has put in the corporation is put there mainly

as an investment for gain, its value to him is determined almost wholly by its

earning capacity, and very little by the fact that it is $100 property in the

hands of the corporation; the reason for this is that the $100 can not be ob-

tained by A. as his property until the corporation is dissolved, which may

never occur, or only at an uncertain time in the future. However much

property the corporation may actually have, the market value of its shares

depends mostly upon the earning capacity of the property, and not upon

the actual value of the property. As Mr. Justice Bigelow savs in Conimw.

v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 12 Allen (Mass.) 298, on 302: "The price for which

all the shares would sell may greatly exceed the aggregate of the cor-

porate property, or it may fall very far short of it. Undoubtedly the

amount of property * * * is one of the considerations that enters into

the market value of its shares; but such market value also embraces other

elements; * * * it includes the profits and gains which have attended its

operations, the prospects of its future success, the nature and extent of its

corporate rights and privileges, and the skill and ability with which its busi-

ness is managed, the estimate put on the potentiality of a corporation." So,

too, the corporate property may be large, because it has all, or most of it, been

purchased by the proceeds of bonds sold, and upon which the income is suffi-

cient to pay large interest, but with nothing left for dividends—in which event

the stock would be of but little value; yet possibly this would in some degree

represent the net value of the property after the bonds were paid. But the

corporation may in fact also have property to the value of a million dollars,

and its shares be worth in the market but little, because the corporate prop-

erty is unproductive—and the owner of the shares can in no way have the

valuable property apportioned to him, but is bound to let it remain unpro-

ductive until dissolution of the corporation. From such considerations as

these it seems clear that the property of the corporation and the capital stock

of the corporation are different materially in value very frequently, the

value of the capital stock being equivalent to the sum total of the value of

the shares, and this being the business estimate of the earning capacity of

the property as it is then emploved—and not the value of the same property

as it could and (if not owned by that corporation) would, probably, be em-

ployed. Because of these differences in value, and in ownership in the case

of shares, it is generally held that a tax on the property of the corporation,

and a tax on the shares of the stockholders are not double taxation—though

cases property rights of great value arising from the existe nce of the corporation are not taxed. When A. subscribes for a share of $100 face value, and
pays in that sum, the corporation is the owner of the $100 as tangible property and A. is the owner of the intangible share, entitling him to have this $100
(if all creditors are otherwise satisfied) with all its net earnings during the
corporate existence returned to him at the dissolution of the corporation, or
from time to time before, in the case of the surplus earnings; though it is not
considered a loan, it is in some respects similar, but without an obligation to repay before dissolution, or to pay interest in the meantime; these rights of the
share holder are considered A.'s property, and, in general, if he receives more
in the way of dividends than he would receive as inte1·est from a safe loan of
$100. these intangible rights would be considered worth more as propertyrepresented by a certificate of shares instead of a promissory note-than $100,
or if the income was less than from a safe loan the share would be considered
less valuable; the $100 that· the corporation has is only $100 as its property,
but because of its earning capacity, A.'s intangible rights arising from it, hia
property fa it is worth more than $100; a valuation, therefore, of the corporate property alone as property does not reach all the elements of value in
connection with the $100; its earning capacity does not add to the corporate
property. but does add to 4.'s property.
But inasmuch as thfl $100 A. bas put in the corporation is put there mainly
as an investment for gain, its value to him is determined almost wholly by its
earning capacity, and very little by the fact that it is $100 property in the
bands of the corporation; the reason for this is that the $100 can not be obtained by A. as his property until the corporation is dissolved, which may
never occur, or only at an uncertain time in the future. Howe ver much
property the corporation may actually have, the market value of its shares
depe nds mostly upon the earning capacity of the property, and not upon
the actual value of the property. As Mr. Justice Bigelow says in Commw.
v . Hamilton Mfg. Co., 12 Allen (Mass.) 298, on 302: "The price for which
all the shares would sell may greatly exceed the aggregate of the corporate property, or it rnay fall very far short of it. Undoubtedly the
amount of property • • • is one of the considerations that enters into
the market value of its shares; but such market value also embraces other
elements; • • • it includes the profits and gains which have attended its
operations, the prospects of its future success, the nature and extent of its
corporate rights and privileges, and the skill and ability with which its business is managed, the estimate put on the potentiality of a corporation." So,
too, the corporate property may be large, because it h as all, or most of it, been
purchased by the proceeds of bonds sold, and upon which the income is sufficient to pay large interest, but. with nothing left for dividends-in which event
the stock would be of but little value; yet possihly this would in some degree
represent the net value of the property after the bonds were pairl. Bnt the
corporation may in fact also have property to the value of a million dollars,
and its shares be worth in the market but little, because the corporate property is unproductive-and the owner of the shares can in no way have tbe
valuable property apportioned to him, but is bound to let it r emain unpro<luctive until dissolution of the corporation . From such considerations as
these it seems clear that the property of the corporation and the capital stock
of the corporation are different materially in value very frequently, the
value of the capital stock being equivalent to the sum total of the value of
the shares, and this being the business estimate of the earning capacity of
the property as it is then employed- and not the value of the same property
aa it could and (if not owned by that corporation) would, probably, be employed. Because of these differences in value, and in ownership in the case
of shares, it is generally held that a tax on the prope•ty of the corporation,
and a tax on the shares of the stockholders are not double taxation-though
both seem to be placed upon the same sources of value.
Although it is certain that confusion will continue to exist in the use of
these terms, yet it is desirable that it be avoided as much as possible ; and as
an aid to that end it is suggested that terms be used as follows so far as possi-

both seem to be placed upon the same sources of value.

Although it is certain that confusion will continue to exist in the use of

these terms, yet it is desirable that it be avoided as much as possible: and as

an aid to that end it is suggested that terms be used as follows so far as possi-
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ble: Authorized capital stock, to mean the total face value of all the shares the

IO

corporation has the right to issue; capital stock, to mean the sum total sub-

ble : Authorized capital stock, to mean the total face value of all the shares the·
corporation has the right to issue; capital s1tock, to mean the sum total st1bscribed, equivalent in face value to the sum total of the face value of the shares.
issued; capital, the sum paid in as the fund with which it transacts busineesor the total value of all the property of the corporation arising from the investment of this fund; shares, the intangible property of the individual
shareholders, in face valu~ equivalent to the capital stock of the corporation,
and in actual value, the business estimate o:f the earning power of the capital of the corporation. It is believed that th1ese views are sanctioued generally by text writers, and also by the best considered cases, where the 1rncertainty of statutes have not made it necessary to hold otherwise. Ang. & A.,
§§ 556, et seq.; Beach, § 465, et seq.; Boone, § 105, 112; Clark, p. 256, et seq.;.
Cook §§ 11, 12, 199; Elliott, §~ 299, 300; Lowell Transfer of Stock, ch. I;
Morawetz, §§ 137, 781; Taylor, §§ .i24, 541, M5; I Thompson,§§ 1059-1085; II
Thompson,§ 2810; III Thompson,§§ 2956, 4:288, et seq.
Below is given a collection of cases where these matters are considered:
Capital stock does not incl?tde m1is:med b11t authorized shares: 1858, Coddington v. Gilbert, 17 N. Y. 489; 18GS, Fisk v. Chicago, etc., R., 36 How. Pr_
(N. Y.) 20, on 22; 1877, Greenpoint Sugar Co. v. Whitin, 69 N. Y. 328, on
338; 1879, Pratt v. Munson, 17 Hun. (N. Y.) 475; 1887, Christensen v. Eno,
106 N. Y. 97.
2. Capital stock means the amount subscribed, and not the sum paid in: 1834,
Bank of Utica v. City of Utica, 4 Paige Ch. ( N. Y.) 399, on 402; 1842, PeoP.lev. Supervisors of Niagara, 4 Hill (N. Y. ) 20; 1844, Ward v. GriswoldVllle
Mfg. Co., 16 Conn. 593; 1850, Hightower v. Thornton, 8 Ga. 486, 52 Am. D.
412; 1851, State v. Morrist.own Fire Assn. , 23 N. J. L . 195, on 196; 1862, Bank
of Commerce v. N. Y . City, 67 U.S. (2 Rlaclk) 620, on 628; 1882, Wetherbee
v. Baker, 35 N. J . Eq. 501; 1891, Security Co. v. Town of Hartford, 61 Conn.
89, on 100, 101.
3. Capital stock means the necessary property of the company purchased by the
fmid derivr-dfrom the payments on the ahares subscribed: 1868, State v. Hood . 15
"Rich. Law (S. C. 1 17i; 1875, State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, on 602;
1880, Ohio and Mississippi R. Co. v. Weber, 96 Ill. 443; 1881, Bank v. Tennessee, 104 U.S. 493; 1883, Williams v. W . U. Tel. Co., 93 N. Y . 162; 1891,
Security Co. v. Hartford, 61 Conn. 89, on 100-1; 1892, Wilkes Barre, etc.,
Bank v. Wilkes Barre, 148 Pa. St. 601; 1R9"i, Union Bank v. City of Richmond, 94 Va. 316; 1898, Commonwealth v. N. Y., P . & 0. R . Co., 188 Pa. St_
169, anrl cases on pp. 195, 198, 199 and 203.
Bnt does not include unneussary property: 1842, Inhabitants of Worcesterv. Western R. Corp., 4 Mete. (Mass.) 564; 1847, Railroad v. Berks Co., 6 Pa.
St. 70; 1855, Vermont Central R. Co. v. Burli ngton, 28 Yt. 193.
Neither does it include surplus: 1883, Wil lliams v. W. U. Tel. Co., 93 N. Y.
162; 1891, P eople v. Coleman, 126 N. Y. 4.33, s11pra, p. 778. But see, 1898~
Commw. v. N. Y., P . & 0 . R. Co., 188 Pa. St. 169.
4. Capital stock does not mea11 the corporate p1·operty-they are distinct things:
1819, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316; 1851, State v. Morristown Fire Assn., 23 N. J. L. 195, on 100; 1862, Bank of Commerce v. N. Y.
City, f'>7 U.S. (2 Black) 620, on 628; 1866, Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg.
Co., 12 Allen (Mass. ) 298, on 302-4; 1877, Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Gaines.
3 Tenn. Ch. 604; 1878, Railroad Companies v. Gaines, 97 U.S. 697; 1886,
Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 129, on 139; 1892, Railway Co(Ilpany v.
Furnace Co., 49 0. S. 102; 1895, Wells v. Green Bay, etc., Co. , 90 Wis. 442.
5. Capital stock and shares of stnck in lumds of shareholde1·s are the same:
1845, Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 44 U. S. (3 How.) 133, on 147; 1852, The
State v. Hranin, 23 N. J. L. 484; 1861, People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 23
N. Y. 192, on 220; 1869, National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall .)
353, on 359; 1875, Nichols v. New Haven & N. Co., 42 Conn. 103, on 120; 1880r
Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U . S. 129.
·
6. Capital stock aiid share.~ in the hands of t:he shareholders are not the sa~.:
1836, Union Bank v. The State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 489; 1864, Lycoming Co. v_
Gamble, 47 Pa. St. 106; 1865, Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall (70 U.S.) 5i3.

scribed, equivalent in face value to the sum total of the face value of the shares-

issued ; capital, the sum paid in as the fund with which it transacts business—

or the total value of all the property of the corporation arising from the in-

vestment of this fund; shares, the intangible property of the individual

shareholders, in face value equivalent to the capital stock of the corporation,

and in actual value, the business estimate of the earning power of the capi-

tal of the corporation. It is believed that these views are sanctioned gener-

ally by text writers, and also by the best considered cases, where the uncer-

tainty of statutes have not made it necessary to hold otherwise. Ang. & A.,

§§ 556, et seq.; Beach, § 465, et scq.; Boone, § 105, 112; Clark, p. 256, et seq.;

Cook §§ 11, 12, 199; Elliott, §§ 299, 300; Lowell Transfer of Stock, ch. 1;

Morawetz, §§ 137, 781; Taylor, §§ i24, 541, 545; I Thompson, §§ 1059-1085: II

Thompson, § 2810; III Thompson, §§ 2956, 4288, et seq.

Below is given a collection of cases where these matters are considered:

Capital stock does not include unissued but authorized shares: 1858, Codding-

ton v. Gilbert, 17 N. Y. 489; 1868, Fisk v. Chicago, etc., R., 36 How. Pr.
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(N.Y.) 20, on 22; 1877, Greenpoint Sugar Co. v. Whitin, 69 N. Y. 328, on

.338; 1879, Pratt v. Munson, 17 Hun. (N. Y.) 475; 1887, Christensen v. Eno,

106 N. Y. 97.

2. Capital stock means the amount subscribed, and not the sum paid in: 1834,

Bank of Utica v. City of Utica, 4 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 399, on 402; 1842, People

v. Supervisors of Niagara, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 20; 1844, Ward v. Griswoldville>

Mfg. Co., 16 Conn. 593; 1850, Hightower v. Thornton, 8 Ga. 486, 52 Am. D.

412; 1851, State v. Morristown Fire Assn., 23 N. J. L. 195, on 196; 1862, Bank

of Commerce v. N. Y. City, 67 TJ. S. (2 Black) 620, on 628; 1882, Wetherbee-

v. Baker, 35 N. J. Eq. 501; 1891, Security Co. v. Town of Hartford, 61 Conn.

89, on 100, 101.

3. Capital slock means thenecessary property of the company purchased by the

fund derived from the payments on the shares subscribed: 1868, State v. Hood, 15

Rich. Law (S. C.) 177; 1875, State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 TJ. S. 575, on 602;

1880, Ohio and Mississippi R. Co. v. Weber, 96 111. 443; 1881, Bank v. Ten-

nessee, 104 U. S. 493; 1883, Williams v. W. II. Tel. Co., 93 N. Y. 162; 1891,

Security Co. v. Hartford, 61 Conn. 89, on 100-1; 1892, Wilkes Barre, etc.,

Bank v. Wilkes Barre, 148 Pa. St. 601; 1897, Union Bank v. Citv of Rich-

mond, 94 Va. 316; 1898, Commonwealth v\ N. Y., P. & O. K. Co., 188 Pa. St.

169, and cases on pp. 195, 198, 199 and 203.

But does not include unnecessary property: 1842, Inhabitants of Worcester

v. Western R. Corp., 4 Mete. (Mass.) 564; '1847, Railroad v. Berks Co., 6 Pa.

St. 70; 1855, Vermont Central R. Co. v. Burlington, 28 Vt. 193.

Neither does it include surplus: 1883, Williams v. W. TJ. Tel. Co., 93 N. Y.

162; 1891, People v. Coleman, 126 N.Y. 433, supra, p. 778. But see, 1898,

Commw. v. N. Y., P. & O. R. Co., 188 Pa. St. 169.

4. Capital stock does not mean the corporate property—thev are distinct things:

1819, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (TJ. S.) 316; 1851, State v. Morris-

town Fire Assn., 23 N. j. L. 195, on 196; 1862, Bank of Commerce v. N. Y.

City, 67 TJ. S. (2 Black) 620, on 628; 1866, Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg.

Co., 12 Allen (Mass.) 298, on 302-1; 1877, Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Gaines,

3 Tenn. Ch. 604; 1878, Railroad Companies v. Gaines, 97 TJ. S. 697; 1886,

Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 TJ. S. 129, on 139; 1892, Railway Company v.

Furnace Co., 49 O. S. 102; 1895, Wells v. Green Bay, etc., Co., 90 Wis. 442.

5. Capital stock and shares of stock in hands of shareholders are the same:

1845, Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 44 U. S. (3 How.) 133, on 147; 1852, The

State v. Branin, 23 N. J. L. 484; 1861, People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 23

N. Y. 192, on 220; 1869, National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U. S. (9 Wall.)

353, on 359; 1875, Nichols v. New Haven & N. Co., 42 Conn. 103, on 120; 1886;

Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 TJ. S. 129.

6. Capital stock and shares in the hands of the shareholders are not the same:

1836, Union Bank v. The State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 489; 1864, Lycoming Co. v.

Gamble, 47 Pa. St. 106; 1865, Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall (70 U. S.) 573.
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on 583; 1869, National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U. fi. (9 Wall.) 353, on
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359; 1873, The Delaware Railroad Tax, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 206, on 229;

1877, Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 TJ. S. 679, on 686; 1884, State Bank v. City

of Richmond, 79 Va. 113; 1896, Shelby Co. v. Union & P. Bank, 161 U. S. 149,

on 154; 1895, Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 134, on 146; 1897,

Union Bank v. City of Richmond, 94 Va. 316; 1898, Bank v. Memphis, 101

Tenn. 154.

7. Capital means the property of the company: 1861, People v. Commission-

ers, etc., 23 N. Y. 192, on 219; 1862, Bank of Commerce v. N. Y. City, 67 U.

S. (2 Black) 620, on 629; 1865, Van Allen v. Assessors, 70 U. S. (3 Wall.) 573,

on 583; 1869. National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U. S. (9 Wall.) 353, on

359; 1874, Bailev v. Clark, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 284; 1878, Burrall v. Bush-

wick R., 75 N. Y. 211; 1880, Bradley v. Bauder, 36 Ohio St. 28, on 35; 1883,

Williams v. Western U. Tel. Co., 93 N. Y. 162; 1886, Tennessee v. Whitworth,

117 U. S. 129, on 139; 1895, Wells v. Green Bay, etc., Co., 90 Wis. 442.

8. Capital is the same as capital stock of the corporation: 1883, Williams v.

Western Union Tel. Co., 93 N. Y. 162; 1891, People v. Coleman, 126 N. Y.

433, supra, p.778:1892, Railway Co. v. Furnace Co., 49 Ohio St. 102; 1894,
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American, etc., Co. v. State Board, 56 N. J. L. 389; 1895, Tradesman Pub.

Co. v. Car Wheel Co., 95 Tenn. 634.

9. Capital is not the same as shares of stock in the hands of the shareholders:

1865, Van Allen v. The Assessors, 70 U. S. (3 Wall.) 573, on 583; 1866, Com-

monwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 12 Allen (Mass.) 298, on 302-^1; 1866, Peo-

ple v. Commissioners, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 244, on 255; 1866, Bradley v. The

People, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 459; 1869, National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76

U. S. (9 Wall.) 353, on 359; 1880, Bradley v. Bauder, 36 Ohio St. 28; 1886,

Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 129; 1897, New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank,

167 U. S. 371, on 402.

10. Property of the corporation is not the same as shares of stock: 1866, Com-

monwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 12 Allen (Mass.) 298, on 302-4; 1898, State

on .'583; 1869, National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U . S. (9 Wall.) 353, on
659; 1873, The Delaware Railroad Tax, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 206, on 229;
1877, Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, on 686; 1884, State Bank v. City
of Richmond, 79 Va. 113; 1896, Shelby Co. v. Union & P. Bank, 161 U. S.149,
on 154; 1895, Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 134, c.n 146; 1897,
Union Bank v. City of Richmond, 94 Va. 316; 1898, Bank v. Memphis, 101
Tenn . 154.
7. Capital means the property of the company: 1861, People v. Commission·
ers, etc., 23 N. Y. 192, on 219; 1862, Bank of Commerce v. N. Y. City, 67 U.
S. (2 Black) 620, on 629; 1865, Van Allen v. ASBessors, 70 U. S. (3 Wall.) 573,
on 583; 1869, National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U. S. (!l Wall.) 353, on
359; 1874, Bniley v. Clark, 88 U. 8. (21 Wall.) 284; 1878, 'Burrall v. Bushwick R., 75 N. Y. 211; 1880, Bradley v. Bauder, 36 Ohio St. 28, on 35; 1883,
Williams v. Western U. Tel. Co., 93 N. Y . 162; 1886, Tennessee v. Whitworth,
117 U.S. 129, on 139; 1895, Wells v. Green Bay, etc., Co., 90 Wis. 442.
8. Capital is the same as capital stock of the corporatio1£: 1883, Williams v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 93 N. Y. 162; 1891, People v. Coleman, 126 N. Y.
433, supra, p. 778: 1892, Railway Co. v. Furnace Co., 49 Ohio St. 102; 1894,
American, etc., Co. v. State Board, 56 N. J. L. 389; 1895, Tradesman Pub.
Co. v. Car Wheel Co., 95 Tenn. 634.
9. Capital is not the same as shares of stock in the hands of the shareholders:
1865, Van Allen v. The Assessors, 70 U . S. (3 Wall.) 573, on 583; 1866, Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 12 Allen (Mass.) 298, on 302-4; 1866, People v. Commission ers, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 244, on 255; 1866, Bradley v. The
People, 71 U.S . (4 Wall. ) 459; 1869, National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76
U . 8. (9 WaII .) 353, on 359; 1880, Bradley v. Bauder, 36 Ohio St. 28; 1886,
TenneSBee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 129; 1897, New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank,
167 U. S. 371, on 402.
10. Property of the corporation is not the same as shares of stock: 1866, Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 12 Allen (Mass.) 298, on 302-4; 1898, State
v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 70 Conn. 590, on 603; 1899, Owensboro National Bank
v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664.

v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 70 Conn. 590, on 603; 1899, Owensboro National Bank

v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664.
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1897. In the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth

HAMLIN v. CONTINENTAL TRUST COMPANY. 1

Circuit (Ohio), 47 U. S. Appeals Rep. 422-438, 78 Fed. Rep.

664, 36 L. R. A. 826, 7 A. & E. C. C. N. S. 631.

[Certain unsecured creditors of the insolvent Toledo, St. L. & K.

C. R. Co., in May, 1893, filed a bill on behalf of all the creditors to

wind up the affairs of the railroad and distribute its assets; a receiver

IN THE UNITED ST~TES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, Sixth
Circuit (Ohio), 47 U. S. Appeals Rep. 422-438, 78 Fed. Rep.
664, 36 L. R. A. 826, 7 A. & E. C. C. N. S. 631.

1897.

was appointed under this bill; the bondholders were not made parties

to this suit, but in December, 1893, the Continental Trust Company,

trustees for the holders of some $9,000,000 mortgage bonds, filed in

the same court a bill to foreclose the mortgage, whereupon the same

receiver was appointed as before, and the two cases ordered to be

consolidated. Before any decree adjudicating claims or decreeing

foreclosure, Hamlin etal., appellants herein, asked to become parties

defendant with leave to file an answer and cross-bill; this was granted,

■Statement of facts abridged. Only part of opinion given.

50—Wil. Cases.

[Certain unsecured creditors of the insolvent Toledo, St. L. & K.
C. R. Co., in May, 1893, filed a bill on behalf of all the creditors to
wind up the affairs of the railroad and distribute its assets; a receiver
was appointed under this bill; the bondholders were not made parties
to this suit, but in December, 1893, the Continental Trust Company,
trustees for the holders of some $9,000,000 mortgage bonds, filed in
the same court a bill to foreclose the mortgage, whereupen the same
receiver was appointed as before, and the two cases ordered to be
consolidated. Before any decree adjudicating claims or decreeing
foreclosure, Hamlin et al., appellants herein, asked to become parties
defendant with leave to file an answer and cross-bill ; this was granted,
istatement of facts abridged.
50-WrL. CASES.

Digitized by

gl

Only part of opinion given.

Origi11al from

PRINCETON UNIVERSiTY

786

HAMLIN V. CONTINENTAL TRUST CO. § 211

subject to the right of complainants, after further examination, to
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move to strike from the files, or strike out anything attacking the

HAMLIN V. CONTINENTAL TRUST CO.

§2

I I

validity of the consideration for the mortgage bonds. Such motion

subject to the right of complainants, after further examination, to
move to strike from the files, or strike out anything attacking the
validity of the consideration for the mortgage bonds. Such motion
was afterward made accordingly, and the court gave an opinion
"denying the claim of the appellants (Hamlin et al.) to be creditors
of the railroad company, or that as preferred stockholders they had
any lien valid as against creditors, or any right or interest in or to the
property of said company antagonistic to the corporation or to the
class ·of common stockholders," and thereupon an order was entered
"denying the appellants the right to intervene or file an answer or
other pleading." This ruling, and the decree following it, are
appealed from. Other facts are stated in the opinion.]
LuRTON, Circuit Judge. • • • The case made by the petition,
answer and cross-bill was substantially this: The appellants and those
acting in concert with them are owners and holders of certificates of
preferred non-voting stock issued by the Toledo, St. Louis and Kansas
City Railroad Company. The total issue of these certificates was
$s 1 805,ooo, and of this total the appellants and those represented by
them hold about $z,ooo,ooo. They claim that these certificates are
money obligations of the railroad company, secured by a lien next
after the existing first mortgage bonds of said company. They aver
that, though no mortgage was executed and registered to secure said
certificates, they constitute a valid equitable mortgage, binding upon
the corporation and upon all creditors who become such with notice
of this equitable lien. These certificates are in form alike, and were
issued simultaneously with the execution of the first mortgage sought
to be foreclosed herein, and were registered by the trustee under said
first mortgage. We here set out one of these certificates and one of
the coupons attached:
"Toledo, St. Louis and Kansas City Railroad Company.
"No.
Preferred capital stock.
10 shares.
"This is to certify that James M. Quigley, or bearer, is entitled to
ten shares of one hundred dollars each, of the preferred non-voting
capital stock of the Toledo, St. Louis and Kansas City Railroad
Company.
"This stock constitutes a lien upon the property and net earnings of
the company next after the company's existing first mortgage. It
does not entitle the holder to vote thereon. After the first day of
January, 1888, it is entitled to, and carries interest at the rate of 4
per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually, represented by interest
coupons attached to this certificate. Such interest is only payable out
of the net earnings of the company after the payment of interest upon
its existing first mortgage bonds, and the cost of maintenance and
operation. A statement showing the business of the company for the
half of its fiscal year next preceding shall be exhibited at the office of
the company in New York to the holder of this certificate, at the maturity of each interest coupon, and the net earnings applicable to such
interest shall be reckoned for such period. Such interest is not to ac-

was afterward made accordingly, and the court gave an opinion

"denying the claim of the appellants (Hamlin et al.) to be creditors

of the railroad company, or that as preferred stockholders they had

any lien valid as against creditors, or any right or interest in or to the

property of said company antagonistic to the corporation or to the

class of common stockholders," and thereupon an order was entered

"denying the appellants the right to intervene or file an answer or

other pleading." This ruling, and the decree following it, are

appealed from. Other facts are stated in the opinion.]

Lurton, Circuit Judge. * * * The case made by the petition,

answer and cross-bill was substantially this: The appellants and those

acting in concert with them are owners and holders of certificates of

preferred non-voting stock issued by the Toledo, St. Louis and Kansas

City Railroad Company. The total issue of these certificates was

$5,805,000, and of this total the appellants and those represented by

them hold about $2,000,000. They claim that these certificates are
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money obligations of the railroad company, secured by a lien next

after the existing first mortgage bonds of said company. They aver

that, though no mortgage was executed and registered to secure said

certificates, they constitute a valid equitable mortgage, binding upon

the corporation and upon all creditors who become such with notice

of this equitable lien. These certificates are in form alike, and were

issued simultaneously with the execution of the first mortgage sought

to be foreclosed herein, and were registered by the trustee under said

first mortgage. We here set out one of these certificates and one of

the coupons attached:

"Toledo, St. Louis and Kansas City Railroad Company.

"No. Preferred capital stock. 10 shares.

"This is to certify that James M. Quigley, or bearer, is entitled to

ten shares of one hundred dollars each, of the preferred non-voting

capital stock of the Toledo, St. Louis and Kansas City Railroad

Company.

"This stock constitutes a lien upon the property and net earnings of

the company next after the company's existing first mortgage. It

does not entitle the holder to vote thereon. After the first day of

January, 1888, it is entitled to, and carries interest at the rate of 4

per cent, per annum, payable semi-annually, represented by interest

coupons attached to this certificate. Such interest is only payable out

of the net earnings of the company after the payment of interest upon

its existing first mortgage bonds, and the cost of maintenance and

operation. A statement showing the business of the company for the

half of its fiscal year next preceding shall be exhibited at the office of

the company in New York to the holder of this certificate, at the ma-

turity of each interest coupon, and the net earnings applicable to such

interest shall be reckoned for such period. Such interest is not to ac-
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cumulate as a charge, and the coupons representing unearned interest

§

211

CAPITAL STOCK .

must be surrendered and canceled on the payment in whole or in part

of a subsequently maturing coupon. At any time after the first day

of January, 1891, and before the first day of January, 1898, this cer-

tificate may be converted into the common capital stock of the com-

pany. If not converted, then to become a preferred four per cent,

non-cumulative stock. The company will create no mortgage of its

main line other than its first mortgage, nor of any part thereof, except

expressly subject to the prior lien of this certificate, without the con-

sent of the holders of at least two-thirds of this stock present at a

meeting, of which reasonable personal notice must be given to each

registered stockholder, and by publication for at least three successive

weeks in two leading daily newspapers published in the cities of New

York and Boston. One-third of the entire issue of this stock present

in person or by proxy shall constitute a quorum. Nor will the com-

pany increase the issue of these certificates of stock without consent

obtained as above. This certificate of stock shall be transferrable by

delivery or by transfer on the book of the company in the city of New
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York, after a registration of ownership, certified hereon by the trans-

fer agent of the company.

"Countersigned.

"American Loan and Trust Company, ,

"By , President.

"Secretary. ,

"New York, June 19, 1886. Secretary.

"Shares $100 each.

"The Toledo, St. Louis and Kansas City Railroad Company will

pay to bearer on the first day of January, 1898, upon the surrender

of this warrant, at its office or agency, in the city of New York, any

amount that may be due hereon under the conditions set forth in the

cumulate as a charge, and the coupons representing unearned interest
must be surrendered and canceled on the p ayment in whole or in part
of a subsequently maturing coupon. At any time after the first day
of January, 1891, and before the first day of January, 1898, this certificate may be converted into the common capital stock of the company. If not converted, then to become a preferred four per cent.
non-cumulative stock. The company will create no mortgage of its
main line other than its first mortgage, nor of any part thereof, except
expressly subject to the prior lien of this certificate, without tke consent of the holders of at least two-thirds of this stock present at a
meeting, of which reasonable personal notice must be given to each
registered stockholder, and by publication for at least three successive
weeks in two leading daily newspapers published in the cities of New
Y ork and Boston. One-third of the entire issue of this stock present
in person or by proxy shall constitute a quorum. Nor will the comp any increase the issue of these certificates of stock without consent
obtained as above. This certificate of stock shall be transferrable by
delivery or by transfer on the book of the company in the city of New
York, after a registration of ownership, certified hereon by the transfer agent of the company.
·
' ' Countersigned.
" American Loan and Trust Company,
'
President.
"By
'
''Secretary.
'
Secretary.
"New York, June 19, 1886.

certificate of stock to which this is attached, not exceeding the sum

of twenty dollars. Coupon No. 20. No. .

"Isaac White, Secretary." * * *

In the absence of charter regulation or prohibition by the law of

the state under which a corporation is organized, a corporation at its

organization may classify its stock, and provide for a preference of

one class over another in respect of both capital and dividends. 1

Cook on Stock and Stockholders (3d ed.), §§ 267, 268, 278; War-

ren v. King, 108 U. S. 389; Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 31 Mich. 76;

Kent v. The Quicksilver Mining Company, 78 N. Y. 159; McGregor

v. The Home Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 33 N. J.

Eq. 181; Miller v. Ratterman, 47 Ohio St. 141, 163.

In providing for the lien of this stock upon the "property" of the

company next after the company's existing first mortgage, "property

and net earnings" are coupled together. This is significant. The

lien given on "net earnings" is the same kind of lien as that given on

the "property" of the company. In such case it is a preference over

"Shares $ 100 each.
11
The Toledo, St. Louis and Kansas City Railroad Company will
pay to bearer on the first day of January, 1898, upon the surrender
of this warrant, at its office or agency, in the city of New York, any
amount that may be due hereon under the conditions set forth in the
certificate of stock to which this is attached, not exceeding the sum
of twenty dollars. Coupon No. 20. No. - - .
"lsAAC WHITE, Secretary." • • •
In the absence of charter regulation or prohibition by the law of
the state under which a corporation is organized, a corporation at its
organization may classify its stock, and provide for a preference of
one class over another in respect of both capital and dividends. 1
Cook on Stock and Stockholders (3d ed.),§§ 267, 268, 278; Warren v. King, 108 U.S. 389; Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 31 Mich. 76;
Kent v. The Quicks ilver Mining Company, 78 N. Y. 159; McGregor
v. The Home Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 33 N. J.
Eq. 181; Miller v. Ratterman , 47 Ohio St. 141, 163.
In providing for the lien of this stock upon the " property" of the
company next after the company's existing first mortgage, "property
and net earnings" are coupled together. This is significant. The
lien given on "net earnings" is the same kind of lien as that given on
the " property" of the company. In such case it is a preference over
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holders. Neither do we think that the provision that this stock shall

HAMLIN V. CONTINENTAL TRUST CO.
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"become a preferred four per cent, non-cumulative stock," in the

the usual rights and interests of another but subordinate class of stockholders. Neither do we think that the provision that this stock shall
"become a preferred four per cent. non-cumulative stock," in the
event the holder fails to avail himself of the privilege of converting it
into common stock within the time allowed, is indicative that it was
not preferred stock before the rejection of the option to become common stock. Before that it was a non-voting, non-cumulative preferred stock with the option to become common stock. After that
time this option is lost, and with it the privilege of sharing equally
with the other class of stock in the control of the corporation and in
the distribution of dividends without the limitation prescribed as to
the amount of such dividends. That seems to be the only result of
rejecting the option.
There is a wide difference between the relation of a creditor and a
stockholder to the corporate property. One can not well be a creditor
as respects creditors proper, and a stockholder by virtue of a certificate evidencing his contribution to the capital of the corporation.
Stock is capital, and a stock certificate but evidences that the holder
has ventured his means as a part of the capital. It is a fixed characteristic of capital stock that no part of it can be withdrawn for the
purpose of repaying the principal of the capital stock until the debts
of the corporation are paid. These principles are elementary. Warren
v. King, i.08 U. S. 389; I Cook on Stock and Stockholders (3 ed.),
§ 271. The chance of gain throws on the stockhotder, as respects
creditors, the entire risk of the loss of his contribution to capital. " He
can not be both creditor and debtor by virtue of his ownership of
stock." Warren v. King, supra. If the purpose in providing for
these peculiar shares was to arrange matters so that under any circumstances a part of the principal of the stock might be withdrawn before
the full discharge of all corporate debts, the device would be contrary
to the nature of capital stock, opposed to public policy, and void as to
creditors affected thereby. 1 Cook on Stock and Stockholders (3d ed.),
§ § 270, 271 ; Chaffee v. Rutland Railroad Company, SS Vermont 1 IO;
McCutcheon v . Merz Capsule Company, 37 U. S. App. s86, 598 ;
Morrow v. Iron & Steel Co., 3 Pickle (Tenn.) 262. If that was the
purpose of this arrangement, most doubtful language was employed.
There is a sense in which every shareholder is a creditor of the corporation to the extent of his contribution to the capital stoc}\. In that
sense every corporation includes its capital stock among its liabilities.
But that creditor relation is one which exists only between the corporation and its shareholders. It is a liability which is postponed to
every other liability, and no part of the capital stock can be lawfully
returned to the stockholders until all debts are paid or provided for.
The violation of this well-understood principle is a breach of trust,
and a creditor affected thereby may pursue the stockholders and
recover as for an unlawful diversion of assets.
The appellants say that it was originally contemplated that the new
corporation should pay them for their interests in the foreclosed rail-

event the holder fails to avail himself of the privilege of converting it

into common stock within the time allowed, is indicative that it was

not preferred stock before the rejection of the option to become com-

mon stock. Before that it was a non-voting, non-cumulative pre-

ferred stock with the option to become common stock. After that

time this option is lost, and with it the privilege of sharing equally

with the other class of stock in the control of the corporation and in

the distribution of dividends without the limitation prescribed as to

the amount of such dividends. That seems to be the only result of

rejecting the option.

There is a wide difference between the relation of a creditor and a

stockholder to the corporate property. One can not well be a creditor

as respects creditors proper, and a stockholder by virtue of a certifi-

cate evidencing his contribution to the capital of the corporation.

Stock is capital, and a stock certificate but evidences that the holder

has ventured his means as a part of the capital. It is a fixed charac-
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teristic of capital stock that no part of it can be withdrawn for the

purpose of repaying the principal of the capital stock until the debts

of the corporation are paid. These principles are elementary. Warren

v. King, 108 U. S. 389; 1 Cook on Stock and Stockholders (3 ed.),

§271. The chance of gain throws on the stockholder, as respects

creditors, the entire risk of the loss of his contribution to capital. t;He

can not be both creditor and debtor by virtue of his ownership of

stock." Warren v. King, supra. If the purpose in providing for

these peculiar shares was to arrange matters so that under any circum-

stances a part of the principal of the stock might be withdrawn before

the full discharge of all corporate debts, the device would be contrary

to the nature of capital stock, opposed to public policy, and void as to

creditors affected thereby. 1 Cook on Stock and Stockholders (3d ed.),

§§ 270, 271; Chaffee v. Rutland Railroad Company, 55 Vermont no;

McCutcheon v. Merz Capsule Company, 37 U. S. App. 586, 598;

Morrow v. Iron & Steel Co., 3 Pickle (Tenn.) 262. If that was the

purpose of this arrangement, most doubtful language was employed.

There is a sense in which every shareholder is a creditor of the cor-

poration to the extent of his contribution to the capital stock. In that

sense every corporation includes its capital stock among its liabilities.

But that creditor relation is one which exists only between the corpo-

ration and its shareholders. It is a liability which is postponed to

every other liability, and no part of the capital stock can be lawfully

returned to the stockholders until all debts are paid or provided for.

The violation of this well-understood principle is a breach of trust,

and a creditor affected thereby may pursue the stockholders and

recover as for an unlawful diversion of assets.

The appellants say that it was originally contemplated that the new

corporation should pay them for their interests in the foreclosed rail-
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road, and for that purpose should issue to them its second mortgage

§

2 II

CAPITAL STOCK.

bonds. If that plan had been carried out there would be no doubt as

to their attitude. They would have become creditors. Under it their

relation would have been one of no doubt, and notice by registration

would have put all who dealt with the corporation on guard. That

plan was abandoned. They agreed to take and did take the relation

of stockholders toward the new company. They surrendered the

privilege of voting. That was perhaps a valid agreement between

stockholders, though of doubtful public poiicy. They thereby gave

some additional value to the common stock. The latter was the ex-

clusive voting stock, and that was worth something as railway man-

agement now goes. The surrender of the right to vote does not make

them creditors. They bargained for preferred shares of stock, pre-

ferred as to dividends and preferred as to capital. For this advan-

tageous position they surrendered the first intention by which they

were to have become secured creditors. If they intended to become

creditors and not stockholders, they adopted a most singular method

of defining their relation. We will not presume that their purpose
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was to adopt a device by which they might withdraw their contribu-

tion to the capital stock and leave creditors unpaid. If they intended

that, they have not made it plain, and if it was plain, the device would

be invalid as to creditors.

Although the appellants were not creditors proper, yet they show a

case on the face of their certificates entitling them to a preference

over common stockholders in relation to both dividends and capital.

Ordinarily preferred stock is entitled to no preference over other

stock in relation to capital. But where there is an expressed agree-

ment giving such a preference, not prohibited by local law or the

charter, we see no reason why it is not a valid contract as between

the corporation and such preferred stockholders, and binding upon

the common stockholders. 1 Cook on Stock and Stockholders (3d

ed.), § 278; Warren v. King, 108 U. S. 389; Chaffee v. Rutland

Railroad Company, 55 Ver. 110; In re Bangor and Portmadoc Slate

and Slab Company, L. R. 20 Eq. 59; Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 31

Mich. 76; Kent v. The Quicksilver Mining Company, 78 N. Y. 159.

Such a preference would not be inconsistent with their relation as

stockholders, and would not affect creditors. This relation to the

corporation and to its common stockholders, in view of the non-voting

provision in this arrangement, makes it eminently proper that these

preferred stockholders should be represented by a reasonable number

standing for the class with the right to stand for and defend in respect

to their own rights. Bronson v. La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad

Company, 2 Wall. 283, 302. » • »

The effect of dismissing the appellants from the case after admitting

them as parties was to deny them the preference over common stock-

holders, and was such a decree as was final, and, therefore, appeal-

able. Ex parte Jordan, 94 U. S. 248. For this error the decree

will be reversed.

Note. 1. As to nature of preferred stock, see, 1841, Davis v. Proprietors,

road, and for that purpose should issue to them its second mortgage
bonds. If that plan had been carried out there would be no doubt as
to their attitude. They would have become creditors. Under it their
relation would have been one of no doubt, and notice by registration
would have put all who dealt with the corporation on guard. That
plan was abandoned. They agreed to take and did take the relation
of stockholders toward the new company. They surrendered the
privilege of voting. That was perhaps a valid agreement between
stockholders, though of doubtful public policy. They thereby gave
some additional value to the common stock. The latter was the exclusive voting stock, and that was worth something as railway management now goes. The surrender of the right to vote does not make
them creditors. They bargained for preferred shares of stock, pref erred as to dividends and preferred as to capital. For this advantageous position they surrendered the first intention by which they
were to have become secured creditors. If they intended to become
creditors and not stockholders, they adopted' a most singular method
of defining their relation. We will not presume that their purpose
was to adopt a device by which they might withdraw their contribution to the capital stock and leave creditors unpaid. If they intended
tha t, they have not made it plain, and if it was plain, the device would
be invalid as to creditors.
Although the appellants were not creditors proper, yet they show a
c ase on the face of their certificates entitling them to a preference
over common stockholders in relation to both dividends and capital.
Ordinarily preferred stock is entitled to no preference over other
stock in relation to capital. But where there is an expressed agreement giving such a preference, not prohibited by local law or the
charter, we see no reason why it is not a valid contract as between
the corporation and such preferred stockholders, and binding upon
the common stockholders. I Cook on Stock and Stockholders (3cl
ed.),§ 278; Warren \'.King, 108 U.S. 389; Chaffee v. Rutland
Railroad Company, 55 Ver. 110; In re Bangor and Portmadoc Slate
and Slab Company, L. R. 20 Eq. 59; Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 31
Mich. 76; Kent v. The Quicksilver Mining Company, 78 N. Y. 159.
Such a preference would not be inconsistent with th eir relation as
stockholders, and would not affect creditors. This relation to the
corporation and to its common stockholders, in view of the non-\'oting
provision in this arrangement, makes it eminently proper that these
preferred stockholders should be represented by a reasonable number
standing for the class with the right to stand for and defend in respect
to their own rights. Bronson v. La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad
Company, 2 Wall. 283, 302. • • •
The effect of dismissing the appellants from the case after ad milting
them as parties was to deny them the preference over common stockholders, and was such a decree as was final, and, therefore, appealable. Ex parte Jordan, 94 U. S. 248. For this error the decree
will be reversed.
Note. 1. As to nature of preferred stock, see, 1844, Davis v. Proprietors,
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etc., 8 Mete. (Mass.) 321; 1860, Bates v. Androscoggin & K. R. Co., 49 Maine

491; 1863, Rutland & B. R. Co. v. Thrall, 35 Vt. 536; 1866, Taft, Trustee, v.

etc., 8 Mete. (Mass.) 321; 1860, Bates v. Androscoggin & K. R. Co., 49 Maine
491; 1863, Rutland & B. R. Co. v. Thrall, 30 Vt. 536; 1866, Taft, Trustee, v.
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Folger, J. These are suits in equity to perpetually restrain the

KENT v. QUICKSILVER MINING COMPANY.1

Quicksilver Mining Company from taking certain action, on the one

hand proposed by it with the expressed assent of some only of the

stockholders in it, and on the other hand demanded of it by certain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.

78 New York

other of the stockholders in it which demand, it and still other stock-

Reports r59-191.

holders resist.

Whatever the frame of the pleadings in the several actions, and

FoLGER 1 J.
These are suits in equity to perpetually restrain the
Quicksilver Mining Company from taking certnin action, on the one
hand proposed by it with the expressed assent of some only of the
stockholders in it, and on the other hand demanded of it by certain
other of the stockholders in it which demand, it and still other stockholders resist.
Whatever the frame of the pleadings in the several actions, and
whatever the formal prayer for judgment, the purpose of the litigation in each is to reach a final and binding judgment, whether certain
''preferred stock,'' heretofore created by that company, is so far valid
as to be recognized in the future business of the company as giving to
the holders thereof the peculiar right expressed in the certificate
thereof. (The judgment below held the issue of preferred stock to
be valid.)
What is meant by "preferred stock" is well enough known in law
and business without definition or circumlocution here. • • •
(The corporation had the usual corpor'\te powers, including "the
power to issue certificates of stock, representing the value of its property, in such form and subject to such regulations as it might from
time to time by its by-laws prescribe.")
A by-law was duly made , which declared the whole value of its
property and the whole amount of its capital stock, and divided the
whole of it into shares equal in amount, and directed the issuing of
certificates of stock therefor. It is not to be said that this by-law authorized anything but shares equal in value and in right; or that 'the

whatever the formal prayer for judgment, the purpose of the litiga-

tion in each is to reach a final and binding judgment, whether certain

"preferred stock," heretofore created by that company, is so far valid

as to be recognized in the future business of the company as giving to

the holders thereof the peculiar right expressed in the certificate

thereof. (The judgment below held the issue of preferred stock to

be valid.)

What is meant by '■'■■preferred stock'" is well enough known in law

and business without definition or circumlocution here. • • •

(The corporation had the usual corporate powers, including "the

power to issue certificates of stock, representing the value of its prop-

erty, in such form and subject to such regulations as it might from

time to time by its by-laws prescribe.")

A by-law was duly made, which declared the whole value of its

property and the whole amount of its capital stock, and divided the

whole of it into shares equal in amount, and directed the issuing of

certificates of stock therefor. It is not to be said that this by-law au-

thorized anything but shares equal in value and in right; or that the

1 Statement much abridged, and only part of opinion given.
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capital, affairs and profits to come, as any other holder of a share.

Certificates of stock were issued under this by-law that gave no ex-

pression of anything different from that. When that by-law was

adopted, it was as much the law of the corporation as if its provisions

had been a part of the charter. (Presbyterian Church v. City of New

York, 5 Cow. 538.) So it is said in Grant on Corporations, p. 80,

in a qualified way. Thereby, and by the certificate, as between it

and every stockholder, the capital stock of the company was fixed in

amount, in the number of shares into which it was divisible, and in

the peculiar and relative value of each share. The by-law entered

into the compact between the corporation and every taker of a share;

it was in the nature of a contract between them. The holding and

owning of a share gave a right which could not be divested without

the assent of the holder and owner; or unless the power so to do had

been reserved in some way. (Mech. Bank v. N. Y. and N. H. R.

Co., 13 N. Y. 599-627.) Shares of stock are in the nature of choses

in action, and give the holder a fixed right in the division of the

profits or earnings of a company so long as it exists, and of its effects
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when it is dissolved. That right is as inviolable as is any right in

property, and can no more be taken away or lessened, against the

will of the owner, than can any other right, unless power is reserved

in the first instance, when it enters into the constitution of the right;

or is properly derived afterwards from a superior law giver. The

certificate of stock is the muniment of the shareholder's title, and

evidence of his right. It expresses the contract between the corpora-

tion and his co-stockholders and himself; and that contract can not,

he being unwilling, be taken away from him or changed as to him

without his prior dereliction, or under the conditions above stated.

Now it is manifest that any action of a corporation which takes hold

of the shares of its capital stock already sold and in the hands of law-

ful owners, and divides them into two classes—one of which is

thereby given prior right to a receipt of a fixed sum from the earnings

before the other may have any receipt therefrom, and is given an

equal share afterwards with the other in what earnings may remain—

destroys the equality of the shares, takes away a right which originally

existed in it, and materially varies the effect of the certificate of stock.

It is said that when a corporation can lawfully buy property, or get

money on loan, any known assurance may be exacted and given which

does not fall within the prohibition, express or implied, of some stat-

ute (Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 66-67); and that is sought to be

applied here. But the prohibition to such action as this is found, not

indeed in a statute commonly so called, but in the constitutional pro-

vision which forbids the impairment of vested rights, save for public

purposes and on due compensation. The right which a stockholder

gets on the purchase of his share and the issue to him of the certifi-

cate therefor is such a vested right.

It is contended that the power so to do is an incidental and implied

power, necessary to the use of the other powers of the corporation,

taker of one did not own as large an interest in the corporation, its
capital, affairs and profits to come, as any other holder of a share.
Certificates of stock were issued under this by-law that gave no expression of anything different from that. When that by-law was
adopted, it was as much the law of the corporation as if its provisions
had been a part of the charter. (Presbyterian Church v. City of New
York, 5 Cow. 538.) So it is said in Grant on Corporations, p. 80,
in a qualified way. Thereby, and by the certificate, as between it
and every stockholder, the capital stock of the company was fixed in
amount, in the number of shares into which it was divisible, and in
the peculiar and relative value of each share. The by-law entered
into the compact between the corporation and every taker of a share;
it was in the nature of a contract between them. The holding and
owning of a share gave a right which could not be divested without
the assent of the holder and owner; or unless the power so to do had
been reserved in some way. (Mech. Bank v. N. Y. and N. H. R.
Co., 13 N. Y. 59~27.) Shares of stock are in the nature of choses
·i n action, and give the holder a fixed right in the division of the
profits or earnings of a company so long as it exists, and of its effects
when it is dissolved. That right is as inviolable as is any right in
property, and can no more be taken away or lessened, against the
will of the owner, than can any other ~ght, unless power is reserved
in the ·first instance, when it enters into the constitution of the right;
or is properly derived afterwards from a superior law giver. The
certificate of stock is the muniment of the shareholder's title, and
evidence of his right. It expresses the contract between the corporation and his co-stockholders and himself; and that contract can not,
he being unwilling, be taken away from him or changed as to him
without his prior dereliction, or under the conditions above stated.
Now it is manifest that any action of a corporation which takes hold
of the shares of its capital stock already sold and in the hands of lawful owners, and divides them into two classes--one of which is
thereby given prior right to a receipt of a fixed sum from the earnings
before the other may have any receipt therefrom, and is given an
equal share afterwards with the other in what earnings may remaindestroys the equality of the shares, takes away a right which originally
existed in it, and materially varies the effect of the certificate of stock.
It is said that when a corporation can lawfully buy property, or get
money on loan, any known assurance may be exacted and given which
does not fall within the prohibition, express or implied, of some statute (Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 66-67); and that is sought to be
applied here. But the prohibition to such action as this is found , not
indeed in a statute commonly so called, but in the constitutional provision which forbids the impairment of vested rights, save for public
purposes and on due compensation. The right which a stockholder
gets on the purchase of his share and the issue to him of the certificate therefor is such a vested right.
It is contended that the power so to do is an incidental and implied
power, necessary to the use of the other powers of the corporation,
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and is a legitimate means of raising money and securing the agreed

consideration therefor. We have already conceded that it is legitimate

and is a legitimate means of raising money and securing the agreed
consideration therefor. We have already conceded that it is legitimate
to borrow money, and to secure the repayment of it, with a compensation for the u se of it. But that is when it is done in such way as to
put the burthen upon every share of stock alike, and to enable every
share of stock to be relieved therefrom alike; in such way as to prese rve the equality of right and privilege and value of the shares, and
maintain intact the contract thereto with the stockholder.
Citations are made to us for the converse of this, but they do not
come up-sometimes in their facts, sometimes in their declarations-to the necessity of the proposition. Either it is where the capital is
n ot limited, and it is new shares that may be issued with a preference,
and where there is express power to borrow on bond and mortgage
(2 Red£. on Railways, ch. 33, §§ 4, 237; Harrison v. Mex. R. W.,
12 Eng. Rep. 793); or the amount of the capital has not been reached
and such stock is issued therefrom (Hazelhurst v. Savannah R., 43
Ga. 53; Tottan v. Tison, 54 Ga. 139) ; or there was legislative au·
thority (Davisv. Proprietors, 8 Mete£. 321; Rutland R. Co. v. Thrall,
35 Vt. 545); or a restriction to authorized capital and there wa
unanimous consent of the stockholders (Prouty v. M. S. & N. I. R.,
I Hun 663; 43 Ga. 53, supra); or there was power to redeem, which
wa~ a transaction in the n ature. of a debt (Westchester, etc. , R. Co.
v. Jackson, 77 Pa. St. 321); or the opinion was ob£ter (Bates v. Androscoggin R. Co., 49 Maine 491); or it was the case of a subscription for stock with a condition for interest until the corporation was
in ope ration (Richardson v. Vt. & Mass. R. Co. , 44 Vt. 613); or it
was an action on a subscription more favorable to defendant than to
other subscribers, and it was held that defendant could not set up the
lack of equality (Evansville R. Co. v. Evansville, 15 Ind. 395); or
a solemn determination of this question was not necessary for the dis·
posal of the case (Williston v. M. S. & N. I. R. Co., 13 Allen400);
or the issue was authorized by the articles of association (In re A'D.
St. N av. & Col. Co., 20 L. R. Eq. 339); or there was full knowl·
edge on the part of all concerned (Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 31 Mich.
81); or the power in the corporate body was conceded, and it was
denied that it existed in the directors (McLaughlin v. D. & M. R.,
8 Mich. 100).
We will not say, for we are not called upon here to say, that never
can a corporation rightfully, against the dissent of a portion of its
stockholders, make some of the stock preferred; what we assert is
that this case does not present a state of facts in which a power so to
do exists.
There is a power in this charter to alter, amend, add to or repeal,
at pleasure, by-laws before made. It is argued' from this that it was
in the power of the corporate body, in due form and manner, to alter
the by-law which had fixed the amount of the capital stock and the
number and relative value of the shares thereof. The power to make
by-laws is to make such as are not inconsistent with the constitution
and the law; and the power to alter has the same limit, so that no

to borrow money, and to secure the repayment of it, with a compen-

sation for the use of it. But that is when it is done in such way as to

put the burthen upon every share of stock alike, and to enable every

share of stock to be relieved therefrom alike; in such way as to pre-

serve the equality of right and privilege and value of the shares, and

maintain intact the contract thereto with the stockholder.

Citations are made to us for the converse of this, but they do not

come up—sometimes in their facts, sometimes in their declarations—

to the necessity of the proposition. Either it is where the capital is

not limited, and it is new shares that may be issued with a preference,

and where there is express power to borrow on bond and mortgage

(2 Redf. on Railways, ch. 33, §§ 4, 237; Harrison v. Mex. R. W.,

12 Eng. Rep. 793); or the amount of the capital has hot been reached

and such stock is issued therefrom (Hazelhurst v. Savannah R., 43

Ga. 53; Tottan v. Tison, 54 Ga. 139); or there was legislative au-

thority (Davis v. Proprietors, 8 Metcf. 321; Rutland R. Co. v. Thrall,
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35 Vt. 545); or a restriction to authorized capital and there was

unanimous consent of the stockholders (Prouty v. M. S. & N. I. R.,

1 Hun 663; 43 Ga. 53, supra); or there was power to redeem, which

wau a transaction in the nature of a debt (Westchester, etc., R. Co.

v. Jackson, 77 Pa. St. 321); or the opinion was obiter (Bates v. An-

droscoggin R. Co., 49 Maine 491); or it was the case of a subscrip-

tion for stock with a condition for interest until the corporation was

in operation (Richardson v. Vt. & Mass. R. Co., 44 Vt. 613); or it

was an action on a subscription more favorable to defendant than to

other subscribers, and it was held that defendant could not set up the

lack of equality (Evansville R. Co. v. Evansville, 15 Ind. 395); or

a solemn determination of this question was not necessary for the dis-

posal of the case (Williston v. M. S. & N. I. R. Co., 13 Allen 400):

or the issue was authorized by the articles of association (/» re A'D.

St. Nav. & Col. Co., 20 L. R. Eq. 339); or there was full knowl-

edge on the part of all concerned (Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 31 Mich.

81); or the power in the corporate body was conceded, and it was

denied that it existed in the directors (McLaughlin v. D. & M. R.,

8 Mich. 100).

We will not say, for we are not called upon here to say, that never

can a corporation rightfully, against the dissent of a portion of its

stockholders, make some of the stock preferred; what we assert is

that this case does not present a state of facts in which a power so to

do exists.

There is a power in this charter to alter, amend, add to or repeal,

at pleasure, by-laws before made. It is argued from this that it was

in the power of the corporate body, in due form and manner, to alter

the by-law which had fixed the amount of the capital stock and the

number and relative value of the shares thereof. The power to make

by-laws is to make such as are not inconsistent with the constitution

and the law; and the power to alter has the same limit, so that no
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alteration could be made which would infringe a right already given

793

and secured by the contract of the corporation. Nor was the power

to alter, to the extent of affecting the contracted relative value of a

share, reserved when the share was sold to the stockholder, so as to

enter into and form a part of the contract. An alteration is a pro tanto

repeal; but no private corporation can repeal a by-law so as to impair

rights which have been given and become vested by virtue of the by-

law afterwards repealed. * * *

We are therefore of the opinion that there was no power in the

corporate body, nor in a majority of the stockholders, to provide by

by-law for the creation of a preferred stock, so as to bind a minority

of the stockholders not assenting thereto. * * *

But there remains a serious question, whether, though there was at

the outstart a minority of the stockholders who gave no assent to the

corporate act, there has not been such tacit acquiescence and delay in

action by that minority as to amount to indefensible laches and

estoppel upon those who constituted it and their assigns. In our

judgment there has, and we find here a safe place on which to rest
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our decisions of these cases.* * *

Affirmed on the ground of estoppel by laches.

Note. Power to issue preferred slock generally: 1867, Everhart v. West Ches-

ter, etc., R. Co., 28 Pa. St. 339; 1865, Hutton v. Scarborough Cliff Hotel Co.,

4 De G. J. & S. 672, 2 Dr. & S. 514, 521; 1884, Gordon v. Richmond, etc., R.

Co., 78 Va. 501; 1885, Belfast, etc., R. Co. v. Belfast, 77 Maine445; 1890, Camp-

alteration could be made which would infringe a right already given
and secured by the contract of the corporation. Nor was the power
to alter, to the extent of affecting the contracted relative value of a
i;hare, reserved when the share was sold to the stockholder, so as to
onter into and form a part of the contract. An alteration is a pro tanto
repeal; but no private corporation can repeal a by-law so as to impair
rights which have been given and become vested by virtue of the by1aw afterwards repealed. • • •
We are therefore of the opinion that there was no power in the
corporate body, nor in a majority of the stockholders, to provide by
by-lavv for the creation of a preferred stock, so as to bind a minority
of the stockholders not assenting thereto. • • •
But there remains a serious question, whether, though there was at
the outstart a minority of the stockholders who gave no assent to the
corporate act, there has not been such tacit acquiescence and delay in
action by that minority as to amount to indefensible !aches and
estoppel upon those who constituted it and their assigns. In our
judgment there has, and we find here a safe place on which to rest
·our decisions of these cases.• • •
Affirmed on the ground of estoppel by !aches.

bell v. American Z. Co., 122 N. Y. 455, 11 L. R. A. 596; 1890, Bamjam v.

Bard, 134 U. S. 291; 1891, Re Dicido Pier Co., L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 354; 1891, Eich-

baum v. City of Chicago Grain Elevators, L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 459; 1895, Higgins v.

Lansingh, 154 111. 301; 1897, Andrews v. Gas Meter Co., 76 L. T. R., 132,

overruling Hutton v. Scarborough C. H. Co., supra; 1898, Ernst v. Elmira M.

I. Co., 54 N. Y. S. 116, 24 Miscl. (N. Y.5 583.

Majority of members can not, without express legislative authority, and with-

out consent of all the subscribers, after organization or subscription upon an

equal basis, convert a part of the shares into preferred. 1865, Hutton v.

Scarborough Cliff Hotel Co., 4 De G. J. & S. 672, 2 Drew & S. 514, 521; 1881,

Boardman v. L. S. & M. S. R., 84 N. Y. 157; 1890, Campbell v. American

Zvlonite Co., 122 N. Y. 455; 1898, Ernst v. Elmira M. I. Co., 54 N. Y. Sup.

ll"6, 24 Miscl. 583.

But it has also been held that express legislative authority will make

such issue valid, even against dissenting shareholders. 1857, Everhart v.

Westchester, etc., R. Co., 28 Pa. St. 339; 1863, Rutland, etc., R. Co. v. Thrall,

36 Vt. 536; 1867, Curry v. Scott, 54 Pa. St. 270; 1875, Westchester, etc., R.

Co. v. Jackson, 77 Pa. St. 321; 1875, Totten v. Tison, 54 Ga. 139; 1897, Andrews

v. Gas Meter Co., 76 L. T. Rep. 132, overruling Hutton v. Scarborough Cliff

Hotel Co., 4 De G. J. & S. 672, and 2 Drew & S. 514, 521.

But upon the other hand, it seems that neither statutory nor charter au-

thority is necessary, if the preferred stock is issued (under a power to in-

crease or complete an authorized issue) by the unanimous consent of the exist-

ing shareholders. Havemaver v. Bordeaux Co., 8 National Corp. Rep. 127;

1896, Higgins v. Lansingh, 154 111. 301; 2 Beach Corp., § 808; 1 Morawetz,

§464.

Note. Potcer to iss11e preferred stock generally: 1857, Everbartv. West Chester, etc., R. Co., 28 Pa. St. 339; 1865, Hutton v. Scarborough Cliff Hotel Co.,
4 De G. J. & S. 672, 2 Dr. & S. 514, 521; 1884, Gordon v. Richmond, etc., R.
Co., 78 Va. 501; 1885, Belfast, etc., R. Co. v. Belfast, 77 Maine445; 1890, Campbell v. American Z. Co., 122 N. Y . 455, 11 L. R. A. 596; 1890, Bamjam v.
Bard, 134 U.S. 291; 1891, Re Dicido Pier Co., L. R. 2 Cb. Div. 354; 1891, Eichbaum v. City of Chicago Grain Elevators, L. R. 3 Cb. Div. 459; 1895, Higgins v.
Lansin~h, 154 Ill. 301; 1897, Andrews v. Gas Meter Co., 76 L. T. R., 132,
overrulmg Hutton v. Scarborough C.H. Co., suprn; 1898, Ernst v. Elmira M.
I. Co., 54 N. Y. S. 116, 24 Misc!. rN. Y.) 583.
Majority of membe?·s can not, without express legislative authority, and without consent of all the subscribers, after organization or subscription upon an
eqnal basis, convert a part of the shares into preferred. 1865, Hutton v.
Scarborough Cliff Hotel Co., 4 De G. J. & S. 672, 2 Drew & S. 514, 521; 1881,
Boardman v. L. S. & M. S. R., 84 N. Y. 157; 1890, Campbell v. American
Zylonite Co., 122 N. Y. 455; 1898, Ernst v. Elmira M. I. Co., 54 N. Y. Sup.
116, 24 Miscl. 583.
But it has also been held that express legislative authority will make
such issue valid, even against dissenting shareholders. lS.57, Everhart v.
Westchester, etc., R. Co., 28 Pa. St. 339; 1863, Rutland, etc., R. Co. v. Thrall,
35 Vt. 536; 1867, Curry v. Scott, 54 Pa. St. 270; 1875, Westchester, etc., R .
Co. v. Jackson, 77 Pa. St. 321; 1875, Totten v. Tison, 54 Ga. 139; 1897, Andrews
v. Gas Meter Co., 76 L. T. Rep. 132, overruling Hutton v. Scarborough Cliff
Hotel Co., 4 De G. J. & S. 672, and 2 Drew & S. 514, 521.
But upon the other hand, it seems that neither statutory nor charter authority is necessary, if the preferred stock is issued (tmder a power to increase or complete an authorized issue) by the unanimous consent of the existing shareholders. Havemayer v. Bordeaux Co., 8 National Corp. Rep. 127;
1895, Higgins v. Lansingh, 154 Ill. 301; 2 Beach Corp., § 808; 1 Morawetz,
§ 464.
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Sec. 213. Shares of stock—Nature of.

( 1 ) Personal property.

Sec. 213.

JOHNS v. JOHNS.1

Shares of stock-Nature of.

1853. In the Supreme Court of Ohio, i Ohio St. 350-362.

. This is a petition in which the plaintiff, the widow of Benjamin

( 1)

Johns, deceased, claims dower in forty-six shares of the capital stock

Personal property.

of "The Mansfield and Sandusky City Railroad Company" and in ten

JOHNS v. JOHNS. 1

shares of the capital stock of "The Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad

Company," of which shares her deceased husband, the said Benjamin

1853.

Johns, was the owner at the time of his death.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT

OF

OH10.

I

Ohio St. 35<>-362.

The defendant, Sherman, as executor as aforesaid, answers, ad-

. This is a petition in which the plaintiff, the widow of Benjamin
Johns, deceased, claims dower in forty-six shares of the capital stock
of "The Mansfield and Sandusky City Railroad Company" and in ten
shares of the capital stock of "The Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad
Company,.' of which shares her deceased husband, the said Benjamin
Johns, was the owner at the time of his death.
The defendant, Sherman, as executor as aforesaid, answers, admitting the facts alleged in the petition, but insisting that said shares
are personal and not real estate.
THURMAN, J. • • • Turning, then, to the charter of the company, we find in it no provision declaring whether its stock is realty
or personalty. We are thus brought to the general question, whether
railroad shares in Ohio are, in the absence of express legislative enactment, to be considered as real or personal estate. This question must
be determined by a reference to the principles of the common law
and the general statutes of the state that have a bearing upon it.
And its solution is not without difficulty, for as to the common law
the adjudicated cases are directly conflicting, and when we resort to our
statutes the chief aid we derive is from analogies and inference.
In Drybutter v. Bartholomew, decided in 1723, 2 P. Wms. 12·7 , the
master of the rolls said that: "a fine may be, and usually is, levied of
New River shares by the description of so much land covered with
water," but the case does not inform us what these shares were, nor
how they were created ; and whether they were real or personal
estate was not discussed. They appear to have had their origin in
the statutes of 3 James 1, ch. 18, and 4 James 1, ch. 12, to enable
the mayor, commonalty and citizens of London to supply the city
with water; but these acts simply authorize the construction of the
works and the acquisition of the necessary right of way. They create
no stock, nor is any mention made in them of shares or shareholders.
Yet it would seem from the case cited, as well as the case of Townshend v. Ash, decided in 1745 1 3 Atkyns 336, that shares were created,
and hence these cases have been frequently cited as showing that stock
in a water-works company is real estate.
By a statute of 10 Anne, the mayor, aldermen and common council
of the city of Bath, their successors or assigns, or such persons as they
should appoint, were authorized to improve the navigation of the
river Avon , and to charge tolls on persons and property transported
thereon. By an agreement executed between the corporate authorities

mitting the facts alleged in the petition, but insisting that said shares

are personal and not real estate.

Thurman, J. * * * Turning, then, to the charter of the com-

pany, we find in it no provision declaring whether its stock is realty

or personalty. We are thus brought to the general question, whether

railroad shares in Ohio are, in the absence of express legislative enact-

ment, to be considered as real or personal estate. This question must
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be determined by a reference to the principles of the common law

and the general statutes of the state that have a bearing upon it.

And its solution is not without difficulty, for as to the common law

the adjudicated cases are directly conflicting, and when we resort to our

statutes the chief aid we derive is from analogies and inference.

In Drybutter v. Bartholomew, decided in 1723, 2 P. Wms. 127, the

master of the rolls said that: "a fine may be, and usually is, levied of

New River shares by the description of so much land covered with

water," but the case does not inform us what these shares were, nor

how they were created; and whether they were real or personal

estate was not discussed. They appear to have had their origin in

the statutes of 3 James 1, ch. 18, and 4 James 1, ch. 12, to enable

the mayor, commonalty and citizens of London to supply the city

with water; but these acts simply authorize the construction of the

works and the acquisition of the necessary right of way. They create

no stock, nor is any mention made in them of shares or shareholders.

Yet it would seem from the case cited, as well as the case of Town-

shend v. Ash, decided in 1745, 3 Atkyns 336, that shares were created,

and hence these cases have been frequently cited as showing that stock

in a water-works company is real estate.

By a statute of 10 Anne, the mayor, aldermen and common council

of the city of Bath, their successors or assigns, or such persons as they

should appoint, were authorized to improve the navigation of the

river Avon, and to charge tolls on persons and property transported

thereon. By an agreement executed between the corporate authorities

1 Only part of opinion is given.
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of the one part, and the Duke of Beaufort and several other persons

§

213

NATURE OF SHARES OF STOCK.

on the other part, the duke and his associates undertook to do the

795

work in consideration of being allowed to take the tolls. By the nth

article of the agreement it was provided that "no survivorship shall at

any time take place between the said parties and undertakers; but if

any or either of them shall happen to die, the share or part of such so

dying, shall descend and go to the heirs and assigns of the party or

parties so dying."

In Buckeridge v. Ingram, decided in 1795, 2 Ves. Jr. 651, the

question was directly made whether these shares were personal or real

estate, and it was decided that they were real estate and subject to

dower. The master of the rolls held that the right to take tolls was

an incorporeal hereditament arising out of realty, and was therefore a

"tenement."

And he remarked: "I have no difficulty in saying, that wherever

a perpetual inheritance is granted, which arises out of lands, or is in

any way connected with, or, as it is emphatically expressed by Lord

Coke, exerciseable within it, it is that sort of property the law denom-

inates real."
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The principle of these cases was followed, and possibly extended,

by the supreme court of Connecticut in 1818, in the case of Welles v.

Cowles, 2 Conn. 567, in which it was held that shares of an incorpo-

rated turnpike company are real estate. The right to the tolls, said

the court, "is a right issuing out of real property, annexed to and ex-

erciseable within it; and comes within the description of an incorpo-

real hereditament of a real nature, on the same principle as a share in

the New River, in canal navigations and tolls of fairs and markets;"

citing Drybutter v. Bartholomew, 2 Peere Williams 127, Habergham

v. Vincent, 2 Ves. Jr. 232, and The King v. The Inhabitants of Chip-

. ping Norton, 5 East 239.

And in answer to the argument that the individual stockholders had

only a claim on the company, and not upon the realty, and that this

must be of a personal nature, the court said: "But the stockholders,

as members of the company, are owners of the turnpike road; and it

is in virtue of this interest that they have their claims for the divi-

dends, or their respective shares of the toll. It is not a mere claim on

the corporation."

This decision was recognized as law in 1822, in a suit between the

same parties, 4 Conn. 182, though the question was not expressly

made.

In 1835 the supreme court of Pennsylvania held that "a toll bridge

erected by two individuals across a river between their lands by legis-

lative authority is real estate." The court said that the right was

"not only a right arising out of the soil, but so far as the abutments

of the bridge are concerned, it is the soil itself." Hurst v. Meason,

4 Watts 346. It is to be observed, however, that it does not appear

that the builders were incorporated.

In Price v. Price's Heirs, 6 Dana 107, the court of appeals of Ken-

tucky, in 1838, held that the stock in the Lexington and Ohio Rail-

of the one part, and the Duke of Beaufort and several other persons
on the other part, the duke and his associates undertook to do the
work in consideration of being allowed to take the tolls. By the l 1th
articl~ of the agreement it was provided that "no survivorship shall at
any time take place between the said parties and undertakers; but if
any or either of them shall happen to die, the share or part of such so
dying, shall descend and go to the heirs and assigns of the party or
parties so dying."
In Buckeridge v. Ingram, decided in 1795, 2 Ves. Jr. 651, the
question was directly made whether these shares were personal or real
estate, and it was decided that they were real estate and subject to
dower. The master of the rolls held that the right to take tolls was
an incorporeal hereditament arising out of realty, and was therefore a
''tenement.''
And he remarked: "I have no difficulty in saying, that wherever
a perpetual inheritance is granted, which arises out of lands, or is in
any way connected with, or, as it is emphatically expressed by Lord
Coke, exerciseable within it, it is that sort of property the law denominates real."
The principle of these cases was followed, and possibly extended,
by the supreme court of Connecticut in 1818, in the case of Welles v.
Cowles, 2 Conn. 567, in which it was held that shares of an incorporated turnpike company are real estate. The right to the tolls, said
the cou1t, "is a right issuing out of real property, annexed to and exerciseable within it; and comes within the description of an incorporeal hereditament of a real nature, on the same principle as a share in
the New River, in canal navigations and tolls of fairs and markets;"
citing Drybutter v. Bartholomew, 2 Peere Williams 1 27, Habergham
v. Vincent, 2 Ves. Jr. 232, and The King v. The Inhabitants of Chip• ping Norton, 5 East 239.
And in answer to the argument that the individual stockholders had
only a claim on the company, and not upon the realty, and that this
must be of a personal nature, the court said: ''But the stockholders,
as members of the company, are owners of the turnpike road; and it
is in virtue of this interest that they have their claims for the dividends, or their respective shares of the toll. It is not a mere claim on
the corporation."
This decision was recognized as law in 1822, in a suit between the
same parties, 4 Conn. 182, though the question was not expressly
made.
In 1835 the supreme court of Pennsylvania held that "a toll bridge
erected by two individuals across a river between their lands by legislative authority is real estate.'' The court said that the right was
"not only a right arising out of the soil, but ·o far as the abutments
of the bridge are concerned, it is the soil itself." Hurst v. Meason,
4 Watts 346. It is to be observed, however, that it does not appear
that the builders were incorporated.
In Price v. Price's Heirs, 6 Dana 107, the court of appeals of Kentucky, in 1838, held that the stock in the Lexington and Ohio Rail-
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road Company is real estate. Without citing any adjudicated case,

the court came to a conclusion which is thus expressed: "The right
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conferred on each shareholder is unquestionably an incorporeal
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hereditament. It is a right of perpetual duration, and though it

road Company is real estate. Without citing any adjudicated case ,
the court came to a conclusion which is thus expressed: "The right
conferred on each shareholder is unquestionably an incorporeal
hereditament. It is a right of perpetual duration, and though it
springs out of the use of personalty, as well as lands and houses, this
matters not. It is a franchise which has ever been classed in that class
of real estate denominated an incorporeal hereditament."
On the other hand, the supreme court of Massachusetts, in 1798, in
Russell et al. v. Temple and Others, 3 Dane's Ahr. 108, held that
shares in incorporated bridge and canal companies are personalty. The
case was between the widow and heirs of Thomas Russell, the
former contending that the shares were personal property, and that.
consequently, she was entitled to a distributive portion of them , and
the latter insisting that they were realty, and that, therefore, she had
but a dower estate. The question was very fully discussed, and was
decided (says Professor Greenleaf in his edition of Cruise) "upon
great consideration."
"For the heirs it was urged that these shares were real estate, because, it was said, the estates were real in the corporations, and that
if the estates in the corporation were real, the estates of the individual
members in them followed their nature and were real, and that the
frequent declarations of the legislature declaring such shares personal
estate, at least show a doubt that when one has a right to receive rent
he has only a right to receive a sum of money, yet it does not follow
that his estate is not real estate out of which his rent issues."
For the widow it was argued that the shares were personalty, because
the estate (in the bridges, canals, towing-paths, wharves and lands)
"can only exist in the corporation, which alone can acquire it, alone
be seized or possessed of it, alone pass it away, manage or repair it,
and so must hold it entire, and that the corporation is a moral person •
to all purposes of property. Its tenure is to their successors, or to
their successors and assigns. The estates can never vest in or be
divided among the individual members to hold as tenants in common,
etc., in their private capacities. Only the corporation can possess the
estate, and that only by possessing the chatter, and only the corporat:ion can be taxed for it on common-law principles, and on these can
it alone be taken in execution for the debts of the corporation."
'"That the share is personal estate, though the corporation hold real
estate, for the individual member has no estate, but only a right to
such dividends as the corporation from time to time assig '.lS to him.
He is unknown in the grants made to it, and he can not grant any
part of the estate; nor can he be taxed for it but by statute law; nor can
any private member of a corporation be distrained for a public concern of it; his only remedy for his dividend is case in assumpsit, or
an action on the case for a wrongful refusal or neglect to pay or allow
him his part of the profits."
The judgment of the court was, as I have stated, that the shares
were personal estate . "The principal reason of the decision," says
Dane, "appears to be because the court considered that the individual

springs out of the use of personalty, as well as lands and houses, this

matters not. It is a franchise which has ever been classed in that class

of real estate denominated an incorporeal hereditament."

On the other hand, the supreme court of Massachusetts, in 1798, in

Russell et al. v. Temple and Others, 3 Dane's Abr. 108, held that

shares in incorporated bridge and canal companies are personalty. The

case was between the widow and heirs of Thomas Russell, the

former contending that the shares were personal property, and that,

consequently, she was entitled to a distributive portion of them, and

the latter insisting that they were realty, and that, therefore, she had

but a dower estate. The question was very fully discussed, and was

decided (says Professor Greenleaf in his edition of Cruise) "upon

great consideration."

"For the heirs it was urged that these shares were real estate, be-

cause, it was said, the estates were real in the corporations, and that

if the estates in the corporation were real, the estates of the individual
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members in them followed their nature and were real, and that the

frequent declarations of the legislature declaring such shares personal

estate, at least show a doubt that when one has a right to receive rent

he has only a right to receive a sum of money, yet it does not follow

that his estate is not real estate out of which his rent issues."

For the widow it was argued that the shares were personalty, because

the estate (in the bridges, canals, towing-paths, wharves and lands)

"can only exist in the corporation, which alone can acquire it, alone

be seized or possessed of it, alone pass it away, manage or repair it,

and so must hold it entire, and that the corporation is a moral person •

to all purposes of property. Its tenure is to their successors, or to

their successors and assigns. The estates can never vest in or be

divided among the individual members to hold as tenants in common,

etc., in their private capacities. Only the corporation can possess the

estate, and that only by possessing the charter, and only the corpora-

tion can be taxed for it on common-law principles, and on these can

it alone be taken in execution for the debts of the corporation."

"That the share is personal estate, though the corporation hold real

estate, for the individual member has no estate, but only a right to

such dividends as the corporation from time to time assigns to him.

He is unknown in the grants made to it, and he can not grant any

part of the estate; nor can he be taxed for it but by statute law; nor can

any private member of a corporation be distrained for a public con-

cern of it; his only remedy for his dividend is case in assumpsit, or

an action on the case for a wrongful refusal or neglect to pay or allow

him his part of the profits."

The judgment of the court was, as I have stated, that the shares

were personal estate. "The principal reason of the decision," says

Dane, "appears to be because the court considered that the individual

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

NATURE OF SHARES OF STOCK.

797

member, or shareholder, had only a right of action for a sum of money,

his part of the net profits or dividends. And so the law has been
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held to be since this decision was made."

In his edition of Cruise, Greenleaf says: "Shares in the property

of a corporation are real or personal property, according to the nature,

object and manner of the investment. Where the corporate powers

are to be exercised solely in land, as where original authority is given

by the charter to remove obstructions in a river and render it naviga-

ble, to open new channels, etc., to make a canal, erect water-works,

and the like, as was the case of the New River water, the navigation

of the river Avon and some others, and the property or interest in the

land, though it be an incorporeal hereditament, is vested inalienably

in the corporators themselves, the shares are deemed real estate.

Such, in some of the United States, has been considered the nature

of shares in toll bridge, canal and turnpike corporations by the com-

mon law; though latterly it has been thought that railway shares

were more properly to be regarded as personal estate. But where

the property originally entrusted is money, to be made profitable to

the contributors by applying it to certain purposes, in the course of
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which it may be invested in lands or in personal property, and changed

at pleasure, the capital fund is vested in the corporation, and the

shares in the stock are deemed personal property, and as such are in

all respects treated. In modern practice, however, shares in corpo-

rate stock, of whatever nature, are usually declared by statute to be

personal estate." i Greenleaf's Cr. Dig. 39, 40.

In support of this statement, Mr. Greenleaf cites the cases we have

already noticed, and some others that require consideration. One of

the most important of these is Blighv. Brent, 2 Y. & C. Exch. Rep.

268, 294. It involved the question whether the shares in the Chelsea

Water-Works Company were realty or personalty. The act of incor-

poration left the question open, as it contained no declaration upon

the subject. The court reviewed the cases bearing upon it, and came

to the conclusion that the shares were personalty. This decision was

afterwards, in 1838, spoken of with approbation in Bradley v. Holds-

worth, 3 M. & W. 422.

In the latter case the question was whether shares in the "London

and Birmingham Railway" might be sold by a verbal contract. On

the part of the defendant it was contended that they constituted an

interest in land within the meaning of the statute of frauds, and that,

therefore, a contract for their sale was void unless reduced to writing.

The court held the contract valid. True, the act of incorporation

declared that the shares should, to all intents and purposes, be deemed

personal estate and transmissible as such, and should not be of the

same nature of real property; but it is evident from what was said,

that, independent of this provision, the same decision would have

been made. Parke. B., said: "No doubt the company are seized

of real property, as well as possessed of a great deal of personal

property; but the interest of each individual shareholder is a share

of the net produce of both when brought into one fund." And

member, or shareholder, had only a right of action for a sum of money,
his part of the net profits or dividends. And so the law has been
held to be since this decision was made."
In his edition of Cruise, Greenleaf says: "Shares in the property
of a corporation are real or personal property, according to the nature,
object and manner of the investment. Where the corporate powers
are to be exercised solely in land, as where original authority is given
by the charter to remove obstructions in a river and render it navigable, to open new channels, etc., to make a canal, erect water-works,
and the like, as was the case of the New River water, the navigation
of the river Avon and some others, and the property or interest in the
land, though it be an incorporeal bereditament, i's vested i'nalienably
in tlie corporators themselves, the shares are deemed real estate.
Such, in some of the United States, has been considered the nature
of shares in toll bridge, canal and turnpike corporations by the common law; though latterly it has been thought that railway shares
were more properly to be regarded as personal estate. But where
the property originally entrusted is money, to be made profitable to
the contributors by applying it to certain purposes, in the course of
which it may be invested in lands or in personal property, and changed
at pleasure, the capital fund is vested in the corporation, and the
shares in the stock arc deemed personal property, and as such are in
all respects treated. In modern practice, however, shares in corporate stock, of whatever nature, are usually declared by statute to be
personal estate." 1 Greenleaf's Cr. Dig. 39, 40.
In support of this statement, 'Mr. Greenleaf cites the cases ,...,e have
already noticed, and some others that require consideration. One of
the most important of these is Bligh v. Brent, 2 Y. & C. Exch. Rep.
268, 294. It involved the question whether the shares in the Chelsea
Water-Works Company were realty or personalty. The act of incorporation left the question open, as it contained no declaration upon
the subject. The court reviewed the cases bearing upon it, and came
to the conclusion that the shares were personalty. This decision was
afterwards, in 1838, spoken of with approbation in Bradley v. Holdsworth, 3M. & W. 422.
In the latter case the question was whether shares in the ''London
and Birmingham Railway" might be sold by a verbal contract. On
the part of the defendant it was contended that they constituted an
interest in land within the meaning of the statute of frauds, and that,
therefore, a contract for their sale was void unless reduced to writing.
The comt held the contract valid. True, the act of in corporation
declared that the shares should, to all intents and purposes, be deemed
personal estate and transmissible as such, and should not be of the
same nature oi real property; but it is evident from what was said,
that, independent of this provision, the same decision would have
been made. Parke. B., said: "No doubt the company are seized
of real property, as well as possessed of a great deal of personal
property; but the interest of each individual shareholder is a sh.are
9f the net produce of both when brought into one fund." And
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again: "I have no doubt whatever that the shares of the proprietors,

as individuals, are personalty; they consist of nothing more than a
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right to have a share of the net produce of all the -property of the

company."

again: "! have no doubt whatever that the shares of the proprietors,
as individuals, are personalty; they consist of nothing more than a
right to have a share of the net prod1'ce of all the property of Ike

Alderson, B., said: "All the cases were under review in Bligh

v. Brent, where the question was as to the shares in the Chelsea Water-

Works Company. That was a stronger case than the present because

company."
.
Alderson, B., said: "All the cases were under review in Bligh
v. Brent, where the question was as to the shares in the Chelsea WaterW orks Company. That was a stronger case than the present because
the re was no cl ause of this kind in the act of parliament, and yet the
shares were held personal property." "!conceive that all the shareholders would take even without such a clause."
Bolland, B., concurred.
So, in Duncuft v. Albrecht, 1 2 Simons & Stewart 189, it was held
that a parol agreement for the sale of railway shares is valid, for they
are neither an interest in lands, nor goods , wares or merchandise,
within the statute of frauds.
A careful exam ination of the adjudications upon the subject has
brought us to the conclusion that, according to the weight of authority,
the shares in question are personal property. In the early English
cases the distinction, now well understood, between the property of a
corporation and the rights of its members, does not seem to have been
taken, and it appears to have been assumed that each shareholder had
an estate in the corporate property, and that, consequently, if that
property was real, his share was also realty. But the cases we have
cited abundantly show that the distinction above mentioned is now
fully recognized in England, and that the property of a corporation
may be mainly, if not wholly, real, and yet the shares of its members
be personalty. • • •
In whatever way we view the case, whether upon adjudication,
reason, or our statute laws, we arrive at the conclusion that t11e share
in question are personal property. The bill must therefore be dis·
missed .
Bill dismissed.

there was no clause of this kind in the act of parliament, and yet the

shares were held personal property." -'I conceive that all the share-

holders would take even without such a clause."

Bolland, B., concurred.

So, in Duncuft v. Albrecht, 12 Simons & Stewart 189, it was held

that a parol agreement for the sale of railway shares is valid, for they

are neither an interest in lands, nor goods, wares or merchandise,

within the statute of frauds.

A careful examination of the adjudications upon the subject has

brought us to the conclusion that, according to the weight of authority,

the shares in question are personal property. In the early English

cases the distinction, now well understood, between the property of a

corporation and the rights of its members, does not seem to have been
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taken, and it appears to have been assumed that each shareholder had

an estate in the corporate property, and that, consequently, if that

property was real, his share was also realty. But the cases we have

cited abundantly show that the distinction above mentioned is now

fully recognized in England, and that the property of a corporation

may be mainly, if not wholly, real, and yet the shares of its members

be personalty. * * *

In whatever way we view the case, whether upon adjudication,

reason, or our statute laws, we arrive at the conclusion that the shares

in question are personal property. The bill must therefore be dis-

missed.

Bill dismissed.

.Vote. Many early cases held shares in corporations owning real property

to be real property. Some of these were followed in this country, as shown

by the above case: 1723, Drvbutter v. Bartholomew, 2 P. Wins. 127; 174-3,

Townsend v. Ash, 3 Atk. 336; 1786, King v. Dock Co., 1 T. R. 219; 1818,

Welles v. Cowles, 2 Conn. 567 (this case led to a statute declaring shares to

be personal property); 1831, Coombs v. Jordan, 3 Bl. Ch. iMd.) 284, 22 Am.

Dec. 236; 1838, Price v. Price, 36 Ky. (6 Dana) 107; 1870, Copeland v. Cope-

land, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 349 (after which holding the legislature changed the

Note. Many early cases held shares in corporations owning real property
to be real property. Some of these were followed in this country, as shown
by the above case: 1723, Drybutter v. Bartholomew, 2 P. Wms. 127 ; 174.S,
Townsend v. Ash, 3 Atk. 336; 1786, King v. Dock Co., 1 T. R. 219; 1818,
Welles v. Cowles, 2 Conn. 567 (this case led to 11 statute declaring shares to
be personal property); 1831, Coombs v. Jordan, 3 Bl. Cb. rMd.) 284, 22 Am.
Dec. 236; 1838, Price v. Price, 36 Ky . (6 Dana) 107; 1870, Copel&Dd v. Cope·
land, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 349 (after which holding the legislature changed the
rule there by statute, declarin~ shares to be personal property).
The great weight of authonty, even from early times, bolds shares to be
personal property: 1781, Weekley v. Weekley, 2 Younge & Col. Exch., p. 281,
note ; 1798, Russell v. Temple, 3 Dane's Abr. 108; 1812, Cooper v. Swamp
Caual Co., 6 N. C. (2 Mmpb .) 195 ; 1830, Blake v. Jones, Bailey's Eq. (S. C.J
141, 21 Arn. Dec. 530; 1836, Bligh v. Brent, 2 Younge & Col. Exe. 268; 1837,
Arnold v. Ruggles, 1 R. I. 165; 1843, North v. Forest, 15 Conn. 400; 1849.
Slaymaker v. Bank of Gettysburg, IO Pa. St. 373; 1854, Watson v. Spratley,
10 Ex. 222, 24 L. J. Ex. 53; 1855, Edwards v. Hall, 25 L. J. Cb. 82, 35 E. L.
& Eq. 433; 1856, Walker v. Bartlett, 18 C. B. 840, 25 L. J .C. P. 263; 1865,
Mc Keen v. Northampton Co., 49 Pa. St. 519, 88 Am. Dec. 515; 1869, South·
western R. Co. v. Thomason, 40 Ga. 408; 1881, Manns v. Brookville National

rule there by statute, declaring shares to be personal property).

The great weight of authority, even from early times, holds shares to be

personal propertv: 1781, Weekley v. Weekley, 2 Younge & Col. Exch.. p. 281,

note; 1798, Russell v. Temple, 3 Dane's Abr. 108; 1812, Cooper v. Swamp

Canal Co., 6 N. C. (2 Murph.) 195; lSiO, Blake v. Jones, Bailey's Eq. (S. C.)

141, 21 Am. Dec. 530; 1836, Bligh v. Brent, 2 Younge & Col. Exc. 268; 1837,

Arnold v. Ruggles, 1 R. I. 165; 1843, North v. Forest, 15 Conn. 400; 1849,

Slavmaker v. Bank of Gettysburg, 10 Pa. St. 373; 1854, Watson v. Spratlev,

10 Ex. 222, 24 L. J. Ex. 53; 1855, Edwards v. Hall, 25 L. J. Ch. 82, 35 E. L.

& Eq. 433; 1856, Walker v. Bartlett, 18 C. B. 845, 25 L. J. CP. 263; 1865,

MeKeen v. Northampton Co., 49 Pa. St. 519, 88 Am. Dec. 515; 1869, South-

western R. Co. v. Thomason, 40 Ga. 408; 1881, Manns v. Brookville National
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Bank, 73 Ind. 243; 1884, Feckheimer v. National Exchange Bank, 79 Va. 80;

1886, Colonial Bank v. Whinney, 56 L. J. Ch. 43, 11 App. Cas. 426; 1890,

§ 214

NATURE OF SHARES OF STOCK.

799

Mattingly v. Roach, 84 Cal. 207, 23 Pac. Rep. 1117; 1897, Jellenik v. Huron

C. M. Co., 82 Fed. Rep. 778; 1899, Herring v. Raskin Co-op. Assn., — Tenn.

Ch. App. —, 52 S. W. Rep. 327.

Sec. 214. Same. Statute of frauds.

(2) "Goods, wares or merchandise."

Bank, 73 Ind. 243; 1884, Feckheimer v. National Exchange Bank, 79 Va. 80;
1886, Colonial Bank v. Whinney, 56 L. J. Ch. 43, 11 App. Cas. 426; 1890,
Mattingly v. Roach, 84 Cal. 207, 23 Pac; Rep. 1117~ 1897, Jellenik v. Huron
C. M. Co., 82 Fed. Rep. 778; 1899, Herring v. Ruskin Co-op. Assn., -Tenn.
Ch. App. - , 52 S. W. Rep. 327.

TI8DALE v. HARRIS.1

1838. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

20 Pick. (Mass.) 9-14.

[Assumpsit by Tisdale against Harris on an oral contract by which

See. 214. Same.

Statute of frauds.

defendant agreed to sell plaintiff two hundred shares, with all the

earnings thereon, in the capital stock of a manufacturing company.

( 2 )
The object was to recover $300, being the amount of dividends

''Goods, wares or merchandise.''

declared on the shares after the agreement to sell.]

TISDALE v. HARRIS.1

Shaw, C. J. * * * But by far the most important question in

the case arises on the objection that the case is within the statute of

frauds. This statute, which is copied precisely from the English

1838.

IN

THR SuPREMR JumctAL
20

statute, is as follows: "No contract for the sale of goods, wares or

CouRT

oF

MASSACHUSETTS.

Pick. (Mass.) 9-14·
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merchandise for the price of ten pounds ($33-33) or more, shall be

allowed to be good, except the purchaser shall accept part of the

goods so sold, and actually receive the same or give something in

earnest to bind the bargain, or in part payment, or that some note or

memorandum in writing of the said bargain be made and signed by

the parties to be charged by such contract or their agent thereunto

lawfully authorized."

This being a contract for the sale of shares in an incorporated com-

pany in a neighboring state for the price of more than ten pounds, and

no part having been delivered and no purchase-money or earnest paid,

the question is, whether it can be allowed to be good without a note

or memorandum in writing signed by the party to be charged with it.

This depends upon the question whether such shares are goods, wares

or merchandise within the true meaning of the statute.

It is somewhat remarkable that this question, arising on the St. 29

Car. 2, in the same terms, which ours has copied, has not been defi-

nitely settled in England. In the case of Pickering v. Appleby,

Com. Rep. 354, the case was directly and fully argued before the

twelve judges, who were equally divided upon it. But in several other

cases afterward determined in chancery, the better opinion seemed to

be that shares in incorporated companies were within the statute, as

goods or merchandise. Mussell v. Cooke, Prec. in Ch. 533; Crull v.

Dodson, Sel. Cas. in Ch. 41.

1 Statement abridged; arguments and part of opinion omitted.

[ Assumpsit by Tisdale against Harris on an oral contract by which
defendant agreed to sell plaintiff two hundred shares, with all the
earnings thereon, in the capital stock of a manufacturing company.
The object was to recover $300, being the amount of dividends
declared on the shares after the agreement to sell.]
SHAW, C. J. • • • But by far the most ~mportant question in
the case arises on the objection that the case is within the statute of
frauds. This statute, which is copied precisely from the English
statute, is as follows: "No contract for the sale of goods, wares or
Dterchandise for the price of ten pounds ($33.33) or more, shall be
allowed to be good, except the purchaser shall accept pa1t of the
goods so sold, and actually receive the same or give something in
earnest to bind the bargain, or in part payment, or that some note or
memorandum in writing of the said bargain be made and signed by
the parties to be charged by such contract or their agent thereunto
lawfully authorized."
This being a contract for the sale of shares in an incorporated company in a neighboring state for the price of more than ten pounds, and
no part having been delivered and no purchase-money or earnest paid,
the question is, whether it can be allowed to be good without a note
or memorandum in writing signed by the party to be charged with it.
This depends upon the question whether such shares are goods, wares
or merchandise within the true meaning of the statute.
It is somewhat remarkable that this question, arising on the St. 29
Car. 2 1 in the same terms, which ours has copied , has not been definitely settled in England. In the case of Pickering v. Appleby,
Com. Rep. 354, the case was directly and fully argued before the
twelve judges, who were equally divided upon it. But in several other
cases afterward determined in chancery, the better opinion seemed to
be that shares in incorporated companies were within the statute, as
goods or merchandise. Mussell v. Cooke, Pree. in Ch. 533; Crull v.
Dodson, Se!. Cas. in Ch. 41.
1

Statement abridged; arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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We are inclined to the opinion that the weight of authorities in

modern times is, that contracts for the sale of stocks and shares in

We are inclined to the opinion that the weight of authorities in
modern times is, that contracts for the sale of stocks and shares in
incorporated companies for more than te:n pounds are not valid unless
there has been a note or memorandum in writing, or earnest or part
payment. 4 Wheaton 89, note; 3 Starkie on Evid., 4th Amer. edit.,

incorporated companies for more than ten pounds are not valid unless

there has been a note or memorandum in writing, or earnest or part

payment. 4 Wheaton 89, note; 3 Starkie on Evid.,4th Amer. edit.,

608.

Supposing this a new question now for the first time calling for a

6o8.

construction of the statute, the court are of opinion that, as well by its

Supposing this a new question now for the first time calling for a
construction of the statute, the court are of opinion that, as well by its
terms as its general policy, stocks are faiirly within its operation. The
words "goods" and "merchandise" are both of very large signification. Bona, as used in the civil law, is almost as extensive as personal property itself, and in many resp1ects it has nearly as large a
signification in the common law. The: word "merchandise" also
including in general, objects of traffic and commerce, is broad enough
to include stocks or shares in incorporated companies. • • •
The main argument relied upon by tlhose who contend that shares
are not within the statute is this: That statute provides that such contract shall not be good, etc., among othe·r things, except the purchaser
shall accept part of the goods. From this it is argued that by nece sary implication the statute applies only to goods, of which part may
be delivered. This seems, however, to be rather a narrow and forced
construction. The provision is general that no contract for the sale
of goods, etc., shall be allowed to be good. The exception is when
part are delivered; but if part can not be delivered , then the exception
can not exist to take the case out of the general prohibition. The provision extended to a great variety of objects, and the exception may
well be construed to apply only to such of those objects to which it is
applicable, without affecting others, to which from their nature it can
not apply.
There t's nothing in th e nature of stocks, or shares t'n compant'es,
wht'ch in reason or sound poli'cy should exempt contracts £n respect to
them from those reasonable restr£ctt'ons, d esigned by the statute to
prevent frauds in the sale of other commodities. On the contrary,
th ese companies lzave become so numerous, so large an amount of tile
property of tlte communt'ty t's now invested t'n them, and as the ordt'nary indict'a of property, art's£ng from del£very and possession,
can not take place, there seems to be p ecult'ar reason for extending
the provt'st'ons of this statute to them. As they may properly be included under the terms goods, as they a1'e wt'thin the reason and policy of the act, the court are of opin£on th at a confract for the
sale of shares, in the absence of the other requt'st'tes , must be p1·0-.1ed
by some note or memorandum in wrt'tt'ng; and as there was no such
memorandum in writing, in the present case, the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain this action.
As to the argument that here was a
part performance, by a payment of the money on one side, and the
delivery of the certificate on the other, these acts took place after this
action was brought, and can not therefore be relied upon to show a
cause of action when the action was commenced
Verdict set aside and plaintiff nonsuit..

terms as its general policy, stocks are fairly within its operation. The

words "goods" and "merchandise" are both of very large significa-

tion. Bona, as used in the civil law, is almost as extensive as per-

sonal property itself, and in many respects it has nearly as large a

signification in the common law. The word "merchandise" also,

including in general, objects of traffic and commerce, is broad enough

to include stocks or shares in incorporated companies. * * *

The main argument relied upon by those who contend that shares

are not within the statute is this: That statute provides that such con-

tract shall not be good, etc., among other things, except the purchaser
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shall accept part of the goods. From this it is argued that by neces-

sary implication the statute applies only to goods, of which part may

be delivered. This seems, however, to be rather a narrow and forced

construction. The provision is general that no contract for the sale

of goods, etc., shall be allowed to be good. The exception is when

part are delivered; but if part can not be delivered, then the exception

can not exist to take the case out of the general prohibition. The pro-

vision extended to a great variety of objects, and the exception may

well be construed to apply only to such of those objects to which it is

applicable, without affecting others, to which from their nature it can

not apply.

There is nothing in the nature of stocks, or shares in companies,

which in reason or sound policy should exempt contracts in respect to

them from those reasonable restrictions, designed by the statute to

prevent frauds in the sale of other commodities. On the contrary,

these companies have become so numerous, so large an amount of the

property of the community is now invested in them, and as the or-

dinary indicia of property, arising from delivery and possession,

can not take place, there seems to be peculiar reason for extending

the provisions of this statute to them. As they may properly be in-

cluded under the terms goods, as they are within the reason and pol-

icy of the act, the court arc of opinion that a contract for the

sale of shares, in the absence of the other requisites, must be proved

by some note or memorandum in writing; and as there was no such

memorandum in writing, in the present case, the plaintiff is not en-

titled to maintain this action. As to the argument that here was a

part performance, by a payment of the money on one side, and the

delivery of the certificate on the other, these acts took place after this

action was brought, and can not therefore be relied upon to show a

cause of action when the action was commenced

Verdict set aside and plaintiff nonsuit.
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seventeenth section of the statute of frauds. See, as to the application of this and

other sections, the following cases: 1810, Colvin v. Williams, 3 Har. & J. (Md.)

38; 1843, North v. Forest, 15 Conn. 400; 1847, Thompson v. Alger, 53 Mass. (12

Mete.) 428; 1862, Hagar v. King, 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 200; 1872, Pray v. Mitchell,

60 Maine 430; 1873, Mayer v. Child, 47Cal. 142; 1878, Mason v. Decker, 72 N. Y.

595; 1880, Boardman v. Cutter, 128 Mass. 388; 1884, Porter v. Worsmer, etc.,

94 N. Y. 431; 1884, Fitzpatrick v. Woodruff, 96 N. Y. 561; 1888, Hinchman v.

Lincoln, 124 U. S. 38; 1889, Seddon v. Rosenbaum, 85 Va. 928; 1891, Ryers v.

Tuska, 14 N. Y. Sup. 926; 1892, Spear v. Bach, 82 Wis. 192; 1893, Dinkier v.

Baer, 92 Ga. 432; 1895, McLure v. Sherman, 70 Fed. Rep. 190; 1895, Flowers

v. Steiner, 108 Ala. 440.

But in England the rule is different: See, 1839, Humble v. Mitchell, 11

Ad. & El. 205; 1841, Duncuft v. Albrecht, 12 Sim. Ch. 189; 1844, Hargreaves v.

Parsons, 13 Mees. & W. 561.

But the statute of frauds does not apply to agreements to subscribe: See,

note, supra, p. 459, and, 1871, Green v. Brookins, 23 Mich. 48; 1886, Colfax

Hotel Co. v. Lyon, 69 Iowa 683; 1898, Rogers v. Burr, 105 Ga. 432.
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The fourth section of the statute of frauds relating to conveyances of inter-

ests in lands does not applv to sales of corporate shares, even if the corpora-

tion owns and deals in land*: 1839, Humble v. Mitchell, 11 Ad. & E. 205; 1836,

Bligh v. Brent, 2 Y. & C. Exc. 268.

Note. It is generally held in this country that sales of stock are wit.bin the
seventeenth section of the statute of frauds. See, as to the application of this and
othe r sections, the following cases: 1810, Colvin v. Williams, 3 Har. & J. (Md.)
38; 1843, North v. Forest, 15 ~onn. 400; 1847, Thompson v. Alger, 53 M~ss. (12
Mete.) 428; 1862, Hagar v. Kmg, 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 200; 1872, Pray v. Mitchell,
601\laine 430; 1873, Mayer v. Child, 47 Cal. 142; 1878, Mason v. Decker, 72 N. Y.
595; 1880, Boardman v. Cutter, 128 Mass. 388; 1884, Porter v. Worsmer, etc.,
94 N. Y. 431; 1884, Fitzpatrick v. Woodruff, 96 N. Y. 561; 1888, Hinchman v.
Lincoln, 124 U.S. 38; 1889, Seddon v. Rosenbaum, 85 Va. 928; 1891, Ryers v.
Tuska, 14 N. Y. Sup. 926; 1892, Spear v. Bach, 82 Wis. 192; 1893, Dinkier v.
Baer, 92 Ga. 432; 1895, McLure v. Sherman, 70 Fed. Rep. 190; 1895, Flowers
v. Steiner, 108 Ala. 440.
But in England the rule is different: See, 1839, Humble v. Mitchell, 11
Ad. & El. 205; 1841, Duncuft v. Albrecht, 12 Sim. Ch. 189; 1844, Hargreaves v.
Parsons, 13 Mees. & W. 561.
But the statute .of frauds does not apply to agreements to subscribe: See,
note, supra, p. 459, and, 1871, Green v. Brookins, 23 Mich. 48; 1886, Colfax
Hotel Co. v. Lyon, 69 Iowa 683: 1898, Rogers v. Burr, 105 Ga. 432.
The fourth section of the statute of frauds relating to conveyances of interests in lands does not apply to sales of corporate shares, even if the corporation owns and deals in land: 1839, Humble v. Mitchell, 11 Ad. & E. 205; 1836,
BHgh v. Brent, 2 Y. & C. Exe. 268.
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(3) Choses in action.

Sec. 215. Same.

COLONIAL BANK v. WHINNEY.1

1885. In English Court of Appeal. L. R. 30 Ch. Div.

( 3) Choses in action.

261-290.

COLONIAL BANK v. WHINNEY.1

[Suit by the bank to enforce an equitable mortgage of shares in a

railway company against Whinney, who was a trustee in bankruptcy

IN

of the person in whose name the shares stood at the commencement

ENGLISH COURT OF APPEAL.

L. R. 30 Ch. Div.

261-290.

of the bankruptcy. The English bankrupt law provided that "all

goods in the possession, order or disposition of the bankrupt" should

pass to the trustee in bankruptcy, "provided that things in action,

other than debts due the bankrupt, shall not be deemed goods within

the meaning" of this law. Under this provision the majority of the

court held that the shares were not choses in action within the mean-

ing of the proviso; but Fry, L. J., pronounced the following dissent-

ing opinion, which was affirmed in the house of lords, 11 App. Cas.

426.]

Fry, L. J. One of the questions argued before us on the present

appeal has been, whether the shares in question in this case are or are

not choses in action, within the meaning of those words as used in

the 3d subsection of the 44th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1883.

1 Statement abridged. Only the dissenting opinion of Fry, L. J., is given

(a part of it being omitted). The majority opinion was overruled upon this

point, and Fry's opinion unanimously affirmed by the house of lords, in 1886.

The Colonial Bank v. Whinney, L. R. 11 App. Cas. 426.

51—Wil. Casks.

[Suit by the bank to enforce an equitable mortgage of shares in a
railway company against Whinney, who was a trustee in bankruptcy
of the person in whose name the shares stood at the commencement
of the bankruptcy. The English bankrupt law provided that "all
goods in the possession, order or disposition of the bankrupt'' should
pass to the trustee in bankruptcy, "provided that things in action,
other than debts due the bankrupt, shall not be deemed goods within
the meaning" of this law. Under this provision the majority of the
court held that the shares were not choses in action within the meaning of the proviso; but Fry, L. J., pronounced the following dissenting opinion , which was affirmed in the house of lords, 11 App. Cas .
.426.J
FRY, L. J. One of the questions argued before us on the present
appeal has been, whether the shares in question in this case are or are
not choses in action, within the meaning of those words as used in
the 3d subsection of the 44th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1883.
1 Statement abridged. Only the dissenting opinion of Fry, L. J ., is given
(a part of it being omitted). The majority opinion was overruled upon this
poin~ and Fry's opinion unanimously affirmed by the house of lords, in 1886.
The uolonial Bank v. Whinney, L. R. 11 App. Oas. 426.
51- WIL. CASES.
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The shares in question are shares in a company constituted by act

802

COLONIAL BANK V. WHINNEY.

of parliament, which incorporates the Companies Clauses Consoli-

dation Act, and that act declares that shares are personal property,

The shares in question are shares in a company constituted by act
of parliament, which incorporates the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, and that act declares that shares are personal property,
transmissible as such, and furthermore provides for the transfer of the
shares by deed in a specified manner.
.
The first question is whether, according to the ordinary legal meaning of the words "things in action," which I take to be technical
words, they include such shares as those in controversy. This leads
to the consideration of some very elementary points in English law.
According to my view of that law, all personal things are either in
possession or in action. The law knows no tertium quid between the
hvo. "No chattel," says Lord Coke, in Fulwood's Case, 4 Rep.
65a, ''either in action or possession, shall go in succc:ssion," as if the
two alternatives were the only possible ones. "Property in chattels
personal," says Blackstone, "may be either in possession-which is
where a man hath not only the right to enjoy, but hath the actual enjoyment of the thing--or else it is in action, where a man hath only
a bare right without any occupation or enjoyment." Bl. Comm. ,
book 2, ch. 25, p. 389, and so Lord Hardwicke, in the great case of
Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Atk. 165, 182, speaks of personal property, whether
in possession or action only, as equivalent to all kinds of personal
property. The expression "choses in suspense" is found in Brooke's
Abridgement, in conjunction with cltoses in action; but, so far as I
can understand, the two expressions are synonymous.
It has been suggested that the expression "choses £n action" was originally only applicable to debts, and that by a lax usage it has acquired
a secondary and wider i::ignificance. I am not able to adopt this view.
The article "Choses £n Actt'on and Choses £n Suspense," in Brooke's
Abridgement, fol. 140, seems to show that as early as 5 Edw. 4 the
expression was held to include the king's right to the marriage of his
ward; in 9 Hen. 6 the property in deeds in the hands of a third person was considered as a chose £n action, and in 33 Hen. 8 the classification of choses £n actt'on into real, personal and mixed, was
recognized. Indeed, the whole article appears to me inconsistent
with the notion that according to early usage the expression was confined to debts. On the contrary, that early usage appears to me to
have been as wide as the modem usage, as explained by Mr. Joshua
\Villiams in the passage which has been cited by Lord Justice Cotton.
What, then, is the character of a share in a company? Is it in its
nature a chose £n possesst'on or a chose £n acti'on.'P Such a share is, in
my opinion, the right to receive certain benefits from a corporation,
and to do certain acts as a member of that corporation; and if those
benefits be withheld or those acts be obstructed, the only remedy of
the owner of the share is by action. Of the share itself, in my view,
there can be no occupation or enjoyment, though of the fniits arising
from it there may be occupation, enjoyment and manual possession.
Such a share appears to me to be closely akin to a debt, which is one
of the most familiar of choses £n action; no action is required to obtain the right to the money in the case of the debt, or the right to the

transmissible as such, and furthermore provides for the transfer of the

shares by deed in a specified manner.

The first question is whether, according to the ordinary legal mean-

ing of the words "things in action," which I take to be technical

words, they include such shares as those in controversy. This leads

to the consideration of some very elementary points in English law.

According to my view of that law, all personal things are either in

possession or in action. The law knows no tertium quid between the

two. "No chattel," says Lord Coke, in Fulvvood's Case, 4 Rep.

65a, "either in action or possession, shall go in succession," as if the

two alternatives were the only possible ones. "Property in chattels

personal," says Blackstone, "may be either in possession—which is

where a man hath not only the right to enjoy, but hath the actual en-

joyment of the thing—or else it is in action, where a man hath only

a bare right without any occupation or enjoyment." Bl. Comm.,

book 2, ch. 25, p. 389, and so Lord Hardwicke, in the great case of
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Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Atk. 165, 182, speaks of personal property, whether

in possession or action only, as equivalent to all kinds of personal

property. The expression "choses in suspense" is found in Brooke's

Abridgement, in conjunction with choses in action; but, so far as I

can understand, the two expressions are synonymous.

It has been suggested that the expression "choses in action" was orig-

inally only applicable to debts, and that by a lax usage it has acquired

a secondary and wider significance. I am not able to adopt this view.

The article "Choses in Action and Choses in Suspense," in Brooke's

Abridgement, fol. 140, seems to show that as early as 5 Edw. 4 the

expression was held to include the king's right to the marriage of his

ward; m 9 Hen. 6 the property in deeds in the hands of a third per-

son was considered as a chose in action, and in 33 Hen. 8 the clas-

sification of choses in action into real, personal and mixed, was

recognized. Indeed, the whole article appears to me inconsistent

with the notion that according to early usage the expression was con-

fined to debts. On the contrary, that early usage appears to me to

have been as wide as the modern usage, as explained by Mr. Joshua

Williams in the passage which has been cited by Lord Justice Cotton.

What, then, is the character of a share in a company? Is it in its

nature a chose in possession or a chose in action? Such a share is, in

my opinion, the right to receive certain benefits from a corporation,

and to do certain acts as a member of that corporation; and if those

benefits be withheld or those acts be obstructed, the only remedy of

the owner of the share is by action. Of the share itself, in my view,

there can be no occupation or enjoyment, though of the fruits arising

from it there may be occupation, enjoyment and manual possession.

.Such a share appears to me to be closely akin to a debt, which is one

of the most familiar of choses in action; no action is required to ob-

tain the right to the money in the case of the debt, or the right to the
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action is the only means of obtaining the money itself or the other

benefits in specie, the right to which is called in one case a debt and

in the other case a share. In the case alike of the debt and of the

sh are, the owner of it has, to use the language of Blackstone, "a bare

right without any occupation or enjoyment." A debt no doubt dif-

fers from a share in one respect, that it confers generally a more lim-

ited right than a share, and that when once paid it is at an end; but

this distinction appears to me immaterial for the purpose now in

hand.

It is true that unassignability by act inter vivos has been a charac-

ter of many choses in action in the earlier stages of our law; but the

question whether a personal thing is or is not assignable, is not, in

my opinion, a criterion of whether it is in possession or in action. The

king has always been able to assign choses in action that are certain.

Bills of exchange have been assignable by our law ever since the law

merchant on that point was recognized by our courts hundreds of years

ago; many choses in action have long been assignable by statute, such
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as promissory notes and bail and replevin bonds, and by the Judicature

Act of 1873 all debts and other legal choses in action were made as-

signable in the manner therein indicated. With great deference to

those who think otherwise, I consider that the power of transfer con-

ferred on the holder of these shares by statute does not affect the

question.

Furthermore, on the question whether a particular property is a

chose in action or not, I think it immaterial to inquire whether the

right in question was formerly enforceable at law or in equity; a right

of suit is equally a chose in action, whether the forum be legal or

equitable.

Turning now to authority, I find that in the case of Humble v.

Mitchell (1839), 11 Ad. & El. 205, the question arose whether shares

in a joint stock company were goods, wares or merchandise within

the meaning of the seventeenth section of the statute of frauds; and in

determining that they were not, Lord Denman observed that shares in

a joint stock company like this are mere choses in action; and in this

judgment Justices Patteson, Williams and Coleridge concurred.

Again, in Ex parte Agra Bank (1868), Law Rep. 3,Ch. 555, a ques-

tion arose as to certain shares in the San Pedro Mining Company

being in the order and disposition of the bankrupt Worcester. Though

the precise constitution of the company is not stated, it appears that

the company was an English one, by which certificates of shares were

issued, and in which the shares passed by transfer; the case was ar-

gued and decided on the footing of these shares being choses in action

and they are so described in the judgment of Lord Hatherly, then

Lord Justice Page Wood. On the other hand, in the case of Ex

parte\3n\on Bank of Manchester (1871), Ibid.. 12 Eq. 354, Vice-

Chancellor Bacon held that shares in a company under 7 and 8 Vict.,

ch. 110, were not choses in action within the meaning of the Bank-

ruptcy Act, 1869, partly upon the ground that if it had been intended

dividends or other accruing benefits in the case of the share; but a.n
action is the only means. of obtaining the money itself or the other
benefits in specie, the right to which is called in one case a debt and
in the other case a share. In the case alike of the debt and of the
share, the owner of it has, to use the· language of Blackstone, "a bare
right without any occupation or enjoyment." A debt no doubt differs from a share in one respect, that it confers generally a more limited right than a share, and that when once paid it is at an end; but
this distinction appears to me immaterial for the purpose now in
band.
It is true that unassignability by act i"nter vivos has been a character of many choses in ac#on in the earlier stages of our law; but the
question whether a personal thing is or is not assignable, is not, in
my opinion, a criterion of whether it is in possession or in action. The
king has always been able to assign choses in action that are certain.
Bills of exchange have been assignable by our law ever since the law
me rchant on that point was recognized by our courts hundreds of years
ago; many choses in acti"on have long been assignable by statute, such
as promissory notes and bail and replevin bonds, and by the Judicature
Act of 1873 all debts and other legal choses in action were made assignable in the manner therein indicated. With great deference to
those who think otherwise, I consider that the power of transfer conferred on the holder of these shares by statute does not affect the
question.
Furthermore, on the question whether a particular property is a
chose in action or not, I think it immaterial to inquire whether the
right in question was formerly enforceable at law or in equity; a right
of suit is equally a chose in action, whether the forum be legal or
equitable.
Turning now to authority, I find that in the case of Humble v.
Mitchell ( 1839), l 1 Ad. & El. 205, the question arose whether shares
in a joint stock company were goods, wares or merchandise within
the meaning of the seventeenth section of the statute of frauds; and in
determining that they were not, Lord Denman observed that shares in
a joint stock company like this are mere choses in action; and in this
judgment Justices Patteson, Williams and Coleridge concun·ed.
Again, in Ex parte Agra Bank (1868), Law Rep. 3 1 Ch. 555, a question arose as to certain shares in the San Pedro Mining Company
being in the order and disposition of the bankrupt Worcester. Though
the precise constitution of the company is not stated, it appears that
the company was an English one, by which certificates of shares were
issued, and in which the shares passed by transfer; the case was argued and decided on the footing of these shares being choses in action
and they are so described in the judgment of Lord Hatherly, then
Lord Justice Page Wood. On the other hand, in the case of Ex
parte µnion Bank of Manchester (1871) , Ibid. , 12 Eq. 354, ViceChanccllor Bacon held that shares in a company under 7 and 8 Viet.,
ch. 1 ro, were not choses in action within the mea ning of the B ankruptcy Act, 1869, partly upon the ground that if it had been intended
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to exclude trom the operation of the law of reputed ownership every-

thing incapable of manual delivery, a clearer term would have been

to exclude trom the operation of the law of reputed ownership everything incapable of manual delivery, a clear~r term would have been
used, and partly on the ground that the owner's title depended on the
register. And again, in Societe Generale de Paris v. Tramways Union
Company, 14 Q. B. D. 424, 45 i, Lord Justice Lindley approved of
the decision of the vice-chancellor, and dwelt upon the fact that a
transferee of shares has a legal and not merely an equitable right to
become a shareholder.
In this conflict of authorities upon the precise point, it is not useless to consider the authorities bearing on personal things of a kind
closely analogous to shares in a company. The right of a fund-holder
in the public funds, where there is, of course, a legal power to assign,
has long ago ( 1790, 1817) been held to be a chose in action. Dundas
v. Du tens, 1 Ves. 196; Rex v. Capper, 5 Price 2 l 7. In Ex parte
Ibbetson (1878), 8 Ch. D. 519, the court of appeal held a policy of
assurance to be beyond all argument a thing in action within the
meaning of the clause in question; and in In re Bainbridge, 8 Ch.
D. 218, Chief Judge Bacon held that the share of a partner in the
partnership property was a chose in action. If it be rightly decided,
as I think it was, that a share in a partnership is a chose in actio1Z, it
is very difficult to conclude that a share in a joint-stock company is
not a chose in action. In the case of a partnership, the real and personal property of the partnership is, or may be, vested in all the
partners, and each therefore may have a legal interest in choses i'n
possessi'on. In the case of a corporation, the whole property of the
concern is vested in the corporation, and the individual corporators
have no direct interest in the chattels in possession which may belong
to the concern. In a partnership of seven persons, each would have
a chose in action; if that partnership incorporated itself under the
Companies Act, 1862, would each of the seven have a chose in possesst'on.P • • •
Appeal dismissed.

used, and partly on the ground that the owner's title depended on the

register. And again, in Societe Generale de Paris v. Tramways Union

Company, 14 Q. B. D. 424, 451, Lord Justice Lindley approved of

the decision of the vice-chancellor, and dwelt upon the fact that a

transferee of shares has a legal and not merely an equitable right to

become a shareholder.

In this conflict of authorities upon the precise point, it is not use-

less to consider the authorities bearing on personal things of a kind

closely analogous to shares in a company. The right of a fund-holder

in the public funds, where there is, of course, a legal power to assign,

has long ago (1790, 1817) been held to be a chose in action. Dundas

v. Dutens, 1 Ves. 196; Rex v. Capper, 5 Price 217. In Ex parte

Ibbetson (1878), 8 Ch. D. 519, the court of appeal held a policy of

assurance to be beyond all argument a thing in action within the

meaning of the clause in question; and in In re Bainbridge, 8 Ch.

D. 218, Chief Judge Bacon held that the share of a partner in the
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partnership property was a chose in action. If it be rightly decided,

as I think it was, that a share in a partnership is a chose in action, it

is very difficult to conclude that a share in a joint-stock company is

not a chose in action. In the case of a partnership, the real and per-

sonal property of the partnership is, or may be, vested in all the

partners, and each therefore may have a legal interest in choses in

possession. In the case of a corporation, the whole property of the

concern is vested in the corporation, and the individual corporators

have no direct interest in the chattels in possession which may belong

to the concern. In a partnership of seven persons, each would have

a chose in action; if that partnership incorporated itself under the

Companies Act, 1862, would each of the seven have a chose in posses-

sion? » • •

Appeal dismissed.

Note. See, 1830, Blake v. Jones, 1 Bailey Eq. (8. C.) 141, 21 Am. Dec. 530;

1837, Arnold v. Buggies, 1 B. I. 165; 1849, Slaymaker v. Bank of Gettysburg,

10 Pa. St. 373.

Sec. 216. Same.

(^4) As subjects of conversion.
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Note. See, 1830, Blake v. JoneB, 1 Bailey Eq. (8. 0.) 141, 21 Am. Dec. 530;.
1837, Arnold v. RuggleB, 1 R. I. 165; 1849, Slaymaker v. Bank of Gettysburg.
10 Pa. St. 373.

1880. In the Supreme Court of California. 54 Cal. Rep.

339-344. 35 Am- ReP- 8o-

Appeal from judgment for plaintiff in the court below.

McKee, J. This is an action of trover. The plaintiff seeks to

Sec. 216. Same.

charge defendants with $2,796.32 and costs for an alleged conversion

1 Arguments and part of opinion omitted.

( 4) As subjects of conversion.
PAYNE v. ELLIOT ET. AL.1

188o.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF CALIFORNIA.

54 Cal. Rep.

339-344• 35 Am. Rep. 80.
Appeal from judgment for plaintiff in the court below.
J. This is an action of trover. The plaintiff seeks to
charge defendants with $2,796.32 and costs for an alleg_e d conversion

McKEE,

J
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Mining Company," and also to have them adjudged guilty of fraud.

The complaint was demurred to on several grounds, and the demurrer

overruled. Defendants afterward answered, and, upon a trial, had in

the absence of defendants and their attorneys, the court gave judg-

ment for the plaintiff for the amount sued for, in gold coin, and also

adjudged that the defendants were guilty of fraud. The appeal comes

to this court upon the judgment roll, and the appellants claim that the

lower court erred in overruling defendants' demurrer to the complaint

upon the grounds that there is no allegation that the plaintiff owned

or that the defendants converted any certificates of shares of stock,

and that the allegation of fraud is insufficient to sustain the judgment

that the defendants were guilty of fraud in the supposed conversion.

The principal question is, whether shares of stock, eo nomine, are

property for which an action, in the nature of an action of trover, can

be maintained.

At common law trover was the proper remedy for a conversion of

personal property; but it lay only for tangible property, capable of
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being identified and taken into actual possession. The conversion of

the property was the gist of the action; and the action did not lie,

unless the defendant had become actually possessed of the property

by some means, whether of finding or otherwise. Shares of stock,

and such things, did not belong to that class of property known as

chattels; they were considered incorporeal, intangible things which

existed in idea, and were incapable of being subjected to actual pos-

session. Nor were they supposed to denote possession, for they had no

other evidence of an existence than the certificate which was issued to

the person who claimed the right to what the certificate represented.

That right consists of the privilege of voting in the concerns of the

corporation, and of participating in the profits of the business of the

corporation. It subsisted only in law or contract. It was a right to

a thing not in possession, but in action. The certificates themselves

were not considered property, but were considered evidence of prop-

erty. Wherever common-law ideas of personal property prevail,

courts hold that trover is not the proper remedy for the conversion of

things which were considered at common law as mere personal rights,

not reducible into possession, but recoverable by law. So the supreme

court of Pennsylvania has held that trover will not lie to recover dam-

ages for shares of bank stock; and, says Justice Sharswood, "the

principle applies to all other corporation stocks." A share of stock,

says the court, "is an incorporeal, intangible thing. It is a right to a

certain proportion of the capital stock of a corporation—never realized

except upon the dissolution and winding up of the corporation—with

the right to receive in the meantime such profits as may be made and

declared in the shape of dividends. Trover can no more be main-

tained for a share in the capital stock of a corporation than it can for

the interest of a partner in a commercial firm." (Neiller v. Kelly,

69 Pa. 407.)

Upon the idea that shares of stock can not be taken away or wrong-

of one hundred shares of the stock of the "Northern Belle Mill and
Mining Company," and also to have them adjudged guilty of fraud.
The complaint was demurred to on several grounds, and the demurrer
overruled. Defendants afterward answered, and, upon a trial, had in
the absence of defendants and their attorneys, the court gave judgment for the plaintiff for the amount sued for, in gold coin, and also
adjudged that the defendants were guilty of fraud. The appeal comes
to this court upon the judgment roll, and the appellants claim that the
lower court erred in overruling defendants' demurrer to the complaint
upon the grounds that there is no allegation that the plaintiff owned
or that the defendants converted any certificates of shares of stock,
and that the allegation of fraud is insufficient to sustain the judgment
that the defendants were guilty of fraud in the supposed conversion.
The principal question is, whether shares of stock, eo nomine, are
property for which an action, in the nature of an action of trover, can
be maintained.
At common law trover was the proper remedy for a conversion of
personal property; but it lay only for tangible property, capable of
being identified and taken into actual possession. The conversion of
the property was the gist of the action; and the action did not lie,
unless the defendant had become actually possessed of the property
by some means, whether of finding or otherwise. Shares of stock,
and such tltt'ngs, did not belong to that class of property known as
chattels; they were considered incorporeal, t'ntangible thz'ngs which
existed in idea, and were incapable of being subjected to actual possession. Nor were they supposed to denote possesst'on, for tliey had no
other evidence of an exz"stence than the certificate whicli was issued to
the person who clat'med the rigltt to what the certificate represented .
That right consists of the privt'lege of voting in tlie concerns of tlte
corporatt'on, and of partidpatt'ng in tlie profits of the business of tlie
corporation. It subst'sted only t'n law or contract. It was a r t'g M to
a tltt'ng not in possesst'on, but t'n action. The certificates themselves
w ere not const'dered property, but were considered evidence of properly. Wherever common-law ideas of personal property prevail,
courts hold that trover is not the proper remedy for the conversion of
things which were considered at common law as mere personal rights,
not reducible into possession, but recoverable by law. So the supreme
court of Pennsylvania has held that trover will not lie to recover damages for shares of bank stock; and, says Justice Sharswood, "the
principle applies to all other corporation stocks." A share of stock,
says the court, "is an incorporeal, intangible thing. It is a right to a
certain proportion of the capital stock of a corporation-never realized
except upon the dissolution and winding up of the corporation-with
the right to receive in the meantime such profits as may be made and
declared in the shape of dividends. Trover can no more be maintained for a share in the capital stock of a corporation than it can for
the interest of a partner in a commercial firm." (Neiller v. Kelly,
69 Pa. 407.)
.
Upon the idea that shares of stock can not be taken away or wrong-
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owner or found by a stranger, there is no doubt of the soundness of

fully detained from the owner, or that they can not be lost by the
owner or found by a stranger, there is no doubt of the soundness of
that decision. But the fiction on whiich the action of trover was
founded, namely, that a defendant had found the property of another,
which was Jost, has become in the progress of law an unmeaning
thing, which has been by most courts diiscarded, so that the action no
longer exists as it did at common law, but has been developed into a
remedy for the conversion of every species of personal property. It
lies for bank notes sealed in a letter (Moody v. Keeney, 7 Ala. 218);
for negotiable instruments (Comparet v. Burr, 5 Black£. 419); for a
judgment (Hudspeth v. Wilson , 2 Dev. N. C. 372); for a promissory note which has been paid (Pierce v. Gibson, 9 Vt. 216); for
copies of a creditor' s account (Fulton v. Cunningham, 16 Vt. 697);
for a writ of execution issued on a judgment (Keeler v. Fassett,
21 Vt. 539), and for certificates of slhares of stock (Anderson v.
Nicholas, 28 N. Y. 6oo; Atkins v. Gamble, 42 Cal. 98; Von Schmidt
v. Bourne, 50 Cal. 616) .
At the same time that the action has 1been thus expanded the words
"things in action" have undergone such a d evelopment from their
original meaning that they now represent things to the imagination in
the light of tangible objects, and as su ch they are the subject of contract, sale, gift, mortgage, bailment and pledge; and, under the provisions of our codes, they are personal property, subject to taxation,
attachment, execution, levy and sale. (Sections 542, 688, Code Civ.
Proc. )
It is, therefore, the "shares of stock" which constitute the property
which belongs to the shareholder. Othierwise, the property would be
in the certificate; but tlie certificate is only evidence of the property;
and it is not the only ev idence, for a transfer on the books of the corporation, without the issuance of a certificate, vests title in th e sh a reholder ; the certificate t's, th erefore, but addi'tt'onal evidence of title,
and if trover is mat'ntainable for the certificate, there is no val id
reason why it is not also mat'ntainable for the tht'ng itself which tlte
certificate represents. For, as the supreme court of Connecticut says,
"If a certificate of stock is unlawfully rietained when demanded , \vhat
is presumed to have been converted? The certificate has no intrinsic
value disconnected from the stock it represents. No one would say
that the paper alone had been converted-that the conversion of the
paper constitutes the entire wrong. The real act done in such cases
is precisely the same as that done here--no more, no less; and to say
that trover will lie in one case and not in the other, is to make a distinction where in reality there is no difference. • • • The stock
in both cases was converted; and we think that in these days , when
the tendency of courts is to do away with technicalities not based
upon reason , a technical distinction of tlbis character should no longer
be sustained." (Ayres v.French , 4r Conn. 151.) In Boylanv.
Hagnel, 8 Nev. 35~, and in Kuhn v. McAllister, 1 Utah 275, actions
of this character for "shares of stock' " were sustained. It follows
that the court below did not err in overruling the demurrer to the com-

that decision. But the fiction on which the action of trover was

founded, namely, that a defendant had found the property of another,

which was lost, has become in the progress of law an unmeaning

thing, which has been by most courts discarded, so that the action no

longer exists as it did at common law, but has been developed into a

remedy for the conversion of every species of personal property. It

lies for bank notes sealed in a letter (Moody v. Keeney, 7 Ala. 218);

for negotiable instruments (Comparet v. Burr, 5 Blackf. 419); for a

judgment (Hudspeth v. Wilson, 2 Dev. N. C. 372); for a promis-

sory note which has been paid (Pierce v. Gibson, 9 Vt. 216); for

copies of a creditor's account (Fulton v. Cunningham, 16 Vt. 697);

for a writ of execution issued on a judgment (Keeler v. Fassett,

21 Vt. 539), and for certificates of shares of stock (Anderson v.

Nicholas, 28 N. Y. 600; Atkins v. Gamble, 42 Cal. 98; Von Schmidt

v. Bourne, 50 Cal. 616).

At the same time that the action has been thus expanded the words
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"things in action" have undergone such a development from their

original meaning that they now represent things to the imagination in

the light of tangible objects, and as such they are the subject of con-

tract, sale, gift, mortgage, bailment and pledge; and, under the pro-

visions of our codes, they are personal property, subject to taxation,

attachment, execution, levy and sale. (Sections 542, 688, Code Civ.

Proc.)

It is, therefore', the "shares of stock" which constitute the property

which belongs to the shareholder. Otherwise, the property would be

in the certificate; but the certificate is only evidence ofthe property;

and it is not the only evidence, for a transfer on the books of the cor-

poration, -without the issuance of a certificate, vests title in the share-

holder; the certificate is, therefore, but additional evidence of title,

and if trover is maintainable for the certificate, there is no valid

reason -why it is not also maintainable for the thing itself which the

certificate represents. For, as the supreme court of Connecticut says,

"If a certificate of stock is unlawfully retained when demanded, what

is presumed to have been converted? The certificate has no intrinsic

value disconnected from the stock it represents. No one would say

that the paper alone had been converted—that the conversion of the

paper constitutes the entire wrong. The real act done in such cases

is precisely the same as that done here—no more, no less; and to say

that trover will lie in one case and not in the other, is to make a dis-

tinction where in reality there is no difference. * * * The stock

in both cases was converted; and we think that in these days, when

the tendency of courts is to do away with technicalities not based

upon reason, a technical distinction of this character should no longer

be sustained." (Ayres v. French, 41 Conn. 151.) In Boylan v.

Hagnel, 8 Nev. 352, and in Kuhn v. McAllister, 1 Utah 275, actions

of this character for "shares of stock" were sustained. It follows

that the court below did not err in overruling the demurrer to the com-
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plaint, or in rendering judgment for the plaintiff for the value of the

stock and interest thereon from the time of the conversion until the

time of the trial. * * *

Judgment modified and affirmed.

Note. As to conversion of stock see, 1821, Kingman v. Pierce, 17 Mass.

247 (conversion of a note); 1830, Plymouth Bank v. Bank of Norfolk, 10 Pick.

(Mass.) 454; 1859, Freeman v. Harwood, 49 Maine 195; 1864, Anderson v.

Nicholas, 28 N. Y. 600; 1869, Morton v. Preston, 18 Mich. 60; 1873, Bank of

America v. McNeil, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 54; 1874, Ayers v. French, 41 Conn.

142; 1875, 1877, Kuhn v. McAllister, 1 Utah 273, 96 U. S. 87; 1881, People v.

Williams, 60 Cal. 1 (shares may be embezzled); 1884, Union, etc., Bank v.

Farrington, 13 Lea (Tenn.) 333; 1884, Daggett v. Davis, 53 Mich. 35, 51 Am.

Rep. 91; 1885, Budd v. Multnomah, etc., R. Co., 12 Ore. 271,53 Am. Rep. 355;

1893, Gresham v. Island City, etc., Bank, 2 Texas Civ. App. 52; 1896, With-

ers v. Bank, 67 Mo. App. 115, on 120; 1896, Ralston v. Bank of California,

112 Cal. 208; 1899, Hine v. Com. Bank of Bay City, 119 Mich. 448,78 N. W.

Rep. 471. See, also, notes 52 Am. Dec. 73; 79 Am Dec. 506; 24 Am. St. Rep.

818.
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But Pennsylvania seems to hold that nothing but the certificate is suscepti-

ble of conversion. 1828, Sewall v. Lancaster Bank, 17 S. & R. (Pa.) 285;

1871, Neiler v. Kelley, 69 Pa. St. 403; 1888, Telford and F. Turnpike Co. v.

Gerhab, 13 Atl. Rep. 90.

plaint, or in rendering judgment for the plaintiff for the value of the
stock and interest thereon from the time of the conversion until the
time of the trial. • • •
Judgment modified and affirmed.
Note. As to conversion of ·stock see, 1821, Kingman v. Pierce, 17 Mass.
247 (conversion of a note); 1830, Plymouth Bank v. Bank of Norfolk, 10 Pick.
(Maas.) 454; 1859, Freeman v. Harwood, 49 Maine 195; 1864, Anderson v.
Nicholas, 28 N. Y. 600; 1869, Morton v. Preston, 18 Mich. 60; 1873, Bank of
America v. McNeil, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 54; 1874, Ayers v. French, 41 Conn.
142; 1875, 1877, Kuhn v. McAllister, 1 Utah 273, 96 U.S. 87; 1881, People v.
Williams, 60 Cal. 1 (&hares may be embezzled) ; 1884, Union, etc., Bank v.
Farrington, 13 Lea (Tenn.) 333; 1884, Daggett v. Davis, 53 Mich. 35, 51 Am.
Rep. 91; 1885, Budd v. Muhnomah, etc., R. Co., 12 Ore. 271, 53 Am. Rep. 355;
1893, Gresham v. Island City, etc., Bank, 2 Texas Civ. App. 52; 1896, Withers v. Bank, 67 Mo. App. 115, on 120; 1896, Ralston v. Bank of California,
112 Cal. 208; 1899, Hine v. Com. Bank of Bay City, 119 Mich. 448, 78 N. W.
Rep. 471. See, also, notes 52 Am. Dec. 73; 79 Am Dec. 506; 24 Am. St. Rep.
818.
But Pennsylvania seems to bold that nothing but the certificate is susceptible of conversion. 1828, Sewall v. Lancaster Bank, 17 S. & R. (Pa.) 285;
1871, Neil er v. Kelley, 69 Pa. St. 4-03; 1888, Telford and F. Turnpike Co. v.
Gerbab, 13 Atl. Rep. 90.

Sec. 217. Same.

(5) Negotiability of shares.

EAST BIRMINGHAM LAND CO. v. DENNIS.1

See. 217. Same.

1888. In the Supreme Court of Alabama. 85 Ala. 565-569,

( 5) Negotiability of shares.

7 Am. St. Rep. 73, 26 Am. & E. C. C. 135.

[Appeal from decree in favor of Dennis, who sued one J. P. Mudd

EAST BIRMINGHAM LAND CO. v. DENNIB.1

and the land company, to compel the transfer of ten shares of stock

in the land company, of which Dennis claimed to be owner, and to

compel Mudd to deliver the certificate of which he had possession

1888.

under claim of ownership. The certificate had been issued to one

IN

ALABAMA. 85 Ala. 565-569,
7 Am. St. Rep. 73, 26 Am. & E. C. C. 135.

THE SUPREME CouRT OF

Dearborn, and was indorsed by him in blank. Dennis bought the cer-

tificate from one who purchased it from Dearborn; afterward it was

lost or stolen, without the fault of Dennis. Mudd had purchased the

certificate for full value from stock brokers in Birmingham.]

Somerville, J. * * * The only question is, whether Mudd,

who paid full value for this stock, without notice of the complainant's

claim to it, acquired a title superior to that of complainant.

The established rule is, that no person can ordinarily be deprived

of his ownership of property save by his own consent, or his neg-

ligence. The only exception to this rule is the case of a bona Jide

purchaser for value of negotiable paper. We have no reference, of

course, to the taking of property for public uses by judicial condemna-

tion, which may be done without the owner's consent.

It can not be contended with any degree of plausibility that under

1 Arguments and part of opinion omitted. Statement abridged.

[Appeal from decree in favor of Dennis, who sued one J. P. Mudd
and the land company, to compel the transfer of ten shares of stock
in the land company, of which Dennis claimed to be owner, and to
compel Mudd to deliver the certificate of which he had possession
under claim of ownership. The certificate had been issued to one
Dearborn, and was indorsed by him in blank. Dennis bought the certificate from one who purchased it from Dearborn; afterward it was
lost or stolen, without the fault of Dennis. Mudd had purchased the
certificate for full value from stock brokers in Birmingham.]
SOMERVILLE, J.
• • • The only question is, whether Mudd,
who paid full value for this stock, without notice of the complainant's
claim to it, acquired a title superior to that of complainant.
The established rule is, that no person can ordinarily be deprived
of his ownership of property save by his own consent, or his negligence. The only exception to this mle is the case of a bona fide
purchaser for value of negotiable paper. We have no reference, of
course, to the taking of property for public uses by judicial condemnation, which may be done without the owner's consent.
It can not be contended with any degree of plausibility that under
1
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the facts of this case the complainant was guilty of negligence or

808

the want of ordinary care in the custody of the certificate. He kept

EAST BIRMINGHAM LAND CO. V. DENNIS.

it in a box in the vault of a banking house, whence it was abstracted

by some unknown person, apparently without any fault on his part.

the facts of this case the complainant was guilty of negligence or
the want of ordinary care in the custody of the certificate. He kept
it in a box in the vault of a banking house, whence it was abstracted
by some unknown person, apparently without any fault on his part.
Nor does any question arise involving the rights of a subsequent
bona fide purchaser of stock, from one shown to be owner on the corporate books, who has already made a prior unregistered transfer of
it to another purchaser. All such transfers made by the true owner,
and not registered on the books of the corporation within fifteen days,
are declared by statute to be ''void as to bona fide creditors or purchasers without notice.'' Code, 1886, .§ 1671; Fisher v. Jones, 82
Ala. 11 7. If the defendant Mudd had claimed by a subsequent purchase from Dearborn, the owner of the stock on the corporate books,
this question would arise. But he does not so claim, his title being
derived through the complainant Dennis himself, by two or more intermediate transferees, the first of whom was a fraudulent holder without title. Whether Mudd's title to the stock, therefore, is superior to
that of Dennis, depends on whether a certificate of stock, indorsed in
blank by the owner, is to be treated as negotiable paper.
The rule is well settled that a bona fide purchaser of a negotiable
bill, bond or note, although he buys from a thief, acquires a good
title, if he pays value for it without notice of the infirmity of his
vendor's title. The authorities are clear in support of the view tit at
a certificate of corporate shares of stock, in the ordt'nary form , i's not
negotiable paper, and that a purchaser of such certificate, although
indorsed in blank by the owner, where no question art'ses under the
registration laws, obtains no better title to the stock than his vendor
had, in the absence of all neglt'gence on the part of the owner, or his
authori'ty, to make the sale. This question arose, and was decided by
the New York Court of Appeals, in Mechanic5' Bank v. New York
& New Haven R. Co., 13 N. Y. (1856) 599. It was there held that
such a certificate does not partake of the character of a negotiable
instrument, and that a bona fide assignee, with full power to transfer
the stock, takes the certificate subject to the equities which existed
against his assignor. Such certificates, said Comstock, J., "contain
no words of negotiability. They declare simply that the person
named is entitled to certain shares of stock. They do not, like negotiable instruments, run to the bearer, or order of the party to whom
t,hey are given." They were said to be in some respects like a bill of
lading or warehouse receipt, being ''the representative of property
existing under certain conditions, and the documentary evidence of
title thereto." The most that can be said is, that all suck instruments possess a sort of quasi-negoti'abilt'ty, dependent on tlte custom
of merchants and the convenience of trade. They are not, in the
matter of transferabili'ty, protected strt"ctly as negotiable paper.
In Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382; s. c., 97 Am. Dec., 1 Am.
Rep. 115 ( 1868), it was also decided that a certificate of corporate
stock, transferred in blank on its back, was clearly not a negotiable
instrument. "No commercial usage," it was said, "could give to

Nor does any question arise involving the rights of a subsequent

bona fide purchaser of stock, from one shown to be owner on the cor-

porate books, who has already made a prior unregistered transfer of

it to another purchaser. All such transfers made by the true owner,

and not registered on the books of the corporation within fifteen days,

are declared by statute to be "void as to bona fide creditors or pur-

chasers without notice." Code, 1886, .§ 1671; Fisher v. Jones, 82

Ala. 117. If the defendant Mudd had claimed by a subsequent pur-

chase from Dearborn, the owner of the stock on the corporate books,

this question would arise. But he does not so claim, his title being

derived through the complainant Dennis himself, by two or more in-

termediate transferees, the first of whom was a fraudulent holder with-

out title. Whether Mudd's title to the stock, therefore, is superior to

that of Dennis, depends on whether a certificate of stock, indorsed in

blank by the owner, is to be treated as negotiable paper.

The rule is well settled that a bona fide purchaser of a negotiable
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bill, bond or note, although he buys from a thief, acquires a good

title, if he pays value for it without notice of the infirmity of his

vendor's title. The authorities are clear in support of the view that

a certificate of corporate shares of stock, in the ordinary form, is not

negotiable paper, and that a purchaser of such certificate, although

indorsed in blank by the owner, where no question arises under the

registration laws, obtains no better title to the slock than his vendor

had, in the absence of all negligence on the part of the owner, or his

authority, to make the sale. This question arose, and was decided by

the New York Court of Appeals, in Mechanics' Bank v. New York

& New Haven R. Co., 13 N. Y. (1856) 599. It was there held that

such a certificate does not partake of the character of a negotiable

instrument, and that a bona fide assignee, with full power to transfer

the stock, takes the certificate subject to the equities which existed

against his assignor. Such certificates, said Comstock, J., "contain

no words of negotiability. They declare simply that the person

named is entitled to certain shares of stock. They do not, like nego-

tiable instruments, run to the bearer, or order of the party to whom

they are given." They were said to be in some respects like a bill of

lading or warehouse receipt, being "the representative of property

existing under certain conditions, and the documentary evidence of

title thereto." The most that can be said is, that all such instru-

ments possess a sort of quasi-negotiability, dependent on the custom

of merchants and the convenience of trade. They are not, in the

matter of transferability, protected strictly as negotiable paper.

In Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382; s. c, 97 Am. Dec, 1 Am.

Rep. 115 (1868), it was also decided that a certificate of corporate

stock, transferred in blank on its back, was clearly not a negotiable

instrument. "No commercial usage," it was said, "could give to
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such an instrument the attribute of negotiability. However many in-

809

termediate hands it may pass through, whoever would obtain a new

certificate in his own name must fill out the blanks, * * * so as

to derive title to himself directly from the last recorded stockholder,

who is the only recognized and legal owner of the shares." The case

of Sewall v. Boston Water Power Co., 4 Allen 282; s. c. 81 Am.

Dec. 701, decided by the same court a few years before, is referred

to as a precedent in support of this conclusion.

The precise point in the present case was also decided in Barstow

v. Savage Mining Co., 64 Cal. 388; s. c, 49 Am. Rep. 705, where

it was expressly held that a bona fide purchaser of stock standing on

the company's books in the name of the former owner, regularly in-

dorsed by him, and stolen from the present owner without his fault,

gets no title. The decision was based on the fact that such certifi-

cates are not negotiable instruments, but simply muniments of title,

and evidences of the holder's right to a given share in the property

and franchise of the corporation. It was observed, in regard to the

matter of negligence, as follows: "But if the purchaser from one
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who has not the title, and has no authority to sell, relies for his pro-

tection on the negligence of the true owner, he mus* show that such

negligence was the proximate cause of the deceit."

The same principle was applied to bills of lading, in Gurney v.

Behrend, 3 Ellis & Bl. 622, decided by the English Queen's Bench,

where an instrument of that kind, indorsed in blank by the consignor,

and sent by him to his correspondent, had been misappropriated.

The correspondent, without authority, fraudulently transferred the

bill for value; and it was held by Lord Campbell, that for the want

of the element of negotiability in the paper, the title to the goods

was unaffected by the transaction.

The doctrine of Barstow v. Savage Mining Co., supra, is well sup-

ported by authority, and, in our judgment, announces a correct prin-

ciple of law, and we fully approve it.—Woolley v. Sargeant, 14

Amer. Dec, note on page 427, and cases there cited; Cook on Stock

and Stockholders, §§ 7, 10, 192, 368, 437; 2 Daniel's Neg. Inst.

(3d. ed.), § 1708^. It harmonizes entirely with the declaration of

our statute, that shares of stock in private corporations "are personal

property, transferable on the books of the corporation" in accordance

with the rules and regulations of the corporation.—Code 1886, § 1669;

Campbell v. Woodstock Iron Co., 83 Ala. 451.

There is a class of cases, not to be confounded with the one in

hand, where the holder of such a certificate of stock indorsed in blank

is clothed with power, as agent or trustee, to deal with such stock to

a limited extent, and transfers it by exceeding his powers, or in breach

of his trust. In such cases it has often been held that the true owner,

having conferred on the holder, by contract, all the external indicia

of title, and an apparently unlimited power of disposition over the

stock, "is estopped to assert his title as against a third person, who,

acting in good faith, acquires it for value from the apparent owner."—

2 Dan. Neg. Inst. (3d ed.), §1708^; McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank, 46

such an _instrument the attribute of negotiability. However many intermediate hands it may pass through, whoever would obtain a new
certificate in his own name must fill out the blanks, • • • so as
to derive title to himself directly from the last recorded stockholder,
who is the only recognized and legal owner of the shares." The case
<>f Sewall v. Boston Water Power Co., 4 Allen 282 ; s. c. 81 Am.
Dec. 701, decided by the same court. a few years before, is referred
to as a precedent in support of this conclusion.
The precise point in the present case was also decided in Barstow
v. Savage Mining Co., 64 Cal. 388; s. c., 49 Am. Rep. 705, where
it was expressly held that a bona fide purchaser of stock standing on
the company's books in the name of the fqrmer owner, regularly indorsed by him, and stolen from the present owner without his fault,
gets no title. The decision was based on the fact that such certificates are not negotiable instruments, but simply muniments of title,
and evidences of the holder's right to a given share in the property
and franchise of the corporation. It was observed, in regard to the
m a tter of negligence, as follows: "But if the purchaser from one
who has not the title, and has no authority to sell, relies for his protection on the negligence of the true owner, he must ~how that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the deceit."
The same principle was applied to bills of lading, in Gurney v.
Behrend, 3 Ellis & Bl. 622, decided by the English Queen's Bench,
where an instrument of that kind, indorsed in blank by the consignor,
and sent by him to his correspondent, had been misappropriated.
The correspondent, without authority, fraudulently transferred the
bill for value; and it was held by Lord Campbell, that for the want
of the element of negotiability in the paper, the title to the goods
was unaffected by the transaction.
The doctrine of Barstow v. Savage Mining Co., supra, is well supported by authority, and, in our judgment, announces a correct principle of law, and we fully approve it.-Woolley v. Sargeant, 14
A~er. Dec., note on page 427, and cases there cited; Cook on Stock
and Stockholders, §§ 7, 10, 192, 368, 437; 2 Daniel's Neg. Inst.
(3d. ed.), § 1708g. It harmonizes entirely with the declaration of
our statute, that shares of stock in private corporations "are personal
property, transferable on the books of the corporation" in accordance
with the rules and regulations of the corporation.-Code 1886, § 1669;
Campbell v. Woodstock Iron Co., 83 Ala. 451.
There is a class of cases, not to be confounded with the one in
hand, where the holder of such a certificate of stock indorsed in blank
is clothed with power, as agent or trustee, to deal with such stock to
a limited extent, and transfers it by exceeding his powers, or in breach
of his trust. In such cases it has often been held that the true owner,
having conferred on the holder, by contract, all the external indida
of title, and an apparently unlimited power of disposition over the
stock, "is estopped to assert his title as against a third person, who,
acting in good faith, acquires it for value from the apparent owner."2 Dan. Neg. Inst. (3d ed.), §x708g; McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank, 46
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N. Y. 325; Mount Holly Turnpike Co. v. Ferree, 17 N. J. Eq. 117;

810

Prall v. Tilt, 28 N. J. Eq. 479; Merchants' Bank v. Livingston, 74

§ 218

HALEY V. REID.

N. Y. 223. These cases rest on the principle that it is more just and

:N". Y. 325; Mount Holly Turnpike Co. v. Ferree, 17 N. J. Eq. 1 r7;
Prall v. Tilt, 28 N. J . Eq. 479; Merchants' Bank v. Livingston, 74
N. Y. 223. These cases rest on the principle that it is more just and

reasonable, where one of two innocent parties must surfer loss, that

he should be the loser who has put trust and confidence in the de-

ceiver than a stranger who has been negligent in trusting no one.

Allen v. Maury & Co., 66 Ala. 10.

reasonable, where one of two innocent parties must suffer loss, that
he should be the loser who has put trust and confidence in the deceiver than a stranger who has been negligent in trusting no one.
Allen v. Maury & Co., 66 Ala. 10.
It being an established principle of law that certificates of stock
are not to be regarded as negotiable paper, it is not permissible to
prove a custom or usage among stock brokers to the contrary. No
usage is good which conflicts with an established principle of law
any more than one which contravenes or nullifies the express stipulations of a contract. Dickinson v. Gay, 83 Am. Dec. 656, and note,
664; E.T., Va. & Ga. R. Co. v. Johnston, 75 Ala. 576; Lehman v.
Marshall, 47 Ala. 362.
The decree of the court below is in accordance with these views,
and must be affirmed.
Note. While shares of stock are almost universally held to be non-nego-

It being an established principle of law that certificates of stock

are not to be regarded as negotiable paper, it is not permissible to

prove a custom or usage among stock brokers to the contrary. No

usage is good which conflicts with an established principle of law

any more than one which contravenes or nullifies the express stipula-

tions of a contract. Dickinson v. Gay, 83 Am. Dec. 656, and note,

664; E. T., Va. & Ga. R. Co. v. Johnston, 75 Ala. 576; Lehman v.

Marshall, 47 Ala. 362.

The decree of the court below is in accordance with these views,

and must be affirmed.

Note. While shares of stock are almost universally held to be non-nego-

tiable, yet they approach very nearly to having such qualities when they pass

bv indorsement and delivery of the certificate. 1850, Harris v. Bank of Mo-
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bile, 5 La. Ann. 538; 1856, Mechanic's Bank v. N. Y. & N. II. R., 13 N. Y.

599; 1857, Mandelbaum v. N. A. Min. Co., 4 Mich. 465; 1861, Bridgeport Bank

v. N. Y. & N. II. R., 30 Conn. 231; 1868, Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382,

97 Am. Dec. 107, 1 Am. Rep. 115; 1870, Mechanic's Bauk v. Merchants' Bank,

tiable, yet they approach very nearly to having such qualities when they pass
b~ indorsement and deiivery of the .c~rtificate. 1850, Harri~ v. Bank of M~
bile, 5 Ln. Ann. 538; 1856, Mechnmc s Bank v. N. Y. & N. II. R., 13 N. Y.
599; 1857, Mandelbaum v. N. A. Min. Co., 4 Mich. 465; 1861, Bridgeport Bank
v. N. Y. & N. IL R., 30 Conn. 231; 1868, Shaw v. Spencer , 100 Mass. 382,
97 Am. Dec. 107, 1 Am. Rep. 115; 1870, Mechanic's Bank v. Merchants' Bank,
45 ~fo. 513, 100 Am. Dec. 388; 1870, State v. Bank of State, 45 Mo. 528; 18il,
McNeil v. Tenth Nnt'l Bank, 46 N. Y. 325, 7 Am. R ep. 341; 1871, First National Bank v. Lanier, 11 Wall. (78 U.S.) 369; 1873, Hall v. Rose H. & E. R.
Co., 70 Ill. 673; 1874, Bercich v. Marye, 9 Nev. 312; 1875, Sherwood v. Meadow
Val. 1\1. Co., 50 Cal. 412; 1877, Weyerv. Second Nat'I Bank, 57 Ind.198; 1883,
Barstow v. Savage Min. Co., 64 Cal. 388, 49 Am. Rep. 705; 1886, Youn~ v.
South Tredegar Iron Co., 85 Tenn. 189, 4 Am. St. R. 752; 1887, Supply D. Co.
v. F:lliott, 10 Colo. 327, 3 Am. St. Rep. 586; 1890, Hammond v. Hastings, 134
U.S. 401; 1892, Clark v. Am. Coal Co., 86 Iowa 436, 17 L. R. A. 557, 53 N. W.
Rep. 291; 1893, Brinkerhoff-Farris, etc., Co. v. Home L. Co., 118 Mo. 447;
1896, Craig v. Hesperia L. & W. Co., 113 Cal. 7, 54 Am. St. Rep. 316 ; 1896,
Knox v. Eden Musee Am. Co., 148 N. Y. 441, 51 Am. St. Rep. 700; 1899.
Masnry v. Ark. Nat'l Bank, 93 Fed. Re p. 603, 35 C. C. A. 476.

4.5 Mo. 513, 100 Am. Dec. 388; 1870, State v. Bank of State, 45 Mo. 528; 1871,

McNeil v. Tenth Nat'l Bank, 46 N. Y. 325, 7 Am. Rep. 341; 1871, First Na-

tional Bank v. Lanier, 11 Wall. (78 U. S.) 369; 1873, Hall v. Rose H. & E. R.

Co., 70 111.673; 1874, Bercich v. Marve, 9 Nev. 312; 1875, Sherwood v. Meadow

Val. M. Co., 50Cal.412; 1877, Wever v. Second Nat'l Bank, 57 Ind. 198; 1883,

Barstow v. Savage Min. Co., 64 Cal. 388, 49 Am. Rep. 705; 1886, Young v.

South Tredegar Iron Co., 85 Tenn. 189, 4 Am. St. R. 752; 1887, Supplv D. Co.

v. Elliott, 10 Colo. 327 , 3 Am. St. Rep. 586; 1890, Hammond v. Hastings, 134

U. S. 401; 1892, Clark v. Am. Coal Co., 86 Iowa 436,17 L. R. A. 557, 53 N. W.

Rep. 291; 1893, Brinkerhoff-Farris, etc., Co. v. Home L. Co., 118 Mo. 447;

1896, Craig v. Ilesperia L. & W. Co., 113 Cal. 7, 54 Am. St. Rep. 316; 1896,

Knox v. Eden Musee Am. Co., 148 N. Y. 441, 51 Am. St. Rep. 700; 1899,

Masury v. Ark. Nat'l Bank, 93 Fed. Rep. 603, 35 C. C. A. 476.

Sec. 218. Same.

(6) As subjects of attachment or execution.

HALEY v. REID.1

1854. In the Supreme Court of Georgia. 16 Ga. Rep.

437-439-

[Reid sued out an attachment against Haley, which the sheriff

Sec. 218.

levied on the stock of Haley in a plank-road company by making an

Same.

entry to that effect upon the attachment. The court overruled a mo-

Only part of opinion given.

( 6) As subjects of attachment or execution.
HALEY v. REID. 1

1854.

IN

THR

SUPREME

CouRT

OF

GEORGIA.

16 Ga. Rep.

437-439.
[Reid sued out an attachment against Haley, which the sheriff
levied on the stock of Haley in a plank-road company by making an
entry to that effect upon the attachment. The court overruled a mo1
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tion by the defendant to dismiss the attachment, and exceptions were

taken.]

Benning, J. * * * To "levy" means to seize—to take cor-

poreally. It follows that what can not be seized—what can not be

taken corporeally—can not be levied on. And as the law is not to

be presumed to require impossibilities when it requires an executing

officer to levy on both personal and real estate, it is not to be pre-

sumed to intend to require him to levy on such personal or real estate

as it is impossible to levy on; that is to say, as it is impossible to

seize—to take corporeally. What precise idea the sheriff meant to

express by the word "levied" when he returned that he had "levied"

the attachment upon one hundred shares in the corporation I am at

some loss to conceive. * * *

Reversed.

Note. At common law shares are not attachable. 1812, Denton v. Livings-

ton, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 96; 1819, Williamson v. Smoot, 7 Martin (La. 0. S.) 31,

12 Am. Dec. 494; 1823, Nashville Bank v. Ragsdale, Peck (Tenn.) 296; 1858,

Evans v..Monot, 4 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 227; 1866, Foster v. Potter, 37 Mo. 525;

tion by the defendant to dismiss the attachment, and exceptions were
taken.]
BENNING, J.
• • •. To "levy" means to seize-to take corporeally. It follows that what can not be seized-what can not be
taken corporeally-can not be levied on. And as the law is not to
be presumed to require impossibilities when- it requires an executing
officer to levy on both personal and real estate, it is not to be presumed to intend to require him to levy on such personal or real estate
as it is impossible to levy on; that is to say, as it is impossible to
seize-to take corporeally. What precise idea the sheriff meant to
express by the word "levied" when he returned that he had "levied"
the attachment upon one hundred shares in the corporation I am at
some loss to conceive. • • •
Reversed.
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1873, Merchants' M. I. Co. v. Brower, 38 Texas 230; 1885, Barnard v. Ins.

Co., 4 Mackev (D. C.) 63; 1887, Rhea v. Powell, 24 111. App. 77; 1889, Duncan-

son v. Nat'l Bank, 7 Mackey (D. C) 348.

But statutes generally provide for the taking of shares by execution or attach-

ment. 1821, Howe v. Starkweather, 17 Mass. 240; 1830, Hussey v. Manufac.

& M. Bank, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 415; 1838, Castle v. Carr, 16 N. J. Law 394; 1882,

Shenandoah Valley R. Co. v. Griffith, 76 Va. 913; 1889, Union Bank v. Byram,

131 111. 92; 1894, Thompson v. Wells, 57 111. App. 436; 1895, Ditty v. Bank,

112 Ala. 391.

Under some statutes only the legal interest is attachable. 1881, Van Nor-

man v. Jackson, Cir. J., 45 Mich. 204; 1888, Weller v. Pace Tobacco Co., 2

N. Y. Supp. 292; 1893, Gypsum Plaster & S. Co. v. Kent, C. J., 97 Mich. 631.

But under other statutes the equitable interest is also. 1854, Bank of St.

Mary's v. St. John, 25 Ala. 566; 1866, Middletown Sav. Bank v. Jarvis, 33

Conn. 372; 1894, Tufts v. Volkening, 122 Mo. 631.

"Stock" can not be the subject of replevin, because of its incorporeal nature.

1899, Ashton v. Heydenfeldt, 124 Cal. 14, 56 Pac. Rep. 624.

Sec. 219. Same.

(7) Location of shares for attachment.

Note. At common law shares are not attachable. 1812, Denton v. Livingston, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 96; 1819, Williamson v. Smoot, 7 Martin (La. 0. S.) 31,
12 Am. Dec. 494; 1823, Nashville Bank v. Ragsrlale, Peck (Tenn.) 296; 1858,
Evans v .. Monot, 4 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 227; 1866, Foster v. Potter, 37 Mo. 525;
1873, Merchants' M. I. Co. v. Brower, 38 Texas 230; 1885, Barnard v. Ins.
Co., 4 :\lackey (D. C.)63; 1887, Rhea v. Powell, 24 Ill . App. 77; 1889, Duncanson v. Nat'I Bank, 7 Mackey (D. C.) 348.
13nt statutes generally provide for the taking'of shares by execution or attachment. 1821, Howe v. Starkweather, 17 Mass. 240; 1830, Hussey v. Manufac.
& M. Bank, 10 Pick. (Mass. ) 415; 1838,Castle v. Carr, 16 N. J. Law 394; 1882,
Shenandoah Valley R. Co. v. Griffith, 76 Va. 913; 1889, Union Bank v. Byram,
131 Ill. 92; 1894, Thompson v. Wells, 57 Ill. App. 436; 1895, Ditty v. Bank,
112 Ala. 391.
Under some statutes only the legal interest is attachable. 1881, Van Norman v. Jackson, Cir. J., 45 Mich. 204; 1888, Weller v. Pace Tobacco Co., 2
N. Y. Supp. 292; 1893, Gypsum Plaster & S. Co. v. Kent, C. J., 97 Mich. 631.
But under other statutes the equitable interest is also. 1854, Bank of St.
)1ary' s v. St. John, 25 Ala. 566; 1866, Middletown Sav. Bank v. Jarvis, 33
Conn. 372; 1894, Tufts v. Volkening, 122 Mo. 631.
"Stock" can not be the subject of replevin, because of its incorporeal nature.
1899, Ashton v. Heydenfeldt, 124 Cal. 14, 56 Pac. Rep. 624.

PLIMPTON v. BIGELOW.1

1883. In the Court of Appeals of New York. 93 New York

592-602.

[Appeal from order of general term of supreme court reversing an

Sec. 219. Same.

order of the special term vacating a levy by attachment upon stock.]

Andrews, J. This action is brought by the plaintiffs, residents of

Massachusetts, against the defendant, a resident of Pennsylvania, upon

( 7) Location of shares for attachment.

'Arguments and parte of opinion omitted.

PLIMPTON v. BIGELOW.1
IN THR CouRT OF APPRALS OF

NEW

YORK.

93 New

York

592-fu2.
[Appeal from order of general term of supreme court reversing an
order of the special term vacating a levy by attachment upon stock. J
ANDREWS, J. This action is brought by the plaintiffs, residents of
Massachusetts, against the defendant, a resident of Pennsylvania, upon
1 Arguments
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Massachusetts and payable generally. The plaintiffs procured an

219

order for the service of the summons upon the defendant by publica-

several promissory notes of the defendant, made and delivered in
Massachusetts and payable generally. The plaintiffs procured an
order for the service of the summons upon the defendant by publication, and also a warrant of attachment against his property. The
sheriff of the city and county of New York, to whom the warrant was
directed, undertook to execute it by levying upon 439 shares of the
stock of the Hat Sweat Manufacturing Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, incorporated under the laws of that state, owned by the defendant, and for which he held and then had, in the state of Pennsylvania, stock certificates issued and delivered to him at the office of
the company in Philadelphia, in February, 1882, at which place the
stock and transfer books of the company then were and still are kept.
The sheriff, for the purpose of making the levy, left with the secretary
of the company in the city of New York a certified copy of the warrant of attachment, together with the notice prescribed by section 649
of the Code of Civil Procedure. The formal proceedings were taken
to complete the levy, and the shares were subjected to the attachment,
provided they were liable to attachment under section 647 of the code.
That section declares that "the rights or shares which the defendant
has in the stock of an association or corporation, together with the
interest and profits thereon, may be levied upon, and the sheriff's certificate of the sale thereof entitles the purchaser to the same rights and
privileges with respect thereto, which the defendant had when they
were attached."
The question here is whether this section applies to shares of stock
of a foreign corporation. It is to be observed that the section is one
of the provisions of a system of proceedings by attachment, and is to
be construed in view of the fundamental principle upon which all attachment proceedings rest, that the res must be actually or constructively within the jurisdiction of the court issuing the attachment in
order to any valid or effectual seizure under the process. In the
case of tangible property, capable of actual manucaption, it must
have an actual situs within the jurisdiction. But credits, choses in
action and other intangible interests are made by statute susceptible
of seizure by attachment. The same principle, however, applies in
this case as in the other, the res, that is the intangible right or interest,
to be subject to the attachment, must be within the jurisdiction. But
it is manifest from the nature of this species of property that it must
be a constructive or statutory presence only, founded upon some characteristic fact which determines its locality. \tVhere the defendant
who owns a credit is within the jurisdiction there is no difficulty
through proceedings z'n personam in reaching and applying it in discharge of his debt to the plaintiff. But where he is out of the jurisdiction, and the debt or duty owing to him, or the right he possesses
exists against some person within the jurisdiction, attachment laws
fasten upon that circumstance, and by notice to the debtor or person
owing the duty or representing the right, impound the debt, duty or
right to answer the obligation which the attachment proceeding is instituted to enforce. In the case supposed, the debt, duty or right for

tion, and also a warrant of attachment against his property. The

sheriff of the city and county of New York, to whom the warrant was

directed, undertook to execute it by levying upon 439 shares of the

stock of the Hat Sweat Manufacturing Company, a Pennsylvania cor-

poration, incorporated under the laws of that state, owned by the de-

fendant, and for which he held and then had, in the state of Pennsyl-

vania, stock certificates issued and delivered to him at the office of

the company in Philadelphia, in February, 1882, at which place the

stock and transfer books of the company then were and still are kept.

The sheriff, for the purpose of making the levy, left with the secretary

of the company in the city of New York a certified copy of the war-

rant of attachment, together with the notice prescribed by section 649

of the Code of Civil Procedure. The formal proceedings were taken

to complete the levy, and the shares were subjected to the attachment,

provided they were liable to attachment under section 647 of the code.

That section declares that "the rights or shares which the defendant
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has in the stock of an association or corporation, together with the

interest and profits thereon, may be levied upon, and the sheriff's cer-

tificate of the sale thereof entitles the purchaser to the same rights and

privileges with respect thereto, which the defendant had when they

were attached."

The question here is whether this section applies to shares of stock

of a foreign corporation. It is to be observed that the section is one

of the provisions of a system of proceedings by attachment, and is to

be construed in view of the fundamental principle upon which all at-

tachment proceedings rest, that the res must be actually or construct-

ively within the jurisdiction of the court issuing the attachment in

order to any valid or effectual seizure under the process. In the

case of tangible property, capable of actual manucaption, it must

have an actual situs within the jurisdiction. But credits, choses in

action and other intangible interests are made by statute susceptible

of seizure by attachment. The same principle, however, applies in

this case as in the other, the res, that is the intangible right or interest,

to be subject to the attachment, must be within the jurisdiction. But

it is manifest from the nature of this species of property that it must

be a constructive or statutory presence only, founded upon some char-

acteristic fact which determines its locality. Where the defendant

who owns a credit is within the jurisdiction there is no difficulty

through proceedings in personam in reaching and applying it in dis-

charge of his debt to the plaintiff. But where he is out of the juris-

diction, and the debt or duty owing to him, or the right he possesses

exists against some person within the jurisdiction, attachment laws

fasten upon that circumstance, and by notice to the debtor or person

owing the duty or representing the right, impound the debt, duty or

right to answer the obligation which the attachment proceeding is in-

stituted to enforce. In the case supposed, the debt, duty or right for
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locality in the jurisdiction. * * *

We now come more directly to the inquiry upon which the case

now under review depends, viz.: Whether the shares of a non-resi-

dent defendant in the stock of a foreign corporation can be deemed to

be within this state, by reason of the fact that the president or other

officers of the corporation are here engaged in carrying on the corpo-

rate business. We do not overlook the fact that we are construing a

section of the code, the language of which is sufficiently general to

include foreign corporations, but they are not expressly named, and

for the purpose of determining whether foreign corporations were in-

tended to be included, it is a relevant inquiry whether upon general

principles the right which a stockholder in a corporation has, by reason

of his ownership of shares, is a debt or duty of the corporation, exist-

ing in a foreign jurisdiction wherever the officers of the corporation

may be found engaged in the prosecution of the corporate business.

If the corporation, by having its officers, and by transacting business

in a state other than its domicile of origin, is deemed to be itself pres-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ent as an entity in such foreign state, to the same extent and in the

same sense as it is present in the state which created it, it may be con-

ceded that its shares might be properly attached in such foreign juris-

diction.

But we regard the principle to be too firmly settled by repeated

adjudications of the federal and state courts, to admit of further con-

troversy, that a corporation has its domicile and residence alone

within the bounds of the sovereignty which created it, and that it is

incapable of passing personally beyond that jurisdiction. (Bank of

Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18

How. (U. S.) 404; Merrick v. Van Santvoord, 34N. Y. 208; Stevens

v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 41 N. Y. 150.) But it is equally true that a

foreign corporation is permitted to sue in the courts of this state and

that suits in personam may be brought against it by service of process

on its officers or agents within the jurisdiction. (Code, §§ 432, 1780;

Gibbs v. Queen Ins. Co.1) But suits by or against foreign cor-

porations are not maintained on the theory that the corporation liti-

gant is here in person, or that the corporate entity attends its officers

in their migrations from one state to another, or that it is itself pres-

ent wherever its property may be, or its business may be transacted.

The jurisdiction, as I understand, rests upon the ground that as a

corporation must act by agents, it may, through its agents, subject it-

self to the jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal. * • *

The right which a shareholder in a corporation has by reason of

his ownership of shares is a right to participate according to the

amount of his stock in the surplus profits of the corporation on a

division, and ultimately on its dissolution in the assets remaining

after payment of its debts. (Burrall v. Bushwick Railroad Co., 75

N. Y. an.) It is this right and interest which is made liable to

'attachment under the section referred to. The right of the share-

holder is derived from the corporation under its charter, or the laws

1 63 N. Y. 114.

the purpose of attachment proceedings is deemed to have its situs or
locality in the jurisdiction. • • •
We now come more directly to the inquiry upon which the case
now under review depends, viz.: Whether the shares of a non-resident defendant in the stock of a foreign corporation can be deemed to
be within this state, by reason of the fact that the president or other
officers of the corporation are here engaged in carrying on the corporate business. We do not overlook the fact that we are construing a
section of the code, the language of which is sufficiently general to
include foreign corporations, but they are not expressly named, and
for the purpose of determining whether foreign corporations were intended to be included, it is a relevant inquiry whether upon general
principles the right which a stockholder in a corporation has, by reason
of his ownership of shares, is a debt or duty of the corporation, existing in a foreign jurisdiction wherever the officers of the corporation
may be found engaged in the prosecution of the corporate business.
If the corporation, by having its officers, and by transacting business
in a state other than its domicile of origin, is deemed to be itself present as an entity in'such foreign state, to the same extent and in the
same sense as it is present in the state which created it, it may be conceded that its shares might be properly attached in such foreign jurisdiction.
But we regard the principle to be too firmly settled by repeated
adjudications of the federal and state courts, to admit of further controversy, that a corporation has its domicile and residence alone
within the bounds of the sovereignty which created it, and that it is
incapable of passing personally beyond that jurisdiction. (Bank of
Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18
How. (U.S.) 404; Merrickv. VanSantvoord'34N. Y. 208; Stevens
v. Phamix Ins. Co., 41 N. Y. 150.) But it is equally true that a
foreign corporation is permitted to sue in the courts of this state and
that suits in personam may be brought against it by service of process
on its officers or agents within the jurisdiction. (Code,§§ 432, 178o;
Gibbs v. Queen Ins. Co. 1 )
But suits by or against foreign corporations are not maintained on the theory that the corporation litigant is here in person, or that the corporate entity attends its officers
in their migrations from one state to another, or that it is itself present wherever its property may be, or its business may be transacted.
The jurisdiction, as I understand, rests upon the ground that as a
corporation must act by agents, it may, through its agents, subject itself to the jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal. • • •
The right which a shareholder in a corporation has by reason of
his ownership · of shares is a right to participate according to the
amount of his stock in the surplus profits of the corporation on a
division, and ultimately on its dissolution in the assets remaining
after payment of its debts. (Burrall v. Bushwick Railroad Co., 75
N. Y. 211.) It is this right and interest which is made liable to
·attachment under the section referred to. The right of the shareholder is derived from the corporation under its charter, or the laws
1 6.3 N. Y. 114.
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of the state which created it. It is enforceable by judicial proceed-
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ing in the local courts, and in case of a dissolution of the corporation

the local courts alone can be resorted to to wind up its affairs and

of the state which created it. It is enforceable by judicial proceeding in the local courts, and in case of a dissolution of the corporation
the local courts alone can be resorted to to wind up its affairs and
distribute its assets. It seems impossible to regard the stock of a
corporation as being present for the purpose of judicial proceedings
except at one of two places, viz., the place of residence of the owner,
or the place of the residence of the corporation. • • •
The foreign corporation is not here because its agents are here, nor
because it has prope1ty here; nor is the stock here because the corporation has property, or is conducting its business in this state.
The individual members of a corporation are not the owners of
the property of the corporation, or of any part of it. The abstract
entity-the corporation-is the owner and only owner of the property. We do not doubt that shares for the purpose of attachment proceedings may be deemed to be in the possession of the corporation which issued them, but only at the place where the cotporation by intendment of law always remains, to wit, in the state or
country of its creation. In all other places it is an alien. It may
send its agents abroad or transact business abroad as any other inhabitant may do, without passing personally into the foreign jurisdic·
tion or changing its legal residence. But such agents are not the
corporation, and do not represent the corporation in respect to rights
as between the corporation and its shareholders incident to the owner·
ship of shares.
It is not necessary to this case to define the limits of legislative
power in subjecting intangible property to attachment by notice served
upon such person or corporation as may be designated by the legisla·
ture. Manifestly the res can not be within the jurisdiction, as a mere
consequence of a legislative declaration, when the actual locality is
undeniably elsewhere. But in respect to intangible interests, as we
have said, there can be no actual seizure of the thing, and it can be
bound only by notice to some one who represents the thing. In case
of a debt, notice to the debtor residing within the jurisdiction is the
ordinary proceeding to attach the debt, and if the debtor is a cotpora·
tion, and the corporation is a domestic one, there is no difficulty.
But in some of the states foreign corporations having an agent, or a
place of business within the state, may be charged under what is called
the trustee process, or as garnishee. (Barrv. King, 96 Pa. St. 485;
Nat'l Bank v. Huntington, I 29 Mass. 444.) In these proceedings
the trustee or garnishee is joined with the principal defendant as a
party to the action, and the debt owing by the trustee or garnishee
is ascertained and the liability of the trustee and garnishee is ad·
judged in the action. There may be no difficulty upon principle in
compelling a corporation which has an agent and officer in another
state and is transacting business there to respond in garnishment proceedings for the debt, although the creditor-the principal defendant
-is a non-resident, and if bound to respond, it is certainly just that
the judgment which compels the corporation to pay the debt to the
plaintiff should protect it in making such payment against a subse-

distribute its assets. It seems impossible to regard the stock of a

corporation as being present for the purpose of judicial proceedings

except at one of two places, viz., the place of residence of the owner,

or the place of the residence of the corporation. * * *

The foreign corporation is not here because its agents are here, nor

because it has property here; nor is the stock here because the cor-

poration has property, or is conducting its business in this state.

The individual members of a corporation are not the owners of

the property of the corporation, or of any part of it. The abstract

entity—the corporation—is the owner and only owner of the prop-

erty. We do not doubt that shares for the purpose of attach-

ment proceedings may be deemed to be in the possession of the cor-

poration which issued them, but only at the place where the corpora-

tion by intendment of law always remains, to wit, in the state or

country of its creation. In all other places it is an alien. It may

send its agents abroad or transact business abroad as any other in-
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habitant may do, without passing personally into the foreign jurisdic-

tion or changing its legal residence. But such agents are not the

coiporation, and do not represent the corporation in respect to rights

as between the corporation and its shareholders incident to the owner-

ship of shares.

It is not necessary to this case to define the limits of legislative

power in subjecting intangible property to attachment by notice served

upon such person or corporation as may be designated by the legisla-

ture. Manifestly the res can not be within the jurisdiction, as a mere

consequence of a legislative declaration, when the actual locality is

undeniably elsewhere. But in respect to intangible interests, as we

have said, there can be no actual seizure of the thing, and it can be

bound only by notice to some one who represents the thing. In case

of a debt, notice to the debtor residing within the jurisdiction is the

ordinary proceeding to attach the debt, and if the debtor is a corpora-

tion, and the corporation is a domestic one, there is no difficulty.

But in some of the states foreign corporations having an agent, or a

place of business within the state, may be charged under what is called

the trustee process, or as garnishee. (Barrv. King, 96 Pa. St. 485;

Nat'l Bank v. Huntington, 129 Mass. 444.) In these proceedings

the trustee or garnishee is joined with the principal defendant as a

party to the action, and the debt owing by the trustee or garnishee

is ascertained and the liability of the trustee and garnishee is ad-

judged in the action. There may be no difficulty upon principle in

compelling a corporation which has an agent and officer in another

state and is transacting business there to respond in garnishment pro-

ceedings for the debt, although the creditor—the principal defendant

—is a non-resident, and if bound to respond, it is certainly just that

the judgment which compels the corporation to pay the debt to the

plaintiff should protect it in making such payment against a subse-
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but whatever view may be taken as to the right to attach a debt owing

by a foreign corporation to a non-resident, by service of notice on an

agent of the corporation within the jurisdiction, we think, in respect to

corporate stock, which is not a debt of the corporation in any proper

sense, it would be contrary to principle to hold that it can be reached

by such a notice. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the funda-

mental condition of attachment proceedings, that the res must be

within the jurisdiction of the court in order to an effectual seizure, is

not answered in respect to shares in a foreign corporation by the pres-

ence here of its officers, or by the fact that the corporation has prop-

erty and is transacting business here, and that section 647 must be

construed as applying to domestic corporations only. (See Moore v.

Gennett, 2 Tenn. Ch. 375; Christmas v. Biddle, 13 Pa. St. 223;

Childs v. Digby, 24 Pa. St. 26; Drake on Attachment, §§ 244, 471,

( 478.) • « »

Order of general term reversed and that of special term affirmed.

Note. See, also, 1875, Moore v. Gennett, 2 Tenn. Ch. 375; 1886, Winslow
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v. Fletcher, 53 Conn. 390, 55 Am. Rep. 122; 1895, Reid Ice Co. v. Stephens,

quent claim by its creditor. We do not enter into this question here,
but whatever view may be taken as to the right to attach a debt owing
by a foreign corporation to a non-resident, by service of notice on an
agent of the corporation within the jurisdiction, we think, in respect to
corporate stock, which is not a debt of the corporation in any proper
sense, it would be contrary to principle to hold that it can be reached
by such a notice. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the fund amental condition of attachment proceedings, that the res must be
within the jurisdiction of the court in order to an effectual seizure, is
not answered in respect to shares in a foreign corporation by the presence here of its officers, or by the fact that the corporation has property and is transacting business here , and that section 647 must be
construed as applying to domestic corporations only. (See Moore v.
Gennett, 2 Tenn. Ch. 375; Christmas v. Biddle, 13 Pa. St. 223;
Childs v. Digby, 24 Pa. St. 26; Drake on Attachment,§§ 244, 471,

' 478.)

•

•

•

62 111. App. 334; 1895, Ireland v. Globe M. & R. Co., 19 R. I. 180, 61 Am. St.

Rep. 756, 29 L. R. A. 429; 1898, New Jersey Sheep & W. Co. v. Traders' Dep.

Bank, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 565, 46 S. W. Rep. 677; 1898. Finney v. Neville, 86 Fed.

Rep. 97.

Sec. 220.

(8) Seizure in equity.

ERWIN v. OLDHAM.

1834. In the Supreme Court of Tennessee. 6 Yerger (14

Order of general term reversed and that of special term affirmed.
N ote. See, also, 1875, Moore v. Gennett, 2 Tenn., Ch. 375; 1886, Winslow
v. Fletcher, 53 Conn . 390, 55 Am. Rep. 122 ; 1895, Reid Ice Co . v. Stephens,
62 Ill. App. 334; 1895, Ireland v. Globe M. & R. Co., 19 R. l. 180, 61 Am. St.
Rep. 756, 29 L. R. A. 429; 1898, Ne w Jersey Sheep & W. Co. v. Traders' Dep.
Bank, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 565, 46 S. W. Rep. 677; 1898, Pinney v. Nevills, 86 Fed.
Rep. 97.

Tenn.) 185-189.

Green, J. This is a bill filed by the complainant to subject stock

in the Nashville Bridge Company to the payment of his debt due

See. 220.

from defendant.

It is not pretended that there is any fraud or trust in this case to

(8) Seizure in equity.

furnish a ground of equity jurisdiction, and the simple question is

ERWIN v. OLDHAM.

whether this court has power to cause stocks, credits and rights of

action held by a debtor, without fraud, to be sold or converted into

money, or transferred to the creditor in payment of his debt. We

1834.

think it has not, and without entering into any reasoning on the sub-

ject or review of authorities, we refer, as conclusively settling the

point, to the case of Donavan v. Finn, 1 Hop. 59.

Our act of assembly of 1833, ch. 11, makes ample provision upon

this subject, but this bill, being filed long before the passage of that

act, can not be governed by it.

Decree affirmed.

Note. Compare, 1854, Bank of St. Mary's v. St. John, 25 Ala. 566; 1866,

Middletown Sav. Bank v. Jarvis, 33 Conn. 372.

IN THE SUPREME CoURT OF TENNESSEE.
Tenn.) 185-189.

6 Yerger (14

GREEN, J. This is a bill filed by the complainant to subject stock
in the Nashville Bridge Company to the payment of his debt due
from defendant.
It is not pretended that there is any fraud or trust in this case to
furnish a ground of equity jurisdiction, and the simple question is
whether this court has power to cause stocks, credits and rights of
action held by a debtor, without fraud, to be sold or converted into
money, or transferred to the creditor in payment of his debt. 'vVe
think it has not , and without entering into any reasoning on the subject or review of authorities, we refer, as conclusively settling the
point, to the case of Donavan v. Finn, 1 Hop. 59.
Our act of assembly of 1833 1 ch. r 11 makes ample provision upon
this subject, but this bill , being filed long before the passage of that
act, can not be governed by it.
Decree affirmed.
Note. Compare, 1854, Bank of St. Mary's v. St. John, 25 Ala. 566; 1866,
Middletown Sav. Bank v. Jarvis, 33 Conn. 372.
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Title V. The Body Corporate—Its Name.

CHAPTER 9.

THE CORPORATE NAME.1

Sec. 221. Necessity of a name.

"There ought to be a name by which it ought to be incorporated."

—10 Coke's Rep., p. 29, c. 1600.

"The name of the corporation is as a name of baptism.'"—21 Ed.

IV, p. 56 (1482); 10 Coke's Rep., p. 28.

"It is a clear and plain rule in our law, that the name of a corpora-

tion is as a name of baptism to a natural man, and if there is any

difference, I conceive that the law requires more strict certainty in

the name of a corporation than in the name of any particular person;

TITLE

for a name is more necessary to a corporation than to another; for

v.

THE BoDY CORPORATE-ITS

N.AMB.

when an infant is born, he is presently a perfect creature before any

name is given him, and the giving the name is not a matter of neces-

sity, but of policy for distinction, etc., but in the case of a corpora-

tion the name is the substance and essence of it, and it is not a body

before a name be imposed upon it."—Argument of Egerton, Solici-

CHAPTER 9.

tor-General, 30 and 31 Eliz., Ley's Rep. 163 pi. 228 (1589); 6

Viner's Abr., p. '261.

"The names of corporations are given of necessity, for the name is

THE CORPORATE NAME.•
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as the very being of the constitution, and though it is the will of the

king that erects them, yet the name is the knot of their combination,

Sec. 221. Necessity of a name.

without which they could not perform their corporate acts, and it is

no body to plead and be impleaded, to take and give till it hath got

a name, but natural persons can take before they come into being,

"There ought to be a name by which it ought to be incorporated.,..
Coke's Rep., p. 29, c. r6oo.
"The name of 'the corporation t's as a name of baptt'snz."-21 Ed.
IV, p. 56 (1482); 10 Coke's Rep., p. 28.
"It is a clear and plain rule in our law, that the name of a corporation is as a name of bapUsm to a natu-ral man, and if there is any
difference, I conceive that the law requt'res 11Zore strt'ct certainty in
tlee name of a corporatt'on than t'n tlee na11Ze of any partt'cular per~m;
for a name is more necessary to a corporation than to another: for
when an infant is born, he is presently a perfect creature before any
name is given him, and the giving the name is not a matter of necessity, but of policy for distinction, etc., but in the case of a corporation the name is the substance and essence of it, and it is not a body
before a name be imposed upon it. "-Argument of Egerttm, Solidtor-General, 30 and 31 Eliz., Ley's Rep. 163 pl. 228 {1589): 6
Viner's Ahr., p. •261.
"The names of corporations are given of necessity, for the name is
as the very bet'ng of t!te constitution , and though it is the will of the
king that erects them, yet the name is the knot of their combination,
without which they could not perform their corporate acts, and it is
no body to plead and be impleaded, to take and give till it hath got
a name, but natural persons can take before they come into being,
and when they are in being, before they have got a name."-Gilb.
Hist. C. B. 181, 182, cap. 17; 6 Viner •262, c. 1620.

and when they are in being, before they have got a name."—Gilb.

-10

Hist. C. B. 181, 182, cap. 17; 6 Viner *262, c. 1620.

1 See Ang. & Ames, §§ 99-103; Beach, §§ 373-5, 864; Boone, §§ 29-32, 47, 75,

286: Clark, pp. 71-4; Cook, § 699, et seq.; Elliott, §§ 47-8; Morawetz, §§ 353-

7. 770, 771, 810-12; Taylor, §§ 12, 14, 137, 158-9; I Thompson, §§284-300;

VII Thompson, §§ 8183-8202.

(816)

1 See Ang. & Ames, §§ 99-103; Beach, §§ 373-5, 864; Boone §§ 29-32, 47, 76~
286.i..Clat'k, pp. 71~; COok, § 699, et seq.; Elliott,
47-8; Morawetz, §§ ~
?, n~ 771, 810-12, Taylor, §§ 12, 14, 137, 168-9, I Thompson, §§ 284-300,
v II Tnompeon, §§ 8183-8202.
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Sec 222. Acquisition of a name.

SMITH v. TALLASSEE BRANCH OF CENTRAL PLANK-ROAD CO.'

1857. In the Supreme Court of Alabama. 30 Ala. Rep.

§ 222

THE CORPORATE NAME.

650-668.

[Action by the "Tallassee Branch of the Central Plank-Road Com-

Sec. 222.

Acquisition of a name.

pany" against Smith upon a subscription to the stock of the Central

Plank-Road Company. Plaintiff showed the organization of the lat-

ter company under its charter; also the proceedings for the establish-

SMITH v. TALLASSEE BRANCH OF CENTRAL PLANK-ROAD 00. 1

ment of the Tallassee branch, including the meeting of the stockhold-

IN

ers for the organization thereof, the adoption of by-laws and a corpo-

THR

SUPREME

COURT

.OF

ALABAMA.

30 Ala. Rep.

650-668.

rate name—"The Tallassee Branch of the Central Plank-Road

Company"—the election of directors, etc. Smith asked the court to

charge that the charter did not give the plaintiff any corporate name,

nor any authority to select one. This was refused, and defendant,

Smith, excepted. The court below found for the road company and

Smith appeals.]

Walker, J. * * * If the plaintiff have any corporate exist-

ence, it is derived from the fourth section of the act of 30th of Janu-

ary, 1850, providing for the incorporation of the Central Plank-Road

Company—Pamphlet Acts 1849-1850, p. 268. This act authorizes
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the incorporation of a company for the construction of a plank-road

from Wetumpka to Gunter's Landing or some other point on the Ten-

nessee river. So much of the fourth section as it is necessary to copy

in this opinion, is in the following words: "Any individual or asso-

ciation may establish branch plank-roads running into and connecting

with said central plank-road, which branches may be governed by the

respective stockholders thereof; and said stockholders for building

branches to said central plank-road may become, and hereby are in-

corporated under the provisions of this act."

It is contended that the bestowment of a name by the charter of a

corporation is indispensable to its creation, and that the plaintiff has

no corporate existence, because no name is provided in the statute.

Names are necessary to the existence of corporations. It is "the very

being of the constitution;" "the knot of their combination, without

whicb they could not do their corporate acts, for it is no body to plead

and be impleaded, to take and give, until it hath gotten a name."—2

Bacon's Abr. Corporation (C). But the authorities clearly show, that

although the name is usually given by the charter, it is not indispensable

that it should be so given. It is said, in Wilcock on Corporations 34.,

that every corporation has at least one name by which it may be identi-

fied; this may be either derived from usage, or conferred upon it by

the statute or charter of creation. In an anonymous case in 1st

Salkeld 191, we find the following: "My Lord Coke says that a cor-

1 Statement much abridged. Arguments omitted; and only that part of the

opinion relating to the one point given.

52—Wil. Cases.

[Action by the "Tallassee Branch of the Central Plank-Road Company" against Smith upon a subscription to the stock of the Central
Plank-Road Company. Plaintiff showed the organization of the latter company under its charter; also the proceedings for the establishment of the Tallassee branch, including the meeting of the stockholders for the organization thereof. the adoption of by-laws and a corporate name-"The Tallassee Branch of the Central Plank-Road
Company"-the election of directors, etc. Smith asked the court to
charge that the charter did not give the plaintiff any corporate name,
nor any authority to select one. This was refused, and defendant,
Smith, excepted. The court below found for the road company and
Smith appeals. J
'
WALKER, J. • • • If the plaintiff have any corporate existence, it is derived from the fourth section of the act of 30th of January, 1850, prov£d£ng for the incorporation of the Central Plank-Road
Company-Pamphlet Acls 1849-1850, p. 268. This act authorizes
the incorporation of a company for the construction of a plank-road
from Wetumpka to Gunter's Lane.ling or some other point on the Tennessee river. So much of the fourth .section as it is necessary to copy
in this opinion, is in the following words: "Any individual or association may establish branch plank-roads running into and connecting
with said central plank-road, which branches may be governed by the
respective stockholders thereof; and said stockholders for builc.ling
branches to said central plank-road may become, and hereby are incorporated under the prov£si'ons of tltt"s act."
It is contended that the bestowment of a name. by the charter of a
corporation is indispensable to its creation, and that the plaintiff has
no corporate existence, because no name is provided in the statute.
Names are necessary to the existence of corporations. It is "the very
being of the constitution;" "the knot of their combination, without
which they could not do their corporate acts, for it is no body to plead
and be impleaded, to take and give, until it hath gotten a name."-2
Bacon's Ahr. Corporation (C). But the authorities clearly show, tlzaf

although the name is usually given by the charter, it is not indispensable
tkal it should be so given. It is said, in Wilcock on Corporations 34,
that every corporation has at least one name by which it may be identified; this may be either der£ved from usage, or conferred upon it by
tlte statute or charter of creation. In an anonymous case in 1st
Salkeld 191, we find the following: "My Lord Coke says that a cor1 Statement much a.bridged.
Arguments omitted; and only that pa.rt of the
opinion relating to the one point given.

52-WIL. CASES.
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poration must have a name; but that must be understood to be either

expressed in the patent or implied in the nature of the thing, as if the

SMITH V. CENTRAL PLANK-ROAD CO.

king should incorporate the inhabitants of Dale with power to choose

pbration must have a name; but that must be understood to be either
expressed in the patent or implied in the nature of the thing, as if the
king should incorporate the inhabitants of Dale with power to choose
.a mayor annually, yet it is a good corporation by the name of mayor
and commonalty. So the city of. Norwich is incorporated to be a
mayor and sheriffs by the charter of Henry IV, and are called mayor,
sheriffs and commonalty.''
Where individuals are authorized to associate themselves together,
and, organizing as a corporation under a general law, give themselves
a name, the existence of the corporation has been maintained.-Falconer v. Campbell, z McLean 195-198; see, also, Minot v. Curtis,
7 Mass. 447.
The charter provides for the establi~hment of branches to the Central plank-road, and so designates them in the 13th as well as the 4th
section above copied. The charter also clearly contemplates the establishment of more branches than one, and thus arises the propriety
of distinguishing the different branches by a variation in the names.
A most appropriate mode of accomplishing the object is by reference
to some noted point toward which the branch leads. Tallassee or its
vicinity is one of the points had in Yiew in the organization of thi
company. It is shown by the record of the proceedings of the corporation, copied into the bill of exceptions, that it has used from the
commencement the name of the Tallassee Branch of the Central
Plank-Road Company. This is the name which would naturally be
given to it by implication from the charter, and the route of the road.
Without determinif)g the effect of implication or usage, in a case
where one existed without the other, we decide that the plaintiff ha ,
by implication and usage, the name of the Tallassee Branch of the
Central Plank-Road Company, and that the complaint, as amended,
is in the proper .name. • • •
Affirmed.
Note. A corporate name may be acquired by user. 1877, Gifford v. Rockett, 121 Mass. 431; 1877, Alexander v. Berney, 28 N. J. Eq. 90. See, infra ,
p. 823, but under the statutes should be distinctive and not vague or oncer·
ta.in. · 1882, State v. McGrath, 75 Mo. 424; 1893, In re Nether Prov. Assn ..
12 Pa. Co. Ct. t.iG6; 1894, Jn re Nether Prov. Assn., 2 Pa. Dist. Rep. 702. Stllt·
utes frequently provide that a corporation shall not select a name already in
use by another corporation, or so similar thereto as to lead to uncertninty or
confu~ion. New York, Gen'I Corp. L. 1890, ch 563, § 6; Michigan, Howell's
Stnt., § 4161a, C. L., § 7037. See, New Jersey ~tatute, 1896, ch. 185, § 8.
Snch provision is declaratory of the common law. Newby v. R. Co., infm,
p. 819.
M'any other statutory provisions exist, e.g . : "'Vhen the name assumed i
that of a person or firm, th e re must be joined thereto 1mme word designatillj!
the bmriness to lw <'arri ed on, followed by the word "company or corporation"
- Alabama . § l2RH of Code - under penalty of partnership liahilily of mei,n·
bers for failnre to <'omply with this provision. Missonri h:is a similar prom·
ion, R. 8. l 88H, § 2496. Ohio provides that the name shall bepn with ..The"
and end with ''<'ompanr," unless the organization is not for profit. R. .F. ,
§ 3236. Wisconsin provides that the "name shall not contain the nnmeso.f tn·
dividnals in the manner in whi<'h they are ordinarily used in partnersht~ or
business names." Statutes 1889, § 1772. In Kentucky, every corporation
doing business in the state is reqnired to have its name painted in large let-

a mayor annually, yet it is a good corporation by the name of mayor

and commonalty. So the city of Norwich is incorporated to be a

mayor and sheriffs by the charter of Henry IV, and are called mayor,

sheriffs and commonalty."

Where individuals are authorized to associate themselves together,

and, organizing as a corporation under a general law, give themselves

a name, the existence of the corporation has been maintained.—Fal-

coner v. Campbell, 2 McLean 195-198; see, also, Minot v. Curtis,

7 Mass. 447.

The charter provides for the establishment of branches to the Cen-

tral plank-road, and so designates them in the 13th as well as the 4th

section above copied. The charter also clearly contemplates the es-

tablishment of more branches than one, and thus arises the propriety

of distinguishing the different branches by a variation in the names.

A most appropriate mode of accomplishing the object is by reference

to some noted point toward which the branch leads. Tallassee or its

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

vicinity is one of the points had in view in the organization of this

company. It is shown by the record of the proceedings of the cor-

poration, copied into the bill of exceptions, that it has used from the

commencement the name of the Tallassee Branch of the Central

Plank-Road Company. This is the name which would naturally be

given to it by implication from the charter, and the route of the road.

Without determining the effect of implication or usage, in a case

where one existed without the other, we decide that the plaintiff has,

by implication and usage, the name of the Tallassee Branch of the

Central Plank-Road Company, and that the complaint, as amended,

is in the proper name. * * *

Affirmed.

Note. A corporate name may be acquired by user. 1877, Gifford v. Rock-

ett, 121 Mass. 431; 1877, Alexander v. Berney, 28 N. J. Eq. 90. See, infra,

p. 823, but under the statutes should be distinctive and not vague or uncer-

tain. 1882, State v. McGrath, 75 Mo. 424; 1893, In re Nether Prov. Assn.,

12 Pa. Co. Ct. 666; 1894, In re Nether Prov. Assn., 2 Pa. Dist. Rep. 702. Stat-

utes frequently provide that a corporation shall not select a name already in

use by another corporation, or so similar thereto as to lead to uncertainty or

confusion. New York, Gen'l Corp. L. 1890, eh 563, § 6; Michigan. Howell's

Stat., § 4161a, C. L., § 7037. See, New Jersev Statute, 18%, ch. 185, I 8.

Such provision is declaratory of the common law. Newbv v. R. Co., infra,

p. 819.

Many other statutory provisions exist, e. g.: "When the name assumed if

that of a person or firm, there must be joined thereto pome word designatinf

the business to be carried on, followed by the word "company or corporation"

— Alabama, § 1286 of Code—under penalty of partnership liability of mem-

bers for failure to comply with this provision. Missouri has a similar provif;

ion, R. S. 1889, § 2496. Ohio provides that the name shall begin with "The"

and end with "company," unless the organization is not for profit. R S,

§ 3236. Wisconsin provides that the "name shall not contain thenamesof in-

dividuals in the manner in which they are ordinarily used in partnership or

business names." Statutes 1889, § 1772. In Kentucky, every corporation

doing business in the state is required to have its name painted in large let-
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corporated, painted in like manner. So the name, with incorporated, shall be
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printed upon all advertising matter. Am. Corp. Legal Man., 1899, p. 159;

Stat. 1894, § 576.

See. 223. Rights in the corporate name.

NEWBY v. THE OREGON CENTRAL RAILWAY CO. Et Al.1

1869. In the U. S. Circuit Court. Deady's Rep. 609-620,

Fed. Cas. 10144.

ters in a conspicuous place at its principal place of busineBB, followed by incorporated, parnted in like manner. So the name, with incorporated, shall be
printed upon all advertising matter. Am. Corp. Legal Man., 1899, p. 169;
Stat. 1894, § 576.

[Suit to enjoin the defendants from using and issuing bonds in the

name of the Oregon Central Railway Company. Prior to 1867 there

had existed a railroad company, duly incorporated and organized un-

der the Oregon law, by the name of the Oregon Central Railway

Sec. 223.

Rights in the corporate name.

Company. This had proceeded to business, and had issued certain

bonds of $1,000 each, two of which Newby owned. In 1867, owing

NEWBY v. THE OREGON CENTRAL RAILWAY CO. ET AL.1

to difficulties among the members, certain of the corporators of the

old company seceded therefrom, and under the general corporation

laws of Oregon proceeded to organize a new corporation with the

1869.

IN THE U. S. CIRCUIT CouRT.

Deady's Rep. 609-620,

Fed. Cas. 10144.

same name, and to issue and put upon the market bonds of a charac-

ter similar to those issued by the old company and under the same

name. The defendants demurred on the ground that the legal right
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to the name—The Oregon Central Railway Company—had not been

established at law, and the facts alleged were not sufficient to consti-;

tute a cause of suit.]

Deadv, J. * * * By the law of Oregon any three or more

persons may incorporate themselves for the purpose of engaging in

any lawful enterprise or occupation. The primary step in the forma-

tion of this legal entity is the execution and filing of articles of incor-

poration, which articles, among other things, must specify—"The

name assumed by the corporation and by which it shall be known."

(Or. Code, 658-9.)

By the execution and filing of these articles the corporate name as-

sumed thereby and specified therein becomes exclusively appropri-

ated. If afterwards any persons attempt to incorporate for any pur-

pose by the same name, this would be an encroachment upon the

rights of the first corporation and therefore illegal. To prevent the

continuance of such a wrong upon the rights of another, equity will

interfere at the suit of the injured party by injunction. The case is

analogous to if not stronger than that of a piracy upon an established

trade-mark. (Bell v. Locke, 8 Paige 75; Taylor v. Carpenter, 11

Paige 292; Partridge v. Menck, 2 B;trb. Ch. 102; Wil. Eq., 402-3.)

The corporate name of a corporation is a trade-mark from the neces-

sity of the thing, and upon every consideration of private justice and

1 Statement abridged.

Only part of opinion given.

[Suit to enjoin the defendants from using and issuing bonds in the
name of the Oregon Central Railway Company. Prior to 1867 there
had existed a railroad company, duly incorporated and organized under the Oregon law, by the name of the Oregon Central Railway
Company. This had proceeded to business, and had issued certain
bonds of $1,000 each, two of which Newby owned. In 1867 1 owing
to difficulties among the members, certain of the corporators of the
old company seceded therefrom, and under the general corporation ·
laws of Oregon proceeded to organize a new corporation with the
same name, and to issue and put upon the market bonds of a character similar to those issued by the old company and under the same
name. The defendants demurred on the ground that the legal right
to the name-The Oregon Central Railway Company-had not been
established at law, and the facts alleged were not sufficient to consti-:
tute a cause of suit. J
DEADY, J. • •
• By the law of Oregon any three or more
persons may incorporate themselves for the purpose of engaging in
any lawful enterprise or occupation. The primary step in the form ation of this legal entity is the execution and filing of articles of incorporation, which articles, among other things, must specify-"The
name assumed by the corporation and by which it shall be known."
(Or. Code, 658-<;.)
By the execution a nd filing of these articles the corporate name assumed thereby and specified therein becomes exclusively appropriated. If afterwards any persons attempt to incorporate for any pur~
pose by the same name , this would be an encroachment upon the
rights of the first corporation and therefore illeg al. To prevent the
continuance of such a wrong upon the rights of another, equity will
interfere at the suit of the injured party by injunction. The case is
analogous to if not stronger tha n that of a pirncy upon an estab lished
trade-mark. (Bell v. Locke , 8 P aig e 75; T aylor v. C arpente r, 11
Paige 292; Partridge v. M enck, 2 Darb. Ch. 102; Wil. Eq. , 4oi-3.)
The corporate name of a corporation is a trade-mark from the necessity of the thing , and upon every consideration of private justice and
1
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public policy deserves the same consideration and protection from a

224

court of equity.

public policy deserves the same consideration and protection from a
court of equity.
Under the law the corporate name is a necessary element of the
corporation's existence; without it a corporation can not exist. Any
act which produces confusion or uncertainty concerning this name is
well calculated to injuriously affect the identity and business of a corporation. And as a matter of fact, in some degree at least, the natural and necessary consequence of the wrongful appropriation of a
corporate name is to injure the business and rights of the corporation
by destroying or confusing its identity. The motives of the persons
attempting the wrongful appropriation are not material.
They
neither aggravate or extenuate the injury caused by such appropriation. The act is an ill ega l one, and must, if necessary, be presumed
to have been done with an intent to cause the results which naturally
flow from it. Nor will a cou1t of equity refuse to enjoin the wrongful appropriation of a corporate name until the right of the first corporation to the name has been established by the verdict of a jury in
an action at law. Such right does not rest in parol but is shown by
the record , if at all, and is determined by the court in any form of
proceeding. Neither in such case has the party injured an adequate
and complete remedy at law. As in the case of patents for inventions and copyrights, the remedy at law can only gi\·e redress for the
past injury, and that often inadequately. But to protect the injured
corporation from the mischief arising from continued violation of its
rig hts and perpetual litigation concerning them, resort must be had to
the equitable remedy by injunction. (Story's Eq. , § 930.)
Nor do I deem it material in this case to the jurisdiction in equity,
that the defendant should be insolvent-unable to respond to the complaint in damages. The jurisdiction in this class of cases-trademarks, patents and copyiights-depends upon the fact that the matter
is intiinsically of equitable cognizance-that the legal rights of the
party can only be protected in equity, and not upon the uncertain and
irrelevant test of the insolvency of the defendant. • • •
Demurrer sustained on another ground suggested in argument, i. e.,
that the old company should be a party to the suit.

Under the law the corporate name is a necessary element of the

corporation's existence; without it a corporation can not exist. Any

act which produces confusion or uncertainty concerning this name is

well calculated to injuriously affect the identity and business of a cor-

poration. And as a matter of fact, in some degree at least, the nat-

ural and necessary consequence of the wrongful appropriation of a

corporate name is to injure the business and rights of the corporation

by destroying or confusing its identity. The motives of the persons

attempting the wrongful appropriation are not material. They

neither aggravate or extenuate the injury caused by such appropria-

tion. The act is an illegal one, and must, if necessary, be presumed

to have been done with an intent to cause the results which naturally

flow from it. Nor will a court of equity refuse to enjoin the wrong-

ful appropriation of a corporate name until the right of the first cor-

poration to the name has been established by the verdict of a jury in

an action at law. Such right does not rest in parol but is shown by
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the record, if at all, and is determined by the court in any form of

proceeding. Neither in such case has the party injured an adequate

and complete remedy at law. As in the case of patents for inven-

tions and copyrights, the remedy at law can only give redress for the

past injury, and that often inadequately. But to protect the injured

corporation from the mischief arising from continued violation of its

rights and perpetual litigation concerning them, resort must be had to

the equitable remedy by injunction. (Story's Eq., § 930.)

Nor do I deem it material in this case to the jurisdiction in equity,

that the defendant should be insolvent—unable to respond to the com-

plaint in damages. The jurisdiction in this class of cases—trade-

marks, patents and copyrights—depends upon the fact that the matter

is intrinsically of equitable cognizance—that the legal rights of the

party can only be protected in equity, and not upon the uncertain and

irrelevant test of the insolvency of the defendant. * * *

Demurrer sustained on another ground suggested in argument, i. e.,

that the old company should be a party to the suit.

.Vote. See note at end of next case.

Sec. 224. Same.

ARMINGTON v. PALMER Et Al.1

1898. In the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. 21 R. I. 109,

79 Am. St. Rep. 786, 42 Atl. Rep. 308, 43 L. R. A. 95, 9 Am.

& Eng. C. C. N. S. 802.

Note.

[Bills by Armington and Sims, individually and as stockholders in

See note at end of next case.

the Armington and Sims Engine Company, to enjoin Palmer and others

from using the name ''Armington and Sims Company, successors

Sec. 224. Same.

1 Statement abridged. Arguments and part of opinion omitted.

ARMINGTON v. P ALMER ET AL. 1
1898.

IN THE SUPREME COlJRT OF RHODE ISLAND.

21 R.

I.

109,

79 Am. St. R ep. 786, 42 At!. Rep. 3o8, 43 L. R. A. 95, 9 Am.
& Eng. C. C. N. S. 802.
[Bills by Armington and Sims, individually and as stockholders in
the Armington and Sims Engine Company, to enjoin Palmer and others
from u sing the name "Armington and Sims Company, successors
1 Statement abridged.
Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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to Armington and Sims Engine Company." The engine company was

§
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incorporated in 1S83, and had acquired the assets, including patents

and good-will, of a former partnership and corporation by the name of

Armington and Sims Company. It had, however, in 1896, become em-

barrassed, and by agreement of all interested, its property was sold at

auction to pay its debts, Palmer and others being purchasers. Thev

immediately organized a corporation under the general corporation law,

with the name Armington and Sims Company, and afterward a meet-

ing of the engine company was called to ratify the use of the name

chosen. At this meeting, against the written protest of Sims, Armington

not being present, a resolution granting the right to use the name was

passed. The defendants demurred on the ground that an injunction

against the use of a corporate name authorized by the state could not

be maintained by a private party, but only by the state; also, that no

facts set out entitled complainants to relief.]

Stiness, J. * * * Upon the first ground of demurrer, the question

is whether a private party can maintain a bill against a corporation for

the wrongful assumption of its name. The respondents rely upon

Rice v. Bank, 126 Mass. 300; Boston Rubber Shoe Co. v. Boston
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Rubber Co., 149 Mass. 436, 21 N. E. Rep. S75; American Order of

Scottish Clans v. Merrill, 151 Mass. 558, 24 N. E. Rep. 918, and

Paulino v. Association, iS R. I. 165, 26 Atl. Rep. 36. The first of

these cases was an information quo warranto, to exclude the respond-

ents from exercising the franchise of being a corporation. The court

held that such a bill must be filed by the state, and not by private par-

ties. With this doctrine we need not disagree. The second case was

a petition for leave to file an information quo warranto, and to re-

strain the respondent from doing business under the name of the Bos-

ton Rubber Company, claiming that this was distinct from the fran-

chise to be a corporation. The statutes of Massachusetts of 1870 pro-

vided that the name assumed in the agreement of association should

not be changed but by act of the legislature, and also that the agree-

ment was to be submitted to a commissioner of corporations for his

approval. The court held that, as it was within his discretion to re-

fuse to approve it, the court could not exercise that discretion, and

the certificate was conclusive. The court said that the statute was

not intended to prevent the fraudulent use of trade-names, but to pre-

vent the identity of corporate names. The statute, like our own, re-

quired that the name should not be one in use by any existing corpo-

ration of the state. The statutes of Massachusetts (Pub. St.. ch. 186,

§ 17) provide for an application to the court in cases of private in-

jury; but as the petitioner had acquiesced in the use of the name for

ten years without injury, the court held that it did not make out a case

for injunction under the statute. The third case is to the same effect,

that the approval by the insurance commissioner of the name adopted

by a beneficial association is conclusive in a private suit of the right

of the association to such corporate name. Both of these latter cases

so clearly rest upon the conclusiveness of the judgment of the com-

missioner that they are hardly in point in respect to our statute, which

to Armington and Sims Engine Company." The engine company ·was
incorporated in 1883, and had acquired the assets, including patents
and good-will, of a former partnership and corporation by the name of
Armington and Sims Company. It had, however, in 1896, become embarrassed, and by agreement of all interested, its property was sold at
auction to pay its debts, Palmer and others being purchasers. They
immediately organized a corporation under the general corporation law,
with the name Armington and Sims Company, and afterward a meeting of the engine company was called to ratify the use of the name
chosen. At this meeting, against the written protest of Sims, Armington
not being present, a resolution granting the right to use the name was
passed. The defendants demurred on the ground that an injunction
against the use of a corporate name authorized by the state could not
be maintained by a priYate party, but only by the state; also, that no
facts set out entitled complainants to relief.]
ST1:-o;Ess, J. * • • Upon the first ground of demurrer, the question
is whether a private party can maintain a bill against a corporation for
the wrongful assumption of its name. The respondents rely upon
Rice , .. Bank, 126 Mass. 300; Boston Rubber Shoe Co. v. Boston
Rubber Co., 149l'vfass. 436, 21 N. E. Rep. 875; American Order of
Scottish Clans v. Merrill, 151 Mass. 558, 24 N. E. Rep. 918, and
Paulino v. Association, 18 R.· I. 165, 26 At!. Rep. 36. The first of
these cases was an information quo warranto, to exclude the respondents from exerci sing the franchise of being a corporation. The court
held that such a bill 'must be filed by the state, and not by private parties. \Vith this doctrine we need not disagree. The second case was
a petition for leave to file an information quo warranto, and to restrain the respondent from doing business under the name of the Boston Rubber Company, claiming that this was distinct from the franchise to be a corporation. The statutes of Massachusetts of 1870 provided that the name assumed in the agreement of association should
not be changed but by act of the legislature, and also that the agreement was to be submitted to a commissioner of corporations for his
approval. The court held that, as it was within his discretion to refuse to approve it, the court could not exercise that discretion, and
the certificate was conclusi\·e. The court said that the statute was
not intended to prevent the fraudulent use of trade-names, but to preYent the identity of corporate names. The statute, like our own, required that the name should not be one in use by any existing corporation of the state. The statutes of Massachusetts (Pub. St. , ch. 186,
§ 17) provide for an application to the court in cases of private injury; but as the petitioner hacl acquiesced in the use of the name for
ten years without injury, the court held that it did not make out a cnse
for injunction under the statute. The third case is to the same effect,
that the appro\'al by the insurance commissioner of the name adopted
by a beneficial association is conclusive in a private suit of the right
of the association to such corporate name. Both of these lntter cases
so clear I y rest upon the conclusiveness of the judgment of the co mmissioner that they are hardly in point in respect to our statute, which
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Clans v. Merrill, foresaw a case like this one in saying: "When

has no such provi ion. Judge Holmes, in American Order of Scottish
Clans v. Merrill, foresaw a case like this one in saying: "\Vhen
there are no statute provisions as to the choice of names, and parties
organize a corporation under general laws, it may be that they choose
a name at their peril, and that, if they take one so like that of an existing corporation as to be misleading and thereby to injure its business, they may be enjoined, if there is no language in the statute to
the contrary." The possibility here suggested is fully sustained by
many cases, among which are the following, some of which were
cited by Judge Holmes: Putnam v. Sweet, I Chand. 286; Newby
v. Railway Co., Deady 6o9; Holmes, Booth & Haydens v. Holmes,
Booth and Atwood Mfg. Co., 37 Conn. 278; Farmers' Loan and
Trust Co. v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. of Kansas (Sup.). I
N. Y. Supp. 44; Higgins Co. v. Higgins' Soap Co., 144 N. Y. 462,
39 N. E. Rep. 490; Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Cellonite Mfg. Co., 32
Fed. Rep. 94; R. \ V . Rogers Co. v. William Rogers' J\.lfg. Co. , 17
C. C. A. 576, and note; Plant Seed Co. v. Michel Plant and Seed
Co., 23 Mo. App. 579, affirmed 37 Mo. App. 313.
The principles upon which these cases rest are, that although a
corporation may be legally created, it can no more use its corporate
name in violation of the rights of others than an individual can u e
his name, legally acquired, so as to mislead the public and to injure
another. The principle adopted is similar to that of a trade-name or
trade-mark, and is applied accordingly. Con&equently a court of
equity has jurisdiction in such a case without the intervention of the
state. The case of Paulino v. Association is quite different from the
case now before us. In that case the complainants, a voluntary association, had appointed a committee to procure a charter, which was
procured, and under which the corporators had organized. The bill
sought to annul the charter because of alleged misconduct on the part
of the corporators. The coutt held that this could not be done.
Clearly, the remedy of the complainants was of a different sort. After
referring to some of the cases cited above, the court U8e<l the same
language herein quoted from the opinion of Judge Holmes in Americ:rn Order of Scotti h Clans v. Merrill, thus intimating the very right
which is claimed in this case. But the respondents argue, as was
argued in the Massachusetts cases, that to restrain the use of the name
is practically to annu l the corporation, because it can not act without
a name. We do not think that this result follows. According to the
allegations of the bill, the name assumed by the respondents is so like
that of the older corporation as to be misleading and injurious. \Ve
see no rca on why the corporation, if it is restrained from U!>ing its
present name, may not, under Gen. Laws R. I., ch. 176, § 7, choose
another name. • • •
Stated genera II y, the defense is that, having the right to make the
engine , the respondents have the right to use the name, which, for
this reason , can not injure the complainants; that no fraud was intended in the choice of the name, and the authority given by the vote
above referred to for the use of the name by the respondent . The

there are no statute provisions as to the choice of names, and parties

organize a corporation under general laws, it may be that they choose

a name at their peril, and that, if they take one so like that of an ex-

isting corporation as to be misleading and thereby to injure its busi-

ness, they may be enjoined, if there is no language in the statute to

the contrary." The possibility here suggested is fully sustained by

many cases, among which are the following, some of which were

cited by Judge Holmes: Putnam v. Sweet, 1 Chand. 2S6: Newby

v. Railway Co., Deady 609; Holmes, Booth & Haydens v. Holmes,

Booth and Atwood Mfg. Co., 37 Conn. 278; Farmers' Loan and

Trust Co. v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. of Kansas (Sup.). 1

N. Y. Supp. 44; Higgins Co. v. Higgins' Soap Co., 144 N. Y.462,

39 N. E. Rep. 490; Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Cellonite Mfg. Co., 32

Fed. Rep. 94; R. W. Rogers Co. v. William Rogers' Mfg. Co., 17

C. C. A. 576, and note; Plant Seed Co. v. Michel Plant and Seed

Co., 23 Mo. App. 579, affirmed 37 Mo. App. 313.
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The principles upon which these cases rest are, that although a

corporation may be legally created, it can no more use its corporate

name in violation of the rights of others than an individual can use

his name, legally acquired, so as to mislead the public and to injure

another. The principle adopted is similar to that of a trade-name or

trade-mark, and is applied accordingly. Consequently a court of

equity has jurisdiction in such a case without the intervention of the

state. The case of Paulino v. Association is quite different from the

case now before us. In that case the complainants, a voluntary as-

sociation, had appointed a committee to procure a charter, which was

procured, and under which the corporators had organized. The bill

sought to annul the charter because of alleged misconduct on the part

of the corporators. The court held that this could not be done.

Clearly, the remedy of the complainants was of a different sort. After

referring to some of the cases cited above, the court used the same

language herein quoted from the opinion of Judge Holmes in Amer-

ican Order of Scottish Clans v. Merrill, thus intimating the very right

which is claimed in this case. But the respondents argue, as was

argued in the Massachusetts cases, that to restrain the use of the name

is practically to annul the corporation, because it can not act without

a name. We do not think that this result follows. According to the

allegations of the bill, the name assumed by the respondents is so like

that of the older corporation as to be misleading and injurious. We

see no reason why the corporation, if it is restrained from using its

present name, may not, under Gen. Laws R. I., ch. 176, § 7» choose

another name. » * •

Stated generally, the defense is that, having the right to make the

engine, the respondents have the right to use the name, which, for

this reason, can not injure the complainants; that no fraud was in-

tended in the choice of the name, and the authority given by the vote

above referred to for the use of the name by the respondents. The
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mark. The latter usually relates chiefly to the thing sold, while, in

addition to this, the former involves the source from which it comes,

the individuality of the maker, both for protection in trade and for

avoiding confusion in business affairs, as well as for securing to him

the advantage of any good reputation which he may have gained.

The law of trade-mark is designed chiefly for the protection of the

public from imposition; that of trade-name for the protection of the

party entitled to it. A case, therefore, in regard to trade-name is of

somewhat broader scope than one relating to a trade-mark. It would

be of little use to go over the numerous cases upon these objects, as

they all agree in principle, however variant may have been its appli-

cation. For this case it is enough to say that although one may make

and sell an unprotected article, he can not simulate the name or prod-

uct of another so as to trench upon the latter's rights or to mislead

the public. * * *

Applying this principle to this case, it is demonstrative. The name

adopted by the respondent is so close a resemblance to that of the
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Armington & Sims Engine Company that there can be little doubt

that it would be misleading and confusing in business matters, and

the respondent advertises itself as the successor of said company.

That company is still in existence. So far as appears, it still has

assets, because its accounts, bills and notes receivable were excepted

from the sale of its property. As such corporation, it has the right

to its name, free from simulative interference. * * *

But the respondents claim that the Armington & Sims Engine

Company is not in business, and so no injury can follow. As we

have said, the company is still in existence, and may be put on a

footing for active business by a further contribution of capital, a thing

which is often done. It has the right to its name, and, if its right be

violated, it is not necessary to show actual damage, nor will the ab-

sence of fraudulent intent be a defense. Davis v. Kendall, 2 R. I.

566. This disposes of the defense on the ground of innocent intent.

The third bnlnch of the defense, the claim of authority, can not

prevail. The respondents did not acquire the right to use the name

by purchase. They bought only the plant, machinery, stock and

such visible property. The purchase of these does not carry the

franchise or name of the corporation. * * *

The vote of the corporation is of no effect. * * * It was done

after the sale of the property and the organization of a new com-

pany, and without consideration. It was therefore a purely voluntary

act. * * *

Demurrer overruled.

Xote. 1. The right to a corporate name is a franchise of the corporation, if

lawfullv acquired: 1889, Boston Rubber Shoe Co. v. Boston Rubber Co., 149

Mass. 436, 27 Am. & E. C. C. 380; 1890, American Order Scottish Clans v.

Merrill, 151 Mass. 558, 8 L. R. A. 320; 1892, Illinois Watch Case Co. v. Pear-

son, 140 III. 423, 41 Am. & E. C. C. 11; 1893, Paulino <>t ai. v. Portuguese B.

Assn., 18 R. I. 165, 41 Am. & K. C. C. 8; but see, 1891, Hazelton Boiler Co.

v. Hazelton Tripod Co., 137 111. 231, 28 N. E. Rep. 248, holding that rights in

use of a trade-name is in some respects different from that of a tradr,mark. The latter usually relates chiefly to the thing sold, while, in
addition to this, the former involves the source from which it comes,
the individuality of the maker, both for protection in trade and for
avoiding confusion in business <1ffairs, as well as for securing to him
the advantage of any good reputation which he may have gained.
The law of trade-mark is designed chiefly for the protection of the
public from imposition; that of trade-name for the protection of the
party entitled to it. A case, therefore, in regard to trade-name is of
somewhat broader scope than one relating to a trade-mark. It \·\'Ould
be of little u e to go over the numerous cases upon these objects, as
they all agree in principle, however variant may have been its application. For this case it is enough to say that although one may make
and sell an unprotected article, he can not simulate the name or product of another so as to trench upon the latter's rights or to mislead
the public. • • •
Applying this principle to this case, it is demonstrative. The name
adopted by the respondent is so close a resemblance to that of the
Armington & Sims Engine Company that there can be little doubt
that it would be misleading and confusing in business matters, and
the respondent advertises itself as the successor of said company.
That company is still in existence. So fa~ as appears, it still has
assets, because its accounts, bills and notes receivable were excepted .
from the sale of its property. As such corporation, it has the right
to its name, free from simulative interferel')ce. • • •
But the respondents claim that the Armington & Sims Engine
Company is not in business, and so no injury can follow. As we
have said, the company is still in existence, and may be put on a
footing for active business by a further contribution of capital, a thing
which is often done. It has the right to its name, and, if its right be
\•iolated, it is not necessary to show actual damage, nor will the ab!'ence of fraudulent intent be a defense. Davis v. Kendall, 2 R. I.
566. This disposes of the defense on the groun<l of innocent intent.
The third bninch of the defense, the claim of authority, can not
prevail. The respondents did not acquire the right to use the nan1e
by purchase. They bought only the plant, machinery, stock and
such visible property. The purchase of these does not carry the
franchise or name of the corporation. • • •
The vote of the corporation is of no effect. • • • It was done
after the sale of the property and the organization of a ne'vv company, and without consideration. It was therefore a purely voluntary
act. • • •
Demurrer overruled.
Note. 1. The right t.o a corporate name is a franchise of the corpor11tion. if
lawfully acquired: 1889, Boston Rubber Shoe Co. v. Boston Rubbe r Co., 149
).Jass. 436, 27 Am. & E. C. C. 380; 1890. American Order Scottish Clans v.
:\Ierrill, 151 Mass. 558, 8 L . R. A. 320; 1892, Illinois Watch Case Co. v. Pearson, 140 Ill . 423, 41 Am. & E. C. C. 11; 1893, Panlin o Pt al. v. Portuguese B .
. \s!'n., 18 R. I. 16.5, 41 Am. & E. C. C. 8; but see, 1891, Hazelton Boiler Co.
v. Hazelton Tripod Co., 137 Ill. 231, 28 N. E. Rep. 248, holding tlrnt rif!hl s in
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to jurisdiction of courts; 1893, Hvgeia Water Ice Co. v. N. Y. Hygeia Water

Ice Co., 140 N. Y.94; 1899, Aiello"v. Montecalo, 21 R. I. 496,44 Atl. Rep. 931.

a corporate name are not a franchise within the meaning of statutes !elating
to jurisdiction of courts; 1893, Hygeia Water Ice Co. v. N. Y. Hygeia Water
Ice Co., 140 N. Y. 94; 1899, Aiello v . .Hontecalo, 21 R. I. 496, 44 Atl. Rep. 931.
2. A corporation, unincorporated association, or an inuividual who l'ias acquired a prior right to a name used as a tmcil'-name or tracle-mnrk may enjoin
its subsequent appropriation and use by another corµoration, association or
person when it does substantial damag-e to the plaintiff or misleads the public: 1869, Newby v. Oregon Cent. R. Uo., Deadv 609, Fed. Cas. 10144, supra,
p. 819; 1870, Holmes, Booth & Hayde ns v. Hoimes B. & A., 37 Conn. 278, 9
Am. Rep. ~24; 1~77, Ringer Machine Co. v. Wilson, 3 App. Cas. ~376; 1878,
Merchants Bankrniz Co., etc., v. Mer. J. S. Co., 9 Ch. Dl\1 • 560, 41 L. J. Ch.
828; 1881, Hendri cks v. l\fontagu, 44 L. T. 879, 50 L. J. Ch. 456, 17 Ch. Dec.
630; 1884, Goodyear Rubber Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Mfg. Co., 21 Fed. Rep.
276, reversed 128 U.S. 598; 1885, Drummond Tobacco Co. v. Rundle, 114 Ill.
412, 10 Am. & E. C. C. 9; 1887, Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Ccllonite Mfg. Co., 32
Fed. Rep. !14; 1890, R endle v. J . Edgcumbe R. Co., 63 L. T. 94; 1890, Gato
v. El. Model lo Cigar Mfg. Co., 25 Fla. 886, 6 L. R. A. 823; 1800, .Madame Tussaud & Sons v. Louis Tussaud, L. R. 44 Ch. Div. 678, 32 Am. & E. C. C. 11;
1892, Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Hazelton T. Co., 142 Ill. 494, 37 Am. & E. C. C.
7; 1892, Vouderbank v. Schmidt, 44 La. Ann. 264, 15 L. R. A. 462; 1892, Fish
Bros. Wagon Co. v. Fish, 82 Wis. 5.J6, 16 L. R. A. 453; 1892, Le Page Co. v.
Russia Cement Co .• 51 Fed. Rep. 941, 17 L. R. A. 354; 1895, Higgins v. Hi1-tg~ns 8oap Co., 144 N. Y. 462, 27 L. R. A. 42; 1895, Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W.
v. Graham, 96 Iowa 592, 31 L . R. A. 133; 1895, Rogers Co. v. Rogers Mfg.
Co., 17 C. C. Ap. 579, 70 Fed. R ep . 1017; 18!J5, Elgin Butter Co. v. Elgin
Creamery Co., 155 Ill. 127; 1896, Snyder l\tfg. Co. v. Snyder, 54 Ohio St. 86,
31 L. R . A. 657; 1896, Investor Pub. Co. v. Dohinson, 72 Fed . Rep. 603; 1897,
Supreme Lodgo K. of P. v. Imp. Or. K. of P., 113 l\Iir.h. 13::!, 38 L. R. A. 658;
1898, Bingham School v. Gray, 122 N. C. 6!J9, 41 L. R. A. 243; 1898, Bristol
Bank & T . Cu. v. Jonesboro B. & T. Co., 101 Tenn. 545; 18!!8, Reed v. \Yilmington S. Co., 1 Marvel (Del.) 193, 40 At.I. Rep. 955; 1898, Walter A. Baker &
Co. v. Baker, 87 Fed. Rep. 209; 1899, St. Patrick's Alliaure, etc., v. Byrne, .;~1
N. J. Eq. 26, 44 At!. Rep. 716; 1899, Red Polled Cattle Club v. Red Pollt>rl
Cattle Club, 108Iowa105, 78 N. W. Rep. 803; 1899, Lamb Kuit Goods Go.'' ·
Lamb G., etc., Co., 120 Mich. 159, 44 L. R. A. 841, 78 N. W. Rep. 1072. But
compare, 1890, Amer. Orner, e tc., v. Merrill, 151 Mass. 55~, 8 L. R . A. 320;
1891, Internatl. T. Co. v. Int. L. & T . Co., 153 Mass. 271, 10 L. R. A . 758.
3. A sale of the property and gnod-will of the business carries with it the
right to use the ti-ade-name, though the name be the name of an individual or
corporation: 1892, Le Page Co. v. Russia Cement Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 941, 17 L.
R. A. 3:)4; 1892, Vonderbank v. Schmitt, 44 La. Ann. 264, 15 L. R. A. ·162;
1892, Fish Bros. v. Fish, 82 Wis. 54G, 16 L. R. A. 453; 1894, Pillsbury v. Pillsbury-Washburn F. M. Co., 12 C. C. App. 432, 64 Fed. Rep. 841; 1895, Higgins
v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N. Y. 462, 27 L. R. A. 42; 1896, Snyder Mfg. Co. v.
Snyder, 54 Ohio St. 86, 31 L. R. A. 657; 1898, Bingham School v. Gray, 122 N.
C. 699, 41 L. R. A. 243; 1898, Walter A. Baker v. Baker, 87 F ed . Rep. 209.
4. It has, however, been held that a foreign corporation can not. prevent the
nee of a corporate name afterward selected by a domestic corporation: 1892,
Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Haze lton, T. B. Co., 142 Ill. 494; 1897, People v.
Assurance Co., 111 Mich. 4-05. But see contra, 1897, Re Bradley Fertilize r Co.,
19 Pa. Co. Ct. 271; 18!l9J_Red Polled Cattle Club v. Red Polled Cattle Club,
108 Iowa 105, 78 N. W . .Kep. S03.
5. But no exclu~i ve traae-name rights can be acquired in geographical names,
though selected by a corporation as its name: 188!1, Nebraska L. & T. Co. v.
Nine, 27 Neb. 507, 27 Am. & Eng. C. C. 374; 1893. Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn ,
liiO U.S. 460; 1899, Illinois Watch Case Co. v. Elgin N. W . Co., 94 Fed. Rep.
667. Butcompare 1899, "\:Valtham Watch Co. v. U.S. Watch Co., 173 Mass. S.'i,
53 N. E. Rep . J.11.
6. 'fhe secretary of state or the proper registering officer has discretiona ry
powe !" to refuse to register a company that chooses a name closely resembling
one already in use by another corporation; and this discretion is not to be

2. A corporation, unincorporated association, or an individual who has ac-

quired a prior right to a name used as a trade-name or trade-mark may enjoin

its subsequent appropriation and use by another corporation, association or

person when it does substantial damage to the plaintiff or misleads the pub-

lic: 1869, Newbv v. Oregon Cent. R. Co., Deadv 609, Fed. Cas. 10144, supra,

p. 819; 1870, Holmes, Booth & Haydens v. Holmes R. & A., 37 Conn. 278, 9

Am. Rep. 324; 1877, Singer Machine Co. v. Wilson, 3 App. Cas. 376; 1S78,

Merchants' Banking Co., etc., v. Mer. J. S. Co., 9 Ch. Div. 560, 47 L. J. Ch.

828; 1881, Hendricks v. Montagu, 44 L. T. 879, 50 L. J. Ch. 456, 17 Ch. Dec.

630; 1884, Goodyear Rubber Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Mfg. Co., 21 Fed. Rep.

276, reversed 128 U. S. 598; 1885, Drummond Tobacco Co. v. Rundle, 114 111.

412, 10 Am & E. C. C. 9; 1887, Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Cellonite Mfg. Co., 32

Fed. Rep. 94; 1890, Rendle v. J. Edgcumbe R. Co., 63 L. T. 94; 1890, Gato

v. El. Modello Cigar Mfg. Co., 25 Fla. 886, 6 L. R. A. 823; 1890, Madame Tus-

saud & Sons v. Louis Tussaud, L. R. 44 Ch. Div. 678, 32 Am. & E. C. C. 11;

1892, Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Hazelton T. Co., 142 111. 494, 37 Am. & E. C. C.
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7; 1892, Vonderbank v. Schmidt, 44 La. Ann. 264, 15 L. R. A. 462; 1892, Fish

Bros. Wagon Co. v. Fish, 82 Wis. 546, 16 L. R. A. 453; 1892, Le Page Co. v.

Russia Cement Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 911, 17 L. R. A. 354; 1895, Higgins v. Hig-

gins Soap Co., 144 N. Y. 462, 27 L. R. A. 42; 1895, Grand Lodge A. O. V. W.

v. Graham, 96 Iowa 592, 31 L. R. A. 133; 1895, Rogers Co. v. Rogers Mfg.

Co., 17 C. C. Ap. 579, 70 Fed. Rep. 1017; 1895, Elgin Butter Co. v. Elgin

Creamery Co., 155 111. 127; 1896, Snvder Mfg. Co. v. Snvder, 54 Ohio St. 86,

31 L. R. A. 657; 1896, Investor Pub. Co. v. Dohinson, 72 Fed. Rep. 603; 1897,

Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Imp. Or. K. of P., 113 Mich. 133, 38 L. R. A. 658;

1898, Bingham School v. Gray, 122 N. C. 699, 41 L. R. A. 243; 1898, Bristol

Bank & T. Co. v. Jonesboro B. & T. Co., 101 Tenn. 545; 1898, Reed v. Wil-

mington S. Co., 1 Marvel (Del.) 193, 40 Atl. Rep. 955; 1898, Walter A. Baker&

Co. v. Baker, 87 Fed. Rep. 209; 1899, St. Patrick's Alliance, etc., v. Bvrne, 59

N. J. Eq. 26, 44 Atl. Rep. 716; 1899, Red Polled Cattle Club v. Red" Polled

Cattle Club, 108 Iowa 105, 78 N. W. Rep. 803; 1899, Lamb Knit Goods Co. v.

Lamb G., etc., Co., 120 Mich. 159, 44 L. R. A. 841, 78 N. W. Rep. 1072. But

compare, 1890, Amer. Order, etc., v. Merrill, 151 Mass. 558, 8 L. R. A. 320;

1891, Internatl. T. Co. v. Int. L. & T. Co., 153 Mass. 271, 10 L. R. A. 758.

3. A sale of the property and good-will of the business carries with it the

right to use the trade-name, though the name he the name of an individual or

corporation: 1892, Le Page Co. v. Russia Cement Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 941, 17 L.

R. A. 354; 1892, Vonderbank v. Schmitt, 44 La. Ann. 264, 15 L. R. A. 462;

1892, Fish Bros. v. Fish, 82 Wis. 546, 16 L. R. A. 453; 1894, Pillshurv v. Pills-

bury-Washburn F. M. Co., 12 C. C. App. 432, 64 Fed. Rep. 841; 1895, Higgins

v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N. Y. 462, 27 L. R. A. 42; 185)6, Snvder Mfg. Co. v.

Snyder, 54 Ohio St. 86, 31 L. R. A. &57; 1898, Bingham School v. Grav, 122 N.

C. 699, 41 L. R. A. 243; 1898, Walter A. Baker v. Baker, 87 Fed. Rep. 209.

4. It has, however, been held that a foreign corporation can not prevent the

use of a corporate name afterward selected by a domestic corporation: 1892,

Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Hazelton, T. B. Co"., 142 111.494; 1897, People v.

Assurance Co.. Ill Mich. 405. But see contra, 1897, Re Bradlev Fertilizer Co.,

19 Pa. Co. Ct. 271; 1899, Red Polled Cattle Club v. Red Polled Cattle Club,

108 Iowa 105, 78 N. W. Rep. 803.

5. But no exclusive trade-name rights can be acquired in geographical names,

though selected bv a corporation as its name: 1889, Nebraska L. & T. Co. v.

Nine, 27 Neb.507, 27 Am. & Eng. C. C.374; 1893, Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn,

150 IT. S. 460; 1899, Illinois Watch Case Co. v. Elgin N. W. Co., 94 Fed. Rep.

667. Butcompare 1899, Waltham Watch Co. v. IT. S. Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85,

53 N. E. Rep. 141.

6. The secretary of state or the proper registering officer has discretionary

power to refuse to register a company that chooses a name closely resembling

one already in use by another corporation; and this discretion is not to be
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EFFECT OF MISNOMER.
controlled by the courts: 1887, State v. McGrath, 92 Mo. 365, 17 Am. & Eng.

C. C. 191; 1889, In re U. S. Mer. Rep. Co., 115 N. Y. 176; 1892, Re Waverly

Ladies, 30 W. N. C. 257; 1892, Illinois Watch C. Co. v. Pearson, 140 111. 423,

41 Am. & Eng. C. C. 11; 1890, Altoona Gas Co. v. Gas Co., 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 662.

But if the corporation applying has a clear prior right to the name chosen,

the secretary of state mav be compelled to register it. 1882, State v. McGrath,

75 Mo. 424;'l900, People'v. Payn, 161 N. Y. 229, 55 N. E. Rep. 849.

Sec. 225. Effect of misnomer.

controlle<l by the courts: 1887, State v. McGrath, 92 Mo. 355, 17 Am. & Eng.
C. C. 191; 1889, In ,.e U. S. Mer. Rep. Co., 115 N. Y. 176; 1892, R e Waverly
Ladies, 30 W. N. C. 257; 18H2, Illinois Watch C. Co. v. Pearson, 140 Ill . 423,
41 .Am. & Eng. 0 . C. 1 l; 1896, Altoona Gas Co . v. Gas Co., 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 662.
Bnt if the corporation applying has a clear prior right to the name chosen,
the secretary of state may be compelled to register it. 1882, State v. McGrath,
75~Io. 424; 1900, P eople v. Payn, 161 K. Y. 229, 55 N. E. Rep. 849.

THE MEDWAY COTTON MANUFACTORY v. ADAMS.1

1813. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 10

Mass. Rep. *36o—*36.|.

Sec. 225.

Effect of misnomer.

Sewall, J. In this action of assumpsit the defendants are charged

THE l\IEDW.\ Y COTTON MANUFACTORY

upon a note made by them with an averment that it was made to the

plaintiffs, by the name of Richardson, Aletcalf & Co. To this

1813.

IN

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

that the promise was in fact made to the plaintiffs in their corporate

capacity, and that the demurrer was no confession of a substantially

deficient averment.]

But the declaration is not liable to the objections which have been

urged against it, if the case there stated is provable in any course of

evidence competent for the plaintiffs to produce in a trial upon the

general issue. For then the variance of name is not fatal to their

demand; and if it is competent for the plaintiffs to prove the allega-

tions of their writ, then these are confessed by the demurrer.

A variance or mistake of the name in cases of existing persons is

not fatal to their contracts when there is a sufficient description of the

parties whereby they may be known. A variance of the name sub-

scribed from the name of the defendant does not prejudice, if it be

found that the defendant executed the deed, although the name should

be totally different.2

A grantee or person entitled by a conveyance takes solely by the

deed, and is therefore to be named or described with more exactness

than is required in naming the party entitled by an obligation or con-

tract constituting a chose in action. But even in grants and convey-

ances it is sufficient if the name be expressed in rc and sensu, al-

though not in verbis. And in all cases a misnomer may be aided by

a verdict or an averment.3

These principles arc noticed and relied on in the case of the Mayor

and Burgesses of Lynn Regis,4 the case of misnomer of corporations

reported by Lord Coke, and which was cited in the argument for the

defendants. In that case the defendant, who was sued upon a bond

1 Statement abridged, and only part of opinion given, arguments omitted.

3 Salk. 462; Com. Dig. Fait. B. 1 E. 3; Grant. A. 2; Co. Lit. 3; 2 Rol. 42.

• Dyer, 279.

4 10 Co. Rep. 120.

IO

Mass. Rep. *360-*364.

ants is, that the promise expressed in the note declared on is not

[It was argued that the variance was not obviated by the averment

ADAMS. 1

THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

declaration there is a demurrer, and the ground taken by the defend-

recoverable by the plaintiffs. * * *

Y.

SEWALL, J.
In this action of assumpsit the defendants arc charged
upon a note made by them with an averment that it was made to the
plaintiffs, by the name of Richardson, 1lietcalf '~ Co. To this
declaration there is a demurrer, and the ground taken by the defendants is, that the promise expressed in the note declared on is not
recoverable by the plaintiffs. • • •
[It was argued that the variance was not obviated by the averment
that the promise was in fact made to the plaintiffs in their corporate
capacity, and that the demurrer was no confession of a substantially
deficient averment.J
But the declaration is not liable to the objections which have been
urged against it, if the case there stated is provable in any course of
evidence competent for the plaintiffs to produce in a trial upon the
general issue. For then the variance of name is not fatal to their
demand; and if it is competent for the plaintiffs to prove the allegations of the ir writ, then these are confessed by the demurrer.
A variance or mi stake of the name in cases of existing persons is
not fatal to their contracts when there is a sufficient description of the
parties whereby they may be known. A variance of the name subscribed from the name of the defendant does not prejudice, if it be
found that the defendant executed the deed, although the name should
be totally different. 2
A grantee or person entitled by a conveyance takes solely by the
deed, and is therefore to be named or described with more exactness
than is required in naming the party entitled by. an obligation or contract constituting a cliose in action. But even in grants and conveyances it is , ufficient if the name be expressed £n re and sensu, although not in vcrbis. And in all cases a misnomer may be aided by
a verdict or an averment. s
These principles arc noticed and relied on in the case of the Mayor
and Burgesses of Lynn Regis, 4 the case of misnomer of corporations
reported by Lord Coke, and which was cited in the argument for the
defendants. In that case the defendant, who was sued upon a bond
1

Rtatement abridged, and only part of opinion given, arguments omitted.
Salk. 462; Com. Dig. Fait. B. 1 E. 3; Grant. A. 2; Co. Lit. 3; 2 Roi. 42.
3 Dyer, 279.
"'10 Co. Rep. 120.
2
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given to the corporation, pleaded non est factum, and relied upon a

variance in the bond from the true and right name of the corporation.

MEDWAY COTTON MANIJFA CTORY Y. ADAMS.

But the plaintiffs had judgment, notwithstanding the misnomer.

In a more modern case1 the misnomer of a corporation was con-

gi,·en to the corporation, pleaded non est factum, and relied upon a
variance in the bond from the true and right name of the corporation.
But the plaintiffs ha<l judgment, notwithstanding the misnomer.
In a more modern case 1 the mi"snomer of a corporation was con. idered \vith a view to the argument which has been urged in the case
at bar, that a corporation is a creature of the law, having no essence
but what is derived from its name. In an action for tolls which accrued to the plaintiffs in their corporate capacity, and as a duty to the
corporation, the corporate name of the plaintiffs was mistaken; and
the declaration was in a name variant from the name gi,·en them in
their chatter. But the decision was, that the mi"snomer was not to be
taken advantage of at the trial as a ground of nonsuit; and ~'vas only
pleadable in abatement , as in the case of an existing person.
It may be objected that the variances in the cases cited of misnomer
of corporations arc not so consi<lerable or material as the variance is
in the .case at bar, where the name of the promisees, as it is expressed
in the note, is totnlly different from the name of the plaintiffs in their
corporate capacity. The inquiry, however, is in this case, as it was
in the cases of misnom er which have been cited, of the description of
the promisees, or parties in the note or contract declared on. Does
the name in the note sufficiently indicate the plaintiffs? Were they
known by it as the promisees? Now this depends, in part at least,
upon any inquiry of facts which may or may not be proved, and
which may be provable by evidence extraneous to the note, or, for
aught that appears, the note itself may m:tintain the plaintiff's a\·er111ent, that it was made to them by the name therein expressed. In
an action of assumpsit there is no profert of the writing declared on,
and this is not like a demurrer for variance as in a case of oyer of a
deed. In such a case, a different construction might be required if
there were no averments to identify the plaintiffs in the action with
the description given of them in their deed.
Upon this demurrer we have only t? determine whether the declaration is in itself nbsurd and repugnant and incapable of proof. We
think it is not, upon the authorities respecting misnomers of corporations, or upon the reason of the thing. The declaration is adjudged
good, and the plnintiffs are to have judgment to recover their demand. 11
N ote. Effect of misnomer.
1. In ra.~e of contracts, grants :ind devises misnomer does not invalidate if

sidered with a view to the argument which has been urged in the case

at bar, that a corporation is a creature of the law, having no essence

but what is derived from its name. In an action for tolls which ac-

crued to the plaintiffs in their corporate capacity, and as a duty to the

corporation, the corporate name of the plaintiffs was mistaken; and

the declaration was in a name variant from the name given them in

their charter. But the decision was, that the misnomer was not to be

taken advantage of at the trial as a ground of nonsuit; and was only

pleadable in abatement, as in the case of an existing person.

It may be objected that the variances in the cases cited of misnomer

of corporations are not so considerable or material as the variance is

in the case at bar, where the name of the promisees, as it is expressed

in the note, is totally different from the name of the plaintiffs in their

corporate capacity. The inquiry, however, is in this case, as it was

in the cases of misnomer which have been cited, of the description of

the promisees, or parties in the note or contract declared on. Does
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the name in the note sufficiently indicate the plaintiffs? Were they

known by it as the promisees? Now this depends, in part at least,

upon any inquiry of facts which may or may not be proved, and

which may be provable by evidence extraneous to the note, or, for

aught that appears, the note itself may maintain the plaintiff's aver-

ment, that it was made to them by the name therein expressed. In

an action of assumpsit there is no profcrt of the writing declared on,

and this is not like a demurrer for variance as in a case of oyer of a

deed. In such a case, a different construction might be required if

there were no averments to identify the plaintiffs in the action with

the description given of them in their deed.

Upon this demurrer we have only to determine whether the decla-

ration is in itself absurd and repugnant and incapable of proof. We

think it is not, upon the authorities respecting misnomers of corpora-

tions, or upon the reason of the thing. The declaration is adjudged

good, and the plaintiffs are to have judgment to recover their demand.2

Note. Effect of misnomer.

1. In cane of contracts, grants and devises misnomer does not invalidate if

the identity of the corporation can be established. 1809, Inhabitants of Mid-

dletown v. McCormick, 3 N. J. L. (2 Penn. *o00) 92; 1816, New York African

Soc. v. Varick, 13 Johns. 38; 1820, Berks & D. T. R. v. Myers, 6 Serg. & R.

12, 9 Am. Dec. 402; 1810, Milford & 0. Tump. v. Brush, 10 Ohio 111, 36 Am.

Dec. 78; 1854, Kentucky Sem. v. Wallace, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 35; 1862, Mount

Palatine Acad. v. Kleinsehintz, 28 111. 133; 1867, Commissioners v. Louisville

Orphans' Home, 3 Bush iKv.) 365; 1871, Athearn v. Ind. Dist. of Millersburg,

33 Iowa 105; 1873, St. Luke's, etc., v. Association, 52 N. Y. 191; 1873, Walrath

the identity of the corporation can he established. 1809, Inhabitants of Middletown v. '.\foCormick, 3 N. J. L. (2 Penn. •fiOO) 92; 1816, New York African
Soc. v. Varic·k, 13 Johns . 38; 1820, Berks & D. T. R. v. Myers, 6 Serg. & R.
12. 9 Am. Dec. 402; 1840, \filford & C. Tnrnp. v. Brush, IO Ohio 111, 36 Am.
Dec. 78; 185-l, Kentu<'ky Sem. v. Wallace, 15 B. Mon.( Ky.) 35; 1862, Mount
Palatine Acad. v. Kl einAcbintz, 28 Ill. 1S3; 1867, Commissioners v. Louisville
Orphans' Home, 3 Bush !Ky .) 36;); 1871, Athearn v . Ind . Dist. of Millersburg,
33 Iowa lOi'); 1873, St. Luke's, etc., v. Association, 52 N. Y. 191; 1873, Walrath
v. CampbE-11, 28 Mich . 111; J871i, Lefev re v. Lefevre, 59 N . Y . 434; 1884, Clement
v. City of Lathrop, 18 Fed. R ep. 88.'); 1889, Chilton v. Brooks, 71 l\fd. 44-0;
189.5, Woodrongh & H 1mchett v. Witte, 89 Wii:1. 537; 1899, Precious Blood
Soc. v. F:Jsythe, 102 Te nn. 40, 50 R. W. R ep. 759.
1 1 Ros. & Pul., 40; 1 Chitty, 252; 3 Ans., 935.
v See 2 Bos. & Pu\., 339, Elliot et al. , .. Davis.

v.Campbell, 28 Mich. Ill ; 1875, Lefevre v. Lefevre,59N. Y. 434; 1884, Clement

v. Citv of Lathrop, 18 Fed. Rep. 885; 1889, Chilton v. Brooks, 71 Md. 445:

1895, Woodrough & Hanchett v. Witte, 89 Wis. 537; 1899, Precious Blood

Soc. v. Elsythe, 102 Tenn. 40, 50 S. W. Rep. 759.

1 1 Bos. & Pal., 40; 1 Chittv, 252; 3 Ans., 935.

•See 2 Bos. & Pul., 339, Elliot et at. v. Davis.
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But in England it is, by statute, more serious—leading to individual liabil-

CHANGE OF NAME.

ity of the corporate officer making the contract. 1858, Penrose v. Martyr, El.

Bl. & El. 96 E. C. L 499; 1889, Atkin v. Wardle, 61 L. T. 23.

2. In process.

(a) Issuing summons against a corporation by the wrong name is not a

valid beginning of the suit against the corporation. 1835, Bank of Virginia v.

Craig, 6 Leigh (Va.)399; 1878, Pennsylvania Co. v. Sloan 1 111. App. 364;

1892, South. Pac. Co. v. Block, 84 Texas 21.

(6) But if process is issued against the corporation in the wrong name, the

mistake can be corrected bv amendment. 1809, Bullard v. Nantucket Bank,

5 Mass. 99; 1832, Burnham v. Strafford Co. Saw Bank, 5 N. H. 573; 1857,

Lane v. Seaboard & R. Co., 56 N. C. 25; 1860, Edinboro Acad. v. Robinson,

37 Pa. St. 210, 78 Am. Dec. 421; I860, Keech v. B. & W. R. Co., 17 Md. 32;

1876, Roberts v. Nat'l Ice Co., 6 Daly (N. Y.) 426; 1885, Thompson v. Allen,

86 Mo. 85.

(c) So, if a corporation has process issued for it in a wrong name, it is

ground for plea in abatement. 1842, Beene v. Cahawba & M. R. Co., 3 Ala.

660. See infra, under pleadings.

3. In pleadings.
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(«) In actions against a corporation, transposition of words or other like,

or slight, variations are not material: 1809, Bullard v. Nantucket Bank, 5

Mass. 99; 1814, Sherman v. Conn. B. Co., 11 Mass. 338; 1831, Burnham v.

Stafford Sav. Bank, 5 N. II. 446; 1864, Board of Ed. v. Greenebaum, 39 111.

610. But see supra, under process (a).

(6) And the corporation defendant may, by appearance, waive what would

otherwise be material variations: 1842, Stone v. Cong Soc, 14 Vt. 86; 1875,

Wilton Town Co. v. Humphrey, 15 Kan. 372; 1880, Mobile & M. R. Co. v.

Yeatee, 67 Ala. 164; 1886, Young v. South T. I. Co., 85 Tenn. 189; 1887, Bate

Refrig. Co. v. Gillett, 31 Fed. Rep. 809.

(c) In actions by the corporation, care is required that no part of the name

be omitted: 1867, Bartlett v. Brickett, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 62; 1873, Drum-

heller v. First U. C, etc., 45 Ind. 275.

(dl But slight variations, not misleading as to the identity of the corpora-

tion plaintiff, are not material: 1832, Burnham v. Sav. Bank, 5 N. H. 573;

1838, Mechanics & T. Bank v. Prescott, 12 La. 444; 1869, Thatcher v. W. R.

N. B., 19 Mich. 196; 1880, State v. Bell Tel. Co., 36 Ohio St. 296, 38 Am. Rep.

583.

(e) Defendant can take advantage of mistake in name of corporation plaint-

iff onlv bv plea in abatement: 1841, Gray v. Monongahela Nav. Co., 2 Watts

6 S. Co. (Pa.) 156, 37 Am. D. 500; 1845, Trustees of M. E. Church v. Tryon,

1 Denio (N. Y.) 451; 1851, Hanover Sav. F. Soc. v. Suter, 1 Md. 502; 1869,

Northumb. Co. Bank v. Eyer, 60 Pa. St. 436.

(J) As to effect of judgment rendered in wrong name, see, 1855, Lafayette

Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. (59 U. S.) 404; 1878, Lehman D. & Co. v. Warner,

But in England it is, by statute, more serious- leadi ng t-0 individual liability of the c~rporute ottic·er making t_h e contract. 1858, Penrose v. Martyr, El.
Bl. & El. 96 E. C. L 499; 1889, Atkrn v. Wardle, 6.1 L. T. 23.
2. 111 process.
(a) Issuing summons against a corporation by the wrong name is not a
valid beginning of the suit against the corporation. 1835, Bank of Virginia v.
Craig, 6 Leigh (Va.J 399; 1878, Pennsylvania Co. v. Sloan 1 Ill. App. 364;
18!-)2, South. Pac. Co. v. Block, 84 Texas 21.
(b) But if process is issued against the corporation in the wrong name, the
mistake can be corrected by amendment. 1809, Bullard v. Nantucket Bank,
5 Mass. 99; 1832, Burnham v. i:;trafford Co. Sav. Bank, 5 N. H. 573 ; 1857,
Lane v. Seaboard & R Co., 56 N. C. 25; 1860, Edinboro Acad. v. Robinson,
37 Pa. St. 210, 78 Am . Dec. 421; 1860, Keech v. B. & W . R. Co., 17 Md. 32;
18i6, Roberts v. Nat'l Ice Co., 6 Daly (N . Y.) 426; 1885, Thompson v. Allen,
86 Mo. 85.
(c) So, if a corporation has process issued for it in a wrong name it is
ground for plea in abatement. 1842, Beene v. Cahawba & M. R. Co., Ala.
660. See infra, under pleadings.
3. In pleadings.
(al In actions against a corporation, trnnsposition of words or other like,
or slight, variations are not material: 1809, Bullard v. Nantucket Bank, 5
Mass. 99; 1814, Sherman v. Conn. B. Co., 11 Mass. 338; 1831. Burnham v.
Stafford Sav. Bank, 5 N. H. 446; 1864, Board of Ed. v. Greenebaum, 39 Ill.
610. Ilut see supra, under process Ca).
(b ) And the corporation defendant may, by appearance, waive what would
otht.>rwise be material variations : 1842, Stone v . Cong Soc., 14 Vt. 86; 1875,
Willon Town Co. v. Humphrey, 15 Kan. 372; 1880, Mobile & M. R . Co. v.
Yeates, 67 Ala. 164; 1886, Young v. South T. I. Co., 85 Tenn . 189; 1887, Bate
Refrig. Co. v. Gillett, 31 Fed. Rep. 809.
(cJ Jn actions by the corporation, care is required that no part of the name
be omitted: 1867, Bartlett v. Brickett, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 62; 1873, Drumheller v. First U. C., etc., 45 Ind. 275.
( d ) But slight variations, not misleading as to the identity of the corporation plaintiff, are not material : 1832, Burnham v. Sav. Bank, 5 N. H . 1)73;
1838, Mechanics & T. Bank v. Prescott, 12 La. 444; 1869, Thatcher v. W.R.
N. B., 19 Mich. 196; 1880, State v. Bell Tel. Co., 36 Ohio St. 296, 38 Am. Rep.
583.
(e) Defendant can take advantage of mistake in name of corporation plaintiff only by plea in abatement: 1841, Gray v. Monongahela Nav. Co., 2 Watts
& S. Co. (Pa.) 156, 37 Am. D. 500; 1845, Trustees of M. E. Church v. Tryon,
I Denio (N. Y.) 451; 1851, Hanover Sav. F . Soc. v. Suter, 1 Md. 502; 1869,
Nortbumb. Co. Bank v. Eyer, 60 Pa. St. 436.
(fl As to effect of judgment re ndered in wrong name, see, 1855, Lafayette
Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. (59 U. 8.) 404; 1878, Lehman D. & Co. v. Warner,
61 Ala. 455; 1879, Wilson v. Baker, 52 Iowa 423; 1880, Brown v. T . H. & I.,
etc., Co., 72 Mo. 567.

3

61 Ala. 455; 1879, Wilson v. Baker, 52 Iowa 423; 1880, Brown v. T. H. & I.,

etc., Co., 72 Mo. 567.

Sec- 226. Change of corporate name.

CINCINNATI COOPERAGE COMPANY v. BATE.1

Sec. 226.

1894. In the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 96 Ky. Rep.

CINCINNATI COOPERAGE COMPANY v. BATE.1

356-361, 49 Am. St. Rep. 300.

[The cooperage company sued Bate upon a draft accepted by the

Change of corporate name.

1894.

IN

THE CounT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY.

96 Ky. Rep.

356-361, 49 Am. St. Rep. 300.

Gebhart & Bate Brewing Company. The facts showed that originally

1 Statement greatly abridged, and only part of opinion given. (Cook Corp.,

§ 243, thinks this decision is erroneous.)

[The cooperage company sued Bate upon a draft accepted by the
Gebhart & Bate Brewing Company. The facts showed that originally
1 Statement greatly abridged, and only part of opinion given. (Cook Corp.,
§ 243, thinks this decision is erroneous.)
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CINCINNATI COOPERAGE COMPANY V. BATE.

CINCINNATI COOPERAGE COMPANY V. BATE.

the New Albany Brewing Company was organized under the In-

diana laws. Afterwards Gebhart, Bate and another acquired all the

stock of this company, became its directors, and without complying

the New Albany Brewing Company was organized under the Indiana laws. Afterwards Gebhart, Bate and another acquired all the
stock of this company, became its directors, and without complying
with the Indiana statute, changed the name to the Gebhart & Bate
Brewing Company, and continued to do business in that name. The
plaintiff contended that the pa1iies thereby became liable indiYitlu:iUy
or as partners and the superior court so held. On appeal to the Louisville law and equity court it was ruled otherwise, and this is the
error assigned. J
HAZELRIGG, J.
• • • The name of a corporation is "the very
being of its constitution, the knot of its combination, "vithout which
it could not perform its corporate functions." (Smith's Mercantile
Lnw, 3<l edition, 14r.)
"When a corporation is created a name must be given to it, and
by that name alone must it sue and he sued and do all legal acts."
( 1 Blackstone's Comm. 474.)
"The law knows a corporation only by its corporate name."
('vValker's American Law, 9th edition, 232.)
•'A corporation has no right or power of itself to change or alter
the name originally selected by it without recourse to such formal
proceedings as are prescribed by law." (Beach on Private Corporations, section 275.) The effect of such change of name is an abandonment not only of the corporate name, but of the corporation itself.
The identity of the creature authorized by the statute to do bu iness
is destroyed. It is in no sense like the case where an individual
changes his name. The very being of its constitution is destroyed
by an abandonment of its name and an attempted substitution of a
new name without authority of law. In the case of Fuller v. Rowe,
57 N. Y. 26, it was said: "Parties assuming to act in a corporate
capacity without a legal organization as a corporate body are liable
as partners to those with whom they contract." In Robinson v.
Harris, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 928, it was held that the corporate existence of associations provided for in chapter 56, General Statutes, depends upon and begins only after the terms of the law are substantially complied with, and until the notice required by section 5 has
been published, the association has no right to begin business as a
corporation, and because such notice had not been published, the
members were held liable as individuals. Vv e concur in the conclusions reached by the superior court in this case, that "The Gebhart
& Bate Brewing Company had no right to do business as a corporation until the members had complied with the law. Until they did
so, no corporation existed. The stockholders were merely doing
business as pa1tners, and as such are individually liable for the debts."
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for proceedings conformable to this opinion.

with the Indiana statute, changed the name to the Gebhart & Bate

Brewing Company, and continued to do business in that name. The

plaintiff contended that the parties thereby became liable individually

or as partners and the superior court so held. On appeal to the Lou-

isville law and equity court it was ruled otherwise, and this is the

error assigned.]

Hazelrigg, J. * * * The name of a corporation is "the very

being of its constitution, the knot of its combination, without which

it could not perform its corporate functions." (Smith's Mercantile

Law, 3d edition, 141.)

"When a corporation is created a name must be given to it, and

by that name alone must it sue and be sued and do all legal acts,"

(1 Blackstone's Comm. 474.)

"The law knows a corporation only by its corporate name."

(Walker's American Law, 9th edition, 232.)

"A corporation has no right or power of itself to change or alter
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the name originally selected by it without recourse to such formal

proceedings as are prescribed by law." (Beach on Private Corpora-

tions, section 275.) The effect of such change of name is an abandon-

ment not only of the corporate name, but of the corporation itself.

The identity of the creature authorized by the statute to do business

is destroyed. It is in no sense like the case where an individual

changes his name. The very being of its constitution is destroyed

by an abandonment of its name and an attempted substitution of a

new name without authority of law. In the case of Fuller v. Rowe,

57 N. Y. 26, it was said: "Parties assuming to act in a corporate

capacity without a legal organization as a corporate body are liable

as partners to those with whom they contract." In Robinson v.

Harris, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 928, it was held that the corporate exist-

ence of associations provided for in chapter 56, General Statutes, de-

pends upon and begins only after the terms of the law are substan-

tially complied with, and until the notice required by section 5 has

been published, the association has no right to begin business as a

corporation, and because such notice had not been published, the

members were held liable as individuals. We concur in the conclu-

sions reached by the superior court in this case, that "The Gebhart

& Bate Brewing Company had no right to do business as a corpora-

tion until the members had complied with the law. Until they did

so, no corporation existed. The stockholders were merely doing

business as partners, and as such are individually liable for the debts."

Judgment reversed and cause remanded for proceedings conforma-

ble to this opinion.

Note. Change of name.

(a) Corporation can change its name onlv by consent of the state: 1847,

Regina v. Registrar, 10 Q. B. (Ad. & E.», 59 E. C. L. 839: 1884, Goodvear

Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 21 Fed. Rep. 27(5; 1890, Sykes v. People, 132 111.32.

Note. Chang-e of name.
(a) Corporation can change its name only by consent of the stat.e: 1847,
Regina v. Registrar, 10 Q . B . (Ad. & E. ), 59 E. C. L. 839: 1884, Goodyear
Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 21 Fed. Rep. 276; 1890, Sykes v. People, 132 Ill. 32.
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(b) And the name can be changed only by consent of the shareholders:

§ 226

CHANGE OF NAxlE.

1873, Morris v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 19 Minn. 528; 1879, Anthonv v. Inter-

national Bank, 93 111. 225; 1883, Wells v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 15 Fed. Rep.

661; 1899, In re Societe Francaise, etc., 123 Cal. 525.

(c) Such a change made by the legislature is an amendment, under consti-

tutional provisions forbidding special acts: 1876, Chicago D. & M.v. Keisel,

43 Iowa 39; 1899, In re La Societe Francaise, 123 Cal. 525. Rut see, 1843,

Doe v. Norton, 11 Mees. & W. 928; 1882, Hazelett v. Butler Univ., 84 Ind.

230.

(d) Such change, if legal, does not affect the rights, duties or liabilities of

the corporation: 1843,The President, etc., of Ft. Wayne v. Jackson, 7 Blackf.

(Ind.) 36; 1852, Trinitv Church v. Hall, 22 Conn. 125; 1857. Hyatt v.

McMahon, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 457; 1858, Rosenthal v. Madison, etc., R. Co., 10

Ind. 358; 1869, Olney v. Ilarvev, 50 111. 453; 1875, Dean v. La Motte Lead

Co., 59 Mo. 523; 1878, Heckel v. Sanford, 40 N. J. L. 180; 1879. Macon & A.

R. Co. v. Goldsmith, 62 Ga. 463; 1895, McCloskey v. Doherty, 97 Ky. 300.

(e) Statutes usually provide a method for changing the corporate name: e.

(/., the laws of Michigan provide that any corporation "organized under the

laws of this state may amend its articles of association by a vote of not less
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than two-thirds in interest of all its stockholders, but before it shall com-

mence any business under its amended articles the said corporation shall

cause such amendment or amendments, subscribed by at least two-thirds in

interest of all its stockholders, and certified by its president, to be filed or

recorded, as the case may be, in the same manner as is provided for in the

original articles of incorporation, and when so recorded, such amendment or

amendments shall become a part of the articles of incorporation of such com-

pany." Comp. L., § 8583.

When a corporation having the right to change its name has done all the

statute requires, the secretary of state may be compelled by mandamus to reg-

ister the change: 1897, State v. Pritchett, S. I. & Lesueur, 141 Mo. 29; 1900,

(bl And the name can be changed only by consent of the shareholders:
1873, Morris v. 8t. Paul, etc. , R. Co., 19 M:inn. 528; 1879, Anthony v. International Bank, 93 Ill. 225; 1883, Wells v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co .• 15 F ed. Rep.
5ol; 1899, fa re Societe Francaise, etc., 123 Cal. 525.
(c) Such a change made by the legislature is an amendment, under constitutional provisions forbidding special acts: 1876. Chicago D. & M. v. Keisel,
43 Iowa 39; 1899, J1l re La Societe Francaise, 123 Cal. 525. Rut see, 1843,
Doe v. Norton, 11 ~foes. & W. 928; 1882, Hazelett v. Butler l'niv. , 84 Ind.
230.
(d) Such change, if legal, does not nffect the rights, duties or liabilities of
the corporation: 1843, The President, etc., of Ft. Wayne v. Jackson, 7 Blaekf.
(Ind.) 36; 1852, Trinity Church v. Hall, 22 Conn. 125; 1857, Hyatt v.
~fdfahon, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 457; 1858, Rosenthal v. Madison, etc., R. Co., 10
Ind. 358; 1809, Olney v. Harvey, 50 Ill. 453; 1875, Dean v. La Motte Lead
Co., 59 Mo. 523; 1878, Heckel v. Sanford, 40 N. J. L. 180; 1879. l\Iacon & A.
R. Co. v. Goldsmith, 62 Ga. 463; 1895, McCloskey v. Doherty, 97 Ky. 300.
(e) Statutes usually provide a method for changing the corporate name: e.
g., the laws of Michigan provide that any corporation "organized under the
laws of this state may amend its articles of association by a vote of not less
than two-thirds in interest of all its stockholders, but before it shall commence any business under its amended articles the said corporation shall
<'ause such amendment or amendments, subscribed by at least two-thirds in
interest of all its stockholders, and certified by its president, to be filed or
recorded, as the case may be, in the same manner as is provided for in the
original articles of incorporation, and when so recorded, such amendment or
amendments shall become a part of the articles of incorporation of such company." Comp. L., § 8583.
When a corporation having the right to change its name has done all the
statute requires, the secretary of state may be compelled by mandamus to register the change: 18971.E'tate v. Pritchett, S. I. & Lesueur, 141 Mo. 29; 1900,
People v. Payn, 161 N. Y. 229.

People v. Payn, 161 N. Y. 229.
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CHAPTER 10.

THE MODE OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE AND ACTION.

ARTICLE I. MODE OF EXISTENCE.

Sec. 227. Perpetual succession.

THE STATE, Ex Rel. WALKER, Attt.-Gkn'l, v. PAYNE.*

1895. In the Supreme Court of Missouri. 129 Mo. Rep.

468-482.

[Quo warranto by the attorney-general against Payne and his asso-

ciates, charging them with usurping the franchise of being a corpora-

tion, after the term of corporate existence was alleged to have ex-

TtTLR VI.

pired. The defense was that the term had not expired.]

THR CORPORATE LIFE.

Macfarlane, J. * * * The only question presented by the

pleadings which we deem it necessary to discuss is whether, under the

act incorporating the Kansas City Gaslight and Coke Company, its

CHAPTER 10.

corporate rights and powers ceased at the expiration of thirty years

after the act became a law. The question is one of vast importance

both to the corporation and the citizens of Kansas City. The corpo-

THE MODE OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE AND ACTION.

ration has expended and now has invested a large amount of money

in plants, mains and other property, which will necessarily be much

ARTICLE I.

depreciated in value should the property go into the hands of the

MODR OF EXISTENCE.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

stockholder or trustees for the settlement of the corporate business.

The citizens, and city itself, have also great interest in securing ade-

quate light at reasonable rates. These considerations, however, can

See. 227.

not affect the legal principles involved.

Perpetual succession.

At the time the act in question was passed the general law of the

state concerning corporations declared: "Every corporation, as such,

THE STATE, Ex REL. WALKER, ATTY.-GEN'L, v. PAYNE.1

has power to have succession by its corporate name for the period

1 Statement, arguments and part of opinion omitted. Sufficient facte are

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.

stated in the opinion for an understanding of the case.

I29 Mo. Rep.

468--482.

(830)

[ ~uo warranto by the attorney-general against Payne and his associates, charging them with usurping the franchise of being a corporation, after the term of corporate existence was alleged to have expired. The defense was that the term had not expired.]
MACFARLANE, J. • • • The only question presented by the
pleadings which we deem it necessary to discuss is whether, under the
act incorporating the Kansas City Gaslight and Coke Company, its
corporate rights and powers ceased at the expiration of thirty years
after the act b ecame a law. The question is one of vast importance
both to the corporation and the citizens of Kansas City. The corporation has expended and now has invested a large amount of money
in plants, mains and other prope1ty, which will necessaril y be much
depreciated in value should the . property go into the hands of the
stockholder or trustees for the settl eme nt of the corporate business.
The citizens, and city itself, have also great interest in securing adequate light at reaso nable rates. These considerations, however, can
not affect the legal principles involved.
At the time the act in question was passed the general law of the
state concerning corporations declared: ''Every corporation, as such,
has power to have succession by its corporate name for the period
1 Statement, ar~llments and part of opinion omitted. Snfficient facts are
stated in the opimon for an understanding of the case.

(830)
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limited in its charter, and when no period is limited, for twenty years."

§ 226

PERPETUAL SUCCESSION .

The first section of the act incorporating the said gaslight and coke

company granted to it "perpetual succession." The second section

grants to the corporation the "exclusive right and power of manufac-

turing gas and coke from any substance whatever for and within the

city of Kansas, Jackson county," for the term of thirty years.

It is insisted by respondents that the grant of "perpetual succes-

sion," without other limiting words, gave to the corporation the right

to perpetual existence, and that the limitation of thirty years, con-

tained in section 2, was not intended to limit the duration of corporate

existence, but of the exclusive rights specified. * * *

The word perpetual, as used in the act, expressly qualifies the suc-

cession and not the duration of the corporate existence. In the con-

nection used, does it imply that the legislature intended to grant the

corporation unlimited existence? The word itself does not necessarily

so imply. It has more than one meaning, as "everlasting," "con-

tinued," "uninterrupted." All lexicographers give these or equiva-

lent words as proper definitions of the word "perpetual."

The word "succession," in its common legal use, denotes the
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devolution of title to property under the laws of descent and distribu-

tion. It is defined as "the coming in of another to take the property

of one who dies without disposing of it by will." Title to corporate

property and franchises is held continuously and uninterruptedly by

and in the name of the corporation, and not in the names of the vari-

ous stockholders. There is no devolution of title in case of the death

of a member or stockholder. The succession is not interrupted, but

continues in the corporation. The succession is continuous during the

life of the corporation, whether it be for years or for an unlimited

time.

Blackstone says that the very end of a corporation is "to have per-

petual succession," "for there can not be a succession forever with-

out an incorporation." 1 Cooley's Blk. Com., 475. Chancellor

Kent says: "A corporation is a franchise possessed by one or more

individuals, who subsist as a body politic under a special denomina-

tion, * * * with the capacity of perpetual succession and of

acting in several respects, however numerous the association may be

as a single individual." 2 Kent's Com., 268.

The duration of a corporation, though unlimited by its charter, and

though it is given the capacity to have perpetual succession, can not

be regarded as everlasting within the general and common meaning

of that word. It may be dissolved and cease to exist for want of

members, by voluntary surrender of franchises, forfeiture by misuser,

etc. Ang. & Ames Corp. [11 ed.], § 8.

It will be found, by reference to all the authorities, that a grant of

capacity to take in "perpetual succession" refers rather to the con-

tinued legal identity and succession than to continuous or perpetual

succession. 1 Blk. Com., supra; 2 Kent's Com., supra; 1 Dill.

Munc. Corp., § 18; Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 636; Field

Corp., §§ 1 and 71.

limited in its charter, and when no period is limited, for twenty years."
The first section of the act incorporating the said gaslight and coke
company granted to it ''perpetual succession." The second section
grants to the corporation the "exclusive right and power of manufacturing gas and coke from any substance whatever for and within the
city of Kansas, Jackson county," for the term of thirty years.
It is insisted by respondents that the grant of " perpetual succession," without other limiting words, gave to the corporation the right
to perpetual existence, and that the limitation of thirty years, contained in section 2, was not intended to limit the duration of corporate
existence, but of the exclusive rights specified. • • •
The word perpetual, as used in the act, expressly qualifies the succession and not the duration of the corporate existence. In the connection used, does it imply that the legislature inten ~led to grant the
corporation unlimited existence? The word itself does not necessarily
so imply. It has more than one meaning, as "everlasting," "continued," "uninterrupted." All lexicographers give these or equivalent words as proper definitions of the word "perpetual."
The word "succession," in its common legal use, denotes the
devolution of title to property under the laws of descent and distribution. It is defined as "the coming in of another to take the property
of one who dies without disposing of it bv will." Title to corporate
property and franchises is held continuously and uninterruptedly by
and in the name of the corporation, and not in the names of the various stockholders. There is no devolution of title in case of the death
of a member or stockholder. The succession is not interrupted, but
continues in the corporation. The succession is continuous dudng the
life of the corporation, whether it be for years or for an unlimited
time.
Blackstone says that the very end of a corporation is ''to have perpetual succession," "for there can not be a succession forever without an incorporation." 1 Cooley's Blk. Com., 475. Chancellor
Kent says : "A corporation is a franchise possessed by one or more
individuals, who subsist as a body politic under a special denomination, • • • with the capacity of perpetual succession and of
acting in several respects, however numerous the association may be
as a sing le individual." 2 Kent's Com., 268.
The duration of a corporation, though unlimited by it charter, and
thoug h it is given the capacity to have perpetual succession, can not
be regarded as everlasting within the general and common meaning
of that word. It may be di solved and cease to exist for want of
members, by voluntary surrender of franchises, forfeiture by misuser,
etc. Ang. & Ames Corp. [ 11 ed. J, § 8.
It will be found, by reference to all the authorities, that a grant of
capacity to take in "perpetual succession" refers rather to the continued legal identity and succession than to continuous or perpetual
succession. 1 Blk. Com., supra; 2 Kent's Com ., supra; r Dill .
Munc. Corp. , § 18; Dartmouth College Case, 4 "Wheat. 636; Field
Corp.,§§ 1 and 71.
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§ 227

STATE V. PAYNE.
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STATE V. PAYNE.
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"The immortality of a corporation means only its capacity to take

in perpetual succession as long as the corporation exists. So far is it

"The immortality of a corporation means only its capacity to take
in perpetual succession as long as the corporation exists. So far is it
from being literally true that a corporation is immortal, many corporations of recent creation are limited in their duration to a certain
number of years." Ang. & Ames Corp., § 8.
Aggregate corporations are "immortal, because, in the judgment
of law, they never die, yet in point of fact, like natural persons, they
are subject to death and dissolution in various ways. * • • Its
immortality, therefore, means only its capacity to take and to act in
perpectual <;uccession so long as the corporation exists.'' Potter
Corp .• § 2.
"When it is said that corporations have perpetual succession, it is
meant that they have continuity only during any limited period of
time which may be fixed by the Jaw of their creation. • • • In
the proper and more restricted sense the immortality of a corporation
means only its capacity to take in perpetual succession so long as it
exists. Spelling Priv. Corp. , § 4.
Chancellor Kent says : "It is sometimes said that a corporation is
an immortal as well as an in\'isible and intang·ible being. But the
immortality of a corporation means only its capacity to take in perpetual succession so long as the corporaticn exists." 2 Kent, supra.
Thus, it appears that the words "perpetual succession" as used in
charters generally mean nothing more than that the corporation should
have continuous and uninterrupted succei;sion so long as it should continue to exist as a corporation , and are not intended to define its duration. If no limit is fixed to its existence then it would have an indefinite or unlimited duration. Morawetz on Corp., § 411.
The general law in force at the time this special act was passed declared that every corporation should have the capacity of succession
by its corporate name for the period limited in its charter, and when
no period was limited, for twenty years. R. S. 1855. § 1, p. 369.
It is claimed by respondents that this provision of the general law
is inconsistent with this special act of inco1poration and was expressly repealed by the ninth section. But if, as we have seen to be
the case, the words "perpetual succession" were intended to imply
nothing more than a continuous succession during the existence of the
corporation , then there is no inconsistency. The general law must be
read into and made a part of the special act. The general law must be
taken as declaring the intent of the legislature in respect to the duration of the corporation. As is said: "Statutes granting such special
privileges are, in one sense, to be read together and construed in conformity with general statutes laying down universal rules applicable
to the class of corporations to which the one claiming under the special act belongs." Endlich Interpretation of Statutes, § 56.
Reading the general law and the first section of the special act together the duration of the corporate existence of the gaslight company
is clearly fixed at twenty years. It does not seem that a doubt of the

from being literally true that a corporation is immortal, many corpo-

rations of recent creation are limited in their duration to a certain

number of years." Ang. & Ames Corp., § 8.

Aggregate corporations are "immortal, because, in the judgment

of law, they never die, yet in point of fact, like natural persons, they

are subject to death and dissolution in various ways. * * * Its

immortality, therefore, means only its capacity to take and to act in

perpectual succession so long as the corporation exists." Potter

Corp., § 2.

"When it is said that corporations have perpetual succession, it is

meant that they have continuity only during any limited period of

time which may be fixed by the law of their creation. * * * In

the proper and more restricted sense the immortality of a corporation

means only its capacity to take in perpetual succession so long as it

exists. Spelling Priv. Corp., § 4.

Chancellor Kent says: "It is sometimes said that a corporation is
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an immortal as well as an invisible and intangible being. But the

immortality of a corporation means only its capacity to take in per-

petual succession so long as the corporation exists." 2 Kent, supra.

Thus, it appears that the words "perpetual succession" as used in

charters generally mean nothing more than that the corporation should

have continuous and uninterrupted succession so long as it should con-

tinue to exist as a corporation, and are not intended to define its du-

ration. If no limit is fixed to its existence then it would have an in-

definite or unlimited duration. Moravvetz on Corp., § 411.

The general law in force at the time this special act was passed de-

clared that every corporation should have the capacity of succession

by its corporate name for the period limited in its charter, and when

no period was limited, for twenty years. R. S. 1855. § 1, p. 369.

It is claimed by respondents that this provision of the general law

is inconsistent with this special act of incorporation and was ex-

pressly repealed by the ninth section. But if, as we have seen to be

the case, the words "perpetual succession" were intended to imply

nothing more than a continuous succession during the existence of the

corporation, then there is no inconsistency. The general law must be

read into and made a part of the special act. The general law must be

taken as declaring the intent of the legislature in respect to the dura-

tion of the corporation. As is said: "Statutes granting such special

privileges are, in one sense, to be read together and construed in con-

formity with general statutes laying down universal rules applicable

to the class of corporations to which the one claiming under the spe-

cial act belongs." Endlich Interpretation of Statutes, § 56.

Reading the general law and the first section of the special act to-

gether the duration of the corporate existence of the gaslight company

is clearly fixed at twenty years. It does not seem that a doubt of the
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MODE OF ACTION.

legislative intent can be raised, but if one should exist it must be re-

solved against the corporation. * * *

Judgment of ouster.

Note. The foregoing case is contrary to 1881, State ex rel. etc., v. Stormont,

24 Kan. 686, which is distinguished, and also to 1880, Fairchild v. Masonic

Hall Assn., 71 Mo. 526, which it overrules. It also seems to conflict with

1889, State v. Ladies of the Sacred Heart, 99 Mo. 533, which is not mentioned

in the case. The later case of 1897, State, etc., v. Lesueur, 141 Mo. 29, where

the language used was "the trusteeship shall he perpetual," with a provision

for each trustee to appoint his successor, holds that "a continuous or per-

petual term" of existence is clearly implied. The case of 1878, Scanlan v.

Crawshaw, 5 Mo. App. 337, is in accord with the principal case.

In case the duration is not expressly limited in some way the corporation

is supposed to have the right of an endless existence, if it is not guilty of mis-

user or non-user, so that the state can complain of a forfeiture: 1841, Van-

derbilt v. Eagle I. W., 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 665; 1850, Farmers' L. & T. Co. v.

Clowes, 3 N. Y. 470; 1879, EastTenn. Mfg. Co. v. Gaskell, 70 Tenn. (2 Lea)

742; 1889, State v. Ladies of the Sacred Heart, 99 Mo. 533; 1892, Cronin
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v. Potters' Co-op. Co., 29 W. L. B. (Ohio) 52; 1897, State v. Lesueur, 141

Mo. 29.

Charter, statutory or constitutional provisions usually fix the period of ex-

istence. Many of these fix the limit in such a way that the articles of associa-

tion can not provide for a longer duration: 1876, Atlantic & G. R. Co. v.

Allen, 15 Fla. 637; 1884, People v. Cheeseman, 7 Colo. 376; 1890, Marysville

Inv. Co. v. Munson, 44 Kan. 491.

Some statutes, however, fix a limit only in case the articles of association

do not name a limit. See the Missouri cases cited above, and 1887, Stead-

man v. Merchants' & P. Bank, 69 Tex. 50.

ARTICLE II. MODE OF ACTION; SHAREHOLDERS AND DIRECTORS.

Sec. 228. Shareholders' meeting.1

DUKE v. MARKHAM.1

1890. In the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 105 N. C.

Rep. 131-138, 18 Am. St. Rep. 889.

[Action by Duke to recover from Markham certain property he;

had taken possession of as the property of a corporation by virtue of

executions in his hands. Plaintiff claimed under a mortgage by the

corporation which the trial judge instructed the jury was valid. The

error assigned was this instruction and allowing the mortgage to be

put in evidence. The secretary of the corporation testified as to the

execution of the mortgage as follows: "Before this mortgage was

executed he went around and saw the stockholders separately in

1 See Ang. & Ames, §§ 487-514; Beach. §§ 272-298; Boone, « 62-6; Clark,

pp. 462-493; Cook, § 589, et seq.; Elliott, §§ 403-493; Morawetz, §4 474-533,

641-7; Taylor, §§ 184, 573-6; I Thompson, §§ 686-697; II Thompson, §§ 1900-

1910; III Thompson, §§3905-37; V Thompson, §§ 6176-6486; VII Thomp-

son, §§ 8451-90.

* Statement abridged, only part of opinion given.

53—Wil. Cases.
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DUKE V. MARKHAM.

regard to executing it; he did not see all the stockholders or directors,

DUKE V. MARKHAM.

he saw a majority of them; they had no meeting, but each one he

saw authorized him to execute the mortgage; the plaintiff requested

regard to executing it; he did not see all the stockholders or directors,
he saw a majority of them; they ha<l no meeting, but each one he
saw authorized him to execute the mortgage; the plaintiff requested
the president and two stockholders to sign the mortgage; this was
done; :Nlr. Duke signed the note for $3,ooo, and witness got the
money from the Raleigh National Bank; the money was used in the
bu siness of the corporation ; he said nothing more to the stockholders
or directors; the directors were stockholders; the note has never been
paid; it sometimes happened that we could not get a meeting of the
board o f directors; they did not attend the meetings regularly; the
mortgage was delivered to W. Duke immediately."]
CLARK, J. • • • We think his honor erred in admitting the
mortgage in evidence upon such probate, and likewise in instructing
the jury, upon the proof offered by plaintiff, that it was valid as to ·
creditors whom defendant represented by virtue of the executions in
his hands.
In Pierce v.·New Orleans Building Co., 9 La. 397, it is held that the
act of a majority of the stockholders, expressed elsewhere than at a mee ting of stockholders, as where the assent of each one is given separately
and at different times, is not binding on the corporation. The same
is true of a meeting of which notice is not given. Stow v. \iVyse, 18
Am. Dec. 99 1 and notes; Cook Stockholders, § 594; 1 Potter on Corporations, § 336 and notes.
In Leggett v. N. J.M. & B. Co., 1 Saxton Ch. 541 , it is held th:it
a corporation is only bound by an agent's acts when within the scope
of his authority, and that a president and cashier, as such, can not
execute a mortgage of corporate property without special authority
from the board of directors or the stockholders, and that the proceeds
of a mortgage have been applied to the use of the corporation in paying its debts, or otherwise, is not sufficient to render the mortgage
binding if its execution was not properly authorized.
"The members of a corporation can not, separately and individually, give their consent in such manner as to bind it as a collective
body, for in such case it is not the body that acts, and this is no less
the doctrine .of the common than of the Roman civil law. Being
lawfully assembled," says Ayliffe, "they represent but one person,
and ma y consequently make contrncts, and by their collective assent,
oblige themselves thereunto. And though all the members of a corporation covenanted on behalf of it under th eir private seals," thi s,
it was held, would on ly bind them personally, and not the corporation.
Angell & Ames Corp., §z32, which is supported by the numerou
cases there cited. Ag-:tin, in the same work, section 504: "The
separate action, individually, without consultation, although a m ajority in number should agree upon a certain act, would not be the act
of the constituted body of men clothed with corporate powers." Indeed, the authorities upon this subject are numerous, uncontradicte<l
and suppo rted by reason. • • •
Error.

the president and two stockholders to sign the mortgage; this was

done; Mr. Duke signed the note for $3,000, and witness got the

money from the Raleigh National Bank; the money was used in the

business of the corporation; he said nothing more to the stockholders

or directors; the directors were stockholders; the note has never been

paid; it sometimes happened that we could not get a meeting of the

board of directors; they did not attend the meetings regularly; the

mortgage was delivered to W. Duke immediately."]

Clark, J. * * * We think his honor erred in admitting the

mortgage in evidence upon such probate, and likewise in instructing

the jury, upon the proof offered by plaintiff, that it was valid as to ■

creditors whom defendant represented by virtue of the executions in

his hands.

In Pierce v. New Orleans Building Co., 9 La. 397, it is held that the

act of a majority of the stockholders, expressed elsewhere than at a meet-

ing of stockholders, as where the assent of each one is given separately
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and at different times, is not binding on the corporation. The same

is true of a meeting of which notice is not given. Stow v. Wyse, 18

Am. Dec. 99' and notes; Cook Stockholders, § 594; 1 Potter on Cor-

porations, § 336 and notes.

In Leggett v. N. J. M. & B. Co., 1 Saxton Ch. 541, it is held that

a corporation is only bound by an agent's acts when within the scope

of his authority, and that a president and cashier, as such, can not

execute a mortgage of corporate property without special authority

from the board of directors or the stockholders, and that the proceeds

of a mortgage have been applied to the use of the corporation in pay-

ing its debts, or otherwise, is not sufficient to render the mortgage

binding if its execution was not properly authorized.

"The members of a corporation can not, separately and individ-

ually, give their consent in such manner as to bind it as a collective

body, for in such case it is not the body that acts, and this is no less

the doctrine of the common than of the Roman civil law. Being

lawfully assembled," says Ayliffe, "they represent but one person,

and may consequently make contracts, and by their collective assent,

oblige themselves thereunto. And though all the members of a cor-

poration covenanted on behalf of it under their private seals," this,

it was held, would only bind them personalty, and not the corporation.

Angell & Ames Corp., §332, which is supported bv the numerous

cases there cited. Again, in the same work, section 504: "The

separate action, individually, without consultation, although a major-

ity in number should agree upon a certain act, would not be the act

of the constituted body of men clothed with corporate powers." In-

deed, the authorities upon this subject are numerous, uncontradicted

and supported by reason. * • *

Error.

1 Infra p. 835.
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§

MODE OF ACTION.

229

697 ; 1836, Pierce v. N. O. Building Co., etc., 9 La. 397, 29 Am. Dec. 448; 1841,

Shortz v. Unangst, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 45; 1847, Smith v. Hurd, 12 Mete.

(Mass.) 371, on 385; 1850, Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13 Pa. St. 133, supra,

p. 417; 1851, Langolf v. Seiberlitch, 2 Pars. Eq. Csis. 64; 1854, Ex parte John-

son, 31 E. L. & Eq. 430; 1861, Torrey v. Baker, 83 Mass. 120; 1874, Hopkins

v. Roseclare Lead Co., 72 111. 373; 1876, Finlev Shoe, etc., Co. v. Kurtz, 34

Mich. 89; 1877, Clarke v. Omaha & S. K. Co., 5 Neb. 314; 1886, England v.

Dearborn, 141 Mass. 590; 1890, Humphreys v. McKissock, 140 U. S. 304, 312;

1890, Allemongv. Simmons, 124 Ind. 199; 1898, Sellers v. Greer, 172 111. 549,

supra, p. 65; 1898, Troy Min. Co. v. White, 10 S. Dak. 475; 1898, Singer v.

Salt Lake, etc., Co., 17 Utah 143; 1898, Morrison v. Wilder Gas. Co., 91 .Mains

492; 1899, Nicholslone City Co. v. Smallev, 21 Tex Civ. App. 210, 51 S. W.

Rep. 527; 1899, De La Vergne Co. v. Ger. Sav. Inst., 175 U. S. 40, on 53.

But compare 1870, Granger v. Grubb, 7 Phil. 350; 1886, Graham v. B., etc.,

R., 118 U. S. 161; 1892, Coe v. East., etc., R., 62 Fed. Rep. 531; 1895, In re

George N. & Co., L. R. 1 Ch. 674.

Sec. 229. Shareholders' meetings—Notice.

Note . To same effect see, 1820, Livingston v. Lynch, 4 Johns. Ch. (N .Y.) 573,
597; 1836, Pierce v. N. 0. Building Co., Ptc., fl J,a. 3!'17, 29 Am. Dec. 448 ; 1841,
Shortz v. Unang~ t, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 45; 1847, Smith v. ·Hurd, 12 Mete.
(Mass.) 371, on 38.5; 1850, Cornmouwen lth v. Cullen , 13 Pa. St. 133, supl'a,
p. 417; 1851, Langolf v. Seiberlitch, 2 Pars. Eq. Ctis. 64; 1854, Expai·te Johnson, 31 R. L. & Eq. 430; 1861, Torrey v. Baker, 83 Mass. 120; 1874, Hopkins
v. Hoseclare Lead Co., 72 Ill. 373; 1876, Finley Shoe, etc., Co. v. Kurtz, 34
Mich. 89; 1877, Clarke v. Omaha & S. R. Co., 5 Neb. 314; 1886, England v.
Dearborn, 141 .'.\lass. 590 ; 1890, Humphreys v. McKissock, 140 U.S. 304, 312;
1890, Allemongv. Simmons, 124 Ind. 199; 1898, Sellers v. Greer, 172 Ill. 549,
supra, p. 65; 1898, Troy Min. Co. v. Whitr., 10 S. Dak. 475; 1898, Singer v.
Salt Lake, etc., Co., 17 Utah 143 ; 18~J8, i\lorrison v. Wilder Gas. Co., 91 Maine
492; 1899, Nicholstone City Co. v . 8n1Hlley, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 210, 51 S. W.
Rep. 5:L7; 1899, De La Vergne Co. v. Ger. 8av. Inst., 1i5 U. 8. 40, 0 11 53.
But compare 1870. Granger v. Grubb, 7 Phil. 350; 1886, Graham v. B., etc.,
R., 118 U. S. 161; 1892, Coe v. East., etc., R., 52 Fed. Rep. 531; 1895, Jn re
George N. & Co., L. R. 1 Ch. 674.

STOWE Et Al. v. WYSE.1
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1828. In the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. 7

Conn. Rep. 214-220, 18 Am. Dec. 99.

Sec. 229. Shareholders' meetings-Notice.

This was an action of trespass quare clausum frcgit, tried on the

general issue at Middletown, February term, 1828, before Dag-

gett, J.

1828.

It was admitted that the defendant entered on the premises in May,

1825, the time specified in the declaration, and continued in the pos-

session and occupation thereof until the commencement of this suit,

claiming right as the tenant of the Middletown Bank, and the only

question was whether the plaintiffs had title to the land or whether it

was in the Middletown Bank. The title of the bank was derived from a

mortgage deed of the Middletown Manufacturing Company, dated the

29th of March, 1817, to the bank. The title of the plaintiffs was de-

rived from a mortgage deed, executed by Arthur W. Magill, some

years afterwards. MagilPs title was acquired by the regular levy of

an execution in his favor against the Middletown Manufacturing Com-

pany subsequent to the execution of the deed to the bank. The Mid-

dletown Manufacturing Company were the undisputed owners of the

land prior to and until their deed of the 29th of March, 1817, above

mentioned. That deed was given to the Middletown Bank by Arthur

W. Magill as agent for the Middletown Manufacturing Company. It

begins thus: "I, Arthur W. Magill, of the town of Middletown,

agent for the Middletown Manufacturing Company of said town, being

empowered, by a vote of said company, in pursuance of said power,"

etc. [It contained the usual covenants of seizin and warranty by

Magill on behalf of the company. The resolution directing the con-

veyance was passed at a meeting at which the holders of only 29 out

of 1,000 shares were represented, and of which the others had no

notice. Verdict for plaintiff. Motion for new trial.3

1 Statement abridged, and only part of opinion given.

STOWE ET AL. v. WYSE. 1
IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT.
Conn. Rep. 214-220, 18 Am. Dec. 99.

7

This was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, tried on the
general issue at Middletown, February term, 1828, before Daggett, J.
It was admitted that the defendant entered on the premises in May,
1825, the time specified in the declaration, and continued in the p ossession and occupation thereof until the commencement of this suit,
claiming right as the tenant of the Middletown Bank, and the only
question was whether the plaintiffs h ad title to the land or whether it
was in' the Middletown Bank. The title of the bank was derived from a
mortgage deed of the Middletown Manufacturing Company, dated the
29th of March, 1817, to the bank. The title of the plaintiffs was d erived from a mortgage deed , executed by Arthur W. Magill, some
years afterwards. Magill's title was acquired by the regular levy of
an execution in his favor against the Middletown Manufacturing Company subsequent to the execution of the deed to the bank. The Middletown Manufacturing Company were the undi sputed owners of the
land prior· to and until their deed of the 29th of March, 1817 1 above
m entioned. That deed was given to the Mi<ldletown Bank by Arthur
W. Magill as agent for the Middletown Manufacturing Compnny. It
begins thus: ' 'l, Arthur W. Magill, of the town of Middletown,
agent for the Middletown Manufacturing Company of said town, being
empowered, by a vote of said compan·y, in pur uance of said power,"
etc. [It contained the usual covenants of seizin and wan-anty by
Magill on behalf of tl:ie company. The resolution directing the conveyance was passed at a meeting at which the holders of only 29 out
of r ,ooo shares were represented, and of which the others had no
notice. Verdict for plaintiff. Motion for new trial.]
1 Statement abridged, and only part of opinion given.

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

836 STEVENS V. EDEN MEETING-HOUSE SOCIETY. § 230

Daggktt, J. The plaintiffs, who claim under A. W. Magill's

deed to them, allege that no title passed by the deed to the Middle-

STEVE~S

town Bank; for that Magill had no authority to bind the Middletown

V. EDEN MEETING-HOUSE SOCIETY.

§

230

Manufacturing Company and transfer the title. The deed is attempted

DAGGETT, J. The plaintiffs, who claim under A. W. Magill's
deed to them, allege that no title passed by the deed to the Middletown Bank; for that Magill had no authority to bind the Middletown
Manufacturing Company and transfer the title. The deed is attempted
to be supported, or rather Magill's power is to make it, on two grounds.
The first is the vote of the Middletown Manufacturing Company,
passed on the 29th day of March, 1817, the <lay of the execution of
the deed, by which he was authorized to make a mortgage to the bank
of the premises. On the other hand, it is insisted that the meeting
was illegal, and the acts done void. It is very clear that a meeting of
the stockholders, constituted as this was, could do no acts binding on
the company. Though a meeting, regularly wamed, would be competent to do any act within their chartered po\.vers by a bare majority, yet if not thus warned their act must be void. If no particular
mode of notifying the stockholders be provided, either in the charte r
or in any by-law, yet personal notice might be given; and this, in
such case, would be indispensable. The counsel for the defendant
do not press this point, and I think it quite untenable. • • •
Another position, however, is taken by counsel for defendant
which is fatal to the plaintiff' s title. • • •
Now Magill has declared under his hand and seal that he was empowered by a vote of the company to execute. this deed. Can he ever
say that he was not thus empowered? If, on the next day after the
deed to the bank was executed, he had procured a valid deed from
the company, and had brought ejectment against the bank, could he
have sustained it against the declarations in his deed? I think he mu t
have been estopped. If so, then all persons claiming under and
through him are estopped. 1 Stark. Ev., 305; Hoyt v. Dimon, 5
Day 483; 1 Phill. Ev., 10.
.
These principles are in entire accordance with the case of Fairtitle
d. Mytton et al. v. Gilbert et al., 2 Term Rep. 169, 171; Palmer v.
Elkins, 2 Stra. 817; Com. Dig., tit. Estoppel, A, 1, 2, 3 and B.
There must, therefore, be a new tria~.

to be supported, orrather Magill's power is to make it, on two grounds.

The first is the vote of the Middletown Manufacturing Company,

passed on the 29th day of March, 1S17, the day of the execution of

the deed, by which he was authorized to make a mortgage to the bank

of the premises. On the other hand, it is insisted that the meeting

was illegal, and the acts done void. It is very clear that a meeting of

the stockholders, constituted as this was, could do no acts binding on

the company. Though a meeting, regularly warned, would be com-

petent to do any act within their chartered powers by a bare major-

ity, yet if not thus warned their act must be void. If no particular

mode of notifying the stockholders be provided, either in the charter

or in any by-law, yet personal notice might be given; and this, in

such case, would be indispensable. The counsel for the defendant

do not press this point, and I think it quite untenable. * * *

Another position, however, is taken by counsel for defendant

which is fatal to the plaintiff's title. * * *
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Now Magill has declared under his hand and seal that he was em-

powered by a vote of the company to execute.this deed. Can he ever

say that he was not thus empowered? If, on the next day after the

deed to the bank was executed, he had procured a valid deed from

the company, and had brought ejectment against the bank, could he

have sustained it against the declarations in his deed? I think he must

have been estopped. If so, then all persons claiming under and

through him are estopped. 1 Stark. Ev., 305; Hoyt v. Dimon, 5

Day 483; 1 Phill. Ev., 10. .

These principles are in entire accordance with the case of Fairtitle

d. Mytton et al. v. Gilbert et a/., 2 Term Rep. 169, 171; Palmer v.

Elkins, 2 Stra. 817; Com. Dig., tit. Estoppel, A, 1, 2, 3 and B-

There must, therefore, be a new trial.

Note. See note at end of next case.

Sec. 230. Same.

STEVENS v. EDEN MEETING-HOUSE SOCIETY.

1839. In the Supremk Court of Vermont. 12 Vt. Rep. 688—9.

This was an action of assumpsit on an award. Plea, non-assumpsit.

On the trial the plaintiff produced the defendants' book of records,

which showed a society regularly organized under the statute consti-

tuting them a corporation. The by-laws provided that, among other

officers, a clerk or secretary should be chosen, and one had been

Note.

See note at end of next case.

regularly elected. The by-laws provided that all meetings were to

Sec. 230. Same.
STEVENS v. EDEN MEETING-HOUSE SOCIETY.
1839.

IN THE SuPREMR CouRT OF VERMONT.

12 Vt. Rep. 688--9.

This w<ls an action of assumpsit on an award. Plea, non-assump it.
On the trial the plaintiff produced the defendants' book of record ,
which showed a society regularly organized under the tatute con tituting tliem a corporation. The by-laws provided that, among other
officers , a clerk or secretary should be chosen, and one had been
regularly elected. The by-laws provided that all meetings were to.
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be warned by the clerk, by posting up a written notice thereof. This

appears to have been done and the records regularly kept up to

December, 1S36. The plaintiff then offered to prove, by parol testi-

mony, that said society continued its meetings, that the persons who

joined him in the submission were, at that time, and at the publish-

ing of the award, the prudential committee of said society, and that

after the award was made and published, said society voted to

approve and confirm the same. This was objected to by the defend-

ants and was rejected by the court, to which the plaintiff excepted.

Verdict and judgment having passed for the defendants, the cause

passed to the supreme court.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Coi.lamer, J. A corporation, and every member thereof, is

bound by a vote of the majority present at a meeting warned agree-

ably to the laws of the corporation, and not otherwise. If no provis-

ion is made for such warning every member must have personal

notice. Here the clerk was authorized to warn a meeting by posting

up a written notice. No other mode of calling a meeting could be
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shown, and most clearly this could not be proved by parol until the

loss of the notification was first proved, but this was not attempted.

Here was an attempt to add to the records by parol, whole warnings,

meetings and votes. This is clearly inadmissible, and the fact that

no record of meetings after 1836 appeared on the books does not

authorize this. The want of such record only shows that no such

meeting was held. If it be asked, what is to be done by third per-

sons, if a corporation will not record its appointments and votes, the

answer is, refuse to recognize or act on any such assumed authority

or unrecorded votes, or hold them personally liable who misrepresent

their authority.

Judgment affirmed.

Note. Notice of corporate meetings.

1. Notice of corporate meetings is necessary to their validity and the va-

lidity of the business done at a meeting as against a stockholder who had no

notice, was not present, and who objects promptly: 1844, Wiggih v. First

Freewill B. Ch., 8 Mete. (49 Mass.) 301; 18.50, Commw. v. Cullen, 13 Pa. St.

be warned by the clerk, by posting up a written notice thereof. This
appears to h ave been done and the records regularly kept up to
December, 1836. The plaintiff then offered to proYe, by parol testimony, that sa id society continued its meetings, that the persons who
joined him in the s ubmission \\·ere, at that time, and at the publishing of the award, the prude ntial committee of sa id society, and that
after the award ·was made and publi shed , said society voted to
approve and confirm the sa me. This was objected to by the defendants and was rejecte d by the court, to which the pla intiff excepted.
Verdict and judgme nt having passed for the defendants, the cause
passed to the supreme court.
The opinion of th.e court was delivered by
CoLLAMER, J.
A corporation, and every member thereof, is
bound by a vote of the majority prese nt at a meeting warned agreeably to the laws of the corporation, and not otherwise. If no provision is made for such warning every member must have personal
notice. Here the clerk was authorized to warn a meeting by posting
up a written notice. No other mode of calling a meeting could be
shown, and most clearly t.his could not be proved by parol until the
lo s of the notification was first proved, but this was not attempte d.
Here was an attempt to add to the records by parol, whole warnings,
meetings and votes. This is clearly inadmissible, and the fact that
no record of meetings after 1836 appeared on the books does not
authorize this. The want of such record only shows that no such
meeting was held. If it be asked, what is to be done by third p ersons, if a oorporation will not record its appointments and votes, the
answer is, refuse to recognize or act on any such assumed authority
or unrecorded votes, or hold them personally liable who misrepresent
their authority.
Judgment affirmed.

133, 53 Am. Dec. 450, supra, p. 417;1852, Stebbins v. Merritt, lOCush. (Mass.)

27; 1871, Westcott v. Minnesota M. Co., 23 Mich. 145; 1876, Shelbv R. Co. v.

L. C. & L. R. Co.. 12 Bush (75 Kv.) 62; 1892, Coe v. East & W.R. Co., 52

Fed. Rep. 531; 1893. Morrill v. Little Fiills Mfg. Co., 53 Minn. 371, 21 L. R.

A. 174, infra, p. 839; 1898, Wall v. London & N. A. Corp., 79 L. T. (N. S.)

249, 67 L. J. Ch. 596; 1899, Heller v. National M. Bank, 89 Md. 602, 45 L. R.

A. 438.

2. In the absence of charter, by-law or statutory provision, personal notice

is required: 1830, Savings Bank v. Davis, 8 Conn. 191; 1834, Bethanv v.

Sperrv, 10 Conn. 200; 1841, Evans v. Osgood, 18 Maine 213; 1844, Wiggin v.

Freewill B. C, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 301; 1860, People v. Batchelor, 22 N. Y. 128;

1860, People's Ins. Co. v. Westcott, 14 Gray (Mass.) 440; 1870, Harding v.

Vandewater, 40 Cal. 77.

3. But statutory, charter or bv-law provisions should be followed: 1871,

Westcott v. Minn". M. Co., 23 Mich. 145; 1876, Stockholders, etc., v. I.ouisville,

etc., R. Co., 12 Bush (Kv.) 62; 1877, Tuttle v. Mich. Air Line, 35 Mich. 247;

1884. Reillv v. Ogle bay,* 25 W. Va. 36; 1897, Matthews v. Columbia Nat'l

Bank, 79 Fed. Rep. 558.

Note.

Notice of corporate meetings.

1. Notice of corporate meetings is necessary to their validity and the validity of the business done at a meeting as against a stockholder who had no
notice, was not present, nnd who objects promptly: 1844, Wiggin v. First
Freewill B. Ch., 8 Mete. (49 Mass.) 301; 1850. Commw. v. Cullen, 13 Pa. St.
133, 53 Am. Dec. 450, supra, p. 417; 1852, Stebbins v. Merritt, 10 Cush. (Mass.)
21; 1871, Westcott v. Minnesota M. Co., 23 Mich. 145; 18i6, Shelby R . Co. v.
L. C. & L. R. Co., 12 Bush (75 Ky.) 62; 1892. Coe v. East & W .R. Co. , 52
Fed. R ep. 531; 1893, Morrill v. Little Falls Mfg. Co., 1)3 Minn. 371, 21 L. R.
A. 174, iiifra, p. 839; 1898, Wall v. London & N. A. Corp., 79 L. T . 1N. 8.)
249, 67 L. J. Ch. 596; 1899, Heller v. National l\f. Bank, 89 Md. 602, 45 L. R.
A. 438.
2. In the absence of charter, by-law or statutory provision, personal notice
is requi<ed : 1830, Savings Bank v. Davis, 8 Con n. 191; 1834, Be thany v.
S perry, 10 Conn. 200; 1841, Evans v. Osgood, 181\'laine 213; 1844, Wii;r~in v.
Freewill B. C., 8 Mete. (l\1nss.) 301; 1860, People v. Batchelor, 22 N. Y. 128;
1860, People's Ins. Co. v. Westcott, 14 Gray (Mass.) 440; 1870, Harding v.
Vandewater, 40 Cal. 77.
3. But statntory, charter or by-law provisions shonld be followed: 1871,
W ~stcott v. Minn . M. Co., 23 Mich. 145; 1876, 8tockholderf', etc .• v. Louisville,
etc., R. Co., 12 Bush (Ky.) 62; 1877, Tnttle v. Mich . Air Line, 315 i\lich. 247;
1884. Reilly v. Oglebay, 25 W. Va. 36; 1897, Matthews v. Columbia Nat'l
Bank, 79 Fed. Rep. 558.
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4. However, it is? frequently held that statutory, charter and by law pro-

visions relating to quorum, notice and business to be done are wholly for the

STEVENS V. EDEN MEETING-HOUSE SOCIETY.

benefit of the shareholders only, and if they do not complain of the irregn-

larity others can not: 1881, Beecher v. Marquette & P. R. M. Co., 45 Mich.

4. However, it is frequently hehl that statutory, charter and by-law provisions relating to quorum, notice and business to be done are wholly for the
benefit of the shareholders only, and if they do not complain of the irregularity others can not: 1881, Beecher v. Marquette & P. R. l\I. Co., 45 Mirh.
103; 1882, Thomas v. Citizens', etc., R. Co., I04 Ill. 462; 1889, Manhattan
Hardware Co. v. Phalen, 128 Pa. St. 110; 1890, Wood v. Corry Water-Works
Co., 44 Fed. Rep. 146; 1892, Nelson v. Hubbard, 96 Ala. 238, 17 L. R . A. 3i:i;
1800, Atlantic Trust Co. v. The Vigilancia, 73 Fed. Rep. 452; 1898, In r~ A. A.
Griffing Iron Co., 63 N. J. L. 168, 41Atl. .Rep.931. But compare, 1885, ~tatev.
l\lcGraL11, 86 Mo. 239.
··
5. If the time of holding m~eti!Jgs is fixed definitely by statute, charter, bylaw or custom, no further notice is necessary, unless extraordinary or special
business is to be done: 1839, Warner v. Mower, 11Vt.385, 393; 1858, Atlantic
M .' F. Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 36 N. H. 252, 269; 1878, State v. Bonnell, 3:i 0 . S.
10, 15; 1893, Morrill v. Little Falls .Mfg. Co., 53 Minn. 371, infra, p.839; 1899.
Heller v. National Marine Bank, 89 Md. 603, 45 L. R. A . 438.
6. Notice should be definite and specific: (a) As to time-day and boor:
1858, Atlantic M. F. Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 36 N. H. 2.52; 1860, People v. Batch·
elor, 22 N. Y. 128; 1875, San Buenaventura, etc., Co. v. Vassault, 50 Cal. 534;
1876, Shelby R. Co~ v. L., C. & L. R. Co., 12 Bush (Ky.) 62.
(b) As to place: 1848, Miller v. English, 21 N. J. L. 3Li; 1856, Jones v. llfilton & R . T. R. Co., 7 Ind. 547; 1875, San Buenaventura, etc., Co. v. V~saalt,
60 Cal. 534.
•
(c) As to business to be done, unless the meeting is a stated one nt which it
is understood any corporate business may be done: 1841, Evans v. O~irood.
18 Maine (6 Shep.) 213; 1853, Sampson v. Bowdoinham, etc., Co., 36 .'.\hine
78; 1860, People l\fot. Ins. Co. v. Westcott, 14 Gray r~1ass.) 440; 1866, B'
Bridport Old Bre wery Co., L. R. 2 Ch. Dh•. 191; 1877, Tuttle v. Michigan Air
Line, 35 Mich. 247; 1881, Beech e r v. Marquette & P.R. M . Co., 45 :\fic-h.100;
1885, American Tube Works v. Boston l\1ach. Co., 139 Mass. 5; 1800, tutz v.
Handley, 41 Fed. Rep. 531; 1892, Evans v. Boston Heating Co., 1571\fa . 37.
7. But if the meeting is one prescriLed by the charter, by-law or stntute, at
which it is usual to transart the general corporate business, th e noti re need
not specify the business to be done: 1839, Warner v. Mower, 11 Yt. 385; 18.53,
Samson v. Bowdoinham, etc .. Co., 36 Maine 78; 1858, Atlantic De Lnine C-0.
v. Mason, 5 R. I. 463; 1891, Chicago, etc., R.. v. Union Pac. R., 47 Feel. Rep.
15; 1892, Jones v. Concord & M. R., 67 N. H. 234, 38 Atl. Rep. 120; 1893, Morrill v.-Little Falls Mfg. Co., 53 Minn. 371, 21 L. R. A. 174, inf;-a, p. 839.
8. But if unusual or extraordinary business is to be done at a general meeting, statutes frequently require the notice to specify that such business is le>
be done: 1892, Jones v. Concord & M . R. Co., 67 N. H. 234; 1898, .'.\Iutoal
Fire Ins. Co. v. Farquhar, 86 Md. 668.
9. If the meeting is called to do specific business designated in the notice,
no other business can be transacterl ~tt rmch meeting against the protest oi
members, or bind those absent: 1839, 'Varner v. Mower, 11 Yt. 385; IS41,
Evans v. Osgood, 18 Maine (6 Shep.) 213; 1860, Peoples' l\lut. Ins. Co. v.
Westcott, 14 Gray (Mass.) 440; 1898, Wall v. London & N. A. Corp .. i!l L.
T. ( N. S.) 249, 67 L. J. Cb. 596. But see, 1892, Evans v. Heating Co., 15i
Mnss. 37.
10. However, if all the members are present and com1ent, other or different
business may be transacted. 1809, Rex v. Theodorick, 8 Eruit 543; 1 · 2, d ebbins v. Merritt, 10 Cush. ()!ass. ) 27; 1891, Handley'" lutz, 139 C. S. 41i;
189~. Nelson v. Hubbard, 96 Ala. 2:J8; 1892, Campbell v. Argenta, etc., Co.,
51 Fed. Rep. 1; 189.'), Bridgeport Electric Co. v. Meader, 72 Fed. Rep. 115 ;
1898, Jn re A. A. Griffin~ Iron Co., 63 N. J. L. 168, 41 At!. Rep. 931.
11. No further notice is necessary of an adjourned meeting, or the business
to be done thereat, than the record of the resolution adjournrng a duly railed
meeting to a definite time and place. 1897, Western Imp. Co. v. Des ~1oines
M . N. Bank, 103 Iowa 455, 72 N. W. Rep. &57; 1897, State v. Cronan, 23 ~ev.
437, 49 Pac. Rep. 41. But if the time to which the meeting is adjourned is not

103; 1882, Thomas v. Citizens', etc., R. Co., 104 111. 462; 1889, Manhattan

Hardware Co. v. Phalen, 128 Pa. St. 110; 1890, Wood v. Corrv Water-Works

Co., 44 Fed. Rep. 146; 1892, Nelson v. Hubbard, 96 Ala. 238, 17 L. R. A. 375;

1896, Atlantic Trust Co. v. The Vigilancia, 73 Fed. Rep. 452; 1898, In re A.

Griffing Iron Co.,63N. J. L. 168,41 Atl.Rep.931. But compare. 1885, State v.

McGralh, 86 Mo. 239.

5. If the time of holding meetings is fixed definitely by statute, charter, by-

law or custom, no further notice is necessary, unless extraordinary or special

business is to be done: 1839, Warner v. Mower, 11 Vt. 385, 393; 1858, Atlantic

M. F. Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 36 N. H. 252, 269; 1878, State v. Bonnell, 35 0. S.

10, 15; 1893, Morrill v. Little Falls Mfg. Co., 53 Minn. 371, infra, p. 839; 1899

Heller v. National Marine Bank, 89 Md. 603, 45 L. R. A. 438.

6. Notice should be definite and specific: (a) An to time—dav and hour:

1858, Atlantic M. F. Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 36 N. H. 252; I860, People v. Batoh-

elor, 22 N. Y. 128; 1875, San Buenaventura, etc., Co. v. Vassault, 50 Cal.534;

1876, Shelby R. Co. v. L., C. & L. R. Co., 12 Bush (Ky.) 62.
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(6) As to place: 1848, Miller v. English, 21 N. J. L. 317; 1856, Jones v. Mil-

ton & R. T. R. Co., 7 Ind. 547; 1875, San Buenaventura, etc., Co. v. Vassault,

60 Cal. 534.

(c) As to business to be done, unless the meeting is a stated one at which it

is understood any corporate business may be done: 1841, Evans v. Oseood.

18 Maine (6 Shep.) 213; 1853, Sampson v. Bowdoinhain, etc., Co., 36 Maine

78; 1860, People Mut. Ins. Co. v. Westcott, 14 Grav (Mass.) 440; IStirt, Br

Bridport Old Brewery Co., L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 191; 1877, Tuttle v. Michigan Air

Line, 35 Mich. 247; 1881, Beecher v. Marquette & P. R. M. Co., 45 Mich. 103;

1885, American Tube Works v. Boston Macb. Co., 139 Mass. 5; 1890. Stntz \.

Handley, 41 Fed. Rep. 531; 1892, Evans v. Boston Heating Co., 157 Mass.37.

7. But if the meeting is one prescribed by the charter, by-law or statute, at

which it is usual to transact the general corporate business, the notice need

not specify the business to be done: 1839, Warner v. Mower, 11 Yt. 385; 1853,

Samson v. Bowdoinhain, etc., Co., 36 Maine 78; 1858, Atlantic De Laine Co.

v. Mason, 5 R. I. 463; 1891, Chicago, etc., R. v. Union Pac. R., 47 Fed. Rep.

15; 1892, Jones v. Concord & M. R., 67 N. H. 234, 38 Atl. Rep. 120: 1893, Mor-

rill v. Little Falls Mfg. Co., 53 Minn. 371, 21 L. R. A. 174, infra, p. 839.

8. But if unusual or extraordinary business is to be done at a general meet-

ing, statutes frequently require the notice to specify that such business is to

be done: 1892, Jones" v. Concord & M. R. Co., 67 N. H. 234; 1898, Mutual

Fire Ins. Co. v. Farquhar, 86 Md. 668.

9. If the meeting is called to do specific business designated in the notice,

no other business can be transacted at such meeting against the protest of

members, or bind those absent: 1839, Warner v. Mower, 11 Yt. 385; 1841,

Evans v. Osgood, 18 Maine (6 Shep.) 213; 1860, Peoples' Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Westcott, 14 Gray (Mass.) 440; 1898, Wall v. London & N. A. Corp., 79 L.

T. (N. S.) 249, 67 L. J. Ch. 596. But see, 1892, Evans v. HeatineCo., 157

Mass. 37.

10. However, if all the members are present and consent, other ordifferent

business may be transacted. 1809, Rex v. Theodoriok, 8 East 543; 1852, Steb-

bins v. Merritt, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 27; 1891, Handlov v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417;

1892, Nelson v. Hubbard, 96 Ala. 238; 1892, Campbell v. Argenta, etc., Co.,

51 Fed. Rep. 1; 1895, Bridgeport Electric Co. v. Meader, 72 Fed. Rep. 115:

1898, In re A. A. Gritting Iron Co., 63 N. J. L. 168, 41 Atl. Rep. 931.

11. No further notice is necessary of an adjourned meeting, or the business

to be done thereat, than the record of the resolution adjourning a duly called

meeting to a definite time and place. 1897, Western Imp. Co. v. Des Moines

M. N. Bank, 103 Iowa 455, 72 N. W. Rep. 657; 1897, State v. Cronan, 23 Nev.

437, 49 Pac. Rep. 41. But if the time to which the meeting is adjourned is not
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'tefinitelv fixed further notice must be given. 1888, Thompson v. Williams,
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76 Cal. 163.

12. Notice must be given by the officer having authority, such as the board

■ if directors or the general manager, but not the president or secretary with-

out special authority. 1834, Betheny v. Sperrv, 10 Conn. 200; 1841, Evans v.

Osgood, 18 Maine 213; 1852, Stebbins v. Merritt, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 27; 1872,

definitely fixed further notice must be given. 1888, Thompson v. Williams,
76 Cal. 153.
12_. Notice must be given by the officer having authority, such as the board
1f directors or the general manager, but not the president or secretary with"ut special authority. 1834, Betheny v. Sperry, 10 Conn. 200; 1841, Evans v.
Osgood, 18 Maine 213; 1852, Stebbins v. )ferritt, 10 Cus h. (Mass.) '27; 1872,
Johnstonv. Jones, 23 N. J. Eq. 216; 1875, Statev. Pettineli, 10 Nev. 141; 1882,
Toronto, etc., Co. v. Blake, 2 Ont. 175; 1888, Cassell v. Lexington, etc., Co.,
10. Ky. L. R_ep. 486, 9 S. W. Rep. 502, 701 ; 1896, Dusen bury v. Looke r, 11 O
Mich. 58. 6r N. W . Rep. 986.
13. Not!ce, to b_e va lid, must be served a re asonable time before the meeting
callerl by 1t. 183r, R e Long Island R., J!J \\ e ncl. 37; 1878, Covert v. Roge rs
38 )licit . 36.'~; 1888, Cassell v. Lexington, etc., Co., 10 Kv. L. Rep. 486 9 s'.
VvT. Rep. 50:!; 18\.13, Brown v. Republican, etc., Mines, 55.FeJ. Rep. 7. '
0

Johnston v. Jones, 23 N. J. Eq. 216; 1875. State v. Pettineli, 10 Nev. 141; 1882,

Toronto, etc., Co. v. Blake, 2 Ont. 175; 1888, Caseell v. Lexington, etc., Co.,

10 Kv. L. Rep. 486, 9 S. W. Rep. 502, 701; 1896, Dusenbury v. looker, 110

Mich'. 58. 67 N. W. Rep. 986.

13. Notice, to be valid, must be served a reasonable time before the meeting

called by it. 1837, Be Long Island R., 19 Wend. 37; 1878, Covert v. Rogers,

38 Mich". 363; 1888, Cassell v. Lexington, etc., Co., 10 Ky. L. Rep. 486, 9 S.

0

W. Rep. 502; 1893, Brown v. Republican, etc., Mines, 55 Fed. Rep. 7.

Sec. 231. Quorum.

MORRILL v. LITTLE FALLS MANUFACTURING CO.1

1893. *N THK Supreme Court of Minnesota. 53 Minn. Rep.

37 ^Z8^ 55 N- W. Rep. 547.

[Action to determine title to land, claimed to belong to the plaintiff,

See. 231. Quorum.
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but in which the company claimed some interest. The corporation

MORRILL v. LITTLE FALLS MANUFACTURING 00.1

had originally owned the lands, but in 1864 it had become hopelessly

insolvent, abandoned its business, and its organization became prac-

tically defunct. No effort to revive it was made by any of the share-

1893.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF MINNESOTA.

S3

Minn.

Rep.

371-380, SS N. W. Rep. S47·

holders until 1881, a period of seventeen years. In the meantime

plaintiff had attempted to acquire title to its lands through tax titles.

In 1881, at plaintiff's suggestion, one Thayer, a shareholder, for him-

self and as proxy for certain other shareholders, went to the place,

and at the time fixed by the by-laws for holding the annual meeting of

the company, and being the only person present, cast the votes of

himself and those for whom he held proxies for a board of directors,

to each of whom he transferred one share of stock. The same thing

was done by another shareholder at the proper time and place in 18S2.

During these years Thayer was elected and acted as president of the

company, and in 1882 he and the secretary under proper directions

conveyed the land in question to persons from whom the plaintiff

traces title. The decision below was for the plaintiff, and the de-

fendant company appealed.]

Mitchell, J. * * * As affecting the validity of the deeds

executed in 1882, in behalf of the corporation, by Thayer as presi-

dent, the appellants assail the finding of the court as to the election

of directors in August, 1881. The grounds of objection are: First,

that no notice was given of the meeting, and. second, that it required

a majority of the shares of stock to constitute a quorum to hold a

meeting, or, in any event, that one person could not hold a meeting,

that at least two persons are necessarv to constitute a corporate

meeting.

1 Statement abridged. Only part of opinion given.

[Action to determine title to land, claimed to belong to the plaintiff,
but in which the company claimed some interest. The corporation
had originally owned the lands, but in 1864 it had become hopelessly
insolvent, abandoned its busi ness, and its organization became practically defunct. No effort to revive it was made by any of th e shareholders until 1881, a period of seventeen years. In the meantime
plaintiff had attempted to acquire title to its lands through tax titles.
In 1881, at plaintiff's suggestion, one Thayer, a shareholder, for himself and as proxy for certain other shareholders, went to the place,
and at the time fixed by the by-laws for holding the annual meeting of
the company, and being the only person present, cast the votes of
himself and those for whom he held proxies for a board of directors,
to each of whom he transferred one share of stock. The same thing
was done by another shareholder at the proper time and place in 1882.
During these years Thayer was elected and acted as president of the
company, and in 1882 he and the secretary under proper directions
conveyed the land in question to persons from whom th e plaintiff
traces title. The decision below was for the plaintiff, and the defendant company appealed. J
MITCHELL, J.
• • • As affecting the \'alidity of the deeds
executed in 1882, in behalf of the corporation, by Thayer as president, the appellants assail the finding of the court as to the election
of directors in Augu st, 1881. The grounds of objection are: First,
that no notice was given of the meeting, and, second, that it required
a majority of the shares of stock to constitute a quomm to hold a
meeting, or, in any event, that one person could not hold a meeting,
that at least two persons are necessary to constitute a corporate
meeting.
1

Statement abridged . Only part of opinion given.
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As to the first point all that is necessary to say is that the by-laws

840

fixed the time and place of holding the meeting, and neither the char-

MORRILL V. LITTLE FALLS MANUFACTURING CO.

§ 23 I

ter nor the by-laws required any notice to be given. Under such cir-

As to the firsl point all that is necessary to say is that the by-laws
fixed the time and place of holding the meeting, and neither the charter no r the by-laws required any notice to be given. Under such circumstances, the rule is that the by-laws themselves are sufficient
notice to a ll the stockholders, and no further notice is necessary. 1
Mor. Priv. Corp. , § 479·
The second objection is equally untenable. Where the charter
and by-laws of a corporation are silent on the subject, the commonlaw rule is that such of the shareholders as actually assemble at a
properly convened meeting, although a minority of the whole munber and representing only a minority of the stock , constitute a quorum
for the transaction of business, and may express the corporate will ,
and the body will be bound by their acts. Cook Stock & S. , §§ 6o7,
623; 2 Kent Comm., 293; Mor. Priv. Corp.,§ 476; Craig v. First
Presbyterian Church, 88 Pa. St. 42; Rex v. Vario, Cowp. 248;
Columbia Bottom L evee Co. v. Meier, 39 Mo. 53; Ex parte Willcocks, 7 Cow. 402; Field v. Field, 9 Wend. 395.
The contention of the appellants that this rule applies only to such
organizations as towns, churches and the like, and not to stock corporations, finds no support either in r easo n or authority. The correct
distinction is between a corporate act to be done by a select body of
a definite number, as, for example, a board of directors or trustees,
and one to be p erformed by the constituent members of the corporatio n. In the latter case a m ajority of those who appear may act.
This distinction is clearly made in several of the cases above cited,
and also in the leading case of Rex v. Bellringer, 4 Term R. 810.
As was said by Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Vario, supra: "It is in
the nature of all corporations to do corporate acts; and, when the
power of doing them is not specially delegated to a particular number, the general mode is for the members to meet on the chatter days,
and the major part who are present to do the act. But when there is
a select body it is a different thing, for then it is a special appointment." And, this being so, it is immaterial whether the number
present is only one or more than one. It was held in Sharpe v. Dawes,
46 Law J. Q. B. 104, followed reluctantly in another case, that one
person can not constitute a quorum; that at least two persons are necessary to hold a corporate meeting; but this decision is based upon a
narrow lexicographical definition of the word " meeting," as the coming together of two or more persons--a reason that does not commend
itself to our judgment.
Therefore , in our opinion, the court was justified in holding that
the election of directors in 1881 was regular; and it follows that the
deeds executed in 1882 by Thayer, the president elected by them,
were the deeds of the corporation. • • •
Reversed upon another point.

cumstances, the rule is that the by-laws themselves arc sufficient

notice to all the stockholders, and no further notice is necessary. 1

Mor. Priv. Corp., § 479.

The second objection is equally untenable. Where the charter

and by-laws of a corporation are silent on the subject, the common-

law rule is that such of the shareholders as actually assemble at a

properly convened meeting, although a minority of the whole num-

ber and representing only a minority of the stock, constitute a quorum

for the transaction of business, and may express the corporate will,

and the body will be bound by their acts. Cook Stock & S., §§ 607,

623; 2 Kent Comm., 293; Mor. Priv. Corp., § 476; Craig v. First

Presbyterian Church, 88 Pa. St. 42; Rex v. Varlo, Cowp. 248;

Columbia Bottom Levee Co. v. Meier, 39 Mo. 53; Ex parte Will-

cocks, 7 Cow. 402; Field v. Field, 9 Wend. 395.

The contention of the appellants that this rule applies only to such

organizations as towns, churches and the like, and not to stock corpo-

rations, finds no support either in reason or authority. The correct
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distinction is between a corporate act to be done by a select body of

a definite number, as, for example, a board of directors or trustees,

and one to be performed by the constituent members of the corpora-

tion. In the latter case a majority of those who appear may act.

This distinction is clearly made in several of the cases above cited,

and also in the leading case of Rex v. Bellringer, 4 Term R. 810.

As was said by Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Varlo, supra: "It is in

the nature of all corporations to do corporate acts; and, when the

power of doing them is not specially delegated to a particular num-

ber, the general mode is for the members to meet on the charter days,

and the major part who are present to do the act. But when there is

a select body it is a different thing, for then it is a special appoint-

ment." And, this being so, it is immaterial whether the number

present is only one or more than one. It was held in Sharpe v. Dawes,

46 Law J. Q. B. 104, followed reluctantly in another case, that one

person can not constitute a quorum; that at least two persons are nec-

essary to hold a corporate meeting; but this decision is based upon a

narrow lexicographical definition of the word "meeting," as the com-

ing together of two or more persons—a reason that does not commend

itself to our judgment.

Therefore, in our opinion, the court was justified in holding that

the election of directors in 1881 was regular; and it follows that the

deeds executed in 1882 by Thayer, the president elected by them,

were the deeds of the corporation. * * *

Reversed upon another point.

Note. Quorum.

1. If all of an indefinite number of shareholders are duly notified to meet,

those who assemble constitute a quorum, unlesB there are statutory, charter, or

by-law provisions otherwise: 1775, Rex v. Varlo, Cowp. 248; 1827, Ex parte

Note.

Quorum.

1. If all of an indefinite number of shareholders are duly notified to meet,

those who assemble constitute a quorum, unless there are statutory, charter, or
by-law provisions otherwise : 1775, Rex v. Varlo, Cowp. 248; 1827, Ez f><Jrte
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Willcocks, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 402, 17 Am. D. 525; 1832, Field v. Field, 9 Wend.

394; 1856, People v. Walker, 2 Abb. Pr. 425, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 304; 1866, Co-

lumbia Bottom L. Co. v. Meier, 39 Mo. 53; 1866, Madison Ave. B. Ch. v.

§

MODE OF ACTION.

232

Baptist Ch.,etc, 5 Robt. (N. Y.) 649; 1867, Brown v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 5

Blatch. 525; 1878, Craig v. First Pres. Ch.;88 Pa. St. 42. 32 Am. Rep. 417;

1885, State v. Chute, 34 Minn. 135. See note in 7 Eng. Rul. Cases, pp. 350-3.

2. A majority of a body composed of a definite number of members must

be present to constitute a quorum: 1693, Hascard v. Somanv, Freem. K. B.

504; 7 Eng. Rul. Cas. 333; 1792, Rex v. Bellringer, 4 T. R. 810; 1823, Rex v.

Devonshire, 1 Barn. & C. 609 (8 Eng. C. L.)

3. Statute, charter or by-laws frequently require a certain number of mem-

bers, or a certain number of shares, to be represented to constitute a quorum;

if so, this number must continue to be present during the meeting: 1827, Ex

parte Rogers, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 526, 530, note; 1898, Rutherford B. S. & C. Elec.

Co. v. Franklin, 57 N. J. Eq. 42, 41 Atl. Rep. 488, s. c. 43 Atl. Rep. 1098.

4. The shares outstanding, and not the authorized but unissued or unsub-

scribed shares, are the ones counted where the quorum is to consist of a "ma-

jority of shares": 1846, Green v. Sevmour, 3 Sandf. Ch. 285; 1897, In re

Election of Directors, etc., 19 Miscl. (N. Y.) 409; 1898, Castner v. Twitchell-

Champlin Co., 91 Maine 524,40 Atl. Rep. 558. But see, 1887, Ellsworth Woolen
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Mfg. Co. v. Faunce, 79 Maine 440.

5. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a quorum will be presumed

to have been present at a corporate meeting: 1817, Commw. v. Woelper, 3

Serg. & R. 29, 8 Am. Dec. 628; 1847, Sargent v. Webster, 13 Mete. (Mass.)

497; 1864, Citizens' M. F. Ins. Co. v. Sortwell, 8 Allen (Mass.) 217.

6. The English courts hold contrary to the case above upon the right of one

man with proxies to hold a meeting: 1876, Sharpe v. Dawes, 47 L. J. Q.

B. 104. Compare also, 1874, Hopkins v. Roseclare L. Co., 72 111. 373; 1886,

England v. Dearborn, 141 Mass. 590.

Sec. 232. Place of meeting.

Willcocks, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 402, 17 Am. D . 525; 1832, Field v. Field, 9 Wend.
394; 1856, People v. Walker, 2 Abb. Pr. 425, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 304; 1866, Qolumbia Bottom L. Co. v. Meier, 39 Mo. 53 ; 1866, Mad.ison Ave. B . Ch . v.
Baptist Ch., etc. , 5 Robt. (::'II . Y.) 649; 1867, Brown v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 5
Blatch. 525; 1878, Crnig v. First Pres. Cb.; 88 Pa. St. 42. 32 Am . Rep. 417;
1885, State v. Chute, 34 Minn. 135. See note in 7 Eng. Rul. Cases, pp. 350-3.
2. A majority of a body composed of a d etinite num ber of n1embers must
be present to co nstitute a quorum: 16\!3, H ascard v. Soman~-, Freem. K. Il.
504; 7 Eng. Ru!. Cas. 333; 1792, Rex v. Bellringer, 4 T. R. 810; 1823, Rex v.
Devonshire, 1 Bnn. & C. 609 (8 Eng. C. L .)
3. Statute, charter or by-laws frequently r eq uire a certain numbe r of members, or a certain number of shares, to be represe nted to constitute a quorum;
jf so, this numbe r must continue to be present during- the meeting: 1827, Ex
parte Rogers, 7 Cow. (N . Y.) 526, 530, not e; 1898, Rutherford B. S. & C. Elec.
Co. v. Franklin, 57 N. J. Eq. 42, 4l At!. Rep. 488, s. c. 43 At!. Rep. 1098.
4. The shares outstanding, and not the authorized but unissued or unsubscribed shares, are the ones counted where the quorum is to consist of a " majority of shares": 1846, Green v. Seymour, 3 Sandf. Ch . 285; l 897, In re
Election of Directors, etc., 19 Misc!. (N. Y..) 409; 1898, Castner v. TwitchellChamplin Co., 91 Maine 524, 40 Ati. Rep. 5.58. But see, 1887, Ellsworth Woole n
Mfg. Co. v. Faunce, 79 Maine 440.
5. In the absence of eyidence to the contrary, a quorum will be presumed
to have been present at a corporate meeting: 1817, Commw. v. Woelper, 3
Serg. & R. 29, 8 Am. Dec. 628; 1847, Sargent Y. W ebste r, 13 Mete. (Mass.)
497; 1864, Citizens' M. F. Ins. Co. v. Sort well, 8 Allen (Mass.) 217.
6. The English courts hold contrary to the case above upon the right of one
man with proxies to bold a meeting: 1876, Sharpe v. Dawes, 47 L. J. Q .
B. 104. Compare also, 1874, Hopkins v. Roseclare L. Co., 72 Ill. 373; 1886,
England v. Dearborn, 141 Mass. 590.

MILLER v. EWER.1

1847. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 27 Maine

Rep. 509-525, 46 Am. Dec. 619.

[Writ of entry to recover land. Demandants derive title from the

Sec. 232.

Place of meeting.

Bluehill Granite Company, through a mortgage purporting to be

MILLER v. EWER.1

executed by the president and secretary of that company. To prove

authority of these officers, the charter granted by the state of Maine,

and the corporate records were introduced in evidence. The records

1847.

showed "that a meeting of the corporators was called for the organ-

IN

J u 01CIAL CounT OF MAINE.
Rep. 509-525, 46 Am. Dec. 619.

THE SUPREME

27 Maine

ization of the corporation under the charter in the city of New York,

and that the charter was there accepted and directors, president and

secretary chosen. The directors by meeting held in New \ ork City

organized and authorized the president and secretary to execute the

mortgage. There w'as no proof of any meeting for the organization

of the company or any election of officers being held in Maine or

that it had ever transacted business there, except by a person acting

as its agent there.]

Shepi.ey, J. * * * The demandants must recover upon the

strength of their own title, not because the tenant does not exhibit a

1 Statement abridged. Arguments and port of opinion omitted.

[Writ of entry to recover land. Demandants derive title from the
Bluehill Granite Company, through a mortgage purporting to be
executed by the president and secretary of that company. To prove
authority of these officers, the charter granted by the state of Maine,
and the corporate records were introduced in evidence. The records
showed "that a meeting of the ~orporators was called for the organization of the corporation under the charter in the city of New York,
and that the charter was there accepted and directors, president and
secretary chosen. The directors by meeting held in New \' ork City
organized and authorized the president and secretary to execute the
mortgage. There was no proof of any meeting for the organi7.ation
of the company or any election of officers being h eld in Maine or
that it had ever transacted business there, except by a pen;on acting
as its agent there. J
SHEPLEY, J.
• • • The clemandants mu~t recover upon the
strength of their own title, not because the t~nant does not exhibit a
1

Statement abridged.
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legal title; and their right to recover will depend upon a decision of

§ 232

MILLER V. EWER.
the question whether the corporation has authorized any board of

directors or other persons to make that conveyance of its estate.

legal title; and their right to recover will depend upon a decision of
the question whether the corporation has authorized any board of
directors or other persons to make that conveyance of its estate.
There is a variety of corporations. It will only Le necessary, on
this occasion, to speak of one class of them, corporations aggregate,
composed of natural persons. It is often stated in book!. that such a
corporation is created by its charter. This is not precisely co1Tect.
The charter only confers the power of life, or the right to come into
existence, and provides the instruments by which it may become an artificial being, or acting entity. Such a corporation has been well defined to be an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in
contemplation of law. The instruments pro\'ided to bring the artificial being into life and actiYe operation are the person's named in
charter, and those who, by virtue of its provisions, may become associated with them. Those persons or corporators, as natural persons, h11ve no such po'vver. The charter confers upon them a new
faculty for this purpose; a faculty which they can have only by Yirtue of
the law which confers it. That law is inoperative beyond the bounds
of the legislatiYe power by which it is enacted. As the corporate
fac11lty can not accompany the natural persons beyond the bounds of
the so,·ereignty, which confers it, they can not possess or exercise it
there. Can have no more power there to make the artificial being act,
than other person s not named or associated as corporators. Any attempt to exercise such a faculty there is merely an usurpation of nuthority by persons <le5titute of it, and acting without any legal capacity to act in that manner. It follows t1iat all votes and proceedings
of p ersons profcsst'ng to act t'n the capacity of corpora/ors, wit en assembled wt'thout tl1e bounds of tlte soverei'g'!Jty gra11tt'ng the charter,
are wholly void.
This is a familiar principle when applied in analogous cases to persons upon whom the law has conferred some power or faculty which,
as natural persons, they do not possess.
The power conferred by law upon executors and administrators
can not accompany their persons beyond the bounds of the sovereignty which has conferred it. Story has collected numerous cases
in note under section 512, in his treatise upon the Conflict of La\.vs,
proving the doctrine to be established both in England ancl in this
country.
The same doctrine prevails respecting the powers of guardians.
Williams v. Storrs, 6 Johns. Chan. 357.
The same doctrine generally prevails in this country, while it does
not in England, respecting the powers of assignees under bankmpt
and insolvent laws. The doctrine is stated ancl discussed and the
cases are collected by Story in his treatise on the Conflict of Laws,
ch. 9, §§ 405 to 417.
If the artificial being called the Bluebill Granite Company may be
considered as having existence and active life in this state, hy proof
of its act within her limits, it vvill be still true that it can not. have
existence without her limits, and of course can not make choice of

There is a variety of corporations. It will only be necessary, on

this occasion, to speak of one class of them, corporations aggregate,

composed of natural persons. It is often stated in books that such a

corporation is created by its charter. This is not precisely correct.

The charter only confers the power of life, or the right to come into

existence, and provides the instruments by which it may become an ar-

tificial being, or acting entity. Such a corporation has been well de-

fined to be an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in

c ontemplation of law. The instruments provided to bring the artifi-

cial being into life and active operation are the persons named in

charter, and those who, by virtue of its provisions, mav become asso-

ciated with them. Those persons or corporators, as natural per-

sons, have no such power. The charter confers upon them a new

faculty for this purpose; a faculty which they can have only by virtue of

the law which confers it. That law is inoperative beyond the bounds

of the legislative power by which it is enacted. As the corporate
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faculty can not accompany the natural persons beyond the bounds of

the sovereignty, which confers it, they can not possess or exercise it

there. Can have no more power there to make the artificial being act,

than other persons not named or associated as corporators. Any at-

tempt to exercise such a faculty there is merely an usurpation of au-

thority by persons destitute of it, and acting without any legal capac-

ity to act in that manner. It follows that all votes and proceedings

of persons professing to act in the capacity of corporators, when as-

sembled without the bounds of the sovereignty granting the charter,

are wholly void.

This is a familiar principle when applied in analogous cases to per-

sons upon whom the law has conferred some power or faculty which,

as natural persons, they do not possess.

The power conferred by law upon executors and administrators

can not accompany their persons beyond the bounds of the sover-

eignty which has conferred it. Story has collected numerous cases

in note under section 512, in his treatise upon the Conflict of Laws,

proving the doctrine to be established both in England and in this

country.

The same doctrine prevails respecting the powers of guardians.

Williams v. Storrs, 6 Johns. Chan. 357.

The same doctrine generally prevails in this country, while it does

not in England, respecting the powers of assignees under bankrupt

and insolvent laws. The doctrine is stated and discussed and the

cases are collected by Story in his treatise on the Conflict of Laws,

ch. 9, §§ 405 to 417.

If the artificial being called the Bluehill Granite Company may be

considered as having existence and active life in this state, by proof

of its acts within her limits, it will be still true that it can not. have

existence without her limits, and of course can not make choice of
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any officers or agents there. It may maintain a suit without those

MODE OF ACTION.

limits, but that does not imply its existence or presence there. It may

also contract without those limits. Being within them it may, acting

per sc. by vote transmitted elsewhere, propose a contract or accept

one previously offered. And it may, by an agent or agents duly con-

stituted, act and contract beyond those limits. But it can neither ex-

ist nor act per se without them, except by the assistance of its officers

or agents duly elected or appointed within them.

The constitution and powers of such corporations were perhaps

more thoroughly discussed and fully considered than ever before, by

any judicial tribunal, in the case of the Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13

Peters 519. C. J. Taney, delivering the opinion of the court, says:

"It is very true that a corporation can have no legal existence out of

the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists

only in contemplation of law; and where that law ceases to operate

and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have no existence. It

must dwell in the place of its creation and can not migrate to another

sovereignty."

The cases of McCall v. The Byram Manufacturing Co., 6 Conn.
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Rep. 428, and of Copp v. Lamb, 3 Fairf. 314, are relied upon as de-

ciding that corporations whose charters were granted by one state

could hold meetings, pass votes and exercise powers in another state.

The question presented in the former case was whether the secre-

tary of a corporation was legally appointed by the directors of a meet-

ing held by them in the city of New York. The charter had been

granted by the state of Connecticut. The decision was in the affirm-

ative.

The directors of a corporation are not a corporate body, are, when

acting as a board, but a board of officers or agents, and they may ex-

ercise their powers as agents beyond the bounds where the corpora-

tion exists. It did, indeed, appear in that case that all the meetings

of the stockholders and of the directors were holden in the city of

New York, but the capacity of the stockholders to act there does not

appear to have been examined or discussed.

In the case of Copp v. Lamb the court did not enter upon an exam-

ination of the question whether the proprietors of common and undi-

vided lands had, by virtue of an act passed by the commonwealth of

Massachusetts, power to organize and act as a corporation in another

state. « » »

That clause in the charter of the Bluehill Granite Company which

authorizes two persons named to call the first meeting of the com-

pany at such time and place as they may think proper can not receive

such a construction as would authorize them to call the meeting at a

place without the limits of this state. Legislative bodies do not

usually in their acts of legislation use language to limit their opera-

tion, but use general language, and the limitation is implied and in-

ferred from the extent of the legislative power. The language used

in that charter does not require any other construction or authorize the

any officers or agents there. It may maintain a suit without those
limits, but that does not imply its existence or presence there. It may
also contract without those limits. Being within them it may, acting
per se, by vote transmitted elsewhere, propose a contract or accept
one previously offered. And it may, by an agent or agents duly constituted, act and contract beyond those limits. But it can neither exist nor act per se without them, except by the assistance of its officers
or agents duly elected or appointed within them.
The constitution and powers of such corporations were perhaps
more thoroughly discussed and fully considered than ever before, by
any judicial tribunal, in the case of the Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13
Peters 519. C. J. Taney, delivering the opinion of the court, says:
"It is very true that a corporation can have no legal existence out of
the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists
only in contemplation of law; and where that law ceases to operate
and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have no existence. It
must dwell in the place of its creation and can not migrate to another
sovereignty."
The cases of McCall v. The Byram Manufacturing Co., 6 Conn.
Rep. 428, and of Copp v. Lamb, 3 Fairf. 314, are relied upon as deciding that corporations who e charters were granted by one state
could hold meetings, pass votes and exercise powers in another state.
The question presented in the former case was whether the secretary of a corporation was legally appointed by the directors of a meeting held by them in the· city of New York. The charter had been
granted by the state of Connecticut. The deci sion was in the affirmative.
The directors of a corporati"on are not a corporate body, are, wllen
actz"ng as a board, but a board of officers or agents, and t!tey may exerdse tl1efr powers as agents beyond the bounds where tile corporatz"on ext"sts. It did, indeed , appear in that case that all the meetings
of the stockholders and of the directors were holden in the city of
New York, but the capacity of the stockholders to act there does not
appear to have been examined or discussed.
In the case of Copp v. Lamb the court did not enter upon an examination of the question whether the proprietors of common and undivided lands had, by virtue of an act passed by the commonwealth of
Massachusetts, power to organize and act as a corporation in another
state. • • •
That clause in the charter of the Blu ebill Granite Company "~hich
authorizes two persons named to call the first meeting of the company at such time and place as they may think proper can not receive
such a construction as would authorize them to call the meeting at a
place without the limits of this state. Legislative bodies do not
usually in their acts of legi sla tion use language to limit their operation, but use general language, and the limitation is implied and in·
ferred from the extent of the legislative power. The language used
in that charter does not require any other construction or authorize the
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844 THE MISSOURI LEAD M. & S. CO. V. REINHARD. § 233

conclusion that it was the intention to authorize that meeting to be

844

held without the limits of the sovereignty. * « *

THE MISSOURI LEAD M . & S. CO. V. REINHARD.

§ 233

Whether the statute provisions of this state and the intention of the

conclusio n tha t it was the intention to authorize that meeting to be
he ld without the limits of the sovereignty. • • •
Whether the statute provisions of this state and the intention of the
legislati ve power, or the general rules of law respecting corporations,
be examined, the conclusion must be the same, that. this corporation
could ho Id no meet ing for the el e ction of its officers or for the regula·
tion of its affairs without the limit s of this state. That all such meet·
ings and proceedings were without right or authority and wholly
void.
If there were no directors de Jure, were there any de facto h a ving
authority to convey the estate of the corporation? • • •
When a co1·poration has held certain persons out to the public as
its di rec tors or officers, tho e d eal ing with them as such and ig norant
of their want of legal power will b e entitled to consider their acts as
binding upon the corporation. And ·wh en there has been an informal
or irregular exercise of an existing power of election, the officers so
elected, until removed, are regarded as officers de facto, and their acts
are obligatory upon the corporation.
But when the corporators have no power at all to proceed to an
election, and when the officers must be considered as assuming to be
such without any election, their acts can not be binding upon the
corporation unless the corporation has held them out in the manner
before stated to be its officers. • • •
(The facts showed that demandants traced their title directly through
deeds from parties having knowledge of and participating in the
organization proceedings.)
Demandants nonsuit.

legislative power, or the general rules of law respecting corporations,

be examined, the conclusion must be the same, that.this corporation

could hold no meeting for the election of its officers or for the regula-

tion of its affairs without the limits of this state. That all such meet-

ings and proceedings were without right or authority and wholly

void.

If there were no directors de jure, were there any de facto having

autlioritv to convey the estate of the corporation? * * *

When a corporation has held certain persons out to the public as

its directors or officers, those dealing with them as such and ignorant

of their want of legal power will be entitled to consider their acts as

binding upon the corporation. And when there has been an informal

or irregular exercise of an existing power of election, the officers so

elected, until removed, are regarded as officers de facto, and their acts

are obligatory upon the corporation.

But when the corporators have no power at all to proceed to an

election, and when the officers must be considered as assuming to be
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such without any election, their acts can not be binding upon the

corporation unless the corporation has held them out in the manner

before stated to be its officers. * * *

(The facts showed that demandants traced their title directly through

deeds from parties having knowledge of and participating in the

organization proceedings.)

Demandants nonsuit.

See note at end of Graham v. Railroad Co., infra, p. 847.

Sec. 233. Same.

THE MISSOURI LEAD M. & S. CO. v. REINHARD.1

1893. In the Supreme Court of Missouri. 114 Mo. Rep. 218-

232, 35 Am. St. Rep. 746.

[Suit to quiet title to lands. The plaintiff, the lead company, was

organized in England. In 1880 it purchased certain mining lands in

See note at end of Graham v. Railroad Co., infra, p. 847.

Missouri, formerly owned by a company organized in Missouri; this

company, having become financially embarrassed, its members, consist-

ing of only three persons, one residing in St. Louis and the other two in

Sec. 233. Same.

London, England, held a meeting in London, England, and there or-

ganized the plaintiff company. While there they held a meeting of

the Missouri company, selected themselves as directors, elected a

THE MISSOURI LEAD M. & S. CO. v. REINHARD. 1

president and empowered him to convey the mining lands to the

'Statement abridged, arguments and much of the opinion omitted. See

1893.

note at end of next case.

IN THE SurRRME CouRT OF MrssouRr. 114 Mo. Rep. 218232, 35 Am. St. Rep. 746.

[Suit to quiet title to lands. The plaintiff, the lead company, was
organized in England. In 1880 it purchased certain mining lands in
Missouri, formerly owned by a company organized in Missouri; this
company, ha ving become fin a nci ally embarrassed, its members, consisting of only three p e r!'ons, one residing in St. Louis and the other two in
London, England, held a meeting in London, England, and there organized the plaintiff company. While there they held a meeting of
the Missouri company, selected themselves as directors, elected a
presid ent and empowered him to convey the mining lands to the
1
'tatt:uieut abridged, argumenls and much of the opinion omitted. See
note at end of next case .
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plaintiff. This was done. One M. had, in 1877, begun suit against

MODE OF ACTION.

the Missouri company and obtained judgment against it in 1S85, and

under an execution issued upon this judgment, the mining lands in

question was sold to Reinhard, who claims title to them. The lower

court directed the plaintiff to pay the judgment and the title to the

land to be quieted.]

Black, C. J. * * * The defendants insist that the deed from

the Missouri company to the English company is void because exe-

cuted and delivered in England.

As our statute provides that the articles of association shall state the

city or town and the county in which the corporation is to be located, it

is but fair and reasonable that acts of the body corporate itself, such as

annualelections ofdirectors, voles to increase or diminish the stock, and

other meetings of the stockholders, should take place at the home office.

But where, as here, there is no prohibitory statute, and all of the

shareholders give their consent, the acts of the stockholders at a meet-

ing held in a foreign jurisdiction are valid. I Morawetz on Private

Corporations (2 cd.), § 484; Taylor on Corporations (2 ed.), § 3S2.

Directors are the agents of the corporation, and it is now quite well
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settled that they may hold meetings and transact business in a foreign

state if they desire to do so unless the contrary is expressly provided

by the charter, by-laws or the general laws of the state under which

the corporation was organized. Morawetz on Private Corporations,

(2 ed.), § 533; Taylor on Corporations (2 ed.), § 381; Railroad v.

McPherson, 35 Mo. 13; Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 422. These

three persons who transacted the business in London held all of the

stock and were the duly-appointed directors. The law of this state

did not prohibit them from holding meetings there, and it follows

that the action of these directors in making the contract for the sale

of the property, and in directing the president to execute the deed, and

his act in delivering it, were and are just as valid as if they had been

performed here at the office of the corporation.

The further contention that the English company had and has no

power to take and hold real property in this state is equally untenable.

Though it was said in Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 584, that a corporation

"must dwell in the place of its creation, and can not migrate to an-

other sovereignty," still it was there held that it did not follow that it

could not do business in other jurisdictions. Though corporations

are mere artificial beings and creatures of the law where organized,

still it is settled beyond a shadow of doubt that they may hold prop-

erty and transact business in a foreign state or country when not pro-

hibited from doing so by the laws of such country. But wherever a

corporation "goes for business it carries its charter, as that is the law

of its existence, and the charter is the same abroad as at home." Rail-

road v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527. * * *

Affirmed.

Note. Compare, 1900, Union Natl. Bank v. State Natl. Bunk, loo Mo. 1)5

78 Am. St. Rep. 560.

plaintiff. This was done. One M. had, in 1877, begun suit against
the Missouri company and obtained judgment against it in 1885, and
under an execution issued upon this judgment, the mining lands in
question was sold to Reinhard, who claims title to them. The lower
court directed the plaintiff to pay the judgment and the title to the
land to be quieted. J
BLACK, C. J. • • • The defendants insist that the deed from
the Missouri company to the English company is void because executed and delivered in England.
As our statute provides that the articles of association shall state the
city or town and the county in which the corpmation is to be located , it
is but fair and reasonable that acts ofthe body corporate itself, suclt as
annual elections ofdirectors, votes to increase or dim inislt the stocl..·, and
other meet£ngs of the stockholders, should ta1~e place at the lt0111e office.
But where, as here, tltere i's no proltibi'tory statute, and all of tlw
shareholders give thei'r consent, the acts of tlte stockholders at a meeting held in a foret"gn jurt"sdiction are valid. I Morawetz on Private
Corporations (2ed.) , § 484; Taylor on COJ-porntions (2 ed.),§ 382.
Dfrectors are the agents of the corporation, and it i's now quite well
settled that they may hold meetz'ngs and transact business in a foreign
state if they desire to do so unless the contrary is expressly provided
by the charter, by-laws or the general laws of the state under which
the corporation was organized. Morawetz on Private Corporations,
(2 ed.),§ 533; Taylor on Corporations (2 ed.), § 381; Railroad v.
McPherson, 35 Mo. r3; Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 422. These
three persons who transacted the business in London held all of the
stock and were the duly-appointed directors. The law of this state
did not prohibit them from holding meetings there, and it follows
that the action of these directors in making the contract for the sale
of the property, and in directi.ng the president to execute the deed, and
his act in delivering it, were and are just as valid as if they had been ·
performed here at the office of the corporation.
The further contention that the English company had and has no
power to take and hold real property in this state is equally untenable.
Though it was said in Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet:. 584, that a corporation
''must dwell in the place of its creation, and can not migrate to another sovereignty," still it was there held that it did I).Ot follow that it
could not do business in other jurisdictions. Though corporations
are mere art~fict'al beings and creatures of tlze law where organized,
still it is settled beyond a shadow of doubt tliat they may hold property and transact business t"n a foreign state or country when not prolzz'bited from dot'ng so by the laws of such c1r;untry. But wherever a
corporation "goes for business it carries its charter, as that is the law
of its existence, and the charter is the same abroad as at home." Railroad v. G~bhard, r09 U. S. 527. • • •
Affirmed.
Note. Compare, 1900, Union Natl. Bank v. 8tR.te Natl. Bu11k, t.J.j ~lo . DO
78 Am. St. Rep. 560.
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Sec. 234. Same.

846

GRAHAM v. BOSTON, HARTFORD AND ERIE R. CO.1

§ 234

GRAHA:'I'[ V. BOSTON, HARTFORD AND ERIE R. CO.

18S6. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 118 U.

Sec. 234. Same.

S. Rep. 161-180.

[Bill in equity in circuit court of the United States, by a stockholder

on behalf of himself and the other shareholders and the creditors, to

GRAHAM v. BOSTON, HARTFORD AND ERIE R. C0.1

set aside a mortgage given by the railroad company upon all its prop-

erty.]

1886.

Blatchford, J. * * * It appears by the bill that the mort-

gagor corporation was chartered by its name by the legislature cf Con-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
S. Rep. 161-180.

I

18

u.

necticut at its May session, 1863; that thereafter acts were passed by

[Bill in equity in circuit court of the United States, by a stockholder
on behalf of himself and the other shareholders and the creditors, to
set aside a mortgage given by the railroad company upon all its property.]
BLATCHFORD, J. • • • It appears by the bill that the mortgagor corporation was chartered by its name by the legi slature cf Connecticut at its May session, 1863; that thereafter acts were passed by
the legislatures of Massachusetts and Rhode Island making it a corporation of those states; that in August, 1863, the Southern Midland
Railroad Company having previously acquired all the franchises and
property of the Boston and New York Central Railroad Company, a
corporation chartered under the laws of Massachusetts, Connecticut
and New York, conveyed all its franchises and property to the Boston, Hartford and Erie Company; and that in November, 1863, the
latter company, under authority contained in acts of the legislatures
of all four of the states, acquired the franchises and prope1ty of the
Hartford , Providence and Fishkill Railroad Company, a corporation
created under the laws of New York, Rhode Island and Connecticut.

the legislatures of Massachusetts and Rhode Island making it a corpo-

ration of those states; that in August, 1863, the Southern Midland

Railroad Company having previously acquired all the franchises and

property of the Boston and New York Central Railroad Company, a

corporation chartered under the laws of Massachusetts, Connecticut

and New York, conveyed all its franchises and property to the Bos-

ton, Hartford and Erie Company; and that in November, 1863, the

latter company, under authority contained in acts of the legislatures

of all four of the states, acquired the franchises and property of the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Hartford, Providence and Fishkill Railroad Company, a corporation

created under the laws of New York, Rhode Island and Connecticut.

•**

The first ground alleged in the bill for declaring the mortgage in-

valid is, that it was authorized and made at a meeting of the share-

holders of the company held in the city of New York; that it was not a

corporation of New York, but was a corporation of Connecticut, Massa-

chusetts and Rhode Island; and that, therefore, the meeting was ille-

gal and the mortgage void. The circuit court held that the corpora-

tion was a New York corporation; that the meeting was lawfully

• • •

held; and that its proceedings were valid and binding on the company.

••«

The first ground alleged in the bill for declaring the mortgage invalid is, that it was authorized and made at a meeting of the shareholders of the company h eld in the city of New York; that it was not a
corporation of New York, but was a corporation of Connecticut, 1'.1assachusetts and Rhode Island; and that, therefore, the meeting was illegal and the mortgage void. The circuit court held that the corporation was a New York corporation; that the meeting was lawfully
held; and that its proceedings were valid and binding on the company.

That a meeting in one of several states of the stockholders of a

corporation chartered by all those states is valid in respect to the prop-

erty of the corporation in all of them without the necessity of a repeti-

tion of the meeting in any other of those states is, we think, a sound

proposition, whether it be or be not true that proceedings of persons

professing to act as corporators, when assembled without the bounds

of the sovereignty granting the charter, are void. Miller v. Ewer,

27 Maine =509. There is no principle which requires that the cor-

• • •

porators of this consolidated corporation should meet in more than one

of the states in which it has a domicile in order to the validity of a

That a meeting in one of several states of the stockholders of a
corporation chartered by all those states is valid in respect to the property of the corporation in all of them without the necessity of a repetition of the meeting in any other of those states is, we think, a sound
proposition, v>hether it be or be not true that proceedings of persons
professing to act as corporators, when assembled without the bounds
of the sovereignty granting the charter, are void. Miller v. Ewer,
27 Maine 509. There is no principle which requires that the corp orntors of this consolidated corporation s hould meet in more than one
of the states in which it h as a domicile in order to the validity of a
corporate act. • • •
The Boston, Hartford and Erie Company, though made up of dis-

corporate act. * * *

The Boston, Hartford and Erie Company, though made up of dis-

1 Statement of facta greatly abridged. Only part of the opinion relating to

the single point is given, and this is rearranged and transposed.

1

Statement of facts greatly abridged.

Only part o.f the opinion relating to

the single point is given, and this is rearranged and transposed.
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tinct coiporations, chartered by the legislatures of different states, had

a capital stock which was a unit, and only one set of shareholders, who

had an interest by virtue of their ownership of shares of such stock in

all of its property everywhere. In its organization and action and the

practical management of its property it was one corporation, having

one board of directors, though in its relations to any state it was a

separate corporation, governed by the laws of that state as to its prop-

erty therein. It, therefore, had a domicile in each state, and the

corporators or shareholders could, in the -absence of any statutory pro-

vision to the contrary, hold meetings and transact corporate business

in any one state, so as to bind the corporation in respect to its prop-

erty everywhere. Bridge Co. v. Mayer, 31 Ohio St. 317; Pierce on

Railroads, 20. * * *

Affirmed.

Note. 1. A great number of decisions hold that business done at an organi-

zation meeting, or other meeting of shareholders held out of the state creat-

ing the corporation, is void, and of no effect: 1854, Freeman v. Machias

tinct corporations, chartered by the legislatures..of different states, had
a capital stock which was a unit, and only one set of shareholders, who
had an interest by virtue of their ownership of shares of such stock in
all of its property everywhere. In its organization and action and the
practical management of its property it was one corporation, having
one board of directors, though in its relations to any state it was a
separate corporation, governed by the laws of that state as to its. property therein. It, therefore, had a domicile in each state, ~nd the
corporators or shareholders could, in the -absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, hold meetings and transact corporate business
in any one state, so as to bind the corporation in respect to its property everywhere. Bridge Co. v. Mayer, 31 Ohio St. 317; Pierce on
Railroads, 20. • • •
Affirmed.

Water, etc., Co., 38 Maine 343; 1858, Hill v. Beach, 12 N. J. Eq. 31; 1862,
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Hilles v. Parrish, 14 N. J. Eq. 380; 1863, Aspinwall v. Ohio, etc., R. Co., 20

Ind. 492, 83 Am. D. 329; 1874, Bellows v. Todd, 39 Iowa 209, 217; 1874,

Ormsbv v. Vermont Copper M. Co., 56 N. Y. 623; 1876, Mitchell v. Vermont

C. M. Co.. 67 N. Y. 280; 1883, Franco Texan Land Co. v. Laigle, 59 Texas

339 (so held although the charter expressly authorized the business to be

done in France); 1885, Smith v. Silver Valley, 64 Md. 85, 54 Am. Rep. 760;

1890, Mack v. De Bardeleben, 90 Ala. 396; 1890, Welch v. Old Dominion, etc.,

R., 10 N. Y. Supp. 174; 1891, Hodgson v.Duluth, etc., R., 46 Minn. 454; 1894,

Jones v. Pearl M. Co., 20 Colo. 417; 1895, Taylor v. Branham, 35 Flsi. 297;

1895, Craig Silver Co. v. Smith, 163 Mass. 262, on 265; 1896, Duke v. Tavlor,

37 Fla. 64, 53 Am. St. Rep. 232, 31 L. R. A. 484 (this intimates that if the

statute authorized, such meeting would be valid); 1897, Bastian v. Modern

Woodmen of Am., 166 111. 595 (this seems to intimate that statutory authority

might make such meeting valid). 1899, Harding v. Glucose Co., 182 111. 557,

74 Am. St. Rep. 189.

2. Several cases, however, hold that such extraterritorial acts are not

void, but, at least, are sufficient to estop the corporation or participating share-

holders, and third parties can not complain, non-participating shareholders

being the only parties who may object. 1864, Ohio & M. R. Co. v. McPher-

son, 35 Mo. 13, on 26; 1867, Camp v. Byrne, 41 Mo. 525; 1875, Heath v. Sil-

verthorn L. M. Co., 39 Wis. 146; 1880, Humphreys v. Mooney, 5 Colo. 282;

1891, Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417; 1892, Wright v. Lee, 2 S. Dak. 596.

3. There seems to be no doubt but that consolidated companies formed by

the union of several corporations, organized in different states, can hold a

valid meeting in either state, as held in Graham v. R. Co., supra. 1877,

Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Maver, 31 Ohio St. 317; 1888, Ohio, etc., R. v.

People, 123 111. 467.

4. As indicated in Miller v. Ewer, the directors, being only corporate

agents, may hold valid meetings outside the state creating the corpora-

tion. 1827, McCall v. Mfg. Co., 6 Conn. 428; 1864, Arms v. Conant, 36 Vt.

744; 1864, Ohio & M. R. Co. v. McPherson, 35 Mo. 13; 1872, Wood, etc., M.

Co. v. King, 45 Ga. 34; 1874, Bellows v. Todd, 39 Iowa 209; 1880, Humphreys

v. Moonev, 5 Colo. 282; 1881, Parsons v. Lent, 34 N. J. Eq. 67; 1888, Salt-

marsh v. Spaulding, 147 Mass. 224; 1892, Wright v. Lee, 2 S. Dak. 596; 1893,

Brockway v. Gadsden M. L. Co., 102 Ala. 620. But, see, 1874, Ormsby v.

Vermont C. M. Co., 56 N. Y. 623, contra.

Statutes sometimes require the directors to meet within the state creating

the corporation. 1897, State National Bank v. Union Nat'l Bank, 168 111.519.

Note. 1. A great number of decisions hold that business done at an organization meeting, or other meeting of share.holders held out of the state creating the corporation, is void, and of no effect: 1854, Freeman v. Machias
Water, etc., Co. , 38 Maine 343; 1858, Hill v. Beach, 12 N. J. Eq. 31; 1862,
Hilles v . Parrish, 14 N. J. Eq. 380; 1863, Aspinwall v. Ohio, etc., R . Co., 20
Ind. 492, 83 Am. D. 329; 1874, Bellows v. Todd, 39 Iowa 209, 217; 1874,
Ormsby v. Vermont Copper M. Co., 56 N. Y. 623; 1876, Mitchell v. Vermont
C. M. Co .. 67 N. Y. 280; 1883, Franco Texan Land Co. v. Laigle, 59 Texas
339 (so held although the charter expressly authorized the business to be
done in France ) ; 1885, Smith v. Silver Valley, 64 Md. 85, 54 Am. Rep. 760;
1890, Mack v. De Bardeleben, 90 Ala. 396; 1890, Welch v. Old Dominion, etc.,
R ., 10 N. Y. Supp. 174: 1891, Hodgson v. Duluth, etc., R., 46 Minn.454; 18!>4,
Jones v. Pearl M. Co., 20 Colo. 417; 1895, Taylor v. Branham, 35 Fin. 2!li;
1895, Craig Silver Co. v. Smith, 163 Mass. 262, on 265; 1896, Duke v. Taylor,
37 Fla. 64, 53 Am. St. Rep. 232, 31 L. R. A. 484 (this intimates that if the
statute authorized, such meeting would be valid); 1897, Bastian v. Modern
Woodmen of Am., 166 Ill. 595 (this seems to intimate that statutory authority
might make such meeting valid). 1899, Harding v. Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 557,
74 Am. St. Rep. 189.
2. Several cases, however, hold that such extraterritorial acts are not
void, but, at least, a re sufficient to estop the corporatiou or participating shareholders, and third parties can not complain, non-participating shareholders
being the only parties who may object. 1864, Ohio & M. R. Co. v. McPherson, 35 .Mo. 13, on 26; 1867, Camp v. Byrne, 41 !\Io. 525; 1875, H eath v. Silverthorn L. M. Co., 39 Wis . 146; 1880, Humphreys v. Mooney, 5 Colo. 282;
1891, Handley v. Stutz, 139 U.S. 417; 1892, Wright v. Lee, 2 S. Dak. 596.
3. There seems to be no doubt but that consolirlllted companies formed by
the union of several corporations, organize<! in different stn.tes, can hold a
valirl meeting in either state, as held in Graham v. R. Co., supra. 18i7,
Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Mayer, 31 Oh io St. 317; 1888, Ohio, etc., R. v.
People, 123 111. 467.
4. As indicated in Miller v. Ewer, the directors, bein~ only corporate
agents, may hold valid m eetings outside the state creating the corporation. 1827, McCall v. Mfg. Co., 6 Conn. 428; 1864, Arms v. Conant, 36 Vt.
744; 1864, Ohio & M. R. Co. v. McPherson, 35 Mo. 13; 1872, Wood, etc., M.
Co. v. King, 45 Gn. 34; 1874, Bellows v. Todd, 39 Iowa 209; 1880, Humphreys
v. Mooney, 5 Colo. 282; 1881, Parsons v. Lent, 34 N. J. Eq. 67; 1888, Sa ltmarsh v. Spaul<ling, 147 Mass. 224; 1892, Wright v. Lee, 2 S. Dak. 596; 1893,
Brockway v. Gadsden M. L. Co., 102 Ala. 620. But, aee, 1874, Ormsby v.
Vermont C. M. Co., 56 N. Y. 623, contra.
Stat11tes sometimes require the directors to meet within the state creating
lhll eorporation. 1897, State National Bank v. Cnion r\at'I Bank, 168 Ill. 51!-J .
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BANK OF LITTLE ROCK v. M'CARTHY.1

1892. In the Supreme Court of Arkansas. 55 Ark. Rep. 473-

482, 29 Am. St. R. 60, 37 Am. & E. C. C. 671.

Sec. 235.

[Suit instituted by a dissenting stockholder to have a receiver ap-

Directors' meeting, necessity, notice and quorum.

pointed for a lumber company. In August, 1869, this company owed

BANK OF LITTLE ROCK v. M'CARTHY. 1

the bank and McCarthy about $25,000 each, and others about

$6,500. In order to meet pressing claims the president sought a

1892.

further loan from McCarthy, who offered to advance $10,000, pro-

IN

THE

SurREME CounT OF ARKANSAS.

55 Ark. Rep.

473-

482, 29 Am. St. R. 6o, 37 Am. & E. C. C. 671.

vided the company would give a mortgage securing that sum and his

existing claim of $25,000. This necessitated a meeting of directors,

[Suit instituted by a dissenting stockholder to have a receiver appointed for a lumber company. In August; 1869, this company owed
the bank and McCarthy about $25,000 each. and others about
$6.500. In order to meet pressing claims the president sought a
furth er loan from McCarthy, who offered to advance $10,000, provided the company would give a mortgage securing that sum and his
existing claim of $z5,ooo. This necessitated a meeting of directors,
a call for which was prepared and served upon all but one, Field.
Inquiry was made at Field's office, but without ascertaining where he
was. The president then went with a notice of the meeting to Field's
residence, and finding no one there, inserted it between the door and
casing and left it. Field ·s family was away, the residence was unoccupied at the time, except by a man who slept there , and the notice
was not received by Field. The meeting was held, and all of the directors (there being five), except Field, were present. At this meeting
it wns determined by a vote of three to one that the mortgage should
b e made to M cCarthy. The shareholders were the same as the directors, and the dissenting director as a shareholder instituted the suit the
same day the mortgage was executed. A receiver was appointed and
it then became apparent the company was insolvent. The bank put
in a cross-bill asking that the mortgage to McCarthy be canceled,
and McCa1thy asked a foreclosure and secured a decree to that effect.
The bank appealed. J
HF.Ml NGW AY, ].
•
•
•
The statute provides that the stock,
property, affairs and business of business corporations shall be managed by not less than three directors (Mansf. Dig., § 964); and,
further, that a majority of the directors , convened according to the
hy-laws, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business
(section 969).
In the case of Simon v. Sevier Association, 54 Ark. 58, the validity
of a general assignment authorized hy a majority of the directors at a
meeting of which the absent directors had no notice was considered ,
and we held that the statute authorized a majority to act only at a
meeting legally convened, and that it was essential to a legal meeting
that it be calle<l in accordance with the by-laws or rules of the corporation or upon due and legal notice given to each of the members.
There \Va no contention that notice could not have been served on
e:-ich me mber, and no expression of the law where that was a fact.
Subsequent in,·estigation has not altered our views as then expressed,
but we arc com·inced that they are in a line with the authority of textwriters and adjudged ca es. If the rule were otherwise, the rights

a call for which was prepared and served upon all but one, Field.

Inquiry was made at Field's office, but without ascertaining where he

was. The president then went with a notice of the meeting to Field's

residence, and finding no one there, inserted it between the door and

casing and left it. Field's family w:as away, the residence was un-

occupicd at the time, except by a man who slept there, and the notice

was not received by Field. The meeting was held, and all of the direc-

tors (there being five), except Field, were present. At this meeting

it was determined by a vote of three to one that the mortgage should
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be made to McCarthy. The shareholders were the same as the direc-

tors, and the dissenting director as a shareholder instituted the suit the

same day the mortgage was executed. A receiver was appointed and

it then became apparent the company was insolvent. The bank put

in a cross-bill asking that the mortgage to McCarthy be canceled,

and McCarthy asked a foreclosure and secured a decree to that effect.

The bank appealed.]

Hemingway, J. * * * The statute provides that the stock,

property, affairs and business of business corporations shall be man-

aged by not less than three directors (Mansf. Dig., § 964); and,

further, that a majority of the directors, convened according to the

by-laws, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business

(section 969).

In the case of Simon v. Sevier Association, 54 Ark. 58, the validity

of a general assignment authorized by a majority of the directors at a

meeting of which the absent directors had no notice was considered,

and we held that the statute authorized a majority to act only at a

meeting legally convened, and that it was essential to a legal meeting

that it be called in accordance with the by-laws or rules of the corpo-

ration or upon due and legal notice given to each of the members.

There was no contention that notice could not have been served on

each member, and no expression of the law where that was a fact.

Subsequent investigation has not altered our views as then expressed,

but we are convinced that they are in a line with the authority of text-

writers and adjudged cases. If the rule were otherwise, the rights

1 Statement abridged. Arguments and part of opinion omitted.

1

Statement abridged.

Argu111ents und part of opinion omitted .
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and interests of minority holders would be liable to great abuse.

MODE OF ACTIOX.

Even majorities might suffer, for, by absence of some of their num-

ber, the minority might become the majority, hold a meeting without

notice to the absentees and change the entire course or policy of the

business, or do acts destructive to its prosperity or future existence.

Such abuse of corporate power is not unknown to the history of cor-

porations, and its evidence is found in the records of the courts.

Rules intended to check or prevent it should be rigidly observed,

except where reason requires that they be relaxed. The wisdom of

the rule and the dangers incident to any other are very clearly stated

by Judge Brewer in the case of the Paola & Fall River R. Co. v.

Comrs. of Anderson Co., 16 Kan. 309, where he shows that if any

other rule prevailed it would be possible, with a board composed of

twelve members, for four directors to convene a meeting of seven by

giving notice to three and witholding it from five others, and to bind

the corporation to acts condemned by eight. That case called for no

expression as to the law in cases of emergency where notice to any

director was impracticable, and contains no discussion of such cases,

but there is an intimation that the rule might admit exceptions in such
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cases.

That such cases may arise as will justify and require exceptions to

be made, is a conclusion to which reflection inevitably leads. In fact,

it is conceded by* the learned counsel for the appellant "that a director

can not put a stop to corporate business by simply leaving its jurisdic-

tion"; and that, "if after a reasonable search the parties are unable

to find him, the remaining directors may attend to the necessary

affairs." This indicates that the exception arises upon a concurrence

of three conditions, first, the impracticability of notice; second, the

existence of an emergency for action; and third, a reasonable neces-

sity for the action taken.

Without committing the court to a full approval of this form of •

stating the exception, we may say that it seems to be substantially

correct. Where notice is practicable, it must be given; it can be dis-

pensed with when impracticable, only to meet an emergency; and the

act done must appear reasonably necessary to the welfare of the cor-

poration. If the act is merely proper, but not necessary, or if it ap-

pear that it may become necessary, but the necessity is not present, the

rule should not yield, for in such cases notice may become practica-

ble, and the presence of the absent director be secured before the ne-

cessity arises or the emergency is present. Such we consider the

rule deducible from the case of Chase v. Tuttle. 55 Conn. 455, relied

upon by the appellee. For it had been held in earlier decisions of

that court that a meeting attended by a majority of the directors, of

which the minority had no notice, was not lawful, and it does not ap-

pear that there was any intention to overrule those decisions. Stow

v. Wyse, 7 Conn. 214; s. c, 18 Am. Dec. 99.1 The learned judge

who delivered the opinion in that case says that "the exigency de-

manded immediate action to save the property and to save expense,"

1 Supra, p. 835.

54—Wil. Cases.

and interests of minority holders would be liable to great abuse.
Even majorities might suffer, for, by absence of some of their number, the minority might become the majority, hold a meeting without
notice to the absentees and change the entire course or policy of the
business, or do acts destructive to its prosperity or future existence.
Such abuse of corporate power is not unknown to the history of corporations, and its evidence is found in the records of the courts.
Rules intended to check or prevent it should be rigidly observed,
except where reason requires that they be relaxed. The wisdom of
the rule and the dangers incident to any other are very clearly stated
by Judge Brewer in the case of the Paola & Fall River R. Co. v.
Com rs. of Anderson Co., 16 Kan. 309, where he shows that if any
other rule prevailed it would be possible, with a board composed of
twelve members, for four directors to convene a meeting of seven by
giving notice to three and witholding it from five others, and to bind
the corporation to acts condemned by eight. That case called for no
expression as to the law in cases of emergency where notice to any
director was impracticable, and cont~ins no discussion of such cases,
but there is an intimation that the rule might admit exceptions in such
cases.
That such cases may arise as will justify and require exceptions to
be made, is a conclusion to which reflection inevitably leads. In fact,
it is conceded by the learned counsel for the appellant "that a director
can not put a stop to corporate business by simply leaving its jurisdiction"; and that, "if after a reasonable search the parties are unable
to find him, the remaining directors may attend to the necessary
affairs." This indicates that the exception arises upon a concuITence
of .three conditions, first, the impracticability of notice; second, the
existence of an emergency for action; and third, a reasonable necessity for the action taken.
Without committing the court to a full approval of this form of
stating the exception, we may say that it seems to be substantially
correct. Where notice ·is practicable, it must be given; it can be di'spensed with wizen i'mpracti'cable, only to meet an emergency; and the
act done must appear reasonably necessary to the welfare of the corporatt'on. If the act i's merely proper, but not necessary, or if z't appear that t't may become necessary, but the necessity i's not present , the
rule should not yi'eld, for i'n s_uch cases notice may become practi'cable, and the presence of the absent di'rector be secu'r ed before the ne-·
cessi'ty arises or the emergency is present. Such we consider the
ruloe deducible from the case of Chase v. Tuttle, 55 Conn. 455, relied
upon by the appellee. For it had been held in earlier deci.s ions of
that court that a meeting attended by a majority of the directors, of
wh ich the minority had no notice, was not lawful, and it does not appear that there was any intention to overrule those decisions. Stow
\". vVyse, 7 Conn. 214; s. c., 18 Am. Dec. 99. 1 The learned judge
who delivered the opinion in that case says that ''the exigency demanded immediate action to save the property and to save expense,"
1

Supra, p. 835.
54-WIL. CASES.
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and the action of the meeting was upheld upon the ground that power
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must be accorded the company to protect itself. • » «

BANK OF LITTLE ROCK V. M'CARTIIY.

Was the notice left at his usual place of residence, at a time when

and the action of the meeting was upheld upon the ground that power
must be accorded the company to protect itself. • • •
Was the notice left at his usual place of residence, at a time when
he and bis family were absent to remain until after the time fixed for
the meeting, notice to him? Counsel insist that it constituted notice,
and to susta in their position cite us to section 52o6, Mansfield Digest;
but that section has reference to notices mentioned in the code, and as
notices to directors of business corporations are not included in such
mention, we think the section inapplicable. The law provides for 110
constructive notice in such cases, and in the absence of suc/1 provision notice must be personal. Such seems to be the rule established by
the authorz'ties. I Beach Corp., § 281; Stow v. Wyse, 7 Conn.
214; s. c., 18 Am. Dec. 99, and note, 102-3; Covert v. Roger·,
38 Mich. 363; I \iVaterman on Corp., § 63, p. 205; I Morawetz
Corp., § 531; Stevens v. Eden Meeting-house Society, 12 Vt. 688;
Harding v. Vandewater, 40 Cal. 77.
Reversed.

he and his family were absent to remain until after the time fixed for

the meeting, notice to him? Counsel insist that it constituted notice,

and to sustain their position cite us to section 5206, Mansfield Digest;

but that section has reference to notices mentioned in the code, and as

notices to directors of business corporations are not included in such

mention, we think the section inapplicable. The law provides for no

constructive notice in suck cases, and in the absence of such provis-

ion notice must be personal. Such seems to be the rule established by

the authorities. 1 Beach Corp., § 281; Stow v. Wyse, 7 Conn.

214; s. c, 18 Am. Dec. 99, and note, 102-3; Covert v. Rogers,

38 Mich. 363; 1 Waterman on Corp., § 63, p. 205; 1 Morawetz

Corp., § 531 ; Stevens v. Eden Meeting-house Society, 12 Vt. 6SS;

Harding v. Vandewater, 40 Cal. 77.

Reversed.

Note. 1. Accord: 1828, Stow v. Wyse, 7 Conn. 214,18 Am. Dec. 99, supra,?.

835; 1839, Stevens v. Eden Meeting-house, etc., 12 Vt. 688, supra, p. 836; 1841,
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Despatch Line v. Bellamy Mfg. Co., 12 N. H. 205, 37 Am. Dec. 203; 1842,Elliot

v. Abbott, 12 N. H. 549, 37 Am. Dec. 227; 1859, Ross v. Crockett, 14 La. Ann.

811; 1876, Paola, etc., F. R. Co. v. Commissioners Anderson Co., 16 Kan. 302;

Note. 1. Accord: 1828, Stow v. Wyse, 7 Conn. 214, 18 Am. Dec. 99, sttpra, p.
835; 1839, Stevens v. Eden .M eeting-house, etc., 12 Vt. 688, supra, p. 836; 1841,
Despatch Line v. Bellamy Mfg. Co., 12 N. H. 205, :n Am. Dec. 203; 1842, Elliot
v. Abbott., 12 N. H. 549, 37 Am. Dec. 227; 1859, Ross v. Crockett, 14 La. Ana.
811; 1876, Paola, etc., F. R. Co. v. Commissioners Anderson Co., 16 Kan. 302;
1~77, Herrington v. Dif!trict Tp. of List.on, 47 Iowa 11; 1878, Covert v. Rogel'!!,
38 Mich. 363; 1878, Choteau Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 68 Mo. 601, 30 Am . Rep 807;
1879, Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43; 1880, Pike Co. v . Rowland, 94 Pa. SL
238; 1882, Buttrick v. Railroad Co., 62 N. H. 413, 418; 1887, Chase v. Tuttle,
55 Conn. 455, 3 Am. St. Rep. 64, and note; 1888, Thompson v. William!!, 76
Cal. 153, 9 Am. St. Rep. 187, and note; 1892, Smith v. Dorn, 96 Cal. 73, 40
Am. & E. C. C. 196; l 895, Smith v. Cornelius, 41 W. Va. 59, on 68; 1895, Fim
Nat' ! Bank v. Asheville, etc., Co., 116N.C.827; 1895, Hamlin v. UnionBrnse
Co., 68 N. H. 292, 44 Atl. Rep. 385; 1897, Limer v. Traders' Co., 44 W. Va.
175, 28 S. E. Rep. 730; 1898, Singer v. Salt Lake City Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 143,
53 Pac. Rep. 1024; 1899, Monroe Mercantile Co. v . Arnold, 108 Ga. 449, 34
8. E. Rep. 176; 1899, Brought.on v. Jones, 120 Mich. 462, 79 N. W. Rep. 001.
See next case, contra.
·
(2) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, not.ice is presumed to have
been properly given and a quorum present: 1847, Sargent v. Webster, 13
Mete. (Mass.) 497, 46 Am. Dec. 743; 1883, Leavitt v. Oxford & G. 8. 1\1. Co.,
3 Ut.ah 265, 4 Am. & E. C. C. 234 ; 1887, Chase v. Tuttle, 55 Conn. 455, 3 Am.
St. Rep. 64, and note; 1890, Rollins v. Shaver Wagon Co., 80 Iowa 380, 20
Am. Rt. Rep. 427; 1894, Benbow v. Cook, 115 N. C. 324, 44 Am. St. Rep. 4.54;
1895, Pauly v. Pauly, 107 Cal. 8, 48 Am. St. Rep. 98; 1899, Balfour-Gathrie
Co. v. Woodworth, 124 Cal. 169, 56 Pac. Rep. 891.
(3) In the absence of stntutory, charter or by-law provieions no qanlific:ition s, except such as the <'orporation may impose. are necessary in order to
be a director. An officer may be, 1847, Sargent v. Webster, 13 Met. 497, 4Q Am.
Dec. 743; a non-resident mny be, 1887, State v . Smith, 15 Ore. 98; an alien.
resident or non-resident may be, 1890, Commonwealth v. Hemingway, 131 Pii.
St. 614; and it has been held where the statute requires a director to be a
shareholder, he may recei\•e shares solely for the purpose of qualifying him
1891, Jn 1·e Argus, etc., Co .. 1 N. Dak. 434, 26 Am. St. Rep. 639.
(4) Delegation of powers by directors:
(a) In general discretionary powers can not be delegated by those to whom
they have once been delegated, and the powers of directors derived from !!hare-

1877, Herrington v. District Tp. of Listen, 47 Iowa 11; 1878, Covert v. Rogers,

38 Mich. 363; 1878, Choteau Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 68 Mo. 601,30 Am. Rep 807;

1879, Baldwin v. Canfleld, 26 Minn. 43; 1880, Pike Co. v. Rowland,94 Pa. St.

238; 1882, Buttrick v. Railroad Co., 62 N. H. 413, 418; 1887, Chase v. Tuttle,

55 Conn. 455, 3 Am. St. Rep. 64, and note; 1888, Thompson v. William?, 76

Cal. 153, 9 Am. St. Rep. 187, and note; 1892, Smith v. Dorn, 96 Cal. 73,40

Am. & E. C. C. 196; 1895, Smith v. Cornelius, 41 W. Va. 59, on 68; 1895, First

Nat'l Bank v. Asheville, etc., Co., 116 N. C. 827; 1895, Hamlin v. Union Brass

Co., 68 N. H. 292, 44 Atl. Rep. 385; 1897, Limer v. Traders' Co., 44 W. Va.

175, 28 S. E. Rep. 730; 1898, Singer v. Salt Lake City Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 143,

53 Pac. Rep. 1024; 1899, Monroe Mercantile Co. v. Arnold, 108 Ga. 449, 34

S. E. Rep. 176; 1899, Broughton v. Jones, 120 Mich. 462, 79 N. W. Rep. 691.

See next case, contra.

(2) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, notice is presumed to have

been properly given and a quorum present: 1847, Sargent v. Webster, 13

Mete. (Mass.) 497, 46 Am. Dec. 743; 1883, Leavitt v. Oxford & G. S. M. Co.,

3 Utah 265, 4 Am. & E. C. C. 234; 1887, Chase v. Tuttle, 55 Conn. 455, 3 Am.

St. Rep. 64, and note; 1890, Rollins v. Shaver Wagon Co., 80 Iowa 380. 20

Am. St. Rep. 427; 1894, Benbow v. Cook, 115 N. C. 324, 44 Am. St. Rep. 454;

1895, Pauly v. Paulv, 107 Cal. 8, 48 Am. St. Rep. 98; 1899, Balfour-Guthrie

Co. v. Wood worth, 124 Cal. 169, 56 Pac. Rep. 891.

(3) In the absence of statutory, charter or by-law provisions no qualifica-

tions, except such as the corporation may impose, are necessary in order to

be a director. An officer may be, 1847, Sargent v. Webster, 13 Met. 497,46 Am.

Dec. 743; a non-resident may be. 1887, State v. Smith, 15 Ore. 98; an alien,

resident or non-resident may be, 1890, Commonwealth v. Hemingway, 131 Pa

St. 614; and it has been held where the statute requires a director to be a

shareholder, he may receive shares solely for the purpose of qualifying him

1891, In re Argus, etc., Co., 1 N. Dak. 434, 26 Am. St. Rep. 639.'

(4) Delegation of powers by directors:

(a) In general discretionary powers can not be delegated by those to whom

they have once been delegated", and the powers of directors derived from share-
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holders are delegated powers: 1832. Percv v. Millaudon, 3 La. 568; 1837,

Bank Commrs. v. Bank of Buffalo, 6 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 497; 1850, Gillis v.

Bailey, 21 N. H. 149; 1855, York, etc., R. Co. v. Ritchie 40 Me. 425; 1866, In re

Leeds Banking Co., L. R. 1 Ch. App. 561; 1876, Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co.

v. Chase, 56 N. H. 341; 1877, Tracy v. Guthrie, etc., Soc, 47 Iowa 27; 1878,

Silver Hook Road v. Greene, 12 R. T. 164; 1892, Weidenfeld v. Sugar, etc.,

R. Co., 48 Fed. Rep. 615; 1895, Temple v. Dodge, 89 Tex. 68.

(6) But if the board of directors is a statutory body, it is frequently held

that its powers are original, and not delegated asthepowerof an agent is, and

so may be delegated by it to others: 1814, North Hampton Bank v. Pepoon,

11 Mass. 288; 1883, Leavitt v. Oxford, etc., G. S. M. Co., 3 Utah 265; 1891,

Sheridan, etc., Co. v. Chatham, etc., Bank, 127 N. Y.517; 1893, Black River,

etc., Co. v. Holwav, 85 Wis. 344; 1896, Burden v. Burden, 8 App. Div. (N.Y.)

160; 1896, Union,' etc., R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 163 U. 8.

564.

(c) Purely ministerial, non-discretionary power mav be delegated: 1823,

Fleckner v. Bank of U. S., 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 338, 355; 1840, Burrill v. Nabant

Bank, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 163; 1848, Stevens v. Hill, 29 Maine 133; 1856, Man-
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chester, etc., R. Co. v. Fisk, 33 N. H. 297; 1864, Arms v. Conant, 36 Vt. 744;

1881, Burleigh v. Ford, 61 N. H. 360; 1893, Skinner v. W. M. & R. M. Co.,

140 N. Y. 217.

(d) Directors can not vote by proxy: 1891, Craig Medicine Co. v. Merchants'

Bank, 59 Hun 561. Neither can shareholders unless specially authorized by

charter or statute or bv law provision: 1812, State v. Tudor, 5 Dav (Conn.)

329,5 Am. Dec. 162; 1829, Philips v. Wickham, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 590; 1834,Tay-

lor v. Griswold, 14 N.J. L. i.i Am. Dec. 33: infra, o. 1591; 1883, Common-

wealth v. Bringhurst, 103 Pa. St. 134, 49 Am. Rep. 119; 1890, Commonwealth

holders are delegated powers: 1832, Percy v. Millaudon, 3 La. 568; 1837,
Bank Commrs. v. Bank of Buffalo, 6 Paige Cb. (N. Y.) 497; 1850, Gillis v.
Baile y,21 N. H. 149; 1855, York, etc.,R. Co . v. Ritcliie40Me. 425; 1866, In 1·e
Leeds Banking Co ., L. R. 1 Ch. App. 561; 1876, Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
v. Chase, 56 N. H. 341; 1877, Tracy v. Guthrie, etc., Soc., 47 Iowa 27; 1878,
Silver Hook Road v. Greene, 12 R. I. 164; 1892, Weideufeld v. Sugar, etc.,
R. Co., 48 Fer!. Rep. 615; 1895, Temple v. Dodge, 89 Tex. 68.
(b) But if the board of directors is a statutory body, it is frequently held
that its powers are original, and not delegated as the power of an agent is, and
so may be delegated by it to others: 1814, North Hampton Bank v. Pepoon,
11 .Mass. 288; 1883, Leavitt v. Oxford, etc., G. S. M. Co., 3 Utah 265; 1891,
Sheridan, etc., Co. v. Chatham, etc., Bank, 127 N. Y. 517; 1893, Black River,
etc., Co. v. lfo!way, 85 Wis. 344; 1896,_Burden v. Burden, 8 App. Div. (N.Y.)
160; 1896, Umon, etc., R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 163 U. S.
564.
(c) Purely ministerial, non-discretionary power may be delegated: 1823,
Fleckner v. Bank of U . S., 8 Wheat. CU. S.) 338, 355; 1840, Burrill v. Na.hunt
Bank, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 163; 1848, Stevens v. Hill, 29 Maine 133; 1856, Manchester, etc., R. Co. v. Fisk, 33 N. H. 297; 1864, Arms v. Conant, 36 Vt. 744;
1881, Barli>igh v. Ford, 61 N. H. 360; 1893, Skinner v. W. M. & R. M. Co.,
140 N. Y. 217.
(d) Directors can not vote by proxy: 1891, Craig Medicine Co. v. Merchants'
Bank, 59 Hun 561. Neither can shareholders unless specially authorized by
charter or statute or by law provision: 1812, St11te v. Tndor, fi Day <Conn.)
329, 5 Am. Dec. 162; 182P, Philips v. Wickham, l Paige ( N. Y.) fi90; 1834, Taylor v. Griswold, H N. J. L. :t~:: . ,;. 1 ·\ m. I > r~ . B:'l: i11frn . o. 15~n; 1883, Commonweafth v. Bringhurst, 103 Pa. St. 134, 49 Am. Rep. 119; 1890, Commonwealth
v. Detwiller, 131 ~a. St. 614, 1 L. R. A. 357.

v. Detwiller, 131 Pa. St. 614, 7 L. R. A. 357.

Sec. 236. Same.

EDGERLY v. EMERSON.1

1851. In the Superior Court of Judicature of New Hamp-

Sec. 236. Same.

shire; 23 N. H. Rep. 555-573, 55 Am. D. 207.

EDGERLY v. EMERSON.1

[The Rochester bank had obtained a judgment against Jones, Rich-

ards and Legro. Execution was levied by Edgerly, as deputy sheriff,

upon the goods of Jones, and these were delivered to Emerson for safe

1851.

IN

THE SUPERIOR CouRT OF JumcATURE OF NEW

SHIRE;

keeping. Legro as surety for Jones paid the judgment, and the execu-

23 N. H. Rep. 555-573,

55

HAMP·

Am. D. 207.

tion was discharged in writing on its back by the cashier of the bank.

Edgerly, relying upon a later assignment of the bank to Legro, de-

manded the goods of Emerson, who failed to deliver them. Edgerly

then sued him, alleging the goods were lost by Emerson's negligence,

and proposed to show that the discharge was written upon the execu-

tion through mistake, and contrary to the agreement of the parties,

and that the same was intended, and supposed at the time it vvas exe-

cuted, to be an assignment of said execution to Legro; and to prove

this he offered the testimony of John McDuffie, Jr., who signed said

discharge, to which the defendant objected, but which the court ad-

mitted.

The plaintiff proposed to show by parol that it was agreed between

1 Statement abridged; arguments and part of opinion omitted.

[The Rochester bank had obtained a judgment against Jones, Richards and Legro. Execution was levied by Edgerly, as deputy sheriff,
upon the goods of Jones, and these were delivered to Emerson for safe
keeping. Legro as surety for Jones paid the judgment, and the execution was discharged in writing on its back by the cashier of the bank.
Edgerly, relying upon a later assignment of the bank to Legro, demanded the goods of Emerson, who failed to deliver them. Edgerly
then sued him, alleging the goods were lost by Emerson's negligence,
and proposed to show that the discharge was written upon the execution through mistake, and contrary to the agreement of the parties,
and that the same was intended, and supposed at the time it was executed, to be an assignment of said execution to Legro; and to prove
this he offered the testimony of John McDuffie, Jr., who signed said
discharge, to which the defendant objected, but which the court admitted .
The plaintiff proposed to show by parol that it was agreed between
1

Statement abridged; arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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the bank and Legro that Lcgro should pay to the bank the amount

of the execution, and the bank, by its cashier, McDuffie, should as-

the bank and Legro that Legro should pay to the bank the amount
of the execution, and the bank, by its cashier, McDuffie, should assign to him the execution, and all its rights, as against Jones, at the
same time that the discharge was written upon the execution; but n<>
vote was passed upon the subject.
The defendant objected that the proceedings of the directors could
be proved by the records alone; but the court decided that if the
directors agreed in any matter of business, it was not necessary that
any formal question should be put, or vote passed; and that if their
agreement was not recorded, it might be shown by parol.
It appeared that the meeting of the directors. last referred to, was a
special meeting, and that only four of the seven directors were present or notified. The defendant objected to the meeting as illegal,
but the court ruled that if a quorum were present, the proceedings
were valid.]
BELL, J.
• • • It was also objected that the meeting of the
directors, on whose action the plaintiff relies, was illegal and their
proceedings invalid, because it was a special meeting at which only
four of the seven directors were present or notified. In the case of
The Despatch Linc of Packets v. The Bellamy Manufacturing Company, 12 N. H. Rep. 205, certain questions were determined in relation to the powers of the directors of corporations, by which we
feel bound to abide. The case was considered with great care and
ability. In that case it was held:
I. That if the authority of the directors, to manage and exercise a
general superintendence and control over the affairs of the corporation, had been conferred by the cha11er itself, it would have been in
the nature of an original corporate power, in a definite number, and a
majority of the whole number being duly assembled at a regular
meeting might act by major vote of those present.
II. That where the by-laws of a private corporation confer upon
the directors power to act in behalf of the corporation without special
limitation as to the manner, a majority may act within the scope of
the authority given to the board and bind the corporation, either
where there is a consultation of all together and a concurrence of a
majority or where there is a regular meeting at which . all might be
present, and a majority actually meet and act by major vote.
III. That the :1Ct of a majority of such board, in the case last supposed, noes not bind the corporation, unless
1. There was an assent of all the directors at a meeting, or, perltaps, separately obtained.
2. Or there was a meeting and consultation of the whole board
and a vote of a majority.
3. Or a meeting held at some regular period, at which a majority
were present and acted by a major vote.
4. Or a meeting regularly notified, at which a majority assembled
and acted by major vote.
IV. When the ;:ict purports to be the act of the board, it may be
presumed it was the act of a majority until the contrary is shown. • •

sign to him the execution, and all its rights, as against Jones, at the

same time that the discharge was written upon the execution; but no

vote was passed upon the subject.

The defendant objected that the proceedings of the directors could

be proved by the records alone; but the court decided that if the

directors agreed in any matter of business, it was not necessary that

any formal question should be put, or vote passed; and that if their

agreement was not recorded, it might be shown by parol.

It appeared that the meeting of the directors, last referred to, was a

special meeting, and that only four of the seven directors were pres-

ent or notified. The defendant objected to the meeting as illegal,

but the court ruled that if a quorum were present, the proceedings

were valid.]

Bell, J. * * * It was also objected that the meeting of the

directors, on whose action the plaintiff relies, was illegal and their

proceedings invalid, because it was a special meeting at which only
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four of the seven directors were present or notified. In the case of

The Despatch Line of Packets v. The Bellamy Manufacturing Com-

pany, 12 N. H. Rep. 205, certain questions were determined in rela-

tion to the powers of the directors of corporations, by which we

feel bound to abide. The case was considered with great care and

ability. In that case it was held:

I. That if the authority of the directors, to manage and exercise a

general superintendence and control over the affairs of the corpora-

tion, had been conferred by the charter itself, it would have been in

the nature of an original corporate power, in a definite number, and a

majority of the whole number being duly assembled at a regular

meeting might act by major vote of those present.

II. That where the by-laws of a private corporation confer upon

the directors power to act in behalf of the corporation without special

limitation as to the manner, a majority may act within the scope of

the authority given to the board and bind the corporation, either

where there is a consultation of all together and a concurrence of a

majority or where there is a regular meeting at which all might be

present, and a majority actually meet and act by major vote.

III. That the act of a majority of such board, in the case last sup-

posed, does not bind the corporation, unless

1. There was an assent of all the directors at a meeting, or, per-

haps, separately obtained.

2. Or there was a meeting and consultation of the whole board

and a vote of a majority.

3. Or a meeting held at some regular period, at which a majority

were present and acted by a major vote.

4. Or a meeting regularly notified, at which a majority assembled

and acted by major vote.

IV. When the act purports to be the act of the board, it may be

presumed it was the act of a majority until the contrary is shown. • *
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But this applies only to a regular meeting, which is a stated meet-

ing, at which all have, of course, the needful notice and opportunity

to be present, or a special meeting, at which all have been duly noti-

fied to be present. The question which arises in this case is different.

The meeting in question was not a stated meeting nor a meeting at which

all had been duly notified to be present. Fouronly of the seven directors

were present, and no others had been notified. The general princi-

ples applicable to the exercise of joint powers are well settled. When

individuals or corporations give an authority jointly to two or more

persons, in order to bind the principal all the agents must act. Jew-

ett v. Alton, 7 N. H. Rep. 253; Andover v. Grafton, 7 N. II'. Rep.

304. But where a number of persons are by law entrusted with

power not of mere private confidence, but in some respects of a gen-

eral nature, and all of them are regularly assembled, the majority will

conclude the minority and their act will be the act of the whole.

Grindley v. Barker, 1 B. & P. 236; King v. Beeston, 3 D. &E. 592;

Green v. Millar, 6 Johns. 39; Farwell's Petition, 2 N. H.Rep. 124;

Damon v. Granbly, 2 Pick. 345.
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There are, however, many cases where an authority is granted to a

board or to several persons, or a majority of them, or a certain lim-

ited number, either more or less than a majority, who are thereby con-

stituted a quorum. Thus, in the usual form of bank charters there is

a provision that "no less than four directors shall constitute a board

for the transaction of business, of whom the president shall be one, ex-

cept in case of sickness or necessary absence, in which case the

directors present may choose a chairman for the time being, in his

stead." The effect of this clause we deem the same as a provision

that the directors, or any four of them, shall be competent to transact

any business of the bank. Four constitute a quorum, and when as-

sembled possess all the powers of the entire board. * * *

We are, therefore, of the opinion, that where a quorum of the di-

rectors of a bank meet and unite in any determination the corpora-

tion are bound, whether the other directors are or are not notified.

Such, we understand, to be the construction, practically given to

this part of their charters by all our banking institutions, and we think

their convenience requires that it should be sustained. * * *

Verdict set aside on other grounds.

Note. Accord. 1876, State v. Smith, 48 Vt. 266; 1885, Bank v. Flour Co.,

41 Ohio St. 552, on 558-9. Compare, 1898, Troy Mining Co. v. White, 10 S.

D. 475, 42 L. R. A. 549. See, however, contra, cases in note, supra, p. 850.

But this applies only to a regular meeting, which is a stated meeting, at ·which all have, of course, the needful notice and opportunity
to be present, or a special meeting, at which all have been duly notified to be present. The question which arises in this case is different.
The meeting in question was not a stated meeting nor a meeting at which
all had been duly notified to be present. Fouronly of the seven directors
were present, and no others had been notified. The general principles applicable to the exercise of joint powers are well settled. \¥hen
individuals or corporations give an authority jointly to two or more
persons, in order to bind the principal all the agents must act. Jewett v. Alton, 7 N. H. Rep. 253; Andover v. Grafton, 7 N. H: Rep.
304. But where a number of persons are by law entrusted with
power not of mere private confidence, but in some respects of a general nature, and all of them are regularly assembled, the majority will
conclude the minority and their act will be the act of the whole.
Grindley v. Barker, I B. & P. 236; King v. Beeston, 3 D. & E. 592;
Green v. Millar, 6 Johns. 39; Farwell's Petition, 2 N. H. Rep. 124;
Damon v. Granbly, 2 Pick. 345.
There are, however, many cases where an authority is granted to a
board or to several persons, or a majority of them, or a certain limited number, either more or less than a majority, who are thereby constituted a quorum. Thus, in the usual form of bank charters there is
a provision that "no less than four directors shall constitute a board
for the transaction of business, of whom the president shall be one, except in case of sickness or necessary absence, in which case the
directors present may choose a chairman fqr the time being, in his
ste·a d." The effect of this clause we deem the same as a provision
that the directors, or any four of them, shall be competent to transact
any business of the bank. Four constitute a quorum, and when assembled possess all the powers of the entire board. • • •
We are, therefore, of the opinion. that where a quorum of the directors of a bank meet and unite in any determinati<>n the corporation are bound, whether the other directors are or are not notified.
Such, we understand, to be the construction, practically given to
this part of their charters by all our banking institutions, and we think
their convenience requires that it should be sustained. • • •
Verdict set aside on other grounds.
Note. Accord. 1876, State v. Smith, 48 Vt. 266; 1885, Bank v. Flour Co.,
41 Ohio St. 552, on 558-9. Compare, 1898, Troy Mining Co. v. White, 10 S.
D. 476, 42 L. R. A. 549. See, however, contra, cases in note, supra, p. 850.
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Sec. 237. Presumptions.

UNITED STATES BANK V. DANDRIDGE. ET AL.

PRESIDENT, DIRECTORS, Etc., OF BANK OF THE UNITED STATES

v. DANDRIDGE Et Al.1

ARTICLE III.

MODE OF ACTION GENERALLY.

1827. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 12 Wheat.

(25 U. S.) Rep. 64-116.

Sec. 237.

[Writ of error from the circuit court.

Presumptions.

The original action was debt upon a bond, purporting to be signed

PRESIDENT, DIRECTORS, ETc., OF BANK OF THE UNITED STATES
v. DANDRIDGE ET AL.1

by Dandridge as principal, and six sureties, to insure the faithful per-

formance by Dandridge of the duties of cashier of the bank. The

plea was non est factum, the ground of which was that the bond had

1827.

never been approved according to the rules and regulations of the

IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

12

Wheat.

(25 U. S.) Rep. 64-116.

bank. These required the cashier "before entering upon the duties

of his office to give bond, with two or more sureties, to the satisfac-

(Writ of error from the circuit court.
The original action was debt upon a bond, purporting to be signed
by Dandridge as principal, and six sureties, to insure the faithful performance by Dandridge of the duties of cashier of the bank. The
plea was non est factum, the ground of which was that the bond had
never been approved according to the rules and regulations of the
bank. These required the cashier "before entering upon the duties
of his office to give bond, with two or more sureties, to the satisfaction of the directors" in a sum named. Evidence to show the execu, tion and approval of the bond was offered, but upon objection was
rejected by the court. This is the error assigned. J
STORY, J.
• • • It is material to state that the rejection of the
evidence did not proceed upon the ground that it was of a secondary
nature, leaving behind, in the possession of the plaintiffs, evidence of
a higher and more satisfactory nature. On the contrary, the whole
structure of the case shows that there was, in the understanding of both
the parties, no record ever made of the approval or acceptance of the
bond in question, and the principal controversy was whether it could
be established by any evidence short of such record proof.
The propositions maintained by the circuit court were, in substance,
these: First, that the cashier cquld not legally enter upon the duties
of his office, nor make his sureties responsible for his non-performance of those duties, before his official bond was accepted as satisfactory by the board of directors, according to the terms of the charter. Secondly, that such acceptance could be established only by
proof drawn from the records of the board of directors; and if no record had been kept of such assent and acceptance, the bond wa~ ineffectual, and no secondary evidence could be admitted to establish the
fact.
The last proposition will be first considered. The correctness of
it in a great measure depends upon the soundness of the distinction
taken between the acts of private persons and the acts of corporations.
It is admitted, in the opinion of the circuit court, that the evidence
offered would, in common cases, between private persons, have been
prt"ma fade evidence, to be submitted to the jury as proof that the
bond was fully executed and accepted.
But it is supposed that
a different rule prevails in cases of corporations; that their acts

tion of the directors" in a sum named. Evidence to show the execu-

tion and approval of the bond was offered, but upon objection was

rejected by the court. This is the error assigned.]

Story, J. • * * It is material to state that the rejection of the

evidence did not proceed upon the ground that it was of a secondary

nature, leaving behind, in the possession of the plaintiffs, evidence of
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a higher and more satisfactory nature. On the contrary, the whole

structure of the case shows that there was, in the understanding of both

the parties, no record ever made of the approval or acceptance of the

bond in question, and the principal controversy was whether it could

be established by any evidence short of such record proof.

The propositions maintained by the circuit court were, in substance,

these: First, that the cashier could not legally enter upon the duties

of his office, nor make his sureties responsible for his non-perform-

ance of those duties, before his official bond was accepted as satis-

factory by the board of directors, according to the terms of the char-

ter. Secondly, that such acceptance could be established only by

proof drawn from the records of the board of directors; and if no rec-

ord had been kept of such assent and acceptance, the bond was inef-

fectual, and no secondary evidence could be admitted to establish the

fact.

The last proposition will be first considered. The correctness of

it in a great measure depends upon the soundness of the distinction

taken between the acts of private persons and the acts of corporations.

It is admitted, in the opinion of the circuit court, that the evidence

offered would, in common cases, between private persons, have been

prima facie evidence, to be submitted to the jury as proof that the

bond was fully executed and accepted. But it is supposed that

a different rule prevails in cases of corporations; that their acts

1 Statement abridged; much of Story's opinion, and most of the dissenting

opinion of Marshall, Ch. J., are omitted.

1 Statement abridged; mnch of Story's opinion, and most of the dissenting
opinion of Marshall, Ch. J., are omitted.
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must be established by positive record of proofs; and that no pre-

sumptions can be made in their favor of corporate assent or adoption,

from other circumstances, though in respect to individuals the same

circumstances would be decisive. The doctrine, then, is maintained

from the nature of corporations, as distinguished from natural per-

sons; and from the supposed incapacity of the former to do any act,

not evidenced by writing, and if done to prove it, except by writing.

Little light can be thrown on this subject, by considerations drawn

from corporations existing by the common law, or dependent upon

prescription. To corporations, however erected, there are said to be

certain incidents attached, without any express words or authority for

this purpose; such as the power to plead and be impleaded, to pur-

chase and alien, to make a common seal, and to pass by-laws. Com.

Dig. Franchise, F. 10, 13. In ancient times, it was held, that corpo-

rations aggregate could do nothing but by deed under their common

seal. But this principle must always have been understood with many

qualifications; and seems inapplicable to acts and votes passed by such

corporations at corporate meetings. It was probably, in its origin,
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applied to aggregate corporations at the common law, and limited to

such solemn proceedings as were usually evidenced under seal, and to .

be done by those persons who had the custody of the common seal,

and had authoritv to bind the corporation thereby, as their permanent

official agents. Be this as it may, the rule has been broken in upon

in a vast variety of cases, in modern times, and can not now, as a

general proposition, be supported. Mr. Justice Bayley, in Harper v.

Charlesworth, 4 B. & C. 575, said, "A corporation can only grant

by deed; yet there are many things which a corporation has power to

do, otherwise than by deed. It may appoint a bailiff, and do other

acts of a like nature." And it is now firmly established, both in Eng-

land and America, that a corporation may be bound by a promise,

express or implied, resulting from the acts of its authorized agent, al-

though such authority be only by virtue of a corporate vote, unaccom-

panied with the corporate seal. * * *

By the general rules of evidence, presumptions are continually made,

in cases of private persons, of acts even of the most solemn nature,

when those acts are the natural result or necessary accompaniment of

other circumstances. In aid of this salutary principle, the law itself,

for the purpose of strengthening the infirmity of evidence, and uphold-

ing transactions intimately connected with the public peace, and the

security of private property, indulges its own presumptions. * • •

The same presumptions are, we think, applicable to corporations.

Persons acting publicly as officers of the corporation are to be pre-

sumed rightfully in office; acts done by the corporation, which pre-

suppose the existence of other acts to make them legally operative,

are presumptive proofs of the latter. Grants and proceedings bene-

ficial to the corporation are presumed to be accepted, and slight acts

on their part, which can be reasonably accounted for, only upon the

supposition of such acceptance, are admitted as presumptions of the

fact. If officers of the corporation openly exercise a power which

must be established by positive record of proofs; and that no presumptions can be made in their favor of corporate assent or adoption,
from other circumstances, though in respect to individuals the same
circumstances would be decisive. The doctrine, then , is maintained
from the nature of corporations, as distinguished from natural persons; and from the supposed incapacity of the former to do any act,
not evidenced by writing, and if done to prove it, except by writing.
Little light can be thrown on this subject, by considerations drawn
from corporations existing by the common law , or dependent upon
prescription. To corporations, however erected, there are said to be
certain incidents attached, without any express words or authority for
this purpose; such as the power to plead and be impleaded, to purchase and alien, to make a common seal, and to pass by-laws. Com.
Dig. Franchise, F. ro, 13. In ancient times, it was held, that corporations aggregate could do nothing but by deed under their common
seal. But this principle must always have been understood with many
qualifications; and seems inapplicable to acts and votes passed by such
corporations at corporate meetings. It was probably, in its origin,
applied to aggregate corporations at the common law, and limited to
such solemn proceedings as were usually evidenced under seal, and to ,
be done by those persons who had the custody of the common seal,
and had authority to bind the corporation thereby, as their permanent
official agents. Be this as it may, the rule has been broken in upon
in a vast variety of cases, in modern times, and can not now, as a
general proposition, be supported. Mr. Justice Bayley, in Harper v.
Charlesworth, 4 B. & C. 575, said, "A corporation can only grant
by deed; yet there are many things which a corporation has power to
do, otherwise than by deed. It may appoint a bailiff, and do other
acts of a like nature." And it is now firmly established, both in England and America, that a corporation may be bound hy a promise,
express or implied, resulting from the acts of its authorized agent, although such authority be only by virtue of a corporate vote, unaccompanied with the corporate seal. • • •
By the general rules of evidence, presumptions are continually made,
in cases of private persons, of acts even of the most sole mn nature,
when those acts are the natural result or necessary accompaniment of
other circumstances. In aid of this salutary principle, the law itself,
for the purpose of strengthening the infirmity of evidence, and upholding transactions intimately connected with the public peace, and the
security of private property, indulges its own presumptions . • • •
The same presumptions are, we think, applicable to corporation!'.
Persons acting publicly as officers of the corporation are to he presumed rightfull y in office; acts clone by the corporation, which presuppose the existence of other acts to make them legally operative,
are presumptive proofs of the latter. Grants and proceedings b eneficial to the corporation are presumed to be accepted, and slight acts
on their part, which can be reasonably accounted for , only upon the
supposition of such acceptance, are admitted as presumptions of the
fact. If officers of the corporation openly exercise a power which
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rate acts show that the corporation must have contemplated the legal

presupposes a delegated authority for the purpose, and other corporate acts show that the corporation must have contemplated the legal
existence of such authority, the acts of such officers will be deemed
rightful, and the delegated authority will be presumed. If a person
acts notoriously as cashier of a bank, and is recognized by the directors or by the corporation as an existing officer, a regular appointment
will be presumed, and his acts, as cashier, will bind the corporation,
although no written proof is or can be adduced of his appointment. In
short, we' think that the acts of artificial persons afford the same presumptions as the acts of natural persons. Each affords presumptions
from acts done of what must have preceded them, as matters of right,
or matters of duty.
It may be not without use to advert to a few cases where corporate acts have been the subject of presumptions. In the first place,
we may advert to the known fact, that a charter may be presumed to
have been given to persons who have long acted as a corporation, and
assumed the exercise of the powers of a corporate body, whether of
an ordinary or extraordinary nature. This is the case in respect to
all corporations exisling by prescription. Yet the very case supposes
. that no written proof can be adduced of a charter, or of a vote of
the corporators to accept the charter. Yet, both a charter and acceptance are \'ital to the existence of the corporation. They are,
however, presumed, not merely from the lapse of time, but from the
continued exercise of corporate powers, which presuppose their existence. So, in relation to the question of acceptance of a particular
charter, by an existing corporation, or by corporators already in the
exercise of corporate functions, the acts of the corporate officers are
admissible evidence from which the fact of · acceptance may be inferred. It is not indispensable to show a written instrument or vote of
acceptance on the corporation books. It may be inferred from other
facts which demonstrate that it must have been accepted. • • •
In respect to grants and deeds beneficial to a corporation, there
seems to be no particular reason why their assent to and acceptance
of the same may not be infetTed from their acts, as well as in the
case of individuals. Suppose a deed poll granting lands to a corporation, can it be necessary to show that there was an acceptance hy
the corporation by an assent under seal, if it be a corporation at the
common law, or by a written vote, if the corporation may signify its
assent in that manner? Why may not its occupation and improvement, and the demise of the land by its agents, be justly admitted by
implication to establish the fact in favor and for the benefit of the
corporation? Why should the omission to record the assent, if actually given, deprive the corporation of the property which it gained
in virtue of such actual assent? The validity of such a grant depends
upon the acceptance, not upon the mode by which it is proved. It is
no implied condition that the corporation shall perpetuate the evidence
of its assent in a particular 'vYay. At least, if it be so , we think it is
incumbent on those who maintain the affirmative to point out the
authorities which sustain it. No"ne such have been cited at the
bar. • • •

existence of such authority, the acts of such officers will be deemed

rightful, and the delegated authority will be presumed. If a person

acts notoriously as cashier of a bank, and is recognized by the direc-

tors or by the corporation as an existing officer, a regular appointment

will be presumed, and his acts, as cashier, will bind the corporation,

although no written proof is or can be adduced of his appointment. In

short, we think that the acts of artificial persons afford the same pre-

sumptions as the acts of natural persons. Each affords presumptions

from acts done of what must have preceded them, as matters of right,

or matters of duty.

It may be not without use to advert to a few cases where corpo-

rate acts have been the subject of presumptions. In the first place,

we may advert to the known fact, that a charter may be presumed to

have been given to persons who have long acted as a corporation, and

assumed the exercise of the powers of a corporate body, whether of

an ordinary or extraordinary nature. This is the case in respect to

all corporations existing by prescription. Yet the very case supposes
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that no written proof can be adduced of a charter, or of a vote of

the corporators to accept the charter. Yet, both a charter and ac-

ceptance are vital to the existence of the corporation. They are,

however, presumed, not merely from the lapse of time, but from the

continued exercise of corporate powers, which presuppose their ex-

istence. So, in relation to the question of acceptance of a particular

charter, by an existing corporation, or by corporators already in the

exercise of corporate functions, the acts of the corporate officers are

admissible evidence from which the fact of acceptance may be infer-

red. It is not indispensable to show a written instrument or vote of

acceptance on the corporation books. It may be inferred from other

facts which demonstrate that it must have been accepted. » « «

In respect to grants and deeds beneficial to a corporation, there

seems to be no particular reason why their assent to and acceptance

of the same may not be inferred from their acts, as well as in the

case of individuals. Suppose a deed poll granting lands to a coqio-

ration, can it be necessary to show that there was an acceptance by

the corporation by an assent under seal, if it be a corporation at the

common law, or by a written vote, if the corporation may signify its

assent in that manner? Why may not its occupation and improve-

ment, and the demise of the land by its agents, be justly admitted by

implication to establish the fact in favor and for the benefit of the

corporation? Why should the omission to record the assent, if act-

ually given, deprive the corporation of the property which it gained

in virtue of such actual assent? The validity of such a grant depends

upon the acceptance, not upon the mode by which it is proved. It is

no implied condition that the corporation shall perpetuate the evidence

of its assent in a particular way. At least, if it be so, we think it is

incumbent on those who maintain the affirmative to point out the

authorities which sustain it. None such have been cited at the

bar. » * *
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written document. The reasoning upon it, however, was very ably

gone into at the bar, and as it furnishes very strong illustrations upon

the point now in judgment, it could not be passed over with propriety.

In the present case, the acts of the corporation itself, done at a

corporate meeting, are not in controversy. * * *

[After examining the charter and showing that the corporation was

created out of the subscribers to the stock, and that the management

was vested in a board of twenty-five directors, chosen by the share-

holders annually, proceeds:]

It is most manifest, that the corporation is altogether a distinct body

from the directors, possessing all the general powers and attributes of

an aggregate corporation, and entitled to direct and superintend the

management of its own property, and the government of the institu-

tion, and to enact by-laws for this purpose. So far as the act dele-

gates authority to the directors, the latter possess it, and may exercise

it, not as constituting the corporation itself, but as its express statute

agents, to act in the ordinary business of the institution. The direct-
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ors are created a board, and not a corporate body. If the authority

delegated to them can only be exercised by them, when assembled as

a board, with a proper quorum, and not by the separate assent of a

majority of the whole body (on which it is unnecessary here to express

any opinion), still it is clear that their meetings and acts are but the

meetings and acts of a board of agents, acting ex officio, and not the

meetings and acts of the corporation itself. The whole structure of

the charter, and the whole proceedings under it, as well as the by-laws

and regulations which have come under our review, demonstrate that

this has been the uniform construction of the corporation itself, and of

the directors. Indeed, this is believed to be so universally acted upon,

in all the cases respecting banks, which have been judicially decided,

that it is not thought necessary to do more than express our opinion

that such is the true interpretation of this charter. * * *

Assuming, then, that the directors of the parent bank were, as a

board, to approve of the bond, so far as it respects the sureties, in

what manner is that approval to be evidenced? Without question,

the directors keep a record of their proceedings as a board, and it ap-

pears by the rules and regulations of the parent bank, read at the bar,

that the cashier is bound "to attend all meetings of the board and to

keep a fair and regular record of its proceedings." If he does not

keep such a record, are all such proceedings void, or is the bank at

liberty to establish them by secondary evidence? In the present case

(we repeat it) the whole argument has proceeded upon the ground,

as conceded, that no such record exists of the approval of the present

bond. • * •

We ask, upon what ground it can be maintained that the approval

of the bond by the directors must be in writing? It is not required

by the terms of the charter, or the by-laws. In each of them, the

language points to the fact of approval, and not to the evidence by

But the present question does not depend upon the point whether
the acts of a corporation may be proved otherwise than by some
written document. The reasoning upon it, however, was very ably
gone into at the bar, and as it furnishes very strong illustrations upon
the point now in judg ment, it could not be passed over with propriety.
In the present case, the acts of the corporation itself, done at a
corporate meeting, are not in controversy. • • •
[After examining the charter and showing that the corporation was
created out of the subscribers to the stock, and that the management
was vested in a board of twenty-five directors, chosen by the shareholders annually, proceeds:]
It is most manifest, that the corporation is altogether a distinct body
from the directors, possessing all the general powers and attributes of
an aggregate corporation, and entitled to 'direct and superintend the
management of its own property, and the government of the institution, and to enact by-laws for this purpose. So far as the act delegates authority to the directors, the latter possess it, and may exercise
it, not as constituting the corporation itself, but as its express statute
agents, to act in the ordinary business of the institution. The directors are created a board, and not a corporate body. If the authority
delegated to them can only be exercised by them, when assembled as
a board, with a proper qt"orum, and not by the separate assent of a
majority of the whole body (on which it is unnecessary here to express
any opinion), still it is clear that their meetings and acts are but the
meetings and acts of a board of agents, acting ex o.f!ido, and not the
meetings and acts of the corporation itself. The whole structure of
the charter, and the whole proceedings under it, as well as the by-laws
and regulations which have come under our review, demonstrate that
this has been the uniform construction of the corporation itself, and of
the directors. Indeed, this is believed to be so universally acted upon,
in all the cases respecting banks, which have been judicially decided,
that it is not thought necessary to do more than express our opinion
that such is the true interpretation of this charter. • • •
Assuming, then, that the directors of the parent bank were, as a
board, to approve of the bond, so far as it respects the sureties, in
what manner is that approval to be evidenced? Without question,
the directors keep a record of their proceedings as a board, and it appears by the rules and regulations of the parent bank, read at the bar,
that the cashier is bound "to attend all meetings of the board and to
keep a fair and regular record of its proceedings." If he does not
keep such a record, are all such proceedings void, or is the bank at
liberty to establish them by secondary evidence? In the present case
(we repeat it) the whole argument has proceeded upon the ground,
as conceded, that no such record exists of the approval of the present
bond. • • •
\Ve ask, upon what ground it can be maintained that the approval
of the bond by the directors must be in writing? It is not required
by the terms of the charter, or the by-laws. In each of them , the
language points to the fact of approval, and not to the evidence by
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which it is to be established, if controverted. It is nowhere said the
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approval shall be in writing or of record. The argument at the bar

UNITEIJ STATES BANK V. DANDRIDGE ET AL.

upon the necessity of its being in writing must, therefore, depend for

its support upon the ground that it is a just inference of law from the

which it is to be established, if controverted. It is nowhere said the
approval shall be in writing or of record. The argument at the bar
upon the necessity of its being in writing must, therefore, depend for
its support upon the ground that it is a just inference of law from the
nature and objects of the statute, from the analogy of the board of
directors to a corporate body, from principles of public convenience
and necessity, or from the language of authorities, which ought not to
be departed from. Upon the best consideration we can give the subject, we do not think that the argument can be maintained under any
of these nspects.
If the directors had been a board constituted by an unincorporated
company, or by a single person for the like purposes and with the
like powers, it would scarcely occur to any person that the acts of the
hoard must, of necessity, oe reduced to writing before they could
bind their principal. The agents of private persons are not u suall_v
in the habit of keeping regular minutes of all their joint proceedings,
and hitherto there has been no adjudication which requires such a
verification of their joint acts . Yet innumerable cases must have
arisen in which such a principle migbt have been applied \.vith success if it had been ever supposed to possess a legal existence. The
acts of private an<l public trustees, of joint agents for commercial
purposes, of commi ssioners for private objects and of public boards,
mu t have presented many occasions for passing upon such a doctrine. The silence of the books under such circumstances would form
no inconsidernble answer to the argument, connected as h must be
with the knowledge of the loose and inartificial manner in which much
of the business of agencies is generally conducted. There may be,
and undoubtedly there is, some convenience in the preservation of
minutes of proceed ings hy agents, but their subsequent acts are often
ju t as irresistible proof of the existence of prior dependent acts and
votes as if minutes were produced. If a board of directors were created to erect a bridge, or make a canal or turnpike, and they proceeded to do the service, and under their superintendence there were
persons employed \·v ho executed the work, and the board proceeded
to pay them there.for out of funds in their hands, the facts of public
noto riety would be as irresistible evidence of the due execution of
their authority and of due contra cts made and proceedings had by the
board as if the proceedings were recorded in the most formal and
regular manner. Can there be a doubt that in the ca ·es put many
contracts are so varied and rescinded, many nets done and assented to
by the board which never are reduced to formal votes and declarations
and written proofs? We think we may safely say that the sense of
the profession and the course of private business have never. hitherto.
in respect to private agencies and boards, recognized the existence of
any rule which required their acts and proceedings to be justified by
written votes.
Wh at foundation is there for a different rule in relation to agencies
for corporation ? The acts of a ingle duly-authorized agent of a
corporation, within the scope of hi authority, bind the corporation,

nature and objects of the statute, from the analogy of the board of

directors to a corporate body, from principles of public convenience

and necessity, or from the language of authorities, which ought not to

be departed from. Upon the best consideration we can give the sub-

ject, we do not think that the argument can be maintained under any

of these aspects.

If the directors had been a board constituted by an unincorporated

company, or by a single person for the like purposes and with the

like powers, it would scarcely occur to any person that the acts of the

board must, of necessity, be reduced to writing before they could

bind their principal. The agents of private persons are not usuallv

in the habit of keeping regular minutes of all their joint proceedings,

and hitherto there has been no adjudication which requires such a

verification of their joint acts. Yet innumerable cases must have

arisen in which such a principle might have been applied with suc-

cess if it had been ever supposed to possess a legal existence. The

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

acts of private and public trustees, of joint agents for commercial

purposes, of commissioners for private objects and of public boards,

must have presented many occasions for passing upon such a doc-

trine. The silence of the books under such circumstances would form

no inconsiderable answer to the argument, connected as it must be

with the knowledge of the loose and inartificial manner in which much

of the business of agencies is generally conducted. There may be,

and undoubtedly there is, some convenience in the preservation of

minutes of proceedings by agents, but their subsequent acts are often

just as irresistible proof of the existence of prior dependent acts and

votes as if minutes were produced. If a board of directors were cre-

ated to erect a bridge, or make a canal or turnpike, and they pro-

ceeded to do the service, and under their superintendence there were

persons employed who executed the work, and the board proceeded

to pay them therefor out of funds in their hands, the facts of public

notoriety would be as irresistible evidence of the due execution of

their authority and of due contracts made and proceedings had by the

board as if the proceedings were recorded in the most formal and

regular manner. Can there be a doubt that in the cases put many

contracts are so varied and rescinded, many acts done and assented to

by the board which never are reduced to formal votes and declarations

and written proofs? We think we may safely say that the sense of

the profession and the course of private business have never, hitherto,

in respect to private agencies and boards, recognized the existence of

any rule which required their acts and proceedings to be justified by

written votes.

What foundation is there for a different rule in relation to agencies

for corporations? The acts of a single duly-authorized agent of a

corporation, within the scope of his authority, bind the corporation.
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although he keeps no minutes of such acts. They may be. and they
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are, daily, proved aliunde. In what respects do the acts of a board
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of agents differ from those of a single agent in their operation as

evidence? A board may accept a contract, or approve a surety, by

vote, or by a tacit and implied assent. The vote or assent may be

more difficult of proof, by parol evidence, than if it were reduced to

writing. But surely this is not a sufficient reason for declaring that

the vote or assent is inoperative. If a board of directors agree to

build a banking-house, and it is accordingly built, and paid for by

their cashier, with their assent, is the whole proceeding to be deemed

void, because, in the progress of the undertaking, from accident or

negligence, the votes and the payments have not been verified by reg-

ular minutes? But it is said that in the present case the cashier is

required to keep a fair and regular record of the proceedings of the

directors. But if this be admitted, it does not establish the purpose

for which it is used. It is a by-law of the corporation, directory to

its officers, enacted for its own security and benefit, and not for the

purpose of restricting the acts of the directors. If the cashier should

neglect to keep such records, or should omit any single vote, the by-

law has not declared that the vote shall be void and the proceedings
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nugatory. Suppose no such by-law had been passed, would not the

votes of the board have bound the corporation? If they had dis-

counted notes, taken mortgages, advanced money, and bought stock,

by faith of viva voce unrecorded votes, and evidence of the existence

of these acts and votes necessarily resulted from the other proceedings

of the bank, could it be the intention of the legislature that they

should be utterly void? or of the stockholders that any by-law should

operate a legal extinguishment of their title to the property? It seems

to us difficult to imagine that such could be the legislative or corpo-

rate intention. If, in ordinary cases, such an intention could not be

inferred, in order to produce a very strict and inconvenient construc-

tion of the charter, there is still less reason to apply it to the cases of

approval of official bonds. These are taken exclusively for the secu-

rity and benefit of the bank itself, and not of mere strangers. The

approval is matter of discretion in the directors, and that discretion

once being exercised, it is of very little consequence to the bank

whether a written minute of the vote be made or not. All that the

bank is interested in is that there shall be an approval: and it mat-

ters not whether the fact is established by a direct record, or by acts

of the directors, which recognize its prior existence. * * *

To all the authorities cited at the bar on this point, the counsel for

the defendants has made one answer, which he deems applicable to

all of them. It is this, that where no particular form for the expres-

sion of the corporate will is prescribed by law, there it may be in-

ferred from corporate acts; but that where such a form is prescribed

it must be followed. This distinction, he supposes, will reconcile all

the cases. The distinction, if admitted, will not aid the argument.

It may be, and, indeed, is conceded, that no corporate act can be

valid if done differently from the manner prescribed by law as essen-

although he keeps no minutes of such acts. They may be. and they
are, daily, proved aliunde. In what respects do the acts of a board
of agents differ from those of a single agent in their operation as
evidence? A board may accept a contract, or approve a surety, by
vote, or by a tacit and implied assent. The vote or assent may be
more difficult of proof, by parol evidence, than if it were reduced to
writing. But surely this is not a sufficient reason for declaring that
tbe vote or assent is inoperative. If a boar<l of directors agree to
build a banking-house, and it is accordingly built, and paid for by
their cashier, with their assent, is the whole proceeding to be deemed
void, because, in the progress of the undertaking, from accident or
negligence, the votes and the payments have not been verified by regular minutes? But it is said that in the present case the cashier is
required to keep a fair and regular record of the proceedings of the
directors. But if this be admitted, it does not establish the purpose
for which it is used. It is a by-law of the corporation, directory to
its o.fficers, enacted for its own security and benefit, and not for the
purpose of restricting the acts of the directors. If the cashier snould
neglect to keep such records, or should omit any single vote, the bylaw has not declared that the vote shall be void and the proceedings
nugatory. Suppose no such by-law had been passed, would not the
votes of the board have bound the corporation? If they had discounted notes, taken mortgages, advanced money, and bought stock,
by faith of viva voce unrecorded votes, and evidence of the existence
of these acts and votes necessarily resulted from the other proceedings
of the bank, could it be tl:e intention of the legislature that they
should be utterly void? or of the stockholders that any by-law should
operate a legal extinguishment of their title to the property? It seems
to us difficult to imagine that such could be the legislative or corporate intention. If, in ordinary cases, such an intention could not be
inferred, in order to produce a very strict and inconvenient construction of the charter, there is still less reason to apply it to the cases of
approval of official bonds. These are taken exclu sively for the security and benefit of the bank itself, and not of mere strangers. The
approval is matter of discretion in the direc,ors, an<l that discretion
once being exercised, it is of very little consequence to the bank
whether a written minute of the vote be made or not. All that the
bank is interested in is that there shall be an approval; and it matters not whether the fact is established by a direct record, or by acts
of the directors, which recognize its prior existence. • • •
To all the authorities cited at the bar on this point, the counsel for
the defendants has made one answer, which he deems applicable to
all of them. It is this, that where no particular form for the expres-·
sion of the corporate will is prescribed by law, there it may be inferred from corporate acts; but that where such a form is prescribed
it must be followed. This distinction, he supposes, will reconcile all
the cases. The distinction, if admitted, will not aid the argument.
It may be, and, indeed, is conceded, that no corporate act can be
valid if done differently from the manner prescribed by law as essen-
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tial to its validity. If in the present case the statute had prescribed

86o

that nothing but a written vote on record should be deemed an ap-

UNITED STATES BANK V. DANDRIDGE ET AL.

proval of the bond, or that the cashier should not be deemed for any

ti al to its validity. If in the present case the statt. te had presc1ibed
that nothing but a written vote on record should be deemed an approval of the bond, or that the cashier should not be deemed for any
purpose in office until such approval, the consequence contended for
would have follo\ved. His acts would have been utterly void, and any
unrecorded vote of approval nugatory. But the very point in contro,·ersy is whether such written record be necessary by the charter or bylaws, not as a m:ttter of convenience or discreet exercise of authority,
but as a sine qua non to the validity of the act. The cases which
have been commented on by the court do not deny the di tinction, but
proceed upon the ground that, unless positively required by law, a
written vote is not to be deemed indispensable. The court is then
called upon , not to administer a doctrine of strict and sett4ed and
technical law, but to introduce a new rule into the law of evidence,
and to exclude presumptive evidence, not only of the acts of corporations, but of their unincorporated agents. If such a rule be fit to be
adopted it must be upon the foundation of some clear and unequivocal analogy of law, and public policy and convenience. We are not
prepared to admit that it has any such foundation. On the contrary,
we are persuaded that the introduction of the rule itself would be
attended with serious public mischiefs, and shake many titles and
rights which have been consummated in entire good faith, and the
confidence that no such written record was necessary to their validity.
We can not, therefore, assent to the doctrine decided in the circuit
court on this point. • • •
Reversed.
MARSHALL , CH. J., dissenting. • • • The plaintiff is a corporation
aggregate; a being created by law; itself impersonal, though composed
of many individuals. These individuals change at will, and even
while members of the corporntion can, in virtue of such membership: perform no corporate act, but are responsible in their natural
capacities, both while members of the corporation and after they
cease to be so, for everything they do, whether in the name of the
corporation or otherwise. The corporation being one entire impersonal entity, di stinct from the individuals who compose it, must be
-endowed with a mode of action peculiar to itself, which will always
distinguish its transactions from those of its members. This faculty
must be exercised according to its own nature. Can such a being
speak or act otherwise than in writing? Being destitute uf the natural organs of man, be ing distinct from all its members, can it communicate its resolutions or d eclare its will without the aid of some ad·
equate substitute for those organs? If the answer to this question
must be in the negntive what is that substitute? I can imagine no
other than writing. The will to be announced is the aggregate will ;
the voice which utters it must be the aggregate voice. Human organs belong only to indiYiduals ; the words they utter are the word of
individuals. These individuals must speak collectively, to peak corp orately, and must use a collective voice; they have no such rnice,
and must communicate this collective will in some other mode. That

purpose in office until such approval, the consequence contended for

would have followed. His acts would have been utterly void, and any

unrecorded vote of approval nugatory. But the very point in contro-

versy is whether such written record be necessary by the charter or by-

laws, not as a matter of convenience or discreet exercise of authority,

but as a sine qua non to the validity of the act. The cases which

have been commented on by the court do not deny the distinction, but

proceed upon the ground that, unless positively required by law, a

written vote is not to be deemed indispensable. The court is then

called upon, not to administer a doctrine of strict and settfed and

technical law, but to introduce a new rule into the law of evidence,

and to exclude presumptive evidence, not only of the acts of corpora-

tions, but of their unincorporated agents. If such a rule be fit to be

adopted it must be upon the foundation of some clear and unequivo-

cal analogy of law, and public policy and convenience. We are not

prepared to admit that it has any such foundation. On the contrary,

we are persuaded that the introduction of the rule itself would be
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attended with serious public mischiefs, and shake many titles and

rights which have been consummated in entire good faith, and the

confidence that no such written record was necessary to their validity.

We can not, therefore, assent to the doctrine decided in the circuit

court on this point. • « *

Reversed.

Marshall, Ch. J., dissenting. * • * The plaintiff is a corporation

aggregate; a being created by law; itself impersonal, though composed

of many individuals. These individuals change at will, and even

while members of the corporation can, in virtue of such member-

ship, perform no corporate act, but are responsible in their natural

capacities, both while members of the corporation and after they

cease to be so, for everything they do, whether in the name of the

corporation or otherwise. The corporation being one entire imper-

sonal entity, distinct from the individuals who compose it, must be

endowed with a mode of action peculiar to itself, which will always

distinguish its transactions from those of its members. This faculty

must be exercised according to its own nature. Can such a being

speak or act otherwise than in writing? Being destitute of the nat-

ural organs of man, being distinct from all its members, can it com-

municate its resolutions or declare its will without the aid of some ad-

equate substitute for those organs? If the answer to this question

must be in the negative what is that substitute? I can imagine no

other than writing. The will to be announced is the aggregate will;

the voice which utters it must be the aggregate voice. Human or-

gans belong only to individuals; the words they utter are the word of

individuals. These individuals must speak collectively, to speak cor-

poratclv, and must use a collective voice; they have no such voice,

and must communicate this collective will in some other mode. That
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rRESl'MPTIONS AS TO CORPORATE ACTS.

other mode, as it seems to me, must be by writing. A corporation

PRESDIPTIO;-\S AS TO CORPOR.\TE ACTS.

will generally act by its agents; but those agents have no self-existing

power. It must be created by law, or communicated by the body

itself. This can be done only by writing.

If, then, corporations were novelties, and we were required now to

devise the means by which they should transact their affairs, or com-

municate their will, we should, I think, from a consideration of their

nature, of their capacities and disabilities, be compelled to say, that

where other means were not provided by statute, such will must be

expressed in writing. But they are not novelties. They are institu-

tions of very ancient date; and the books abound with cases in which

their character, and their means of action, have been thoroughly in-

vestigated. In Brooke's Abridgment (title Corporation) we find

many cases, cited chiefly from the Year Books, from which the gen-

eral principle is to be extracted, that a corporation aggregate can nei-

ther give nor receive, nor do anything of importance, without deed.

Lord Coke, in his commentary on Littleton (663), says, "but no

corporation aggregate of many persons capable" "can do homage."

"And the reason is, because homage must be done in person, and a
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corporation aggregate of many can not appear in person; for, albeit,

the bodies natural, whereupon the body politic consists, may be seen,

yet the body politic or corporate itself can not be seen, nor do any

act, but by attorney." So, too, a corporation is incapable of attorn-

ing, otherwise than by deed (6 Co., 386), or of surrendering a lease

for years (10 Co., 676), or of presenting a clerk to a living (Bro.

Corp., 83), or of appointing a person to seize forfeited goods (1

Vent., 47), or agreeing to a disseizin to their use (Bro. Corp., 34).

These incapacities are founded on the impersonal character of a cor-

poration aggregate, and the principle must be equally applicable to

every act of a personal nature. * * *

It is stated in the old books (Bro. Corp., 49) that a corporation

may have a ploughman, butler, cook, etc., without retaining them by

deed; and in the same book (p. 50) Wood says, "small things need

not be in writing, as to light a candle, make a fire and turn cattle off

the land." Fairfax said, "A corporation can not have a servant but

by deed; small things are admissible on account of custom, and the

trouble of a deed in such cases, not by strict law." Some subsequent

cases show that officers may be appointed without deed, but not that

they may be appointed without writing. Every instrument under

seal was designated as a deed, and all writings not under seal

were considered as acts by parol. Consequently, when the old

books say a thing may be done without deed or by parol, nothing

more is intended than that it may be done without a sealed instru-

ment. It may still require to be in writing. In 2 Bac. Abr., 13, it is

said, "aggregate corporations, consisting of a constant succession of

various persons, can regularly do no*act without writing; therefore,

gifts by and to them must be by deed." In page 340 it is said, "if

a corporation aggregate disseize to the use of another, they are dissei-

zors in their natural capacity," "as a corporation they can regularly

do no act without writing." * * *

See note at the end of the next case.
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I

other mode, as it seems to me, must be by writing. A corporation
will generally act by its agents; but those agents have no self-existing
power. It must be created by law, or communicated by the body
itself. This can be done only by writing.
If, then, corporations were novelties, and we were required now to
devise the means by which they should transact their affairs, or communicate their will, we should, I think, froin a consi<;leration of their
nature, of their capacities and disabilities, be compelled to say, that
where other means were not provided by statute, such will must be
expressed in writing. But they are not novelties. They are institutions of very ancient date; and the books abound with cases in which
their character, and their means of action, have been thoroughly investigated. In Brooke's Abridgment (title Corporation) ,,.,.e find
many cases, cited chiefly from the Year Books, from which the general principle is to be extracted, that a corporation aggregate can neither give nor receive, nor do anything of importance, without deed.
Lord Coke, in his commentary on Littleton (66b), says, "but no
corporation aggregate of many persons capahle" "can do homage."
"And the reason is, because homage must be done in person, and a
corporation aggregate of many can not appear in person; for, albeit,
the bodies natural, whereupon the body politic co·n sists, may be seen,
yet the body politic or corporate itself can not be seen, nor do any
act, but by attorney." So, too, a corporation is incapable of attoming, otherwise than ~y deed (6 Co., 386), or of surrendering a lease
for years (10 Co., 676), or of presenting a clerk to a living (Bro.
Corp., 83), or of appointing a person to seize forfeited goods (1
Vent., 47), or agreeing to a disseizin to their use (Bro. Corp., 34).
These incapacities are founded on the impersonal character of a corporation aggregate, and the principle must be equally applicable to
every act of a personal nature. * * •
It is stated in the old books (Bro. Corp., 49) that a corporation
may have a ploughman, butler, cook, etc., without retaining them by
deed; and in the same book (p. 50) Wood says, "small things need
not be in writing, as to light a candle, make a fire and turn cattle off
the land." Fairfax said, "A corporation can not have a servant but
by deed; small things are admissible on account of custom, and the
trouble of a deed in such cases, not by strict law." Some subsequent
cases show that officers may be appointed without deed, but not that
they may be appointed without writing. Every instmment under
seal was designated as a deed, and all writings not under seal
were considered as acts by parol. Consequently, when the old
books say a thing may be done without deed or by parol, nothing
more is intended than that it may be done without a sealed instrument. It may still require to be in writing. In 2 Bae. Abr., 13, it is
said, "aggregate corporations, consisting of a constant succession of
various persons, can regularly do no• act without writing; therefore,
gifts by and to them must be by deed." In page 340 it is said, "if
a corporation aggregate disseize to the use of another, they are disseizors in their natural capacity," "as a corporation they can regularly
do no act without writing." • • •

See note at the end of the next case.
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Sec. 238. Execution of contracts.

ZOLLER v. IDE.

Sec. 238.

1871. In the Supreme Court of Nebraska, i Neb. Rep. 439.

Execution of contracts .

This was a bill in chancery, filed to recover the legal title to lands.

ZOLLER v. IDE.

Zoller sought to make his title through a corporation called "The

Sulphur Springs Land Company," by a deed which ran, "I, Thomas

H. Benton, Jr., President of the Sulphur Springs Land Company, do

1871.

hereby convey," etc., and was signed by Benton in the same way.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT

OF

NEBRASKA.

I

Neb. Rep. 439.

The court, by Lockwood, J., held that this conveyance did not

This was a bill in chancery, filed to recover the legal title to lands.
Zoller sought to make his title through a corporation called "The
Sulphur Springs Land Company," by a deed which ran, "I, Thomas
H. Benton, Jr., President of the Sulphur Springs Land Company, do
hereby convey," etc., and was signed by Benton in the same way.
The court, by Lockwood, ]. , held that this conveyance did not
pass the title of the company, and, therefore, Zoller did not show
title in himself.

pass the title of the company, and, therefore, Zoller did not show

title in himself.

Note. See, as to use of seal, infra, pp. 1136-1153.

1. Corporate meetings, both those of shareholders and directors, being de-

liberative assemblies are conducted in such ways as may be convenient and

agreeable to the members, though, perhaps, in the absence of any specific

charter or by-law regulations, or custom to the contrary, they are supposed to

follow ordinary parliamentary usage: 1829, Phillips v. Wickliam, 1 Paige

Ch. (N. Y.) 590; 1834, People v. Peck, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 604; 1849, Hughes v.
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Parker, 20 N. H. 58; 1851, Downing v. Potts, 23 N. J. L. 66; 1852, People v.

Note. See, as to use of seal, infra, pp.1136-1153.
1. Corporate meetings, both those of shareholders and directors, being deliberative assemblies are conducted in such ways as may be convenient and
agreeable to the members, though, perhaps, in the absence of any specific
charter or by-law regulations, or custom to the co ntrary, they are supposed to
follow ordinary parliamentary usage: 1829, Phillips v. Wickham, 1 Paige
Cb. (N. Y.J 590; 1834, People v. Peck, 11 Wencl. (N. Y.) 604; 1849,Hughes v.
Parker, 20 N. H. 58; 1851, Downing v. Potts, 23 N. J. L. 66; 1852, People v.
Campbell, 2 Cal. 135; 1875, State v. Pettineli, 10 Nev. 141; 1879, In re Horbury, etc., Co., L. R. 11 Cb. Div. 109; 1889, Landers v. Frank St. M. E.
Church, 114 N. Y. 626; 1890, Henderson v. Bank of .Australasia, 62 L. T. Rep.
869.
2. It is not necessary to the validity of corporate action that the proceedings be recorded: 1848, Waters v . Gilbert, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 27; 1859,
Langsdale v. Bonton, 12 Ind. 467; 1891, Handley v. Stutz, 139 U.S. 417; 1892,
New Boston Fire Ins. Co. v. Saunders, 67 N. H. 249 ; 1896, Boggs v. Lakeport,
etc., Assoc., 111 Cal. 354; 1897, Zalesky v. Iowa, etc., Co., 102 Iowa 512, 70
N. W. Rep. 187.
'
3. If corporate records are kept, they are the best evidence of the corporate
action, anci other evidence is not admissible until it is shown the r ecords can
not be obtained: 1817, Hallowell, etc., Bank v. Hamlin, 14 Mass. Ii8; 1820,
Owings v. Speed, 5 Wheat. (U.S.) 420; 1830, Thayer v. Middlesex Co., 27
Mass. (10 Pick.) 326; 1852, Gould v. Norfolk, etc., Co., 63 Mass. (9 Cush.)
338; 1888, Dini v. Valley, etc , Assoc., 29 S. C. 560; 1891, Mullanpby Sav.
Bank v. Schoot, 135 Ill . 665; 1891, Bowick v. Mille r, 21 Ore. 25; 1895. Mandel v. Swan, etc., Co., 154 Ill. 177. But Pompare, 1845, Van Hook v. Somervi lie, etc., Co .. 5 N. J. Eq. 137, 169; 1897, Johnson v. Okerstrom, 70 Minn.
303, on :ms.
4. All corporate contracts and conveyances should be made in the legal
name of the corporation, and be executed by it in its own name, and not in
the na me of the person rep resentini;t it. It is usual, tbongh not necessary, for
th e instrum e nt itself somewhe re to recite that the person who actually represents the corporation has been duly authorized to execute the instrument for
and in the name of the corporation.
fll11 stratio11s . (a) Deed: The following would be proper: Know all men
by theRe present'3, that the A. B. Co., a corporation duly organized and existing under and by authority of the laws of - - , in consideration of - dollars to it paid, etc., does be reby 'l!'rant, etc., unto the X . Y. Co., a corpora·
tion duly organized anrl existing uncie r and by authority of the laws of - - ,
its successors and assigns forever, the fol lowing, etc., etc.
And the said A. B. Co., for itself and its succes1wrs, does hereby covenant,
etc., etc.
In witneBB whereof, th e said A. B. Co. h as hereunto caused its corpornte
name to be signed, and its corporate senl to be affixed, and the same to be at·

Campbell, 2 Cal. 135; 1875, State v. Pettineli, 10 Nev. 141; 1879. In re Hor-

bury, etc., Co., L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 109; 1889. Landers v. Frank St. M. E.

Church, 114 N. Y. 626; 1890, Henderson v. Bank of -Australasia, 62 L. T. Rep.

869.

2. It is not necessary to the validity of corporate action that the proceed-

ings be recorded: 1848, Waters v. Gilbert, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 27; 1859,

Langsdale v. Bonton, 12 Ind. 467; 1891, Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417; 1892,

New Boston Fire Ins. Co. v. Saunders, 67 N. H. 249; 1896, Boggs v. Lakeport,

etc., Assoc., Ill Cal. 354; 1897, Zalesky v. Iowa, etc., Co., 102 Iowa 512, 70

N. W. Rep. 187.

3. If corporate records are kept, they are the best evidence of the corporate

action, and other evidence is not admissible until it is shown the records can

not be obtained: 1817, Hallowell, etc., Bank v. Hamlin, 14 Mass. 178; 1820,

Owings v. Speed, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 420; 1830, Thayer v. Middlesex Co., 27

Mass. (10 Pick.) 326; 1852, Gould v. Norfolk, etc., Co., 63 Mass. (9 Cnsh.)

338; 1888, Dial v. Valley, etc , Assoc., 29 S. C. 560; 1891, Mullanphv Sav.

Bank v. Schoot, 135 111."055; 1891, Bowick v. Miller, 21 Ore. 25; 1895i Man-

del v. Swan, etc., Co., 154 111. 177. But compare, 1845, Van Hook v. Som-

erville, etc., Co., 5 N. J. Eq. 137, 169; 1897, Johnson v. Okerstrom, 70 Minn.

303, on 308.

4. All corporate contracts and conveyances should be made in the legal

name of the corporation, and be executed by it in its own name, and not in

the name of the person representing it. It is usual, though not necessary, for

the instrument iteelf somewhere to recite that the person who actually repre-

sents the corporation has been duly authorized to execute the instrument for

and in the name of the corporation.

Illustrations, la) Deed: The following would be proper: Know all men

by these presents, that the A. B. Co., a corporation duly organized and exist-

ing under and by authority of the laws of , in consideration of

dollars to it paid, etc., docs hereby Arrant, etc., unto the X. Y. Co., acorpora-

tion duly organized and existing under and by authority of the laws of ,

its successors and assigns forever, the following, etc., etc.

And the said A. B. Co., for itself and its successors, does hereby covenant,

etc., etc.

In witness whereof, the said A. B. Co. has hereunto caused its corporate

name to be signed, and its corporate seal to be affixed, and the same to be at-
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EXECUTION OF CONTRACTS .

EXECUTION OF CONTRACTS.

tested by the signatures of C. D., its president, and E. F., its. secretary, being

•

thereunto duly authorized, on this day of .

[corporate seal.] A. B. Co.,

Signed, sealed and acknowledged By C. D., its president, and

in our presence: E. F., its secretary.

Witness:

In Norris v. Dains, 52 0. S. 215 (1894), an instrument worded and executed

as follows was held not to be the act of the company: Know all men by these

tested by the signatures of C. D., its president, and E. F., its secretary, being
thereunto duly authorized, on this-- day o f - - .
[CORPORATE SEAL.]
A. B. Co.,
Si~ned, sealed and acknowledged
By C. D., its president, and
JO our presence:
E. F., its secretary.
Witne11s:

------.

presents, That I, G. F. Baker, treasurer of the S. I. & C. M. Co., by virtue of

the power in me vested by virtue of the vote of directors of said company (a

copy of which is hereto annexed), and in consideration of dollars, etc.,

to me paid by, etc., do hereby sell, etc., to G. W. Norris, etc. In witness

whereof, I, the said G. F. Baker, treasurer as aforesaid, in behalf of said com-

pany, have hereunto set my hand and the seal of said company this eighth

day of, etc.

G. F. Baker, Treas. of S. I. & C. M. Co.

t„ „t JJ- F- Augustus, /Seal. S. I. & C. M. Co.,\

In presence of (j Njcke«on' ( Organized 1864. J
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(Copy of vote of directors, authorizing lease to be made to Norris, and

authorizing the treasurer to execute the same.)

Commw. of Mass., Suffolk Co., ss., Nov., 1864.

"Then personally appeared G. F. Baker, who executed the foregoing instru-

ment, and acknowledged the same to be his free act and deed and the free

act and deed of said company before me.

J. Nickerson, Justice of the Peace.

Some of the older cases, however, hold that a conveyance by an authorized

officer, sealed with the corporate seal, is valid as the act of the corporation.

8ee 1830, Savings Bank v. Davis, 8 Conn. 191 (old cases collected in counsel's

brief); 1832, Leggett v. N. J. Mfg. Co., 1 Saxton Ch. (N. J.) 541, 23 Am.

Dec. 728, note, 746.

But the more recent cases, as well as many of the early cases, approve the

rule above stated. I am indebted to J. H. Brewster, professor of conveyanc-

ing in the law department of U. of M. for most of the following: 1614, Combes'

Case, 9 Co. Rep. 75, 766; 1824, Hatch v. Barr, 1 Ohio 390; 1827, Coburn v.

Ellenwood, 4 N. H. 99; 1847, Ishara v. Bennington Iron Co., 19 Vt. 230;

1848, Bnnley v. Mann, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 337; 1863, Miller v. Rutland R. Co.,

36 Vt. 452; 1872, Merrill v. Montgomery, 25 Mich. 73; 1873, Northwestern

Distilling Co. v. Brant, 69 111. 658, 18 Am. Rep 631; 1876, Hays v. Galion

G. L. & C. Co., 29 Ohio St. 330, on 334; 1880, C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Lewis,

53 Iowa 101; 1882, Merchants v. Goddin, 76 Va. 503; 1883 Eppright v.

Nickerson, 78 Mo. 482; 1887, Galloway v. Hamilton, 68 Wis., 651; 1889,

Alta Silver M. Co. v. Mining Co., 78 Cal. 629; 1890, McElrov v. Nucleus

Assoc., 131 Pa. St. 393; 1891, Danville Seminarv v. Mott, 136 111. 289; 1893,

Brown v. Farmer's Supply Co., 23 Ore. 541, 32 Pae. Rep. 548; 1894, Norris v.

Dains, 52 Ohio St. 215; 1894, Gray v. Waldron, 101 Mich. 612; 1895, Garrett

v. Belmont Land Co., 94 Tenn. 459 (collecting cases as to seal); 1897, Globe

Accident I. Co. v. Reid, 19 Ind. App. 203; 1897, Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo.

1,61 Am. St. Rep. 436; 1898, Lewis v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 77 Mo. App. 434;

1899, Little Saw Mill V. T. & Co. v. Fed. St. R. Co., 193 Pa. 144, 45 AO.

Rep. 66; 1900, New Memphis Gaslight Co. Cases, 105 Tenn. 268, 80 Am. St.

Rep. 880, 60 S. W. 206.

As to seal, see powers of corporation to have a seal, infra, pp. 1130-1153.

(b) Acknowledgment: The American Bar Association (5 Report, 1882, p.

304) recommends the adoption and use of the following form for the acknowl-

edgment by a corporation. According to the last edition of Jones' Forms of

Conveyancing, p. 9, this form has been authorized bv Iowa, Code 1897,

§§ 2959-60; Massachusetts, Acts 1894, ch. 253; Michigan, Public Acts 1895, p.

In Norris v. Dains, 52 0. S. 215 (1894), an instrument worded and executed
as follows was held not to be the act of the company: K11010 all men by these
preset1ts, That I, G. F. Baker, treasurer of the S. 1. & C. M. Co., by virtue of
the power in me vested by virtue of the vote of directors of said company (a
copy of which is hereto annexed), and in consideration of - - dollars, etc ..
to me paid by, etc., do hereby sell, etc., to G. W. Norris, etc. In witness
whereof, I, the said G. F. Baker, treasurer as aforesaid, in behalf of said company, have hereunto set my hand and the seal of said company this eighth
day of, etc.
'
G. F. BAKER, Treas. of S. I. & C. M. Co.
. Augustus,
{Seal. S. I. & C. M. Co.,}
1 n pres e nce 0 f { JJ .. F
Nickerson.
Organized 1864.
(Copy of vote of directors, authorizing lease to be made to Norris, and
authorizing the treasurer to execute the same.)

Commie. of Mass., Suffolk Co., ss., Nov., 1864.
"Then personally appeared G. F. Baker, who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged the same to be his free act and deed and the free
act and deed of said company before me.
J. NICKERSON, Jttslice of the Peace.
Some of the older cases, however, hold that a conveyance by an authorized
officer, sealed with the corporate seal, is valid as the act of the corporation.
See 1830, Savings Bank v. Davis, 8 Conn. 191 (o)d cases collected in counsel's
brief); 1832, Leggett v. N. J. Mfg. Co., 1 Saxton Ch. (N. J.) 541, 23 Am.
Dec. 728, note, i 46.
But the more recent cases, as well as many of the early cases, approve the
role above stated. I am indebted to J . H. Brewster, professor of conveyancing in the law department of U. of M. for most of the following : 1614, Combes'
Case, 9 Co. Rep. 75, 76b; 1824, Hatch v. Barr, 1 Ohio 390; 1827, Coburn v.
Ellenwood, 4 N. H. 99; 1847, Isham v. Bennington Iron Co., 19 Vt. 230;
1848, Brinley v. Mann, 2 Cush . (Mass.) 337; ·1863, Miller v. Rutland R. Co.,
36 Vt. 452; 1872, Merrill v. Montgomery, 25 Mich. 73; 1873, Northwestern
Distilling ~· v. Bran~, 69 Ill. 6.J8, 18 Am. Rep 631; 1876, Hays v. Gali?n
G. L. & C. Uo., 29 Ohio St. 330, on 334; 1880, C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Lewis,
53 Iowa 101; 1882, Merchants v. Goddin, 76 Va. 503; 1883 Eppright v.
Nickerson, 78 Mo. 482; 1887, Galloway v. Hamilton, 68 Wis., 651; 1889,
Alta Silver M. Co. v. Mining Co., 78 Cal. 629; 1890, McElroy v. Nucleus
Assoc., 131 Pa. St. 393; 1891, Danville Seminary v. Mott, 136 Ill. 289; 1893,
Brown v. Farmer's Supply Co., 23 Ore. 541, 32 Pac. Rep. 548; 1894, Norris v.
Dains, 52 Ohio St. 215; 1894, Gray v. Waldron, 101 Mich. 612; 1895, Garrett
v. Belmont Land Co., 94 Tenn. 459 (collecting cases as to seall; 1897, Globe
Accident 1. Co. v. Reid, 19 Ind. App. 203; 1897, Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo.
1, 61 Am. St. Rep. 436; 1898, Lewis v. Pulitzer Pub . Co., 77 Mo. App. 434;
1899, Little Saw Mill V. T. & Co. v. Fed. St. R. Co., 193 Pa. 144, 45 Atl.
Rep. 66; 1900, New Memphis Gaslight Co. Cases, 105 Tenn. 268, 80 Am. St.
Rep. 880, 60 8. w. 206.
As to seal, see powers of corporation to have a seal, inft·a, pp. 11 36-1153.
(b) Acknowledgment: The American Bar Association (5 Report, 1882, p.
304) recommends the adoption and use of the following form for th e acknowledgment by a corporation . According to the last edition of Jones' Forms of
Conveyancing, p. 9, this form has heen authorized by Iowa, Code 1897,
§§ 2959;--60; Massachusetts, Acts 1~94, c!i. 253.; Michigan, Public Acts 189.S, p.
~.ffl; Mrnne!'ota, 2 G. R. 1894, ch . 12; M1ssour1, R. S. 1889, § 2408; New Mexico, Comp. Laws 1897, § 3945. It undoubtedly would be i:mfficient in 111any
other states, though pe rhaps not in all; nnd in any event, if there is any stat-

346; Minnesota, 2 G. S. 1894, ch. 72; Missouri, R. S. 1889, § 2408; New Mex-

ico, Cora p. Laws 1897, § 3945. It undoubtedly would be sufficient in many

other states, though perhaps not in all; and in any event, if there is any stat-
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ute of the state upon the subject it should be consulted and carefully fol-

lowed. The form suggested is:

ute of the state upon the subject it shouhl be consulted and carefully fol·
lowed. The form 1mggested is:
"State of---, connty o f - - , ss:
On this - - dav of---, 19-, before me, the 1mbscriher [insert here the
title of tlte officer]:appeared C. D., to me personnlly known, who, being by me
duly sworn (or a.ffil·rnp.d), did say that he is the president [or other officer _or
agent of the corpomtion 01· association] of [describing the corporation <>r assocwtiun], ancl that the seal affixed to said instrument is the corporate seal of said
l'Orporation Lur aiuwciatiun], and thnt said inst rum.ent wns signed and 8ealed
in behalf Of said corporation [ ur tWiuciation l by authority of its board of directors Lor trustees ], and said C. D. acknowfeclged said instrument lo be the
free act and deed of said corporation [ 01· association].
[In case the corpomtio11 or association has no corporate seal omit the tcor!U

"State of , county of , ss:

On this day of — , 19—, before me, the subscriber [insert here the

title of the officer], appeared C. D., to me personally known, who, being by me

duly sworn {or affirmed), did say that he is the president [or other officer or

agent of the corporation or association] of [describing the corporation or associa-

tion], and that the seal affixed to said instrument is the corporate seal of said

corporation [or association], and that said instrument was signed and sealed

in behalf of said corporation [or association] by authority of its board of direc-

tors [or trustees], and said C. D. acknowledged said instrument to be the

free act and deed of said corporation [or association].

[In case the corporation or association has no corporate seal omit the vords

"the seal affixed to said instrument is the corporate seal of said corporation (or

"the .<eal affixed to said in.~t1·m11.ent is the corporatt'. seal of said corporation (or
and that'' and add at the end of the affidavit clause the 'll:ords "and
that said corporation (or association) has no corpora ti' seal."]
["bi all case11 add th e signatm·e and title of the officer takiug the ark11otrledg-

as.~ociation)

association) and that" and add at the end of the affidavit clause the words "and

that said corporation (or association) has no corporate seal."]

["In all cases add the signature and title of the officer taking the acknowledg-

m e11t . "l

ment."]

See tbe following: 1872, Me rrill v. Montgomery, 25 Mich. 73 ; 187i, Kelly
v. Calhoun, 95 U.S. 710; 1880, C. B. & Q . R. Co. v . Lewis, 53 Iowa IOI;
1883, Eppright v. Nickerson, 78 l\to. 482; 1894, Gray v. Waldron, 101 l\Jich.
612; 1894. Jinwright v. Nelson, 105 Ala. 399.
(cl Notes. etc. The ordinary form of a note would be:
"One year after date, for value received, The A. B . Co. promises to pay to
the X. Y. Co. or order, the sum of - - - dollars, at---, with intereet, etc.
"The A. B. Co., by C. D., its president (or officer duly authorized) ."
This would be properly indorsed as follows:
"Pay to the or<ler of John Doe.
"The X.Y. Co., by E. F., its president (or other officer authorized)."
It is not necessary to attar Ii the corporate seal 1868, Jones v. Homer. 60
Pa. St. 214, and some of the earlier cases held that affixing the seal to what
wonld otherwise be a negotiable instrument would make it non-negotiable:
1810, Warren v . Lynch, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 239; 1836, Clark v. Farmer's Woolen
:Mfg. Co., 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 2r>6; 1840, Frevall v. Fitch, 5 Whart. (Pa.) 325. 34
Am. Dec. 558; 1866, Conine v. Junction, etc .. R. Co., 3 H onst. (Del.) 288, 89
Am. Dec. 230; 1881, Coe v. The Cayuga I~. R. Co. (C.C. !\. D. ), 8 Fed. Rep.
534.
But the recent cases all hold otherwise: 1873, Bank v. Railroad Co., 5 S. C.
156; 1875, Jackson v. Merers, 43 Md. 452; 1889, Miller v. Roach, 150 Maas.
140; 1891, Stevens v. Bal Club, 142 Pa. St. 52; 1894, Weeks v. Esler, 143 ~.
Y. 374; 1896, Chase National Bank v. Faurot, 149 N. Y.532; 1897, Landauer
v. Sioux, etc., Co., 10 S. D. 205, 72 N. W. Rep. 467; 1898, Clark v. Read, 12
App. D. C. 343.
Judge Thompson, however, thinks it is useful to affix the corporate seal, as
showing it is the note of the corporation, and not that of the officer signing
for the corporation, and also furnishing pl'im,a facie evidence of agent's
authority, and of e verything else necessary to tbe validity of the act: IV.
Thomf>SOn , §§ 5054, 51()._'l, 5123 n . I, p. ~9; 1840, .Burrill ~·.Nahant Bank, 2
Met. (Mass.) 163, 35 Am. Dec. 395; 181i7, Gasbw1ler v. W1lhs, 33 Cal. ll, 11
Am. Dec. 607, note collectin2' cases, p . 616; 1889, Miller v. Roach, 150 Mass.
140. 8ee, infra, pp. 1147- 1153.
There is much conflict as to the effect of making and signing promissory
notes in a way different from that s uggested above: e. g. Where a note read
"We promille t-0 pay, etc.," s i11:ned "D11bw.[1te 1lfatress Co., Joh11 Kapp, Pt."-it
was h e ld to be the note of Kapp as well as of the corporation, and parol evidence was not admitted to show it to be only the note of the corporation.
1893, Mathews v. Dubuque ~fatress Co., 87 Towa 246, 54 N. W . Rep. 22-0. On
the other hand, 1889, Liebscher v. Kraus, 74 Wis. 387, wh ere the notP read
" We p1·omise to pay, etc. ," signed "San Pedro Mini11g a11d Milling Co., P.
Kl'aus, President," it was h e ld to be the note of the corporation alone, and

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Seethe following: 1872, Merrill v. Montgomery, 25 Mich. 73; 1877. Kelh-

v. Calhoun, 95 U. S. 710; 1880, C. B. & Q. K. Co. v. Lewis, 53 Iowa 101;

1883, Eppright v. Nickerson, 78 Mo. 482; 1894, Gray v. Waldron, 101 Mich.

612; 1894, Jinwright v. Nelson, 105 Ala. 399.

(c) Notes, etc. The ordinary form of a note would be:

"One year after date, for value received, The A. B. Co. promises to pay to

the X. Y. Co. or order, the sum of dollars, at , with interest, etc.

"The A. B. Co., by C. I)., its president (or officer duly authorized)."

This would be properly indorsed as follows:

"Pay to the order of John Doe.

"TheX.Y.Co.,by E. F., its president (or other officer authorized)."

It is not necessary to attach the corporate seal 1868, Jones v. Horner. 60

Pa. St. 214, and some of the earlier cases held that affixing the seal to what

would otherwise be a negotiable instrument would make it non-negotiable:

1810, Warren v. Lynch. 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 239; 1836, Clark v. Farmer's Woolen

Mfg. Co., 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 256; 1840, Frevall v. Fitch, 5 Whart. (Pa.) 325, 34

Am. Dec. 558; 1866, Conine v. Junction, etc., R. Co., 3 Houst. (Del.) 288, 89

Am. Dec. 230; 1881, Coe v. The Cayuga L. R. Co. (C.C. N. D.), 8 Fed. Rep.

534.

But the recent cases all hold otherwise: 1873, Bank v. Railroad Co., 5 S.C.

156; 1875, Jackson v. Meyers, 43 Md.452; 1889, Miller v. Roach, 150 Mass.

140; 1891, Stevens v. Ball Club, 142 Pa. St. 52; 1894, Weeks v. Esler, 143 S.

Y. 374; 1896, Chase National Bank v. Faurot, 149 N. Y. 532; 1897, Landauer

v. Sioux, etc., Co., 10 S. D. 205, 72 N. W. Rep. 467; 1898, Clark v. Read, 12

App. D. C. 343.

Judge Thompson, however, thinks it is useful to affix the corporate seal, as

showing it is the note of the corporation, and not that of the officer signing

for the corporation, and also furnishing prima facie evidence of agent's

authority, and of everything else necessary to the validity of the act: IV.

Thompson, $$ 5054, 5105, 5123 n. 1, p. 3839; 1840, Burrill "v. NahantBank.2

Met. (Mass.) 163, 35 Am. Dec. 3*5; 1867, Gashwiler v. Willis, 33 Cal. 11,11

Am. Dec. 607, note collectine cases, p. 616; 1889, Miller v. Roach, 150 Mass.

140. See, infra, pp. 1147-1153.

There is much conflict as to the effect of making and signing promissory

notes in a way different from thatsuggested above: e. g. Where a note read

"We promise to pay, etc.," signed "Dubuque Matress Co., John Kapp, ff."—it

was held to be the note of Kapp as well as of the corporation, and parol evi-

dence was not admitted to show it to be only the note of the corporation.

1893, Mathews v. Dubuque Matress Co., 87 Iowa 246, 54 N. W. Rep. 225. On

the other hand, 1889, Liebscher v. Kraus, 74 Wis. 387, where the note read

"We promise to pay, etc.," signed "San Pedro Mining and Milling Co., F.

Kraus, President," it was held to be the note of the corporation alone, and
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when the note read " We promise to pan, etc.," and was signed "National Forge

find Iron Co., Mark Swarts, President," it was held to be ambiguous, as to

whether it was the note of Swarts alone, or the company alone, or a joint-

note, and parol evidence was admitted to clear up the ambiguity. 1894,

Swarts v. Cohen, 11 Ind. App. 20. In neither of the foregoing was the corpo-

rate seal affixed. In Miller v. Roach, 150 Mass. 140 (1889), the note read,

"We promise to pay, etc.," and in the usual place of the signature the corpo-

rate seal, giving the name of the corporation, was stamped, and "John Roach,

Treasurer," was written partly across the seal. This was held to be the note

of the company.

Judge Thompson, Vol. iv, §§ 5121-54, and Daniell's Negotiable Instruments,

§§ 401^15, review many cases. The form of making and executing corporate

notes is discussed in the following cases: 1823, Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. (N. Y.)

513,13 Am. Dec. 550; 1839, Horah v. Long. 4 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 274, 34 Am.

Dec. 378; 1855, Pierce v. Robie, 39 Maine 205, 63 Am. Dec. 614; 1880, Pack v.

White, 78 Ky. 243; 1889, McKensey v. Edwards, 88 Ky. 272, 21 Am. St. Rep.

339; 1889, Liebscher v. Kraus, 74 Wis. 387, 17 Am. St. Rep. 171; 1889,
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McCandless v. Belle Plaine, etc., Co., 78 Iowa 161,16 Am. St. Rep. 429; 1894,

Swarts v. Cohen, 11 Ind. App. 20, collecting cases; 1896, Hately v. Pike, 162

111. 241, 53 Am. St. Rep. 304; 1896, Nebraska Nat'l Bank v. Ferguson, 49 Neb.

109, 59 Am. St. Rep. 522; 1897, Albany Furniture Co. v. Merchants' Nat'l

Bank, 17 Ind. App. 531; 1897, Taylor v. Reger, 18 Ind. App. 466; 1898,

National Bank v. Allen, 90 Fed. Rep. 545,33 C. C. A. 169; 1898, Clark v.

Read, 12 App. D. C. 343; 1899, Youngs v. Perry, 42 App. Div. (N. Y.) 247;

1900, Crawford v. Albany Ice Co., 36 Ore. 535, 60 Pac. Rep. 14.

parol evidence was inadmissible to show Kraus was a joint maker. Again
when the note read" We promise to pa!/, etc.,'' and was signed "National Forge
ans Iron Co., Mark Swarts, President," it wns held to be ambiguous, as to
whether it was the note of Swarts alone, or the company alone, or a jointnclte, and parol evidence was admitted to clear up the ambiguity. 1894,
Swart.av. Cohen, 11 Ind. App. 20. Jn neither of the foregoing was the corporate seal affixed. In Miller v. Roach, 150 Mass. 140 (1889), the note read,
"We promise to pay, etc.," and in the usual place of the signature the corporate seal, giving the name of the corporation, was stamped, and "John Roach,
Treasurer," was written partly across the seal. This was held to be the note
of the company.
Judge Thom{>SOn, Vol. iv,§§ 5121-54, and Daniell's Negotiable Instruments,
§§ 401-415, review many cases. The form of making and executing corporate
notes is discussed in the following cases: 1823, Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. (N. Y.)
513, 13 Am. Dec. 550; 1839, Horab v. Long. 4 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 274, 34 Am.
Dec. 378; 1855, Pierce v. Robie, 39 Maine 205, 63 Am. Dec. 614; 1880, Pack v.
White, 78 Ky. 243: 1889, McKensey v. Edwards, 88 Ky. 272, 21 Am. St. Rep.
339; 1889, Liebacher v. Kraus, 74 Wis. 387, 17 Am. St. Rep. 171; 1889,
McCandless v. Belle Plaine, etc., Co., 78 lowa 161, 16 Am. St. Rep. 429; 1894,
Swarts v. Cohen, 11 Ind. App. 20, collecting cases; 1896, Hately v. Pike, 162
Ill. 241, 53 Am. St. Rep. 304; 1896, Nebraska Nat'l Bank v. Ferguson, 49 Neb.
109, 59 Am. St. Rep. 522; 1897, Albany Furniture Co. v. Merchants' Nat'l
Bank, 17 Ind. App. 531; 1897, Taylor v. Reger, 18 Ind. App. 466; 1898,
National Bank v. Allen, 90 Fed. Rep. 545, 33 C. C. A. 169 i 1898, Clark v.
Read, 12 App. D. C. 343; 1899, Youngs v. Perry, 42 App. Div. (N. Y.) 247;
1900, Crawford v. Albany Ice Co., 36 Ore. 535, 60 Pac. Rep. 14.
50--WIL. C.AS.

55—WIL. CAS.

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Title VII. Corporate Death—Dissolution.

CHAPTER 11.

MODES AND EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION.

ARTICLE I. METHODS OK DISSOLUTION.

Sec. 239. In general.

THE BOSTON GLASS MANUFACTORY v. LANGDON.'

1834. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

24 Pick. (Mass.) 49^54, 35 Am. Dec. 292.

[Assumpsit by Glass company upon a note given by defendant to

plaintiff. Plea in abatement that there was at time of suit no such

corporation—the facts showing an incorporation and organization in

TITLE VII.

1811, an assignment of all the corporate property in 1817 to trustees

to pay creditors, and an omission to hold annual meetings, choose di-

CORPORATE DRATH-DISSOLUTION.

rectors or transact business since that time. The jury were instructed

that the corporate life continued, and they found for the plaintiff.

The instructions and verdict upon them are assigned as errors.]

CHAPTER 11.

Morton, J. * * * The legal establishment and due organiza-

tion of the corporation were admitted; but it was contended that the

MODES AND EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION.

facts disclosed showed a dissolution of it.

The elementary treatises on corporations describe four methods in

ARTICLE

which they may be dissolved. It is said that private corporations

I.

MRTHODS OF DISSOLUTION.
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may lose their legal existence by the act of the legislature; by the

death of all the members; by a forfeiture of their franchises; and

Sec. 239. In

by a surrender of their charters. 2 Kyd Corp. 447; 1 Bl. Comm.

general.

485; 2 Kent's Comm. (1st ed.) 245; Angell and Ames Corp.. 501;

THE BOSTON GLASS MANUFACTORY v. LANGDON.I

Oakes v. Hill, 14 Pick. 442. No other mode of dissolution is any-

where mentioned or alluded to.

1834.

1. In England, where the parliament is said to be omnipotent, and

IN THE SuPRRME JUDICIAL CouRT
24 Pick. (Mass.) 49:-54 1

where in fact there rs no constitutional restraint upon their action,

OF

MASSACRUSBTrS.

35 Am. Dec. 292.

but their own discretion and sense of right, corporations are supposed

to hold their franchises at the will of the legislature. But if they pos-

[Assumpsit by Glass company upon a note given by defendant to
plaintiff. Plea in abatement that there was at time of suit no such
corporation-the facts showing an incorporation and organization in
I811, an assignment of all the corporate property in 1817 to trustees
to pay creditors, and an omission to hold annual meetings, choose di·
rectors or transact business since that time. The jury were instructed
that the corporate life continued, and they found for the plaintiff.
The instructions and verdict upon them are assigned as errors.]
MORTON, J. • • • The legal establishment and due organization of the corporation were adniitted; but it was contended that the
facts disclosed showed a dissolution of it.
The elementary treatises on corporations describe four methods in
which they may be dissolved. It is sa£d thai private corpora/£ons
may lose th eir legal existence by tlte act of tlie legislature; by the
d eatlL of all the m embers ; by a forfet.ture of their francldses ; and
/Jy a surrender of tlte£r c!tarters. 2 Kyd Corp. 447; I Bl. Comm.
485; 2 Kent's Comm. ( 1st ed.) 245; Angell and Ames Corp., 501;
Oakes v. Hill, 14 Pick. 442. N o othe r mode of dissolution is any·
where mentioned or alluded to.
1. In England , where the parliament is said to be omnipotent, and
where in fact there is no constitutional restraint upon their action,
but their own discretion and sen!:e of right, corporations are supposed
to hold their franchi ses at the will of the legislature. But if they pos--

1 Statement abridged; arguments and part of opinion omitted.

(866)

1 Statement

abridged; arguments and part of opinion omitted.

(866)
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METHODS OF DISSOLUTION.

METHODS OF DISSOLUTION.

sess the power to annul charters, it certainly has been rarely exercised

867

by them. In this country, where the legislative power is carefully de-

fined by explicit fundamental laws, by which it must be governed and

beyond which it can not go, it has become a question of some diffi-

culty to determine the precise extent of their authority in relation to

the revocation of charters granted by them. But as it is not pre-

tended that there has been any legislative repeal of the plaintiff's

charter, it will not be useful further to discuss this branch of the sub-

ject.

2. As all the original stockholders are not deceased, the corporation

can not be dissolved for the want of members to sustain and exercise

the corporate powers. Besides, this mode of dissolution can not apply

to pecuniary or business corporations. The shares, being property,

pass by assignment, bequest or descent, and must ever remain the

property of some persons, who of necessity must be members of the

corporation as long as it may exist.

3. Although a corporation may forfeit its charter by an abuse or

misuser of its powers and franchises, yet this can only take effect
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upon a judgment of a competent tribunal. 2 Kent's Com m. (1 st ed.)

249; Corporation of Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1866; Smith's

Case, 4 Mod. 53. Whatever neglect of duty or abuse of power the

corporation may have been guilty of, it is perfectly clear that they

have not lost their charter by forfeiture. Until a judicial decree to

this effect be passed, they will continue their corporate existence.

The King v. Amery, 2 T. R. 515.

4. Charters are in many respects compacts between the govern-

ment and the corporators. And as the former can not deprive the

latter of their franchises in violation of the compact, so the latter can

not put an end to the compact without the consent of the former. It

is equally obligatory on both parties. The surrender of a charter

can only be made by some formal solemn act of the corporation; and

■will be of no avail until accepted by the government. There must be

the same agreement of the parties to dissolve that there was to form

the compact. It is the acceptance which gives efficacy to the surren-

der. The dissolution of a corporation, it is said, extinguishes all its

debts. The power of dissolving itself by its own act would be a

dangerous power, and one which can not be supposed to exist.

But there is nothing in this case which shows an intention of the

corporators to surrender or forfeit their charter, nor anything which

can be construed into a surrender or forfeiture.

The possession of property is not essential to the existence of a cor-

poration. 2 Kent's Comm. (1st ed.) 249. Its insolvency can not,

therefore, extinguish its legal existence. Nor can the assignment of

all its property to pay its debts, or for any other purpose, have that

effect. The instrument of assignment was not so intended, and can

not be so construed. All its provisions look to the continuance of

the corporation. It contains covenants that the assignees may use the

corporate name for the collection of the debts and the disposition of

the property assigned; that the corporation will not hinder or ob-

sess the power to annul charters, it certainly has been rarely exercised
by them. In this country, where the legislative power is carefully defined by explicit fundamental laws, by which it must be governed and
beyond which it can not go, it has become a question of some difficulty to determine the precise extent of their authority in relation to
the revocation of charters granted by them. But as it is not pretended that there has been any legislative repeal of the plaintiff's
charter, it will not be' useful further to discuss this branch of the subject.
z. As all the original stockholders are not deceased, the corporation
can not be dissolved for the want of members to sustain and exercise
the corporate powers. Besides, tht's mode ofdt'ssolutt'on can not apply
to pecuniary or bust'ness corporations. The shares, bet'ng property,
pass by assignment, bequest or descent, and must ever remat'n tke
property of some persons, wko of necessity mttst be members of the
corporatt"on as long as i't may exist.
3. Altlzough. a corporatt'on may forfet't its charter by an abuse or
misuser of t"ts powers and franchises, yet tht's can only take effect
upon a judgment of a competent tribunal. z Kent's Comm. (1st ed.)
i49; Corporation of Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1866; Smith's
Case, 4 Mod. 53. Whatever neglect of duty or abuse of power the
corporation may have been guilty of, it is perfectly clear that they
have not lost their charter by forfeiture. Until a judicial decree to
this effect be passed, they will continue their corporate existence.
The King v. Amery, z T. R. 515.
4. Charters are in many respects compacts between the government and the corporators. And as the former can not deprive the
latter of their franchises in violation of the compact, so the latter can
not put an end to the compact without the consent of the former. It
is equally obligatory on both parties. The sttrrender of a charter
can only be made by some formal solemn act of the corporation; and
wi"ll be of no avat'l until accepted by the government. Tltere must be
the same agreement of tlze partt"es to dt'ssolve tlzat there was to form
tlze compact. It is the a'cceptance which gives efficacy to the surrender. The dissolution of a corporation , it is said, extinguishes all its
debts. The power of dissolving itself by its own act would be a
dangerous power, and one which can not be supposed to exist.
But there is nothing in this case which shows an intention of the
corporators to surrender or forfeit their charter, nor anything which
can be construed into a surrender or forfeiture.
The possessi"on of property is not essential to the existence of a corporatt'on. z Kent's Comm. (1 st ed.) 249. Its insolvency can not,
therefore, extinguish its legal existence. Nor can the assignment of
all its property to pay its debts, or for any other purpose, ha ve th at
effect. The instrument of assignment was not so intended , and ca n
not be so construed. All its provisions look to the continuance of
the corporation. It contains covenants that the assignees may use the
corporate name for the collection of the debts and the disposition of
the property assigned ; that the corporation will not hinder or ob-
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struct them in the performance of these functions; that it will make

BRADLEY V. REPPELL.

any further conveyances and assurances which may become necessary,

and will do and perform any other and further acts which may be re-

struct them in the performance of these functions; that it will make
any further conveyances and assurances which may become necessary,
and will do and perform any other and further acts which may be required to enable the assignees fully to execute their trust. The instrument which covenants for future acts can not be construed to take
away all power of action.
The omission to choose directors clearly does not show a dissolution
of the corporation. Attlwugh tile proper officers may be necessary to
enable tile body to act, yet they are not essential to its vitality. Even the
want of officers and the want of power to elect them , would not be
fatal to its c;xistence. It has a potentiality which might, by proper
authority, be called into action without affecting the identity of the
corporate body. Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1870.
But here in fact was no lack of officers. Although no directors had
been chosen for several years, yet by the by-laws of the corporation
the directors, though chosen for one year, were to continue in office
till others were chosen in their stead. • • •
Affirmed.
Nott'.. Modes of dissolution. In Swan J,,and, etc., Co. v. Frank, 148 U. S. 603,
611 (1893 ), Mr. Justice Jackson states the following methods of dissolution:

quired to enable the assignees fully to execute their trust. The in-

strument which covenants for future acts can not be construed to take

away all power of action.

The omission to choose directors clearly does not show a dissolution

of the corporation. Although the proper officers may be necessary to

enable the body to act, yet they are not essential to its vitality. Even the

want of officers and the want of power to elect them, would not be

fatal to its existence. It has a potentiality which might, by proper

authority, be called into action without affecting the identity of the

corporate body. Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1870.

But here in fact was no lack of officers. Although no directors had

been chosen for several years, yet by the by-laws of the corporation

the directors, though chosen for one year, were to continue in office

till others were chosen in their stead. * * *

Affirmed.

Note. Modes of dissolution. In Swan Land, etc., Co. v. Frank, 148 TJ. S. 603,
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611 (1893), Mr. Justice Jackson states the following methods ol dissolution:

(1) By expiration of charter; (2) by failure of an essential part that can not

be restored; (3) by dissolution and surrender of franchise with consent of

the state; ('4) by legislative enactment within constitutional authority; (5)

by forfeiture of franchises and judgment of dissolution declared in regular

judicial proceedings, or by other lawful means.

(lJ By expiration of charter; (2) by failure of an essential part that can not
be restored; (3) by dissolution and surrender of franchise with consent of
the state; ('4) by Iegislati ve enactment within constitutional authority; (5)
by forfeiture of franchises and judgment of dissolution declared in regular
judicial proceedings, or by other lawful means.
In 9 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 546, 2d ed., it is said: "A corporation may
be diRsolved : ( 1) By the repeal of its charter; (2) by the happening of a
condition or contingency prescribed by the charter; (3) by the natural death
of all its members or the loss of an inte~ral part; (4) by the surrender of its
franchises; (5) by expiration of the penod of its existence as limited in its
charter; (6) by judgment of forfeiture in a judicial proceeding.
Elliott Private Corporations, § 592, says dissolution may be effected (1) by
the expiration of the statutory period of its existence; (2) an act of the legislature under a reserved power to repeal; (3) the surrender of the charter
with the consent of the state; ( 4) the forfeiture of the charter for misuse or
non-use of its powers; (5) the loss of an integral part without whose existence the functions of the corporation can not be exercised, and (6) compli·
ance with whatever statutory requirements may exist in order to effect a voluntary dissolution.

In 9 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 546,2d ed., it is said: "A corporation may

be dissolved: (1) By the repeal of its charter; (2) by the happening of a

condition or contingency prescribed by the charter; (3) by the natural death

of all its members or the loss of an integral part; (4) by the surrender of its

franchises; (5; by expiration of the period of its existence as limited in its

charter; (6) by judgment of forfeiture in a judicial proceeding.

Elliott Private Corporations, § 592, says dissolution may be effected (1) by

the expiration of the statutory period of its existence; (2) an act of the legis-

lature under a reserved power to repeal; (3) the surrender of the charter

with the consent of the state; (4) the forfeiture of the charter for misuse or

non-use of its powers; (5) the loss of an integral part without whose exist-

ence the functions of the corporation can not be exercised, and (6) compli-

ance with whatever statutory requirements may exist in order to effect a vol-

untary dissolution.

Sec. 240. Expiration of charter.

BRADLEY v. REPPELL.'

1896. In the Supreme Court of Missouri. 133 Mo. Rep. 545-

561, 54 Am. St. Rep. 685.

[Ejectment by Bradley to recover land claimed by Reppell bv ad-

Sec. 240.

verse possession. Plaintiff offered in evidence to show title a certified

copy of a deed to the land executed by the West Kansas City Land

Expiration of charter.

1 Statement much abridged, arguments and much of the opinion omitted.

BRADLEY v. REPPELL. 1

1896.

IN

M1ssoua1. 133 Mo. Rep. 545561, 54 Am. St. Rep. 685.

THE SuPRRME CoURT OF

[Ejectment by Bradley to recover land claimed by Reppell by adverse possession. Plaintiff offered in evidence to show title a certified
copy of a deed to the land executed by the West Kansas City Land
1
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Company, by its president and secretary, August 20, 1880. This

86g

company was incorporated by special act of March 14, 1859, without

any special provision as to its duration. The general law at the time

provided that every corporation should have succession for the period

limited in its charter, and when no period is limited, for twenty years,

with power in the president and directors to settle up its affairs after-

ward. A demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence contained in the deed was

sustained by the court on the ground that corporate life had ceased at

the time of its execution, and there was a verdict for the defendant.

Sustaining the demurrer is the error assigned. To the defendant's

contention that the corporate life had ceased before the deed was exe-

cuted, the plaintiff answered that a de facto corporation existed, and

its acts could be questioned only by the state.]

Brace, P. J. * * * This answer does not. meet the question,

unless it be assumed that a corporation whose corporate existence has

expired by the terms of the law which created it still exists as a de

facto corporation as to all persons except the state, an assumption that

we think is not sustained by the authorities cited, and is not "the set-
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tled law in this state."

On the contrary, in this state, as elsewhere, unless otherwise pro-

vided by statute, the law is, that where the term of the existence of a

corporation is fixed by its charter or the general law, upon the expira-

tion of that term the corporation becomes ipso facto dissolved; it can

no longer act in a corporate capacity and its title to property ceases.

2 Beach Priv. Corp., § 780; 2 Morawetz Priv. Corp., § 1031. In

such an event in this state the title to its property is by statute de-

volved upon trustees for the settlement of its affairs and the distribu-

tion of its assets. R. S. 1855, ch. 34, § 24; R. S. 1889, § 2513. And

thereafter it has no power to make a legal contract or convey property

in its corporate name and capacity; it ceases to be a corporation de

jure et de facto, for the reason that there is no law in force authoriz-

ing its existence, and no law by virtue of which it might exist, and no

person, unless estopped by his own action, ought to be, or can be,

precluded from showing this fact, apparent on the face of the law it-

self, without the necessity of any judicial investigation, in an issue in-

volving his own personal rights and interests.

An examination of the authorities cited by counsel for respondents,

and of all the other cases touching this question, will show that it has

never been otherwise ruled in this state, nor elsewhere so far as we

have been able to discover.

The first case cited by counsel for respondent, Mclndoev. St. Louis,

10 Mo. 576, does not touch the question, side, edge, or bottom. The

cases of Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Land v. Coffman, 50

Mo. 243; Shewalter v. Pirner, 55 Mo. 218, and Conn. Mutual Ins.

Co. v. Smith, 117 Mo. 261, go no farther in the direction of our

present inquiry than to hold that where an existing corporation has

power to acquire, hold and dispose of land, the question whether such

corporation has transcended the limits of such power in respect thereto

can only be raised and determined in a direct proceeding by the state

Company, by its president and secretary, August 20, 188o. This
company was incorporated by special act of March 14, 18s9, without
any special provision as to its duration. The general law at the time
provided that every corporation should have succession for the period
limited in its charter, and when no period is limited, for twenty years,
with power in the president and directors to settle up its affairs afterward. A demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence contained in the deed was
sustained by the court on the ground that corporate life had ceased at
the time of its execution, and there was a verdict for the defendant.
Sustaining the demun-er is the error assigned. To the defendant's
contention that the corporate life had cea ·ed before the deed was executed, the plaintiff answered that a de facto corporation existed, and
its acts could be questioned only by the state.]
BRACE, P. J. • • • This answer does not. meet the question,
unless it be assumed that a corporation whose corporate existence has
expired by the terms of the law which created it still exists as a de
facto corporation as to all persons except the state, an assumption that
we think is not sustained by the authorities cited, and is not "the settled law in this state."
On the contrary, in this state, as elsewhere, unless otherwise provided by statute, the law is, that where the term of the existence of a
corporation is fixed by its charter or the general law, upon the expiration of that term the c;orporation becomes ipso facto djssolved ; it can
no longer act in a corporate capacity and its title to property ceases.
2 Beach Priv. Corp., § 78o; 2 Morawetz Priv. Corp., § 103 r.
In
such an event in this state the title to its property is by statute devolved upon trustees for the settlement of its affairs and the clist1;bution of its assets. R. S. 1Sss, ch. 34, § 24; R. S. 1889, § 2513. And
thereafter it has no power to make a legal contract or convey property
in its corporate name and capacity; it ceases to be a corporation de
jure et de facto, for the reason that there is no law in force authorizing its existence, and no law by virtue of which it migltt exist, and no
person, unless estoppcd by his own action, ought to be, or can be,
precluded from showing this fact, apparent on the face of the law itself, without the necessity of any judicial investigation, in an issue involving his own personal rights and interests.
An examination of the authorities cited by counsel for re!>pondents,
and of all the other cases touching this question, will show that it has
never been otherwise ruled in this state, nor elsewhere so far as we
have been able to discover.
·
The first case cited by counsel for respondent, Mcindoe v. St. Louis,
10 Mo. s76, does not touch the question, side, edge, or bottom. The
c ases of Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. S43; Land v. Coffman, so
Mo. 243; Shewalter v. Pirner, SS Mo. 218, and Conn. Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Smith, 117 Mo. 261, go no farther in the direction of our
present inquiry than to hold that where an existing corporation has
power to acquire, hold and dispose of land, the question whether su ch
-corporation has transcended the limits of such power in respect thereto
can only be raised and determined in a direct proceeding by the state
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against the corporation. But this falls far short of the question here

BRADLEY V. REPPELL.

which goes to the fact of the existence of the corporation, conceded

against the corporation. But this falls far short of the question herewhich goes to the fact of the existence of the corporation, conceded
in these cases.
It is also well-settled law that one who has contracted with an organization as a corporation in its corporate name is estopped from
denying the existence of su-ch corporation at the time of making the
contract or of alleging any defect in its organization affecting its capacity to contract or sue as a corporation upon such contract. 4
Thomp. Corp., § S27S; 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 198, and
cases cited, note 1, p. 199; 2 Morawetz Priv. Corp., §§ 7so, 7S3; I
Beach Priv. Corp., § 13.
And so it has been ruled in this state in many cases, including those
n ext cited in the brief of counsel for respondent. Railroad v. McPherson, 3S Mo. 13; Ins. Co. v. Needles, s2 Mo. 18; St. Louis v.
Shields, 62 Mo. 247; Stoutimore v. Clark, 70 Mo. 471; Studebaker
Bros. v. Montgomery, 74 Mo. ror; St .. Louis Gaslight Co. v. St.
Louis, 84 Mo. 202 , affirming 1 r Mo. App. SS; Broadwell v. Merritt,
87 Mo. 9S; Granby Mining Co. v. Richards, 9S Mo. 106.
Of course, such estoppel extends as well to the privies of as to
the parties· to such contracts. · Hasenritter v . Kirchhoffer, 79 Mo.
239; Ragan v. McElroy, 98 Mo. 349; Broadwell v. Merritt, 87 Mo.
9S; Reinhard v. Lead Mining Co., 107 Mo. 616.
The ruling in none of these cases, however, supports the contention that the deeds should have been admitted in evidence in the case
in hand, in which, as has been already seen, there is no question of
estoppel.
Nor do the cases of Finch v. Ullman, ros Mo. 2ss, or Crenshaw
v. Ullman, 113 Mo. 633 , cited by plaintiff's counsel, in which it was
ruled (where there was a law authorizing the existence of the corporation, at the tir;.ne when the organization assumed to act and did act
as such corporation) that its corporate existence as to such act could
not be called in question in a collateral proceeding, sustain respondent's
contention.
It is true in these and in other cases it is sometimes broadly stated
as settled law, in substance, "that a transfer of property to or by a
corporation d e facto will be binding and valid as against all parties
except the state," but this is simply a restatement in another form of
the proposition niled. It implies that the case is one in which a corporation may by law exist, for there cim be no corporation de facto
when there can not he a corporation de jure ( r Beach Priv. Corp. ,
§ 13; 4 Thomp. Corp., § s27s; 1 Thomp. Corp., § s23); at least as
to any person who is not precluded by his own action, or that of those
under whom he claims, from questioning its existence. Whatever
may be the rule as to these, as to all other persons there must be at
least color of law for its corporate existence to preclude such inquiry,
and it would seem to go without saying th at a law which gh·es existence to a corporation for a certain number of years, at the end of
which time it must surely die, can not give color to its corporate ex-

in these cases.

It is also well-settled law that one who has contracted with an or-

ganization as a corporation in its corporate name is estopped from

denying the existence of such corporation at the time of making the

contract or of alleging any defect in its organization affecting its ca-

pacity to contract or sue as a corporation upon such contract. 4

Thomp. Corp., § 5275; 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 198, and

cases cited, note 1, p. 199; 2 Morawetz Priv. Corp., §§ 750, 753; 1

Beach Priv. Corp., § 13.

And so it has been ruled in this state in many cases, including those

next cited in the brief of counsel for respondent. Railroad v. Mc-

Pherson, 35 Mo. 13; Ins. Co. v. Needles, 52 Mo. 18; St. Louis v.

Shields, 62 Mo. 247; Stoutimore v. Clark, 70 Mo. 471; Studebaker

Bros. v. Montgomery, 74 Mo. 101; St.. Louis Gaslight Co. v. St.

Louis, 84 Mo. 202, affirming 11 Mo. App. 55; Broadwell v. Merritt,

87 Mo. 95; Granby Mining Co. v. Richards, 95 Mo. 106.
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Of course, such estoppel extends as well to the privies of as to

the parties- to such contracts. Hasenritter v. Kirchhoffer, 79 Mo.

239; Ragan v. McElroy, 98 Mo. 349; Broadwell v. Merritt, 87 Mo.

95; Reinhard v. Lead Mining Co., 107 Mo. 616.

The ruling in none of these cases, however, supports the conten-

tion that the deeds should have been admitted in evidence in the case

in hand, in which, as has been already seen, there is no question of

estoppel.

Nor do the cases of Finch v. Ullman, 105 Mo. 255, or Crenshaw

v. Ullman, 113 Mo. 633, cited by plaintiff's counsel, in which it was

ruled (where there was a law authorizing the existence of the corpo-

ration, at the time when the organization assumed to act and did act

as such corporation) that its corporate existence as to such act could

not be called in question in a collateral proceeding, sustain respondent's

contention.

It is true in these and in other cases it is sometimes broadly stated

as settled law, in substance, "that a transfer of property to or by at

corporation de facto will be binding and valid as against all parties

except the state," but this is simply a restatement in another form of

the proposition ruled. It implies that the case is one in which a cor-

poration may by law exist, for there can be no corporation de facto

when there can not be a corporation de jure (1 Beach Priv. Corp.,

§ 13; 4 Thomp. Corp., § 5275; 1 Thomp. Corp., § 523); at least as

to any person who is not precluded by his own action, or that of those

under whom he claims, from questioning its existence. Whatever

may be the rule as to these, as to all other persons there must be at

least color of law for its corporate existence to preclude such inquiry,

and it would seem to go without saying that a law which gives exist-

ence to a corporation for a certain number of years, at the end of

which time it must surely die, can not give color to its corporate ex-
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istence after the date of its death as decreed by the terms of that same
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law.

Judge Thompson, in his recent work on Private Corporations, says:

"There is much judicial authority for the proposition that where a cor-

poration is brought to an end by lapse of time, that is, by the expira-

tion of the distinct limitation of its life in its charter, any further exercise

of its corporate powers may be questioned collaterally. The govern-

ing principle here is that, upon the expiration of the term limited by

the charter for the existence of the corporation, its dissolution is com-

plete. 'The dissolution in such a case,' it has been said, 'is declared

by the act of legislature itself. The limited time of existence has ex-

pired, and no judicial determination of that fact is requisite. The

corporation is de facto dead '." Thomp. Corp., § 530, citing, in sup-

port of the text, People v. Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 351;

Morgan v. Ins. Co., 3 Ind. 285; Wilson v. Tesson, 12 Ind. 2S5;

Grand Rapids Bridge Co. v. Prange, 35 Mich. 400; Dobson v. Si-

monton, 86 N. C. 492; Sturges v. Vanderbilt, 73 N. Y. 384; Bank

of U. S. v. McLaughlin's Adm'r, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 20.

(Citing and discussing St. Louis Gaslight Co. v. St. Louis, 84
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Mo. 202, and Miller v. Coal Co., 31 W. Va. 836, contra, and con-

cluding the statements therein were dicta.) * * *

Affirmed, and this opinion adopted by the court in banc, four

judges concurring, and two dissenting.

Note. Compare 1888, Miller v. Newberg Coal Co., 31 W. Va. 836,13 Am.

St. Rep. 903.

Note: See, also, 1832, Chesapeake, etc., Co. v. Bait. & O. R. Co., 4 Gill & J.

(Md.) 1, on 123; 1841, Commercial Bank v. Lockwood, 2 Harr. (Del.) 8;

1844, State Bank v. Wrenn, 3 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 791; 1845, Greeley v. Smith,

istence after the date of its death as decreed by the terms of that same
!aw.
Judge Thompson, in his recent work on Private Corporations, says:
"There is much judicial authority for the proposition that where a corporation is brought to an end by lapse of time , that is, by the expt'ration of the distinct limitation of its life in its cha1ter, any further exercise
of its corporate po\·v ers may be questioned collaterally. The governing principle here is that, upon the expiration of the term limited by
the charter for the existence of the corporation, its di ssolution is complete. 'The dissolution in such a case,' it has been said, 'is declared
by the act of legislature itself. The limited time of existence has expired, and no judicial determination of that fact is requisite. The
corporation is de facto dead'." Thomp. Corp., § 530, citing, in support of the text, People v. Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 351;
Morgan v. Ins. Co., 3 Ind. 285; Wilson v. Tesson, 12 Ind. 285;
Grand Rapids Bridge Co. v. Prange, 35 Mich. 400; Dobson v. Simonton, 86 N. C. 492; Sturges v. Vanderbilt, 73 N. Y. 384; Bank
of U.S. v. McLaughlin's Adm'r, 2 Cranch C. C. (U.S.) 20.
(Citing and discussing St. Louis Gaslight Co. v . St. Louis, 84
Mo. 202, and Miller v. Coal Co., 31 W. Va. 836, contra, and concluding the statements therein were dicta.) • • •
Affirmed, and this opinion adopted by the court in bane, four
judges concurring, and two dissenting.

3 Story 567, 658; 1846, Gallipolis Bank v. Trimble, 6 B. Mon. (Kv.) 599, 601;

1870, LaGrange, etc., R. Co. v. Rainey, 47 Tenn. (7 Cold.) 420; 1878,

Sturges v. Vanderbilt, 73 N. Y. 384,390; 1880, Eagle Chair Co. v. Kelsey,

23 Kan. 632; 1885, Agheville Div. No. 15 v. Astor, 92 N. C. 578, 585; 1888,

People v. Anderson, etc., Co., 76 Cal. 190; 1891, Logan v. Western, etc., R.

Co., 87 Ga. 533.

Sec. 241. Happening of a condition or contingency prescribed

by the charter.

BROOKLYN STEAM TRANSIT CO. v. CITY OF BROOKLYN.1

1879. In the Court of Appeals of New York. 78 N. Y. Rep.

524-535-

Note. Compare 1888, Miller v. Newberg Coal Co., 31 W. Va. 836, 13 Am .
St. Rep. 903.
N ote: See, also, 1832, Chesapeake, etc., Co. v. Balt. & 0. R. Co., 4 Gill & J.
(Md.) 1, on 123; 1841, Commercial Bank v. Lockwood, 2 Harr. (Del.) 8;
1844, State Bank v. Wrenn, 3 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 791; 1845, Greeley v. Smith,
3 Story 567, 658; 1846, Gallipolis Bank v. Trimble, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 599, 601;
1870, LaGrange, etc., R. Co. v. Rainey, 47 Tenn. (7 Cold.) 420; 1878,
Sturges v. Vanderbilt, 73 N. Y. 384, 390; 1880, Eagle Chair Co. v. Kelsey,
23 Kan. 632; 1885, Asheville Div. No. 15 v. Astor, 92 N. C. 578, 585; 1888,
People v. Anderson, etc., Co., 76 Cal. 190; 1891, Logan v. Western, etc., R.
Co., 87 Ga. 533.

[Suit by the transit company to restrain the city from interfering with

it in constructing its road in the city streets. The charter of 1871 pro-

vided that "unless said transit company be organized, and at least one

mile of such railroad * * * be laid within three years" after the pas-

Sec. 241.

Happening of a condition or contingency prescribed
by the charter.

1 Statement much abridged; arguments and much of opinion on other points

omitted.

BROOKLYN STEAM TRANSIT CO. v. CITY OF BROOKLYN. 1

1879.

IN THE CoURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.

78 N. Y. Rep.

524-535.
[Suit by the transit company to restrain the city from interfering with
it in con~tructing its road in the city streets. The charter of 1871 provided that "unless said transit company be organized, and at least one
mile of such railroad • • • be laid within three years'' after the pas1 Statement much abridged; arguments and much of opinion on other pointe
omitted.
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sage of the act,"all the powers,rights and franchises herein granted shall

STEAM TRANSIT CO. V. ClTY OF BROOKLYN.

be deemed forfeited and terminated." A supplementary act in 1873

§ 241

provided forthe construction "as provided in the original act," and en-

acted "the time for the construction of the one mile of railroad * * *

sage of the act,'' all the powers, rights and franchises herein granted shall
be deemed forfeited and terminated." A supplementary act in 1873
provided for the construction "as provided in the original act," and enacted " the time for the construction of the one mile of railroad • • •
is hereby extended to the fourth day of July, 1876. No road was constructed till June, 1878, when a mile was laid upon the surface of a
portion of its route outside of Brooklyn, and about the same time operations were begun in the city, when it was prevented from proceeding further by the city. Judgment below .for defendant.]
EARL , J.
• • • The claim of the defendant is that the plaintiff
lost its corporate existence by not building the one mile of its read
before the expiration of the time limited, to wit, July 4, 1876.
The general principle is not disputed that a corporation , by omitting to perform a duty imposed by its charter, or to comply with its
provisions, does not ipso facto lose its corporate character or cease to
be a corporation, but simply exposes itself to the hazard of being deprived of its corporate character and franchises by the judgment of
the court in an action instituted for that purpose by the attorney-general in behalf of the people; but it can not be denied that the legi lature has the power to provide that a corporation may lose its corporate existence without the intervention of the courts b y any omission of
duty or violation of its cha11er or d efault as to limitations imposed,
and whether the legislature has intended so to provide in any case
depends upon the construction of the language used. Here the l:mguage used shows that the legislature intended to make the continued
existence of the plaintiff as a corporation depend upon its compliance
with the requirements of section seventeen of the original act. In
case of non-complia nce the act itself was to cease to have any operation, and all the powers, rights and franchises thereby granted were
to be "deemed forfeited and terminated." There was to be not
merely a cause of forfeiture which could be enforced in an action instituted by the attorney-general, but the powers, rig hts and franchises
were to be taken and treated as forfeited and terminated .
At the end of time limited the co1voration was to come to an end,
as if that were the time limited in its charter for its corporate exist·
ence. A preci se authority for this construction of this statute is found
in the case of the Brooklyn, Winfield and Newton R ailroad Com·
pany (72 N. Y. 245). That company was organized under the gen·
era) railroad act of 1850, as amended by the act, chapter 775 of the
law of 1867. By the last-named act it is pro\'ided that "if any cor·
poration formed under the general act shall not, within fi,·e years
after its articles of association are filed and recorded, begin the con·
stniction of its road and expend thereon ten per cent. on the amount
of its capital, or sha ll not fini sh its road and put it in operation in ten
years from the time of filing its articles of association, as aforesaid,
its corporate existence and powers shall cease." Th at company had
not begun the construction of its road within the time limited, and it
was he ld that it had lost its corporate existence, and the same view
was emphatically reiterated when a similar case of the same company

is hereby extended to the fourth day of July, 1876. No road was con-

structed till June, 1878, when a mile was laid upon the surface of a

portion of its route outside of Brooklyn, and about the same time op-

erations were begun in the city, when it was prevented from proceed-

ing further by the city. Judgment below for defendant. ]

Earl, J. * * « The claim of the defendant is that the plaintiff

lost its corporate existence by not building the one mile of its read

before the expiration of the time limited, to wit, July 4, 1876.

The general principle is not disputed that a corporation, by omit-

ting to perform a duty imposed by its charter, or to comply with its

provisions, does not ipso facto lose its corporate character or cease to

be a corporation, but simply exposes itself to the hazard of being de-

prived of its corporate character and franchises by the judgment of

the court in an action instituted for that purpose by the attorney-gen-

eral in behalf of the people; but it can not be denied that the legisla-

ture has the power to provide that a corporation may lose its corpo-
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rate existence without the intervention of the courts by any omission of

duty or violation of its charter or default as to limitations imposed,

and whether the legislature has intended so to provide in any case

depends upon the construction of the language used. Here the lan-

guage used shows that the legislature intended to make the continued

existence of the plaintiff as a corporation depend upon its compliance

with the requirements of section seventeen of the original act. In

case of non-compliance the act itself was to cease to have any opera-

tion, and all the powers, rights and franchises thereby granted were

to be "deemed forfeited and terminated." There was to be not

merely a cause of forfeiture which could be enforced in an action in-

stituted by the attorney-general, but the powers, rights and franchises

were to be taken and treated as forfeited and terminated.

At the end of time limited the corporation was to come to an end,

as if that were the time limited in its charter for its corporate exist-

ence. A precise authority for this construction of this statute is found

in the case of the Brooklyn, Winfield and Newton Railroad Com-

pany (72 N. Y. 245). That company was organized under the gen-

eral railroad act of 1850, as amended by the act, chapter 775 of the

law of 1867. By the last-named act it is provided that "if any cor-

poration formed under the general act shall not, within five years

after its articles of association are filed and recorded, begin the con-

struction of its road and expend thereon ten per cent, on the amount

of its capital, or shall not finish its road and put it in operation in ten

years from the time of filing its articles of association, as aforesaid,

its corporate existence and powers shall cease." That company had

not begun the construction of its road within the time limited, and it

was held that it had lost its corporate existence, and the same view

was emphatically reiterated when a similar case of the same company
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was again before this court (75 N. Y. 335). It was held that the

METHODS OF DISSOLUTION.
statute executed itself, and that the intervention of the courts in an

action instituted by the attorney-general was not necessary. The

language of limitation used in section seventeen of the act of 1871,

more plainly if possible indicates the legislative intention, that a fail-

ure to comply with the limitations should put an absolute end to the

corporation, than the language used in the act 1867.

Judgment for defendant affirmed. » » *

Note. See, 1839, Crease v. Babcock, 23 Pick. ("Mass.) 335, 34 Am. Dee. 61;

1857, Mobile, etc., R. v. State, 29 Ala. 573; 1869, N. Y., etc., R. Co. v. Boston,

etc., R. Co., 36 Conn. 196; 1873, Oakland R. Co. v. Oakland, 45 Cal. 365;

1885, Commw. v. Lykens W. Co., 110 Pa. St. 391; 1888. Atchison, etc., R. Co.

v. Nave, 38 Kan. 744, 5 Am. St. Rep. 800; 1889, Elizabethtown Gas L. Co. v.

Green, 46 N. J. Eq. 118; 1892, Houston v. Houston Belt R. Co., 84 Tex. 581,

590; 1892, Ford v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 52 Mo. App. 439; 1894, Belle-

ville v. City, etc., R. Co., 152 111. 171, 26 L. R. A. 681.

And compare, 1872, Flint and Fentonville P. R. Co. v. Woodhull, 25 Mich.

99, supra, p.39*: 1877,Wallamet, etc., Co. v. Kittridge, 5 Saw. 44; 1896, N. Y.

L. I. & B. Co. v. Smith, 148 N. Y. 540; 1897, State v. Spartanburg, etc., R.
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Co., 51 S. C. 129, 28 S. E. Rep. 145.

Sec. 242. Death of members.

McGINTY v. ATHOL RESERVOIR COMPANY.1

1892. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

was again before this court (75 N. Y. 335). It was held that the
statute executed itself, and that the intervention of the courts in an
action instituted by the attorney-general was not necessary.
The
language of limitation used in section seventeen of the act of 1871,
more plainly if possible indicates the legislative intention, that a failure to comply with the limitations should put an absolute end to the
corporation, than the language used in the act 1867.
Judgment for defendant affirmed. • • •
N ote. See, 1839, Crease v. Babcock, 23 Pick. (Mass .) 335, 34 Am. Dec. 61;
1857, Mobile, etc., R. v. State, 29 Ala. 573; 1869, N. Y ., etc,, R. Co. v. Boston,
etc., R. Co., 36 Conn. 196; 1873, Oakland R. Co. v. Oakland, 45 Cal. 365;
1885, Commw. v. Lykens W. Co., llO Pa. St. 391; 18&q, Atchison, etc., R. Co.
v. Nave, 38 Kan. 744, 5 Am. St. Rep . 800; 1889, Elizabethtown Gas L. Co. v.
Green, 46 N. J. Eq. 118; 1892, Houston v. H onston Belt R. Co., 84 Tex. 581,
590; 1~92, Ford v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 52 Mo. App. 439; 1894, Belle·
ville v. City, etc., R. Co., 152 ill. 171, 26 L. R . A. 681.
And compa~e. 1872. Flint and Fenton ville P. R. Co. v. Woodhull, 25 Mich.
99, supra, p .'.'l9q : 1877.Wullamet, etc., Co. v. Kittridge, 5 3aw. 44; 1896, N. Y.
L. I. & B. Co. v. Smith, 148 N. Y. 540; 1897, State v. Spartanburg, etc., R.
Co., 51 S. C. 129, 28 S. E. Rep. 145.

155 Mass. Rep. 183-1S8.

[Action by McGinty for damages for personal injury done him

while in employ of the defendant. Suit was brought originally

against certain individuals who pleaded in abatement that the injury

Sec. 242.

Death of members.

was done, if at all, by the reservoir company, a corporation of which

McGINTY v. ATHOL RESERVOIR COMPANY.1

they were members. Plaintiff then amended his writ and substituted

the reservoir company as defendant, alleging it to be a corporation.

This the reservoir company denies. It appears that three persons

named and their associates, by an act of 1854, were "made a corpo-

1892.

ration by the name of the Athol Reservoir Co.," the capital stock not

IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
155 Mass. Rep. 183-188.

to exceed $10,000, to be issued only at a par value per share to be

fixed. One of the persons named, without objection from the others,

and seven persons not named, met and accepted the act of incorpora-

tion, organized and commenced business under it. Whether or not

there was a corporation was left to the jury who found for the plaintiff,

and defendant accepted.]

Morton, J. * * * It is clear that the persons who took part

in these proceedings became a corporation under the name of the

Athol Reservoir Company. Chester Glass Co. v. Dewey, 16 Mass.

94; Walworth v. Brackett, 98 Mass. 9S; Hawes v. Anglo-Saxon Pe-

troleum Co., 101 Mass. 385, 393; Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, I Pet.

1 Statement abridged, and only part of opinion given.

[Action by McGinty for damages for personal injury done him
while in employ of the defendant. Suit was brought originally
against certain individuals who pleaded in abatement that the injury
was done, if at all, by the reservoir company, a corporation of which
they were members. Plaintiff then amended his writ and substituted
the reservoir company as defendant, alleging it to be a corporation.
This the reservoir company denies. It appears that three p e rsons
named and their associates, by an act of 1854, were "made a corporation by the name of the Athol Reservoir Co.," the capital stock not
to exceed $10,000, to be issued only at a par value per share to be
fixed. One of the persons named, without objection from the others,
and seven persons not named, met and accepted the act of incorporation, organized and commenced business under it. Whether or not
there was a corporation was left to the jury who found for the pl a intiff,
and defendant accepted. J
MORTON, J. • • • It is clear that the persons who took part
in these proceedings b ecame a corporation unde r th e name of the
Athol Reservoir Company. Chester Glass Co. v. Dewey, 16 Mass.
94; Walworth v. Brackett, 98 Mass . 98: Hawes v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., 101 Mass. 385, 393; Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, I Pet.
1 Statement abridged, and only part of opinion given.
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46; Frost v. Frostburg Coal Co., 24 How. 27S. It is true that none
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of the capital stock has been issued. Something in the nature of cap-

M'GINTY V. ATHOL RESERVOIR COMPANY.

ital or joint stock has been paid in, and has been expended by the

company in the construction of its dams; but neither the paying in

46; Frost v. Frostburg Coal Co., 24 How. 278. It is true that none
of the capital stock has been issued. Something in the nature of capital or joint stock has been paid in, and has been expended by the
company in the construction of its dams; but neither the paying in
nor the issuing of it was a condition precedent to the exi~tence of the
corporation . See cases supra. Nothing in the act of incorporation ,
nor in chapters 38 and 44 of the Revised Statutes referred to in it,
required either to be done as precedent to the formation of the corporation. As soon, therefore, as the act of incorporation was accepted
and an organization effected the grant from the state took effect, and
the corporation began to exist.
It is contended, however, that all the persons named in the act of
incorporation, and who took pmt in the organization, are dead; that,
no stock having been iss ued, there was no provision for a succession
of memhers; and that therefore the corporation ha s heen di!'solved
by operation of law. Undoubtedly a corporation may be dissolved
by the deat!t of all its members, or by t!te loss of an integral part of
£ts organization, so t!tat the exercise of its corporate functions can
not be restored. Penobscot Boom Co. v. Lamson, 16 Maine 224 1
231. But it appears that the company has met annually since its
organization and elected officers, and has from time to time. as occasion required, held special meetings; that it built and has maintained
the dam, which it was chartered especially to build, and has built two
others, and had voted to build and was constructing the dam on which
the plaintiff was injured; that it has taken in the corporate name a
dee<l of the land on which the dam authorized by the act was built,
and also deeds of certain rights of flowage; and that it has transactect
other business that \'Vas incident to and grew out of the purpose for
which it was chaitered.
There can be no reasonable doubt that the persons interested have
believed that they were acting and have intended to act as a corporation, and they should be held to be one unless there are inl'uperable
difficulties in the way. vVe do not think there are. The corporation
was established for the purpose of constructing and supporting a reservoir to supply the mills on the stream below it. Before the act of
incorporation was passed a number of mill-owners on the stream had
associated themselves together by an agreement bearing date April
26, 1853 1 for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a reservoir
aero s it. The agreement provided among other things , "that those
who may hereafter have their (the parties) r espective estates in the
mills, mill-dams and mill privileges, shall succeed to their rights and
be subject to their duties respectively in the reservoir;" that the business of the association should he under the control of the association,
and that the proprietors of each of the several mill-dams who were
parties to said agreement should be entitled to a voice in all the business of the association equal to the proportion of the expenses which
such dam was to pay; and that dam-owners who were not parties
might become such at any time by paying their reasonable proportion
of the expenses. By article 6 of its by-laws the corporation adopted

nor the issuing of it was a condition precedent to the existence of the

corporation. See cases supra. Nothing in the act of incorporation,

nor in chapters 38 and 44 of the Revised Statutes referred to in it,

required either to be done as precedent to the formation of the corpo-

ration. As soon, therefore, as the act of incorporation was accepted

and an organization effected the grant from the state took effect, and

the corporation began to exist.

It is contended, however, that all the persons named in the act of

incorporation, and who took part in the organization, are dead; that,

no stock having been issued, there was no provision for a succession

of members; and that therefore the corporation has been dissolved

by operation of law. Undoubtedly a corporation may be dissolved

by the death of all its members, or by the loss of an integral part of

its organization, so that the exercise of its corporate functions can

not be restored. Penobscot Boom Co. v. Lamson, 16 Maine 224,

231. But it appears that the company has met annually since its
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organization and elected officers, and has from time to lime, as occa-

sion required, held special meetings; that it built and has maintained

the dam, which it was chartered especially to build, and has built two

others, and had voted to build and was constructing the dam on which

the plaintiff was injured; that it has taken in the corporate name a

deed of the land on which the dam authorized by the act was built,

and also deeds of certain rights of flowage; and that it has transacted

other business that was incident to and grew out of the purpose for

which it was chartered.

There can be no reasonable doubt that the persons interested have

believed that they were acting and have intended to act as a corpora-

tion, and they should be held to be one unless there are insuperable

difficulties in the way. We do not think there are. The corporation

was established for the purpose of constructing and supporting a res-

ervoir to supply the mills on the stream below it. Before the act of

incorporation was passed a number of mill-owners on the stream had

associated themselves together by an agreement bearing date April

26, 1853, for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a reservoir

across it. The agreement provided among other things, "that those

who may hereafter have their (the parties) respective estates in the

mills, mill-dams and mill privileges, shall succeed to their rights and

be subject to their duties respectively in the reservoir;" that the busi-

ness of the association should be under the control of the association,

and that the proprietors of each of the several mill-dams who were

parties to said agreement should be entitled to a voice in all the busi-

ness of the association equal to the proportion of the expenses which

such clam was to pay; and that dam-owners who were not parties

might become such at any time by paying their reasonable proportion

of the expenses. By article 6 of its by-laws the corporation adopted
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"as the basis of their association the articles of agreement made and

entered into by the members thereof as proprietors of mills, bearing

date April 26, 1853." Article 5 of the by-laws provided that the

capital stock should consist of $2,500 divided into snares of $25 each,

and that the money already advanced for the purpose of the associa-

tion should go in part payment for the shares. It is clear that the

corporation succeeded to and took the place of the association. The

members of the latter became and were members of the former, and

the evident intention was that as the members of the corporation died

or conveyed their mills, mill-dams, or mill privileges, those who suc-

ceeded to their respective estates as heirs or purchasers should become

members of the corporation in their stead, and succeed to their re-

spective interests in it. The uniform practice since the corporation

was formed shows that this was and has been the understanding.

Ordinarily, membership in a private trading corporation arises from

the ownership of stock which has been issued by it, but it is not al-

ways so. In re Philadelphia Savings Institution, 1 Whart. 461.

Shares might have been issued in the present case, or could be issued

now. Instead of issuing shares, however, the members in substance
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agreed that their rights in the joint or capital stock of the corporation

should pass with the mills, mill-dams and mill privileges, thus con-

fining the membership to persons directly interested in the mainte-

nance of the dams. In the absence of any restriction in the charter,

we think that in the case of a corporation like this there can be no

valid objection to a membership so constituted, and therefore that the

objection that the corporation has been dissolved by the death of the

original members can not be sustained. Watuppa Reservoir v. Fall

River, 134 Mass. 267. * * *

Exceptions sustained upon other points.

Note. See Russell v. M'Lellan, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 63.

Sec. 243. Loss of integral part.

PHILIPS v. WICKHAMEt Al.

1829. In the Court of Chancery of New York, i Paige

(N. Y.) Ch. Rep. 590-601.

[Bv an act of 1807, drainage commissioners were created, with

powers to cease on the first Tuesday in June, 1808, at which time the

"as the basis of their association the articles of agreement made and
entered into by the members thereof as proprietors of mills, bearing
date April 26, 1853." Article 5 of the by-laws provided that the
capital stock should consist of $2,500 divided into shares of $25 each,
and that the money already advanced for the purpose of the association should go in part payment for the shares. It is clear that the
corporat£on succeeded to a'ltd took tlte place of tlte association. The
members of the latter became and were members of tlte former, and
lite evt'dent intent£on was that as the members of the corporatt'on died
or conveyed tlteir mills, mill-dams, or mill privileges, those who succeeded to tlzeir respect£ve estates as heirs or purcltasers should become
members of the corporat£on in their stead, and succeed to tl1eir respect£ve t'ntercsts t'n t't. The uniform practice since the corporation
was formed shows that this was and has been the understanding.
Ordinarily, membership in a privnte trading corporation arises from
the ownership of stock which has been issued by it, but it is not always so. In re Philadelphia Savings Institution, I Whart. 461.
Shares might have been issued in the present case, or could be issued
now. Instead of issuing shares, however, the members in substance
agreed that their rights in the joint or capital stock of the corporation
should pass with the mills, mill-dams and mill privileges, thus confining the membership to persons directly interested in the maintenance of the darns. In lite absence of any restrt'ctt'on t'n the clzarter,
we tit ink that in the case of a corporatz'on like tltt's there can be no
valid objection to a membership so constt'tuted, and therefore that the
objection that the corporat£on has been dt'ssolved by tlze death of the
original members can not be sustat'ned. Watuppa Reservoir v. Fall
River, 134 Mass. 267. • • •
Exceptions sustained upon otlzer points.
Note. See Russell v. M'Lellan, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 63.

owners of lands affected were to meet at a designated place, and se-

lect other commissioners for one year, and so on annually. In 1828,

no election was held, and the old commissioners continued to act.

In 1829, new commissioners,—the defendants,—were elected. Their

Sec. 243.

Loss of integral part.

power was denied on the ground that the failure to elect in 1828 ter-

PHILIP8 v. WICKH .AM ET AL.

minated their official existence.]

The Chancellor (Walworth). * * * If a corporation con-

1829.

sists of several integral parts, and some of those are gone, and the

IN

THE

CouRT OF CHANCERY OF NEW YoRK.
(N. Y.) Ch. Rep. 59o-601.

1 Paige

remaining parts have no power to supply the deficiency, the corpora-

[By an act of 1807, drainage commissioners were created, with
powers to cease on the first Tuesday in June, 1808, at which time the
owners of lands affected were to meet at a designated place, and select other commissioners for one year, and so on annually. In 1828,
no election was held, and the old commissioners continued to net.
In 1829, new commissioners,-the defendants,-were elected. Their
power was denied on the ground that the failure to elect in 1828 terminated their official existence. J
THE CHANCELLOR ('Valworth).
• • • If a corporation consists of several integral parts. an<l some of those are gone, :rnd the
remaining parts have no power to supply the deficiency, the corpora-
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PHILIPS V. WICKHAM ET AL.

tion is dissolved. As in the case in Rolle(i Roll. Abr. 514, I.),

where the corporation was to be composed of a certain number of

tion is dissolved. As in the case in Rolle ( 1 Roll. Ahr. 514, I.),
where the corporation was to be composed of a certain number of
brothers, and a certain number of sisters, and all the sisters were dead,
it was admitted that all grants and acts done by the brothers afterward were void; for, after the sisters were dead, it was not a perfect corporation. But the case, which is immediately aftenvards
stated by Rolle, sho·ws that if the brothers had possessed the power
to appoint other sisters in the place of those who were dead, the corporation might have been revived. So, Baron Comyn says, if a
corporation refuses to continue the election of officers till all die who
could make an el ection, the corporation is dissolved. (4 Com. Dig .
273, tit. Franchises, G. 4.
The incapacity to receive or resuscitate the powers of a corporation
may arise from three causes: 1. The absence of the necessary officers who are required to be present when the deficiency is supplied, or
their incapacity or neglect to do some act which is requisite to the
validity of the appointment. 2. The \.Vant of the n ecessary corporators who are required to unite in the appointment; and 3. The want
of the proper persons from whom the appointment is to be made.
The case of The C orporation of Banbury, before refe1Ted to , appears
to be one of the first description. And the case cited from Rolle and
that put by Chief Baron Comyn, as well as the King v. Passmore
(3 Term R ep. 199), and The Corporation of Maidstone and The
Borough of Teverton, referred to in that case, all appear to belong to
the t\\'O last classes of cases . The statute, 11 Geo. 1, ch. 4 ( 1 5 Stat.
at Large 178), has provided for the first class of cases, but the sixth
section of the act expressly excludes the second class, and no provision is made for cases of the third class . The result of an examination of all the cases on thi s subject is the principle so ably and succec;sfully contended for by S e rjeant East in the King v. Passmore,
that if the corporators have the povver in themselves to supply the deficiency in their body their rig hts are not extinguished but only dormant. If, however, that powe r is gone, and they can not act until
the deficiency is supplied, the corporation is dissolved. In the language of Lord Macclesfield, this is not a forfeiture for non-user. but is
a consequence of law. "The corporation is dead, and not barely
asleep." • • •

brothers, and a certain number of sisters, and all the sisters were dead,

it was admitted that all grants and acts done by the brothers aft-

erward were void; for, after the sisters were dead, it was not a per-

fect corporation. But the case, which is immediately afterwards

stated by Rolle, shows that if the brothers had possessed the power

to appoint other sisters in the place of those who were dead, the cor-

poration might have been revived. So, Baron Comyn says, if a

corporation refuses to continue the election of officers till all die who

could make an election, the corporation is dissolved. (4 Com. Dig.

273, tit. Franchises, G. 4.

The incapacity to receive or resuscitate the powers of a corporation

may arise from three causes: 1. The absence of the necessary offi-

cers who are required to be present when the deficiency is supplied, or

their incapacity or neglect to do some act which is requisite to the

validity of the appointment. 2. The Want of the necessary corpora-

tors who are required to unite in the appointment; and 3. The want
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of the proper persons from whom the appointment is to be made.

The case of The Corporation of Banbury, before referred to, appears

to be one of the first description. And the case cited from Rolle and

that put by Chief Baron Comyn, as well as the King v. Passmore

(3 Term Rep. 199), and The Corporation of Maidstone and The

Borough of Teverton, referred to in that case, all appear to belong to

the two last classes of cases. The statute, 11 Geo. 1, ch. 4(15 Stat,

at Large 178), has provided for the first class of cases, but the sixth

section of the act expressly excludes the second class, and no provis-

ion is made for cases of the third class. The result of an examina-

tion of all the cases on this subject is the principle so ably and suc-

cessfully contended for by Serjeant East in the King v. Passmore,

that if the corporators have the power in themselves to supply the de-

ficiency in their body their rights are not extinguished but only dor-

mant. If, however, that power is gone, and they can not act until

the deficiency is supplied, the corporation is dissolved. In the lan-

guage of Lord Macclesfield, this is not a forfeiture for non-user, but is

a consequence of law. "The corporation is dead, and not barely

asleep." * * *

[The court then concluded that because of the fact that the electors

could meet at a fixed time and place without the intervention of the

commissioners, there was nothing requiring a continued succession of

such commissioners and hence new commissioners could be elected at

anv annual meeting.]

Note. See 2 Kvd Cor. 448. 1717, Banburv's Case, 10 Mod. 346; 1803, Rex

[The cou1t then concluded that because of the fact that the electors
could meet at a fixed time an<l place without the intervention of the
commissioners, there was nothing requiring a continued succession of
such commi ssioners and hence new commissioners could be elected at
any annual meeting.]

v. Morris, 3 East 213; 1833, Lehigh K. B. Co. v. Lehigh Coal Co., 4 Rawle

(Pa.) 0; 1838, State University v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 366, 421, 31

Am. Dee. 72; 1854, State v. Vincennes Univ., 5 Ind. 77; 1875, Harris v. Mis-

sissippi V. R. Co., 51 Miss. 602.

Note . See 2 Kyd Cor . 448. 1717, Banbury's Case, 10 Mod. 346; 1803, Rex
v. Morris, 3 East 213; 183~, Lehigh R. B. Co. v. Lehigh Coal Co., 4 Rawle
(Pa.) n; 1838, State UniverAity v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 365, 421, 31
Am. Dec. 72; 1854, State v. Vincennes Univ., 5 Ind. 77; 1875, Harris v. Mississippi V. R. Co., 51 Miss. 602.
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THE MECHANICS' BANK v. HEARD."

1867. In the Supreme Court of Georgia. 37 Ga. Rep. 401-422.

[Suit by Heard against the bank upon bills which it refused to pay.

Sec. 244.

Surrender.

The sheriff's return showed personal service upon "T. S. Metcalf,

THE MECHANICS' BANK v. HEARD.1

president of the Mechanics' Bank," September 12, 1866. Metcalf

put in a traverse averring that he was not at that time president of

1867. IN

THE

' COURT OF GEORGIA. 37 Ga. Rep. 401-422.
SUPREME

the bank, and that it had at a meeting of the stockholders on February

20, 1866, duly called, and by a unanimous vote of the directors, sur-

rendered the charter to the state, and by order of said meeting notice

of such surrender was sent to, and received by, the governor of the

state, thus dissolving the corporation. The bank asked for a special

jury to try this collateral issue, and the court refused, allowing this

issue to be tried with others in the case. The jury found for the

plaintiff. Among the errors assigned was the refusal of a special jury

to try the collateral issue as to the surrender of the corporate exist-

ence.]

Harris, J. * * * It can not be denied that all banking cor-

porations in America are the creatures of legislative-will, and that no
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power to create such corporations belongs to either of the other de-

partments of the state government. Nor can it be denied that every

act of the legislature creating a banking corporation upon its accept-

ance becomes an executed contract between the state and corporation.

This principle, decided in Dartmouth College v. Woodard, 4 Whea-

ton 518, places plaintiff in error within the protection of the constitu-

tion of the United States. Under such protection it follows that the

act creating the Mechanics' Bank as a corporation can not be modified

or repealed by the legislature of Georgia without the free assent of the

corporators, and then only when such alteration or repeal does not

affect the rights of its creditors. It may be safely asserted that the

legislature, its creator, has no power of its will merely to dissolve it.

As long as it performs its engagement by the act creating it, it has a

corporate existence within the limit of time fixed by the act which can

not be shortened.

This brings us to consider the grounds on which corporations (pri-

vate) could be dissolved at common law.

They are: 1. Death of the corporators. 2. Surrender-of char-

ter accepted and enrolled. 3. Forfeiture. Section 3, Burrows

Repts. 1866.

But counsel for plaintiff in error have gravely, and with seeming

earnestness, asserted a dissolution of a corporation by a voluntary sur-

render was unknown to the common law, that such a privilege was

the creation of our code, and upon this assumption rests the plaintiff's

case. Let us see if it can stand the test of examination. It is said

of corporations created by letters-patent from the crown, that the

1 Statement abridged; arguments, part of opinion, and dissenting opinion

ol Walker, J., omitted.

[Suit by Heard against the bank upon bills which it refused to pay.
The sheriff's return showed personal service upon "T. S. Metcalf,
president of_the Mechanics' Bank," September 12, 1866. Metcalf
put in a traverse averring that he was not at that time president of
the bank, and that it had at a meeting of the stockholders on February
20, 1866, duly called, and by a unanimous vote of the directors, surrendered the charter to the state, and by order of said meeting notice
of such surrender was sent to, and received by, the governor of the
state, thus dissolving the corporation. The bank asked for a special
jury to try this collateral issue, and the court refused, allowing this
issue to be tried with others in the case. The jury found for the
plaintiff. Among the errors assigned was the refusal of a speciai jury
to try the collateral issue as to the surrender of the corporate existence.]
HARRIS, J. • • • It can not be denied that all banking corporations in America are the creatures of legislative w£ll, and that no
power to create such corporations belongs to either of the other departments of the state government. Nor can it be denied that eycry
act of the legislature creating a banking corporation upon its acceptance becomes an executed contract between the state and corporation.
This principle, decided in Dartmouth College v. Woodard, 4 Wheaton 5 18, places plaintiff in error within the protection of the constitution of the United States. Under such protection it follows that the
act creating the Mechanics' Bank as a corporation can not be modified
or repealed by the legislature of Georgia without the free assent of the
corporators, and then only when such alteration or repeal does not
affect the rights of its creditors. It may be safely asserted that the
legislature, its creator, has no power of its will merely to dissolve it.
As long as it performs its engagement by the act creating it, it has a
corporate existence within the limit of time fixed by the act which can
not be shortened.
This brings us to consider the grounds on which corporations (private) could be dissolved at common law.
They are: 1. Death of the corporators. 2. Surrender ·of charter accepted and enrolled. 3. Forfeiture. Section 3, Burrows
Repts. 1866.
But counsel for plaintiff in error have gravely, and with seeming
earnestness, asserted a dissolution of a corporation by a voluntary surrender was unknown to the common law, that such a privilege was
the creation of our code, and upon this assumption rests the plaintiff's
case. Let us see if it can stand the t<!st of examinati1..'n. It is said
of corporations created by letters-patent from the cro'vvn, that the
1 Statement abridged; arguments, part of opinion, and dissenting opinion
of Walker, J., omitted.
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king could not ex tnero motu alter or resume his grant. It could be

dissolved upon the free consent of the corporators surrendering their

franchises under the seal of the corporation. Grant on Corporations,

king could not ex mero motu alter or resume his grant. Jt could be
dissolved upon the free consent of the corporators surrendering their
franchises under the seal of the corporation. Gr.ant on Corporations,
p. 303. Rex v. Lanier, Salk. 168; 8 Meeson and Welsby, 1.
Here then we find that sur render was a mode whereby a. corporation might be dissolved. It was voluntary, for it proceeded from
the free e<msent of the corpora tors. The franchise could not be resumed unless the grantees concurred. Rex v. Lanier, S alk. 168; 8
Meeson and Welsby, I. Thus Vie have the definition of surrender;
its characteristic is that it is voluntary, springing from th'! free consent
of the corporators. Can mc,re 0e necessary to satisfy the enquirer
that a voluntary surrender was a mode whereby a dissolution of a corporation might be effected according to the common law? To make
it complete, such surrender required the assent or acceptance of the
creator of the corporation, duly enrolled and of record. The English authorities cited established these doctrines.
Our code, in enumerating the grounds whereby corporations are
dissolved, but repeats those existing at common law. "Surrender"
is one of them. In a subsequent clause, voluntary surrender is defined, thus clearly showing that in the minds of the codifiers they
were one and the same mode.
An identity is thus shown between "surrender" at common law,
ana tne surrender or voluntary surrender of the code, proceeding alike
from the free wt'/l of the corporators. 'Tis this which distinguishes
them from another mode of dissolution by forfeiture; this last is the
result solely of the coercion, compulsion by the judgment of a court.
In England the surrender was required to be made to tlze creator of
the corporation. In G eorgia, the code requires it to be made to the
state, by which the legislature, as the creator by law of banking corporations, must necessarily be understood. • • •
Counsel have throughout confounded the resolution to make a surrender with an actual dissolution of a corporation. These things are
entirely distinct, proceeding from different parties. A surrender is
not a d£sso!ution; it is but a m ode, a way, a means to an end. The
corporators consent to surrender their franchise, tender it back to the
legislature and ask to b e dissolved as a corporation. This is their fr ee
act and proceeds from one party to the contract. If the surrender i
formal under the seal of the corporation and the legislature, the other
party to the contract in behalf of the state accepts it by an act or ordinance in some authoritative form, and that is authenticated as law
and ordinances usually are, tlzen, and not till then, is the dissolution
of the corporation upon surrender and the evidence of it complete.

p. 303. Rex v. Lanier, Salk. 168; 8 Meeson and Welsby, 1.

Here then we find that surrender was a mode whereby a. corpora-

tion might be dissolved. It was voluntary, for it proceeded from

the free consent of the corporators. The franchise could not be re-

sumed unless the grantees concurred. Rex v. Lanier, Salk. 168; 8

Meeson and Welsby, 1. Thus v/e have the definition of surrender;

its characteristic is that it is voluntary, springing from the free consent

of the corporators. Can more be necessary to satisfy the enquirer

that a voluntary surrender was a mode whereby a dissolution of a cor-

poration might be effected according to the common law? To make

it complete, such surrender required the assent or acceptance of the

creator of the corporation, duly enrolled and of record. The En-

glish authorities cited established these doctrines.

Our code, in enumerating the grounds whereby corporations are

dissolved, but repeats those existing at common law. "Surrender"

is one of them. In a subsequent clause, voluntary surrender is de-
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fined, thus clearly showing that in the minds of the codifiers they

were one and the same mode.

An identity is thus shown between "surrender" at common law,

ana tne surrender or voluntary surrender of the code, proceeding alike

from the free -will of the corporators. 'Tis this which distinguishes

them from another mode of dissolution by forfeiture; this last is the

result solely of the coercion, compulsion by the judgment of a court.

In England the surrender was required to be made to the creator of

the corporation. In Georgia, the code requires it to be made to the

state, by which the legislature, as the creator by law of banking cor-

porations, must necessarily be understood. • * •

Counsel have throughout confounded the resolution to make a sur-

render with an actual dissolution of a corporation. These things are

entirely distinct, proceeding from different parties. A surrender is

not a dissolution; it is but a mode, a way, a means to an end. The

corporators consent to surrender their franchise, tender it back to the

legislature and ask to be dissolved as a corporation. This is their free

act and proceeds from one party to the contract. If the surrender is

formal under the seal of the corporation and the legislature, the other

party to the contract in behalf of the state accepts it by an act or or-

dinance in some authoritative form, and that is authenticated as law

and ordinances usually are, then, and not till then, is the dissolution

of the corporation upon surrender and the evidence of it complete.

***

Now corporations in Great Britain were created either by virtue of

the royal prerogatives or by act of parliament; if by the crown, by

letters-patent under its seal and duly enrolled; if by parliament, by

an act of the three estates duly enrolled and with the great seal

attached.

In the case of crown grants, when dissolved upon surrender by the

• • •

Now corporation s in Great Britain were created either by virtue of
the royal prerogatives or by act of parliament; if by the crown, by
letters-patent uncler its seal and duly enrolled; if by parliament, by
an act of the three estates duly enrolled and with the great seal
attached.
In the case of crown grants, when dissolved upon surrender by the
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grantees, the acceptance of the king of such surrender was required

to be enrolled and of record. 3 Burr. Rep. 1866; 1 Wooddeson's

Lectures, 500; 1 Salk. Rep. 191. Parliamentary could only be dis-

solved by act of parliament. See Grant on Corporations.

The foregoing are familiar principles regulating the creation and

dissolution of corporations, and they are in accordance with a maxim

pervading the common law in other departments. Nihil tarn conven-

iens est naturali aequitati quam iinum quoque dissolet eo ligamine

quo ligatum est.

Again, "a corporation aggregate may surrender and in that way

dissolve itself, but then the surrender must be accepted by government,

and be, made by some solemn act to render it complete." 2 Kent's

Com. 209.

An act of the legislature repealing the act of incorporation, passed

■with the assent of the corporators, would undoubtedly be sufficient

to effect a dissolution. Revere v. Boston Copper Co.,- 15 Pick. R.

351-

The surrender must be by a formal act of the corporation under
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seal; and it can not avail but by an acceptance of such surrender by

an enrolled act or law. There must be the same agreement to dissolve

as to make. The power in a corporation to dissolve by its own act

is too dangerous to be supposed to exist. See Boston Glass Co. v.

Langdon, 24 Pickering Rep. 49.

In this country, where corporations are usually created by act of

the legislature, no mode of surrender is pointed out by the books as

necessary to be pursued, differing from that in England, where cor-

porations are usually created by charter from the crown. It is said a

surrender, if accepted, will be sufficient. Angell and Ames on Cor-

porations, 638; 2 Kent. Com. 250; 15 Pick. Rep. 351.

As the identity of surrender at common law as a mode of dissolu-

tion of a corporation, with the surrender defined by the code, can not

but be conceded by every lawyer who will take the trouble of investi-

gating the subject, and no mode or form is prescribed by the code as

necessary to be pursued in order to make it effectual, there seems to

me no escape from the necessity of alleging, and, in support of such

allegation, exhibiting, some act or ordinance of the legislature, ap-

proved by the governor, assenting to or accepting the proposed sur-

render of their franchise by the Mechanics' Bank.

A dissolution at the will of corporators would leave no evidence of

the surrender but the entry of the resolution of the corporators on the

minutes of the bank, and when thus dissolved who can say where will

be the depository of the minutes?

In fine the proposition of plaintiff in error involves, besides what

has been said in reference to it, this striking inequality, that a law

containing a contract of the highest importance between the corpora-

tion and the state may be set aside and annulled at the will of the

corporators by a mere resolution, notice of which is given to the gov-

ernor, whilst the state can not alter or repeal that law, or resume the

franchises granted, or compel their delivery up or cause a dissolution

grantees, the acceptance of the king of such surrender was required
to be enrolled and of record. 3 Burr. Rep. 1866; 1 Wooddeson's
Lectures, 500; I Salk. Rep. 191. Parliamentary could only be dis·
soh·ed hy act of parliament. See Grant on Corporations.
The foregoing are familiar principles regulating the creation and
dissolution of corporations, and they are in accordance with a maxim
pervading the common law in other departments. Nihil tam conveniens est naturali aequitati 9uam unum <JUO<JUe dissolet eo lt'gamine
<JUO ligatum est.
Again, "a corporation aggregate may surrender and in that way
dissolve itself, but then the surrender must be accepted by government,
and be. made by some solemn act to render it complete." 2 Kent's
Com . 209.
An act of the legislature repealing the act of incorporation, passed
with the assent of the corporators, would undoubtedly be sufficient
to effect a dissolution. Revere v. Boston Copper Co.,. 15 Pi-ck. R.
35r.
The surrender must be by a formal act of the corporation under
seal ; and it can not avai'l but by an acceptance of suclz surrender by
an enrolled act or law. There must be the same agreement to dissolve
as to make. The power t'n a corporatt'on to dissolve by its own act
is too dangerous to be supposed to ext'st. See Boston Glass Co. v.
Langdon , 24 Pickering Rep. 49.
In this country, where corporations are usually created by act of
the legislature, no mode of surrender is pointed out by the books as
necessary to be pursued, differing from that in England, where corporations are usually created by charter from the crown. It is said a
surrender, if accepted, will be sufficient. Angell and Ames on Corporations, 638; 2 Kent. Com. 250; 15 Pick. Rep. 35 I.
As the identity of surrender at common law as a mode of dissolution of a corporation, with the surrender defined by the code, can not
but be conceded by every lawyer who will take the trouble of investigating the subject. and no mode or form is prescribed by the code as
necessary to be pursued in order to make it effectual, there seems to
me no escape from the necessity of alleging, and, in support of such
allegation, exhibiting, some act or ordinance of the legislature, approved by the governor, assenting to or accepting the proposed surrender of their franchise by the Mechanics' Bank.
A dissolution at the will of corporators would leave no evidence of
the surrender but the entry of the resolution of the corporators on the
minutes of the bank, and when thus dissolved who can say where will
be the depository of the minutes?
In fine the proposition of plaintiff in error im·olves, besides what
has been sai<l in reference to it, this striking inequality, that a law
containing a contract of the highest importance between the corporation and the state may be set aside and annulled at the wt'll of the
corporators by a mere resolution, notice of which is given to the governor, whilst the state can not alter or repeal that law, or resume the
franchises granted, or compel their delivery up or cause a dissolution
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of that corporation, but upon some ground of forfeiture judicially es-

tablished, and the judgment thereon of a competent court. Such ine-

880

MERCHANTS' AND PLANTERS' LINE V. WAGANER.

§ 245

quality between the rights of contracting parties as flows from the

position of plaintiff's counsel demonstrates the absurdity of such

of that corporation, but upon some ground of forfeiture judicially established , and the judgment thereon of a competent court. Such inequality between the rights of contracting parties as flows from the
position of plaintiff's counsel demonstrates the absurdity of such
position. • • •
Affirmed.
Note. See note to § 246.

position. » * •

Affirmed.

Note. See note to § 246.

Sec. 245. Same.

MERCHANTS' AND PLANTERS' LINE v. WAGANER.1

18S2. In the Supreme Court of Alabama. 71 Ala. Rep.

581-589.

[Bill filed in 1S82 by Waganer and others, as shareholders in the

line corporation asking for a dissolution of the corporation, and to

Sec. 245. Same.

hold the directors thereof personally liable for misconduct and mis-

MERCHANTS' AND PLANTERS' LINE v. WAGANER.1
1882. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA. 71 Ala.. Rep.
581-589.
[Bill filed in 1882 by W agancr and others, as shareholders in the
line corporation asking for a dissolution of the corporati on, and to
h old the dire.c tors thereof personally liable for misconduct and mismanagement. The corporation was organized in No\'embcr, 1879,
and by-laws were adopted, one of which provided , "This corporation
shall be di ssolved January I. r88 1." These \.Vere made pa1i of the
bill; to this a demurrer "ms filed, on the ground that the corp oration
w as dissolved before the suit was brought. The demurrer was overmleJ in the lower cou1t and thi s is the error assigned .]
STONE, J. • • • In Ang. & Ames on Corp. , § 766, after enumerating several modes by which corporations may be dissolved, the authors
say: "To these modes of dissolution may be added one grown to be
quite common in this country: the dissolution of a corporation by expiration of the term of its duration , limited by charter or general law. "
And in section 77 2 the same authors say : ''In this country, the power of
a private corporation to dissolve itself by its own assent seems to be assumed by nearly all the judges who touch upon the point.'' Many
authorities are cited in support of this; but the authors add: "It
would seem that, as there are two parties to the charter compact, the
assent of both would be necessary to the abrogation of the contract.''
In Treadwell v. Salisbury Manuf. Co., 7 Gray 393,·the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts held that corporations of a private nature ,
established solely for manufacturing purposes, may by vote, even of
a majority of their members, wind up their business and close their
operations, if they elect to do so. It will be observed that this right
is placed on the ground that the corporation was purely of a private
nature, in which the public could not be supposed to have any interest. Between such corporation and any joint adventure in which
p arties may associate themselves, there can be little.or no difference,
so far as the rights of the public ·are concerned. • • •
We hold that the stockholders of this corporation had the power to
dissolve it, without obtaining the consent of the state. This principle was so announced in Savage v. Walshe, 26 Ala. 619. See, also,
M. & 0. R. Co. v. State, 29 Al a. 573; McLaren v. Pennington, I
Paige 102 ; Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v . Conn. Riv. Co., 7 Conn. 45;
1 Statement much abridged, and only part of t he opinion given.

management. The corporation was organized in November, 1879,

and by-laws were adopted, one of which provided, "This corporation

shall be dissolved January 1. 18S1." These were made part of the

bill; to this a demurrer was filed, on the ground that the corporation

was dissolved before the suit was brought. The demurrer was over-

ruled in the lower court and this is the error assigned.]
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Stone, J. * * * In Ang. & Ames on Corp., § 766, after enumer-

ating several modes by which corporations may be dissolved, the authors

say: "To these modes of dissolution may be added one grown to be

quite common in this country: the dissolution of a corporation by expi-

ration of the term of its duration, limited by charter or general law."

And in section 772 the same authors say: "In this country, the power of

a private corporation to dissolve itself by its own assent seems to be as-

sumed by nearly all the judges who touch upon the point." Many

authorities are cited in support of this; but the authors add: "It

would seem that, as there are two parties to the charter compact, the

assent of both would be necessary to the abrogation of the contract."

In Treadwell v. Salisbury Manuf. Co., 7 Gray 393,'the Supreme

Court of Massachusetts held that corporations of a private nature,

established solely for manufacturing purposes, may by vote, even of

a majority of their members, wind up their business and close their

operations, if they elect to do so. It will be observed that this right

is placed on the ground that the corporation was purely of a private

nature, in which the public could not be supposed to have any inter-

est. Between such corporation and any joint adventure in which

parties may associate themselves, there can be little or no difference,

so far as the rights of the public are concerned. * * *

We hold that the stockholders of this corporation had the power to

dissolve it, without obtaining the consent of the state. This princi-

ple was so announced in Savage v. Walshe. 26 Ala. 619. See, also,

M. & O. R. Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 573; McLaren v. Pennington, I

Paige 102; Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Conn. Riv. Co., 7 Conn. 45;

1 Statement much abridged, and only part of the opinion given.
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Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. 456; Canal Co. v. R. Co., 4 Gill & Johns.

1; Mclntyre Poor School v. Zanesville Canal Co., 9 Ohio 203;

Mumma v. Potomac Co., S Pet. 281.

In the very act of organizing this corporation the stockholders, by a

by-law, fixed the term of its duration. Their language was, it shall

be dissolved on the first day of January, 1881. A more solemn agree-

ment and compact could not be entered into. We can not know that

in the absence of that compact the corporation ever would have been

organized, or its duties entered upon. We hold that such stipulation,

embodied in the original compact, is at least as obligatory on the stock-

holders as a resolution afterwards adopted would be. This put an

end to the corporation, as a corporation January 1, 1S81. * * *

[Considered, however, as a bill to settle accounts of a dissolved

corporation and of its successor, a quasi joint stock company resulting

from a continuance of the business in the same way after dissolution,

there was no substantial error in overruling the demurrer. Affirmed.]

Note. See note to § 246.

Sec. 246. Non-user, insolvency and surrender.
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SLEE v. BLOOM and Others.1

1821. In Court of Chancery. 1S22. In the Court of Er-

rors, New York. 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) Rep. 366-388, 19

Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. 456; Canal Co.'"· R. Co., 4 Gill & Johns.
1; Mcintyre Poor School v. Zanesville Canal Co., 9 Ohio 203;
Mumma v. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 281.
In the very act of organizing this corporation the stockholders, by a
by-law, fixed the term of its duration. Their language was, it shall
be dissolved on the first day of January, 1881. A more solemn agreement and compact could not be entered into. We can not know that
in the absence of that compact the corporation ever would have been
organized, or its duties entered upon. We hold that such stipulation,
embodied in the original compact, is at least as obligatory on the stockholders as a resolution afterwards adopted would be. This put an
end to the corporation, as a corporation January 1, r 881. • • •
[Considered, however, as a bill to settle accounts of a di!o,solved
corporation and of its successor, a quasi' joint stock company resulting
from a continuance of the business in the .same way after dissolution,
there was no substantial error in overruling the demurrer. Affirmed.]
Note. See note to § 246.

Johns. (N. Y.) 456-486, 10 Am. Dec. 273.

[Bill in equity by Slee against Bloom et al., filed in 1819. It

showed that Slee had been the owner of a cotton mill in New York,

Sec. 246. Non-user, insolvency and surrender.

and in order to provide additional funds he, in 1814, induced Bloom

SLEE v. BLOOM

and others to unite with him in the formation of a corporation for the

purpose of purchasing and operating the mill. The corporation was

1821.

IN

formed under the New York Act of 1S11, with a capital stock of

RORS,

$60,000. After organization Slee proposed to sell the mill for $30,-

900, which was accepted, and 172 shares of $100 each, full paid,

were issued to him in part payment, leaving $13,700 yet due. From

time to time calls were made upon the other shares to the extent of

50 per cent, but only a small part was paid. In December, 1815, in

order to carry on the business. $10,000 were borrowed, upon the

individual note of Slee, due in one year, indorsed as surety by Bloom

and the other directors. In order to protect them Slee executed to

them a penal bond in the sum of $20,000, with power to confess

judgment against him, which they did in June, 1816. In October, 1816,

it was determined to discontinue business, and Slee, as superintend-

ent, was directed to wind up the affairs and dispose of the company's

property, and upon the report of a committee appointed for that pur-

pose it was found that the company then owed Slee $23,493 (includ-

ing the note), and for security executed its penal bond, with power

1 Only parts of opinions of Chancellor Kent and Spencer, Ch. J., are given.

Arguments are omitted.

56—Wil. Casks.

COURT OF CHANCERY.

AND 0rHERS. 1

1822.

IN

THE COURT OF

ER-

NEW YoRK. 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) Rep. 366-388, 19
Johns. (N. Y.) 456-486, 10 Am. Dec. 273.

[Bill in equity by Slee against Bloom et al., filed in 18r9. It
showed that Slee had been the owner of a cotton mill in New York,
and in order to provide additional funds he, in 1814, induced Bloom
and others to unite with him irr the formation of a corporation for the
purpose of purchasing and operating the mill. The corporation was
formed under the New York Act of 1811, with a capital stock of
$6o,ooo. After organization ·Slee proposed to sell the mill for $30,900, which was accepted, and 172 shares of $100 each, full paid,
were issued to him in part payment, leaving $13,700 yet due. From
time to time calls were made upon the other shares to the extent of
50 per cent. but only a small part was paid. In December, 1815, in
order to carry on the business, $ 10,000 were borrowed, upon the
individual note . of Slee, due in one year, indorsed as surety by Bloom
and the other directors. In order to protect them Slee executed t<>
them a penal bond in the sum of $20,000, with power to confess,
judgment against him, which they did in June, 1816. In October, 1816,
it was determined to discontinue business , and Slee, as superintendent, was directed to wind up the affairs and dispose of the company's
property, and upon the report of a committee appointed for that purpose it was found that the company then owed Slee $z3,493 (including the note) , and for security executed its penal bond, with power
1
Only parts of opin.ions of Chancellor Kent and Spencer, Cb. J., are given.
Arguments are omitted.
56- W!L. CASES.
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to take judgment against the company for $46,986. In May, 1817,

882

Slee took judgment upon this, with stay till October, 1817. In

SLEE \ . . IlLOOM ANO OTHERS.

August, 1817, it was resolved, with the assent of Slee, that all share-

to take judgment against the company for $46,986. In May, r817 ,
Slee took judg m ent upon this, with stay till October, 1817. In
August, 1817, it was resolved, with the assent of Slee, that all shareholders who paid up the 50 per cent. of subscriptions called for
should be exempt fro m further liability. But few p aid , and in November, 1817, against the protest of Slee, it was resolved tha t those who
paid 30 per cent. of the ir stock should be entirely relieved. M ost of
the delinquents did this and wholly abandoned the corporation. Ko
shareholders and no directors' meetings were he ld afte r M ay and D ecember, 18 17, respectively. Slee being unable to pay the note v•hen
due Bloom and others paid it, and in O ctober, 1817, issued execution
again ·t Slee, ,,·hereby his land to value of $9 1 000, and his intere t in
the corporate pro perty, became liable to sale. 111 order to save himself he took out execution against the company, allowed $4, ro5 received upon calls to be paid to Bloo m and the rest , and procured one
E. to become surety for the lfa lancc due on the note , by assigning to
E. his property and ' th e avails of his execution against the company.
whereupon Bl oo m ct al. gave up the note and we re discharged from
liability upon it. The sale of the corporate property under execution
F ebruary 1, 18r8, netted only $160, leaving (after crediting the
$ 4, 105 as payment) over $18,000 yet due, which Slee alleged he had
no way of obtaining unless the stockholders should be compelled to pay
their subscriptions. The statute provided "that for all debts which
shall be due and owing to the company at tlte time of dissolution , the
p e rsons then composing the company shall be individually respons ible
to the extent of their respective shares of stock in said company and
no further."
Most of the material facts were admitted by Bloom et al., and the
chancellor dismissed the bill and appeal was taken. P art of the chancellor's opinion (S Johns. Ch. 377 et seq.) is as follows]:
KENT, C.
• • • The first and leading question in the case is
whether the corporation is dissolved , so as to enable the plaintiff to
call upon the individual members. It will not be disputed that with- ·
out such a provision in the statute the individuals would not be res pon ·ihle in their private property, either before or after the dissolution of the company for corporate debts. The facts from which an
actual dissolution is inferred are, that the stockholders have not
elected trustees since April, 1817 , a nd that the trustees have not met
as a body since th e 31st of D ecember, r 8 I 7, and that all the corporate property, real and personal , was sold o n an execution i ued
in the name and at th e in tance of the plaintiff on the 1st of F ebruary,
r8 18, and that the members have since abandoned all attention to the
in titution . • • •
The omission to elect new trustees in 1818 anci 1819 did not, of
itself, work a disi;olution according to the opinion of the supreme
court in the case of the P eople v. Runkle (9 Johns. Rep. r47) , nnd
by the authority of the cases there referred to , a corporate election
after the year would be good, upon general principles of law, if an
integ ral part of the corporation re mained , and the officers already in

holders who paid up the 50 per cent, of subscriptions called for

should be exempt from further liability. But few paid, and in Novem-

ber, 1817, against the protest of Slee, it was resolved that those who

paid 30 per cent, of their stock should be entirely relieved. Most of

the delinquents did this and wholly abandoned the corporation. No

shareholders and no directors' meetings were held after May anil De-

cember, 1S17, respectively. Slee being unable to pay the note when

due Bloom and others paid it, and in October, 1S17, issued execution

against Slee, whereby his land to value of $9,000, and his interest in

the corporate property, became liable to sale. In order to save him-

self he took out execution against the company, allowed $4,105 re-

ceived upon calls to be paid to Bloom and the rest, and procured one

E. to become surety for the balance due on the note, by assigning to

E. his property and the avails of his execution against the company,

whereupon Bloom ct al. gave up the note and were discharged from

liability upon it. The sale of the corporate property under execution
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February 1, 1818, netted only $460, leaving (after crediting the

$4,105 as payment) over $iS,ooo yet due, which Slee alleged he had

no way of obtaining unless the stockholders should be compelled to pay

their subscriptions. The statute provided "that for all debts which

shall be due and owing to the company at the time of dissolution, the

persons then composing the cornpanv shall be individually responsible

to the extent of their respective shares of stock in said company and

no further."

Most of the material facts were admitted by Bloom et al., and the

chancellor dismissed the bill and appeal was taken. Part of the chan-

cellor's opinion (5 Johns. Ch. 377 et seq.~) is as follows]:

Kent, C. * * * The first and leading question in the case is

whether the corporation is dissolved, so as to enable the plaintiff to

call upon the individual members. It will not be disputed that with-

out such a provision in the statute the individuals would not be re-

sponsible in their private property, either before or after the dissolu-

tion of the company for corporate debts. The facts from which an

actual dissolution is inferred are, that the stockholders have not

elected trustees since April, 1817, and that the trustees have not met

as a body since the 31st of December, 1817, and that all the cor-

porate property, real and personal, was sold on an execution issued

in the name and at the instance of the plaintiff on the 1st of February.

iSi8, and that the members have since abandoned all attention to the

institution. * * «

The omission to elect new trustees in 1818 and 1819 did not, of

itself, work a dissolution according to the opinion of the supreme

court in the case of the People v. Runkle (9 Johns. Rep. 147), and

by the authority of the cases there referred to, a corporate election

after the year would be good, upon general principles of law, if an

integral part of the corporation remained, and the officers already in
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would continue to be good officers after the year, and until others

were elected. * * *

METHODS OF DISSOLUTION.

The members of the corporation, who are the integral part of it,

are in esse, and I see no difficulty in a future meeting of the last

elected trustees, and in a new election of trustees to be ordered and

prescribed. * * *

A corporation aggregate may be dissolved within the period pre-

scribed by its charter in certain modes and upon certain events, none

of which have occurred in this case. It may be dissolved if it be-

come incapable of continuing its corporate succession or executing

its corporate functions, as by the death of all its members or the de-

struction of an integral part of it, or it may be dissolved by surrender

of its franchises into the hands of the government, or bv forfeiture of

its charter through abuse or neglect of its franchises. The last is the

alleged ground of forfeiture in this case; but I apprehend that the

forfeiture in such case must be judicially ascertained and declared, and

that the power, which may have been abused or abandoned, can not

be ta"ken away but by regular process. The judgment in such cases

is, that the parties be ousted or that the liberty be seized into the

hands of the government. (Rex v. Stevenson, Yelv. 190.) This
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subject underwent great and learned discussion in the case of the

King v. Amery, in the K. B. (2 Term Rep. 515), and it was decided

by that court as the result of the investigation, that a corporation may

be dissolved and its franchises lost by non-user or neglect; but it was

assumed as an undeniable proposition that the default was to be judi-

cially determined in a suit instituted for the purpose. * * *

Assuming the charges in the bill in this case to be true, Lord

Kenyon points out the proper remedy: It is by the judicial process

of scire facias; and I believe that there is no instance of calling in

question the rights of a corporation as a body, for the purpose of de-

claring its franchises forfeited and lost, but at the instance and on be-

half of the government. * * *

(Citing Rex v. Passmore, 3 T. R. 199; Commw. v. Union Ins. Co.,

5 Mass. 230; Atty.-General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 389.)

I conclude, therefore, that the corporation is still subsisting in judg-

ment of law, and that this court is not authorized from anything that

appears in the case to consider the corporation dissolved. It follows,

then, that the bill against individual members for a corporate debt

can not be sustained. * * *

Spexcer, Ch. J. (In Court of Errors, 19 Johns. *473). With the

most profound and undissembled respect for the Chancellor, I am

constrained to differ from the opinion held by him that this corpora-

tion is not dissolved.

The object and intention of the legislature in authorizing the asso-

ciation of individuals for manufacturing purposes was, in effect, to

facilitate the formation of partnerships without the risks ordinarily at-

tending them, and to encourage internal manufactures. There is

nothing of an exclusive nature in the statute; but the benefits from as-

sociating and becoming incorporated, for the purposes held out in the

would continue to be good officers after the year, and until others
were elected. • • •
The members of the corporation, who are the integral part of it,
are in esse, and I see no difficulty in a future meeting of the last
elected trustees, and in a new election of trustees to be ordered and
prescribed. • • •
A corporation aggregate may be dissolved within the period prescribed by its charter in certain modes and upon ce;tain events, n one
of which have occurred in this case. It may be dissolved if it l >ccome t"ncapable of continuing its corporate succession or executing
its corporate function s, as by the death of all its me mbers or the destruction of an integral part of it, or it may be dissolved by surrcnda
of its franchises into the hands of the government, or by forfeiture of
its charter throug h abuse or neglect of its franchi ses. The last is the
alleged ground of forfeiture in this case; but I apprehend that the
forfeiture in such case mu st be judicially ascertained and d eclared , and
th at the power, which may have been abused or abandoned, can not
be t~ken away but by regular process. The judg ment in such c:iscs
is, that the parties be ousted or that the liberty be seized into the
hands of the government. (Rex v. Stevenson, Yelv. 190.) This
subject underwent great and learned discussion in the case of the
King v. Amery, in the K. B. (2 Term Rep. 515), and it was decided
by that court as the result of the investigation, that a corporation may
be dissolved and its franchises lost by non-user or neglect; but it was
assumed as an undeniable proposition that the default was to he judicially determined in a suit instituted for the purpose. • • •
Assuming the charges in the bill in this case to be true , Lord
Kenyon points out the proper remedy: It is by the judicial process
of sdre facias; and I believe that there is no instance of calling in
question the rights of a corporation as a body, for the purpo ~e of declaring its franchises forfeited and lost, but at the instance and on behalf of the government. • • •
(Citing Rex v. Passmore, 3 T. R. 199; Commw. v. Union Ins. Co.,
5 Mass. 230; Atty .-General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 389.)
I conclude, therefore, that the corporation is still subsisting in judgment of law, and that this court is not authorized from anything that
appears in the case to consider the corporation dissolved. It fo llows,
then, that the bill against individual members for a corporate debt
can not be sustained. • • •
SPENCER, CH. J. (In Court of ErTors, 19 J ohns. •473). With the
most profound and undissembled respect for the Chancellor, I am
constrained to differ from the opinion held by him that this corporation is not dissolved.
The object and intention of the legislature in authorizing the association of individuals for manufacturing purposes was, in effect, to
facilitate the formation of pa1tnerships without the risks ordinarily at·
tending them, and to encourage internal m anufactures. There is
nothing of an exclusive nature in the statute; but the benefits from associating and becoming incorporated, for the purposes held out in the
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act, are offered to all who will conform to its requisitions. There are

no franchises or privileges which are not common to the whole com-

SLEE V. BLOOM AND OTHERS.

munity. In this respect, incorporations under the statute differ from

corporations to whom some exclusive or peculiar privileges are

act, are offered to all who will conform to its requisitions. There are
no franchises or privileges which are not common to the whole community. In this respect, incorporations under the statute differ from
corporations to whom some exclusive or peculiar privileges are
granted. The only advantages of an incorporation under the statute
over partnerships, and the only substantial difference between them,
consists in a capacity to manage the affairs of the institution by a few
and select agents, and by an exoneration from any responsibility
beyond the amount of the individual subscriptions.
In coming to the conclusion that the corporation in this case is
dissolved, I lay out of the case everything of misu ser, or non-user,
excepting the influence which the fact of non-user may have as evidence, connected with other facts, to show the renunciation of the
corporate rights. Upon the authorities, and for the reasons given by
the chancellor, misuser or non-user can not be relied on as a substantive and specific ground of a dissolution. The ground on which I
place my opinion , that the corporation is dissolved, is, that they have
d one, and suffered to be done, acts equivalent to a direct surrender.
The chancellor concedes, and it does not, in my judgment, admit of
a doubt, that a corporation may be dissolved by a surrender of all
their corporate rights.
In 2 Kyd on Corp. 467 the rational and true rule is laid down. He
says, "the nile adopted in all the cases which have o ccurred on this
question seems to have been this, that where the effect of the surrender is to destroy the end for \>vhich the corporation , or the corporate capacity, was instituted, the corporation, or the corporate capacity, is itself destroyed;" and we have the high authority of L ord
Coke to the same effect. He says, if there be a warden of a chapel,
and the chapel and all the possessions be aliened, he ceases to be a
corporation, because he can not be warden of nothing; but if the
body o f a prebend be a manor and no more , and the m anor be recovered from the prebendary , by title paramount, yet his corporate
capacity r emains, because he has stallum £n choro. et vocem in cap£tulo,
and he is prebendary, although he has no possess ions. Thus, according to L o rd Coke, a recovery by title paramount would have produced
an extinction of the corporation, had it reached all the rights and
powers of the corporation, but inasmuch as there were rights unaffected hy the recovery, it did not work a dissolution. Suffering an
act to be done which destroys the end and object for which the corporation was instituted, must be regarded as equivalent to the doing an
act whi ch produces the very same consequences. A surrender is an
act in pais; it can, therefore, be no objection, in this case. that the
acts which have di ssolved the corporation are acts in pais.
This bill was not filed until the 24th of April, 18r9. In February,
18 18, all the estate, real and person al, of the corporation \vns sold
under an execution; and , as has already been stated , the corporation
has totally ceased fro m acting si nce D ecembe1-, 1817. The bill
charges, substantially, that the corporation is dissolved, and not one
of the respondents asserts that it d oes exist, or that there is the re-

granted. The only advantages of an incorporation under the statute

over partnerships, and the only substantial difference between them,

consists in a capacity to manage the affairs of the institution by a few

and select agents, and by an exoneration from any responsibility

beyond the amount of the individual subscriptions.

In coming to the conclusion that the corporation in this case is

dissolved, I lay out of the case everything of misuser, or non-user,

excepting the influence which the fact of non-user may have as evi-

dence, connected with other facts, to show the renunciation of the

corporate rights. Upon the authorities, and for the reasons given by

the chancellor, misuser or non-user can not be relied on as a substan-

tive and specific ground of a dissolution. The ground on which I

place my opinion, that the corporation is dissolved, is, that they have

done, and suffered to be done, acts equivalent to a direct surrender.

The chancellor concedes, and it does not, in my judgment, admit of

a doubt, that a corporation may be dissolved by a surrender of all
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their corporate rights.

In 2 Kyd on Corp. 467 the rational and true rule is laid down. He

says, "the rule adopted in all the cases which have occurred on this

question seems to have been this, that where the effect of the sur-

render is to destroy the end for which the corporation, or the corpo-

rate capacity, was instituted, the corporation, or the corporate capac-

ity, is itself destroyed;" and we have the high authority of Lord

Coke to the same effect. He says, if there be a warden of a chapel,

and the chapel and all the possessions be aliened, he ceases to be a

corporation, because he can not be warden of nothing; but if the

body of a prebend be a manor and no more, and the manor be re-

covered from the prebendary, by title paramount, yet his corporate

capacity remains, because he has stallum in ckoro, et vocem in capitulo,

and he is prebendary, although he has no possessions. Thus, accord-

ing to Lord Coke, a recovery by title paramount would have produced

an extinction of the corporation, had it reached all the rights and

powers of the corporation, but inasmuch as there were rights un-

affected by the recovery, it did not work a dissolution. Suffering an

act to be done which destroys the end and object for which the corpo-

ration was instituted, must be regarded as equivalent to the doing an

act which produces the very same consequences. A surrender is an

act in pais; it can, therefore, be no objection, in this case, that the

acts which have dissolved the corporation are acts in pais.

This bill was not filed until the 24th of April, 1819. In February,

1818, all the estate, real and personal, of the corporation was sold

under an execution; and, as has already been stated, the corporation

has totally ceased from acting since December, 1817. The bill

charges, substantially, that the corporation is dissolved, and not one

of the respondents asserts that it does exist, or that there is the re-
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motest idea of resuscitating it. Here is, then, a corporation pos-

885

sessed of nothing, abandoning the end and object of their institution,

without pretending that they ever hope or expect to resume their

functions; and, it may be added, all the corporators either admit the

dissolution of the corporation (I speak of those who have suffered

the bill to be taken pro confesso), or deny that they are corporators,

thus, presenting the phenomenon of a corporation without corpora-

tors, a nominal, inert body, pretending to have life and existence.

Such an anomaly can not be recognized. The argument is, that

being incorporated for twenty years, there exists a corporate capacity

during that period, and that although all the functions of the corpora-

tion have ceased, yet they may be resumed. The second section of

the act provides that as soon as the certificate shall be filed, the persons

who shall have signed and acknowledged the same, and their succes-

sors, shall, for the term of twenty years next after, be a body politic

and corporate, in fact and in name, etc. The legislature never

meant, nor does the act authorize the conclusion, that the corporation

should remain and continue during all that period nolens volens. It
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was implied that during that time they should do nothing to forfeit

their rights, nor surrender them back, or do any act tantamount

thereto. The act prolongs the corporation for twenty years, subject

to all the incidents attending corporations; and I have endeavored to

show that one of the incidents is an extinction of the corporation if

it does what is equivalent to a surrender. I doubt, extremely,

whether the capacity to resume the functions of the corporation does,

in fact, exist, but it is not necessary to decide that point. I consider

it merely as a matter of speculation, thrown out, without any practi-

cal reference to the cause, as a stumbling block to the attainment of

justice between the parties. For all the substantial purposes of jus-

tice, and in effect, the corporation is dissolved. » * *

In point of good sense this corporation was dissolved within the

meaning and intent of the act as regards creditors, when it ceased to

own any property, real or personal, and when it ceased for such a

space of time from doing any one act manifesting an intention to re-

sume their corporate functions. The end, being and design of the

corporation were completely determined, and even if it had the capac-

ity to reorganize and reinvigorate itself, the case has happened, when,

as relates to its creditors, it is dissolved.

If I am right thus far, then by the seventh section of the statute,

the persons composing the company at the time of its dissolution are

individually responsible to the extent of their respective shares for the

debts then due and owing by the company.

With respect to the period of the dissolution, it appears to me that

we may safely say it happened on the 1st of February, 1818, when

all the property of the company was sold, for since that time no cor-

porate act has been done. * * *

(Held also that Slee assenting to discharge of members upon pay-

ment of 50 per cent, of stock was bound by it, but that he was not

Reversed.

motest idea of resuscitating it. Here is, then, a corporation possessed of nothing, abandoning the end and object of their institution,
without pretending that they ever hope or expect to resume their
functions; and, it may be added, all the corporators either admit the
dissolution of the corporation (I speak of tho e who have suffered
the bill to be taken pro confesso) , or deny that they are corpor::itor~,
thus. presenting the phenomenon of a corporation without corporators, a nominal, inert body, pretending to have Ii fe and existence.
Such an anomaly can not be recognized. The argument is, that
being incorporate.cl for twenty years, there exists a corporate capacity
during that period, and that although all the functions of the corporation have ceased, yet they may be resumed. The second section of
the act provides that as soon as the certificate shall be filed, the p ersons
who shall have signed and acknowledged the same, and their successors, shall, for the term of twenty years next after, be a body politic
and corporate, in fact and in name, etc. The legislature never
meant, nor does the act authorize the conclusion, that the corporation
should remain and continue during all that period no/ens volens. It
was implied that during that time they should do nothing to forfeit
their rights, nor surrender them back, or do any act tantamount
thereto. The act prolongs the corporation for twenty years, subject
to all the incidents attending corporations; and I have endeavored to
show that one of the incidents is 'an extinction of the corporation if
it does what is equivalent to a surrender. I doubt, extremely,
whether the capacity to resume the functions of the corporation does,
in fact, exist, but it is not necessary to decide that point. I consider
it merely as a matter of speculation, thrown out, without any practical reference to the cause, as a sturnbling block to the attainment of
justice between the parties. For a ll the substantial purposes . of justice, and in effect, the corporation is dissolved. • • •
In point of good sense this corporation was dissolved within the
m eaning and intent of the act as regards creditors, when it ceased to
own any property, real or p e rsonal, and when it ceased for such a
space of time from doing any one act manifesting an intention to resume their corporate functions. The end, being and design of the
corporation were completely determined, and even if it had the capacity to reorganize and re invigorate itself, the case has happened, when,
as relates to its creditors, it is dissolved.
If I am right thus far, then by the seventh section of the statute,
the persons composing the company at the time of its dissolution are
individually responsible to tht- extent of their respective shares for the
debts then due and owing by the company.
With respect to the period of the dissolution, it appears to me that
·we may safely say it happened on the 1st of February, 1818, when
all the property of the company was sold, for since that time no corporate act has been done. • • •
(Held also that Slee assenting to discharge of members upon payment of 50 per cent. of stock was bound by it, but that he was not
Reversed.

Digitized by

Go gle

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

886

5 246

886

SLEE V. BLOOM AND OTHERS.

SLEE V. BLOOM A:l\D OT HERS.

bound by the resolution releasing shareholders upon payment of 30

bound by the resolution releasing shareholders upon payment of 30
per cent.)

per cent.)

As to insolvency, see, also, 1857, Coburn v. Manufacturing Co., 10 Gray

(Mass.) 243; 1887, Dewey v. St. Albans, etc., Co., 60 Vt. 1, 6 Am. St. E. 84;

As to insolvency, see, also, 1857, Coburn v. Manufacturing Co., 10 Gray
(Mase.) 243; 1887, Dewey v .• t . Albans, etc., Co., 60 Vt. l, 6 Am. St. R. 84;:
1888 Jones v. Bank of Leadville , 10 Colo. 4!H, 20 Am. & Eng. C. C. 554; 1889,.
R"u~e v. Merrhants' Bank, 46 Ohio ~t. 493, 15 Am. ~l. Re p. 644; 1 H:~. ~aloin
'" ( 'o lumhia Fue l Co .. 2-'.i Ore. J,), 4~ Am. ~ I. 750; 18H3 Larrnbee v. Frank li n
U 111k, 114 '.\1o. 5H~, ;;5 ,\ 111. ' t. He p. 77-!.
Note. Surl'ender.
1. A corporation may voluntarily surrender its franchises. 1822, Slee v.
Bloom, 19 J ohns. (N. Y.) 41)6, 10 Am. Dec. 273, eupra; 1832, Chesapeake& 0. Canal Co. v. Bal. & 0. R., 4 Gill & J. (Md. ) l; 1834, Boston Glass
Mfy . v. Langdon, 24 Pick. (M iies.) 49, 35 Am. Dec. 292, 8t1pra, p. ftfi6 ;.
1831), P enobscot Boom Corp. v. Lamson, 16 Maine (4 S bep.1 224, 33 Am. Dec.
656; 1839, Mcintire Poor School v. Zanesv ille, etc., Co., 9 Ohio 203, 34 Am.
Dec. 436 ; 1858, Lauma n v. Leb. V. R., 30 Pa. St. 42, 72 Am. Dec. 685 ; 1859,
Attorney-General v. Cieri?)' Sor., 10 Hieb. Eq. tS. C.: .) 604; 1869, P eople v. California College, 38 Cal. lti6; 1870, Houston v. Jefferso n College, 63 Pa. St ~
428; 18i l, Moore v. \\'hitcomh, 48 Mo. 543; 1892, Cronin v. Potters' Co-op.
Co., 29 \Vklv. L . B. (Oh io1 52.
2. Accepfanre by the state (through the legislature) is necessary in order
to co mpl ete dissolution . In :2 Kyd Corporati ons, 447, it is snicl th e king may
accept a surre nder ~·f charte rs gran,teJ by himself. ,but n ?t o ne gru 11 ted by
parliamE'nt. 1828 , Enfi eld Toll B. Co. v. Conn. R. Cu., 7 Conn. -9 8, 45; 1834,
Boston Glal'R Mfy. v. Langdon, 24 Pic-k. (l\f !ll'R.) 40, 35 Am. Dec. 292, s11pra, P8titi; 18:!4, Hevere v. Bol'to n Coppn ( 'o., 15 Pick. (l\Iass.) ::!i"> l ; 1836, H arri!' v_
Mu skingum Mfg. (;o .. 4 BlnC'k f. dnd .} 2ti7 , 29 Am. Dec. 372; 1845. Grt-eley v.
Smith, 3 ~to ry Wii; 1847, T own v. Rive r Raisi n ~ank , 2 Dong. Plich .) 530 ;
1851, Norris v. :hlayor, e tc., l 8 wun 131Te nn .)1G4; 18G l , l\Ic:\J nh an v . Morrison, 16 Ind. 172, 7!;) Am. Dec . ..Jl8; 18G l. Curie n v . F:ant ini, 16 La. Ann. 27;
1870, Wilso n v. ('p nl rn l Br. Co., 9 R. I. 5!)0; 1870, LaGn1111?e, etc., R. Co., 7
Co hv. !TPnn.) 420, 437 ; 189fi, Combes v . K ryes, 81) Wil'<. 297, 4fi Am. St. R ep.
839; 1896, The Attorney-Gent>ral v. Su p<'ri nr, etc., R. Co. , !13_W i1;. 604. See,
contra, Merc hants' and Plante rs' Line v. \Vag:m er, 71 Ala. 581, supra, p. 8SO,
and C'ases th ere in stat eil . A statutory m eth od of voluntary dissolution under
a ge neral la w giving the state's consent. whe n certain formalities are complied
with , is qui te lH!trn lly provided hy th e states.
3. A!:l to the ri gh t of the ma jori t y to i;urrender th e charter and dissolve th e
corporation, th e re see ms to be cons ide rable conflict. The question is c·loeely
alli e<i to the ri ght of a m11jority t o d iRpnse of th e assets of t h e corporation,
and th e following r ases, or m a n y of the m , are upon this point.
a. Jn the ease o f n solv<>nt., goinl?, private business corporation the m njor.
ity cnn 11ot, againAt the wiRhes of the minority, dispose of tht> a Asets and dissolve the corpo ration : 1813. Smith v. Rmith, 3 D<>s. Eq. tR. C.) 55i; 1844,
Wnr1! v. Soc. of A tt ys. , 1 Col l. 370; 1857, Mobile & O. R. v. ~t11ti>. 29 Ala.
573, ii81l; 1861, Cnrii> n v. Santi ni , 16 L n. Ann . 27; J8ffl, Ahbott v. Am. H:ird
RnbbE' r C'-0., 83 R11rb. (N . Y .) 578; l8fi7, Zahriskie v . H ackens:-irk. etc., R,
JS N . .T. Eq.178, 00 Am. Dec. fili; 18G8,Clinch v.Financial Corp. , L. R . 5
Eq. Cns. 450; 1872, Bini v. Bircl'A, E'lc., C'o., L. R . 9 C h . App. 358; 1813.
Black v. Del. & R. Ca na l Co. , H C. F.. G reen (24 N. ,J. Eq .) 455; 1876, Buford v,
K eok uk N. L. Co., 3 Mo. App . 15\l; 1882, Ber~mnn v. Rt. Poul. etr., M. B .
As1m ., 2!) Minn. 27il; 1883, Balli et v . Brown, 108 Pn. St. 546; 1887. Harton
v . The EntPrprise Loan, etc., Co., ll4 [11d . 226 ; 188H, 111 ,.,. Soverei~n Life
Assu~a n ce
42 Ch.!>· 540, 61 J,. T . I!. 455 ; 18110, Ro thwe ll v. R ohipson~
9
44 Mmn. 538; 1892, C h1 cngo, etc., Cab. Co. v. Yerkes, 141 TIJ, 3.,.Q,
~Am. t...
R e p. 31fi : 18!l2, PPople v. Balla ril , J!H N. Y. 2£N; 1895, Bv-ne v . Schnvl ei.
Elec. Mfg. Co., 65 Conn . 336; 1896, McC11tcheon v . :Merz Capsule ()Q.t 37 U.'
S . A pp. 586; 1897, Pringle v. E ltringham Constr. Co. , 49 La. Ann. 301, f\ .i\· &.'
E. C. C. (N . S.) 385; 1898, Forrester v. Boston M. M. Co., 21 Mont. 54;!,
Pac. Rep. 229:

1888 Jones v. Bank of Leadville, 10 Colo. 464, 20 Am. & Eng. C.C. 554; 1889,

Rouse v. Merchants' Bank, 46 Ohio St. 493, 15 Am. St. Rep. 644; 1893, Sal.in

v. Columbia Fuel Co.. 25 Ore. 15, 42 Am. St. 756; 18!)3 Larrabee v. Franklin

Bunk, 114 Mo. 592, 35 Am. St. Rep. 774.

Note. Surrender.

1. A corporation may voluntarily surrender its franchises. 1822, Slee v.

Bloom, 19 Jobns. (N. Y.) 456, 10 Am. Dec. 273, tupra; 1832, Chesapeake

& O. Canal Co. v. Bal. & O. R., 4 Gill & J. (Md.) 1; 1834, Boston Glass

Mfy. v. Langdon, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 49, 35 Am. Dec. 292, supra, p. 866;.

1839, Penobscot Boom Corp. v. Lamson, 16 Maine (4 Shep.i 224, 33 Am. Dec.

656; 1839, Mcintire Poor School v. Zanesville, etc., Co., 9 Ohio 203, 34 Am.

Dec. 436; 1858, Lauman v. Leb. V. R., 30 Pa. St. 42, 72 Am. Dec. 680; 1859,

Attorney-Oeneral v. Clergy Soc, 10 Rich. Eq. iS. C.) 604; 1809, People v. Cal-

ifornia College, 38 Cal. 166; 1870, Houston v. Jefferson College, 63 Pa. St.
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428; 1871, Moore v. Whitcomb, 48 Mo. 543; 1892, Cronin v. Potters' Co-op.

Co., 29 Wkly. L. B. (Ohioi 52.

2. Acceptance by the state (through the legislature) is necessary in order

to complete dissolution. In 2 Ky<l Corporations, 447, it is said the king may

accept a surrender of charters granted by himself, but not one grunted by

parliament. 1828, Enfield Toll B. Co. v. Conn. R. Co., 7 Conn. 28, 45; 1834,

Boston Glass Mfv. v. Langdon, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 4!>, 35 Am. Dec. 292, nupra, p.

866; 1834, Revere v. Boston Copper Co., 15 Pick. (Mass.) 351; 1836, Harris v.

Muskingum Mfg. Co., 4 Blackf. ilnd.) 267, 29 Am. Dec. 372; 1845. Greelev v.

Smith, 3 Story 657; 1847, Town v. River Raisin Bank, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 530;

1851, Norris v. Mavor, etc., 1 Swan (31 Tenn.) 164; 1861, McManan v. Morri-

son, 16 Ind. 172, 79 Am. Dec. 418; 1861, Curien v. Pantini, 16 La. Ann. 27;

1870, Wilson v. Central Br. Co., 9 R. I. 590; 1870, LaGranee, etc., R. Co., 7

Colw. (Tenn.) 420, 437; 1895, Combes v. Keyes, 89 Wis. 297, 46 Am. St. Rep.

839; 1896, The Attorney-General v. Superior, etc., R. Co., 93.Wis. 604. See,

contra, Merchants' and Planters' Line v. Waganer, 71 Ala. 581, snpra, p. 880,

and cases therein stated. A statutory method of voluntary dissolution under

a general law* giving the state's consent when certain formalities are complied

with, is quite usually provided by the states.

3. As to the right of the majority to surrender the charter and dissolve the

corporation, there seems to be considerable conflict. The question is closely

allied to the right of a majority to dispose of the assets of the corporation,

and the following cases, or many of them, are upon this point.

a. In the case of a solvent, goiner, private business corporation the major-

ity can not, against the wishes of the minority, dispose of the assets and dis-

solve the corporation: 1813, Smith v. Smith, 3 Des. Eq. (S. C.) 557; 1844,

Ward v. Soc. of Attvs., 1 Coll. 370; 1857, Mobile & 0 R. v. State. 29 Ala.

573, 586; 1861, Curien v. Santini, Hi La. Ann. 27; 18(11, Abbott v. Am. Hard

Rubber Co., 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 678; 1867, Zabriskie v. Hackensack. etc., R ,

18 N. J.Eq. 178, 90 Am. Dec. 617; 1868, Clinch v. Financial Corp., L. R. 5

Eq. Cas. 450; 1H72, Bird v. Bird's, etc., Co., L. R. 9 Ch. App. 358; 1873,

po. ,

Black v. Del. & R. Canal Co., 9 C. E. Green (24 N. J. Eq.) 455; 1876, Buford v,

Keokuk N. L. Co., 3 Mo. App. 159; 1882, Bersrman v. St. Paul. et<\, M. B.

Assn., 2!) Minn. 275; 1883, Balliet v. Brown, 103 Pa. St. 546; 1887, Barton

v. The Enterprise Loan, etc., Co., 114 Did. 226; 1889, In re Sovereign Life

Assurance Co., 42 Ch. D. 640, 61 L. T. R. 455; 1890, Rothwell v. Robinson,

pq

44 Minn. 538; 1892, Chicago, etc., Cab. Co. v. Yerkes, 141 HI. 320, 33 Am. St.

Rep. 315; 1892, People v. Ballard, 134 N. Y. 2(19; 1895, Bvne v. Schuvler

Elec. Mfg. Co., 65 Conn. 336; 1896, McCutcheon v. Merz Capsule Oft.. 37 U."

S. App. 586; 1897,Pringle v. Eltringham Constr. Co., 49 La. Ann. 301, 6, A.<fc

E. C. C. (N. S.) 385; 1898, Forrester v. Boston M. M. Co., 21 Mont. 54L 55.

Pac. Rep. 229.
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b. But the majority may dispose of the assets of a corporation, surrender

its charter and dissolve the corporation, even against the wishes of a minor-

ity, when the corporation is in failing circumstances, unable to go on and ac-

complish its ends, in the absence of unfairness, oppression or fraud: 1847,

Sargeant v. Webster, 13 Mete. (Mass.l 497, 46 Am. Dec. 743; 1850, Hodges v.

New Eng. Screw Co., 1 R. I. 312, 53 Am. Dec. 624; 1856. Treadwell v. Salis-

bury Mfg. Co., 7 Gray iMass.) 393, 66 Am. Dec. 490; 1862, Bank of Switzer-

land v. Bank, 5 L. T. (N. S.) 549; 1870, Wilson v. Proprietors, etc., 9 R. 1.590;

1881, Hancock v. Holbrook, 9 Fed. Rep. 353; 1883, Sheldon Hat Co. v. Eick-

niever, etc., Co., 56 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 70; 1886, Ervin v. Oregon R. & Nav.

Co.', 27 Fed. Rep. 625; 1886, Hutchinson v. Green, 91 Mo. 371; 1888, Berrv

v. Bronch, 65 Miss. 450; 1888, Botts v. Simpsonville Tp. Co., 88 Ky. 54; 1889,

Mason v. Pewabic Min. Co., 133U. S. 50; 1889, Sawyer v. Dubuque, etc., Co.,

77 Iowa 242; 181)0, Havden v. Official Hotel, etc., Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 875; 1891,

Trisconi v. Winship, 43 La. Ann. 45; 1892, Skinner v. Smith, 134 N. Y. 240;

1893, Price v. Holcomb, 89 Iowa 123; 1893, Sewell v. East Cape Mav, etc.,

Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 717; 1896, Elyton Land Co. v. Dowdell, 113 Ala. 177; 1897,

Peabodv v. Westerly W. W., 20 R. I. 176, 37 Atl. Rep. 807; 1899, Phillips v.

Prov. Steam, etc., Co., 21 R. I. 302, 45 L. R. A. 560.

b. But the majoritv may dispose of the assets of a corporation, surrender
its charter and dissolve the corporation, even against the wishes of a minority, when the corporation is in failing circumstances, unnble to go on and accomplish its endA, in the absence of unfairness, oppression or fraud: 1847,
Sargl!ant v. Webster, 13 Mete. (Mass.l 497, 46 Am. Der. 743; 1850, Hodges v.
New Eng. Scre w Co., 1 R. I. lH2, 53 Am. Dec. fi'.!4; 1856. Trend well v. Halisbury Mfg. Co., 7 Grny 1Ma. s.l 393, 66 .Am. Dec. 490; 1862, Bank of Switzerland v. Bank, 5 L. T. ( ~ . S . ) 54\.l; 1870, Wilson v. Proprietors, etc., 9 R. I. 590;
1881, Hancock v. Holbrook, 9 Fed. Re p. 353; 188:!, Sheldon Hat Co. v. Eickmeyer, etc., Co., 5H How. Pr. ( N. Y.) 70; 1886, Ervin v. Oreii:on R. & Nav.
Co., 27 Fed . Re p. 625; 1886, Hutchinson v. Green, 91 Mo. 37 1; 1888, Berry
v . Bronch , 65 ;\fi ss. 4fi0; 1888, Botts v. Hirnp!'onville Tp. Co., 88 Ky. 54; 188~,
Mason v. Pewabic ;\fin. Co., 133U. S. 50; 1889, Sawyer v. Dubuque, etc., Co.,
77 Iowa 242; 18HO, Hayden v. Official ll otel, etc., Co., 4'.! Fe <l. Rep. 875; 18\Jl,
Trisroni v. Winship, 43 La. Ann. 45; 1892, Skinner v. 8mith, 134 N. Y. 240;
1893, Price v. Holcomb, 89 Iowa 123; 1893, i:;ewell v. East Cnpe May, etc.,
Co., 1)0 N. J. Eq. il7; 1896, Elyton Lm11\ Co. v . Dowdell, 113 Ala. 177; 1897,
Peabody v. West erly W.W., 20 R. I. 176, 37 Atl. Rep. 807; 1899, Phillips V:
Prov. Steam, etc., Co., 21 R. I. 302, 45 L. R. A. 560.
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Sec. 247. Repeal.

See, infra, The State and Corporation, §§ 453-73. Also see Pro-

prietors of Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire, 7 N. H. 35, supra,

p. 309; Flint & F., P. R. Co. v. Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99, supra, p.

398; Commonwealth v. Cullcn, 13 Pa. St. 133, ^upra, p. 417;

Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, supra, p. 708;

Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10, supra, p. 752; Tomlinson v. Jes-

sup, 15 Wall. 454, supra, p. 754; Ireland v. Palestine Turn. Co., 19

Ohio St. 369, supra, p. 757; Mormon Church (Romney) v. United

States, 136 U. S. 1, infra, p. 906.

Sec. 248. Forfeiture.

See, infra, The State and Corporation, §§ 410-18. Also see

, King v. Mayor of London, 1 Show. 280, supra, p. 152; People v.

Sec. 247.

Repeal.

See, infra, The State and Corporation, §§ 453-73. Also see Proprietors of Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire, 7 N. H. 35, supra,
p. 309; Flint & F., P. R. Co. v. Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99, supra, p.
398; Commonwe::alth v. Cullen, 13 Pa. St. 133, .supra, p. 417;
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 51 8, supra, p. 708;
Hawthorne v. Cale£, 2 Wall. IO, supra, p. 752; Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454, ·supra, p. 754; Ireland v. Palestine Turn. Co., 19
Ohio St. 369, supra, p. 757; Mormon Church (Romney) v. United
States, 136 U. S. I, t'nfra, p. 906.

N. R. Sug. R. Go., supra, p. 100; Iliggins v. Downward, 8 Houst.

(Del.) 227, supra, p. 152; State v. Standard Life Assn., 38 Ohio

St. 281, supra, p. 234; State v. Curtis, 35 Conn. 374, supra, p. 259;

State Bank v. The State, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 267, infra, p. S91.

Sec. 249. Ownership of stock by one member.

LOUISVILLE BANKING COMPANY v. EISENMAN.1

1894. In the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 94 Ky. Rep,

83-96, 42 Am. St. Rep. 335, 19 L. R. A. 684, with note.

[Suit by the bank to hold J. C. Eisenman personally liable upon

an acceptance for the accommodation of Mattinglv & Sons of drafts

Sec. 248.

Forfeiture.

See, t'nfra, The State and Corporation, §§ 410-18. Also see
• King v. Mayor of London, l Show. 280, supra, p. 152; People v.
N. R. Sug. R. Co., supra, p. 100; Higgins v. Downward, 8 Houst.
(Del.) 227, supra, p. lj2; State v. Standard Life Assn., 38 Ohio
St. 281, supra, p. 234; State v . Curtis, 35 Conn. 374, supra, p. 259;
State Bank v . The State, r Black£. (Ind.) 267, t'nfra, p. 891.

to the amount of $20,000. drawn by them upon the corporation of

Eisenman Bros. & Co., and accepted by it, after J. C. Eisenman had

become the sole owner of the stock of the corporation. The failure

Sec. 249.

Ownership of stock by one member.

'Statement.much abridged. Arguments and part of opinion omitted.

LOUISVILLE BANKING COMPANY v. EISENMAN. 1

1894.

IN THE CouRT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY. 94 Ky. Rep,
83-96, 42 Am. St. Rep. 335, 19 L. R. A . 684, with note.

[Suit by the bank to hold J. C. Eisenman personally liable upon
an acceptance for the accommodation of Mattingly & Sons of drafts
to the amount of $20,000, drawn by them upon the corporation of
Eisenmnn Bro . & Co., and accepted by it, after J. C. Ei <.: cnma11 had
become the sole owner of the stock of the corporation. The fnilure
1Statement,m11ch
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of Mattingly & Sons to meet the drafts rendered Eisenman Bros. &

LOUISVILLE BANKING COMPANY V.

EISEN~IA1'.

§ 249

Co. insolvent. The bank knew the circumstances under which the

of Mattingly & Sons to meet the drafts rendered Eisenman Bros. &
Co. insolvent. The bank knew the circumstances under which the
drafts were accepted. The statute provided "any number of persons
may associate themselves together, and become incorporated," etc.
The bank contended that the sole ownership of stock dissolved the
corporation, and rendered the sole owner individually liable. The
lower comt held otherwise.]
PRYOR, J. • • • The purpose of the statute was to enable two or
more persons possessed of capital or skill to associate themselves in
business, and to limit their liability as against the improvident acts of
each other, or the act of the corporation, in the event of pecuniary loss
in the leg itim ate and proper conduct of its business. It invites the investment of the capital stock of one to be place.cl in the same business
with the skill of another, or a combination of capital that encourages
trade, the burden of which mere individual enterprise would be unwilling to assume, and it could not have been the legislative intent that any
one man could form a corporation of which he is the creature and sole
stockholder, so as to limit his liability for the debts contracted, and
from which he h as derived the benefit, to the extent only of what be
might designate his corporate estate. He owns the entire property
belonging to the corporation-it is his. He can sell or dispose of it
as he pleases; ~orrow money, acqu ire property, in the name of the
corporation, for the sole purpose of exempting him from any responsibility, other than that belonging to the corporation; and however
reckless or improvident he may be, he has all to gain and nothing to
lose. He could make a gift of the entire corporate estate, dispense
with all corporate forms, and to say, when exercising such unlimited
control, he is not personally responsible for every debt he contracts,
would be to pcn·ert the plain purpose of the statu te.
There is no such being in this state as a sole corporation, and certainly none such allowed to be created by the statute.
This corporation, ho\vever, was properly organized, had its several •
stockholders and board of directors and was prospering in its business until these drafts were drawn for the benefit of Mattingly &
Sons. • • •
That both the appellant and appellee were acting on the belief that
the corporation was alone liable is beyond dispute, and the corporation, as it was called, the appellee being the sole owner of the stock,
submitted to the judgment against it for the drafts in an action by
the bank, and the appellee is making no resistance to its pay ment out
of the property of the corporation, but in ·ists that no personal liability
exists. The appellant has obtained all he contracted for. There
was no fraud practiced upon it by the appellee, and certainly no
intention to bind himself personally, nor any of the proceeds of these
drafts applied to his benefit in any manner or to the benefit of what
he supposed was an existing corporation. If the stock had been held
as it was originally the pecuniary condition of the corporatio1,1 would
have been the same, as no act had been done by the appellee by ·which
the interest of creditors or those dealing with the corporation :would have

drafts were accepted. The statute provided "any number of persons

may associate themselves together, and become incorporated," etc.

The bank contended that the sole ownership of stock dissolved the

corporation, and rendered the sole owner individually liable. The

lower court held otherwise.]

Pryor, J. • * * The purpose of the statute was to enable two or

more persons possessed of capital or skill to associate themselves in

business, and to limit their liability as against the improvident acts of

each other, or the act of the corporation, in the event of pecuniary loss

in the legitimate and proper conduct of its business. It invites the in-

vestment of the capital stock of one to be placed in the same business

with the skill of another, or a combination of capital that encourages

trade, the burden of which mere individual enterprise would be unwill-

ing to assume, and it could not have been the legislative intent that any

one man could form a corporation of which he is the creature and sole

stockholder, so as to limit his liability for the debts contracted, and

from which he has derived the benefit, to the extent only of what he
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might designate his corporate estate. He owns the entire property

belonging to the corporation—it is his. He can sell or dispose of it

as he pleases; borrow money, acquire property, in the name of the

corporation, for the sole purpose of exempting him from any respon-

sibility, other than that belonging to the corporation; and however

reckless or improvident he may be, he has all to gain and nothing to

lose. He could make a gift of the entire corporate estate, dispense

with all corporate forms, and to say, when exercising such unlimited

control, he is not personally responsible for every debt he contracts,

would be to pervert the plain purpose of the statute.

There is no such being in this state as a sole corporation, and cer-

tainly none such allowed to be created by the statute.

This corporation, however, was properly organized, had its several .

stockholders and board of directors and was prospering in its busi-

ness until these drafts were drawn for the benefit of Mattingly &

Sons. * • »

That both the appellant and appellee were acting on the belief that

the corporation was alone liable is beyond dispute, and the corpora-

tion, as it was called, the appellee being the sole owner of the stock,

submitted to the judgment against it for the drafts in an action by

the bank, and the appellee is making no resistance to its payment out

of the property of the corporation, but insists that no personal liability

exists. The appellant has obtained all he contracted for. There

was no fraud practiced upon it by the appellee, and certainly no

intention to bind himself personally, nor any of the proceeds of these

drafts applied to his benefit in any manner or to the benefit of what

he supposed was an existing corporation. If the stock had been held

as it was originally the pecuniary condition of the corporation would

have been the same, as no act had been done by the appellee by which

the interest of creditors or those dealing with the corporation would have
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been prejudiced. Nor are we prepared to adjudge, after a corpora-
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METHODS OF DISSOLUTION.
tion has been created by the statute, with the stock distributed among

several stockholders, that the purchase by one stockholder of all the

stock destroys the corporate existence and places all the property of

the corporation upon the same footing with the other estate of the in-

dividual stockholder. The legal title to the estate of the corporation

is still vested in it, and while the stockholder's interest could be sub-

jected to the payment even of his individual debt, when he contracts

in behalf of the corporation, and with no fraudulent intent, it seems

to us the party with whom he contracts gets all he bargains for when

he subjects the corporate property to the payment of his debt. (Cit-

ing and commenting upon Swift v. Smith, 65 Md. 428.) * • •

In the case before us there was no surrender of the franchise, but

the business conducted in good faith and under the belief that the cor-

porate estate was alone liable. The corporation still lived and had

such vitality as enabled the holder of the stock to transfer it and pro-

ceed with the corporate powers as if he had never become the sole

owner; and the argument that such a construction as to the meaning

of the statute would enable two or more to organize a corporation
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with a view of vesting the entire stock in one of the corporators is

not available, for the reason that the corporate property in the hands

of one stockholder, when made liable by him for his corporate or

individual debts, remains so, although he may transfer the stock to

others, as they must take it subject to the incumbrances the sole stock-

holder has placed upon it prior to his sale of the stock. (Citing and

commenting upon Button v. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 20; Wilde v. Jenk-

ins, 4 Paige 481 ; Winona, etc., R. Co. v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 23

Minn. 359; Cook on Stock, § 631; Moravvetz, p. 635.) * * *

While we recognize the general rule on the subject sustained by

the authorities referred to, it must be held that the purchase by one

of all the shares in a corporation created under the statute is a disso-

lution of the corporation to the extent that it suspends the exercise of

the rights under the franchise until the owner transfers the stock in

good faith, so as to maintain an organization under the statute. There

is a difference between the attempt to create one person a corporation

under this statute, and the purchase in good faith of all the stock after

the corporation has been created. In the first instance there is no cor-

poration, and in the last there is a franchise, the operations of which

are suspended until the stock may be transferred to others; and while

in the hands of one person the corporate and individual property are

ordinarily alike liable for the payment of any debt contracted by the

owner, and subsequent purchasers of stock take it subject to the liens

or equities of- the creditors of the sole owner created prior to the trans-

fer of the stock to them. * • »

Affirmed.

Note. One-man companies.

1. It seems that where a statute provides that "any number of persons"

may form a corporation, the courts will hold that more than one person is

meant. Louisville Banking Co. v. Eisenman, !)4 Ky. 83, 42 Am. St. Rep. 335,

supra, p. 887; Montgomery v. Forbes, 148 Mass. 249, supra, p. 694. Yet the

been prejudiced. Nor are we prepared to adjudge, after a corporation has been created by the statute, with the stock distributed among
several stockholders, that the purchase by one stockholder of all the
stock destroys the corporate existence and places all the property of
the corporation upon the same footing with the other estate of the individual stockholder. The legal title to the estate of the corporation
is still vested in it, arid while the stockholder's interest could be subjected to the payment even of his individual debt, when he contracts
in behalf of the corporation, and with no fraudulent intent, it seems
to us the party with whom he contracts gets all he bargains for when
he subjects the corporate property to the payrnent of his debt. (Citing and commenting upon Swift v. Smith, 65 Mel. 428.) • • •
In the case before us there was no sun-ender of the franchise, but
the business conducted in good faith and under the belief that the corporate estate was alone liable. The corporation still lived and had
such vitality as enabled the holder of the stock to transfer it and proceed with the corporate powers as if he had never become the sole
owner; and the argument that such a constmction as to the meaning
of the statute would enable two or more to organize a corporation
with a view of vesting the entire stock in one of the corporators is
not available, for the reason that the corporate property in the hands
of one stockholder, when made liable by him for his corporate or
individual debts, remains so, although he may transfer the stock to
others, as they must take it subject to the incumbrances the sole stock·
holder has placed upon it prior to his sale of the stock. (Citing and
commenting upon Button v. Hoffman, 61 \Vis. 20; Wilde v. Jenkins , 4 Paige 481; Winona, etc., R. Co. v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 23
Minn. 359; Cook on Stock, § 631 ; Morawetz, p. 635.) • • •
\Vhile ""e recognize the gene ral mle on the subject sustained by
the authorities referred to, it must be he ld that the purchase by one
of all the shares in a corporation created under the statute is a dissolution of the corporation to the extent that it suspends the exercise of
the rights under the franchise until the owner transfers the stock in
good faith, so as to maintain an organization under the statute. There
is a difference between the attempt to create one person a corporation
under this statute, and the purchase in good faith of all the stock after
the corporation has been created. In the first instance there is no corporation, and in the last there is a franchise, the operations of which
are suspended until the stock may be transferred to others; and while
in the hands of one person the corporate and individu a l property are
ordinarily alike liable for the payment of any debt contracted by the
owner, and subsequent purchasers of stock take it subject to the liens
or equities of· the creditors of the sole owner created prior to the transfer of the tock to them. • • •
Affirmed.
Note.

One-man companies.

1. It seems that whe re

11 statute provides that "any number of
may form a corporation, the court s will hold that more than one
meant. Louisville Bunking Co. v. Eisenman, ~H Ky. 83, 42 Am. St.
supra, p. 887; Montgomery v. Forbes, 148 Mass. 249, supra, p. 594.
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English case of Salomon v. Salomon, 1897, App. Caa. 22, 66 L. J. Ch. 35, holds

890

that the court can not go hack of the record, when regular, to inquire intothe

LOUISVILLE BANKING COMPANY V. EISENMAN.

motive of those forming the cor])oration. The Iowa Code of 1897, title ix,

English case of Salomon v. RRlomon, l89i, App. Cas. 22, 66 L. J. Ch . 35, holds
that the court can not go lrnck of the record, when regular, to inquire into the
motive of tl101>e forming the eorporation . The Iowa Code of J8\.17, title ix,
ch . l, § HI08, p1-ov ides that, ''Except as otherwise provided by law. a i;in~le
pernon nllly incorporate under the provisions of this chapter, thereby ent1tlrng himself to all the privileges nnrl immunities herein, but if he adopti! the
name of an inrlividnal or in1li\•iduals as that of the corporation, be mu st add
thereto the word 'ia\·orporated' (Code 1873, § 1088; Code 1888, § 1638 )."
So far as I am aware this is the only state that permifs this. Since tbP forego'.niz chapter provides for stock corporations as well as others, it is submitted th:1t if a stock C'Orporat ion is created by one man it would not be a <·orporation sole. See note, s11pm, p. 200; but if not a stock corporation, whether
or uot a 1·orpnrntion Role. q11aere~
2. By the great weigl1t of authority, if a stock corporntion is once va lidly
created, the fact tlJRt one person, or fewer persons than may lawfully incorporate, acquire in good faith 11 11 the stock , the corpor11tion still E'xists, and
baR t.hc title and control of a ll its property, nnrl tbe individual ads of the sole
or otlwr owners of stock do not bind the corporation. 1811, Smith v. ~mitb,
3 Desaus. cs. U.) *55i, *58:!; 1819, Williamson v. Smoot, 7 Martin (La.) 31.
supra, p. 70; 1833, Russell v. McLellan, 14 Pick. (Mass. I 63; 1833, Spcneer
v. Champion, 9 Conn. 586; 1834, Wade v. Jenkins, 4 Paige Ch. \N. Y.) ·Hil ~
1881/, PenobsC'ot Boo m Corp. v. Lamson, JO Maine 224, 111tpra, p. i83; I 48,
Wheelock v. Mo11lton, 15 Yt. 511:) 1deed by ull tbe shareholders is not the
d eetl of tbe corporation); 184(i, Queen v. Arnaud , 25 L. J. (10 ~. ~ . )
Q. B. 50, supra, p. 58; 1&>0, Evarts v. Killingworth l\lfg. Co., 20 Conn. 447.
4.'>R ; 1856, Bohannon v. BinnR, 31 ;\lies. 355; i858, Lillard v. Porter, 2 Head
(TE>nn. ) li6; l HO, Frost v. Frostburg Const r. Co., 24 How. (U. ~.) 278, 283;
18il, Newton )Tfg. Co. v. White, 42 Ga. 148; 1877, Winona & St. P.R. Co. v.
SL Pan] & 8. R. Co., 23 1\Iinn. 359; 1879, Balwin v. Cunfield, 26 Minn. 43;
1880, K eith v. Clarke, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 718; 1884, Button v. Hoffman, fil Wis.
20, 50 Am. Rep. 131; 188-t, Mfltliis v. Morgan, 72 Ga. 5 17. 525; 1880, England
v. Dearborn, 141 !\lass. 590; 18VO, Fitzhugh v. Mo. Pac. R. Co .. 4.'i Fed. Rep.
812; 18HO, Humphreys v. McKissock, 140 U. S . 304, 312; 1893, Gall11gber v.
Germania Brewing Co., 53 Minn. 2H; 1893. Fo1>ter & f'on v. Comn1'rs of Inland Rev., L. R. (1891) 1 Q. B. 516, 1111pra, p. 60; 1895. Matter of Belton,
47 La. Ann. IGJ.5; 1896, Parker v. Bethel Hotel C'o .. 96 Tenn. 2.52 ; 189i
Harrington v. Connor, 51 NE>b. 214 ; 1897, Salomon v. SRlomon, App. Cns. 22'.
lloL.J.C 'h .:l.i; 1 8~ 18, Loni;lville,Ptr.,Co. v. Kuuf111an, :w Ky. L. Ilt>p. 1069, 48
·. W. Hep. 4:1.+; 1R!l8, First :'\at'l Bank v. Winchester, ll!J Ala. lli8. 7'!. Am. Rt.
Rep. 904; 1899, Chase v. Mich. Tel. Co., 121 Mich. 631, 11 Am. & E. C. C. (r\.
S.i 715; 1899, In t•e Hirth, 1 Q . B. 612, 68 L. J. Q. B. 28i; 1898, Durlucher v.
Frazer, 8 Wyo. 58, 80 Am. St. Rep. 918, 55 Pac. 306. llut it has beE'n
held in ~forylfrnd, that the ownership of rstock by o ne pt-rson virtunlly Fuspenrls the corpornte exiHtPnce during sucli sole ownt>rehip. 1831, Bellona
CoA. Case, 3 Bland. Ch. (i\Jd.) 442, 446; 1886, 8wift v. Smith, 65 Md. 428, 57
Am . Rep. 336; 1898, First :'\at'I Bank v. Winchester, l19AIR. 168, i2 Am. St..
Rep. 904.
3. Rut in equity, or in c:ise of frnud, or evasion of corporate dutiE>s, the
a<'tFl of all th e f<hareholders ai> individualR will he treutPd ns the arts of the
corporation, if neeessnry to work out jufitice. 1882, Bundy v. Ophir Iron Co.,
38 Ohio St. ~00; 1800. People v. North Riv . S. Ref. Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 18 Am .
St. Rep. 843. sHpra,p. 100;1892, State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio !-\t. J3i;
18\l8, First Nat'l Bnnk v. Winchester, 119 Ala. 168, 72 Am. St. Rep. 904.
See also, supra, the corporation as a collection of persons, secs. 16-21, and
note, p. 109, et seq.

ch 1, § 1608, provides that, "Except as otherwise provided by law, a single

person may incorporate under the provisions of this chapter, thereby entitl-

ing himself to all the privileges and immunities herein, but if he adopts the

name of an individual or individuals as that of the corporation, he must add

thereto the word 'incorporated' (Code 1873, § 1088; Code 1888, § 1638)."

So far as I am aware this is the only state that permifs this. Since the fore-

going chapter provides for stock corporations as well as others, if is submit-

ted that if a stock corporation is created by one man it would not be a corpo-

ration sole. See note, supra, \>. 200; but if not a stock corporation, whether

or not a corporation sole, quaere?

2. By the great weight of authority, if a stock corporation is once validly

created, the fact that one j>erson, or fewer persons than may lawfully incor-

porate, acquire in good faith all the stock, the corporation still exists, and

has the title and control of all its property, and the individual ai ts of the sole

or other owners of stock do not hind the corporation. 1811, Smith v. Smith,

3 Desaus. (8. C.) •657, *582; 1819, Williamson v. Smoot, 7 Martin (La.) 31.

supra, p. 70; 1833, Russell v. McLellan, 14 Pick. (Mass.i 63; 1833, Spencer
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v. Champion, 9 Conn. 536; 1834, Wade v. Jenkins, 4 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 481;

1839, Penobscot Boom Corp. v. Lamson, 16 Maine 224, supra, p. 283; 1843,

Wheelock v. Moulton, 15 Vt. 519 [deed by all the shareholders is not the

deed of the corporation); 1846, Queen v. Arnaud, 25 L. J. (16 N. S.)

Q. B. 50, supra, p. 58; 1850, Evarts v. Killingworth Mfg. Co., 20 Conn. 447,

458; 1856, Bohnnnon v. Binns, 31 Miss. 355; 1858, Lillard v. Porter, 2 Head

(Tenn.) 176; I860, Frost v. Frostburg Constr. Co., 24 How. (U. S.) 278, 283;

1871, Newton Mfg. Co. v. White, 42 Ga. 148; 1877, Winona & St. P. R. Co. v.

8t. Paul & S. R. Co., 23 Minn. 359; 1879, Balwin v. Canfleld, 26 Minn. 43;

1880, Keith v. Clarke, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 718; 1884, Button v. Hoffman, 61 Wis.

20, 50 Am. Hep. 131; 1884, Mathis v. Morgan, 72 Ga. 517, 525; 1886, England

v. Dearborn, 141 Mass. 590; lnOO, Fitzhugh v. Mo. Pac. R. Co.. 45 Fed. Rep.

812; 1890, Humphreys v. McKissock, 140 U. S. 304, 312; 1893, Gallagher v.

Germania Brewing Co., 53 Minn. 214; 1893, Fopter & Son v. Comm'rsof In-

land Rev., L. R. (1891) 1 Q. B. 516, supra, p. 60; 1895. Matter of Kelton,

47 La. Ann. 1615; 1896, Parker v. Bethel Hotel Co., 96 Tenn. 252; 1897,

Harrington v. Connor, 51 Neb. 214; 1897, Salomon v. Salomon, App. Cas. 22,

66L. J. Oh.35; 1898, Louisville, etc., Co. v. Kaufman, 20 Kv. L. Pep. 1069, 48

S. W. Hep. 434; 1898, First Nat'l Bank v. W inchester, 119 Ala. 168. 72 Am. St.

Rep. 904; 1899, Chase v. Mich. Tel. Co., 121 Mich. 631, 11 Am. & E. C. C. (N.

S.i 715; 1899, In re Hirth, 1 Q. B. 612, 68 L. J. Q. B. 287; 1898, Durlacher v.

Frazer, 8 Wyo. 58, 80 Am. St. Rep. 918, 55 Pac. 306. But it has been

held in Maryland, that the ownership of stock by one person virtually sus-

pends the corporate existence during such sole ownership. 1831, Bellona

Cos. Case, 3 Bland. Ch. (Md.) 442, 446; 188(5, Swift v. Smith, 65 Md. 428, 57

Am. Rep. 336; 1898, First Nat'l Bank v. Winchester, 119 Ala. 168, 72 Am. St.

Rep. 904.

3. But in equity, or in cnse of fraud, or evasion of corporate duties, the

act" of all the shareholders as individuals will he treated as the acts of the

corporation, if necessary to work out justice. 1882, Bundv v. Ophir Iron Co.,

38 Ohio St. 300; 1890. People v. North Riv. 8. Ref. Co., 121 N. Y 582, 18 Am.

St. Rep. 843, supra,\<. 100;1892, State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137;

1898, First Nat'l Bank v. Winchester, 119 Ala. 168, 72 Am. St. Rep. 904.

See also, supra, the corporation as a collection of persons, sees. 16-21, and

note, p. 109, et seq.
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ARTICLE II. EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION.

Sec. 250. Lands, chattels and debts at common law.

ARTICLE ll.

EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION.

STATE BANK v. THE STATE.1

1823. In the Supreme Court of Indiana, i Blackf. (Ind.) Rep.

Sec. 250.

Lands, chattels and debts at common Jaw.

267-285, 12 Am. Dec. 234.

STATE BANK'"· THE STATE. 1

[•^W warranto against the bank for numerous Violations of its char-

ter. The defendant pleaded not guilty to all the charges. On the trial

1823.

IN

THE

SUPREME

CouRT

OF INDIANA.

1

Black£. (Ind.) Rep •.

267-285, 12 Am. Dec. 234.

in the lower court the jury found them guilty of nine of the charges.

A motion in arrest of judgment was made and overruled, and judg-

ment given that the privileges, liberties and franchises be seized into

the custody of the state, together with all the goods, chattels, rights,

credits and effects of every kind. Various errors were assigned, two

of which were: 1, that the charges did not justify a forfeiture, and

2, the judgment of seizure of the franchises and property violated the

constitution of the state, providing that no man's property should be

taken for a public use without the consent of his representatives, etc.]

Holman, J. * * * That a corporation may forfeit its charter

for misusing or abusing its franchises is a doctrine that can not now
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be disputed. See 1 Bl. Comm., 485; 2 Kvd Cor., 474, and the cases

there cited. For there is an implied condition annexed to each par-

ticular grant, which, if violated, forfeits the whole franchise. 2 Bac,

31. Inasmuch as it is the duty of corporations to act up to the end

or design for which they were created (1 Bl. Comm., 480) so when

they pursue such measures as wholly frustrate this design the reason

of their existence ceases, and it is but just that their existence should

also be terminated. Whether every slight deviation from the inten-

tion of the charter should occasion a forfeiture is not the question, but

when the grand, leading conditions and restrictions in the charter have

been violated there can be no question but the franchises are thereby

forfeited. Several of the charges found by the jurv against this cor-

poration are of this nature, and show that they have evidently abused

their most important privileges to the manifest injury of others and of

the community in general. (Considering the chaiges in detail.) * * *

But if it be contended that such a private property exists in the in-

dividual shareholders as will be destroyed if the franchises of the

corporation be seized, and, inasmuch as the private property is guar-

anteed by the constitution, that the constitution must also of necessity

guaranty the continued existence of those franchises or otherwise this

property will be annihilated, we shall find that this doctrine is not

warranted by the constitution. The privilege of holding stock in this

bank is inseparably connected with its existence as a corporation, and

inasmuch as we have seen that the existence of the corporation de-

pends on the implied condition that it will not violate its charter, so

this privilege of holding stock in this bank must depend for its contin-

uance on the same implied condition. The president and directors of

the corporation become the agents of the stockholder, and if they vio-

1 Statement much abridged, and much of opinion omitted.

[ ~uo warranto against the bank for numerous violations of its charter. The defendant pleaded not guilty to all the charges. On the trial
in the lower court the jury found them guilty of nine of the charges.
A motion in arrest of judgment was made and overruled, and judgment given that the privileges , liberties and franchises be ·seized into·
the custody of the state, together with all the goods, chattels, rights,
credits and effects of every kind. Various errors were ass"igned, two
of which were: I, that the ch arges did not justify a forfeiture, and
2, the judgment of seizure of the franchi ses and property violated the
constitution of the state, providing that no man's property should be
take n for a public use without the consent of his representatives, etc.]
HoLMA~, J.
• • • That a corporation may forfeit its charter
for misu sing or abusing its franchises is a doctrine that can not now
be disputed. See 1 Bl. Comm., 485; 2 Ky"d Cor., 474, and the cases
there cited. For there is an implied condition annexed to each parti cular grant, which, if violated, forfeits the whole franchise. 2 Bae.,
31. Inasmuch as it is the duty of corporations to act up to the end
or design for which they were created ( 1 Bl. C omm., 48o) so when
they pursue such measures as wholly frustrate this design the reason
of their existence ceases, and it is but just that their existence should
also be terminated. Whether every slig ht deviation from the intention of the charter should occasion a forfeiture is not the question, but
when the grand, leading conditions and restrictions in the charter have
been violated there can be no question but the franchises are thereby
forfeited. Several of the charges found by the jury against this corporation are of this nature, and show that they have evidently abused
their most important privileges to the manifest injury of others and of
the community in general. (Considering the charges in detail.) • • •
But if it be contended that such a private property exists in the individual shareholders as will he d estroyed if the franchises of the
corporation be seized, and, inasmuch as the private property is guaranteed by the constitution, th at the constitution must also of necessity
guaranty the continued existence of those franchises or othetwise this
property will be annihilated, ""e shall find that this <loctrine is not
warranted by the constitution. The pri\'ilege of holding stock in this
bank is inseparably connected with its existence as a corporation, and
inasmuch as we ha\"e seen that the existence of the corporation depends on the implied condition that it will not violate its ch:irter, so
this privilege of holding stock i11 this bank must depen<l for its continuance on the same implied condition . The president and directors of
the corporation become the agents of the stockholder, and if they vio1
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STATE BANK V. THE STATE.
late the conditions on which he enjoys this privilege, his privilege is

immediately subjected to forfeiture by this act of his agents. Nor

late the conditions on which he enjoys this privilege, his privilege is
immediately subjected to forfeiture by this act of his agents. Nor
will the regard which the constitution h as for private property secure
such prope1ty from annihilation by a dissolution of the corporation.
So that we see nothing in the constitution to prevent the seizure of
those franchises, Jct the effect upon private property be what it may.
And there can be no doubt but that this judgment, so far as it authorizes a seizure of the franchises into the hands and custody of the state,
is warranted by law. When it appears that the liberty has been once
granted, and is forfeited by misuser or non-user , the judgment shall be
that it be seized into the king's hands. Year Book 15 Ed. 4, cited in
2 K yd Corp., 407.
And such appears to be the law at present. • • •
There are but two grounds on which it can be contended that the
corporate effects fall into the hands of the state: 1. As a forfeiture
for abusing the franchises; or 2. For the want of an owner by the
dissolution of the corporation. vVhen we examine the first of these
grounds we find nothing in the books to suppcrt an idea that the abuse
of corporate franchises occasions forfeiture of lands or goods, rights
or credits, or, in fact, occasions any other forfeiture but the franchises
themseh-es. The consequence of a breach of the implied condition
on which their liberties were granted \\'as not that they ~hould forfeit
their property or possessions if they abused their franchises, but only
that they should forfeit their franchises. That which comes out of
the hands of the king is the proper su bjcct of forfeiture; the king, b y
the seizure, resuming what originally flowed from his bounty. Authorities leading to this conclusion are numerous. See the cases cited
in 2 Bae., 32, and in The King v. Amery, 2 T . R. 515. Fortheforfeiture is the same for non-u ser \\·hen no property has been held or
rights exercised, as for misuser or abuser after the possession of much
property and the exercise of extensive rights and credits; and the
judgment is the same in both cases. Consequently, the judgment
could n ot direct a seizure of the corporate possessions as a forfeiture
for the violation of the charter. Nor is the second ground- that the
property falls to the state for the \vant of an owner, on the dissolution
of the corporation-more tenable as a foundation on which to sustain
thi s judgment. For the ownership of the corporation does not cea e
until its dissolution. And ·whether it is dissolved by the judgment
of seizure or not, until the state has execution on that judgment, is
not here very material. For if the corporation is dissolved by the
judgment, the judgment must h e regularly entered, and ha,·e its full
effect before the dissolution takes place, and it is not till then that the
property can be said to be without an owner. The loss of the property to the corporation is a consequence of the judgment, and it is a
contradiction of the first principles of reason-a complete reversal of
effect and cause-to make such loss of property a part of the judgment. That which can not exist until after the judgment, can never
be the subject-matter on which the judgment is g iven. But the better
opinion seems to me, that the corporation is not dissolved by the judgment of :..eizure, but that it exists until the franchises are seized by

will the regard which the constitution has for private property secure

such property from annihilation by a dissolution of the corporation.

So that we see nothing in the constitution to prevent the seizure of

those franchises, let the effect upon private property be what it may.

And there can be no doubt but that this judgment, so far as it author-

izes a seizure of the franchises into the hands and custody of the state,

is warranted by law. When it appears that the liberty has been once

granted, and is forfeited by misuser or non-user, the judgment shall be

that it be seized into the king's hands. Year Book 15 Ed. 4, cited in

2 Kyd Corp., 407. And such appears to be the law at present. * * *

There are but two grounds on which it can be contended that the

corporate effects fall into the hands of the state: 1. As a forfeiture

for abusing the franchises; or 2. For the want of an owner by the

dissolution of the corporation. When we examine the first of these

grounds we find nothing in the books to support an idea that the abuse

of corporate franchises occasions forfeiture of lands or goods, rights
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or credits, or, in fact, occasions any other forfeiture but the franchises

themselves. The consequence of a breach of the implied condition

on which their liberties were granted was not that they should forfeit

their property or possessions if they abused their franchises, but only

that they should forfeit their franchises. That which comes out of

the hands of the king is the proper subject of forfeiture; the king, by

the seizure, resuming what originally flowed from his bounty. Au-

thorities leading to this conclusion are numerous. See the cases cited

in 2 Bac, 32, and in The King v. Amery, 2 T. R. 515. For the for-

feiture is the same for non-user when no property has been held or

rights exercised, as for misuser or abuser after the possession of much

property and the exercise of extensive rights and credits; and the

judgment is the same in both cases. Consequently, the judgment

could not direct a seizure of the corporate possessions as a forfeiture

for the violation of the charter. Nor is the second ground- that the

property falls to the state for the want of an owner, on the dissolution

of the corporation—more tenable as a foundation on which to sustain

this judgment. For the ownership of the corporation does not cease

until its dissolution. And whether it is dissolved by the judgment

of seizure or not, until the state has execution on that judgment, is

not here very material. For if the corporation is dissolved by the

judgment, the judgment must be regularly entered, and have its full

effect before the dissolution takes place, and it is not till then that the

property can be said to be without an owner. The loss of the prop-

erty to the corporation is a consequence of the judgment, and it is a

contradiction of the first principles of reason—a complete reversal of

effect and cause—to make such loss of property a part of the judg-

ment. That which can not exist until after the judgment, can never

be the subject-matter on which the judgment is given. But the better

opinion seems to me, that the corporation is not dissolved by the judg-

ment of seizure, but that it exists until the franchises are seized by
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thorities there cited. Consequently, the last shadow of a support for

this judgment on this ground must vanish.

We have thus far examined the judgment which directs a seizure of

the goods and chattels, rights and credits, lands and tenements of the

corporation, on the assumed position that they will necessarily fall to

the state on the dissolution of the corporation. We shall now inquire

into the correctness of this positiop. In order to elucidate the subject

we shall examine it in detail, and in the first place inquire what be-

comes of the lands and tenements; secondly, what becomes of the goods

and chattels, and thirdly, what becomes of the rights and credits of

the corporation? and we shall find that each of these three items is

governed by different principles.

First. As to the lands and tenements: "When a corporation is dis-

solved," says Sir Wm. Blackstone, "the lands and tenements revert

to the person or his heirs who granted them to the corporation; for

the law doth annex a condition to every such grant, that if the cor-

poration be dissolved the grantor shall have the lands again. The

grant is only during the life of the corporation, which may endure
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forever, but when that life is determined by the dissolution of the body

politic, the grantor takes it back by reversion, as in the case of every

other grant for life." 1 Bl. Comm., 484. This is the doctrine ad-

vanced by Lord Coke, Co. Litt. 13d. See, also, 2 Kyd Cor., 516; 2

Bac.,32; 2 Cruise, 493; Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1866. Wesee

but little in the books that contradicts or questions those authorities,

and the cases that look a different way maintain that the lands would

escheat. 2 Bac. 32. If either of those principles be correct we feel

warranted in determining that the corporate lands and tenements can

not be seized into the hands of the state, and certainly not in the

manner contemplated by this judgment.

Secondly. As to the goods and chattels: On this subject the books

are almost silent. "In the argument of Colchester v. Seaber, it is said

by Sir Fletcher Norton, on the authority of 1 Ro. Ab. 816, that the

goods and chattels go to the crown. An English writer, who has col-

lected together most of the cases on corporations, concludes his re-

marks on the effect of a dissolution in these words: "What becomes

of the personal estate is, perhaps, not decided; but probably it vests

in the crown." 2 Kyd on Corp., 516. We do not feel under the

necessity of resolving any doubts which may rest on this subject; for

if the law were conclusive, that the goods and chattels in this case

would vest in the state on the dissolution of the corporation, yet we

have already seen that this would not be as a forfeiture, but because

they are without an owner, and that the claim of the state could not

exist until after judgment; consequently, it is impossible to include

them in the terms of the judgment.

Thirdly. As to the rights and credits of the corporation: These, as

applying to the debts, etc., due to the corporation, are supposed to be

of considerable amount, and have formed a principal feature in every

view of this case. But the importance of the case, arising from the

execution on that judgment. See Kyd Corp., 409, 410, and the au·
thorities there cited. Consequently, the last shadow of a support for
this judgment on this ground must vanish.
We have thus far examined the judgment which directs a seizure of
the goods and chattels, rights and credits, lands and tenements of the
corporation, on the assumed position that they will necessarily fall to
the state on the dissolution of the corporation. We shall now inquire
into the correctness of this positiop. In order to elucidate the subject
we shall examine it in detail, and in the first place inquire what becomes of the lands and tenements; secondly, what becomes of the goods
and chattels, and thirdly, what becomes of the rights and credits of
the corporation? and we shall find that each of these three items is
governed by different principles.
First. As to the lands and tenements: "When a corporation is dissolved," says Sir Wm. Blackstone, "the lands and tenements revert
to the person or his heirs who granted them to the corporation ; for
the law doth annex a condition to every such grant, that if the corporation be dissolved the grantor shall have the lands again. The
grant is only during the life of the corporation, which may endure
forever, but when that life is determined by the dissolution of the body
politic, the grantor takes it back by reversion, as in the case of every
other grant for life." 1 Bl. Comm., 484. This is the doctrine advanced by Lord Coke, Co. Litt. l3b. See, also, 2 Kyd Cor., 516; 2
Bae., 32; 2 Cruise, 493; Colchesterv. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1866. We see
but little in the books that contradicts or questions those authorities,
and the cases that look a different way maintain that the lands would
escheat. 2 Bae. 32. If either of those principles be correct we feel
warranted in determining that the corporate lands and tenements can
not be seized into the hands of the state, and certainly not in the
manner contemplated by this judgment.
Secondly. A!! to the goods and chattels: On this subject the books
are almost silent . .,.., In the argument of Colchestf?r v. Seaber, it is said
by Sir Fletcher Norton, on the authority of 1 Ro. Ab. 816, that the
goods and chattels go to the crown. An English writer, who has collected together most of the cases on corporations, concludes his remarks on the effect of a dissolution in these words: "What becomes
of the personal estate is, perhaps, not decided; but probably it vests
in the crown." 2 Kyd on Corp., 516. We do not feel under the
necessity of resolving any doubts which may rest on this subject; for
if the law were conclusive, that the goods and chattels in this case
would vest in the state on toe dissolution of the corporation, yet we
have already seen that this would not be as a forfeiture, but because
they are without an owner, and that the claim of the state could not
exist until after judgment; consequently, it is impossible to include
them in the terms of the judgment.
Thirdly. As to the rights and credits of the corporation: These, as
applying to the debts, etc., due to the corporation, arc supposed to be
of considerable amount, and have formed a principal feature in every
view of this case. But the importance of the case, arising from the
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let the consequence to individuals or the community be what it may.

amount in controversy, can not affect the principles by which it is
governed; and when those principles are fixed they must be declared,
let the consequence to individuals or the community be what it may.
That the debts are necessarily lost to the corporation naturally follows from the principles we have examined. For wheri dissolved
they have no existence, and can have no claim to, nor control over,
anything whatever. They not only die, but leave no representati\'e
behind them. This, in every respect, is the case with aggregate corporations. Sole corporations depend, in this respect, upon principles
somewhat different; but with them we have now no concern. But
although the debts fall out of the lifeless hands of the corporation at
the same time with their real and personal estate, yet when thus out
of their hands, they are very different in their natures from the real
and personal estate.
Lands and goods have a necessary existence, although they may be
without an owner in being or in expectancy. They continue in being
and may be made the subject of possession by occupancy. But this
is not the case with respect to debts. They ha\'e no necessary existence, and are so conclusively personal that they can not exist without
an obligor and obligee in being or in expectancy. And on the death
of the obligor or obligee, without the possibility of a representative,
the obligation ceases. Such appears to be the case on the dissolution of a corporation aggregate.
Blackstone says: "The debts
of a corporation, either to or from it, are totally extinguished by
its dissolution, so that the members thereof can not recover or be
charged with them, in their natural capacities. l Bl. Comm., 484;
2 Kyd Corp., 516, uses the same language.
2 Bae., 32, advances
nearly the same doctrine, on the authority of Lev., 237; Owen, 73,
and 2 And., 107. And this doctrine is either directly or indirectly
supported in a variety of cases, See the before-mentioned case of
Colchester v. Seaber; also Rex v. Pas1:nore, 3 T. R. 199; The Mayor,
etc., of Scarborough v. Butler, 2 Lev. 237; 4 Com. Dig., 273. If this
doctrine be correct, and we find it uncontradicted, the seizure of the
rights and credits of the corporation is impossible in the nature of
things, because their existence ceases as the claim of the state commences. But even if they could be seized into the hands of the state
they would be unavailing. The debts due to the corporation could
not, on any common law principle, be collected by the state or its
agent, there being no privity of contract, either in fact or law, between
the state and debtor to the corporation. • • •
Thus, in no view of the case, can that part of the judgment which
directs a seizure, into the hands of the state, of the goods and chattels, rights, credits and effects, lands, tenements and hereditaments of
the corporation, be supported.

That the debts are necessarily lost to the corporation naturally fol-

lows from the principles we have examined. For when dissolved

they have no existence, and can have no claim to, nor control over,

anything whatever. They not only die, but leave no representative

behind them. This, in every respect, is the case with aggregate cor-

porations. Sole corporations depend, in this respect, upon principles

somewhat different; but with them we have now no concern. But

although the debts fall out of the lifeless hands of the corporation at

the same time with their real and personal estate, yet when thus out

of their hands, they are very different in their natures from the real

and personal estate.

Lands and goods have a necessary existence, although they may be

without an owner in being or in expectancy. They continue in being

and may be made the subject of possession by occupancy. But this

is not the case with respect to debts. They have no necessary exist-

ence, and are so conclusively personal that they can not exist without
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an obligor and obligee in being or in expectancy. And on the death

of the obligor or obligee, without the possibility of a representative,

the obligation ceases. Such appears to be the case on the dissolu-

tion of a corporation aggregate. Blackstone says: "The debts

of a corporation, either to or from it, are totally extinguished by

its dissolution, so that the members thereof can not recover or be

charged with them, in their natural capacities. I Bl. Comm., 484;

2 Kyd Corp., 516, uses the same language. 2 Bac, 32, advances

nearly the same doctrine, on the authority of Lev., 237; Owen, 73,

and 2 And., 107. And this doctrine is either directly or indirectly

supported in a variety of cases.. See the before-mentioned case of

Colchester v. Seaber; also Rex v. Pasmore, 3 T. R. 199; The Mayor,

etc., of Scarborough v. Butler, 2 Lev. 23754 Com. Dig., 273. If this

doctrine be correct, and we find it uncontradicted, the seizure of the

rights and credits of the corporation is impossible in the nature of

things, because their existence ceases as the claim of the state com-

mences. But even if they could be seized into the hands of the state

they would be unavailing. The debts due to the corporation could

not, on any common law principle, be collected by the state or its

agent, there being no privity of contract, either in fact or law, between

the state and debtor to the corporation. * * *

Thus, in no view of the case, can that part of the judgment which

directs a seizure, into the hands of the state, of the goods and chat-

tels, rights, credits and effects, lands, tenements and hereditaments of

the corporation, be supported.

Affirmed as to seizure of franchises but reversed as to seizure of

■property.

Note. See following cases and note, infra, p. 910.

Ajfirmed as to seizure offranclii'ses but reversed as to seizure of
property.
Note.
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Sec. 251. Contracts of shareholders.

FOSTER v. ESSEX BANK.1

1820. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 16

See. 251.

Contracts of shareholders.

Mass. Rep. 245-274.

FOSTER v. ESSEX BANK.1

[Assumpsit against the bank for $50,000, begun April term 1819.

At the trial term it was suggested the bank's charter had expired. By

the act creating it, it was to exist for twenty years from July 1, 1799.

1820.

IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

16

Mass. Rep. 245-274.

By an act of June 19, 1819, all such corporations were "continued

bodies corporate and politic, for the term of three years from and

after the day on which their powers would expire," for the purpose

of prosecuting and defending suits, now or hereafter instituted, and to

settle their concerns, and divide their capital stock, but not for con-

tinuing business. It was contended that this statute impaired the

obligation of the shareholders' contracts.]

Parker, C. J. * * * In the first place, we see no pretense for say-

ing that it impairs the force of contracts. Certainly it has not that

effect on contracts made by or with the bank; but the very object of

the statute is to enforce such contracts.
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It is said, however, that the contract with the government was that at

the end of twenty years the corporation should be dissolved, and each

member take his share out of the common fund. But it should be

considered that, by the original charter, each member's share was

liable for all the debts of the bank, and that he would have no moral

right to withdraw it until all the debts of the bank were paid; so

that there was an equitable lien upon his share; and the legislature,

we think, had a right, if it was not their duty, to provide the means

of enforcing this moral obligation.

The law complained of is a general law operating upon all bodies

corporate, and it is convenient for them and the public that their

power of suing and being sued should be continued beyond the period

within which they are empowered to make contracts, in order that

their concerns may be properly adjusted.

Nor do we think it an objection that this additional term should be

granted by an act made subsequent to the time when their charter was

granted. A debtor to the bank could not object to a suit on the ground

that the original term of the charter had expired, for the very bringing

of the suit would be an acceptance of the prolongation of the charter,

and it would be absurd for him to say that his debt was discharged,

or that there were no means of recovering it because he contracted

with the corporation on a supposition that it would continue in being

only a certain number of years. We think it equally incompetent for

such corporation to deny its existence against a statute of the govern-

ment,'the object of which is to give a right of action on contracts upon

which they were legally and morally bound under their charter.

It is said that the members of such a corporation associated upon

1 Statement abridged. Much of the opinion, and the elaborate arguments

of Saltonstall, Pickering and Webster, omitted.

[ Assumpsit against the bank for $50,000, begun April term 1819.
At the trial term it was suggested the bank's charter had expired. By
the act creating it, it was to exist for twenty years from July 1, 1799.
By an act of June 19, 1819, all such corporations were "continued
bodies co1·porate and politic, for the term of three years from and
after the day on which their powers would expire," for the purpose
of prosecuting and defending suits, now or hereafter instituted, and to
settle their concerns, and divide their capital stock, but not. for continuing business. It was contended that this statute impaired the
obi igation of the shareholders' contracts.]
PARKER, C. J. • • • In the first place, we see no pretense for saying that it impairs the force of contracts. Certainly it has not that
effect on contracts made by or with the bank; but the very object of
the statute is to enforce such contracts.
It is said, however, that the contract with the government was that at
the end of twenty years the corporation should be dissolved, and each
member take his share out of the common fund. But it should be
considered that, by the original chatter, each r:1ember's share was
liable for all the debts of the bank, and that he would have no moral
right to withdraw it until all the debts of the bank were paid; so
that there was an equitable lien upon his share; and the legislature,
we think, had a right, if it was not their duty, to provide the means
of enforcing this moral obligation.
The law complained of is a general law operating upon all bodies
corporate, and it is convenient for them and the public that their
power of suing and being sued should be continued beyond the period
within which they are empowered to make contracts, m order that
their concerns may be properly adjusted.
Nor do we think it an objection that this additional term should be
granted by an act made subsequent to the time when their charter '"'' as
granted. A debtor to the bank could not object to a suit on the ground
that the original term of the cha1ter had expired, for th,e Yery bringing
of the suit would be an acceptance of the prolongation of the charter,
and it would be absurd for him to say that his debt was <liicharged,
or that there were no means of recovering it because he contracted
with the corporation on a supposition that it would continue in being
only a certain number of years. We think it equally incompete nt for
such corporation to deny its existence against a statute of the government; the object of which is to give a right of action on contracts upon
which they were legally and morally bound under their chaiter.
It is said that the members of such a corporation associated upon
1 Statement abridged. Much of the opinion, and the elaborate arguments
of Saltonstall, Pickering and Webster, omitted.
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MUMMA V. THE POTOMAC COMPANY.

the faith that after the time limited in their charter they might sepa-

rate and take their shares of the stock. But it is to be answered that

the faith that after the time limited in their charter they might separate and take their shares of the stock. .But it is to be answered that
their stock is, in an equitable view, pledged for fhe payment of all
debts due from the corporation, and that it would be fraudulent to
withdraw the funds, knowing that there were debts to be paid, leaving no m eans of coercing the payment of those debts. What should
be said of a banking company which just before its expiration should
divide all the stock, making no provision for the payment of its debts?
Yet this might be done if the legislature have no authority to establish by law a mode by which it should be compelled to fulfill its obligations. For it is cetiainly doubtful whether any means exist, under
our laws, of pursuing the funds into the hands of individual corporators and subjecting them to the claims of creditors. We see no violation of the rights of the corporators, no impairing of the obligation
of contracts, for it can never be the right of any person to withhold a
just debt from his creditor. • • •
(The suggestion filed can not impede the progress of tbt: suit.)
Note. See following cases, and note, infra, p. 910.

their stock is, in an equitable view, pledged for the payment of all

debts due from the corporation, and that it would be fraudulent to

withdraw the funds, knowing that there were debts to be paid, leav-

ing no means of coercing the payment of those debts. What should

be said of a banking company which just before its expiration should

divide all the stock, making no provision for the payment of its debts?

Yet this might be done if the legislature have no authority to estab-

lish by law a mode by which it should be compelled to fulfill its obli-

gations. For it is certainly doubtful whether any means exist, under

our laws, of pursuing the funds into the hands of individual corpora-

tors and subjecting them to the claims of creditors. We see no vio-

lation of the rights of the corporators, no impairing of the obligation

of contracts, for it can never be the right of any person to withhold a

just debt from his creditor. * * *

(The suggestion filed can not impede the progress of the suit.)

Note. See following eases, and note, infra, p. 910.
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Sec. 252. Contracts of creditors.

MUMMA v. THE POTOMAC COMPANY."

1834. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 8 Pe-

ters (33 U. S.) Rep. "281-7.

[Mumma, in 1S1S, obtained a judgment in the circuit court of the

District of Columbia against the Pototnac Company for $5,000. No at-

Sec. 252.

tempt was made to enforce it till April iS, 1S28, when a scire facias

Contracts of creditors.

was issued to revive the judgment; this revivor case was continued

MUMMA v. THE POTOMAC COMPANY.'

till 1830, when the facts were agreed to be that after the rendition of

1834.

the judgment in question and in accordance with a provision of the

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF THE UNITED STATES.

8 Pe-

ters (33 U. S.) Rep. •281-7.

laws of Virginia, Maryland and the United States incorporating the

Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, so authorizing, the Potomac

[Mumma, in 1818, obtained a judgment in the circuit court of the
District of Columbia agninst the Poto'mac Company for $s,ooo. No attempt was made .to enforce it till April 18, 1828, when a scire facias
was issued to revive the judgment; this revivor case was continued
till 1830, when the facts were agreed to be that after the rendition of
the judgment in question and in accordance with a provision of the
laws of Virginia, Maryland and the United States incorporating the
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, so authorizing, the Potomac
Company had surrendered all its property, rights and privileges by deed
of August 15, 1828, to and the same had been accepted by the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, whereby the charter ofthe Potomac
Company was vacated and annulled, and its powers vested in the canal
company. It was contended, secondly, that the deed of surrender
and the acts of the legislature were void as impairing the obligatjon
of contracts. The lower court gave judgment for the defendant.]
STORY, J.
• • • Unless, then, the second point can be maintained , there is an end of the cause, for there is no pretense to say
that a sdre fadas can be maintained, and a judgment had thereon,
against a dead corporation any more than again st a dead man . . We
are of opinion that the dissolution of the corporation , under the acts
of Virgin in and Maryland ( even supposing the act of confirmation of
congress out of the way) , can not , in any just sense, be considered,
1 Statement abridged, only part ·of opinion given.

Company had surrendered all its property, rights and privileges by deed

of August 15, 1828, to and the same had been accepted by the Chesa-

peake and Ohio Canal Company, whereby the charter of the Potomac

Company was vacated and annulled, and its powers vested in the canal

company. It was contended, secondly, that the deed of surrender

and the acts of the legislature were void as impairing the obligation

of contracts. The lower court gave judgment for the defendant.]

Story, J. * * * Unless, then, the second point can be main-

tained, there is an end of the cause, for there is no pretense to say

that a scire facias can be maintained, and a judgment had thereon,

against a dead corporation any more than against a dead man. . We

are of opinion that the dissolution of the corporation, under the acts

of Virginia and Maryland (even supposing the act of confirmation of

congress out of the way), can not, in any just sense, be considered,

1 Statement abridged, only part of opinion given.
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within the clause of the constitution of the United States on this sub-

ject, an impairing of the obligation of the contracts of the company by

those states, any more than the death of a private person can be said

to impair the obligation of his contracts. The obligation of those con-

tracts survives, and the creditors may enforce their claims against any

property belonging to the corporation which has not passed into the

hands of bona fide purchasers, but is still held in trust for the com-

pany, or for the stockholders thereof, at the time of its dissolution, in

any mode permitted by the local laws. Besides, the twelfth section

of the act incorporating the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company

makes it the duty of the president and directors of that company, so

long as there shall be and remain any creditor of the Potomac Com-

pany who shall not have vested his demand against the same in the

stock of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (which the act ena-

bles him to do), to pay to such creditor or creditors, annually, such div-

idend or proportion of the net amount of the revenues of the Potomac

Company, on an average of the last five years preceding the organi-

zation of the said Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, as the de-
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mand of the said creditor or creditors at that time may bear to the

whole debt of $175,800 (the supposed aggregate amount of the debts

of the Potomac Company). So that here is provided an equitable

mode of distributing the assets of the company among its creditors, by

an apportionment of its revenues in the only mode in which it could

be practically done upon its dissolution; a mode analogous to the dis-

tribution of the assets of a deceased insolvent debtor.

Independent of this view of the matter, it would be extremely

difficult to maintain the doctrine contended for by the plaintiff in

error, upon general principles. A corporation, by the very terms

and nature of its political existence, is subject to dissolution, by a sur-

render of its corporate franchises, and by a forfeiture of them for will-

ful misuser and non-user. Every creditor must be presumed to under-

stand the nature and incidents of such a body politic, and to contract

with reference to them. And it would be a doctrine new in the law,

that the existence of a private contract of the corporation should force

upon it a perpetuity of existence, contrary to public policy, and the

nature and objects of its charter. * * *

Affirmed.

See following cases, and note, infra, p. -910.

Sec. 253. Executory contracts.

GRIFFITH Et Al. v. BLACKWATER BOOM AND LUMBER CO.-

1899. In the Supreme Court of West Virginia. 46 W. Va.

56, 33 S. E. Rep. 125-128.

[In a suit Dy creditors against the lumber company to settle up its

affairs there were three contested claims in favor of one Thompson,

1 Statement abridged; only part of the opinion given.

within the clause of the constitution of the United States on this subject, an impairing of the obligation of the contracts.of the company by
those states, any more than the death of a private person can be said
to impair the obligation of his contracts. The obligation of those contracts survives, and the creditors may enforce their claims against any
property belonging to the corporation which has not passed into the
hands of bona fide purchasers, but is still held in trust for the company, or for the stockholders thereof, at the time of its dissolution, in
any mode permitted by the local laws. Besides, the twelfth section
of the act incorporating the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company
makes it the duty of the president and directors of that company, so
long as there shall be and remain any creditor of the Potomac Company who shall not have vested his demand against the same in the
stock of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (which the act enables him to do), to pay to such creditor or creditors, annually, such dividend or proportion of the net amount of the revenues of the Potomac
Company, on an average of the last five years preceding the organization of the said Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, as the demand of the said creditor or creditors at that time may bear to the
whole debt of $175,800 (the supposed aggregate amount of the debts
of the Potomac Company). So that here is provided an equitable
mode of distributing the assets of the company among its creditors, by
an apportionment of its revenues in the only mode in which it could
be practically done upon its dissolution; a mode analogous to the distribution of the assets of a deceased insolvent debtor.
Independent of this view of the matter, it would be extremely
difficult to maint:iin the doctrine contei;ided for by the plaintiff in
error, upon general principles. A corporation, by the very terms
and nature of its political existence, is subject to dissolution, by a surrender of its corporate franchises, and by a forfeiture of them for willful misuser and non-user. Every creditor must be presumed to understand the nature and incidents of such a body politic, and to contract
with reference. to them. And it would be a d.octrine new in the law,
that the existence of a private contract of the corporation should force
upon it a perpetuity of existence, contrary to public policy, and the
nature and objects of its charter. • • •
Affirmed.
See following cases, and note, infra, p. ·910.
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for over $115,000. One of these, for over $98,000, was adjudged not

to be a preferred claim, but if of any validity at all, to be such as to

898

share only pro rata with other claims. This claim arose out of a con-
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tract called the stocking contract, whereby Thompson was to cut,

for over $ 1 1 5,ooo. One of these, for over $98,ooo, was acljudged not
to be a preferred claim, but if of any validity at all, to be such as to
share only pro rata with oth er claims.· This claim arose out of a contract called the stocking contract, whereby Thompson was to cut,
saw and deliver all its timber at the mill at a certain price. Before
any part of this contract was carried out the company's affairs were
placed in the han<ls of a receiver by consent of all parties interested.
Thompson claimed damages for the breach of this contract, and over
$98,ooo was found to be the proper amount, if he was e ntitled to anything. I le claimed also that under a statute making clnims for work
and labor preferred claims , the damages for a breach of contract for
work and labor would have the same preference. The lower court
decreed that this was n ot a preferred claim, but allowed it to be a
valid claim. Other creditors appealed.]
•
DENT, P.
• • • The last repo1t of the receiver shows that, if
the three contested claims of Albert Thompson are allowed, the assets
of the company will greatly fall short of the liabilities ; but, if such
claims are disallowed, there will be in the neighborhood of $30,000
to be distributed among the stockholders. So these amounts are of
very grave importance to the stockholders, Albert Thompson, and the
other creditors, the most important of which is his right to recover
the alleged profits of his abrogated contract by way of d amages, ascertained by the final decree to amount to $98,66 1.56, as of the 24th
day of November, 1896. These damages are claimed by reason of
an alleged breach of its contract by the company. This, however , is
a legal impossibility, for the reason that, at the time the alleged
breach occurred, the company had ceased to exist save only in name,
and its bones were already bleaching on the plains of corporate existence amid millions of their kind. By force of law, it had been compelled to surrender its fran chises into the hands of a receiver on account of its inability to further carry on its business, without great
threatened loss to its creditors and stockholders, and it was afterwards
finally dissolved by the disposal of all its prope1ty, to all which Albert
Thompson was present and gave his assent, with certain reservations
in his own interest. Where an insolvent corporation is forced into
liquidation and disso lution all its executory contracts perish with it,
for this is an implied condition of their execution.
In 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2 ed.), 116, the law is stated to be:
"When performance of a contract is dependent upon the continued
existence of a g iven pcrron or thing, and such continued existence was
assumed as the basis of the agreement, the death of the person or the
d estru ction of the thing puts an end to the obligation." The continued existence of the corporation was assumed as the ba is of the
contract with Albert Thompson, and its involuntary dissolution put
a n end to performance on its part, and the contract ceased to be binding, as there was no one left to perform it according to its terms.
PecJplc , .. Globe Mut. Life Ins. Co., 9r N. Y. 174; 1 Am. & Eng.
Corp. Cas. 586, note 59+· Such, however, is not the law where a
solvent corporatio n is voluntarily dissolved. By its own act it can not

saw and deliver all its timber at the mill at a certain price. Before

any part of this contract was carried out the company's affairs were

placed in the hands of a receiver by consent of all parties interested.

Thompson claimed damages for the breach of this contract, and over

$98,000 was found to be the proper amount, if he was entitled to any-

thing. He claimed also that under a statute making claims for work

and labor preferred claims, the damages for a breach of contract for

work and labor would have the same preference. The lower court

decreed that this was not a preferred claim, but allowed it to be a

valid claim. Other creditors appealed.]

Dent, P. * * • The last report of the receiver shows that, if

the three contested claims of Albert Thompson are allowed, the assets

of the company will greatly fall short of the liabilities; but, if such

claims are disallowed, there will be in the neighborhood of $30,000

to be distributed among the stockholders. So these amounts are of

very grave importance to the stockholders, Albert Thompson, and the
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other creditors, the most important of which is his right to recover

the alleged profits of his abrogated contract by way of damages, ascer-

tained by the final decree to amount to $98,661.56, as of the 24th

day of November, 1S96. These damages are claimed by reason of

an alleged breach of its contract by the company. This, however, is

a legal impossibility, for the reason that, at the time the alleged

breach occurred, the company had ceased to exist save only in name,

and its bones were already bleaching on the plains of corporate exist-

ence amid millions of their kind. By force of law, it had been com-

pelled to surrender its franchises into the hands of a receiver on ac-

count of its inability to further carry on its business, without great

threatened loss to its creditors and stockholders, and it was afterwards

finally dissolved by the disposal of all its property, to all which Albert

Thompson was present and gave his assent, with certain reservations

in his own interest. Where an insolvent corporation is forced into

liquidation and dissolution all its executory contracts perish with it,

for this is an implied condition of their execution.

In 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2 ed.), 116, the law is stated to be:

"When performance of a contract is dependent upon the continued

existence of a given perron or thing, and such continued existence was

assumed as the basis of the agreement, the death of the person or the

destruction of the thing puts an end to the obligation." The con-

tinued existence of the corporation was assumed as the basis of the

contract with Albert Thompson, and its involuntary dissolution put

an end to performance on its part, and the contract ceased to be bind-

ing, as there was no one left to perform it according to its terms.

People v. Globe Mut. Life Ins. Co., 91 N. Y. 174; 1 Am. & Eng.

Corp. Cas. 586, note 594. Such, however, is not the law where a

solvent corporation is voluntarily dissolved. By its own act it can not

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 254

899

EtFECT OF DISSOLUTION.

El- FECT OF DISSOLUTION.

relieve itself from its contracts, but its assets will be held liable for

breaches thereof. It must be taken as an implied condition of all such

contracts that such corporation will not voluntarily try to escape or

evade fulfillment, and if it does, equity will not recognize its dissolu-

tion nor permit the distribution of its assets until its contracts are sat-

isfied. Glass Co. v. Stoehr, 54 Ohio St. 157, 43 N. E. Rep. 279;

Schleider v. Dielman. 44 La. Ann. 462, 10 South. 934. The appellee,

Thompson, claims that the dissolution of the corporation was volun-

tary, for the reason that the officers assented thereto. They assented

because its business had assumed such a condition that it could not be

continued without great loss to its creditors and stockholders. And to

this the appellee, Thompson, also assented. Hence its dissolution

was not voluntary, but was brought about by the force of circum-

stances, and the final determination of its affairs shows that it was not

solvent. * * *

A receiver is not bound to carry out executory contracts of the cor-

poration, but he may disregard them. Beach Rec, § 328. The

power to adopt or reject the defendant's contract, lo accept those
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which are of advantage to the trust estate, and reject the burdensome

ones, is restricted to the receiver. The rule is not reciprocal, hence

it is called "anomalous." Section cited:

"The court, however, may order the receiver to complete unfin-

ised contracts, if by so doing the interests of all parties will be better

conserved, and in such case whatever is done by the receiver in the

performance of such contracts becomes an obligation upon the receiv-

ership and its property, to be protected by the court." Smith Rec,

pp. 102, 103, § 35. The receiver in this case did adopt, under the

instruction of the court, and partly carry out the stocking contract;

but finally the court, reaching the conclusion, with the assent of all

parties, except Albert Thompson, determined to, and did, abandon

the stocking contract and direct a sale of the property. This the

court had the legal and equitable power to do. It thereby determined

that the carrying out of the contract would be injurious to those in

interest. After this action on the part of the court, the corporation,

the receiver or Albert Thompson would be in contempt even in seek-

ing to carry out the same. • * *

Decree below reversed.

Note. See following cases and note, infra, p. 910.

See. 254. Generally upon rights and liabilities in equity,

BACON Et Al. v. ROBERTSON.1

1855. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 18 How.

(59 U. S.) Rep. 480-4S9.

[Appeal from United States circuit court for the southern district of

relieve itself from its contracts, but its assets will be held liable for
breaches thereof. It must be taken as an implied condition of all such
contracts that such corporation will not voluntarily try to escape or
evade fulfillment, and if it does, equity will not recognize its dissolution nor permit the distrihution of its assets until its contracts are satisfied. Glass Co. v. Stoehr, 54 Ohio St. 157• 43 N. E. Rep. 279;
Schleider v. Dielman, 44 La. Ann. 462, 10 South. 934. The appellee,
Thompson, claims that the dissolution of the corporation was voluntarv, for the reason that the officers assented thereto. They assented
because its business had assumed such a condition that it could not be
continued without great loss to its creditors and stockholders. And to
this the appellee, Thompson, also assented. Hence its dissolution
was not voluntary, but was brought about by the force of circumstances, and the final determination of its affairs shows that it was not
solvent. • • •
A receiver is not bound to carry out executory contracts of the cor·
poration, but he may disregard them. Beach Rec., § 328. The
power to adopt or reject the defendant's contract, to accept those
which are of advantage to the trust estate, and reject the burdensome
ones, is restricted to the receiver. The rule is not reciprocal, hence
it is called "anomalous." Section cited:
"The court, however, may order the receiver to complete unfinised contracts, if by so doing the interests of all parties will be better
conserved, and in such case whatever is done by the receiver in the
performance of such contracts becomes an obligation upon the receivership and its property, to be protected by the court." Smith Rec.,
pp. 102, 103, § 35. The receiver in this case did adopt, under the
instruction of the court, and partly caJTy out the stocking contract;
but finally the court, reaching the conclusion, with the assent of all
parties, except Albert Thompson, determined to, and did, abandon
the stocking contract and direct a sale of the property. This the
court had the legal and equitable power to do. It thereby determined
that the carrying out of the contract would be injurious to those in
interest. After this action on the part of the court, the corporation,
the receiver or Albert Thompson would be in contempt even in seek·
ing to carry out the same. • • •
Decree below reversed.

Mississippi. In 1843 the legislature of Mississippi directed that ac-

1 Statement abridged, and much of opinion omitted.

Note.

See following cases and note, infra, p. 910.
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[Appeal from Umted States circuit court for the southern district of
Mississippi. In 1843 the legislature of Mississippi directed that ac1
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tions in quo -warranto be instituted against all banking- corporations

BACON ET AL. V . ROBERTSON.

§ 254

in the state that had so violated their charters as to incur their forfeit-

tions in qu,o warranto be i11 tituted against all banking corporations
in the state that had so violated their charters as to incur their forfeiture, and provided that trustees should be appointed by the court declaring a forfeiture, whose duty it should be to collect the assets, and
after paying the debts distribute the surplus, if any, ratably among
the stockholders. The charter of the Commercial Bank of Natchez,
after due proceedings, was declared forfeited, and Robertson appointed trustee to pay debts and make distribution. After all debts
were paid he refused to distribute the $4,000,000 surplus. Bacon
and the other shareholders brought their bill in equity to obtain their
shares. Upon demurrer the circuit court dismissed the bill and plaintiffs appealed. J
CAMPBELL, J. • • • To comprehend the import of this legislation we must consider the mischiefs it was designed to prevent or
remove, and the mode adopted to accomplish the end, for the legislation is of a character wholly remedial. The common law of Great
Britain was deficient in supplying the instrumentalities for a speedy
and just settlement of the affairs of an insolvent corporation whose
charter had been forfeited by a judicial sentence. The opinion usually expressed as to the effect of such a sentence was unsatisfactory
and questioned. There had been instances in Great Britain of the
dissolution of public or ecclesiastical corporations by the exertion of
the public authority, or as a conseqnence of the death of their members, and parliament and the courts had affirmed in these instances
that the endowments they had received from the prince or pious founders would revert in such a case. Stat. de Terris Templariorum, 17
Edw. II; Dean and Canons of Windsor, Godb. 211; Johnson v.
Norway, Winch. 37; Owen, 73; 6 Vin. Ahr., 28o. What was to become of their personal estate and of their debts and credits had not
been settled in any adjudged case, and as was said by Pollexfen in the
argument of the quo warranto against the city of London was perhaps "non de.ftnt'tur t'n jure." • • •
It may be admittt:d that the courts of law could not give any relief
to the shareholders of a corporation disfranchised by a judicial sentence in respect to a corporate right. Their modes of proceeding do
not provide for the case, as they have not for many others. l Plow,
276, 277; Richards v. Richards, 2 B. & Adol. 447; Will. Ex., 1129.
But this concession does not involve an acknowledgment that the
rights of the corporations are extinguished. Courts of chancery have
been forced into a closer contact with these associations, and have
formed a more rational conception of their constitution and a more
accurate estimate of their importance to the industrial relations of
society. Those courts have evinced a spirit o{ accommodation of
their modes of proceeding so as to adapt them to the changing exigencies of society. (Citing and quoting as illustrating this doctrine,
Lord Cottenham in,. Wallworth v. Holt, 4 M. & C. 635, Sir James
vVigram, V. C., in Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 491; Bank of U. S. v.
Deveaux, 5 Cr. 61; Lennox v. Roberts, 2 Wheat. 373; Mumma v.
Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 281; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304.) • •

ure, and provided that trustees should be appointed by the court de-

claring a forfeiture, whose duty it should be to collect the assets, and

after paying the debts distribute the surplus, if any, ratably among

the stockholders. The charter of the Commercial Bank of Natchez,

after due proceedings, was declared forfeited, and Robertson ap-

pointed trustee to pay debts and make distribution. After all debts

were paid he refused to distribute the $4,000,000 surplus. Bacon

and the other shareholders brought their bill in equity to obtain their

shares. Upon demurrer the circuit court dismissed the bill and plaint-

iffs appealed.]

Campbell, J. * * * To comprehend the import of this legis-

lation we must consider the mischiefs it was designed to prevent or

remove, and the mode adopted to accomplish the end, for the legisla-

tion is of a character wholly remedial. The common law of Great

Britain was deficient in supplying the instrumentalities for a speedy

and just settlement of the affairs of an insolvent corporation whose
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charter had been forfeited by a judicial sentence. The opinion usu-

ally expressed as to the effect of such a sentence was unsatisfactory

and questioned. There had been instances in Great Britain of the

dissolution of public or ecclesiastical corporations by the exertion of

the public authority, or as a conseqnence of the death of their mem-

bers, and parliament and the courts had affirmed in these instances

that the endowments they had received from the prince or pious found-

ers would revert in such a case. Stat, de Terris Templariorum, 17

Edw. II; Dean and Canons of Windsor, Godb. 211; Johnson v.

Norway, Winch. 37; Owen, 73; 6 Vin. Abr., 280. What was to be-

come of their personal estate and of their debts and credits had not

been settled in any adjudged case, and as was said by Pollexfcn in the

argument of the quo -warranto against the city of London was per-

haps '■'-non definitur in jure." * * *

It may be admitted that the courts of law could not give any relief

to the shareholders of a corporation disfranchised by a judicial sen-

tence in respect to a corporate right. Their modes of proceeding do

not provide for the case, as they have not for many others. 1 Plow,

276, 277; Richards v. Richards, 2 B. & Adol. 447; Will. Ex., 1129.

But this concession does not involve an acknowledgment that the

rights of the corporations are extinguished. Courts of chancery have

been forced into a closer contact with these associations, and have

formed a more rational conception of their constitution and a more

accurate estimate of their importance to the industrial relations of

society. Those courts have evinced a spirit of accommodation of

their modes of proceeding so as to adapt them to the changing exi-

gencies of society. (Citing and quoting as illustrating this doctrine,

Lord Cottenham iiv Wallworth v. Holt, 4 M. & C. 635, Sir James

Wigram, V. C., in Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 491; Bank of U. S. v.

Deveaux, 5 Cr. 61; Lennox v. Roberts, 2 Wheat. 373; Mumma v.

Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 281; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304.) * *
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The tendency of the discussions and judgments of the court of chan-

cery in Great Britain, and of the courts of this country, is to concede

the existence of a distinct and positive right of property in the indi-
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viduals composing the corporation in its capital and business, which

is subject in the main to the management and control of the corpora-

tion itself, but that cases may arise where the corporators may assert

not only their own rights but the rights of the corporate body. And

no reason can be given why the dissolution of a corporation, whether

by judicial sentence or otherwise, whose capital was contributed by

shareholders for a lawful and perhaps laudable enterprise, with the

consent of the legislature, should suspend the operation of these prin-

ciples, or hinder the effective interference of the court of chancery for

the preservation of individual rights of property in such a case. The

withdrawal of the charter—that is, the right to use the corporate name

for the purposes of suits before the ordinary tribunals—is such a sub-

stantia! impediment to the prosecution of the rights of the parties

interested, whether creditors or debtors, as would authorize equitable

interposition in their behalf within the doctrine of chancerv prece-

dents. Staintonv. The Carron Company, 23 L. and E. 315; Travis

v. Milne, 9 Hare 141; Travis v. Milne, 2 Hare 491. For the sen-
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tence of forfeiture does not attain the rights of property of the corpo-

rators or corporation, for then the state would appropriate it. If those

rights arc put an end to, it would seem to be rather from a careless

disregard, or hardened and reckless indifference to consequences on

the part of the public authority, than from any preconceived plan or

purpose. For, according to the doctrine of the text-writers on this

subject, the consequences are visited without any discrimination; the

losses are imposed upon those who are not blameworthy, and the ben-

efits are accumulated upon those who are without desert.

The effects of a dissolution of a corporation are usually described

to be, the reversion of the lands to those who had granted them; the

extinguishment of the debts, either to or from the corporate body, so

that they are not a charge nor a benefit to the members. The in-

stances which support the dictum in reference to the lands consist of

the statutes and judgments which followed the suppression of the mil-

itary and religious orders of knights, and whose lands returned to

those who had granted them, and did not fall to the king as an

escheat; or of cases of dissolution of monasteries and other ecclesias-

tical foundations, upon the death of all their members, or of donations

to public bodies, such as a mayor and commonalty. But such cases

afford no analogy to that before us. The acquisitions of real prop-

erty by a trading corporation are commonly made upon a bargain and

sale, for a full consideration, and without conditions in the deed; and

no conditions are implied in law in reference to such conveyances.

The vendor has no interest in the appropriation of the property to

any specific object, nor any reversion, where the succession fails. If

the statement of the consequences of a dissolution upon the debts and

credits of the corporation is literally taken, there can be no objection

to it. The members can not recover nor be charged with them, in

The tendency of the di scussions an<l judgments of the court of chancery in Great Britain, and of the courts of this country, is to concede
the existence of a distinct and positive right of property in the individuals composing the corporation in its capital and business, which
is s ubject in the main to the management and control of the corporation itse lf, but that cases may arise where the corporators may assert
not only their own rights but the rights of the corporate body. And
· no reason can be given why the dis ·olution of a corporation, whether
by judicial sentence or otherwise, whose capital was contributed by
shareholders for a lawful and perhaps laudable enterprise, with the
consent of the legislature, should suspend the operation of these principles, or hinder the effective interference of the court of chancery for
the preservation of individual rights of property in such a case. The
withdrawal of the charter-that is, the right to use the corporate name
for the purposes of suits before the ordinary tribunal s-is such a substantia! impediment to the prosecution of the rights of the parties
interested, whether creditors or debtors, as would authorize equitable
interposition in their behalf within the doctrine of chancery precedents. Staintonv. The Carron Company, 23 L. and E. 315; Travis
v. Milne, 9 Hare 141; Travis v. Milne, 2 Hare 49r. For the sentence of forfeiture does not attain the rights of property of the corporators or corporation, for then the state would appropriate it. If th~se
rights are put an end to, it would seem to be rather from a careless
disregard, or hardened and reckless indifference to consequences on
the part of the public authority, than from any preconceived plan or
purpose. For, according to the doctrine of the text-writers on this
subject, the consequences are visited without any discrimination; the
losses are imposed upon those who are not blameworthy, and the benefits are accumulated upon those who are without desert.
The effects of a di ssolution of a corporation are usually described
to be, the reversion of the lands to those who had granted them; the
extinguishment of the debts, either to or from the corporate body, so
that they are not a charge nor a benefit to the members. The instances which support the dictum in reference to the lands consist of
the statutes and judgments which followed the suppression of the military and religious orders of knights, and whose lands returned to
those who had granted them, and did not fall to the king as an
escheat; or of cases of cl issolution of monasteries and other ecclesiastical foundations, upon the death of all their members, or of donations
to public bodies, such as a mayor and commonalty. But such case&
afford no analogy to that before us. The acquisitions of real property by a trading corporation are commonly made upon a bargain and
sale, for a full consideration, and without conditions in the deed; and
no conditions are implied in law in reference to such conveyances.
The vendor has no interest in the appropriation of the property to
any specific object, nor any reversion, where the succession fails. If
the statement of the consequences of a dissolution upon the debts and
credits of the corporation is literally taken , there can be no objection
to it. The members can not recover nor be charged with them, in
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their natural capacities, in a court of law. But this does not solve

BACON ET AL. V. ROBERTSON.

the difficulty.

The question is, has the bona Jide and just creditor of a corpora-

their natural capacities, in a court of law. But this does not solve
the difficulty.
The question is, has the bona fide and just creditor of a corporation, dissolved under a judicial sentence for a breach in its charter,
any claim upon the corporate property for the satisfaction of his debt,
apa1t from the reservation in the act of the legislature which directed
the prosecution? Can the lands be resumed in disregard of their
rights by vendors, who have received a full payment of their price,
and executed an absolute conveyance? Can the careless, improvident or faithless debtor plead the extinction of his debt or of the creditor's claim, and thus receive protection in his delinquency? The
creditor is blameless-he has not participated in the corporate mismanagement, nor procured the judicial sentence; he has trusted upon
visible property acquired by the corporation in virtue of its legislative sanction. How can the vendors of the lands or the delinquent
debtors resist the might of his equity? But, if the claims of the creditor are irresistible those of the stockholder are not inferior, at least
against the parties who claim to hold the corporate property. The
money, evidences of debts, lands and personalty acquired by the
corporation were purchased with the capital they lawfully contributed
to a legitimate enterprise conducted under the legislative authority.
T~e enterprise has failed under circumstances, it may well be, which
entitled the state to \vithdraw its special support and encouragement,
but the state does not affirm that any cause for the confiscation of the
property, or for the infliction of a heavier penalty, has arisen. It is a
case, therefore, in which courts of chancery, upon their well-settled
principles, would aid the parties to realize the property belonging to
the corporation, and compel its application to the satisfaction of the
d emands which legitimately rest upon it.
In our view of the equ it_v of this bill we have the support and sanction of the legislature of Mississippi. Their legislation excludes all
the consequences which have been imputed as necessary to a sentence
of dissolution on a civil corporation. From the plentitude of their
powers for the amelioration of the condition of the body politic, and
the supply of defects in their system of remedial laws, they have
afforded a plan for the liquidation and settlement of the business of
these corporations in which th e equities of the creditors and shareholders respectively are recognized as attaching to all the corporate
property of whatever description. And the inquiry arises, who is
authorized to obstruct the enforcement of these equities in so far as
the stockholders of the Commercial Bank of Natchez are concerned?
The creditors have been satisfied. The defendant in the present suit
is the trustee appointed under these legislative enactments. His demurrer confesses that he has received money, stocks, evidences of
debt, lands, and personal property, which he refuses to distribute.
He claims that the stockholders have no rights since the dissolution of
the corporation, and if any, they must he looked for in the circuit
court of Adams county, Mississippi. But the trustee can not deny
the title of the stockholders to a distribution. To collect and distrib-

tion, dissolved under a judicial sentence for a breach in its charter,

any claim upon the corporate property for the satisfaction of his debt,

apart from the reservation in the act of the legislature which directed

the prosecution? Can the lands be resumed in disregard of their

rights by vendors, who have received a full payment of their price,

and executed an absolute conveyance? Can the careless, improvi-

dent or faithless debtor plead the extinction of his debt or of the cred-

itor's claim, and thus receive protection in his delinquency? The

creditor is blameless—he has not participated in the corporate mis-

management, nor procured the judicial sentence; he has trusted upon

visible property acquired by the corporation in virtue of its legisla-

tive sanction. How can the vendors of the lands or the delinquent

debtors resist the might of his equity? But, if the claims of the cred-

itor are irresistible those of the stockholder are not inferior, at least

against the parties who claim to hold the corporate property. The

money, evidences of debts, lands and personalty acquired by the
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corporation were purchased with the capital they lawfully contributed

to a legitimate enterprise conducted under the legislative authority.

The enterprise has failed under circumstances, it may well be, which

entitled the state to withdraw its special support and encouragement,

but the state does not affirm that any cause for the confiscation of the

property, or for the infliction of a heavier penalty, has arisen. It is a

case, therefore, in which courts of chanceiy, upon their well-settled

principles, would aid the parties to realize the property belonging to

the corporation, and compel its application to the satisfaction of the

demands which legitimately rest upon it.

In our view of the equity of this bill we have the support and sanc-

tion of the legislature of Mississippi. Their legislation excludes all

the consequences which have been imputed as necessary to a sentence

of dissolution on a civil corporation. From the plentitude of their

powers for the amelioration of the condition of the body politic, and

the supply of defects in their system of remedial laws, they have

afforded a plan for the liquidation and settlement of the business of

these corporations in which the equities of the creditors and share-

holders respectively are recognized as attaching to all the corporate

property of whatever description. And the inquiry arises, who is

authorized to obstruct the enforcement of these equities in so far as

the stockholders of the Commercial Bank of Natchez are concerned?

The creditors have been satisfied. The defendant in the present suit

is the trustee appointed under these legislative enactments. His de-

murrer confesses that he has received money, stocks, evidences of

debt, lands, and personal property, which he refuses to distribute.

He claims that the stockholders have no rights since the dissolution of

the corporation, and if any, they must be looked for in the circuit

court of Adams county, Mississippi. But the trustee can not deny

the title of the stockholders to a distribution. To collect and distrib-
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ute the property of the corporation among the creditors and stock-

holders is his commission—for this end he was placed in the posses-

sion of the property, and was armed with all the powers he has exer-

cised.

His title is in subordination to theirs, and his duties are to maintain

their rights and to consult their advantage. Pearson v. Lindley,'3

Ju. 758; 3 Pet.,43; 4 Bligh 1; Willis Trus., 125, 172, 173. He is

estopped from making the defense of a want of title in the stockhold-

ers. * * * Reversed.

Note. See following cases, and note, infra, p. 910.

Sec. 255. Reversion of land.

WILSON v. LEARY.1

ute the property of the corporation among the creditors and stockholders is his commission-for this end he was placed in the possession of the property, and was armed with all the powers he has exercised.
His title is in subordination to theirs, and his duties are to maintain
their rights and to consult their advantage. Pearson v. Lindley,· 2
Ju. 758; 3 Pet.,43; 4 Bligh r; Willis Trus., 125, 172, 173. He is
estopped from making the defense of a want of title in the stockholders. • • • Reversed.

1897. In the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 120 N.

C. Rep. 90-94, 58 Am. St. Rep. 778.

Note.

See following cases, and note, illfm, p. 910.

[Action to recover land. In 1849, plaintiff's ancestor conveyed the

land in fee to an Odd Fellows Lodge, which was incorporated the

following year and duly chartered by the grand lodge. This lodge

Sec. 255.

Reversion of land.

took and held possession till 1872, when it ceased to exist, and was

WILSON v. LEARY.1

never revived. Under the direction of the Grand Lodge the land
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was sold in 1873 to the defendants. Suit was brought in 1892, by

1897.

IN THR SUPREME

COURT

OF NORTH CAROLINA.

120 N.

the heirs of the original grantor, claiming a reverter upon the extinc-

C. Rep. 9Q-94, 58 Arn. St. Rep. 778.

tion of the subordinate lodge; and the lower court so found.]

Clark, J. * * * The plaintiff's counsel insist, however, that at

the time of the conveyance the Revised Statutes (ch. 26, sec. 17) pro-

vided that a corporation, unless otherwise specially stated in its charter,

had existence for only thirty years, and as there was no special pro-

vision in this charter, the grantor only parted with the property for

thirty years and held a resulting trust. But the conveyance was in fee,

and a corporation limited in duration can take a fee-simple convey-

ance just as a natural being, whose existence is also limited. Either

may convey away the property, and ifpon the death of either, without

having disposed of it, the property will go to pay creditors, to heirs,

to stockholders, or as an escheat, according to the circumstances, but

in neither case is there any reverter to the grantors. On the death of

a corporation the property is usually administered by a receiver, and

on the death of a natural person, by the personal representative, or

passes to the heirs.

It is true it was held in an opinion by Gaston, J. (Fox v. Horah,

36 N. C. 358), that by the common law, upon the dissolution of a cor-

poration by the expiration of its charter or otherwis-e, its real property

reverted to the grantor, its personal property escheated to the state,

and its choses in action became extinct, and hence that on the expira-

tion of the charter of a bank a court of equity would enjoin the collec-

tion of notes made payable to the bank or its cashier, the debtor be-

1 Statement abridged, and part of opinion omitted.

[Action to recover land. In 1849, plaintiff's ancestor conveyed the
land in fee to an Odd Fellows Lodge, whfch was incorporated the
following year and duly chartered by the grand lodge. This lodge
took and held possession till r872, when it ceased to exist, and was
never revived. Under the direction of the Grand Lodge the land
was sold in 1873 to the defendants. Suit was brought in 1892, by
the heirs of the original grantor, claiming a reverter upon the extinction of the subordinate lodge; and the lower court so found. J
CLARK, J. • • • The plaintiff's counsel insi -t, however, that at
the time of the conveyance the Revised Statutes (ch. 26, sec. 17) provided that a corporation, unless otherwise sp~cially stated in its charter,
had existence for onl_v thirty years, and as there was no special provi ion in this charter, the grantor only parted with the property for
thirty years and held a resulting trust. But the conveyance was in fee,
and a corporation limited in duration can take a fee-simple conveyance just as a natural being, whose existence is also limited. Either
may convey away the property, and ttpon the death of either, without
having di posed of it, the property will go to pay creditors, to heirs,
to stockholders, or as an escheat, according to the circumstances, but
in neither case is there any reverter to the grantors. On the death of
a corporation the property is usually administered by a receiver, and
on the death of a natural person, by the personal representative, or
pa ses to the heirs.
It is tnic it was held in an opinion by Gaston, J. (Fox v. Horah,
36 N. C. 358), that by the common law, upon the dissolution of a corporatioi1 by the expiration of its charter or otherwise, its real property
reverted to the grantor, its personal property escheated to the state,
and its choses in action became extinct, and hence that on the expiration of the charter of a bank a court of equity would enjoin the collection of notes made payable to the bank or its cashier, the debtor be1

Statement abridged, and part of opinion omitted.
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ing absolved by the dissolution. Judge Thompson (5 Thomp. Corp.,

904

§ 6720) refers to this decision "in accordance with the barbarous rule

TITCOMB V. KENNEBUNK MUT. F. INSURANCE CO .

§ 256

of the common law" as "probably the last case of its kind," and

ing absolved by the dissolution. Judge Thompson (S Thomp. Corp.,
§ 6720) refers to this decision "in accordance with the barbarous rule
of the common law" as "probably the last case of its kind," and
notes that it has since been in effect overruled in Von Glahn v. De
Rossett, 8r N. C. 467, and it is now expressly overruled by us.
ehancellor Kent (2 Comm., 307, note) says "this rule of the common
law has, in fact, become ob olete and odious," and elsewhere he
stout! v denied that it had ever been the rule of the common law, except as to a restricted class of corporations (5 Thompson , supra,
§ 6730). The subject is thoroughly discussed by Gray on Perpetuities, §§ 44-51, and he demonstrates that my Lord Coke's doctrim..
rested on the dictum of a fifteenth century judge (Mr. Justice Choke,
in the Prior of Spalding's Case, 7 Edward IV, 1467), and is contrary
to the only case deciding the point, Johnson v. No1way, Winch.
37 (1622), though Coke's statement has often been referred to as
law. But whatever the extent of this rule a~ the common law, if it
was the rule at all, it was not founded upon justice and reason, nor
could it be approved by experience, and has been repudiated by
modem courts. The m<;>dern doctrine is, as held by us, that ''upon
a dissolution the title to real property does not revert to the original
grantors or their heirs, and the personal property does not escheat
to the state." Thompson, supra, § 6746; Owen v. Smith, 3 1 Barb.
641; Towar v. Hale, 46 Barb. 361. The crude conceptions of
corporntions naturally entertained in a feudal and semi-barbarous
age, when they were few in number and insignificant in value and
functions, by even so able a man as Sir Edward Coke, and the fanciful reason given by him (Coke Lit., 136) for the reverter of their real
estate, to wit, that a conveyance to them must necessarily be a qul'llificd or base fee, have long since beoome outworn and discredited.
That which is termed "the common law" is simply the "right reason
of the thing'' in matters as to which there is no stat\1tory enactment.
When it is misconceived an<l wrongly declared, the common rule
is equally subject to, be overruled, whether it is an ancient or a recent
decision. Upon the facts agreed judgment should be entered below
against the plaintiffs, dismissing- their action.
Reversed.

notes that it has since been in effect overruled in Von Glahn v. De

Rossett, 81 N. C. 467, and it is now expressly overruled by us.

Chancellor Kent (2 Comm., 307, note) says "this rule of the common

law has, in fact, become obsolete and odious," and elsewhere he

stoutly denied that it had ever been the rule of the common law, ex-

cept as to a restricted class of corporations (5 Thompson, supra,

§ 6730). The subject is thoroughly discussed by Gray on Perpetui-

ties, §§ 44—51, and he demonstrates that my Lord Coke's doctrine

rested on the dictum of a fifteenth century judge (Mr. Justice Choke,

in the Prior of Spalding's Case, 7 Edward IV, 1467), and is contrary

to the only case deciding the point, Johnson v. Norway, Winch.

37 (1622), though Coke's statement has often been referred to as

law. But whatever the extent of this rule at the common law, if it

was the rule at all, it was not founded upon justice and reason, nor

could it be approved by experience, and has been repudiated by

modern courts. The modern doctrine is, as held by us, that "upon

a dissolution the title to real property does not revert to the original
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grantors or their heirs, and the personal property does not escheat

to the state." Thompson, supra, § 6746; Owen v. Smith, 31 Barh.

641; Towar v. Hale, 46 Barb. 361. The crude conceptions of

corporations naturally entertained in a feudal and semi-barbarous

age, when they were few in number and insignificant in value and

functions, by even so able a man as Sir Edward Coke, and the fanci-

ful reason given by him (Coke Lit., 136) for the reverter of their real

estate, to wit, that a conveyance to them must necessarily be a quali-

fied or base fee, have long since become outworn and discredited.

That which is termed "the common law" is simply the "right reason

of the thing" in matters as to which there is no statutory enactment.

When it is misconceived and wrongly declared, the common rule

is equally subject to, be overruled, whether it is an ancient or a recent

decision. Upon the facts agreed judgment should be entered below

against the plaintiffs, dismissing their action.

Reversed.

See following cases and note, infra, p. 910.

Sec. 256. Reversion of property of mutual company.

TITCOMB v. KENNEBUNK MUT. F. INSURANCE CO.

1887. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 79 Maine

Rep- 3I5~317-

Walton, J. The Kennebunk Mutual Fire Insurance Company

was incorporated in 1856. It has issued no policies since 1877.

In 1884, its last policy having expired, the company voted to close

See following cases and note, infrci, p. 91 O.

Sec. 256.

Reversion of property of mutual company.

TITCOMB v. KENNEBUNK MUT. F. INSURANCE CO.

1887.

IN THE SUPREME JumcIAL CouRT OF MAINE.
Rep. 315-317.

79

Maine

WALTON, J. The Kennebunk Mutual Fire Insurance Company
was incorporated in 1856. It has issued no policies since 1877.
In 1884, its last policy having expired, the company voted to close
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up its affairs and to do no more business. A decree has been ob-

905

tained at nisi firius dissolving the corporation, from which no appeal

has been taken or claimed; and the only question before the law

court is to determine what shall be done with the assets of the com-

pany. Our statutes contain ample provisions for the disposition of

the assets of stock companies. R. S., , c. 46, §§ 25, 26, 27 and

54. But this is a mutual company and has no stockholders, and the

provisions cited do not apply. According to the old settled law of

the land, says Chancellor Kent, upon the civil death of a corporation,

when there is no special statute to the contrary, all its real estate re-

verts to the grantors and their heirs, and all its personal estate vests

in the people. 2 Kent. (10th ed.), 3S5, 386. To the same effect is

Angcll and Ames on Corp., c. 22, § 6 (2d ed.).

But it is said that in this class of cases the corporators named in the

act of incorporation should be regarded as stockholders. They are

not stockholders, and to hold that they are would be a fiction, and

fictions are not favored, and are never resorted to except to work out

some strong and inherent equity, and there is no such equity in favor
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of the corporators of a mutual insurance company. They contribute

nothing towards its assets, and we think it would be against public

policy to allow them to have a pecuniary interest in them. Such an in-

terest would inevitably tend to create a temptation to fix the rates of

insurance higher than would be necessary to meet losses, and then,

when a surplus had been thus obtained, to divide it among themselves

and thus reap a profit from business in which they had invested no

capital and had taken no risks, and this at the expense of the policy-

holders. We think there is a much stronger equity in favor of the

former policy-holders, whose money has contributed to produce the

assets. But we do not think they can be regarded as stockholders

after their policies have expired and their premium notes have been

canceled or given up to them. They have then received in full the

benefits for which they contracted and are no longer members of the

company, and to distribute among them a small amount of assets, and

to determine what each former policy-holder's share ought in equity

to be, would be attended with difficulties and an amount of labor

which the end would not justify. When a man dies leaving no wife

or kindred his property descends to the state. And when a corpo-

ration which, like a mutual insurance company, has no stockholders,

ceases to exist, we are not prepared to say that the rule of the com-

mon law, which gives its surplus assets to the state, is not a wise one.

* * * (Ordered that balance after paying debts, costs, etc., be

paid to the state treasurer for the use of the state.)

Note. See, 1899, Cummings v. Hollis (Ga.), 33 S. E: 919; 1883, Mason v.

Fire Co., 70 Ga. 604. Also next case, and note, infra, p. 910.

up its affairs and to do no more business. A decree has been obtained at nisi prius dissolving the' corporation, from which no appeal
has been taken or claimed; and the only question before the law
court is to determine what shall be done with the assets of the company. Our statutes contain ample provisions for the disposition of
the assets of stock companies. R. S., - - , c. 46, §§ 25 , 26, 27 and
54. But this is a mutual company and has no stockholders, and the
provisions cited do not apply. According to the old settled law of
the land, says Chancellor Kent, upon the civil death of a corporation,
when there is no special statute to the contrary, all its real estate reverts to the grantors and their heirs, and all its personal estate vests
in the people. 2 Kent. (10th ed.), 385, 386. To the same effect is
Angell and Ames on Corp., c. 22, § 6 (2d ed.).
But it is said that in this class of cases the corporators named in the
act of incorporation should be regarded as stockholders. They are
not stockholders, and to hold that they are would be a fiction, and
fictions are not favored, and are never resorted to except to work out
some strong and inherent equity, and there is no such equity in favor
of the corporators of a mutual insurance company. They contribute
nothing towards its assets, and we think it would be against public
policy to allow them to have a pecuniary interest in them. Such an interest would inevitably tend to create a temptation to fix the rates of
insurance higher than would be necessary to meet losses, and then,
when a surplus had been thus obtained, to divide it among themselves
and thus reap a profit from business in which they had invested no
capital and had taken no risks, and this at the expense of the policyholders. We think there is a much stronger equity in favor of the
former policy-holders, whose money has contributed to produce the
assets. But we do not think they can be regarded as stockholders
after their policies have expired and their premium notes have been
canceled or given up to them. They have then received in full the
benefits for which they contracted and are no longer members of the
company, and to distribute among them a small amount of assets, and
to determine what each former policy-holder's share ought in equity
to be, would he attended with difficulties and an amount of labor
which the end would not justify. When a man dies leaving no wife
or kindred h ~ s property descends to the state. And when a corporation which, like a mutual insurance company, has no stockholders,
ceases to exist, we are not prepared to say that the rule of the common law, which gives its surplus assets to the state. is not a wise one.
• • • (Ordered that balance after paying debts, costs, etc., be
paid to the state treasurer for the use of the state.)
Note. See, 1899, Uummings v. Hollis (Ga.), 33 8. E : 919; 188::!, l\lason v.
Fire Co., 70 Ga. 604. Also next case, and note, infra, p. 910.
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Sec. 257. Reversion of property^ charitable corporation.

Sec. 257.

MORMON CHURCH v. UNITED STATES.1

ROMNEY v. UNITED STATES.

Reversion of property, charitable corporation .

•

1890. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 136

MORMON CHURCH v. UNITED STATES.1

U. S. Rep. 1-67.

Bradley, J. The principal questions raised are, first, as to the

ROMNEY v. UNITED STATES.

power of congress to repeal the charter of the Church of Jesus Christ

of Latter-Day Saints; and, secondly, as to the power of congress and

1890.

the courts to seize the property of said corporation and to hold the

IN

THE

SUPREME

COURT OF

THE

UNITED

STATES.

136

U. S. Rep. 1-67.

same for the purposes mentioned in the decree.

The power of congress over the territories of the United States is

BRADLEY, J.
The principal questions raised are, first, as to the
power of congress to repeal tbe charter of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints; and, secondly, as to the power of congress and
the courts to seize the property of said! corporation and to hold the
same for the purposes mentioned in the decree.
The po ..ver of congress over the territories of the United States is
general and plenary, arising from and incidental to the right to acquire
the territory itself, and from the power given by the constitution to
make all needful rules and regulations 1re::;pecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States. It would be absurd to hold
that the United States has power to acquire territory, and no power
to govern it when acquired. The po.,,ver to acquire territory, other
than the territory northwest of the Ohio river (which belonged to the
United States at the adoption of the constitution), is derived from the
treaty-making power and the power to declare and carry on war.
The incidents of these powers are those of nation·al sovereignty, and
belong to all independent governments . The power to make acqu i·itions of territory by conquest, by treaty and by cession is an incident
of national sovereignty. The territory of Louisiana, when acquired
from France, and the territories west of the Rocky mountains , when
acquired from Mexico, became the absolute property and domain of
the United States, subject to such conditions as the government , in its
diplomatic negotiations, had seen fit to accept relating to the rights of
the people then inhahiting those territories. Having rightfully acquired said territories, the United States government was the only one
which could impose laws upon them, and its sovereignty over them
was complete. No state of the Union had any such right of sovereignty over them; no other country or government had any such right.
These propositions are so elementary, and so necessarily follow from
the condition of things arising upon the acquisition of new territory,
that they need no argument to support them. · They are self-e,·ident.

general and plenary, arising from and incidental to the right to acquire

the territory itself, and from the power given by the constitution to

make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other

property belonging to the United States. It would be absurd to hold

that the United States has power to acquire territory, and no power

to govern it when acquired. The power to acquire territory, other

than the territory northwest of the Ohio river (which belonged to the
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United States at the adoption of the constitution), is derived from the

treaty-making power and the power to declare and carry on war.

The incidents of these powers are those of national sovereignty, and

belong to all independent governments. The power to make acqui-

sitions of territory by conquest, by treaty and by cession is an incident

of national sovereignty. The territory of Louisiana, when acquired

from France, and the territories west of the Rocky mountains, w hen

acquired from Mexico, became the absolute property and domain of

the United States, subject to such conditions as the government, in its

diplomatic negotiations, had seen fit to accept relating to the rights of

the people then inhabiting those territories. Having rightfully ac-

quired said territories, the United States government was the only one

which could impose laws upon them, and its sovereignty over them

was complete. No state of the Union had any such right of sover-

eignty over them; no other country or government had anv such right.

These propositions are so elementary, and so necessarily follow from

the condition of things arising upon the acquisition of new territory,

that they need no argument to support them. They are self-evident.

•»«

This brings us directly to the question of the power of congress to

revoke the charter of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.

That corporation, when the territory of Utah was organized, was a

corporation de facto, existing under an ordinance of the so-called State

of Deseret, approved February 8, 1851. This ordinance had no va-

lidity except in the voluntary acquiescence of the people of Utah then

'Facts sufficiently stated in opinion; arguments and much of opinion

omitted.

• • •

This brings us directly to the question of the power of congress to
revoke the charter of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.
That corporation, when the territory of Utah was organized , was a
corporation de facto, existing under an ordinance of the so-called State
of Deseret, approved February 8, 1851. This ordinance had no validity except in the voluntary acquiescence of the people of Utah then
1 Facts sufficiently stated in opimun; a:rgumenta and much of opinion
omitted.
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residing there. Deseret, or Utah, had ceased to belong to the Mexi-

can government by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and in 1851 it

belonged to the United States, and no government without authority

from the United States, express or implied, had any legal right to ex-

ist there. The assembly of Deseret had no power to make any valid

law. Congress had already passed the law for organizing the terri-

tory of Utah into a government, and no other government was lawful

within the bounds of that territory. But after the organization of the

territorial government of Utah under the act of congress, the legisla-

tive assembly of the territory passed the following resolution: '•'■Re-

solved by the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah, That the

laws heretofore passed by the provisional government of the state of

Deseret, and which do not conflict with the organic act of said terri-

tory, be and the same are hereby declared to be legal and in full force

and virtue, and shall so remain until superseded by the action of the

legislative assembly of the territory of Utah." This resolution was

approved October 4, 1851. The confirmation was repeated on the

19th of January, 1855, by the act of the legislative assembly, entitled
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"An act in relation to the compilation and revision of the laws and

resolutions in force in Utah Territory, their publication and distribu-

tion." From the time of these confirmatory acts, therefore, the said

corporation had a legal existence under its charter. But it is too plain

for argument that this charter or enactment was subject to revocation

and repeal by congress whenever it should see fit to exercise its power

for that purpose. Like any other act of the territorial legislature, it

was subject to this condition. Not only so, but the power of congress

could be exercised in modifying or limiting the powers and privileges

granted by such charter, for if it could repeal, it could modify; the

greater includes the less. Hence there can be no question that the act

of July 1, 1862, already recited, was a valid exercise of congressional

power. Whatever may be the effect or true construction of this act,

we have no doubt of its validity. As far as it went it was effective.

If it did not absolutely repeal the charter of the corporation, it cer-

tainly took away all right or power which may have been claimed un-

der it to establish, protect or foster the practice of polygamy, under

whatever disguise it might be carried on; and it also limited the

amount of property which might be acquired by the Church of Jesus

Christ of Latter-Day Saints, not interfering, however, with vested

rights in real estate existing at that time.

If the act of July 1, 1862, had but a partial effect, congress had

still the power to make the abrogation of its charter absolute and com-

plete. This was done bv the act of 1887. By the seventeenth sec-

tion of that act it is expressly declared that "the acts of the legisla-

tive assembly of the territory of Utah, incorporating, continuing or

providing for the corporation known as the Church of Jesus Christ of

Latter-Day Saints, and the ordinance of the so-called general assem-

bly of the State of Deseret, incorporating the said church, so far as the

same mav now have legal force and validity, are hereby disapproved

and annulled, and the said corporation, so far as it may now have, or

residing there. Deseret, or Utah, had ceased to belong to the Mexican government by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and in 1851 it
belonged to the United States, and no government without authority
from the United States, express or implied, had any legal right to exist there. The assembly of Deseret had no power to make any ndid
law. Congress had already passed the law for organizing the territory of Utah into a government, and no other government was lawful
within the bounds of that territory. But after the organization of the
territorial government of Utah under the act of congress, the legislative assembly of the territory passed the follov;ing resolution: "Resolved by tile Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah, That the
laws heretofore passed by the provisional government of the state of
Deseret, and which do not conflict with the organic act of said territory, be and the same are hereby declared to be legal. and in full force
ancl virtue, and shall so remain until superseded by the action of the
legislative assembly of the territory of Utah." This resolution was
approved October 4, 185 I. The confirmation was repeated on the
19th of January, 1855, by the act of the legislative assembly, entitled
"An act in rek ~ ion to the compilation and revision of the laws and
reso lutions in force ih Utah Territory, their publication and distribution." From the time of these confirmatory acts, therefore, the sa id
corporation had a legal existence under its charter. But it is too plain
for argument that this charter or enactment was subject to revocation
and repeal by congress whenever it should see fit to exercise its power
for that purpose. Like any other act of the territorial leg islature, it
was subject to this condition. Not only so, but the power of congress
could be exercised in modifying or limiting the powers and privileges
granted by such charter, for if it could repeal, it could modify; the
greater includes the less. Hence there can be no question that the act
of July I, 1862, already recitetl, was a valid exercise of congressional
power. Whatever may be the effect or true construction of this act,
we have no tloubt of its validity. As far as it went it was effective.
If it did not absolutely repeal the charter of the corporation, it certainly took away all right or p ower which may have been claimed under it to establi sh, protect or foster the practice of polygamy, under
whatever disguise it might be carried on; and it also limited the
amount of property which might be acquired by the Church of J esus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, not interfering, howeYer, with vested
rights in real estate existing at that time .
. If the act of July 1, 1862, h ad but a partial effect, congress had
still the power to make the abrogation of its charter absolute and complete. This was done by the act of 1887. By the se\'cnteenth section of that act it is expressly declared that "the acts of the legislative assembly of the territory of Utah, incorporating, continuing or
providing for the corporation known as the Church of J esus Chr.ist of
Latter-Day Saints, and the ordinance of the so-called general assembly of the State of Deseret, incorporating the sa id church, so far as the
same may now have ltga l force and validity, are hereby disnpproved
and annulled, and the saiu corporation, so far as it may now have, or
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pretend to have, any legal existence, is hereby dissolved." This ab-

908

solute annulment of the laws which gave the said corporation a legal
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existence has dissipated all doubt on the subject, and the said corpo-

pretend to have, any legal existence, is hereby dissolved." This abso.lute annulment of the laws which gave the said corporation a legal
existence has dissipated all doubt on the subject, and the said corporation has ceased to have any existence as a civil body, whether for
the purpose of holding property or of doing any other corporate act.
It was not nece ·sary to resort to the condition imposed by the act of
1862, limiting the amount of real estate which any corporation or association for re lig ious or charitable purposes was authorized to acquire
or hold, although it is apparent from the findings of the court that this
condition was violated by the corporation before the passage of the
act of 1887. Congress, for good and sufficie nt reasons of its own, independent of that limitation and o f any violation of it, had a full and
p erfect rig ht to repeal its charter and abrogate its corporate existence,
which, of course, d epended upon its charter.
The next question is whether congress or the court had the power
to cause the property of the sa id ·c orporation to be seized and taken
possession of as was done in this case.
vVhen a business corporation instituted for the purposes of gain or
private interest is dissolved, the modem doctrine is that it property,
after payment of its debts , equitably belongs to 'its stockholders. But
this d octrine has never been extended to public or charitable corporations. A s to these the ancient and established rule prevails, namely:
that when a corporation is dissolved its personal property , like that
of a man dy ing without heirs, ceases to be the subject of private ownership, and becomes subject to the disposal of the sover eign authority,
whilst its real estate reverts or escheats to the grantor or donor, unless
some other · cour e of devolutio n has been directed by positive law,
though still subject, as \.\·e shall hereafter see, to the charitable u se.
To this rule the corporation in question was undoubtedly subject. But
the gr:mtor of all or the principal part of the real estate of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints was really the United State ,
from whom the prope1ty wa derived by the church or its tru tees
through the operation of the town-site act. Besides, as we have seen ,
the act of 1862 expressly declared that all real estate acquired or held
by any of the corporations or associations therein mentioned (of
which the Church of Jesu s Christ of Latter-Day Saints was one), contrary to the provisions of that act, should be forfeited, and escheat to
the United States, with a saving of existing vested rights. The act
prohibited the acquiring or holding of real estate of greater Yalue than
$50.000 in a territory, and no legal title had vested in any of the
lands in Salt Lake City at that time, as the town-site act was not passed
until March 2, 1867. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the real
estate of the corporation in question could not, on its dissolution, revert or pa ss to a ny other pe rson or persons than the United States.
If it be urged that the re al e~tate did not stand -in the name of the
corporation but in th e nam e of a trustee or trustees, and therefore was
not subject to the ru Jes relating to corporate property , the su bstnnce
of the difficulty still remains. It can not be contended that the prohibition of the act of 1862 could have been so easily evaded as by put-

ration has ceased to have any existence as a civil body, whether for

the purpose of holding property or of doing any other corporate act.

It was not necessary to resort to the condition imposed by the act of

1S62, limiting the amount of real estate which any corporation or as-

sociation for religious or charitable purposes was authorized to acquire

or hold, although it is apparent from the findings of the court that this

condition was violated by the corporation before the passage of the

act of 18S7. Congress, for good and sufficient reasons of its own, in-

dependent of that limitation and of any violation of it, had a full and

perfect right to repeal its charter and abrogate its corporate existence,

which, of course, depended upon its charter.

The next question is whether congress or the court had the power

to cause the property of the said corporation to be seized and taken

possession of as was done in this case.

When a business corporation instituted for the purposes of gain or

private interest is dissolved, the modern doctrine is that its property,

after payment of its debts, equitably belongs to its stockholders. But
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this doctrine has never been extended to public or charitable corpo-

rations. As to these the ancient and established rule prevails, namely:

that when a corporation is dissolved its personal property, like that

of a man dying without heirs, ceases to be the subject of private own-

ership, and becomes subject to the disposal of the sovereign authority,

whilst its real estate reverts or escheats to the grantor or donor, unless

some other course of devolution has been directed by positive law,

though still subject, as we shall hereafter see, to the charitable use.

To this rule the corporation in question was undoubtedly subject. But

the grantor of all or the principal part of the real estate of the Church

of Jesus Christ of Lattcr-Day Saints was really the United States,

from whom the property was derived by the church or its trustees

through the operation of the town-site act. Besides, as we have seen,

the act of 1S62 expressly declared that all real estate acquired or held

by any of the corporations or associations therein mentioned (of

which the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints was one), con-

trary to the provisions of that act, should be forfeited, and escheat to

the United States, with a saving of existing vested rights. The act

prohibited the acquiring or holding of real estate of greater value than

$50,000 in a territory, and no legal title had vested in any of the

lands in Salt Lake City at that time, as the town-site act was not passed

until March 2, 1867. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the real

estate of the corporation in question could not, on its dissolution, re-

vert or pass to any other person or persons than the United States.

If it be urged that the real estate did not stand in the name of the

corporation but in the name of a trustee or trustees, and therefore was

not subject to the rides relating to corporate property, the substance

of the difficulty still remains. It can not be contended that the prohi-

bition of the act of 1862 could have been so easily evaded as by put-
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ting the property of the corporation into the hands of trustees. The

equitable or trust estate was vested in the corporation. The trustee

EFFECT OF DISSOLUTIO;'I/.

held it for no other purpose, and the corporation being dissolved, that

purpose was at an end. The trust estate devolved to the United

States in the same manner as the legal estate would have done had it

been in the hands of the corporation. The trustee became trustee for

the United States instead of trustee of the corporation. We do not

now speak of the religious and charitable uses for which the corpora-

tion, through its trustee, held and managed the property. That as-

pect of the subject is one which places the power of the government

and of the court over the property on a distinct ground.

Where a charitable corporation is dissolved and no private donor

or founder appears to be entitled to its real estate (its personal prop-

erty not being subject to such reclamation), the government or sover-

eign authority, as the chief and common guardian of the state, either

through its judicial tribunals or otherwise, necessarily has the disposi-

tion of the funds of such corporation, to be exercised, however, with

due regard to the objects and purposes of the charitable uses to which

the property was originally devoted so far as they are lawful and not

repugnant to public policy. * * *
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The property in question has been dedicated to public and charita-

ble uses. It matters not whether it is the product of private contri-

butions, made during the course of half a century, or of taxes imposed

upon the people, or of gains arising from fortunate operations in busi-

ness, or appreciation in values, the charitable uses for which it is

held are stamped upon it by charter, by ordinance, by regulation and

by usage, in such an indelible manner that there can be no mistake

as to their character, purpose or object. • * *

The manner in which the due administration and application of

charitable estates is secured, depends upon the judicial institutions and

machinery of the particular government to which they are subject. In

England, the court of chancery is the ordinary tribunal to which this

class of cases is delegated, and there are comparatively few which it

is not competent to administer. Where there is a failure of trustees,

it can appoint new ones; and where a modification of uses is neces-

sary in order to avoid a violation of the laws, it has. power to make

the change. There are some cases, however, which are beyond its

jurisdiction; as where, by statute, a gift to certain uses is declared

void and the property goes to the king; and in some other cases of

failure of the charity. In such cases the king as parens patricc, under

his sign manual, disposes of the fund to such uses, analogous to those

intended, as seems to him expedient and wise.

These general principles are laid down in all the principal treatises

on the subject, and are the result of numerous cases and authorities.

See Duke on Char. Uses, ch. 10, §§4, 5, 6; Boyle on Char., bk. 2, ch.

3. 4; 2 Story's Eq. Jur., §§ 1167, et sea. ; Attorney-General v. Guise,

2 Vernon 266; Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36, 77: De Them-

mines v. De Bonneval. 5 Russ. 289: Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9

Cranch 292, 335, 336; Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. 566; Vidal v. Girard's

ting the property of the corporation into the hands of trustees. The
equitable or trust estate was ve te<l in the corporation. The trustee
held it for no other purpose, and the corporation being dissoh-ed, that
purpose was at an end. The trust estate devolved to the United
States in the sam!! manner as the legal estate would haYe done had it
been in the hands of the corporation. The tiustee became trustee for
the United States instead of trustee of the corporation. We do not
now speak of the religibus and charitable uses for v•hich the corporation, through its trustee, held and managed the property. That aspect of the subject is one which places the power of the government
and of the court over the property on a distinct ground.
Where a charitable corporation is dissolved and no private donor
or founder appears to be entitled to its real estate (its personal property not being subject to such reclamation), the government or sovereign authority, as the chief and common guardian of the state, either
through its judicial tribunals or otherwise, necessarily has the disposition of the funds of such corporation, to be exercised, however, with
due regard to the objects and purposes of the charitable uses to which
the property was originally devoted so far as they are lawful and not
repugnant to public policy. • • •
The property in question has been dedicated to public and charitable uses. It matters not whether it is the product of private contributions, made during the course of half a century, or of taxes imposed
upon the people, or of gains arising from fortunate open1tions in business, or appreciation in values, the charitable uses for which it is
held are stamped upon it by charter, by ordinance, by regulation and
by usage, in such an indelible manner that there can he no mistake
as to their character, purpose or object. • • •
The manner in which the due administration and application of
charitable estates is secured, depends upon the judicial institutions and
machinery of the particular government to which they are subject. In
England, the court of chancery is the ordinary tribunal to which this
class of cases is delegated, and there are comparatively few which it
is not competent to administer. Where there is a failure of trustees,
it can appoint new ones; and where a modification of uses is necessary in order to avoid a violation of the laws, it has , power to make
the change. There are some cases, however, which are beyond its
jurisdiction; as where, by statute, a gift to certain uses is declared
void and the property goes to the king; and in some other cases of
failure of the charity. In such cases the king as parens patrim, under
his sign manual, disposes of the fund to such uses, analogous to those
intended, as seems to him expedient and wise.
These general principles are laid down in all the principal treatises
on the subject, and are the result of numerous cases and authorities .
See Duke on Char. Uses, ch. 10, §§ 4, 5 , 6; Boyle on Char., bk. 2 , ch.
3. 4; 2 Story's Eq. Jur., §§I 167, et seq.; Attorney-General'" Guise,
2 Vernon 266; Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 V es. 36, 77: De Themmines v. De Bonneval , 5 Russ. 289: Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9
Cranch 292, 335, 336; Beatty '" Kmiz , 2 Pet. 566; Vidal'" Girard's
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Executors, 2 How. 127; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539; Child v.

Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. 303; Jones v. Habersham, 107 U.S.

MORMON CHURCH V. UNITED STATES.

910
174. » • •

It is obvious that any property of the corporation which may be ad-

Executors, 2 How. 127; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539; Ould v.
Washington Hospital, 95 U.S. 303; Jones v. Habersham, 107 U.S.

judged to be forfeited and escheated will be subject to a more abso-

lute control and disposition by the government than that which is not

1

so forfeited. The non-forfeited property will be subject to such dis-

• • •

judged lo be forfeited and escheated will be s ubject -to a more absolute control and disposition by the government than that which is not
so forfeited. The non-forfeited property will be subject to such disposition only a may be required by the law of charitable uses; whilst
the forfeited and escheated property, being subject to a more absolute
control of the government, will admit of a greater latitude of discretion in regard to its disposition. As we have seen, however, congress has signified its will in this regard, having declared that the proceeds shall be applied to the use and benefit of common school in
the tenitory. \Vhether that will be a proper destination for the nonforfeited property will be a matter for future consideration in view of
all the circumstances of the case. • • •
Decree affirmed generally, Fuller, C. J., Field and Lamar, J.J.,
dissenting.
·

the forfeited and escheated property, being subject to a more absolute

control of the government, will admit of a greater latitude of discre-

tion in regard to its disposition. As we have seen, however, con-

gress has signified its will in this regard, having declared that the pro-

ceeds shall be applied to the use and benefit of common schools in

the territory. Whether that will be a proper destination for the non-

forfeited property will be a matter for future consideration in view of

all the circumstances of the case. • * *

Decree affirmed generally, Fuller, C. J., Field and Lamar, J.J.,

dissenting.

Note. Effect of dissolution.

1. Franchises can be no longer exercised: 1844, White v. Campbell, 5

Humph. (Tenn.|38; 1844, Bank of Mississippi v. Wrenn, 11 Miss. l3 Sru.
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It is obvious that any property of the corporation which may be ad-

position only as may be required by the law of charitable uses; whilst

& M. ) 791; 1877, Turnpike Co. v. Illinois, 9(5 U. S. 63; 1879, State v. Lawrence

Bridge Co., 22 Kan. 438; 1881, Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13, infra,

p. 1422; 1882, Campbell v. Talbot, 132 Mass. 174; 1889, People v. O'Brien'lll

Note. Effect of dissolution.
1. Franchises can be no longer exercised: 1844, White v. Campbell, 5
Humph. (Tenn.J 38; 1844, Bank of Mississippi v. Wrenn, 11 Miss. (3 Sm.
& l\l. ) 791; 1877, Turnpike Co. v. Illinois, 96 U. S. 63; 1879, State v. Lawrence
Bridge Co., 22 Kan. 438; 1881. Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U.S. 13, infra,
p. 14~2; 1882, Campbell v. Talbot, 132 Mass. 174; 1889, People v. O'Brien, l1l
N . Y. 1, infra, p. 1426; 1800, Marysville Invest. Co. v. Munson, 44 Kan. 491.
A nrl Ree s·ttpra, pp. 8ti8-87 l.
2. Exectttory w11tracts:
a. lnvolm1tai-y dissolution, at common law, extinguished execut-0ry contracts, and all claims for damages for non-performance: 1797, Bracken v.
William & M. College, 1C11ll1Va.) 161; 1876, Si lliman v. Fredericksburg, etc.,
R Co., 27 Grntt. (Va. ) 119; 1883, People v. Globe l\.lut. L. Ins. Co., 91 N. Y.
174; 1892, Schleider v. Dielman, 44 La. Ann. 462; 1897, Rosenbaum v. U.S.
Creel. Sys. Co., 60 N. J. L. 294; 1899, Griffith v. Blackwater B. & L. Co., 41'
W . Va. 56. 33 S. E. Rep. 125, supm, p. 897 .
b. Voluntary dissolution does not extinguish executory contracts: 1834,
Revere v. Boston Copper Co., 15 Pick. (Mass.) 351; 1865, Muscatine T. V. v.
Funck, 18 Iowa 469, on 472; 18i0, Pahquioque Bank v. Bethel Bank, 36 C<>nn.
325, 4 Am. Rep. 80; 1877, Shields v. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319,on324; 1892, Schleider
v. Dielman, 44 La. Ann. 462; 1896, Tiffin Glass Co. v. St-0ebr, 54 Ohio fo;t. J!H.
c. In equity the obligation of such contracts survives, and may ht> enforN>d
against corporate assets: 1819, Vose v. Grant, 15 Mass. 50-5, on 522; 1819,
SpPar v. Grant, l6 ~1ass . !l, on 15; 1824, Wood v. Dummer, 3 M:ieon :~1 ~'>.
1834, l\fnmma. \' . Potomac Co., 8 Pet. (U . S .) 28 1, supra, p. Silo; 18-'J~ .
Conlter v. Rober~on, 16 Ind. 46, 79 Am. Dec. 405; 1853, Curran v. Arkan·
saA, 15 How. (U.S . \ 304, on 311-2; lS.">5, Bncon v. Robertson, 18 How. (U . . )
48Q-6, supra, p. 899; 18f\1, State v. Bailey, 99 Mass. 267, 96 Am. Dec. 74i;
1807, Powell v. North ~fo. R. Co ., 42 J\fo. 63, on 68; 1873, Oakland R. Co. v.
Oakland, etc., R. Co., 45 Cal. 3fl5, 13 Am . Rep. 181; 187fl, Rroni<rht.on v. Pe.o·
sacola, 93 U. 8. 2t\li. on 2H8; 1877, 8hields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. am, on p. 324;
1877, Wullamet Falls Canal, etc., Co. v. Kittridite, 5 Saw. 44. on 50; I i7,
Shamokin Valley. etc., R. Co. v. Malone, S.5 Pa. St. 2.'i,on36; 1882, Taylorv.
Holmes 14 Fed. Rep. ·lfl8; 1887, Stamm v. N. W. Mut. Ben. Assn., 65 Mi\'h.
317, on '3:m; 1899, Boyd v. Hankinson, 92 Fed. Rep. 49. See infra, Sb, anti
dicta in cases next paragraph.
cl. Under statutes rights arising from executory contract.a are preserved :

N. Y. 1, infra, p. 1426; 1890, Marysville Invest. Co. v. Munson, 44 Kan. 491.

And see supra, pp. 868-871.

2. Executory contracts:

a. Involuntary dissolution, at common law, extinguished executory con-

tracts, and all claims for damages for non-performance: 1797, Bracken v.

William & M. College, 1 Call iVa.) 161; 1876, Sillimanv. Fredericksburg, etc.,

R. Co., 27 Gratt. (Va.) 119; 1883, People v. Globe Mat. L. Ins. Co., 91 N. Y.

174; 1892, Schleider v. Dielman, 44 La. Ann. 462; 1897, Kosenbaum v. V. 8.

Cred. Sys. Co., 60 N. J. L. 294; 1899, Griffith v. Blackwater B. & L. Co., 4"

W. Va."56. 33 S. E. Rep. 125, supra, p. 897.

b. Voluntary dissolution does not extinguish executory contracts: 1834,

Revere v. Boston Copper Co., 15 Pick. (Mass.) 351; 1865, Muscatine T. V. v.

Funck, 18 Iowa 469, on 472; 1870, Pahquioque Bank v. Bethel Bank, 36 Conn.

325, 4 Am. Rep. 80; 1877, Shields v. Ohio, 95 IJ. S. 319, on 324; 1892, Schleider

v. Dielman, 44 La. Ann. 462; 1896, Tiffin Glass Co. v. Stoehr, 54 Ohio St. 157.

c. In equity the obligation of such contracts survives, and maybe enforced

against corporate assets: 1819, Vose v. Grant, 15 Mass. 505, on 522; 1819,

Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass. 0, on 15; 1824. Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason Si'*:

1834, Muuima v. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. (U. S.) 281, supra, p. 8%; 1S5S,

Coulter v. Robertson, 16 Ind. 46,79 Am. Dec. 405; 1853, Cnrran v. Arkan-

sas, 15 How. (U. S.I304, on 311-2; 1855, Bacon v. Robertson, 18 How. (U. S.)

480-6, supra, p. 899; 1861, State v. Bailev, 99 Mass. 267 , 96 Am. Dec. 747;

1867, Powell v. North Mo. R. Co., 42 Mo."63, on 68; 1873, Oakland R. Co. v.

Oakland, etc., R. Co., 45 Gal. 365, 13 Am. Rep. 181; 1876. Bronghton v. Pen-

sacola, 93 U. S. 266, on 268; 1877, Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319, on p.324;

1877, Wallumet Falls Canal, etc., Co. v. Kittridge, 5 Saw. 44. on 50; 1877,

Shamokin Valley, etc., R. Co. v. Malone, 85 Pa. St. 25, on 36; 1882, Tavlor v.

Holmes, 14 Fed. Rep. 498; 1887, Stnmm v. N. W. Mut, Ben. Assn., 65 Mich.

317, on 330; 1899, Boyd v. Hankinson, 92 Fed. Rep. 49. See infra, 36, and

dicta in cases next paragraph.

d. Under statutes rights arising from executory contracts are preserved:
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1843, Read v. Frankfort Bank, 23 Maine 318; 1866, Towar v. Hale, 46 Barb.

(N. Y.) 361; 1877, Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; 1879, Von Glahn v. De Ros-

EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION. .

set. 81 N. C. 467, 473; 1880, People v. Trust Co., 82 N. Y. 283; 1882, Life

91 I

Assoc. v. Fassett, 102 111. 315; 1882, Taylor v. Holmes, 14 Fed. Rep. 498; 1886,

Beck v. Henderson, 76 Ga. 360; 1889, Mott v. Danville Seminary, 129 111.

403; 1891, Nelson v. Hubbard, 96 Ala. 238, 244; 1892, Schleider v. Dielman,

44 La. Ann. 462; 1894, Mason v. Pewabic Min. Co., 66 Fed. Rep. 391, on 394;

1896, Tiffin Glass Co. v. Stoehr, 54 Ohio St. 157.

3. Debts due to or from the corporation:

a. At common law debts were extinguished: 1835, Commercial Bank v.

Lockwood, 2 Har. (Del.) 8; 1841, Fox v. Horah, 1 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 3.58, 36 Am.

Deo. 48; 1844, White v. Campbell, 5 Humph. (Tenn.i 38; 1847, Commercial

Bank v. Chambers, 8Sin. & M. (Miss.) 9; 1849, Town of Port Gibson v. Moore,

13Sm.& M. (Miss.) 157; 1&50, Hightower v. Thornton, 8 Ga. 486,52 Am. Dec.

412; 1854, Moultrie v. Smilev, 16 Ga. 289; 1863, Malloy v. Mallett, 59 N. C.

(6 Jones Eq ) 345; 1867, Conwell v. Pattison, 28 Ind. 509; 1872, Exchange

Bank v. Teddy, 67 N. C. 169; 1878, Bank of Mississippi v. Duncan, 56 Miss.

166; 1888, Higgins v. Downward, 8 Houst. (Del.) 227, 40 Am. St. 141, supra,

p. 152.

6. But debts and claims are preserved in equity: 1861, State, ex rel. Brown,
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v. Bailev, 16 Ind. 46, 79 Am. Dec. 405; 1868, Folger v. Columbia Ins. Co., 99

Mass. 267,96 Am. Dec. 747; 1877, McCoy v. Farmer, 65 Mo. 244; 1883, Howe v.

Robinson, 20 Fla. 352; 1888, People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 7 Am. St. Rep.

684, infra, p. 1426; 1888, Higgins v. Downward, 8 Houst. (Del.) 227, 40 Am. St.

Rep. 141, supra, p. 152; 1890, Havermever v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. 327, 18

Am. St. Rep. 192; 1895, Conover v. Hull, 10 Wash. 673, 45 Am. St. Rep. SlO.

See, supra, 2c.

c. And very generally now by statute, rights, credits or liabilities arising

ex contractu or ex delicto are preserved, and trustees provided for the settle-

ment of such claims: 1847, Commercial Bank v. Chambers, 8 Sin. & M.

(Miss.) 9; 1856, Robinson v. Lane, 19 Ga. 337; 1860, Hargroves v. Chambers,

30 Ga. 580; 1861, Bank of Salem v. Caldwell, 16 Ind. 469; 1867, Hunt v. Co-

lumbia Ins. Co., 55 Maine 290, 92 Am. Dec. 592; 1885, Society Perun v. Cleve-

land, 43 Ohio St. 481, supra, p. 617; 1888, Miller v. Newburg Coal Co., 31 W.

Va. 836, 13 Am. St. Rep. 903; 1891, Hepworth v. Union Ferry Co., 62 Hun

(N. Y.) 257; 1891, Grafton v. Union Ferry Co., 19 N. Y. Supp. 966, contra;

1894, People v. Troy St. & I. Co., 82 Hun 303, 1 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 138; 1894,

Marsteller v. Mills, 143 N. Y. 398, 38 N. E. Rep. 370; 1898, State v. Fogertv,

105 Iowa 32; 1899, American Surety Co. v. Great W. S. Co., 58 N. J. Eq. 526, i:

Atl. Rep. 579; 1899, Boyd v. Hankinson, 92 Fed. Rep. 49. See, supra, 2d.

Compare, 18*5, Gray v. National S. S. Co., 115 U. S. 116 (tort).

4. Personal property, at common law, upon dissolution, vested in the crown

or state: Coke's Littleton, 136; Rex v. Pasmore, 3 Term R. 199; 1823, State

Bank v. State, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 267, supra, p. 89171841, Foxv. Horah, 1 Ired.

Eq. (N. C.) 358, 36 Am. Dec. 48; 1844, White v. Campbell, 5 Humph. (Tenn.)

38; 18-56, Erie R. Co. v. Casey, 26 Pa. St, 287. See infra, be.

5. Beat property:

a. At common law real estate reverted to the grantor. 1823, State Bank v.

State, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 267, supra, p. 891; 1844, White v. Campbell, 5 Humph.

(Tenn.) 38; 1848, Bingham v. Wiederwax, 1 N. Y. 509; 1852, Nicoll v. N. Y.

& E. R. Co., 12 Barb. 460; 1856, Erie, etc., R. v. Casev, 26 Pa. St. 287 (goes

to the state); 1862, Plitt v. Cox, 43 Pa. St. 486 (same)'; 1869, People v. Col-

lege of California, 38 Cal. 166; 1875, Mercer Academy v. Rusk, 8 W. Va. 373;

1877, Turnpike Co. v. Illinois, 96 U. S. 63; 1885, New York, etc., R. v. Parma-

lee, 1 Ohio C. C. 239; 1891, Danville Seminary v. Mott, 136 111. 289. See also,

supra, 3c.

b. But a corporation whose duration is limited may take or grant an estate

in fee: 1848, People v. Mauran, 5 Denio 389; 1852, Nicoll v. N. Y. & E. R.

1843, Read v. Frankfort Bank. 23 Maine 318; 1866, Tower v. Hale, 46 Barb.
(N. Y.) 361; 1877, 8hields v. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319; 1879, Von Glahn v. De Rosset. 81 N. C. 467, 473; 1880, People v. Trust Co., 82 N. Y. 2R3; 1882, Life
Assoc. v. Fassett, 102 Ill. 315; 1882, Taylor v. Holmes, 14 Fed. Rep. 4\:18; 1886,
Beek v. Henrlerson, 76 Ga. 360; 1889, Mott v. Danville Semin:uy, 129 Ill.
403; 1891, Nelson v. Hubbard, 96 Ala. 238, 244; 1892, Schleirler v. Dielman,
44 La. Ann. 462; 1894, Mason v. Pewabic Min. Co., 66 Fed. Rep. 3!ll, on 394;
1896, Tiffin Glass Co. v. Stoehr, 54 Ohio St. 157.
3. Debts due lo or from the corporation:
a. At common law debts were extinguishetl: 1835, Commercial Bank v.
Lockwood, 2 Har. (Del.) 8; 1841, Fox v. Horah, l Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 358, 36 Am.
De~. 48; 1844, White v. Campbell, 5 Humph. (Tenn.l 38; 1847, Commercial
Bank v. Chambers, 8Sm. & M:. (~iss. l 9; 184!-1, Town of Port Gibson v. Moore,
13 t:irn. & ;\{. (Miss.) 157; 1850, Hightower v. Thornton, 8 Ga. 486, 52 Am. Dec.
412; 1854, ;\foultrie v. Smiley, 16 Ga. 289; 1863, Malloy v. Mallett, 59 N. C.
(6 Jones Eq) 345; 1867, Conwell v. Pattison, 28 Ind. 509; 1872, Exchange
Bank v. Teddy, 67 N. C. 169 ; 1878, Bank of Mississippi v. Duncan, 56 Miss.
166; 1888, Higgins v. Downward, 8 Honst. (Del.) 227, 40 Am. St. 141 , supra,
p. 152.
b. But debts and claims are preserved in equity: 1861, State, ex rel. Brown,
v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46, 79 Am. Dec. 405; 1868, Folger v. Columbia Ins. Co., 99
Mass. 267, 96 Arn. Dec. 747; 1877, McCoy v. Farmer, 65 Mo. 244; 1883, Howe v .
Robinson, 20 Fla. 352; 1888, People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 7 Am. St. Rep.
684, infra, p.1426; 1888, Higgins v. Downward, 8 Tloust. <Del.) 227, 40 Am. 8t.
Rep. 141, sttpra, p. 152; 18\10, Haverm~yer v. Superior Con rt_, 84 Cal. 3~7. 18
Am. St. Rep. 192; 1895, Conover v. Hull, 10 Wash. 673, 45 Am. St. Rep. 810.
See, s!lpra, 2c.
c. And very generally now by statute, rights, credits or liabilities arising
ex contractu or ex aelicto are preserved, and trustees provided for the settlement of such claims: 1847, Commercial Bank v. Chambers, 8 Sm. & 1\1.
(Miss.) 9; 1856, Robinson v. Lane, 19 Ga. 337; 1860, Hargroves v. Chambers,
30 Ga. 580; 1861, Bank of Salem v. Caldwell, 16 Ind. 469; 186'7, Hunt v. Columbia Ins. Co., 55 Maine 290, 92 Am. Dec. 592; 1885, Society Perun v. Cleveland, 43 Ohio St. 481, supra, p. 617; 1888, Miller v. Newburg Coal Co., 31 W.
Va. 836, 13 Am. St. Rep. 903; 1891, Hepworth v. Union Ferry Co., 62 Hun
(N. Y.I 257; 1891, Grafton v. Union Ferry Co., 19 N. Y. Supp. 966, ro11tra;
1894, People v. Troy St. & I. Co., 82 Hun 303, 1 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 138; 1804,
Marsteller v. Mills, 143 N. Y. 398, 38 N. E. Rep. 370; 1898, State v. Fogerty,
105 Iowa 32; 1899, American Surety Co. v. Great W. S. Co., 58 N. J . Eq. 526, 4;,
Atl. Rep. 579; 1899, Boyd v. Hankinson, 92 Fed. Rep. 49.· See, supra, · 2d.
Compare, 1885, Gray v. National S. 8. Co., 115 U.S. ll6 (tort).
4. Personal propert1J, at common Jaw, upon dissolution, vested in the crown
or state: Coke's Littleton, 13b; Rex v. PHsmore, 3 Term R. 199; 1823, State
Bank v. State, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 267, supra, p. 8!ff;1841, Foxv. Horab, 1 Ired.
Eq. (N. C. l 358, 36 Am. Dec. 48; 1844, White v. Campbell, 5 Humph. (Tenn.)
38; 18-56, Erie R. Co. v. Casey, 26 Pa. St. 287. See infra, 5c.
5. R eal property:
a. At common law real estate reverted to the grantor. 1823, State Bank v.
State, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 267, supra, p. 891; 1844, White v . Campbell, 5 Humph.
(Te nn.) 38; 1848, Bingham v. Wiederwax, 1 N. Y. 509; 18-52, Nicoll v. N. Y.
& E . R. Co., 12 Barb. 460; 1856, Erie, etc., R. v. Casey, 26 Pa. St. 287 (i:toes
to the state); 1862, Plitt v. Cox, 43 Pa. St. 486 I same); 1869, People v. College of California, 38 Cal. 166; 1875, Mercer Academy v. Rusk, 8 W . Va. 373;
1877, Tllrnpike Co. v. Illinois, 96 lT. R. 63; 188-5, New York, etc., R . v. Parmalee, 1 Ohio C. 0. 239; 1891, Danville Seminary v. Mott, 136 Ill. 289. See also,
supra, 3c.
b. But a corporation whose duration is limited may take or grant an estate
in fee: 1848, People v. Mauran, f> Denio 389; 1852, Nicoll v . N. Y . & RR.
Co., 12Barb. 460; 1854, Nicoll v. N. Y . & RR. Co., 12N. Y. 121; I8.'l6, Rives
v. Dndley, 3 .Tones Eq. (56 N. C. \ 126, 67 Am. Dec. 231; 18Ci4, Erie R. Co. v.
State, 31 N. J . L. 531, 86 Am. Dec. 226; 1889, Biii ley v . Pliittc, etr., Co., 12

Co., 12 Barb. 460; 18-54, Nicoll v. N. Y. & E. R. Co., 12 N. Y. 121 : 1856, Rives

v. Dudlev, 3 Jones Eq. (56 N. C.l 126, 67 Am. Dec. 231; 1864, Erie R. Co. v.

State, 31 N. J. L. 531, 86 Am. Dec. 226; 1889, Bailev v. Platte, etc., Co., 12
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Colo. 230; 1889, Davis v. Memphis, etc., R., 87 Ala. 633; 1890. Miner v. X.

MOR~IO~

Y., etc., R., 123 N. Y. 242; 1894, Detroit Citizens' St. R. v. Detroit, 64 Fed.

CHURCH V. UNITED STATES.

Rep. 628; 1896, Union, etc., R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R., 163 U. S. 564; 1897,

C"o lo. 230; 1889, Davis v. :Memphis, etc., R., 87 Ala. 633; 18901 Minerv. ~
Y. , etc., R., 123 X. Y. 242; 1894, Detroit Citizens' St. R. v. Det roit, 64 Fed.
l~ep. 628; 1896, "Cnion, etc., R . Co. v. Chicago, etc., R., 163 U . . 564; 1897.
81011x, etc., Co. v. Trust Co.. 82 Fed. Rep. 124; 1897, Wilson v. Lea.rv 120 K
C. 90, 58" Am .. t. R ep. ii ', supra, p. 903.
·'
c. ~ut iu equi ty o r. by statute, real or personal est.ate, o r the proceeds
from its eale, are considered a fund for the payment of debts, and distributio n
anion~ s hare h o lder:, a1!<l there i~ no reversion either t o the grn.ntor or to the
st:1te 111 ~L e case o r p_rn-ati> busmess corporations, but in eleemo ynary and
no~1 -business coq~oratwns the co_mn~on law doctrines are applied frequently:
l 'iO. Owen,._ 81mth, 31 Barb. (~. 1 .) 641; 1 06, To war v. Hale, 46 Barb. ( .N.
Y. ) 361 ; I 72, Heath'" Barmo re, 50 X. Y . 302; I i, Titcomb ,. _ Kennebunk
Mut. F . Im!. Co., i \l :\faine 315, supra, p. 90-l; 1888, P eople , .. O" Brien, Ill N.
Y. l , 7 .\ m. Rt. Rt>p. Ii 4; I 9, Bailey,._ Platte L. D .C'an a l & ~f.C' .. 12Colo.
230; 1 9, Dad ,. . :\Iem phis, etc., R., 87 :\la. 633; 1890 H :n-nmever v . Superio r Court, 84 Cal. 3~i, 18 Am. St. Hep. 19:!; 1 90. )Jo~on C'hurd1° v. l'nited
~tates, 136 V. S. l, tmpra, p. 906 ; 1891, Danville ~em inan· v . :\Iott. 136 Il l. 2 .1:
1R93, Sulpliur S . & . )I. P . H . , .. St. Louis, 2 Texas Ci\" ...\pp. 6-50: 1897, Wilson
,. _Leary, 120 ~- C. 90. : ..\m .•.'t . Re p. 118, supra, p. 903.
6. A rt ions b!I a curp11r11ti1111 :
a. '"'uits J,_,. a corporation at 1·0111mon l:1w abate upon its di ~lution: 1810,
Bank ofl". ~- Y . '.\kLaughlin, 2 ' mru·h C. C. 20, F ed. Cae. ~:? : 1843, May v.
F:tate B a nk , 2 R ob. {Ya .) i)li. 4-0 ..\111. Dec. 72G; 1844, Bank of '.\Ii s. "° · Wrenn,
3 .'m. &: '.\f. p ris;:.) i91; J, H , '.\liami Exporting Co. v. Gano, 13 Ohio 269;
1. -16. Bank of(3a ll ipo lis v. Trimbl P. 6 B. '.\ion. ( Ky. ) 599; 1851. Tngraham v.
T erry , 1 L Humph . (Tenn .) .57-.!.; I 52, To rry\' . R obertson , 2-1 ?-liss. 192; 1891,
Van P e lt v. H ome Bldg. .\ S"ll. , Si Ga. 370.
b. But see the follo wing easel' h oldiug dissolution of n pll\intiff corporation
afte r suit is bel!un iF . not ground for nons uit: 1 2 , ..\ene w \'. Bank, 2 Har.
& G. ('.\l<l. l 4i ; JS~:?, C'ity of Louisville v . Bank of l". ::;., 3 B. )[ on. ( Ky. 1
138; 1849, Gran<l Gnlf !1:111k ,. . Wood, 12 Sm. & )I. D liss.) 4 ::? ; 1 50. Kimball v. Grafton Bank, ~O ~ - If. 3-17; 1877, Kansas City H otel Co. v . .. auer. 65
1\Io. 279; 1832, Rutdw n~' · n. Bank v. Pulitzer, 11 )lo. App. 594.
c. ~tatutes may p~e,·e nt ubate111er_:it of snits by di l'Oluti on o~ plaintif! corporation : 1826, Presid e nt, etc. , of ~. J., etc., Bu11k v. Thorp. 6 Cow . ( ~ . Y. )
46 ; 1847, Bank of 'U.S. v. Leathe1 , 8 B. :\Ion. (Ky.) 126; 1S.5i, , tnte v. Bank,
18 Ark. 5:)4; 1897, Riclimo 11d Cnion Pass. Co. v . R. Co., 9-5 Ya. 386: 1898.
Singer & Talcott ~tone Co. v . Hutch inson , li6 Ill. 48.
7. 811its against a corporation :
•
a. :Xo valid judgme nt at common law could be rendered against a dissolved
corporatio n: 1836, Ride r v . ~ elson, etc., Fae., 7 Leigh ( \"n. 1 154, 30 Am. Dec.
495; 18-15, Musson v. Ricbardeon , 11 Rob. (La. ) 3i; 184.5, Greeley v. Smith, 3
Story 657, Fed. Caa. 5i.J8; 1 -19, Merrill v. Bank, 31 '.\laine 57 . 50 Am. Dec.
6-19; 1874, McCnllongh v. ~ o rwood , 58 ~. Y . 562; 1874. Fim ~ational Bank
v. Colby, 88 "C. S . GW; 18i 8, Stnrgi.11 v. Vanderbilt , 73 K. Y . 384; 1880, Ferry
v. '.\le rchants' , etc ., Bank , 66 Gn. 177; 1891, P e ndleton v. Ra "ell, 14-1 IT. S.
640; 18~5, 111 re K . Y . Oxygen Co., 33 N. Y. Supp . 726, 24 Civ. Proc. Rep. 398;
1895, Combes v. Keyes, AA Wis. 297, 46 .Am. St. Rep. 839; 1 ~7. 111 re Directors, etc. , Brewing Co., ~.J .App. Div. CN. Y. ) 223. ~ee, i11frn, c and d and 8.
b . Attachme nt or garnishment proceedings are tnmin a te<l b'" dissolution
of defendant corporntion: 1844, Farmers'. etc., Bank v. Little, "'\\'. & S.
{Pa.) 20i, 13 .\m . Dee. 2\.13; 1 74, Fra iley v. Central Fire Ins. Co. , 9 Phil. ?.19;
1895, ·waiters v . W ef'tern , etc., R . Co., 69 Fed. Rep. 6i9. Bnt eee, 1840, Lindell v. Ben ton, 6 )lo. 361; 1882, Hays v. Lycoming Fire Ins._ Co .. 99 Pa. d.
u21, contra; LUOl, F ittl:! v. Xatl. ~ife A s~n., - .A.In. - , 30 So. ~14 .
.
c. Statutes may provide that chssolut1on shall n ot abate s~nts pending, no r
prevent the bringing of i-uitl' a)!ainst the defunct corporation: 1859. Bl:1ke
v . Portsmouth . et1· .. R . Co . . 39 ~ - H. 435 ; 1870, Ramsay v . Peoria. et c .. Ins.
Co ., bf> Ill. !'I ll : 1 ~7. Greenbrier Lnmber Co. v . Ward, 30 ""\\'.Ya. 43: 1890,
Lake Superior Iron Co. ,.. Brown, R . & Co., 44 Fed. Rep. 531>; 1894, People
v. Troy Steel & Irr111 t'o . . '.! Hun (~. Y .) 30.J ; 1895, Rtate v. Port Royal, etc .•

Sioux, etc., Co. v. Trust Co.. 82 Fed. Rep. 124; 1897, Wilson v. Lean.', 120 N.

C. 90, 58" Am. St. Rep. 778, supra, p. 903.

c. But in equity or by statute, real or personal estate, or the proceeds

from its sale, are considered a fund for the payment of debts, and distribution

among shareholder*, and there is no reversion either to the grantor or to the

state in the case of private business corporations, but in eleemosynary and

non-business corporations the common law doctrines are applied frequently:

18S0. Owen v. Smith, 31 Barb. (X. Y.) 641 ; 1866, Towar v. Hale. 46 Barb. (X.

Y.) 361 ; 1872, Heath v. Barmore, 50 X. Y. 302; 1887, Titcomb v. Kennebunk

Mut. F. Ins. Co., 79 Maine 315, supra, p. 904; 1888, People v. O'Brien, 111 N.

Y. 1, 7 Am. St. Rep. 684; 1889, Bailev v. Platte L. D. Canal & M. C, 12Colo.

230; 1889, Davis v. Memphis, etc., R., 87 Ala. 633; 1890, Havermever v. Su-

perior Court, 84 Cal. 327,18 Am. St. Rep. 192; 1890, Mormon Church v. United

States, 136 V. S. I, supra, p. 908; 1891, Danville Seminary v. Mott. 136 III. 289:

1893, Sulphur S. &. M. P. R. v. St. Louis, 2 Texas Civ. App. 650; 1897, Wilson

v. Leary, 120 X. C. 90, .38 Am. St. Rep. 778, supra, p. 903.

6. Actions btja corporation:
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a. Suits bv a corporation at common law abate upon its dissolution: 1810,

Bank of U. S. v. McLaughlin, 2 Cranch C. C. 20, Fed. Cas. 928; 1843, Mav v.

State Bank, 2 Rob. (Va.) 56, 40 Am. Dec. 726; 1844, Bank of Miss. v. Wrenn,

3Sm.&M. (Miss.) 791; 1814, Miami Exporting Co. v. Gano, 13 Ohio 269;

1846, Bank of Gallipolis v. Trimble, 6 B. Mou. (Kv.) 599; 1851. Ingraham v.

Terrv, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 572; 1852, Torry v. Robertson, 24 Miss. 192; 1891,

Van'Pelt v. Home Bldg. Assn., 87 Ga. 370.

b. But see the following cases holding dissolution of a plaintiff corporation

after suit is beeun is not ground for nonsuit: 1828, Agnew v. Bank. 2 Har.

& G. lMd.1 478; 1S42, Citv of Louisville v. Bank of U. S., 3 B. Mon. (Kv. ,

138; 1849, Grand Gnlf Hank v. Wood, 12 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 482; 1850. Kim-

ball v. Grafton Bank. 20 X. II. 347; 1877, Kansas Citv Hotel Co. v. Sauer, 65

Mo. 279; 1882, Butchers' & D. Bank v. Pulitzer, 11 Mo. App. 594.

c. Statutes may prevent abatement of suits by dissolution of plaintiff cor-

poration: 1826, President, etc., of X. J., etc., Bunk v. Thorp, 6 Cow. (X. Y. >

46; 1847, Bank of U. S. v. Leathers, 8 B. Mon. (Kv.) 126; 18-57, State v. Bank,

18 Ark. 554; 1897, Richmond Union Pass. Co. v. R. Co., 9-5 Va. 386: 1898,

Singer & Talcott Stone Co. v. Hutchinson, 176 III. 48.

7. Suits against a corporation:

a. Xo valid judgment at common law could be rendered against a dissolved

corporation: 1836, Rider v. Xelson, etc., Fac, 7 Leigh (Va. 1 154. 30 Am. Dec.

495; 1845, Musson v. Richardson, 11 Rob. (La.) 37; 1845, Greelev v. Smith, 3

Storv 657, Fed. Cas. 5748; 1849, Merrill v. Bank, 31 Maine 57. 50 Am. Dec.

649; 1874, McCullough v. Xorwood, 58 X. Y. 562; 1874. First Xational Bank

v. Colby, 88 U. S. 609; 1878, Sturgis v. Vanderbilt, 73 X. Y. 384; 1880, Ferry

v. Merchants', etc., Bank, 66 Ga. 177; 1891, Pendleton v. Russell, 144 U. S.

640; 1895, In re X. Y. Oxvgen Co., 33 X. Y. Supp. 726, 24 Civ. Proc. Rep. 398;

1895, Combes v. Keyes, 89 Wis. 297, 46 Am. St. Rep. 839; 1897, In re Direc-

tors, etc.. Brewing Co., 24 App. Div. (X. Y.) 223. See, infra, e and d and 8.

b. Attachment or garnishment proceedings are terminated bv dissolution

of defendant corimration: 1844, Farmers', etc., Bank v. Little, 8 W. <t S.

(Pa.) 207, 13 Am. Dec. 293; 1874, Frailev v. Central Fire Ins. Co., 9 Phil. 919;

1895, Walters v. Western, etc., R. Co., 69 Fed. Rep. 679. But see, 1840, Lin-

dell v. Benton, 6 Mo. 361; 1882, Hays v. Lycoming Fire Ins. Co., 99 Pa. St.

621, contra; 1901, Fitts v. Xatl. Life'Assn., — Ala. —, 30 So. 374.

c. Statutes mav provide that dissolution shall not abate suits pending, nor

prevent the bringing of suits against the defunct corporation: 1859. Blake

v Portsmouth, etc., R. Co., 39 X. H. 435; 1870, Ramsay v. Peoria, etc., Ins.

Co 55 III. 311: 18H7. Greenbrier Lumber Co. v. Ward, 30 W. Va. 43: 1890,

Lake Superior Iron Co. v. Brown, B. & Co., 44 Fed. Rep. 539; 1894, People

v Trov Steel & Iron Co.. 82 Hun (X. Y.) 304; 1895, State v. Port Royal, etc..
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R., 45 S. C. 413, 23 S. E. Rep. 363; 1898, Steinhaur v. Colmar, 11 Colo. App.

EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION.
494, 55 Pac. Rep. 291; 1901, Shayne v. Evening Post Pub. Co., 168 N. Y. 70,

55 L. R. A. 777.

An action for libel against a corporation which abates by the expiration of

the corporate charter may be revived against the trustees of the dissolved

corporation in office at the time of dissolution: 1901, Shayne v. Evening

Poet Pub. Co., 168 N. Y. 70, 55 L. R. A. 777.

d. And it seems that a decree dissolving a corporation may provide that

pending suits against the corporation shall not be affected: 1882, Life Asso-

ciation v. Funck, 102 111. 315; 1891, Hepworth v. Union Ferry Co., 62 Hun

(N. Y.) 257; 1895, People v. Troy Steel, etc., Co., 82 Hun (N. Y.) 303, 1 N. Y.

Ann. Cas. 138.

8. Judgments: At common law, a judgment in favor of a corporation was ex-

tinguished by the dissolution of the corporation: 1842, May v. State, 2 Rob.

(Va.) 56, 40 Am. Dec. 726; but if such judgment was assigned before dissolu-

tion the assignee could enforce it after dissolution: 1855, De Vendell v. Ham-

ilton, 27 Ala. 156; 1861, Leach v. Thomas, 27 111. 457.

A judgment against a corporation, obtained while an appeal from a judg-

ment of dissolution is pending, may be enforced before the judgment of disso-
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lution is affirmed: 1894, Giles v. Stanton, 86 Tex. 620, 26 S.W.Rep. 615, 1111.

58—Wil. Casks.

R., 45 S. C. 413, 23 S. E. Rep. 363; 1898, Steinhaur v. Colmar, 11 Colo. App.
494, 55 Pac. Rep. 291; 1901, Shayne v. Evening Poat Pub. Co., 168 N. Y. 70,
50 L. R. A. 777.
An action for libel against a cor_poration which abates by the expiration of
the corporate charter may be revived against the trustees of the dissolved
corporation in office at the time of dissolution: 1901, Shayne v. Evening
Pnst Pub. Co., 168 N. ¥. 70, 55 L. R. A. 777.
d. And it seems that a decree dissolving a corporation may provide that
pending suits against the corporation shall not be affected: 1882, Life Association v. Funck, 102 Ill. 315; 1891, Hepworth v. Union Ferry Co., 62 Hun
(N. Y.) 257; 1895, People v. Troy Steel, etc., Co., 82 Hun (N. Y.) 303, 1 N. Y.
Ann. Ca.a. 138.
8. Judgments: At common law, a judgment in favor of a corporation was extinguished by the dissolution of the corporation: 1842, May v. State, 2 Rob.
(Va. I 56, 40 Am. Dec. 726; but if such judgment was assigned before dissolution the assignee could enforce it after dissolution: 1855, De Yendell v. Hamilton, 27 Ala. 156; 1861, Leach v. Thomas, 27 Ill. 457.
A judgment against a corporation, obtained while an appeal from a J'udgment of dissolution is pending, may be enforced before the judgment of iasolution is affirmed: 1894, Giles v. Stanton, 86 Tex. 620, 26 S.W.Rep. 616, 1111.
68-WJL. CASES.
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ARTICLE I. THEORIES OF CORPORATE CAPACITY.

Sec 258. Corporate powers.—' 'The capacities of corporations

are limited: (i) by natural possibility, i. e., by the fact that

they are artificial and not natural persons; (2) by legal

possibility, i. e., by the restrictions which the power creating

PART III.

a corporation may impose on the legal existence and action

of its creature.

"First, of the limits set to the powers and liabilities of cor-

THE CORPORATION AS A SUBJECT AND SOURCE OF
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.

porations by the mere fact that they are not natural persons.

The requirement of a common seal is sometimes said to spring

from the artificial nature of a corporation. The fact that it is

not known in Scotland is, however, enough to show that it is

a mere positive rule of English law. The correct and compre-

hensive proposition is that a corporation can do no act except

TITLE

by an agent (for even if all the members concur they are but

I.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE CORPORATION IN GRNRRAL.
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agents). * * *

"We come now to consider the far more difficult and com-

plicated questions of special restrictions. * * * On this

there have been many decisions, much discussion, and some

CHAPTER 12.

real conflict of judicial opinions. There are two opposite

views by which the consideration of the matter may be gov-

POWERS AND AUTHORITY IN GENERAL.

erned, and they may be expressed thus:

(914)

ARTICLE I.

THEORIES OF CORPORATE CAPACITY.

See. 258. Corporate powers.-' 'The capacities of corporations
are limited : ( I ) by natural possibility, i. e ., by the fact that
they are artificial and not natural persons ; ( 2) by legal
possibility, i. e., by the restrictions which the power creating
a corporation may impose on the legal existence and action
of its creature.
''First, of the limits set to the powers and liabilities of corporations by the mere fact that they are not natural persons .
The requirement of a common seal is sometimes said to spring
from the artificial nature of a corporation. The fact that it is
not known in Scotland is, however, enough to show that it is
a mere positive rule of English law . The correct and comprehensive proposition is that a corporation can do no act except
by an agent (for even if all the members concur they are but
agents). • • •
"We come now to consider the far more difficult and complicated questions of special restrictions. • • • On this
there have been many decisions, much discussion, and some
real conflict of judicial opinions . There are two opposite
views by which the consideration of the matter may be governed, and they may be expressed thus :
(914)
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"1. A corporation is an artificial creature of the law, and

915

has no existence except for the purposes for which it was cre-

''I. A corporation is an artificial creature of the law, and
has no existence except for the purposes for which it was created. No act exceeding the limits of those purposes can be
the act of the corporation, and no one can be authorized to
bind the corporation to such an act. In each particular case,
therefore, the question is: Was the corporation empowered to
bind itself to this transaction?
'' 2. A corporation once duly constituted has all such powers and capacities of a natu~al person as in the nature of things
can be exercised by an artificial person. Transactions entered
into with apparent authority in the name of the corporation
are presumably valid and binding, and are invalid only if it
can be shown that the legislature has expressly or by necessary implication deprived the corporation of the power it naturally would have had of entering into them. The question is,
therefore : Was the corporation forbidden to bind itself to
this transaction? • • • •
''These views we may call ( I ) the doctrine of special capacities, and ( 2) the doctrine of general capacity.'' Pollock
on Contracts, pp. 86-91.

ated. No act exceeding the limits of those purposes can be

the act of the corporation, and no one can be authorized to

bind the corporation to such an act. In each particular case,

therefore, the question is: Was the corporation empowered to

bind itself to this transaction?

"2. A corporation once duly constituted has all such pow-

ers and capacities of a natural person as in the nature of things

can be exercised by an artificial person. Transactions entered

into with apparent authority in the name of the corporation

are presumably valid and binding, and are invalid only if it

can be shown that the legislature has expressly or by neces-

sary implication deprived the corporation of the power it nat-

urally would have had of entering into them. The question is,

therefore: Was the corporation forbidden to bind itself to

this transaction? * * * *

"These views we may call (1) the doctrine of special ca-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

pacities, and (2) the doctrine of general capacity." Pollock

on Contracts, pp. 86-91.

Sec. 259. Special capacities.

THOMAS v. RAILROAD COMPANY.1

1879. In the Supreme Court of United States, ioi U.

S. 71-87.

[Error to the circuit court of the United States for the eastern dis-

trict of Pennsylvania.

This was an action of covenant, by Thomas et al. against the West

Jersey Railroad Company, and they, to maintain the issue on their

part, offered to prove that:

In October, 1863, the Millville and Glassboro Railroad Company,

incorporated by the legislature of New Jersey in 1859, entered into

Sec. 259. Special capacities.
THOMAS v. RAILROAD OOMPANY.1

an agreement with them leasing its road, buildings and rolling-stock

to them for twenty years from August, 1863, for the consideration of

IN

one-half of the gross sum collected from the operation of the road by

THE

SUPREME

the plaintiffs during that period; and providing that the company

might at any time terminate the contract and retake possession of the

railroad, and in such case, if the plaintiffs so desired, arbitrators

should decide upon the value of the contract and the loss incurred by

the termination thereof; and the decision was to be final, conclusive,

and binding upon the parties.

In October, 1867, articles of agreement were entered into between

1 Statement abridged.

COURT

OF

s. 71-87.

UNITED

STATES.

IOI

U.

[Error to the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania.
This was an action of covenant, by Thomas et al. against the West
Jersey Railroad Company, and they, to maintain the issue on their
part, offered to prove that:
In October, 1863, the Millville and Glassboro Railroad Company,
incorporated by the legislature of New Jersey in 1859. entered into
an agreement with them leasing its road, buildings and rolling-stock
to them for twenty years from August, 1863 1 for the consideration of
one-half of the gross sum collected from the operation of the road by
the plaintiffs during that period; and providing that the company
might at any time terminate the contract and retake possession of the
railroad, and in such case, if the plaintiffs so desired, arbitrators
should decide upon the value of the contract and the loss incurred by
the termination thereof; and the decision was to be final, conclusive,
and binding upon the parties.
In October, 1867 1 articles of agreement were entered into between
1

Statement abridged.
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the Millville and Glassboro Railroad Company and the West Jersey

THOMAS V. RAILROAD COMPANY.

Railroad Company, the defendant, whereby it was agreed that the

the Millville and Glassboro Railroad Company and the \Vest Jersey
Railroad Company, the defendant, whereby it was agreed that the
former should be merged into and consolidated with the latter.
In November, 1867, a written notice was served by the Millville and
Glassboro Railroad Company upon the plaintiffs, putting an end to
the contract and to all the rights thereby granted, and notifying them
that the company would retake possession of the railroad on the first
day of April, 1868.
In March, 1868, the legislature of New Jersey enacted that, upon
the fulfillment of certain preliminaries, the Millville and Glassboro
R ailroad Company should be consolidated with the West Jersey Rail·
road Company, "subject to all the debts, liabilities and obligations of
both of said companies." These conditions were fulfilled, and the
railroad was duly delivered by the plaintiffs to the West Jersey Rail·
road Company on the first of April, 1868.
Notices to arbitrate according to the terms of the agreement were
served by the plaintiffs upon the Millville. and Glassboro Railroad
Company, and immediately thereafter upon the West Jersey Railroad
Company. An agreement of submission was entered into whereby
arbitrators were appointed, with power to settle the controversy between the parties. An award was m ade by which the value of the
unexpired term of the lease, and the loss sustained by reason of the
termination thereof, to and by the plaintiffs, was adjudged to be the
sum of $159,437.07; and the West Jersey Railroad Company was
ordered to pay that sum to the plaintiffs. This award was subsequently set aside in a suit in equity brought in New Jersey.
The plaintiffs further offered to prove their compliance in all respects with the terms of the lease, its value, and the loss and damage
they had sustained by reason of its termination as aforesaid. The
court excluded the offered testimony on the ground that the lease by
the Millville and Glassboro Railroad Company to the plaintiffs was
ultra vt"res, and directed the jury to return a verdict for the defend·
ant. The plaintiffs duly excepted, and sued out this writ.]
MILLER, J. • • • The ground on which the court held the
contract to be void, and on which the ruling is supported in argument
here, is that the contract amounted tq a lease, by which the railroad,
rolling-stock, and franchises of the corporation were transferred to
plaintiffs, and that such a contract was ultra vfres of the company.
It is denied by the plaintiffs that the contract can be fairly called a
lease.
But we know of no element of a lease which is wanting in this in·
strument. "A lease for years is a contract between lessor and lessee,
for possession of lands, etc., on the one side, and a recompense by
rent or other consideration on the other." 4 Bae. Ahr. 632. • • •
The authority to make this lease is placed by counsel primarily in
the following language of the thirteenth section of the company's
charter:
"That it shall be lawful for the said company, at any time during
the continuance of its charter, to make contracts and engagements

former should be merged into and consolidated with the latter.

In November, 1867, a written notice was served by the Millville and

Glassboro Railroad Company upon the plaintiffs, putting an end to

the contract and to all the rights thereby granted, and notifying them

that the company would retake possession of the railroad on the first

day of April, 1868.

In March, 1868, the legislature of New Jersey enacted that, upon

the fulfillment of certain preliminaries, the Millville and Glassboro

Railroad Company should be consolidated with the West Jersey Rail-

road Company, "subject to all the debts, liabilities and obligations of

both of said companies." These conditions were fulfilled, and the

railroad was duly delivered by the plaintiffs to the West Jersey Rail-

road Company on the first of April, 1868.

Notices to arbitrate according to the terms of the agreement were

served by the plaintiffs upon the Millville^ and Glassboro Railroad

Company, and immediately thereafter upon the West Jersey Railroad
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Company. An agreement of submission was entered into whereby

arbitrators were appointed, with power to settle the controversy be-

tween the parties. An award was made by which the value of the

unexpired term of the lease, and the loss sustained by reason of the

termination thereof, to and by the plaintiffs, was adjudged to be the

sum of $159,437.07; and the West Jersey Railroad Company was

ordered to pay that sum to the plaintiffs. This award was subse-

quently set aside in a suit in equity brought in New Jersey.

The plaintiffs further offered to prove their compliance in all re-

spects with the terms of the lease, its value, and the loss and damage

they had sustained by reason of its termination as aforesaid. The

court excluded the offered testimony on the ground that the lease by

the Millville and Glassboro Railroad Company to the plaintiffs was

ultra vires, and directed the jury to return a verdict for the defend-

ant. The plaintiffs duly excepted, and sued out this writ.]

Miller, J. * * * The ground on which the court held the

contract to be void, and on which the ruling is supported in argument

here, is that the contract amounted to a lease, by which the railroad,

rolling-stock, and franchises of the corporation were transferred to

plaintiffs, and that such a contract was ultra vires of the company.

It is denied by the plaintiffs that the contract can be fairly called a

lease.

But we know of no element of a lease which is wanting in this in-

strument. "A lease for years is a contract between lessor and lessee,

for possession of lands, etc., on the one side, and a recompense by

rent or other consideration on the other." 4 Bac. Abr. 632. • * *

The authority to make this lease is placed by counsel primarily in

the following language of the thirteenth section of the company's

charter:

"That it shall be lawful for the said company, at any time during

the continuance of its charter, to make contracts and engagements
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with any other corporation, or with individuals, for the transporting

or conveying any kinds of goods, produce, merchandise, freight, or

passengers, and to enforce the fulfillment of such contracts."

This is no more than saying: "You may do the business of carry-

ing goods and passengers, and may make contracts for doing that

business. Such contracts you may make with any other corporation

or with individuals." No doubt a contract by which the goods re-

ceived from railroad or other carrying companies should be carried

over the road of this company, or by which goods or passengers from

this road should be carried by other railroads, whether connecting im-

mediately with them or not, are within this power, and are probably

the main object of the clause. But it is impossible, under any sound

rule of construction, to find in the language used a permission to sell,

lease, or transfer to others the entire road and the rights and fran-

chises of the corporation. To do so is to deprive the company of

the power of making those contracts which this clause confers, and of

performing the duties which it implies. * » •

It is next insisted, in the language of counsel, that though this may
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be so, "a corporate body may (as at common law) do any act which

is not either expressly or impliedly prohibited by its charter; although

where the act is unauthorized by the charter a shareholder may enjoin

its execution, and the state may, by proper process, forfeit the

charter."

We do not concur in this proposition. We take the general doc-

trine to be in this country, though there may be exceptional cases and

some authorities to the contrary, that the powers of corporations

organized under legislative statutes are such and such only as those

statutes confer. Conceding the rule applicable to all statutes, that

■what is fairly implied is as much granted as what is expressed, it

remains that the charter of a corporation is the measure of its pow-

ers, and that the enumeration of these powers implies the exclusion

of all others. * * *

[Citing and discussing East Anglian R. Co. v. Eastern Counties

R. Co., 11 C. B. 775; Eastern Counties R. Co. v. Hawkes, 5 H.

L. Cas. 331; McGregor v. Deal & Dover R. Co., 22 Law J. Q. B.

69, 18 Q. B. 618.]

There is another principle of equal importance and equally conclu-

sive against the validity of this contract, which, if not coming exactly

within the doctrine of ultra vires as we have just discussed it, shows

very clearly that the railroad company was without the power to

make such a contract.

That principle is that where a corporation, like a railroad company,

has granted to it by charter a franchise intended in large measure to

be exercised for the public good, the due performance of those func-

tions being the consideration of the public grant, any contract which

disables the corporation from performing those functions, which un-

dertakes, without the consent of the state, to transfer to others the

rights and powers conferred by the charter, and to relieve the grant-

ees of the burden which it imposes, is a violation of the contract with

the state, and is void as against public policy. * * * [Citing New

with any other corporation, or with individuals, for the transporting
or conveying any kinds of goods, produce, merchandise, freight, or
passengers, and to enforce the fulfillment of such contracts."
This is no more than saying: "You may do the business of carrying goods and passengers, and may make contracts for doing that
business. Such contracts you may make with any other corporation
or with individuals." No doubt a contract by which the goods received from railroad or other caITying companies should be carried
over the road of this company, or by which goods or passengers from
this road should be carried by other railroads, whether connecting immediately with them or not, are within this power, and are probably
the main object of the claase. But it is impossible, under any sound
rule of construction, to find in the language used a permission to sell,
lease, or transfer to others the entire road and the rights and franchises of the corporation. To do so is to deprive the company of
the power of making those contracts which this clause confers, and of
performing the duties which it implies. • • •
It is next insisted, in the language of counsel, that though this may
be so, "a corporate body may (as at common law) do any act which
is not either expressly or impliedly prohibited by its charter; 11lthough
where the act is unauthorized by the charter a shareholder may enjoin
its execution, and . the state may, by proper process, forfeit the
charter."
We do not concur in this proposition. We take the general doctrine to be in this country, though there may be exceptt'onal cases and
some authorities to the contrary, that · the powers of corporatt'ons
organized under legislative statutes are such and such only as those
statutes confer. Concedt'ng the rule applicable to all statutes, t!tat
wltat i's fairly t'mplt'ed is as much granted as what t's expressed , t't
remains that the charter of a corporation i's the measure of its pow ers, and tlzat the enumeratt'on of these powers t'mplt'es the exclust'on
of all others. • • •
[Citing and discussing East Anglian R. Co. v. Eastern Counties
R. Co. , 11 C. B. 775; Eastern Counties R. Co. v. Hawkes, 5 H.
L. Cas. 331; McGregor v. Deal & Dover R. Co., 22 Law J. Q. B.

69, 18 Q.

B. 618.]

There is another principle of equal importance and equally conclusive against the validity of this contract, which, if not coming exactly
within the doctrine of ultra vires as we have just discussed it, shows
very clearly that the railroad company was without the power to
make such a contract.
That principle is that where a corporation, like a railroad company,
has granted to it by charter a franchise intended in large measure to
be exercised for the public good, the due performance of those functions being the consideration of the public grant, any contract which
disables the corporation from performing those functions, which undertakes, without the consent of the state, to transfer to others the
rights and powers conferred by the charter, and to relieve the grantees of the burden which it imposes, is a violation of the contract vvith
the . tate , and is void as against public policy. • • • [Citing New
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York & M. L. R. Co. v. Winans, 17 How. 30; Beman v. Rufford,

1 Sim. (N. S.) 550; Winch v. Birkenhead, L. & C. J. R. Co., 13 Eng.

York & M. L. R. Co. v. Winans, I 7 How. 30; Beman v. Rufiord,
I Sim. (N. S.) 550; Winch v. Birkenhead, L. & C. J. R. Co., 13 Eng.
L. & Eq. 5o6; Black v. Delaware & R. Canal Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 130.]
It remains to consider the suggestion that the contract, having been
executed, the doctrine of ultra vfres is inapplicable to the case. There
can be no question that, in many instances where an invalid contract,
which the party to it might have avoided or refused to perform, has
been fully p erformed on both sides, whereby money has been paid or
property changed hands, the courts have refused to sustain an action for the recovery of the property or the money so transferred.
In regard to corporations the rule has been well laid down by Comstock, C. ]., in Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494, that the executed
dea lings of corporations must be allowed to stand for and against both
parties when the plainest rules of good faith require it.
But what is sought in the case before us is the enforcement of the
tmexecuted part of this agreement. So far as- it has been executed,
namely, the four or five years of action under it, the accounts have
been adjusted and each party has received what he was entitled to by
its terms. There remains unperformed the covenant to arbitrate with
regard to the value of the contract. It is the damages provided for
in that clause of the contract that are sued for in this action. Damages for a material part of the cor.tract never p erformed; damages for
the value of a contract which was void. It is not a case of a contract
full y executed. The very nature of the suit is to recover damages for
its non-performance. As to this it is not an executed contract.
Not only so, but it is a contract forbidden by public policy and beyond the power of the defendants to make. Having entered into the
agreement it was the duty of the company to rescind or abandon it at
the earliest moment. This duty was independent of the clause in the
contract which gave them the right to do it. Though they delayed
its performance for several years, it was nevertheless a rightful act
when it was done. Can this performance of a legal duty, a duty both
to stockholders of the company and to the public, give to tbe plaintiffs a right of action? Can they found such a right on an agreement
void for want of corporate authority and forbidden by the policy of
the law? To hold that they can, is, in our opinion , to hold that any
act performed in executing a void contract makes all its parts valid,
and that the more that is done under a contract forbidden by law, the
stronger is the claim to its enforce ment by the courts.
We can not see that the present case comes within the principl e
that requires that contracts, which, though invalid for want of corporate power, have been fully executed, shall remain as the foundation
of rights acquired by the transaction.
We have given this case our best consideration on account of the
importance of the principles involved in its decision , and after a full
examination of the authorities we can see no error in the action of the
circuit court. Judgment affirmed.
Note. Special capacities. Only the following among numerous authorities are given: 1804, Head v. Providence Ins. Co., 2 Cranch (6 U.S.) 127;

L. & Eq. 506; Black v. Delaware & R. Canal Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 130.]

It remains to consider the suggestion that the contract, having been

executed, the doctrine of ultra vires is inapplicable to the case. There

can be no question that, in many instances where an invalid contract,

which the party to it might have avoided or refused to perform, has

been fully performed on both sides, whereby money has been paid or

property changed hands, the courts have refused to sustain an ac-

tion for the recovery of the property or the money so transferred.

In regard to corporations the rule has been well laid down by Corn-

stock, C. J., in Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494, that the executed

dealings of corporations must be allowed to stand for and against both

parties when the plainest rules of good faith require it.

But what is sought in the case before us is the enforcement of the

Unexecuted part of this agreement. So far as- it has been executed,

namely, the four or five years of action under it, the accounts have

been adjusted and each party has received what he was entitled to by
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its terms. There remains unperformed the covenant to arbitrate with

regard to the value of the contract. It is the damages provided for

in that clause of the contract that are sued for in this action. Dam-

ages for a material part of the contract never performed; damages for

the value of a contract which was void. It is not a case of a contract

fully executed. The very nature of the suit is to recover damages for

its non-performance. As to this it is not an executed contract.

Not only so, but it is a contract forbidden by public policy and be-

yond the power of the defendants to make. Having entered into the

agreement it was the duty of the company to rescind or abandon it at

the earliest moment. This duty was independent of the clause in the

contract which gave them the right to do it. Though they delayed

its performance for several years, it was nevertheless a rightful act

when it was done. Can this performance of a legal duty, a duty both

to stockholders of the company and to the public, give to the plaint-

iffs a right of action? Can they found such a right on an agreement

void for want of corporate authority and forbidden by the policy of

the law? To hold that they can, is, in our opinion, to hold that any

act performed in executing a void contract makes all its parts valid,

and that the more that is done under a contract forbidden by law, the

stronger is the claim to its enforcement by the courts.

We can not see that the present case comes within the principle

that requires that contracts, which, though invalid for want of corpo-

rate power, have been fully executed, shall remain as the foundation

of rights acquired by the transaction.

We have given this case our best consideration on account of the

importance of the principles involved in its decision, and after a full

examination of the authorities we can see no error in the action of the

circuit court. Judgment affirmed.

Note. Special capacities. Only the following among numerous author-

ities are given: 1804, Head v. Providence Ins. Co., 2 Cranch (6 U. S.) 127;
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1807, Beatty v. Marine Ins. Co., 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 109,3 Am. Dec. 401;

919

1818, People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358, 8 Am. Dec. 243; 1819, Dart-

mouth College v. Woodward, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 636, supra, p. 708; 1827,

Fuller v. Plainfield, 6 Conn. 532; 1828, State v. Stebbins, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 299;

1830, Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. (29 U. S.) 514; 1831, Betts v. Men-

ard, 1 111. (Breese) 395; 1839, Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.)

519, 587; 1839, Penobscot Boom Co. v. Lamson, 16 Maine 224, 33 Am. Dec.

656; 1839, Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 9, supra, p. 19; 1841, State v. Wash-

ington 8. L. Co., 11 Ohio 96; 1846, Coleman v. Eastern Counties R. Co., 10

Beav. 1; 1846, Janesville Bridge Co. v. Stoughton, 1 Pin. (Wis.) 667; 1850,

Perrine v. Ches. & D. C. Co., 9 How. (50 U. S.) 172; 1851, East Anglian R.

Co. v. Eastern Counties R., 11 C. B. (73 E. C. L.) 775; 1852, Bank of Penn-

sylvania v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. St. 144; 1853, Hood v. N. Y. & N. H. R.

Co., 22 Conn. 502-; 1856, Commw. v. Erie & N. E. R. Co., 27 Pa. St. 339, 67

Am. Dec. 471; 1858, Pearce v. Madison & Ind. R. Co., 21 How. (62 U. S.)441;

1858, Abby v. Billups, 35 Miss. 618,72 Am. Dec. 143; 1859, Talmadge v.

North Am. C. & T. Co., 3 Head (40 Tenn.) 337; 1860, Bissell v. Mich. South-
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RICHE v. THE ASHBURY RAILWAY CARRIAGE & IRON CO., LTD.»
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Sec. 260.

General capacity.

[The defendants were incorporated as a limited company under the

companies' act, 1862, the objects of the company, as stated in the

RICHE v. THE ASHBURY RAILWAY CARRIAGE & IRON CO., LTD.a

memorandum of association, being "To make, sell, or lend on hire,

railway carriages and wagons, and all kinds of railway plant, fittings,

1874.

IN THE COURT OF ExcHBQUER.

L. R. 9

Ex.

224-J97.

machinery and rolling stock; to carry on the business of mechanical

engineers and general contractors; to purchase, lease, work and sell

1 Statement of facts abridged, arguments, part of opinion of Blackburn, J.,

and dissenting opinion of Archibald, J., omitted. Brett and Grove, JJ.,

concurred with Blackburn, and Keating and Quain, JJ., concurred with

Archibald, J. The court being evenly divided, the judgment below was

affirmed. Upon appeal to the house of lords, 1875, Ashbury, etc., R. Co. v.

[The defendants were incorporated as a limited company under the
companies' act, 1862, the objects of the company, as stated in the
memorandum of association, being "To make, sell, or lend on hire,
railway carriages and wagons, and all kinds of railway plant, fittings,
machinery and rolling stock; to carry on the business of mechanical
engineers and general contractors; to purchase, lease, work and sell

Riche. L. R. 7 H. L. Rep. 653, the decision above was overruled, and the doc-

trine of special capacities established as to parliamentary corporations. See

note, infra, p. 924.

1 Statement of facts abridged, arguments, part of opinion of Blackburn, J.,
and dissenting opinion of Archibald, J., omitted. Brett and Grove, JJ.,
concurred with Blackburn, and Keating and Quain, JJ., concurred with
Archibald, J . The court being evenly divided, the judgment below was
affirmed. Upon appeal to the house of lor<ls, 1875, Asbbury, etc., R. Co. v.
Riche, L. R. 7 H. L. Rep. 653, the decision above was overruled, and the doctrine of special capacities established as to parliamentary corporations. See
note, infra. p. 924.
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mines, minerals, land and buildings; to purchase and sell as mer-

chants timber, coal, metal and other materials, and to buy and sell
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any such materials on commission as agents." And by article 4 of

their articles of association, "An extension of the company's business

mines, minerals, land and buildings; to purchase and sell as merchants timber, coal, metal and other materials, and to buy and sell
any such materials on commission as agents.'' And by article 4 of
their articles of association, "An extension of the company' s business
beyond or for other than "the objects or purposes expressed or implied
in the memorandum of association, shall take place only in pursuance
of a special resolution."
The defendants' directors in January, 1865, entered into contracts
on behalf of the company, by which the company became purchasers
of a concession granted by the Belgian government for the construction of a railway in Belgium, and contracted with the plaintiff that,
through the medium of a societe anonyme which the company were to
form in Belgium, he should be employed to construct the line, and
that they would pay certain sums of money into the treasury of the
societe anonyme for the purpose of payments being made to him
thereout for the construction of the railway. These contracts were
afterward modified in certain particulars by agreements entered into,
October, 1865, by the directors on behalf of the company.
In October, 1865, the plaintiff entered on the construction of the
line; the sodete anonyme was formed, and for some time payments
were made by the company into the treasury of the societe in pursuance of their contract with the plaintiff. ·
In M ay, 1866 1 defendants repudiated the contracts, on the ground
that they were ultra vires. Afterwards these contracts were ratified
at an annual meeting of the shareholders. Plaintiffs cl aimed the contracts were not ultra vi'res, but if they were they could be ratified by
the shareholders.]
BLACKBURN, J. • • • It is of great importance, when we come
to construe a statute creating a corporation, to consider what would
be the incidents at common law conferred on a corporation created by
charter.
The leading authority on this subject is the case of Sutton's Hospital, 10 Co. 1. There were many points raised in that case. Those
which I think material to the present point arose on a part of the
charter set out in the special verdict (p. wb) , by which the king incorporated the first governors of the charterhouse, and expressly provided, 1. That they should have power to purchase, etc., as well
goods, chattels, etc., as lands. 2. To sue and be sued. 3. To have a
common seal, "whereby the same corporation shall or may seal any
manner of instrument touching the said corporation and the manor,
lands, etc., thereto belonging, or in any wise touching or concerning
the same. Nevertheless, it is our true intent and meaning that the
said governors, for the time being, and their successors, nor any of them,
shall do, or suffer to be done, at any time hereafter, any act or thing
whereby or by means whereof any of the manors, etc., of the said incorporation, or any estate, etc., shall be conveyed, etc., to any other
whatsoever contrary to the true meaning hereof, other than by such
leases as are hereafter mentioned, and that in such manner and form
as is hereafter expressed, and not otherwise." The king, therefore,

beyond or for other than the objects or purposes expressed or implied

in the memorandum of association, shall take place only in pursuance

of a special resolution."

The defendants' directors in January, 1865, entered into contracts

on behalf of the company, by which the company became purchasers

of a concession granted by the Belgian government for the construc-

tion of a railway in Belgium, and contracted with the plaintiff that,

through the medium of a societe anonyme which the company were to

form in Belgium, he should be employed to construct the line, and

that they would pay certain sums of money into the treasury of the

societe anonyme for the purpose of payments being made to him

thereout for the construction of the railway. These contracts were

afterward modified in certain particulars by agreements entered into,

October, 1S65, by the directors on behalf of the company.

In October, 1865, the plaintiff entered on the construction of the

line; the societe anonyme was formed, and for some time payments
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were made by the company into the treasury of the societe in pursu-

ance of their contract with the plaintiff.

In May, 1866, defendants repudiated the contracts, on the ground

that they were ultra vires. Afterwards these contracts were ratified

at an annual meeting of the shareholders. Plaintiffs claimed the con-

tracts were not ultra vires, but if they were they could be ratified by

the shareholders.]

Blackburn, J. * • * It is of great importance, when we come

to construe a statute creating a corporation, to consider what would

be the incidents at common law conferred on a corporation created by

charter.

The leading authority on this subject is the case of Sutton's Hos-

pital, 10 Co. 1. There were many points raised in that case. Those

which I think material to the present point arose on a part of the

charter set out in the special verdict (p. io£), by which the king in-

corporated the first governors of the charterhouse, and expressly pro-

vided, 1. That they should have power to purchase, etc., as well

goods, chattels, etc., as lands. 2. To sue and be sued. 3. To have a

common seal, "whereby the same corporation shall or may seal any

manner of instrument touching the said corporation and the manor,

lands, etc., thereto belonging, or in any wise touching or concerning

the same. Nevertheless, it is our true intent and meaning that the

said governors, for the time being, and their successors, nor any of them,

shall do, or suffer to be done, at any time hereafter, any act or thing

whereby or by means whereof any of the manors, etc., of the said in-

corporation, or any estate, etc., shall be conveyed, etc., to any other

whatsoever contrary to the true meaning hereof, other than by such

leases as are hereafter mentioned, and that in such manner and form

as is hereafter expressed, and not otherwise." The king, therefore,
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by this charter not only did not in express terms give a power of alien-

921

ation, but by express negative words forbade any alienation except by

lease. But the resolution of the court, as reported by Coke (at p.

30^), was that "when a corporation is duly created all other incidents

are tacite annexed; » * * and, therefore, divers clauses subsequent

in. the charter are not of necessity, but only declaratory, and might

well have been left out. As, 1. By the same to have authority, ability,

and capacity to purchase; but no clause is added that they may alien,

etc., and it need not, for it is incident. 2. To sue and be sued, im-

plead and be impleaded. 3. To have a seal, etc., that is also declar-

atory, for when they are incorporated they may make or use what

seal they will. 4. To restrain them from aliening or demising but in

a certain form; that is an ordinance testifying the king's desire, but

it is but a precept and doth not bind in law."

This seems to me an express authority that at common law it is an

incident to a corporation to use its common seal for the purpose of

binding itself to anything to which a natural person could bind him-

self, and to deal with its property as a natural person might deal with
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his own. And further, that an attempt to forbid this on the part of

the king, even by express negative words, does not bind at law. Nor

am I aware of any authority in conflict with this case.

If there are conditions contained in the charter that the corporation

shall not do particular things, and these things are nevertheless done,

it gives ground for a procceeding by scire facias in the name of the

crown to repeal the letters-patent creating the corporation. See Reg.

v. Eastern Archipelago Company, 2 E. & B. 857, 22 L. J. Q. B. 196.

But if the crown take no such steps it does not, as I conceive, lie in

the mouth, either of the corporation or of the person who has con-

tracted with it, to say that the contract into which they have entered

was void as beyond the capacity of the corporation.

I am aware of no decision by which a corporation at common law

has been permitted to do so. I take it that the true rule of law is, that

a corporation at common law has, as an incident given by law, the

same power to contract and subject to the same restrictions that a nat-

ural person has. And this is important when we come to construe the

statutes creating a corporation. For if it were true that a corporation

at common law has a capacity to contract to the extent given it by the

instrument creating it, and no further, the question would be, does

the statute creating the corporation, by express provision or by neces-

sary implication, show an intention in the legislature to confer upon

this corporation capacity to make the contract? But if a body corpo-

rate has, as incident to it, a general capacity to contract, the question

is, does the statute creating the corporation, by express provision or

necessary implication, show an intention in tbe legislature to prohibit,

and so avoid the making of a contract of this particular kind?

I think this is the real question, and for that I refer to the judgment

of Parke, B., in South Yorkshire R. Co. v. Great Northern R. Co.,

9 Ex. 55, 84, 22 L. J. Ex. 305, 313, and the various other cases cited

by this charter not only did not in express terms give a power of alienation, but by express negative words forbade any alienation except by
lease. But the resolution of the court, as reported by Coke (at p.
300), was that "when a corporation is duly created all other incidents
are tadte annexed; • • • and, therefore, divers clauses subsequent
in. the charter are not of necessity, but only declaratory, and might
well have been left out. As, 1. By the same to have authodty, ability,
and capacity to purchase; but no clause is added that they may alien,
etc., and it need not, for it is incident. 2. To sue and be sued, implead and be irhpleaded. 3. To have a seal, etc., that is also declaratory, for when they are incorporated they may make or use what
seal they will. 4. To restrain them from aliening or demising but . in
a certain form; that is an ordinance testifying the king's desire, but
it is but a precept and doth not bind in law."
This seems to me an express authority that at common law it is an
incident to a corporation to use its common seal for the purpose of
binding itself to anything to which a natural person could bind himself, and to deal with its property as a natural person might deal with
his own. And further, that an attempt to forbid this on the part of
the king, even by express negative words, does not bind at law. Nor
am I awar~ of any authority in conflict with this case.
If there are conditions contained in the charter that the corporation
shall not do particular things, and these· things are nevertheless done,
it gives ground for a procceeding by sct're fadas in the name of the
crown to repeal the letters-patent creating the corporation. See Reg.
v. Eastern Archipelago Company, 2 E. & B. 857, 22 L. J. Q. B. 196.
But if the crown take no such steps it does not, as I conceive, lie in
the mouth, either of the corporation or of the person who has contracted with it, to say that the contract into which they have entered
was void as beyond the capacity of the corporation.
I am aware of no decision by which a corporation at common law
has been permitted to do so. I take it that the true rule of law is, that
a corporation at common law has, as an incident given by law, the
same power to contract and subject to the same restrictions that a natural person has. And this is important when we come to construe the
statutes creating a corporation. For if it were true that a corporation
at common law has a capacity to contract to the extent given it by the
· instrument creating it, and no further, the question would be, does
the statute creating the corporation, by express provision or by necessary implication, show an intention in the legislature to confer upon
this corporation capacity to make the contract? But if a body corporate has, as incident to it, a general capacity to contract, the question
is, does the statute creating the corporation, by express provision or
necessary implication, show an intention in the legislature to prohibit,
and so avoid the making of a contract of this particular kind?
I think this is the real question, and for that I refer to the judgment
of Parke, B., in South Yorkshire R. Co. v. Great Northern R. Co.,
9 Ex. 55, 84, 22 L. J. Ex. 305, 313, and the various other cases cited
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by my late brother Willes and by myself in Taylor v. Chichester and

Midhurst R. Co., L. R. 2 Ex., at pp, 375, 389.
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And when we are construing a statute creating and regulating a

corporation, it is right to bear in mind that, as Lord Coke says, "It

by my late brother Willes and by myself in Taylor v. Chichester and
Midhurst R. C o ., L. R. 2 Ex., at pp, 375, 389.
And when we are construing a statute creating and regulating a
corporation, it is right to bear in mind that, as Lord Coke says, "lt
is a maxim in the common law that a statute made in the affirmative,
without any negative expressed or implied, doth not take away the
common law." 2 Inst. 200. Affirmative words may no doubt be
u sed so as to imply a negative ( see Plowden Com., 113), but I take it
the general principle is that thus laid down by Cresswell, J., in the
Eastern Archipelago Company v. Reg., 2 E. & B., itt p. 888, 23 L.
J. Q. B. 82, "that to make the words giving an express liberty or
right have the effect of controlling or limiting that which would otherwise exist, they must be very plain."
I now come to consider the construction of the act of 1862, under
whi ch the present company is formed. The sections of the act of
1862 bearing on the present case seem to me to be only sections 6, 8,
9, 10 and 12.
By the sixth section of the act of 1862, any seven persons may, by
subscribing their names to a memorandum of association, and otherwise complying with the requisitions of this act in respect of registration, form an incorporated company with or without limited liability .
The eighth, ninth and tenth sections provide that the memorandum
of association shall contain the objects for which the proposed company is to be established.
The twelfth section provides that the company may make certain
specified alterations in the memorandum of association, not including
a change in the objects for which the company is to be established ,
and then, in express negative words provides that, "save as aforesaid,
no alteration shall be made in the conditions contained in the memorandum of association."
The objects of the proposed company must, therefore, always remain the same, and that has, I think, two important effects: First,
I think that if the company as a body proposes to do anything beyond
these objects, any one dissentient shareholder (who has not preclnded
himself from doing so) may prevent it from doing so.
S e condly. No person can be entitled to fix the company with a
contract made by the board f9r any purpose beyond those objects, on
the ground that the board had an ostensible or apparent authority to
make contracts of that kind, but must, in order to fix the company ,
at least prove an actual authority given to the board to make the particular contract he seeks to enforce.
Now , if I thought that it was at common law an incident to a corporation that its capacity should be limited to the extent conferred on it
by the instrument creating it, I should agree that the capacity of a
company incorporated under the act of 1862 was limited to the objects in the memorandum of association. But if I am right in the
opinion which I have already expressed, that the general power of
contracting is an incident to a corporation which it requires an indication of intention in the legislature to take away, I see no such indi-

is a maxim in the common law that a statute made in the affirmative,

without any negative expressed or implied, doth not take away the

common law." 2 Inst. 200. Affirmative words may no doubt be

used so as to imply a negative (see Plowden Com., 113), but I take it

the general principle is that thus laid down by Cresswell, J., in the

Eastern Archipelago Company v. Reg., 2 E. & B., at p. 888, 23 L.

J. Q. B. 82, "that to make the words giving an express liberty or

right have the effect of controlling or limiting that which would oth-

erwise exist, they must be very plain."

I now come to consider the construction of the act of 1862, under

which the present company is formed. The sections of the act of

1862 bearing on the present case seem to me to be only sections 6, 8,

9, 10 and 12.

By the sixth section of the act of 1862, any seven persons may, by

subscribing their names to a memorandum of association, and other-

wise complying with the requisitions of this act in respect of registra-
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tion, form an incorporated company with or without limited liability.

The eighth, ninth and tenth sections provide that the memorandum

of association shall contain the objects for which the proposed com-

pany is to be established.

The twelfth section provides that the company may make certain

specified alterations in the memorandum of association, not including

a change in the objects for which the company is to be established,

and then, in express negative words provides that, "save as aforesaid,

no alteration shall be made in the conditions contained in the memo-

randum of association."

The objects of the proposed company must, therefore, always re-

main the same, and that has, I think, two important effects: First,

I think that if the company as a body proposes to do anything beyond

these objects, any one dissentient shareholder (who has not preclnded

himself from doing so) may prevent it from doing so.

Secondly. No person can be entitled to fix the company with a

contract made by the board for any purpose beyond those objects, on

the ground that the board had an ostensible or apparent authority to

make contracts of that kind, but must, in order to fix the company,

at least prove an actual authority given to the board to make the par-

ticular contract he seeks to enforce.

Now, if I thought that it was at common law an incident to a corpo-

ration that its capacity should be limited to the extent conferred on it

by the instrument creating it, I should agree that the capacity of a

company incorporated under the act of 1862 was limited to the ob-

jects in the memorandum of association. But if I am right in the

opinion which I have already expressed, that the general power of

contracting is an incident to a corporation which it requires an indi-

cation of intention in the legislature to take away, I see no such indi-
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cation here. There are not even affirmative words, those used in § 25

THEORIES OF CORPORATE CAPACITY.

of 7 and 8 Vict., ch. no, to which I shall now refer, having been (I

923

presume advisedly) not repeated.

The 7 and 8 Vict., ch. no, § 25, enacts that from the date of the

certificate the shareholders shall be incorporated "by the name of the

company as set forth in the deed of settlement, and for the purpose of

carrying on the trade or business for which the company was formed,

but only according to the provisions of this act, and of such deed as

aforesaid." And then express powers are given to the company to

enter into contracts for any "necessary purpose of the company."

I think if the question was whether the legislature had conferred on

a corporation created under this act capacity to enter into contracts

beyond the provisions of the deed, there could be only one answer.

The legislature did not confer such capacity.

But if the question be, as I apprehend it is, whether the legislature

have indicated an intention to take away the power of contracting,

which at common law would be incident to a body corporate, and not

merely to limit the authority of the managing body and the majority

of the shareholders to bind the minority, but also to prohibit and make
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illegal contracts made by the body corporate in such a manner that

they would be binding on the body if incorporated at common law, I

think the answer should be the other way. There certainly is ground

for suspecting that the person who framed the act, 7 and 8 Vict., ch.

no, thought that the corporation would have no other powers than

those thus expressly given to it, and perhaps meant to restrict its pow-

ers accordingly, but when we remember the canon of construction

that affirmative words do not take away the common law right, I

think he has not used words sufficient to effect such a purpose. It

would be different if negative words had been used, and it had been

said that the company should not do any other acts than those neces-

sary for the purpose for which it is formed.

The two acts, 7 and 8 Vict., ch. no, and the act of 1862, are so

much in pari materia, that if it had been settled by judicial construc-

tion that a company under 7 and 8 Vict., ch. no, was forbidden to

make any contract for objects beyond those specified in the deed, I

should endeavor to put the same construction on the act of 1862, un-

less the change in the language showed an intention in the legislature

to alter the law.

There are many dicta in courts of equity worthy of great respect,

which indicate an opinion not only that such acts are beyond the au-

thority of the board, or even of a majbrity of the shareholders, but

also that they are beyond the capacity of the company, though unani-

mous.

These are worthy of great attention, but I can find no case in which

it has been decided that a contract so made or ratified by the whole

company that it would have bound the company in its corporate ca-

pacity (but for the provisions of the statute) has, either at law or in

equity, been held void on account of the provisions of that act. And

I think that the three cases already referred to of Spackman v. Evans,

cation here. There are not even affirmative words, those used in§ 25
of 7 and 8 Viet., ch. 110, to which I shall now refer, having been (I
presume advisedly) not repeated.
The 7 and 8 Viet., ch. 110, § 25, enacts that from the date of the
certificate the shareholders shall be incorporated ''by the name of the
company as set forth in the deed of settlement, and for the purpose of
carrying on the trade or business for which the company was formed,
but only according to the provisions of this act, and of such deed as
aforesaid." And then express powers are given to the company to
enter into contracts for any "necessary purpose of the company."
I think if the question was whether the legislature had conferred on
a corporation created under this act capacity to enter into contracts
beyond the provisions of the deed, there could be only one answer.
The legislature did not confer such capacity.
But if the question be, as I apprehend it is, whether the legislature
have indicated an intention to take away the power of contracting,
which at common law would be incident to a body corporate, and not
merely to limit the authority of the managing body and the majority
of the shareholders to bind the minority, but also to prohibit and make
illegal contracts made by the body corporate in such a manner that
they would be binding on the body if incorporated at common law, I
think the answer should be the oth er way. There certainly is ground
for suspecting that the person who framed the act, 7 and 8 Viet., ch.
110, thought that the corporation would have no other powers than
those thus expressly given to it, and perhaps meant to restrict its powers accordingly, but wher. we remember the canon of construction
that affirmative words do not take away the common law right, I
think he has not used words sufficient to effect such a purpose. It
would be different if negative words had been used, and it had been
said that the company should not do any other acts than those necessary for the purpose for which it is formed.
The two acts, 7 and 8 Viet., ch. uo, and the act of 1862, are so
much in par£ matert'a, that if it had been settled by judicial construction that a company undar 7 and 8 Viet., ch. 110, was forbidden to
make any contract for objects beyond those specified in the deed, I
should endeavor to put the ·s ame construction on the act of 1862, unless the change in the language showed an intention in the legislature
to alter the law.
There are many dt'cta in courts of equity worthy of great respect,
which indicate an opinion not only that such acts are beyond the authority of the board, or even of a majbrity of the shareholders , but
- also that they are beyond the capacity of the company, though unanimous.
_ These are worthy of great attention, but I can find no case in which
it has been decided that a contract so made or ratified by the whole
company that it would have bound the company in its corporate capacity (but for the provisions of the statute) has, either at law or in
equity, been held void on account of the provisions of that act. And
I think that the three cases already referred to of Spackman v. Evans,
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L. R. 3 H. L. Cas. 171; Evans v. Smallcombe, L. R. 3 H. L.

Cas. 249, and Houldsworth v. Evans, L. R. 3 H. L. Cas. 263, all

RICHE V. THE ASHBURY RAILWAY, ETC.,

.co.

decided in the house of lords, are at least authorities for the contrary

L. R. 3 H. L. Cas. 171; Evans v. Smallcombe, L. R. 3 H. L.
Cas. 249, and Houldsworth v. Evans, L. R. 3 H. L. Cas. 263, all
decided in the house of lords, are at least authorities for the contrary
doctrine. • • •
I think, for the reasons I have above given, that in this case the
unanimous shareholders have, in fact, assented to the ratification under
the seal of the company of this contract, and that such a ratification,
at all events, makes the contract binding on the company in its corporate capacity.
I think, therefore, that the judgment of the court below should be
affirmed.

doctrine. * * *

I think, for the reasons I have above given, that in this case the

unanimous shareholders have, in fact, assented to the ratification under

the seal of the company of this contract, and that such a ratification,

at all events, makes the contract binding on the company in its cor-

porate capacity.

I think, therefore, that the judgment of the court below should be

affirmed.

Note. General capacity. While the rule of special capacities is verbally

almoBt universally adhered to, there is a tendency, especially in the decisions

of the state courts, when no public interest or policy is specially involved,

and creditors' rights are not affected, practically to allow a general capacity

to do everything in every way an individual could do, within the field covered

by the business in which the corporation was organized to engage. As was

Note. General capacity. While the rule of special capacities is verbally
almost universally adhered to, there is a tendency, especially in the decisions
of the state courts, when no public interest or policy is specially involved,
and creditors' rights are not affected1 practically to allow a general capacity
to do everything in every way an individual could do, within the field covered
by the business in which the corporation was organized to engage. As was
stated in 1&51, by Willard, P . J., in Conro v. Port Henry Iron Co., 12 Barb.
(N. Y.) 27, 53, "modern decisions tend to assimilate the actions, rights, duties and liabilities of corporations to those of individuals and commercial
partnerships;" or as stRted in 1&57, in Shrewsbury & B. R. Co. v. N. W.R.
Co., 6 H. L. CRses 113, "Prima fa cie all corporate bodies are bound, by contracts under their common seal, but this prima facie power to contract can not
be insisted on as to matters where, from the nature of the corporate body or
the object of its incorporation, it is Elxpressly m: impliedly, 'by reasonable inference, ' prohibited from contracting. A contract as to such matters is ultra
1'ires." So, too, in 1&59, Lord Wensleydale, in Scottish N. E. R . Co. v. Stewart, 3 Macq. H. L. Oas. 382, said: "There can be no doubt that a corporation
is fully capable of binding itself by any contract, except when the statutes
by: which it is created or regulated expressly or by necessary implication prohibit such contract between the parties. Prima facie aJJ its contracts are
valid, and it lies on those who impeach an7 contract to make out that it is
bad.'' And in 1887, Lord Selborne said m A.-G. v. Great Eastern R. Co.,
5 App. Cas. 478, "The doctrine of ultra 'flires is one which ought to be
reasonably and not unreasonably applied, and whatever may fairly be regarded as incidental to or consequential upon those things which the legislature bas authorized, ought not (unless expressly prohibited) to be held by jndicial construction to be ultra vires."
Cook Corporations, 4th ed., 1898, § 3, statEls the modem tendency more
broadly than other writers, and perhaps too broadly. He says: "The theory
of a corporation is that it has no powers except those expressly given or necessarily implied. But this theory is no longer strictly applied to private corporations. A private corporation may exercise many extraordinary ~wers,
provided all of its stockholders assent and none of its creditors are mjured.
There is no one to complain except the state, and the business being entirely
private, the state does not interfere. • • • The old theory of a corporation
was that it could not legally do anything in excess of its express or implied
powers. But the modern view is that a private corporation may, if all its
stockholders assent and if creditors are paid. Public policy does not require
business corporations to confine themselves strictly within the limits of the
words of their charter." He cites particularly, 1879, Kent v. Quicksilver
Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159, 186; 1896, Bath Gaslight Co. v. Claffy, 151 N. Y.24.
29-31, 33, 34, 37; 1897, Augusta, etc., R . Co. v. City_Council,_100 Ga. 701,, 28
S. E. Rep. 126; 1897, Farwell Co. v. Wolf, 96 Wis. 10, 70 N. W. Rep. 289.
This latter case holds that "none b11t n person directly interested in the corporation or the state can question such [corporate] authority;" and the following cases seem to support this doctriue: 1860, Natoma, etc., Co. v. Clarkin,

stated in 1851, by Willard, P. J., in Conro v. Port Henry Iron Co., 12 Barb.

(N. Y.) 27, 53, "modern decisions tend to assimilate the actions, rights, du-

ties and liabilities of corporations to those of individuals and commercial
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partnerships;" or as stated in 1857, in Shrewsbury & B. R. Co. v. N. W. R.

Co., 6 H. L. Cases 113, "Prima facie all corporate bodies are bound by con-

tracts under their common seal, but this prima facie power to contract can not

be insisted on as to matters where, from the nature of the corporate body or

the object of its incorporation, it is expressly or impliedly, 'by reasonable in-

ference,' prohibited from contracting. A contract as to such matters isw/tiu

vires." So, too, in 1859, Lord Wensleydale, in Scottish N. E. R. Co. v. Stew-

art, 3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 382, said: "There can be no doubt that a corporation

is fully capable of binding itself by any contract, except when the statutes

by which it is created or regulated expressly or by necessary implication pro-

hibit such contract between the parties. Prima facie all its contracts are

valid, and it lies on those who impeach any contract to make out that it is

bad." And in 1887, Lord Selborne said in A.-G. v. Great Eastern R. Co.,

6 App. Cas. 478, "The doctrine of ultra vires is one which ought to be

reasonably and not unreasonably applied, and whatever may fairly be re-

garded as incidental to or consequential upon those things which the legisla-

ture has authorized, ought not (unless expressly prohibited) to be held by ju-

dicial construction to be ultra vires."

Cook Corporations, 4th ed., 1898, § 3, states the modern tendency more

broadly than other writers, and perhaps too broadly. He says: "The theory

of a corporation is that it has no powers except those expressly given or neces-

sarily implied. But this theory is no longer strictly applied to private corpo-

rations. A private corporation may exercise many extraordinary powers,

provided all of its stockholders assent and none of its creditors are injured.

There is no one to complain except the state, and the business being entirely

private, the state does not interfere. * * * The old theory of a corporation

was that it could not legally do anything in excess of its express or implied

powers. But the modern view is that a private corporation may, if all its

stockholders assent and if creditors are paid. Public policy does not require

business corporations to confine themselves strictly within the limits of the

words of their charter." He cites particnlarlv, 1879, Kent v. Quicksilver

Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159, 186; 1896, Bath Gaslight Co. v. Claffy, 151 K. Y. 24.

29-31, 33, 34, 37; 1897, Augusta, etc., R. Co. v. City Council, 100 Ga. 701, 28

S. E. Rep. 126; 1897, Farwell Co. v. Wolf, 96 Wis. 10, 70 N. W. Rep. 289.

This lattercase holds that "none but a person directly interested in the corpo-

ration or the state can question such [corporate] authority;" and the follow-

ing cases seem to support this doctrine: 1860, Natoma, etc., Co. v. Clarkin,
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14Cal. 544; 1876, Grant v. Henry Clay, etc., Co., 80 Pa. St. 208; 1878, Na-

tional Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99; 1883, Hovelman v. Kansas City, etc.,

CLASSES OF CORPORATE POWERS.

Co., 79 Mo. 632; 1884, Alexander v. Tolleston Club, 110 111.65; 1886, Baker v.

North West, etc., Loan Co., 36 Minn. 185; 1889, Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U. S.

282; 1893, Prescott Nat'l Bank v. Butler. 157 Mass. 548; 1898, Rogers v. R.

Co., 33 C. C. A. 517, 91 Fed. Rep. 2<)<»; 1898. South & N. A. R. Co. v. High-

land Ave., etc., 119 Ala. 105, 24 So. Rep. 114; 1898, Chapman v. Iron Clad R.

Co., 62 N. J. L. 497, 41 Atl. Rep. 690; 1898, Bishop v. Kent & Stanley Co., 20

R. I. 680, 41 Atl. Rep. 255; 1898, Miller v. American Tobacco Co., 55 N. J. Eq.

352, 42 Atl. Rep. 1117; 1899, Union Trust Co. v. M. L. H. Co., 189 Pa. St. 263,

42 Atl. Rep. 129; 1899, Murphy v. Arkansas & L. L. & I. Co. (C. C. Ark.), 97

Fed. Rep. 723; 1899, Colorado Springs Co. v. Am. Pub.Co. (C. C. A. Colo.), 97

Fed. Rep. 843; 1899, International B. & L. Assn. v. Wall, 153 Ind.554, 55 in.

E. Rep. 431; 1900, Burke Land & L. S. Co. v. Wells F., etc., Co., — Idaho —,

60 Pac. Rep. 87; 1900, City of Spokane v. Amsterdamsch T. K., 22 Wash. 172,

60 Pac. Rep. 141.

Late cases hold also that the state will not object except when some special

public interest is injuriously affected: 1836, State v. Essex Bank, 8 Vt. 489;

I860, Bissell v. Mich. So. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 258, 289; 1879, State v. Oberlin B.

& L. Assn., 35 Ohio State 258; 1889, State v. Minnesota Thresher Co., 40
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Minn. 213; 1890, People v. North River S. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 582, supra, p. 100;

1890, Martin v. Niagara Falls Co., 122 N. Y. 165; 1892, Oliver v. Gilmore (C.

C. Mass.), 52 Fed. Rep. 562; 1892, Edgar Collegiate Institute v. People, 142

111. 363; 1896, State v. Janesville Water Co., 92 Wis. 496, 501; 1897, Illinois

Health Univ. v. People, 166 111. 171; 1898, State v. National School of Oste-

opathy, 76 Mo. App. 439.

These two doctrines—that the state alone can complain, and that it will

complain only when the public are injuriously affected—with the extension of

the doctrine of implied powers indicated below, leave but little of the old doc-

trine of special capacities, and approximate to the doctrine of general capacity >

—an unwise extension in the writer's opinion.

ARTICLE II. CLASSES OF CORPORATE POWERS.

1~ Cal. 544 ; 1876, <;7rant v. Henry Clay, etc., Co ., 80 Pa. St. 208; 1878, National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99; 1883, Hovelman v. Kansas City, etc.,
Co ., 79 Mo. 632; 1884, Alexander v. Tolleston Club, llO Ill. 65; 1886, Baker v.
North West, etc., Loan Co., 36 Minn. 185; 1889, Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U. S.
282; 1893, Prescott Nat' I Bank v. Butler, 157 Mass. 548; 1898, Rogers v. R.
Co., 33 C. C. A. 517, 91 Fed. Re p. 2!lH; 1898. South & N. A. R. Co. v. Highland Ave., etc., 119 Ala. 105, 24 So. Rep. 114; 1898, Chapman v. Iron Clad R .
Co., 62 N. J. L. 497, 41 Atl. Rep. 690; 1898, Bishop v. Kent & Stanle:v Co., 20
R. I. 680, 41 Atl . Rep. 255 ; 1898, Miller v . .American Tobacco Co., 55 N. J. Eq.
352, 42 Atl. Rep. 1117; 1899, Union Trust Co. v. M. L . H. Co., 189 Pa. St. 263,
42 Atl. Rep. 12~; 1899, Murphy v. Arkansas & L. L. & I. Co. (C. C. Ark. ), 97
Fed. Rep. 7:23; 1899, Colorado Springs Co. v. Am. Pub. Co. (C. C. A. Colo. ), 97
Fed. Rep. 843; 1899, International B. & L. Assn. v. Wall,153Ind.554, 55.1.\.
K Rep. 431; 1900, Burke Land & L. S. Co. v. Wells F. , etc., Co., - Idaho-,
60 Pac. Rep. 87; 1900, pity of Spokane v. Amsterdamsch T. K., 22Wasb. 172,
60 Pac. Rep. 141.
Late cases bold also that the state will not object except when some special
public interest is injuriously affected: 1836, State v. Essex Bank, 8 Vt. 489;
1860, Bissell v. Mich . So. R. Co., 22 N. Y . 258, 289; 1879, State v. Oberlin 13.
& L. Assn. , 35 Ohio State 258; 1889, State v. Minnesota Thresher Co. 4()
Minn . 213; 1890, People v. North River S. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 582,supra, p. JOO;
1890, Martin v. Niagara Falls Co., 122 N. Y.165; 1892, Oliver v. Gilmore (C.
C. Mass.}, 52 Fed. Rep. 562; 1892, Edgar Collegiate Institute v. People, 142
Ill. 363; 1896, State v. Janesville Water Co., 92 Wis.496, 501; 1897, Illinois
Health Univ. v. People, 166 Ill. 171; 1898, State v. National School of Osteopathy, 76 Mo. App. 439.
These two doctrmes-that the state alone can complain, and that it will
complain only when tbe public are injuriously affected-with the extension of
the doctrine of implied powers indicated below, leave but little of the old doctrine of special capacities, and approximate to the doctrine of general capacity '
-an unwise extension in the writer's opinion.

Sec. 261. I. Incidental powers—those tacitly annexed without

any express words to every corporation duly created. These

are:

ARTICLE II.

(1) To have perpetual succession during the period for which the

CLASSES OF CORPORATE POWERS.

corporation is created.

(2) To have a corporate name and to contract, to grant and re-

ceive, and to sue and be sued thereby.

Sec. 261.

1.
Incidental powers-those tacitly annexed without
any express words to every corporation duly created. These
are:

(3) To purchase and hold real and personal property for the pur-

poses authorized by the charter.

(4) To have and use a common seal.

(5) To make by-laws.

(6) To remove members or officers, under some circumstances,

called the power of disfranchisement (in case of removal of mem-

bers) and amotion (in case of removal of officers). 2 Kent Comm.,

277, 278; 1 Blackstone's Comm., ch. 18. Supra, Warner v. Beers,

p. 2; Thomas v. Dakin, p. 19; Sutton's Hospital Case, p. 264;

and the cases following, under the next title.

{ 1 )To have perpetual succession during the period for which the
corporation is created.
{ 2) To have a corporate name and to contract, to grant and receive, and to sue and be sued thereby.
(3) To purchase and hold real and personal property for the purposes authorized by the charter.
( 4) To have and use a common seal.
{S) To make by-laws.
(6) To remove members or officers, under some circumstances,
called the power of disfranchisement (in case of removal of members) and amotion (in case of removal of officers). 2 Kent Comm.,
277, 278 i I Blackstone's Comm., ch. 18. Supra, Warner v. Beers.
p. 2; Thomas v. Dakin, p. 19; Sutton's Hospital Case, p. 26-f;
and the cases following, under the next title.
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§ 262

Sec. 262. 2. Express powers, such as are specifically enumer-

926

ated in the charter or general law, and constitutionally granted

THE PEOPLE V. THE PULLMAN'S PALACE CAR CO.

§ 262

therein, together with such as are lawfully inserted in the ar-

Sec. 262.

2. Express powers, such as are specifically enumerated in the charter or general law, and constitutionally granted
therein, together with such as are lawfully inserted in the articles of incorporation.
3. Implied powers, such as are reasonably necessary or
proper for the execution of the powers expressly granted, and
not expressly or impliedly excluded.

ticles of incorporation.

3. Implied powers, such as are reasonably necessary or

proper for the execution of the powers expressly granted, and

not expressly or impliedly excluded.

THE PEOPLE v. THE PULLMAN'S PALACE CAR COMPANY.'

1898. In the Supreme Court of Illinois. 175 111. Rep.

125-182.

\_£>uo warranto against the car company specifying twenty-five

usurpations of power by the defendant, justifying as alleged a for-

feiture of the corporate franchises. Pleas were put in by the defend-

THE PEOPLE v. THE PULLMAN'S PALACE CAR COMPANY.1

ant alleging other facts by way of answer to the complaint. Demur-

rers to the various pleas admitted the allegations of fact.]

1898.

Boggs, J. * * * A corporation in our state has its existence

IN

THE

SuPREME

CouRT

OF

ILLINOIS.

175 Ill. Rep.

125-182.

by virtue of the enactment, general or special, of the law-making

power. The appellee corporation was created by a special act of the

· [ ~uo warranto against the car company specifying twenty-five
usurpations of power by the defendant, justifying as alleged a for·
feiture of the corporate franchises. Pleas were put in by the defendant alleging other facts by way of answer to the complaint. Demur·
rers to the various pleas admitted the allegations of fact. J
BoGGS, J. • • • A corporation in our state has its existence
by virtue of the enactment, general or special, of the law-making
power. The appellee corporation was created by a special act of the
general assembly. The only difference between a corporation organized under a general law and one created by a special statute is,
"that in the former we look to the certificate of the promoters, while
in the latter we look to the special statute to ascertain the scope of the
powers of the corporation." The rule for construing the instruments
must necessarily be the same, viz., the powers specifically enumerated, and such other powers as are incidental or necessary to carry
those powers into effect, but none others may be exercised by the corporation. Rockhold v. Canton Masonic Benevolent Society, 129

general assembly. The only difference between a corporation organ-
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ized under a general law and one created by a special statute is,

"that in the former we look to the certificate of the promoters, while

in the latter we look to the special statute to ascertain the scope of the

powers of the corporation." The rule for construing the instruments

must necessarily be the same, viz., the powers specifically enumer-

ated, and such other powers as are incidental or necessary to carry

those powers into effect, but none others may be exercised by the cor-

poration. Rockhold v. Canton Masonic Benevolent Society, 129

111. 440.

The enactment creating the appellee corporation is the full meas-

ure of its power. In order to enable it to carry into execution the

powers thus conferred it may exercise other powers, known to the

law as incidental or implied powers. Implied powers exist only to

enable a corporation to carry out the express powers granted—that

is, to accomplish the purpose of its existence—and can in no case

avail to enlarge the express powers, and thereby warrant it to devote

its efforts and capital to other purposes than such as its charter ex-

pressly authorizes, or to engage in collateral enterprises not directly

Ill. 440.

but only remotely connected with its specific corporate purposes. A

power which the law will regard as existing by implication must be

The enactment creating the appellee corporation is the full measure of its power. In order to enable it to carry into execution the
powers thus conferred it may exercise other powers, known to the
law as incidental or implied powers. Implied powers exist only to
enable a corporation to carry out the express powers granted-that
is, to accomplish the purpose of its existence-and can in no case
avail to enlarge the express powers, and thereby warrant it to devote
its efforts and capital to other purposes than such as its charter expressly authorizes, or to engage in collateral enterprises not directly
but only remotely connected with its specific corporate purposes. A
power which the law will regard as existing by implication must be
one in a sense necessary-that is, needful, suitable and proper to accomplish the object of the grant-and one that is directly and immediately appropriate to the execution of the specific powers, and not one
that has but a slight, indirect or remote relation to the specific pur1 Facts sufficiently stated in the opinion.
Arguments and much of the prevailing and dissentmg opinions omitted.

one in a sense necessary—that is, needful, suitable and proper to ac-

complish the object of the grant—and one that is directly and immedi-

ately appropriate to the execution of the specific powers, and not one

that has but a slight, indirect or remote relation to the specific pur-

1 Facts sufficiently stated in the opinion. Arguments and much of the pre-

vailing and dissenting opinions omitted.
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poses of the corporation. Illinois Conference Female College v.
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Cooper, 25 111. 133; Caldwell v. City of Alton, 33 111. 416; Chicago,

Pekin and Southwestern R. Co. v. Town of Marseilles, 84 111. 643;

Chicago Gas Light Co. v. People's Gas Light Co., 121 111. 530;

Mott v. Danville Seminary, 129 111. 403; People v. Chicago Gas

Trust Co., 130 111. 268; North Side R. Co. v. Worthington (Tex.),

30 S. W. Rep. 1055; Field Corporations, §§ 53, 54; IV Thompson

Law of Corp., § 5638; 2 Beach Private Corp., § 385; Green's

Brice's Ultra Vires, 88, 89.

Keeping these definitions as to implied powers in view, we may

proceed to determine whether the acts set forth in the pleas are within

or beyond the measure of power possessed by the appellee company.

It appears from the averments of those pleas which are intended to

answer the allegations of the information set forth hereinbefore as

Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 24, that the defendant

company about the year 1880 acquired and now holds a certain tract

of land containing about eighty-three acres, on a portion of which, in

the year 1880—at least not later than 1882—it caused to be constructed

a large number of dwellings and tenement houses, some of the height

of two stories and others three stories in height; that the total num-
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ber of such buildings is twenty-two hundred, and that it has laid out

and now maintains the usual and necessary streets and alleys to afford

the tenants to whom it rents said dwellings and tenement houses

the proper and usual means of ingress and egress to and from their

homes and places of business; that it now rents said dwellings and

tenements to its employes; that upon the same plat of ground upon

which said dwellings and tenements stand and where said streets and

alleys are located, it caused to be erected a number of school-houses,

a church edifice, a hotel, a la*rge building called "The Arcade," in

which are a number of rooms, some of which were constructed to be

rented for dry goods, grocery and other retail stores, and other of the

rooms were built for school, lecture and theatre rooms and for the use

of religious congregations for church purposes, and that it now rents

the rooms in said "Arcade" for the various purposes for which they

were intended when built; that it has also constructed on the same

plat of ground a large building called "Market Hall," the lower floor

whereof it caused to be fitted up for meat and vegetable markets, and

it has rented and now rents them to retail dealers in such articles of

food, and the upper floor is a large hall where concerts, dances and

other entertainments may be given, and is rented by it for such pur-

poses; that it maintains a system of water-works and sewers and a

gas plant, and for a consideration supplies those who inhabit its houses

with water, light and heat. * * *

Manifestly the acts of the corporation which have resulted in the

creation of this town or city and its acts in connection with the streets,

alleys, dwellings, tenements, school, church and business houses,

water system, sewerage, heat, etc., which the plea admits it was per-

forming at the time of the filing of the information, can not be re-

garded as the exercise of powers expressly given. Can they be justi-

poses of the corporation. Illinois Conference Female College v.
Cooper, 25 III. 133; Caldwell v. City of Alton, 33 Ill. 416; Chicago,
Pekin and Southwestern R. Co. v. Town of Marseilles, 84 Ill. 643;
Chicago Gas Light Co. v. People's Gas Light Co., 121 Ill. 530;
Mott v. Danville Seminary, 129 Ill. 403; People v. Chicago Gas
Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268; North Side R. Co. v. Worthington (Tex.),
30 S. W. Rep. 1055; Field Corporations, §§ 53, 54; IV Thompson
Law of Corp., § 5638; 2 Beach Private Corp., § 385; Green's
Brice's Ultra Vires, 88, 89.
Keeping these definitions as to implied powers in view, we may
proceed to determine whether the acts set forth in the pleas are within
or beyond the measure of power possessed by the appellee company.
It appears from the averments of those pleas which are intended to
answer the allegations of the information set forth hereinbefore as
Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 24, that the defendant
company about the year 188o acquired and now holds a certain tract
of land containing about eighty-three acres, on a portion of which, in
the year 188o-at least not later than 1882-it caused to be constructed
a large number of dwellings and tenement houses, some of the height
of two stories and others three stories in height; that the total number of such buildings is twenty-two hundred, and that it has laid out
and now maintains the usual and necessary streets and alleys to afford
the tenants to whom it rents said dwellings and tenement houses
the proper and usual means of ingress and egress to and from their
homes and places of business; that it now rents said dwellings and
tenements to its employes; that upon the same plat of ground upon
which said dwellings and tenements stand and where said streets and
alleys are located, it caused to be erected a number of school-houses,
a church edifice, a hotel, a la.rge building called "The Arcade," in
which are a number of rooms, some of which were constructed to be
rented for dry goods, grocery and other retail stores, and other of the
rooms were built for school, lecture and theatre rooms and for the use
of religious congregations for church purposes, and that it now rents
the rooms in said "Arcade" for the various purposes for which they
were intended when built; that it has also constructed on the same
plat of ground a large building called "Market Hall," the lower floor
whereof it caused to be fitted up for meat and vegetable markets, and
it has rented and now rents them to retail dealers in such articles of
food, and the upper floor is a large hall where concerts, dances and
other entertainments may be given, and is rented by it for such purposes; that it maintains a system of water-works and sewers and a
gas plant, and for a consideration supplies those who inhabit its houses
with water, light and heat. • • •
Manifestly the acts of the corporation which have resulted in the
creation of this town or city and its acts in connection with the streets,
alleys, dwellings, tenements, school, church and business houses,
water system, sewerage, heat, etc., which the plea admits it was performing at the time of the filing of the information, can not be regarded as the exercise of powers expressly given. Can they be justi-
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fied as the proper exercise of powers incidental to the express powers
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possessed by the corporation, or by the provision in the sixth clause
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of the charter that it may be lawful for the corporation to acquire and

hold such real estate as may be deemed necessary for the successful

fled as the proper exercise of powers incidental to the express powers
possessed by the corporation, or by the provision in the sixth clause
of the charter that it may be lawful for the corporation to acquire and
hold such real estate as may be deemed necessary for the successful
prosecution of its business? The declaration of the sixth clause is not
that the company may acquire and hold such real estate as it or its
directory may deem necessary, but such as may be deemed necessary
to the successful prosecution of its business. The true meaning of
this clause is not that the company or its governing body is vested
with unlimited and unbridled power to acquire and hold such real
estate as it may deem necessary, but with power to purchase and hold
only such real estate as, under the rules of law, may be deemed necessary for the successful prosecution of its business. "The rule of
construction, when any doubt arises out of any language employed in
such a charter, is, that every power that is not clearly granted is withheld, and that any ambiguity in the terms of the grant must operate
against the corporation and in favor of the public." (American
Trust Co. v. Minnesota and Northwestern Railroad Co., 1)7 lll. 641;
Illinois Health University v. People, 166 Ill. 17 r.) "Irrespective of
the operation of statutory restrictions, it is a settled principle of American jurisprudence that a corporation can not take and hold land except in so far as reasonably necessary to carry out the objects of its
creation. These bodies, which never die, are not allowed, iigainst
the objection of the state, to take and hold land for purposes wholly
foreign to the purposes for which the state endowed them with corporate existence and the power of perpetual succes~ion." 5 Tbompson' s Law of Corp., § 5772.
This court has declared that it is against the public policy of this
state to allow corporations to own real estate beyond what is necessary
for the transaction of their corporate business, or such as is acquired
in the collection of debts. (Carroll v. City of East St. Louis, 67 Ill.
568; United States Trust Co. v. Lee, 73 Ill. 142.) And in furtherance of this declared public policy statutes have been enacted by the
general assembly, requiring all corporations which have acquired
lands in the collection of debts to sell and dispose of all that is not
necessary to the purposes of the corporation, and providing remedies
designed to coerce compliance with such requirements.
Revised
Statutes, section 5I 7, chapter 32, entitled "Corporations.'' • • •
With a view of showing that the situation at the time justified the
course pursued by the company, and was sufficient to invest it with
the legal right to pursue such course, the appellee company filed pleas
averring, in substance, as follows: That after it had been for several
years in the exercise of the powers conferred by its charter, its bu iness increased to such an extent that it became necessary for it to build
large and extensive shops in which to manufacture cars; that a large
amount of land was necessary on which to locate such shops; that it
was decided to locate and build said shops in the county of Cook, in
or near the city of Chicago, where its general offices and headquarters
were, and where its principal officers resided; that it found that it

prosecution of its business? The declaration of the sixth clause is not

that the company may acquire and hold such real estate as it or its

directory may deem necessary, but such as may be deemed necessary

to the successful prosecution of its business. The true meaning of

this clause is not that the company or its governing body is vested

with unlimited and unbridled power to acquire and hold such real

estate as it may deem necessary, but with power to purchase and hold

only such real estate as, under the rules of law, may be deemed nec-

essary for the successful prosecution of its business. "The rule of

construction, when any doubt arises out of any language employed in

such a charter, is, that every power that is not clearly granted is with-

held, and that any ambiguity in the terms of the grant must operate

against the corporation and in favor of the public." (American

Trust Co. v. Minnesota and Northwestern Railroad Co., 157 111. 641;

Illinois Health University v. People, 166 111. 171.) "Irrespective of

the operation of statutory restrictions, it is a settled principle of Amer-
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ican jurisprudence that a corporation can not take and hold land ex-

cept in so far as reasonably necessary to carry out the objects of its

creation. These bodies, which never die, are not allowed, against

the objection of the state, to take and hold land for purposes wholly

foreign to the purposes for which the state endowed them with corpo-

rate existence and the power of perpetual succession." 5 Thomp-

son's Law of Corp., § 5772.

This court has declared that it is against the public policy of this

state to allow corporations to own real estate beyond what is necessary

for the transaction of their corporate business, or such as is acquired

in the collection of debts. (Carroll v. City of East St. Louis, 67 111.

568; United States Trust Co. v. Lee, 73 111. 142.) And in further-

ance of this declared public policy statutes have been enacted by the

general assembly, requiring all corporations which have acquired

lands in the collection of debts to sell and dispose of all that is not

necessary to the purposes of the corporation, and providing remedies

designed to coerce compliance with such requirements. Revised

Statutes, section 517, chapter 32, entitled "Corporations." * • *

With a view of showing that the situation at the time justified the

course pursued by the company, and was sufficient to invest it with

the legal right to pursue such course, the appellee company filed pleas

averring, in substance, as follows: That after it had been for several

years in the exercise of the powers conferred by its charter, its busi-

ness increased to such an extent that it became necessary for it to build

large and extensive shops in which to manufacture cars; that a large

amount of land was necessary on which to locate such shops; that it

was decided to locate and build said shops in the county of Cook, in

or near the city of Chicago, where its general offices and headquarters

were, and where its principal officers resided; that it found that it
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could not acquire a sufficient amount of land upon which to erect said
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shops within the city of Chicago on account of the high price of land

in said city; that after diligent and careful inquiry as to the price of

land and the means of access thereto, it decided to build its shops

where they are now situated. * • *

[It is claimed that]: "Accordingly, in the exercise of its best

judgment, appellee selected and purchased about 350 acres of land

situated upon the shores of Lake Calumet, fourteen miles distant from

its offices and ten miles beyond the then limits of the city of Chicago.

The land at that time was practically an unoccupied waste. It was

surrounded for a very considerable distance in all directions save to-

ward the lake, by farming and unoccupied lands. There were no con-

venient places where employes of the company could find homes or

dwelling places. The construction of the manufactory therefore in-

volved, not the expediency simply, but the necessity, of providing

places suitable for the occupancy of those who were to do its work.

The manufactory and the homes for the workmen were mutually and

equally necessary to the success of the enterprise. 'The power to

manufacture cars' was barren without the other charter power 'to pur-
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chase, acquire and hold such real estate as may be deemed necessary.'

It was only by the combination of the two—by their exercise together,

in the manner which has been described—that the object of the charter,

'the successful prosecution of their business,' could be accomplished.

Accordingly, the exercise of these powers was undertaken cotempora-

neously. The construction of the works and the construction of the

dwelling places of those who were to operate them was undertaken at

the same time and as a part of a single, harmonious scheme. Two

years of time and the labor of 4,000 men transported daily to and fro

between Chicago and the point of location, were devoted to the work.

At the expiration of that time the result appeared in the completed

structures of a manufactory giving employment to 5,000 persons, and

in its immediate vicinity dwelling houses sufficient in number for the

comfortable occupancy of a large part of these persons with their fam-

ilies and those dependent upon them, with the necessary school-houses

for the education of their children, churches for their religious in-

struction, stores and shops where the necessaries of life could be pro-

cured, halls suitable for lectures and social entertainments—all so ar-

ranged with such accessories of streets, parks and other provisions, as

to minister not simply to the necessities, but also to the comfort and

well-being of those who might be employed."

The averment of the plea the corporation was obliged to construct

such houses and tenements is but the statement of a conclusion, and

we find the facts pleaded do not justify such a deduction. No reason

existed, nor do we find in the pleas even a suggestion that there was

reason or ground, for the apprehension that individual enterprise and

private capital would not at once, after the purpose and intention of

the corporation became known, provide all necessary dwellings and

• tenements for the accommodation of the workmen, or that the wants

59—Wil. Cases.

could not acquire a sufficient amount of land upon which to erect said
shops within the city of Chicago on account of the high price of land
in said city; that after diligent and careful inquiry as to the price of
land and the means of access thereto, it decided to build its shops
where they are now situated. • • •
[It is claimed that]: "Accordingly, in the exercise of its best
judgment, appellee selected and purchased about 350 acres of land
situated upon the shores of Lake Calumet, fourteen miles distant from
its offices and ten miles beyond the then limits of the city of Chicago.
The land at that time was practically an unoccupied waste. It was
surrounded for a very considerable distance in all directions save toward the lake, by farming and unoccupied lands. There were no convenient places where employes of the company could find homes or
dwelling place_s. The construction of the manufactory therefore involved, not the expediency simply, but the necessity, of providing
places suitable for the occupancy of those who were to do its work.
The manufactory and the homes for the workmen were mutually and
eq_ually necessary to the success of the enterprise. 'The power to
manufacture cars' was barren without the other charter power 'to purchase, acquire and hold such real estate as may be deemed necessary.'
It was only by the combination of the two-by their exercise together,
in the manner which has been described-that the object of the charter,
'the successful prosecution of their business,' could be accomplished.
Accordingly, the exercise of these powers was undertaken cotemporaneously. The construction of the works and the construction of the
dwelling places of those who were to operate them was undertaken at
the same time and as a part of a single, harmonious scheme. Two
years of time and the labor of 4,000 men transported daily to and fro
between Chicago and the point of location, were devoted to the work.
At the expiration of that time the result appeared in the completed
structures of a manufactory giving employment to 5,000 persons, and
in its immediate vicinity dwelling houses sufficient in number for the
comfortable occupancy of a large part of these persons with their families and those dependent upon them, with the necessary school-houses
for the education of their children, churches for their religious instruction, stores and shops where the necessaries of life could be procured, halls suitable for lectures and social entertainments-all so arranged with such accessories of streets, parks and other provisions, as
to minister not simply to the necessities, but also to the comfort and
well-being of those who might be employed."
The averment of the plea the corporation was obliged to construct
such houses and tenements is but the statement of ·a conclusion, and
we find the facts pleaded do not justify such a deduction. No reason
existed, nor do we find in the pleas even a suggestion that there was
reason or ground, for the apprehension that individual enterprise and
private capital would not at once, after the purpose and intention of
the corporation became known, provide all necessary dwellings and
tenements for the accommodation of the workmen, or that the wants
59-WIL. CASES.
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of the community composed of such workmen would not at once be

met by the location in its midst of schools, churches, dry goods and
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grocery stores, meat markets, etc., or that the necessary streets, alleys,
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and public ways would not be provided without any intervention

of the community composed of such workmen would not at once be
met by the location in its midst of schools, churches, dry goods and
grocery stores, meat markets, etc., or that the necessary streets, alleys,
and public ways would not be provided without any intervention
whatever on the part of the corporation. The public laws of the
state would have supplied the requisite school-houses and teachers,
and the inclinations of the inclividual members of the community
could have been safely relied upon to provide church houses and
rooms for imparting religious instruction. It is idle to argue it became in any sense necessary or directly appropriate to the accomplishment of the lawful and chartered purposes or objects of the corporation it should engage its efforts or capital in the construction of dwellings, tenement houses, store houses, streets, alleys, theaters, hotel,
churches, school-houses, water-works, a system of sewers, etc. Workmen, if they have families, must have homes, or if unmarried must
be accommodated with boarding and places of lodging. Homes,
groceries, vegetables, bread, meat, clothing, furniture, light, heat,
water, school books, medicine, the services of physicians, dentists
and other professional men, and many other things, become necessary
to the health, comfort, or convenience of such workmen and their
families; but the right and power to supply such wants had, in this
instance, so far as the pleas show, no direct relation or connection
with the successful prosecution of the specific object of the appellee
corporation. The relation was but remote, indirect and mediate,not direct and immediate. Implied power can not be invoked to
authorize a corporation to engage in collateral enterprises but remotely
connected with the specific purposes it was created to accomplish.
A power which a corporation may exercise by implication must be
bounded by the purposes of the corporate existence and the terms and
intention of the charter, and acts which tend only remotely and by
indirection to promote its interests and chartered objects can not be
justified by implication of law, but are ultra vires.
Cases cited holding corporations operating mines or mills engaged
in sawing lumber had implied power to construct dwellings and
boarding-houses for their employes can have little or no influence
upon the question here presented. In those cases the fact the works
or mills of the corporation were necessarily located at mines or near
large forests, and other circumstances peculiar to the respective cases,
were deemed sufficient to justify the corporations in arranging for the
lodging or boarding of their workmen or in building homes to s-helter
them and their families. The circumstances in each of such cases as
can be accepted as having been well considered, were such it became,
in a legal sense, necessary to the accomplishment of the chartered
purposes of the corporation that it should exercise such power as was
accorded it by implication of law. Exceptional circumstances or extraordinary conditions may make it necessary to the proper prosecution of the business of a corporation that it shall be accorded implied
power to perform acts beyond its express power, and which, except
for the prevailing conditions, would be wholly unwarranted. But in

whatever on the part of the corporation. The public laws of the

state would have supplied the requisite school-houses and teachers,

and the inclinations of the individual members of the community

could have been safely relied upon to provide church houses and

rooms for imparting religious instruction. It is idle to argue it be-

came in any sense necessary or directly appropriate to the accomplish-

ment of the lawful and chartered purposes or objects of the corpora-

tion it should engage its efforts or capital in the construction of dwell-

ings, tenement houses, store houses, streets, alleys, theaters, hotel,

churches, school-houses, water-works, a system of sewers, etc. Work-

men, if they have families, must have homes, or if unmarried must

be accommodated with boarding and places of lodging. Homes,

groceries, vegetables, bread, meat, clothing, furniture, light, heat,

water, school books, medicine, the services of physicians, dentists

and other professional men, and many other things, become necessary

to the health, comfort, or convenience of such workmen and their
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families; but the right and power to supply such wants had, in this

instance, so far as the pleas show, no direct relation or connection

with the successful prosecution of the specific object of the appellee

corporation. The relation was but remote, indirect and mediate,—

not direct and immediate. Implied power can not be invoked to

authorize a corporation to engage in collateral enterprises but remotely

connected with the specific purposes it was created to accomplish.

A power which a corporation may exercise by implication must be

bounded by the purposes of the corporate existence and the terms and

intention of the charter, and acts which tend only remotely and by

indirection to promote its interests and chartered objects can not be

justified by implication of law, but are ultra vires.

Cases cited holding corporations operating mines or mills engaged

in sawing lumber had implied power to construct dwellings and

boarding-houses for their employes can have little or no influence

upon the question here presented. In those cases the fact the works

or mills of the corporation were necessarily located at mines or near

large forests, and other circumstances peculiar to the respective cases,

were deemed sufficient to justify the corporations in arranging for the

lodging or boarding of their workmen or in building homes to shelter

them and their families. The circumstances in each of such cases as

can be accepted as having been well considered, were such it became,

in a legal sense, necessary to the accomplishment of the chartered

purposes of the corporation that it should exercise such power as was

accorded it by implication of law. Exceptional circumstances or ex-

traordinary conditions may make it necessary to the proper prosecu-

tion of the business of a corporation that it shall be accorded implied

power to perform acts beyond its express power, and which, except

for the prevailing conditions, would be wholly unwarranted. But in
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the case in hand the appellee corporation voluntarily assumed to de-
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vote its corporate capital and power to that which, to say the least,
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but remotely and indirectly tended to aid the accomplishment of the

purposes it had the right to pursue under conditions and circumstances

which were neither rare nor unusual.

The argument of counsel for appellee that the construction of the

manufacturing plant involved, not the expediency simply, but the ne-

cessity of providing places suitable for the occupancy of those who

were to do its work, "and that in view of this the company deter-

mined to undertake, and did undertake, to construct its works and

dwelling places for its workmen at the same time and as a part of a

single harmonious plan," is fallacious. It ignores the palpable fact

that no duty of providing houses for its workmen was pressed upon

the company by surrounding conditions or circumstances as a neces-

sity, but was adopted as a matter of choice, based, it may have been,

upon motives which were in part benevolent or charitable in their

nature. Had it purchased only that quantity of ground needful for its

proper corporate uses, and restricted its efforts and expenditures to

the construction of such buildings as would have answered its corpo-
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rate wants, there appears to us no reason to believe that the question

of homes for its workmen, market places or stores where such work-

men could purchase supplies, or school rooms where their children

could receive instruction, or the making of streets and alleys, would

ever have demanded the thought or attention of its governing body.

It is beyond reason to conclude that had the way been left open pri-

vate capital and individual enterprise would have overlooked this de-

sirable field of operations, or that merchants, tradesmen, butchers and

other classes of business men would not have appeared and entered

into business rivalry for the custom of the workmen and their fami-

lies, and that the prosecution of the business of the corporation would

have suffered because its workmen could not find homes or places

where the articles necessary to supply their wants and add to their

comfort could be purchased, and yet it is upon this ground it is sought

to justify the acts of the corporation which are now under considera-

tion.

The prohibition of the law against the unauthorized exercise of

power by corporations is based upon grounds of public policy, and

the wisdom of the rule may here find exemplification. Conceding the

rectitude of the purpose which it is alleged operated to induce the

acts of the corporation which resulted in the creation of the town or

city of Pullman, we are constrained to declare the corporation had

not lawful power to perform such acts, and that the existence of a

town or city where the streets, alleys, school-houses, business houses,

sewerage system, hotels, churches, theaters, water-works, market

places, dwellings and tenements are the exclusive property of a cor-

poration is opposed to good public policy, and incompatible with the

theory and spirit of our institutions. It is clearly the theory of our

law that streets, alleys and public ways, and public school buildings,

should be committed to the control of the proper public authorities,

the case in hand the appellee corporation voluntarily assumed to devote its corporate capital and power to that which, to say the least,
but remotely and indirectly tended to aid the accomplishment of the
purposes it had the right to pursue under conditions and circumstances
which were neither rare nor unusual.
The argum ent of counsel for appellee that the construction of the
manufacturing plant involved, not the expediency simply, but the necessity of providing places suitable for the occupancy of those who
were to do its work, "and that in view of this the company determined to undertake, and did undertake, to construct its works and
dwelling places for its workmen at the same time and as a part of a
single harmonious plan," is fallacious. It ignores the palpable fact
that no duty of providing houses for its workmen was pressed upon
the company by surrounding conditions or circumstances as a necessity, but was adopted as a maher of choice, based, it may have been,
upon motives which were in part b_e nevolent or charitable in their
nature. Had it purchased only that quantity of ground needful for its
proper corporate uses, and restricted its efforts and expenditures to
the construction of such buildings as would have answered its corporate wants, there appears to us no reason to believe that the question
of homes for its workmen, market places or stores where such workmen could purchase supplies, or school rooms where their children
could receive instruction, or the making of streets and alleys, would
ever have demanded the thought or attention of its governing body.
It is beyond reason to conclude that had the way been left open private capital and individual enterprise would hav~ overlooked this desirable field of operations, or that merchants, tradesmen, butchers and
other classes of business men would not have appeared and entered
into business rivalry for the custom of the workmen and their families, and that tne prosecution of the business of the corporation would
have suffered because its workmen could not find homes or places
where the articles necessary to supply their wants and add to their
comfort could be purchased, and yet it is upon this ground it is sought
to justify the acts of the corporation which are now under consideration.
The prohibition of the law against the unauthorized exercise of
power by corporations is based upon grounds of public policy, and
the wisdom of the rule may here find exemplification. Conceding the
rectitude of the purpose which it is alleged operated to induce the
acts of the corporation which resulted in the creation of the town or
city of Pullman, we are constrained to declare the corporation h ad
not lawful power to perform such acts, and that the existence of a
town or city where the streets, alleys, school-houses, business houses,
sewerage system, hotels, churches, theaters, water-works, market
places, dwellings and tenements are the exclusive property of a corporation is opposed to good public policy, and incompatible with the
theory and spirit of our institutions. It is clearly the theory of our
law that streets, alleys and public ways, and public school buildings,
should be committed to the control of the proper public authorities,
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and that real estate should be kept as fully as possible in the channels

of trade and commerce, and good public policy demands that the
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number of persons who should engage in the business of selling such
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articles as are necessary to the support, maintenance and comfort of

and that real estate should be kept as fully as possible in the channels
of trade and commerce, and good public policy demands that the
number of persons who should engage in the business of selling such
articles as are necessary to the support, maintenance and comfort of
the people of any community should not be restricted by the will of
any person, natural or artificial, but should be left to be determined
by the healthy, wholesome and natural operations of the rules of trade
and bu sinesl', free from all that which tends to stifle competition and
foster monopolies.
We think the averments of the plea in response to the allegations of
the information under consideration were insufficient to present a legal
defense.. • • •
·
[The court held further that the construction and operation of a
sewerage system and sewerage farm, .w ith truck gardening thereon,
though necessary to the health of the dwellers in Pullman, was not
justified by its relation to the usurped power of owning the town of
Pullman; that under the express power to "sell supplies" to persons
traveling on its cars, it was authorized to sell beer, wine and whisky
as beverages; that the ownership of fifty-five acres of vacant land,
upon which to dump cinders was lawful; that the ownership of twenty-three acres solely to meet the necessity for additional dwelling
hou ses was unlawful ; that the ownership of twenty-five acres, for the
purpose of providing for the proper storage of its cars when needed in
the future, was lawful; that it was lawful to construct very large
steam boilers with a view of anticipating its probable future wants ,
and, in the meantime, until needed, to furnish an adjoining manufacturing company with steam; that it is unlawful to hold shares of
stock in the Pullman Iron and Steel Company though all its product,
being necessary in the construction of cars, is used by the defendant,
so that in effect the Steel Company is a mere department of the defendant; that the existence of the alleged usurpations for eighteen
years, with the knowledge of the state, and the collection of taxes
during that time upon the property was not a waiver, nor sufficient to
work an estoppel , upon the part of the state.]
R eversed and r emanded.

the people of any community should not be restricted by the will of

any person, natural or artificial, but should be left to be determined

by the healthy, wholesome and natural operations of the rules of trade

and business, free from all that which tends to stifle competition and

foster monopolies.

We think the averments of the plea in response to the allegations of

the information under consideration were insufficient to present a legal

defense. * * •

[The court held further that the construction and operation of a

sewerage system and sewerage farm, with truck gardening thereon,

though necessary to the health of the dwellers in Pullman, was not

justified by its relation to the usurped power of owning the town of

Pullman; that under the express power to "sell supplies" to persons

traveling on its cars, it was authorized to sell beer, wine and whisky

as beverages; that the ownership of fifty-five acres of vacant land,

upon which to dump cinders was lawful; that the ownership of twen-
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ty-three acres solely to meet the necessity for additional dwelling

houses was unlawful; that the ownership of twenty-five acres, for the

purpose of providing for the proper storage of its cars when needed in

the future, was lawful; that it was lawful to construct very large

steam boilers with a view of anticipating its probable future wants,

and, in the meantime, until needed, to furnish an adjoining manufac-

turing company with steam; that it is unlawful to hold shares of

stock in the Pullman Iron and Steel Company though all its product,

being necessary in the construction of cars, is used by the defendant,

so that in effect the Steel Company is a mere department of the de-

fendant; that the existence of the alleged usurpations for eighteen

years, with the knowledge of the state, and the collection of taxes

during that time upon the property was not a waiver, nor sufficient to

work an estoppel, upon the part of the state.]

Reversed and remanded.

Craig, Wilkin and Cartwright, JJ., dissenting, approved the

following statement as to implied powers:

"It is axiomatic that corporations have not only the powers ex-

pressly granted but those which are necessarily implied; that while

they derive all their powers from the legislature which creates them,

it is also true that what is fairly implied is as certainly granted as

what is expressed; that unless restrained by their charters they have

the power to deal precisely, in carrying out the corporate purposes,

as individuals seeking to accomplish the same ends; that they may

CRAIG, WILKIN AND CARTWRIGHT, JJ., dissenting, approved the
following statement as to implied powers :
"It is axiomatic that corporations have not only the powers expressly granted but those which are necessarily implied; that while
they derive all their powers from the legislature which creates them
it is also true that what is fairly implied is as certainly granted as
what is expressed; that unless restrained by their charters they have
the power to deal precisely, in carrying out the corporate purposes,
as individuals seeking to accomplish the same ends; that they may
' resort to any means that would be necessary and proper for an individual in executing the same , unless they be prohibited by the tenns
of their charters or some public law from so doing;' that while, in regard to their express powers, the grants are construed most liberally

'resort to any means that would be necessary and proper for an indi-

vidual in executing the same, unless they be prohibited by the terms

of their charters or some public law from so doing;' that while, in re-

gard to their express powers, the grants are construed most liberally
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in favor of the state and most strictly against the corporation, yet in

933

regard to incidental powers neither strict nor liberal, but only reason-

able, rules of construction are applied; that corporations may so far

develop and extend their operations as to engage in matters not pri-

marily contemplated by their founders, provided these matters be

fairly within their scope, and provided, also, that in so developing and

extending their undertakings they employ direct, and not indirect,

means; that different rules of construction are to be applied to char-

ters of corporations organized under special acts and those organized

under a general law, the greater strictness of interpretation being em-

ployed in dealing with the latter; that 'necessary,' when used in de-

fining the powers of corporations, does not mean what is simply in-

dispensable, but also what is useful, convenient and proper to carry

into effect the franchises granted. I Spelling on Corp., §§ 68, 73,

5, and cases cited; Green's Brice's Ultra Vires, pp. 66, 71, 73, 75,

7, 91, and cases cited; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9; Union Bank

v. Jacobs, 6 Humph. 525; Railroad Co. v. Berks County, 6 Pa. St.

70; P. & S. R. Co. v. Lewis, 33 Pa. St. 33; New England Fire
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and Marine Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 25 Ind. 541; Brown v. Winnisim-

met Co., 11 Allen 326; Old Colony R. Co. v. Evans, 6 Gray 25;

McCuIloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; State v. Hancock, 35 N. J.

L. 537; Crawford v. Longstreet, 43 N. J. L. 328; Ellerman v. Rail-

way Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 217; 2 Cook Stockholders (3d ed.), § 681."

See, also, Madison, etc., Co. v. Watertown, etc., Co., 5 Wis. 173,

and Clark v. Farrington, 11 Wis. 321.

In the case of Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9, it was held that cor-

porations, along with their specific powers, take all the reasonable

means of execution, all that are convenient and adapted to the end in

view; that the corporation has a liberty of choice amongst those

means, and that if in the exercise of such liberty an intelligent good

faith is used, then the power to select the means adopted can not be

called in question.

In State v. Hancock, 35 N. J. L. 537, it was said by Chief Justice

Beasley: "Power necessary to a corporation does not mean simply

power which is indispensable. Such phraseology has never been in-

terpreted in so narrow a sense. There are a few powers which are,

in the strict sense, absolutely necessary to those artificial persons, and

to concede to them powers only of such a character, while it might not

entirely paralyze, would very greatly embarrass their operations.

Such in similar cases has never been the legal acceptance of this term.

A power which is obviously appropriate and convenient to carry into

effect the franchise granted has always been deemed a necessary one."

And further said: "The term comprises a grant of the right to use all

the means suitable and proper to accomplish the end which the legis-

lature had in view at the time of the enactment of the charter."

Note. (1) Implied powers. 1825, The Banks v. Poitiaux, 3 Rand. (Va.)

136, 15 Am. Dec. 706; 1831, Attorney-General v. Stevens, 1 Saxton Ch. (N-

J.) 369, 22 Am. Dec. 526; 1840, Commercial Bank v. Newport Mfg. Co., 1 B-

Mon. (Kv.) 13, 35 Am. Dec. 171; 1848, Mclntire v. Preston, 5 Gil. (111.) 48,

in favor of the state and most strictly against the corporation, yet in
regard to incidental powers neither strict nor liberal, but only reasonable, rules of construction are applied; that corporations may so far
develop and extend their operations as to engage in matters not primarily contemplated by their founders, provided these matters be
fairly within their scope, and provided, also, that in so developing and
extending their undertakings they employ direct, and not indirect,
means; that different rules of construction are to be applied to charters of corporations organized under special acts and those organized
under a general law, the greater strictness of interpretation being employed in dealing with the latter; that 'necessary,' when used in defining the powers of corporations, does not mean what is simply indispensable, but also what is useful, convenient and proper to carry
into effect the franchises granted. 1 Spelling on Corp., §§ 68, 73,
75, and cases cited; Green's Brice's Ultra Vires, pp. 66, 71, 73, 75,
87, 91, and cases cited; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9; Union Bank
v. Jacobs, 6 Humph. 525; Railroad Co. v... Berks County, 6 Pa. St.
70; P. & S. R. Co. v. Lewis, 33 Pa. St. 33; New England Fire
and Marine Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 25 Ind. 541; Brown v. Winnisimmet Co., 11 Allen 326; Old Colony R. Co. v. Evans, 6 Gray 25;
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; State v. Hancock, 35 N. J.
L. 537; Crawford v. Longstreet, 43 N. J. L. 328; Ellerman v. Railway Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 217; 2 Cook Stockholders (3d ed.),§ 681."
See, also, Madison, etc., Co. v. Watertown, etc., Co., 5 Wis. 173,
and Clark v. Farrington, 11 Wis. 321.
In the case of Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9 1 it was held that corporations, along with their specific powers, take all the reasonable
means of execution, all that are convenient and adapted to the end in
view; that the corporation has a liberty of choice amongst those
means, and that if in the exercise of such liberty an intelligent good
faith is used, then the power to select the means adopted can not be
called in question.
In State v. Hancock, 35 N. J. L. 537 1 it was said by Chief Justice
Beasley: "Power necessary to a corporation does not mean simply
power which is indispensable. Such phraseology has never been interpreted in so narrow a sense. There are a few powers which are,
in the strict sense, absolutely necessary to those artificial persons, and
to concede to them powers only of such a character, while it might not
entirely paralyze, would very greatly embarrass their operations.
Such in similar cases has never been the legal acceptance of this term.
A power which is obviously appropriate and convenient to carry into
effect the franchise granted has always been deemed a necessary one.''
And further said: "The term comprises a grant of the right to use all
the means suitable and proper to accomplish the end which the legislature had in view at the time of the enactment of the charter."
Note. (1) Implied powers. 1825, The Banke v. Poitiaux, 3 Rand. (Va.}
136, 15 Am. Dec. 706; 1831, Attorney-General v. Stevena, 1 Saxton Ch. (N·
J.) 369, .22 Am. Dec. 526; 1840, Commercial Bank v. Newport Mfg. Co., 1 B.
Mon. ( Ky.) 13, 35 Am. Dec. 171; 1848, Mcintire v. Preston, 5 Gil. (Ill.) 48,
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48 Am. Dec. 321; 1852, State v. Coram'rs, 3 Zabr. (N. J.) 510, 57 Am. Dec.
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409; 1853, Southern Life Ins. & T. Co. v. Lanier, 5 Fla. 110,58 Am. Dec. 448;
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1853, Smith v. Nashua, etc., R. Co., 27 N. H. 86, 94, 59 Am. Dec. 364; 1859,

Philadelphia, etc., R. v. Lewis, 33 Pa. St. 33, 75 Am. Dec. 574; 1859, Hope

48 Am. Dec. 321; 1852, State v. Comm'rs, 3 Zabr. (N. J. ) 510, 57 Am. Dec.
409 ; 1853, Southern Life Ins. & T. Co. v. Lanier, 5 Fla. 110, 58 Am. Dec. 448;
1853, Smith v. Nashua, etc., R. Co., 27 N. H. 86, 94, 59 Am. Dec. 364; 1859,
Philadelphia, etc., R. v. Lewis, 33 Pa. St. 33, 75 Am. Dec. 574; 1859, Hope
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Weed, 28 Conn. 51, 63; 1860, Miles v. Gleason, 11 Wis.
470, 78 Am. Dec. 721; 1860, Downie v. White & Hoover, 12 Wis. 174, 176, 78
Am. Dec. 730, 731; 1862, Bardstown, etc., R. Co. v. Metcalf, 4 Metcf. (Ky.)
199, 81 Am. Dec. 541; 1863, Olcott v. Tioga R. Co., 27 N. Y. 546, 84 Am Dec.
298; 1865, Brown v. Winnissimmet, 11 Allen (Mass.) 326, 334; 1867, Cleve·
la nd, etc., R. Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. St. 325, 94 Am. Dec. 84; 1867, Pixley v.
Western Pac. R. Co., 33 Cal. 183, 91 Am. Dec. 623; 1871, State v. Hancock, 35
N. J. L. 537, 545; 1877, Low v. Central Pac. R., 52 Cal. 53, 28 Am. Rep. 629;
1878, Deringer v. Deringer, 5 Houst. (Del. ) 416, 1 Am. St. Rep. 150; 1880,
Attorney-General v. Great East. R. Co., L. R. 5 App. 473; 1883, Liebke v.
Knapp, 79 Mo. 22, 49 Am. Rep. 212; 1884, London Finan. Assn. v. Kelk, L.
R., 26 Oh. Div. 107; 1885, Graber v . Washi11gton, etc., R. Co., 1:12 N. C. 1;
1885, Sutro Tunnel Co. v. Segregated B. M. Co., 19 Nev. 121; 1887, Ele vator
Co. v. l\:lempbis, etc., R. Co., 85 Tenn. 703, 4 Am. St. Rep. 798; 1889, P eople
v. Chicago, etc., T. Co., 130 Ill. 268, 17 Am. St. Rep. 319; 1890, Killingsworth
v. Portland Trust Co., 18 Ore. 351, 17 Am. St. Rep. 737; 1891, Ellerman v.
Chicago J c. R. Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 217; 1892, Richelieu Hotel Co. v. lnternnt'l
Mill En. Co., 140 Ill. 248, 33 Am. St. Rep. 234; 1894, Fort Worth City v.
Smith Bridge Co., 151 U. S. 294, 44 Am. & E. C. C. 604; 1894, Wheeler Osgood, etc., Co. v. Everett L. Co., 14 Wash. 630; 1895, B. S. Green Co. v.
Blodgett, 159 Ill. 169, 50 Am. St. Rep. 1~; 1895, Northside R. Co. v. W ortbington, 88 Texas 562, 53 Am. St. Rep. 778, n. 789; 1895, Jacksonville, etc., R.
Co. v. Hooper, 160 U.S. 514; 1896, Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffy, 151 N. Y.
24; 1897, Winterfield v. Cream Brewing Co., 96 Wis. 239; 1897, Malone v.
Lancaster L. Co., 182 Pa. St. 309; 1898, Nicollet Nat'! Bank v. Frisk-Turner
Co., 71 Minn. 413, 70 Am. St. 334; 1899, Central Ohio Natural Gae Co. v. Capital City Dairy Co. , 60 Ohio St. 96; 1899, Parkman Sugar Co. v . Bank, etc., Co.,
60 Kan. 474, 57 Pac. Rep. 126; 1899, State v. Newman, 51 La. Ann. 833, i2
Arn. St. Rep. 476; 1899, Trenton Potteries Co. v. Oliphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507,

Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Weed, 28 Conn. 51, 63; 1860, Miles v. Gleason, 11 Wis.

470, 78 Am. Dec. 721; 1860, Downie v. White & Hoover, 12 Wis. 174, 176, 78

Am. Dec. 730, 731; 1862, Bardstown, etc., R. Co. v. Metcalf, 4 Metcf. (Ky.)

199, 81 Am. Dec. 541; 1863, Olcott v. Tioga R. Co., 27 N. Y. 546, 84 Am Dec.

298; 1865, Brown v. Winnissimmet, 11 Allen (Mass.) 326,334; 1867, Cleve-

land, etc., R. Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. St. 325, 94 Am. Dec. 84; 1867, Pixley v.

Western Puc. R. Co., 33 Cal. 183, 91 Am. Dec. 623; 1871, State v. Hancock, 35

N. J. L. 537, 545; 1877, Low v. Central Pac. R,, 52 Cal. 53, 28 Am. Rep. 629;

1878, Deringer v. Deringer, 5 Houst. (Del.) 416, 1 Am. St. Rep. 150; 1880,

Attorney-General v. Great East. R. Co., L. R. 5 App. 473; 1883, Liebke v.

Knapp, 79 Mo. 22, 49 Am. Rep. 212; 1884, London Finan. Assn. v. Kelk, L.

R., 26 Ch. Div. 107; 1885, Graber v. Washington, etc., R. Co., 92 N. C. 1;

1885, Sutro Tunnel Co. v. Segregated B. M. Co., 19 Nev. 121; 1887, Elevator

Co. v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 85 Tenn. 703, 4 Am. St. Rep. 798; 1889, People

v. Chicago, etc., T. Co., 130 111. 268, 17 Am. St. Rep. 319; 1890, Killingsworth

v. Portland Trust Co., 18 Ore. 351, 17 Am. St. Rep. 737; 1891, Ellerman v.
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Chicago Jc. R. Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 217; 1892, Richelieu Hotel Co. v. Internat'l

Mill En. Co., 140 111. 248, 33 Am. St. Rep. 234; 1894, Fort Worth City v.

Smith Bridge Co., 151 U. S. 294, 44 Am. & E. C. C. 604; 1894, Wheeler"Os-

good, etc., Co. v. Everett L. Co., 14 Wash. 630; 1895, B. S. Green Co. v.

Blodgett, 159 111. 169,50 Am. St. Rep. 146; 1895, Northside R. Co. v. Worth-

ington, 88 Texas 562, 53 Am. St. Rep. 778, n. 789; 1895, Jacksonville, etc., R.

Co. v. Hooper, 160 IT. S. 514; 1896, Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffv, 151 N. Y.

24; 1897, Winterfleld v. Cream Brewing Co., 96 Wis. 239; 1897", Malone v.

Lancaster L. Co., 182 Pa. St. 309; 1898, Nicollet Nat'l Bank v. Frisk-Turner

Co., 71 Minn. 413, 70 Am. St. 334; 1899, Central Ohio Natural Gas Co. v. Cap-

ital City Dairy Co., 60 Ohio St. 96; 1899, Parkman Sugar Co. v. Bank, etc., Co.,

60 Kan. 474, 57 Pac. Rep. 126; 1899, State v. Newman, 51 La. Ann. 833, 72

Am. St. Rep. 476; 1899, Trenton Potteries Co. v. Oliphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507,

46 L. R. A. 255.

46 L. R. A. 255.

(2) Rules of construing corporate charters.

(2) Rules of construing corporate charters.

1. The cardjnal rule h ere, as in all cases, is to ascertain the legislative inand give it full effect. 1836, Middle Bridge Proprietors v; Brooks, 13
Mame 391, 29 Am. Dec. 510; 1846, Enfield T. B . Co. v. H. & N. R. Co .. 17
Conn. 454, 44 Am. Dec. 556; 1848, Mayor, etc., v. B. & 0 . R. Co., 6 Gill ( Md .)
288, 48 Am. Dec. 531; 1854, Boston & L. R . Co. v. Salem & L. R. Co., 2 Grny
(68 Mass.) 1; 1855, Straus, etc., v. Eagle Ins. Co., 5 Ohio State 59, 61; 1858,
State v. Passaic T. P. Co., 27 N. J. Law 217; 1859, Pennock v. Coe, 23 H ow.
(64 U.S.) 117; 1859, State v. Noyes, 47 Maine 189; 1860, Hartford Bridge Co.
v . Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 210; 1862, Moran v. Miami Co. Comm'rs, 2
Black (67 U., .) 722; 1869, Home of Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. (75 U.S. )
430 ; 1887, Lawrence v. Morgan, etc., Co., 39 La. Ann. 427, 4 Am. St. Rep.
265; 1888, West Branch, etc., Co. v. Lumber, etc., Co., 121 Pa. St. 143, 6 Am.
St. Rep. 766.
2. With the exceptions n oted below, the language granting corporate pow-

1. The cardinal rule here, as in all cases, is to ascertain the legislative in-

ten~,

tent, and give it full effect. 1836, Middle Bridge Proprietors v. Brooks, 13

Maine 391, 29 Am. Dec. 510; 1846, Enfield T. B. Co. v. H. & N. R. Co.. 17

Conn. 454, 44 Am. Dec. 556; 1848, Mayor,etc., v. B. & O. R.Co., 6 Gill fMd.)

288, 48 Am. Dec. 531; 1854, Boston & L. R. Co. v. Salem & L. R. Co., 2 Gray

(68 Mass.) 1; 1855, StrauB, etc., v. Eagle Ins. Co., 5 Ohio State 59. 61; 1858,

State v. Passaic T. P. Co., 27 N. J. Law 217; 1859, Pennock v. Coe, 23 How.

1 (64 U. S.) 117; 1859, State v. Noyes, 47 Maine 189; 1860, Hartford Bridge Co.

v.Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 210; 1862, Moran v. Miami Co. Comm'rs. 2

Black (67 U. S.) 722; 1869, Home of Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. (75 U. S.)

430; 1887, Lawrence v. Morgan, etc., Co., 39 La. Ann. 427, 4 Am. St. Rep.

265; 1888, West Branch, etc., Co. v. Lumber, etc., Co., 121 Pa. St. 143,6 Am.

St. Rep. 766.

ers should ne ither be construed strictly nor liberally, but according to its fair
and natural import, with reference to the purposes and objects of the corporation; the whole law should be consid'ered, and the words given their ordin ary meaning, unless custom or usage bas clearly given them a different one.
18-!6, Enfielo T. B. Co. v. H. & N. R. Co., 17 Conn. 454, 44 Am. Dec. 531;
1853 Belleville, etc., R. Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20, 58 Am. Dec. 589; 1855,
Stra~e v. Eagle Ins. Co., 5 Ohio State 59; 1859, Dexter Lime-Rock Co. v.
Dexter, 6 R. I. S53; 1860, Downing v. Mt. Wnshington R. Co., 4-0 N . B.
230; 1865, The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 51: 1865, Brown v.
Winnieimmet Co., 11 Allen (Mass. l 326, 334: 1876, State v. Fla. Cent. R. Co.,
15 Fla. 690. 699; 1878, Whitaker v. Canal Co., 87 Pa. St. 34, 37; 1880, AUy .Gen') v. Great East. R. Co., L. R., 5 App. 473; 1880, Fairchild v. Masonic

2. With the exceptions noted below, the language granting corporate pow-

ers should neither be construed strictly nor liberally, Dut according to its fair

and natural import, with reference to the purposes and objects of the corpo-

ration; the whole law should be considered, and the words given their ordi-

nary meaning, unless custom or usage has clear]v given them a different one.

1846, Enfield T. B. Co. v. H. & N. R. Co., 17 Conn. 454, 44 Am. Dec. 531;

1853, Belleville, etc., R. Co. v. Gregory, 15 111. 20, 58 Am. Dec. 589; 1855,

Straus v. Eagle Ins. Co., 5 Ohio State 59; 1859, Dexter Lime-Rock Co. v.

Dexter, 6 R. I. 353; 1860, Downing v. Mt. Washington R. Co., 40 N. H.

230; 1865, The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 51; 1865, Brown v.

Winnisimmet Co., 11 Allen (Mass.) 326, 334; 1876, State v. Fla. Cent. R. Co.,

15 Fla. 690, 699; 1878, Wldtaker v. Canal Co., 87 Pa. St. 34, 37; 1880, Attv.-

Gen'l v. Great East. R. Co., L. R., 5 App. 473; 1880, Fairchild v. Masonic
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Hall Assn., 71 Mo. 526; 1884, National Bank v. Continental L. Ins. Co., 41
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Ohio St. 1, 13; 1891, Ellerman v. Chicago Jet. R. Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 217;

1892, Riker v. Leo, 133 N. Y. 519, 524; 1895, Jacksonville, etc., R. Co. v.

Hooper, 160 U. S. 514, 523; 1896, Wheeler v. Everett Land Co., 14 Wash.

630, 633; 1900, Inter-Ocean Pub. Co. v. Associated Press, 184 111. 438, 75 Am.

St. Rep. 184.

3. The enumeration of certain powers and privileges, by implication ex-

cludes all other unnecessary powers: 1818, People v Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns.

(N. Y.) 358, 383; 1825, N. Y. F. Ins. Co. v. Ely, 5 Conn. 560,572, 13 Am. Dec.

100; 1831, Life, etc., Ins. Co. v. Mech. F. I. Co., 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 31; 1850,

Perrine v. Ches. & 0. Canal Co., 9 How. (50 U. S.) 172, 183; 1852, Talmage

v. Pell, 7 N. Y. 328, 345; 1875, Ashbury R., etc., Co. v. Riche, 7 H. L. Rep.

653; 1888, State v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 24 Neb. 143, 8 Am. St. Rep. 164;

1889, Case v. Kelly, 133 U. S. 21, 26.

4. While the rule of statutory construction that general words following

special words shall extend to and include only things of a nature similar to

those specially mentioned, is applied in some cases to the construction of cor-

porate charters: 1875, Ashbury R., etc., Co. v. Riche, L. R. 7 H. L. Rep. 653;

1876, Navigation Co. v. County of Galveston, 45 Tex. 272, 290; 1894, State v.
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International Inv. Co., 88 Wis. 512, 43 Am. St. Rep. 920; yet it does not seem

to be followed in other cases. 1881, Wells F. & Co. v. N. P. R. Co., 23 Fed.

Rep. 469, 474; 1889, Brown v. Corbin, 40 Minn. 508; 1889, National Bank v.

Texas Inv. Co., 74 Tex. 421, 434; 1894, State v. Corkin, 123 Mo. 56.

5. When the question is one between the state and the corporation, or when

the public interest is involved, "All rights which are asserted against the state

must be clearly defined, and not raised by inference or presumption; and if

the charter is silent about a power it does not exist. If on a fair reading of

the instrument reasonable doubts arise as to the proper interpretation to be

given to it, those doubts are to be solved in favor of the state; and where it

is susceptible of two meanings, the one restricting and the other extending

the powers of the corporation, that construction is to be adopted which works

the least harm to the state."—Davis, J., in The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall.

(70 CJ. S.) 51 (1865). This rule is applied in

(a) Cases where the state restricts its own action, as in exemptions from

taxation: 1830, Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. (29 U. S.) 514; 1861,

Jefferson Bank v. Skelly 1 Black (66 U. S.) 436; 1878, Railroad Co. v. Gaines,

97 U. S. 697; 1881, Bank v. Tennessee, 104 IT. S. 493; 1885, Chesapeake, etc.,

R. Co. v. Miller, 114 U. S. 176; 1892, Wilmington, etc., R. Co. v. Alsbrook,

146 U. S.279; 1896, Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 134; 1899,

Citizens' Sav. Bank v. Owensboro, 173 TJ. S. 636, 10 Am. & E. C. C. N. S. 540.

See note, supra, p. 749.

(6) Cases in which an exclusive privilege or monopoly is claimed: 1837,

Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. (36 U. S.) 420; 1883, Georgia,

etc., R. Co. v. Smith, 70 Ga. 694; 1885, Birmingham, etc., R. Co. v. Birming-

ham St. R. Co., 79 Ala. 465, 58 Am. Rep. 615; 1888, Rockland Water Co. v.

Camden, etc., Co., 80 Maine 544; 1889, Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse, 116

N. Y. 167; 1890, State v. Hamilton, 47 Ohio St. 52; 1890, Indianapolis

Cable, etc., Co. v. Citizens, etc., R., 127 Ind. 369; 1891, Stein v. Bienville

Water Imp. Co., 141 U. S. 67; 1895, Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co., 161

U. S. 646, 664; 1900, Adirondack R. Co. v. New York, 176 U. S. 336.

(c) Cases in derogation of common right, as in the appropriation of private

property under eminent domain proceedings, or erecting nuisances, etc.:

1848, Moorehead v. Little Miami R. Co., 17 Ohio 340; 1856, Edward, v. Law-

rence bnrgh, etc., R. Co., 7 Ind. 711; 1860, Downing v. Mt. Washington R.

Co., 40 N. H. 230; 1871, N. Y., etc., R. Co. v. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546, 7 Am. Rep.

385; 1878, Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659; 1883, Alabama, etc.,

R. Co. v. Gilbert, 71 Ga. 591; 1887, Snell v. Buresh, 123 111. 151.

(d) Cases in derogation of common law: 1872, Moyerv. Penn. Slate Co., 71

H all Assn., 71 Mo. 526; 1884, National Bank v. Continental L. Ins. Co., 41
Ohio St. 1, 13; 1891, Ellerman v. Chicago Jct. R. Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 217;
1892, Riker v. Leo, 133 N. Y. 519, 5:t4; 1895, Jacksonville, etc., R. Co. v.
Hooper, 160 U.S. 514, 523; 1896, Wheeler v. Everett Land Co., 14 Wash.
630, 633; 1900, Inter-Ocean Pub. Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438, 75 Am.
8t. R e p. 184.
3. The enumeration of certain powers and privileges, by implication ex~
eludes all other unnecessary powers: 1818, People v Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns.
(N. Y.) 3.58, 383; 1825, N. Y. F. Ins. Co. v. Ely , 5 Conn.560,572, 13 Am. Dec.
100; 1831, Life, etc., Ins. Co. v. Mech. F. I. Co., 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 31; 1850,
Perrine v. Ches. & 0. Canal Co., 9 How. (50 U.S.) 172, 183; 1852, Talmage
v. Pell, 7 N. Y. 328, 345; 1875, Ashbury R., etc., Co. v. Riche, 7 H. L. Rep.
653; 1888, State v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 24 Neb. 143, 8 Am. St. Rep. 164;
1889, Case v. Kelly, 133 U.S. 21, 26.
4. While the rule of statutory construction that general words following
special words shall extend to and include only things of a nature similar to
those specially mentioned, is applied in some cases to the construction of corporate charters: 1875, Ash bury R., etc., Co. v. Riche, L. R. 7 H. L. Rep. 653;
1876, Navigation Co. v. County of Galveston, 45 Tex. 272, 290; 1894, State v.
International Inv. Co., 88 Wis. 512, 43 Am. St. Rep. 920; yet it does not seem
to be followed in other cases. 1881, Wells F. & Co. v. N. P.R. Co., 23 Fed.
Rep. 469, 474; 1889, Brown v. Corbin, 40 Minn. 508; 1889, National Bank v.
Texas Inv. Co., 74 Tex. 421, 434; 1894, State v. Corkin, 123 Mo. 56.
5. When the question is one between the state and the corporation, or when
the public interest is involved, "All rights which are asserted against the state
must be clearly defined, and not raised by inference or presumption; and if
the charter is silent about a power it does not exist. If on a fair reading of
the instrument reasonable doubts arise as to the proper interpretation to be
~ ven to it, those doubts are to be solved in favor of the state; and where it
1s susceptible of two meanings, the one restricting and the other extending
the powers of the corporation, that construction is to be adopted which works
the least harm to the state."-Davis, J., in The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall.
(70 U. S.) 51 (186.5). This rule is applied in
(a) Cases where the state restricts its own action. as in exemptions from
taxation: 1830, Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. (29 U.S.) 514; 1861,
Jefferson Bank v. Skelly 1 Black (66 U.S.) 436; 1878, Railroad Co. v . Gaines,
97 U. S. 697; 1881, Bank v. Tennessee, 104 U. 8. 493; 1885, Chesapeake, etc.,
R. Co. v. Miller, 114 U.S. 176; 1892, Wilmington, etc., R. Co. v. Alsbrook,
146 U. S.279; 1896, Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 134; 1899,
Citizens' Se.v. Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 636, lOAm. & E. C. C. N. S. 540.
See note, supra, p. 749.
(bi Cases in which an exclusive privilege or monopoly is claimed: 1837,
Charles River Brid~e v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. (36 U. 8.) 420; 1883, Georgia,
etc., R. Co. v. Smith, 70 Ga. 694; 1885, Birmingham, etc., R. Co. v. Birmingham St. R. Co., 79 Ala. 465, 58 Am. Rep. 615; 1888, Rockland Water Co. v.
Camden, etc., Co., 80 Maine 544; 1889, Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse, 116
N. Y. 167; 1890, State v. Hamilton, 47 Ohio St. 52; 1890, Indianapolis
Cable, etc .. Co. v. Citizens, etc., R., 127 Ind. 369; 1891, Stein v. Bienville
Water Imp. Co., 141 U.S. 67; 1895, Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co., 161
U. S . 646, 664; 1900, Adirondack R. Co. v. New York, 176 U . S. 336.
(cl Cases in dero~ation of common right, as in t.he appropriation of private
property under emrnent domain proceedings, or erecting nuisances, etc.:
1848, Moorehead v. Little Miami R. Co., 17 Ohio 340; 1856, Edward. v. Lawrenceburgh. etc., R. Co., 7 Ind. 711; 1860, Downing v. Mt. Washington R.
Co., 40 N. H . 230; 1871, N. Y., etc., R. Co. v. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546, 7 Am. Rep.
385; 1878, Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659; 1883, Alabama, etc.,
R. Co. v. Gilbert, 71 Ga. 591; 1887, Snell v. Buresh, 123 Ill . 151.
(d ) Cases in derogation of common law: 1872, Moyerv. Penn. Slate Co., 71
Pa. St. 293.
(e) Cases directly interfering with the nee of franchises already granted,
as one railroad encroaching upon the right of way of another, or of a turnpike or canal: 1878, Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Lowell, 124 Mass. 368; 1880, Penn•

•

Pa. St. 293.

(e) Cases directly interfering with the use of franchises already granted,

as one railroad encroaching upon the right of way of another, or of a turn-

pike or canal: 1878, Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Lowell, 124 Maes. 368; 1880, Penn.
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sylvania R. Co.'s Appeal, 93 Pa. St. 150; 1888, Barre R. Co. v. Montpelier, 61

936

Vt. 1,4 L. R. A. 785; 1888, Appeal of Sharon R., 122 Pa. St. 533, 9 Am. St.

THE PEOPLE V. THE PULLMAN'S PALACE CAR CO.

§ 262

Rep. 133; 1891, Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Belle Centre, 48 Ohio St. 273.

6. General and special laws under which corporations are formed: There

eylvania R. Co. 'e Appeal, 93 Pa. St. 150; 1888, Barre R. Co. v . Montpelier, 61
Vt. 1, 4 L. R . A. 785; 1888, Appeal of Sharon R., 122 Pa. St. 533, 9 Am. St.
Rep. 133; 1891, Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Belle Centre, 48 Ohio St. 273.
6. General and special laws under which corporations are formed: There
seems to be some conflict of expression as to rules of construin¥ charters under general laws as compared with the rules when the corporation is created
by a special act. Granger, C. J ., in National Bank of Wash . v. Ins. Co., 41
Ohio St. 1, on p. 11 (1884), says: "A radical change has occurred in the relation of corporations to the state and the people. • • • Special charters
granted to persons named • • • gave special powers and rights, that as
a rule were beyond legislative control; only in the rare cases where the power
to amend, alter or repeal was expressly reserved could the legislature modify,
limit, or take away power once granted. In those days a corporation was a
monopoly. It was necessary to strictly construe the grants made in order to
protect the interests of the state and of people generally. But now the legislature bas far more power over corporations than over individuals. It may
alter or repeal all acts granting corporate power. • • • There is no
longer reason to hesitate to apply to the language of acts of incorporation the
same rules of interpretation as applied to like words in any contract or statute."
On the other band, in regard to corporations formed under general laws,
Justice Miller, in Oregon R. Co. v. Oregonian R. Co., 130 U.S. 1, on p. 26
(1888), says: "If the articles of association • • • instead of being the
mere adoption by the corporators themselves, of the declaration of their own
purposes and powers, had been an act of the legislat.ure • • • conferring
such powers on the corporations, they would be subject to the rule above
stated (strict construction in favor of the state and against the grantee) and
to a rigid construction in r~ard to the powers granted. How much more,
then, should this rule be applied, and with how much more reason should a
court, called upon to determme the powers granted by these articles of association, construe them rigidly, with the stronger le1mm~ in doubtful cases in
favor of the public and against the private corporation. ' To the same effect
is, 1896, Rose-Meehan Brake Shoe F. Co. v. Southern M. I. Co., 72 Fed. Rep.

seems to be some conflict of expression as to rules of construing charters un-

der general laws as compared with the rules when the corporation is created

by a special act. Granger, C. J., in National Bank of Wash. v. Ins. Co., 41

Ohio St. 1, on p. 11 (1884), says: "A radical change has occurred in the rela-

tion of corporations to the state and the people. » * * Special charters

granted to persons named • * * gave special powers and rights, that as

a rule were beyond legislative control; only in the rare cases where the power

to amend, alter or repeal was expressly reserved could the legislature modify,

limit, or take away power once granted. In those days a corporation was a

monopoly. It was necessary to strictly construe the grants made in order to

protect the interests of the state and of people generally. But now the legis-

lature has far more power over corporations than over individuals. It may

alter or repeal all acts granting corporate power. * » * There is no

longer reason to hesitate to apply to the language of acts of incorporation the

same rules of interpretation as applied to like words in any contract or stat-

ute."
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On the other hand, in regard to corporations formed under general laws,

Justice Miller, in Oregon R. Co. v. Oregonian R. Co., 130 TJ. S. 1, on p. 26

(1888), says: "If the articles of association * » * instead of being the

mere adoption by the corporators themselves, of the declaration of their own

purposes and powers, had been an act of the legislature » * • conferring

such powers on the corporations, they would be subject to the rule above

stated (strict construction in favor of the state and against the grantee) and

to a rigid construction in regard to the powers granted. How much more,

then, should this rule be applied, and with how much more reason should a

court, called upon to determine the powers granted by these articles of asso-

ciation, construe them rigidly, with the stronger leaning in doubtful cases in

favor of the public and against the private corporation.' To the same effect

is, 1896, Ross-Meehan Brake Shoe F. Co. v. Southern M. I. Co., 72 Fed. Rep.
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Title II. Particular Powers and Liabilities.

CHAPTER 13.

PARTICULAR POWERS.

ARTICLE I. PERPETUAL SUCCESSION.

Sec. 263. See State v. Payne, 129 Mo. 468, supra, p. 830; also,

Warner v. Beers, supra, p. 2, and Thomas v. Dak in, supra,

p. 19.

ARTICLE n. NAME.

Sec 264. See, supra, chapter 9. Smith v. Tallassee Branch,

etc., 30 Ala. 650, supra, p. 817; Newby v. Oregon Central

R., Deady 609, supra, p. 819; Armington v. Palmer, 42

Atl. Rep. (R. I.) 308, supra, p. 820. Note, supra, p. 823.

TrrL•

ARTICLE IH. POWER TO CONTRACT.

n.

PARTICULAR PowERs AND LIABILITIBS.

Sec. 265. (A) As to form.

1. In general: "In determining whether a contract may

be enforced against a corporation, three things are to be con-

CHAPTER 13.

sidered: First, did the corporation have the power to enter

into such a contract? Second, was the contract entered into

by a duly authorized agent of the corporation? Third, was

PARTICULAR POWERS.

the contract drawn, signed, and sealed in a form which binds

the corporation?

ARTICLE I,
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"A corporation may be bound by a contract which is exe-

PERPETUAL SUCCESSION.

cuted in any of the following ways: by a written instrument

sealed with the corporate seal, and either with or without the

(937)

See. 263.

See State v. Payne, 129 Mo. 468, supra, p . 830; also,
Warner v. Beers, supra, p. 2, and Thomas v. Dakin, supra,
p. 19.
.

ARTICLE 11.

NAME.

Sec. 264. See, supra, chapter 9. Smith v. Tallassee Branch,
etc., 30 Ala. 6 50, supra, p. 8 I 7 ; Newby v. Oregon Central
R., Deady 609, supra, p. 819; Armington v. Palmer, 42
Atl. Rep . ( R. I.) 308, supra, p. 820. Note, supra, p. 823.

ARTICLE lll.

POWER TO CONTRACT.

See. 265. (A ) As to form.
I. In g eneral: ''In determining whether a contract may
be enforced against a corporation, three things are to be considered : First, did the corporation have the power to enter
into such a contract? Second, was the contract entered into
by a duly authorized agent of the corporation? Third, was
the contract drawn, signed, and sealed in a form which binds
the corporation?
''A corporation may be bound by a contract which is executed in any of the following ways: by a written instrument
sealed with the corporate seal , and either with or without the
(937)
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938 FRANKLIN CO. V. LEWISTON INST'N FOR SAVINGS. § 266

corporate name signed thereto; by an unsealed written in-

strument signed with the corporate name; by a written record

of a resolution of its directors; by an unwritten resolution of

its directors; by the oral agreements of its authorized agents;

or by ratifying, acquiescing in, or accepting the benefits of

contracts made in its name by unauthorized agents."—Cook

Corporations, 4th ed., part of §§ 704 and 721. See also,

supra, §§ 190, 191, 193, 194, 228-238.

2. As to seal. See, infra, Art. VII., p. 1136.

Sec. 266. (5) As to subject-matter.

(1) In general. See, supra, §§ 258-262.

Sec. 267. (2) Contract debts and borrow money.

See Barry v. Merchants' Exchange Co., 1 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.)

280, supra, p.766.

Note. See, also, 1889, Wright v. Hughes, 119 Ind. 324, 12 Am. St. Rep. 412;

1890, Woolverton v. Taylor, 132 111. 197, 22 Am. St. Rep. 521; 1890, Davis v.

Jackson, 152 Mass. 58. See note at end of next case.

Sec. 268. Same.

FRANKLIN COMPANY v. LEWISTON INSTITUTION FOR SAVINGS.1

1877. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 68 Maine
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Rep. 43-49.

[In 1875 the Savings Company subscribed for $50,000 of the cap-

ital stock of a manufacturing company, having no money with which

to pay for the same. The Franklin Company agreed to pay the sum,

take the notes of the Savings Company for the amount, and hold the

stock as security. Notes for this amount were duly given, and the

stock was issued directly to the Franklin Company as collateral, but

not to the Savings Company, or with its knowledge. The Savings

Company failed in 1876, and commissioners were appointed to pass

upon the claims presented; the notes and a claim for $50,000 for

money paid out at the request of the Savings Company were pre-

sented by the Franklin Company and rejected by the commissioners;

the validity of the claims is the question involved.]

Walton, J. * * * The first question is whether it is compe-

1 Statement abridged and part of opinion omitted.

POWER TO BORROW MONEY.

939

tent for the trustees of a savings bank, at a time when there are no

POWER TO BORROW MONEY.
funds in the bank for investment, to agree to take shares in a manu-

939

facturing corporation, and thereby create a debt binding upon the bank.

We think not. It is familiar law that a corporation possesses such

powers, and such only as the law of its creation confers upon it. The

rule is stated with great uniformity.

[After quoting to this effect from several cases proceeds:] It would

seem, therefore, upon principle as well as authority, that it is not

within the authority of the trustees of a savings bank to invest its

funds in the stock of manufacturing corporations, unless expressly

authorized so to do by its charter or the public laws of the state.

But we do not rest our decision upon this ground. We rest it

upon the broader ground that it is not competent for the trustees of a

savings bank to purchase on credit property of any kind not needed

for immediate use, or the investment of existing funds. No such

power is expressly conferred upon them, nor do we think it can be

sustained as an incidental power.

It is suggested that it may be convenient in this way to provide in

advance for the investment of funds that may afterward come into the
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possession of the bank. We think the creation of debts by corpora-

tions or individuals, for no other purpose than to provide a ready way

to dispose of future acquisitions, a proceeding of very questionable

convenience; that in the great majority of cases it would be likely to

prove, as it did in this case, very inconvenient. But it is a sufficient

answer to say that the law imposes no duty upon the trustees of sav-

ings banks to provide for the investment of future funds or future de-

posits. Their whole duty is performed when they have provided safe

investments for the funds already committed to their care, 'To hold

that they may create debts binding upon existing depositors, for the

benefit of future depositors, whose money after all may never be com-

mitted to their care, would be a doctrine as startling as it would be

unprecedented.

[The court further held that the Franklin Company, having know-

ingly participated in the illegal transaction, could not claim the priv-

ileges of a bona fide holder of the notes, and the Savings Company

having received no benefit from the transaction was not estopped to

set up the defense of ultra vires."]

Claim not allowed.

Note.—A corporation can not borrow money for the purpose of purchasing

its own shares: 1894, Adams & W. Co. v. Deyette, 5 So. Dak. 418, 49 Am.

St. Rep. 887; 1896, Adams & W. Co. v. Deyette, 8 So. Dak. 119, 59 Am.

St. Rep. 751.

The statutes frequently fix a limit as to the amount that a corporation is

allowed to borrow; in such a case the courts hold strictly that it has no power

to exceed those limits, and an attempt to do so can be restrained: 1884,

tent for the trustees of a savings bank, at a time when there are no
funds in the bank for investment, to agree to take shares in a manufacturing corporation, and thereby create a debt binding upon the bank.
We think not. It is familiar law that a corporation possesses such
powers, and such only as the law of its creation confers upon it. The
rule is stated with great uniformity.
[After quoting to this effect from several cases proceeds:] It would
seem, therefore, upon principle as well as authority, that it is not
within the authority of the trustees of a savings bank to invest its
funds in the stock of manufacturing corporations, unless expressly
authorized so to do by its charter or the public laws of the state.
But we do not rest our decision upon this ground. \Ve rest it
upon the broader ground that it is not competent for the trustees of a
savings bank to purchase on credit property of any kind not needed
for immediate use, or the investment of existing funds. No such
power is expressly conferred upon them, nor do we think it can be
sustained as an incidental power.
It is suggested that it may be convenient in this way to provide in
advance for the investment of funds that m ay afterward come into the
possession of the bank. Vv e think the creation of debts by corporations or individual!>, for no other purpose than to provide a ready way
to dispose of future a cquisitions, a proceeding of very questionable
convenience; that in the great majority of cases it would be likely to
prove, as it did in this case, very inconvenient. But it is a sufficient
answer to say that the law imposes no duty upon the tmstees of savings banks to provide for the investment of future funds or future deposits. Their whole duty is performed when they have provided safe
investments for the funds already committed to their care, · To hold
that they may create debts binding upon existing depositors, for the
benefit of future depositors, whose money after all may never be committed to their care, would be a doctrine as startling as it would be
unprecedented.
[The court further held that the Franklin Company, having knowingly participated in the illegal transaction, could not claim the privileges of a bona fide holder of the notes, and the Savings Company
having received no benefit from the transaction was not estopped to
set up the defense of ultra vires.]
Claim not allowed.

Wenlock v. River Dee Comm'rs, 10 App. Cas. 354; 1889, Commonwealth's

Appeal, 24 W. N. C. (Pa.) 530; 1889, Oommw. v. Lehigh Ave. R. Co., 129 Pa.

St. 405; 1893, First Nat'l Bank v. K. M. Co., 95 Ky. 97. One who loans a cor-

poration money in excess of the authorized limit can not collect the excess,

though he may collect up to the limit. 1874, Osippee, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Can-

ney, 54 N. H. 295; 1878, DeCamp v. Dobbins,29N. J. Eq. 36; 1879, Humphrey

N ote.-A corporation can not borrow money for the purpose of purchasing
its own shares: 1894, Adams & W . Co. v. Deyette, 5 So. Dak. 418, 49 Am.
St. Rep. 887; 1896, Adams& W. Co. v. Deyette, 8 So. Dak. 119, 59 Am.
St. Rep. 751.
The statutes frequently fix: a limit as to the amount that a corporation is
allowed to borrow; in such a case the courts hold strictly that it h as no power
to exceed those limits, and an attempt to do so can be restrained: 1884,
Wenlock v. River Dee Comm'rs, 10 App. Cas. 3.54; 1889, Commonwealth's
Appeal, 24 W. N. C. (Pa.) 530; 1889, Commw. v. Lehigh Ave. R . Co., 129 Pa.
St. 405 ; 1893, First Nat'l Bank v . K. M. Co., 95 Ky. 97. One who loans a corporation money in excess of the auth orized limit can not collect the excess,
though he may collect up to the limit. 1874, Osippee, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Canney, 54 N. H. 295; 1878, DeCamp v . Dobbins,29N. J. Eq. 36; 1879, Humphrey
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BRADBURY V. BOSTON CANOE CLUB.

v. Patron's M. Assoc., 60 Iowa 607; 1881, Auerbachv.LeSeuerM. Co., 28Minn.

940

291,41 Am. Rep. 285; 1886, Garrett v. Burlington, etc., Co., 70 Iowa 697, 59

BRADBURY V. BOSTON CANOE CLUB.

Am. Rep. 461; 1891, Fidelity, etc., Co. v. West. Pa. R., 138 Pa. St. 494; 1893,

v. Patron's M . Assoc., 50 Iowa 607; 1881, Auerbach v. Le Sener M . Co., 28 Minn.
291, 41 Am. Rep. 285; 1886, Garrett v. Burlington, etc., Co., 70 Iowa 697, 59
Am. Rep. 461; 1891, Fidelity, etc., Co. v. West. Pa. R .• 138 Pa. St. 494; l~,
First Nat') Bankv.K.M.Co.,95 Ky.97; 1893,Merchants' Nat'l Bankv.C.G.
L. Co., 159 M_ass. 505; 1895, Krl;lniger v. People's.B'ld'g ~oc., 60 Minn. 94; 1896,
Oswald v. Mmn. T. Co., 65 Mmn. 249; 1897, Sioux City, etc., Co. v. Trust
Co., 82 Fed. Rep. 124.
And it seems that one who, in good faith, loans money to a corporation
after the corporation has already borrowed up to the limit, can recover if he
had no knowledge that the limit had been reached. 1845, Stoney v. Am.,
etc., Co., 11 Paige Ch. (N. Y . ) 635; 1874, Osippee, etc., Co. v. Canney, 54 N.
H. 295; 1881, Auerbach v. Le Seuer M. Co., 28 Minn. 291, 41 Am. Rep. 401;
1886, Garrett v. Burlington, etc., Co., 70 Iowa 697, 59 Am. Rep. 461; 1890,
Allis v. Jones, 45 Fed. Rep. 148.

First Nat'l Bank v. K. M. Co", 95 Ky.97; 1893, Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. C.G.

L. Co., 159 Mass. 505; 1895, Kraniger v. People's B'ld'gSoc, 60 Minn. 94; 1896,

Oswald v. Minn. T. Co., 65 Minn. 249; 1897, Sioux City, etc., Co. v. Trust

Co., 82 Fed. Rep. 124.

And it seems that one who, in good faith, loans money to a corporation

after the corporation has already borrowed up to the limit, can recover if he

had no knowledge that the limit had been reached. 1845, Stoney v. Am.,

etc., Co., 11 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 635; 1874, Osippee, etc., Co. v. Canney,54 N.

H. 295; 1881, Auerbach v. Le Seuer M. Co., 28 Minn. 291, 41 Am. Rep. 461;

1886, Garrett v. Burlington, etc., Co., 70 Iowa 697, 59 Am. Rep. 461; 1890,

Allis v. Jones, 45 Fed. Rep. 148.

Sec. 269. (3) Negotiable instruments.

BRADBURY v. BOSTON CANOE CLUB.

1891. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 153

Mass. Rep. 77-8.

See. 269. ( 3)

Holmes, J. This is an action upon a promissory note for $150
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and interest, given by the defendant to the plaintiff for money lent to

Negotiable instruments.

it by the plaintiff to be used in building a club-house. There is a sec-

BRADBURYv. BOSTON CANOE CLUB.

ond count for money lent. At a meeting duly called the corporation

passed a vote authorizing its treasurer to borrow money in terms suffi-

IN

ciently broad to cover the loan in question. The suggestion that no

THE

sufficient notice of the business to be transacted was given, does not

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. 153
Mass. Rep. 77-8.

seem to us fairly open on the agreed facts. Moreover, it would be

HoLMES, J. This is an action upon a promissory note for $150
and interest, given by the defendant to the plaintiff for money lent to
it by the plaintiff to be used in building a club-house. There is a second count for money lent. At a meeting duly called the corporation
passed a vote authorizing its treasurer to borrow money in terms sufficiently broad to cover the loan in question. The suggestion that no
sufficienfnotice of the business to be transacted was given, does not
seem to us fairly open on the agreed facts. Moreover, it would be
impossible to argue that the defendant had not recognized and ratified
the act of its treasurer in borrowing from the plaintiff. The money
was received by the corporation, and was used by it for the purpose
mentioned. The only question fo:c. us is, whether the corporation
acted illegally in borrowing money for the purpose of erecting a clubhouse upon land of which it held a lease.
The defendant is a corporation formed under the Public Statutes,
ch. 115, § 2, for encouraging athletic exercises. By section 7 it " may
hold real and personal estate, and may hire, purchase, or erect suitable buildings for its accommodations, to an amount not exceeding
$soo,ooo,'' etc. We are of opinion that under these words the defendant had power to take a lease of land and to erect a suitable clubhouse upon it. Having this power it was entitled to raise money for
the purpose. No argument is needed to show that the power at the
end of section 7 to receive and hold in trust funds received by gift or bequest does not confine the corporations to that mode of raising it.
B orrowing money is a usual and proper means of accomplishing what
the statute expressly permits. See Fay v. Noble , 12 Cush. r, 18 ;
Morville v. American Tract Society, 123 Mass. 129, 136; Davis v.
Old Cc;>lony Railroad, 131 Mass. 258, 271, 275. As this is a suffi-

impossible to argue that the defendant had not recognized and ratified

the act of its treasurer in borrowing from the plaintiff. The money

was received by the corporation, and was used by it for the purpose

mentioned. The only question for. us is, whether the corporation

acted illegally in borrowing money for the purpose of erecting a club-

house upon land of which it held a lease.

The defendant is a corporation formed under the Public Statutes,

ch. 115, § 2, for encouraging athletic exercises. By section 7 it "may

hold real and personal estate, and may hire, purchase, or erect suita-

ble buildings for its accommodations, to an amount not exceeding

$500,000," etc. We are of opinion that under these words the de-

fendant had power to take a lease of land and to erect a suitable club-

house upon it. Having this power it was entitled to raise money for

the purpose. No argument is needed to show that the power at the

end of section 7 to receive and hold in trust funds received by gift or be-

quest does not confine the corporations to that mode of raising it.

Borrowing money is a usual and proper means of accomplishing what

the statute expressly permits. See Fay v. Noble, 12 Cush. 1, iS;

Morville v. American Tract Society, 123 Mass. 129, 136; Davis v.

Old Colony Railroad, 131 Mass. 258, 271, 275. As this is a suffi-
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cient reason for giving the plaintiff judgment, it is unnecessary to

consider whether there are not others.
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Note. See note at the end of next case.

cient reason for giving the plaintiff judgment, it is unnecessary to
consider whether there are not others.
Judgment for the plaintiff.

Sec. 270. Same.

UNION BANK v. JACOBS.1

1845. In the Supreme Court of Tennessee. 25 Tenn. (6

Humph.) 515, Cooper's Ed., 389.

Note.

[On the 28th day of September, 1841, Jacobs, as president of the

See note at the end of next case.

Hiwassee Railroad Company, executed a note, binding that company

to pay to said Jacobs the sum of $5,641, negotiable and payable at

the branch of the Union Bank at Knoxville, four months after date.

Sec. 270.

The note was indorsed by Jacobs to Trautwine, and by Trautwine to

the Union Bank, and delivered to the president and directors of the

Same.

bank, and discounted by the bank for the benefit of the Hiwassee

UNION BANK v. JACOBS. 1

company. At maturity, the note was protested, and suit brought by

the bank against Jacobs, as indorser, in the circuit court of Knox

1845.

county.

IN

THE

SUPREME

It was tried by Judge Lucky and a jury at the February term,

Humph.)

1845. He charged the jury that the Hiwassee company had no

CouRT

OF

TENNESSEE.

25 Tenn. (6

515, Cooper's Ed., 389.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

power to borrow money, and that the note given in execution of a

[On the 28th day of September, 1841, Jacobs, as president of the
Hiwassee Railroad Company, executed a note, binding that company
to pay to said Jacobs the sum of $5 1 641, negotiable and payable at
the branch of the Union Bank at Knoxville, four months after date.
The note was indorsed by Jacobs to Trautwine, and by Trautwine to
the Union Bank, and delivered to the president and directors of the
bank, and discounted by the bank for the benefit of the Hiwassee
company. At maturity, the note was protested, and suit brought by
the bank against Jacobs, as indorser, in the circuit court of Knox
county.
It was tried by Judge Lucky and a jury at the February term,
1845. He charged the jury that the Hiwassee company had no
power to borrow money, and that the note given in execution of a
void contract was null and void also.
·
The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and plaintiff appealed.
The railroad company was created with all the rights "necessary
to the well ordering and conducting the affairs of said company; and
capable in law of purchasing, accepting, selling and conveying
estates, real, personal and mixed, to the end, and for the purpose of
facilitating the intercourse and transportation" designated; and was
"invested with all the powers and rights necessary for the building-,
constructing, and keeping in repair of a railroad;" and the directors
"may cause to be made, or contract with others for making of said
road or any part thereof."]
TURLEY, J. • • • It is contended against the plaintiff's right
to recover that there is no power given. either expressly or by necessary implication, by the charter to the Hiwassee Railroad Company,
to borrow money or to execute promissory notes; and that, therefore,
the note executed and indorsed to the bank is void, both as against the
maker and indorsers, and that no action can be maintained against them
thereon.

void contract was null and void also.

The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and plaintiff ap-

pealed.

The railroad company was created with all the rights "necessary

to the well ordering and conducting the affairs of said company; and

capable in law of purchasing, accepting, selling and conveying

estates, real, personal and mixed, to the end, and for the purpose of

facilitating the intercourse and transportation" designated; and was

"invested with all the powers and rights necessary for the building,

constructing, and keeping in repair of a railroad;" and the directors

"may cause to be made, or contract with others for making of said

road or any part thereof."]

Turkey, J. * * * It is contended against the plaintiff's right

to recover that there is no power given, either expressly or by neces-

sary implication, by the charter to the Hiwassee Railroad Company,

to borrow money or to execute promissory notes; and that, therefore,

the note executed and indorsed to the bank is void, both as against the

maker and indorsers, and that no action can be maintained against them

thereon.

1 Statement abridged. Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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The construction of the powers of corporations has been a fruitful
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source of litigation, both in the courts of Great Britain and the United

The construction of the powers of corporations has been a fruitful
source of litigation, both in the courts of Great Britain and the United
States. In the earlier cases they were construed with great strictness,
and a stringent rule as to the mode of exercising them enforced.
Mr. Story, in the case of Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, 7 Cranch
305, says: "Anciently it seems to have been held that corporations
could not do anything without deed. 13 Hen. VIII, l 2; 4 Hen. VII,
6; 7 Hen. VII, 7, 9. Afterwards, the ml~ seems to have been relaxed,
and they were for convenience sake permitted to act in ordinary
matters without deed, as to retain a servant, cook, or butler (Plow,
91; 2 Saund. 395); and gradually this relaxation widened to embrace
other objects (Bro. Corp., 51; 3 Salk. 191; 3 Lev. 107). At length,
it seems to have been established, that though they could not contract
directly except under their corporate seal, yet they might, by mere
vote or other corporate act, not ·under their corporate seal, appoint
an agent whose acts and contracts within the scope of his authority
would be binding on the corporation. 3 P. VVms. 419. And courts
of equity, in this respect, seeming to follow the law, have decreed a
specific performance of an agreement made by a major part of a corporation, and entered in the corporation books, although not under
the corporate seal. 1 Fonbl. Eq. 305. This technical doctrine has
in more modern times been entirely broken down." The same judge,
in continuation in the same case, observes : "The doctrine that a corp oration could not contract except under its seal, or, in other words,
could not make a promi se, if it had ever been fully settled, must have
been productive of great mischief. Indeed, as soon as the doctrine
was established, that its regularly appointed agents could contract in
their name without seal, it was impossible to support it; for, otherwise, the party who trusted such contract would be without remedy
against the corporation. Accordingly, it would seem to be a sound
rule of law 1 that whenever a corporation is acting within the scope of
the legitimate purposes of its institution, all parol contracts, made by
its authorized agents, are express promises of the corporation; and
all duties imposed upon them by law, and all benefits conferred at
their request, raise implied promises, for the enforcement of which an
action may well lie. 3 Brown Ch. 262 ; Doug., 5 i4; 3 Mass. 364;
5 Mass. 89 1 491 ; 6 Mass. 50." Whatever of strictness may have
existed in the earlier cases, in restricting their power of contracting to
the express grant of authority, has been also greatly relaxed, and the
doctrine upon the subject been made more conformable to reason and
necessity, the powers granted to corporations being now construed
like all other grants of power, not according to the letter, but the
spirit and meaning. In Ang. & A. Corp., p. 192, § 12, it is said:
"A corporation having been created for a specific purpose, can not
only make no contracts forbidden by its charter, which is, as it were,
the law of its na ture, but in general can make no contract which is
not necessary, either directly or incidentally, to enable it to answer
that purpose. In d eciding, therefore, whether a corporation can
make a particular contract, we are to consider, in the first place,

States. In the earlier cases they were construed with great strictness,

and a stringent rule as to the mode of exercising them enforced.

Mr. Story, in the case of Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, 7 Cranch

305, says: "Anciently it seems to have been held that corporations

could not do anything without deed. 13 Hen. VIII, 12; 4 Hen. VII,

6; 7 Hen. VII, 7, 9. Afterwards, the rule seems to have been relaxed,

and they were for convenience sake permitted to act in ordinary

matters without deed, as to retain a servant, cook, or butler (Plow,

91; 2 Saund. 395); and gradually this relaxation widened to embrace

other objects (Bro. Corp., 51:3 Salk. 191; 3 Lev. 107). At length,

it seems to have been established, that though they could not contract

directly except under their corporate seal, yet they might, by mere

vote or other corporate act, not under their corporate seal, appoint

an agent whose acts and contracts within the scope of his authority

would be binding on the corporation. 3 P. Wms. 419. And courts

of equity, in this respect, seeming to follow the law, have decreed a
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specific performance of an agreement made by a major part of a cor-

poration, and entered in the corporation books, although not under

the corporate seal. 1 Fonbl. Eq. 305. This technical doctrine has

in more modern times been entirely broken down." The same judge,

in continuation in the same case, observes: "The doctrine that a cor-

poration could not contract except under its seal, or, in other words,

could not make a promise, if it had ever been fully settled, must have

been productive of great mischief. Indeed, as soon as the doctrine

was established, that its regularly appointed agents could contract in

their name without seal, it was impossible to support it; for, other-

wise, the party who trusted such contract would be without remedy

against the corporation. Accordingly, it would seem to be a sound

rule of law, that whenever a corporation is acting within the scope of

the legitimate purposes of its institution, all parol contracts, made by

its authorized agents, are express promises of the corporation; and

all duties imposed upon them by law, and all benefits conferred at

their request, raise implied promises, for the enforcement of which an

action may well lie. 3 Brown Ch. 262; Doug., 524; 3 Mass. 364;

5 Mass. 89, 491; 6 Mass. 50." Whatever of strictness may have

existed in the earlier cases, in restricting their power of contracting to

the express grant of authority, has been also greatly relaxed, and the

doctrine upon the subject been made more conformable to reason and

necessity, the powers granted to corporations being now construed

like all other grants of power, not according to the letter, but the

spirit and meaning. In Ang. & A. Corp., p. 192, § 12, it is said:

"A corporation having been created for a specific purpose, can not

only make no contracts forbidden by its charter, which is, as it were,

the law of its nature, but in general can make no contract which is

not necessary, either directly or incidentally, to enable it to answer

that purpose. In deciding, therefore, whether a corporation can

make a particular contract, we are to consider, in the first place,

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 270 POWER AS TO NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. 943

whether its charter, or some statute binding upon it, forbids or per-

mits it to make such a contract; and, if the charter and valid statutory
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law are silent upon the subject, in the second place, whether the
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power to make such a contract may not be implied on the part of the

corporation, as directly or incidentally necessary to enable it to fulfill

the purpose of its existence, or whether the contract is entirely foreign

to that purpose. In general, an express authority is not indispensa-

ble to confer upon a corporation the right to become drawer, indorser,

or acceptor of a bill of exchange, or to become a party to any other

negotiable paper. It is sufficient if it be implied as the usual and

proper means to accomplish the purposes of the charter. Chit. Bills

(5th ed.), 17-21; Baily Bills (5th ed.), p. 69, ch. 2, § 7; Story

Bills Exch., p. 94, § 79. In the case of Mum v. Commission Co., 15

Johns. 52, Spencer, J., who delivered the opinion of the court, says:

"It has been strongly urged that, under the act of incorporating this

company, they could neither draw nor accept bills of exchange.

Their power is undoubtedly limited; they are required to employ

their stock solely in advancing money, when required, on goods and

articles manufactured in the United States, and the sale of such goods

and articles on commission. The acceptance of a bill is an engage-
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ment to pay motiey; and the company may agree to pay or advance

money at a future day, and they may engage to do this by the accept-

ance of a bill. When a charter or act of incorporation and valid stat-

utory law are silent as to what contracts a corporation may make, as

a general rule it has power to make all such contracts as are necessary

and usual in the course of business, as means to enable it to attain the

object for which it was created, and none other. The creation of a

corporation for a specific purpose implies a power to use the neces-

sary and usual means to effectuate that purpose." Ang. & A. Corp.,

p. 200, § 3.

Mr. Story, in his treatise on Bills of Exchange (page 95), speak-

ing of the power of corporations to draw, indorse and accept bills of

exchange, says: "It is sufficient if it be implied as a usual and appro-

priate means to accomplish the objects and purposes of the charter.

But when the drawing, indorsing, or accepting such bills is obviously

foreign to the purposes of the charter, or repugnant thereto, then the

act becomes a nullity, and not binding on the corporation."

In the case of People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns., Thompson, C.

J., who delivered the opinion of the court, says, at page 383, "An

incorporated company has no rights but such as are specially granted,

and those that are necessary to carry into effect the powers so

granted."

In the case of Mott v. Hicks, a quantity of wood was purchased

for the president and directors of the Woodstock Glass Company by

Whitehead Hicks, the president thereof, for which he executed the

promissory note of the company at six months. It appears, from a

reference in argument to the charter of the company, that there was

no clause authorizing it to issue bills or notes, or making such, if

issued, binding and obligatory upon the company; yet it was held by

whether its charter, or some statute binding upon it, forbids or permits it to make such a contract; and, if the charter and valid statutory
law are silent upon the subject, in the second place, whether the
power to make such a contract may not be implied on the part of the
corporation, as directly or incidentally necessary to enable it to fulfill
the purpose of its existence, or whether the contract is entirely foreign
to that purpose. In general, an express author£ty £s not £nd£spensable to confer upon a corporat£on tlz e riglzt to become drawer, £ndorser,
or acceptor of a be'll of exclzange, or to become a party to any otlter
negotiable paper. It £s sufficient if £t be £mplied as the usual and
proper means to accompl£sh tlte purposes of tlte charter. Chit. Bills
(5th ed.), 17-21; Baily Bills (5th ed.), p. 69, ch. 2, § 7; Story
Bills Exch., p. 94, § 79. In the case of Mum v. Commission Co., 15
Johns. 52, Spencer, J., ·who delivered the opinion of the court, says:
"It has been strongly urged that, under the act of incorporating this
company, they could neither draw nor accept bills of exchange.
Their power is undoubtedly limited; they are required to employ
their stock solely in advancing money, when required, on goods and
articles manufactured in the United State , and the sale of such goods
and articles on commission. The acceptance of a bill is an engagement to pay money; and the company may agree to pay or advance
money at a future day, and they may engage to do this by the acceptance of a bill. When a charter or act of incorporation and valid statutory law are silent as to what contracts a corporation may make, as
a general rule it has power to make all such contracts as are necessary
and usual in the course of business, as means to enable it to attain the
obj ect for which it was created, and none other. The creation of a
corporation for a specific purpose implies a power to use the necessary and usual means to effectuate that purpose." Ang. & A. Corp.,

P·

200, §

3·

Mr. Story, in his treatise on Bills of Exchange (page 95), speaking of the power of corporations to draw, indorse and accept bills of
exchange, says: "It is sufficient if it be implied as a usual and appropriate means to accomplish the objects and purposes of the charter.
But when the drawing, indorsing, or accepting such bills is obviously
foreign to the purposes of the charter, or repugnant thereto, then the
act becomes a nullity, and not binding on the corporation."
In the case of People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns., Thompson, C.
J., who delivered the opinion of the court, says, at page 383, "An
incorporated company has no rights but such as are specially granted,
a nd those that are necessary to carry into effect the powers so
g ranted.''
In the case of Mott v. Hicks, a quantity of wood was purchased
for the president and directors of the Woodstock Glass Company by
Whitehead Hicks, the president thereof, for which he executed the
promissory note of the company at six months. It appears, from a
reference in argument to the charter of the company, that there was
no clause authorizing it to issue bills or notes, or making such , if
iasued, binding and obligatory upon the company; yet it was held by
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the court that an action would lie against the corporation upon the
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note, it having been executed by its legally authorized agent, acting

the court that an action would lie against the corporation upon the
note, it having been executed by its legally authorized agent, acting
within the scope of the legitimate purposes of such corporation. 1
Cow. 513.
In the case of Hayward v. Pilgrim Soc., 21 Pick. 270, it was held
that the trustees of a society incorporated for the purpose of building
a monument, in virtue of their authority to manage the finances and
property of the society, were held competent to bind the society by a
promissory note through the agency of their treasurer.
These authorities fully establish the proposition, that, in the construction of charters of corporations, the power to contract and the
mode of contracting is not limited to the express grant, but may be
extended by implication to all necessary and proper means for the accomplishment of the purposes of the charter. Now, what are necessary and proper means? Mr. Story, as we have seen, says if the
means are usual and appropriate, the implication of power arises.
Story Bills, 95.
Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 413, says: "But the argument on which most reliance is placed, is drawn from the peculiar language of this clause of
the constitution. Congress is not empowered by it to make all laws
which may have relation to the powers conferred on the government,
but such only as may be necessary and proper for carrying them intoexecution. The word 'necessary' is considered as controlling the
whole sentence, and as limiting the right to pass laws for the execution of the granted powers to such as are indispensable, and without
which the power would be nugatot)'. That it excludes the choice of
means, and leaves congress in each case that only which is most
direct and simple. Is it true that this is the sense in which the word
'necessary' is always used? Does it always import an absolute physical necessity, so strong that one thing to which another may be
termed necessary can not exist without that other? We think it does
not. If reference be had to its use in the common affairs of the world,
or in approved authors, we find that it frequently imports no more
than that one thing is convenient or useful or essential to another. To
employ the means necessary to an end, is generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as being
confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable. Such is the character of the human mind that no
word conveys to it in all situations one single definite idea, and nothing is more common than to use words in a figurative sense. Almost
all compositions contain words which, taken in their rigorous sense,
would convey a meaning different from that which is obviously intended. It is essential to just construction that many words which
import something excessive should be understood in a more mitigated
sense-in that sense which common usage justifies. The word 'necessary' is of this description. It has no fixed character peculiar to
itself. It admits of all degrees of comparison , and is often connected
with other words, which increase or diminish the impression the mind

within the scope of the legitimate purposes of such corporation. I

Cow. 513.

In the case of Hay ward v. Pilgrim Soc, 21 Pick. 270, it was held

that the trustees of a society incorporated for the purpose of building

a monument, in virtue of their authority to manage the finances and

property of the society, were held competent to bind the society by a

promissory note through the agency of their treasurer.

These authorities fully establish the proposition, that, in the con-

struction of charters of corporations, the power to contract and the

mode of contracting is not limited to the express grant, but may be

extended by implication to all necessary and proper means for the ac-

complishment of the purposes of the charter. Now, what are neces-

sary and proper means? Mr. Story, as we have seen, says if the

means are usual and appropriate, the implication of power arises.

Story Bills, 95.

Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of McCulloch v. State of Mary-
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land, 4 Wheat. 413, says: "But the argument on which most reli-

ance is placed, is drawn from the peculiar language of this clause of

the constitution. Congress is not empowered by it to make all laws

which may have relation to the powers conferred on the government,

but such only as may be necessary and proper for carrying them into-

execution. The word 'necessary' is considered as controlling the

whole sentence, and as limiting the right to pass laws for the execu-

tion of the granted powers to such as are indispensable, and without

which the power would be nugatory. That it excludes the choice of

means, and leaves congress in each case that only which is most

direct and simple. Is it true that this is the sense in which the word

'necessary' is always used? Does it always import an absolute phys-

ical necessity, so strong that one thing to which another may be

termed necessary can not exist without that other? We think it does

not. If reference be had to its use in the common affairs of the world,

or in approved authors, we find that it frequently imports no more

than that one thing is convenient or useful or essential to another. To

employ the means necessary to an end, is generally understood as em-

ploying any means calculated to produce the end, and not as being

confined to those single means, without which the end would be en-

tirely unattainable. Such is the character of the human mind that no

word conveys to it in all situations one single definite idea, and noth-

ing is more common than to use words in a figurative sense. Almost

all compositions contain words which, taken in their rigorous sense,

would convey a meaning different from that which is obviously in-

tended. It is essential to just construction that many words which

import something excessive should be understood in a more mitigated

sense—in that sense which common usage justifies. The word 'nec-

essary' is of this description. It has no fixed character peculiar to

itself. It admits of all degrees of comparison, and is often connected

with other words, which increase or diminish the impression the mind
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receives of the urgency it imports. A thing may be necessary, very
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necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary. To no mind would

945

the same idea be conveyed by these several phrases." In conclusion

upon this subject, he says, page 421, same case: "We admit, as all

must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that

its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound con-

struction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature that

discretion with respect to the means by which the powers it confers

are to be carried into execution which will enable that body to per-

form the high duties assigned to it in the manner most beneficial to

the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of

the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are

plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with

the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."

Now if this be true doctrine in relation to the constitution of the

United States, surely it will not he contended that a more stringent

rule will be applied in the construction of the powers of a corpora-

tion than is applied in the construction of the powers of congress un-

der the constitution of the United States.
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To apply these principles, as established by the authorities cited, to

the case under consideration. The Hiwassee Railroad Company is

chartered to construct a railroad, a thing of itself necessarily involving

a heavy expenditure of money; but in addition thereto it is empowered

to sue and be sued, to acquire and hold, sell, lease and convey es-

tates, real, personal and mixed, which necessarily involves the power

of making contracts for the same. How shall these contracts be made,

both for the construction of the road and the purchase of the property?

It is argued that the capital stock of the company is the only means

provided for the payment, and that no other can be resorted to for

that purpose; or, in other words, that it must pay cash for every con-

tract, for that no power is given by which it may contract upon time;

for if it may create a debt of necessary consequence, it may create

written evidences of that debt, and these may be either promissory

notes or bills of exchange. It is true that the capital stock of the

company is the source from whence an ultimate payment of the debts

of the company must be made; but to hold that a sufficient amount

of this stock must always be on hand to pay immediately for every con-

tract made would be destructive of the operations of the company.

By the provisions of the charter not more than one-fourth of the stock

shall be called for in any one year, and this upon thirty days' notice;

and if, within thirty days after such notice, the amount called for be

not paid, the company is authorized to take steps against the delin-

quent stockholders to enforce payment. Now it is obvious that it

never was intended that all the stock should be paid in before the

company commenced operations. The early completion of the road

was a desirable object for commercial purposes, and it can be pre-

tended that the expenditures of the company were to be limited and

restricted to the amount of capital actually paid in by the stockhold-

60—Wil. Cases.

receives of the urgency it imports. A thing may be necessary, very
necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary. To no mind would
the same idea be conveyed by these several phrases." In conclusion
upon this subject, he says, page 421, same case: "We admit, as all
must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that
its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature that
discretion with respect to the means by which the powers it confers
are to be carried into execution which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it in the manner most beneficial to
the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with
the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
Now if this be true doctrine in relation to the constitution of the
United States, surely it will not he contended that a more stringent
rule will be applied in the construction of the powers of a corperation than is applied in the construction of the powers of congress under the constitution of the United States.
To apply these principles, as established by the authorities cited, to
the case under consideration. The Hiwassee Railroad Company is
chartered to construct a railroad, a thing of itself necessarily involving
a heavy expenditure of money; but in addition thereto it is empowered
to sue and be sued, to acquire and hold, sell, lease and convey estates, real, personal and mixed, which necessarily involves the power
of making contracts for the same. How shall these contracts be made,
both for the construction of the road and the purchase of the property?
It is argued that the capital stock of the company is the only means
provided for the payment, and that no other can be resorted to ft>r
that purpose; or, in other words, that it must pay cash for every contract, for that no power is given by which it may contract upon time;
for if it may create a debt of necessary consequence, it may create
written evidences of that debt, and these may be either promissory
notes or bills of exchange. It is true that the capital stock of the
company is the source from whence an ultimate payment of the debts
of the company must be made ; but to hold that a sufficient amount
of this stock must always be on hand to pay immediately for every contract made would be destructive of the operations of the company.
By the provisions of the charter not more than one-fourth of the stock
shall be called for in any one year, and this upon thirty days' notice;
and if, within thirty days after such notice, the amount called for be
not paid, the company is authorized to take steps against the delinquent stockholders to enforce payment. Now it is obvious that it
never was intended that all the stock should be paid in before the
company commenced operations. The early completion of the road
was a desirable object for commercial purposes, and it can be pretended that the expenditures of the company were to be limited and
restricted to the amount of capital actually paid in by the stockhold60-W1L. CASES.
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ers, and that under no circumstances was the company to exceed

them? If, upon failure of the means on hand, the stockholders should

ers, and that under no circumstances was the company to exceed
them? If, upon failure of the means on hand, the stockholders should
neglect to pay upon a proper call, are the works to be suspended until such time as payments could be enforced? Are the persons who
may have done work for it, and for which they have not been paid,
to wait the slow process of the law before they can receive satisfaction? And shall the company not be permitted to use its credit in
such emergency? It is so argued for the defendant. This construction of the charter would be ruinous in its consequences. The company might be compelled to suspend all operations at a time when
great loss would result from deterioration to unfinished work, and be
greatly injured also in its credit.
The restriction contended for is too refined and technical. It might
have suited the days of the Year Books, when it was held that a corporation could contract for nothing except under its corporate seal;
but it is strange that it should be urged at this day of enlightened jurisprudence, when the substance of things is looked to rather than
forms. A corporation is, in the estimation of law, a body created for
special purposes, and there is no good reason why it should not, in
the execution of these purposes, resort to any means that would be
necessary and proper for an individual in executing the same, unless
it be prohibited by the terms of its charter or some public law from
so doing.
There is no principle which prevents a corporation from contracting
debts within the scope of its action; and, as has been observed, if it
may contract a debt, it necessarily may make provision for its payment by drawing or indorsing or accepting notes or bills. It is not
P.retonded that this power extends to the drawing, indorsing or accepting of bills or notes generally, and disconnected from the purposes for
which the corporation was created. • • •
Judgment reversed.

neglect to pay upon a proper call, are the works to be suspended un-

til such time as payments could be enforced? Are the persons who

may have done work for it, and for which they have not been paid,

to wait the slow process of the law before they can receive satisfac-

tion? And shall the company not be permitted to use its credit in

such emergency? It is so argued for the defendant. This construc-

tion of the charter would be ruinous in its consequences. The com-

pany might be compelled to suspend all operations at a time when

great loss would result from deterioration to unfinished work, and be

greatly injured also in its credit.

The restriction contended for is too refined and technical. It might

have suited the days of the Year Books, when it was held that a cor-

poration could contract for nothing except under its corporate seal;

but it is strange that it should be urged at this day of enlightened ju-

risprudence, when the substance of things is looked to rather than

forms. A corporation is, in the estimation of law, a body created for
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special purposes, and there is no good reason why it should not, in

the execution of these purposes, resort to any means that would be

necessary and proper for an individual in executing the same, unless

it be prohibited by the terms of its charter or some public law from

so doing.

There is no principle which prevents a corporation from contracting

debts within the scope of its action; and, as has been observed, if it

may contract a debt, it necessarily may make provision for its pay-

ment by drawing or indorsing or accepting notes or bills. It is not

pretonded that this power extends to the drawing, indorsing or accept-

ing of bills or notes generally, and disconnected from the purposes for

which the corporation was created. • • »

Judgment reversed.

Note. Power to issue negotiable instruments.

1. Corporations have Buch power whenever it is a necessary or convenient

method of conducting their proper business: 1797, Phelps v. Livingston, 2

Root (Conn.) 495; 1838, Hayward v. Pilgrim Soc, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 270;

1848, Stevens v. Hill, 29 Maine 133; 1849, Butts v. Cuthbertson, 6 Ga. 166;

1860, Brown v. Donnell, 49 Maine 421, 77 Am. Dec. 266; 1871, Downer v.

Note. Power to issue negotiable 1nstruments.
1. Corporations have such power whenever it is a necessary or convenient
method of conducting their proper business: 1797, Phelps v. Livingston, 2
Root (Conn.) 495; 1838, Hayward v. Pilgrim Soc., 38 Mass. (21 Pick .) 270 :
1848, Stevens v. Hill, 29 Maine 133; 1849, Butts v. Cuthbertson, 6 Ga. 166;
1860 Brown v. Donnell, 49 Maine 421, 77 Am. Dec. 266; 1871, Downer v.
Read, 17 Minn . 493; 1873, In re Great West. Tel. Co, 5 Biss. 363, Fed. Cas.
5740; 1875, Watts' Appeal, 78Pa. St. 370; 1877, Franklin Co. v. Lewiston Inst.
for Sav., 68 Maine 43, sttpra, p. 938; 1882, Wright v. Pipe Line Oom~any, 101
Pa. St. 204; 1889, National Bank v. German Mut., etc., Co., 116 N. Y. 281;
1892, Am. Ex. Nat'l Bank v. Oreg"on, etc., Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 265; 1896, Farmers' Mot. Ins. Co. v. Meese, 49 Neb. 861; 1896, Kneeland v . Braintree, 167
Mass. 161; 1899, National Loan & Inv. Co. v. Rockland Co., 94 Fed. Rep. 335;
1899, G. V. B. Min. Co. v. First Nat'! Bank, 95 Fed. Rep. 23; 1899, McGarry
v. Tanner, etc., 21 Utah 16, 59 Pac. Rep. 93.
But corporations, unless expressly authorized, have no power to deal in
notes or bonds: 1863, Goodrich ·v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 490 83 Am. Dec. 240;
1899, Indiana Bond Co. v. Ogle, 22 Ind. App. 593, 72 Am. St. Rep. 326.
2. As between the original parties to the negotiable instrument, the officer
who acts for the corporation must have express or implied authority to bind
the corporation, but generally no formal proceedings upon the part of the cor-

Read, 17 Minn. 493; 1873, In re Great West. Tel. Co , 5 Biss. 363, Fed. Cas.

5740; 1875, Watts' Appeal, 78Pa. St. 370; 1877, Franklin Co. v. Lewiston Inst,

for Sav., 68 Maine 43, supra, p. 938; 1882, Wright v. Pipe Line Coinpanv, 101

Pa. St. 204; 1889, National Bank v. German Mut., etc., Co., 116 N.Y. 281;

1892, Am. Ex. Nat'l Bank v. Oregon, etc., Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 265; 1896, Farm-

ers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meese, 49 Neb. 861; 1896, Kneeland v. Braintree, 167

Mass. 161 ; 1899, National Loan & Inv. Co. v. Rockland Co., 94 Fed. Rep. 335;

1899, G. V. B. Min. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 95 Fed. Rep. 23; 1899, McGarry

v. Tanner, etc., 21 Utah 16, 59 Pac. Rep. 93.

But corporations, unless expressly authorized, have no power to deal in

notes or bonds: 1863, Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 111. 490,83 Am. Dec. 240;

1899, Indiana Bond Co. v. Ogle, 22 Ind. App. 593, 72 Am. St. Rep. 326.

2. As between the original parties to the negotiable instrument, the officer

who acts for the corporation must have express or implied authority to bind

the corporation, but generally no formal proceedings upon the part of the cor-
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poration are necessary: 1897, Blake v. Domestic Mfg. Co., — N. J. Eq. ,

38 Atl. Rep. 241; 1898, Washington Times Co. v. Wilder, 12 App. D. C. 62;

1898, Dexter Savings Bank v. Friend, 90 Fed. Rep. 703; 1899, Monroe Mer-
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cantile Co. v. Arnold, 108 Ga. 449, 34 S. E. Rep. 176; 1899, Porter v. Winona

& D. G. Co., 78 Minn. 210, 80 N. W. Rep. 965; 1899, G. V. B. Min. Co. v.

First Nat'l Bank, 95 Fed. Rep. 23; 1900, Crawford v. Albany Ice Co., 36 Ore.

535, 60 Pac. Rep. 14.

But if the corporation has power to issue promissory notes for any purpose

a bona fide holder for value, with no knowledge of lack of authority of the

agent, or of other irregularity, or that it was in fact issued by the corpora-

tion for an ultra vires purpose, will be protected: 1825, Ridgway v. Bank,'12

Serg. & R. (Pa.) 256; 1848, Mclntire v. Preston, 10 111. (5 Gil.) 48; 1869, Mon-

ument Nat'l Bank v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 57; 1886, National Bank v.

Young, 41 N. J. Eq. 531; 1889, National Park Bank v. G. A. M. W. & S. Co.,

116 N. Y. 281; 1895, Jacob's Pharmacy Co. v. So. B. & T. Co., 97 Ga. 573;

1895, Marshall Nat'l Bank v. O'Neal, 11 Texas Civ. App. 640.

As in other cases, there is much uncertainty as to the extent of the power o!

the president to bind the corporation by notes issued without express authority.

The two following cases illustrate this: 1899, G. V. B. Mining Co. v. First Nat'l

Bank, 95 Fed. Rep. 23 (holding that president has implied authority); 1900,
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Crawford v. Albany Ice Co., 36 Ore. 535, 60 Pac. Rep. 14 (holding that ex-

press authority must be shown).

Sec. 271. Same.

BATEMAN v. THE MID WALES RAILWAY COMPANY.1

poration are necessary: 1897, Blake v. Domestic Mfg. Co., - N. J. Eq. - ,
38 Atl. Rep. 241; 1898, Washington Times Co. v. Wilder, 12 App. D. C. 62;
1898, Dexter Savings Bank v. Friend, 90 Fed. Rep. 703; 1899, Monroe Mercantile Co. v. Arnold, 108 Ga. 449, 34 8. E. Rep. 176; 1899, Porter v. Winona
& D. G. Co., 78 Minn. 210, 80 N. W. Rep. 965; 1899, G. V. B. Min. Co. v.
First ~at'! Bank, 95 Fed. Rep. 23; 1900, Crawford v. Albany Ice Co., 36 Ore .
.535, 60 Pac. Rep. 14.
But if the corporation has power to issue promissory notes for any purpose
a bona fide holder for value, with no knowledge of lack of authority of the
agent, or of other irregularity, or that it was in fact issued by the corporatio11 for an ultra vire.~ purpose, will be protected: 1825, Ridgway v. Bank,· 12
Serg. & R. (Pa.) 256; 1848, Mcintire v. Preston, JO Ill. (5 Gil.) 48; 1869, :Monument Nat'! Bank v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 57; 1886, National Bank v.
Young, 41 N. J. Eq. 531; 1889, National Park Bank v. G. A. M. W. & S. Co.,
116 N. Y. 281; 1895, Jacob's Pharmacy Co. v. So. B. & T. Co., 97 Ga. 573;
1895, Marshall Nat'! Bank v. O'Neal, 11 Texas Civ. App. 640.
As in other cases, there is much uncertainty as to the extent of the power of
the president to bind the corporation by notes issued without express authority.
The two following cases illustrate this: 1899, G.V. B. Mining Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 95 Fed. Rep. 23 (holding that president has implied authority); 1900,
Crawford v. Albany Ice Co., 36 Ore. 535, 60 Pac. Rep. 14 (holding that express authority must be shown).
·

1866. In the Court of Common Pleas. 35 L. J. Rep. (C. P.)

205-210, 1 Com. Pleas 499.

The plaintiffs in these actions, as indorsees, sued the defendants,

as acceptors of certain bills of exchange; and the defendants pleaded

Sec. 271. Same.

that they did not accept.

BATEMAN v. THE MID WALES RAILWAY COMPANY. 1

The defendants were a railway company, constituted under the 22

& 33 Vict., ch. lxiii. This special act was in the usual form, both as

to the powers given to and the restrictions placed on the company,

1866.

IN THR CouRT OF CoMMON PLEAS.
205-210, 1

and as to the incorporation of general acts; and there was no differ-

35 L. J. Rep. (C. P.)

Com. Pleas 499.

ence between the cases, except that in the last case evidence was

given of the defendants having actually commenced business.

The bills were directed to the Mid Wales Railway Company, and

were accepted in the following form: "Accepted by order of the

board of directors, and payable at the Agra & Masterman's Bank,

John Wade, Secretary," with the seal of the company affixed under

these words. And there was no question but that there was a resolu-

tion of the board of directors to the above effect.

At the trial a verdict was entered for the plaintiffs, with leave to

the defendants to move to enter a verdict for themselves on the

grounds, first, that the defendants had no power by law to accept the

bills, and, secondly, that the acceptances were not binding on them,

and that even if bills could be accepted by them the bills were not ac-

cepted in such a form as to be binding on them.

1 Arguments, and opinions of Erie, C. J., Byles & Keating, JJ., omitted.

The plaintiffs in these actions, as indorsees, sued the defendants,
as acceptors of certain bills of exchange ; and the defendants pleaded
that they did not accept.
The defendants were a railway company, constituted under the 22
& 23 Viet., ch. !xiii. This special act was in the usual form, both as
to the powers given to and the restrictions placed on the company,
and as to the incorporation of general acts; and there was no difference between the cases, except that in the last case evidence was
given of the defendants having actually commenced business.
The bills were directed to the Mid Wales Railway Company, and
were accepted in the following form: "Accepted by order of the
board of directors, and payable at the Agra & Masterman's Bank,
John Wade, Secretary," with the seal of the company affixed under
these words. And there was no question but that there was a resolution of the board of directors to the above effect.
At the trial a verdict was entered for the plaintiffs, with leave to
the de'f endants to move to enter a verdict for themselves on the
grounds, first, that the defendants had no power by law to accept the
bills, and, secondly, that the acceptances were not binding on them,
and that even if bills could be accepted by them the bills were not accepted in such a form as to be binding on them.
•Arguments, and opinions of Erle, C. J ., Byles & Keating, JJ., omitted.
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Rules nisi were obtained, pursuant to such leave.

Montague Smith, J. The plaintiffs as indorsees sue the defend-

948

ants as acceptors, so that the action is not between the immediate

BATEMAN V. THE MID WALES RAILWAY COMPANY.

§ 271

parties to the bills. I think a railway company is not competent to

Rules nisi were obtained, pursuant 1to such leave.
MONTAGUE SMITH, J. The plaintiffs as indorsees sue the defendants as acceptors, so that the action is not between the immediate
parties to the bills. I think a railway company is not competent to
accept bills of exchange. A railway company is incorporated to
make and maintain a railway; its powers and resources are limited
by the incorporating statutes; but if they may accept bills of exchange, they either may do so to any extent, or there would have to
be· an ·inquiry whether the purposes for which the bills were accepted
were within their powers in each partiicular case. I think the legislature did not intend to give them the power. It is admitted that there
is no authority in favor of it; and there is a great abundance of
authority to show that in the analogous cases of mining, ·water-works,
gas, and other companies, the companies can not draw bills of exchange, though they are more trading companies than a railway company. The first object in the constitution of a railway company is
to make a railway, though, it is true, they may, and practically always do become carriers. Corporations for the purposes of trade
have the power of issuing bills of exchange as incidental to such
trading; but this doctrine only applies where the primary object is
trade, buying and selling. In addition to the authorities referred to,
there is the distinct authority of various eminent text-writers that such
a company as this can not accept a bill of exchange. Amongst others, Mr. J. W. Smith, in his tr~ati se on Mercantile Law , says :
"However, it has been conside red that a trading corporation may differ
from others as to its powers of contracting and its remedies on contracts relating to the purposes for which it was formed. Thus, such
a corporation may in some cases bind itself by promissory notes and
bills of exchange; and it was even held that the Bank of England
might without deed appoint an agent for such purposes. But a corporation will not have these extraordinary powers unless the nature of
the business in which it is eng aged raises a necessary implication of
their exi stence." Now clearly, here th ere is no express power, nor
is there any necessary implication. For these reasons, I am of opinion that the defendants were not competent to accept a bill of exchange; and on the other point I also agree with the rest of the court.

accept bills of exchange. A railway company is incorporated to

make and maintain a railway; its powers and resources are limited

by the incorporating statutes; but if they may accept bills of ex-

change, they either may do so to any extent, or there would have to

be an inquiry whether the purposes for which the bills were accepted

were within their powers in each particular case. I think the legis-

lature did not intend to give them the power. It is admitted that there

is no authority in favor of it; and there is a great abundance of

authority to show that in the analogous cases of mining, water-works,

gas, and other companies, the companies can not draw bills of ex-

change, though they are more trading companies than a railway com-

pany. The first object in the constitution of a railway company is

to make a railway, though, it is true, they may, and practically al-

ways do become carriers. Corporations for the purposes of trade

have the power of issuing bills of exchange as incidental to such

trading; but this doctrine only applies where the primary object is
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trade, buying and selling. In addition to the authorities referred to,

there is the distinct authority of various eminent text-writers that such

a company as this can not accept a bill of exchange. Amongst oth-

ers, Mr. J. W. Smith, in his treatise on Mercantile Law, says:

"However, it has been considered that a trading corporation may differ

from others as to its powers of contracting and its remedies on con-

tracts relating to the purposes for which it was formed. Thus, such

a corporation may in some cases bind itself by promissory notes and

bills of exchange; and it was even held that the Bank of England

might without deed appoint an agent for such purposes. But a cor-

poration will not have these extraordinary powers unless the nature of

the business in which it is engaged raises a necessary implication of

their existence." Now clearly, here there is no express power, nor

is there any necessary implication. For these reasons, I am of opin-

ion that the defendants were not competent to accept a bill of ex-

change; and on the other point I also agree with the rest of the court.

Note.—The above case gives the general doctrine in England, but the power

to give notes or accept bills of exchange exists "where upon a fair construc-

tion of the memorandum and articles of association it appears that it was in-

tended to be conferred." 1866, Peruvian R. v. Thames & M. M. I. Co., 36 L.

J. Ch. 864, L. R. 2 Ch. 617. Or where "it is necessary to carry on the business

under ordinary circumstances and in the usual way." 1887, In re Cunning-

ham & Co., 36 Ch. Div. 538, 57 L. J. Ch. 169; 1889,'Atkin v. Wardle, 61 L. T.

23. This power seems to be implied in purely trading companies. 1869, In

re Land Credit Co., L. R. 4 Ch. App. 460; but not in railway (Bateman &

Note.-The above case gives the general dloctrine in England, but the power
to give notes or accept bills of exchange exists "where upon a fair construction of the memorandum and articles of association it appears that it was intended to be conferred." 1866, Peruvian R v. Thames & M. M. I. Co., 36 L.
J. Oh. 864, L . R. 2 Oh. 617. Or where "it is1necessary to carry on the business
under ordinary circumstances and in the msual way." 1887, In re Cunningham & Co., 36 Ch. Div. 538, 57 L. J. Ch. 16'9; 1889, Atkin v. Wardle, 61 L. T.
23. This power seems to be implied in purely trading companies. 1869, In
r e Land Credit Co., L. R. 4 Ch. App. 460; but not in railway (Bateman &
Mid Wales, etc., supra) , gas (1837, Brarnah v. Roberts, 3 Bing. N. C. 963, 32
E . C. L. 4041, water-works (1819, Broughton v. Manchester, etc., Co., 3 B.
& Ald. 1, 5 E. C. L. 11), or mining compa1nies (1829, Dickinson v. Valpy, 10
B. & C. 128, 21 E. C. L . 63).

Mid Wales, etc., supra), gas (1837, Bramah v. Roberts, 3 Bing. N. C. 963, 32

E. C. L. 404), water-works (1819, Broughton v. Manchester, etc., Co., 3 B.

& Aid. 1, 5 E. C. L. 11), or mining companies (1829, Dickinson v. Valpy, 10

B. & C. 128, 21 E. C. L. 63).
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1869. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, ioi

Mass. Rep. 57-59.

Sec. 272. Same.

Accommodation paper.

Hoar, J. The single question presented for our decision in this

MONUMENT NATIONAL BANK v. GLOBE WORKS.1

cause, all others which arise upon the report having been waived, is,

whether the note of a manufacturing corporation, in the hands of a

holder in good faith for value, who took it before maturity, and with-

out any knowledge that the makers had not received the full consider-

1869; IN

THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

IOI

Mass. Rep. 57-59.

ation, can not be enforced against them, because it was in fact made

as an accommodation note.

The argument for the defendants takes the ground that to issue an

accommodation note is not within the powers conferred upon the

corporation; and that, as any persons taking it had notice that it was

the note of the corporation, they had notice that it was of no validity

unless issued for a purpose within the scope of the corporate powers,

and were, therefore, bound to ascertain not only that it was executed

by the officer of the corporation who had the general authority to sign

the notes which they might lawfully make, but that the purpose for
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which it was issued was such as the charter authorized them to enter-

tain and execute.

The court are all of opinion that this position is not tenable, and

that the defense can not be maintained.

It has long been settled in this commonwealth that a manufactur-

ing corporation has the power to make a negotiable promissory note.

Narragansett Bank v. Atlantic Silk Co., 3 Met. 282. And it was

held in Bird v. Daggett, 97 Mass. 494, as a just corrollary to that

proposition, that such note in the hands of a holder in good faith for

value is binding upon the maker, although made as an accommodation

note. The question was not discussed, nor the reasons for the decis-

ion fully stated in Bird v. Daggett; but it was assumed that the doc-

trine announced was clear and undoubted law.

The doctrine of ultra vires has been carried much farther in Eng-

land than the courts in this country have been disposed to extend it;

but, with just limitations, the principle can not be questioned, that

the limitations to the authority, powers, and liability of a corporation

are to be found in the act creating it. And it no doubt follows, as

claimed by the learned counsel for the defendants, that when powers

are conferred and defined by statute, every one dealing with the cor-

poration is presumed to know the extent of those powers.

But when the transaction is not the exercise of a power not confer-

red on a corporation, but the abuse of a general power in a particular

instance, the abuse not being known to the other contracting party,

the doctrine of ultra vires does not apply. As was said by Selden, J.,

1 Part of opinion omitted.

HoAR, J. The single question presented for our decision in this
cause, all others which arise upon the report having been waived, is,
whether the note of a manufacturing corporation, in the hands of a
holder in good faith for value, who took it before maturity, and without any knowledge that the makers had not received the full consideration, can not be enforced against them, because it was in fact made
as an accommodation note.
The argument for the defendants takes the ground that to issue an
accommodation note is not within the powers conferred upon the
corporation; and that, as any persons taking it had notice that it was
the note of the corporation, they had notice that it was of no validity
unless issued for a purpose within the scope of the corporate powers,
and were, therefore, bound to ascertain not only that it was executed
by the officer of the corporation who had the general authority to sign
the notes which they might lawfully make, but that the purpose for
which it was issued was such as the charter authorized them to entertain and execute.
The court are all of opinion that this position is not tenable, and
that the defense can not be maintained.
It has long been settled in this commonwealth that a manufacturing corporation has the power to make a negotiable promissory note.
Narragansett Bank v. Atlantic Silk Co., 3 Met. 282. And it was
held in Bird v. Daggett, 97 Mass. 494, as a just corrollary to that
proposition, that such note in the hands of a holder in good faith for
value is binding upon the maker, although made as an accommodation
note. The question was not discussed, nor the reasons for the decision fully stated in Bird v. Daggett; but it was assumed that the doctrine announced was clear and undoubted law.
The doctdne of ultra vfres has been carried much farther in England than the courts in this country have been disposed to exterid it;
but, with just limitations, the principle can not be questioned, that
the limitations to the authority, powers, and liability of a corporation
are to be found in the act creating it. And it no doubt follows, as
claimed by the learned counsel for the defendants, that when powers
are conferred and defined by statute, every one dealing with the corporation is prest~med to know the extent of those powers.
But when the transaction is not the exercise of a power not conferred on a corporation, but the abuse of a general power in a particular
instance, the abuse not being known to the other contracting party,
the cloctrine of ultra vires does not apply. As was said by Selden, J.,
1
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in Bissell v. Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad Com-
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pany, 22 N. Y. 289, 290: "There are no doubt cases in which a
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corporation would be estopped from setting up this defense, although

its contract might have been really unauthorized. It would not be

in Bissell v. Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad Company, 22 N. Y. 289, 290: "There are no doubt cases in which a
corporation would be estopped from setting up this defense, although
its contract might have been really unauthorized. It would not be
available in a suit brought by a bona .fide indorsee of a negotiable
promissory note, provided the corporation was authorized to give notes
for any purpose; and the reason is, that the corporation, by giving
the note, has virtually represented that it was given for some legitimate purpose, and the indorsee could not be presumed to know the
contrary. The note, however, if given by a corporation, absolutely
prohibited by its charter from giving notes at all, would be voidable
not only in the hands of the original payee, but in those of any subsequent holder; because all persons dealing with a corporation are
bound to take notice qf the extent of its chartered powers. The same
principle is applicable to contracts not negotiable. When the want
of power is apparent upon comparing the act done with the terms of
the cha1ter, the party dealing with the corporation is presumed to
have knowledge of the defect, and the defense of ultra vires is available against him. But such a defense would not be permitted to prevail against a party who can not be presumed to have had any knowledge of the want of authority to make the contract. Hence, if the
question of power depends not merely upon the law under which the
corporation acts, but upon the existence of certain extrinsic facts,
resting peculiarly within the knowledge of the corporate officers, then
the corporation would be estopped from denying that which, by assuming to make the contract, it had virtually affirmed."
This doctrine seems to us sound and reasonable; and in conformity
with it, it was held, in Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank v. Empire
Stone Dressing Company, 5 Bosw. 275, that an accommodation acceptance qy an officer of a manufacturing corporation , on behalf of
the company, was not binding, unless the consideration had been advanced upon the faith of the acceptance; but that if the consideration
was paid in good faith after the acceptance, and upon the credit of it,
it could be enforced. • • •
Judgment for plaintiffs.

available in a suit brought by a bona fide indorsee of a negotiable

promissory note, provided the corporation was authorized to give notes

for any purpose; and the reason is, that the corporation, by giving

the note, has virtually represented that it was given for some legiti-

mate purpose, and the indorsee could not be presumed to know the

contrary. The note, however, if given by a corporation, absolutely

prohibited by its charter from giving notes at all, would be voidable

not only in the hands of the original payee, but in those of any subse-

quent holder; because all persons dealing with a corporation are

bound to take notice of the extent of its chartered powers. The same

principle is applicable to contracts not negotiable. When the want

of power is apparent upon comparing the act done with the terms of

the charter, the party dealing with the corporation is presumed to

have knowledge of the defect, and the defense of ultra vires is avail-

able against him. But such a defense would not be permitted to pre-

vail against a party who can not be presumed to have had any knowl-
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edge of the want of authority to make the contract. Hence, if the

question of power depends not merely upon the law under which the

corporation acts, but upon the existence of certain extrinsic facts,

resting peculiarly within the knowledge of the corporate officers, then

the corporation would be estopped from denying that which, by as-

suming to make the contract, it had virtually affirmed."

This doctrine seems to us sound and reasonable; and in conformity

with it, it was held, in Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank v. Empire

Stone Dressing Company, 5 Bosw. 275, that an accommodation ac-

ceptance by an officer of a manufacturing corporation, on behalf of

the company, was not binding, unless the consideration had been ad-

vanced upon the faith of the acceptance; but that if the consideration

was paid in good faith after the acceptance, and upon the credit of it,

it could be enforced. * • *

Judgment for plaintiffs.

Note. Accord: 1858, Smead v. R. Co., 11 Ind. 104; 1865, Hall v. Auburn

Tp. Co., 27 Cal. 255, 87 Am. Dec. 75; 1886, National Bank v. Young, 41 N. J.

Eq. 531; 1889, National Park Bank v. G. A. M. W. & S. Co., 116 N. Y. 281;

1895, Jacob's Pharmacy Co. v. So. Bank & T. Co., 97 Ga. 573; 1898, Steiner v.

Steiner L. & L. Co., 120 Ala. 128, 26 So. Rep. 494. But see next case.

Sec. 273. Same.

MTJRPHY Et Al. v. ARKANSAS & L. LAND IMPROVEMENT

COMPANY.1

Note . Accord: 1858, Smead v. R. Co., 11 Ind. 104; 1865, Hall v. Auburn
Tp. Co., 27 Cal. 255, 87 Am. Dec. 75; 1886, National Bank v. Young, 41 N . J.
Eq. 51H; 1889, National Park Bank v. G . A. M. W. & S. Co., 116 N. Y . 281 ;
1895, Jacob's Pharmacy Co. v. So. Bank & T. Co., 97 Ga. 573; 1898, Steiner v.
Steiner L. & L. Co., 120 Ala. 128, 26 So. Rep. 494. But see next case.

1899. In the United States Circuit Court, N. D. Arkansas.

97 Fed. Rep. 723-730.

[Bill to foreclose a trust deed. P. F. B. owned one-third of a

1 Statement abridged, and only part of opinion given.

Sec. 273. Same.
MURPHY ET AL. v. ARKANSAS & L. LAND IMPROVEMENT
COMPANY.'

1899.

IN

THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT,

N. D.

ARKANSAS.

97 Fed. Rep. 723-730.
[Bill to foreclose a trust deed.
1 Statement
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$30,000 judgment in favor of tjie A. & L. R. Co. against J. D. B.

POWER AS TO NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

In order to discharge this third, J. D. B. paid P. F. B. $6,000, and

951

delivered to him a note for $4,000, secured by a deed of trust, exe-

cuted by the Land Company, and made payable to J. D. B. or his

assignee, for the purpose of enabling him to pay his claim. The note

and deed were executed with the full consent of all the directors and

shareholders of the Land Company, composed of J. D. B., who

owned all the stock except shares necessary to qualify a son of J. D.

B. and his attorney to be directors; also at a time when the corpora-

tion had ample property to pay all its debts including this claim. P.

F. B. assigned the note and deed of trust in the ordinary course of

business to Murphy, who brings the suit.]

Rogers, District Judge. * * * It is urged that the land com-

pany had no authority to execute accommodation paper, and hence

the execution of the note was ultra -vires. I incline to think that

the charter of the land company is broad enough to authorize it to ex-

ecute accommodation paper, but it makes no difference as to that.

The land company is a private corporation. It owed no debts.

The paper was issued by the consent of all the stockholders, and it

has been accepted, and the consideration parted with by P. F. B.
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for it. Can it now be permitted to take shelter under the plea of ultra

vires? I think not. In 1 Cook Corp., § 3, the author says:

"A private corporation may become an accommodation indorser,

distribute its assets, issue its notes, stock, or bonds below par, or, for

no consideration whatever, give away its assets, or may mortgage its

property for the personal benefit of a part or all of its stockholders or

officers; provided, always, that all the stockholders assent, and pro-

vided that corporate creditors are not injured, and provided that no

statute forbids such acts. The doctrine of ultra vires is no longer

held to forbid such acts by a private corporation under such circum-

stances. * * * The theory of a corporation is that it has no pow-

ers except those expressly given or necessarily implied. But this

theory is no longer strictly applied to private corporations. A private

corporation may exercise many extraordinary powers, provided all of

its stockholders assent, and none of its creditors are injured. There

is no one to complain except the state, and, the business being entirely

private, the state does not interfere. Thus, fifty years ago the courts

would have summarily declared it illegal for a business corporation

to become an accommodation indorser of commercial paper, but to-

day there is no rule of public policy which prohibits a private corpo-

ration having a capital stock from becoming the accommodation in-

dorser of commercial paper, providing such indorsement is made with

the knowledge and assent of all the directors and stockholders, and

provided corporate creditors are paid."

In the subsequent discussion of the author it is shown that whatever

is done by a private corporation with the assent of all of its stockhold-

ers, and where no creditor is injured, although it may be ultra vires,

is lawful, and will be enforced by the courts. The principle does not

$30,000 judgment in favor of t;he A. & L. R. Co. against J. D. B.
In order to discharge this third, J. D. B. paid P. F. B. $6,ooo, and
delivered to him a note for $4,000, secured by a deed of trust, executed by the Land Company, and made payable to J. D. B. or his
assignee, for the purpose of enabling him to pay his claim. The note
and deed were executed with the full consent of all the directors and
shareholders of ' the Land Company, composed of J. D. B., who
owned all the stock except shares necessary to qualify a son of J. D.
B. and his attorney to be directors; also at a time when the corporation had ample property to pay all its debts including this claim. P.
F. B. assigned the note and deed of trust in the ordinary course of
business to Murphy, who brings the suit.]
RoGERS, District Judge.
• • • It is urged that the land company had no authority to execute accommodation paper, and hence
the execution of the note was 14/tra v£res. I incline to think that
the charter of the land company is broad enough to authorize it to execute accommodation paper, but it makes no difference as to that.
The land company is a private corporation. It owed no debts.
The paper was issued by the consent of all the stockholders, and it
has been accepted, and the consideration parted with by P. F. B.
for it. Can it now be permitted to take shelter under the plea of ultra
vires.P I think not. In 1 Cook Corp., § 3, the author says:
.
"A private corporation may become an accommodation indorser,
distribute its assets, issue its notes, stock, or bonds below par, or, for
no consideration whatever, give away its assets, or may mortgage its
property for the personal benefit of a part or all of its stockholders or
officers; provided, always, that all the stockholders assent, and provided that corporate creditors are not injured, and provided that no
statute forbids such acts. The doctrine of ultra vfres is no longer
held to forbid such acts by a private corporation under such circumstances. • • • The theory of a corporation is that it has no powers except those expressly given or necessarily implied. But this
theory is no longer strictly applied to private corporations. A private
corporation may exercise many extraordinary powers, provided all of
its stockholders assent, and none of its creditors are injured. There
is no one to complain except the state, and, the business being entirely
private, the state does not interfere. Thus, fifty years ago the courts
would have summarily declared it illegal for a business corporation
to become an accommodation indorser of commercial paper, but today there is no rule of public policy which prohibits a private corporation having a capital stock from becoming the accommodation indorser of commercial paper, providing such indorsement is made with
the knowledge and assent of all the directors and stockholders, and
provided corporate creditors are paid."
In the subsequent discussion of the author it is shown that whatever
is done by a private corporation "with the assent of all of its stockholders, and where no creditor is injured, although it may be ultra vt'res,
is lawful, and will be enforced by the courts. The principle does not
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apply to railroad corporations or guasi-public corporations. * * *
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Decree for ■plaintiff.

TOD ET AL. V. KENTUCKY t;NION LAND CO.

Note. Accord: 1890, Martin v. Niagara Falls Paper Co., 122 N. Y. 165;

1895, Bensiek v. Thomas, 66 Fed. Rep. 104; 1897, Solomon Solar S. Co. v.

apply to railroad corporations or quasi-public corporations.
Decree for plat"ntiff.

Barber, 58 Kan. 419, 49 Pac. Rep. 524; 1898, Central Trust Co. v. C. H. V. &

T. R. Co., 87 Fed. Rep. 815.

• • •

Sec. 274. (4) Surety or guarantor.

Note. Accord: 1890, Martin v. Niagara Falls Paper Co., 122 N. Y. 1611;
1895, Bensiek v. Thomas, 66 Fed. Rep. 104; 1897, Solomon Solar S. Co. v.
Barber, 58 Kan. 419, 49 Pac. Rep. 524; 1898, Central :rrust Co. v. C.H. V. ct
T. R. Co., 87 Fed. Rep. 815.

TOD Et Al. v. KENTUCKY UNION LAND COMPANY Et Al.1

1893. In the United States Circuit Court, District op

Kentucky. 57 Fed. Rep. 47-66.

[Bill in equity against the land company and others for the appoint-

ment of a receiver, and declaring an assignment under the Kentucky

laws, on account of the debtor land company having made preferences

which, as alleged, operated as an assignment. Decree for complain-

See. 274.

ants, with a reference to a commissioner, to report as to priority of

(4) Surety or guarantor.

claims. The land company had guaranteed the first mortgage bonds

TOD ET AL. v. KENTUCKY UNION LAND COMPANY ET A..L.1

to the extent of $2,625,000, $800,000 second mortgage bonds, and a

5 per cent, dividend upon $500,000 of the capital stock, of the Ken-

IN

tucky Union Railway Company; the validity of these guaranties, be-

ing assailed by other creditors, was submitted by the commissioner to

THE

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT
KENTUCKY.
57 Fed. Rep.

CouRT,

DISTRICT OF

47-66.
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the court.]

[Bill in equity against the land company and others for the appoint·
ment of a receiver, and declaring an assignment under the Kentucky
laws, on account of the debtor land company having made preferences
which, as alleged, operated as an assignment. Decree for complainants, with a reference to a commissioner, to report as to priority of
claims. The land company had guaranteed the first mortgage bonds
to the extent of $z,625,ooo, $800,000 second mortgage bonds, and a
5 per cent. dividend upon $500 1 000 of the capital stock, of the Ken·
tucky Union Railway Company; the validity of these guaranties, being assailed by other creditors, was submitted by the commissioner to
the court.]
LuRTON, C. J. • • • Did the Kentucky Union Land Company have the power to bind itself by its contract guarantying the
principal and interest of the first mortgage bonds issued by the Kentucky Union Railway Company?
The question, a~ presented on this record, is a question pure and
simple as to how far the authority to execute these contracts is sustained by the corporate powers which the law has vested in this com·
pany. No question arises as to the rights of bona fide holders of
these bonds for value and without notice of the facts that the bonds
had not been indorsed upon their sale and transfer by the guarantying
corporation. The general doctrine may be taken to be well settled in
the courts of the United States that the powers of the corporation are
such , and such only, as are conferred by the law under which it is incorporated. The charter is the measure of the power of every corporation , and by this test must every corporate act be tried. This rule.
however, concedes the usual propositions applicable to every legislative act-that what is fairly implied is as much granted as if expressly
enumerated. • • •
The power to execute accommodation paper or to guaranty for ac·
commodation the obligations of another corporation is not expressly
conferred by the charter of the land company. Ordinarily, such
1 Statement abridged, and only part of opinion given.

Lurton, C. J. * * * Did the Kentucky Union Land Com-

pany have the power to bind itself by its contract guarantying the

principal and interest of the first mortgage bonds issued by the Ken-

tucky Union Railway Company?

The question, as presented on this record, is a question pure and

simple as to how far the authority to execute these contracts is sus-

tained by the corporate powers which the law has vested in this com-

pany. No question arises as to the rights of bona fide holders of

these bonds for value and without notice of the facts that the bonds

had not been indorsed upon their sale and transfer by the guarantying

corporation. The general doctrine may be taken to be well settled in

the courts of the United States that the powers of the corporation are

such, and such only, as are conferred by the law under which it is in-

corporated. The charter is the measure of the power of every corpo-

ration, and by this test must every corporate act be tried. This rule,

however, concedes the usual propositions applicable to every legisla-

tive act—that what is fairly implied is as much granted as if expressly

enumerated. • » •

The power to execute accommodation paper or to guaranty for ac-

commodation the obligations of another corporation is not expressly

conferred by the charter of the land company. Ordinarily, such

1 Statement abridged, and only part of opinion given.
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power is not implied from the powers conferred upon corporations,

and such contracts are generally in excess of the powers of corpora-

POWER TO BE SURETY.

tions, and therefore void as ultra vires, in the true sense of the term.

0 53

This proposition rests upon two or more very evident reasons:

(1) The corporate funds belong to its shareholders and, by the

very terms of the law creating it, can not be devoted to any other pur-

pose than those indicated by its charter and constitution. Such obli-

gations would violate the fundamental terms of the agreement be-

tween the corporators themselves.

(2) To do so would be to exercise a power not conferred by the

state, either expressly or impliedly. The state's grant of the corpo-

rate franchises is for the purpose prescribed, and the execution of

such obligations would be beyond the power conferred, and therefore

a diversion of the corporate purposes, as well as of the corporate

funds.

(3) Such obligations rest upon no consideration, and would not,

therefore, be valid. They would amount to a donation of the corpo-

rate funds, and therefore an unlawful diversion. Mor. Priv. Corp.,

423; Davis v. Railroad Co., 131 Mass. 258; Madison Plank-Road Co.

v. Watertown Plank-Road Co., 7 Wis. 59; McClellan v. File Works,
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56 Mich. 579, 23 N. W. Rep. 321; National Park Bank v. German-

American Mutual Warehouse & Security Co., 116 N. Y. 292, 22 N.

E. Rep. 567; yEtna Nat'l Bank v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 50

Conn. 167.

But there is no inherent want of power in a business corporation,

having the power to execute negotiable paper, to obligate itself as a

surety or guarantor. If such a corporation receives commercial paper

or bonds in due course of business we see no reason why, upon transfer-

ring such paper, it may not be lawful to obligate itself as indorser or

guarantor. Such a contract would be a new and independent con-

tract, and would rest upon a sufficient consideration, if entered into as

a legitimate means of increasing the value of the security to be dis-

posed of in ordinary course of business. In Railroad v. Howard the

question arose as to the liability of a railroad company upon its guar-

anty of certain bonds issued by various counties and cities, and re-

ceived by the railroad company in payment of subscription to its

stock.

Upon full consideration it was held that, inasmuch as the company

had received the bonds in payment of stock, it had a right to obligate

itself by its own bonds for the purpose of building its road; it might

lawfully, and in furtherance of its authorized purpose, guaranty such

bonds as a means of augmenting their value on the market, thus pro-

ducing funds to build its road. 7 Wall. 411, 412. The power of a

corporation to bind itself by a guaranty, when it does so for its own

benefit and as a means of selling at an augmented value, is generally

conceded by the authorities. "In such cases," says Mr. Randolph

in his work upon Commercial Paper (vol. 1, sec. 334), "the guaranty

is an original contract of the corporation for its own benefit; the con-

sideration moving to itself, and not to the person whose debt is guar-

antied." * * »

power is not implied from the powers conferred upon corporations,
and such contracts are generally in excess of the powers of corporations, and therefore void as ultra vires, in the true sense of the term.
This proposition rests upon two or more very evident reasons:
( l) The corporate funds belong to its shareholders and, by the
very terms of the law creating it, can not be devoted to any other purpose than those indicated by its charter and constitution. Such obligations would violate the fundamental terms of the agreement between the corporators themselves.
( 2) To do so would be to exercise a power not conferred by the
state, either expressly or impliedly. The state's grant of the corpornte franchises is for the purpose prescribed, and the execution of
such obligations would be beyond the power conferred, and therefore
a diversion of the corporate purposes, as well as of the corporate
funds.
(3) Such obligations rest upon no consideration, and would not,
therefore, be valid. They would amount to a donation of the corporate funds, and therefore an unlawful diversion. Mor. Priv. Corp.,
423; Davis v. Railroad Co., 131 Mass. 258; Madison Plank-Road Co.
v. Watertown Plank-Road Co., 7 Wis. 59; McClellan v. File Works,
56 Mich. 579, 23 N. W. Rep. 321; National Park Bank v. GermanAmerican Mutual Warehouse & Security Co., 116 N. Y. 292, 22 N.
E. Rep. 567; ..tEtna Nat'l Bank v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 50
Conn. 167.
But there is no inherent want of power in a business corporation,
having the power to execute negotiable paper, to obligate itself as a
surety or guarantor. If such a corporation receives commercial paper
or bonds in due course of business we see no reason why, upon transferring such paper, it may not be lawful to obligate itself as indorser or
guarantor. Such a contract would be a new and independent contract, and would rest upon a sufficient consideration, if entered into as
a legitimate means of increasing the value of the security to be disposed of in ordinary course of bu'liness. In Railroad v. Howard the
question arose as to the liability of a railroad company upon its guaranty of certain bonds issued by various counties and cities, and received by the railroad company in payment .o f subscription to its
stqck.
Upon full consideration it was held that, inasmuch as the company
had received the bonds in payment of stock, it had a right to obligate
itself by its own bonds for the purpose of building its road; it might
lawfully, and in. furtherance of its authorized purpose, guaranty such
bonds as a means of augmenting their value on the market, thus producing funds to build its road. 7 Wall. 41 l, 412. The power of a
corporation to bind itself by a guaranty, when it does so for its own
benefit and as a means of selling at an augmented value, is generally
conceded by the authorities. "In such cases," says Mr. Randolph
in his work upon Commercial Paper (vol. l, sec. 334), "the guaranty
1s an original contract of the corporation for its own benefit; the consideration moving to itself, and not to the person whose debt is guarantied." • • •
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In the light of these principles let us look at the facts connected

954

with the contract under consideration.

TOD ET AL. V. KENTUCKY UNION LAND CO. ET AL.

§ 274

The Kentucky Union Land Company was incorporated under a

special charter granted by the legislature of Kentucky in 1880. Its

In the light of these principles let us look at the facts connected
with the contract under consideration.
The Kentucky Union Land Company was incorporated under a
special charter granted by the legislature of Kentucky in 188o. Its
original corporate title was, "The Central Kentucky Lumber, Mining, Manufacturing and Transportation Company." This name was
by amendment of charter in 1890, and after these bonds had been
guarantied, changed to "The Kentucky Union Land Company."
The original title indicated very thoroughly the large power conferred by the charter, and the composite character of the business contemplated thereunder. • • •
The Kentucky Union Railway Company was organized under a
special charter granted by Kentucky in 1854. Under its charter the
stock might be subscribed for by "any individual or corporation."

original corporate title was, "The Central Kentucky Lumber, Min-

ing, Manufacturing and Transportation Company." This name was

by amendment of charter in 1890, and after these bonds had been

guarantied, changed to "The Kentucky Union Land Company."

The original title indicated very thoroughly the large power confer-

red by the charter, and the composite character of the business con-

templated thereunder. * * *

The Kentucky Union Railway Company was organized under a

special charter granted by Kentucky in 1854. Under its charter the

stock might be subscribed for by "any individual or corporation."

•»»

Without undertaking to state the details as to how and under what

circumstances, and upon what consideration, it is sufficient for the

purpose of this case to say that, at the date of the contract of guaranty

in question, shares of stock in. the railway company to the amount of

• • •

$i,Soo,ooo were held and owned by the land company. This con-

Without undertaking to state the details as to how and under what
circumstances, and upon what consideration, it is sufficient for the
purpose of this case to say that, at the date of the contract of guaranty
in question, shares of stock in. the railway company to the amount of
$ 1,800,000 were held and owned by the land company. This constituted the whole of the shares issued by that ~ompany except, perhaps, nine, which were held by the directors of the railwny company
in ~'rder that they might be qualified to act. The land company at
the same time ha<l acquired the title to between 300,000 and 500,uoo
acres of mountain lands on the line of the projected continuation of
this railway. In order to the development of these lands, and to the
utilization of the timber and mines thereon, it became most essential
that this railway should be completed. Did the land company have
power to aid in the extension and completion of this railway? • • •
(The charter provided inter alia, that the land company might
"acquire by purchase or condemnation the necessary rights of way for
exporting the products of the mines and timber," and might "effect
a temporary or permanent consolidation with any railroad or transportation company," and "the consolidated companies may have and exercise the powers of both companies."]
Now, the case, as it was presented to the land company, was this:
"We have purchased ,' as authorized by our charter, a vast body of
timbered and mineral lands. We are authorized, expressly, to utilize
these lands. by developing their timber and mineral interest. The intention of the legislature was that this buried natural wealth shall be
utilized by the erection of sawmills, iron works, rolling mills, furniture
factories, iron furnace s, and by the opening and operating of iron and
coal mines. It contemplated that transportation of the products of
these mines, mills and factories would be a matter of great concern.
The right to condemn rights of way is conferred.''
That railroad transportation would be essential to get to market
these products, nnd for the necessary development of the towns whicil
must spring up around enterprises so numerous, was also in contem-
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stituted the whole of the shares issued by that company except, per-

haps, nine, which were held by the directors of the railway company

in order that they might be qualified to act. The land company at

the same time had acquired the title to between 300,000 and 500,000

acres of mountain lands on the line of the projected continuation of

this railway. In order to the development of these lands, and to the

utilization of the timber and mines thereon, it became most essential

that this railway should be completed. Did the land company have

power to aid in the extension and completion of this railway? * * *

[The charter provided inter alia, that the land company might

"acquire by purchase or condemnation the necessary rights of way for

exporting the products of the mines and timber," and might "effect

a temporary or permanent consolidation with any railroad or transpor-

tation company," and "the consolidated companies may have and ex-

ercise the powers of both companies."]

Now, the case, as it was presented to the land company, was this:

"We have purchased, as authorized by our charter, a vast body of

timbered and mineral lands. We are authorized, expressly, to utilize

these lands- by developing their timber and mineral interest. The in-

tention of the legislature was that this buried natural wealth shall be

utilized by the erection of sawmills, iron works, rolling mills, furniture

factories, iron furnaces, and by the opening and operating of iron and

coal mines. It contemplated that transportation of the products of

these mines, mills and factories would be a matter of great concern.

The right to condemn rights of way is conferred."

That railroad transportation would be essential to get to market

these products, and for the necessary development of the towns which

must spring up around enterprises so numerous, was also in contem-
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plation of the state when the charter was granted, is evident from sev-

955

eral considerations:

(1) The coal, iron and timber, and the manufactured products of

the contemplated mills and factories could not be profitably utilized

without cheap transportation.

(2) That the company should engage in transportation is indicated

by the original title of the corporation. It was to be a transportation

company as well as a mining and manufacturing company.

(3) The power to consolidate with any railroad company, char-

tered or to be chartered, is expressly conferred.

(4) In case of such consolidation the companies were to exercise

the powers of both, and act in the name of either, or in an agreed

name. The power did not stop here. There might be a "temporary

consolidation" with a railroad company. • » •

There is nothing in this charter to indicate that only a technical

consolidation was authorized. On the contrary, the power to make a

"temporary consolidation," looking to all the four corners of this char-

ter, clearly implies the power to make such an alliance or bring about
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such a union and co-operation of interests between the land company

and the railway company as shall be to the mutual interest of each,

and place both under the same control and management. This could

be done by the plan suggested by Mr. Morawetz in section 942,

whereby the shares of one company should be held by the other, or

by the same persons. This meaning seems reasonable and proper,

looking to the objects and purposes of this corporation, and any steps

which brought about unity of interest and co-operation in purpose as

being legitimate and authorized. Under the power we are of opinion

that the Kentucky Union "Land Company had the power to acquire

the shares in the railway company, and the right to exercise control

over the railway company through the ownership and control of those

shares. * * *

Having authority to acquire this stock the land company became

the sole stockholder in the railway company. Each had express au-

thority to borrow money and issue bonds to carry out the purposes of

the organization. The completion of this railway was an object

within the scope of its charter powers. It could do so by its own

name, or by aiding the railway company to negotiate its securities by

guarantying their payment. The guaranty was not for the accom-

modation of the railway company. The guarantor being the sole

shareholder of the railway company, it was a contract for its own ben-

efit, and therefore rested upon a sufficient security. In addition, the

land company was a creditor of the railway company, and was to,

and did receive the proceeds arising from sale of one-half million of

these bonds. The remainder of the money thus raised was to be ap-

plied to the building of the railway line. The consideration was suf-

ficient to fully support the contract. » » *

One railway company, under authority of law, leased the line of

another for a term of years. The consideration of the lease was an an-

nual rental, and that the lessee company should guaranty the principal

plation of the state when the charter was granted, is evident from several considerations:
(1). The coal, iron and timber, and the manufactured products of
the contemplated mills and factories could not be profitably utilized
without cheap transportation.
(2) That the company should engage in transportation is indicated
- by the original title of the corporation. It was to be a transportation
company as well as a mining and manufacturing company.
(3) The power to consolidate with any railroad company, chartered or to be chartered, is expressly conferred.
(4) In case of such consolidation the companies were to exercise
the powers of both, and act in the name of either, or in an agreed
name. The power did not stop here. There might be a ''temporary
consolidation'' with a railroad company. • • •
There is nothing in this charter to indicate that only a technical
consolidation was authorized . On the contrary, the power to make a
"temporary consolidation," looking to all the four corners of this charter, clearly implies the power to make such an alliance or bring about
such a union and co-operation of interests between ~he land company
and the railway company as shall be to the mutual interest of each,
and place both under the same control and management. This could
be done by the plan suggested by Mr. Morawetz in section 942 1
whereby the shares of one company should be held by the other, or
by the sa me persons. This meaning seems reasonable and proper,
looking to the objects and purposes of this corporation, and any steps
which brought about unity of interest and co-operation in purpose as
being legitimate and authorized. Under the power we are of opinion
that the Kentucky Union Land Company had the power to acquire
the shares in the railway company, and the right to exercise control
over the railway company through the ?wnership and control of those
shares. • • •
Having authority to acquire this stock the land company became
the sole stockholder in the railway company. Each had express authority to borrow money and issue bonds to carry out the purposes of
the organization. The completion of this railway was an object
within the scope of its charter powers. It could do so by its own
name, or by aiding the railway company to negotiate its securities by
guarantying their payment. The guaranty was not for the accommodation of the railway company. The guarantor bei.n g the sole
shareholder of the railway company, it was a contract for its O\.Vn b e nefit, and therefore rested upon a sufficient security. In addition , the
land company was a creditor of the railway company, and was to,
and did receive the proceeds arising from sale of one-half million of
these bonds. The remainder of the money thus raised was to be applied to the building of the railway line. The consideration was sufficient to fully support the contract. • • •
One railway company, under authority of law , leased the line of
another for a term of years. The consideration of the lease was an annual rental , and that the lessee company should guaranty the principal
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and interest of bonds to be issued by the lessor company. The con-

956

tract of guaranty was challenged as ultra vires. The lessee company
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had no express authority to make such contract of guaranty, but did

have power to make all such contracts as were usual and proper in

and interest of bonds to be issued by the lessor company. The contract of guaranty was challenged as ultra vires. The lessee company
had no express authority to make such contract of guaranty, b.ut did
have power to make all such contracts as were usual and proper in
the building and operation of the railway, and it likewise h ad power
to lease the line of the lessor company. It was held that the consideration was sufficient and the guaranty valid. The court was of opinion that it was as competent for the company to promise to pay conditionally as to promise to pay absolutely; that the validity of the
agreement depended upon the sufficiency of the consideration. The
right to take the lease being express, it was a good consideration for
the conditional promise involved by a contract guaranty. Low v.
Railroad Co., 52 Cal. 53. See, also, Smead v. Railroad Co., 11 Ind.
104, and Zabriskie v. Railroad Co., 23 How. 381, where a general
authority to aid a connecting railroad company was held sufficient to
authorize the guarantying of the bonds of such road. Also, Mor.
Priv. Corp., § 423. • • •
Guaranties held valid.

the building and operation of the railway, and it likewise had power

to lease the line of the lessor company. It was held that the consid-

eration was sufficient and the guaranty valid. The court was of opin-

ion that it was as competent for the company to promise to pay con-

ditionally as to promise to pay absolutely; that the validity of the

agreement depended upon the sufficiency of the consideration. The

right to take the lease being express, it was a good consideration for

the conditional promise involved by a contract guaranty. Low v.

Railroad Co., 52 Cal. 53. See, also, Smead v. Railroad Co., ir Ind.

104, and Zabriskie v. Railroad Co., 23 How. 381, where a general

authority to aid a connecting railroad company was held sufficient to

authorize the guarantying of the bonds of such road. Also, Mor.

Priv. Corp., § 423. » * »

Guaranties held valid.

Note. Power to be surety or guarantor.

1. The general rule is that a corporation has no implied power to become
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surety or guarantor in a matter not clearlv authorized: 1846, Coleman v. R.

Co., 10 Beav. 1; 1858, Smead v. R. Co., 11 Ind. 104; 1865, Hall v. Auburn T.

P. Co., 27 Cal. 255, 87 Am. Dec. 75; 1895, Northside R. Co. v. Worthington,

8STexas562, 53 Am. St. Rep. 778; 1899, Gilbert v. Seatco Mfg. Co., 98 Fed Rep.

Note. Power to be .mrety or guarantor.

208; 1899, M. V. Monarch Co. v. Farmers' & D. Bank, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1351, 49 S.

1. The general rule is that a corporation bas no implied power to become
surety or guarantor in a matter not clearly authorized: 1846, Coleman v. R.
Co., 10 Beav. 1; 1858, Smead v. R. Co., JI Ind. 104; 1865, Hall v. Auburn T.
P. Co., 27 Cal. 255, 87 Am. Dec. 75; 1895, Northside R. Co. v. Worthington,
8~ Texas 562, 53 Am. St. Rep. 778; 1899, Gilbert v. Re11tco Mfg. Co., 98 Fed Rep.
208; 1899 M. V. Monarch Co. v. Farmers' & D. Bank, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 135 1, 4H S.
W. Rep. 317. But it seems that a guaranty may be binding if all the sb:treholders agree, and no bonajide creditor's rights are affected, though the purpose may be ttltra vires. 1898, First National Bank, etc., v: WincheRter, 119
Ala. 168, 72 Am. St. Rep . 904, and Murphy v. Ark. & L. L. Imp. Co., supra,
p. 950, and note.
2. There are, however, some well-defined exceptions to the general rule:
e.g., A corporation holding the s~curitiesof nnotbeq:iarty bas the right to dispose of them, and guarantee their payment in the orihnary course of business:
1868, Railroad v. Howard, 7 Wall (74 U.S.) 392; 1876, Arnot v. Erie R. Co.,
67 N. Y. 315; 1891, Ellerman v. Chicago J. R. Co., 49 N. J . Eq. 217; 1898, National Bank of Com. v. Allen, 90 Fed. Rep. 545.
A railroad company may guarantee the payment of the bonds and interest
of a company whose road it is authorized to lease : 1877, Low v. Railroad Co.,
52 Cal. 53, 28 Am. Rep. 629; or the bonds of cities that are lawfully issued to aid
in its construction, 1868, Railroad v. Howard, 7 Wall. (74 U. 8.) 392; or a
note given by a party for its right of way, 1900, Lake St . El. R. Co. v. Carmichael, 184 Tll . 348, 56 N. E. Rep . 372; but a railroad company can not guarantee the profits of a connecting steamship company, 1846, Colman v. Railroad Co., 10 Beav. l.
A land comp11ny-witb power to do whatever is necessary to the development of the land- may guarantee the bonds of a railroad company necessl\ry
to the success of the land company: 1870, Vandall v. Dock Co., 40 C11l. 83;
189~, Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kizer, 91 Ga. 636; 1894, Marbury v. Kentucky
U111on Land Co .. 62 Fed. Rep. 335. But see, 1895, Northside R. Co. v. Worthington, 88 Texas 562, 53 Am. St. Rep. 778. Such companv may also bnild,
or help another corporation build, a saw-mill, 1875, Watts's Appeal, 78 Pa.
St. 370; or a bridge, 1894. Fort Worth City Co. v. Smith Bridge Co., 151 U.
S. 294, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539.
So a lumber company may be a guarantor for a railroad n ecessary for ita
success: 1893, Mercantile Co. v. Kizer, 91 Ga. 636; or for a builder who ~Pts
his material from such company, 1896, Wheeler, Osgood, etc., Co. v. Ever-

W. Rep. 317. But it seems that a guaranty may be binding if all the share-

holders agree, and no bona fide creditor's rights are affected, though the pur-

pose may be ultra vires. 1898, First National Bank, etc., v. Winchester, 119

Ala. 168| 72 Am. St. Rep. 904, and Murphy v. Ark. & L. L. Imp. Co., supra,

p. 950, and note.

2. There are, however, some well-defined exceptions to the general rule:

e. g., A corporation holding the securities of another party has the right to dis-

pose of them, and guarantee their payment in the ordinary course of onsiness:

1868, Railroad v. Howard, 7 Wall (74 U. S.) 392; 1876, Arnot v. Erie R. Co.,

67 N. Y. 315; 1891, Ellerman v. Chicago J. R. Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 217; 1898, Na-

tional Bank of Com. v. Allen, 90 Fed. Rep. 545.

A railroad company may guarantee the payment of the bonds and interest

of a company whose road it is authorized to lease: 1877, Low v. Railroad Co.,

52 Cal. 53, 28 Am. Rep. 629; or the bonds of cities that arelawfullv issued to aid

in its construction, 1868, Railroad v. Howard, 7 Wall. (74 U. "S.) 392; or a

note given by a party for its right of way, 1900, Lake St. El. R. Co. v. Car-

michael, 184 111. 348, 56 N. E. Rep. 372; but a railroad company can not guar-

antee the profits of a connecting steamship company, 1846, Colman v. Rail-

road Co., 10 Beav. 1.

A land company—with power to do whatever is necessary to the develop-

ment of the land—may guarantee the bonds of a railroad company necessarv

to the success of the land companv: 1870, Vandall v. Dock Co., 40 Cal. 83";

1893, Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kizer, 91 Ga. 636; 1894, Marburv v. Kentuckv

Union Land Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 335. But see, 1895, Northside R". Co. v. Worth-

ington, 88 Texas 562, 53 Am. St. Rep. 778. Such company may also build,

or help another corporation build, a saw-mill, 1875, Watts's Appeal, 78 Pa.

St. 370; or a bridge, 1894. Fort Worth Citv Co. v. Smith Bridge Co., 151 U.

S. 294, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539.

So a lumber company may be a guarantor for a railroad necessary for its

success: 1893, Mercantile Co. v. Kizer, 91 Ga. 636; or for a builder who gets

his material from such company, 1896, Wheeler, Osgood, etc., Co. v. Ever-
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ett, etc., Co., 14 Wash. 630; 1900, Wittmer Lumber Co. v. Rice, 23 Ind. App.

586, 55 N. E. Rep. 868.
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MALLORY v. HANAUR OIL WORKS.1

1888. In the Supreme Court of Tennessee. 86 Tenn. Rep.

598-609, 20 Am. & E. C. C. 478.

ett, etc., Co., 14 Wash. 630; 1900, Wittmer Lumber Co. v. Rice, 23 Ind. App.
586, 55 N. E. Rep. 868.
.

Appeal in error from circuit court of Shelby county.

Lurton, J. This is an action of unlawful detainer, brought by

the Hanaur Oil Works, a corporation created under the General In-

Sec. 275. ( 5)

Partnership.

corporation Act of 1875, and engaged in the manufacture of cotton-

MALLORY v. HANAUR OIL WORKS.1

seed oil at Memphis, Tenn.

The facts which raise the question to be determined are these: In

July, 1884, a contract was entered into by and between four corpora-

1888. IN

THE SUPREME

598-609,

tions engaged in manufacturing cotton-seed oil at Memphis for the

CoURT
20

OF TENNESSEE.

86 Tenn. Rep.

Am. & E. C. C. 478.

formation of what is designated in the agreement as a "combination,"

"syndicate," and "partnership." The contracting mills agreed to se-

lect a committee, composed of representatives from each corporation,

and to turn over to this committee the properties and machinery of

each mill, to be managed and operated by this committee, through

officers, agents and employes selected by them, for the common ben-
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efit, the profits and losses of such operations to be shared in propor-

tions agreed upon. This arrangement was to last one year, but, with

consent of all, might be renewed for two additional years, and, as ap-

pears, was at the end of first year renewed for two other years, termi-

nating August 1, 1887. * • *

The argument here has largely turned upon the correctness of the

charge of the circuit judge, who distinctly instructed the jury that the

contract between the Hanaur Company and the other four corporations

was a contract for a partnership between corporations, and that under

the charter of the Hanaur Oil Works it had no power to make such a

contract, and that it was, therefore, void, and that it had a right to

recover possession of its property, it being withheld solely under and

by virtue of an agreement ultra vires.

"A partnership," says Judge Story, "is usually defined to be a

voluntary contract between two or more competent persons to place

their money, effects, labor and skill, or some or all of them, in lawful

commerce or business, with the understanding that there shall be a

communion of the profits thereof between them."

Pothier says that "a partnership is a contract whereby two or more

persons put, or contract to put, something in common to make a law-

ful profit in common, and reciprocally engage vyith each other to ren-

der an account thereof." Story Part., § 2.

A careful examination of this agreement discloses every material

element to a contract of partnership. The absolute ownership of the

1 Only part of opinion given.

Appeal in error from circuit court of Shelby county.
J. This is an action of unlawful detainer, brought by
the Hanaur Oil Works, a corporation created under the General Incorporation Act of 1875, and engaged in the manufacture of cottonseed oil at Memphis, Tenn.
The facts which raise the question to be determined are these: In
July, 1884, a contract was entered into by and between four corporations engaged in manufacturing cotton-seed oil at Memphis for the
formation of what is designated in the agreement as a "combination,"
"syndicate," and "partnership." The contracting mills agreed to select a committee, composed of representatives from each corporation,
and to turn over to this committee the properties and machinery of
each mill, to be managed and operated by this committee, through
officers, agents and employes selected by them, for the common benefit, the profits and losses of such operations to be shared in proportions agreed upon. This arrangement was to last one year, but, with
consent of all, might be renewed for two additional years, and, as appears, was at the end of first year renewed for two other years, terminating August 1 , 1887. • • •
The argument here has largely turned upon the correctness of the
charge of the circuit judge, who distinctly instructed the jury that the
contract between the Hanaor Company and the other four corporations
was a contract for a partnership between corporations, and that under
the charter of the Hanaur Oil' Works it had no power to make such a
contract, and that it was, therefore, void, and that it had a right to
recover possession of its property, it being withheld solely under and
by virtue of an agreement ultra vires.
"A partnership," says Judge Story, "is usually defined to be a
voluntary contract between two or more competent persons to place
their money, effects, labor and skill, or some or all of them, in lawful
commerce or business, with the understanding that there shall be a
communion of the profits thereof between them."
· .Pothier says that "a pattnership is a contract whereby two or more
persons put, or contract to put, something in common to make a lawful profit in common, and reciprocally engage with each other to render an account the reof.'' Story Part., § 2.
A careful examination of this agreement discloses every material
element to a contract of partnership. The absolute ownership of the
1 Only part of opinion given.
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corporate property, the mills, machinery, etc., is not conveyed to the

958

partnership, nor is this necessary. The beneficial use of all such

MALLORY V. HANAUR OIL WORKS.

property is surrendered to the common purpose. The provisions for

corporate property, the mills, machinery, etc., is not conveyed to the
p artnership, nor is this necessary. The beneficial use of all such
property is surrendered to the common purpose. The provisions for
the complete possession, control and use of the properties of the several corporations by the partnership or syndicate is perfect. Nothing
is left to the several corporations but the right to receive a share of
the profits and participate in the management and cont:ol of the consolidated interests as one of the new association. The contract is,
both technically and in its essential character, a partnership in so far as
it is possible for corporations to form such an association.
It is, however, argued by the learned counsel for appellants that if
it be a partnership, that it does not, therefore, follow that .it is ttltra
vins ; that such a contract, not being prohibited by law or the charter of the defendant in error, or against public policy, is not void ,
even if in excess of power expressly conferred ; that the business proposed by the contract, being within th~ purposes of the charter, is,
therefore, within the implied powers of the corporation, and not 1dtra
vires. In other words, "that the question is not whether the corporation had, by virtue of the act of incorporation, authority to make
the contract, but whether they are by those statutes forbidden to do
it." In this doctrine we do not concur. There is, however, resp.ectable authority for the position. A corporation, being an artificial creation, is the very thing it is made by the statute which brings it into
b eing, and nothing more. The extent of its powers are those enumerated in its charter, or implied by fair and natural construction of
powers expressly conferred.
The charter is the measure of its powers, and the enumeration
thereof implies the exclusion of all others. We are not to look to the
charter to see whether the thing done be prohibited, but whether there
is authority to do it. These principles we understand to have the
support of the great weight of authority in this country, and to have
the sanction of the supreme court of the United States. Thomas v.
Railroad Co., IOI U.S. 71.
This view of the law has been the one entertained by this court,
and clearly and distinctly enforced in an opinion by the present chief
justice in the case of Elevator Company v. Memphis and Charleston
R. Co., 1 Pick. 703. The power to enter into a partnership is not
expressly or impliedly conferred by our act of 1875, under which the
Hanaur Oil Works is incorporated. N either is such authority ·w ithin
the implied powers of corporations. A partnership and a corporation
are incongruous. Such a contra ct is wholly inconsistent with the scope
and tenor of the powers expressly conferred and the duties expressly
enjoined upon a corporation , whether it be a strictly business and private corporation or one owing duties to the public, such as a common carrier. In a partnership each member binds the firm when acting within the scope of the business. A corporation must act through
its directors or authorized agents, and no individual member can, as
such member, bind the corporation.

the complete possession, control and use of the properties of the sev-

eral corporations by the partnership or syndicate is perfect. Nothing

is left to the several corporations but the right to receive a share of

the profits and participate in the management and control of the con-

solidated interests as one of the new association. The contract is,

both technically and in its essential character, a partnership in so far as

it is possible for corporations to form such an association.

It is, however, argued by the learned counsel for appellants that if

it be a partnership, that it does not, therefore, follow that it is ultra

vires; that such a contract, not being prohibited by law or the char-

ter of the defendant in error, or against public policy, is not void,

even if in excess of power expressly conferred; that the business pro-

posed by the contract, being within the purposes of the charter, is,

therefore, within the implied powers of the corporation, and not ultra

vires. In other words, "that the question is not whether the corpo-

ration had, by virtue of the act of incorporation, authority to make
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the contract, but whether they are by those statutes forbidden to do

it." In this doctrine we do not concur. There is, however, respect-

able authority for the position. A corporation, being an artificial cre-

ation, is the very thing it is made by the statute which brings it into

being, and nothing more. The extent of its powers are those enu-

merated in its charter, or implied by fair and natural construction of

powers expressly conferred.

The charter is the measure of its powers, and the enumeration

thereof implies the exclusion of all others. We are not to look to the

charter to see whether the thing done be prohibited, but whether there

is authority to do it. These principles we understand to have the

support of the great weight of authority in this country, and to have

the sanction of the supreme court of the United States. Thomas v.

Railroad Co., iot U.S. 71.

This view of the law has been the one entertained by this court,

and clearly and distinctly enforced in an opinion by the present chief

justice in the case of Elevator Company v. Memphis and Charleston

R. Co., 1 Pick. 703. The power to enter into a partnership is not

expressly or impliedly conferred by our act of 1875, under which the

Hanaur Oil Works is incorporated. Neither is such authority within

the implied powers of corporations. A partnership and a corporation

are incongruous. Such a contract is wholly inconsistent with the scope

and tenor of the powers expressly conferred and the duties expressly

enjoined upon a corporation, whether it be a strictly business and pri-

vate corporation or one owing duties to the public, such as a com-

mon carrier. In a partnership each member binds the firm when act-

ing within the scope of the business. A corporation must act through

its directors or authorized agents, and no individual member can, as

such member, bind the corporation.
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Now, if a corporation be a member of a partnership it may be
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bound by any other member of the association, and in so doing he

959

would act, not as an offieer or agent of the corporation, and by virtue

of authority received from it, but as a principal in an association in

which all are equal, and each capable of binding the society by his

acts. The whole policy of the law creating and regulating corpora-

tions looks to the exclusive management of the affairs of each corpo-

ration by the officers provided for or authorized by its charter. This

management must be separate and exclusive, and any arrangement by

which the control of the affairs of the corporation should be taken

from its stockholders and the authorized officers and agents of the cor-

poration would be hostile to the policy of our general incorporation

acts. The decided weight of authority is that a corporation has not

the power to enter a partnership, either with other corporations or

with individuals. Says Mr. Morawetz: "It seems clear that corpo-

rations are not impliedly authorized to enter into partnership with

other corporations or individuals. The existence of a partnership

not only would interfere with the management of the corporation by

its regularly appointed officers, but would impair the authority of the
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shareholders themselves, and involve the company in new responsi-

bilities through agents over whom it had no control." i Morawetz

Corp., § 421; Whittenton Mills v. Upton, 10 Gray 528 (s. c. 71 Am.

Dec. 681); Angell & Ames Corp., § 272.

It is unnecessary to consider this contract as constituting a mere traffic

arrangement; for the conclusion already announced that it was an ef-

fort to form a partnership, determines that in its scope and effect it

sought to accomplish much more than would be understood by the

phrase "traffic arrangement." * * *

Affirmed.

Note. Power to enter into partnership.

1. The general rale is that a corporation has no such power,unless expressly

authorized: 1831, Sharon Canal Co. v. Fulton Bank, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 412*

1858, Whittenton Mills v. Upton, 10 Gray (Mass.) 582, 71 Am. Dec. 681; 1862,

Marine Bank v. Ogden, 29111. 248; 1885, Gunn v. Central R. Co., 74 Ga. 509;

1890, People v. North River Sug. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 18 Am. St. Rep. 843,

Now, if a corporation be a member of a partnership it ~ay be
bound by any other member of the association, and in so doing he
would act, not as an offieer or agent of the corporation, and by virtue
of authority received from it, but as a principal in an association in
which all are equal, and each capable of binding the society by his
acts. The whole policy of the law creating and regulating corporations looks to the exclusive management of the affairs of each corporation by the officers provided for or authorized by its charter. This
management must be separate and exclusive, and any arrangement by
which the control of the affairs of the corporation should be taken
from its stockholders and the authorized officers and agents of the corporation would be hostile to the policy of our general incorporation
acts. The decided weight of authority is that a corporation has not
the power to enter a partnership, either with other corporations or
with individuals. Says Mr. Morawetz: "lt seems clear that corporations are not impliedly authorized to enter into partnership with
other corporations or individuals. The existence of a partnership
not only would interfere with the management of the corporation by
its regularly appointed officers, bu~ would impair the authority of the
shareholders themselves, and involve the company in new responsibilities through agents over whom it had no control." r Morawetz
Corp., § 42r; Whittenton Mills v. Upton, IO Gray 528 (s. c. 7r Am.
Dec. 68r); Angell & Ames Corp.,§ 272.
It is unnecessary to consider this contract as constituting a mere traffic
arrangement; for the conclusion already announced that it was an effort to form a partnership, determines that in its scope and effect it
sought to accomplish much more than would be understood by the
phrase "traffic arrangement." • • •
Affirmed.

supra, p. 100; 1895, Aurora Bank v. Oliver, 62 Mo. App. 390; 1897, Sabine

Tram Co. v. Bancroft, 16 Texas Civ. App. 170, 40 S. W. Rep. 837; 1899, Mer-

chants' Nat'l Bank v. Standard W. Co., 6 Ohio N. P. 264.

2. Exceptions.—Some exceptions have been recognized by the courts. Of

course, if expressly authorized there can be no question: 1878, Butler v. Am.

Toy Co., 46 Conn. 136. In, 1851, Catskill Bank v. Gray, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 471,

it was held that an iron manufacturing company had implied power to be-

come a partner with an individual. In, 1876, Allen v. Woonsocket Co., 11 R.

I. 288, it was held that a corporation with undefined powers and a single

shareholder could become a member of a partnership strictly at will. And

in 1895, Bates v. Coronado Beach Co., 109 Cal. 160, it was held that a corpo-

ration could be a partner, if the management was left entirely to the corpora-

tion.

3. Although the corporation exceeds its powers by becoming a partner, it

will be liable to the extent of benefits received upon joint contracts: 1851,

Catskill Bank v. Gray, 14 Barb. (N.Y.) 471; 1862, Marine Bank v. Ogden, 29

111. 248; 1880, Clarkson v. Erie & N. S. D., 6 111. App. 284; 1887, Swift, etc., v.

Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 106 N. Y. 206; 1895, Northside R. Co. v. Worth-

Nou.

Power to enter into partnership.

1. The general rnl£1 is that a corporation has no such power,unless expressly

authorizea: 1831, Sharon Canal Co. v. Fulton Bank, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 41~
1858, Whittenton Millsv. Upton, lOGray (Mass.)582, 71Am.Dec.681;1862,
Marine Bank v. Ogden, 29 Ill. 248; 1885, Gunn v. Central R. Co., 74 Ga. 509;
1890, People v. North River Sug. R . Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 18 Am. St. Rep. 843,
supra, p. 100; 1895, Aurora Bank v. Oliver, 62 Mo. App. 300; 1897, Sabine
Tram Co. v. BancroCt, 16 Texas Civ. App. 170, 40 S. W. Rep. 837; 1899, Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Standard W. Co., 6 Ohio N. P. 264.
2. Exception8.-Some exceptions have been recognized by the courts. Of
course, if expressly authorized there can be no question: 1878, Butler v. Am.
Toy Co., 46 Conn.136. In, 1851, Catskill Bank v. Gray, 14 Barb. (N . Y.) 471,
it was held that an iron manufacturing company had implied power to become a partner with an individual. In, 1876, Allen v. Woonsocket Co., 11 R.
I. 288, it was held that a corporation with undefined powers and a single
sh!ueholder could become a member of a partnership strictly at will. And
in 1895, Bates v. Coronado Beach Co., 109 Cal. 160, it was held that a corporation could be a partner, if the management was left entirely to the corpora-

tion.

3. Although the corporation exceeds its pow~rs by becoming a partner, it
will be liable to the extent of benefits received upon joint contracts: 1851,
Catskill Bank v. Gray, 14 Barb. rN. Y. l 471; 1862, Marine Bank v. Ogden, 29
Ill. 248; 1880, Clarkson v. Erie & N. S. D., 6 Ill. App. 284; 1887, Swift, etc., v.
Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 106 N. Y. 206; 1895, Northside R. Co. v. Worth-
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ington, 88 Texas 502. 53 Am. St. Rep. 778. And also mav reeover for it*
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share of benefits conferred: 1831, N. Y. & S. Canal Co. v. Fulton Bank, 7
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Wend. 412; 1899, Wilson v. Carter Oil Co., 46 W. Va. 469, 33 S. E. Rep. 249.

See, infra, corporations as joint tenants and tenants in common, §§ 292, 293.

ington, 88 Texas 562, 53 Am. St. Rep . 778. Anrl also may recover for it&
share of benefits conferred: 1831, N. Y . & S. Canal Co. v. Fulton Bank, 7
Wend. 412; 1899, Wilson v. Carter Oil Co., 46 W . Va. 469, 33 8 . E. Rep. 249.
See, infra, corporations as joint tenants and tenants in common, §§ 292, 293.

Sec. 276. (6) Trade combinations.

(a) Pools.

THE CLEVELAND, COLUMBUS, CINCINNATI AND INDIANAPOLIS

RAILWAY COMPANY v. CLOSSER Et Al.1

1890. In the Supreme Court of Indiana. 126 Ind. Rep. 34S-

369, 22 Am. St. Rep. 593.

Sec. 276. ( 6) Trade combinations.

Elliott, J. The appellees were partners, under the name of

(a) Pools.

Closser& Co., and as such prosecute this action against the appellant.

They base their right of action upon contracts made with the appel-

THE CLEVELAND, COLUMBUS, CINCINNATI AND INDIANAPOLIS
RAILWAY COMPANY v. CLOSSER ET AL.1

lant wherein it undertook to transport grain from Indianapolis to the

seaboard, and they charge that the appellant agreed to receive, at the

1890.

time of the shipment, a designated sum as compensation for the trans-

IN THE

portation of the grain, and to refund to them a certain part of the sum

SUPREME CouRT OF INDIANA.
369, 22 Am. St. Rep. 593·

126

Ind. Rep. 348-

received. They demand that the appellant be compelled to respond in

ELLIOTT, J.
The appellees were partners, under the name of
Closser & Co., and as such prosecute this action against the appellant.
They base their right of action upon contracts made with the appellant wherein it undertook to transport grain from Indianapolis to the
seaboard, and they charge that the appellant agreed to receive. at the
time of the shipment, a designated sum as compensation for the transportation of the grain, and to refund to them a certain part of the s um
received. They demand that the appellant be compelled to respond in
damages for a breach of the agreement to refund part of the money
p aid to it as freight on the grain carried under the contracts. • • •
The second paragraph of the complaint alleges that the defendant
is , and long has been , a common carrier of goods, and that its custom
of long standing is to make contracts for carrying grain from Indi anapolis to the eastern cities ; that the plaintiffs have long been engaged
in the business of buying, selling and shipping grain; that on the fii·st
day of November, 1884, the plaintiffs~ under the firm name of Closser & Co. , entered into a contract with the defendant whereby it
undertook to transport grain from a station on its road, known as
Union City, to the city of New York; that at the time this contract
was made "there was no open and established rate of freight charges
for carrying such grain, except a certain rate agreed upon between the
defendant and other railway companies owning competing lines ; the
rate so fixed by the competing companies was established by an
agreement made by them for the purpose of preventing competition , "
and was enforced and maintained , in so far as it was enforced and
m aintained , by an agency of such companies established for that purpose, and called a "pool"; that the "pool" was managed by a pe rson selected by the companies for that purpose, and called a " pool
commissioner"; that at the time mentioned all the railway companies
that "were so located or situated as to be competitors for such freight
were parties to said arrangement and "pool"; that the rate established
by the combin ation of common carriers was 21 ~ cents per hundredweight; that the defenda nt, " notwithstanding such combination and
pool , offered and gave to Closser & Co. an inducement for shipping

damages for a breach of the agreement to refund part of the money

paid to it as freight on the grain carried under the contracts. » * *
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The second paragraph of the complaint alleges that the defendant

is, and long has been, a common carrier of goods, and that its custom

of long standing is to make contracts for carrying grain from Indiana-

polis to the eastern cities; that the plaintiffs have long been engaged

in the business of buying, selling and shipping grain; that on the first

day of November, 1884, the plaintiffs, under the firm name of Clos-

ser & Co., entered into a contract with the defendant whereby it

undertook to transport grain from a station on its road, known as

Union City, to the city of New York; that at the time this contract

was made "there was no open and established rate of freight charges

for carrying such grain, except a certain rate agreed upon between the

defendant and other railway companies owning competing lines; the

rate so fixed by the competing companies was established by an

agreement made by them for the purpose of preventing competition,"

and was enforced and maintained, in so far as it was enforced and

maintained, by an agency of such companies established for that pur-

pose, and called a "pool"; that the "pool" was managed by a per-

son selected by the companies for that purpose, and called a "pool

commissioner"; that at the time mentioned all the railway companies

that "were so located or situated as to be competitors for such freight

were parties to said arrangement and "pool"; that the rate established

by the combination of common carriers was 21 }4 cents per hundred-

weight; that the defendant, "notwithstanding such combination and

pool, offered and gave to Closser& Co. an inducement for shipping

1 Statement abridged; only part of opinion given.

1 Statement
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freight over its lines at a rate lower than that fixed by the combina-

tion and 'pool', but, in order to do this and be able to report to the

pool commissioner that such pool rate had been charged," the defend-

ant "requested Closser & Co., when shipping freight over its lines,

to pay the pool rate, and agreed at the same time with Closser &

Co. to pay a certain portion of the pool rate so charged, as a rebate,

in order that the shippers might, in the end, be only required to pay

the rate fixed by the defendant"; that "in this manner and for this

purpose the defendant did, on the same day, agree with Closser & Co.,

in respect to the shipment of grain, that Closser & Co. should pay the

pool rate of 21 y2 cents per hundred-weight, and that the defendant

would thereupon repay to them 4^ cents on every hundred-weight

of grain so shipped as a rebate, so that they should, in the end, pay as

freight upon such shipment but 17 cents per hundred-weight, which

was then, in fact, the rate of defendant for such freight between said

points as then agreed upon, which rebate the defendant agreed to pay

promptly after such shipment." It is also alleged that grain was

shipped by Closser & Co., under the contract, and that they paid the
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••pool" rate? * * * Decision below for plaintiff.

The central question is as to the validity of the contracts between

the rival railroad companies. * * *

We preface our discussion of the central question by saying that

we are not, at this point, dealing with the case where a combination

is formed for the purpose of preventing ruinous competition, and in

which there is no design to stifle fair competition. We are not re-

quired to decide, nor do we decide, that combinations fair to the pub-

lic, untainted by any sinister design, and formed solely to prevent the

destruction of business by unregulated competition, may not be valid.

There are, we know, cases sanctioning the doctrine that combinations

may be formed where the purpose is lawful, and the means employed

not forbidden by positive law or high considerations of public policy.

Central Trust, etc., Co. v. Ohio Central R. Co., 23 Am. & Eng. R.

Cases 666; Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Lake Shore, etc., R.

Co., 32 Am. & Eng. R. Cases 618; Hare v. London, etc., R. Co.,

2 J. & H. 80; Leslie v. Lorillard, no X. Y. 519; Manchester,

etc., R. Co. v. Concord R., 8 R. & Corp. Law Journal 443. The

doctrine of these cases we neither affirm nor deny; we do, however,

declare that they are not relevant to the matter here in dispute. It is,

however, both appropriate and necessary to adjudge that a combina-

tion between common carriers to prevent competition is, at least, prima

facie illegal. The doubt is as to whether any ultimate purpose can

save it from the condemnation of the law; there can be no doubt that,

unexplained, such a combination for such a purpose is condemned by

public policy. If such a combination can, in any event, be ad-

mitted to be legal, it can only be so where it is affirmatively shown

that its object was to prevent ruinous competition, and that it does not

establish unreasonable rates, unjust discriminations or oppressive reg-

ulations. If such a contract can stand it must be upon an affirmative

showing, and one so full, complete and clear, as to remove the pre-

61—WrL. Cases.

freight over its lines at a rate lower than that fixed by the combination and 'pool' , but, in order to do this and be able to report to the
pool commissioner that such pool rate had been charged," the defendant "requested Closser & Co., when shipping freight over its lines,
to pay the pool rate, and agreed at the same time with Closser &
Co. to pay a certain portion of the pool rate so charged, as a rebate,
in order that the shippers might, in the end, be only required to pay
the rate fixed by the defendant"; that "in this manner and for this
purpose the defendant did, on the same day, agree with Closser & Co.,
in respect to the shipment of grain, that Closser & Co. should pay the
pool rate of 21 Yz cents per hundred-weight, an<l that the defendant
would thereupon repay to them 4Yz cents on every hundred-weight
of grain so shipped as a rebate, so that they should, in the end, pay as
freight upon such shipment but 17 cents per hundred-weight, which
was then, in fact, the rate of defendant for such freight between said
points as then agreed upon, which rebate the defendant agreed to pay
promptly after such shipment.'' It is also alleged that grain was
shipped by Closser & Co., under the contract, and that they paid the
· · pool" rate~ • • • Decision below for plaintiff.
The central question is as to the validity of the contracts between
the rival railroad companies. • • •
We preface our discussion of the central question by saying that
we are not, at this point, dealing with the case where a combination
is formed for the purpose of preventing niinous competition, and in
which there is no design to stifle fair competition. We are not required to decide, nor do we decide, that combinations fair to the public, untainted by any sinister design. and formed solely to pre,·ent the
destruction of business by unregulated competition, may not be valid.
There are, we know, cases sanctioning the doctrine that combinations
may be formed where the purpose is lawful, and the means employed
not forbidden by positive law or high considerations of public policy.
Central Trust, etc., Co. v. Ohio Central R. Co., 23 Am. & Eng. R.
Cases 666; Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Lake Shore, etc., R.
Co., 32 Am. & Eng. R. Cases 618; ·Hare v. London, etc., R. Co.,
2 J .. & H. 8o; Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N. Y. 519; Manchester,
etc., R. Co. v. Concord R., 8 R. & Corp. Law Journal 443. The
doctrine of these cases we neither affirm nor deny; we do, however,
declare that they are not relevant to the matter here in dispute. It is,
however, both appropriate and nece sary to adjudge that a combina:tion between common carriers to prevent competition is, at least, prima
facie illegal. The doubt is as to whether any ultimate purpose can
save it from the condemnation of the law; there can he no doubt that,
unexplained, such a combination for su ch a purpose is condemned by
public policy. If such a combination can, in any event, be admitted to be legnl, it can only he so where it is affirmatively shown
that its object '.ms to prevent niinous competition, and that it does not
estnhlish unreasonable rates, unju st disc1;111inations or oppress ive regulations. If su ch a contract can stnn<l it must he upon an affirmative
showing, and one so full , complete and clear, as to remove the pre61- WrL. CASES.
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sumption (to which its existence, in itself, gives rise) that it was
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formed to do mischief to the public by repressing fair competition.
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The burden is on the carrier to remove the presumption, and until it

sumption (to which its existence, in itself, g:ves rise) that it was
formed to do mischief to the public by repressing fair competition.
The burden is on the carrier to re move the presumption, and until it
is removed the ag reement providing for the combination gives way before this presumption, and the agreement must be held to be within
tht:: condemnation directed against all contracts which violate public
policy.
Coming to the qu estion which awaits our judgment, and to which
we h ave cleared our path, we affirm that a contract between corpora·
tions charged with a public duty, such as is that of common carriers,
providing fo r the formation of a combination ha ving 110 other purpose
than that of stifling competition, and providing means to accomplish
th at object, is illegal. The purpose to break d own competition poisons the whole contract, and there is here no antidote which will r escue it from legal death. The element which d estroys the contract is
the purpose to stifle competition, for a combination of ri\'a l carriers,
mo\'ed and controlled by that purpo e alone, is destructive of public
interest, and, to the la. t degree , antagonistic to sound public p olicy .
The principle on which this rule rests is a \'cry old one~ and its place
in the law is very firm. The overshadowing element in this case, and
in kindred cases, is the purpo e which influences the parties in uniting
themse lves in a combination, and concerting m eans to make its purpose effective, for the law abhors a coml?ination which has for its
priru:ipal object the suppression of competition in matters of commerce in which the public have an interest. • • •
Releva nt and striking illustrations of the scope and force of the
general principle are supplied by what are known as " The Sugnr
Trust Cases," decided by the courts of New York-cases rich in
argument and authority. People v. North River Sugar R e fining Co. ,
22 Abbott N. Cases 164; see, also, Law Literature of Trust Combinations, etc., 23 Abbott N. C ases 317; Peoplev. ·:-forth Ri,·erSugar
Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582. 1 The authorities coll ected in those
cases demonstrate the proposition that a trust, or combination, having
for its purpose the suppression of free competition , can not liYe where
the common law preva ils. There are, however, cases which, on their
facts , bear a closer resemblance to the present than the sugar tmst
cases; but, after all, it may be said with propriety the important
thing to be secured is a so und and salutary general principle, a111l n ot
merely cases with closely resem bling facts. There is no difficulty in
securing the principle we seek, for cases nlmo t with out number assert and enforce it in an almost e ndless variety of fo rms nnd pha se . .
One of the ca<;es near akin to the o ne before us is that of Hooker v.
V andewate r. 4 Denio 3+9· In that case comp eting can a l companies
comb ined , a nd agrcecl to fix an established rate of fre ig h t, a nd to divide profits . The agreement was adjudged ill egal , the court saying.
among other things, that "It is a general proposition th at an agreement to do an unl awful act can not be supported at law-that no rig ht
of action can spring out of an illegal contract; and this rule applies

is removed the agreement providing for the combination gives way Vie-

fore this presumption, and the agreement must be held to be within

the condemnation directed against all contracts which violate public

policy.

Coming to the question which awaits our judgment, and to which

we have cleared our path, we affirm that a contract between corpora-

tions charged with a public duty, such as is that of common carriers,

providing for the formation of a combination having no other purpose

than that of stifling competition, and providing means to accomplish

that object, is illegal. The purpose to break down competition poi-

sons the whole contract, and there is here no antidote which will res-

cue it from legal death. The element which destroys the contract is

the purpose to stifle competition, for a combination of rival carriers,

moved and controlled by that purpose alone, is destructive of public

interest, and, to the last degree, antagonistic to sound public policy.

The principle on which this rule rests is a very old one. and its place

in the law is very firm. The overshadowing element in this case, and
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in kindred cases, is the purpose which influences the parties in uniting

themselves in a combination, and concerting means to make its pur-

pose effective, for the law abhors a combination which has for its

principal object the suppression of competition in matters of com-

merce in which the public have an interest. * * *

Relevant and striking illustrations of the scope and force of the

general principle are supplied by what are known as "The Sugar

Trust Cases," decided by the courts of New York—cases rich in

argument and authority. People v. North River Sugar Refining Co.,

22 Abbott N. Cases 164; see, also, Law Literature of Trust Combi-

nations, etc., 23 Abbott N. Cases 317; People v. North River Sugar

Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582.1 The authorities collected in those

cases demonstrate the proposition that a trust, or combination, having

for its purpose the suppression of free competition, can not live where

the common law prevails. There are, however, cases which, on their

facts, bear a closer resemblance to the present than the sugar trust

cases; but, after all. it may be said with propriety the important

thing to be secured is a sound and salutary general principle, and not

merely cases with closely resembling facts. There is no difficulty in

securing the principle we seek, for cases almost without number as-

sert and enforce it in an almost endless variety of forms and phases.

One of the cases near akin to the one before us is that of Hooker v.

Vandewater, 4 Denio 349. In that case competing canal companies

combined, and agreed to fix an established rate of freight, and to di-

vide profits. The agreement was adjudged illegal, the court saying,

among other things, that "It is a general proposition that an agree-

ment to do an unlawful act can not be supported at law—that no right

of action can spring out of an illegal contract; and this rule applies

1 Supra, p. 100.
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not only when the contract is expressly illegal, but whenever it is op-

posed to public policy." Still closer is the resemblance between

this case and that of Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Southern Pacific R.

Co., 41 La. Ann. 970. The court there held a "pooling contract"

substantially the same as the one described in the appellees' com-

plaint to be void, and in support of its ruling referred to the cases of

Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396; Woodstock Iron Co.

v. Richmond, etc., Extension Co., 129 U. S. 643; Morris Run Coal

Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173; Arnot v. Pittson, etc.,

Coal Co., 68 N. Y. 558; Craft v. McConoughy, 79 111. 346; Morrill

v. Boston, etc., R., 55 N. H. 531; Jackson v. McLean, 36 Fed.

Rep. 213; Santa Clara Valley, etc., Co. v. Hayes, 18 Pac. Rep. 391;

Fireman's Charitable Association v. Berghaus, 13 La. Ann. 209;

Indiana Bagging Association v. Kock, 14 La. Ann. 168; Glasscock

v. Wells, 23 La. Ann. 517, and Cummings v. Saux, 30 La. Ann. 207.

The authorities found on every hand not only fully support our

conclusion that a contract between competing carriers, forming a

combination for the purpose of stifling competition, is -prima facie
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illegal, but many of them carry the principle to a much greater length;

it is enough for us, however, that the law, as it has long existed, sus-

tains the conclusion we here affirm, since it is neither necessary nor

proper for us to go beyond the case before us for judgment. * * *

Judgment affirmed.

Note. The following cases hold pooling contracts void: 1848, Stanton v.

Allen, oDenio (N. Y.) 434; 1871, Morris Run, etc., Co. v. Barclay Coal Co.,

68 Pa. St. 173; 1875, Morrill v. Railroad Co., 55 N. H. 531; 1877, Wilson v.

Harlem & N. Y. Nav. Co., 52 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 348; 1881, Burke, etc., v. Con-

not only when the contract is expressly illegal, but whenever it is opposed to public policy.'' Still closer is the resemblance between
this case and that of Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Southern Pacific R.
Co., 41 La. Ann. 970. The court there held a "pooling contract"
substantially the same as the one described in the appellees' complaint to be void, and in support of its ruling referred to the ca!'es of
Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396; Woodstock Iron Co.
v. Richmond, etc., Extension Co., 129 U.S. 643; Morris Run Coal
Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173; Arnot v. Pittson, etc.,
Coal Co., 68 N. Y. 558; Craft v. McConoughy, 79 III. 346; Morrill
v. Boston, etc., R., 55 N. H. 531; Jackson v. McLean, 36 Fed.
Rep. 213; Santa Clara Valley, etc., Co. v. Hayes, 18 Pac. Rep. 391;
Fireman's Charitable As ociation v. Berghaus, 13 La. Ann. 209;
Indiana Bagging Association v. Kock, 14 La. Ann. 168; Glasscock
v. \Veils, 23 La. Ann. 517, and Cummings v. Saux, 30 La. Ann. 207.
The authorities found on every hand not only fully support our
conclusion that a contract between competing carriers, forming a
combination for the purpose of stifling competition, is prima facie
illegal, but many of them carry the principle to a much greater length;
it is enough for us, however, that the law, as it has long existed, sustains the conclusion we here affirm, since it is neither necessary nor
proper for us to go beyond the case before us for judgment. • • •

Judgment atfirmed.

cord, etc., R., 61 N. H. 161; 1883, Denver & N. 0. R. Co. v. A., T. & S. F. R.

Co., 15 Fed. Rep. 650, 110 U. S. 667; 1883, State v. Concord, etc., R., 13 Am.

& Eng. R. Cas. (N. H.) 94; 1888, Gibbs v. Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396; 1889,

Anderson v. Jett, 11 Kv. L. Rep. 570, 12 S. W. Rep. 670; 1889, Texas & Pac.

R. v. Southern Pac, etc., R., 41 La. Ann. 970; 1894, C. M. & St. Paul R. v.

Wabash, St. L. & P. R.. 61 Fed. Rep. 993; 1896, United States v. Trans-Mis-

souri Frt. Assn., 166 U.S. 290; 1898, United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 TT.

S. 505, 19 Sup. Ct. 25, reverses 76 Fed. Rep. 895 (C. C.),and 89 Fed. Rep. 1020

(C. C. A.); 1899, State v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1, 52 S. W. Rep.

595.

See note at end of the next case.

Sec. 277. Same.
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Note. The following cases hold pooling contracts void: 1848, Stanton v.
Allen, 5Denio (N. Y .) 434; 1871, M;orris Run, etc., Co. v. Barclay C<?al Co.,
68 Pa. St. 173; 1871l, Morrill v. Railroad Co., 55 N. H.531; 1877, Wilson v.
Harlem & N. Y . Nav. Co., 52 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 348; 1881, Burke, etc., v. Concord, etc., R., 61 N. H. Hil; 1883, Denver & N. 0. R. Co. v. A., T. & S. F. R.
Co., 15 Fed. Rep. 650, 110 U. 8. 667; 1883, State v. Concord, etc., R., 13 Am.
& Eng. R. Cas. (N. H.) 94;._ 1888, Gibbs v. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396; 1889,
Anderson v. Jett, 11 Ky. L . .ttep. 570, 12 S. W. Rep. 670; 1889, Texas & Pac.
R. v. 8outhem Pac., etc., R., 41 La. Ann. 970; 1894, C.. M. & St. P1ml R. v.
Wabash, St. L. & P.R .. 61 Fed. Rep. 993; 1896, United StRtes v. Trans-Missouri Frt. Assn., 166 U.S. 290; 1898, United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 TT.
S. 505, 19 Sup. Ct. 25, reverses 76 Fed. Rep. 895 (C. C.), and 89 Fed. Rep. 1020
( C:C. A.); 1899, State v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1, 52 S. W. Rep.
595.
. See note at end of the next case.

1889. In the Supreme Court ok New Hampshire. 66 New

Hampshire Rep. 100-134.

[Bill in equity for a discovery and an accounting. Defendants

filed special pleas, to which the plaintiffs demurred. Defendants de-

Sec. 277.

murred to the parts of the bill not covered by the pleas.]

Same.

MANCHESTER AND LAWRENCE RAILROAD v. CONCORD
RAILROAD.1

1 Only part of opinion given.

1889.

IN

THE

CouRT OF NEw HAMPSHIRE.
Hampshire Rep. 100-134.

SUPREME

66 New

[Bill in equity for a disco\"ery and an accounting. Defendants
filed special pleas, to which the plaintiffs demurred. Defendants demurred to the parts of the bill not covered by the pleas.]
1
Only part of opinion given.
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Blodgett, J. * * * The second plea avers, and the demur-

964

rer admits, that at the time of the making of the contracts between
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the parties and of the dealings thereunder, their respective roads "were

BLODGETT , J.
• • • The second plea avers, and the demurrer admits, that at the time of the making of the contracts between
the parties and of the dealings thereunder, their respective roads "were
rival and competing railroads, by the competition of which the prices
of transportation thereon were, and but for said supposed contracts,
dealings, transactions, operations and business, would have continued
to be, materially reduced, and said alleged contracts, dealings, transactions and business were made and had for the purpose of destroying and preventing such competition, and did destroy and preyent it."
It will be noticed that there is no averment in the plea that the purpose of the contracts was to raise the prices of transportation above a
reasonable standard, or that they did have this effect. or that the public were prejudiced by their operation in any manner; and the naked
question presented then is, whether all contracts between rival railway corporations which prevent competition are necessarily contrary
to public policy, and therefore ma/a prohibita and illegal in themselves.
To state this question is to answer it in the negative, because it is
obvious that the answer depends upon circumstances. \Vhile, without doubt, contracts which have a direct tendency to prevent a
healthy competition are detrimental to the public and con~equently
against public policy, it is equally free from doubt that when such
contracts prevent an unhealthy competition and yet fumish the public
with adequate facilities at fixed an<l reasonable rates, they are beneficial
and in accord with sound principles of public policy. For the lesson
of experience, as well as the deductions of reason, amply demonstrate
that the public interest is not subserved by competition which reduce
the rate of transportation below the standard of fair compensation;
and the theory which formerly obtained, that the public is benefited
by unrestricted competition between railroads has been so emphatically disproved by the results which have generally followed its adoption in practice, that the hope of any permanent relief from excessive rates through the competition of a parallel or rival road may,
as a rule, be justly characterized as illusory and fallacious.
·
Upon authority, also, arnmgements.and contracts between competing railroads, by which unrestrained competition is prevented , do not
contravene public policy. Hare v. Railway Co., 2 Johns. & H. So,
is directly in point. In that case a bill in chancery had been brought
by a stockholder in the defendant company to annul an agreement
between two railway companies to divide the profits of the traffic in
fixed proportions ; and it \\'as admitted there, as it is here, that the
purpose o f t he agreement was to prevent competition. In di smi ~ ing
th e bill, Vice-Chancellor Wood said, page 103, "\Vith regard to the
:irgument against the validity of the agreement, I may clear the
ground of one objection by saying that I see nothing in the alleged
injury to the p ubli c arising from the prevention of competition. • • •
It is a mi staken notion that the public is benefited by pitting two railw ay companies ag-ainst each other till one is mined, the re. ult being
at last to rai<;e the fare s to the hi~hest possible standard . " So, al o,

rival and competing railroads, by the competition of which the prices

of transportation thereon were, and but for said supposed contracts,

dealings, transactions, operations and business, would have continued

to be, materially reduced, and said alleged contracts, dealings, transac-

tions and business were made and had for the purpose of destroy-

ing and preventing such competition, and did destroy and prevent it."

It will be noticed that there is no averment in the plea that the pur-

pose of the contracts was to raise the prices of transportation above a

reasonable standard, or that they did have this effect, or that the pub-

lic were prejudiced by their operation in any manner; and the naked

question presented then is, whether all contracts between rival rail-

way corporations which prevent competition are necessarily contrary

to public policy, and therefore mala frohibita and illegal in them-

selves.

To state this question is to answer it in the negative, because it is

obvious that the answer depends upon circumstances. While, with-

out doubt, contracts which have a direct tendency to prevent a
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healthy competition are detrimental to the public and consequently

against public policy, it is equally free from doubt that when such

contracts prevent an unhealthy competition and yet furnish the public

with adequate facilities at fixed and reasonable rates, they are beneficial

and in accord with sound principles of public policy. For the lessons

of experience, as well as the deductions of reason, amply demonstrate

that the public interest is not subserved by competition which reduces

the rate of transportation below the standard of fair compensation:

and the theory which formerly obtained, that the public is benefited

by unrestricted competition between railroads has been so emphatic-

ally disproved by the results which have generally followed its adop-

tion in practice, that the hope of any permanent relief from ex-

cessive rates through the competition of a parallel or rival road may,

as a rule, be justly characterized as illusory and fallacious.

Upon authority, also, arrangements-and contracts between compet-

ing railroads, by which unrestrained competition is prevented, do not

contravene public policy. Hare v. Railway Co., 3 Johns. & H. 80.

is directly in point. In that case a bill in chancery had been brought

by a stockholder in the defendant company to annul an agreement

between two railway companies to divide the profits of the traffic in

fixed proportions; and it was admitted there, as it is here, that the

purpose of the agreement was to prevent competition. In dismissing

the bill, Vice-Chancellor Wood said, page 103, "With regard to the

argument against the validity of the agreement, I may clear the

ground of one objection by saying that I see nothing in the aliened

injury to the public arising from the prevention of competition. » * *

It is a mistaken notion that the public is benefited by pitting two rail-

way companies against each other till one is ruined, the result being

at last to raise the fares to the highest possible standard." So, also.
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in 1 Red. Railroads, § 146, 2, it is said, "There is no principle of

public policy which renders void a traffic arrangement between two lines

POWER AS TO TRADE COMBINATIONS.

of railway for the purpose of avoiding competition." And Mr. Mora-

wetz says, in his admirable treatise on corporations, "Public policy

clearly does not demand that railroad companies operating competing

lines shall engage in strife, causing their financial ruin; and, so far as

agreements among companies are designed to effect this result, their

purpose is not injurious to the public or illegal. Moreover, such

agreements arc positively beneficial to the public so far as they pre-

vent the fluctuation of rates and unjust discriminations among ship-

pers, which invariably attend the unrestricted competition of rival

companies. It is therefore impossible to support the proposition that

all agreements among railroad companies which restrict competition

are condemned by law. Some such agreements may be contrary to

public policy and unlawful; but if an agreement of this character is a

reasonable business arrangement to protect the shareholders and cred-

itors of the companies from loss, and does not cause unreasonably

high charges or violate any duty which the companies owe to the

public, it should be sustained and enforced by the courts." Mor.

Corp. (2d ed.), § 1131. In the same section, in speaking of contracts
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in restraint of trade (to which many of the authorities and much of

the argument for the defendants relate) he says: "Even if there were

such a rule as has been claimed applicable to competition in trade,

the principle and policy of the rule would not be applicable to traffic

arrangements designed merely to prevent ruinous competition and

'wars' among railroad companies. The main objection which has

been urged against combinations restraining competition in trade,

namely, that such combinations tend to produce monopolies and

cause extortion, has no application to combinations among railroad

companies, for railroad companies are prohibited by law to charge

more than reasonable rates. It should be observed, also, that compe-

tition among railroad companies has not the same safeguards as com-

petition in trade. Persons will ordinarily do business only when

they think they see a fair chance of profit; and if press of competi-

tion renders a particular trade unprofitable, those engaged in that

trade will suspend or reduce their operations, and apply their capital

and labor to other uses until a reasonable margin of profit has been

reached. But the capital invested in the construction of a railroad

can not be withdrawn when competition renders the operation of the

road unprofitable. A railroad is of no use except for railroad pur-

poses, and if the operation of the road were stopped, the capital

inve sted in its construction would be wholly lost. Hence it is for the

interest of a railroad company to operate its road, though the earnings

are barely sufficient to pay the operating expenses. The ownership of

the road may pass from the shareholders to the bondholders and be of

no benefit to the latter; but the struggle for traffic will continue so

long as the means of paving operating expenses can be raised. Unre-

stricted competition will thus render the competitive traffic wholly un-

remunerative, and will cause the ultimate bankruptcy of the company

in I Red. Railroads, § 146, 2, it is said, "There is no principfe of
public policy which renders void a traffic arrangement between two lines
of railway for the purpose of avoiding competition." And Mr. Morawetz says, in his admirable treatise on corporations, "Public policy
clearly docs not demand that railroad companies operating competing
Jines shall eng.age in strife, causing their financial ruin; and, so far as
agreements among companies are designed to effect this result, their
purpose is not injurious to the public or illegal. Moreover, such
agreements arc positively beneficial to the public so far as they prevent the fluctuation of rates and unjust discriminations among shippers, which invariably attend the unrestt;ctcd competition of rival
companies. It is the.-efore impossible to support the proposition that
all agreements a111011g railroad companies which restrict competition
are condemned by law. Some such agreements may be contrary to
public policy and unlawful; but if an agreement of this character is a
rea~onable business arrangement to protect the shareholders and creditors of the companies from loss, anrl does not cause unreasonably
high charges or violate any duty which the companies owe to the
public, it should be sustained and enforced by the courts." J\t!or.
Corp. ( 2d ed.), § 1131. In the same section, in speaking of contracts
in restraint of trade (to which many of the authorities and much of
the argument for the defendants relate) he says: "Even if there were
such a rule as has been claimed applicable to competition in trade,
the principle and policy of the rule would not be applicable to traffic
arrangements designed merely to prevent ruinous competition and
'wars' among railroad companies. The main objection which has
been urged against combinations restraining competition in trade,
namely, that such combinations tend to produce monopolies and
cause extortion, has no application to combinations among railroad
companies, for railroad companies are prohibited by law to charge
more than reasonable rates. It should be observed, al o, that competition among railroad companies has not the same safeguards as competition in trade.
Persons will ordinarily do business only when
they think they see a fair chance of profit; and if press of competition renders a particular trade unprofitable, those engaged in tliat
trade will suspend or reduce their operations, and apply their capital
and labor to other uses until a reasonable margin of profit has h een
reached. But the capital invested in the construction of a railroad
can not be withdrawn when competition renders the operation of the
road unprofitable. A railroad is of no use except for railroad pu rposes, and if the operation of the road were stopped, the capital
invested in its construction would be wholly lost. Hence it is for the
interest of a railroad company to operate its road, though the earning s
are barely sufficient to pay the operating expenses. The ownersh ip of
the road may pass from the shareholders to the bondholders and be o f
no benefit to the latter; but the struggle for traffic will continue so
long as the means of paying operating expenses can be raised. Unrestricted competition will thus render the competitive traffic wholly unremunerative, and will cause the ultimate bankruptcy of the company
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unless the portion of their traffic which is not the subject of competi-
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tion can be made to bear the entire burden of the interest and fixed
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charges."

The application of these principles to the plea under consideration

unless the portion of their traffic which is not the subject of competition can be made to bear the entire burden of the interest and fixed
charges."
The application of these principles to the plea under consideration
is patent and decisive. The geographical location and relative resources of the two roads \Vere such as to render it obvious that the
plaintiffs could not reasonably hope successfully to compete with their
more powerful rival. The alternatives presented, it may be safely
assumed, were combination or ruinous competition. They accepted
the former; and as the combination di<l not, so far as appears by the
pleadings, raise the rate of transportation above the standard of fair
compensation, or violate any duty that is owing to the public from
roads which arc non-competing, there is nothing averred in the plea
which bars the right of the plaintiffs to an accounting with the defendants.
Numerous cases have been cited in behalf of the oefendants in support of their proposition that the combination bet\.\'een the parties
must be regarded as void at common law because agai:ist public policy. It is quite impos ible, without extending this opinion beyond
all reasonable limits, to go throug h and comment upon these cases in
detail, as ha5 been done in the bst brief for the plaintiffs; but it i
sufficient to say, in general terms, as is there said, that they are c;ises
of contracts in restraint of mercantile business ; or cases of contra cts
which attempt to derogate from the right of eminent domain inherent
in the state; or cases where contracts between railroad companies
were held contrary to _public policy because one of the pa rties attempted to bind itself not to perform duties incid ent to the legal character of common catTiers or public scrvnnts; or cases where contracts
between railroad compnnies were held contrary to public policy because one of the parties agreed not to build, or to cease to operate, a
rond which they were chartered to build or operate; or cases where
contracts between railroad companies have been held illegal merdy
on the ground that they were ultra vt'res; in short, they do not establi sh a rule which fairly includes a case like the one at b;ir. The demurrer to the second plea is sustained. • • •
Plaintiffs' d emurrers sustained. and defendants' overruled.

is patent and decisive. The geographical location and relative re-

sources of the two roads were such as to render it obvious that the

plaintiffs could not reasonably hope successfully to compete with their

more powerful rival. The alternatives presented, it may be safely

assumed, were combination or ruinous competition. They accepted

the former; and as the combination did not, so far as appears by the

pleadings, raise the rate of transportation above the standard of fair

compensation, or violate any duty that is owing to the public from

roads which are non-competing, there is nothing averred in the plea

which bars the right of the plaintiffs to an accounting with the defend-

ants.

Numerous cases have been cited in behalf of the defendants in sup-

port of their proposition that the combination between the parties

must be regarded as void at common law because against public pol-

icy. It is quite impossible, without extending this opinion beyond

all reasonable limits, to go through and comment upon these cases in
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detail, as has been done in the last brief for the plaintiffs; but it is

sufficient to say, in general terms, as is there said, that they are cases

of contracts in restraint of mercantile business; or cases of contracts

which attempt to derogate from the right of eminent domain inherent

in the state; or cases where contracts between railroad companies

were held contrary to public policy because one of the parties at-

tempted to bind itself not to perform duties incident to the legal char-

acter of common carriers or public servants; or cases where contracts

between railroad companies were held contrary to public policy be-

cause one of the parties agreed not to build, or to cease to operate, a

road which they were chartered to build or operate; or cases where

contracts between railroad companies have been held illegal merely

on the ground that they were ultra vires; in short, they do not estab-

lish a rule which fairly includes a case like the one at bar. The de-

murrer to the second plea is sustained. * * *

Plaintiffs' demurrers sustained, and defendants'' overruled.

Note. The following cases hold pools to he valid, or at least not void under

all circumstances: 1861, Hare v. London <fc N. W. R. Co., 2 J. & H. 80; 1865.

Hartford, etc., R. v. N. Y., etc., R., 3 Rob. (N. Y.) 411; 1868, Sussex R. Co,

v. Morris and Essex R., 19 N. J. Eq. 13; 1882, Elkins v. Camden & A. R., 36

N. J. Eq. 234, 244; 1885, Central T. Co. v. Ohio Cent. R. Co., 23 Fed Rep.

306; 1886, Dolph v. Trov Laundry M. Co., 28 Fed. Rep. 553; 1888, Ives v.

Smith, 3 N. Y. Supp. 645; 181)2, Mogul Steamship v. McGregor, App. Cas. 25;

1892, U. S. v. Trans-Mo. Frt. Assn., 53 Fed. Rep. 440; 1893, U. 8. v. Trans-

Mo. Frt. Assn., 58 Fed. Rep. 58, 19 U. S. App. 36, 7 C. C. A. 15 (these being

Note. The following cases hold pools to be valid, or at least not void under
all circumstances: 1861, Hare v. London & N. W.R. Co., 2 J. & H .80; 186.''i.
H artford, etc., R. v. N. Y., etc., R., 3 Rob. ( N. Y .l 411; 1868, ~U!" ' ex R. C<i,
v . .Morris anrl Essex R., 1!) ~. J. Eq. 13; 188:!, Elkins v. C:1mden & A. R., 36
N. J. Eq. 23~. 2H; 1885, Cl:' ntral T. Co. v. Ohio Ce nt. R. Co., 2R Fed Rep.
306; 1886, Dol ph v. Troy Laundry )1. Co., 28 Fed. Rep. 553; 1888, Ivt>s v.
Smith, 3 N. Y. Sn pp . IH.'); 18H2, '.\fogul Steamship v. i\fcGregor, App. Ca . 25:
1892, U. 8. v. Trans-}lo. Frt. Ass n., 53 Fed . Rep. 440; 1893, U. 8. v. Trt111!"Mo. Frt. Assn., 58 F ed. Rep. 58, HJ U . S. App. 36, 7 C. C. A. 15 (tbesl:' bi>ing
overrnled by the supreme court, 166 U. S. 290); 1899, Post v. Southern R. Co .•
100 Tenn. 184, 16 Am. & E. R. Cas. (N. 8.) 201.

overruled bv the supreme court, 166 U. S. 290); 1899, Post v. Southern R. Co.,

103 Tenn. 184, 16 Am. & E. R. Cas. (N. S.) 201.
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POWER AS TO TRADE COMB INATIONS.

Sec. 278. Same, (b) Contracts restraining trade and compe-

tition.

UNITED STATES v. ADDYSTON PIPE and STEEL COMPANY Et Al."

Sec. 278. Same.

(b)

Contracts restraining trade and compe-

tition.

1898. In the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, E. D. Tennessee.

85 Fed. Rep. 271.

[Appeal from the circuit court. Suit in equity by the attorney-gen-

eral of the United States against six corporations engaged in manufac-

UNIT.LD STATES v. ADDYSTON PIPE

AND

STEEL COMPANY ET AL.1

turing cast iron pipe, charging them with a combination and conspir-

acy in restraint of inter-state commerce, contrary to the anti-trust law

1898. IN,

passed by congress July 2, 1890.2 The defendants were the Addyston

THE

U.S. Crncu1T CouRT OF APPEALS, E. D.
85 Fed. Rep. 271.

TENNESSEE.

Co., of Cincinnati, Ohio, Long & Co., of Louisville, Ky., How-

ard-Harrison & Co., of Bessemer, Ala., Anniston Co., of Anniston,

Ala., South Pittsburgh Co., of South Pittsburgh, Tenn., and the

Chattanooga Co., of Chattanooga, Tenn. The petition prayed for a

seizure and confiscation of the pipe, a dissolution of the conspiracy

and a perpetual injunction against the same. Defendants admitted

the existence of an association for the purpose of avoiding ruinous

competition, but denied that it was in restraint of trade, created a mo-
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nopoly or violated the anti-trust law. The circuit court dismissed the

petition. The evidence showed that the association had divided up

the United States into "pay" and "free" territory; the capacity of

the mills in the pay territory was 392,500 tons, 220,000 tons being

represented by the association, the other mills in the pay territory be-

ing located in Colorado, Texas, Oregon and St. Louis, with an aggre-

gate capacity of 57,500 tons, and at Columbus, Cleveland and New

Comerstown, Ohio, and Detroit, Mich., with an aggregate capacity

of 113,000 tons; the capacity of mills in the "free" territory was

34S,000 tons, and they were located in eastern Virginia (14,000 tons),

four in eastern Pennsylvania (87,000 tons), three in New Jersey

(2 r0,000 tons), and two in New York (35,000 tons) ; from these "free"

mills to the "pay" territory the freight rates varied from $2 to $6 per

ton. Within the "pay" territory of thirty-four states certain cities were

reserved to be supplied exclusively by a certain company, as, e. g., the

Addyston Company was to have the exclusive right to handle the business

of Cincinnati, Ohio, Covington and Newport, Ky. The plan contem-

plated was as follows: "All competition or pipe lettings shall take

place among the various pipe shops prior to said letting. To accom-

plish this purpose it is proposed that the six competitive shops have a

representative board located at some central city, to whom all inquir-

ies for pipe shall be referred, and said board shall fix the price at

which said pipe shall be sold, and bids taken from the respective

shops for the privilege of handling the order, and the party securing

1 Statement abridged and much of opinion omitted. This opinion should

be read in full, and carefully studied. It was affirmed, though the decree

was slightly modified by the United States Supreme Court. See 175 U. S. 211.

'See note, infra p. 977.

[Appeal from the circuit court. Suit in equity by the attorney-general of the United States against six corporations engaged in manufacturing cast iron pipe, charging them with a combination and conspiracy in restraint of inter-state commerce, contrary to the anti-trust law
passed by congress July 2, 1890. ri The defendants were the Addyston
Co., of Cincinnati, Ohio, L ong & Co., of Louisville, Ky., Howard-Harrison & Co.,. of Bessemer, Ala., Anniston Co., of Anniston,
Ala., South Pittsburgh Co. , of South Pittsburgh, Tenn., and the
Chattanooga Co., of Chattanooga, Tenn. The petition prayed for a
seizure and confiscation of the pipe, a dissolution of the conspiracy
and a perpetual injunction against the same. Defendants admitted
the existence of an association for the purpose of avoiding ruinous
competition, but d enied that it was in restraint of trade, created a monopoly or violated the anti-trust law. The circuit court dismissed the
petition. The evidence sho wed that the association had divided up
the United States into "pay" and "free" territory; the capacity of
the mills in the pay territory ·was 392,500 tons, 220,000 tons being
represented by the association, the other mills in the pay territory being located in Colorado, Texas, Oregon and St. Louis, ·with an aggregate capacity of 57,500 tons, and at Columbus, Cleveland a nd New
Comerstown, Ohio, and Detroit, Mich., with an aggreg ate capacity
of I 13,000 tons; the capacity of mills in the "free" territory was
348,000 tons, an<l they were located in eastern Virginia ( r4,ooo tons ),
four in eastern Pennsylvania (87,000 tons), three in New Jersey
( 2 ro,ooo tons), and two in N ew York (35,000 tons); frcm these ''free"
mills to the "pay" territory the freight rates varied from $2 to $6 per
ton. Within the "pay" territory of thirty-four states certain cities were
reserved to be supplied exclu sively hy a certain company, as, e.g., th e
Addyston C ompany was to have the exclusive right to h a ndle the business
of Cincinnati, Ohio, Covington and Newport, Ky . The plan contemplated was as follows: "All competition or pipe lett ings shall take
place among the various pipe shops prior to said letting. To accomplish this purpose it is proposed that the six competitive shops have a
representative board located at some central city, to whom all inquiries for pipe shall be referred, an<l said board shall fix the price at
which sa id pipe shall be sold , and bids taken from the respective
shops for the priYil ege of handling the order, and the party securing
1 Statement. abridged and much of opinion omit.led. This opinion ehould
be read in full, and carefully studied. ft wns affirmed, though the decree
was slightly modified by the United 8tates Supreme Court. See 175 U . . ~11.
'See note, i11fra p. 917.
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the order shall have the protection of all the other shops." This
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board proceeded as follows: "It was moved to sell the 519 pieces of
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20-inch pipe for Omaha, Neb., for $23.40 delivered. Carried. It

was moved that Anniston participate in the bonus, and the job be sold

the order shall have the protection of all the other shop ·." Thi
board proceeded as follows : "It was moved to sell the 519 pieces of
20-inch pipe for Omaha, Neb., for $23.40 delivered. Carried. It
was moved that Anniston participate in the bonus, and the job be sold
over the table . Carried. Pursuant to the motion, the 5 19 pieces 20inch pipe for Omaha was sold to Bessemer at a premium of $8.20. "
In a case of a letting at St. Louis , this city being reserved to the Bessemer (Ala.) Company, the price was fixed by the association at $24
per ton on 2,800 tons, and the bonus at $6. 50. Before the letting,
the vice-president of the Besseme r Company wrote to the other members of the association saying, "I prefer that if any of you find it necessary to put in a bid without going to St. Louis, plea&e bid not less
than $27 for the pipe. • • • I would also like to know as to
which of you would find it convenient to have a representative at the
letting. It will be necessary to ha Ye two outside bidders." At thr
letting the Addyston Company b id $z4.37 and the Louisville Company $24.57. The contract being let to the Bessemer Company at
$24; the eYidence showed that the Chattanooga Company could have
furnished the same at from $I 7 to $ 18 per ton at a profit. The
bonus or premium bid was to be paid to the other companies in proportion to the capacities of the various miJls. There was much other
evidence of a similar and confirmatory character.]
TAFT, C. J. • • • Two questions are presented in this case
for our decision: I. Was the a ssociation of the defendants a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade, as the terms are
to be understood in the act? 2. Was the trade thus restrained between the states?
The contention on behalf of defendants is that the association
would have been valid at common law, and that the federal anti-trust
law was not intended to reach any agreements that were not void and
unenforcible at common law. It might be a sufficient answer to this
contention to point to the decision of the supreme court of the United
States in the United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.
S. 290, I 7 Sup. Ct. 540, in which it w as held that contract in restraint of interstate transportation were within the statute, whether the
restraints would be regarde<l as reasonable at common law or not. It
is suggested , however, that that case related to a quasi-public employment, necessarily unde r public control and affecting public interests, and that a less stringent rule of construction applies to contracts
restricting parties in sales of merchandise , which is purely a private
bu siness , having in it no ele ment of a public or quasi-public character. Whether or not there is substance in such a distinction-a que tion w e do not d ecide-it is certain that, if the contract of associ:ition
which bo und the defendants was void and unenforcible at the common law because in restraint of trade, it is within the inhibition of thr
statute if the trade it restrained was interstate. Contract that were
in unreasonabl e restraint of trad e at common law were not unlawful
in the sense of being criminal, or g iving rise to a civil action for d:unages in favor of one prcjudiciaJly affected thereby, but were simply

over the table. Carried. Pursuant to the motion, the 519 pieces 20-

inch pipe for Omaha was sold to Bessemer at a premium of $8.20."

In a case of a letting at St. Louis, this city being reserved to the Bes-

semer (Ala.) Company, the price was fixed by the association at $24

per ton on 2,800 tons, and the bonus at $6.50. Before the letting,

the vice-president of the Bessemer Company WTOte to the other mem-

bers of the association saying, "I prefer that if any of you find it nec-

essary to put in a bid without going to St. Louis, please bid not less

than $27 for the pipe. * * • I would also like to know as to

which of you would find it convenient to have a representative at the

letting. It will be necessary to have two outside bidders." At the

letting the Addyston Company bid $24.37 am' tne Louisville Com-

pany $24.57. The contract being let to the Bessemer Companv at

$24; the evidence showed that the Chattanooga Company could have

furnished the same at from $17 to $18 per ton at a profit. The

bonus or premium bid was to be paid to the other companies in pro-
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portion to the capacities of the various mills. There was much other

evidence of a similar and confirmatory character.]

Taft, C. J. * * * Two questions are presented in this case

for our decision: 1. Was the association of the defendants a con-

tract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade, as the terms are

to be understood in the act? 2. Was the trade thus restrained be-

tween the states?

The contention on behalf of defendants is that the association

would have been valid at common law, and that the federal anti-trust

law was not intended to reach any agreements that were not void and

unenforcible at common law. It might be a sufficient answer to this

contention to point to the decision of the supreme court of the United

States in the United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166U.

S. 290, 17 Sup. Ct. 540, in which it was held that contracts in re-

straint of interstate transportation were within the statute, whether the

restraints would be regarded as reasonable at common law or not. It

is suggested, however, that that case related to a quasi-public em-

ployment, necessarily under public control and affecting public inter-

ests, and that a less stringent rule of construction applies to contracts

restricting parties in sales of merchandise, which is purely a private

business, having in it no element of a public or quasi-public charac-

ter. Whether or not there is substance in such a distinction—a ques-

tion we do not decide—it is certain that, if the contract of association

which bound the defendants was void and unenforcible at the com-

mon law because in restraint of trade, it is within the inhibition of the

statute if the trade it restrained was interstate. Contracts that were

in unreasonable restraint of trade at common law were not unlawful

in the sense of being criminal, or giving rise to a civil action for dam-

ages in favor of one prejudicially affected thereby, but were simply
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void, and were not enforced by the courts. Mogul Steamship Co. v.

McGregor, Gow & Co. (1892), App. Cas. 25; Hornby v. Close, L.

R. 2 Q. B. 153; Lord Campbell, C. J., in Hilton v. Eckersley, 6

El. & Bl. 47, 66: Ilannen, J., in Farrer v. Close, L. R. 4 Q. B.

602, 612. The effect of the act of 1890 is to render such contracts

unlawful in an affirmative or positive sense, and punishable as a mis-

demeanor, and to create a right of civil action for damages in favor

of those injured thereby, and a civil remedy by injunction in favor of

both private persons and the public against the execution of such con-

tracts and the maintenance of such trade restraints.

The argument for defendants is that their contract of association

•was not, and could not be, a monopoly, because their aggregate ton-

nage capacity did not exceed 30 per cent, of the total tonnage capac-

ity of the country; that the restraints upon the members of the asso-

ciation, if restraints they could be called, did not embrace all the

states, and were not unlimited in space; that such partial restraints

were justified and upheld at common law if reasonable, and only pro-

portioned to the necessary protection of the parties; that in this case the
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partial restraints were reasonable, because without them each member

would be subjected to ruinous competition by the other, and did not

exceed in degree of stringency or scope what was necessary to protect

the parties in securing prices for their product that were fair and rea-

sonable to themselves and the public; that competition was not stifled

by the association, because the prices fixed by it had to be fixed with

reference to the very active competition of pipe companies which

were not members of the association, and which had more than double

the defendant's capacity; that in this way the association only modi-

fied and restrained the evils of ruinous competition, while the public

had all the benefit from competition which public policy demanded.

From early times it was the policy of Englishmen to encourage

trade in England, and to discourage those voluntary restraints which

tradesmen were often induced to impose on themselves by contracts.

Courts recognized this public policy by refusing to enforce stipulations

of this character. The objections to such restraints were mainly two.

One was that by such contracts a man disabled himself from earning

a livelihood, with the risk of becoming a public charge, and deprived

the community of the benefit of his labor. The other was that such

restraints tended to give to the covenantee, the beneficiary of such re-

straints, a monopoly of the trade, from which he had thus excluded

one competitor, and by the same means might exclude others. * * •

The inhibition against restraints of trade at common law seems at

first to have had no exception. See language of Justice Hull, Year

Book, 2 Hen. V., folio 5, pi. 26. After a time it became apparent

to the people and the courts that it was in the interest of trade that

certain covenants in restraint of trade should be enforced. It was of

importance, as an incentive to industry and honest dealing in trade,

that, after a man had built tip a business with an extensive good-will,

he should be able to sell his business and good-will to the best of ad-

vantage, and he could not do so unless he could bind himself by an

void, and were not enforced by the courts. Mogul Steamship Co. v.
McGregor, Gow & Co. (1892), App. Cas. 25; Hornby v. Close, L.
R. 2 Q. B. 153; Lord Camphell, C. J., in Hilton v. Eckersley, 6
El. & Bl. 47, 66; Hannen, J., in Farrer v. Close, L. R. 4 Q. B.
6o2, 612. The effect of the act of 1890 is to render such contracts
unlawful in an affirmative or positive sense, and puni hable as a misdemeanor, and to create a right of civil action for damages in favor
of those injured thereby, and a civil remedy by injunction in favor of
both private persons and the public against the execution of such contracts and the maintenance of such trade restraints.
The argument for defendants is that their contract of association
was not, and could not be, a monopoly, because their aggregate tonnage capacity did not exceed 30 per cent. of the total tonnage capacity of the country; that the restraints upon the m e mbers of the association, if restraints they could be called , <lid not embrace all the
states, and were not unlimited in space; that snch partial restraints
were justified and upheld at common law if reasonable, and only proportioned to the necessary protection of the parties; that in this case the
partial restraints were reasonable, because without them each member
would be subjected to ruinous competition by the other, and did ~ot
exceed in degree of stringency or scope what was necessary to protect
the parties in securing prices for their product that were fair and reasonable to themselves and the public; that competition was not stifled
by the association, because the prices fixed by it had to be fixed with
reference to the very active competition of pipe companies which
were not members of the association, and which had more than double
the defendant's capacity; that in this way the association only modified and restrained the evils of ruinous competition, while the public
had all the benefit from competition which public policy demanded.
From early times it was the policy of Englishmen to encourage
trade in Eng land, and to discourage those voluntary re -traints which
tradesmen were often induced to impose on themselves by contracts.
Courts recognized this public policy hy refu, ing to enforce stipulations
of this character. The objections to such restraints were m ainly two.
One was th at by such contracts a man disabl ed himself from earning
a livelihood , with the risk of becoming a puulic charge, and deprived
the community of the benefit of his labor. The other was that such
restraints tended to g ive to the covenantee, the beneficiary of suc h restraints, a monopoly of the trade, from which he had thus excl uded
one competitor, and by the same means might exclude ot hers. • • •
The inhibition against restraints of trade at common law seems at
first to have h:-icl no exception. Sec language of Ju stice Ilull, Year
Book, 2 Hen. V .. folio 5, pl. 26. After a time it became appa rent
to the people <1ncl the courts that it was in th e interest of trade that
certain covenants in restraint of trade should be cnforcetl. I t was of
importance, as an incentive to indu stry and honest dealing in trade,
that, after a man had built up a business with an extensive good-will,
he should be able to sell his business and good-will to the best of advantage, and he could not do so unless he could bind him elf by an
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enforcible contract not to engage in the same business in such a way

as to prevent injury to that which he was about to sell. It was equally
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for the good of the public and trade, when partners dissolved, and one
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took the business, or they divided the business, that each partner

enforcible contract not to engage in the same business in such a way
as to prevent injury to that which he was about to sell. It was equally
for the good of the public and trade, when partners dissolved, and one
took the business, or they divided the business, that each partner
might hind himself not to do anything in traJe thereafter which would
derogate from his grant of the interest convt:ye<l to his former pa1tner.
Again, when two men became partners in a bu~incss, although their
union might reduce competition, this effect was only an incident to
the main purpose of a union of their capital, enterprise, and energy to
carry on a successful business, and one useful to the community.
Restrictions in the articles of pa1tnership upon the business activity of
the members, with a view of securing their entire effort in the common
enterpri e, were, of course, only ancillary to the main end of the
union, and were to be encouraged. Again, when one in business
sold property with which the buyer might set up a rim! bu. ines , it
'rVas certainly reasonable that the seller should be able to restrain the
buyer from doing him an injnry which, hut for the sale, the buyer
would be unnhle to inflict. This was not reducing competition, but
was only securing th e sell er against an increase of co111pctition of his
own creating. Such an exception was necessary to promote the free
purchase and sale of property. "Again, it was of importance that
business men and professional men should have every motive to employ the ablest a s~istants, and to instruct them thoroughly; but they
would naturally be reluctant to do so unless such assi~tants were able
to bind themselves not to set up a rival business in the vicinity after
learning the details an<l secrets of the business of their employers. • • •
For the reasons g iven, th en , covenants in partial restraint of trade
are generally upheld as valid when they are agreements ( 1) hy the
sell er o{ property or bu siness not to compete with the buyer in such a
way as to d erogate from the value of property or business sold; ( 2)
by a retiring pa1tner not to compete with the firm; ( 3) by a pai-tner
pending the partnerl-> hip not to do anything to interfere, by competition or otherwise, with the business of the firm: (4) by the buyer of
property n ot to u l-.e the same in competition with the business retained
by the seller; and ( 5) by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete with his ma ~te r or employer after the expirntion of his time of
sen·icc. 13dore such agreements arc upheld, however, the conrt
mnst find th :1t the restraints attempted thereby are reasonably necessary ( r , 2 and 3) to the enjoyment by the buyer of the property,
good-will o r intl:'rcl->t in the partner hip bought; or (4) to the legitimate end s of the exi~ting partnership; or (5) to the pre,·ention of
pm;siblc injury to th e business of the sel ler fro m use by the buyer of
the thing sold; or (6) to protection from the danger of loss to the
em ployer's bu~inc"s caused by the unjust use on the p art of the employc of the confidential knowledge acquired in ~uch business. Uncier
the first clns-; com e the cases of Mitchel v. Re ynold s, r P. ~'ms . 181:
Fowh- ,., Parke, 13r U.S. 88. 9 Sup. Ct. 658 ;.Nordenfelclt v. M aximNordenfddt Co. ( 189+), App . Cas. 534; Rousillon v. Rou1-illon, 14
Ch. Di,-, 351; Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345; Whittaker v.

might bind himself not to do anything in trade thereafter which would

derogate from his grant of the interest conveyed to his former partner.

Again, when two men became partners in a business, although their

union might reduce competition, this effect was only an incident to

the main purpose of a union of their capital, enterprise, and energy to

carry on a successful business, and one useful to the community.

Restrictions in the articles of partnership upon the business activity of

the members, with a view of securing their entire effort in the common

enterprise, were, of course, only ancillary to the main end of the

union, and were to be encouraged. Again, when one in business

sold property with which the buyer might set up a rival business, it

was certainly reasonable that the seller should be able to restrain the

buyer from doing him an injury which, but for the sale, the buver

would be unable to inflict. This was not reducing competition, but

was only seem ing the seller against an increase of competition of his

own creating. Such an exception was necessary to promote the free
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purchase and sale of property. Again, it was of importance that

business men and professional men should have every motive to em-

ploy the ablest assistants, and to instruct them thoroughly; but they

would naturally be reluctant to do so unless such assistants were able

to bind themselves not to set up a rival business in the vicinity after

learning the details and secrets of the busine ss of their employers. » » *

For the reasons given, then, covenants in partial restraint of trade

are generally upheld as valid when they are agreements (1) by the

seller of property or business not to compete with the buyer in such a

way as to derogate from the value of property or business sold; (2)

by a retiring partner not to compete with the firm; (3) by a partner

pending the partnership not to do anything to interfere, by competi-

tion or otherwise, with the business of the firm; (4) by the buver of

property not to use the same in competition with the business retained

by the seller; and (5) by an assistant, servant or agent not to com-

pete with his master or employer after the expiration of his time of

service. Before such agreements arc upheld, however, the court

must find that the restraints attempted thereby are reasonably neces-

sary (1, 2 and 3) to the enjovment by the buyer of the propertv,

good-w ill or interest in the partnership bought; or (4) to the legiti-

mate ends of the existing partnership; or (5) to the prevention of

possible injury to the business of the seller from use by the buyer of

the thing sold; or (6) to protection from the danger of loss to the

employer's business caused by the unjust use on the p:irt of the em-

ploye of the confidential knowledge acquired in such business. Under

the first class come the cases of Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181;

Fovvle v. Parke, 131 U. S. 8S.9 Sup. Ct. 658; Nordenfeldt v. Maxim-

Nordenfcldt Co. (1S94), App. Cas. 534; Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14

Ch. Div. 351 ; Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345; Whittaker v.
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Howe, 3 Beav. 383 ; Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E.

97 1

Rep. 419; Tode v. Gross, 127 N. Y. 480, 28 N. E. Rep. 469; Beal

v. Chase, 31 Mich. 490; Hubbard v. Miller, 27 Mich. 15; National

Ben. Co. v. Union Hospital Co., 45 Minn. 272, 47 N. W. Rep. 806;

Whitney v. Slayton, 40 Maine 224; Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223;

Richards v. Seating Co., 87 Wis. 503, 58 N. W. Rep. 787. In the

second class are Tallis v. Tallis, 1 El. & Bl. 391, and Lange v.

Werk, 2 Ohio St. 520. In the third class are Machinery Co. v.

Dolph, 138 U. S. 617, 11 Sup. Ct. 412, Machinery Co. v. Dolph, 28

Fed. Rep. 553; and Matthews v. Associated Press, 136 N. Y. 333,

32 N. E. Rep. 9S1. In the fourth class are American Strawboard

Co. v. Halcleman Paper Co., 83 Fed. Rep. 619; and Hitchcock v.

Anthony, 83 Fed. Rep. 779, both decisions of this court; Navigation

Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. 64; Dunlop v. Gregory, 10 N. Y. 241;

Hodge v.Sloan, 107 N. Y. 244, 17 N. E.Rep. 335. While in the fifth

class are the cases of Homer v. Ashford, 3 Bing. 322; Horner v.

Graves, 7 Bing. 735: Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Adol. & E. 438 ; Ward v.

Byrne, 5 Mees. & W. 547; Dubovvski v. Goldstein (1896), 1 Q. B.
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478; Peels v. Saalfeld (1892), 2 Ch. 149; Taylor v. Blanchard, 13

Allen 370; Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. St. 467; Herreshoff v. Bouti-

neau, 17 R. I. 3, 19 Atl. Rep. 712/

It would be stating it too strongly to say that these five classes of

covenants in restraint of trade include all of those upheld as valid at

the common law; but it would certainly seem to follow from the tests

laid down for determining the validity of such an agreement that no

conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant

embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful con-

tract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the

legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of

an unjust use of those fruits by the other party. In Horner v. Graves,

7 Bing. 735, Chief Justice Tindal, who seems to be regarded as the

highest English judicial authority on this branch of the law (see Lord

Macnaghten's judgment in Nordenfeldt v. Maxim Nordenfeldt Co.

(1894), App. Cas. 535, 567), used the following language:

"We do not see how a better test can be applied to the question,

whether this is or not a reasonable restraint of trade, than by consider-

ing whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection to

the interests of the party in favor of whom it is given, and not so large

as to interfere with the interests of the public. Whatever restraint is

larger than the necessary protection of the party requires can be of no

benefit to either. It can only be oppressive. It is, in the eye of the

law, unreasonable. Whatever is injurious to the interests of the pub-

lic is void on the ground of public policy."

This very statement of the rule implies that the contract must be

one in which there is a main purpose, to which the covenant in

restraint of trade is merely ancillary. The covenant is inserted

only to protect one of the parties from the injury which, in the

execution of the contract or enjoyment of its fruits, he may suffer

from the unrestrained competition of the other. The main purpose

Howe, 3 Beav. 383; Match Co. v. Roeber, rn6 N. Y . 473, 13 N. E.
Rep. 419; Tocle v. Gross, 127 N. Y . 480, 28 N. E. Rep. 469; Beal
v. Chase, 31 Mich. 490; Hubbard v. Miller, 27 Mich. 15; National
Ben. Co. v . Union Hospital Co., 45 Minn . 272, 47 N. W. Rep. 806;
Whitney v . Slayton, 40 Maine 224; Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Masi;. 223;
Richards v. Seating Co., 87 vVis. 503, 58 N. W. Rep. 787. In the
second class are Tallis v. Tallis, r El. & Ill. 391, and Lange v.
Werk, 2 Ohio St. 5 20. In the third class are Machinery Co. v.
Dolph, 138 U.S. 617, 11 Sup. Ct. 412, Machinery Co. v. Dolph, 28
Fed. Rep. 553; and Matthews v. Associated Press, 136 N. Y. 333,
32 N. E. Rep. 98 r. In the fourth class are American Strnwboard
Co. v. Haldeman Paper Co., 83 Fed. Rep. 619; and Hitchcock v.
Anthony, 83 Fed. Rep. 779, both decisions of this court; Navigation
Co. v. \Vinsor, 20 Wall. 6+; Dunlop v. Gregory, 10 N . Y. 241;
Hodge v . Sloan, rn7 N. Y. 244, 17 N. E.Rep. 335. \Vhile in the fifth
class are the cases of Homer v. Ashford, 3 Bing. 322; Horner v.
Graves, 7 Bing. 735: Hitchcock Y. Coker, 6 Adol. & E. 438; Ward v.
Byrne, 5 Mees . & \V. 547; Dubowski v. Goldstein ( 1896), 1 Q. B.
478: Peels v. S :rnlfeld ( 1892), 2 Ch. 149; Taylor v. Blanchard, 13
Allen 370; Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Pn. St. 467; Herreshoff v. Boutinean, 17 R. I. 3, 19 At!. Rep. 712:
It would be stating it too strongly to say that these fh·e classes of
covenants in restraint of trnde include all of those upheld as valid at
the common law; but it would certainly seem to follow from the tests
laid down for determining the validity of such an agreement that no
conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant
embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the co,·enantee in th e enjoyment of the
le ~ itimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of
an unjust use of those fruits by the other party. In Horner v. Graves,
7 Bing. 735, Chief Justice Tindal, who seems to be regarded as the
highest English judicial authority on this branch of the law (see Lord
Macnaghten's judgment in Norclenfeldt v. Maxim Nordenfeldt Co.
( 1894 ), App. Cas. 535, 567), used the following language:
"We do not see how a better test can be applied to the question,
whether this is or not a reasonable restraint of trade, than by considering whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection to
the interests of the party in favor of whom it is given, and not so large
as to interfere with the interests of the public. Whatever restraint is
l ar~c r than the necessary protection of the party requires can be of no
henefit to either. It can only be oppressive. It is, in the eye of the
law , unreasonable. Whate\'er is injurious to the interests of the publi c is void on the ground of public policy."
This very statement of the rule implies that the contract must be
one in which there is a main purpose, to which the covennnt in
restraint of trade is mere ly ancillary. ' The covenant is insert ed
only to protect one of the parties from the injury which, in the
execution of the contract or enjoyme nt of its fruit~, he may suffer
from the unrestrained competition of the other. The main purpose

Digitized by

gl

Origi11al from

PRINCETON UNIVERSiTY

972 U. S. V. ADDYSTON PIPE AND STEEL CO. ET AL. § 278

of the contract suggests the measure of protection needed, and fur-

972

nishes a sufficiently uniform standard by which the validity of such

restraints may be judicially determined. In such a case, if the
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restraint exceeds the necessity presented by the main purpose of the

of the contract suggests the measure of protection needed, and furnishes a sufficiently uniform standard by which the validity of such
restraints may be judicially determined. In such a case, if the
restraint exceeds the nece sity presented by the main purpose of the
contract, it is void for two reasons: First, because it oppresses the
cuvenantor without :rny corresponding benefit to the covenantee; and,
second, because it tends to a monopoly. But ·where the sole object
of both parties in making the contract as express~d therein is merely
to restrain competition, and enhance or maintain prices, it would
seem thnt there wns nothing to justify or excuse the restraint, that it
would necessa rily have a tendency to monopoly and therefore would
be void . In such a case there is no measure of whnt is necessary to
the protection of either pa1ty except the vague and varying opinion
of judges as to how much, on principles of political economy, men
ought to be allowed to restrain competition. There is in such contracts no main lav.·ful purpose to subserve which partial restraint is
permitted, and by which its reasonableness is measured, but the
sole object is to restrain trade in order to avoid the competition which
it has always been the policy of the common law to foster.
[Reviewing many cases. J • • • • • • • • •
Upon this review of the law and the authorities, we can have no
doubt that the association of the defendants, however reasonable the
prices they fixed, however great the competition they had to encounter, and however great the necessity for curbing themselves by joint
agreement from committin~ financial suicide by ill-advised competition, was void at common law, because in restraint of trade, and
tending to a monopoly. But the facts of the case do not require us
to go so far as this, for they show that the attempted justification of
this association on the grou11ds stated is without foundation.
Another aspect of this contract of association brings it within the
term used in the statute, "a conspiracy in restraint of trade." A
conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish an
unlawful end by lnwful means or a lawful end by unlawful means. In
the answer of the d efendants, it is averred that the chief way in which
ca st~ iron pipe is sold is by contracts let after competitive bidding invited by the intending purchaser. It would have much interfered
with the smooth working of defendants' association had its existence
and purposes become kno\-vn to the public. A part of the plan was
a deliberate attempt to create in the minds of the members of the
public inviting bids the belief that competition existed between the
defendants. Several of the defendants were required to bid at every
letting, :ind to make their bids nt such prices that the one already selected to obtnin the contract should have the lowest bid.
It is well settled that an agreement between intending bidders at a
public auction or a public letting not to hid against each other. and
thu s to prevent competition, is a fraud upon the intenqin g vendor or
contractor, and th e e nsu ing sa le or contract will be set aside. Breslin
v. Brown. 24 Ohio St. 565; Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N. Y. 147;
Loyd v. Malone, 23 Ill. 41; Wooten v. Hinkle, 20 Mo. 290; Phip·

contract, it is void for two reasons: First, because it oppresses the

covenantor without any corresponding benefit to the covenantee; and,

second, because it tends to a monopoly. But where the sole object

of both parties in making the contract as expressed therein is merely

to restrain competition, and enhance or maintain prices, it would

seem that there was nothing to justify or excuse the restraint, that it

would necessarily have a tendency to monopoly and therefore would

be void. In such a case there is no measure of what is necessaiy to

the protection of either party except the vague and varying opinion

of judges as to how much, on principles of political economy, men

ought to be allowed to restrain competition. There is in such con-

tracts no main lawful purpose to subserve which partial restraint is

permitted, and by which its reasonableness is measured, but the

sole object is to restrain trade in order to avoid the competition which

it has always been the policy of the common law to foster.

[Reviewing many cases.] •*••»»»•»
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Upon this review of the law and the authorities, we can have no

doubt that the association of the defendants, however reasonable the

prices they fixed, however great the competition they had to encoun-

ter, and however great the necessity for curbing themselves by joint

agreement from committing financial suicide by ill-advised competi-

tion, was void at common law, because in restraint of trade, and

tending to a monopoly. But the facts of the case do not require us

to go so far as this, for thev show that the attempted justification of

this association on the grounds stated is without foundation.

Another aspect of this contract of association brings it within the

term used in the statute, "a conspiracy in restraint of trade." A

conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish an

unlawful end by lawful means or a lawful end by unlawful means. In

the answer of the defendants, it is averred that the chief way in which

castriron pipe is sold is by contracts let after competitive bidding in-

vited by the intending purchaser. It would have much interfered

with the smooth working of defendants' association had its existence

and purposes become known to the public. A part of the plan was

a deliberate attempt to create in the minds of the members of the

public inviting bids the belief that competition existed between the

defendants. Several of the defendants were required to bid at every

letting, and to make their bids at such prices that the one already se-

lected to obtain the contract should have the lowest bid.

It is well settled that an agreement between intending bidders at a

public auction or a public letting not to bid against each other, and

thus to prevent competition, is a fraud upon the intending vendor or

contractor, and the ensuing sale or contract will be set aside. Breslin

v. Brown, 24 Ohio St. 565; Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N. Y. 147;

Loyd v. Malone, 23 111. 41; Wooten v. Hinkle, 20 Mo. 290; Phip-
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pen v. Stickney, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 384; Kearney v. Taylor, 15 How.
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494, 519; Wilbur v. How, 8 Johns. 444; Hannah v. Fife, 27 Mich.

172; Gibbs v. Smith, 115 Mass. 592; Swan v. Chorpenning, 20 Cal.

182; Gardiner v. Morse, 25 Maine 140; Ingram v. Ingram, 49 N. C.

188; Brisbane v. Adams, 3 N. Y. 129; Woodruff v. Berry, 40 Ark.

251; Wald Pol. Cont., 310, note by Mr. Wald, and cases cited.

The case of Jones v. North, L. R. 19 Eq. 426, to the contrary, can

not be supported. The largest purchasers of pipe are municipal cor-

porations, and they are by law required to solicit bids for the sale of

pipe in order that the public may get the benefit of competition. One

of the means adopted by the defendants in their plan of combination

was this illegal and fraudulent effort to evade such laws, and to de-

ceive intending purchasers. No matter what the excuse for the com-

bination by defendants in restraint of trade, the illegality of the means

stamps it as a conspiracy, and so brings it within that term of the fed-

eral statute.

The second question is whether the trade restrained by the combi-

nation of the defendants was interstate trade. * * *

In Robbins v. Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592, a law
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of Tennessee, which imposed a tax on all "drummers" who solicited

orders on samples, was held unconstitutional in so far as it applied to

the drummer of an Ohio firm, who was soliciting orders for goods to

be sent from Ohio to the purchasers in Tennessee, on the ground that

it was a tax on interstate commerce. In delivering the opinion of the

court in that case, Mr. Justice Bradley said (page 497, 120 U. S.,

and page 596, 7 Sup. Ct.) that a tax on the sale of goods, or the offer

to sell them before they are brought into the state, was clearly a tax

on interstate commerce. He further said:

"The negotiation of sales of goods which are in another state, for

the purpose of introducing them into the state in which the negotia-

tion is made, is interstate commerce." * * *

If then, the soliciting of orders for, and the sale of, goods in one

state, to be delivered from another state, is interstate commerce in its

strictest and highest sense—such that the states are excluded by the

federal constitution from a right to regulate ortax the same,—it seems

clear that contracts in restraint of such solicitations, negotiations, and

sales are contracts in restraint of interstate commerce. The anti-trust

law is an effort by congress to regulate interstate commerce. Such

commerce as the states are excluded from burdening or regulating in

any way by tax or otherwise, because of the power of congress to reg-

ulate interstate commerce, must, of necessity, be the commerce which

congress may regulate, and which, by the terms of the anti-trust law,

it has regulated. We can see no escape from the conclusion, there-

fore, that the contract of the defendants was in restraint of interstate

commerce. * * *

Reversed.

Corporate Combinations.

Note: See decision in supreme court of U. S., 175 TJ. S. 211, infra, p. 1535.

1. In general. In the discussion of this topic two principles should be kept

pen v. Stickney, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 384; Kearney v. Taylor, 15 How.
494, 519; Wilbur v. How, 8 Johns. 444; Hannah v. Fife, 27 Mich.
172; Gibbs v. Smith, 115 Mass. 592; Swan v. Chorpenning, 20 Cal.
182; Gardiner v. Mprse, 25 Maine 140; Ingram v. Ingram, 49 N. C.
188; Brisbane v. Adams, 3 N. Y. 129; Woodruff v. Berry, 40 Ark.
25 1 ; Waid Pol. Cont., 310, note by Mr. Wald, and cases cited.
The case of Jones v. North, L. R. 19 Eq. 426, to the contrary, can
not be supported. The largest purchasers of pipe are municipal corporations, and they are by law required to solicit bids for the sale of
pipe in order that the public may get the benefit of competition. One
of the means adopted by the defendants in their plan of combination
was this illegal and fraudulent effort to evade such laws, and to deceive intending purchasers. No matter what the excuse for the combination by defendants in restraint of trade, the illegality of the means
stamps it as a conspiracy, and so brings it within that term of the federal statute.
The second question is whether the trade restrained by the combination of the defendants was interstate trade. • • •
In Robbins v. Taxing Di st., 120 U.S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592, a law
of Tennessee, which imposed a tax on all "drummers'' who solicited
orders on samples, was held unconstitutional in so far as it applied to
the drummer of an Ohio firm, who was soliciting orders for goods to
be sent from Ohio to the purchasers in Tennessee, on the ground that
it was a tax on interstate commerce. In delivering the opinion of the
court in that case, Mr. Justice Bradley said (page 497, 120 U. S.,
and page 596, 7 Sup. Ct.) that a tax on the sale of goods, or the offer
to sell them before they are brought into the state, was clearly a tax
on interstate commerce: He further said:
"The negotiation of sales of goods which are in another state, for
the purpose of introducing them into the state in which the negotiation is made, is interstate commerce." • • •
If then, the soliciting of orders for, and the sale of, goods in one
state, to be delivered from another state, is interstate commerce in its
strictest and highest sense-such that the states are excluded by the
federal constitution from a right to regulate or tax the same,-it seem:;
clear that contracts in restraint of such solicitations, negotiations, and
sales are contracts in restraint of interstate commerce. The anti-trust
law is an effort by congress to regulate interstate commerce. Such
commerce as the states are excluded from burdening or regulating in
any way by tax or otherwise, because of the power of congress to regulate interstate commerce, must, of necessity, be the commerce which
congress may regulate, and which, by the terms of the anti-trust law,
it has regulated. We can see no escape from the conclusion, therefore, that the contract of the defendants was in restraint of interstate
commerce. • • •
Reversed.

Corporate Combinations.

Note: See decision in supreme court of U.S., 175 U.S. 211, infra, p. J.)35.
1. Jn general. In the discussion of this topic two priuciples isLould be k e pt
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constantly in mind,—one baaed upon the nature of a corporation is, that tlie
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grant of corporate power is a franchise granted by the state for a definite pur-
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pose, to be exercised in a way prescribed, and subject to forfeiture by the

constantly in mind,-one based upon the nature of a corporation is, that the
grant of corpornte power is a fmncltise granted by the state for a definite purpose, to be exercised in a way prescril>eJ, ·and subject to forieiture by the
state if it is not carried out in accorJance with the grant; the second is b11 eil
upon public policy, viz., that combination agreement,,c;; of individuals, part·
nerships, or corporations, with the purpose and effect (with certain ex:-ep·
tions) of restraining trade, destroying competition, and resulting in monopoly,
are unenforcible, and under some circumstances wrongful,-tortious or criminal.
2. Thi> first principle, that a corpomtion must not abdicate its p11rpose or presrribfd
method. of maiiagement, is well expressed in Whittenton Mills v. U µton, JO
Gray (~lass.) 582 (1858), by Thomas, J., where the question involved was
whether a corporation could be a member of a partnership. He i:aid: "An
act of the corporation, d one either by direct vote or by &.gents authorized for
the purpose, is the manifestation of the collected will of the society. No
membe r of the corporation, as such, can hind the society. In a part1ie~hip
each member binds the society as a principnl. If, then, this corporation may
enter into partnership with an individual, there would be two principals, the
legal person and the natural person, each having, within the scope of the
society's business, full authority to manage its concerns, inclnc.ling even the
disposition of its property. • • • Tlie partner may manage and rondnct.
the business of the corporation, :md bind it by his acts. In doing so he does
not act as an officer or agent of the corporation bv authority received from it,
but as a principal in a society iu which all are equals, ancl each capable of
binding the society by the act of its individual will." This agreement was
held void. Such agreements, if valid, wonld have the effect, as Jud,ge Finrb
says, in Peop_le v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N. Y. 582 (18901, supra,
p. 100, to permit a corporation "to accept from the state tl1e gift of corporate
life only to dis regard the conditions upon which it was given; to receive its
powers and privileges men•ly to put them in pawn; a11d to gi're away to an
irresponsible boai·d (or person) its entire independenc~ and self"';ontrol.'' So. too,
it would have t.he effect of conferring upon the partner the capacity of wield·
ing or enjoying corporate power without the states' grant being made to him.
The same doctrines are stated in Mallory v. Hanaur Oil Works, 86 Tenn. 598,
supra, p. 957.
The above were all cases of purely private business corporations, not those
owing any special duty to the public. The rule npplies, of course, with more
reason and more strictness to quasi-public corporations, or those owing part1c·
ular duties to the public. As stated by Justice Miller in Thourns v. West Jer13ey R. (',o., 101 U.S. 71 ( 1879), supra, p. 915; "Where a corporation, like a railroad C'Ompany, has granted to it by charter a franchise int.endt-d, in lllrge
measure, to be exerC'ised for the public good, the due performirnce of thot!e
funr.tions being the consideration of the public grant, any contract whiC'b disables the corporation from performing those functions, which und ertake!!,
without the consent of the state, to transfer to others the rights irnd powers
conferred by the cha.rter, and to relieve the J?rflntees of the burden whirh it
impoAes, is a violation of the l'ontral't with the state, and is void as against
public policy." '.\'hile .Justice ~Iiller says such contract is void as ugai11$I
public policy, he evidt-ntly means that it is void because it is in conflict with a
definite rule of law. ,.i?.., that <'OrporAtions are account::ible to tbe state for
non-user or miS-ll!'er of tlw frnnchii>e.s grante<l, and not that only qu<U1·-public
corporations are so R<'C'Onntahle. (Rec ill.fra, this note, class d.)
From these pri nr.iples, therefore, it follows that all <'ont.ritcts of a corpora·
tion, eithe r privat.e 01· quas-i-pnhlic, to enter into com hi nations, whether of partnership, pool, restraint of trade, trust, lea.'3e, consolidation, s11 le or otherwise.
the necessary effC<'t of which is to destro~ its autonomv in the performance of
its duty to the state, are, or onizht to b<'. held to he void and unenforcible, nnrl
this so, re~ardless of any othn qu alitv of the contract. A nrl it is genernlly
held so, although there are holdings to the contrary (erronoonsly we thiok i.
in the case of leases and sales by purely private corporations. See cases
cited in notes to§§ 275, 276, 277, 279-28:?, and below, class din this note.

state if it is not carried out in accordance with the grant; the second is based

upon public policy, viz., that combination agreement^ of individuals, part-

nerships, or corporations, with the purpose and effect (with certain excep-

tions) of restraining trade, destroying competition, and resulting in monopoly,

are unenforcible, and under some circumstances wrongful,—tortious or crim-

inal.

2. The first principle, thai a corporation must not abdicate its purpose or prescribed

method of management, is well expressed in Whittenton Mills v. Upton, 10

Gray (Mass.) 682 (1858), by Thomas, J., where the question involved was

whether a corporation could be a member of a partnership. He said: "An

act of the corporation, done either by direct vote or by agents authorized for

the purpose, is the manifestation of the collected will of the society. No

member of the corporation, as such, can bind the society. In a partnership

each member binds the society as a principal. If, then, this corporation may

enter into partnership with an individual, there would be two principals, the

legal person and the natural person, each having, within the scope of the

society's business, full authority to manage its concerns, including even the
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disposition of its property. * * * The partner may manage and conduct

the business of the corporation, and bind it by bis acts. In doing so he does

not act as an officer or agent of the corporation by authority received from it,

but as a principal in a society in which all are equals, and each capable of

binding the society by the act of its individual will." This agreement was

held void. Such agreements, if valid, would have the effect, as Judge Finch

says, in People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N. Y. 582 (1890*. supra,

p. 100, to permit a corporation "to accept from the state the gift of corporate

life only to disregard the conditions upon which it was given; to receive its

powers and privileges merely to put them in pawn; and to give away to an

irresponsible board (or person) Us entire independence and self-control." So. too,

it would have the effect of conferring upon the partner the capacity of wield-

ing or enjoving corporate power without the states' grant being made to him.

The same doctrines are stated in Mallory v. Hanaur Oil Works, 8t> Tenn. 598,

supra, p. 957.

The above were all cases of purely private business corporations, not those

owing any special duty to the public. The rule applies, of course, with more

reason and more strictness to qnasi-pnblic corporations, or those owing partic-

ular duties to the public. As stated by Justice Miller in Thomas v. West Jer-

sey R. Co., 101 U.S.71 (1879),supra, p"91o; "Where a corporation, like a rail-

road company, has granted to it by charter a franchise intended, in large

measure, to be exercised for the public good, the due performance of those

functions being the consideration of the public grant, any contract which dis-

ables the corporation from performing those functions, which undertakes,

without the consent of the state, to transfer to others the rights and powers

conferred by the charter, and to relieve the grantees of the burden which it

imposes, is a violation of the contract with the state, and is void as against

public policy." While Justice Miller says such contract is void as against

public policy, he evidently means that it is void because it is in conflict with a

definite rule of law. viz., that corporations are accountable to the state for

non-user or mis-iifer of the franchises granted, and not that only </wa.si-public

corporations arc so accountable. (See infra, this note, class d.)

From these principles, therefore, it follows that all contracts of a corpora-

tion, either private or otmst-pnblic, to enter into combinations, whether of part-

nership, pool, restraint of trade, trust, lease, consolidation, sale or otherwise,

the necessary effect of which is to destroy its autonomy in the performance oi

its duty to the state, are, or ought to be, held to be void and unenforcible, ami

this so, regardless of any other quality of the contract. And it is generally

held so, although there are holdings to the contrary (erroneously we think:,

in the case of Teases and sales by purely private corporations. See cases

cited in notes to §§ 275, 276, 277, 279-282, and below, class d in this note.
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While a contract by a corporation violating this principle alone is not crim-

inal or wrongful, it is ultra vires in the true sense, and the state undoubt-

edly has a technical right to complain. The state, however, does nut, and

will not, complain of such a transaction unless the contract made, or things

done under it, injuriously affect or threaten public interests; then the state

may interfere by quo warranto to prevent or enjoin its consummation, either

bv ousting the corporation of the power usurped or annulling the charter. As

Judge Finch says, People v. Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 608: "The state,

as prosecutor, must show on the part of the corporation accused some sin

against the law of its being which has produced, or tends to produce, injury

to the public. The transgression must not be merely formal or incidental,

but material and serious; ami such as to harm or menace the public wel-

fare." See, 1S1K), People v. North River 8. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 582; 1892, State

v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137; 1899, State v. Portland Natural Gas &

Oil Co., 153 Ind. 483, 53 N. E. Rep. 1089.

3. The second principle—that contracts in restraint of trade (with certain ex-

ceptions) are void and unenforcible—has alone no peculiar application to cor-

porations, but applies to individuals and partnerships also; but this principle
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together with the first one above gives the state a power over corporations in

regard to such contracts that it does not have over individuals, viz., that the

state can actively and of its own accord take the life of the offending corpo-

ration for engaging in B'ich a contract, though no punishment, aside from

refusing to enforce the contract, could be meted out to an offending individual

or partnership.

What contracts restraining trade are void is a difficult matter, in the pres-

ent state of the law, to determine. It seems to me that Judge Taft, in the

Addyston Pipe case, supra, p. 967, has struck the true basis of classification by

dividing contracts in restraint of trade and competition into three classes:

a. Those in which the restraining contract is wholly incidental and ancil-

lary to another main or principal contract that is lawful; and,

6. Those in which the restrainingcontraet is the main or principal contract,

to which others are only incidental, ancillary, or preliminary to this pur-

pose; and,

c. Those in which the restraining contract is the only contract made.

As to class a, it was formerly held, perhaps, that all restraints upon trade

were invalid: 1415, Y. B., 2 Hen. V. 5, 26; 1613, Darcv v. Allein, 11 Co. 84;

1711, Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181; 1837, Alger v. Thacher, 19 Pick.

(Mass.) 51; but the rule has been Bettled that such restraints as are rea-

sonably necessary for the protection of the rights acquired by the main

contract are valid: 1621, Broad v. Jollvfe, Cro. Jac. 596; 1711, Mitchel v.

Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181; 1793, Davis v". Mason, 5 T. R. 118; 1803, Bunn v.

Guy, 4 East 190; 1806, Gale v. Reed, 8 East 80; 1811, Pierce v. Fuller. 8

Mass. 223; 1813, Perkins v. Lyman, 9 Mass. 522; 1818, Hayward v. Young, 2

Chitty 407; 1822, Brvson v. Whitehead, 1 Simons & S. 74; 1827, Nobles v.

Bates, 7 Cowen 307; 1831, Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 73."); 1837, Alger v.

Thacher, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 61; 1839, Chappel v. Brockwav, 21 Wend. 157;

1851, Dunlop v. Gregory, 10 N. Y. 241,61 Am.Dec.746: 1856, Cal. Steam Nav.

Co. v. Wright, 6 Cal. 259, 65 Am. Doc. 511 ; 1869, Jenkins v. Templs, 39 Ga. 655,

99 Am. Dec. 482; 1869, Morse T. D. Co. v. Morse, 103 Mass. 73, 4 Am. Rep.

513; 1872, Hovtv. Holly, 39 Conn. 326,12 Am. Rep. 390; 1887, Diamond

Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473, 60 Am. Rep. 464; 1890, Newell v. Meven-

dorff, 9 Mont. 254, 18 Am. St. Rep. 738; 1891, Chapin v. Brown, 83 Iowa"l56,

32 Am. St. Rep. 297; 1894, Nordenfeldt v. Maxim N. Co., App. Cas. 535;

1895, MeCurry v. Gibson, 108 Ala. 451, 54 Am. St. Rep. 177; 1896, Kramer v.

Old, 119 N. C. 1, 56 Am. St. Rep. 650; 1898, Lufkin R. Co. v. Fringeli, 67

Ohio St. 596, 63 Am. St. Rep. 736; 1898, Stride v. Martin, 77 L. T. (N. S.)

While a contract hy a corporation violating this principle alone is not criminal o r wrongful, it i1:1 11llra vires in the true sense, and the state und oubtedly has a technical ri ght to complain. The state, howev e r, d oes nut, and
will not, complain of s uch a transaction unless th e contract mnd e , or things
done und e r it, i 11juriously affec t or tb reaten public interests; then th e state
may interfere by quo 1on1·rantu to preve nt or enjoin its consummation, eitller
by ousting the corporation of the power usurped or annulling the charter. As
Judge !.<~ inch says, P eo ple v. Sugar Ref. Co., 12L N. Y. 582, GOS: "Tbe state,
Rs prosecutor, must sh ow on the part of the corporation accused some sin
against the htw of its being wbicl.t has produced, or tends to produce, injury
to thP. public. The transgression must not be merely formal or incidental,
bnt 111aterial Rnd se rious; anri such ns to harm or menace th e pnblic welfarA." See, 18HO, People v. North River S. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 582; 1892, State
v. 'tandard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137; 1899, State v. Portland Natural Gas &
Oil Uo., 153 I nri. 483, 53 N. E. Re p. 108ti.
3. The serond principle-that co1itracts in restraint of trade (with certain exceptions) are void a11d 1menforcible-has alone no peculiar app lication to corporations, but appli es to individun~ and partnerships a lso; but this principle
together with the first one above gives the stnte a powe r over corporations in
regard to such contracts that it does not have over individuals, viz., tha.t the
state <'Rn a<·tively and of its own accord take the life of the offending corpo·ration for engaging in s "ch a contract, though no punishment, nside from
refusing to enforce the contract, could be meted out to an offending individual
or partn e r1;hip.
What co ntracts restrainin!? trade are void is a difficult matter, in the present 11tnte of the law, to deter111ine. It seems to me that .Tudg-e Taft, in the
Addyston Pipe case, suprn, p. 967, has struck the true basis of classification by
<li vi ding contracts in restraint of trade and competition into thrne classes:
a . Tl.lose in whicl.I the re:sLraining coutract is wholly incidental and ancillary to another main or principal contract that is lawful; and,
b. Those in which the restramingcontrnct is the main or principal contract,
to which others are only incidental, ancillary, or preliminary to this purpose; and,
c. Those in which the restraining contract is the only contract made.
As to c lass a, it wa.s formerly held, pe rhaps, that a ll r estraints upon trade
were invalid: 1415, Y. B., 2 Hen. V. 5, 26; 1613, Darcy v. Allein, 11 Co. 84;
1711, Mitchel v. Reynolds, l P. Wms. 181; 1837, Al!!e r v. Thacher, 19 Pick.
(Mass.) 51; but the rule hns been settl ed that such res traints as are reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights Required by the main
contract are valid: 1621, Broad v . .Jollyfe, Cro . Jac.5fl<i; 1711, Mitr.hel v.
Reynolds, 1 P . Wms. 181; 1793, D1tvis v. Mason, 5 T . R. 118 ; 1803, Bu nn v.
Guy, 4 Enst 100; 1806, Gale v. R eed , 8 East 80; 1811, Pierce v. Fuller, 8
Mnss. 223; 1813, P erkins v . Lyman, 9 Mass. 52~; 1818, Hnyward v. Young, 2
Chitty 407; 1822, Bryson v. Whitehead , I Simons & S. 74; 1827, Nobles v.
Bates, 7 Cowen 307 ; 1831, Horne r v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735; 1837, Algerv .
Thacher, 19 Pick. (Mass. ) 51; 18::!9, Chappel v. BroC'kwav, 21 W end . 157;
1851 , Dunlop v. Gregory, 10 N. Y. 241, 61 Am. Dec. 746 : 1856, Cnl. Ste11m Nav .
Co. v. Wright, 6 Cal. 259, 65 Am. DPc. 511; 1869, Jenkin s v. Temple, 39 Ga. 65.5,
99 Am. DPc. 482; 1869, MorRe T. D. Co. v. Morse, 103 1\iass. 73, 4 Am. R e p.
1113; 1872, Hoy t v. Holly, 39 Conn. 326, 12 Am. Rep. 390; 1887, Diamond
M11tr.h Co. v. Roeber, 106 N . Y. 473, 60 Am. Rep. 464; 18!l0, Newell v. Meyenrlorff, 9 )font. 254. 18 Am. St. Rep. 738; 1891, Chapin v. Brown, 83 Iowa l iifl,
32 Am. St. Rep . 297; 1894, N'ordenfeldt v . Maxim N. C'n., App. Cas. 535;
1895, MeCurrv v. Gibson, 108 Ala. 451, 5-l Am . St. Re p. Iii ; 1896, Krnm er v.
Old, 119 N. d. l, 56 Am. St. Rep. 6fi0; 1898, Lufkin R. Co. v. FringPli, 57
Ohio St. 596, 63 Am. St. Re p. 736; 18!l8, Stride v. Martin, i7 L. T. (N. S. )
600; 1900, .TaC"kson v. Byrnes, 103 Tenn. 698, 54 S. W. Rep 984.
What is rea~o nable or unre11sonithl e d epends upon the circumstances of each
case, and diffe rent courts take differe nt vi ews of similar cirr.umstan ces, but
total restrRints in both space and time arc~enerally li e l<l void; with improved
mnchinery and commumcation, what nre n ow reasonable for protection (Dia-

600; 1900, Jackson v. Byrnes, 103 Tenn. 698, 54 S. W. Rep 984.

What is reasonable or unreasonable depends upon the circumstances of each

case, and different courts take different views of similar circumstances, but

total restraints in both space and time are generally held void; with improved

machinery and communication, what are now reasonable for protection (Dia-
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(Mitchelv. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181).

mond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473; Nordenfeldt v. Maxim N. Co..
App. Oas. (1894) 535) would formerly have been held to be unreasonable
(Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P . Wms. 181).
The subdivisions of class a are given in the report of the Addyston case,
supra, p. 1170.
•
Under class b, when the main contract is to restrain trade, and this does so
unreasonably as to affect public interests, such main and ancillary contract&
a re not ·enforcible. The following late cases illustrate this: 1877, Arnot v.
Coal Uo., 68 N. Y. 558; 1888, Santa Clara Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 76 Cal. 387,
18 Pac. Rep. 391; 1889, Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632, 43 N. W. Rep.1102;
1890, People v. Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582, supra, p. 100;1890, State v. Neb.
Dis. Co., 29 Neb. 700, 46 N. W. Rep. 155; 1890, Pitl!!burgh Carbon Co. v. McMillin, 119 N. Y. 46, 23 N. E. Rep. 530; 1891, Am. Biscuit Mfg. Co. v. Klotz,
44 Fed. Rep. 721; 1891, Pacific Factor Co. v. Adler, 90 Cal. 110; 1892, State v.
Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137; 1895 People'" Milk Exchange, 145 N. Y.
267; 1895, Distilling and Cattle Feeding 60. v. People, 156 Ill. 448, infra, p. 978;
1897, National Harrow Co. v. Htlncb, 83 Fed. Rep. 36; 1898, United States v.
Coal Dealers' Assn., A5 Fed. Rep. 252; 1899, Harding v. Am. Glucose Co., 182
111. 551, 55 N. E. Rep. 577.
Under class c, there being no lawful purpose to forward, no rule to measure
the necessity of restriction, hut a purpose to avoid competition which the law
favors, surh contracts should be held void. The following are cases of this
kind: 18~7, Alger v. !harlier, 1~, Pick. ~l; 18.55, Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 EI..&:.
.Bl. (88 K C. L.) 47, lS.59, India Bagging Assn. v. Kock, 14 La. Ann. 168;
1871, :'.\forris Hun Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173; 1875, Craft v.
1\Jcl'onouizhy, 7H Ill. 346; 1880, Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666; 1889. Leonard v. P oole, 114 N. Y. 371; 188!1, Anderson v.Jett, 89 Ky. 375; 1890, Emery
v. Candle Co.,47 Ohio St. 320; 1890, Urmllton v. WhiteleM Rros., 63 L. T. (N.
S .) 455; 1891, Chapin v. Brown, 83 Iowa 156; 1892 Vulr1m Powder Co. v.
H e rcules Powder Co., 96 Cal. 510; 1892, Oil Co. v. Adoue, 83 Tex. 650; 1892,
l\Iore v. Bennett, 140 Ill. 69; 1892, Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, App.
Cna. 25; 18!13, People v. Sheldon, 139 N. Y. 251; 1893, Judd v. Harrington,
139 N. Y.105; 1894, Nester v. Brewing Co., 161 Pa. St. 473; 1895, Ford v. l\filk
Association, 155 Ill. 166; 1895, Bishop v. Preservers' Co., 157 Ill. 284; 189i, Milwaukee M. & B. Assoc. v. Niezerowski, 9.5 Wis. 129; 1898, United States v.
Trans-Missouri Ft. Assoc., 166 U.S. 290; 1898, United States v. Joint Traffic
Association, 171 U. ' Fl. 50.5; 1899, State v. Fireman's F. Ins. Co .. 152 Mo. 1, 52
S. W. Rep. 595; 189!l, Bailey v. Association of Plumbers, 103 Tenn . 99, 52
S. W. Rep. &53; 1899, Hardin~ v . .Am. Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551, 55 N. E. Rep.
577; 1900, Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N. W. Rep. 1003.
With these cnses, howeve r; should be compared the following: Wickens v.
Evans, 3 Y. & J. 318; Collins v. Locke, 4 App. Cae. 674~ Ontario Salt Co. v.
Merchants' S . Co., 18 Grant (U. C.) 540; and Leatie v. Lorrillard, 110 N. Y.
519.
.
Perhaps there should be added to the above classes another that we may
call class d- pttblic. service companies or occt1pations- in which any restraints
that prevent the performance of their whole dnty to the pub1fo are held to
be invnli<l : 184.7, Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio 349; 1848, Stanton v.
Allen, 5 Denio 434; 1869, Railroad Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582; 1871, Hazelhurst v. R. Co., 48 Ga. 13; 1883, \Vest Va. Transp. Co. v. Ohio Riv., etc., Co .•
22 W. Va. 600; 1888, Gibbs v. Gae Co., 130 U . S. 396 ; 1889, People v. Chicago Gas T. Co., 130 Ill. 268, infra, p. 10.54 ; 18H2, Stockton v. Ce ntral R. Co.,
50 N. J. Eq. 52; 1899, :::itate v. Portland Nat. Gas Co., 153 Ind. 483, 53 N. E.
Rep. l 089; anrl see cases rited under section 276.
'Vheth e r contracts in undue restraint of trade are anything more tha.n unenforcihlf:\, that is, illegal as being tortious or wrongful , Ro as to be the basis
oi a suit for <lamagm~ . or a r.riminal prosecntion, in the absence of any statute
reglll n.ti nir th e matt.er , i;1 in controver11y; but the weight of 11uthority <'ertni!11Y
is that if there is no fraud, coerrion, intimidation. or Rom1>thing of the k111d
pra r~tif•f>d upon some onf>. th erp is no rivil or <·riminnl linhil ity .
Th e following cases bold there is u civil or cciminal liability : King v.

The subdivisions of class a are given in the report of the Addyston case,

supra, p. 970.

Under class 6, when the main contract is to restrain trade, and this does so

unreasonably as to affect public interests, such main and ancillary contracts

are not enforeible. The following late cases illustrate this: 1877, Arnot v.

Coal Co., 68 N. Y. 558; 1888, Santa Clara Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 76 Cal. 387,

18Pac. Rep. 391; 1889, Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632,43 N. W. Rep. 1102;

1890, People v. Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582, supra, p. 100; 1890, State v. Neb.

Pis. Co., 29 Neb. 700, 46 N. VV. Rep. 155; 1890, Pittsburgh Carbon Co. v. Mc-

Millin, 119 N. Y. 46, 23 N. E. Rep. 530; 1891, Am. Biscuit Mfg. Co. v. Klotz,

44 Fed. Rep. 721; 1891, Pacific Factor Co. v. Adler, 90 Cal. 110; 1892, State v.

Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137; 1895, People v. Milk Exchange, 145 N. Y.

267; 1895, Distilling and Cattle Feeding Co. v. People, 156 111. 448, infra, p. 978;

1897, National Harrow Co. v. Hench, 83 Fed. Rep. 36; 1898, United States v.

Coal Dealers'Assn., 85 Fed. Rep. 252; 1899, Harding v. Am. Glucose Co., 182

111. 551, 55 N. E. Rep. 577.

Under class c, there being no lawful purpose to forward, no rule to measure
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the necessity of restriction, but a purpose to avoid competition which the law

favors, such contracts should be held void. The following are cases of this

kind: 1837, Alger v. Thacher, 19 Pick. 51; 1855, Hilton v. Eckerslev, 6 El. &

Bl. (88 E. C. L.) 47; 1859, India Bagging Assn. v. Kock, 14 La. Ann. 108;

1871, Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173; 1875, Craft v.

McConoughy, 79 111. 346; 1880, Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666; 1889. Leon-

ard v. Poole, 114 N. Y. 371; 1889, Anderson v. Jett, 89 Kv. 375; 1890, Emery

v. CandleCo.,47 Ohio St. 320; 1890, Urmston v. Whitelegjr Bros., 63 L. T.(N.

S.) 455; 1891, Chapin v. Brown, 83 Iowa 156; 1892, Vulcan Powder Co. v.

Hercules Powder Co., 96 Cal. 510; 1892, Oil Co. v. Adoue, 83 Tex. 650; 1892,

Morev. Bennett, 140 111. (19; 1892, Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, App.

Cas. 25; 1893. People v. Sheldon, 139 N. Y. 251; 1893, Judd v. Harrington,

139 N. Y. 105; 1894, Nester v. Brewing Co., 161 Pa. St. 473; 1895. Ford v. Milk

Association, 155 111. 166; 1895, Bishop v. Preservers' Co., 157 111. 284; 1897, Mil-

waukee M. & B. Assoc. v. Niezerowski, 95 Wis. 129; 1898, United States v.

Trans-Missouri Ft. Assoc., 166U. S. 290; 1898, United States v. Joint Traffic

Association, 171 U. S. 505; 1899, State v. Fireman's F. Ins. Co.. 152 Mo. 1, 52

S. W. Rep. 595; 1899, Bailev v. Association of Plumbers, 103 Tenn. 99, 52

S. W. Rep. 853; 1899, Harding v. Am. Glucose Co., 182 111. 551, 55 N. E. Rep.

577; 1900, Gatzow v. Bnening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N. W. Rep. 1003.

With these cases, however, should be compared the following: Wickens v.

Evans, 3 Y. & J. 318; Collins v. Locke, 4 App. Cas. 674; Ontario Salt Co. v.

Merchants' S. Co., 18 Grant (U. C.) 540; and Leslie v. Lorrillard, 110 N. Y.

519.

Perhaps there should be added to the above classes another that we may

call class d—public service companies or occupations -in which any restraints

that prevent the performance of their whole duty to the public are held to

be invalid: 1847, Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio 349; 1848, Stanton v.

Allen, 5 Denio 434; 1869, Railroad Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582; 1871, Hazel-

hurst v. R. Co., 43 Ga. 13; 1883, West Va. Transp. Co. v. Ohio Riv., etc., Co.,

22 W. Va. 600; 1888, Gibbs v. Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396; 1889. People v. Chi-

cago Gas T. Co., 130 111. 268, infra, p. 1054; 1892, Stockton v. Central R. Co.,

50 N. J. Eq. 52; 1899, State v. Portland Nat. Gas Co., 153 Ind. 483, 53 N. E.

Rep. 1089; and see cases cited under section 276.

Whether contracts in undue restraint of trade are anything more than nn-

enforcible, that is, illegal as being tortious or wrongful, so as to be the basis

of a suit for damages, or a criminal prosecution, in the absence of any statute

regulatine the matter, is in controversy; but the weight of authority certainly

is that if there is no fraud, coercion, intimidation, or something of the kind

practiced upon some one. there is no civil or criminal liability.

The following cases hold there is a civil or criminal liability: King v.
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Journeyman Tailors, 8 Mod. 10; 1835, People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9, 28 Am.

977

Dec. 501; 1867, Master Stevedore's Assn. v. Walsh, 2 Daly 1; 1871, Morris

Run Coal Co. v. Barclay, etc., Co., 68 Pa. St. 173; 1888, Crump v. Commw.,

84 Va. 927, 10 Am. St. Rep. 895; 1893, People v. Sheldon, 139 N. Y. 251, 36

Am. St. Rep. 690; 1898, United States v. Trans-Mo. Ft. Assn., 166 U. S. 290;

1898, Doremus v. Hennesy, 176 111. 608, 68 Am. St. Rep. 203; 1900, Ertz v.

Produce Ex. Co., 82 Minn. 173,81 N. W. Rep. 346.

The following hold otherwise: 1842, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Mete.

(Mass.) Ill, 38 Am. Dec. 346; 1892, Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, App.

Cas. 25; 1895, Macaulev v. Tierney, 19 R. I. 255, 61 Am. St. R. 770; 1897,

Beechley v. Mulville, 102 Iowa 602, 63 Am. St. Rep. 479; 1897, Allen v. Flood,

77 L. T. R. 717; 1899, .Etna Ins. Co. v. Commw., 21 Ky. L. Rep. 503 , 45 L.

R. A. 355, 51 S. W. Rep. 624.

4. Anti-Trust Acts: Most of the states have enacted anti-trust acts, mak-

ing a civil and criminal liability for creating or attempting to create a monop-

oly. Some of these, especially the late Michigan, act 255, 1899, Missouri, R.

S.'l899, §§ 8978-85, and Texas, ch. 146, 1899, acts, are peculiarly stringent.

The United States act of 1890 (26 Stat. 209) created seven different crimes
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relating to interstate, foreign, or territorial trade or commerce, punishable by

a penalty not exceeding $5,000, or one year's imprisonment, or both, by pro-

viding that every person (including corporations or associations) who shall

make (1) a contract in restraint of such trade, or (2) engage in a combination

in form of a trust or otherwise, or (3) engage in a conspiracy in restraint of

such trade, or (4) monopolize, or (5) attempt to monopolize, or (6) combine,

or (7) conspire, to monopolize such trade, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor

punishable as stated; and an injured party may recover damages, and the

combination can be enjoined at the suit of United States attorneys.

This applies not. to the making or manufacture of goods (United States v.

E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1), but allows an injunction against a combina-

tion of railway employes to obstruct railroad commerce. In re Debs, 158 U.

S. 564. It also prevents the formation of pools and traffic combinations

among railroads, the direct tendency of which is to limit competition,

whether reasonable or unreasonable (United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight

Assn., 1896, 166 U. S. 290; United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 1898,

171 U. S. 505; also such combinations as directly affect the sale of products

that are to cross state lines, 1899, United States v. Addvston Pipe & S. Co.,

175 U. S. 211, infra, p. 1535; 1899, Lowrv v.Tile M. & <?. Assn., 98 Fed. Rep.

817; 1902, Bement v. National Harrow Co., — U. S. —, Adv. June Hi, 1902,

p. 747.

An to constitutionality of the anti-trust acts: That they are constitutional,

see, 1900. State v. Sch'litz Brewing Co., 104 Tenn. 715, 78 Am. St. Rep. 941;

15)01, In re Davis, 168 N. Y. 89, 61 N. E. 118.

That they are unconstitutional, see, 1901, Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Cornell

(C. C. Neb"), 110 Fed. 816; 1902, Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., — U. S.

—, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; 1902, Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., — Ga. —, 41

S. E. 553; 1902, State v. Shippers Compress Co., — Tex. Civ. App. —, 67 S.

W. 1049; 1902, State v. Waters-Pierce Oil Co., — Tex. Civ. App. —, 67 S. W.

1057.

5. Bibliography: See "The Bibliography of Commercial Trusts, Law Liter-

ature of Trust Combinations, Monopolies,"etc.," bv Wm. H. Winters, 7 Ry. &

.lonrneyman Tailors, 8 Mod. 10; 1835, People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9, 28 Am.
Dec. 501; 1867, Master Stevedore's Assn. v. Wa)sh, 2 Daly l; 1871, Morris
Run Coal Co. v. Barclay, etc., Co., 68 Pa. St. 173; 1888, Crump v. Commw.,
~4 Va. 927, 10 Am. St. Rep. ~95; 1893, People v. Sheldon, 139 N. Y. 251, 36
Am. St. Rep. 690; 1898, Umted Statee v. Trans-Mo. Ft. Assn., 166 U.S. 290;
1898, Doremus v. Hennesy, 176 Ill. 608, 68 Am. St. Rep. 203; 1900, Ertz v.
Produce Ex. Co., 82 Minn. 173,81 N. W. Rep. 346.
The following ho)d otherwise: 1842, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Mete.
(Mass.) 111, 38 Am. Dec. 346; 1892, Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, App.
Cas. 25; 1895, Macauley v. Tierney, 19 R. I. 255, 61 Am. St. R. 770; 1897,
Beechley v. Mulville, 102 Iowa 602, 63 Am. St. Rep. 479; 1897, Allen v. Flood,
7i L. T. R. 717; 1899, £tua Ins. Co. v. Commw., 21 Ky. L. Rep. 503, 45 L.
R. A. 355, 51 S. W. Rep. 624.
4. Anti-Trust Acts: Most of the states have enacted anti-trust acts, making a civi l and criminal liability for creating or attempting to create a monopoly. Some of these, especially the late Michigan, act 255, 1899, Missouri, R.
S. 1899, §9 8978--85, and Texas, ch. 146, 1899, acts, are peculiarly stringent.
The United States act of 1890 (26 Stnt. 209) created seven different crimes
relating to interstate, foreign, or territorial trade or commerce, pur1'ishable by
a penalty not exceeding $5,000, or one year's imprisonment, or both, by providing that every person (including corporations or associations) who shall
make (1) a contract in restraint of such tracle, or ( 2) engage in a combination
in form of a trust or otherwise, or (3 ) engage in a conspiracy in restraint of
such t.rade, or ( 4) monopolize, or (5) attempt to monopolize. or (6) combine,
or ( 7) conspire, to monopolize snch trade, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
punishable as stated; and an injnred party may recover damages, and the
combination can be enjoi ned at the suit of l nited States attorneys.
This applies not to the makinR" or manufacture of goods (Umted States v.
E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. l) ,but allows an injunction against a <"l>m~ina
tion of railway employee to obstruct railroad commerce. 111 re Dchs, 158 U.
S. 564. It also prevents the formation of pools and traffic combinations
among railroads, the direct tendency of which is to limit com(>fltition,
whether reasonable or unreasonable (United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight
Assn., 1896, 166 U.S. 290; Uniter! States v .•Joint Traffic Association, 1898,
171 U. S. 505; also such combinations as directly affPct the sale of products
that are to cross state lines, 1P99, U niterl Rtates \'. Arldyston Pipe & S. Co.,
175 U.S. 211, infra, p. 1535; 1800, Lowry v.Tile M. & G. Assn., 98 Fed . Rep.
817; 1902, Bement v. National Harrow Co., - U.S.-, Adv. Jnne Hi, 1902,
p. i41.
A s to constitutionality of the anti-trust aets: That they are constitutional,
:<~e, HlOO. 8tuw. v. ~chlitz Brew!ng C~ .• 104 Tenn. 715, 78 Am. St. Rep. 941;
J,){)J, 111 re Davis, 168 N. Y. 89, hi N. h. 118.
Tb at they are unconstitutional , see, rno1, Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Cornell
( t:. C. Neb.), llOFed. 816; 1!102, Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., - U.S.
- , 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; JOO~, Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., - Ga.-, 41
S. E. 5.53; 1902, Htate v. i;:hippers Compress Co., - Tex. Civ. App.-, 67 S.
W . 1049; 1902, State v. Wnters-Pierce Oil Co., - Tex. Civ. App. - , 67 S. W.
1057.
6. Bibliography: See "The Bibliography of Commercial Trusts, Law Literature of Trust Combinations, Monopolies, etc.," by Wm. H. Winters, 7 Ry. &
Corp. L. J. 236 (1890); 2 Beach on Private Corporations,§ 856, note 1; noter
23 A bb. N. C. 317. See also, especially, Cook Corporations, §§ 603a-60ad;.
Elliott Corporations,§§ 172-179.

Corp. L. J. 236 (1890); 2 Beach on Private Corporations, § 856, note 1; note,

23 Abb. N. C. 317. See also, especially, Cook Corporations, §§503a-503d;

Elliott Corporations, §§ 172-179.

Sec. 279. (c) Unincorporated trusts.

See Pteople v. N. R. Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 18 Am.

St. R. 843, supra, p. 100.

jfoU.—See note to preceding case, and also note, supra, pp. 109, 963, 966.

62—Wri,. Casks.

See. 279.

( c) Unincorporated trusts.

See People v. N. R . Sugar Ref. Co.,
St. R. 843, supra, p. 100.

121

N. Y. 582 ,

18

Am.

Note.-See note to preceding case, 11.nd nlso note, supra, pp. 109, 963, 006.
82-Wn.. CASE!!.
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Sec. 280. {d) Incorporated trusts.

DISTILLING AND CATTLE FEEDING COMPANY v. PEOPLE.1

978

1895. In the Supreme Court of Illinois. 156 111. Rep. 448-

DISTIL.LING ANO CATTLE FEEDING CO. V. PEOPLE.

§ 280

492, 47 Am. St. R. 200.

Sec. 280.

[Quo warranto against the distilling company. Defendant filed a

( d) Incorporated trusts.

number of pleas, to all of which demurrers were sustained, and the

DISTILLING AND CA'ITLE FEEDING COMP ANY v. PEOPLF.. 1

defendant electing to abide by its pleas judgment of ouster was

rendered against it, from which this appeal is taken. The people al-

leged that in 1887, five corporations of Illinois, one of Missouri, one

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF ILLINOIS.
of Ohio, with a partnership and an individual of that state, all en-

I 56

Ill. Rep. 448-

492, 47 Am. St. R. 200.

gaged in distilling, executed an agreement "to form a trust to be

known as the Distillers' and Cattle Feeders' Trust, for the purpose of

[ ~uo warranto against the distilling company. Defendant filed a
number of pleas, to all of which demurrers were sustained, and the
defendant electing to abide by its pleas judgment of ouster was
rendered agaimt it, from which this appeal is taken. The people al·
leged that in 1887, five corporations of Illinois, one of Missouri, one
of Ohio, with a partnership and an individual of tha t state, all en·
gaged in distilling, executed an agreement "to form a trust to be
known ~ the Distillers' and Cattle Feeders' Trust, for the purpose of
securing intelligent co-operation in the business of dis tilling spirits,
etc.," by creating nine trustees (named for the first year, to be elected
annually, by the certificate holders ), who were required to prepare
trust certificates of $ 100 each, to be issued to shareholders in the
various corporations in lieu of all their shares of stock which (except
enough to qualify a minority of the directors in each company) was to
be assigned absolutely to the trustees (but without power of sale),
thereby enabling them to exercise supervision over the various cor·
porations entering into the trust, with power to elect themselves directors of such companies if found desirable; also with power to
purchase stock in other distilling companies and issue trust certificates
therefor; to receive and distribute all diYidends declared, in proportion to trust ce1tificates held; that each corporation conveyed its real
estate to some person to be held in trust for its shareholders, which
trustee leased the property back to the corporation for twenty-five
years, the period for which the trust was to exi st; that within a yesr
after this agreement was entered into, eighty-one distilleries (including twenty-two in Illinois ), had been drawn into the ITu' t,
and the trustees held, owned and controlled the capital stock,
bu siness and frnnchises of all of such corporations; that in 1~
it was de termined to change the organization from a trust to a
corporation, and the trustees were directed to incorporate the Distill·
ing and Cattle Feeding Company in Illinois, \Yith $35 ,000,000 capital
stock, the shares to be of $100 each , and to bt· exchanged share for share
for trust cc1tificates . and the latte r cnnce led; that the trustees were
also directed to transfer all their rig hts as trustees to the ne w corporation, and also cause the various separate compani es (of e ach of which
the tru stees formed a majority of the directors) to co1wey all their
property of every kind to the new corporation; that all of thi:, was
done by organizing the company under the Illinois law, " to carr~· on
a g eneral hu-,iness of distilling, r edbtilling and rectifying high wine~.
alcohol. spirits , gins and whis kies of every kind and description. and
deal in the same in the state of Illinois and elsewhere, antl owning
1
Stutemeut of facts much abridged; only part of opinion given.

securing intelligent co-operation in the business of distilling spirits,

etc.," by creating nine trustees (named for the first year, to be elected

annually, by the certificate holders), who were required to prepare

trust certificates of $100 each, to be issued to shareholders in the

various corporations in lieu of all their shares of stock which (except

enough to qualify a minority of the directors in each company) was to

be assigned absolutely to the trustees (but without power of sale),

thereby enabling them to exercise supervision over the various cor-
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porations entering into the trust, with power to elect themselves di-

rectors of such companies if found desirable; also with power to

purchase stock in other distilling companies and issue trust certificates

therefor; to receive and distribute all dividends declared, in propor-

tion to trust certificates held; that each corporation conveyed its real

estate to some person to be held in trust for its shareholders, which

trustee leased the property back to the corporation for twenty-five

years, the period for which the trust was to exist: that within a year

after this agreement was entered into, eighty-one distilleries (in-

cluding twenty-two in Illinois), had been drawn into the trust,

and the trustees held, owned and controlled the capital stock,

business and franchises of all of such corporations; that in 1S90

it was determined to change the organization from a trust to a

corporation, and the trustees were directed to incorporate the Distill-

ing and Cattle Feeding Company in Illinois, with $35,000,000 capital

stock, the shares to be of $ 100 each, and to be exchanged share for share

for trust certificates, and the latter canceled; that the trustees were

also directed to transfer all their rights as trustees to the new corpora-

tion, and also cause the various separate companies (of each of which

the trustees formed a majority of the directors) to convey all their

property of every kind to the new corporation; that all of this was

done by organizing the company under the Illinois law, "'to carrv on

a general business of distilling, redistilling and rectifying high wines,

alcohol, spirits, gins and whiskies of every kind and description, and

deal in the same in the state of Illinois and elsewhere, and owning

1 Statement of facts much abridged; only part of opinion given.
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the pi'operty necessary for that purpose;" also to deal in cattle, to

malt and deal in malt, and "do any other business incident to the

§ 280
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main purpose of this corporation," the principal office to be located

at Peoria; that the nine trustees subscribed for all the stock, elected

themselves directors and then caused the stock to be exchanged and

conveyances to be made as directed and thereby continued to retain

control of said corporations; that other distilleries had been acquired,

many of them dismantled and discontinued so that in 1892 it owned

and controlled over 95 per cent, of the distilling business of the United

States, and by a system of rebates of 7 cents per gallon, payable at

the end of six months to every purchaser who had in the meantime

purchased of no other seller, and otherwise, had destroyed all compe-

tition in its products; and that all the foregoing had been done for the

purpose, with the intent, and with the effect of raising prices, prevent-

ing competition and creating a monopoly in the production and sale

of its products.

The pleas admitted substantially all the allegations relating to the

formation of the trust and the corporation, the dismantling of distiller-

ies and the allowance of rebates, except such as charged a scheme for
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the purpose or with the effect of preventing competition and creating

a monopoly, all of which were denied in detail, as was also denied all

allegations of the continued existence and control of the former cor-

porations by the defendant. On the other hand the pleas alleged that

the defendant used its franchises and powers by virtue of its charter

alone, and that after its incorporation it purchased the various plants

for a valuable consideration for the purpose of utilizing them in its

authorized business; that each corporation had by the unanimous

direction of its shareholders sold all of its property of every kind to

the defendant, and had directed that all of its stock be canceled by its

directors, and the charter be surrendered to the state, all of which was

alleged to have been done; that at the time when the purchases were

made the producing capacity of all plants was at least four times the

demand, and forty-eight of the plants had long been idle, and por-

tions of their machinery useless, but that such as could be was used

in fitting up such distilleries as were necessary; and that the sole pur-

pose of the defendant was to meet the demand of the public and secure

only fair remuneration, and not to enhance prices, nor create a mo-

nopoly, nor prevent other parties from engaging in the business, and

that in fact it never had produced more than 65 per cent, of the de-

mand, and there were then eighteen distilleries capable of producing

two-thirds of the entire demand, with which the defendant was then

in active competition.]

Mr. Justice Bailey [after holding the "trust" preceding the corpo-

ration had been illegal upon the authority of State v. Neb. Dist. Co.,

29 Neb. 700; State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137; People v.

N. R. S. R. Co., 54 Hun 354, 121 N. Y. 578, supra, p. 100; Rich-

ardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632; People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co.,

130 111. 266, infra, p. 1054] proceeds: * * *

But the defendant contends that, while this may all be so, the change

the property n ecessary for that purpose;" also to deal in cattle, to
malt and deal in malt, and ''<lo any other business incident to the
main purpose of this corporation," the principal office to be located
at Peoria; that the nine trustees subscribed for all the stock, elected
themselves directors and then caused the stock to be exchanged and
conveyances to be made as directed and thereby continued to retain
control of said corporations; that other distilleries had been acquired,
many of them dismantled and discontinued• so that in 1892 it owned
and controlled over 95 per cent. of the distilling business of the United
States, and by a system of rebates of 7 cents per gallon, payable at
the end of six months to every purchaser who had in the meantime
purchased of no other seller, and otherwise, had destroyed all competition in its products; and that all the foregoing had been done for the
purpose, with the intent, and with the effect of raising prices, preventing competition and creating a monopoly in the production and sale
of its products.
The pleas admitted substantially all the allegations relating to the
formation of the trust and the corporation, the dismantling of distilleries an<l the allowance of rebates, except such as charged a scheme for
the purpose or with the effect of preventing competition and creating
a monopoly, all of which were denied in detail, as was also denied all
allegations of the continued existence and control of the former corporations by the defendant. On the other hand the pleas alleged that
the defendant used its franchises and powers by virtue of its charter
alone, and that after its incorporation it purchased the various plants
for a valuable consideration for the purpose of utilizing them in its
authorized business; that each corporation had by the unanimous
direction of its shareholders sold all of its property of every kind to
the defendant, and had directed that all of its stock be canceled by its
directors, and the charter be surrendered to the state, all of which was
alleged to have been done; that at the time when the purchases were
made the producing capa city of all plants was at least four times the
demand, and forty -eight of the plants had long been idle, and portions of their machinery useless, but that such as could be was u sed
in fitting up such distilleries as were necessary; and that the sole purpose of the defendant was to meet the demand of the public and secure
only fair remun eration, and no t to enhance pri ces, nor create a m onopoly, nor preve nt other parties from eng-aging in the business, a nd
that in fact it neve r h ad produced more than 65 per cent. of the demand, a"nd there were the n eig htee n distilleries capable of producing
two-thirds of the entire demand, with which the defendant was then
in active competition.]
MR. JusTICE BAILEY [afterh0lrling the "trust" preceding the corporation had Leen illegal upon the authority of Stnte v. Neh. Dist. Co.,
29 Neb. 700; State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137; People v.
N. R. S. R. Co., 54 Hun 354, 121 N. Y. 578, supra, p. 100; Ri chardso n v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632; People v. Chicago Gas Trust Ct.. ,
130 Ill. 268, i'nfra, p. 105+] proceeds:
• • •
But the <lefe 11d::lllt contends that, while this may all be so, the change
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in organization from an unincorporated association to a corporation,and

the change in the mode of holding the distillery properties of the va-

980

rious corporations formerly belonging to the trust, by surrendering the
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stock of the corporations, by means of which the control of those

in organization from an unincorporated association to a corporation,and
the change in the mode of holding the distillery properties of the various corporations formerly belonging to the trust, by surrendering the
stock of the corporations, by means of which the control of those
properties was formerly maintained, and having the properties themselves transferred and conveyed directly to the defendant corporation,
have purged the combinatjon of its illegality. It must be admitted
that these changes, so far as they have any effect upon the rights or
interests of the former stockholders in those corporations or of the
public~ are formal rather than substantial.
The same interests are
controlled in substantially the same way and by the same agencies as
before. The nine trustees of the trust who, as the holders of all the capital stock of the corporations and as a majority of the directors of
each, controlled such corporate property, became the subscribers for
all the stock of the new corporation, and its board of directors. The
conveyance and transfer of the properties of the constituent companies
to the new corporation was merely a transfer by the trustees to thernselve~, though in a slightly different c.apacity, and the former stockholders in the constituent companies simply exchanged their trust
certificates, share for share, for stock in the new corporation. That
corporation thus succeeds to the trust, and its operations are to be carried on in the same way, for the same purposes and by the same agen·
cies as before. The trust, then, being repugnant to public policy and
illegal, it is impossible to see why the same is not true of the corporation which succeeds to it and takes its place. The control exercised
over the distillery business of the country-over production and prices
-and the. virtual monopoly formerly held by the tru st, are in no degree changed or relaxed, but th e methods and purposes of the trust
are perpetuated and ca1Tied out with the same persistence and vigor
as before the organization of the corporation. There is no magic in a
corporate organization which can purge the trust scheme of its illegal·
ity, ::ind it remains as essentially opposed to the principles of sound
public policy as when the trust was in existence. It was illegal before and is illegal still, and for the same reasons.
But it is urged that the defendant, by its charter, is authorized to
purchase and own distillery property and that there is no limit placed
upo n the amount of property which it may thus acquire. By its certifi cate of organization it is authorized to engage in a general distillery business in Illinois and elsewhere, and to own the properry necessa ry for that purpose. It should be remembered that grants of power
in corporate charters are to be construed strictly, and that what is not
clearly gi,·c n is, by implication, denied. The defendant i :mthorized to own such property as is necessary for carrying on its distillery
business, and no more. Its power to acquire and hold property is
limited to that purpose, and it has no power, by its charter, to enter
upon a scheme of getting into its hands and under its control all , or
substantially all. the distillery plants and the distillery businesg of the
country, for the purpose of controlling production and prices. of
crushing o ut competition, and of establi shing a virtual monopoly in that

properties was formerly maintained, and having the properties them-

selves transferred and conveyed directly to the defendant corporation,

have purged the combination of its illegality. It must be admitted

that these changes, so far as they have any effect upon the rights or

interests of the former stockholders in those corporations or of the

public, are formal rather than substantial. The same interests are

controlled in substantially the same way and by the same agencies as

before. The nine trustees of the trust who, as the holders of all the cap-

ital stock of the corporations and as a majority of the directors of

each, controlled such corporate property, became the subscribers for

all the stock of the new corporation, and its board of directors. The

conveyance and transfer of the properties of the constituent companies

to the new corporation was merely a transfer by the trustees to them-

selves, though in a slightly different capacity, and the former stock-

holders in the constituent companies simply exchanged their trust

certificates, share for share, for stock in the new corporation. That
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corporation thus succeeds to the trust, and its operations are to be car-

ried on in the same way, for the same purposes and by the same agen-

cies as before. The trust, then, being repugnant to public policy and

illegal, it is impossible to see why the same is not true of the corpo-

ration which succeeds to it and takes its place. The control exercised

over the distillery business of the country—over production and prices

—and the. virtual monopoly formerly held by the trust, are in no de-

gree changed or relaxed, but the methods and purposes of the trust

are perpetuated and carried out with the same persistence and vigor

as before the organization of the corporation. There is no magic in a

corporate organization which can purge the trust scheme of its illegal-

ity, and it remains as essentially opposed to the principles of sound

public policy as when the trust was in existence. It was illegal be-

fore and is illegal still, and for the same reasons.

But it is urged that the defendant, by its charter, is authorized to

purchase and own distillery property and that there is no limit placed

upon the amount of property which it may thus acquire. By its cer-

tificate of organization it is authorized to engage in a general distill-

ery business in Illinois and elsewhere, and to own the property neces-

sary for that purpose. It should be remembered that grants of power

in corporate charters are to be construed strictly, and that what is not

clearly given is, by implication, denied. The defendant is author-

ized to own such property as is necessary for carrying on its distillery

business, and no more. Its power to acquire and hold property is

limited to that purpose, and it has no power, by its charter, to enter

upon a scheme of getting into its hands and under its control all, 01

substantially all. the distillery plants and the distillery business of the

country, for the purpose of controlling production and prices, of

crushing out competition, and of establishing a virtual monopoly in that
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business. Such purposes are foreign to the powers granted by the

981

POWER AS TO TRADE COMBINATIONS.

charter. Acquisitions of property to such extent and for such pur-

pose do not come within the authority to own the property necessary

for the purpose of carrying on a general distillery business. In ac-

quiring distillery properties in the manner and for the purposes shown

by the information, the defendant has not only misused and abused

the powers granted by its charter, but has usurped and exercised pow-

ers not conferred by, but which are wholly foreign to, that instrument.

It has thus rendered itself liable to prosecution by the state by quo

•warranto, and we arc of the opinion that, upon the facts shown by

the information, the judgment of ouster is clearly warranted. It

will accordingly be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Note. See next case, and note to People v. N. R. Sugar Ref. Co., supra,

p. 109; also, note to section 278, supra.

Sec. 281. Same.

TRENTON POTTERIES COMPANY v. OLIPHANT Et Al.1

1899. In the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals.

58 N. J. Eq. 507, 78 Am. St. R. 612, 43 Atl. Rep. 723-730,

46 L. R. A. 255.

business. Such purposes are foreign to the powers granted by the
charter. Acquisitions of property to such extent and for such purpose do not come within the authority to own the property necessary
for the purpose of carrying on a general distillery business. In acquiring distillery properties in the manner and for the purposes shown
by the information , the defendant has not only misused and abused
the powers granted b_v its charter, but has u surped and exercised p ow ers not conferred by, but which are wholly foreign to, that instrument.
It has thus rendered itself liable to prosecution hy the state by quo
warranto, and we are of the opinion that, upon the facts shown by
the information, the judgment of ouster is clearly warranted. It
will accordingly be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Note. See next case, and note to People v. N. R. Sugar Ref. Co., supra,
p. 109; also, note to section 278, supra.
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[Bill by the Potteries Company, a New Jersey corporation, against

the defendants, the owners of the Delaware Potteries, to enjoin them

from engaging directly or indirectly in the business of manufacturing

pottery within any state of the United States (except Arizona and

See. 281. Same.

Nevada) for fifty years. In 1890, there were nine pottery factories

TRENTON POTTERIES COMPANY v. OLIPHANT ET AL. 1

engaged in manufacturing of sanitary pottery in the United States,—

seven in Trenton, N. J., one in Baltimore, Md., and one at Tiffin. O.

The eight eastern potteries had formed the American Sanitary Pot-

teries Association, for the purpose of securing uniform prices of their

wares, to be fixed by the vote of a majority (each having one vote),

and by which all were bound to sell. About this time a New York

promoter "undertook" to organize them into a corporation to control

the manufacture of sanitary pottery. He sought and obtained options

from five of the Trenton potteries, including the defendant, whereby

each of them agreed to sell all of its property and processes of every

kind to the promoter or his assignee, and covenanted that it would

not, for the period of fifty years, either directly or indirectly, engage

in the pottery business, within any state of the United States (except

Arizona and Nevada). These five options were those of the potteries

manufacturing about seventy-five per cent, of the product, and by

their vote they were able to control the fixing of prices by the associa-

tion. After these options were obtained, they were assigned by the

promoter to the Trenton Potteries Company, organized in New Jer-

sey with a capital of $1,750,000 common, and $1,250,000, prefe rred

1 Statement greatly abridged, and only that part of the opinion as to the

validity of the corporate existence and ownership is given.

1899. IN THE NEW JERSEY COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS.
58 N. J. Eq. 507; 78 Am. St. R. 612, 43 Atl. Rep. 723-730,
46 L. R. A. 255.
[Bill by the Potteries Company, a New Jersey corporation, against
the defendants, the owners of the Delaware Potteries, to enjoin them
from engaging directly or indirectly in the business of manufacturing
pottery within any state of the United States (except Arizona and
Nevada) for fifty years.
In 1890, there were nine pottery factories
engaged in manufacturing of sanitary pottery in the United Stat~s,
seven in Trenton, N. J., one in Baltimore, Md., and one at Tiffin, 0.
The eight eastern potteries had formed the American S a nitary Potteries Association, for the purpose of securing uniform prices of their
wares , to be fixed by the vote of a majority (each having one vote),
and by which all were bound to sell. About this time a New York
promoter "undertook" to organize them into a corporation to control
the manufacture of sanitary pottery. He sought and obtained options
from five of the Trenton potteries, including the defendant, whereby
each of them agreed to sell all of its property an<l processes of every
kind to the promoter or his assignee, and covenanted that it would
not, for the period of fifty years, either directly or indirectly , engage
in ·the pottery business, within any state of the United States (except
Arizona and Nevada). These five options were those of the potteries
manufacturing about seventy-five per cent. of the product , and by
their vote they were able to control the fixing of prices by the as!<ociation. After these options were obtained, they were nssigned hy the
promoter to the Trenton Potteries Company, organized in New Jersey with a capital of $1 ,750,000 common, and $1 ,250,000, preferred
1 Statement greatly abridJ?ed, and only that part of the opinion as to the
validity of the corporate eristence and ownership is given.
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stock, "to manufacture, sell, and trade in pottery and earthenware,

TRE:\TO.'.'< POTTERIES CO. V. OL!l'll.\.N

and other like products, and in all materials commonly or conven-

r

ET AL.

iently used, manufactured, bought and sold in connection therewith,

or necessary, or convenient in and about the transaction of the said

stock, " to manufa cture, sell, and trade in pottery and earthenware,
and other like products, and in all materials corpmonly or conveniently used , manufactured, bought and sold in connection therewith,
or necessary, or conveni ent in and about the transaction of the said
business." This company was formed after the options were secured,
and in pursuance thereof the property of these potteries was conveyed
to it, together with the covenants not to engage in bu siness, and p:iyment therefor was made partly in cash and partly in stock in th e new
company. After coming into possession of the five potteries, this
new company continued to operate them as separate concerns, and
kept its right to five votes in the American Sanitary Potteries Association, thereby controlling it for several years, although at the time
this suit was brought, the association had broken up.
The defendants herein-the p artnership owning the Delaware potteries-afterward organized a corporation to be located in New Jersey,
and to engage in the manufacture and sale of sanitary pottery, in active competition ·with the complainants. The defense made was that
the contract "not to engage in business was in unlawful restraint of
trade, that the complain:rnt company was formed for the purpose of
obtaining a monopoly of the manufacture and sale of sanitary ware,
a necessity of life, and th at the contracts not to engage in business
w ere in aid of this unlawful purpose, and therefore void." ViceChancellor Grey so held, and dismissed the bill (39 Atl. Rep. 9z3).
From this decision an appeal was taken.]
MAG IE, C. J.,
• • • [ after holding that, though a contract in
general restraint of tracle was void, the words "within any state of the
United States except Arizona and Nevada," were a short way of
enumerating the states, and the contract was valid in those states
where reasonably necessary to protect the purchaser, though it might
be void elsewhere; that the Sanitary Potteries A ssociation, with its
power of fixing prices was un!awful as against public policy] proceeds : • • •
It is further urged that the simultaneous contracts procured by app ellant create or tend to create a monopoly, because they stipulate for
the removal of many competitors in the business of manufacturing
sanitary pottery ware. The owners of five of the eight potteries in
Tre nton m anufacturing that kind of ware (and there were but few , if
more than on e, elsewhere) thereby agreed not to engage in that business for a long period of time, and over a great extent of country.
The engage ment of respondents in that respect has been found not to
be an improper restraint of trnde. nor inimical to public policy on
that ground, but a contrnct partially enforceable upon respondents; if
not otherwise objectionable. The engagements of the other vendnnwho sold their properties an d business to appellant are sim ilar in
terms to that en tered into by respondents, and furnish a reasonable
protectio n to appellant of the business and good will purchased hy it
of each of th em. Each sale and each incidental co ntract again<-t
competition are, for reason before g iven , unobjection able . Are they
rendered objectionable by the fact that, b eing simultaneously m ade,

business." This company was formed after the options were secured,

and in pursuance thereof the property of these potteries was conveyed

to it, together with the covenants not to engage in business, and pay-

ment therefor was made partly in cash and partly in stock in the new

company. After coming into possession of the five potteries, this

new company continued to operate them as separate concerns, and

kept its right to five votes in the American Sanitary Potteries Asso-

ciation, thereby controlling it for several years, although at the time

this suit was brought, the association had broken up.

The defendants herein—the partnership owning the Delaware pot-

teries—afterward organized a corporation to be located in New Jersey,

and to engage in the manufacture and sale of sanitary pottery, in ac-

tive competition with the complainants. The defense made was that

the contract "not to engage in business was in unlawful restraint of

trade, that the complainant company was formed for the purpose of

obtaining a monopoly of the manufacture and sale of sanitary ware,
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a necessity of life, and that the contracts not to engage in business

were in aid of this unlawful purpose, and therefore void." Vice-

Chancellor Grey so held, and dismissed the bill (39 Atl. Rep. 923).

From this decision an appeal was taken.]

Magie, C. J., * * * [after holding that, though a contract in

general restraint of trade was void, the words "within any state of the

United States except Arizona and Nevada," were a short way of

enumerating the states, and the contract was valid in those states

where reasonably necessary to protect the purchaser, though it might

be void elsewhere; that the Sanitary Potteries Association, with its

power of fixing prices was unlawful as against public policy] pro-

ceeds: * * *

It is further urged that the simultaneous contracts procured by ap-

pellant create or tend to create a monopoly, because they stipulate for

the removal of many competitors in the business of manufacturing

sanitary pottery ware. The owners of five of the eight potteries in

Trenton manufacturing that kind of ware (and there were but few, if

more than one, elsewhere) therebv agreed not to engage in that busi-

ness for a long period of time, and over a great extent of country.

The engagement of respondents in that respect has been found not to

be an improper restraint of trade, nor inimical to public policy on

that ground, but a contrnct partially enforceable upon respondents; if

not otherwise objectionable. The engagements of the other vendors

who sold their properties and business to appellant ate similar in

terms to that entered into by respondents, and furnish a reasonable

protection to appellant of the business and good will purchased by it

of each of them. Each sale and each incidental contract against

competition are, for reason before given, unobjectionable. Are they

rendered objectionable by the fact that, being simultaneously made,
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they excluded from engaging in the business of manufacturing sani-

POWER AS TO TRADE COMBINATIONS.

tary pottery ware so large a proportion of those previously engaged

in that manufacture? It is to be observed that the contracts of re-

spondents and the other vendors, to appellant, restricted them from

engaging in the business of manufacturing, not sanitary pottery ware

alone, but all pottery ware. The proofs show that a large number

of persons are engaged in manufacturing pottery ware in various

parts of the countiy, and that the contracts in question would exclude

from competition a veiy small proportion of them. But as the proofs

also show that the main purpose of appellant was to engage in the

manufacture of sanitary pottery ware, I have stated the proposition in

a more restricted form. Whether sanitary pottery ware has become

a necessity of life, is open to question. It is certain that many per-

sons manage to exist without using it. But if its use is of importance

to health and comfort, and a considerable and increasing number of

persons desire to acquire and use it, the public may have such an

interest in its manufacture and sale that public policy will justify judi-

cial interference and refusal to enforce illegal combinations to en-

hance its price. The elimination of competition may produce that
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result. The contracts in question were not intended to withdraw,

and do not appear to have withdrawn, from work a single workman

in that industry. They restrain a comparatively small number of

capitalists, who had previously employed their capital in such manu-

facture, from continuing so to do. The entire capital of the country

except theirs is free to be employed in the manufacture.

There seems no ground for the claim that we should refuse to en-

force respondents' contracts by injunction, when the proofs furnish

no reason for the belief that the public will suffer if they are held to

their bargains. The contemporaneous contracts were all made as in-

cidental to the sale and purchase of competing concerns engaged in

the manufacture of sanitary pottery ware. They were, as we have

seen, reasonably appropriate to the protection of the purchaser in each

case. While contracts to restrain or limit competition in the produc-

tion of that ware may be repugnant to the public interest, such a re-

straint or limit may result from contracts which the courts are bound

to enforce. A person engaged in any manufacture or trade, having

the right to acquire and possess property, and to do with it what he

chooses, may lawfully buy the business of any of his competitors.

His first purchase would at once diminish competition. If he con-

tinued to purchase, each succeeding transaction would remove another

competitor. If his capital was large enough to enable him to buy the

business of all competitors, the last purchase would completely ex-

clude competition, at least for a time. But in the absence of legisla-

tive restrictions, if such could be imposed, upon the acquisition of

such property, and its use when so acquired, courts could impose no

limitation. They would be obliged to enforce such contracts, not-

withstanding the effect was to diminish, or even to exclude, competition.

But appellant is a corporation, and not an individual. Corpora-

tions, however, may lawfully do any acts within the corporate powers

they excluded from engaging in the bu siness of manufacturing sanitary pottery ware so large a proportion of those previously engaged
in that manufacture? It is to be observed that the contracts of res pondents and the:: other vendors, to appellant, restricted the m from
engaging in the business of manufacturing, not sa nitary pottery ware
alone, but all pottery ware. The proofs show that a large number
of p ersons are engaged in m anufacturing pottery ware in various
parts of the country, and that the contracts in questi on would exclude·
from competition a very small proportion of them. But as the proofs
also show that the main purpose of appellant w as to engage in the
manufacture of sanitary pottery ware, I have stated the proposition in
a more restricted form. Whether sanitary pottery ware has become
a necessity of life, is open to question. It is certain that many persons manage to exist without u sing it. But if its use is of importance
t o health and comfort, and a considerable and increasing number of
persons desire to acquire and use it, the public may have such an
interest in its manufacture and sale that public policy will justify judicial interference and refusal to enforce illega l combinations to enhance its price. The elimination of competition may produce th at
result. The contracts in question were not intended to withdraw,
and do not appear to have withdrawn, from work. a single workman
in that industry. They restrnin a compara tively small number of
capitalists , who had previously employed their capital in such manufacture, from continuing so to do . The entire capital of the country
except theirs is free to be e mployed in the m anufacture .
There seems no ground for the claim that we should r e fu se to enforce respondents' contracts by injun ction, when the proofs furnish
no r eason for the belief th at the public will suffer if they a re held to
the ir b argains. The contemporaneous contracts were all m ade as incidental to the sale and purchase of competing concerns engaged in
the manufacture of san itary pottery ware. Th ey were, as we have
seen, reasonably appropriate to the p rotection of the purchaser in each
case. \Vhile contracts to restrain or limit co mpetition in the p roduction of that ware may be repugnant to the public interest, su ch a restraint or limit may result from contracts which the cou rts are bound
to enforce. A person engaged in any manufacture or trade, having
the r ight to acquire and possess p rop erty, and to do ·w ith it what he
chooses, m ay lawfully buy the business of any of his competi tors.
Hi s first purchase would at once dimini sh compNition. If he continu ed to purcha ·e, each succeeding transaction would re move another
co mpetitor. If hi s capita l was large enough to enable him to buy the
business of a ll competitors, the last purchase would completely exclude competition , at least fo r a time . But in the absence of legisla·
tive restriction s, if such could be imposed , upon the acquisitio n of
su ch p roperty, and its use w he n so acquired , courts cou ld impo-;c no
lim itation. Th ey would he ob liged to enforce such contracts, notw ith standing the effect w as to cl iminis h, or even to exclude. compet ition.
But appellant is a co rporation, and n ot an individual. Corporations, however, may lawfully do any acts within the corporate powers
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conferred on them by legislative grant. Under our liberal corpora-

§ 282
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tion laws, corporate authority may be acquired by aggregation of in-

dividuals, organized as prescribed, to engage in and carry on almost

conferred on them by legislative grant. Under our liberal corporation laws, corporate authority may be acquired by aggregation of individuals, organized as prescribed, to engage in and carry on almost
every conceivable manufacture or trade. Such corporations are empowered to purchase, hold, and use property appropriate to their business. They may also purchase and hold the stock of other corporations. Under such powers it is obvious that a corporation may
purchase the plant and business of competing individuals and concerns. The legislature might have withheld such powers, or imposed
limitations upon their u se. In the absence of prohibition or limitations on their powers in this respect, it is impossible for the courts to
pronounce acts <lone under legislative grant to be inimical to public
policy. The grant of the legislature authorizing and permittihg such
acts must fix for the courts the character and limit of public policy in
that regard. It follows that a corporation empowered to carry on a
particular business may lawfully purchase the plant and business of
competitors, although such purchases may diminish or for a time, at
least, destroy competition. Contracts for such purchases can not be
refused enforcement. Since contracts by individuals, and by corporations having legislative authority, for the purchase of competing plants
and business, may be made, and are enforcible, although, as a result
thereof, competition is diminished or temporarily destroyed, it further
follows that contracts reasonably required to make such purchases
effective by protecting the purchaser in the use and enjoyment of the
thing purchased can not be declared by the courts to be repugnant to
public policy. The interference with competition resulting from such
purchases under legislative permission being found not to invalidate
contracts for such purchases, the like interference by contracts reasonably required for the protection of the purchaser can not be held to
invalidate them.
Decree modified. Lippincott and Hendrickson,JJ., dissent.
Note. See, preceding case, and cases cited in note to People v. N. R. Sugar
Ref. Co., supra, p.109.

every conceivable manufacture or trade. Such corporations are em-

powered to purchase, hold, and use property appropriate to their busi-

ness. They may also purchase and hold the stock of other corpora-

tions. Under such powers it is obvious that a corporation may

purchase the plant and business of competing individuals and con-

cerns. The legislature might have withheld such powers, or imposed

limitations upon their use. In the absence of prohibition or limita-

tions on their powers in this respect, it is impossible for the courts to

pronounce acts done under legislative grant to be inimical to public

policy. The grant of the legislature authorizing and permitting such

acts must fix for the courts the character and limit of public policy in

that regard. It follows that a corporation empowered to carry on a

particular business may lawfully purchase the plant and business of

competitors, although such purchases may diminish or for a time, at

least, destroy competition. Contracts for such purchases can not be

refused enforcement. Since contracts by individuals, and by corpora-

tions having legislative authority, for the purchase of competing plants
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and business, may be made, and are enforcible, although, as a result

thereof, competition is diminished or temporarily destroyed, it further

follows that contracts reasonably required to make such purchases

effective by protecting the purchaser in the use and enjoyment of the

thing purchased can not be declared by the courts to be repugnant to

public policy. The interference with competition resulting from such

purchases under legislative permission being found not to invalidate

contracts for such purchases, the like interference bv contracts reason-

ably required for the protection of the purchaser can not be held to

invalidate them.

Decree modified. Lippincott and Hendrickson,JJ., dissent.

Note. See, preceding case, and cases cited in note to People v. N. R. Sugar

Ref. Co., supra, p. 109.

Sec. 282. (7) Consolidation.

(a) Power to consolidate.

CLEARWATER v. MEREDITH Et Al."

1863. In the United States Supreme Court, i Wallace's

(68 U. S.) Rep. 25-43.

[Clearwater, in 1853, sold a tract of land to Meredith and others

for $10,000, taking in pay therefor 200 shares in the S. L. R. Co.,

which Meredith and his associates guaranteed would be worth $50

per share (*. e., the par value), in Cincinnati, O.. on Oct. 1, 1855.

In 1854, the S. L. R. Co., by authority of law, and with the consent

Sec. 282. (7)

1 Statement of facta abridged. Arguments and part of opinion omitted.

Consolidation.
(a) Power to consolidate.
CLEARWATER v. MEREDITH ET AL. 1

1863.

IN

THE

UNITED STATES SUPREME CouRT.
(68 U.S.) R ep. 25-43.

1 Wallace's

[Clearwater, in 1853. sold a tract of land to Meredith and others
for $10,000, taking in pay therefor 200 shares in the S , L. R. Co.,
which Meredith and his assoc iates guaranteed would he worth $so
per share (i. e., the par value ) , in Cincinnati, 0., on Oct. 1 1 1855.
In 1854, the S. L. R. Co.,, by authority of law, and with the consent
1 Statement of
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of its stockholders and directors, was consolidated with another rail-

road company. Oct. i, 1855, having arrived and passed, and Clear-

water considering his stock was not worth $50 per share, sued on the

guaranty. The defendants pleaded that the consolidation of the

companies necessarily destroyed and rendered worthless the stock,

that plaintiff consented to this and so could not now complain. Judg-

ment below for defendants.]

Mr. Justice Davis. * * * If Clearwater was a consenting

party to a proceeding which, of itself, put it out of the power of the

defendants to perform their contract, he can not recover, for "prom-

isors will be discharged from all liability when the non-performance

of their obligation is caused by the act or the fault of the other con-

tracting party."

The Cincinnati, Cambridge and Chicago Short Line Railway Com-

pany, whose stock was guaranteed, was, as stated in the pleadings,

organized under a general act of the state of Indiana, providing for

the incorporation of railroad companies. This act was passed May

11, 1852, and contained no provision permitting railroad corporations
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to consolidate their stock. It can readily be seen that the interests of

the public, as well as the perfection of the railway system, called for

the exercise of a power by which different lines of road could be

united. Accordingly on the 23d of February, 1853, the general as-

sembly of Indiana passed an act allowing any railway company that

had been organized to intersect and unite their road with any other

road constructed or in progress of construction, and to merge and con-

solidate their stock, and on the 4th of March, 1853, the privileges of

the act were extended to railroad companies that should afterwards

be organized.

The power of the legislature to confer such authority can not be

questioned, and- without the authority railroad corporations organ-

ized separately could not merge and consolidate their interests. But

in conferring the authority, the legislature never intended to compel

a dissenting stockholder to transfer his interest because a majority

of the stockholders consented to the consolidation. Even if the legis-

lature had manifested an obvious purpose to do so, the act would

have been illegal, for it would have impaired the obligation of a

contract. There was no reservation of power in the net under which

the Cincinnati, Cambridge and Chicago Short Line Railway was or-

ganized, which gave authority to make material changes in the pur-

poses for which the corporation was created, and without such a res-

ervation in no event could a dissenting stockholder be bound.

When any person takes stock in a railroad corporation, he has

entered into a contract with the company that his interests shall be

subject to the direction and control of the proper authorities of the

corporation to accomplish the object for which the company was

organized. He does not agree that the improvement to which he

subscribed should be changed in its purposes and character, at the will

and pleasure of a majority of the stockholders, so that new responsi-

bilities, and it may be new hazards, are added to the original under-

of its stockholders and directors, was consolidated with another railroad company. Oct.' 1, 1855, having arrived and passed, and Clearwater considering his stock was not worth $50 per share, sued on the
guaranty. The defendants pleaded that the consolidation of the
companies necessarily destroyed and rendered worthless the stock,
that plaintiff consented to this and so could not now complain. Judgment below for defendants. J
MR. JUSTICE DAv1s. • • • If Clearwater was a consenting
party to a proceeding which, of itself, put it out of the power of the
defendants to perform their contract, he can not recover, for "promisors will be discharged from all liability when the non-performance
of their obligation is caused by the act or the fault of the other contracting party."
The Cincinnati, Cambridge and Chicago Short Line Railway Company, whose stock was guaranteed, was, as stated in the pleadings,
organizecl under a general act of the state of Indiana, providing for
the incorporation of railroad companies. This act was passed May
11, 1852, and contained no provision permitting railroad corporations
to consolidate their stock. It can readily be seen that the interests of
the public, as well as the perfection of the railway system, called for
the exercise of a power by which different lines of road could be
united. Accordingly on the 23d of February, 1853, the general assembly of Indiana passed an act allowing any railway company that
had qeen organized to intersect and unite their road with any other
road constructed or in progress of construction, and to merge and consolidate their stock, and on the 4th of March, 1853, the privileges of
the act were extended to railroad companies that should afterwards
be organized.
.
The power of the legislature to confer such authority can not be
qztestioned, and witlzout the authority railroad corporations organized separately could not merge and consoh'date their £nterests. But
in conferring the authority, the legislature never intended to compel
a clt'ssenting stockholder to transfer his interest because a majority
of the stockholders consented to the consolidation. Even if the legislature had manifested an obvious purpose to do so, the act would
have been illegal, for it would have impaired the obligation of a
contract. There was no reservation of power in the act under which
the Cincinnati, Cambridge and Chicago Short Line Railway was organized, which gave authority to make material changes in the purposes for which the corporation was created, and without such a reservation in no event could a dissenting stockholder he bound.
When any person takes stock in a railroad corporation, he has
entered into a contract with the company that his interests shall be
subject to the direction and control of the proper authorities of the
corporation to accomplish the object for which the company was
organized. He does not agree that the improvement to whi ch he
subscribed should be changed in its purposes and character, at the will
ann pleasure of a majority of the stockholders , so that new responsibilities, and it may be new hazards, are added to the original under-
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taking. He may be very willing to embark in one enterprise, and

§ 282

unwilling to engage in another; to assist in building a short line rail-

way, and averse to risking his money in one having a longer line of

taking. He may he very willing to embark in one enterpri ~e, and
U11\o\'illing to engage in another; to assist in building a short line railway, and averse to risking his money in one having a longer line of
transit.
But it is not every unimportant change which would work a dissolution of the contract. It must be such a change that a new and different business is superadded to the original undertaking. The act of
the legislature of Indiana allowing railroad corporations to m e rge
and consolidate their stock, was an enabling act-.,,\'as permissive,
not mandatory. It simply gave the consent of the legislature to
wh:itever could lawfully be done and which without that consent
could not be done at all. By virtue of this act the consolidations in
the pl ea stated were macle. Clearwater, before the com;oJidation,
was a stockholder in one corporation created for a gjven purpo e.
A fter it he was a stockholder in another and different corporation,
with other privileges, p owers, franchises and stockholders. The
effect of th e consoli"dation "was a dissolution of tlw tl1ree corporations , and at th e same instant th e creation of a new corpo1·ation witll
property, liabilities and stocklwlders, d<'rived from those passing- out
of existence. " McMahon \'. M orrison. 1 And the act o ( consolidat-ion was not void because the state assented to it, but a non-con ~e nt
in g stockholder was dischargell. Clea rwater could have prc,·ented
this consolidation had he chosen to do so; instead of that he gave hi s
assent to it, and m erged his own stock in the new ad\'cnture. If a
m ajority of the stockholders of the corporation of which he was a
m e mber had undertaken to transfer his interest against his wi ~h, they
would have been enjoined. There was no power to force him to join
the new corporation, and to rece ive stock in it on the surrender of
his stock in the old company. By his own act he has destroyed the
stock to which the guaranty attached, and made it impossible for the
de fendants to p erform their agreement. After th e act of consolidation the stock could not have any separate, distinct market value.
There was, in fact , no longer any stock of the Cincinnati , Cambridg e
and Chi cago Short Line Railway .
Meredith and his co-defendants undertook that the stock should be
at par in Cincinnati, if it m a intained the same separate and independent existence that it had when they gave their guaranty. Their undertaking did not extend to another stock , cre ated afterwards, with
which they had no concern and whi ch might be b etter or worse than
the one guara nteed . It is not material whether the new stock w as
worth more or less than the old. It is sufficient that it is another stock,
and represented other interests. • • •
Affirmed.

transit.

But it is not every unimportant change which would work a disso-

lution of the contract. It must be such a change that a new and dif-

ferent business is superadded to the original undertaking. The act of

the legislature of Indiana allowing railroad corporations to merge

and consolidate their stock, was an enabling act—was permissive,

not mandatory. It simply gave the consent of the legislature to

whatever could lawfully be done and which without that consent

could not be done at all. By virtue of this act the consolidations in

the plea stated were made. Clearwater, before the consolidation,

was a stockholder in one corporation created for a given purpose.

Alter it he was a stockholder in another and different corporation,

with other privileges, powers, franchises and stockholders. The

effect of the consolidation ltwas a dissolution of the three corpora-

tions, and at the same instant the creation of a new corporation with

property, liabilities and stockholders, derived from those passing out
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of existence." McMahon v. Morrison.1 And the act of consolida-

tion was not void because the state assented to it, but a non-consent-

ing stockholder was discharged. Clearwater could have prevented

this consolidation had he chosen to do so; instead of that he gave his

assent to it, and merged his own stock in the new adventure. If a

majority of the stockholders of the corporation of which he was a

member had undertaken to transfer his interest against his wish, they

would have been enjoined. There was no power to force him to join

the new corporation, and to receive stock in it on the surrender of

his stock in the old company. By his own act he has destroyed the

stock to which the guaranty attached, and made it impossible for the

defendants to perform their agreement. After the act of consolida-

tion the stock could not have any separate, distinct market value.

There was, in fact, no longer any stock of the Cincinnati, Cambridge

and Chicago Short Line Railway.

Meredith and his co-defendants undertook that the stock should be

at par in Cincinnati, if it maintained the same separate and independ-

ent existence that it had when they gave their guarantv. Their un-

dertaking did not extend to another stock, created afterwards, with

which they had no concern and which might be better or worse than

the one guaranteed. It is not material whether the new stock was

worth more or less than the old. It is sufficient that it is another stock,

and represented other interests. * * *

Affirmed.

116 Ind. 172.
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Sec. 283. Same.

POWER AS TO CON:,OLIDATION .

IN THE MATTER OF THE PROSPECT PARK & C. I. RAILROAD CO.1

1876. In the Court of Appeals of NewYork. 67 N. Y. Rep.

37I~379-

Sec. 283. Same.

[Appeal from order of lower court appointing commissioners to ap-

praise land taken by the railroad company under the railroad act.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PROSPECT PARK &

c. I.

RAILROAD C0. 1

Objection was made to the application upon the ground, inter alia,

that the company had been formed by the consolidation of two

1876.

companies, one of which had the power "to consolidate with any

IN THE CouRT OF APPEALS OF NEwYoRK.
37r-379.

67 N. Y. Rep.

other company and form a new company," but the company consoli-

dated with had no charter authority to so consolidate.]

Folger, J. * * * The act of 1S74 (Laws of 1S74, chap. 448,

pp. 591-592, § 3) gave power to one of the corporations, which now

together form the corporation which is the petitioner in this case, to

consolidate with any other like corporation. The point of the appel-

lants, that no power to consolidate is given to the other of those cor-

porations, is without effect. Power is given to one corporation by

statute to form a consolidation with any other. It can not form a con-

solidation unless it finds another with which to unite and which is
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capable of union with it; hence, whatever other company it selects

for a union, and finds willing to join it, that other company, though

not named in the statute, gets power from the statute to .unite with

that company which the statute names.

Affirmed.

Note. See next case.

Sec. 284. Same.

GAINES, C. J., in MORRILL v. SMITH COUNTY.

1896. In the Supreme Court of Texas. 89 Texas 529, on 552.

It has been held that the power given to one railroad company to

consolidate with any other like company, without naming any, author-

izes any other company to consolidate with it. (Matter of P. P. &

C. I. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 371.) But a contrary rule is recognized in

[Appeal from order of lower court appointing commissioners to appraise land taken by the railroad company under the railroad act.
Objection was made to the application upon the ground, £nter al£a,
that the company had been formed by the consolidation of two
companies, one of which had the power "to consolidate with any
other company and form a new company," but the company consolidated with had no charter authority to so consolidate. J
FOLGER, J. • • • The act of 1874 (Laws of 1874 1 chap. 448 1
pp. 591-592, § 3) gave power to one of the corporations, which now
together form the corporation which is the p e titioner in this case, to
consolidate with any other like corporation. The point of the appellants, that no power to consolidate is given to the other of those corporations, is without effect. Power is given to one corporation by
statute to form a consolidation with any other. It can not form a consolidation unless it finds another with which to unite and which is
capable of union with it; hence, whatever other company it selects
for a union, and finds willing to join it, that other company, though
not named in the statute, gets power from the statute to ,unite with
that company which the statute names.
Affirmed.

this state. Railway v. Rushing, 69 Texas 306. See, also, Railway

N ote.

See next case.

v. Morris, 67 Texas 692. It does not follow that because the char-

ter of a railway company empowers it in general language "to con-

solidate with any other railroad company," these words should be

Sec. 284. Same.

construed as conferring the power upon any other company to consol-

GAINES, C. J.,

idate with it. They reasonably admit of the construction that the

company named is empowered only to unite with any other company

which has a like power, and it would seem that, under the general rule

1N

MORRILL v. SMITH COUNTY.

1896. IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF TEXAS.

89 Texas 529 1 on 552.

previously announced, the construction least favorable to the corpora-

1 Statement abridged, and only the part of the opinion relating to the single

point given.

It has been held that the power given to one railroad company to
consolidate with any other like company, without naming any, authorizes any other company to consolidate with it. (Matter o f P. P. &
C. I. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 371.) But a contrary rule is recognized in
thi s st ate. Railway v. Rushing, 69 Texas 306. See, also, Railway
v. M o rris, 67 Texas 692. It does not follow that because th e charter of a railway company empowers it in gene ral language "to consolidate with any other railroad co mpa ny, " these words should be
construed as conferring the power upo n any other compa ny to comolidatc with it. They reasonab ly admit of the constru ction that the
company named is empowered only to unite w ith a ny other company
which has a like power, and it would see m th at , under the general rnle
previou sly announced, the construction least favorable to th e corpora1 Sta te me nt abridged, and only the part of the opinion relating to the single
point given.
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tion should control; at all events, when we attempt to adopt the con-

988

struction insisted upon on behalf of Smith county, in respect to the

QUINCY RAILROAD BRIDGE CO. V. ADAMS COUNTY.

§ 285

grant in the charter of the Houston Tap and Biazoria Railroad Com-

pany, we encounter a grave constitutional difficulty. The contention

tion should control; at all events, when we attempt to adopt the construction insisted upon on behalf of Smith county, in respect to the
grant in the cl"!arter of the Houston Tap and B1 azoria Railroad Company, we encounter a grave constitutional difficulty. The contention
is that the special charter of the company not only confers powe1· upon
the company to consolidate with any other railroad company, but al o
upon any other such company to consolidate with it. The title of the act
is clearly sufficient to embrace the grant of any powers to the company incorporated which were appropriate to its purpose. But is
there anything in the title that indicated that it wa'l one of the objects
of the act to confer power upon all the rnilroads of the state to consoli<late with that company? That involved a distinct grant and enlargement of power to every other railroad company in the state, and it
seems to us that, if such was the intent of the legislature, it comes
within the scope of the very evil which was intended to be suppressed
by that section of the constitution which required that the object of
every, act be expressed in its title. Giddings v. San Antonio, 47 Texas
548; Peck v. San · Antonio, 5I Texas 490.

is that the special charter of the company not only confers power upon

the company to consolidate with any other railroad company, but also

upon any other such company to consolidate with it. The title of the act

is clearly sufficient to embrace the grant of any powers to the com-

pany incorporated which were appropriate to its purpose. But is

there anything in the title that indicated that it was one of the objects

of the act to confer power upon all the railroads of the state to consol-

idate with that company? That involved a distinct grant and enlarge-

ment of power to every other railroad company in the state, and it

seems to us that, if such was the intent of the legislature, it comes

within the scope of the very evil which was intended to be suppressed

by that section of the constitution which required that the object of

every, act be expressed in its title. Giddings v. San Antonio, 47 Texas

548; Peck v. San Antonio, 51 Texas 490.

Note. See preceding case.

Sec. 285. (b) Interstate consolidation.
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QUINCY RAILROAD BRIDGE COMPANY v. ADAMS COUNTY.1

1878. In the Supreme Court of Illinois. _ 88 111. Rep.

615-622.

[Action by the county to collect a tax upon the capital stock of the

Note.

bridge company. The first section of the tax law provided for a tax

See preceding case.

upon "the capital stock of the companies and associations incorpo-

rated under the laws of this state." In 1865, the Railroad Bridge

Company was incorporated in Illinois,—and about this time the

Quincy Bridge Company was incorporated in Missouri,—the purpose

Sec. 285. ( b) Interstate consolidation.

of both companies being to build a bridge across the Mississippi river

at Quincy; in order to do this successfully it became necessary to

QUINCY RAILROAD BRIDGE COMPANY v. ADAMS COUNTY.1

consolidate, and this was done bv agreement duly filed in the office of

the secretary of state in each state, and the consolidation was legalized

I878.

by the respective legislatures, under the name of the Quincy Railroad

Bridge Company. The corporation claimed it was not "a companv

IN THR SuPREMR CouRT OF ILLINOIS.
6I5-622.

88 Ill.

Rep.

incorporated under the laws of Illinois." A demurrer to this claim

was sustained, and judgment rendered for the county. The company

[Action by the county to collect a tax upon the capital stock of the
bridge company. The first section of the tax law provided for a tax
upon "the capital stock of the companjes and associations incorporated under the laws of this state." In I865, the Railroad Bridge
Company was incorporated in Illinois,-and about this time the
Quincy Bridge Company was incorporated in Missouri,-the purpose
of both companies being to build a bridge across the Mississippi river
at Quincy; in order to do this successfu_lly it became nece ·sary to
consolidate, and this was done by agreement duly filed in the office of
the secretary of state in each state, and the consolidation was legalized
by the respective legislatures, under the name of the Quincy Railroad
Bridge Company. The corporation claimed it was not "a company
incorporated under the laws of Illinois." A demurrer to this claim
was sustained, and judgment rendt:red for the county. The company
appealed.]
BRE ESE, J. • • • But it is said by appellants, this corporation, although it derived some of its powers and in part its corporate
existence from this state, derived an equal part from the sovereign
1 Statement abridged, and only part of opinion given.

appealed.]

Breese, J. * * * But it is said by appellants, this corpora-

tion, although it derived some of its powers and in part its corporate

existence from this state, derived an equal part from the sovereign

1 Statement abridged, and only part of opinion given.
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state of Missouri, and therefore they are not a corporation created

under the laws of either state. To this it is answered, and we think

satisfactorily, that the legislatures of this state and of Missouri can

not act jointly, nor can any legislation of the last named state have

the least effect in creating a corporation in this state. Hence, the

corporate existence of appellants, considered as a corporation of this

state, must spring from the legislation of this state, which, by its own

vigor, performs the act. The states of Illinois and Missouri have no

power to unite in passing any legislative act. It is impossible, in the

very nature of their organizations, that they can do so. They can not

so fuse themselves into a single sovereignty, and as such create a body

politic which shall be a corporation of the two states, without being

a corporation of each state or of either state. As argued by appellee,

the only possible status of a company acting under charters from two

states is, that it is an association incorporated in and by each of the

states, and when acting as a corporation in either of the states it acts

under the authority of the charter of the state in which it is then act-

ing, and that only, the legislation of the other state having no opera-
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tion beyond its territorial limits. We do not, and can not, understand

that appellants derive any of its corporate powers from the legislature

of the state of Missouri, but wholly and entirely derived from the

general assembly of this state. Consequently they are embraced in

the first section of the revenue act, above cited. • « *

Affirmed.

Xote: Compare, 1892, People v. N. Y. C. & S. L. R. Co., 129 N. Y. 474; 1898,

State v. Lesueur, 145 Mo. 322; 1892, Ashley v. Ryan, 49 Ohio St. 504; and

cases in note at end of section 288, 4a and 5a.

Sec. 286. (c) Consolidation or merger.

KEOKUK AND WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY v. MISSOURI.1

1894. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 152

United States Rep. 301-317.

[Action in Missouri state court for collection of taxes. Defendant,

state of Missouri, and therefore they are not a corporation created
under the laws of either state. To this it is answered, and we think
satisfactorily, that the legislatures of this state and' of Missouri can
not act jointly, nor can any legislation of the last named state have
the least effect in creating a corporation in this state. Hence, the
corporate existence of appellants, considered as a corporation of this
state, must spring from the legislation of this state, which, by its own
vigor, performs the act. The states of Illinois and Missouri have no
power to unite in passing any legislative act. It is impossible, in the
very nature of their organizations, that they can do so. They can not
so fuse themselves into a single sovereignty, and as such create a body
politic which shall be a corporation of the two states, without being
a corporation of each state or of either state. As argued by appellce,
the only possible status of a company acting under charters from two
states is, that it is an association i!lcorporated in and by each of the
states, and when acting as a corporation in either of the states it acts
under the authodty of the charter of the state in which it is then acting, and that only, the legislation of the other state having no operation beyond its territorial limits. We do not, and can not, understand
that appellants derive any of its corporate powers from the legislature
of the state of Missouri, but wholly and entirely derived from the
general assembly of this state. Consequently they are embraced in
the first section of the revenue act, above cited. • • •
Affirmed.
Note: Compare, 1892, People v. N. Y. C. &S. L. R.Co.,129N. Y.474; 1898,
State v . Lesueur, 145 Mo. 322; 1892, Ashley v. Ryan, 49 Ohio St. 504; and
cases in note at end of section 288, 4a and 5a.

a consolidated company, relied on a charter exemption from taxation,

appearing in the charter of one of the original Missouri companies

out of which the consolidated company had been formed. Before the

consolidation, the new Missouri constitution had expressly provided

Sec. 286. ( c)

Consolidation or merger.

that such property should not be exempt. The tax was levied after

the consolidation, and the state court gave judgment for the tax. This

KEOKUK AND WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY v. MISSOURI.1

was affirmed by the supreme court of the state, and the defendant sued

IN

out this writ of error.]

THE SUPREME

COURT

OF

THE

UNITED

STATES.

United States Rep. 301-317.

Mr. Justice Brown. * * * The question in this case is

whether the defendant, the Keokuk and Western Railroad Company,

was entitled to the exemption of its property from taxation contained

'Statement abridged and part of opinion omitted.

[Action in Missouri state court for collection of taxes. Defendant,
a consolidated company, relied on a charter exemption from taxation,
appearing in the charter of one of the original Missouri companies
out of which the consolidated company had been formed. Before the
consolidation, the new Missouri constitution had expressly provided
that such property should not be exempt. The tax was levied after
the consolidation, and the state court gave judgment for the tax. This
was affirmed by the supreme court of the state, and the defendant sued
out this writ of error. J
Mn. JusTICE BROWN. • • • The question in thi case is
whether the defendant, the Keokuk and Western Railroad Company,
was entitled to the exemption of its property from taxation contained
1Statement abridged and part of opinion ou1itteJ.
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in the original charter to the Alexandria and Bloomfield Railroad

990

Company, of which road it is the successor in interest.

KEOKUK AND WESTERN R. CO . V. MISSOURI.

§ 286

(1) It will be observed that the constitutional provision upon which

the state relies for the enforcement of this tax for the year 1S86 was

in the original charter to the Alexand1ria and Bloomfield Railroad
Company, of which road it is the successor in interest.
( 1) It will be observed that the constitutional provision upon which
the state relies for the enforcement of this tax for the year 1886 was
adopted in 1865, before the consolidation of the Alexandria and
Bloomfield Company, under its changed name of the Alexandria and
Nebraska City Railroad Company, with the Iowa Southern Company,
which took place in 1870, and before the completion of the road in
1872. That the exemption from taxation contained in the original
charter to the Alexandria and Bloomfield Company would have continued the full twenty years from the completion of the road in 1872,
had such consolidation not taken place, is, for the purpose of this
case, conceded. Indeed, it was so held by the supreme court of the
state, in State v. Macon County, 41 Mo .. 453. The court, construing
sections 3 and 14 of article 11 of the constitution, held the provi!-ions
of section 14 to be a limitation upon the future power of the general
assembly, and not intended to retroact so as to have any controlling
application to laws in existence when tlhe constitution was adopted.
See nlso, State v. Cape Girardeau Railway, 48 Mo. 468; State v.
Coffee, 59 Mo. 59; Atlantic, etc., Railrnad v. St. Louis, 66 Mo. 228.
The question then arises whether the Alexandria and Bloomfield
Railroad Company, whose charter contained the exemption, is still in
existence, or was dissolved by the consolidation, and a new corporation was thereby called into being, which held its property subject to
the constitutional provisions of 1865, denying the power of the general assembly to exempt property from taxation. In the numerous
cases which have arisen in this court as to the effect of a consolidation upon the existence and status of the constituent corporations, it
has been held that the question of the dissolution of such corpora. tions depended upon the language of the statute under which the consoli<lation took place-the presumption in each case being that each
of the two lines of road will be held respectively to the privileges and
burdens originally attaching thereto. Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall.
46o. If, upon the one hand, the identilty of the prior corporntions is
preserved, an exemption from taxation which one of them possessed,
falls to that portion of the new corporation to which , under its
former name, it had been attached. If, upon the other hand, the consolidation worked a dissolution of the prior corporations, their forme r
privileges and franchises also ceased to exist. Thus, in the earliest
of these cases, Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Maryland, 10 How. 376,
it was held that .the Baltimore and Port Deposit Railroad Company,
whose charter contained no exemption from taxation , did not acquire
such exemption by consolidation with the Delaware and Maryland
Railroad Company, whose charter exempted the road from taxation ,
"except upon that portion of the permanent and fixed works which
mig ht be in the state of Maryland." A general rule was 111id down
in this case to which this court has steadily adhered, that the taxing
power of the state should never be presiumed to be relinquished, unless the intention to do so be decl ared in clear and unambiguous terms

adopted in 1865, before the consolidation of the Alexandria and

Bloomfield Company, under its changed name of the Alexandria and

Nebraska City Railroad Company, with the Iowa Southern Company,

which took place in 1870, and before the completion of the road in

1872. That the exemption from taxation contained in the original

charter to the Alexandria and Bloomfield Company would have con-

tinued the full twenty years from the completion of the road in 1872,

had such consolidation not taken place, is, for the purpose of this

case, conceded. Indeed, it was so held by the supreme court of the

state, in State v. Macon County, 41 Mo. 453. The court, construing

sections 3 and 14 of article 11 of the constitution, held the provisions

of section 14 to be a limitation upon the future power of the general

assembly, and not intended to retroact so as to have any controlling

application to laws in existence when the constitution was adopted.

See also, State v. Cape Girardeau Railway, 48 Mo. 468; State v.

Coffee, 59 Mo. 59; Atlantic, etc., Railroad v. St. Louis, 66 Mo. 228.
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The question then arises whether the Alexandria and Bloomfield

Railroad Company, whose charter contained the exemption, is still in

existence, or was dissolved by the consolidation, and a new corpora-

tion was thereby called into being, which held its property subject to

the constitutional provisions of 1S65, denying the power of the gen-

eral assembly to exempt property from taxation. In the numerous

cases which have arisen in this court as to the effect of a consolida-

tion upon the existence and status of the constituent corporations, it

has been held that the question of the dissolution of such corpora-

tions depended upon the language of the statute under which the con-

solidation took place—the presumption in each case being that each

of the two lines of road will be held respectively to the privileges and

burdens originally attaching thereto. Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall.

460. If, upon the one hand, the identity of the prior corporations is

preserved, an exemption from taxation which one of them possessed,

falls to that portion of the new corporation to which, under its

former name, it had been attached. If, upon the other hand, the con-

solidation worked a dissolution of the prior corporations, their former

privileges and franchises also ceased to exist. Thus, in the earliest

of these cases, Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Maryland, 10 How. 376,

it was held that the Baltimore and Port Deposit Railroad Company,

whose charter contained no exemption from taxation, did not acquire

such exemption by consolidation with the Delaware and Maryland

Railroad Company, whose charter exempted the road from taxation,

"except upon that portion of the permanent and fixed works which

might be in the state of Maryland." A general rule was laid down

in this case to which this court has steadily adhered, that the taxing

power of the state should never be presumed to be relinquished, un-

less the intention to do so be declared in clear and unambiguous terms
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This case was subsequently reaffirmed in the Delaware Railroad Tax,

18 Wall. 206.
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In Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall. 460, it was held that when a

railroad company to which, by its charter, an exemption from taxa-

tion was granted, for a limited period, was by act of the legisla-

ture "merged" in another company, which thereby became invested

with all its rights, property and privileges, the exemption applied to

the property with its limitation of time, and, although the company

in which it was merged had been granted a perpetual exemption from

taxation in its charter, this perpetual exemption would not be extended

to property so acquired, without express words, or necessary intend-

ment to that effect. In Central Railroad v. Georgia, 92 U. S. 665,

the act of the legislature authorized the Central Railroad and the

Macon Railroad "to unite and consolidate" their "stocks" and all

their "rights, privileges, immunities, property and franchises" under

the name and charter of the Central Railroad in such manner that

each owner of shares of stock of the Macon road should be entitled to

receive an equal number of shares of the consolidated companies. It

was held this consolidation was not a surrender of the existing charters
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of the two,companies, and did not work the extinction of the Central

Company nor the creation of a new company, and also that the con-

solidated company continued to possess all the rights and immunities

which were conferred upon each company by its original charter. The

Central Company having been exempted from taxation beyond a lim-

ited amount by its original charter, it was held not to be within the

power of the legislature to impose an increased tax after the consoli-

dation was effected; but as the Macon Company had no provision in

its charter limiting its liability to taxation, the power of the legislature

remained unimpaired to tax its franchises, property and income after

its consolidation with the Central. It was said in the opinion of the

court that "if in the statute there be no words of grant of corporate

powers, it is difficult to see how a new corporation is created. If it

is, it must be by implication; and it is an unbending rule that a grant

of corporate existence is never implied." It was held that the act

did not work the dissolution of the existing corporations, and at the

same time the creation of a new company, the court giving among

other reasons that there was no provision for the surrender of the cer-

tificates of stock of the shareholders of the Central, and none for the

issue of other certificates to them. It will be observed in this case

that the road whose charter contained the exemption from taxation

was preserved intact by the consolidation; and it was held that its

exemption continued, while the other road was undoubtedlv intended

to go out of existence; and as the Macon road held its property and

franchise subject to taxation, the Central, succeeding to the franchises

and property, held them alike subject. Other cases to the same effect,

and holding that the act of consolidation did not operate as a dissolu-

tion of the constituent companies are, Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad

v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 718; Green County v. Conness, 109 U. S. 104;

and Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 139.

This case was su.bsequently reaffirmed in the Delaware Railroad T ax,
18 Wall. 206.
In Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall. 460, it was held that when a
railroad company to which, by its charter, an exemption from taxation was granted, for a limited period, was by act of the legislature "merged" in another company, which thereby became invested
with all its rights, property and privileges, the exemption applied to
- the property with its limitation of time, and, although the company
in which it was merged had been granted a perpetual exemption from
taxation in its charter, this perpetual exemption would not be extended
to property so acquired, without express• words, or necessary intendment to that effect. In Centrnl Railroad v. Georg ia, 92 U. S. 665,
the act of the legislature authorized the Central Railroad and the
Macon Railroad "to unite and consolidate" their "stocks" and all
their "rights, privileges, immunities, property and franchi ses" under
the name and charter of the Central R ailroad in such manner that
each owner of shares of stock of the Macon ro:id should be entitled to
receive an equal number of shares of the consolidated companies. It
was held this consolidation was not a surrender of the existing charters
of the two. companies, and did nc;t work the extinction of the Central
Company nor the creation of a new company, and also that the consolidated company continued to possess all the rights and immunities
which were conferred upon each company by its original charter. The
Central Company having been exempted from taxation beyond a limited amount by its original charter, it was held not to be within the
power of the legislature to impose an increased tax after the consolidation was effected; but as the Macon Company had no provisi on in
its charter limiting its liability to taxation, the power of the legislature
remained unimpaired to tax its franchises, property and income after
its consolidation with the Central. It was said in the opinion of the
court that "if in the statute there be no words of grant of corporate
powers, it is difficult to see how a new corporation is created. If it
is, it must be by implication; and it is an unbending rule that a grant
of corporate existence is never implied.'' It was held that the act
did not work the di5solution of the existing corporations, and nt the
same time the creation of a new company, the court giving among
other reasons thnt there was no prov ision for the s urre nder of the certificates of stock of the shareholders of the Central, and none for the
issue of other certificates to the m . It will be observed in this ca,.,e
that the road whose charter contained the exemption from taxation
was preserved intact by the consolidation; and it was held tha t its
exe mption continued, while the other road was undoubtedly intended
to go out of existence; and as the Mncon road held its property and
franchise subject to taxation, the Central , succeeding to the franchises
and property, held them alike subject. Other cases to the same effect,
and holding that the act of consolidation did not operate as a dissolution of the constituent companies are, Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad
v. Virginia , 94 U . S. 718; Green County v. C onness, 109 U .S. 104;
and Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. r39.
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Upon the other hand, we have held that the consolidation acts of

Ohio and Maine worked a dissolution of the constituent companies

992

and the incorporation of a new company, and that such company was
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subject to intermediate acts declaring the charters of corporations sub-

Upon the other band, we have held that the consolidation acts of
Ohio and Maine worked a dissolution of the constituent companies
and the incorporation of a new company, and that such company was
subject to intermediate acts declaring the charters of corporations subject to be altered, amended, or repealed by the legislature. Shields
v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; Railroad Company v. Maine, 96 U.S. 499.
A leading case is that of a Railroad Company v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359,
362, wherein two railroad companies, each of which enjoyed by its
charter a limited exemption from taxation, were consolidated by an
act of the legislature passed j\pril 18, 1863, which authorized a consolidation of their stocks, conferred upon the consolidated companies
full corporate powers, and continued to it the franchises, privileges,
and immunities which the companies had held by their original charters. It was held that by the consolidation the original companie
were dissolved and a new corporation created , which hecame subject
to the provisions of a statutory code, adopted January I , 1863, permitting the charters of private corporations to he changed, modified,
or destroyed at the will of the legislature. It was further held that
a subsequent legislati,·e act taxing the property of such new corporation as other property in the state was taxed was not a la\\ impairing
the obligation of a contract. It was said that the consolidation provided for was not a merger of one company into another, and the case
of Railroad Company v. Georgia, 92 U. S. 665, \Yas distinguished
from it in this particular.
'·Nor was it," says Mr. Justice Strong, "a mere alliance or confederation of the two. If it had been, each would have preserved its
separate existence as well as its corporate name. But the act authorized the consolidation of the stocks of the two companies, thus making one capital in place of two. It contemplated, therefore, that the
separate capital of each company should go out of existence as the
capital of that company." In St. Louis, Iron Mountain, etc., Railway v. Berry, l 13 U . S. 465, a like effect was given to the consolidation of two roads by an agreement which provided that all the property
of each company should be taken and deemed to be transferred to the
consolidated company "as such new corporation without further act
or deed ." It was held that this created a new corporation, with an
ex.istence dating from the time the consolidation took effect, and that
it was subject to constitutional provisions with reference to taxation
in force at that time. See, also, McMahan v. Monison, 16 Ind. r72.
Looking at the act in question in this case, we find that, by section 1.
any Missouri railroad company whose tracks should connect with the
road of an adjoining state wa authorized to make and enter into an
agreement with such connecting company for the consolidation of the
stock of the respective companies whose tracks should be so connected. making one company of the two, whose stock should he so
consolidated upon such terms, conditions, and stipu lations as might be
mutually agreed between them; that, by section 2 , "such consolidation shall not he made, unless th e terms and provisions thereof shall
be approved hy a majority of the stock, or the holders of a majority

ject to be altered, amended, or repealed by the legislature. Shields

v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; Railroad Company v. Maine, 96 U. S. 499-

A leading case is that of a Railroad Company v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359,

362, wherein two railroad companies, each of which enjoyed by its

charter a limited exemption from taxation, were consolidated by an

act of the legislature passed April 18, 1863, which authorized a con-

solidation of their stocks, conferred upon the consolidated companies

full corporate powers, and continued to it the franchises, privileges,

and immunities which the companies had held by their original char-

ters. It was held that by the consolidation the original companies

were dissolved and a new corporation created, which became subject

to the provisions of a statutory code, adopted January I, 1863. per-

mitting the charters of private corporations to be changed, modified,

or destroyed at the will of the legislature. It was further held that

a subsequent legislative act taxing the property of such new corpora-

tion as other property in the state was taxed was not a law: impairing
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the obligation of a contract. It was said that the consolidation pro-

vided for was not a merger of one company into another, and the case

of Railroad Company v. Georgia, 92 U. S. 665, was distinguished

from it in this particular.

'•Nor was it," says Mr. Justice Strong, "a mere alliance or con-

federation of the two. If it had been, each would have preserved its

separate existence as well as its corporate name. But the act author-

ized the consolidation of the stocks of the two companies, thus mak-

ing one capital in place of two. It contemplated, therefore, that the

separate capital of each company should go out of existence as the

capital of that company." In St. Louis, Iron Mountain, etc., Rail-

way v. Berry, 113 U. S. 465, a like effect was given to the consolida-

tion of two roads by an agreement which provided that all the property

of each company should be taken and deemed to be transferred to the

consolidated company "as such new corporation without further act

or deed." It was held that this created a new corporation, with an

existence dating from the time the consolidation took effect, and that

it was subject to constitutional provisions with reference to taxation

in force at that time. See, also, McMahan v. Morrison, 16 Ind. 172.

Looking at the act in question in this case, we find that, by section 1,

any Missouri railroad company whose tracks should connect with the

road of an adjoining state was authorized to make and enter into an

agreement with such connecting company for the consolidation of the

stock of the respective companies whose tracks should be so con-

nected, making one company of the two, whose stock should be so

consolidated upon such terms, conditions, and stipulations as might be

mutually agreed between them: that, by section 2, "such consolida-

tion shall not be made, unless the terms and provisions thereof shall

be approved by a majority of the stock, or the holders of a majority
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of the capital stock in each of said companies whose stock shall be

993

consolidated;" that, by section 3, the board of directors were author-

ized to adopt by resolution a new corporate name for the consolidated

company, and call in the certificates of stock then outstanding in each

company, and exchange them for stock in the new company; and pro-

viding that a copy of the consolidation agreement, and the name

adopted for the new company, "shall be filed with the secretary of

state, and shall be conclusive evidence of such consolidation, and of

the corporate name of the consolidated company." It is difficult to

see how the legislature could provide more clearly for the extinguish-

ment of the prior companies, and the formation of a new one, than

by providing that the two companies shall become one; that new cer-

tificates of stock shall be issued in exchange for the stock of the con-

stituent companies; and that the consolidation agreement shall be

recorded with the secretary of state as the charter of a new company.

In our opinion this was the effect of the act in question.

It is impossible to conceive of a corporation existing without stock,

or certificates representing the interests of the corporators in the or-
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ganization. Now if the act provides that these certificates shall be

surrendered, and certificates in another company issued in their place,

what becomes of the prior companies? Who are their stockholders,

who their officers? If the stock in the new company is sold, what

interest in the prior companies passes by the sale? There can be but

one answer to these questions. The property and franchises of the

prior companies are gone as much as if they had formally surrendered

their charters. The new company may doubtless receive by trans-

mission from its constituent companies their property, rights, privi-

leges and franchises, including any immunity from taxation, but it re-

ceives them as an heir receives the estate of his ancestor, or as a

grantee receives the estate of his grantor, by inheritance, succession,

or purchase. The result is not a mere union or partnership of two

companies, nor the merger of the franchises of one in another, but

the extinguishment of one and the creation of another in its place.

Speaking of a similar act of Ohio, which declared that the consoli-

dated companies "shall be deemed and taken to be one corporation,

possessing within the state all the rights, privileges and franchises,

and subject to all the restrictions, liabilities and duties of such corpo-

rations of this state so consolidated," Mr. Justice Swayne observed

in Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319, 322,323: "It (the consolidation)

could not occur without their consent. The consolidated company

had then no existence. It could have none while the original corpo-

rations subsisted. All—the old and the new—could not co-exist. It

was a condition precedent to the existence of the new corporation that

the oid ones should first surrender their vitality and submit to dissolu-

tion. This being done, eo instartti the new corporation came into

existence."

It follows from this that when the new corporation came into exist-

ence, it came precisely as if it had been organized under a charter

granted at the date of the consolidation, and subject to the constitu-

66—WIL. CA8.

of the capital stock in each of said companies whose stock shall be
consolidated;" that, by section 3 1 the board of directors were authorized to adopt by resolution a new corporate name for the consolidated
company, and call in the certificat~s of stock then outstanding in each
company, and exchange them for stock in the new company; and providing that a copy of the consolidation agreement, and the name
adopted for the new company, "shall be filed with the secretary of
state, and shall be conclusive evidence of such consolidation, and of
the corporate name of the consolidated company." It is difficult to
see how the legislature could provide more clearly for the extinguishment of the prior companies, and the formation of a new one, than
by providing that the two companies shall become one; that new certificates of stock shall be issued in exchange for the stock of the constituent companies; and that the consolidation agreement shall be
recorded with the secretary of state as the charter of a new company.
In our opinion this was the effect of the act in question.
It is impossible to conceive of a corporation existing without stock,
or certificates representing the interests of the corporators in the organization. Now if the act provides that these certificates shall be
surrendered, and certificates in another company issued in their place,
what becomes of the prior companies? Who are their stockholders,
who their officers? If the stock in the new company is sold, what
interest in the prior companies passes by the sale? There can b e but
one answer to these questions. The property and franchises of the
prior companies are gone as much as if they had formally surrendered
their charters. The new company may doubtless receive by transmission from its constituent companies their property, rights, privileges and franchises, including any immunity from taxation, but it receives them as an heir receives the estate of his ancestor, or as a
grantee receives the estate of his grantor, by inheritance, succession,
or purchase. The result is not a mere union or partnership of two
companies, nor the merger of the franchises of one in another, but
the extinguishment of one and the creation of another in its place.
Speaking of a similar act of Ohio, which declared that the consolidated companies "shall be deemed and taken to be one corporation,
possessing within the state all the rights, privileges and franchises,
and subject to all the restrictions, liabilities and duties of such corporations of this state so consolidated," Mr. Justice Swayne observed
in Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319, 322,323: "It (the consolidation)
could not occur without the ir con. ent. The consolidated company
had then no existence. It could have none while the original corporations subsisted. All-the old and the new-could not co-exist. 1t
was a condition precedent to the existence of the new corporation that
the old ones should first surrender their vitality and submit to dissolution. This being done, eo z'nstanti' the nev..· corporation came into
existence."
It follows from this that when the new corporation cam e into existence, it came precisely as if it had been organized under a cha rter
granted at the date of the consolidation, and subject to the constitu66-w1L. CAB.
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tional provisions then existing, which required (art. II, 5 16) that no

property, real or personal, should be exempted from taxation, except
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such as was used exclusively for public purposes; in other words,

KEOKUK ANU WESTERN R. CO . V. MISSOURI.

that the exemption from taxation contained in section 9 of the orig-

tional provi. ions then existing, which required (art. 11, § 16) that no
llropcrty, real or personal, should be exempted from taxation, except
such as \vas used exclusively for public purposes; in other ·words,
that the exemption from taxation contained in section 9 of the original charter of the Alexandria and Bloomfi eld Railway Company did
not pa. s to the Missouri, Iowa and Nebraska . Company . As was
said of an Arkansas corporation, in St. L ouis, Iron Mountain, etc.,
Raihivay v . Berry, 113 U. S. 465, 475 1 "it came into existence as a
corporation of the state of Arkansas, in pursuance of its constitution
and laws, and subject in all respects to their restrictions and limitations . Among the e was that one which declared that 'the property
of corporations now existing, or hen:after crea ted, shall be forenr
subject to taxation the same as property of individuals.' This rendered it impossible in law for the con solidated corporation to receive
by transfer from the Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company, or otherwise, the exemption sought to be enforced in this suit." S ee also,
Memphis and Little Rock Railroad v. Commissioners, 112 U.S.~;
Shields v. Ohio , 95 U.S. 319; Louisville and Nashville Railroad v.
Palmes, 109 U. S . 244.
Nor was the exemption saved by section 3 of article 11, providing
that "all statute laws of this state now in force, not inconsistent with
this constitution, shall continue in force until they shall expire by
their own limitation, or be amended or repealed by the general assembly." This referred to statutes in force at the time the constitution \Vas adopted, the operation of which continued, notwithstanding
the constitution. In this case, however, the exemption contained
in section 9 of the charter of the Alexandria and Bloomfield Railway
Company ceased to exist, not by the operation of the constitution,
but by the dissolution of the corporation to which it was attached.
It is further insisted, however, that under section 4 of the act of
March 2, 1869, there was a . further provision that the consolidated
company should be "subject to all the liabilities, and bound by all
the obligations of the company within this state,'' and "be entitled
to the sa me fran chi es and privileges under the laws of this state as if
the consolidation had not taken place." Whether, under th e name
"franchises a nd privileges," an immunity from taxation would p ass
to the new company may admit of some doubt, in view of the decisions of this court, which, upon this point, are not easy to be reconc iled . Tn the Chesapeake nnd Ohio Railway v. Miller, l 14 U. S.
176, it was held th at an immunity from taxation enjoyed by the Covington and Ohio Railway Compnny did not pass to n purcha er of
such road under foreclosure of a m01tga ge, although the act proYi<led
that " aid purchaser sha ll forthwith he a corporation , " and " hall
i-ucceed to all uch franch ises, rig hts and priYilegcs • • • as
wou ld have been had • • • hy the first comp :m y hut for such
sale and con\"eyance." It was he ld , following in this p articular,
Morgan v. L oui siana, 93 U. S. 217 , that the words "franchises,
rig hts and privileges" did not necessarily embrace a grant of an ex-

inal charter of the Alexandria and Bloomfield Railway Company did

not pass to the Missouri, Iowa and Nebraska Company. As was

said of an Arkansas corporation, in St. Louis, Iron Mountain, etc.,

Railway v. Berry, 113 U. S. 465, 475, "it came into existence as a

corporation of the state of Arkansas, in pursuance of its constitution

and laws, and subject in all respects to their restrictions and limita-

tions. Among these was that one which declared that 'the property

of corporations now existing, or hereafter created, shall be forever

subject to taxation the same as property of individuals.' This ren-

dered it impossible in law for the consolidated corporation to receive

by transfer from the Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company, or other-

wise, the exemption sought to be enforced in this suit." See also,

Memphis and Little Rock Railroad v. Commissioners, 112 U. S. 609;

Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; Louisville and Nashville Railroad v.

Palmes, 109 U. S. 244.

Nor was the exemption saved by section 3 of article 11, providing
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that "all statute laws of this state now in force, not inconsistent with

this constitution, shall continue in force until they shall expire by

their own limitation, or be amended or repealed by the general as-

sembly." This referred to statutes in force at the time the constitu-

tion was adopted, the operation of which continued, notwithstanding

the constitution. In this case, however, the exemption contained

in section 9 of the charter of the Alexandria and Bloomfield Railway

Company ceased to exist, not by the operation of the constitution,

but by the dissolution of the corporation to which it was attached.

It is further insisted, however, that under section 4 of the act of

March 2, 1869, there was a further provision that the consolidated

company should be "subject to all the liabilities, and bound by all

the obligations of the company within this state," and "be entitled

to the same franchises and privileges under the laws of this state as if

the consolidation had not taken place." Whether, under the name

"franchises and privileges," an immunity from taxation would pass

to the new company may admit of some doubt, in view of the decis-

ions of this court, which, upon this point, are not easy to be recon-

ciled. In the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway v. Miller, 114 U. S.

176, it was held that an immunity from taxation enjoyed by tbe Cov-

ington and Ohio Railway Company did not pass to a purchaser of

such road under foreclosure of a mortgage, although the act provided

that "said purchaser shall forthwith be a corporation." and "shall

succeed to all such franchises, rights and privileges * * * as

would have been had * * * by the first company but for such

sale and conveyance." It was held, following in this particular,

Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217, that the words "franchises,

rights and privileges" did not necessarily embrace a grant of an ex-
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Upon the other hand, it was held in Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117

U. S. 139, that the right to have shares in its capital stock exempted

from taxation within the state is conferred upon a railroad corpora-

tion by state statutes granting to it "all the rights, powers and privi-

leges" conferred upon another corporation named, if the latter cor-

poration possesses by law such right of exemption, citing in support

of this principle a number of prior cases. See also Wilmington and

Weldon Railroad v. Alsbrook, 146 U. S. 279, 297.

But the decisive answer to this objection is that the legislature had

no power, in 1869, to extend to a new corporation created by the

consolidation an exemption contained in an act passed in 1857, before

the constitution was adopted, and hence that, under the terms of this

act, we can not hold that immunity from taxation passed as a fran-

chise or privilege to the consolidated corporation. The construction

claimed by the defendant would be directly in the teeth of the consti-

tutional provision that no property shall be exempted from taxation.

While, as heretofore observed, an exemption from taxation contained
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in a charter previously granted could not be taken away by this con-

stitutional provision without the impairment of the obligation of a

contract, it doubtless applies to all corporations thereafter formed

either by original charter or by the consolidation of prior corporations

under the act of 1869. * * *

Affirmed. Harlan and Brewer, JJ., dissent.

Note. See note at end of section 288, infra, Nos. 1, 4 and 5.

Sec. 287. (d) Effect of consolidation upon creditor's rights.

COMPTON v. RAILWAY COMPANY.1

1888. In the Supreme Court of Ohio. 45 Ohio State Reports

593-625.

[In 1862 the Toledo and Wabash Railway Company, formed by the

consolidation of a road in this state with one in the state of Indiana,

emption or immunity. See also Picard v. Tennessee, etc., Railroad,
130 u. s. 637.
Upon the other hand, it was held in Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117
U. S. r 39, that the right to have shares in its capital stock exempted
from taxation within the state is conferred upon a railroad corporation by state statutes granting to it "all the rights, powers and privileges" conferred upon another corporation named, if the latter corporation possesses by law such right of exemption, citing in support
of this principle a number of prior cases. See also Wilmington and
Weldo~ Railroad v. Alsbrook, 146 U. S. 279, 297.
But the decisive answer to this objection is that the legislature had
no power, in 1869, to extend to a new corporation created by the
consolidation an exemption contained in an act passed in 1857, before
the constitution was adopted, and hence that, under the terms of this
act, we can not hold that immunity from taxation passed as a franchise or privilege to the consolidated corporation. The construction
claimed by the defendant would be directly in the teeth of the constitutional provision that no property shall be exempted from taxation.
While, as heretofore observed, an exemption from taxation contained
in a charter previously granted could not be taken away by this constitutional provision without the impairment of the obligation of a
contract, it doubtless applies to all corporations thereafter formed
either by original charter or by the consolidation of prior corporations
under the act of 1869. • • •
Affirmed. Harlan and Brewer, JJ., dissent.
Note. See note at end of section 288, infra, Nos. l, 4 and 5.

issued $600,000 of what were termed convertible equipment bonds,

payable in 1S83, and bearing interest at the rate of seven per cent.,

payable annually. It operated its road until 1865, when it was con-

solidated with certain roads in the state of Illinois, the new company

being called the Toledo, Wabash and Western Railway Company. It

See. 287.

( d) Effect of consolidation upon creditor's rights.

was stipulated in the agreement forming the basis of the consolida-

COMPTON v. RAILWAY COMPANY. 1

tion that these equipment bonds should be "protected" by the new

company at their maturity. In 1873 the last-named company, con-

tinuing to own and operate its road, issued certain bonds amounting

1888.

IN

THE

SUPREME CouRT

OF

Omo.

45 Ohio State Reports

592-625.

to $5,000,000, and secured the same by a mortgage upon all its

* Statement of facts abridged, arguments and part of opinion omitted.

[In 1862 the Toledo and Wabash Railway Company, formed by the
consolidation of a road in this state \·v ith one in the state of Indiana,
issued $6oo,ooo of what were termed convertible equipment bonds,
payahle in 1883, and bearing interest at the rate of seven per cent. ,
payable annually. It operated its road until 1865, when it was consolidated with certain roads in the state of Illinois, the new company
being called the Toledo, Wabash and Westcm Railway Company. It
was stipulated in the agreement forming the basis of the consolidation that these equipment bonds should be "protected" by the new
company at their maturity. In 1873 the last-named company, continuing to own and operate its road, issued certain bonds amounting
to $5 1 000,000, and secured the same by a mortgage upon all its
1

Statement of facts abridged, arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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property. Under proceedings begun in 1875 for the foreclosure of

this mortgage in the courts of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, the road

property. Under proceedings begun in 1875 for the foreclosure of
this mortgage in the courts of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, the road
was sold in 1877 to one Ellis and two others associated with him, it
being specially provided in the decree rendered in the court of this
state, the common pleas of Lucas county, that the sale should be
made "without prejudice to any claim which may be made by the
holders" of the above-named equipment bonds. The owner of the
road at the commencement of this suit, The Wabash, St. Louis and
Pacific Railway Company, derives its title from Ellis and his associates.
The case, after judgment for plaintiff in the common pleas court,
was appealed by the defendants to the district court, where it was
reserved for decision to the supreme court upon an agreed statement
of facts.]
MINSHALL, ].
The principal grounds upon which the plaintiff asserts his right to relief are ( 1) the provisions of the statute under
which the proceedings in consolidation were had; (2) the stipulation
in the agreement forming the basis of the consolidation; and ( 3) the
mortgage executed by the new company in 1867, known as the consolidated mortgage.
( 1) The bonds owned by the plaintiff, amounting at their face
value to $150,000, were issued by the Toledo and Wabash Railway
Company in 1862, were unsecured by mortgage on the property of
the company, and the entire series, of which they were part, were
d enominated convertible equipment bonds, and amounted to $6oo.ooo,
payable in 1883, bearing interest at the rate of 7 per cent., payable
semi-annually, with the usual coupons attached. The company had
been formed by the consolidation of the road of a company in Ohio
with one of a company in Indiana, under the laws of these states,
and its road extended from Toledo in the former, to State Line city
in the latter, state. It operated its road until in 1865, when it was
consolidated with certain other roads in the state of Illinois, the new
company thus formed taking the name of the Toledo, Wabash and
Western Railway Company.
The consolidation was had under the laws of the several states in
which the constituent roads were located, the statute in this state applicable to the transaction being the act of April 10, 1856 (r 8. &
C. 327). The act required that an agreement forming the basis of
the consolidation shou ld be presented to the stockholders of the respective companies at separate meC'tings called for that purpose upon
due notice; and then provided that upon its adoption by a vote of t\vothirds of the stockholders, the filing of the agreement with the requisite certificate of its adoption, by the secretary of each company. in
the office of the secretary of state, and the election of directors hy the
stockholders of the new company, the consolidation should be deemed
complete, and that a ll the rights, pri\'ilegcs and franchises and all the
property of every description "of each of the corporations, parties to
the same • • • shall be deemed to be transferred and ,·ested ;n
such new corporation without further act or deed," with this exprel'.."

was sold in 1877 to one Ellis and two others associated with him, it

being specially provided in the decree rendered in the court of this

state, the common pleas of Lucas county, that the sale should be

made "without prejudice to any claim which may be made by the

holders" of the above-named equipment bonds. The owner of the

road at the commencement of this suit, The Wabash, St. Louis and

Pacific Railway Company, derives its title from Ellis and his associ-

ates.

The case, after judgment for plaintiff in the common pleas court,

was appealed by the defendants to the district court, where it was

reserved for decision to the supreme court upon an agreed statement

of facts.]

Mwshall, J. The principal grounds upon which the plaintiff as-

serts his right to relief are (1) the provisions of the statute under

which the proceedings in consolidation were had; (2) the stipulation

in the agreement forming the basis of the consolidation; and (3) the
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mortgage executed by the new company in 1867, known as the con-

solidated mortgage.

(1) The bonds owned by the plaintiff, amounting at their face

value to $150,000, were issued by the Toledo and Wabash Railway

Company in 1862, were unsecured by mortgage on the property of

the company, and the entire series, of which they were part, were

denominated convertible equipment bonds, and amounted to $600,000,

payable in 1883, bearing interest at the rate of 7 per cent., payable

semi-annually, with the usual coupons attached. The company had

been formed by the consolidation of the road of a company in Ohio

with one of a company in Indiana, under the laws of these states,

and its road extended from Toledo in the former, to State Line city

in the latter, state. It operated its road until in 1865, when it was

consolidated with certain other roads in the state of Illinois, the new

company thus formed taking the name of the Toledo, Wabash and

Western Railway Company.

The consolidation was had under the laws of the several states in

which the constituent roads were located, the statute in this state ap-

plicable to the transaction being the act of April 10, 1856 (1 S. &

C. 327). The act required that an agreement forming the basis of

the consolidation should be presented to the stockholders of the re-

spective companies at separate meetings called for that purpose upon

due notice ; and then provided that upon its adoption by a vote of two-

thirds of the stockholders, the filing of the agreement with the requi-

site certificate of its adoption, by the secretary of each companv. in

the office of the secretary of state, and the election of directors by the

stockholders of the new company, the consolidation should be deemed

complete, and that all the rights, privileges and franchises and all the

property of every description "of each of the corporations, parties to

the same * * * shall be deemed to be transferred and vested in

such new corporation without further act or deed," with this express
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proviso, "that all rights of creditors, and all liens upon the property
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of either of said corporations, shall be preserv ed unimpaired, and the

respective corporations may be deemed to be in existence to preserve

the same; and all debts, liabilities and duties of either of said com-

panies shall thenceforth attach to said new corporation and be en-

forced against it to the same extent as if said debts, liabilities and

duties, had been contracted by it." Whilst the Indiana statute is not

so definite in its provisions as to the rights of creditors of the constitu-

ent companies as our own, yet an effect has been given it by the con-

struction of its courts that is substantially the same. McMahan v.

Morrison, 16 Ind. 172; Indianapolis, C. & L. R. Co. v. Jones, 29

Ind. 465.

What, then, is the sum of the rights of creditors that, as against

proceedings had under it, arc to be preserved unimpaired? It is true

that, ordinarily, a creditor has no right that will interfere with that of

his debtor to sell and dispose of his property for a valuable consider-

ation, unless he has taken the precaution to acquire some lien upon

it, by mortgage or otherwise, as a security in his own behalf. As a
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rule the right of an unsecured creditor is confined to the personal ob-

ligation and the undisposed of property of his debtor; still it is not

strictly accurate to sav that such creditor has no claim upon the prop-

erty of his debtor, for in one sense all the property owned by a debtor,

unless exempt by statute from sale on execution, is subject to the

claims of his creditors, and he can not dispose of it, unless for a

valuable consideration, so as to defeat this right. It is upon this

principle that relief is constantly afforded creditors in equity against

conveyances in fraud of their rights. Hence the right of a creditor,

though unsecured, to maintain an action for a personal judgment, is

not the sum of his rights. These may arise from a variety of cir-

cumstances, conferring not merely a right to a personal judgment for

money, but to have it satisfied from certain specific property formerly

owned by the debtor, irrespective of its acquisition by others. The

decease of the debtor, assignments made by him, his bankruptcy, loss

of the power to own and acquire property, as, for example, the dis-

solution of a corporation, or the civil death of the debtor, are some

of the most frequent instances in which this right of the creditor has

been recognized.

But the question presented here is not general, but special: It is,

what are the rights of unsecured creditors of an incorporated railway

company whose entire road and property have been transferred to a

new company, formed by its consolidation with other roads, under the

laws of this state? The general doctrine that all the property of a

corporation is a trust fund for its creditors, and that upon its dissolu-

tion they have the right to require that it be applied in payment of

their claims, is not controverted by the defendants. There seems to

be no conflict in the authorities as to this, and that the right gives rise

to an equitable lien upon the property in favor of the creditor that is

superior to the claims of every one but purchasers for value without

notice. Story Eq. Juris., § 1252; 2 Kent Com., 307, and note 6; Mor.

proviso, "that all rights of creditors, and all liens upon the property
of either of said corporations, shall be preserved unimpaired, and the
respective corporations may be deemed to be in existence to preserve
the same; and all debts, liabilities and duties of either of said companies shall thenceforth attach to said new corporation and be enforced against it to the same extent :is if said debts, liabilities and
dutjes, had been contracted by it." Whilst the Indiana statute is not
so definite in its provisions as to the rights of creditors of the constituent companies as our own, yet an effect has been given it by the construction of its courts that is substantially the same. McMahan v.
Morrison, 16 Ind. 172; Indianapolis, C. & L. R. Co. v. Jones, 29
Ind. 465.
What, then, is the sum of the rights of creditors that, as against
proceedings had under it, are to be preserved unimpaired? It is true
that, ordinarily, a creditor has no right that will interfere with that of
his debtor to sell and dispose of his property for a valuable consideration, unless he has taken the precaution to acquire some lien upon
it, by mortgage or otherwise, as a security in his own behalf. As a
rule the right of an unsecured creditor is confined to the personal obligation and the undisposed of property of his debtor; still it is not
strictly accurate to say that such creditor has no claim upon the property of his debtor, for in one sense all the property owned by a debtor,
unless exempt by statute from sale on execution, is subject to the
claims of his creditors, and he can not dispose of it, unless for a
valuable consideration, so as to defeat this right. It is upon this
principle that relief is constantly afforded creditors in equity against
conveyances in fraud of their rights. Hence the right of a creditor,
though unsecured, to maintain an action for a personal judgment, is
not the sum of his rights. These may arise from a variety of circum tances, conferring not merely a right to a person·a l judgme.nt for
money, but to have it satisfied from certain specific property formerly
owned by the debtor, irrespective of its acquisition by others. The
decease of the debtor, assignments made by him, his bankruptcy, loss
of the power to own and acquire property, as, for example. the dissolution of a corporation, or the civil death of the debtor, are some
of the most frequ ent instances in which this right of the creditor has
been recognized.
But the question presented here is not general, but special: It is,
what are the rights of unsecured creditors of an incorporated railway
company whose entire road and property have been transferred to a
new company, formed by its consolidation with other roads, under the
laws of this state? The 'general doctrine that all the property of a
corporation is a trust fund for its creditors, and that upon its di ;;sol11tion they have the right to require that it be applied in pay ment of
their claims, is not controverted by the defendants. There seem ;; to
be no conflict in the authorities as to this, and that the right give..; rise
to an equitable lien upon the property in favor of the creditor that is
superior to the claims of every one but purchasers for value without
notice. Story Eq. Juris.,§ 1252; 2 Kent Com., 307, and note b; Mor.
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Priv. Cor., §§ 780, 1035; Mont, and West Point R. Co. v. Branch,

59 Ala- !53-

Pri,·. Cor., §§ 780, 1035; Mont. and West Point R. Co. v. Branch,
59 Ala. 153.
Nor can there be much question but that by l'.'.onsolidation the prior
companies are extinguished for all pm'poses except to preserve the
rights of their creditors, for which purpose they "may," in the language of the law, "be deemed to be in existence." The obsen·ation of Mr. Justice Swayne, in construing this statute in Shields v.
Ohio, 95 U. S. 319, that "it was a condition precedent to the existence of the new corporation that the old ones should first surrender
their vitality and submit to dissolution" is quite accurate.
It is, however, claimed by the defendants that no new rights are
confen·ed by the statute upon creditors; tlrnt if they were unsecured
before, they remain such after, the consolidation; and that the new
company may deal with the property-may sell or mortgage it-as
could have been done, and with like effect, by the former company
had it continued the owner thereof. This argument is placed upon
two grounds, ( 1) the assumption that the transaction is analogous to
a sale, and (2) that such is the effect of the statute upon all contrncts made subsequent to its passage. We will consider them seria-

Nor can there be much question but that by consolidation the prior

companies are extinguished for all purposes except to preserve the

rights of their creditors, for which purpose they "may," in the lan-

guage of the law, "be deemed to be in existence." The observa-

tion of Mr. Justice Swayne, in construing this statute in Shields v.

Ohio, 95 U. S. 319, that "it was a condition precedent to the exist-

ence of the new corporation that the old ones should first surrender

their vitality and submit to dissolution" is quite accurate.

It is, however, claimed by the defendants that no new rights are

conferred by the statute upon creditors; that if they were unsecured

before, they remain such after, the consolidation; and that the new

company may deal with the property—may sell or mortgage it—as

could have been done, and with like effect, by the former company

had it continued the owner thereof. This argument is placed upon

two grounds, (1) the assumption that the transaction is analogous to

a sale, and (2) that such is the effect of the statute upon all con-

tracts made subsequent to its passage. We will consider them seria-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

tim.

1. The first is, as we think, certainly erroneous. Whilst the

transaction has some of the features, it is wanting in the essential ele-

ments of a sale. A sale implies a vendor and a vendee, and by it the

tim.

former sells and transfers a thing that he owns to the latter for a price

paid or to be paid to himself. The vendor parts with nothing but his

1. The first is, as we think, certainly erroneous.
Whilst the
· transaction has some of the features, it is wanting in the essential elements of a sale. A sale implies a vendor and a vendec, and by it the
former sells and tram.fers a thing that he owns to the latter for a price
paid or to be paid to himself. The vendor parts with nothing but bi
p;·operty, and for it receives a quid pro quo. Such is not the case
where companies arc consolidated under this statute. It i true that
the owner of each constituent road parts with its property. But it
does much more; it not only parts with its property, but cea ·es to b e
a juristical entity, capable of o-wning or acquiring property. It does
not, and could not, receive any consideration for the transfer. becau e
it is extinguished and dissolved by the act of its stockholders in a senting to the proposed agreement. It is futile to urge that the consideration is received by the stockholders. They are not the corporation.
nor do they represent it in its relation to its creditors. "An essential
incident of corporations is that their rights are not \"ested in the :ig gregate of indi\'iduals, but in the ideal whole, regarded as distin ct
from the members of which it is composed." Per Mr. Poste in hi
edition of Gaius, 154. And see Rank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 P e t.
519, 587. There has been no relaxation of this principle in its application to the relation of an incorporated company to its creditors. It
is the owner in law and equity of all its corporate property. and it,
and not the stockholders, is the debtor in all corporate obligations.
Mor. Priv. Corp., 2 ed., § 227. Moreover, in a consolidation of
companies, the stockholders receive no part of the property or as. e t
of their respective companies; th ese pass to the ownership of the ne w
company. All that the stockholders of either of the old compani e~
receive is stock in the new company in exchange for \vhat t h e~· he-Id
in the former company. We must look elsewhere for the analogin

property, and for it receives a quid pro quo. Such is not the case

where companies are consolidated under this .statute. It is true that

the owner of each constituent road parts with its property. But it

does much more; it not onlv parts with its property, but ceases to be

a juristical entity, capable of owning or acquiring property. It does

not, and could not, receive any consideration for the transfer, because

it is extinguished and dissolved by the act of its stockholders in assent-

ing to the proposed agreement. It is futile to urge that the consider-

ation is received by the stockholders. They are not the corporation,

nor do they represent it in its relation to its creditors. "An essential

incident of corporations is that their rights are not vested in the ag-

gregate of individuals, but in the ideal whole, regarded as distinct

from the members of which it is composed." Per Mr. Po.ste in his

edition of Gaius, 154. And see Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet.

519, 587. There has been no relaxation of this principle in its appli-

cation to the relation of an incorporated company to its creditors. It

is the owner in law and equity of all its corporate property, and it,

and not the stockholders, is the debtor in all corporate obligations.

Mor. Priv. Corp., 2 ed., § 227. Moreover, in a consolidation of

companies, the stockholders receive no part of the property or assets

of their respective companies; these pass to the ownership of the new

company. All that the stockholders of either of the old companies

receive is stock in the new company in exchange for what thev held

in the former company. We must look elsewhere for the analogic
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acquires the property of certain old ones. We are not without such

analogies. They are to be found in the numerous instances in ancient

and modern law, where, to use the terminology of the Roman civil

law, a universitas juris is transferred. The term expresses the legal

conception of a university or bundle of rights and liabilities, belonging

to one person and constituting, as it were, his legal personality; and

where these are transferred by one and the same act to another, the

latter is said to acquire per univcrsitatem, that is, he becomes clothed

with the rights and legal duties of the individual to whose personality

he succeeds. Among some of the leading instances of such acquisi-

tion are—(i) a succession to an inheritance by an heir—somewhat

obscured in the common law by its division between the heir and the

personal representative of the deceased (Maine Anc. Law, 180);

(2) where, by adrogation, one not under power became the son of

another, and the adrogator by the diminution of the status of the

adrogatus, or adopted son, acquired his property and, by prajtorian

law, became liable for his debts to the extent of the property so ac-

quired; (3) co-emption, where the husband acquired, by the mar-
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riage, the property of the wife, and by a remedy furnished by the

pi ajtor, was made liable for her debts in the same manner as in the

case of adrogation. And in the common law may be suggested, not

merely the case of an inheritance transmitted by the death of the an-

cestor, but also the estate of one regarded as civiliter mortus, which

was transmitted and administered upon as that of a person in fact de-

ceased. And the succession of an assignee in bankruptcy to the en-

tire property of a bankrupt is, as observed by Sir Henry Sumner

Maine, a modified form of a universal succession. And, he says:

"Were it common among us for persons to take assignments of all a

man's property on condition of paying all his debts, such examples

would exactly resemble the universal successions known to the oldest

Roman law." Maine Anc. Law, 180.

In all these cases the point most to be observed, is the extreme care

of the law to secure the rights of creditors. The case of an inheri-

tance is familiar and needs little or no comment—the creditors of the

deceased are regarded as having a lien upon the property of the de-

ceased, and this is secured to them through the methods of administra-

tion, and so in the case of those regarded as being civilly dead, for

example in the case of a monk, the individual, in anticipation of be-

coming a "monk professed," could make a will and appoint his own

executor, but if he did not, administration was awarded by the ordi-

nary as upon the estate of one in fact deceased. 1 Bl. Com., 132.

For some reason, not well understood, neither the adrogator nor the

husband in a marriage by co-emption was, by the ancient civil law,

liable to creditors for the debts of the person thus reduced to his

power. But a remedy was provided at an early period through an

action given by the prsetor, in which, by a fiction, the former status

of the debtor was deemed to continue, and this, like all fictions intro-

duced to favor the remedy, could not be disputed, and preserved the

to the transactions whereby, through consolidation, a new company
acquires the property of certain old <~>nes. We are not without such
analogies. They are to be found in the numerous instances in ancient
and modern law, where, to use the terminology of the Roman civil
law, a unt'versitas juri's is transferred. The term expresses the legal
conception of a university or bundle of rights and liabilities, belonging
to one person and constituting, as it were, his legal personality; and
where the ·e are transferred by one and the same act to another, the
latter is said to acquire p er univcrst'tatem, that is, he becomes clothed
with the rights and legal duties of the individual to whose personality
he succeeds. Among some of the leading instances of such acquisition are-( 1) a succession to an inheritance by an heir-somewhat
obscured in the common law by its division between the heir and the
personal representative of the deceased (Maine Anc. Law, 180);
(2) where, by adrogation, one not under power became the son of
another, and the adrogator by the diminution of the status of the
adrogatus, or adopted son, acquired his property and, by prretorian
law, became liable for his debts to the extent of the property so acquired; e3) co-emption, where the husband acquired, by the marriage, the property of the wife, and by a remedy furnished by the
prretor, was made liable for her debts in the same manner as in the
case of adrogation. And in the common law may be sugge ted, not
merely the case of an inheritance transmitted by the death of the ancestor, but also the estate of one regarded as ct'viliter mortus, which
wa transmitted and administered upon as that of a person in fact deceased. And the succession of an assignee in bankruptcy to the entire property of a bankrupt is, as observed by Sir Henry Sumner
Maine, a modified form of a universal succession. And, he says:
"\Vere it common among us for persons to take assignments of all a
man's property on condition of paying all his debts, such examples
would exactly resemble the universal successions knovm to the oldest
Roman law." Maine Anc. Law, 180.
In all these cases the point most to be observed, is the extreme care
of the law to secure the rights of creditors. The case of an inheritance is familiar and needs little or no comment-the creditors of the
<l eceased are regarded as having a lien upon the property of the deceased, and t his is secured to them through the m ethods of administration, and so in the case of those regarded a heing civilly dead, for
example in the ca se of a monk, the individual, in anticipation of becoming a "monk professed," could make a will and appoint hi s own
executor, but if he did not, administration was awarded by the ordinary as upon the estate of one in fact deceased. 1 Bl. Com., 13 2.
For some reason, not well understood, neither the adrogator nor the
husb:md in a marriage by co-emption was, by the ancient civil law,
liable to creditors for the debts of the person thus reduced to his
power. But a remedy was provided at an early period through an
action given by the prretor, in which, by a fiction, the former status
of the dehtor \>va.s deemed ~o continue, and this, like all fi ct ion s introduced to favor the remedy, could not be disputed, and preserved the
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rights of the creditor as against the property of his debtor. Poste's

Gaius Inst., bk. 3, § 84; Poste's Gaius Inst., bk. 4, § 38, and com-

rights of the creditor as against the property of his debtor. Poste's
Gaius Inst., bk. 3, § 84; Poste_'s Gaius Inst., bk. 4 , § 38, and comments by Poste, p. 521; Just. Inst., bk. 3, tit. 10, §§ 1-3; and
Hunter Rom. Law (2d ed.), 741. And it is worthy of note in this
connection that our statute regulating proceedings in consolidation,
provides that, to preserve the rights of creditors, " the resp ective corporations may be deemed to be in ex istence." It thus appears to be
a principle of uniYersal law that the d eath , real or supposed, of an
individual, possessed of property and owing debts, gives to his creditors a right to have his property applied to the satisfaction of their
claims. It is a misapprehension of the doctrine to say that its application to the consolidation of railway companies ·would make every
consolidation an assignment for the benefit of creditors. The new
company does not take the property as assignee, but in its own right,
subject only to the p ayment of the debts of the constih1ent companies. This liability is created by statute and the lien results as a consequence. It is not a jus in re, nor a jus ad rem, but a charge in
the na ture of an equitable lien upon the p roperty available against all
purchasers with notice. 3 Porn. Eq. Jur., § 1233, and note 3. The
reason underly ing the principle upon which the law proceeds in all
this class of cases is, that the debtor does not merely part with his
property and rights, but also loses his capacity to own and acquire
property; and all that is left the creditor upon which he trusted bis
debtor-property constituting the principal ground of credit in all
cases-is the property that his debtor o-wned, and to that he has the
right to look for the satisfaction of his claim, the person v.-110m he
trusted having ceased to be. It is no answer to this to say th at the
new company is required to assume the payment of the d ebts of the
old companies. I a m aware that the convenience of trade and commerce has so changed the ancient doctrines of the common law that a
d ebtor may be required in a variety of instances to accept as a creditor
one with whom he did not in fact contract; but I know of no instance in which it can be said that a creditor can be compelled to accept a n ew debtor in the place of the on e to whom he extended
credit. It is impossible to perce ive how this could be done without
impa iring the obligatio n of the contract. The company with which
he dealt may have possessed ample means to discharge all its debts;
the new one m ay, by reason of the debts of the other companies. be
hopelessly insolvent, and to compel him to accept it as a general
creditor, migh t be but another mode of rob b ing him of his credits.
2. The claim is, however, that such is th e effect of the statute
unde r which the consolid ation was had, and having been in force at
th e time the equ ipment bonds were issued, entered into the contract
and became a part of it. It is difficult to perceive how this claim can
be maintained in the face of the language of the st:1tute heretofore
quot ed, "that all rights of cred itors • • • of eith er of said corporations shal l be preserved unimpa ired." There is no question but
that every statute enters into and forms part of any c.ontract to wllich
it is applicable as a part of the law of the land, but it is not perceived

ments by Poste, p. 521; Just. Inst., bk. 3, tit. 10, §§ 1-3; and

Hunter Rom. Law (2d ed.), 741. And it is worthy of note in this

connection that our statute regulating proceedings in consolidation,

provides that, to preserve the rights of creditors, "the respective cor-

porations may be deemed to be in existence." It thus appears to be

a principle of universal law that the death, real or supposed, of an

individual, possessed of property and owing debts, gives to his cred-

itors a right to have his property applied to the satisfaction of their

claims. It is a misapprehension of the doctrine to say that its appli-

cation to the consolidation of railway companies would make every

consolidation an assignment for the benefit of creditors. The new

company does not take the property as assignee, but in its own right,

subject only to the payment of the debts of the constituent compa-

nies. This liability is created by statute and the lien results as a con-

sequence. It is not a jus in rc, nor a jus ad rem, but a charge in

the nature of an equitable lien upon the property available against all
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purchasers with notice. 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 1233, and note 3. The

reason underlying the principle upon which the law proceeds in all

this class of cases is, that the debtor does not merely part with his

property and rights, but also loses his capacity to own and acquire

property; and all that is left the creditor upon which he trusted his

debtor—property constituting the principal ground of credit in all

cases—is the property that his debtor owned, and to that he has the

right to look for the satisfaction of his claim, the person whom he

trusted having ceased to be. It is no answer to this to say that the

new company is required to assume the payment of the debts of the

old companies. I am aware that the convenience of trade and com-

merce has so changed the ancient doctrines of the common law that a

debtor may be required in a variety of instances to accept as a creditor

one with whom he did not in fact contract; but I know of no in-

stance in which it can be said that a creditor can be compelled to ac-

cept a new debtor in the place of the one to whom he extended

credit. It is impossible to perceive how this could be done without

impairing the obligation of the contract. The company with which

he dealt may have possessed ample means to discharge all its debts;

the new one may, by reason of the debts of the other companies, be

hopelessly insolvent, and to compel him to accept it as a general

creditor, might be but another mode of robbing him of his credits.

2. The claim is, however, that such is the effect of the statute

under which the consolidation was had, and having been in force at

the time the equipment bonds were issued, entered into the contract

and became a part of it. It is difficult to perceive how this claim can

be maintained in the face of the language of the statute heretofore

quoted, "that all rights of creditors * * * of either of said cor-

porations shall be preserved unimpaired." There is no question but

that every statute enters into and forms part of any contract to wbich

it is applicable as a part of the law of the land, but it is not perceived
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how, in the application of this rule, a contract may be impaired or in

any way affected by proceedings had under a statute which by its

terms excludes any such effect. The proposition involves a contradic-

tion in terms. The only question that can be raised in such a case is,

whether a particular effect claimed for a proceeding had under the

statute will or will not impair the contract of a creditor, and an

answer to the question in the affirmative must be fatal to the claim.

No reason is perceived why a different intention should be imputed

to the legislature in the enactment of this law. The object of the

legislature in authorizing the consolidation of railway companies was,

as we apprehend, not to enable the new company to obtain credit by

impairing the securitv of existing creditors of either of the former

roads, but to enable existing companies to unite and form a continu-

ous line of railway under one corporate management between widely

separated points of trade and commerce; and as this may be attained

without impairing the rights of creditors of the constituent roads, a

court might well hesitate to so construe the statute if its provisions

were silent on the subject. It would seem to be quite as consistent
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with a wise public policy to preserve the foundations of commercial

credit as to promote the formation of great lines of interstate com-

merce; both may be necessary to the interests of commerce, but the

one not more than the other.

This view is much strengthened by the further provision as to the

rights of creditors, that "the respective corporations shall be deemed to

be in existence to preserve the same." How, for this purpose, shall they

be deemed to be in existence—as legal entities with or without prop-

erty? Manifestly in the former sense, for the existence of a corporate

entity without property wherewith to answer claims against it would be

of no avail to a creditor; a judgment against it would be without

fruit. The clause was inserted in the interest of creditors, and the

only interpretation that can be of any avail to them can not be rejected

without doing violence to well settled rules of construction. The

statute introduces a fiction much as the praetor did in favor of the

creditors of an adrogatus, and we see no reason why it was1 not in-

tended to answer substantially the same purpose. In a suit by a

creditor, the company, though in fact dissolved, is to be deemed in

existence, and a judgment in his favor, whether against it or the new

company, is to be satisfied from the property owned by the old company

at the time of consolidation as if such proceedings had never been

had; the fact of consolidation is pushed aside, and no one will be

permitted to question the fiction until his rights have been satisfied.

Of this no one as a creditor of the new company can in justice com-

plain. The lien is a result of the proceedings under which the new

company acquired its title to the property, and of it creditors of the

new company have, in law, the same notice they have of prior mort-

gages upon the same property.

The former decisions of this court do not affect the question as to

the rights of creditors. They are simply to the effect that the statute

becomes a part of all subscriptions to the capital stock of a company

how, in the application of this rule, a contract may be impaired or in
any way affected by proceedings had under a statute which by its
terms excludes any such effect. The proposition involves a contradiction in terms. The only question that can be raised in such a case is,
whether a particular effect claimed for a proceeding had under the
statute will or will not impair the contract of a creditor, and an
answer to the question in the affirmative must be fatal to the claim.
No reason is perceived why a different intention should be imputed
to the legislature in the enactment of this law. The object of the
.legislature in authorizing the consolidation of railway companies was,
as we apprehend, not to enable the new company to obtain credit by
impairing the security of existing creditors of either of the former
roads, but to enable existing companies to unite and form a continuQUS line of railway under one corporate management between widely
separated points of trade and commerce; and as this may be attained
without impairing the rights of creditors of the constituent roads, a
court might well hesitate to so construe the statute if its provisions
were silent on the subject. It would seem to be quite as consistent
with a wise public policy to preserve the foundations of commercial
credit as to promote the formation of great . lines of interstate commerce; both may be necessary to the interests of commerce, but the
one not more than the other.
This view is much strengthened by the further provision as to the
rights of creditors, that "the respective corporations shall be deemed to
be in existence to preserve the same." How, for this purpose, shall they
be deemed to be in existence-as legal entities with or without property? Manifest! y in the former sense, for the existence of a corporate
entity without property wherewith to answer claims against it would be
of no avail to a creditor; a judgment against it would be without
fruit. The clause was inserted in the interest of creditors, and the
only interpretation that can be of any avail to them can not be rejected
without doing violence to well settled rules of construction. The
statute introduces a fiction much as the prretor did in favor of the
creditors of an adrogatus, and we see no reason why it was · not intended to answer substantially the same purpose. In a suit by a
creditor, the company, though in fact dissolved, is to be deemed in
existence, and a judgment in his favor, whether against it or the new
company, is to he ·atisficd from the property owned by the old company
at the time of consolidation as if such proceedings had neYer been
had; the fact of consolidation is pushed aside, and no one will be
permitted to question the fiction until his rights haYe been satisfied.
Of this no one as a creditor of the new company can in justice complain. The lien is a result of the proceedings under whi ch the new
company acquired its title to the property, and of it creditors of the
new company have, in law, the same notice they have of prior mortgages upon the same property.
The former decisions of this court do not affect the question as to
the rights of creditors. They are simply to the effect that the statute
becomes a part of all subscriptions to the capital stock of a company
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made subsequent to its passage, so that the same may be recovered in

a suit by the consolidated company brought for that purpose. Mans-

made subseq uent to its passage, so that the sa me may be recovered in
a s uit by the consolidated company brought for that purpose. Man sfield , Coldw. & L. 1. R. C o. v. Brown , 26 Ohio St. 223. The
rig hts of a stockholder are preserved by giving him an election to become one in the new company, or of rleclining, and being paid the
highest market value of his stock at any time within the six months
n ext preceding the making of the agreement, but unless he does so
previou s to the consolidation, he is treated as a stockholde1· in the new
company; and this fact accentuates the construction cla imed for creditors; as no voice is giYen them in the transaction, it is but reasonable
that their rights sho uld be in no way affected by it.
II. The plaintiff does n ot, however, base his claim to relief solely
upon the provision s of tire st atute, but likewise upon the effect of the
stipulation in the agreement forming the basis upon which the consolidati on was had , that the cl ass of bonds owned b y him should be protected , both as to interest and principal, as the same should m ature,
by the new company. The principl e upon which this claim is based
is , that whl're property is tr:111sferred upon the condition that the
grantee shall pay some third p erson a debt or sum of m oney, the latter acquires an equitable lien on the property to the extent of the debt
or sum of money to be paid him. This principle is well recognized
an·d has been app lied in a great variety of cases. A masterly treatment of the doctrine by Ranney , J. , will be found in Clyde v. Simpson. 4 Ohio St. 445. See, also, Story Eq. Juris., §§ 1244-6 ; Porn.
Eq . Juri s.,§ 166 and§ 1234; Montgomery and West P oint R. Co.
v. Branch , 59 Ala. 139; Hamilton v. Gilbert, 2 Hiesk. 680; Vanm eter v. Vanmeter, 3 Grat. 148.
It is true that most of the instances in which this lien has been recognized is where property had b een devised charged with the payment of debts or legacies to others , and for the pl ain rea~on that the
most frequent occasions for its application will arise in such instances,
an<l not because the principle is in its n ature inapplicable to other
transfers of property; for, as is said by R anney, J., in Clyde v. Simpson , supra, a "doctrine resting upon the broad foundations of justice
and conscience " can not be made "to depend upon the manner in
which the titl e is derived." No such limitation has been placed upon
the doctrine by the courts or text-writers. Story Eq. Juris . ,§ 1146.
In Vanrrieter v . Vanmeter, supra, it appears that a g rantor h11d
made a conveyance of all his real estate in consideration of $1 and
the agreement of the grantees to pay his debts and a ce1tain legacy; this was hel<l by the court to constitute a li en upon th e property
in favor of the creditors. Many sim ilar instances v.-ill be found among
the cases cited; and. ind ependent of the provisions of the statute, we
arc unable to see why the principl e, when applied to the facts of this
ca~e, does not create a similar lien in fovor of the holders of these
equipm ent bond ·. It would seem to follow as a corollary from what
has been said as to the lien based upo n the provisions of the tah1te.
Wh atever may be urged against the claim tltat the agreement to protect these bonds imposed the duty of securing them by mortgage or

field, Coldw. & L. M. R. Co. v. Brown, 26 Ohio St. 223. The

rights of a stockholder are preserved by giving him an election to be-

come one in the new company, or of declining, and being paid the

highest market value of his stock at any time within the six months

next preceding the making of the agreement, but unless he does so

previous to the consolidation, he is treated as a stockholder in the new-

company; and this fact accentuates the construction claimed for cred-

itors; as no voice is given them in the transaction, it is but reasonable

that their rights should be in no way affected by it.

II. The plaintiff does not, however, base his claim to relief solely

upon the provisions of the statute, but likewise upon the effect of the

stipulation in the agreement forming the basis upon which the consol-

idation was had, that the class of bonds owned by him should be pro-

tected, both as to interest and principal, as the same should mature,

by the new company. The principle upon which this claim is based

is, that where property is transferred upon the condition that the
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grantee shall pay some third person a debt or sum of money, the lat-

ter acquires an equitable lien on the property to the extent of the debt

or sum of money to be paid him. This principle is well recognized

and has been applied in a great variety of cases. A masterly treat-

ment of the doctrine by Ranney, J., will be found in Clyde v. Simp-

son, 4 Ohio St. 445. See, also, Story Eq. Juris., §§ 1244-6; Pom.

Eq. Juris., § 166 and § 1234; Montgomery and West Point R. Co.

v. Branch, 59 Ala. 139; Hamilton v. Gilbert, 2 Hiesk. 680; Van-

meter v. Vanmeter, 3 Grat. 148.

It is true that most of the instances in which this lien has been rec-

ognized is where property had been devised charged with the pay-

ment of debts or legacies to others, and for the plain reason that the

most frequent occasions for its application will arise in such instances,

and not because the principle is in its nature inapplicable to other

transfers of property; for, as is said by Ranney, J., in Clyde v. Simp-

son, supra, a "doctrine resting upon the broad foundations of justice

and conscience" can not be made "to depend upon the manner in

which the title is derived." No such limitation has been placed upon

the doctrine by the courts or text-writers. Story Eq. Juris., § 1746.

In Vanmeter v. Vanmeter, supra, it appears that a grantor had

made a conveyance of all his real estate in consideration of $1 and

the agreement of the grantees to pay his debts and a certain leg-

acy; this was held by the court to constitute a lien upon the property

in favor of the creditors. Many similar instances will be found among

the cases cited; and, independent of the provisions of the statute, we

are unable to see why the principle, when applied to the facts of this

case, does not create a similar lien in favor of the holders of these

equipment bonds. It would seem to follow as a corollary from what

has been said as to the lien based upon the provisions of the statute.

Whatever may be urged against the claim that the agreement to pro-

tect these bonds imposed the duty of securing them by mortgage or
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otherwise, the least that can be claimed for such agreement is, that it

imposed the duty of paying them, interest and principal, at maturity.

And, as all the property of the company issuing them was transferred

upon the basis of this agreement, the transfer was, at least, upon the

stipulation to pay his claim as a part of the consideration thereof. If,

for the purpose of withdrawing from the cares of business, or any

other reason, a private person were to make a conveyance of all his

property to another upon the agreement of the latter to pay his debts,

it will not be questioned but that such transfer would create an equi-

table lien upon the property in favor of creditors, that would avail

against all persons with notice. This case is everyway analogous to

such a transfer, and no reason exists why it should not be governed

by the same principle so far as the rights of creditors are con-

cerned. The only difference between the real and the supposed case

strengthens the reason of its application to the real one. In the sup-

posed case the person making the transfer may still own and acquire

property, but in the real one, as heretofore shown, the debtor termi-

nates its personality, and can no longer own or acquire anything; all
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that is left the creditor is the property that it owned; and, unless we

disregard all the analogies of the law, this property must be charged

with its debts in the hands of one that succeeded to its place in con-

sideration of the agreement to pay them, and the lien so created must

be superior to the title of all purchasers with notice. * * *

Judgment for plaintiff, finding the amount due and order of sale.

Note. This ease was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. 1897,

Compton v. Jessup, 167 U. S. 1. ,

Note. Consolidation. /

1. Meaning of: A late ease defines consolidation to be "a merger, a union,

otherwise, the least that can be claimed for such agreement is, that it
imposed the duty of paying them, interest and principal, at maturity.
And, as all the property of the company issuing them was tran sferred
upon the basis of this agreement, the transfer was, at least, upon the
stipulation to pay his claim as a part of the consideration thereof. If,
for the purpose of withdrawing from the cares of business, or any
other reason, a private person were to make a conveyance of all his
property to another upon the agreement of the latter to pay his debts,
it v. ill not be questioned but that such transfer would create an equitable lien upon the property in favor of c:reditors, that would avail
against all persons with notice. This case is every way analogous to
such a transfer, and no reason exists why it should not be governed
by the same principle so· far as the rights of creditors are concerned. The only difference between the real and the supposed case
strengthens the reason of its application to the real one. In the supposed case the person making the transfer may still own and acquire
property, but in the real one, as heretofore shown, the debtor terminates its personality, and can no longer own or acquire anything; all
that is left the creditor is the property that it owned; and, unless we
disregard all the analogies of the law, this property must be charged
with its debts in the hands of one that succeeded to its place in con~ideration of the agreement to pay them, and the lien so created must
be superior to the title of all purchasers with notice. • • •
Judg ment for p.laintiff, finding the amount due and order of sale.

or amalgamation, by which the stock of the two is made one, their property

and franchises combined into one. their powers become the powers of one,

their names merged into one, and the identity of the two practically, if not

actually, runs into one."—Hunt, J., in State v. Montana R., 21 Mont. 221, 45

L. R. A 271 (1898i. The fullest discussion of the meaning of consolidation is

in, 1879, Meyer v. Johnson & Stewart, 64 Ala. 603, on 650-669; see also, 1898,

Adams v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. (Miss.), 24 So. Rep. 200, not officially reported;

1899, Rafferty v. liuffalo City Gas Co., 37 App. Div. (N. Y.) 618.

In England the term used is amalgamation, and it there has as uncertain

and undefined a meaning as consolidation here. See Mever v. Johnston, 64

Ala. 603, 651, et seq., and 1898, Wall v. London & N. W. Assetts Corp., 79 L.T.

R. 249.

Illustrations: Power to connect orunite does not permit consolidation: 1895,

Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677; exchange of stock by one

corporation for that, of another does not effect consolidation: 1899, Rafferty v.

Ruffalo City Gas Co., 37 App. Div. (N. Y. 1 618; a short lease is not a consoli-

dation: State v. Montana R., 21 Mont. 221, 45 L. R. A. 271; but a long lease

is practically a consolidation: 1888, State v. Atchison, etc., R., 24 Neb. 113;

power to consolidate does not include a power to sell or lease: 1875, Tippe-

canoe County v. Lafayette, etc., Co., 50 Ind. 85; 1882, State v. Vanderbilt, 37

Ohio St. 590; 1882, Archer v. Terre Haute R. Co., 102 111. 493; 1886,

Mills v. Central R., 41 N. J. Eq. 1 ; 1889. East L. & R. R. Co. v. Texas, 75 Tex.

434; 1892, St. L., etc., R. Co. v Terre Haute, etc., R. Co., 145 TT. S. 393. But

see, contra, 1875, Williamson v. N. J. So. R., 26 N J. E<). 398; 1S82, Branch v.

Jesup, 106 U. S. 468; 1895. Chicago, S. F., etc., Co. v. Ashling. 160 111. 373.

2. Consent of the state is essential; but ratification by the legislature after

Note. This case was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. 1897,
Compton v. J essup, 167 U.S. 1.
Note. Consolidation.
1. Ml'.anillg or: A late case defin es consolidation to be "a merger, a tmion,
or amalgamation, b.v which the stock of the two is made one, their property
and franehises combined into one , their powers bP<·ome the powers of one,
their nam es merge!! into one, an<l tlie idi> nti ty of the two practically, if not
actually, mns into one."-Hnnt, J . , in State v. Montana R., 21 l\'font. 221, 45
L. R. A 271 (18981. The fnllPst discussion of the meaning of consolidat ion is
in. 1879, Mi>yer v . .Johnson & Stewart, 64 .A.In. 603, o n 650-669; see also, 18!!8,
A1lams v. Y nzoo & M. V. R. Co. (J\liss. ), ~4 So. Ri>p. 200, not officially reported;
189H, Rafferty v. Bnffnlo City Gns Co., 37 App. Div. (N. Y.) 618.
In England the term used is amalgamation, and it there h ns as uncertain
and und efi ned n meaning as consolidation here. Rpe Mever v. Johnston, 64
Ala. 603, !i51, et 1w1., a nd 1898, Wall v. Lontlon & N. W. Ass11tts Corp., 79 L. 'l'.
R. 24!l.
lll1111tration.~ : Power to connect or unite does n ot permit con Ro lid at.ion : 1895,
L<misville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677; exchange of stock by one
corporation for that. of another does not Pffec-t. consolidation : 1899, Raffe rty v.
Ruffalo City Gas Co., 37 App. Div. (N. Y. l 6 18; a short l Pa~e iR not a coni:olirlation: Strite v. Montana H., 21 i\Tont. 221, 45 L. R. A. 271; but a long- lenRe
is prnrti<"iill y a consoli<hlt.ion: 1888, State v. Atchison, elf'., R., 24 1\l-'h. H3;
power to consolidate <!ors not include a pow<'r to st>ll or lease : 187-'i, Tippecanoe County v. Lafayette, etc., Cn., !')0 Ind. >15; 1882, Stnfe v. Van<lt>rbilt, ~7
Ohio St. 5!l0; 1882, Arc-her v. Terre Hanle R. Co. , 102 Ill . 493; ] RR6,
Mills v. Ci>ntra l R., 41 N . .T. F.<J. 1; 1889. :Enflt L. & R.R. Co. v. Ti>xllf', 75 Ti>x.
4:34; 1892, St. L ., i>tc- ., R. Co . v T e rre H ante, etc-., R. C:o., 1-1'1 U. R. :·ma. Rnt
see, contrri, 1875, Williarn ~on v. N. J. Ro. R., 26 N J. Eq. 398; 1882, Bnrnch v.
J esup. 106 U. ~ . 468; 1805, Chirttg-o, S. F., e t<'., Co. v. Ashlinj.!', HiO Ill. 378.
2. ConseJtt of the state is essential; but ratification by the l('gis lature after

J
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an attempt at consolidation will be sufficient: 1866, Fisher v. Evansville,

an attempt at consolidation will be sufficient:

etc., R. Co., 7 Ind. 407; 1858, Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. Co., 30 Pa. St.

42, 72 Am. Dec. 685; 1858, Pearce v. Madison, etc., P. R. Co., 21 How. (62
U.S.) 441; 1859, Bishop v . .Brainerd, ::!8 Conn. 289 (ratification); 1861. State
v. Bailey, Hl lud. 46, i\J Am. Dec. 405; 1875, \Varrener v. Kankakee Couuty,
Fed. Cas. li2lJ.:i ; 18i!i, In re Prospect Park, C. I. R. Co., 67 :N. Y. H71, supra ;
18i7, Mead v. 'ew York, H. & 1\1. R. Co., 45 Conn. 199 (ratification ) ; 1883,
M1!<iiouri Pnc. R Co. v. Owens, 1 W. & W. Civ. Uns. (Tex. Ct. App. I,§ 385;
188.) ; Crawfordsville & D. T. Co. v. State, 102 Ind.435; 18Ul, Home Friendly
Soc. v. Tyle r , 9 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 617; 1892, Cameron v. N. Y. & Mt. Y . W . W.,
13:1 ~ - Y. 33U, 31 N. E. R e p. 104; 1893, People v. Hi ce, 138 N. Y. 151, 33 N.
R Hep. 846; 1898, G reenville Compress Co. v. Planters', etc., Co., 70 Miss.
o(i\), :35 Am. Rt. lle p. 1>81; 18\'.15, Louisville & N. R. v. Kentucky, 101 U.S. 67i;
J8U.J, Americnn L. & T. Co. v. l\linn . & N. W. R. Co., 157 Ill. 641, 42 N. E.
Rt'p. 153; l8H8, T ope ka Paper Co. v. Oklahoma P. Co., 7 Okla. 220, 54 Pac.
Rep. 4..iii: rnnn, \\' uod v . Seattle, - Wash.-, 52 L. R. A. 369, note.
The state's permiAsion to consolidate is a license and not the grant of a
fran chise: 1895, Pearsall v. Great N. R. Co., 161 U.S. 646; 1898, Adams v.
Yazoo & :\I. V. R. Co., 24 So. Rep. 200.
3. Consent of shareholders:
(a) In the ubsence of a reserved power to amend or repeal, or a charter or
statutory provision allowing consolidation when the corporation is organized,
th fl unanimous consent of shareholders is essential: 1853, Kenn v. Johnson,
9 N. J. Eq. 401; 18.'iG, Chapman v. Mad River, etc., R. Uo., 6 Ohio St. 119;
1858, Lauman v. Lt>banon Valley R., 30 Pa. SL 42, 72 Am. Dec. 685; 1863,
Clearwater v. Meredith, 1 Wall. (68 U. 8.) 25, aupra, p. 984; 1866, Mowrey v.
Ind. & C.R. Co., 4 Hiss. 78, Fed. Caa. 9891; 1867, Zabris kie v. Hack e nsack,
etc, R., 18 N. J . F.q. 178; 1S73, Bh1ck v. Del. & R. Canal Co., 24 N . J. Eq.
45:); 1882, N. 0 . G. L . Co. v. Louisinna L. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 277; 1886, Mills v.
Central R. Co., 41 N. J. Eq. l; 1888, Botts v. Simpsouville & B. Co., 88 Ky.
ti4, 2 L. R. A. 594; 1890, Deposit Bank of Owensboro v. Barrett, 11 Ky. L. Rep.
910, 13 I:;. W. Rep. 337; 1891, Home :Friendly 8oc. v. Tyler, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. tl li.
Long- aequiescence is sufficient evidence of consent: 189-1, Phinizy v. Augusta, K. R. Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 678.
(b) Under a r ese rved powe r to alter or amenrl a charter, a majority may
be nuthorized to consent ton consolitlatiou against the wishe!-1 of U1e minority:
1856, Railroad Co.. "· Dt~dl ey, 14 N. Y. 336; _1856, Sparrow v. E~nnsville,
etc., R., 7 Ind. 3h9; 1fil>7, l\IcCrny v. Junction R. Co., 1:1 Ind. 3°>8; 1859,
Bishop v . Braint>rd, 28 Conn. 281); 1862, Durfee v. Old Colony R. Co., 5
Allen (i\fass.) 230; 1865, Gardner v . Hamilton Ins. Co., 33 N. Y . 421; 1873.
Nng<'nt v. Hupervisor I l!l Wall ru. S. l 241; 1875, Mansfield, etc., R. Co. v.
Br•iwn, 26 Ohio St. 223; 1877,. tate v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 66 Me. 488; l8i8,
Wil so n v. Salnmanra, 09 U. S . 499; 1885, Middletown v. Boston, etc., R., 53
Conn . 3!)1; 1804, Hale v. Cheshire R. Co., 161 MHss. 443, Si N. E. Rep. 307;
J8!):i, Markel Ht. R . Co. v. H e llman, 109 Cal. 571, 42 Pac. Rep. 225.
Rut th e re are decisiona holding thnt unanimous consent is required under
the r eAerved power to amend: 1Hli7, Zabriskie v. Hackensack R., 18 N. J. Eq.
178; 18!13, Earle v. Sc•atlle, etc., R., 50 F<'ll. Rep. 009.
4. E.f!ect of cnnsolidalion 11po11 f urmP.1· compu11 ies :
The intent of the consolidation statute and agreement controls, but the variouR views are, as to:
I a) Their t>.1 istence: Theories: (1) Old companies are dissolved and go out
of exiRte nce, thi>re hei ng a new <'Om pany on ly after eonsolidation: 1861, State
v. Bailey, Hi Ind. 4fi, 79 Am. De!'. 405; 1863, Clf'arwat~r v . Meredith, 1 Wnll.
25,supra,p.1184;1868, Indinnapolis C. & L .ro.v.Jo nes , 29 Jnd .46-5.95 D.
fi.-,4 ; 1Rfi8, Tagart v. N. C.R., :l9 Md. 551; 1875, Rhieltls v. Stnte, 26 Ohio St.
86; 1R7i, ShiPlrls v. Ohio, !15 1 . R. 319; 1878, Rnilrond Co. v. Georiria, 98 U.
R. 3Ml; IRR2, N. 0 . Gae; Li!!ht & H . Co. v. L. L. & II . Co., 11 Fed. Rt>p. 2ii;
1R8H, S I. Lo uis, I . M. & ,'. R. v. Tie rry, 41 Ark. !)09; 1888, Kan saA, 0. & T . R.
Co. v. Smith, 40 Kan. 192; 18!14, Keokuk & W . H.. Co. v . State, J!l2 U .S. 301.
1>11.µru, J.>. v ,,,; 10.J.,, 1.. uu111 ·11 0. 0. C., etc., R. Co. v. Lawrence, 3 Kan. Al11··

U.S.) 441; 1859, Bishop v. Brainerd, 28 Conn. 289 (ratification); 1801, State

v. Bailey, 1H Ind. 46, 79 Am. Dec. 405; 1875, Warrener v. Kankakee County,

Fed. Caw. 17205; 1876, In re Prospect Park, C. I. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 871, supra;

1877, Mead v. New York, H. & M. Ii. Co., 45 Conn. 199 (ratification); 1883,

Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Owens, 1 W. & W. Civ. Cas. (Tex. Ct. App.), § 385;

1885; Crawfordsville & D. T. Co. v. State, 102 Ind. 435; 1891, Home Friendly

Soc. v. Tyler, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 617; 1892, Cameron v. N. Y. & Mt. V. W. W.,

133 N. Y. 336, 31 N. E. Rep. 104; 1893, People v. Rice, 138 N. Y. 151, 33 N.

E. Rep. 840; 1893, Greenville Compress Co. v. Planters', etc., Co., 70 Miss.

009, 35 Am. St. Rep. 681; 1895, Louisville & N. R. v. Kentucky, 101 U. S.677;

1895, American L. & T. Co. v. Minn. & N. W. R. Co., 157 111. 641, 42 N. E.

Rep. 153; 1898, Topeka Paper Co. v. Oklahoma P. Co., 7 Okla. 220, 54 Pao.

Rep. 455; 1900, Wood v. Seattle, — Wash. —, 52 L. R. A. 309, note.

The state's permission to consolidate is a license and not the grant of a

franchise: 1895, Pearsall v. Great N. R. Co., 161 U. S. 646; 1898, Adams v.

Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 24 So. Rep. 200.
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1856, Fisher v. Evansville,

etc., R. Co., 7 Ind. 40i; 1858, Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. Co., 30 Pa. St.

42, 72 Am. Dec. 085; 1858, Pearce v. Madison, etc., P. R. Co., 21 How. (62

3. Consent of shareholders:

(a) In the absence of a reserved power to amend or repeal, or a charter or

statutory provision allowing consolidation when the corporation is organized,

the unanimous consent of sbareholders is essential: 1853, Kean v. Johnson,

9 N. J. Eq. 401; 1856, Chapman v. Mad River, etc., R. Co., 0 Ohio St. 119;

1858, Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R., 30 Pa. St. 42, 72 Am. Dec. 685; 1863,

Clearwater v. Meredith, 1 Wall. (68 U. S.) 25, supra, p. 984; 1806, Mowrev v.

Ind. & C. R. Co., 4 Biss. 78, Fed. Cas. 9891; 1807, Zabriskie v. Hackensack,

etc , R., 18 N. J. Eq. 178; 1873, Black v. Del. & K. Canal Co., 24 N. J. Eq.

455; 1882, N. O. G. L. Co. v. Louisiana L. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 277; 1880, Mills v.

Central R. Co., 41 N. J. Fq. 1; 1888, Botts v. Simpsonville & B. Co., 88 Kv.

54, 2L. R. A. 594; 1890, Deposit Bank of Owensboro v. Barrett, 11 Kv. L. Rep.

910, 13 S. W. Kep. 337; 1891, Home Friendly Soc. v. Tyler, 9 Pa. Co. Ct.017.

Long acquiescence is sufficient evidence of consent: 1894, Phinizy v. Au-

gusta, K. R. Co., 02 Fed. Rep. 678.

(6) Under a reserved power to alter or amend a charter, a majority may

be authorized to consent to a consolidation against the wishes of the minority:

1856, Railroad Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 330; 1850, Sparrow v. Evansville,

etc., R., 7 Ind. 309; 1857, "McCray v. Junction R. Co., 9 Tnd. 358; 1859,

Bishop v. Brainerd, 28 Conn. 289; 1802, Durfee v. Old Colony R. Co., 5

Allen (Mass.) 230; 1805, Gardner v. Hamilton Ins. Co., 33 N. Y. 421; 1873.

Nugent v. Supervisors, 19 Wall (U. S.) 241; 1875, Mansfield, etc., R. Co. v.

Brown, 20 Ohio St. 223; 1877, State v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 00 Me. 488; 1878,

Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 U. S. 499; 1885, Middletown v. Boston, etc., R., ,53

Conn. 351; 1894, Hale v. Cheshire R. Co., 161 Mass. 443, 37 N. E. Rep. 307;

1895, Market St. R. Co. v. Hellman, 109 Cal. 571, 42 Pac. Rep. 225.

But there are decisions holding that unanimous consent is required under

the reserved power to amend: 1807, Zabriskie v. Hackensack R., 18 N. J. Eq.

178; 1893, Earle v. Seattle, etc., R., 50 Fed. Rep. 909.

4. Effect of consolidation upon former companies:

The intent of the consolidation statute and agreement controls, but the va-

rious views are, as to:

la) Their existence: Theories: (1) Old companies are dissolved and go out

of existence, there being a new company only after consolidation: 1861, State

v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46, 79 Am. Dec. 405; 1803, Clearwater v. Meredith, 1 Wall.

25,«i/j>;a,p.984;1868, Indianapolis C. & L. Co. v. Jones, 29 Ind. 4(55. 95 D.

054; 1808, Tagart v. N. 0. R., 29 Md. 557; 1875, Shields v. State, 20 Ohio St.

80; 1877, Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; 1878, Railroad Co. v. Geonria, 98 U.

S. 359; 1882, N. O. Gas Lieht & H. Co v. L. L. & H. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 277;

1888, St. Louis, I. M. <fe S. R. v. Berrv, 41 Ark. 509; 1888, Kansas.O. & T. R.

Co. v. Smith, 40 Kan. 192; 1894, Keokuk & W. R. Co. v. State, 152 U. S. 301.

aupro., p. 9.D; ioj->, V.OUUC1) G. (). C, etc., R. Co. v. Lawrence, 3 Kan. Apj..
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274; 1897, Rio Grande W. R. Co. v. Tellurite, etc., Co., 16 Utah 125, 51 Pac.

itep. 146; 1899, Wagner v. Atchison, T. & 8. F. R. Co., 9 Kan. App. 661, 58

Pac. Rep. 1018; 1901, Yazoo & Miss. V. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 1.

(2) The old companies are not dissolved, the consolidated company being

a giiasi-partnership among the old companies and continuing their existence:

1830, Farnum v. Blackstone Canal Co., 1 Sumner 46; 1871, Pennsylvania

College Cases, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 190; 1873, Columbus, C. & I. C. R. v. Skid-

more, 69 111. 566; 1875, Central R., etc., Co. v. Georgia. 92 U. S. 665; 1876,

Shackelford v. Mississippi C. R. Co., 52 Miss. 159; 1879, Meyer v. Johnson,

64 Ala. 603; 1880, Newport & Cin. Bridge Co. v. Wooley, 78 Kv. 523; 1888,

Edison Elec. L. Co. v. N. H. El. Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 233; 1889, Hancock M.L.

I. Co. v. Worcester, etc., R., 149 Mass. 214; 1890, United States v. So. Pac.

R. Co., 45 Fed. Rep. 596; 1890, Day v. Worcester, N., etc., R. Co., 151 Mass.

302; 1896, Louisville Trust Co. v. L.,N. A., etc., R., 75 Fed. Rep. 433.

(6) Their property: Becomes that of the succeeding company. See infra,

this note, 5 (6), (3).

(c) Their rights generally: These become those of the successor company.

See infra, this note 5 (a), (6).
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(d) Their liabilities: These continue against the old company, although

they are usually enforcible against the consolidated company: 1873, Prouty

v. Lake S., etc., R. Co., 52 N. Y. 363; 1874, Montgomery &W. P. R. Co. v.

Boring, 51 Ga. 582; 1876, Shackelford v. Miss., etc., R. Co., 52 Miss. 159;

1877, Montgomery, etc., R. v. Branch, 59 Ala. 139; 1888, Louisville, etc., R.

v. Boney, 117 Ind. 501; 1888, Compton v. R. Co., 45 Ohio St. 592; 1895, Mar-

ket St. R. v. Hellman, 109 Cal. 571; 1897, Compton v. Jesup, 167 U. S. 1;

1897, Santa Fe Elec. Co. v. Hitchcock, 9 N. M. 156, 50 Pac. Rep. 332; 1897,

In re Utica Nat. Bank Co., 154 N. Y. 268. See, infra, this note.

5. Effect as to the consolidated company:

(a) A new corporation, or at least a somewhat different corporation, comes

into existence which, for most business purposes, is a distinct entity from the

constituent corporations: 1868, Racine, etc., R. Co. v. F. L. & T. Co., 49 111.

331; 1875, Wilmer v. The Atlantic, etc , R. Co., 2 Woods 409; 1884, Burger v.

Grand Rapids & I. R., 22 Fed. Rep. 561; 1885, Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Mo.

Pac, etc., Co., 115 D. S. 587; 1886, Graham v. R. Co., 118 U. S. 161; 1888, O.

& M. R. Co. v. People, 123 111. 467; 1890, Fitzgerald v. Mo. Pac. R., 45 Fed.

Rep. 812; 1895, Market St. R. Co. v. Hellman, 109 Cal. 571.

However, as to interstate consolidations the new company is a new company

existing in each state with the powers, rights and franchises that the constit-

uent companies in that state had, but not those that one or more of the con-

stituent companies created in another state had. And for jurisdictional pur-

poses in the United States courts, there are as many new companies (with the

name of the consolidated company^ as there are states authorizing the consol-

idation: 1861, O. & M. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black (66 U. S.) 286; 1865, Countv

of Allegheny v. C. & P. R. Co., 51 Pa. St. 228; 1876, Muller v. Dows, 94 U. 8.

444; 1886, St. Paul & N. P. R. Co. v. Minn., 36 Minn. 85; 1890, Nashua & L.

R. Co. v. B. & L. R. Co., 136 U. S. 356; 1896, St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. James,

161 U. S. 545; 1899, Louisville, N. A., etc., R. Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174

IT. S. 552.

The new company dates its existence from the consolidation: 1875, Shields

v. The State. 26 Ohio St. 86; 1875, Central R. & Banking Co. v. State, 54 Ga.

401; 1876, State v. Northern Cent. R. Co., 44 Md. 131; 1898, Adams v. Yazoo

& M. V. R. Co. (Miss.), 24 So. Rep. 200.

(6) Rights and privileges of the consolidated company:

(1) Special privileges and immunities: As the consolidated company is a new

company dating from the consolidation, as against the state, it is subject to

all the laws existing at the date of consolidation, such as the right to repeal

274; 1897, Rio Grande W.R. Co. v. Telluride, etc., Co., 16 Utah 125, 51 Pac.
itep. 146; 189\J, Wagner v. Atchison,'!'. & S. F. R. Co., 9 Kan. App. 661, 58
Pac. Rep. 1018; 1901, Yazoo & Miss.\'. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 180 U.S. 1.
(2) The old companies are not dissolved, the consolidated company being
a quasi-partnership among the old companies and continuing their existence:
1830, Farnum v. Blackstone Canal Co., I Sumner 46; 1871, Pennsylvania.
College Cases, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 190; 1873, Columbus, C. & I. C.R. v. Skidmore, 69 Ill. 561:1; 1875, Central R., etc., Co. v. Georgia, 92 U. S. 665; 1876,
Shackelford v. Mississippi C.R. Co .. 52 Miss. 159; 1879, Meyer v. Johnson,
64 Ala. 603; 1880, Newport & Cin. Bridge Co. v. Wooley, 78 Ky. 523; 1888,
Edison Elec. L. Co. v. N. H. El. Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 233; 1889, Hancock M. L.
I. Co. v. Worcester, etc., R., 149 Mass. 214; 1890, United States v. So. Pac.
R. Co., 45 Fed. Rep. 596; 1890, Day v. "\:Vorcester, N., etc., R. Co., 151 Mass.
302; 1896, Louisville Trust Co. v. L.,N. A., etc., R., 75 Fed . Rep. 433.
(b) Their property: Becomes that of the succeeding company. See ilifra,
this note, 5 (b), (3).
(c) Their rights generally: These become those of the successor company.
See infra, this note 5 (a), (b).
(d) Their liabilities: These continue against the old company, although
they are usually enforcible against the consolidated company: 1873, Prouty
v. Lake S., etc., R. Co., 52 N. Y. 363; 1874, Montgomery & W . P.R. Co. v.
Boring, 51 Ga. 582; 1876, Suackelford v. Miss., etc., R. Co., 52 Miss. 159;
1877, J\fon t.gomery, etc. , R. v. Branch, 59 Ala.139; 1888, Louisville, etc., R.
v. Boney, 117 Inrl. 501; 1888, Compton v. R. Co., 45 Ohio St. 592; 1895, Market St. R. v. H ellman, 109 Cal. 571; 1897, Compton v. Jesup, 167 U. S. 1;
1897, Santa Fe Elec. Co. v. Hitchcock, 9 N. M. 156, 50 Pac. Rep. 332; 18!Ji,
In re Utica Nat. Bank Co., 154 N. Y . 268. See, infra, this note.
5. Effect as to the consolidated company:
(a) A new corpoi·ation, or at least a somewhat different corporation, comes
into ~xistence which_. for most bnsin.ess purposes, is a distinct entity from the
constituent corporat10ns: 1868, Racine, etc., R . Co. v. F. L. & T. Co., 49 Ill.
331; 1875, Wilmer v. The Atlnntic, etc, R. Co., 2 Woods 409; 1884, Burger v.
Grand Rapids & I. R ., 22 Fed. Rep. 561; 1885, Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Mo.
Pac., etc., Co., 115 U.S. 587; 1886, Graham v. R. Co., 118 U.S. 16 l; 1888, 0.
& M. R. Co. v. People, 123 Ill. 467; 1890, Fitzgerald v. Mo. Pac. R., 45 Fed.
Rep. 812; 1895, Market St. R. Co. v. Hellman, 109 Cal. 571.
However, as to interstate consolidations the new company is a new company
existing in each state with the powers, rights and franchises that the <'Onstituent companies in that state had, but not those that one or more of the constituent companies created in another state had. And for jurisdictional purposes in the United States courts, there are as many new companies (with the
name of the consolidated company\ as there are states authorizing the consolidation: 1861, 0. & M. R. Co. v. Wheeler, I Rlack (66 U. S.) 286; 1865, County
of Allegheny v. C. & P.R. Co., 51 Pa. St. 228; 1876, :\<fuller v. Dows, 94 U. 8.
444; 1886, St. Paul & N. P.R. Co. v. Minn., 36 Minn. 85; 1890, Nashua & L.
R. Co. v. B. & L. R. Co., 136 U. S. 356; 1896, St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. James,
161 U.S. 545; 1899, Louisville, N. A., etc., R. Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174
u. s. 552.
The new company dates its existence from the consolidation: 1875, Shiel<ls
v. The State, 21:1 Ohio St. 86; 1875, Central R. & Banking Co. v. State, 54 Ga.
401; 1876, State v. Northern Cent. R. Co., 44 ~fd. 131; 1898, Adams v. Yazoo
& M. V. R. Co. (:\1iss. l, 24 So. Rep. 200.
(b) Rights and privileges of the consolidated company:
( 1) Special privileges and immunities: As the consolidated company is a new
company dating from the consolidation, as against the state, it is subject to
all the laws existing at the date of consolidation, such as the right to repeal
or amend, notwithstanding the fact that the charters of the constituent companies were not subject to repeal or amendment : 1875, Shields v. State, 26
Ohio St. 86; 1895, Mercantile Bank v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 161; 1897, Smith
v. Lake Shore & Mich. So. R., 114 :\1ich. 460.
Rights to use streets pass: 1895, Africa v. Knoxville, 70 Fed. Rep. 729; right

or amend, notwithstanding the fact that the charters of the constituent com-

panies were not subject to repeal or amendment: 1875, Shields v. State, 26

Ohio St. 86; 1895, Mercantile Bank v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 161; 1897, Smith

v. Lake Shore &, Mich. So. R., 114 Mich. 460.

Rights to use streets pass: 1895, Africa v. Knoxville, 70 Fed. Rep. 729; right
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to take property under eminent domain pass also: 1882,Toledo, etc., R. Co.

v. Dunlap, 47 Mich. 456; 1888, Abbott v. N. Y., etc., B. Co., 145 Mass. 450;

tO tllke property under eminent domain pass also: 1882, Toledo, etc., R. Co.
v. Dunlap, 47 Mich. 456; 1888, Abbott v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 145 Mass. 450;
so a lso an exclusive right to furnish gas: 1885, New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana, 115 U. S. 650.
An unexecute<.l power to consolidate is not a vested right, and hence would
not pass to a consolidated compan~: lSHi), Pearsall v. Great Northe rn R., 161
U . S. 646; 1896, Morrill v. mith Co., 8BTex. 529, 551; nor does th e right to
fix railroad rates: l8U;J, St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill, 156 U.S. 667.
As to exemptions from taxation, if the hrngua~e of th e consolidation statute
is ample to indude aueh privileges, and there is nothing to indi cate u contrary intent, the tax exemption inures to tbe benefit of the new compttny, so
far as, but no farther than, the property twquired was exempt. 1850, Philade lphia, etc., R. Co. v. Maryland, 10 How . (51 U. 8 .1 3i6; 1872, Tomlin!'on v.
Branch, 15 Wall. 182 U.S .) 4b0; 1873, Delaware R. Tax, 16 Wall. (85 U.S.)
20<.i; 1875, Central, elc., R. v . Georgia, 92 U.S. 665; 1876, Chesapeake & 0.
R. Co. v. Virginia, 9·l U.S. 718.
The late r cases apply even a strir.ter rule, and the tax-exemption does not
pass unless the int e ntion to <lo so ls clearly expressed-all presumptions be111g agiliost it; 1894, Keokuk & \V. R. v. Missouri, 152 U. S.301 , supra, p. H89;
1895, Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. Penrlleton, 156 U. R. 667; 1895, Mercantile Bank
v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 161; 1898, Adams v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 24 So.
Rep. 200 (Miss.); 1898, Citizens' Sav. Bk . v. Owensboro, 173 U. S.636; 1899,
The Kentucky Rank Cases, l 74 U. S. 408, et seq.
(2) Contract rights, such as stock subscriptions, subscriptions in aid of the
purposes, rights to use patents, copyrights, etc., rights nnder indemnity bonds,
etc., held by conRtitueut companies pass to the consolidated company:
Stock subscriptions: 1856, Sparrow v. E. & C.R., 7 Ind . 369; 1863, Bish
v. Johnson, 21 Ind. 299; 1875, Mansfielcl, etc., R. Co. v. Stout, 26 Ohio St.
241; 18!JJ, Hamilton v. Clttrion, etc., R. Co., 144 Pa. St. 34.
Patent rights: 18(19, Lightner v. B & A. R., 1 Low. 338, Fed. C11s. 8343.
Subscriptions in aid of undertakin~: 1876, Scotl11nd Co. v. Thomas, 94 U.
S . 6S2; 1878, Edwards v. People, 88 Ill. 340; 1879, Empire Tp. v. Darlington,
101 U.S. 87; 1883, Scott v . Hansheer, 9-1 Tnd . l; 1885, Marion Co. v. Center
Tp., 105 Ind. 422; 1888, Livingston Co. v. FirRt Nat'I Bank, 128 U.S. 102, with
cases cited there; bnt see contra, 1872, New Jersey M. R. Co. v. Strnit, 35 N.
J. L. 32~; J 875, Harsh man v. Rates Co., 92 U. S. 5fl9; 1877, County of Bates
v. Winter, 97 U . S. 83; 1878, Wagner v. Meety, 69 Mo. 150.
Indemnity bonds: 1892, Pennsylvania, etc., R. v. Harkins, 149 Pa. St. 121.
(31 Property rig lits:
.
Lands vest , by virtue of the act of consolidation, in the new company without further conveyance: l8tH , N. Y . Cent. R. Co . v. Saratoga, etc., Co .. 39
Barb. ( N. Y.) 289; 1888, Georgi a Pac. R. Co. v. Wilke, 86 Ala. 478; J BAA, Tnrpey v. Deseret Salt Co., 5 Utah 494; 1891. Cnshman v, Brownlee, 128 Ind.
266; 1896, Day v. N. Y. S. & W.R. Co.,fi8 N. J . L. 677; 1900, Greene v. Woodlancl, etc., R. Co., 62 Ohio St. 67, 06 N. E . Rep. 642.
ChoAes in action do also: 1863, Cumberland College v. Ish , 22 Cal. 641;
186fi, State University of Vermont v. Baxter, 42 Vt. 99; 1868, Miller v. Lancaster, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 514.
( 4) Liabilitie.~:
Contracts-Ne w company must perform those of old: 1868, R11cine & M . R.
Co. v. FarmcrR' L . & T . Co.,49111.331, 95 Am . Dcc.59!5; 1874, Western Union
R. Co. v. Smith, 75 Ill. 496; 188 1. Sappini? v. Little Rock, etc., Co., 37 Ark.
2~; 1889, Union Pac. R. v. McAlpine , 129 U.S. 305; 1890, Day v. Worcester,
etc .. R. Co., 151 MasR.302; lflOO, J onesv. Fitchburg R. Co., 123 N. Y . 502;
1890, Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U.S. 1; 18n2, Chirn1?0 & Inc'!. Coal C:o. v. Rllll , 135
Ind. 91, 23 L . R . A. 231; 1896, Cumberland Valley R. Co. v. Gettysburg, et.c.,
Co., 177 Pa. St. 519.
Rut see: 1868, Tagnrt v. Northern Cent. R. Co. 291\fd. 557; 1873, Prouty
v. L. 8. etc., R. Co ., 52 N. Y. 3H3; 1874, City and County of S11n Francisco v.
Water-Works, 48 Cal. 493; 1899, Chase v. Mich. Tel. Co., 121 l\lich. 631. sn
N. \\'. Rep. 717; JIJOO, Capital Traction Co. v. Offutt, 17 App. D . V. 2112, 53

so also an exclusive right to furnish gas: 1885, New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisi-

ana, 115 U. S. 650.

An unexecuted power to consolidate is not a vested right, and hence would

not pass to a consolidated company: 181)5, Pearsall v. Great Northern R., 1H1

U. S. 646; 1896, Morrill v. Smith Co., 89 Tex. 529, 551; nor does the right to

fix railroad rates: 189"), St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. 8. 667.

As to exemptions from taxation, if the lnnguage of the consolidation statute

is ample to include such privileges, and there is nothing to indicate a con-

trary intent, the tux exemption inures to the benefit of the new company, so

far as, but no farther than, the property acquired was exempt. 1850, Phila-

delphia, etc., R. Co. v. Maryland, 10 How. (51 U. S.i 376; 1872, Tomlinson v.

Branch, 15 Wall. (82 U. S.) 4t)0; 1873, Delaware R. Tax, 16 Wall. (85 U. S.)

200; 1875, Central, etc., R. v. Georgia, 92 U. S. 665; 1876, Chesapeake & O.

R. Co. v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 718.

The later cases apply even a stricter rule, and the tax-exemption does not

pass unless the intention to do so is clearly expressed—all presumptions be-
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ing against it; 1894, Keokuk & W. R. v. Missouri, 152 U.S.301, supra, p. 989;

1895, Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Pendleton, 156 U. P. 667; 1895, Mercantile Bank

v. Tennessee, 161 U. 8. 161; 1898, Adams v. Y'azoo & M. V. R. Co., 24 So.

Rep. 200 (Miss.); 1898, Citizens' Sav. Bk. v. Owensboro, 173 U. S.636; 1899,

The Kentucky Bank Cases, 174 U. S. 408, et seg.

(2) Contract rights, such as stock subscriptions, subscriptions in aid of the

purposes, rights to use patents, copyrights, etc., rights under indemnity bonds,

etc., held by constituent companies pass to the consolidated company:

Stock subscriptions: 1856, Sparrow v. E. & C. R., 7 Ind. 369; 1863, Bish

v. Johnson, 21 Ind. 299; 1875, Mansfield, etc., R. Co. v. Stout, 26 Ohio St.

241 ; 1891, Hamilton v. Clarion, etc., R. Co., 144 Pa. St. 34.

Patent rights: 18(59, Lightner v. B & A. R., 1 Low. 338, Fed. Cas 8343.

Subscriptions in aid of undertaking: 1876, Scotland Co. v. Thomas, 94 D.

S. 6*2; 1878, Edwards v. People, 88 111. 340; 1879, Empire Tp. v. Darlington,

101 U. S. 87; 1883, Scott v. Hansheer, 94 Ind. 1; 1885, Marion Co. v. Center

Tp., 105 Ind. 422; 1888, Livingston Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 128 U. S. 102, with

cases cited there; but see contra, 1872, New Jersev M. R. Co. v. Strait, 35 N.

J. L. 322; 1875, Harshman v. Bates Co., 92 U. S. 569; 1877, County of Bates

v. Winter, 97 U. S. 83; 1878, Wagner v. Meety, 69 Mo. 150.

Indemnity bonds: 1892, Pennsylvania, etc., R. v. Harkins, 149 Pa. St. 121.

(3) Property rights:

Lands vest, by virtue of the act of consolidation, in the new company with-

out further conveyance: 1861, N. Y. Cent. R. Co. v. Saratoga, etc., Co.. 39

Barb. (N. Y.) 289"; 1888, Georgia Pac. R. Co. v. Wilks, 86 Ala. 478; 1888, Tar-

pey v. Deseret Salt Co., 5 Utah 494; 1891. Cashman v, Brownlee, 128 Ind.

266; 1896, Dav v. N. Y. S. & W.R.Co.,58 N. J. L.677; 1900, Greeney. Wood-

land, etc., R.Co.,62 Ohio St. 67, 56 N. E Rep. 642.

Choses in action do also: 1863, Cumberland College v. Ish, 22 Cal. 641;

1865, State University of Vermont v. Baxter, 42 Vt. 99; 1868, Miller v. Lan-

caster, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 514.

(4) Liabilities:

Contracts—New company must perform those of old: 1868, Racine & M. R.

Co. v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 49 111. 331, 95 Am. Dec. 595; 1874, Western Union

R. Co. v. Smith, 75 111. 496; 1881, Sappine v. Little Rock, etc., Co., 37 Ark.

23; 1889. Union Pac. R. v. McAlpine, 129 U. S. 305; 1890, Day v. Worcester,

etc., R. Co., 151 Mass.302; 1890, Jones v. Fitchburg R. Co.,"l23 N. Y. 502;

1890, Jov v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1; 1892, Chicago & Ind. Coal Co. v. Hall, 135

Ind. 91,"23 L. R. A. 231; 1896, Cumberland Vallev R. Co. v. Gettysburg, etc.,

Co., 177 Pa. St. 519.

L . I{. A .

3~0.

But see: 1868, Tagart v. Northern Cent. R. Co., 29 Md. 557; 1873, Prouty

v. L. S. etc., R. Co., 52 N. Y. 363; 1874, City and County of San Francisco v.

Water-Works, 48 Cal. 493; 1899, Chase v. Mich. Tel. Co., 121 Mich. 631, SO

N. W. Rep. 717; 1900, Capital Traction Co. v. Ofiutt, 17 App. D. C. 292, 53

L. R. A. 390.
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Debts—New company are liable for, to the extent of property received, and

1007

where expressly assumed, are liable beyond the property received: 1863,

Eaton, etc., R. Co. v. Hunt, 20 Ind. 457; 1868, Indianapolis, C. & St. L. R. Co.

v. Jones, 29 Ind. 465, 95 Am. Dec. 654; 1869, Wright v. Milwaukee, etc., R.

Co., 25 Wis. 46; 1874, Bailev v. N. Y. C. R Co., 89 U. S. (22 Wall.)604; 1875,

Meyer v. Johnson, 53 Ala. 237; 1881, Boardman v. L., S. & M. S. R., 84 N. Y.

157; 1885, llrown v. Susquehanna Boom Co., 109 Pa. St. 57, 58 Am. Rep. 709;

1889, Louisville, N. A., etc., R. v. Snider, 117 Ind. 501, 3 L. R. A. 434; 1894,

Berrv v. Kansas, etc., R. Co., 52 Kan. 774, 39 Am. St. R. 381; 1895, Lang-

hoine v. Richmond R. Co., 91 Va. 369; 1897, In re Utica, etc., Co., 154 N. Y.

268; H97, Tompkins v. Augusta So. R. Co., 102 Ga. 436; 1899, U. S. Capsule

Co. v. Isaacs, 23 Ind. App. 533, 55 N. E. Rep. 832; 1899, Copp v. Colorado C.

& I. Co., 60 N. Y. Supp. 293, 29 Miscl. R. 109.

Torts: New company is liable for the torts of the former constituent com-

panies: 1860, Bissell v. Michigan So. R , 2> N. Y. 258; 1873, Warren v.

Mobile, etc., R., 49 Ala. 582; 1874, Chicago, etc., R. v. Moffatt, 75 111. 524;

1883, St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Marker, 41 Ark. 542; 1892, Louisville, etc., R.

Co. v. Summers, 131 Ind. 241; 1893, Berry v. Kansas C. F. & S. R., 52 Kan.
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759, 39 Am. St. R. 371; 1895, Southern, etc., R. Co. v. Bonrkright, 70 Fed.

Rep. 442, 30 L. R. A. 823; 1895, Langhorne v. Richmond R. Co., 91 Va. 369.

But see contra, 189><, Von Cotzhausen v. Johns Mfg. Co., 100 Wis. 473, 76

N. W. Rep. 622; 1899, Chase v. Mich. Tel. Co., 121 Mich. 631, 80 N. W.

Rep. 717.

Debts-New company are liable :for, to the extent of property received, and
where expressly assumed, are liable beyond the property received: 1863,
Eaton, etc., R. Co. v. Hunt, 20 Ind. 4f17; 1868, Indianapolis, C. & St. L. R. Co.
v. Jones, 29 Ind. 4ti!>, 1:15 Am. Dec. 654; 1869, Wright v. Milwaukee, etc., R.
Co., 25 Wis. 46; 1874, Bitiley v. N. Y. C.R. Co.,81:1U. S. (22 Wall. 1604; 1875,
Meyer v. Johnson, 53 Ala. 237; 1881, Boardman v. L., S. & M. S. R., 84 N. Y.
157; 1885, l:rown v. Susquehanna Boom Co., 109 Pa. St. 57, 58 Am. Rep. 709;
1889, Louisville, N. A., etc., R. v. Snider, 117 Ind. 501, 3 L. R. A. 434; 1894,
B e rry v. Kansas, etc., R. Co., 52 Kan. 774, 39 Am. St. R. 381; 18lJ5, Langhome v. Richmond R. Co., 91 Va. 369; 1897, In re Utica, etc., Co., 154 N. Y.
268; 1)(97, Tompkins v. Augusta So. R. Co., 102 Ga. 436; 1899, U .S. Capscle
Co. v. Isaacs, 23 Ind. App. 533, 55 N. E. Rep. 832; 181:19, Copp v. Colorado C.
& I. Co., 60 N. Y. Snpp. 293, 29 Misc!. R. 109.
Turts: New company is liable for the torts of the former constituent companies: 1860, Bissell v. Michigan So. R, 2! N. Y. 258; 18i3, Warren v.
Mobile, etc., R., 49 Ala. 582; 1874, Chicago, etc., R. v. Moffatt, 75 Ill. 524;
1883, St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Marker, 41 Ark. 542; 1892, Louisville, etc., R.
Co. v. Summers, 131 Ind . 2-U; 1893, Berry v. Kansas C. F. & S. R., 52 Kan.
759, 39 Am. St. R. 371; 1895, Southern, etc., R. Co. v. Bonrkright, 70 Fed.
Rep. 442, 30 L. R. A. 823; 1895, Langhorne v. Richmond R. Co., 91Va.369.
But see contra, 189~, Von Cotzbansen v. Johns Mfg. Co., JOO Wis. 473, 76
N. W. Rep. 622; 1899, Chase v. Mich. Tel. Co., 121 Mich. 631, 80 N. W.
Rep. 717.

ARTICLE IV. ACQUIRE, HOLD AND ALIENATE PROPERTY.

Sec. 288. (I) Acquire and hold real property.

(A) By purchase:

ARTICLE

IV.

ACQUIRE, HOLD AND ALIENATE PROPERTY.

(a) Presumptions.

STOCKTON SAVINGS BANK v. STAPLES.1

1893. In the Supreme Court of California. 98 Cal. Rep.

Sec. 288. (I) Acquire and hold real property.
(A) By purchase :
(a) Presumptions.

189-193.

[Action by the bank to quiet title to land. Judgment was in favor

of the plaintiff, and defendants appealed therefrom. The bank

traced title through conveyances from one C, and alleged that C.

STOCKTON SAVINGS BANK v. STAPLES.1

had ousted the defendant, and he and his subsequent grantees had

maintained an open and notorious possession for the statutory period.

IN

The immediate grantor of the bank was Mrs. Hudson.]

THE SUPREME

CouRT

OF

CALIFORNIA.

98

C a l.

Rep.

189--193.

Vanclief, C. * * * Appellants contend that the court erred

in overruling their objections to the introduction in evidence of the

deed from Mrs. Hudson to plaintiff. The ground of the objection

was that the plaintiff "was not shown to have the power to purchase,

hold, or receive said land, nor that said land was conveyed to it for

any of the purposes of the corporation." There was no evidence to

show for what purpose the corporation had been organized, or what

business it was conducting. The court found according to the alle-

gation of the complaint, not denied in the answer, that at all the times

1 Statement abridged, only part of opinion given.

[Action by the bank to quiet title to land. Judgment was in favor
of the plaintiff, and defendants appealed therefrom. The ban!c
traced title through conveyances from one C., and alleged that C.
had ousted the defendant, and he and his subsequent grantees had
maintained an open ·and notorious possession f~r the statutory period.
The immediate grantor of the bank was Mrs. Hudson.]
VANCLIEF, C.
•
•
•
Appellants contend that the court erred
in overruling their objections to the introduction in evidence of the
deed from Mrs. Hudson to plaintiff. The ground of the objection
was that the plaintiff "was not shown to have the power to purchase,
hold, or receive said land , nor that said land was conveyed to it for
any of the purposes of the corporation." There was no evidence to
show for what purpose the corporation had been organized , or what
business it was conducting. The court found according to the allegation of the complaint, not denied in the answer, that at a ll the times
1

Statement abridged, only part of opinion given.
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stated the plaintiff "was a corporation duly organized and incorporated

under and by virtue of the laws of the state of California, and having

stated the plaintiff "was a corporation duly organized and incorporated
under and by virtue of the laws of the state of California, and having
its office and principal place of business in the city of Stockton, county
of San Joaquin, state of California."
Under these circumstances I think it must be presumed (as against
the defendants, at least) that the corporation had power to purchase
and hold the land. (Natoma Water & M. Co. v. Clarkin, 14 Cal.
544; Evans v. Bailey, 66 Cal. 112 ; Hagar v. Board of Supervisors,
47 Cal. 222; People '" La Rue, 67 Cal. 526; Spelling on Private
Corporation, §§ 203, 206.) It does not appear under what statute or
for what purpose the plaintiff was incorporated, nor what business it
was engaged in, nor for what purpose the property was purchased or
u sed. In answer to a simil ar objection in People v. La Rue, 67 Cal.
526, it was said: " If there was anything in its charter or the business
in which it was engaged, or in the law under which it was organized.
in any manner abridging its right to hold land, it does not appear of
record, hence we deem the objection untenable." • • •
Affirmed.

its office and principal place of business in the city of Stockton, county

of San Joaquin, state of California."

Under these circumstances I think it must be presumed (as against

the defendants, at least) that the corporation had power to purchase

and hold the land. (Natoma Water & M. Co. v. Clarkin, 14 Cal.

544; Evans v. Bailey, 66 Cal. 112; Hagar v. Board of Supervisors,

47 Cal. 222; People v. La Rue, 67 Cal. 526; Spelling on Private

Corporation, §§ 203, 206.) It does not appear under what statute or

for what purpose the plaintiff was incorporated, nor what business it

was engaged in, nor for what purpose the property was purchased or

used. In answer to a similar objection in People v. La Rue, 67 Cal.

526, it was said: l-If there was anything in its charter or the business

in which it was engaged, or in the law under which it was organized,

in any manner abridging its right to hold land, it does not appear of

record, hence we deem the objection untenable." * * *

Affirmed.
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XoU: In the absence of any showing of any kind to the contrary there is a

presumption that purchases of land by a corporation are for a valid purpose,

and the contrary must, be shown by the one alleging it. 1827, Ex parte Peru

Iron Co., 7 Conn. (N. Y.) 540; 1859, Chautauqua Co. Bank v. Ripley, 19 N.

Note: In the absence of any showing of any kind to the contrary there is a
presumpt.i on that purchases of land by a corporation a.re for a rnlid purpose,
and th e contrary must h e shown by the one alleging it. 1827, Ex parte Peru
Iron Co., 7 Con n . (N. Y.) 5-W; 1859, Chautauqua Co. Bank v. Risley, 19 1'.
Y . 369, 75 Am. De<'. 347; l8fi3, Regents of Univ. v . Detroit Y. M . Soc., 12
Mich. 138; 1871, ~lyns v. Croft, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 291; 1874, Hagar v. Yolo
Co .. 47 Cal. :.:!22; 1874 , Yates v. Van De Bogert, 56 N. Y. 526; 1885, People v.
J,a lfoe . 67 Cal. 526; 1893, Connecticut, etc., Ins. Co. v. Smith, 117 Mo. 261,
38 :\ m. St. Rep. 656.

Y. 369, 75 Am. Dec. 347; 1863, Regents of Cniv. v. Detroit. Y. M. Soc, 12

Mich. 138; 1871, Mvers v. Croft, 13 Wall. (80 U. S.) 291; 1874, Hagar v. Yolo

Co., 47 Cal. 222; 1874, Yates v. Van De Bogert, 56 N. Y. 526; 1885, People v.

La line, 67 Cal. 526; 1893, Connecticut, etc., Ins. Co. v. Smith, 117 Mo. 261,

38 Am. St. Rep. 656.
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LEAZURE v. HILLEGAS.

1821. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 7 Serg. & R.

Sec. 289.

(Pa-) 3I3"323-

Error to the common pleas of Bedford county.

Same.

Frederick Hillegas, the plaintiff below (the defendant in error),

( b) Extent of power to purchase and hold.

claimed the land in dispute, under a warrant and survey to Thomas

Holt, who conveyed to George Armstrong, who conveyed to William

LEAZURE v·. HILLEGAS.

Hcurv, who conveyed to the Bank of North America, who conveyed

to the plaintiff. On the trial of the cause, four bills of exceptions to

1821. IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
(Pa.) 313-323.

evidence were taken by the defendant below. * * *

The third exception was to the admission of a deed from the Bank

7 Serg. & R.

of North America to James Ross, to which there were two objections:

1st. Thnt there was no evidence of the seal of the corporation. 2d.

Error to the common pleas of Bedford county.
Frederick Hillegas, the plaintiff below (the defendant in error),
claimed the land in dispute, under a warrant and survey to Thomas
Holt, who conveyed to George Armstrong, who conveyed to William
Henry, who conveyed to the Bank of North America, who conveyed
to the pla intiff. On the trial of the cause, four bills of exceptions to
evidence were taken by the defendant below. • • •
The third exception was to the admission of a d eed from the Bank
?f North America to J nm es Ross, to which there were two objecti on s :
1st. Th:lt there wa no evidence of the seal of the corporation. 2il.
That th e corporation was incapnhle of receiving a conveyance of land
otherwise th a n b y mortgage, and therefore had no e~tate which could
be CO ii \·e\ C'd.

That the corporation was incapable of receiving a conveyance of land

otherwise than bv mortgage, and therefore had no estate which could

be conveved.
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for that reason the deed should not have been admitted, proceeds:]

1009

Tilghman, C. J. * * * But the great points in this cause are,

the capacity of the bank to take the land conveyed by William Henry's

deed, and afterwards to convey the same to James Ross. There is no

doubt that a corporation must be governed by the charter from which

it derives its existence. It can do no act nor take any estate contrary

to its charter. If, therefore, it can be shown, that the Bank of North

America is forbidden by its charter, either to take or to convey, the

land contained in William Henry's deed, the plaintiff's action can not

be supported. By the third section of the act of incorporation (17th

of March, 1787, 2 Sm. L. 399), the bank is made capable "to have,

hold, purchase, receive, possess, enjoy and retain lands, rents, tene-

ments, goods, chattels and effects of whatsoever kind, nature or qual-

ity, to the amount of two millions of dollars and no more, and also to

sell, grant, etc., the same lands, etc. Provided, nevertheless, that

such lands and tenements, which the said corporation are hereby en-

abled to purchase and hold, shall only extend to such lot and lots of

ground, and convenient buildings, and improvements thereon erected

or to be erected, which they may find necessary and proper for carry-
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ing on the business of the said bank, and shall actually occupy for

that purpose, and to such lands and tenements which are or may be

bona Jide mortgaged to them as securities for their debts.'" It is re-

markable that with regard to the holding of lands, the charter of this

bank is more restricted than that of any other bank in the state, for all

the others are enabled to hold, not only the lands which have been

bona fide mortgaged to them by way of security for debts, but also

those "which may be conveyed to them in satisfaction of debts pre-

viously contracted in the course of their business, or purchased at sales

upon judgments which shall have been obtained for such debts."

This difference of restriction must have arisen from the extreme jeal-

ousy of monied corporations which pervaded the mind of the legisla-

ture when the Bank of North America was incorporated. It never

could have been intended to place that bank on a worse footing than

others, for it was the only one which risked its capital on a field alto-

gether untried in America, and which had the merit of rendering es-

sential service to the United States during the war of the revolution.

It would be improper, therefore, to carry the restriction, by construc-

tion, farther than the words of the law plainly import. The restric-

tion is, that the bank shall not purchase and hold. Purchasing and

holding are very different things, and the consequences' of each are

very different. If the words had been that the bank should neither

purchase nor hold, then it could have done neither one nor the other.

But, although purchasing a?id ho/ding might have been thought

dangerous, because of the power which it would have given the bank

to bring too much land into mortmain, yet to purchase, subject to the

statutes of mortmain, which authorized the commonwealth to appro-

priate the land to its own use, could be attended with no danger.

64—Wit. Cases.

{After holding the seal of the corporation had not been proved and
for that reason the deed should not ha Ye been admitted, proceeds:]
TILGHMAN, C. J. • • • But the great points in this cause are,
the capacity of the bank to take the land conveyed by William Henry's
deed, and afterwards to convey the same to James Ross. There is no
doubt that a corporation must be governed by the charter from which
it derives its existence. It can do no act nor take any estate contrary
to its charter. If, therefore, it can be shown, that the Bank of North
America is forbidden by its charter, either to take or to convey, the
land contained in William Henry's deed, the plaintiff's action can not
be supported. By the third section of the act of incorporation (17th
of March, 1787, 2 Sm. L. 399), the bank is made capable "to have,
hold, purchase, receive, possess, enjoy and retain lands, rents, tenements, goods, chattels and effects of whatsoever kind, nature or quality, to the amount of two millions of dollars and no more, and also to
sell, grant, etc., the same lands, etc. Provided, nevertheless, that
such lands and tenements, which the said corporation are hereby enabled to purchase and hold, shall only extend to such lot and lots of
ground, and convenient buildings, and improvements thereon erected
or to be erected, which they may find necessary and proper for carrying on the business of the said bank, and shall actually occupy for
that purpose, and to such lands and tenements wlticlt are or may be
bona fide mortgaged to them as securities for tltei'r debts." It i remarkable that with regard to the ltoldi11g of lands, the charter of this
bank is more restricted than that of any other bank in the state, for all
the others are enabled to hold, not only the lands which have been
bona fide mortgaged to them by way of security for debts, but also
those "which may be conveyed to them in satisfaction of debts previously contracted in the course of their business, or purchased at sales
upon judgments which shall have heen obtained for such debts."
This difference of restriction must have arisen from the extreme jealousy of monied corporations which pervaded the mind of the legislature when the Bank of North America was incorporated. It never
could nave been intended to place that bank on a worse footing than
others, for it was the only one which risked its capital on a field altogether untried in America, and which had the merit of rendering essential service to the United States during the war of the revolution.
It would be improper, therefore, to carry the restriction, by construction, farther than the words of the law plainly import. The restriction is, that the bank shall not purchase and hold. Purchasing and
holdi'ng are very different things, and the consequences· of each are
very different. If the words had been that the bank should neither
purchase nor hold, then it could have done neither one nor the other.
But, although purchasing and holdi'ng might have been thought
dangerous, because of the power which it would have given the bank
to bring too much land into mortmain , yet to purchase, subject to the
statutes of mortmain, which authorized the commonwealth to appropriate the land to its own use, could be attended with no danger.
64- WrL. CASES.
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This construction would satisfy the jealous policy of the legislature,

preserve the community from the danger of too great a mass of real

This construction would satisfy the jealous policy of the legislature,
preserve the community from the danger of too great a mass of real
property held in mortmain, and at the same time put in the power of
the commonwealth to act towards the bank as justice might seem to
require. This is a consideration of no small importance; for v. hen
the directors of the bank accepted from W illi am Henry a conveyance
of his lan<l at a fair price in payment of a debt bona fide due, it would
be hard to presume that they knew they were acting in violation of
their charter. But granting that the restriction in the charter di<l not
extend to the simple act of purcliast'ng, it may be asked, whence did
the corporation derive the r£ght to purchase, and what would be the
situation of land purchased without a capacity of holding? The answer is, that a corporation has, from £ts nature, a right to purchase
lands, though the charter contains no license to that purpose. And
in this respect the statutes of mortmain have not altered the law, except in case of superst£tt"ous uses. But since those statutes, it is necessary, in order to enable a corporation to retain lands which it has
purchased, to have a license for that purpose; otherwise, in England,
the next lord of the fee may enter within a year after the alienation,
and if he do not, then the next immediate lord, from time to time,
has half a year to enter, and for default of all the mesne lords,
the king takes the land so aliened, forever. That this is the law appears from the following authorities: 2 Black. Comm., 268, 269;
Co. Lit., 2; 6 Vin. Ab., 265 (G . pl. 2. ); 6Vin. Ab., 266, pl. 8; J cnk.
Cent., 270; 3 Com. Dig., 399 (F. ro); 3Com. Dig., 401 (F. 15);
1 Roi. Ab., 513; I, 35; 10 Co. 30. But in Pennsylvania, v.·here
there are no mesne lords, the right would accrue immediately to the
commonwealth. It has been objected, however, that according to
the report of the judges of this court, made on the 14th of December,
18o8, in pursuance of an act of assembly requiring them to make a
report of the English statutes which are in force in the commonwealth, etc., it appenrs that all conveyances of land to a corporation,
without license, are absolutely void. I will consider this objection.
The judges r eported the follo'vving ~tatutes of mortmain, "i Ed. I.
(Stat. 2); 13 Ed. I , ch. 32; 15 Ri ch. II, ch. 5, and 23 Hen. VIII,
ch. 10; which are in part inappli cable to this country, and in part applicable and in force. They arc so far in force, tha t all conveyances
by deed or will, of lands, tenem ents or hen:ditnments, made to a body
corporate. are void unless sanctioned by ch:irter or act of assemhly.
So, also, are all such conveyances void. made either to an indi\·idu:tl
or to any num ber of per ons :-issoci:1tC'cl, hut not incorporatt'd, ii the
a id conveyances arc for u-;es or purposes of a supcrstt"tt"ous nature,
and not calcu latccl to p romote objects of charity or utility ."
I have quoted the words of the report, and it is eYiclent that the
judges could have no intent, nor had they power tn make any addition to the statutes, or in any manner to alter them. Now hy reference
to the statutes it will appear that in all of them except the 23 H en .
VIII, ch. IO , the conveya nce is not absolutely void, but the e tate
passes to the corporation, subject, as before mentioned, to the right

property held in mortmain, and at the same time put in the power of

the commonwealth to act towards the bank as justice might seem to

require. This is a consideration of no small importance; for when

the directors of the bank accepted from William Henry a conveyance

1

of his land at a fair price in payment of a debt bona fide due, it would

be hard to presume that they knew they were acting in violation of

their charter. But granting that the restriction in the charter did not

extend to the simple act of purchasing, it may be asked, whence did

the corporation derive the right to purchase, and what would be the

situation of land purchased without a capacity of holding? The an-

swer is, that a corporation has.fi/-om its nature, a right to purchase

lands, though the charter contains no license to that purpose. And

in this respect the statutes of mortmain have not altered the law, ex-

cept in case of superstitious uses. But since those statutes, it is nec-

essary, in order to enable a corporation to retain lands which it has

purchased, to have a license for that purpose; otherwise, in England,
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the next lord of the fee may enter within a year after the alienation,

and if he do not, then the next immediate lord, from time to time,

has half a year to enter, and for default of all the mesne lords,

the king takes the land so aliened, forever. That this is the law ap-

pears from the following authorities: 2 Black. Comm., 268, 269;

Co. Lit., 2; 6 Vin. Ab., 265 (G. pi. 2.); 6Vin. Ab., 266, pi. 8; Jenk.

Cent., 270; 3 Com. Dig., 399 (F. 10); 3 Com. Dig., 401 (F. 15);

1 Rol. Ab., 513; 1, 35; 10 Co. 30. But in Pennsylvania, where

there are no mesne lords, the right would accrue immediately to the

commonwealth. It has been objected, however, that according to

the report of the judges of this court, made on the 14th of December,

1808, in pursuance of an act of assembly requiring them to make a

report of the English statutes which are in force in the common-

wealth, etc., it appears that all conveyances of land to a corporation,

without license, are absolutely void. I will consider this objection.

The judges reported the following statutes of mortmain, "7 Ed. I.

(Stat. 2); 13 Ed. I, ch. 32; 15 Rich. II, ch. 5, and 23 Hen. VIII,

ch. 10; which are in part inapplicable to this country, and in part ap-

plicable and in force. They are so far in force, that all conveyances

by deed or will, of lands, tenements or hereditaments, made to a body

corporate, are void unless sanctioned by charter or act of assembly.

So, also, are all such conveyances void, made cither to an individual

or to any number of persons associated, but not incorporated, it the

said conveyances are for uses or purposes of a superstitious nature,

and not calculated to promote objects of charity or utility."

I have quoted the words of the report, and it is evident that the

judges could have no intent, nor had they power to make any addi-

tion to the statutes, or in any manner to alter them. Now by reference

to the statutes it will appear that in all of them except the 23 Hen.

VIIT, ch. 10, the conveyance is not absolutely void, but the estate

passes to the corporation, subject, as before mentioned, to the right

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 289

IOI I

POWER TO ACQUIRE REAL PROPERTY.

POWER TO ACQUIRE REAL PROPERTY.

of the several mesne lords, and in their default, of the king, to enter

IOI I

and hold in fee. But by the statute of 23 Hen. VIII, ch. 10 (which

has been determined to extend to superstitious uses only: see 2 Black

Com., 273; 1 Co. Rep., 24), uses and trusts made and contrived in

favor of religious persons, or any bodies corporate, for more than

twenty years, shall be utterly void. Now the meaning of the report

of the judges is, that, according to the statute cited by them, convey-

ances to superstitious uses are absolutely void, and conveyances to

corporations, to uses not superstitious, are so far void that those cor-

porations shall have no capacity to hold the estates for their own ben-

efit, but subject to the right of the commonwealth, who may appro-

priate them to its own use at pleasure; in other words, that such con-

veyances have no validity for the purpose of enabling the corporation

to hold in mortmain. But to support the plaintiff's title, it must be

shown that the corporation had power, not only to take by purchase,

but to aliene. In this respect I considera corporation in the situation

of an alien who has power to take but not to hold. That an alien

may take by purchase (though not by descent), has been settled from
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the earliest times. It is so laid down in Co. Lit. 2, and I believe has

never been questioned. Neither has it been questioned that the land is

subject to forfeiture, and may be seized for the king after office found.

But it has been questioned what is the right of the alien before office

found for the king. Without reference to English cases, which leave

the matter in doubt, we have the highest authority in our own coun-

try for saying that until some act done by the commonwealth accord-

ing to its own laws, to vest the estate in itself, it remains in the alien,

who may convey it to a purchaser, but he can convey no estate which

is not defeasible by the commonwealth. This principle was asserted

by Judge Story, who delivered the opinion of the supreme court of

the United States in the case of Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee,

7 Cranch 603; and this was the opinion of the supreme court of Mas-

sachusetts, in the case of Sheaffe v. O'Neil, 1 Mass. Rep. 256, cited

by Judge Story.

It is reasonable in theory, and can have no ill effect in practice,

that he who has a defeasible estate may convey a defeasible estate.

Provided the right of the commonwealth to defeat the estate granted

by the alien remains entire, it is immaterial who holds the land until

that right be prosecuted. Supposing;, then, that the cases of the alien

and the corporation be similar (and I see not how they can be dis-

tinguished), it follows that the deed from the Bank of North Amer-

ica to James Ross conveyed a fee-simple, defeasible by the common-

wealth. * * *

[Reversed on the ground that the deed was admitted without prcof

of the corporate seal.]

Note. See note, § 291.-

of the several mesne lords, and in their default, of the king, to enter
and hold in fee. But by the statute of 23 Hen. VIII, ch. IO (which
h as been dt:termined to extend to superstitious uses only: see 2 Black
Com., 273; 1 Co. Rep., 24), uses and trusts made and contrived in
favor of religious persons, or any bodies corporate, for more than
twenty years, shall be utterly void. Now the meaning of the report
()f the judges is, that, according to the statute cited by them, conveyances to superstt'tious uses are absolutely void, and conveyances to
corporations, to u ses not superstt'tious, are so far void that those corporations shall have no capacity to hold the estates for their own benefit, but subject to the right of the commonwealth, who m ay appropriate them to its own use at pleasure; in other words, that such conveyances have no Yalidity for the purpose of enabling the corporation
to hold in mortmain. But to support the plaintiff's title, it mu st be
shown that the corporation had power, not only to take by purchase,
but to aliene. In this respect I consider a corporation in the situation
of an alien who has power to take but not to hold. That an alien
may take by purchase (though not by descent), has been settled from
the earliest times. It is so laid down in Co. Lit. 2, and I believe has
never been questioned. Neither has it been questioned that the land is
subject to .forfeiture, and may be seized for the king after office found.
But it has been questioned what is the right of the alien before office
found for the king. Without reference to English cases, which leave
the matter in doubt, we have the highest authority in our own country for saying that until some act d one by the commonwealth according to its own laws, to vest the estate in itself, it remains in the alien,
who may convey it-to a purchaser, but he can convey no estate which
is not defeasible by the commonwealth. This principle was asse1te<l
by Judge Story, who delivered the opinion of the supreme court of
the United States in the case of Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's L essee,
7 Cranch 603; and this was the opinion of the supreme court of Massachusetts, in the case of Sheaffe v. O'Neil, 1 Mass. R ep. 236, cited
by Judge Story.
It is r easonable in theory, and can have no ill ieffect in practice,
that he who has a defeasible estate may convey a defeasible estate.
Provided the right of the commonwea lth to defeat the estate granted
bv the alien remains entire, it is immaterial who holds the lnncl 1111til
th at right be prosecuted. Supposing, then, that the case.<; of the aiien
and the corporation be similar (and I see not how they can he rli stingui-;hed), it fol lows that the deed from the Bank of North A me rica to James Ross conveyed a fee-simple, defensible by the co mmonwealth. • • •
[Reversed on the ground that the deed was admitted without prcof
of the corporate seal. l
Note.
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CASE v. KELLY Et Al.?

Sec. 290. Same.

1890. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 133

U. S. Rep. 21.

CASE v. KELLY ET AL/

[The Green Bay and Minnesota Railroad Company being in the

hands of a receiver, namely, Timothy Case, in the circuit court of

1890.

the United States, in a suit by the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company

IN

to foreclose a mortgage on said railroad, said receiver was directed

THE SUPREME

CouRT OF
U. S. Rep.

THE

UNITED

STATRs.

133

2r.

by the court to take possession of all the property, real and personal,

of said company, with authority to bring suits, in the name of the

[The Green Bay and Minnesota Railroad Company being in the
hands of a receiver, namely, Timothy Case, in the circuit court of
the United States, in a suit by the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company
to foreclose a mortgage on said railroad, said receiver was directed
by the court to take possession of all the property, real and personal,
of said company, with authority to bring suits, in the name of the
railroad company. Under this order, Mr. Case, as receiver, brought
the present suit, stating that he sues in behalf of said railroad company, and as receiver, the defendants Kelly, Ketchum, and Hiles,
who were officers of the railroad company during its period of construction, and who as alleged had procured numerous donations of
land from citizens who were interested in the construction of the road,
along its line, intended to be for the use and benefit of the railroad
company, and to assist it in such construction. The fundamental allegation of the Lill is that these defendants, representing to the persons
who made the donations that they were officers of the road, and soliciting these grants for the benefit of the road, took the conveyances to
themselves individually; that they did this in a fraudulent manner, by
making the grantors in the con\'eyances believe that they, as officers
of the company, could receive the conveyances for the benefit of the
road, and that either the grantors did not really know to whom the
conveyances were made, or were induced to believe that when made
the grantees held the lands as a trust for the benefit of the road.
These defendants not recognizing this trust, and the conveyances on
their faces being merely conveyances to the individuals, Ketchum,
Kelly, and Hiles, who now refuse to convey to the company, or to
admit its right to the lands, this suit is brought to have a declaration
of the trust made by the court, and a decree ordering conveyances by
t}Je defenciants of the land to the corporation. It is further alleged
that the mortgage in process of foreclosure in the court under which
Case is acting as receiver covered all the lands of the corporation,
and would cover these lands, if the title of the corporation in them
was establi shed. The defendants, Kelly, Ketchum, and Hiles, filed
answers, in which they denied all fraud or deception, denied that they
held the l:inds in tmst for the railroad company, and denied the right
of pl a intiff to any relief. Replications were filed to the answers.
The case was put at issue. The circuit court held that only such
lands as were necessary and proper for the immediate use of the road
could be recovered in this suit. J
MILLER, J. • • • The principal question suggested by this
appeal is whether the complainant, as representing the railroad com-

railroad company. Under this order, Mr. Case, as receiver, brought

the present suit, stating that he sues in behalf of said railroad com-

pany, and as receiver, the defendants Kelly, Ketchum, and Hiles,

who were officers of the railroad company during its period of con-

struction, and who as alleged had procured numerous donations of

land from citizens who were interested in the construction of the road,

along its line, intended to be for the use and benefit of the railroad

company, and to assist it in such construction. The fundamental alle-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

gation of the bill is that these defendants, representing to the persons

who made the donations that they were officers of the road, and solic-

iting these grants for the benefit of the road, took the conveyances to

themselves individually; that they did this in a fraudulent manner, bv

making the grantors in the conveyances believe that they, as officers

of the company, could receive the conveyances for the benefit of the

road, and that either the grantors did not really know to whom the

conveyances were made, or were induced to believe that when made

the grantees held the lands as a trust for the benefit of the road.

These defendants not recognizing this trust, and the conveyances on

their faces being merely conveyances to the individuals, Ketchum,

Kelly, and Hiles, who now refuse to convey to the company, or to

admit its right to the lands, this suit is brought to have a declaration

of the trust made by the court, and a decree ordering conveyances by

the defendants of the land to the corporation. It is further alleged

that the mortgage in process of foreclosure in the court under which

Case is acting as receiver covered all the lands of the corporation,

and would cover these lands, if the title of the corporation in them

was established. The defendants, Kelly, Ketchum, and Hiles, filed

answers, in which they denied all fraud or deception, denied that they

held the lands in trust for the railroad company, and denied the right

of plaintiff to any relief. Replications were filed to the answers.

The case was put at issue. The circuit court held that only such

lands as were necessary and proper for the immediate use of the road

could be recovered in this suit.]

Miller, J. * * * The principal question suggested by this

appeal is whether the complainant, as representing the railroad com-

1 Statement abridged, only part of opinion given.
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pany, can maintain a suit for these lands; that is to say, whether the

1013

company was endowed by the legislature of Wisconsin with a capac-

ity to receive an indefinite quantity of lands, with no limitation upon

their use, or upon their sale, or whether they were limited to the lands

necessary to such uses as were appropriate to the operations of a rail-

road. It is not pretended that there is any general statute of the state

of Wisconsin which authorizes either this company or any other cor-

poration to purchase and hold lands indefinitely, as an individual

could do, without regard to the uses to be made of such real estate.

The charter of the company, approved April 12, 1866 (chapter 540),

authorizes it to acquire real estate, namely, the fee-simple in lands,

tenements, and easements, for their legitimate use for railroad pur-

poses. It is thus authorized to take lands 100 feet in width for right

of way, and also such as is needed for depot buildings, stopping-

stages, station-houses, freight-houses, warehouses, engine-houses, ma-

chine-shops, factories, and for purposes connected with the use and

management of the railroad. This enumeration of the purposes for

which the corporation could acquire title to real estate must neces-

sarily be held exclusive of all other purposes, and, as the court said
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at the time of making its interlocutory decree, "it was not authorized

by its charter to take lands for speculative or farming purposes." It

must be held, therefore, that there was no authority, under the laws

of Wisconsin, for this corporation to receive an indefinite quantity of

lands, whether by purchase or gift, to be converted into money or

held for any other purpose than those mentioned in its act of incorpo-

ration.

To this view of the subject, counsel urges several objections. The

first of these which we will notice is that the charter of the corporation

is a private act, of which the court can not take judicial notice, and

that, as it was not pleaded nor offered in evidence, nor otherwise

brought to the attention of the court, it could not be the foundation of

its judgment. To this there are two sufficient answers. The first of

which is that, if the statute creating this corporation gave it no power

to receive and hold lands in the manner we have mentioned, then it

had no such power by virtue of any law of the state of Wisconsin;

for a corporation, in order to be entitled to buy and sell, to receive

and hold, the title to real estate, must have some statutory authority

of the state in which such lands lie to enable it to do so, and the ab-

sence of such provision in the law of its incorporation does not create

any general statute which authorizes any such right.

Another answer is that in the charter of the railroad company itself

(Laws Wis. 1866, ch. 540, § 14) it is expressly enacted that "this

act is hereby declared to be a public act, and shall take effect, and be

in force, from and after its passage and publication." To this it is

replied by counsel for appellant that the statute of Wisconsin can not

make that a public law which, in its essential nature, is a private law.

However this may be, we do not doubt the authority of the legislature

of a state to enact that after the passage and publication of one of its

statutes the courts of the state shall be bound to take judicial notice

pany, can maintain a suit for these lands; that is to say, whether the
company was endowed by the legislature of Wisconsin v.·ith a capacity to receive an indefinite quantity of lands, with no limitation upon
their use, or upon their sale, or ·whether they were limited to the lands
necessary to such uses as were appropriate to the operations of a railroad. It is n ot pretended that there is any general statute of the state
of Wisconsin which authorizes either this company or any other corporation to purchase and hold lands indefinitely, as an individual .
could do, without regard to the uses to be made of such real estate.
The charter of the company, approved April 12, 1866 (chapter 540),
authorizes it to acquire real estate, namely, the fee-simple in lands,
tenements, and easements, for their legitimate u se for railroad purposes. It is thus authorized to take lands roo feet in width for right
of way, and also such as is needed for d epot buildings, stoppingstages, station-houses, freight-houses, warehouses, engine-houses, machine-shops, factories, and for purposes connected with the use and
management of the railroad. This enumeration of the purposes for
which the corporation could acquire title to real estate mu st necessarily be held exclusive of all other purposes, and, as the court said
at the time of making its interlocutory decree, "it was not authorized
by its charter to take lands for speculative or farming purposes." It
must be held, therefore, that there was no authority, under ' the laws
of Wisconsin, for this corporation to receive an indefinite quantity of
lands, whether by purchase or gift, to be converted into money or
held for any other purpose than those mentioned in its act of incorporation.
To this view of the subject, counsel urges several objections. The
first of these which we will notice is that the charter of th~ corporation
is a private act, of which the court can not take judicial notice, and
that, as it was not pleaded nor offered in evidence, nor otherwise
brought to the attention of the court, it could not be the foundation of
its judgment. To this there are two sufficient answers. The first of
which is that, if the statute creating this corporation gave it no power
to receive and hold lands in the manner we have mentioned , then it
had no such power by virtue of any law of the state of Wisconsin;
for a corporation, in order to be entitled to buy and sell, to receive
and hold, the title to real estate, must have some statutory authority
of the state in which such lands lie to enable it to do so, and the absence of such prm·ision in the law of its incorporation does not create
any general statute which authorizes any such right.
Another answer is that in the charter of the railroad company itself
(Laws Wis. 1866, ch. 540, § 14) it is expressly enacted that "this
act is hereby declared to be a public act, an<l shall take effect, and J-.e
in force, from and after its p assage and publication." To this it is
replied by counsel for appellant that the statute of Wisconsin can not
make that a public law which, in its essential nature, is a private law.
However this may be, we do not doubt the authority of the legislature
of a state to enact that after the passage and publication of one of its
statutes the courts of the state shall be bound to take judicial notice
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of it, without its being pleaded or proven before them. This rule,

1014

thus prescribed for the government of the courts of the states, must be
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binding in proceedings in federal courts in the same state. * • *

It is next objected to the principle adopted by the court that the

of it, without its b e ing pleaded or proven before them. This rule,
thus prescribed for the government of the courts of the states, must be
binding in proceedings in federa l courts in the same state. • • •
It is next objected to the principle adopted by the court that the
limitation upon the power of the corporation to receiYe land i one
which concerns the state alone, and the title to such la nds in a corporation can only be d efeated b y a proceeding, in the n ature of a quq
warranto, on behalf of the state. The case of B ank \'. Matthews. 9
U.S. 621, is strenuously relied on to support this Yiew. \\'e need
not stop here to inquire whether this company can hold title to land ,
which it is impliedly forbidden to do by its charte r, because the case
before us is not one in which the title to the lands in que tion has e\'er
b een vested in the railroad company, or attempted to be so vested.
The railroad company is pl aintiff in this action, and i seeking to obtain the title to such lands. It has no authority by the statute to recei>e
such title, and to own such lands; a nd the question here is, not\\ hether
the courts would de prive it of such lands, if they had been conveyed
to it, but whether they will aid it to violate the law, and obtain a title
which it has no power to hold. vVe think the questions are very different ones, and that, while a court might h esitate to declare the title
to lands received already, and in the possession and owners hip of the
company, void, on th e principle that they had no nuthority to take
such lands, it is very clear that it will not make itself th e active agent,
in behalf of the company, in violating the law, and enabling the company to do that which the law forbids. • • •
We are urged to consider that if this decree is affirmed, dismissing
the bill of the railroad company, the defendants will be left in the
possession of property fraudulently acquired , of con idernble value,
for which they gave no consideration. The answer to this is that
such question can not be raised by the plaintiff in this case , because,
having no right to take the property, it is not injured by a decree of
the court which fails to grant such right. The other questions must
be between the defendants in this case and those from '"'horn they took
deeds of conveyance, or such other parties, public or private, a may
show that they have an interest in the controversy. The decree of the
circuit court is affirmed.
Note. See note, § 291.

limitation upon the power of the corporation to receive land is one

which concerns the state alone, and the title to such lands in a corpo-

ration can only be defeated by a proceeding, in the nature of a quo

■warranto, on behalf of the state. The case of Bank v. Matthews. 9S

U. S. 621, is strenuously relied on to support this view. We need

not stop here to inquire whether this company can hold title to lands,

which it is impliedly forbidden to do by its charter, because the case

before us is not one in which the title to the lands in question has ever

been vested in the railroad company, or attempted to be so vested.

The railroad company is plaintiff in this action, and is seeking to ob-

tain the title to such lands. It has no authority by the statute to receive

such title, and to own such lands; and the question here is, not whether

the courts would deprive it of such lands, if they had been conveyed

to it, but whether they will aid it to violate the law, and obtain a title

which it has no power to hold. We think the questions are very dif-

ferent ones, and that, while a court might hesitate to declare the title
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to lands received already, and in the possession and ownership of the

company, void, on the principle that they had no authority to take

such lands, it is very clear that it will not make itself the active agent,

in behalf of the company, in violating the law, and enabling the com-

pany to do that which the law forbids. * * *

Wc are urged to consider that if this decree is affirmed, dismissing

the bill of the railroad company, the defendants will be left in the

possession of property fraudulently acquired, of considerable value,

for which they gave no consideration. The answer to this is that

such question can not be raised by the plaintiff in this case, because,

having no right to take the property, it is not injured by a decree of

the court which fails to grant such right. The other questions must

be between the defendants in this case and those from whom they took

deeds of conveyance, or such other parties, public or private, as may

show that they have an interest in the controversy. The decree of the

circuit court is affirmed.

Note. See note, § 291.

Sec. 291. (c) Consequences of ultra vires purchase.

COMMONWEALTH v. NEW YORK, ETC., RAILROAD CO. Et Al.1

1890. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 132 Pa. St.

Rep. 591-611.

Paxson, C. J. This was an information in the nature of a quo

warranto, filed by the attorney-general, the object of which was to

1 Statement abridged; only that part of the opinion relating to the single

point is given.

Sec. 291.

( c) Consequences of ultra vires purchase.

COM:d:ONWEALTH v . NEW YORK, ETC., RAILROAD CO. ET AL. 1
1890.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

132

Pa. St.

Rep. 591-6rr.
PAXSON, C. ].
This was an information in the nature of a quo
warranto, filed by the attorney-general, the object of which was to
1 Statement abridged; only that part of the opinion re lating to the f!ingle
point is given.
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escheat to the commonwealth certain lands in Elk county, alleged to
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be held by or for the defendant railroad company. * * *

IOI 5

It was alleged, in the first place, by the commonwealth that the

railroad company had violated section 5, article xvii of the constitu-

tion of this state. The said section is as follows:

"No incorporated company doing the business of a common carrier

shall directly or indirectly prosecute or engage in mining or manu-

facturing articles for transportation over its works; nor shall such

company, directly or indirectly, engage in an}7 other business than that

of common carriers, or hold or acquire lands, freehold or leasehold,

directly or indirectly, except such as shall be necessary for carrying

on its business; but any mining or manufacturing company may cany

the products of its mines and manufactories on its railroad or canal,

not exceeding fifty miles in length."

It will be noticed that this clause in the constitution affixes no pen-

alty for its violation. It is conceded that, for a violation of the or-

ganic law, a Pennsylvania corporation, or a foreign corporation having

or exercising corporate franchises within this commonwealth, would

forfeit such franchises. This, however, would not involve an escheat

or confiscation of its property. • * *
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[Holding also that under a statute prohibiting "the acquisition or

holding by a corporation of any real estate, either directly or through

a trustee or other device whatsoever," under penalty of escheat to the

state, lands held by a mining company authorized to hold, were not

subject to escheat because an unlicensed railroad company had pur-

chased and owned the stock of the mining company.]

Note. Acqnisition of property by corporation:

1. Common law: "To enable it to answer the purposes of its creation

every corporation aggregate has incidentally, at common law, a right to take,

hold and transmit in succession, property, real and personal, to an unlimited

extent or amount." Angell and Ames Corporations, § 145; or "at common

law corporations had the same capacity to take and hold lands as a private

escheat to the commonwealth certain lands in Elk county, alleged to
be held by or for the defendant railroad company. • • •
It was alleged, in the first place, by the commonwealth that the
railroad company had violated section 5, article xvii of the constitution of this state. The said section is as follows:
"~o incorporated company d o ing the business of a common carrier
shall directly or indirectly prosecute or engage in mining or manufacturing articles for transportation over its works; nor shall uch
company, directly or indirectly, engage in any other business thnn that
of common carriers, or hold or acquire lands, freehold or leasehold,
dirc:.:tly or indirectly, except such as shall be necessnry for carrying
on its business; but any mining or manufacturing company may carry
the products of its mines and manufactories on its railroad or canal,
not exceeding fifty miles in length."
It will be noticed that this clause in the constitution affixes no penalty for its violation. It is conceded that, for a violation of the organi c law, a Pennsylvania corporation, or a foreign corporation having
or exercising corporate frnnchises within this commonwealth, would
forfeit such franchises. This, however, would not involve an escheat
or confiscation of its property. • • •
[Holding also that under a statute prohibiting "the acquisition or
holding by a corporation of any real estate, either directly or through
a trustee or other device whatsoever," under penalty of escheat to the
state, lands held by a mining company authorized to hold, were not
subject to escheat because an unlicensed railroad company had purchased and owned the stock of the mining company.]

person prior to Magna Charta (1215). 1 Kyd Corp., 79, citing 19 Hen. VI,

44; see note 2, Elliott Corporations, § 160. See also Littleton's Reports, 49,

112, 114; Coke's Littleton, 2a, 44a, 3006; 10 Coke's Reports, 30ft; Comyns'

Digest, Franchise F., 11, 15, 16 and 17; First Parish in Sutton v.Cole, 3 Pick.

(Mass.), 232, 239; 2 Kent's Comm., *281; 1 Kvd Corp., 76, 78,108, 115;

Lathrop v. Commercial Bank, 8 Dana (Ky.) 114, 33 Am. Dec. 481.

2. Statute* of mortmain: "But a corporation, sole or aggregate, ecclesiastical

or lay, can not purchase or take lands and tenements, without license to take

in mortmain." Comyns' Digest, Franchises F., 17. These were 9 Hen. Ill,

c. 36 (Magna Charta); 7 Ed. I, c. 13; 13 Ed. 1, c. 32; 15 Rich. II, c. 5; 23 Hen.

VIII, c. 10, and 9 Geo. II, c. 36. "By these, alienation to corporations with-

out license in mortmain from the crown, and a license also from the lord, if

any, from whom the land was held, was made a cause of forfeiture. * *

Alienation in mortmain was not void, but voidable," and was good if the

right of the crown or lord to re-enter was not exercised. The present law of

England is contained in 51 and 52 Vict., c. 42, and 54 and 55 Vict., c. 73, and

Erovides that "land shall not be assured to, or for the benefit of, or acquired

y, or on behalf of, any corporation in mortmain otherwise than under the au-

thority of a license from the crown, or of a statute for the time being in force;

and if any land is so assured the land shall be forfeited to the crown, who

may enter and hold the land." 9 Eng. Encyc. of Law, pp. 1-2. But these

provisions do not apply to joint stock companies incorporated under the com-

Note. Acquisition of property by corporation :
l. Commo1i lato: "To enable it to answer the purposes of itR rreation

every corporation aggregate has incidentally, at common law, a right lo take,
hold and transmit in succession, property, real anrl personal, to an unlimiterl
extent or amount." Angell and Ames Corporations, § Hil; or "at common
law corporations had the same capacity to take anrl hold lands ns a private
person prior to :'Vlae:na Charta ( l'.lt5). 1 Kyd Corp., 79, citing 19 Hen. VI,
44; see note 2, Elliott Corporations, § 160. See also Littleton's Reports, 49,
112, 114; Coke's Littleton, 2a. 44a, 300b; JO Coke's ReportR, 30l>; Com,vns'
Die:est, Franchise F., 11, l!'i, 16 and 17; Firnt Parish in Sutton v. Cole, 3 Pick.
(Ma!'!ll.), 232, 239; 2 Kent's Comm., *281; 1 Kyrl Corp .• 76, 78, 108, 115;
Lathrop v. Commercial Bank, 8 Dana (Ky.) 114, ii::! Am. De<'. 481.
2. Statutes of mo1·tmai11: "But a corporation, sole or ag~regate, ecclesiastical
or Jay, can not purchase or take Janus and tenements, without license to take
in mortmain." Comyns' Digest, Franchises F., 17. These were 9 Hen. III,
c. a6 ( Ma~na Chartn); 7 Erl. I, c. rn; 13 Ed. 1, c. 32; 15 Rich. IT, c. 5; 23 Hen.
VJII, c. 10, and 9 Geo. II. c. 36. "By these, alienation to corporations without license in mnrtmain from the crown, and a lirense also from the lor<i, if
any, from whom the lanrl was held, was made a canse of forfeitnre. • •
Alienation in mortmnin was not void , but voidable," anrl was good if the
right of the crown or lord to re-enter was not exercised. The present law of
England is contained in .51 and 52 Viet., c. 42, and F>4 and !)Fi Virt.., r . 73, nnd
provirles that "land shall not be assured to, or for the benefit of, or n<'qnired
by, or on behalf of, any corporation in mortmain otherwise than under the authority of a liC'ense from the r.rown, or of a statute for the time hE>inir in forC'e;
and if nnv land is so assnre(l the land shall be forfeited tn the crown, who
may E>nter and hold the land ." 9 Eng. Encyc. of Law, pp. 1-2. Rnt these
provisions do not apply to joint fo!tock companies incorporated under th~ com-
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anies acts of 1802-1890, nor to the trades-union acts of 1861. 1 Cbitty's

1016

tat. Charities, p. 61, note (a).
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These statutes are not generally in force in the United States: 1839, Lath-

rop v. Com. Bank, 8 Dana (Ky.") 114, 33 Am. Dec. 481; 1840, Rivanna Nav.

panies acts of 1862-1890, nor to the trades-union acts of 1861. 1 Chitty's
Stat.. Charities, p. 61, note (a).
These statutes are not generally in force in the United States: 1839, Lathrop v. Com . Bank, 8 Dana (Ky.) 114, 33 Am. Dec. 481; 1846, Rivanna :r\av.
Co. v. Dawso n's, 3 Gratt. (Va. ) 19, 46 Am. Dec. 183; 1868, Page v. Heineberg,
40 Vt. 81, 94 Am. Dec. 378; 1886, .Mallett v. Simpson, 94 N. C. 37, 55 Am.
Re p. 594; 1896, Fayette Land Co. v. L. & N. R. Co., 93 Va. 274. But they
are partially so in Pennsylvania, 1821, Leazure v. Hillegas, 7 S. & R. (Pa..)
313, 320.
But many states have statutes forbidding religious and charitable corporations from holding more than a certain amount of land. See 1 Stimson's Statute Law,§§ 403, 1446, 2618.
3. But in th e absence of statutory provisions, it is now generally held that
corporatio11s have the 1·ight to purchase and hold such property, and such only, both
in kind and amount, as is necessary or convenient to carry out their legitimate
corporate purposes.
Real p1·operty : 1825, First Parish in Sutton v. Cole, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.1 232;
1842, Bank of Mich. v. ~iles, Walk . (Mich.) 99; 1844, Bank of Mieh. v.Niles,
1 Doug. ( Mich.) 401; 1847, Chautauqua Co. Bank v. Risley, 4 Denio (N. I.)
480; 1846, Rivanna Nav. Co. v . Dawson's, 3 Gratt. (Va. ) 19, 46 Am. Dec. 183;
1852, State (C. & A. R., etc., Co.l v. Commrs., 23 N. J. L. 510, 57 Am. Dec.
409; 1855, New Jersey R. & 1'. Co. v. Newark, 25 N. J. L . 315; 1868, Occum.
Co. v. A. & W ., etc., Co., 34 Conn. 529; 1870, Pac. R. v . Seeley, 45 Mo. 212,
100 Am . Dec. 369; 1872, Thompson v. Waters, 25 l\1ich. 214, 12 Am. Rep. 243;
1873, Carroll v. City of E. St. Louis, 67 Ill. 568; 1885, Wilks v . Georgia P.R.
Co., 79 Ala. 180; 1890, Case v. Kelly, 133 U. S. 21, supra, p. 1012; 1898, People
v. Pullman Car Co., 175 Ill. 125, supra, p. 1!2ti; 1899, First M. E. Church>.
Dixon, 178 Ill. 260.
In most of the states there are statutory provisions to the effect that corporations may own such real estate as shall be necessary, proper, convenient,
or required. Others make no qualification, while still others say to any
amount (Miss. ), or as an individual (Iowa, Ky.). See 2 Stimson's Stat. Law,
§ 8204.
In Hayward v. Davidaon, 41Ind.212 (1872), it is said: "With referencet-0
their power to take and hold real estate, corporations may be classified as
follows:
"First. Those whose charters or laws of creation forbid that they should
acquire and hold real estate. Such corporations can not take and hold real
estate; and a deed or devise to such corporation can pass no title. (But eee
infra , 4 (el.)
"Sec011d . Those whose charters, or laws of creation, are silent as to whether
they may or may not acquire and hold real estate. In such a case, if the objects for which the corporation is formed can not be accomplished without
ac~uirin~ and holding reRl estate, the power so to do will be implied.
' Third. Those whose charters, or laws of creation, authorize them, in some
cases, and for some purpose, to take and hold the title to real estate.
"Fourth. Those whose charters, or Jaws of creation, confer upon them a gen·
era! power to acquire and hol<l reRl estate. Corporations thus e mpowered
may take and hold renl est.ate, RS freely, and fully. and perfectly as natural
persons may take and hold. As to this point see, 1895, Market St. R. ' ·Hell·
man, 109 Cal. 571."
P ersonal p1·operty, see note §298, infra.
4. Who can complain of an 11/trri vires holding? (a) General rule, only
tbe' st.ate can cornplain aftPr thP conve\·ance is execnted: 1820, Silver Lake
Bank v. North, 4 Johns. Ch.(~. Y. l 370; 1825, Banks v. Poitiaux, 3 Rand.
(Va. ) 136 (purchaser from corporation ) ; 1840, Runyan v. Coster, 14 Pet. (39
U.S. ) 122 (ejectme nt by party trncing title through corporation); 18-IB, BRrrow v. Turnpike Co .. 9 Humph. (28 Tenn.) 30-t (vendor to corporation); 1853.
Riley v. Rochei:;ter, 9 N. Y. 64 (trespa!ls upon land held by corporation); 1800,
Natoma, etc., Co. v. Clarken, 14 Cal. 544 lsuit for possession by corporation l;
1860, Blunt v. Wnlker, 11 Wis. 334 (ven<lee of corp. gets good title); 1873,

Co. v. Dawson's, 3 Gratt. (Va.)"l9, 46 Am. Dec. 183; 1868, Page v. Heineberg,

40 Vt. 81, 94 Am. Dec. 378; 1886, Mallett v. Simpson, 94 N. C. 37, 55 Am.

Rep. 594; 1896, Fayette Land Co. v. L. & N. R. Co., 93 Va. 274. But they

are partially so in Pennsylvania, 1821, Leazure v. Hillegas, 7 S. & R. (Pa.)

313, 320.

But many states have statutes forbidding religious and charitable corpora-

tions from holding more than a certain amount of land. See 1 Stimson's Stat-

ute Law, §§ 403, 1446, 2618.

3. But in the absence of statutory provisions, it is now generally held that

corporations hare the right to purchase and hold such property, and svch only, both

in kind and amount, as is necessary or convenient to carry out their legitimate

corporate purposes.

Heal property: 1825, First Parish in Sutton v. Cole, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 232;

1842, Bank of Mich. v. Niles, Walk. (Mich.) 99; 1844, Bank of Mich. v. Niles,

1 Doug. (Mich.) 401; 1847, Chautauqua Co. Bank v. Risley, 4 Denio (N. Y.)

480; 1846, Rivanna Nav. Co. v. Dawson's, 3 Gratt. (Va.) 19, 46 Am. Dec. 183;
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1852, State (C. & A. R., etc., Co.) v. Commrs., 23 N. J. L.510, 57 Am. Dec.

409; 1855, New Jersey R. & T. Co. v. Newark, 25 N. J. L. 315; 1868, Occum.

Co. v. A. & W., etc., Co., 34 Conn. 529; 1870, Pac. R. v. Seelev, 45 Mo. 212,

100 Am. Dec. 369; 1872, Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich. 214, 12 Am. Rep. 243;

1873, Carroll v. City of E. St. Louis, 67 111. 568; 1885, Wilks v. Georgia P. R.

Co., 79 Ala. 180; 1890, Case v. Kelly, 133 U. S. 21, supra, p. 1012; 1898, People

v. Pullman Car Co., 175 111. 125, supra, p. 926; 1899, First M. E. Church v.

Dixon, 178 111. 260.

In most of the states there are statutory provisions to the effect that corpo-

rations may own such real estate as shall be necessary, proper, convenient,

or required. Others make no qualification, while still others say to any

amount (Miss.), or as an individual (Iowa, Ky.). See 2 Stimson's Stat. Law,

§ 8204.

In Hayward v. Davidson, 41 Ind. 212 (1872), it is said: "With reference to

their power to take and hold real estate, corporations may be classified as

follows:

"First. Those whose charters or laws of creation forbid that they should

acquire and hold real estate. Such corporations can not take and hold real

estate; and a deed or devise to such corporation can pass no title. (But see

infra, 4 (<0.)

"Second. Those whose charters, or laws of creation, are silent as to whether

they may or may not acquire and hold real estate. In such a case, if the ob-

jects for which the corporation is formed can not be accomplished without

acquiring and holding real estate, the power so to do will be implied.

"Third. Those whose charters, or laws of creation, authorize them, in some

cases, and for Rome purpose, to take and hold the title to real estate.

"Fourth. Those whose charters, or laws of creation, confer upon them a gen-

eral power to acquire and hold real estate. Corporations thus empowered

may take and hold real estate, as freely, and fully, and perfectly as natural

persons may take and hold. As to this point see,1895, Market St. R. v. Hell-

man, 109 Cal. 571."

Personal property, see note §298, infra.

4. Who can complain of an vltra vires holding? (a) General rule, only

the*state can complain after the conveyance is executed: 1820, Silver Lake

Bank v. North. 4 Johns. Oh. (N. Y.) 370; 1825, Banks v. Poitiaux, 3 Rand.

(Va.) 136 (purchaser from corporation); 1840, Runyan v. Coster, 14 Pet. (39

TJ. S.) 122 (ejectment by party tracing title through corporation); 1848, Bar-

row v. Turnpike Co., 9 Humph. (28 Tenn.) 304 (vendor to corporation); 1853,

Riley v. Rochester, 9 N. Y. 64 (trespass upon land held by corporation); 1860,

Natoma, etc., Co. v. darken, 14 Cal. 544 (suit for possession bv corporation 1;

1860, Blunt v. Walker, 11 Wis. 334 (vendee of corp. gets good title); 1873,
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Wash v. Barton, 24 Ohio St. 28 (vendee of corp. gets good title); 1374, Hough

v. Cook Co. L., etc., Co., 73 111. 23, 24 Am. Rep. 230 (grantor to corporation

can not complain); 1878, National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621; 1880,
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Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99; 1881, Davis v. Old Colonv R., 131 Mass. 258,

273; 1882, Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174; 1884, Alexander v. Tolleston

Club, 110 111. 65; 1886, Mallett v. Simpson, 94 N. C. 37; 1889, Fritts v. Pal-

mer, 132 U. S. 282 (vendee of corp. gets good title) ; 1889, Ragan v. McElroy,

98 Mo. 349 (grantor to corp. or his heirs can not complain); 1890, Long v.

Georgia P. R. Co., 91 Ala. 519 (grantor to corporation can not complain);

1891, Holmes & G. Mfg. Co. v. II. & W. M. Co., 127 N. Y. 252; 1891, Gilbert

v. Hole, 2 So. Dak. 164; 1892, Shelby v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 143 III. 385

(grantor to corporation cannot complain); 1892, Willoughbv v. Chicago J.,

etc., Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 056; 1893, Connecticut, etc., Ins. Co. v."Smith, 117 Mo.

261, 38 Am. St. Rep. 656; 1894, Hanson v. Little Sisters, etc., 79 Md. 434, 32

L. R. A. 293; 1897, Farwell Co. v. Wolf, 96 Wis. 10, 65 Am. St. Rep. 22,37 L.

R. A. 138; 1897, Henderson v. Virden Coal Co., 78 111. App. 437; 1897, In re

Stickneys' Will, 85 Md. 79, 60 Am. St. Rep. 308, 35 L. R. A. 693; 1897, Wa-

ter, etc., Co. v. Tennev, 24 Colo. 344; 1897, Cooney v. Booth, 169 III. 370; 1898,

South & N. A. R. Co. v. Highland Ave., etc., Co., 119 Ala. 105; 1898, State v.

Elizabeth, 61 N. J. L. 411, 693; 39 Atl. Rep. 683, 906; 1898, Rogers v. Nash-
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ville, etc., R. Co., 91 Fed. Rep. 299 (stockholder can not complain after con-

veyance executed); 1899, Ray v. Foster, — Texas Civ. App. —, 53 S. W. Rep.

54"; 1900, Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Keegan. 185 111. 70, 56 N. E. Rep. 1088.

(6) But if the contract or conveyance is not completed, an interested party

mav object, in any suit bv the corporation to perfect its title: 1870, Pacific R.

Co." v. Seelev, 45 Mo. 212", 100 Am. Dec. 369; 1874, United States Trust Co. v.

Lee, 73 111. 142; 1875, Coleman v. San Rafael T. C, 49 Cal.517; 1883, Thweatt

v. Bank, 81 Ky. 1; 1890, Case v. Kelly, 133 U. S. 21, supra, p. 1012; 1890,

Mitchell v. Cline, 84 Cal. 409; 1890, Houston Elec. Co. v. Simon, 20 Ore. 60,

10 L. R. A. 251; 1898, South & N. R. Co. v. Highland Ave., etc., 119 Ala.

105.

The courts are in conflict as to whether a corporation can maintain eject-

ment for lands which it is ultra vires for it to hold.

That it mav, see 1860, Natoma, etc., Co. v. Clarkin, 14 Cal. 544; 1874,

Shewalter v. Pirner, 55 Mo. 218; 1886, Bone v. Del. & II. Canal Co., 18 W. N.

C. (Pa.) 125, 5 Atl. Rep. 751; 1887, East N. L., etc., Church v. Froislie, 37

Minn. 447.

That it can not, see: 1827, Quaker Soc. v. Dickenson, 1 Dev. L. (N. C.)

189; 1873, Carroll v. E. S. & L., 67 111. 568; 1879, Leasure v. Un. M. Co., 91

Pa. St. 491; 1882, St. Peters' Cath. C. v. German, 104 III. 440.

But the purchaser from the corporation can not raise the question in a suit

by the corporation vender for the specific performance by the purchaser:

1825. Banks v. Poitiaux, 3 Rand. (Va.) 136, 15 Am. D. 706; 1856, Old Colony

R. Co. v. Evans, 6 Gray (Mass.) 25, 66 Am. Dec. 394.

(c) A non-consenting shareholder who acts promptly may enjoin the con-

summation of the unexecuted ultra virea transaction: 1820, Gray v. Chaplin,

2 Russ. (3 Eng. Ch.) 126; 1850, Bagshaw v. Eastern, etc., Rv., 19 L. J. Ch.

410; 1860, Simpson v. Westminster, etc.. Co., 8 H. L. Cas. 712; 1869, Cen-

tral R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582; 1871, Stewart v. Erie, etc., Co., 17 Minn.

372; 1877, Watson v. Harlem, etc., Co., 52 How. Pr. 348; 1882, Klkins v.

Camden and A. R. Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 5; 1890, Carson v. Iowa City G. L. C,

80 Iowa 638; 1891, Shaw v. Campbell Tp. Co., 12 Ky. L. Rep. 799, 15 S. W.

Rep. 24"); 1895, Byrne v. Schuyler, 65 Conn. 336, 28 L. R. A. 304; 1895, Pol-

lock v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 157 U. S. 429.

Although it is sometimes said that if the ultra rtres transaction is com-

pletely executed, the non-consenting shareholder can not complain (and

especially if he fails to act promptly): 1S79, Terry v. Eagle I-ock Co., 47

Conn. 141, 161; 1892, Willoughbv v. Chicago J., etc., Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 565;

1896, Jefferson Co. Sav. Bank v. Francis. 115 Ala. 317; 1898, Rogers v. Nash-

Wash v. Barton, 24 Ohio St. 28 (vendee of corp. gets good title); 1874, Hough
v. Cook Co. L., etc., Co., 73 lll. 23, 24 Am . Rep. 230 (grantor to corporation
can not complain ); 1878, National Bank v . .Matthews, 98 U. S. 621; 1880,
Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99; 1881, Davis v. Old Colony R., 131 Mass. 258,
273; 1882, Jones v. Habersham, 107 U.S. 174; 1884, Alexande r v. Tolleston
Club, 110 Ill. 65 ; 1886, :Mallett v. Simpson, 9-l N. C. 37; 1889, Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U . S. 282 (ven11ee of corp. gets good title); 1889, Ragan v. McElroy,
98 l\'Io. 349 (grantor to corp. or his hei rs can not complain) ; 1890, Long v.
Georgia P. R. Co., 91 A la . 519 (grantor to corporation can n ot complain) ;
1891, Holmes & G. Mfg. Co. v. II . & W. l\I. Co., 127 N. Y. 252; 1891, Gilbert
v . Hole, 2 So. Dak. 16-l; 1892, Shelby v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 143 Ill. 385
(grantor to corporation can not complain ) ; 1 89~, Willoughby v. Chicago J.,
etc., Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 656; 1893, ConnectiC'nt, etc., Ins. Co. v. Smith , 117 Mo.
261, 38 Am. St. Rep. 65G; 1894, Hanson v. Little F:isters, etc., 7H Md. 434, 32
L. R. A. 293; 1897, Farwell Co. v. Wolf, 96 Wis. 10, 6.5 Am. St. Rep. 22, 37 L.
R. A. 138; 1897, H enderso n v. Virden Coal Co., 78 Ill. App. 437; 1897, In re
Stickneys' Will, S.5 !\Jd. i9, 60 Am. St. Rep. 308, 35 L. R. A. 693: 18m, Water, etc., Co. v. Tenney, 2-l Colo. 344 : 1897 , Cooney v. Booth, 169 Ill. 370; 1898,
South & N. A. R. Co. v. Highland Ave., etc., Co., 119 A la . 105 ; 1898, State v.
Elizabeth, 61 N. J. L. 411, 693; 39 Atl. Rep. 683, 906; 1898, Rogers v. Nashville, etc., R. Co., 91 Fed. Rep. 299 (stockholder can not complain after conveyance executed): 1899.l Ray v. Foster, - Texas Ci v. A pp. - , 53 S. W. Rep.
6-l; HJOO, Chicago & A. K Co. v. Keegan. 185 Ill. 70, 56 N. E. Rep. 1088.
(b) - But if the contrad or-conveyance is n ot completea, an interested party
mav object, in any suit by the corporation to perfect its title: 1870, Pacific R.
v. Seeley, 45 Mo. 212, 100 Am. Dec. 369 ; 1874, United States Trust Co. v.
Lee, 73 Ill. 142; 1875, Coleman v. San Rafael T. C., 49 Cal. 517; 1883, Thweatt
v. Bank, 81 Ky. l; 1890, Case v. Kelly, 133 U. S. 21, supra, p. 1012; 1890,
Mitchell v. Cline, 84 Cal. 409; 1800, H ouston Elec. Co. v. Simon, 200re. 60,
10 L . R. A. 251; 1898, South & N. R. Co. v. Highland Ave., etc., 119 Ala.
105.
The courts are in conflict as to whether a corporation can maintain ejectment for lands which it is ultra vires for it to bold .
That it may, see 1860, Natoma, etc., Go. v. Clarkin, 14 Cal. 544; 1874,
Shewalter v. Pirner, 55 Mo. 218; 1886, Bone v. Del. & II. Canal Co., 18 W. N.
C. (Pa.) 125, 5 At!. Rep. 751; 1887, East N. L., etc., Church v. Froislie, 37
Minn. 447.
That it can not, see: 1827, Quaker Soc. v. Dickenson, l Dev. L. (N. C.)
189; 1873, Carroll v. E . S. & L., 67 Ill. 568: 1879, Leasure v. Un. M. Co., 91
Pa. St. 491; 1882, St. Peters' Cath. C. v. German, 104 Ill. 440.
But the purchaser from the corporation can n ot rai se th e question in a suit
by the corporation vender for th e specific performance by tLe purchaser:
1825, Banks v. Poitiaux, 3 Rand. (Va.) 136, 15 Am. D. i06; 1856, Old Colony
R. Co. v. Evans, 6 Gray (Mass .) 25, 66 Am . Dec. 394.
(c) A non-consenting shareholder wh o acts promptly may enjoin the consummation of the unexecuted ultra vires transaction : 1826, Gray v. Chaplin,
2 Russ. 13 Eng. Ch.) 12n; 1850, Bagshaw v. Eastern, etc., Ry., 19 L. J . Ch.
410; 1860, 8impsonv. W estminster, etc ., Co.,8 H. L.CHs.712; 18H9, Central R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582; 1871, Stewart v. Erie, etc., Co., 17 Minn.
372; 1877, Watson v. Harlem, etc., Co., .12 'H ow. Pr. 348 ; 1882, Elkins v.
Camden and A. R. Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 5: 1800, Carson v. Iowa City G . L . C.,
80 Iowa 638; 1891 , ~haw v. Can1pbell Tp. Co., 12 Ky. L. Rep. 7!:19, 15 8 . W.
Rep. 24.); 1895, Byrne v. Schuyle r, 6.5 Conn. 336, 28 L. RA. 30:!- ; 18\:!5, Pollock v. Farmeni' L. & T. Co., 157 U. 8. 42!:l.
Although it is sornetime!l sai<l that if the 11 ltra rire.~ transaction is completely executed, the n on-C'onsenting shareholder can not complain (and
esp€.cially if he fails to a<'L pro111ptl.v ) : 1879, Terry v. Eagle Lock Co., 47
Conn. 141, 161; J8!l2, Will onghb~r v. Chirago J., etc., Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 565 ;
1896, J effe rson Co. 8av. Bank v. Fran<'is, llli Ala. 317; 1898, Rogers v. Nashville, etc., R. Co.,!ll Feel. Rep 209on 317; 1900, City of Spokan e v. Amsterdamscb (Wash.), 60 Pac. Rep. 141. Yet the better statement is that equity

eo:

ville, etc., R. Co., 91 Fed. Rep 299 on 317; 1900, City of Spokane v. Amster-

darasch (Wash.), 60 Pac. Rep. 141. Yet the better statement is that equity
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executed ultra vires transaction, even to the extent of setting it aside, if in the
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meantime no superior equity lias intervened, nor the rights of innocent third

parties attached: 1862, Match v. Eastern R. Co., 43 N. H. 515; 1874, Hough

will relieve an injured storkholderwho acts promptly, from the efferts of an
exeeuted ultra vires transarti•rn, even to th<' extent of setting it aside. if in the
meantime no superior eq11ity has intervened, nor the rights of innocent third
parties attached: 18(i2, ;\larch v. Eastern R. Co., 48 N. H. 515; 1874, Hou~h
v. Cook Co. L. Co., 73 Ill. 23, 24 Am. R. 230; 1887, Chicago v. Cameron. 120
Ill. 447, 458; 1890, Ashto n v. Dushaway Assn., 84 Cal. 61; 1899, Harding v.
Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551, 05 ~- E. Hep. 577.
(d) Unless there is a statute making the conveyance void, and providing
for un escheat to the Flute, o r unless the mortmain st11tutes are in fon·e, the
state's complaint is limited to a forfeiture of the charter of the corporation,
an<! not a. forfeiture of the prope rty obtained by the ultra 9·irn; tntnsac-tion:
182-1, The Banks v. Poitiaux, 3 Rand. (Va.) 136, 142, 15 Am. Det·. i06, i07;
1873, Walsh v. Bartou, 24 Ohio 8t. 28. 42; 1875, Edwards v. Fairbanks, etc.,
27 La. Ann. 4-rn, 450; 18i8, l\ational Bank v. Matthe ws, 98 U.S. f\21, on ti2\.l ;
1880, Bank v. \VhitnPy, 103 U.S. 9H ; 1888, In re l\1cGraw, 111 N. Y. 66, 96;
l 8!l0, C'oniw. v. N. Y . . ctc.,H., 18'.? P a.f'l.591,su11ra; 11<94, Liincasterv.A.
I. Co., 140 N. Y. 51n, -586; 189li, Fayette Land Co. v. Louisville, etc., Co., 93
Va. ~14, 291, :U !3. E. Hep. lOHi.
H is often said, however (obiter dictum, we think), t.hat the cont·eyance is
"valid nntil asHaile<l by th e statP in n direct proce(>ding for that purpose ' '
(1886, Mallet v. Simpson, H4 :K. C. 31; l8flH, Burden v. Burden, 159 N. Y. ~87,
804) , or until office found (1821, Leazure v. Hillcgaf', 7 R. & R. 313; Runyan
v. CoRt~r, J4 P et. (L. S.) 122, 131; 1887, Russell\". Texas, etc., R Co., 68TPx.
H4G; 18fl0, Long v. Georgia Pac. R., 91 Ala. 519, 522), or the ('OrRoration may
hol.d subjed to the fltate's right of escbeat (1887, Hickory F. 0. Co. v. Buffalo,
etc., Uo., 32 Feel. Rep. 22).
(e) A prohibited purchase is sometimes said to be void, and uo title passes:
1844, Bank v. Niles. 1 Doug. (Mich.) 401; 1873, Carroll v. E., St. T... ., etr .. Co.,
67 Ill. 5ti8; 1882, St.. Peter's Roman Cath. Cong. v. Germain, 104 Ill. HO;
1898, State v. Burlson Land Co., 18 Wash. 604, 52 Pac. 574; yet there seems to
be no good reason why the rule above, that on ly the state could complain as
for a forfeiture of the charter, should not apply: 1875, Edwards v. Fairban kt<,
27 La. Ann. 449, 450; 1800, Carlow v. Aultman, 28 Neb. 672, 44 N. W. Rep. 873;
18fll, Fisk v. Patten, 7 Utah 399; 1892, St. Louis R. v. Terre H. R., 145 lJ. S.
393.
See particularly upon this topic, article in8 Harv. L. R. 15 11894-5) by A.
M. Alger, upon consequences of illegal or ultra vires acquisition of real estate
by a corporation.
Minnesota (2 G. S. 769, 770, § 4ld l, Pennsylvania (after five years, G. L.
1894, §§ 42-53, Esclteats), Wisconsin (Stat.1889, ch. 96,§§ 2200a), Illinois (after
five years, R. S. 1805, ch. 32, § 5, 5 !, Texas (R. S. 1895, art. 749d,e), North Carolina (afLer t.hirty years. Code 1883, § 6!l0 l and perhaps others, provide for forfeitures or escheats to the state, but Texas and lllinois provide for the sale of
land so esch ented, and payment of the proceeds to the shareholders. Michigan Coust., Art. XV,§ 12, provides "No corporation shall hold any real estate,
for a longer period than ten years, except such as shall be actually occupied
by such corporation in the exercise of its frnnchise."

v. Cook Co. L. Co., 73 111. 23, 24 Am. R. 230; 1887, Chicago v. Cameron, 120

111. 447, 458; 1890, Ashton v. Dashawav Assn., 84 Cal. 61; 1899, Harding v.

Glucose Co., 182 III. 551, 55 N. E. Rep. 577.

(d) Unless there is a statute making the conveyance void, and providing

for an escheat to the stale, or unless the mortmain statutes are in force, the

state's complaint is limited to a forfeiture of the charter of the corporation,

and not a forfeiture of the property obtained by the ultra vires transaction:

1825, The Banks v. Poitiaux, 3 Rand. (Va.) 136, 142, 15 Am. Dec. 706, 707;

1873, Walsh v. Barton, 24 Ohio St. 28. 42; 1875, Edwards v. Fairbanks, etc.,

27 La. Ann. 449, 450; 1878, National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621, on 629;

18811, Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99; 1888, In re McGraw, 111 N. Y. 66, 96;

1890, Comw. v. N. Y., etc., R., 132 Pa. St. 591, supra; 1894, Lancaster v. A.

I. Co., 140 N. Y. 576, 086; 1896, Favette Land Co. v. Louisville, etc., Co., 93

Va. 274, 291, 24 8. E. Rep. 1016.

It is of ten said, however (obiter dictum, we think), that the conveyance is

"valid until assailed by the slate in a direct proceeding for that purpose''
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(1886, Mallet v. Simpson, 94 N. C. 37; 1899, Burden v. Burden, 169 N. Y. 287.

304), or until ottice found (1821, Leazure v. Hillegas, 7 S. & R. 313; Runvan

v. Coster, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 122, 131; 1887, Russell v. Texas, etc., R. Co., 68Tex.

646; 1890, Long v. Georgia Pac. R., 91 Ala. 519, 522), or the corporation may

hold subject to the state's right of escheat (1887, Hickory F. O. Co. v. Buffalo,

etc!, Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 22).

(e) A prohibited purchase is sometimes said to be void, and no title passeR:

1844, Bank v. Niles, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 401; 1873, Carroll v. E.,St. L., etc.. Co.,

67 111. 568; 1882, St. Peter's Roman Cath. Cong. v. Germain, 104 III. 440;

1898, State v. Hudson Land Co.,18 Wash. 664,52 Pac. 574 ; yet there seems to

be no good reason why the rule above, that only the state could complain as

for a forfeiture of the charter, should not apply: 1875, Edwards v. Fairbanks,

27 La. Ann. 449, 450; 1890, Carlow v. Aultman,"28 Neb. 672,44 N. W. Rep. 873;

1891, Fisk v. Patten, 7 Utah 399; 1892, St. Louis R. v. Terre H. R., 145 U. S.

393.

See particularly upon this topic, article in8 Harv. L. R. 15 (1894-5) by A.

M. Alger, upon consequences of illegal or ultra vires acquisition of real estate

by a corporation.

Minnesota (2 G. S. 769, 770, § 41<J), Pennsylvania (after five vears, G. L.

1894, §§ 42-53, Escheats), Wisconsin (Stat. 1889, eh. 96,§§ 2200a), Illinois (after

five years, R. S. 1895, ch. 32, § 5, 5), Texas (R. S. 1895, art. 749d,e), North Car-

olina (after thirty years. Code 1883, § 690) and perhaps others, provide for for-

feitures or escheats to the state, but Texas and Illinois provide for the sale of

land so escheated, and payment of the proceeds to the shareholders. Michi-

gan Const., Art. XV, § 12, provides "Nocorporation shall hold any real estate,

for a longer period than ten years, except such as shall be actually occupied

by such corporation in the exercise of its franchise."

Sec. 292. Same.

Sec. 292. Same.

(d) Estates that may be acquired.

(1) Fee simple. See Wilson v. Leary, 120 N. C. 90, supra,

( d) Estates that may be acquired.
(1) Fee simple. See Wilson v. Leary, 120 N . C. 90, supra,
p. 903.

P- 903.

Note. See note, supra, p. 911.

1. The common law rule was that land reverted to the grantor upon disso-

lution of the corporation: 1848, Bingham v. Weiderwax, ] N. Y. 509; 1875,

Note.

See note, supra, p. 911.
1. The common law rule waA that land reverted to the grantor upon dissolnl ion of the corporation: 18.J~, Bingham v. Weiderwax, 1 N. Y. 509; 1875,
.Mercer Acad. v. Rusk, 8 \V. Ya. an. St-1', ~upm, I" 8!JI.

Mercer Acad. v. Rusk, 8 W. Va. 373. Sec, supra, p. 891.
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tion, though only an estate for the life of the corporation for purposes of en-

joyment: 1848, People v. Mauran, 5 Denio 389; 1852, Nicoll v. New York,

etc., It. Co., 12 Barb. 460; and this was true, though the corporation had

only a limited duration; 1*54, Nicoll v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 12 N. Y. 121.

3. Finally it has been settled that a business corporation, though of limited

deration, takes a fee for enjoyment, or rather for disposition as a part of the

assets at dissolution, without reverter: 1872, Heath v. Barmore, 50 N. Y. 302;

1888, People v. O'Brien, 111 N.Y.I, 7 Am. St. Rep. 684, and note, infra,p. 1426;

but the common law rule yet obtains as to mutual issurance and charitable or

non-stock corporations. See, supra, §§ 25(1, 257, and note.

4. A grant of a freehold without words of inheritance, perpetuity or suc-

cession will pass a fee: 1836, Union Canal Co. v. Young, 1 Whart. 'Pa.) 410,

30 Am. Dec. 212; 1839, Trustees of Caledonia, etc., v. Burt, 11 Vt. 632; 1861,

Conz. Soc. v. Stark, 34 Vt. 243; 1864, Erie R. Co. v. State, 31 N. J. L. 531, 86

Am. Dec. 226; 1867, Wilcox v. Wheeler, 47 N. H. 488; 1868, Page v. Heine-

berg, 40 Vt. 81, 94 Am. Dec. 378; 1885, Asheville Div. v. Aston, 92 N. C.578.

Sec. 293. Same.

2 But at common law the corporation took a fee for pnrposes of alienatio11, th ough onlv an estate for the life of the corporation ior purposes of enjoyuwnt: 1848, P eople v. Mauran, 5 De nio 389; 1852, Nicoll v. New York,
etc., IC Co., L2 Barb. 460; and this wus true, though the corporation had
only a limited duration; 18-54, Nicoll v. N. Y., etc., H. Co., 12 N. Y. 121.
3. Finally it has been settled that a business corporation, though of limited
d •1ration, takes a fee for enjoyme 11t, or rather for dispo8ition as a part of the
assets at dissolution, without reverter: 1872, Heath v. Barmore, 50 N. Y. 302;
1888, Peoplev. O'Brien, 111 N. Y.1, 7 Am. St. Rep.t>84, an<! note, infra,p.1426;
bu t th e common law rule yet obtains as to mutu a l issurance and charitable or
nou-stock corporations. See, supra, §§ 21>n, 257, and note.
4. A grant of a freeholri without word s of inheritancP, pe rpetuity or succession will pass a ff'e: 1836, Union Cuna! Co. v. Young, l 'Vhart.. •PH .) 410,
30 Am. Dec. 212; 18:~9, Trustees of Calt><lonia, etc., v. Burt, 11 Vt. 632; 1861,
Con!.!. ."oc. v. Stark, 3~ Vt. 243; 1864, Etie R. Co. v. Statf' , 31 N. J. L. 531, 86
Am. Dec. 226; 1867, Wilcox v. Wl1 Pele r, 47 N. H. 488; 181i8, Page v. Heineberg, 40 VL. 81, 94 Am. Dec. 378; 1885, Asheville Div. v. Aston, 92 N. C. 578.

(2) Estates in common and joint tenancy.
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DE WITT Et Al. v. THE CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO.1

1852. In the Supreme Court of California. 2 California Re-

Sec. 293. Same.

ports 289—304.

[Appeal from district court denying a motion to dissolve an in-

junction restraining defendants from completing a contemplated pur-

( 2) Estates in common and joint tenancy.

chase of certain land by the city of San Francisco and the county of

DE WITT ET AL. v. THE CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO.I

San Francisco, for the use of both corporations.]

Wells, Justice. * * * The next objection advanced, and which is

IN THE SuPREME CouRT OF CALIFORNIA.

said to be fatal to the power claimed by the appellants, is, that the cor-

city of San Francisco can not hold lands as joint tenants, or tenants

in common. It is not pretended that these said corporations can hold

as joint tenants. Joint tenancy is a technical feudal estate, founded,

like the laws of primogeniture, on the principle of the aggregation of

landed estates in the hands of a few, and opposed to their division

among many persons. For the creation of a joint tenancy, four uni-

ties are required, namely, unity of interest, unity of title, unity of

time, unity of possession. 1 Cruise's Digest (by Grecnleaf), 355,

§ 11; 2 Crabb's Real Prop., § 2303. But the distinguishing incident

is a right of survivorship. 1 Cruise, 359, § 27; 2 Crabb's Real Prop.,

§ 2306.

Two corporations can not hold as joint tenants, because two of the

essential unities are wanting, namely,-of the same capacity and title.

1 Cruise, 362, § 39. Nor can they hold as joint tenants for another

reason: Being each perpetual there can be no survivorship between

them; and this, as we have just seen, is the distinguishing incident of

'Only that part of opinion of Wells, J., relating to estates in common and

joint tenancy is given.

2

California Re-

ports 289-304.

poration of the county of San Francisco and the corporation of the

[Appeal from district court denying a motion to dissolve an injunction restraining defendants from completing a contemplated purcha'\e of certain land by the city of San Francisco and the county of
San Francisco, for-the use of both corporations.]
WELLS, Justice. • • • The next objection advanced, and which is
said to be fatal to the power claimed by the appellants, is, that the corporation of the county of San Francisco and the corporation of the
city of San Francisco can not hold lands as joint tenants, or tenants
in common. It is not pretended that these said corporations can hold
as joint tenants. Joint tenancy is a technical feudal estate, founded,
like the laws of prt"mogeniture, on the principle of the aggregation of
landed estates in the hands of a few, and opposed to their division
among many persons. For the creation of a joint tenancy, four unities are required, namely, unity of t"nterest, unity of title, unity of
tz'me, unity of possess£on. 1 Cruise's Digest (hy Greenleaf), 355,
§ 11; 2 Crabb's Real Prop., § 2303. But the distinguishing incident
is a right of survivorship. 1 Cruise, 359 1 § 27; 2 Crabb's Real Prop.,
§ 2306.

Two corporations can not hold as jo£nt tenants, because two of the
essential unities are wanting, namely, · of the same capacity and title.
1 Cruise, 362, § 39.
Nor can they hold as joint tenants for another
reason: Being each perpetual there can be no survivorship between
them: and this, as we have just seen, is the <listingtii shing incident of
1 Only that part of opinion of Wells, J., relating to estates in common and
joint tenancy is given.
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this estate. Nor can a corporation hold lands as joint tenant with a

1020 DE WITT ET AL V. THE CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO.

natural person, for there is no reciprocity of survivorship between

§ 294

them. Angell and Ames Corporations, 150; I Kyd Corp., 72.

But a tenancy in common requires for its existence but one unity,

this estate. Nor can a corporation hold lands as joint tenant with a
n atural person, for there is no reciprocity of survivorship between
them. Angell and Ames Corporations, l)Oi l Kyd Corp., 72.
But a tenancy in common requires for its existence but one unity,
namely, that of possession. 1 Cruise, 390, § 2; 2 Crabb's Real Prop.,
627, § 2316. If, therefore, a grant should be made to two persons,
which in its terms should imply a joint tenancy, but such an estate
could n ot vest, fo r the reason th at some of the requisite un£tics were
wantjng, the resu lt would be the creation of a tenancy in common.
The rule of law is, that a grant shall not fail if there is a capacity to
take under it, and if the higher estate can not vest, the next estate
which is possible shall vest. This is an equitable rule which is made
to apply to all grants and devises. The appellants in this case propose to purchase the undivided one-half of the property known as the
Jenny Lind and P arker H ouse, and the land upon which the same
stands, to be used as tenants in common with the city of San Francisco. But it is said that two incorporations can not hold lands as
tenants in common; and the case of the New York and Sharon Canal
C o mpany v. The Fulton Bank, 7 vVendell 4r2, is cited in the opinion
d elivered by the di strict judge, and is the only authority produced to
sustain thi s proposition. From an examination of the case, v>e think
that it maintains the opposite doctrine.
The eminent counsel on the part of the plaintiff, arguendo, asserted
that two or more corporations may unite in the purchase of property
real or personal; they may take a deed of real estate for the establishment of their houses of business. Insurance companies may own
pilot boats in common, and canal companies may be tenants in common
of locks , canal boats and other property subserving their mutual interest;
I Kyd, 108; 2 Kent's Com. , 315; and the counsel for the defendant
said, "It is n ot denied that distinct corporations may O'v\'11 propi::rty in
common," while SaYage, the chief justice, in delivering the opinion
of the court, said, "These two companies had certain moneys in the
hands of their officer; they were both interested in those moneys, and
p robably in equal degree. Not being partners, they were tenants in
common; in th nt character they made the deposit of the mon ey. and
in that character I can see no objection to their sustaining an action
fo r it; thus the court d ecides that they may be tenants in common in
a chatte l, but does not d ecide that they may be so in lands, that que ·tion not being before the court," and yet this case is cited to mnintnio
the doctrine that two corporations can not hold real estate as tenants
in common.
The books and cases do not afford any instance in which this right
of holding lands as tenants in common, either with each other or with
natural persons, is denied to corporations. Not one of the reasons
which work a want of capacity to hold as j oint tenants would prevent
their holding as tenallts i'n common, for this estate requ ires but one
unitv, that of possession.
far from corporations not being able to hold lands in common,
the origina l condition at common law of the largest class of corpora-

namely, that of possession. 1 Cruise, 390, §252 Crabb's Real Prop.,

627, § 2316. If, therefore, a grant should be made to two persons,

which in its terms should imply a joint tenancy, but such an estate

could not vest, for the reason that some of the requisite unities were

wanting, the result would be the creation of a tenancy in common.

The rule of law is, that a grant shall not fail if there is a capacity to

take under it, and if the higher estate can not vest, the next estate

which is possible shall vest. This is an equitable rule which is made

to apply to all grants and devises. The appellants in this case pro-

pose to purchase the undivided one-half of the property known as the

Jenny Lind and Parker House, and the land upon which the same

stands, to be used as tenants in common with the citv of San Fran-

cisco. But it is said that two incorporations can not hold lands as

tenants in common; and the case of the New York and Sharon Canal

Company v. The Fulton Bank, 7 Wendell 412, is cited in the opinion

delivered by the district judge, and is the only authority produced to
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sustain this proposition. From an examination of the case, we think

that it maintains the opposite doctrine.

The eminent counsel on the part of the plaintiff, arguendo, asserted

that two or more corporations may unite in the purchase of property

real or personal; they may take a deed of real estate for the estab-

lishment of their houses of business. Insurance companies may own

pilot boats in common, and canal companies may be tenants in common

of locks, canal boats and other property subserving their mutual interest;

1 Kyd, 108; 2 Kent's Com., 315; and the counsel for the defendant

said, "It is not denied that distinct corporations may own property in

common," while Savage, the chief justice, in delivering the opinion

of the court, said, "These two companies had certain moneys in the

hands of their officer; they were both interested in those moneys, and

probably in equal degree. Not being partners, they were tenants in

common; in that character they made the deposit of the money, and

in that character I can see no objection to their sustaining an action

for it; thus the court decides that they may be tenants in common in

a chattel, but does not decide that they may be so in lands, that ques-

tion not being before the court," and yet this case is cited to maintain

the doctrine that two corporations can not hold real estate as tenants

in common.

The books and cases do not afford any instance in which this right

of holding lands as tenants in common, either with each other or with

natural persons, is denied to corporations. Not one of the reasons

which work a want of capacity to hold as joint tenants would prevent

their holding as tenants in common, for this estate requires but one

unitv, that of possession.

So far from corporations not being able to hold lands in common,

the original condition at common law of the largest class of corpora-

'o
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tions known to the law, was that of holding all their lands in common
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1021

with each other; and they were never separated until the original

position produced inconveniences, i Kyd Corporations, 108. • * •

Order denying motion reversed.

Note. See to same effect, as to joint tenancy: 1851, Telfair v. Howe, 3 Rich.

Eq. (S. C.) 235, 55 Am. D. 637. Also to same effect, as to tenancy in common:

1883, Estell v. University of the South, 80 Tenn. (12 Lea) 476; 1885. Hackett

tions known to the law, was that of holding all their lands in common
with each other; and they were never separated until the original
position produ ced inconveniences. 1 Kyd Corporations, 108. • • •
Order d enyt'ng mott'on reversed.

v. Multnomah R. Co., 12 Ore. 124, 53 Am. Rep. 327; 1894, Calvert v. Idaho

Stage Co., 25 Ore. 412; 1895, Bates v. Coronado Beach Co., 109 Cal. 160.

Sec. 294. (B) By devise.

(a) History and general doctrines.

McCARTEE v. ORPHAN ASYLUM SOCIETY OF NEW YORK.1

Note. See to same effect, as to joint tenancy: 1851, Telfair v. H owe, 3 Rich.
Eq. (8 . C.) 235, 55 Am. D. 637. Also to same effect, as to tenancy in common:
1883, Estell v. University of the South, 80 Tenn. (12 Lea) -176; 1885, Hackett
v. Multnomah R. Co., 12 Ore. 124, 53 Am. Rep. 327; 1894, Calvert v. Idaho
Stage Co., 25 Ore. 412; 1895, Bates v. Coronado Beach Co., 109 Cal. 160.

1827. In the Court for the Correction of Errors of New-

York. 9 Cowen (N. Y.) Rep. 437-525, iS Am. Dec. 516.

[J., being seized of real estate, devised that if, at his death, he

should have a child living, the rents and profits should be received

by his executors, and applied for the support, etc., of the child, the

Sec. 294.

( B) By devise .
(a) History and general doctrines.

surplus to be invested in stock to accumulate and be paid over to the

child at twenty-one, or marriage. He gave all the residue of his real and
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personal estate, after payment of all legacies and other bequests, to

a corporate company (the Orphan Asylum Society in the city of New

York), the bequest to take effect immediately after debts and lega-

cies paid, if he should leave no child; or, if he should leave a child,

McCARTEE v. ORPHAN ASYLUM SOCIETY OF NEW YORK.1

1827.

IN THE COURT FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF NEW
YORK. 9 Cowen (N. Y.) Rep. 437-525, 18 Am. Dec. 516.

then, upon the child's death, inter-marriage or attaining twenty-one.

The will then gave to his executors all his real estate, subject to the

trusts aforesaid, and declared his will to be that when such child

should attain twenty-one, or marry, his real estate should be sold by

his executors, and one-half of the proceeds paid to the child, if it

should attain twenty-one, or marry. The testator died, seized, and

a posthumous child was born to him, which died before twenty-one,

and unmarried.

The chancellor, Jones, upheld the devise to the orphan asylum,

and appeal was taken.]

Stebbins, Senator, dissenting. * * *

The questions presented by the case, as I view it, are Jirst, whether

the testator (Phillip Jacobs) devised the real estate in question to the

corporation directly, or to his executors, subject to the trusts mentioned

in the will; second, whether the devise to trustees for the use of the

respondents, is a valid devise, under which they can take as cestuis

que use; and third, whether the use is executed by the statute of uses,

and if so, the effect.

[After holding contrary to the majority opinion that the devise was

1 Statement abridged; Chancellor Jones' and Senators Woodworth'a and

Crary's opinions omitted, and only part of Senator Stebbins's opinion given.

[J., being seized of real estate, devised that if, at his death, he
should have a child living, the rents and profits should be received
by his executors, and applied for the support, etc., of the child, the
surplus to be invested in stock to accumulate and be paid over to the
child at twenty-one, or marriage. He gave all the residue of his real and
personal estate, after payment of all legacies and other bequests, to
a corporate company (the Orphan A sylum Society in the city of New
York), the bequest to take effect immediately after debts and legacies paid , if he should leave no child; or, i£ he should leave a child,
then, upon the child's death, inter-marriage or atta ining twenty-one.
The will then gave to his executors all his real estate, subj ect to the
tTusts aforesaid, and declared his
to be that when such child
should attain twenty-one , or marry, his real estate should be sold by
his executors, and one-half of the proceeds paid to the child, if it
should attain twenty-one, or marry. The testator died, seized, and
a posthumous child was born to him, which died before twenty-one,
and unmarried.
The chancellor, JoNES, upheld the devise to the orphan asylum,
and appeal was taken. J
STEBBINS, SENATOR, dissenting. • • •
The questions presented by the case, as I view it, are.first, whether
the testator (Phi II ip Jacobs) devised the real estate in question to the
corporation directly, or to his executors, subject to the tmsts mentioned
in the will ; second, whether the devise to trustees for the use of the
respondents, is a valid devise, under which they can take as cestut's
<pee use; and tllird, whether the use is executed by the statute of uses,
and if so, the effect.
[After holding contrary to the m ajority opinion that the devise was

will

1 Statement abridged ; Chancellor J ones' and Senators Woodworth's and
Crary's opinions omitted, and only part of Senator Stebbins's opinion.given.
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not to the corporation directly, but to the executors in trust—a ques-

1022

tion of construction, proceeds:]

M'CARTEE V. ORPHAN ASYLUM SOCIETY.

§

294

The next and more important question is, whether the corporation

can take the use under this will, notwithstanding the provisions of

not to the corporation directly, but to the executors in trust-a question of construction, proceeds:]
The next and more important question is, whether the corporation
can take the use under this will, notwithstanding the provisions of
our statute of wills. This statute enacts that any person having any
estate of inheritance in any lands, tenements or hereditaments , may
give or devise the same, or any rent or profit out of the same, to any
person or p ersons ( except bodies politic and corporate) by his last
will and testament, or by any other act by him lawfully executed;
and it is contended that if a devise to a corporation directly would be
void, a devise of the use is also void.
Although in England, under the Saxons, lands were devisable by
will at common law, yet at the conquest, and upon the introduction of the feudal system, the common law underwent a complete
change in this respect; and an estate in fee-simple in lands was no
longer d evisable. It became in consistent with the nature of that system, that a tenant should have nn unlimited power to devise bis lands;
for the reason that he might devise to persons incapable of performing feudal services. The po ..ver of alienation by devise (except of a
chattel interest) is in England, then, to be traced to the statutes of
wills o{ the 32 Hen. VIII, ch. I, and 34 Hen. VIII, ch. 5.
Our statute of wills is a transcript of these, with the additional
enumeration of rents and profits. It is contended that the terms rents
and profits, mentioned in the statute, are intended to describe a use,
and that, as the lands can not, so the use also can not, be devised to a
corporation under this statute.
I apprehend, however, there i.s a material difference between rents
and profits, and that which has long been known under the denomination of a use.
R ents and profits are incorporeal hereditaments; but a use is not.
A use is said to be neither jus in re nor ad rem, neither right, title
nor interest in law, but a species of property unknown to the common lav·:, and owing its exi5tence to the equitable jurisdiction of
chancery, resting upon confidence in the person and privity of estate,
a thing collater:i l to the land , and only annexed to a particular estate
in it, not to the mere possession; so that when the estate to which
the use i" annexed is destroyed, the use itself is destroyed. as hy dissei .. in, or the entry of tenant by the curtesy or in dower. It was
rather a bold upon the conscience of the feoffee to uses, than a lien
upon, or interest in, th e land; and the prin ciple upon which it was
fo1111d ccl w;is that the feoffee wns hound in conscience to follow the
d irection of the feoffor . (See Cruis . Dig., tit. 11, ch. 2.) A thing
so suhtlc, and cognizable only in courts of equity, which act upon
the conscience-, differs essentially from :m incorporeal hereditament,
which is of lega l cognizance. Indeed, incorporeal hereditaments,
such as rents, advowsons, etc. , were the subject of conveyance to
uses.
If, then, a use is not comprehended in the terms of the statute the

our statute of wills. This statute enacts that any person having any

estate of inheritance in any lands, tenements or hereditaments, may

give or devise the same, or any rent or profit out of the same, to any

person or persons {except bodies politic and corporate) by his last

will and testament, or by any other act by him lawfully executed;

and it is contended that if a devise to a corporation directly would be

void, a devise of the use is also void.

Although in England, under the Saxons, lands were devisable by

will at common law, yet at the conquest, and upon the introduc-

tion of the feudal system, the common law underwent a complete

change in this respect; and an estate in fee-simple in lands was no

longer devisable. It became inconsistent with the nature of that sys-

tem, that a tenant should have an unlimited power to devise his lands;

for the reason that he might devise to persons incapable of perform-

ing feudal services. The power of alienation by devise (except of a

chattel interest) is in England, then, to be traced to the statutes of
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wills of the 32 Hen. VIII, ch. 1, and 34 Hen. VIII, ch. 5.

Our statute of wills is a transcript of these, with the additional

enumeration of rents and profits. It is contended that the terms rents

and profits, mentioned in the statute, are intended to describe a use,

and that, as the lands can not, so the use also can not, be devised to a

corporation under this statute.

I apprehend, however, there is a material difference between rents

and profits, and that which has long been known under the denomina-

tion of a use.

Rents and profits are incorporeal hereditaments; but a use is not.

A use is said to be neither jus in re nor ad rem, neither right, title

nor interest in law, but a species of property unknown to the com-

mon law, and owing its existence to the equitable jurisdiction of

chancery, resting upon confidence in the person and privity of estate,

a thins collater;il to the land, and only annexed to a particular estate

in it, not to the mere possession; so that when the estate to which

the use is annexed is destroyed, the use itself is destroyed, as by dis-

seisin, or the entry of tenant by the curtesy or in dower. It was

rather a hold upon the conscience of the feoffee to uses, than a lien

upon, or interest in, the land; and the principle upon which it was

founded was that the feoffee wns bound in conscience to follow the

direction of the feoffor. (See Cruis. Dig., tit. 11, ch. 2.) A thing

so subtle, and cognizable only in courts of equity, which act upon

the conscience, differs essentially from an incorporeal hereditament,

which is of legal cognizance. Indeed, incorporeal hereditaments,

such as rents, advowsons, etc., were the subject of conveyance to

uses.

If, then, a use is not comprehended in the terms of the statute the
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argument rests upon the ground that if a devise of land to the cor-
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poration would have been invalid, the devise of the use is equally so.

It might perhaps be conceded that if corporations were prohibited

by statute from taking the fee by devise (which, by the by, is not the

case), the law would not allow them to take the use. But the his-

tory of the English law furnishes at least a plausible argument against

such a proposition.

Corporations were prohibited by several statutes of mortmain from

holding lands; yet it was deemed necessary to enact the statute of 15

Rich. II, ch. 5, declaring uses subject to the statutes of mortmain.

(Chudleigh's Case, 1 Rep. 120.)

But the statute of wills is an enabling statute, and not prohibitory.

Before this statute individuals had no capacity to devise lands; but

this enibled them to do so, except to corporations. In conferring the

capacity to devise the legislature withheld the capacity to devise to a

corporation, and for what reason?

Before the statute of wills, corporations were prohibited by the

mortmain acts from taking or holding lands, or uses arising from them.

The exception, therefore, in the statute of wills, could not have been
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introduced for the purpose of prohibiting corporations from taking by

devise, for they were already prohibited from taking in any mode;

but was to guard against enabling them to take by devise. Without

the exception in the statute of wills in England they would have been

enabled to take by devise, when the mortmain acts would have pro-

hibited their taking in any other way.

The history of the statute, I think, fortifies this view of it. In the first

statute of wills (32 Hen. VIII, ch. 1) corporations were not excepted,

and were, therefore, enabled to take by devise in common with other

persons, contrary to the policy of the statutes of mortmain; but two

years afterwards the parliament, finding the mortmain acts so far re-

pealed bvthe statute of wills, passed a new statute (34 Hen. VIII, ch,

5), not prohibiting corporations in terms from taking under the stat-

ute of wills, but entitled, "an act for the explanation of the statute of

wills," in which they re-enact the provisions of the first statute of

wills, and introduce the exception as to corporations; not, therefore,

expressly prohibiting corporations from taking, but qualifying the ca-

pacity to devise. The intention seems to have been to rely upon the

mortmain laws, to keep property from corporations and to qualify the

statute of wills so as not to interfere with those prohibitory acts.

The distinction is a wide one between an incapacity to devise and

a prohibition against taking; for, although there may be an incapac-

ity to devise directly to a corporation, yet such incapacity will not pre-

vent the corporation from taking by grant from the devisee in trust, if

there is no prohibition against their taking. So, too, there may be an in-

capacity to devise lands to a corporation, and yet the corporation may

take a use. But in either case, if prohibited from taking, the law

would not probably allow that to be indirectly done which was directly

prohibited.

If, then, there is no other reason arising from the statute of wills

argument rests upon the ground that if a devise of land to the corporation would have been invalid, the devise of the use is equally so.
It might perhaps be conceded that if corporations were prohibited
by statute from taking the fee by de ..·ise (which, by the by, is not the
case) , the law would not allow them to take the use. But the history of the English law furnishes at least a plausible argument against
such a proposition.
Corporations were prohibited by several statutes of mortmaln from
holding lands; yet it was deemed necessary to enact the statute of 15
Rich. II, ch. 5, declaring uses subject to the statutes of mortmain.
(Chudleigh's Case, 1 Rep. 120.)
But the statute of wills is an enabling statute, and not prohibitory.
Before this statute individuals had no capacity to devi ~e lands; but
this en'lbled them to do so, except to corporations. In conferring the
capacity to devise the legislature withheld the capacity to devise to a
corporation, and for what reason?
Before the statute of wills, corporations were prohibited by the
mortmain acts from taking or holding lands, or uses arising from them.
The exception, therefore, in the statute of wills, could not have been
introduced for the purpose of prohibiting corporations from taking by
devise, for they were already prohibited from taking in any mode;
but was to guard against enabling them to take by devise. Without
the exception in the statute of wills in England they would have been
enabled to take by devise, when the mortmain acts would have prohibited their taking in any other way.
The history of the statute , I think, fortifies this view of it. In the first
statute of wills (32 Hen. VIII, ch. 1) corporations were not excepted,
and were, therefore, enabled to take by devise in common with other
persons, contrary to the policy of the statutes of mortmain; but tvm
years afterwards the parlia ment, finding the mortmain acts .so far repealed by the statute of wills, passed a new statute (34 Hen. VIII, ch,
5), not prohibiting corporations in terms from taking under the statute of wills, but entitled, "an act for the explanation of the statute of
wills," in which they re-enact the provisions of the first sta tute of
wills, and introduce the exception as to corporations; not, therefore,
expressly prohibiting corporations from taking, but qualifying the capacity to devise. The intention see ms to have been to rely upon the
mortmain laws, to keep property from corporations and to qualify the
statute of wills so as not to interfere with those prohibitory acts.
The distinction is a wide one between an incapacity to devise and
a prohibition against taking; for, although there may he an incapacity to devise directly to a corporation, yet such incapacity \viii not prevent the corporation from tnking by grant from the devisee in tru st, if
there is no prohibition against their taking. So, too, there may be an incapacity to devise lands to a corporation, and yet the corporation may
take a use. But in e ither case, if prohibited from taking, the law
would not probably allow that to be indirectly done ·which was directly
prohibited.
If, then, there is no other reason arising from the statute of wilJs
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why corporations may not take land by devise, except the want of

capacity in the devisor to convey, there would seem to be no objec-

why corporations may not take land by devise, except the want of
capacity in the devisor to convey, there would seem to be no objection in this case against the corporation's taking as cestui que use; for
a devisor has capacity to devise a use; and this corporation is not prohibited from taking and holding either land itself or a use. All the
English mortmain acts, including the 15th Rich. 2, are repealed by
our statutes.
And if corporations can not take by devise, merely for want of
capacity to take in that particular way, the cases of a conveyance
from a wife to her husband through the intervention of a trustee, and
of a tenant in tail to a purchaser by means of a common recovery
seem to be conclusive to show that an indirect mode of conveyance is
no fraud upon the law when resorted to only to remedy a want of
capacity to convey directly.
·
If it is shown that the exception in the statute of wills is to be regarded not as a prohibition against the taking of lands by a corporation, but as a qualification of the capacity to devise, created by that
statute, the opinion pronounced in the court of chancery in this cause
contains another view of the subject which appears to my mind perfectly conclusive. It is, that before the statute of wills, v.•hen persons
were not capacitated to take lands by devise, they might nevertheless
take the use in that way; and, therefore, that since the statute of will ,
although corporations can not take lands by devise, yet they may take
the use, there being no prohibition.
Corporations, since the statute of wills, stand in the same situation
as to taking lands by devi~e as all natural persons stood in before
that statute. If, therefore, a use was devisable before the statute, a
corporation may take a use by devise since the statute, especially if it
be such as is not executed by the statute of uses.
It is said by Cruise that uses were devisable, though lands were not;
and persons, by that means, acquired a disposition of property for the
benefit of their families, which they had not otherwise. They were
the invention of ecclesiastics to evade the statutes of mo1tmain. And
after the 15th Rich. 2, ch. 5, which subjected them to the statutes of
mortmain, the practice of conveying to uses was continued as the
most effectual mode of evading the hardships of the feu<lal tenures,
and of securing estates from forfeiture for treason. They became
general, and were applied to purposes inconsistent with the policy of
the government. • • •
Finally, by the statute of uses, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 10, after reciting all
these mischiefs, the legislature declared that possession shall be annexed to the use.
The object of the crown was to reassert its rights of wardship and
other feudal profits out of the lands of the nobility; and the intention
of parliament was to abolish uses by changing them into legal estates,
and subjecting them to the rules of common law tenures. • • •
Before the statute of uses we have seen they were devisable to
natural persons, although there was then no statute of wills nor any
common law capacity to devise. The operation of the statute upon

tion in this case against the corporation's taking as cestui que use; for

a devisor has capacity to devise a use; and this corporation is not pro-

hibited from taking and holding either land itself or a use. All the

English mortmain acts, including the 15th Rich. 2, are repealed by

our statutes.

And if corporations can not take by devise, merely for want of

capacity to take in that particular way, the cases of a conveyance

from a wife to her husband through the intervention of a trustee, and

of a tenant in tail to a purchaser by means of a common recovery,

seem to be conclusive to show that an indirect mode of conveyance is

no fraud upon the law when resorted to only to remedy a want of

capacity to convey directly.

If it is shown that the exception in the statute of wills is to be re-

garded not as a prohibition against the taking of lands by a corpora-

tion, but as a qualification of the capacity to devise, created by that

statute, the opinion pronounced in the court of chancery in this cause
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contains another view of the subject which appears to my mind per-

fectly conclusive. It is, that before the statute of wills, when persons

were not capacitated to take lands by devise, they might nevertheless

take the use in that way; and, therefore, that since the statute of wills,

although corporations can not take lands by devise, yet they may take

the use, there being no prohibition.

Corporations, since the statute of wills, stand in the same situation

as to taking lauds by devise as all natural persons stood in before

that statute. If, therefore, a use was devisable before the statute, a

corporation may take a use by devise since the statute, especially if it

be such as is not executed by the statute of uses.

It is said by Cruise that uses were devisable, though lands were not;

and persons, by that means, acquired a disposition of property for the

benefit of their families, which they had not otherwise. They were

the invention of ecclesiastics to evade the statutes of mortmain. And

after the 15th Rich. 2, ch. 5, which subjected them to the statutes of

mortmain, the practice of conveying to uses was continued as die

most effectual mode of evading the hardships of the feudal tenures,

and of securing estates from forfeiture for treason. They became

general, and were applied to purposes inconsistent with the policy of

the government. » * *

Finally, by the statute of uses, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 10, after reciting all

these mischiefs, the legislature declared that possession shall be an-

nexed to the use.

The object of the crown was to reassert its rights of wardship and

other feudal profits out of the lands of the nobility; and the intention

of parliament was to abolish uses by changing them into legal estates,

and subjecting them to the rules of common law tenures. * * *

Before the statute of uses we have seen they were devisable to

natural persons, although there was then no statute of wills nor any

common law capacity to devise. The operation of the statute upon
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375-) * * •

But all the reasoning arising from the statute of uses is answered,

if the use in this case is such as could not be executed by that statute;

for clearly, in such case, it could have no operation to destroy the

capacity to devise. <

The question then arises, whether the use in this case is within the

statute; and the examination of it necessarily casts us back upon the

will, to seek for the intention of the testator. He devises the estate

to trustees, in trust for the Orphan Asylum Society, to be applied to

the charitable purposes for which the association was established. His

object was not to benefit the society; but through it, to apply the

estate to the charitable purposes for which the society was organized.

The society itself is a trustee; and has a trust to perform, which a

court of equity would undoubtedly enforce. It is a devise to trustees

for the use of the society, as trustees for certain charitable pur-

poses. * * *

If it is granted, then, that the corporation itself had a trust to exe-

cute under this will, it is a case not within the statute of uses; for that

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

statute can only execute the first use, which, in this case, would vest

the estate in the corporation, unincumbered by any trust for charitable

purposes, and contrary to the plain intention of the testator. A trust

is a use not executed by the statute; and the author of the Touchstone

remarks (p. 507, n. 1) that "one of the modes of creating a trust is

said to be where lands are limited to the use of A. in trust to permit

B. to receive the rents and profits; for the statute can only execute the

first use."

The conclusions which follow my view of the case are, that the

devise of the real estate in question was not to the corporation directly,

but to the executors for the use of the corporation upon the con-

tingency which has happened, to be appropriated to certain charitable

purposes:

That under the statute of wills there is a mere incapacity in. cor-

porations to take lands by devise, and not a prohibition against their

taking:

That a use was devisable at common law before the statute of

wills; and therefore that this corporation may take a use by devise,

not being prohibited by statute from taking either a use or the land

itself:

That the use in this case is not such as could be executed by the

statute of uses; or if it is, that the operation of the statute would not

invalidate the devise, but vest the estate in the corporation.

If these propositions are established, it follows that the respondents

are entitled to the estate in question, and that the decree of the court

of chancery is, at least, substantially correct. * * •

Reversed.

Note. See following cases.
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uses is said to have been by turning the use into land , to render it no·t
devisahle in the same manner as the land itself. (2 Black. Com.,
375·) • • •
But all the reasoning arising from the statute of uses is answered,
if the use in this case is such as could not be executed by that statut~;
for clearly, in such case, it could have no operation to destroy the
capacity to devise.
The question then arises, whether the use in this case is within the
statute; and the examination of it necessarily casts us back upon the
will, to seek for the intention of the testator. He devises the estate
to trustees, in trust for the Orphan A sylum Society, to be applied to
the charitable purposes for which the association was established. His
object was not to benefit the society; but through it, to apply the
estate to the charitable purposes for which the society was organized.
The society itself is a trustee; and has a trust to perform, which a
comt of equity would undoubtedly enforce. It is a devise to trustees
for the use of the society, as tru stees for certain charitable purposes. • • •
If it is granted, then, that the corporation itself had a trust to execute under this will, it is a case not within the statute of uses; for that
statute can only execute the first use, which , in this case, would vest
the estate in the corporation, unincumbered by any trust for charitable
purposes, and contrary to the plain intention of the testator. A tmst
is a use not executed by the statute; and the author of the Touchstone
remarks (p. 507, n. 1) that " one of the modes of creating a trust is
said to be where lands are limited to the use of A. in tru st to permit
B. to receive the rents and profits; for the statute can only execute the
first use."
The conclusions which follow my view of the case are, that the
devise of the real estate in question was not to the corporation directly,
but to the executors for the use of the corporation upon the contingency which has happened, to be appropriated to certain charitable
purposes:
That under the statute of wills there is a mere i"ncapadty in. corporations to take lands by devise, and not a prohibition against their
taking:
That a use was devisable at common law before the statute of
wills; and therefore that this corporation may take a u se by devise,
not being prohibited by statute from taking either a use or the land
itself:
That the use in this case is not such as cou l<l be executed by the
statute of uses ; or if it is, that the operation of the statute would not
invalidate the devise, but vest the estate in the corporation.
If these propositions are established, it follows that the respo ndents
are entitled to the estate in question, and that the decree of the court
of chancery is, at least, substantially correct. • • •
Reversed.
N ote. See following cases.
65-WJL. CASES.
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(6) Restrictions in charters and restrictions in statutes of wills.

Sec. 295. Same.

WHITE v. HOWARD.1

1871. In the Supreme Coukt of Errors ok Connecticut. 38

Conn. Rep. 342-368.

( b) Restrictions in charters and restrictions m statutes of wills.

[Bill in equity by the executors of William Bostwick, praying for

advice in the construction of the will. Bostwick devised certain prop-

WHITE v. HOWARD. 1

erty to trustees in fee-simple for the benefit of his daughter during

life, and in case of her decease without issue or husband surviving

1871.

her, the trust fund was to be divided equally among six benevolent

IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT.

38

Conn. Rep. 342-368.

societies, one of which was the American Tract Society, incorporated

in New York, with power to hold, purchase and convey real and per-

sonal property, provided its net income therefrom should not exceed

[Bill in equity by the executors of William Bostwick, praying for
advice in the construction of the will. Bostwick devised certain property to trustees in fee-simple for the benefit of his daughter during
life, and in case of her decease without issue or husband sur\'iving
her, the trust fund was to be divided equally among six benevolent
societies, one of which was the American Tract Society, incorporated
in New York, with power to hold, purchase and convey real and personal property, provided its net income therefrom should not exceed
$10 1000 annually.
The New York statute of wills provided that "no
devise to a corporation shall be valid unless such corporation be
expressly authorized by its charter, or by statute, to take by devise."
It was contended by the heirs at law that this prevented the society
from taking a devise of land in Connecticut, and that the residuary
clause failed to this extent. Case was reserved by the superior court
for advice on facts found by a committee. J
FosTE R, J.
• • • It is asserted that the American Tract
Society can take neither real nor personal property under this will.
That it can not take real, because its charter of incorporation,
granted by the state of New York, does not confer the power of taking by devise; that it can not take personal, because the charter provides that the net income of said society arising from real and personal
estate shall not exceed the sum of $10 , 000 annually. This limit, it i
claimed, has been reached and exceeded: and so the capacity of the
society to take property is exhausted. This society was incorporated
by a special act of the legislature of the state of New York, pa sed
May 26, 1841. The third section of its charter provides that the corporation shall possess the general powers, and be subject to the provisions contained in title third of chapter eighteen of the first part
of the revised statutes, so far as the same are applicable, and have not
been repealed. The title and chapter referred to enumerate the powers of corporations, and the clause which bears directly upon this subject reads thus: "To hold, purchase and convey such real and personal estate as the purposes of the corporation shall require, not exceeding the amount limited in its charter." This charter was amended
by the legislature of New York on the 31st of March. 1866; but a
this was after the death both of the testator and of his daughter, that
amendment neecl not be particularly considered, as it can not materially affect the que tion involvecl. Now it is manifest that this corporation ha. express power by its charter to hold, purchase and convey
1
Statement abridged. Arguments and part of opinion omitted.

$10,000 annually. The New York statute of wills provided that "no

devise to a corporation shall be valid unless such corporation be

expressly authorized by its charter, or by statute, to take by devise."

It was contended by the heirs at law that this prevented the society

from taking a devise of land in Connecticut, and that the residuary

clause failed to this extent. Case was reserved by the superior court
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for advice on facts found by a committee.]

Foster, J. * * * It is asserted that the American Tract

Society can take neither real nor personal property under this will.

That it can not take real, because its charter of incorporation,

granted by the state of New York, does not confer the power of tak-

ing by devise; that it can not take personal, because the charter pro-

vides that the net income of said society arising from real and personal

estate shall not exceed the sum of $10,000 annually. This limit, it is

claimed, has been reached and exceeded, and so the capacity of the

society to take property is exhausted. This society was incorporated

by a special act of the legislature of the state of New York, passed

May 26, 1841. The third section of its charter provides that the cor-

poration shall possess the general powers, and be subject to the pro-

visions contained in title third of chapter eighteen of the first part

of the revised statutes, so far as the same are applicable, and have not

been repealed. The title and chapter referred to enumerate the pow-

ers of corporations, and the clause which hears directly upon this sub-

ject reads thus: "To hold, purchase and convey such real and per-

sonal estate as the purposes of the corporation shall require, not ex-

ceeding the amount limited in its charter." This charter was amended

by the legislature of New York on the 31st of March. 1866; but as

this was after the death both of the testator and of his daughter, that

amendment need not be particularly considered, as it can not materi-

ally affect the question involved. Now it is manifest that this corpo-

ration has express power by its charter to hold, purchase and convey

1 Statement abridged. Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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real and personal estate, for specified purposes and to a limited

amount. There is no express power to take by devise, nor is the

power so to take expressly prohibited.

We suppose there could be no doubt that this corporation could

take by devise in New York, if the statute of wills of that state em-

powered corporations generally to take in that manner. The English

statute of wills, passed in the time of Henry VIII, authorized every

person having a sole estate in fee-simple of any manors, etc., '-to

give, dispose, will or devise, to any person or persons, except to bod-

ies politic and corporate, by his last will and testament in writing, or

otherwise by any acts lawfully executed in his lifetime, all his manors,

etc., at his own will and pleasure, any law, statute, custom, or other

thing theretofore had, made, or used to the contrary notwithstanding."

Thus corporations, by express exception in these statutes, were not

enabled to take lands directly by devise in England, and the statute

of wills of the state of New York makes the same exception. By

that statute it is enacted, that all persons, except idiots, persons of

unsound mind, married women, and infants, may devise their real
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estate by a last will and testament duly executed, etc. "Such devise

may be made to every person capable by law of holding real estate;

but no devise to a corporation shall be valid, unless such corporation

be expressly authorized by its charter, or by statute, to take by devise."

3 N. Y. Rev. Stat., 138 (5th ed.). This corporation, therefore,

prior to the recent amendment of its charter, could not take by de-

vise in New York, and such is the decision of their supreme court and

court of appeals in this very case. And so it is earnestly contended

that it can not take by devise in Connecticut. We yield readily to

the doctrine laid down in this connection in regard to corporations;

indeed it is too thoroughly established to be doubted or questioned.

That doctrine perhaps is nowhere better stated than in the case of

Head v. Providence Ins. Co., 2 Cranch 127, by the then illustrious

head of the supreme court of the United States, the late Chief Justice

Marshall. "It [a corporation] may correctly be said to be precisely

what the incorporating act has made it; to derive all its powers from

that act, and to be capable of exerting its faculties only in the manner

which that act authorizes." Now this corporation stands at the bar

of this court claiming the right to take lands within our territory by

devise. It is clothed with such powers as have been conferred by its

charter. Those, a portion of them, as we have seen, are to hold,

purchase, and convey real estate. It is not expressly authorized to

take by devise, nor is it prohibited from so taking. Can it then take

by devise? Not in New York, as we have seen. Therefore not in

Connecticut, say the counsel for the heirs at law, for being a New

York corporation, and by the law of that state devoid of power to

take by devise, no argument is needed to show its inability to take by

devise in Connecticut.

This conclusion is too hastily drawn. If the inability to take by

devise arose out of a prohibitory clause in the charter, the conclusion

would be legal and logical. But the inability does not so arise.

real and personal estate, for specified purposes and to a limited
amount. There is no express power to take by devise, nor is the
power so to take expressly prohibited.
We suppose there could be no doubt that this corporation could
take by devise in New York, if the statute of wills of that state empowered corporations generally to take in that manner. The English
statute of wills, passed in the time of Henry VIII, authorized every
person having a sole estate in fee-simple of any manors, etc., '·to
give, dispose, will or devise, to any person or persons, except to bodies politic and corporate, by his last will and testament in writing, or
otherwise by any acts lawfully executed in his lifetime, all his manors,
etc., at his own will and pleasure, any law, statute, custom, or other
thing theretofore had, made, or used to the contrary notwithstanding."
Thus corporations, by express exception in these statutes, were not
enabled to take lands directly by devise in England, and the statute
of wills of the state of New York makes the same exception. By
that statute it is enacted, that all persons, except idiots, persons of
unsound mind, married women, and infants, may devise their real
estate by a last will and testament duly executed, etc. "Such devise
may be made to every person capable by law of holding real estate;
but no devise to a corporation shall be valid, unless such corporation
be expressly authorized by its charter, or by statute, to take by devi ·e."
3 N. Y. Rev. Stat., 138 (5th ed.). This corporation, therefore,
prior to the recent amendment of its charter, could not take by devise in New York, and such is the decision of their supreme court and
court of appeals in this very case. And so it is earnestly contended
that it can not take by devise in Connecticut. vVe yield readily to
the doctrine laid down in this connection in regard to corporations;
indeed it is too thoroughly established to be doubted or questioned.
That doctrine perhaps is nowhere better stated than in the case of
Head v. Providence Ins. Co., 2 Cranch 127, by the then illustrious
head of the supreme court of the United States, the late Chief Justice
Marshall. "It [a corporation] may correctly be said to be precisely
what the incorporating act has made it; to derive all its powers from
that act, and to be capable of exerting its faculties only in the manner
which that act authorizes." Now this corporation stands at the bar
of this court claiming the right to take lands within our territory by
devise. It is clothed with such powers as have been conferred by its
charter. Those, a portion of them, as we have seen, are to h old,
purchase, and convey real estate. It is not expres~ly authorized to
take by devise, nor is it prohibited from so taking. C an it then take
by devise? Not in New York, as we have seen. Therefore not in
Connecticut, say the counsel for th e heirs at law, for being a New
York corporation, and by the law of that state devoid of power to
take by devise, no prgument is needed to show its inability to take by
devise in Connecticut.
This conclusion is too hastily drawn. If the inability to take by
devise arose out of a prohibitory clause in the charter, the conclusion
would be legal and logical. But the inability does not so arise.
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There is no prohibition in the charter; the inability js created by the

WIIITE V. HOWARD.

New York statute of wills, expressly excepting corporations from

taking by devise. Now this corporation •brings with it from New

There is no prohibition in the charter; the inability is created by the
New York statute of wills, expressly excepting corporations from
taking by devise. Now this corporation• brings with it from New
York its charter, but it does not bring with it the New York statute
of wills and can not bring it to be recognized as law within this
jurisdiction. There is an obvious distinction between an incapacity
to take created by the statute of a state, which is local, and a prohibitory clause in the charter, which everywhere cleaves to the corporation. The reasoning is fallacious, not recognizing this distinction. There being no prohibition in the charter, and the power to
hold and convey real estate being expressly given, we must look to
our own statutes and laws, and not to those of New York, to determine whether or not this corporation can take by devise in Connecticut.
The state of New York has partially adopted the policy of England in regard to devises to corporations, though the English statutes,
usually called the statutes of mortmain, have not been re-enacted in
that state. Those statutes began with .ft/Iagna Charla, in 9 Henry
III, and embrace a succession of acts down to and including 9 George
II. They were intended to check the ecclesiastics of the Roman
church from absorbing in perpe tuity , in dead clutch, all the lands of
the kingdom, and so withdrawing them from public and feudal
charges.
Shelford Mortmain, 2.
By the statute of 43 Eliz.,
ch. 4, known as the statute of charitable uses, lands may be devised to a corporation for a charitable use, and the court of chancery
will support and enforce such devises.
Whether a court of equity has power to execute and enforce such
trusts, as charities, independent of any statute, is a question which
has been much discussed, and very high authorities can be quoted
both in favor and against the exercise of such a power. · We think
the latter and better opinion to be in favor of an original and necessary jurisdiction in courts of equity as to devises in trust for charitable purposes, when the general object is sufficiently certain and not
contrary to any positive rule of law. It is unnecessary, however, to
decide this question, for in this state we have no statutes of mortmain;
no exception in our statute of wills prohibiting corporations from taking by devise; aliens, resident in this state or in any of the United
States, may purchase, hold, inherit, or transmit real estate in as full
and ample a manner as native born citizens; their wives are entitled
to dower; their children and other lineal descendants may inherit;
and we have besides a statute, passed in our colonial days in 1702,
in effect re-enacting the st atute of 43 Elizabeth, and containing indeed
more liberal and comprehensive provisions to sustain devises of this
description than are contained in the 43 Elizabeth. That act provides th<1t "all lands, tenements, or other estates that have been or
sha ll be given or granted by the general asse.mbly, or any town or
particular person, for the maintenance of the ministry of the gospel
or of schools of learning, or for the relief of the poor, or for any other
public and charitable u se, shall forever remain to the uses to which

York its charter, but it does not bring with it the New York statute

of wills and can not bring it to be recognized as law within this

jurisdiction. There is an obvious distinction between an incapacity

to take created by the statute of a state, which is local, and a pro-

hibitory clause in the charter, which everywhere cleaves to the cor-

poration. The reasoning is fallacious, not recognizing this distinc-

tion. There being no prohibition in the charter, and the power to

hold and convey real estate being expressly given, we must look to

our own statutes and laws, and not to those of New York, to deter-

mine whether or not this corporation can take by devise in Connec-

ticut.

The state of New York has partially adopted the policy of Eng-

land in regard to devises to corporations, though the English statutes,

usually called the statutes of mortmain, have not been re-enacted in

that state. Those statutes began with Magna Charta, in 9 Henry

III, and embrace a succession of acts down to and including 9 George
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II. They were intended to check the ecclesiastics of the Roman

church from absorbing in perpetuity, in dead clutch, all the lands of

the kingdom, and so withdrawing them from public and feudal

charges. Shelford Mortmain, 2. By the statute of 43 Eliz.,

ch. 4, known as the statute of charitable uses, lands may be de-

vised to a corporation for a charitable use, and the court of chancery

will support and enforce such devises.

Whether a court of equity has power to execute and enforce such

trusts, as charities, independent of any statute, is a question which

has been much discussed, and very high authorities can be quoted

both in favor and against the exercise of such a power. We think

the latter and better opinion to be in favor of an original and neces-

sary jurisdiction in courts of equity as to devises in trust for charita-

ble purposes, when the general object is sufficiently certain and not

contrary to any positive rule of law. It is unnecessary, however, to

decide this question, for in this state we have no statutes of mortmain;

no exception in our statute of wills prohibiting corporations from tak-

ing by devise; aliens, resident in this state or in any of the United

States, may purchase, hold, inherit, or transmit real estate in as full

and ample a manner as native born citizens; their wives are entitled

to dower; their children and other lineal descendants may inherit;

and we have besides a statute, passed in our colonial days in 1702,

in effect re-enacting the statute of 43 Elizabeth, and containing indeed

more liberal and comprehensive provisions to sustain devises of this

description than are contained in the 43 Elizabeth. That act pro-

vides that "all lands, tenements, or other estates that have been or

shall be given or granted by the general assembly, or any town or

particular person, for the maintenance of the ministry of the gospel,

or of schools of learning, or for the relief of the poor, or for any other

public and charitable use, shall forever remain to the uses to which
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We therefore entertain no doubt that the American Tract Society

can take by devise in this state. As to the other objection, that hav-

ing an income greater in amount than is allowed by its charter it has

exhausted its power to take, it suffices to say that no such fact is found

by the very competent committee whose report is on the record. * » *

Superior court advised accordingly.

Note. A statute of wills operates only within the state enacting it, and

upon land lying therein, and hence does not prevent devises to corporations

having power to take, of land lying in foreign states: 1855, Thompson v.

Swoope, 24 Pa. St. 474; 1864, American Bible Society v. Marshall, 15 Ohio

St. 537; 1871, Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424; 1871, White v.

Howard, 38 Conn. 342, supra; 1876, United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315; 1880,

Crum v. Bliss, 47 Conn. 592.

A charter provision, or a provision in the general corporation law (but not

one in the general law of persons or property), limiting the corporation's right

to take and hold property, cleaves to it everywhere, both at home and abroad,

and makes a taking of such propertvin violation thereof ultra vires: 1859,
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Bovee v. St. Louis, 29 Barb. 650; 1871,' White v. Howard, 38 Conn. 342, supra;

1874, Starkweather v Am. Bib. Soc, 72 111. 60.

But a statute of wills may be so worded as to be considered a part of

the general corporation law of the state, and therefore amount to a charter

limitation: 1874, Starkweather v. Am. Bib. Soc. 72 111. 50, 22 Am. Rep. 133;

1874, U. S. Trust Co. v. Lee, 73 111. 142, 24 Am. Rep. 236.

A state statute or policy clearly meant to exclude corporations from hold-

ing real estate within the state would prevent a foreign corporation from so

holding. 1893, In re Prime's Estate, 136 N. Y. 347, 362; 1897, Amherst Col-

lege v. Rich, 151 N. Y. 282.

So, too, a corporation with power to take land can not take land left to it

by a foreign testator when the devise is not in accordance with the law where

the land lies. 1871, White v. Howard, 46 N. Y. 144.

The capacity to bequeath personal property generally depends upon the law

of the domicile of the owner, rather than the law of the situs of the property,

and with that modification, the rules above as to the corporation's right to

take and hold a bequest would apply. Jarman Wills (6th ed.), p. 1, et seq.

1871, Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424; 1880, Crum v. Bliss, 47

Conn. 592; 1892, Cross v. U. S. Trust Co., 131 N. Y. 330, 27 Am. St. Rep. 597;

1893, Dammert v. Osborn, 140 N. Y. 30.
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they have been or shall be given or granted, according to the true
intent and meaning of the grantor, and to no otlier use whatever."
We therefore entertain no doubt that the American Tract Society
can take by devise in this state. As to the other objection, that having an income greater in amount than is allowed by its charter it has
exhausted its power to take, it suffices to say that no such fact is found
by the very competent committee whose report is on the record. • • •
Superior court advised accordingly.
Note. A statute of wills operates only within the state enacting it, and
upon laud lying therein, and hence <loes not prevent devises to corporations
having power to take, of land lying in foreign states: 1855, Thompson v.
Swoope, 24 Pa. St. 474; 1864, American Bible Society v. Marshall, 15 Ohio
St. 53i; 1871, Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424; 1871, White v.
Howard, 38 Conn. 342, supra; 18i6, United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315; 1880,
Crum v. Bliss, 47 Conn. 592.
A charter provision, or a provision in the general corporation law (but not
one in the general law of persons or property), limi ting the corporation's right
to take and hold property, cleaves to it everywhere, both at home and abroad,
and makes a taking of such property in violation th<"reor ttltra vires : 1859,
Boyce v. St . Louis, 29 Barb. 650; 1871, White v. Howard, 38 Conn. 342, supra;
1874, Starkweather v Am. Bib. Soc., 72 Ill. 50.
But a statute of wills may be so worded as to be considered a part of
the general corporation law of the state, and therefore amount to a chart.er
limitation: 1874, Starkweather v. Am. Bib. Soc.L. 72 Ill. 50, 22 Am. Rep. 133;
1874, U .S. Trust Co. v. Lee, 73 Ill. 142, 24 Am. Kep. 236.
A state statute or policy clearly meant to exclude corporations from holding real estate within the state would prevent a foreign corporation from so
holding. 1893, In re Prime's Estate, 136 N. Y. 347, 362; 1897, Amherst College v. Rich, 151 N. Y. 282.
So, too, a corporation with power to take land can not take land left to it
by a foreign testator when the devise is not in accordance with the Jaw where
the land lies. 1871, Whitev. Howard, 46 N. Y. 144.
The capacity to bequeath personal property generally depends upon the law
<>f the domicile of the owner, rather than the law of the sittts of the property,
and with that modification, the rules above as to the corporation's right to
take and hold a bequest would apply. Jarman Wille (6th ed.), p. l, et seq.
1871, Chllmberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424; 1880, Crum v. Bliss, 47
Conn. 592; 1892, Croes v. U. 8. Trust Co., 131 N. Y. 330, 27 Am. St. Rep. 597;
1893, Dammert v. Osborn, 140 N . Y. 30.

(c) Who may object when limit is exceeded.

FARRINGTON Et Al. v. PUTNAM Et A*.1

1897. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 90 Maine
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Rep. 405-447, 37 Atl. Rep. 652.

[Bill in equity brought by the heirs at law of Ira P. Farrington

against his executors and the Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary to enjoin

( c) Who may object when limit is exceeded.

the executors from paying over and the infirmary from receiving gifts

FARRINGTON ET AL. v. PUTNAM ET AL.1

1 Statement abridged. Only part of opinion given.

1897.

IN

THE

SUPREME Jumc1AL CouRT OF MAINE.
Rep. 405-447, 37 Atl. Rep. 652.

90 Maine

[Bill in equity brought by the heirs at law of Ira P. Farrington
against bis executors and the Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary to enjoin
the executors from paying over and the infirmary from receiving gifts
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of real and personal property as residuary legatee. The bill alleged

FARRlr\GTON ET AL. V. PuTNA.M ET AL.

that the law under which the infirmary was incorporated provided:

"Such corporations may take and hold, by purchase, gift, devise or

of real and personal _property as residuary legatee. The bill alleged
that the law under which the infirmary was incorporated pro,·ided :
"Such corporations may take and hold, by purchase, gift, devise or
bequest, personal or real estate, in all not exceeding$ 100,000, owned
at any one time;" also that the infirmary had at the death of the te._
tator property to the full amount of $ 100,000; that any additional
amount would be in excess of the limit, violate the statutes, be in\'alid
and void, and revert to the heirs. General demurrers were filed and
sustained by the court below, and final decree rendered in favor of
respondents; exceptions were taken and appeal made to the supreme
court.]
PETERS, C. J.
• • • The question on the first branch of the
case, therefore, is whether these devises and bequests are absolutely
void as the complainants contend, or whether they are merely Yoidable according to the view of the question taken by the respondents.
After very much examination of the authorities pro and con. and
careful consideration of the principles which affect the respecti,·e positions of the parties, we feel forced to the conclusion that the position
advocated by the complainants ought not to be sustained. We feel
very much impressed with the theory, stated in many of the ca es,
that a charter is a contract between the state and the corporation; and
that for any misuse or abuse of its privileges or powers the corporation is amenable to the state only, no individual having anything to do
with the question. As applicable to the present case, the principle is
that, if the infirmary, by accepting these bequests and devises, increases its property ever so much in excess of the amount in value
which the statute allows it to possess, it would be a transgression of
the law which the state can prosecute or not as it pleases, and the
heirs of the testator have no interest therein. As long as the state
does not interfere for the violation, it waives it and permits the infirm ary to retain the property.
The general statute under which this infirmary was organized is not
expressly prohibitory, but rather regulative and directory. No penalties are attached and none intended more than a possible forfeiture
of the excessive property received, or of the charter, or of one or both.
This interpretation of the statute can not by any possibility be harmful to the community, as the state can make it as stringent a it pleases
at any time. But thus far the state has h::td no motive either to amencl
the statute or to enforce forfeitures for violation of its provisions. • •
It wilJ be noticed that most of the authorities, on which the complainnnts rely, concede that the rule which we would ripply to devises
is at all events applicable to g ifts by deed , the argument being that in
s~1ch a case as this a deed would be valid and a devise void. It
seems inconsi. tent that such potential consequences should attach to
the mere form of transmitting the property. We do not appreciate
th e jnstice of snying that a deed of property delivered by a donor on
the day of his death to a corporation would be good, :md a devise of
the same prope1ty made on the same day would be bad. But the ar·
gument by the complainants is that, in the one case, the transaction is

bequest, personal or real estate, in all not exceeding $100,000, owned

at any one time;" also that the infirmary had at the death of the tes-

tator property to the full amount of $100,000; that any additional

amount would be in excess of the limit, violate the statutes, be invalid

and void, and revert to the heirs. General demurrers were filed and

sustained by the court below, and final decree rendered in favor of

respondents; exceptions were taken and appeal made to the supreme

court.]

Peters, C. J. * • * The question on the first branch of the

case, therefore, is whether these devises and bequests are absolutely

void as the complainants contend, or whether they are merely voida-

ble according to the view of the question taken by the respondents.

After very much examination of the authorities pro and con. and

careful consideration of the principles which affect the respective po-

sitions of the parties, we feel forced to the conclusion that the position

advocated by the complainants ought not to be sustained. We feel
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very much impressed with the theory, stated in many of the cases,

that a charter is a contract between the state and the corporation; and

that for any misuse or abuse of its privileges or powers the corpora-

tion is amenable to the state only, no individual having anything to do

with the question. As applicable to the present case, the principle is

that, if the infirmary, by accepting these bequests and devises, in-

creases its property ever so much in excess of the amount in value

which the statute allows it to possess, it would be a transgression of

the law which the state can prosecute or not as it pleases, and the

heirs of the testator have no interest therein. As long as the state

does not interfere for the violation, it waives it and permits the in-

firmary to retain the property.

The general statute under which this infirmary was organized is not

expressly prohibitory, but rather regulative and directory. No pen-

alties are attached and none intended more than a possible forfeiture

of the excessive property received, or of the charter, or of one or both.

This interpretation of the statute can not by any possibility be harm-

ful to the community, as the state can make it as stringent as it pleases

at any time. But thus far the state has had no motive either to amend

the statute or to enforce forfeitures for violation of its provisions. * *

It will be noticed that most of the authorities, on which the com-

plainants rely, concede that the rule which we would apply to devises

is at all events applicable to gifts by deed, the argument being that in

sach a case as this a deed would be valid and a devise void. It

seems inconsistent that such potential consequences should attach to

the mere form of transmitting the property. We do not appreciate

the justice of saying that a deed of property delivered by a donor on

the day of his death to a corporation would be good, and a devise of

the same property made on the same day would be bad. But the ar-

gument by the complainants is that, in the one case, the transaction is
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executed and, in the other case, that it can not be considered as exe-

cuted without a resort to the forms and assistance of the courts. We

think the whole thing involves a distinction without a difference, a

formal but not substantial distinction. Each mode of transfer needs

the protection and aid of the law to render it operative. In the first

place, the wTill must be probated, it is said. But on that question no

inquiry can be instituted to see if there be any impropriety in any par-

ticular devise or bequest. The residuary bequest in this will is fair

and proper on its face, and that is all that is required. The act of

probating the will is the probating of all its parts. A devise of real

estate vests such estate at once in the devisee, the title of such devisee

being liable to be defeated if the estate be necessary for the payment

of debts or the expenses of administration. « » *

The foregoing reasoning only serves to illustrate the unsubstantial

foundation upon which it is endeavored to raise a technical excuse for

pronouncing a deed voidable and a devise absolutely void.

The true and conclusive answer, however, to this indefensible posi-

tion of the complainants is, that it is utter assumption on their part in
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declaring a devise like this to be void when it is voidable merely, and

can be rendered void in no way other than by the act of the govern-

ment itself. No wrongful act by a corporation renders its charter

void or creates any forfeiture without proceeding by which such for-

feiture shall be established. A cause for forfeiture is not itself for-

feiture. The same section which prescribes the amount of property

which this corporation may hold, also declares that it may use and

dispose of the same for the purposes for which it was organized.

Suppose the corporation wrongfully uses or disposes of its property,

could any party but the state intervene to punish the corporation for

such transgression?

Now what is there illegal, let us ask, in this court or in the probate

court below acting in the furtherance of bequests that are simply void-

able and consequently valid until they have been declared to be other-

wise upon the intervention of the state? If the state has the exclusive

privilege, as it has, of rendering the voidable bequest void, what is

there wrongful in our regarding it as sound and sufficient while the

question of its validity is not acted upon by the state, or the error is

waived or permitted by the state? What right has the judicial branch

of the government to dictate what the state should do against its will

or its policy, and decide a question for the state which the state can

better decide for itself? What right has the court to deprive the state

of all oppoi-tunity to determine whether it will thus severely punish

this corporation for the mistake of the testator or will waive or over-

look it? Certainly the state should not be prevented from making

such election. If courts at the instigation of heirs can refuse to act

upon voidable bequests as valid until avoided by the state, then, as a

matter of course, the state can practically never have any opportunity

to exercise its discretion in such a case any more than as if such right

never existed, and the court would be assuming the prerogative of

really acting in opposition to the state. The court could not exercise

executed and, in the other case, that it can not be considered as executed without a resort to the forms and assistance of the courts. We
think the whole thing involves a distinction without a <lifference , a
formal but not substantial distinction. Each mode of transfer needs
the protection and aid of the law to render it operative. In the first
place, the will must be probated, it is said. But on th at question no
inquiry can be instituted to see if there be any impropriety in any particular devise or bequest. The residuary bequest in this will is fair
and proper on its face, and that is all that is require·d. The act of
probating the will is the probating of all its parts. A devi se of real
estate vests such estate at once in the devisee, the title of such devisee
being liable to be defeated if the estate be necessary for the payment
of debts or the expenses of administration. • • •
The foregoing reasoning only serves to illustrate the unsubstantial
foundation upon which it is endeavored to raise a technical excuse for
pronouncing a deed voidable and a devise absolutely void.
The true and conclusive answer, however, to this indefensible posi~
tion of the complainants is, that it is utter assumption on their part in
declaring a devise like thi s to be void when it is voidable merely, and
can be rendered void in no way othe r than by the a ct of the government itself. No wrongful act by a corporatio n renders its charter
void or creates any forfeiture without proceeding by which such forfe iture shall be established. A cause for forfeiture is not itself forfeiture. The same section which prescribes the amount of property
which this corporation may hold, also declares that it may use and
dispose of the same for the purposes for which it was organized.
Suppose the corporation wrongfully uses or disposes of its property,
could any party but the state intervene to punish the corporation for
such transgression?
Now what is there illegal, let us ask,. in this court or in the probate
court below acting in the furtherance of bequests that are simply voidable and consequently valid until they h ave been decl ared to be otherwi se upon the inter\'ention of the state ? If the state h as the exclusive
privilege, as it has , of rendering the voidable bequest void, wh at is
there wrongful in our regarding it as sound and suffi cient w hile the
question of its validity is not acted upon by the state, or th e e rror is
waived or permitted by the state? What right has the judicia l branch
of the government to dictate what th e state should do against its will
o r its p olicy, and decide a question for the state w hi ch the state can
b etter decide for itself? What right has the court to depri ve the state
of all opportunity to determine whether it will thu s severely punish
thi s corporation for the mistake of the testator or will waive or overlook it ? Certainly the state should not be prevented from making
such election. If courts at the instigation of hei rs can refuse to <1ct
upon Yoidable bequests as va lid u ntil avoided by the state, then , as a
matter of course, the state can practi cally ne\·er have any oppo1tun ity
to exercise its discretion in su ch a case any more th an as if such right
never ex isted, and the court would be assuming the prerogative of
really acting in opposition to the state . The cou1i could not exercise
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could. It certainly is an excellent policy to refer such questions to

the discretionary power of the state, which can determine them, ac-

any broad discretion in the solution of the question, while the state
q>Uld. It certainly is an excellent policy to refer such question s to
the discretionary power of the state, which can determine them, according to the circumstance, upon the great principles of justice and
generosity, and in conformity with the wishes and welfare of the whole
community. • • •
There is but little authority, either English or American, favoring
the conclusion that bequests or devises not strictly authorized by law
are to be consi"dered void instead of voidable. This will be seen in
the examination of cases in this country to be made in the progress of
this discussion. But it may also be worth the while to notice what
appiication has been made of the principle by the Eng lish courts in
view of the statutes of mortmain as existing in that country. In Grant
on Corporation1>, a reputable English work on the subject, at page
101, the author states the doctrine as follows:
"It is clear, however, that if a corporation have exhausted their
license to hold in mortmain, the fact does not make a devise or conveyance to them void. The only result is, that they may take, though,
unless they can obtain an extension by the crown of their license,
they can not hold the lands, unless the mcsne lords and the crown
choose to sleep upon their respective titles." • • •
The cases in this country, most of them which favor the principle
that an estate in the condition this is goes to the heirs of a testator rather
than to the devisee, seem to inculcate the idea that the h eirs may waive
their right so as to allow the estate to pass to the devisee. And we
have not the slightest doubt that, but for the interference of the heirs
in the present case by this bill in equity, no obstacle would have stood
in the way of a complete administration of the testator's estate according to his clearly expressed intention. No court would have had the
least hesitation in followiug the ordinary course of procedure , or
would have entertained the thought suo moto, of instituting inquiry to
see whether the bequests in question were valid or not. But why
should a bequest, invalid when not consented to by the heirs, become
unobjectionable when such consent is obtained? If illegal as coming
from the testator, why not just as illega l when coming from the testator and his heirs ? Such considera tions as these go to show how illogical
and untenable a position it is to denominate the devises and bequests
in the present will absolutely void. • • •
(After citing a nd reviewing numerous authorities upon both s ides,
and p articularly Trustees of D avidson C ollege v. Chamber' s Executors, 3 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 253; Heirs v. Louisville Orphan's Home,
3 Bush (Ky.) 365; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424 ;
Matter of McGraw, 1 r r N. Y. 66; Wood v. Hammond, 16 R. I. 98;
and D e Camp v. Dobbins, 31 N". J. Eq. 671 , specially relied upon by
counsel for plaintiff, proceeds : J
Upon closing his discussion of the direct cases cited on his opening
brief, the learned counsel for the complainants says: "But if the
decisions of New Y o rk are claimed to rest upon the provisions of
special New York statutes, what has the counsel to say as to all the

cording to the circumstance, upon the great principles of justice and

generosity, and in conformity with the wishes and welfare of the whole

community. * • »

There is but little authority, either English or American, favoring

the conclusion that bequests or devises not strictly authorized by law

are to be consrdered void instead of voidable. This will be seen in

the examination of cases in this country to be made in the progress of

this discussion. But it may also be worth the while to notice what

application has been made of the principle by the English courts in

view of the statutes of mortmain as existing in that country. In Grant

on Corporations, a reputable English work on the subject, at page

101, the author states the doctrine as follows:

"It is clear, however, that if a corporation have exhausted their

license to hold in mortmain, the fact does not make a devise or con-

veyance to them void. The only result is, that they may take, though,

unless they can obtain an extension by the crown of their license,
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they can not hold the lands, unless the mesne lords and the crown

choose to sleep upon their respective titles." * * *

The cases in this country, most of them which favor the principle

that an estate in the condition this is goes to the heirs of a testator rather

than to the devisee, seem to inculcate the idea that the heirs may waive

their right so as to allow the estate to pass to the devisee. And we

have not the slightest doubt that, but for the interference of the heirs

in the present case by this bill in equity, no obstacle would have stood

in the way of a complete administration of the testator's estate accord-

ing to his clearly expressed intention. No court would have had the

least hesitation in following the ordinary course of procedure, or

would have entertained the thought suo moto, of instituting inquiry to

see whether the bequests in question were valid or not. But why

should a bequest, invalid when not consented to by the heirs, become

unobjectionable when such consent is obtained? If illegal as coming

from the testator, why not just as illegal when coming from the testa-

tor and his heirs? Such considerations as these go to show how illogical

and untenable a position it is to denominate the devises and bequests

in the present will absolutely void. * * *

[After citing and reviewing numerous authorities upon both sides,

and particularly Trustees of Davidson College v. Chamber's Execu-

tors, 3 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 253; Heirs v. Louisville Orphan's Home,

3 Bush (Ky.) 365; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424;

Matter of McGraw, 111 N. Y. 66; Wood v. Hammond, 16 R. I. 98;

and De Camp v. Dobbins, 31 N. J. Eq. 671, specially relied upon by

counsel for plaintiff, proceeds:]

Upon closing his discussion of the direct cases cited on his opening

brief, the learned counsel for the complainants says: "But if the

decisions of New York are claimed to rest upon the provisions of

special New York statutes, what has the counsel to say as to all the
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other cases cited by the plaintiffs from North Carolina, from Ken-
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tucky, from New Jersey and from Rhode Island?" We have sub-

stantially, according to our view, answered the question ourselves by

saying that the force of the opinion of the two judges in the North

Carolina case is much lessened bv the able minority opinion of the

chief justice in the case, and by the fact that the majority opinion

yields the question as to devises of real estate; that the Kentucky

case is a better authority for the respondents than for the complain-

ants; that it is not sure that the complainants have any support in the

New Jersey case outside of that contributed by the chief justice in his

opinion: and that the Rhode Island case evidently follows the decis-

ions in New York. How little authority then have the complainants

to rely on outside of the McGraw case in New York? We have no

reason to doubt the correctness of the result of the decision in that

case as based upon exceptional statutes in that state not existing else-

where. » • *

From the foregoing propositions it is clearly deducible that bequests

like the present are voidable only, and may be avoided by the state
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alone, and are in no sense to be regarded as void; that a policy arose

as to what better be done in the circumstances of each particular

case, and that that policy belongs to the state and not to the court and

is an executive and not a judicial right, for the court would decide

the question in the case for all cases and all time, while the state may

decide the question differently at different times according to its dis-

cretion and the public good. This right the state has never surren-

dered and the court can not take it from the state. But it would

surely deprive the state of its privilege if the court fails to act upon

these bequests as valid bequests until, in proper and independent pro-

ceedings, such bequests are declared to be void.

This conclusion renders it unnecessary and inexpedient to discuss

the further contention of the respondents that the bequests are valid

in equity if not at law, upon the maxim that no legal trust of a char-

itable nature shall fail for want of a competent trustee, and that if

this corporation can not act some other party may be appointed by

the court that can.

Exceptions overruled.

Appeal dismissed, and decree below affirmed.

Note. Aci-ord: 1844,Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. (43 U. S.) 127; 1846,

Wade v. Am., etc., Soc, 7 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 6133, 45 Am. Dec. 324; 1847, Bo-

gardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 633, 758; I860, Chambers v.

St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; 1870, Smith v. Sheelev, 12 Wall. 358, 361; 1871, Rainey

v. Laing, 58 Barb. (N. Y.) 453; 1872, Havward v. Davidson, 41 Ind.212; 1878,

De Camp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Eq. 36: 1879, Jones v. Habersham, 3 Woods

other cases cited by the plaintiffs from North Carolina, from Ken•
tucky, from New Jersey and from Rhode Island?" We have substantially, according to our view, answered the question ourselves by
saying that the force of the opinion of the two judges in the North
Carolina case is much lessened by the able minority opinion of the
chief justice in the case, and by the fact that the majority opinion
yields the question as to devises of real estate; that the Kentucky
case is a better authority for the respondents than for the complainants; that it is not sure that the complainants have any support in the
New Jersey case outside of that contributed by the chief justice in his
opinion: and that the Rhode Island case evidently follows the decisions in New York. How little authority the n have the complainants
to rely on outside of the McGraw case in New York? We have no
reason to d oubt the correctness of the result of the decision in that
case as based upon exceptional statutes in that state not existing else·w here. • • •
From the foregoing propositions it is clearly deducible that bequests
like the present are voidable only, and may be avoided by the state
alone, and are in no sense to be regarded as void; that a policy arose
as to what better be done in the circumstances of each particular
case, and that that policy belongs to the state and not to the court and
is an executive and not a judicial right, for the court would decide
the question in the case for all cases and all time, while the state may
<lecide the question differently at different times according to its discretion and the public good. This right the state has never surrendered and the court can not take it from the stale. But it would
surely deprive the state of its privilege if the court fails to act upon
these bequests as valid bequests until, in proper and independent proceedings, such bequests are declared to be void.
This conclusion renders it unnecessary and inexpedient to discuss
the further contention of the respondents that the bequests are valid
in equity if not at law, upon the maxim that no legal trust of a charitable nature shall fail for want of a competent trustee, and that if
this corporation can not act some other party may be appointed by
the court that can.
. Exceptions overruled.
Appeal dismissed, and decree below affirmed.

443, 476; 1880, National Bank v. Whitney, 103 TJ. S. 99; 1882, Jones v. Hab-

ersham, 107 U. S. 174; 1884, Alexander v. Tolleeton Club, 110 111. 66; 1889,

Fritts v. Palmer, 132 TJ. S. 282; 1889, Heiskell v. Chickasaw Lodge, 87 Tenn.

668; 1890, Hamsher v. Hamsher, 132 111. 273; 1894, Hanson v. Little Sisters,

etc., 79 Md. 434; 1897, In re Stickney's Will, 85 Md. 79, 60 Am. St. R. 308.

See next case and note, contra.

Note. Accord: 1844,Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. (43 U.S.) 127; 1846,
Wade v. Arn., etc.). Soc., 7 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 663, 45 Am. Dec. 324; 1847, Bogardus v. Trinity uhurch, 4 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 633, 758; 1860, Chambers v.
St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; lRiO, Smith v. Rheeley, 12 Wall. 358, 3111; 187 1, Rainey
v. Laing, 58 Barb. (N. Y.) 453; 1872, Hayward v. Davi<lRon,41Ind.212; 1878,
De Camp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Eq. 36·: 1879, JoneR v. Habersham, 3 Woods
443, 476; 1880, Nutional Bank v. Whilney, 103 U. 8. 99; 1882, Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174; 1884, Alexan<ler v. Tolleston Club, 110 lll. 65; 1889,
Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U. 8. 282; 1889, Heiskell v. Chickasaw Lod!f'e, 87 Tenn.
668; 1890, H amsher v. Haml'h er, 132 Ill. 273; 1894, llanson v. Little Sisters,
etc., 79 :Md. 434; 1897, In re 8tickney's ·will, 85 Md. 79, 60 Am. St. R. 308.
See next case and note, contra.
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1888. In the (5durt of Appeals of New York. hi N. Y.

Sec. 297. Same.

66-137, 19 N. E. Rep. 233.

[Appeal from judgment of the general term of the supreme court.

IN RE McGRAW'S ESTATE. 1

The will of Mrs. Fiske directed that her estate "be converted into

money," and after numerous bequests contained the following resid-

IN Re: FISKE'S ESTATE.

uary clause: "I give, devise, and bequeath all the rest, residue and

1888.

remainder of my property (if any there shall be) to Cornell Univer-

IN

THE <'ouRT OF APPEALS OF

NEw YonK.

1 II N. Y.

sity, aforesaid, to be added to the 'McGraw Library Fund' aforesaid,

66-137, 19 N. E. Rep. 233.

and subject to the trusts, purposes, uses and conditions hereinbefore

prescribed for said fund." The amount of Jennie McGraw Fiske's

[Appeal from judgment of the general term of the supreme court.
The will of Mrs. Fiske directed that her estate "be converted into
money," and after numerous bequests contained the following residuary clause: "l give, devise, and bequeath all the rest, residue and
remainder of my property (if any there shall be) to Cornell University, aforesaid, to be added to the 'McGraw Library Fund' aforesaid,
and subject to the trusts, purposes, uses and conditions hereinbefore
prescribed for said fund." The amount of Jennie !\JcGraw Fiske's
estate at the time of her death, as found by the surrogate, was $z,275,933.46; legacies to other than Cornell University, $ 1, 121 ,570; bequests to said university, $ 1, 154,363.46. The university already had
property valued at more than $3 1 000,000. the amount limited by the
charter. The judgment below was against Cornell University.]
PECKHAM, J.
The question to be decided in this case is whether
Cornell University, or some other parties, being the residuary legatees, or else the heirs at law or next of kin of John McGraw, deceased, or of Jennie McGraw Fiske, deceased, or her husband, shall
have the prope rty; or any portion of it, bequeathed to the university
by the will of Mrs. Fiske. • • •
Our revised statutes provided that every corporation, as such, has
power, among other things(§ 1, subd. 4), to hold, purchase and convey such real and personaJ estate as the purposes of the corporation
shall require, not exceeding the amount limited in its charter. • • •
Under this power to hold, purchase and convey, • • •
the
corporation could take the property by devise. • • • The same
revised statutes, in providing for the tranc;mission of real property by
will, stated that " e very estate and interest in real property descendible
to heirs" might be devised. "Such devise may be made to every person capable by law of holding real estate; but no devise to a corporntion shall b e valid unless such corporation be expressly a uthori zed by
its charter or by statute to ta ke by devise." • • •
[The revised statutes provided that the tmstees of every such college
shall have power] • • • to take and hold, by gift, grnnt or d e vise, any real or personal prope rty, the yearly income or revenue of
which shall not exceed th e value of $25,000. • • •
Section 5 of th e charter of the Cornell University reads as follO"ws:
"Sec. 5. The corporatio n hereby cre ated may hold real and p e rsonal
property not exceed ing three millions of dollars in the aggregate."

estate at the time of her death, as found by the surrogate, was $2,275,-

933.46; legacies to other than Cornell University, $1,121,570; be-

quests to said university, $1,154,363.46. The university already had

property valued at more than $3,000,000. the amount limited by the

charter. The judgment below was against Cornell University.]

Peckham, J. The question to be decided in this case is whether

Cornell University, or some other parties, being the residuary lega-
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tees, or else the heirs at law or next of kin of John McGraw, de-

ceased, or of Jennie McGraw Fiske, deceased, or her husband, shall

have the property, or any portion of it, bequeathed to the university

by the will of Mrs. Fiske. * * *

Our revised statutes provided that every corporation, as such, has

power, among other things (§ 1, subd. 4), to hold, purchase and con-

vey such real and personaj estate as the purposes of the corporation

shall require, not exceeding the amount limited in its charter. * * *

Under this power to hold, purchase and convey, * * * the

corporation could take the property by devise. * * * The same

revised statutes, in providing for the transmission of real property by

will, stated that "every estate and interest in real property descendible

to heirs" might be devised. "Such devise may be made to every per-

son capable bylaw of holding real estate; but no devise to a coqiora-

tion shall be valid unless such corporation be expressly authorized by

its charter or by statute to take by devise." * * »

[The revised statutes provided that the trustees of every such college

shall have power] * * * to take and hold, by gift, grant or de-

vise, any real or personal property, the yearly income or revenue of

which shall not exceed the value of $25,000. * * *

Section 5 of the charter of the Cornell University reads as follows:

"Sec. 5. The corporation hereby created may hold real and personal

property not exceeding three millions of dollars in the aggregate."

•*•

Looking for a moment outside of and beyond the statute laws of

1 Statement abridged. Arguments and much of opinion omitted.

• • •

Looking for a moment outside of and beyond the statute laws of
1
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the state, and in order to strengthen his position regarding the true

construction to be given that law as to the material distinction, in the
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case at least of a corporation, between the power to take and the

power to hold property, the counsel for the appellant has made a most

able and learned argument. Its outlines are, in substance, as follows:

A corporation, at common law, could take and hold property by de-

vise. At an early stage in the history of the law of England, relating

to the power of corporations to hold real property, and while the feu-

dal system still prevailed, it was enacted that no man should alien his

feud to a corporation under penalty of a forfeiture thereof to his next

superior, of whom he held the land, and. in default of such superior

insisting upon the forfeiture, then his superior might do so, and thus

on until the king, as the general superior and lord of all, was reached.

But, in case the forfeiture was not insisted upon, the corporation,

which had taken a defeasible title to the land, could hold it as against

all the world.

He, therefore, insists that this distinction between taking and hold-

ing strengthens his claim that the use of the word "hold" in the char-

ter was intentional and for the specific purpose of permitting the cor-
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poration to "take" an unlimited amount of property and to hold only

the amount specified. No sound reason for giving such unlimited

power to take, while limiting the power to hold, can, as it seems to

me, be stated; and, if such were the intent, I think it would have

been plainly stated in the charter, instead of trusting to such a con-

jectural application to be given to another statute.

The counsel cites about all the writers upon the subject of corpora-

tions, and they have all adverted to this distinction as existing in re-

lation to the English corporations subject to the mortmain statutes,

and they state that licenses to hold in mortmain were granted to such

bodies, but without such licenses they took the title to the real prop-

erty aliened, subject only to the right of the superior lord to enter

and take the land under the power of forfeiture. The only penalty,

therefore, which a corporation risked when it took lands without a

license in mortmain was that of a forfeiture of the land to the next

superior of the grantor, and so on up to the king; and the counsel

claims that in this state, in the case of a corporation with unlimited

power to take, but not to hold more than a certain amount, the pen-

alty for holding more is that the state, representing the whole people,

and standing in this respect in lieu of the king (there being no mesne

lords), can forfeit the charter of the corporation, and thus prevent

the further holding. And, assuming this to be the fact, he uses it as

strengthening his argument as to the existence of this clear and mate-

rial distinction between taking and holding property.

The further claim is then made th;it. as title to the property has

vested in the corporation, which, in holding it, has become subject to

the forfeiture of its charter, the heirs or next of kin of the testator have

no more right to raise the question than any other third parties who

have no interest therein. It is said that it is a matter for the state

alone to take cognizance of, and until it does the corporation holds the

the state, and in order to strengthen his position regarding the true
construction to be given that law as to the material distinction, in the
case at least of a corporation, between the power to take and the
power to hold property, the counsel for the appellant has made a most
able and learned argument. Its outlines are, in substance, as follows:
A corporation, at common law, could take and hold property by devise. At an early stage in the history of the law of England, relating
to the power of corporations to hold real property, and while the feudal system still prevailed, it was enacted that no man should alien his
feud to a corporation under penalty of a forfeiture thereof to his next
superior, of whom he held the land, and. in default of such superior
insisting upon the forfeiture, then his superior might do so, and thus
on until the king, as the general superior and lord of all, was reached.
But, in case the forfeiture was not insisted upon, the corporation,
which had taken a defeasible title to the land, could hold it as against
all the world.
He, therefore, insists that this distinction between taking and holding strengthens his claim that the use of the word "hold" in the charter was intentional and for the specific purpose of permitting the corporation to "take" an unlimited amount of property and to hold only
the amount specified. No sound reason for giving such unlimited
power to take, while limiting the power to hold, ca~, as it seems to
me, be stated; and, if such were the intent, I think it would have
been plainly stated in the charter, instead of trusting to such a conjectural application to be given to another statute.
The counsel cites about all the writers upon the subject of corporations, and they have all adverted to this distinction as exi sting in relation to the English corporations subject to the mortmain statutes,
and they state that licenses to hold in mortmain were granted to such
bodies, but without such licenses they took the title to the real property aliened, subject only to the right of the superior lord to enter
and take the land under the power of forfeiture. The only penalty,
therefore, which a corporation risked when it took lands without a
license in mortmain was that of a forfeiture of the land to the next
superior of the grantor, and so on up to the king ; and the counsel
claims that in this state, in the case of a corporation with unlimited
power to take, but not to hold more than a certain amount, the penalty for holding more is that the state, representing the whole people,
and standing in this respect in lieu of the king (there being no mes ne
lords), can forfeit the charter of the corporation, and thus prevent
the further holding. And, assuming this to be the fact, he uses it as
strengthening his argument as to the existence of this clear and material distinction between taking and holding property .
The further claim is then 111ade thnt, as titl e to the property has
vested in the corporation, which, in holding it, has hecome subject to
the forfeiture of its charter , the heirs or next of kin of the testator have
no more right to raise the question than any other third parties who
have no interest therein. It is said that it is a matter for the stale
alone to take cognizance of, and until it does the corporation holds the
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property, however much it may transcend the limitation prescribed in

its charter.

The counsel states accurately the law of mortmain in England, and

its consequences of possible forfeiture of the estate granted, and. un-

til forfeiture, the vesting of the title in the corporation indefeasible,

except by the re-entry of the person entitled to take it by reason of

the forfeiture. But the circumstances under which lands are held by

citizens of New York, where their tenure is so wholly different from

that which prevailed in England when the early mortmain acts were

enacted, render any argument in regard to those acts and their effect

totally inapplicable to the case of a corporation of this state. Tak-

ing the law as it exists in our statutes, including the special provision

upon the subject in the charter of the university, it seems to me that

the provision therein limiting the holding of property is, as I have

said, a restriction also upon the power to take in excess of the speci-

fied amount. As, at common law, a corporation could take real

property in the same way as an individual, the consequence was that,

in England, large landed possessions were held by religious corpora-

tions, and, by reason of alienations of real estate to them, the services

due by the vassal to the lord were partially, if not totally, paralyzed,
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and the chief lords lost their escheats. This was a constantly grow-

ing and alarming evil. To remedy the difficulty, the first mortmain

act was placed in Magna Charta, which declared all such alienations

to corporations entirely void, and that the lands should revert to the

lord of the fee. It was held, however, that the reversion must be ac-

complished by an entry, and then and from that time there was a for-

feiture, the corporation having taken the title and held the property

until such forfeiture bv re-entrv. Shelf. Mortm. 8, 34; 1 KydCorp.,

81; Grant Corp., 106. * « «

The nature of the tenure of real property at the time of the pas-

sage of the early mortmain acts in England bears no resemblance to

the tenure by which a citizen of this state holds lands. Here there

is no vassal and superior, but the title is absolute in the owner, and

subject only to the liability to escheat. Const. N. Y., art. 1, § 13.

The escheat takes place when the title to lands fails through defect of

heirs. Const. N. Y., art. 1, § 11.

A devise to a corporation which is forbidden to take (or forbidden

to hold, if the word, under the circumstances of the case, is construed

to include a taking also) does not, therefore, give a title subject to the

right of some superior to claim a forfeiture of the land; but, if it

be in violation of a statute, I think the devise is void, and the land

descends to the heir or residuary devisee.

We have not, in this state, re-enacted the statutes of mortmain, or

generally assumed them to be in force, and the only legal check to

the acquisition of lands by corporations consists in those special re-

strictions contained in the acts by which they are incorporated, and

which usually confine the capacity to purchase real estate to specified

and necessary objects. 2 Kent Comm., 282. Of course, the re-

§ 297 POWKR TO ACQUIRE REAL PROPERTY. 1037

strictions contained in any general law. if applicable, must also be re-
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There is, by reference to our laws, no such necessary and univer-

sal distinction between taking and holding property by corporations

as is seen in the laws of England relating to alienations in mortmain.

Whether the legislature, when using language providing for a limita-

tion upon holding property, meant to permit an unlimited taking, is a

question of legislative intent; and I think the general inference would

be, in the absence of some plain and controlling circumstance to the

contrary, that the legislative body meant to limit a taking as well as a

holding beyond the specified amount. * * *

The counsel for the appellant does not claim that this property was

itself forfeited to the state, if the state should choose to enforce the

forfeiture. His claim is, as I understand it, that if the university ex-

ceeded its limitation by holding more property than it was allowed by

law to hold, a cause of forfeiture of the charter was thereby created,

and that in enforcing such forfeiture after the payment of the debts

of the corporation the rest of the property would (as he insists) prob-

ably go to the state, because there would be no living claimant to it

who would have any right to acquire it. A forfeiture the state may
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claim and may enforce at pleasure, when the occasion arises, but it is

a forfeiture of the charter, and not a forfeiture of the property held

by the corporation. It is further claimed that this distinction between

the right to take and the power to hold property is one which has been

admitted and enforced in the courts of England, of this state, and of

the other states of the Union for a long number of years, and that

there is no reason why effect to such a distinction should not be given

in this case; the result being, as is stated, that the corporation has an

unlimited right to take property, and also an unlimited right to hold

it as against any one but the state in its capacity of sovereign. There

is undoubtedly a distinction between the right to take and the power

to hold property under some circumstances, the only question being

whether the legislature had such distinction in mind, and meant to

provide for it in the case in hand. It is said that an alien has the

right to take property by purchase, but he can not hold it as against

the state. That is so. He takes, however, a defeasible title, good

as to all but the sovereign power, which must take it upon office

found or by escheat. Wright v. Saddler, 20 N. Y. 320.

In such case it is not exactly an accurate description of the alien's

title to simply say that he can take but can not hold. That is a con-

tradiction in terms. If he take, he must hold, if for but a fractional

part of a second of time. The expression is but a short one for the

statement that he can not hold, as against the claim of the state, where

properly made and enforced. The same expression is used in the

case of a corporation under the mortmain laws, that it can take but

not hold; the meaning being that it can not hold as against the claim

for forfeiture when made by the next superior lord of the grantor of

the lands. That the words lose all their meaning when wrenched

from the circumstances under which they were used, and applied to

strictio11s contained in any general law, if applicable, must also be referred to.
There is, by reference to our laws, no such necessary and universal distinction between taking and holding property by corporations
as is seen in the laws of England relating to alienations in mortmain.
Whether the legislature, when using language providing for a limitation upon holding property, meant to permit an unlimited taking, is a
question of legislative intent; and I think the general inference would
be, in the absence of some plain and controlling circumstance to the
contrary, that the legislative body meant to limit a taking as well as a
holding beyond the specified amount. • • •
The counsel for the appellant does not claim that this property was
itself forfeited to the state, if the state should choose to enforce the
forfeiture. His claim is, as I understand it, that if the university exceeded its limitation by holding more property than it \HIS allowed by
law to hold, a cause of forfeiture of the charter was thereby created,
an<l that in enforcing such forfeiture after the payment of the debts
of the corporation the rest of the property would (as he insists) probably go to the state, because there would be no living claimant to it
who would have any right to acquire it. A forfeiture the state may
claim and may enforce at pleasure, when the occasion arises, but it is
a forfeiture of the charter, and not a forfeiture of the property held
by the corporation. It is further claimed that this distinction between
the right to take and the power to hold property is one which has been
admitted and enforced in the courts of England, of this state, and of
the other states of the Union for a long number of years, and that
there is no reason why effect to such a distinction should not be given
in this case; the result being, as is stated, that the corporation has an
unlimited right to take property, and also an unlimited right to hold
it as against any one but the state in its capacity of sovereign. There
is undoubtedly a distinction between the right to take and the power
to hold property under some circumstances, the only question beingwhether the legislature had such distinction in mind, and meant to
provide for it in the case in hand. It is said that an alien has the
right to take property by purchase, but he can not hold it as against
the state. That is so. He takes, however, a defeasible title, good
as to all but the sovereign power, which must take it upon office
found or by escheat. Wright v. Saddler, 20 N. Y. 320.
In such case it is not exactly an accurate description of the alien's
title to simply say that he can take but can not hold. That is a contradiction in terms. If he take, he must hold , if for but a fractional
part of a second of time. The expression is but a short one for the
statement that he can not hold, as against the claim of the state, where
properly made and enforced. The same expression is used in the
case of a corporation under the mortmain laws, that it c~m take but
not hold; the meaning being that it can not hold as against the claim
for forfeiture when made by the next superior lord of the grantor of
the lands. That the words lose all their meaning when wrenched
from the circumstances under which they were used, and applied to
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corporations existing by virtue of the laws of this state, seems to me

a plain proposition.

The counsel has, however, with great industry and research, cited

a number of cases from our own courts and those in other states,

where this distinction, he claims, has been admitted, and in cases,

too, where the principles involved were similar to the case at bar (one

or two being, he says, precisely like it), and where it has been held

that in such cases, although the corporation was violating the law of

its being, yet no one but the state could take advantage thereof.

I think that, with the exception of one case, they were all entirely

different from this one, and the decisions were based upon a totally dif-

ferent, and probably a perfectly unassailable, ground. [Citing and

discussing Leazure v. Hillegas, 7 Serg. & R. 313; Baird v. Bank,

11 Serg. & R. 411; Runyan v. Coster, 14 Pet. 122; Jones v. Haber-

sham, 107 U. S. 174; Smith v. Shelley, 12 Wall. 358-361; Bogardus

v. Trinity Church, 4 Sand. Ch. 633; De Camp v. Dobbins, 29 N.

J. Eq. 36; Davis v. Railroad Co., 131 Mass. 258-273; Hayvvard v.

Davidson, 41 Ind. 212; Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 127; Bank

v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99; Fortier v. Bank, 112 U. S. 439.] * * * .

Although we never adopted or enacted the English statutes of mort-
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main, yet in this, as in other states, we have a decided mortmain pol-

icy. It is found in our statute in relation to wills, prohibiting a devise

to a corporation unless specially permitted by its charter or by some

statute to take property by devise.

"It is a statute of mortmain, resting on a mortmain policy as dis-

tinctly as any act of the British parliament. » • * The necessity

is recognized of forbidding the acquisition by will, unless the legisla-

ture, in granting the charter, and in full view of the reasons for so

doing, think proper to confer the power in express terms," * » •

The counsel claims, however, that a devise to a corporation vests

the title in it, so far as the question of capacity is concerned, whenever

it would in the case of a sale for a valuable consideration. Hence he

says that the cases of sales above cited are decisive of this, if they be

admitted as well decided. In the case of an executed sale, however,

the question of ultra vires, as set forth in the modern cases, comes in

play, and the question of a want of title in the corporation in such

case would not be permitted to be raised by the grantor, or his heirs,

because it would be against justice and would accomplish a legal

wrong. Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N. Y. 62.

The question of an executed gift without consideration by a donor,

by an absolute delivery to a corporation without power to take, is also

instanced, and the question is asked whether the title vests in such a

case in the corporation so that the donor or his heirs could not recover

it back, and if it do, the counsel asks where is the difference in the

two cases? It is time enough to decide such a case when it arises.

But it seems to me there is a decided difference. In the one case the

gift is made inter vivos by the absolute owner, and it is made effect-

ual as to him by a delivery. In such case it would seem that he

stands in no position to ask the aid of the court to get him out of a

POWER TO ACQUIRE REAL PROPERTY.
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situation into which he voluntarily entered with his eyes open, and

1039

the court might well say to him that he stood in no position to attack

the right of his donee to property which he freely and absolutely gave

it. As to his heirs, it could be said that their ancestor had made a dis-

position of property which was absolutely his own in his lifetime, and

in such a way that he could not question its validity, and that as he

could not, they succeeding only to his rights, were alike disabled.

In the case of a devise, however, the case is essentially different.

The will does not take effect until the testator's death, and then, if

his property is not legally devised or bequeathed, no title vests for a

single moment in the devisee or legatee, but it vests instantly in the

heir or next of kin; and the corporation claiming under the will asks

the aid of the law to give the property to it, and in so doing it must

show the authority it has to take. And if there were only a prohibi-

tion in words against holding the property, would the law not be do-

ing a vain thing in handing it over to a corporation which by the very

fact of holding would render itself liable to have its charter forfeited

on that account? Would not the prohibition against holding be prop-

erly and necessarily construed as a prohibition against taking also?
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Is not this an argument against the right of the corporation to take, if

by holding it is thus rendered liable to such a penalty? And is it not

an argument in favor of the construction of the language in the charter

that the limitation upon the power to hold property is, under all the

circumstances, a limitation upon the power to take any more than it

can legally and properly hold? * * *

Upon a review of the whole question as to the proper construction

of the legislation, general and special, affecting this university, I am

of the opinion that it had no power to take or hold any more real and

personal property than $3,000,000, in the aggregate.

Second. Coming to the conclusion I have, on the first branch of

the case, it becomes necessary to examine the second and only re-

maining question, viz.: Does this property, if taken and held by the

university, exceed the amount which bylaw it can hold?' * * *

This brings the property of the university, above set forth, up to more

than its permitted aggregate at the time of the decease of Mrs. Fiske,

and no debts to be deducted therefrom. Under such circumstances,

the university could not take the various legacies bequeathed to it by

her will. * * *

Affirmed.

1 Part of the opinion relating to this question is omitted.

Note. Accord: 1857, Trustees v. Chamber's Ex., 3 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 253;

1867, Cromie v. Louisville, etc., Soc, 3 Hush (Kv.) 365; 1871, Chamberlain

v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424; 1879, De Camp v. Dobbins, 31 N. J. Eq. 671,

690; 1889, ^Vood v. Hammond, 16 R. I. 98; 1890, Cornell Univ. v. Fiske, 136

U. S. 152; 1894, Coggeshall v. Home for Children, etc., 18 R. I. 696.

See preceding case and note, contra.

situation into which he voluntarily entered with his eyes open, and
the court might well say to him that he stood in no position to attack
the right of his donee to property which he freely and absolutely gave
it. As to his heirs, it could be said that their ancestor had made a disposition of property which was absolutely his own in his lifetime, and
in such a way that he could not question its validity, and that as he
could not, they succeeding only to his rights, were alike disabled.
In the case of a devise, however, the case is essentially different.
The will does not take effect until the testator's death, and then, if
his property is not legally devised or bequeathed, no title vests for a
single moment in the devisee or legatee, but it vests instantly in the
heir or next of kin; and the corporation claiming under the will asks
the aid of the law to give the property to it, and in so doing it must
show the authority it has to take. And if there were only a prohibition in words against holding the property, would the law not be doing a vain thing in handing it over to a corporation which by the very
fact of holding would render itself liable to have its charter forfeited
on that account? Would not the prohibition against holding be properly and necessarily construed as a prohibition against taking: also?
Is not this an argument against the right of the corporation to take, if
by holding it is thus rendered liable to such a penalty? And is it not
an argument in favor of the construction of the language in the charter
that the limitation upon the power to hold property is, under all the
circumstances, a limitation upon the power to take any more than it
can legally and properly hold? • • •
Upon a review of the whole question as to the proper construction
of the legislation, general and special, affecting this university, I am
of the opinion that it had no power to take or hold any more real and
personal property than $3 1 000,000, in the aggregate.
Second. Coming to the conclusion I have, on the first branch of
the case, it becomes necessary to examine the second and only remaining question, viz.: Does this property, if taken and held by the
university , exceed the amount which by law it can bold ?1 • • •
This brings the property of the university, above set forth, up to more
than its permitted aggregate at the time of the decease of Mrs. Fiske,
and no debts to be deducted therefrom. Under such circumstances,
the university could not take the various legacies bequeathed to it by
her will. • • •
Affirmed.
1 Part

of the opinion relating to this question is omitted.
Note. .Accord: 1857, Trustees v. Chamber's Ex., 3 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 253;
1867, Cromie v. Louisville, etc., Soc., 3 Bush (Ky.) 365; 1871, Chamberlain
v. Chamberlain, 43 N . Y. 424; 1879, De Camp v. DobbinR, 31 N. J . Eq. 671,
690; 1889, Wood v. ffammonrl, 16 R. I. 98; 1800, Cornell Univ. v. Fiske, 136
U. S. 152; 1894, Coggeshall v. Home for Children, etc., 18 R. I. 696.
See preceding case and note, contra.
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Sec. 298. (2) To acquire personal property
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(I) In general.

THE NORTHWESTERN UNION PACKET CO. V. SHAW.

§ 298

THE NORTHWESTERN UNION PACKET COMPANY v. SHAW.1

Sec. 298. ( 2) To acquire personal property

1875. In the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 37 Wis. Rep.

655-662.

[Appeal by plaintiff from judgment in a suit to recover $1,000 paid

( I )

upon a contract and damages for its breach. The packet company

In general.

was organized in 1870, and from that time had been engaged in the

THE NORTHWESTERN UNION PACKET COMPANYv. SHAW. 1

business of a common carrier upon the Mississippi, and also in buying,

selling and dealing in wheat, grain and produce generally; it con-

1875.

tracted to purchase 4,000 bushels of wheat from Shaw and paid him

IN

THE

SUPREME

CouRT

OF

WISCONSIN.

37 Wis. Rep.

655-662.

$1,000 on account, the wheat to be delivered at a certain time and

place, but Shaw failed to deliver as agreed. The corporate charter

[Appeal by plaintiff from judgment in a suit to recover $r ,ooo paid
upon a contract and damages for its breach. The packet company
was organized in 1870, and from that time had been engaged in the
business of a common carrier upon the Mississippi, and also in buying,
selling and dealing in wheat, grain and produce generally; it contracted to purchase 4,000 bushels of wheat from Shaw and paid him
$1 ,ooo on account, the wheat to be delivered at a ceitain time and
place, but Shaw failed to deliver as agreed. The corporate charter
provided for owning and controlling vessels of various kjnds for transportation on the Mississippi river, etc., to own warehouses, depots, etc. ,
necessary for freighting, storing and forwarding property and person .
with power to sell any of its property of every description, and to do any
and all acts and things necessary to an economical and successful
prosecution of said business, to borrow money. for all its purposes, to
contract v;ith any per on in reference to the storing, forwardiug or
freighting of any kind of property, or "to any and all business incidental to, or arising from, the transportation of persons and property."]
LYON, J.
• • • The question to be determined is, whether
the plaintiff can lawfully buy and sell the produce of the country in
the same manner and to the same extent that a natural person may.
We think this question must be an. wered in the negative. There
is no necessary connection between the business of a common carrier
and that of buying nnd selling the commodities which the carrier
transports. Neither is the latter business necessarily or usually dependent upon the former. The two are as essentially distinct as the
business of the carrier and that of the producer. It will scarcely be
claimed that the plaintiff is authorized, under its articles of incorporation, to purchase large tracts of lnnd on which to raise grain and
other produce to be stored in its warehouses and shipped over its
lines. If it may not do this, it is not perceived on what principle it
may purchase the commodities instead of raising them. \Ve think
the principle is the same in both cases. Moreover, in view of the
fact that the transportation of the products of the country is mainly
controlled by powerful corporations representing immense aggregations of capital , there are reasons, if not of public policy, certainly
rensons which should have much weight with the legislnture, for confining common carriers to their legitimate business as carriers. At
least no forced construction of their charters should be· sanctioned to
enable them to become producers or purchasers of such products.

provided for owning and controlling vessels of various kinds for trans-

portation on the Mississippi river, etc., to own warehouses, depots, etc.,

necessary for freighting, storing and forwarding property and persons,

with power to sell any of its property of every description, and to do any

and all acts and things necessary to an economical and successful

prosecution of said business, to borrow money for all its purposes, to

contract with any person in reference to the storing, forwarding or
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freighting of any kind of property, or "to any and all business inci-

dental to, or arising from, the transportation of persons and property."]

Lyon, J. * * * The question to be determined is, whether

the plaintiff can lawfully buy and sell the produce of the country in

the same manner and to the same extent that a natural person may.

We think this question must be answered in the negative. There

is no necessary connection between the business of a common carrier

and that of buying and selling the commodities which the carrier

transports. Neither is the latter business necessarily or usually de-

pendent upon the former. The two are as essentially distinct as the

business of the carrier and that of the producer. It will scarcely be

claimed that the plaintiff is authorized, under its articles of incorpora-

tion, to purchase large tracts of land on which to raise grain and

other produce to be stored in its warehouses and shipped over its

lines. If it may not do this, it is not perceived on what principle it

may purchase the commodities instead of raising them. We think

the principle is the same in both cases. Moreover, in view of the

fact that the transportation of the products of the country is mainlv

controlled by powerful corporations representing immense aggrega-

tions of capital, there are reasons, if not of public policy, certainly

reasons which should have much weight with the legislature, for con-

fining common carriers to their legitimate business as carriers. At

least no forced construction of their charters should be' sanctioned to

enable them to become producers or purchasers of such products.

1 Statement abridged, part of the opinion omitted.

1
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By confining them to the proper business of common carriers, the

temptation to make unjust discriminations in the transportation of

POWER TO ACQUIRE PERSONAL PROPERTY.

their own property to the manifest injury and oppression of persons

having like property for transportation, can only be avoided. Hence,

while it is conceded that the legislature may confer upon a corpora-

tion common carrier the right of a natural person to buy and sell the

commodities which it transports, it must be held that until so con-

ferred the right does not exist.

We conclude that the contract set forth in the pleadings as to the"

plaintiff, is ultra vires, and that no claim for damages resulting from

a breach thereof can be successfully asserted by either party. This

disposes of the counter-claim ,of the defendant, and of all claims of

the plaintiff except the claim to recover the $1,000 paid on account

of the attempted purchase of the wheat. * * *

[After holding that the $1,000 might be recovered in an action for

money had and received, and that the complaint stated facts justify-

ing this:]

Reversed and remanded.

Note. Personal property: Such personal property, but such only both as to

kind and amount, as is reasonably necessarv for the corporate purposes, may
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be lawfully acquired: 1858, Pearce v. R. Co., 21 How. (62 IT. S.) 441; 1860,

Downing v. Road Co., 40 N. H. 230; 1875, Northwestern Packet Co. v. Shaw,

37 Wis. 655; 1876, Fanners', etc., Bank v. Baldwin, 23 Minn. 198, 23 Am.

Rep. 683; 1877, Morgan v. Donovan, 58 Ala. 241; 1877, Franklin Co. v. Lew

By confining them to the proper business of common carriers, the
temptation to make unjust discriminations in the transportation of
their own property to the manifest injury and oppression of persons
having like property for transportation, can only be avoided. Hence,
while it is conceded that the legislature may confer upon a corporation common carrier the right of a natural person to buy and sell the
commodities which it transports, it must be held that until so conferred the right docs not exist.
vVe conclude that the contract set forth in the pleadings as to the
plaintiff, is ultra vfres, and that no claim for damages resulting from
a breach thereof can be successfully asserted by either party. This
disposes of the counter-claim ,of the defendant, and of all claims of
the plaintiff except the claim to recover the $ r ,ooo paid on account
of the attempted purchase of the wheat. * • •
[After holding that the $ r ,ooo might be recovered in an action for
money had and received, and that the complaint stated facts justifying this: J
Reversed and remanded.

iston Sav. Inst., 68 Maine 43, 28 Am. Rep. 9; 1884, Central R. Co. v. Smith,

76 Ala. 572, 52 Am. Rep. 353; 1885, Dav v. Buggv Co., 57 Mich. 146, 58 Am.

Rep. 352; 1888, Chewaekla Lime-Works v. Dismukes, 87 Ala. 344; 1890, Jemi-

son v. Citizens' Sav. Bank, 122 N. Y. 135, 19 Am. St. Rep. 482; 1895, Boss-

hardt & W. Co. v. Crescent Oil Co., 171 Pa. St. 109; 1897, Farwell v. AVolf, 96

Wis. 10, 05 Am. St. Rep. 22, 37 L. R. A. 138; 1897, Mahoney v. Butte Hard-

ware Co., 19 Mont. 377; 1897, Malone v. Lancaster Gas L., etc., Co., 182 Pa.

St. 309; 1899, Central Ohio Nat'l Gas, etc., Co. v. Cap. Citv Dairy Co., 60

Ohio St. 96, 53 N. E. Rep. 711; 1899, State v. Debenture G. & L. Co., 51 La.

Ann. 1874, 26 So. Rep. 600; 1899, Herring v. Ruskin Co-op Assn., — Tenu.

Ch. App. —, 52 S. W. Rep. 327.

There, however, is no limit upon the amount of personal property that a

corporation may acquire or hold arising from the profits of carrying on prop-

erly its legitimate business.

Sec. 299. (2) Power to acquire its own shares.

(1) The English rule.

In Re DRONFIELD SILKSTONE COAL COMPANY.1

1880. In the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division. L.

R. 17 Chancery Division 76—97.

Note. Personal property: Such personal property, but such only both as to
kind and amount, as is reasonably necessary for the corporate purposes, may
be lawfully acquired: 1858, Pearce v. R. Co., 21 How. (62 U.S.) 441; 1860,
Downing v. Road Co., 40 N. H. 230; 1875, No1-thwestern Packet Co. v. Shaw,
37 \Vis. 655; 1876, Farmers', etc., Bank v. Baldwin, 23 Minn. 198, 23 Am.
Rep. 683; 1877, Morgan v. Donovan, 58 Ala. 241; 1877, Franklin Co. v. Lewiston Sav. Inst., 68 Maine 43, 28 Am. Rep. 9; 1884, Central R. Co. v. Smith,
76 Ala. 572, 52 Am. Rep. 353; 1885, Day v. Buggy Co., 57 Mich. 146, 58 Am.
Rep. 352; 1888, Chewackla Lime-Works v. DismL1kes, 87 Ala. 344; 1890, ,J ernieon v. Citizens' Sav. Bank, 122 N. Y. 135, 19 Am. St. Rep. 482; 1895, Bosshardt & W. Co. v. Crescent Oil Co., 171 Pa. St. lW; 1897 1 Farwell v. Wolf, 96
Wis. 10, 65 Arn. St. Rep. 22, 37 L. R. A. 138; 1897, Mahoney v. Butte Hardware Co., 19 Mont. 377; 1897, Malone v. LancSBter Gas L., etc., Co., 182 Pa.
St. 309; 1899, Central Ohio Nat'l Gas, etc., Co. v. Cap. City Dairy Co., 60
Obio ~t. \-16, 53 N. E. Rep. 711; 1899, State v. Debenture G. & L. Co., 51 La.
Ann. 1874, 26 So. Rep. tiOO; 1899, Herring: v. Ruskin Co-op Assn., - Tenn .
Ch. App.-, 52 S. W. Rep. 327.
There, however, is no limit upon the amount of persona] property that a
corporation may acquire or hold arising from the profits of carrying on properly its legitimate business.

Jessel, M. R. The memorandum of association of a limited col-

liery company gave the company power to do all things which it should

consider conducive to the attainment of its objects, hut did not in terms

Bee. 299. ( 2) Power to acquire its own shares.

■Only the opinion of the master of the rolls is given. The statement of

(I) The English rule.

facts is that given in the syllabus to the case.

63—WIL. CAS.

IN RE DRONFIELD SILKSTONE COAL COMPANY. 1
1880.

IN THE HrGH CouRT OF JusTICE, CHANCERY D1v1sroN.

L.

R. 17 Chancery Division 76-<;7.
JESSEL, M. R.
The memornndum of association of a limited colliery company gave the company power to do all things which it should
consider conducive to the attainment of its objects, hut did not in terms
1 Only the opinion of the master of the rolls is given. The statement of
facts is that given in the syllabus to the case.

63-WIL. CAS.
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give any power to purchase its own shares. The tenth clause of the

articles empowered the directors to purchase for the company any shares

1042

in the company, and directed that the shares so purchased should be

IN RE DRONFlELD SlLKSTONE COAL COMPANY.

dealt with as if they had never been issued, and that any profit aris-

give any power to purchase its own shares. The tenth clause of the
articlesempo·wercd tbe directors to purchase for the company any shares
in the company, and directed that the shares so purchased should be
dealt with as if they had never been issued, and that any profit arising on the reissuing or subsequent sale of such shares should be
deemed profits of the year in which they were reissued or sold. In
1872, disputes ha\'ing arisen as to the conduct of the business, the directors agreed with W., the largest shareholder, who was also one of
the directors, to purchase for the company his shares, and also his interest as landlord of the mines worked by the company. This arrangement was confirmed by an extraordinary general meeting of the
company, and was carried into effect by an assignment of his interest
in the mines to the company for a specific sutn, and by a transfer to
the company of his shares for another specific sum. The company
\Vas entered in the share register as holder of these shares, and in all
the subsequent returns to the registrar of joint stock companies the
company was entered as such holder. The company for some time
was prosperous, but afterwards fell into difficulties, and in 1879 an
order was made for winding it up. • • •
I now come to the point as to the surrender of shares-a point
upon which I feel much more difficulty. It is not for me to say what
the limits of surrender are which are allowable by the act. As I read
this same judg1nent of Lord Justice James, 1 certain surrenders are
allowable.
I can imagine one ·where the shares would be liable to forfeiture,
and it is the shortest way to surrender them; then the same result
would follow. But I am by no means prepared to say that there is a
right under the term "surrender" to buy up the shares, and to have
them surrendered to the company as on an ordinary purchase for
money. That, I think, is clearly beyond the limit; but it is not necessary for me to say what is exactly within the limit, because each
case as it arises must be decided on its own merits. I can well imagine that certain cases are clearly within the limi.t, and ought not to be
treated as a diminution of capital, and that other cases are clearly
beyond the limit-such as ~he cases I have put of an ordinary purchase or ordinary traffic in shares, although the term "surrender"
may be employed instead of the transaction taking the form it does
here, of an actual transfer to the company.
Having dealt with the case so far, let us see what the twelfth sec·
tion of the companies act, 1862, must, as I think, mean. The suggestion made on the part of Mr. Ward is this , that all the act of
parliament means is that the company must not alter the terms of the
memorandum as to the nominal amount of the capital. It would be
a very singular res ult if that were so, because it would come to this-the company may destroy the whole of its real capital without altering
its nominal amount. I will put the case in this way: The company
has a million of capital in £ 10 shares, and has£ 100,000 paid upon
the shares, leaving £900,000 remaining to be paid; there is a power
1
Hope v. International Finan. Soc., 4 Ch . D. 327, 336.

ing on the reissuing or subsequent sale of such shares should be

deemed profits of the year in which they were reissued or sold. In

1872, disputes having arisen as to the conduct of the business, the di-

rectors agreed with W., the largest shareholder, who was also one of

the directors, to purchase for the company his shares, and also his in-

terest as landlord of the mines worked by the company. This ar-

rangement was confirmed by an extraordinary general meeting of the

company, and was carried into effect by an assignment of his interest

in the mines to the company for a specific sum, and by a transfer to

the company of his shares for another specific sum. The company

was entered in the share register as holder of these shares, and in all

the subsequent returns to the registrar of joint stock companies the

company was entered as such holder. The company for some time

was prosperous, but afterwards fell into difficulties, and in 1879 an

order was made for winding it up. » * *

I now come to the point as to the surrender of shares—a point
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upon which I feel much more difficulty. It is not for me to say what

the limits of surrender are which are allowable by the act. As I read

this same judgment of Lord Justice James,1 certain surrenders are

allowable.

I can imagine one where the shares would be liable to forfeiture,

and it is the shortest way to surrender them; then the same result

would follow. But I am by no means prepared to say that there is a

right under the term "surrender" to buy up the shares, and to have

them surrendered to the company as on an ordinary purchase for

money. That, I think, is clearly beyond the limit; but it is not nec-

essary for me to say what is exactly within the limit, because each

case as it arises must be decided on its own merits. I can well imag-

ine that certain cases are clearly within the limit, and ought not to be

treated as a diminution of capital, and that other cases are clearly

beyond the limit—such as the cases I have put of an ordinary pur-

chase or ordinary traffic in shares, although the term "surrender"

may be employed instead of the transaction taking the form it does

here, of an actual transfer to the company.

Having dealt with the case so far, let us see what the twelfth sec-

tion of the companies act, 1862, must, as I think, mean. The sug-

gestion made on the part of Mr. Ward is this, that all the act of

parliament means is that the company must not alter the terms of the

memorandum as to the nominal amount of the capital. It would be

a very singular result if that were so, because it would come to this—

the company may destrov the whole of its real capital without altering

its nominal amount. I will put the case in this way: The company

has a million of capital in j£io shares, and has ;£ioo,ooo paid upon

the shares, leaving ^900,000 remaining to be paid; there is a power

1 Hope v. International Finan. Soc., 4 Ch. D. 327, 336.
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to accept a surrender of shares; the company resolve at a general

meeting to retain one share for each of the seven directors, and to ac-

POWER TO ACQUIRE PERSONAL PROPERTY.
cept a surrender of all the other shares. I am putting an extreme case

1043

to try the question. According to the argument of Mr. Ward, that is

perfectly valid; so that the result is that the primary capital of the

company is reduced from ^900,000, remaining to be called up, to

^70, if there are seven directors. That is an extreme case, no doubt,

but it shows to what an absurdity you would reduce the provisions of

the act of parliament if that were allowed. It can not be said that

the conditions of the memorandum mean that the company may in

effect destroy the nominal capital; that it can not so mean is, I think,

clear from the words of the section. The company may increase its

capital by the issue of new shares to such an amount as it thinks ex-

pedient, or it may consolidate and divide its capital to a larger amount

than the existing shares, or it may convert the paid-up shares into

stock. If the section were only to apply to nominal capital, what is

the meaning of the power for the company "to convert its paid-up

shares into stock"? What the section means is that the company

shall not convert the unpaid-up shares into stock. That implies, as it
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has always been held to imply, that the company can not turn the un-

paid-up shares into stock, so as to exclude the right of making further

calls. Therefore, the section must apply to the issued capital, and

not merely to the nominal capital; and it has always been so treated,

as far as I know.

There is the additional observation to be made that the subsequent

acts of parliament, namely, the acts of 1867 and 1877, would have

singularly little meaning if it were not so, for they contain most elab-

orate provisions as regards the mode of increasing the capital, and re-

ducing the capital, and as regards the trading capital and the issued

capital. The provisions of the section, I admit, are difficult to con-

strue if you read them word by word, but I do not think they are so

difficult to construe if you look at the meaning of the whole of the acts

as to the formation of these companies. If they are to be taken to apply

only to the amount of the nominal capital, I must say that the acts of

1867 and 1877 are the most extraordinary legislative productions I ever

saw. But if you read the section the other way, and say that it means

that the conditions in the memorandum relate to the issued capital,

then the subsequent acts are perfectly intelligible. Let us now look

at the ninth section of the act of 1867: "Any company limited by

shares may, by special resolution, so far modify"—what?—"the con-

ditions contained in its memorandum of association, if authorized so

to do by its regulations as originally framed or as altered by special

resolution, as to reduce its capital." What capital? Does that mean

nominal capital? It is plain that it means the trading capital. There-

fore when you look at the ninth section it is clear that the legislature

considered the twelfth section of the original act somehow or other

prohibitive, and that a new act was required to authorize a company

to reduce its capital. Then there are provisions which the legislature

to accept a surrender of shares; the company resolve at a general
meeting to retain one share for each of the seven directors, and to ac~
cept a surrender of all the other shares. I am putting an extreme case
to try the question. According to the argument of Mr. Ward, that is
perfectly valid; so that the result is that the primary capital of the
company is reduced from £900,000, remaining to be called up, to
£10, if there are seven directors. That is an extreme cal>e, no <loubt,
but it shows to what an absurdity you would reduce the provi sions of
the act of parliament if that were allowed. It can not be said that
the conditions of the memorandum mean that the company may in
effect destroy the nominal capital; that it can not so mean is, I think,
clear from the words of the section. The company may increase its
capital by the issue of new shares to such an amount as it thinks expedient, or it may consolidate and divide its capital to a larger amount
than the existing shares, or it may convert the paid-up shares into
stock. If the section were only to apply to nominal capital, what is
the meaning of the power for the company "to convert its paid-up
shares into stock"? What the section means is that the company
shall not convert the unpaid-up shares into stock. That implies, as it
has always been held to imply, that the company can not turn the unpaid-up shares into stock, so as to exclude the right of making further
calls. Therefore, the section must apply to the issued capital, and
not merely to the nominal capital; and it has always been so treated,
as far as I know.
There is the additional observation to be made that the subsequent
acts of parliament, namely, the acts of 1867 and 1877, would have
singularly little meaning if it were not so, for they contain most elaborate provisions as regards the mode of increasing the capital, and reducing the capital, and as regards the trading capital and the issued
capital. The provisions of the section, I admit, are difficult to construe if you read them word by word, but I do not think they are so
difficult to construe if you look at the meaning of the whole of the acts
as to the formation of these companies. If they are to be taken to apply
only to the amount of the nominal capital, I must say that the acts of
1867 ancl 1877 are the most extraordinary legislative productions I ever
saw. But if you read the section the other way, and say that it means
that the conditions in the memorandum relate to the issued capital,
then the subsequent acts arc perfectly intelligible. Let u s now look
at the ninth section of the act of 1867: "Any company limited by
shares may, by special resolution, so far modify"-what?-''the conditions' contained in its memorandum of a ssociation, if authorized so
to do by its regulations as originally framed or as altered by pecial
resolution, as to reduce its capital." What capital? Does that mean
nominal capital? It is plain that it means the trading capital. Therefore when you look at the ninth section it is clear that the legislature
considered the twelfth section of the original act somehow or other
prohibitive, and that a new act was required to authorize a company
to reduce its capital. Then there are provisions which the legl$lature
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considered necessary for the protection of creditors in case of a reduc-

tion of capital.

1044

But it is said a surrender is no more a diminution of capital than is

IN RE DROXFIELD SIL K.STONE COAL COMPANY.

a forfeiture, and the creditors are not injured by a surrender. That,

considered n ecessary for the protection of creditors in case of a reduction of capital.
But it is said a surrender is no more a diminution of capital than is
a forfeiture, and the creditors are not injured by a surrender. That,
however, is not so. If the company could, either by taking a surrend er or by a purchase of shares, actually diminish the capital, not in
the shape of dealing with a solitary individual shareholder who can
not pay, but to a greater extent, what would be the result? I am not
now sp eaking of future creditors, who mu st be held to take with notice
of what was on the register. What would b e the result? Every
creditor who could not enforce his demand would Iese it. Suppose,
for instance, the vendor, having sold the mine to the company, were
to take a mortgage of it not to be called in for five years if the interest
were duly paid, and the directors then found that they were carrying
on business at a loss and could take a surrender of all the shares except seven,. then the mortgagee-creditor would be actually without
remedy, because he could not apply to have the company wound up
until the mortgage debt was due. That would not be until the end of
five years, by which time all the shareholders would have been off as
past shareholders for probably four years. So that it is not correct to
say that in case of surrende r the creditors are protected, because they
may all lose all remedy whatsoever, unless indeed their money b ecomes
payable within a twelve month after the transaction takes place.
ll seems to me that when you look at what I may call the purvi ew
of the act, it can not be possible that the company can buy up its own
shares in this way so as to destroy the shares in every sense and for
every purpose and intent, except that they may, if they can, reissue
or transfer the shares to new shareholders during the intervening period
that the capital is diminished, if not absolutely extinguished. That being my view of the whole of the act, and I may say of the result of
the decisions, which really have any bearing on the subject-matter I
have to consider, I think the present transaction was a diminution of
the capital of the company which is prohibited by the companies act,
1862 , and the transaction is, therefore, void on that ground also.
The transfer being void, and, if I may say so, void at law, although
that expression h as no longer the meaning that it formerly had , the
result is that Mr. \Varel remains a contributory; and that is the only
point I have now to decide. • • •
[This decision of the master of rolls was appealed from and overruled, on the appeal. But the views of Jessel, M. R., of the general
doctrine of the company's capacity to purchase its own shares, g iven
h ere, were taken and applied in the later case of Trevor v. \Vhitworth, in the house of lo rds , L. R. 12 Appeal Cases, 409 1 holding
that a limited "company has no power under the companies acts t o
purchase its own shares." See particularly the opinion of L o rd :Macnaghten , in Trevor v. Whitworth, L. R. 12 App. Cas . 432-433.]

however, is not so. If the company could, either by taking a surren-

der or by a purchase of shares, actually diminish the capital, not in

the shape of dealing with a solitary individual shareholder who can

not pay, but to a greater extent, what would be the result? I am not

now speaking of future creditors, who must be held to take with notice

of what was on the register. What would be the result? Every

creditor who could not enforce his demand would lose it. Suppose,

for instance, the vendor, having sold the mine to the company, were

to take a mortgage of it not to be called in for five years if the interest

were duly paid, and the directors then found that they were carrying

on business at a loss and could take a surrender of all the shares ex-

cept seven,, then the mortgagee-creditor would be actually without

remedy, because he could not apply to have the company wound up

until the mortgage debt was due. That would not be until the end of

five years, by which time all the shareholders would have been off as

past shareholders for probably four years. So that it is not correct to
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say that in case of surrender the creditors are protected, because they

may all lose all remedy whatsoever, unless indeed their money becomes

payable within a twelve month after the transaction takes place.

It seems to me that when you look at what I may call the purview

of the act, it can not be possible that the company can buy up its own

shares in this way so as to destroy the shares in every sense and for

every purpose and intent, except that they may, if they can, reissue

or transfer the shares to new shareholders during the intervening period

that the capital is diminished, if not absolutely extinguished. That be-

ing my view of the whole of the act, and I may say of the result of

the decisions, which really have any bearing on the subject-matter I

have to consider, I think the present transaction was a diminution of

the capital of the company which is prohibited by the companies act,

1862, and the transaction is, therefore, void on that ground also.

The transfer being void, and, if I may say so, void at law, although

that expression has no longer the meaning that it formerly had, the

result is that Mr. Ward remains a contributory; and that is the only

point I have now to decide. * * *

[This decision of the master of rolls was appealed from and over-

ruled, on the appeal. But the views of Jessel, M. R., of the general

doctrine of the company's capacity to purchase its own shares, given

here, were taken and applied in the later case of Trevor v. Whit-

worth, in the house of lords, L. R. 12 Appeal Cases, 409, holding

that a limited "company has no power under the companies acts to

purchase its own shares." See particularly the opinion of Lord Mac-

naghten, in Trevor v. Whitworth, L. R. 12 App. Cas. 432-43S.]

Note: (1) An English company has no right to purchase its shares unless

specially authorized: 1870, In rt» London, Hamburg, etc., Bank, L. R. 5

Cu. App. Uas. 444, 39 L. J. Ch. 598; 1870, In re United Service Co., L. R. 5

Note: (1) An En~lish company has no ri ght to purchase its shares unless
specially autG.orized: 1870, In re London, Hamburg, etc., Bank, L. R. 5
Ch. App. Uas. 444, 39 L. J . Ch. 5H8; 1870, In re United Service Co., L. R. 5
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Ch. App. Cas. 707, 39 L. J. Ch. 730, 23 L. T. 331; 1876, Hope v. International

F. Soe., 35 L. T. 623; 1887, Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 409, 57 L. J.

Oh. 28, 57 L. T. 457; 1888, In re Walker & Hacking, 57 L. T. 763.

§ 300

POWER TO ACQUIRE PERSONAL PROPERTY.

(2) But may if specially authorized. 1874, In re Countv Palatine, L. & D.

Co., App. Cas. L. R., 9 Ch. 54, 43 L. J. Ch. 578, 29 L. T. 707; 1886, In re Kal-

gooley Distillery Co., 17 L. R. Ir. 239; 1889, In re General Finance Co., 23 L.

R. Ir. 173; 1892, In re Sovereign, L. A. Co., 3 Ch. 279, 62 L. J. Ch. 36, 67 L.

T. 336.

(3) As to what is such a purchase, see 1871, Phosphate Lime Co. v. Green,

L. R., 7 C. P. 43, 25 L. T. 636; 1874, In re Countv Palatine, L. & I). Co., L. R.,

9 Ch. 54, 43 L. J. Ch. 578, 29 L. T. 707; 1893, In"re Denver Hotel Co., 1 Ch.

495, 62 L. J. Ch. 450, 68 L. T. 8.

Sec. 300. (2) American rule: Theories.

(a) May (with certain exceptions) acquire its own shares, un-

Cb. App. Cas. 707, 39 L. J. Ch. 730, 23 L. T. 331; 1876, Hope v. International
F. Soc., 35 L. T. 623; 1887, Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 409, 57 L . J.
Ch. 28, 57 L. T. 4.57; 1888, In re Walker & Hacking, 57 L 'r. 763.
(2) But may if specially authorized. 1874, In re County Palatine, L. & D.
Co. , App. Cas. L. R., 9 Ch. 54, 43 L. J. Ch. 578, 29 L. T. 707; 1886, In re Bui·
g0oley Distillery Co., 17 L. R. Ir. 239; 1889, In re General Finance Co., 23 L.
R. Ir. 173 ; 1892, In re Sovereign, L.A . Co., 3 Ch. 279, 62 L. J . Ch. 36, 67 L.
T. 336.
(3) As to what is such a purchase, see 1871, Phosphate Lime Co. v. Green,
L. R., 7 C. P. 43, 25 L. T. 636; 1874, In re County Palatine, L . & D. Co., L . R.,
9 Cb. 54, 43 L. J. C h. 578, 29 L. T. 707; 1893, In re Denver Hotel Co., 1 Ch.
495, 62 L. J. Cb. 450, 68 L. T. 8.

less expressly or impliedly restrained.

CHAPMAN v. IRON CLAD RHEOSTAT COMPANY.

1898. In the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 62 N. J. Law 497,

41 Atl. Rep. 690, 9 A. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 769.

Dixon, J. The declaration alleges that it was agreed between the

Sec. 300.

( 2) American rule:

Theories.

plaintiff and the defendant, the latter being a corporation organized
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under the laws of this state, that the defendant should employ the

plaintiff at a regular weekly salary; that the plaintiff should purchase

and hold during his employment eighty shares of stock in the defend-

(a) May (with certain exceptions) acquire its own shares, unless expressly or impliedly restrained.

ant company; and that if the defendant should discharge the plaintiff

CHAPMAN v. IRON CLAD RHEOSTAT COMPANY.

from its employ, it would purchase said stock from the plaintiff at par.

The declaration further alleges that in pursuance of said agreement,

the plaintiff entered into the employ of the defendant at a weekly sal-

1898.

IN THE

SUPREME CouRT OF NEw JERSEY,

62

N. J.

Law 497,

41 At!. Rep. 690, 9 A. & E. C. C. (N. S.) 769.

ary; that he purchased said stock, and held it during his employment,

and that the defendant discharged him from the employment against

his will; that thereupon the plaintiff demanded of the defendant that

it should purchase the said stock from him at par, and the defendant

refused to do so. To this the defendant demurs, insisting that the de-

fendant's contract for the purchase of stock was. on its face, ultra

vires and, therefore, not enforcihle against it.

In England the general rule seems to be that corporations can not

purchase their own stock without express authority from the statute,

though perhaps even there this rule would not be applied if it appeared

that the object of the purchase was not merely to traffic in the stock

or to diminish the amount of the capital, but to accomplish some legit-

imate corporate purpose. Hope v. Society, 4 Ch. Div. 327. But in

the United States the weight of authority seems to be in favor of the

view that corporations have an implied power to purchase shares in

their own capital stock, provided, of course, no illegitimate design ap-

pears. Many of the cases are cited in the notes of 23 Am. & Eng.

D1xoN, J. The declaration alleges that it was agreed between the
plaintiff and the defendant, the latter being a corporation organized
under the laws of this state, that the defendant should employ the
plaintiff at a regular weekly salary; that the plaintiff should purchase
and hold during his employment eighty shares of stock in the defendant company; and that if the defendant should discharge the plaintiff
from its employ , it would purchase said stock from the plaintiff at par.
The declaration further alleges that in pursuance of said agreement,
the plaintiff entered into the employ of the defendant at a weekly !'alary; that he purchased said stock, and held it during his en ~ployment,
and that the defendant discharged him from the employ ment against
his will; that thereupon the plaintiff demanded of the defendant that
it should purchase the said stock from him at par, and the defendant
refused to do so. To this the defendant demurs, insisting that the defendant's contract for the purchase of stock was, on its face, ultra
vires and, therefore, not enforcible against it.
In Eng land the general rule seems to be that corporations can not
purchase their own stock without express authority from the statute,
though perhaps even the re this rule would not be applied if it appeared
that the object of the purchase was not merely to traffic in the stock
or to diminish the amount of the capital, but to accomplish some legitimate corporate purpose. Hope v. Society, 4 Ch. Div. 327. But in
the United St:ites the weight of authority seems to be in favor of the
view that corporations have an implied power to purchase shares in
their own capital stock, provided, of course, no illegitimate des ign appears . Many of the cases arc cited in the notes of 23 Am. & Eng.
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Enc. Law, 676. This question, as it turns on common-law principles,

IN RE DRONFIELD SlLKSTONE COAL COMPANY.

seems not to have been judicially decided in New Jersey, nor need it

§ 300

now be; for the provisions of our corporation act (P. L. 1896. p.

Enc. Law, 676. This question, as it turns on common-law principles,
seems not to have been judicially decided in New Jersey, nor need it
now be; for the provisions of our corporation act (P. L. 1896, p.
277), by which (section 20) the shares of stock in every corporation
are declared to be personal property, and (section 1) every corporation is vested with power to purchase such personal e tate as the purposes of the corporation shall require, except (section 3) certain designated sorts of personal property, which do not embrace shares of its
own capital stock, coupled with those provisions which recognize the
power of corporations to own capital stock (sections 29, 38), plainly
imply a legislative grant of the necessary power in all cases where the
purposes of the corporation require it. In the present case the fact
that the corporation exerted the power in order to secure the sen·ices
of the plaintiff is prt'ma fade sufficient indication that the purpose of
the corporation required it.
There is also another pl"inciple standing in the defendant's way.
The plaintiff has fully performed the contract on his part, and can not
be restored to his former status, nor be honestly dealt with otherwise
than by holding the defendant to performance of its share of the bargain. Under these circumstances the plea of ultra vt'res is inadmissible. Camden & A. R. Co. v. May's Landing & E. H. C. R. Co.,
48 N. J. Law 530, 7 Atl. 523. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment
on the demurrer.
Note. {4.cco1·d: 1828, Hartridge v. Rockwell, 1 R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 260;

277), by which (section 20) the shares of stock in every corporation

are declared to be personal property, and (section 1) every corpora-

tion is vested with power to purchase such personal estate as the pur-

poses of the corporation shall require, except (section 3) certain desig-

nated sorts of persona] property, which do not embrace shares of its

own capital stock, coupled with those provisions which recognize the

power of corporations to own capital stock (sections 29, 38), plainly

imply a legislative grant of the necessary power in all cases where the

purposes of the coiporation require it. In the present case the fact

that the corporation exerted the power in order to secure the serv ices

of the plaintiff is prima facie sufficient indication that the purpose of

the corporation required it.

There is also another principle standing in the defendant's way.

The plaintiff has fully performed the contract on his part, and can not

be restored to his former status, nor be honestly dealt with otherwise

than by holding the defendant to performance of its share of the bar-

gain. Under these circumstances the plea of ultra vires is inadmissi-
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ble. Camden & A. R. Co. v. May's Landing & E. II. C. R. Co.,

48 N. J. Law 530, 7 Atl. 523. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment

on the demurrer.

Note. Accord: 1828, Hartridge v. Rockwell, 1 R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 260;

1831, Verplanck v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 1 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 84; 1846, Bank

v. Champlain Trans. Co., 18 Vt. 131, 139; 1858, City Bank v. Pruce, 17 N. Y.

507; 1873, Dupee v. Boston Water Power Co., 114M;iss.37; 1877, Chicago P. &

S. W. R. Co. v. Marseilles, 84 111. 643; 1877, Chetlain v. Repuh. L. I. Co., 86

111. 220; 1878, Iowa Lumber Co. v. Foster, 49 Iowa 25, 31 Am. Rep. 140; 1881,

Eraser v. Ritchie, 8 111. App. 554; 1882, Clapp v. Peterson, 104 111. 26; 18S8,

1831, Verplanck v. Mercantile Ins. Co., I Edw. Ch. (N. Y .) 84; 18-'6, Bank
v . Champlain Trans. Co., 18 Vt. 131, 13!); 1858, City Bank v. Bruce, 171'. Y.
507; 1873, Dupee v . Bost.on Water Power Co., 114 M11ss. 37; 1877, Cbir&?o P. &
S. W . R. Co. v. Marseilles, 84 Ill. 6-13; 1877, Cbetluin v. Repub. L. I. Co., 86
Ill. 220; 1878, Iowa Lumber Co. v. Foster, 49 Iowa 25, 31 Am. Rep. HO; 1881,
Fraser v. Ritchie, 8 Ill. App. 554; 1882, Clnpp v. Peterson, 104 lll. 2R; 1888,
Morgan v. Lewis, 46 Ohio St. I, 8; 1889, First National B:rnk v. SnlPm, etc.,
Co., 39 Feel. Rep. 89; 1889, Stnte v. Minnesota, etc., Co., 40 Minn. 213; 1800.
Rollins v. Shaver W. Co., 80 Iowa380, 20 Am. St. Rep. 427; 1890, Egg-man v.
Blanke, 40 Mo. App. 318; 1800, Thompson v. 1\loxey, 47 N. J. Eq. 538; 1800,
Republic L . Ins. Co. v. Swigert., 135 Ill. 150; 1892, Yenton v. Eagle, etc., Co.,
4 Wash. St. 183; 1894, N. E. Trust Co. v . .A bhott, 162 Mass. 148. 27 L . R. A.
271; 1895, Lowe v. Pioneer Threshing Co., 70 Fed. R(lp. 6-t6; 189.'i, Browne v.
St. Paul, etc., 62 Minn. 90; 1895, Dock v. Cordage Co., Hi7 Pa. St. 370; 1896,
V ent v. Coffee Co., 64 Minn . 307; 1897, Vercoutere v. (':r0lden S. L. Co., l 16
Cal. 410; 1897, Shoemaker v. Washburn, etc., Co., 97 Wis. 585; 18W, West
v. Averill Grocery Co., lO!J Iowa 488, 80 N. W. Rep. 555. See following cases
and llOlPB .
Sh11res of its own stock, helrl by the <'orporation, or iu trust for it, can n ot
be voted : 1821, United Rtates v. Columbia, etc., Ins. Co., 2 Cr. C. C . 2tl6, F eci.
Cns. 14, 840; 1826, ExParte Holmes, 5Cow. (N. Y .) 426; 18G9, Am . Rnilway
Frog Co . v. Haven, 101 Mass. 398, 3 Am . Rep. 377; 1869. Brewsl e r v. Hartley,
37 Cal. 15, 99 Am. Dec. 237; 1876, St.ate v. Smith, 48 Vt. 266; 1881. Vail ''·
Hamilton, 85 N. Y. 453; 1888, Allen v. De Lagerberger, 20 W . L.B. (O!Jio)
368.

Morgan v. Lewis, 46 Ohio St. 1, 8; 1889, First National Bniik v. Salem, etc.,

Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 89; 1889, State v. Minnesota, etc., Co., 40 Minn. 213; 1890,

Rollins v. Shaver W. Co., 80 Iowa 380, 20 Am. St. Rep. 427; 1890, Eggman v.

Blanke, 40 Mo. App. 318; 1890, Thompson v. Moxev, 47 N. J. Eq. 538; 1890,

Republic L. Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 135 II). 150; 1892, Yeaton v. Eaelc, etc., Co.,

4 Wash. St. 1&3; 1894, N. E. Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 27 L. R. A.

271; 1895, Lowe v. Pioneer Threshing Co., 70 Fed. Rep. 646; 1895, Prowne v.

St. Paul, etc., 62 Minn. 90; 1895, Dock v. Cordage Co., 167 Pa. St. 370; 1896,

Vent v. Coffee Co., 64 Minn. 307; 1897, Vereoutere v. Golden S. L. Co., 116

Cal. 410; 1897, Shoemaker v. Washburn, etc., Co., 97 Wis. 585; 1899, West

v. Averill Grocery Co., 109 Iowa 488, 80 N. W. Rep. 555. See following cases

and notes.

Shares of its own stock, held by the corporation, or in trust for it, can not

be voted: 1821, United States v. Columbia, etc., Ins. Co., 2 Cr. C. C. 266, Fed.

Cas. 14, 840; 1826, Ex Parte Holmes, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 426; 1869, Am. Railway

Frog Co. v. Haven, 101 Mass. 398, 3 Am. Rep. 377; 1869. Brewster v. Hartlev,

37 Cal. 15, 99 Am. Dec. 237; 1876, State v. Smith, 48 Vt. 266; 1881. Vail v.

Hamilton, 85 N. Y. 453; 1888, Allen v. De Lagerberger, 20 W. L. B. (Ohio)

368.
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See. 301. Same. Exceptions to rule allowing acquisition of its

own shares.
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PRICE v. PINE MOUNTAIN IRON AND COAL COMPANY.«

1895. In the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 32 S. W. Rep.

267-268.

Sec. 301. Same. Exceptions to rule allowing acquisition of its
own shares.

[Price sued the company on a note given by it for $8,500 in pay-

ment of 179 shares at $50 each, of the stock of the company. The

PRICE v. PINE MOUNTAIN IRON AND COAL COMPANY. 1

company had concluded to sell out its property; propositions were

submitted by Churchill, and by Calhoun respectively, the former be-

IN THE CouRT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY.

ing much the more advantageous to shareholders, but the latter claimed

32 S. W. Rep.

267-268.

to have an option on the property. Perhaps this was not well for-

warded, but it was, nevertheless, thought best to have him withdraw

his claim, and in order to do so, the company agreed to sell him within

ten days 2,500 shares of its stock at $25; the company sought to pur-

chase shares in the market, but failed to get enough; a meeting was

held at which plaintiff was present, and at which it was proposed that

the directors and such shareholders as would should sell to the com-

pany enough to have the deal go through. This was objected to by

the president as being illegal, and the opinion was given by a lawyer

present that the giving of notes for the purchase of its shares by the
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company itself would be illegal, and would not be upheld, unless the

deal was successful.

The company had no money to invest in its shares, yet it was rea-

sonably certain that if the sale was made to Churchill as proposed, it

would be beneficial to all concerned, even if the company had to pur-

chase 2,500 shares in order to complete the sale. The scheme of sale

to Churchill was not consummated. The lower court found for the

defendant, and plaintiff appeals.]

Hazelrigg, J. * * * It is insisted.by the appellant—and we

are not unmindful of the strength of his contention—that as he was

not a director or officer of the company, as the note was executed in

good faith by the corporation in an effort to benefit all its stockhold-

ers, and is unconditional in its terms, and as he was an outsider, and

wholly without notice of the existence of any contingency upon which

the validity of the note depended, not being present at any meeting

or discussion of this matter, as he testifies, therefore the company,

not being prohibited by its charter from buying its own stock, is

bound by its purchase from him, whatever maybe said by its dealings

with its directors. We are not satisfied, however, even regarding

the appellant as ignorant of the terms on which the notes were exe-

cuted, and the officers as attempting in the best of faith to forward

the interests of all stockholders alike, that the company may not elect

not to be bound by the contract. Corporations ought not to be allowed

to speculate in their own stocks; and, while they may not always do

an illegal iking in buying in .their own stock, such a transaction

1 Statement abridged; part of opinion omitted.

[Price sued the company on a note given by it for $8,500 in payment of 179 shares at $50 each, of the stock of the company. The
company had concluded to sell out its property; propositions were
submitted by Churchill, and by Calhoun respectively, the former being much the more advantageous to shareholders, but the latter claimed
to have an option on the property. Perhaps this was not well forwarded, but it was, nevertheless, thought best to have him withdraw
his claim, and in order to do so, the company agreed to sell him within
ten days 2,500 shares of its stock at $25; the company sought to purchase shares in the market, but failed to get enough; a m eeting was
held at which plaintiff was present, and at which it was proposed that
the directors and such shareholders as would should sell to the company enough to h ave the deal go through. This was objected to by
the president as being illegal, and the opinion was given by a lawyer
present that the giving of notes for the purchase of its shares by the
company itself would be illegal, and would not be upheld, unless the
deal was successful.
The company had no money to invest in its shares, yet it was reasonably certain that if the sale was made to Churchill as proposed, it
would be beneficial to all concerned, even if the company had to purchase 2,500 shares in order to complete the sale. The scheme of sale
to Churchill was not consummated. The lower . toutt found for the
defondant, and plaintiff appeals. J
HAZELRIGG, J.
• • • It is insisted .by the appellant-and we
are not unmindful of the strength of his contention-that as he was
not a director or officer of the company, as the note was executed in
good faith by the corporation in an effort to benefit all its stockholders, and is unconditional in its terms, and as he was an outsider, and
wholly without notice of the existence of any contingency upon which
the validity of the note depended, not being prese nt at any meeting
or discussion of this matter, as h e testifies, therefore the company,
not being prohibited by its charter from buying its own stock, is
bound by its purchase from him , whatever may be said by its dealin gs
with its directors. We are not satisfied, however, even regarding
the appellant as ig norant of the terms on which the notes were executed. and the officers as attempting in th e best of faith to forward
the interests of all stockholders alike, that the company may not e lect
not to he bound by the contract. Corporatt"ons oug!tt not to be allowed
to speculat e in tll eir <TWn stocks; and, while they may not always do
an illegal th £ng in buying t'n .the£r own stock, sttcll a transaction
1
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must be not only in entire good faith, but the exchange must be oj
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equal value, and the transaction free from all fraud, actual or con-
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structive, and -when the corporation is neither insolvent nor in pro-

must be not only in entire good faith, but tl1 e exchange must be of
equal value, and the transaction free from all fraud, actual or constructive, and wlten the corporation is neither insolvent nor in process of dissolution; and, fttrtller, the rig!tts of creditors are not to
be injuriously affected. Such is the principle laid down in Clapp v.
Peterson, 104 Ill. 30, a case cited by this court with approval in Jefferson v. Burford, 17 S. W. Rep. 855. We may add to these qualifications tltat the contract of exchange ougM not to be to the advantage of a few favored stockllOlders, to the injury of the great body of
them. In this case how much soever the apparent intention was to
benefit all, the result of the contracts, if enforced, is disastrous to the
last degree to the main body of the stockholders. Under this state
of case, the contracts are, at least, voidable at the option of the company if repudiated within a reasonable time. See 1 Beach Priv.
Corp., § 242.
Affirmed.
N ote. Corporation can not purchase its own stock to the injury of cred-

cess of dissolution; and, further, the rights of creditors are not to

be injuriously affected. Such is the principle laid down in Clapp v.

Peterson, 104 111. 30, a case cited by this court with approval in Jef-

ferson v. Burford, 17 S. W. Rep. 855. We may add to these quali-

fications that the contract of exchange ought not to be to the advan-

tage of a few favored stockholders, to the injury of the great body of

them. In this case how much soever the apparent intention was to

benefit all, the result of the contracts, if enforced, is disastrous to the

last degree to the main body of the stockholders. Under this state

of case, the contracts are, at least, voidable at the option of the com-

pany if repudiated within a reasonable time. See I Beach Priv.

Corp., § 242.

Affirmed.

Note. Corporation can not purchase its own stock to the injurv of cred-

itors' security: 1879, State v. Oberlin, etc., Assn., 35 Ohio St. 258, 263; 1880,

Peterson v. 111. L. & L. Co., 6 III. App. 257; 1887, St. Louis C. Mfg. Co. v.

Hilbert, 24 Mo. App. 338; 1887, Farnsworth v. Robbins, 36 Minn. 369; 1890,
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Commercial Natl. Bank v. Bureh, 40 111. App. 505; 1892, Blalock v. Kerners-

ville Mfg. Co., 110 N. C. 99; 1892, In re Columbian Bank, 147 Pa. St. 422; 1892,

itors' security: 1879, State v. Oberlin, etc., Assn., 35 Ohio St. 258, 263; 1880,
Peterson v. Ill. L. & L. Co., 6 Ill. App. 257; 1887, St. Louis C. Mfg. Co. v.
Hilbert, 24 Mo. App. 338; 1887, Farnsworth v. Robbins, 36 Minn. 369; 1890,
Commercial Natl. Bank v. Burch, 40 Ill. App. 505; 1892, Blalock v. Kernersville Mfg. Co., 110 N. C. W; 1892, In re Columbian Bank, 147 Pa. St. 422; 1892,
Commercial Bank v. Burch, 14L Ill. 519.
Or to the injury of shareholders: J895, Price v. Pine, etc., Co., 32 S. W.
Rep. 267, supra ; 1897, Augsburg, etc., Co. v. Pepper, 95 Va. 92.
But a purchase of stock in it.qelf by a corporation is not necessarily a reduction or its capital: 1858, City Bank v. Bruce, 17 N. Y. 507; 1891, Jefferson v.
Burford, 17 S. W. Rep. (Ky.) 855; 1897, Western, etc., Co. v. Des Moines,
etc., Bank, 103 Iowa 455; 1899, Howe G. & M. Co. v. Jones, 21 Tex. Civ. App.
198. 51 S. W. Rep. 24.
But see 1892, In re Sovereign L . A. Co., 3 Ch. 279, 62 L. ,)'.Ch. 36, 67 L. T.
336, contra.
See case preceding, and case following, with notes.

Commercial Bank v. Burch, 141 111. 519.

Or to the injury of shareholders: 1895, Price v. Pine, etc., Co., 32 S. W.

Rep. 267, xupra; 1897, Augsburg, etc., Co. v. Pepper, 95 Va. 92.

But a purchase of stock in itself by a corporation is not necessarily a reduc-

tion of its capital: 1858, City Bank v. Bruce, 17 N. Y. 507; 1891, Jefferson v.

Burford, 17 S. W. Rep. (Kv.) 855; 1897, AVesteru, etc., Co. v. Dee Moines,

etc., Bank, 103 Iowa 455; 1899, Howe G. & M. Co. v. Jones, 21 Tex. Civ. App.

198. 51 S. W. Rep. 24.

But see 1892, In re Sovereign L. A. Co., 3 Ch. 279, 62 L. J. Ch. 36, 67 L. T.

336, contra.

See case preceding, and case following, with notes.

Sec. 302. Same.

(b) May not, unless necessary to prevent loss to the company.

COPPIN v. GREENLEES& RANSOM COMPANY.1

1882. In the Supreme Court of Ohio. 38 Ohio St. Rep. 275-

281, 43 Am. Rep. 425.

[Suit by Coppin for specific performance or for damages for non-

Sec. 302. Same.

performance of a contract between him. and the company whereby it

agreed to convev to him two lots at $1,800, and do manufacturing

( b) May not, unless necessary to prevent loss to the company.

work to the extent of $1,500 in consideration of the transfer by Cop-

pin of 33 shares of $100 each of the company's stock to the com-

pany. It was alleged that the plaintiff had for a time been employed

COPPIN

'Statement abridged; arguments omitted.

1882.

IN

THE

v"GREE~LEE~&

RANSOM COMPANY. 1

SUPREME CotrRT OF Omo. 38 Ohio St. Rep. 275281, 43 Am. Rep. 425.

[Suit by Coppin for specific performance or for damages for nonp erformance of a contract between him, and the company whereby it
agreed to convey to him two lots at $1 ,800, and do manufacturin g
work to the extent of $1,500 in consideration of the transfer by Coppin of ~3 shares of $ IOO each of the company's stock to the company. It was a lleged that the plaintiff had for a time been employed
1Statement
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by the company, and while so employed had acquired the stock;

that it had been a custom of the company to buy back the stock of

those of its servants when they ceased to work for the company, and

that the foregoing contract was made in accordance with that custom.

The trial court found for plaintiff, but this was reversed by the dis-

trict court, on the ground that the facts did not show a sufficient cause

of action. To reverse this the case was taken to the supreme court.]

McIlvaine, J. Whether the defendant corporation was bound by

its executory agreement with the plaintiff to purchase shares of its own

stock, under the circumstances detailed in the petition, was, undoubt-

edly, the question upon which the case turned in the district court.

The power of a trading corporation to traffic in its own stock, where

no authority to do so is conferred upon it by the terms of its charter,

has been a subject of much discussion in the courts; and the conclu-

sions reached by different courts have been conflicting. Of course,

cases wherein the power is found to exist by express or implied grant

in the charter, furnish no aid in the solution of the question before us;

unless the claim of the plaintiff can be sustained, that such power was
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conferred on the defendant by section 63 of the corporation act of 1852

(Swan & C. St. 301), as amended, which confers on manufacturing

corporations the powers enumerated in section 3 of the act, and among

others, the power "to acquire and convey at pleasure, all such real

and personal estate as may be necessary or convenient to carry into

effect the objects of the corporation." We think, however, that this

claim can not be maintained. The sole object of the defendant organ-

ization was "for manufacturing purposes;" and it can not be said, in

any just sense, that the power to acquire or convey its own stock was

either necessary or convenient "for manufacturing purposes."

The doctrine that corporations, when not prohibited by their char-

ters, may buy and sell their own stocks, is supported by a line of

authorities; and prominent among them may be mentioned the cases

of Dupee v. Boston Water Power Co., 114 Mass. 37, and Chicago,

P. & S. W. R. Co. v. Town of Marseilles, 84 111. 145. But never-

theless, we think the decided -weight of authority, both in England

and in the United States, is against the existence of the power unless

conferred by express grant or clear implication. The foundation

principle upon which these latter cases rest is that a corporation pos-

sesses no powers except such as are conferred upon it by its charter,

either by express grant or necessary implication; and this principle

has been frequently declared by the supreme court of this state; and

by no court more emphatically than by this court. It is true, how-

ever, that in most jurisdictions, where the right of a corporation to

traffic in its own stock has been denied, an exception to the rule has

been admitted to exist, whereby a corporation has been allowed to take

its own stock in satisfaction of a debt due to it. This exception is

supposed to rest on a necessity which arises in order to avoid loss;

and was recognized in this state as early as Taylor v. Miami Export-

ing Co., 6 Ohio 176, and has been incidentally referred to as an ex-

by the company, and while so employed had acquired the stock;
t hat it had been a custom of the company to buy back the stock of
those of its servants ,.,·hen they ceased to work for the company, and
that the foregoing contract was made in accordance with that custom.
The trial court found for plaintiff, but this was reversed by the di strict court, on the ground that the facts did not show a sufficient cause
of action. To reverse this the case was taken to the supreme court.]
MclLV.AINE , J.
Whether the defendant corporation was bound by
its executory agreement with the plaintiff to purchase shares of its own
stock, under the circumstances detailed in the petition, was, undoubtedly, the question upon which the case turned in the district court.
The power of a trading corporation to traffic in its own stock, where
no authority to do so is conferred upon it by the terms of its charter,
has been a subject of much discussion in the courts; and the conclusions reached by different courts have been conflicting. Of course,
cases wherein the power is found to exist by express or implied grant
in the charter, furnish no aid in the solution of the question before us;
unless the claim of the plaintiff can be sustained, that such power was
conferred on the defendant by section 63 of the corporation act of 1852
(Swan & C. St. 301), as amended, which confers on manufacturing
corporations the powers enumerated in section 3 of the act, and among
others, the power "to acquire and convey at pleasure, all such real
and personal estate as may be necessary or com·enient to carry into
effect the objects of the corporation." We think, however, that this
claim can not be maintained. The sole object of the defendant organization was "for manufacturing purposes ;" and it can not be said, in
any just sense, that the power to acquire or convey its own stock was
either necessary or convenient "for manufacturing purp~ses."
The doctrine that corporations, when not prohibited by their chart&s, may buy and sell their own stocks, is supported by a line of
authorities; and prominent among them may be mentioned the cases
of Dupee v. Boston Water Power C o., 114 Mass. 37, and Chicago,
P. & S. W. R. Co. v. Town of Marseilles, 84 Ill. 145. But nevertheless, we think tlte dedded weight of authori'ty, botlt £n England
and £n the United States, is agat"nst the existence of the power unless
conferred by express grant or clear implz"cation. The foundation
principle upon which these latter cases rest is that a corporation possesses no powers except such as are conferred upon it by its charter,
either by express grant or necessary implication; nnd this principle
has been frequently dcclnred by the supreme court of thi s state; and
by no court more emphatically than by this court. It is trne, however, that in most jurisdictions, where the right of a corporntion to
traffic in its own stock has been denied, an exception to tlte rule has
6een admitted to exist, wher eby a corporation ltas been allowed to take
its own stock in satt"sfaction of a d ebt due to i"t. This exception is
supposed to rest on a necessity which ari . es in order to :n ·oid loss ;
and was recognized in this state as early as Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 6 Ohio 176, and has been incidentally referred to as an ex-
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But, however that may be, the right of a corporation to traffic in

isting right since the adoption of our present constitution. State v.
Building Ass'n, 35 Ohio St. 258.
But, however that may be, the right of a corporation to traffic in
its own stock, at pleasure, appears to us to be inconsistent with the
principle of the provisions of the present constitution (article 13, § 3),
which reads as follows: "Dues from corporations shall be secured
by such individual liability of stockholders, and· other means, as may
be prescribed by law; but, in all cases, each stockholder shall be liable, over and above the stock by him or her owned, and any amount
unpaid thereon, to a further sum, at least equal in amount to such
stock." Now, ·it is just as plain, that a business or trading corporation can not exist without stock and stockholders, as it is that the creditors of such corpon1tions are entitled to the security named in the
constitution. State Y. Sherman, 22 Ohio St. 411. The corporation
itself can not he a stockholder of its own stock within the meaning of
this provision of the constitution. Nobody will deny this proposition.
And if a corporation can buy one share of its stock at pleasure, why
may it not buy every share? If the right of a corporation to purchase
its own stock at pleasure exists and is unlimited, where is the provision intended for the benefit of creditors? This is not the security to
which the constitution invites the creditors of c01·porations. I am
aware, that the amount of stock required to be issued is not fixed by
the constitution or by statute, and also that provision is made by statute for the reduction of the capital stock of corporations; but of these
matters, creditors are bound to take notice . They have a right, however, to assume tliat stock once i sued, and not called back in the
manner provided by law, remains outstanding in the hands of stockholders liable to respond to creditors to the extent of the individual liability prescribed. In this view it matters not whether the stock purchased by the corporation that issued it becomes extinct, or is he~d
subject to be reissued. It is enough to know that the corporation , as
purchaser of its own stock, docs not afford to creditors the security
intended. And surely, if the law forbids the organization of a corporation without stock, because the required security is not furnish ed , it
can not be that, having brought the corporation into existence, it invests it with power to assume, at pleasure, the identical character or
relation to the public that was an insurmountable objection to the
giving of corporate existence in the first place.
Plaintiff in error lays much stress on the averments in the petition,
that it had been the custom of the corporation that its officers and
others, actively engaged in its service, should be holders of shares of
its stock , and upon ceasing to be connected with the company such
persons had been accustomed to sell, and the company to buy, such
stock; and that the plaintiff h:1d purchased the stock for the price of
which suit was brought while in the employment of defendant.
We can not see why these averments should take the case out of the
general rule.
If it were avened that the plaintiff had purcha ed this stock from
the defendant, or from others, under an agreement with the company

its own stock, at pleasure, appears to us to be inconsistent with the

principle of the provisions of the present constitution (article 13, § 3),

which reads as follows: "Dues from corporations shall be secured

by such individual liability of stockholders, and other means, as may

be prescribed by law; but, in all cases, each stockholder shall be lia-

ble, over and above the stock by him or her owned, and any amount

unpaid thereon, to a further sum, at least equal in amount to such

stock." Now, it is just as plain, that a business or trading corpora-

tion can not exist without stock and stockholders, as it is that the cred-

itors of such corporations are entitled to the security named in the

constitution. State v. Sherman, 22 Ohio St. 411. The corporation

itself can not be a stockholder of its own stock within the meaning of

this provision of the constitution. Nobody will deny this proposition.

And if a corporation can buy one share of its stock at pleasure, why

may it not buy every share? If the right of a corporation to purchase

its own stock at pleasure exists and is unlimited, where is the provis-

ion intended for the benefit of creditors? This is not the security to
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which the constitution invites the creditors of corporations. I am

aware, that the amount of stock required to be issued is not fixed by

the constitution or by statute, and also that provision is made by stat-

ute for the reduction of the capital stock of corporations; but of these

matters, creditors are bound to take notice. They have a right, how-

ever, to assume that stock once issued, and not called back in the

manner provided by law, remains outstanding in the hands of stock-

holders liable to respond to creditors to the extent of the individual lia-

bility prescribed. In this view it matters not whether the stock pur-

chased by the corporation that issued it becomes extinct, or is held

subject to be reissued. It is enough to know that the corporation, as

purchaser of its own stock, does not afford to creditors the security

intended. And surely, if the law forbids the organization of a corpo-

ration without stock, because the required security is not furnished, it

can not be that, having brought the corporation into existence, it in-

vests it with power to assume, at pleasure, the identical character or

relation to the public that was an insurmountable objection to the

giving of corporate existence in the first place.

Plaintiff in error lays much stress on the averments in the petition,

that it had been the custom of the corporation that its officers and

others, actively engaged in its service, should be holders of shares of

its stock, and upon ceasing to be connected with the company such

persons had been accustomed to sell, and the company to buy, such

stock; and that the plaintiff had purchased the stock for the price of

which suit was brought while in the employment of defendant.

We can not see w hy these averments should take the case out of the

general rule.

If it were averred that the plaintiff had purchased this stock from

the defendant, or from others, under an agreement with the company
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different questions would arise.

It is not even averred that the plaintiff relied upon such custom,

either in making the purchase or the sale of the stock; so that, in fact,

he is unaffected by the alleged custom. But if such custom had been

relied on by the plaintiff when he purchased the stock, it would not

have made the executory contract of the defendant to buy the stock

binding, which, without such custom, would be void. The usage of

a corporation does not become the law of its existence, or the meas-

ure of its powers. The general law of the state, of which all persons

are presumed to have knowledge, is the source and limit of all its

powers and duties; and these can not be varied either by usage or con-

tract. The doctrine of estoppel has no application in the case. Nor

is there any such equity in the case as would have arisen between the

parties in case the contract had been executed.

Judgment affirmed.

Note. Accord: 1833, Taylor v. Miami Ex. Co., 6 Ohio 176, 218; 1854, Bar-

ton h. Port Jackson, etc., Co., 17 Barb. 397; 1875, Currier v. Lebanon State

Co., 56 N. H. 262; 1875, First Natl. Bank v. Exchange, etc., Bank, 92 U. S.
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122; 1877, German Sav. Bank v. Wulfekuhler, 19 Kan. 60; 1878, Hubbard

v. Rilev, 3 W. L. B. (Ohio) 434; 1879, Abeles v. Cochran, 22 Kan. 405; 1882,

that it would buy the same from him when he quit its employment, or
if the contract of purchase by the defendant had been executed, very
different questions would arise.
It is not even averred that the plaintiff relied upon such custom,
either in making the purchase or the sale of the stock; so that, in fact,
he is unaffected by the a11eged custom. But if such custom had been
relied on by the plaintiff when he purchased the stock, it would not
have made the executory contract of the defendant to buy the stock
binding, which, without such custom, would be void. The usage of
a corporation does not become the law of its existence, or the measure of its powers. The general law of the state, of which aJJ persons
are presumed to have knowledge, is the source and limit of aJJ its
powers and duties; and these can not be varied either by usage or contract. The doctrine of estoppel has no application in the case. Nor
is there any such equity in the case as would have arisen between the
parties in case the contract had been executed.
Judgment affirmed.

Coppin v. Greenlees, etc., Co., 38 Ohio St. 275, 43 Am. R. 425, svpra; 1884,

Crandall v. Lincoln, 52 Conn. 73; 1887, St. Louis C. M. Co. v. Hilbert, 24 Mo.

App. 338; 1888, Shaw v. Ohio Edison, etc., Co., 19 W. L. B. (Ohio) 292;

1895, Adams, etc., W. Co. v. Devette, 8 S. D. 119; 1896, Barto v. Nix, 15

Wash. 563, 46 Pac. Rep. 1033; 1897, Hamor v. Taylor-Rice, etc., Co., 84 Fed.

Rep. 392; 1897, St. Louis Rawhide Co. v. Hill, 72 Mo. App. 142; 1898, Mer-

chants' Natl. Bank v. Overman, 17 Ohio C. C. 253; 1899, Herring v. Ruskin

Co-op. Assn., — Tenn. Ch. App. —, 52 S. W. Rep. 327.

See preceding cases and notes.

Sec. 303. (3) Power to acquire shares of stock in other corpo-

rations.

I. The English rule.

In Re BARNED'S BANKING COMPANY.1

Note. Accord: 1833, Taylor v. Miami Ex. Co., 6 Ohio 176, 218; 1854, BarPort Jackson, etc., Co., 17 Barb. 397; 1875, Currier v. Lebanon State
Co ., 56 N. H. 2ti2; 1875, First Natl. Bank v. Exchange, etc., Bank, 92 U.S.
122; 1877, German Sav. Bank v. Wulfekuhler, 19 Kan. 60; 1878, Hubbard
v. Riley, 3 W. L. B. (Ohio) 434; 1879, Abeles v. Cochran, 22 Kan. 405; 1882,
Coppin v. Greenlees, etc., Co., 38 Ohio St. 275, 43 Am. R. 425, supra; 1884,
Crandall v. Lincoln, 52 Conn. 73; 1887, St. Louis C. M. Co. v. Hilbert, 24 Mo.
App. 338; 1888, Shaw v. Ohio Edison, etc., Co., 19 W. L. B : (Ohio) 292;
1895, Adams, etc., W. Co. v. Deyette, 8 S. D. 119; 1896, Barto v. Nix, 15
Wash . 563, 46 Pac. Rep. 1033; 1897, Hamor v. Taylor-Rice, etc., Co., 84 Fed.
Rep. 392; 1897, St. Louis Rawhide Co. v. Hill, 72 Mo. App. 142; 1898, Merchants' Natl. Bank v. Overman, 17 Ohio C. C. 253; 1899, Herring v. Ruskin
Co-op. Assn. 1 -Tenn. Ch. App.-, 52 S. W. Rep. 327.
See precedmg cases and notes.
ton~.

Ex Parte THE CONTRACT CORPORATION.

1867. In English Chancery Appeals. L. R. 3 Ch. App. Cas.

105-118.

[Appeal by the official liquidator of The Contract Corporation from

Sec. 303.

( 3)

Power to acquire shares of stock in other corpo-

rations.

the decision of the master of the rolls, who had placed its name on the

list of contributories to the banking company, as a contributory upon

368 shares owned by it.]

I.

Lord Cairns, L. J. The first objection taken to the order under

The English rule.

1 Statement abridged; only part of opinion given; arguments omitted.

IN RE BARNED'S BANKING COMPANY.1
Ex PARTE THE CONTRACT CORPORATION.

1867.

IN

ENGLISH CHANCERY

APPEALS.

L. R . 3

Ch.

App.

Cas.

rn5-1 r8.
[Appeal by the official liquidator of The Contract Corporation from
the decision of the master of the rolls, who had placed its name on the
list of contributories to the banking company, as a contributory upon
368 shares owned hy it. J
LoRD CAIRNS, L. J. The first objection taken to the order under
1

Statement abridged; only part of opinion given; arguments omitted.
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appeal was that it was ultra vires The Contract Corporation to
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take shares in any other trading corporation, and to apply its funds in

IN RE BARNED'S BANKING COMPANY.

payment for those shares. Generally speaking,-this would be so. It

is at first sight beyond the province of one trading corporation to be-

appeal was that it was ultra vires The Contract Corporati on to
take shares in any other trading corporation, and to apply its funds in
payment for those shares. Generally speaking, this would be so. It
is at first sight beyond the province of one trading corporation to become a shareholder in another, and to apply its funds for that purpose. But here one of the objects of The Contract Corporation, aE
defined by its memorandum of association, was "to purchase or accept any obligations, bonds, debentures, notes and shares in any foreign or English company, and to negotiate the sale of any such securities." It appears to me~ that in applying for and accepting shares
in Ilarned's Banking Company, The Contract Corporation, Limited,
was strictly and to the letter complying with and acting withjn
these terms. If it were necessary to make this power still clearer, the
forty-seventh clause of the articles of association provides that the
directors may invest any of the money of the corporation on such securities (other than the corporation's own shares) as they, the directors, may think desirable, plainly implying that, although they might
not invest their money upon the purchase or allotment of their own
shares, they might invest them upon the allotment or purchase of
shares ejusdem generis in other companies.
The second argument was, that even assuming that, according to
the constitution of the contract corporation, it was not ultra vires to
invest their money in shares of another trading company; yet that
under the act of 1862 one trading corporation could not become a
member of another trading corporation. Now, if that argument is
to prevail , it must be upon the words of the act of parliament of ·
1862, because there is no apparent or prt'ma fade objection to a
corporation so joining with another corporation in trade. A trading
corporation, as we all well know, may enter into trade or partnership
along with an individual. There is no reason at common law, so far
as I know, why one corporate body should not become a member of
another corporate body. Other acts of parliament relating to companies appear to assume that corporations may become members of
and shareholders in companies. For example, the general act, the
companies clau ses consolidation act of 1845, provides, in the interpretation clause, that "shareholder" in that act shall include a corporation; and the chartered companies act, 1 Viet., c. 73, expressly
points out that the crown may grant a charter to a trading corporation, the shareholders in which may themselves be corporate bodi es,
and whose liability under that charter may be limited. Now, looking
to the words of the act of 1862, it is said, no doubt justly, that they
appear throughout to point to person, and to the executors and administrators of persons, as if the shareholders were all to be per5'ons
in their natural capacity. But even in this act there are traces that the
term "shareholder" and the word "persons" must have been intended to be used in a larger sense, for in the fiftieth and fifty-first
clauses provision is made for the d etermination of questions of cou~iderab le importance by general meetings, ~nd by votes to be gh·en
at those meetings, either in person or by proxy, in cases ·where, by

come a shareholder in another, and to apply its funds for that pur-

pose. But here one of the objects of The Contract Corporation, as

defined by its memorandum of association, was "to purchase or ac-

cept any obligations, bonds, debentures, notes and shares in any for-

eign or English company, and to negotiate the sale of any such secu-

rities." It appears to me, that in applying for and accepting shares

in Barned's Banking Company, The Contract Corporation, Limited,

was strictly and to the letter complying with and acting within

these terms. If it were necessary to make this power still clearer, the

forty-seventh clause of the articles of association provides that the

directors may invest any of the money of the corporation on such se-

curities (other than the corporation's own shares) as they, the direc-

tors, may think desirable, plainly implying that, although they might

not invest their money upon the purchase or allotment of their own

shares, they might invest them upon the allotment or purchase of

shares ejusdem generis in other companies.
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The second argument was, that even assuming that, according to

the constitution of the contract corporation, it was not ultra vires to

invest their money in shares of another trading company; yet that

under the act of 1862 one trading corporation could not become a

member of another trading corporation. Now, if that argument is

to prevail, it must be upon the words of the act of parliament of

1862, because there is no apparent or prima facie objection to a

corporation so joining with another corporation in trade. A trading

corporation, as we all well know, may enter into trade or partnership

along with an individual. There is no reason at common law, so far

as I know, why one corporate body should not become a member of

another corporate body. Other acts of parliament relating to com-

panies appear to assume that corporations may become members of

and shareholders in companies. For example, the general act, the

companies clauses consolidation act of 1S45, provides, in the inter-

pretation clause, that "shareholder" in that act shall include a cor-

poration; and the chartered companies act, 1 Vict., c. 73, expressly

points out that the crown may grant a charter to a trading corpora-

tion, the shareholders in which may themselves be corporate bodies,

and whose liability under that charter maybe limited. Now, looking

to the words of the act of 1862, it is said, no doubt justly, that they

appear throughout to point to person, and to the executors and ad-

ministrators of persons, as if the shareholders were all to be persons

in their natural capacity. But even in this act there are traces that the

term "shareholder" and the word "persons" must have been in-

tended to be used in a larger sense, for in the fiftieth and fifty-first

clauses provision is made for the determination of questions of con-

siderable importance by general meetings, and by votes to be given

at those meetings, either in person or by proxy, in cases where, by

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 303 POWER TO ACQUIRE PERSONAL PROPERTY. IO53

the regulations of the company, proxies are allowed, and on turning

to the forms in the schedule, which may be adopted bv any company

PO\YER TO

for its regulation, we find, in the forty-ninth clause of table A, a pro-

...\C<~UIRE

PERSONAL PROPERTY.
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vision that the instrument appointing a proxy shall be in writing un-

der the hand of the appointer; "or if such appointer is a corpora-

tion, under their common seal." Form B contains a similar clause

(clause 22), as do also the forms in the schedule to the act of 1865.

It would, therefore, appear to have been in the contemplation of the

legislature that the appointer of a proxy might be a corporation; and

inasmuch as the appointer was to be a shareholder, that a share-

holder might be a corporate body.

The case, however, does not rest there. The act of 1862 is an act

amending and consolidating the whole of the prior laws with regard

to the joint stock companies. Among other acts of parliament re-

pealed by the act of 1862 are 7 and S Vict., ch. no (the joint stock

companies act of 1844), and 11 and 12 Vict., ch. 45 (the winding-up

act of 1848). The interpretation clause in each of those acts pro-

vided that the word "person" throughout the act should include bodies

politic or corporate, whether sole or aggregate. In the present act of

1862 there is no interpretation clause, but section 180 and the follow-
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ing sections provide that companies formed under the repealed act of

the 7 and 8 Vict., ch. no, and under the chartered companies act, 1

Vict., ch. 73, may be registered under this act of 1862, and that before

registration they must send in a list showing the names, addresses and

occupations of all persons who on a certain day were members of the

company, and when so registered they are to become subject in every

respect to the act of 1862. But the company which was thus to regis-

ter itself, and thus to send in a list of its shareholders to the registrar

under the act of 1862, might be a company entitled to have and hav-

ing among its shareholders corporate bodies, whether sole or aggre-

gate, and they would become members of the company registered

under that act of 1862. It would, therefore, be necessary, in reading

the act of 1862, with regard to a company of that kind, to, read the

word "person" as including bodies politic.

So also, on turning to section 199, and the following sections, we

find provisions for the winding up of joint stock companies formed un-

der 7 and 8 Vict., c. 110, and provisions which, as regards the process

of winding up, are identical with provisions applicable to companies

formed for the first time under the act of 1862. There again the

whole of those provisions, though apparently pointing to persons and

individuals, must, of necessity be read as applying to corporate bodies

which should be shareholders under the former act of parliament.

Now, I think the conclusion irresistible, that if in all these sections

to which I have referred, beginning with section 180, and ending

with section 200, the general words used must be read as comprising

bodies corporate which are shareholders, there is no reason why,

throughout the whole of the act, from the beginning to the end, the

same words should not be read in the same way, and be held to in-

clude bodies corporate. It is satisfactory to find that the conclusion

the regulations of the company, proxies are allowed, and on turning
to the forms in the schedule, which may be adopted by any company
for its regulation, we find, in the forty-ninth clause of table A, a provision that the instrument appointing a proxy shall be in writing under the hand of the appointer; ''or if such appointer is a corporation, under their common seal." Form B contains a similar clause
(clause 22) 1 as do also the forms in the schedule to the act of 1865.
It would, therefore, appear to have been in the contemplation of the
legislature that the appointer of a proxy might be a corporation; and
inasmuch as the appointer was to be a shareholder, that a shareholder might be a corporate body.
The case, however, does not rest there. The act of 1862 is an act
amending and consolidating the whole of the prior laws with regard
to the joint stock companies. Among other acts of parliament repealed by the act of I 862 are 7 and 8 Viet., ch. I IO (the joint stock
companies act of 1844), and 11 and 12 Viet., ch. 45 (the winding-up
act of 1848). The interpretation clause in each of those acts provided that the word "person" throughout the act should include bodies
politic or corporate, whether sole or aggregate. In the present act of
1862 there is no interpretation clause, but section 180 and the following sections provide that companies formed under the repealed act of
the 7 and 8 Viet., ch. I 10, and under the chartered companies act, I
Viet., ch. 73, may be registered under this act of 1862, and that before
registration they must send in a list 'showing the names, addresses and
occupations of all persons who on a certain day were members of the
company, and when so registered they are to become subject in every
respect to the act of 1862. But the company which was thus to register itself, and thus to send in a list of its shareholders to the registrar
under the act of 1862, might be a company entitled to have and having among its shareholders corporate bodies, whether sole or aggregate, and they would become members of the company registered
under that act of 1862. It would, therefore, be necessary, in reading
the act of 1862, with regard to a company of that kind, to. read the
word "person" as including bodies politic.
So also, on turning to section 199, and the following sections, we
find provisions for the winding up of joint stock companies formed under 7 and 8 Viet., c. 110, and provisions which, as regards the process
of winding up, are identical with provisions applicable to companies
formed for the first time under the act of 1862. There again the
whole of those provisions, though apparently pointing to persons and
individuals, must, of necessity be read as applying to corporate bodies
which should be shareholders under the former act of parliament.
Now, I think the conclusion irresistible , that if in all these sections
to which I have referred, beginning \:vith section 180, and ending
with section 200, the general words used must be read as comprising
bodies corporate which are shareholders, there is no reason why,
throughout the whole of the act, from the beginning to the end, the
same words should not be read in the same way, and be held to include bodies corporate. It is satisfactory to find that the conclusion
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at which I have arrived tallies with the conclusion which has been ar-

rived at in several cases, because instances were mentioned, and do

1054

not appear to have been disputed, in which limited companies have

PEABODY V. THE CHICAGO GAS TRUST CO~IPANY.

§ 304

been registered as shareholders in other companies, and have been

at which I have arrived tallies with the conclusion which has been arriYed at in several cases, because instances were mentioned, and do
not appear t o have been di sputed, · in which limited compnnies have
been registered a s shareholders in other companies, and have been
fixed as contributories in the course of the winding up of those other
companies. It is true the objection does not seem in any of those cases
to have been t a ken, or the point to haye been argued, and if the m atte r
rested upon practice alone, probably there would not have been
enough in the practice by itself to have led to the conclusion at which
I have arrived. But it appears to me, upon the proper construction
of the act, that the practice is entirely warranted by the act of parliam ent. The second argument, therefore, of the official liquidator
seems to me to fall to the ground.

fixed as contributories in the course of the winding up of those other

companies. It is true the objection does not seem in any of those cases

to have been taken, or the point to have been argued, and if the matter

rested upon practice alone, probably there would not have been

enough in the practice by itself to have led to the conclusion at which

I have arrived. But it appears to me, upon the proper construction

of the act, that the practice is entirely warranted by the act of parlia-

ment. The second argument, therefore, of the official liquidator

seems to me to fall to the ground.

Order of master of rolls affirmed.

Note,. Accord: 1863, Great Western Ry. Co. v. Met. Ry., 32 L. J. Ch. 382;

1869, Royal Bank of Indiana, 4 Ch. App. 252.

But see 1851, East Anglican Rv. Co. v. Eastern Counties Ry., 7 Eng. L. &

Eq. 505; 1878, Ex Parte Liquidators B. N. L. I. Assn., L. R. 8 Ch. 679, contra.

Order of master of rolls affirmed.

Sec. 304. Same.

2. General rule in the United States.

Note . .Accord: 1863, Great Western Ry. Co. v. Met. Ry., 32 L.J.Ch.382;
1869, Royal Bank of Indiana, 4 Ch. App. 252.
But see 1851, East Anglican Ry. Co. v. Eastern Counties Ry., 7 Eng. L. &
Eq. 505; 1878, Ex Parte Liquidators B. N. L. I. Asen., L. F.. 8 Ch. 679, contra.
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THE PEOPLE, Ex Rel. PEABODY, v. THE CHICAGO GAS TRUST

COMPANY.1

1889. In the Supreme Court of Illinois. 130 III. Rep. 268—

303, 17 Am. St. Rep. 319, 8 L. R. A. 497.

[Quo warranto as to the authority of the Gas Trust Company to

exercise certain powers. The company pleaded that its charter per-

Sec. 304. Same.

mitted the exercise of the powers in question. The error assigned

was the overruling of demurrers to the pleas.]

2.

Magruder, J. The Chicago Gas Trust Company, appellee

General rule in the United States.

herein, was organized under the general incorporation law of this

THE PEOPLE, Ex

state. The statement filed by the original incorporators with the

secretary of state sets forth that the Trust Company was formed

REL.

PEABODY, v. THE CHIOAGO GAS TRUST
COMPANY. 1

for two objects, or for one object of a twofold character. The object,

1889.

named in the first clause of the second specification of the "state-

ment" is, in brief, the erection and operation of works in Chicago

130 Ill. Rep. 268303, 17 Am. St. Rep. 319, 8 L. R. A. 497.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF ILLINOIS.

and other places in Illinois, for the manufacture, sale and distribution

[ ~uo warranto as to the authority of the Gas Trust Company to
exercise certain powers. The company pleaded that its charter permitted the exercise of the powers in question. The error assigned
was the overruling of d emurrers to the pleas.]
MAGRUDER, J.
The Chicago Gas Trust Company, appellee
herein, was organized under the general incorporation law of this
state. The statement filed by the original incorporators with the
secretary of state sets forth that the Trust Company was formed
for two objects, or for one ohject of a twofold character. The object,
named in the first clause of the second specification of the "statement" is, in brief, the erection and operation of works in Chicago
and other places in Illino is, for the manufacture, sale and distribution
of gas and electricity.
The object named in the second clause of the second specification
of the "statement," is, in brief, "to purchase and hold or sell the
capital stock" of any gas or electric company or companies in Chicago or elsewhere in Illinois.
In this proceeding no attack is made upon the validity of the organization of the Gas Trust Company as a corporation.

of gas and electricity.

The object named in the second clause of the second specification

of the "statement," is, in brief, "to purchase and hold or sell the

capital stock" of any gas or electric company or companies in Chi-

cago or elsewhere in Illinois.

In this proceeding no attack is made upon the validity of the organ-

ization of the Gas Trust Company as a corporation.

1 Statement, except as in opinion, arguments and part of opinion omitted.

1
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The controversy presented by the record relates solely to the au-

POWER TO ACQUIRE PERSONAL PROPERTY.

thority of the appellee to carry out the object designated in the second

1055

clause above mentioned. It is claimed, on the part of the people,

that the charter or articles of association of the Gas Trust Company

did not and could not confer upon it the power "to purchase and hold

* * * the capital stock" of other gas companies. It is averred in

the information, and admitted in eight of the eleven pleas, that ap-

pellee has purchased and now holds a majority of the shares of the

capital stock of four gas companies.

There are two views which may be taken of the power to purchase

and hold the capital stock of other gas companies as designated in

said second clause. Must it be regarded as an original, independent

power intended to exist exclusively of and in addition .to the power

named in the first clause, or may it be considered as merely ancillary

to the other power of maintaining and operating works for the manu-

facture and sale of gas? If the latter view be correct, the main object

for which the Gas Trust Company was formed would be that it

might itself maintain and operate works for the manufacture and sale

of gas, while the purchase of shares of stock in other companies would
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be merely a subordinate object, incidental only to the main purpose of

the corporate formation. An illustration of this idea may be found

in the general law of this state in regard to the life insurance com-

panies, which makes it lawful for a life insurance company organized

in the state to "invest its funds or accumulations in the stocks of the

United States » • * or in such other stocks and securities as may

be approved by the auditor." The main object of forming such a

company is to engage in the business of life insurance, but the power

to invest surplus funds in certain stocks is given as an incident to such

business.

Can the power to purchase and hold the stock of other gas com-

panies be lawfully exercised by the appellee as incidental to the main

purpose of maintaining and operating works for the manufacture and

sale of gas?

Corporations can only exercise such powers as may be conferred

by the legislative body creating them, either in express terms, or by

necessary implication; and the implied powers are presumed to exist

to enable such bodies to carry out the express powers granted, and to

accomplish the purposes of their creation. (C. P. & S. W. R. Co.

v. Marseilles, 84 111. 643; Chicago Gas Light Co. v. People's Gas

Light Co., 121 111. 530.) An incidental power is one that is directly

and immediately appropriate to the execution of the specific power

granted, and not one that has a slight or remote relation to it. (Hood

v. N. Y. & N. H. R., 22 Conn. 1; Franklin Co. v. Lewiston Sav-

ings Institution, 68 Maine 43.)

Where a charter in express terms confers upon a corporation the

power to maintain and operate works for the manufacture and sale of

gas, it is not a necessary implication therefrom that the power to pur-

chase stock in other gas companies should also exist. There is no

necessary connection between manufacturing gas and buying stocks.

The controversy presented by the record relates solely to the authority of the appellee to carry out the object designated in the second
clause above mentioned. It is claimed, on the pa1t of the people,
that the charter or articles of association of the Gas Trust Company
did not and could not confer upon it the power "to purchase and hold
• • • the capital stock" of other gas ·companies. It is averred in
the information, and admitted in eight of the eleven pleas, that appellce has purchased and now holds a majority of the shares of the
capital stock of four gas companies.
There are two views which may be taken of the power to purchase
and /10/d the capital stock of other gas compant'es as designated in
sai'd second clause. Must it be regarded as an original, independent
power intended to exist exclusively of and in addition . to the power
named in the first clause, or may it be considered as merely ancillary
to the other power of maintaining and operating works for the manufacture and sale of gas? If the latter view be correct, the main object
for which the Gas Trust Company was formed would be that it
might itself maintain and operate works for _the manufacture and sale
of gas, while the purchase of shares of stock in other companies would
be merely a subordinate object, incidental only to the main purpose of
the corporate formation. An illustration of this idea may be found
in the general law of this state in regard to the life insurance companies, which makes it lawful for a life insurance company organized
in the state to "invest its funds or accumulations in the stocks of the
United States • • • or in such other stocks and securities as .may
be approved by the auditor." The main object of forming such a
company is to engage in the business of life insurance, but the power
to invest surplus funds in certain stocks is given as an incident to such
business.
Can the power to purchase and hold the stock of other gas companies be lawfully exercised by the appellee as incidental to the main
purpose of maintaining and operating works for the manufacture and
sale of gas?
Corporations can only exercise such powers as may be conferred
by the legislative bony creating them, either in express terms, or by
necessary implication; and the implied powe1:s are presumed to exist
to enable such bodies to carry out the express powers granted, and to
accomplish the purposes of their creation. (C. P. & S. W. R. Co.
v. Marseilles, 84 Ill. 643; Chicago Gas Light Co. v. People's Gas
Light Co., 121 Ill . 530.) An incidental power is one that is directly
and immediately appropriate to the execution of the specific power
granted, and not one that has a slight or remote relation to it. (Hood
v. N. Y. & N. H. R . , 22 Conn. 1; Franklin Co. v. Le\l\'iston Savings In stitution, 68 Maine 43.)
'Vhere a charter in express terms confers upon a corporation the
power to maintain and operate works for the manufacture and sale of
gas, it is not a necessary implication therefrom that the power to purchase stock in other gas companies should also exist. There is no
necessary connection between manufacturing gas an~ ' buying stocks.
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If the purpose for which a gas company has been created is to make

and sell gas and operate gas works, the purchase of stock in other gas

PEABODY V. THE CHICAGO GAS TRUST CO.
companies is not necessary to accomplish such purpose. "The right

of a corporation to invest in shares of another company can not be

If the purpose for which a gas company has been created is to make
and sell gas and operate gas works, the purchase of stock in other gas
companies is not necessary to accomplish such purpose. "The right
of a corporation to invest in shares of another company can not be
implied because both companies are engaged in a similar kind of business." (r Morawetz on Priv. Corp.,§ 43r.)
It is true that a gas company might take the stock of another corporation in payment of a debt, or perhaps as security for a debt, but
the actual purchase of such stock is not directly and immediately appropriate to the execution of a specifically granted power to operate
gas works and manufacture gas. Some corporations, like insurance
companies, may find it necessary to keep funds on hand for the payment of losse~ by death or fire, or to meet other necessary demands,
but it is questionable whether even these can invest their surplus funds
in the stocks of other corporations without special legislative authority. But there is nothing in the nature of a gas company which
renders it proper for such a company to accumulate funds for outside
investment; its surplus profit!'; belong to the stockholders, and, when
distributed among them , can be used by them as they see fit.
If, then, the power to purchase outside stocks can not be implied
from the power to operate gas works and make and sell gas, a company to whom the latter power has been expressly granted can not
exercise the former without legislative authority to do so. This is
the law as settled by the great weight of authority.
Boone on the Law of Co1vorations says: ''\iVithol!t a power specifically granted, or necessarily implied, a corporation can not become
a stockholder in another corporation, and especially where the object
is to obtain the control or affect the management of the latter." In
Green's Brice's Ultra Vires (page 91, note b) it is said: "ln the
United States a corporation can not become a stockholder in another
corporation unless by power specifically granted by its charter, or
necessarily implied in it." So also l\rforawetz on Private Corporations (secs. 431-433) says: "A corporation has no implied right to
purchase shares in another company for the purpose of controlling its
management. • • • A corporation can not, in the absence of
express statutory authority, become an incorporator by subscribing
for shares in a new corporation, nor can it do this indirectly through
persons acting as its agents or tools." The authorities referred to by
these text writers sustain the conclusions announced by them. It bas
been held in many cases, that, "in the United States, corporations can
not purchase, or hold, or deal in the stocks of other corporations, unless expressly authorized to do so by law," and that "one corporation
can not become the owner of any portion of the capital stock of
another corporation, unless authority to become such is clearly conferred by statute." (Franklin Co. v. Lewiston Sav. Ins., supra;
Franklin Bank v. Commercial Bank, 36 Ohio St. 350; Milbank v.
N. Y., L. E. & \V. R. Co., 64 How. (N. Y.) 20; Sumner '"·
Marcy, 3 W. & M. 105; 1ut. Savings Bank v. Meriden Agency, 24
Conn. 159; Ce11tral R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582 ; Hazelhurst ,._

implied because both companies are engaged in a similar kind of busi-

ness." (1 Morawetz on Priv. Corp., § 431.)

It is true that a gas company might take the stock of another cor-

poration in payment of a debt, or perhaps as security for a debt, but

the actual purchase of such stock is not directly and immediately ap-

propriate to the execution of a specifically granted power to operate

gas works and manufacture gas. Some corporations, like insurance

companies, may find it necessary to keep funds on hand for the pay-

ment of losses by death or fire, or to meet other necessary demands,

but it is questionable whether even these can invest their surplus funds

in the stocks of other corporations without special legislative author-

ity. But there is nothing in the nature of a gas company which

renders it proper for such a company to accumulate funds for outside

investment; its surplus profits belong to the stockholders, and, when

distributed among them, can be used by them as they see fit.

If, then, the power to purchase outside stocks can not be implied
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from the power to operate gas works and make and sell gas, a com-

pany to whom the latter power has been expressly granted can not

exercise the former without legislative authority to do so. This is

the law as settled by the great weight of authority.

Boone on the Law of Coiporations says: "Without a power spe-

cifically granted, or necessarily implied, a corporation can not become

a stockholder in another corporation, and especially where the object

is to obtain the control or affect the management of the latter." In

Green's Brice's Ultra Vires (page 91, note b) it is said: "In the

United States a corporation can not become a stockholder in another

corporation unless by power specifically granted by its charter, or

necessarily implied in it." So also Morawetz on Private Corpora-

tions (sees. 431-433) says: "A corporation has no implied right to

purchase shares in another company for the purpose of controlling its

management. * * * A corporation can not, in the absence of

express statutory authority, become an incorporator by subscribing

for shares in a new corporation, nor can it do this indirectly through

persons acting as its agents or tools." The authorities referred to by

these text writers sustain the conclusions announced by them. It has

been held in many cases, that, "in the United States, corporations can

not purchase, or hold, or deal in the stocks of other corporations, un-

less expressly authorized to do so by law," and that "one corporation

can not become the owner of any portion of the capital stock of

another corporation, unless authority to become such is clearly con-

ferred by statute." (Franklin Co. v. Lewiston Sav. Ins., supra;

Franklin Bank v. Commercial Bank, 36 Ohio St. 350; Milbank v.

N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co.. 64 How. (N. Y.) 30; Sumner v.

Marcy, 3 W. & M. 105; Mut. Savings Bank v. Meriden Agency, 24

Conn. 159; Central R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582; Hazelhurst v.
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Savannah R. Co., 43 Ga. 13; Berry v. Yates, 24 Barb. 199.)

The special charters of the Chicago Gas Light and Coke Campany

POWER TO ACQI;IRE PERSONAL PROPERTY.

and of the People's Gas Light and Coke Company, which are set out

1057

in full in fhe information and not called in question in any of the

pleas, confer by express grant the power to erect gas works and man-

ufacture and sell gas, etc., but do not confer the power to buy shares

of stock in other companies; upon the latter subject they are silent.

It will not be denied, that, under the authorities already cited, these two

companies can not buy and hold stock in other gas companies. The

same would undoubtedly be admitted to be true of the Chicago Gas

Trust Company, if it held under a special charter of like tenor and

effect granted before the adoption of the constitution of 1870. Does

it make any difference that the appellee was organized under the gen-

eral incorporation act?

The general incorporation act of this state does not, in express

terms, confer upon the corporations organized under it the power to

purchase and hold shares of stock in other corporations. It is silent

upon that subject. The only powers granted by it are the ordinary

corporate powers, such as the rights to be bodies corporate and politic,

to sue and be sued, to have a common seal, etc. The charter of a
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corporation formed under such a general law does not consist of the

articles of association alone, but of such articles taken in connection

with the law under which the organization takes place. (1 Morawetz

on Priv. Corp., § 318.) The provisions of the law enter into and

form a part of the charter. It certainly can not be true, that a corpo-

ration, formed under the general incorporation act for a purpose other

than that of dealing in stocks, can exercise the power of purchasing

and holding stock in other corporations, where such power can not be

necessarily implied from the nature of the power specifically granted,

and is not necessary to carry the latter into effect.

The power to purchase and hold stock in other companies must be

the subject of legislative grant, if not in all cases, at least in cases

where it can not be implied from the powers expressly granted. The

general incorporation law contains no grant of such power by the

legislature. Can a corporation organized under that law be clothed

with such a power by merely naming it in the statement filed with

the secretary of state? We think not. The action of the secretary

of state in issuing the license and the certificate of organization is

necessarily, to a large extent, merely ministerial. (Oregon Ry. Co.

v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 130 U. S. i1; 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,

Tit. Corporations, page 192, note 1.) Whether the articles of asso-

ciation, consisting of the statement, the license, the report of the

commissioners, the certificate of organization, etc., do or do not confer

such rights and powers as are authorized by the law, is a matter for

judicial determination. Counsel for appellee say: "We do not claim,

of course, that the action of the secretary of state is conclusive and

not subject to review by this court." * * *

When a corporation is formed under the general incorporation act

1 Supra, p. 429.

67—Wil. Cab.

Savarinah R. Co., 43 Ga. 13i Berry v. Yates, 24 Barb. 199·)
The special charters of the Chicago Gas Light and Coke Campany
and of the People's Gas Light and Coke Company, which are set out
in full in tbe information and not called in question in any of the
pleas, confer by express grant the power to erect gas works and manufacture and sell gas, etc., but do not confer the po~er to buy shares
of stock in other companies; upon the latter subject they are silent.
It will not be denied, that, under the authorities already cited, these two
companies can not buy and hold stock in other gas companies. The
same would undoubtedly be admitted to be true of the Chicago Gas
Trust Company, if it held under a special charter of like tenor and
effect granted before the adoption of the constitution of 1870. Does
it make any difference that the appellee was organized under the general incorporation act?
The general incorporation act of this state does not, in express
terms, confer upon the corporations organized under it the power to
purchase and hold shares of stock in other corporations. It is silent
upon that subject. The only powers granted by it are the ordinary
corporate powers, such as the rights to be bodies corporate and politic,
to sue and be sued, to have a common seal, etc. The charter of a
corporation formed under such a general law does not consist of the
articles of association alone, but of such articles taken in connection
with the law under which the organization takes place. ( l Morawetz
on Priv. Corp., § 318.) The provisions of the law enter into and
form a part of the charter. It certainly can not be true, that a corporation, formed under the general incorporation act for a purpose other
than that of dealing in stocks, can exercise the power of purchasing
and holding stock in other corporations, where such power can not be
necessarily implied from the nature of the power specifically granted,
and is not necessary to carry the latter into effect.
The power to purchase and hold stock in other companies must be
the subject of legislative grant, if not in all cases, at least in cases
where it can not be implied from the powers expressly granted. The
general incorporation law contains no grant of such power by the
legislature. Can a corporation organized under that law be clothed
with such a power by merely naming it in the statement filed with
the secretary of state? We think not. The action of the secretary
of state in issuing the license and the certificate of organization is
necessarily, to a large extent, merely ministerial. (Oregon Ry. Co.
v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 130 U.S. 1 1 ; 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,
Tit. Corporations, page 192, note r.) Whether the articles of association, consisting of the statement, the license, the report of the
commissioners, the certificate of organization, etc., do or do not confer
such rights and powers as are authorized by the law, is a matter for
judicial determination. Counsel for appellee say: "We do not claim ,
of course, that the action of the secretary of state is conclusive and
not subject to review by this court." • • •
When a corporation is formed under the general incorporation act
1

Supra, p. -129.
67-WIL. CA.S.
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for the purpose of carrying on a lawful business, the law, and not the

statement, or the license, or the certificate, must determine what

PEOPLE V. THE CHICAGO GAS TRUST CO.

powers can be exercised as incidents to such business. Even if shares

§ 304

of stock be regarded as personal property, as claimed by counsel for

appellee, section five of the general law provides, that corporations

for the purpose of carrying on a lawful. business, the law, and not the
statement, or the license, or the certificate, must determine what
powers can be exercised as incidents to such business. Even if shares
of stock be regarded as personal property, as claimed by counsel for
appellee, section five of the general law provides, that corporations
formed under it "may own
•
•
•
so much •
•
• personal estate as shall be necessary for the transaction of their business,
and may sell and dispose of the same when not required for the u ses
of the corporation, • • • and may ha,·e and exercise all the
powers necessary and requisite to carry into effect the objects forwhich
they may be formed." This langu age negatives the idea that a corporation formed under the general law can exercise the power of buying and holding the stock of other companies. A company engaged
on its own account in manufacturing and selling gas does not need
the stock of other gas companies in order to transact its business.
Hence, it is forbidden to own such stock, the same being "personal
estate." • • •
The second of the two objects is stated as follows: "And to purchase and hold or sell the capital stock, or purchase, or lease, or
operate the property, plant, good will , rights and franchises of any
gas works, or gas company ,1r companies, or any electric company or
electric companies in •
• • Chicago • • • or el sewhere
in • • • Illinois, as said corporation may, by vote of the majority of the stockholders, elect," etc. Manufacturing and selling
gas is one kind of business ; dealing in stocks is another and different
kind of business. If it appeared that the appellee \vas engaged in
both under its present charter, a serious question might arise as to the
power to organize one corporation for two distinct purposes under
the general incorporation act of this state. This record, however,
only shows that the appellee is exercising the power designated by the
declaration of the second object of its formation. What is the power
which it is so exercising? • • •
The fact that the appellee almost immediately after its orga nization bought up a majority of the sha11·es of stock of each of these
companies, shows that it was not making a mere investment of surplus funds, but that it designed and intended to bring the four companies under its control, and, by crushing out competition, to monopolize the gas business in Chicago.
The general incorporation act provides, "that corporations may be
formed in the manner provided by this act for any lawful pu1-po~e
except banking, insurance, real estate brokerage, the operation of
railroads and the business of loaning: money." The purpose for
which a corporation is formed under the act must be a lawful purpose. So far as appellee was organized with the object of purcha. ing and holding all the shares of the capital stock of any gas company in Chicago or Illinois, it was not organized for a lawful purpose,
and all acts done by it towards the accomplishment of such object are
illegal and void. • • •
'
The common law will not permit individuals to oblige themselves

formed under it "may own * * * so much * * * per-

sonal estate as shall be necessary for the transaction of their business,

and may sell and dispose of the same when not required for the uses

of the corporation, * * * and may have and exercise all the

powers necessary and requisite to cany into effect the objects for which

they may be formed." This language negatives the idea that a cor-

poration formed under the general law can exercise the power of buy-

ing and holding the stock of other companies. A company engaged

on its own account in manufacturing and selling gas does not need

the stock of other gas companies in order to transact its business.

Hence, it is forbidden to own such stock, the same being "personal

estate." * • *

The second of the two objects is stated as follows: "And to pur-

chase and hold or sell the capital stock, or purchase, or lease, or

operate the property, plant, good will, rights and franchises of any
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gas works, or gas company or companies, or any electric company or

electric companies in * * * Chicago * * * or elsewhere

in * * * Illinois, as said corporation may, by vote of the ma-

jority of the stockholders, elect," etc. Manufacturing and selling

gas is one kind of business; dealing in stocks is another and different

kind of business. If it appeared that the appellee was engaged in

both under its present charter, a serious question might arise as to the

power to organize one corporation for two distinct purposes under

the general incorporation act of this state. This record, however,

only shows that the appellee is exercising the power designated by the

declaration of the second object of its formation. What is the power

which it is so exercising? * * *

The fact that the appellee almost immediately after its organiza-

tion bought up a majority of the shares of stock of each of these

companies, shows that it was not making a mere investment of sur-

plus funds, but that it designed and intended to bring the four com-

panies under its control, and, by crushing out competition, to monop-

olize the gas business in Chicago.

The general incorporation act provides, "that corporations may be

formed in the manner provided by this act for any lawful purpose

except banking, insurance, real estate brokerage, the operation of

railroads and the business of loaning money." The purpose for

which a corporation is formed under the act must be a lawful pur-

pose. So far as appellee was organized with the object of purchas-

ing and holding all the shares of the capital stock of any gas com-

pany in Chicago or Illinois, it was not organized for a lawful purpose,

and all acts done by it towards the accomplishment of such object are

illegal and void. * * *

The common law will not permit individuals to oblige themselves
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by a contract either to do or not to do anything when the thing to be

done or omitted is in any degree clearly injurious to the public.

POWER TO ACQUIRE PERSONAL PROPERTY.

(Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157; Transportation Co. v. Pipe
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Line Co., 22 W. Va. 600.) In Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio 434, an

agreement, whose tendency was to prevent competition, was held to

be void by the principles of. the common law, because it was against

public policy and injurious to the interests of the state.

"Contracts creating monopolies are null and void as being con-

trary to public policy." (3 Addison on Cont., 743.) All grants

creating monopolies are made void by the common law. (7 Bacon's

Abridgment, page 22.) In The Case of the Monopolies (Coke's Re-

ports, Vol. 6, part XI, page 84), it was decided as long ago as the

forty-fourth year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, that a "grant to

the plaintiff of the sole making of cards within the realm was utterly

void, and that for two reasons: 1. That it is a monopoly and against

the common law. 2. That it is against divers acts of parliament,"

etc. (Bell v. Leggett, 7 N. Y. 176; Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441.)

If contracts and grants, whose tendency is to create monopolies, are

void at common law, then where a corporation is organized under a

general statute a provision in the declaration of its corporate pur-
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poses, the necessary effect of which is the creation of a monopoly,

will also be void. * * *

That the exercise of the power attempted to be conferred upon the

appellee company must result in the creation of a monopoly results

from the very nature of the power itself. If the privilege of purchasing

and holding all the shares of stock in all the gas companies of Chi-

cago can be lawfully conferred upon appellee under the general

incorporation act, it can be lawfully conferred upon any other corpo-

ration formed for the purpose of buying and holding all the shares of

stock of said gas companies. The design of that act was that any

number of corporations might be organized to engage in the same

business if it should be deemed desirable. But the business now un-

der consideration could hardly be exercised by two or three corpora-

tions. Suppose that after appellee had purchased and become the

holder of the majority of shares of stock of the four companies in

Chicago, another corporation had been organized with the same ob-

ject in view, that is to say, for the purpose of purchasing and holding

a majority of the shares of stock of the gas companies in Chicago.

There being only four of such companies, what would there be for

the corporation last formed to do? It could not carry out the object

of its creation, because the stock it was formed to buy was already

owned by an existing corporation. Hence to grant to the appellee the

privilege of purchasing and holding the capital stock of any gas com-

pany in Chicago is to grant to it a privilege which is exclusive in its

character. It is making use of the general incorporation law to secure

a special "privilege, immunity or franchise;" it is obtaining a special

charter, under the cover and through the machinery of that law, for

a purpose forbidden by the constitution. To create one corporation

by a contract either to do or not to do anything when the thing to be
done or omitted is in any degree clearly injurious to the public.
(Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157i Transportation Co. v. Pipe
Line Co., 22 W. Va. 6oo.) In Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio 434 1 an
agreement, whose tendency was to prevent competition, was held to
be void by the principles of. the common law, because it was against
public policy and injurious to the interests of the state.
"Contracts creating monopolies are null and void as being contrary to public policy." (2 Addison on Cont., 743.) All grants
creating monopolies are made void by the common law. (7 Bacon's
Abridgment, page 22.) In The Case of the Monopolies (Coke's Reports, Vol. 6, part XI, page 84) 1 it was decided as long ago as the
forty-fourth year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, that a ''grant to
the plaintiff of the sole making of cards within the realm was utterly
void , and that for two reasons: l. That it is a monopoly and against
the common law. 2. That it is against divers acts of parliament,"
etc. (Bell v. Leggett, 7 N. Y. 176; Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441.)
If contracts and grants, whose tendency is to create monopolies, are
void at common law, then where a corporation is organized under a
general statute a provision in the declaration of its corporate purposes , the necessary effect of which is the creation of a monopoly,
will also be void. • • •
That the exercise of the power attempted to be conferred upon the
appellee company must result in the creation of a monopoly results
from the very nature of the power itself. If the privilege of purchasing
and holding all the shares of stock in all the gas companies of Chicago can be lawfully conferred upon appellee under the general
incorporation act, it can be lawfully conferred upon any other corporation formed for the purpose of buying and holding all the shares of
stock of sa id gas companies. The design of that act was that any
number of corporations might be organized to engage in the same
business if it should be deemed desirable. But the business now under consideration could hardly be exercised by two or three corporations. Suppose that after appellee had purchased and become the
holder of the majority of shares of stock of the four companies in
Chicago, another corporation had been organized with the same object in view, that is to say, for the purpose of purchasing and holding
a majority of the shares of stock of the gas companies in Chicago.
There being only four of such companies, what \;VOuld there be for
the corporation last formed to do? It could not carry out the object
of its creation, because the stock it was formed to buy was already
owned by an existing corporation. Hence to grant to the appellee the
privilege of purchasing and holding the capital stock of any gas com.pany in Chicago is to grant to it a privilege which is exclusive in its
character. It is making use of the general incorporation law to secure
a special "privilege, immunity or franchise;" it is obtaining a special
charter, under the cover and through the machinery of that law, for
a purpose forbidden by the constitution. To create one corporation
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that it may destroy the energies of all other corporations of a given

kind, and suck their life blood out of them, is not a "lawful purpose."

1000

•*•

PEARSON V. CONCORD RAILROAD CORPORATION.

§ 305

The privileges awarded to the four gas companies under their re-

that it may destroy the energies of all other corporations of a given
kind, and suck their life blood out of them, is not a "lawful purpose."

spective charters were given them in return for, and in consideration

of, services to be rendered by them to the public. When they en-

• • •

tered the streets of Chicago, they assumed the performance of the

public duty of furnishing light to the inhabitants. That they should

The privileges awarded to the four gas companies under their respective charters were given them in return for, and in consideration
of, services to be rendered by them to the public. When they entered the streets of Chicago, they assumed the performance of the
public duty of furnishing light to the inhabitants. That they should
be permitted, or required, or forced, to abandon the performance of
such public duty is against the policy of the law. The public duty
is imposed upon each company separately, and not upon the four
when combined together. Each for itself, when it accepted its articles of association, assumed an obligation to perform the objects of
its incorporation. But the appellee, through the control which it
does or may exercise over the four companies by reason of its ownership of a majority of their stock, renders it impossible for them to
discharge their public duties except at the dictation of an outside
force, and in the manner prescribed by a corporation operating independently of them. They are thus virtually forced to abandon the
performance of their duty to the public. The freedom and effecti\'eness of their action in carrying out the purposes of their creation are
seriously interfered with, if not actually destroyed. A power, whose
exercise leads to such a result can not be lawfully entrusted to any corporate body. • • •
The court below erred in overruling the demurrers. Reversed.

be permitted, or required, or forced, to abandon the performance of

such public duty is against the policy of the law. The public duty

is imposed upon each company separately, and not upon the four

when combined together. Each for itself, when it accepted its arti-

cles of association, assumed an obligation to perform the objects of

its incorporation. But the appellee, through the control which it

does or may exercise over the four companies by reason of its own-

ership of a majority of their stock, renders it impossible for them to

discharge their public duties except at the dictation of an outside

force, and in the manner prescribed by a corporation operating inde-

pendently of them. They are thus virtually forced to abandon the

performance of their duty to the public. The freedom and effective-
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ness of their action in carrying out the purposes of their creation are

seriously interfered with, if not actually destroyed. A power, whose

exercise leads to such a result can not be lawfully entrusted to any cor-

porate body. * • *

The court below erred in overruling the demurrers. Reversed.

Note. See note at end of next case.

Sec. 305. Same.

3. Exceptions to general rule.

PEARSON v. CONCORD RAILROAD CORPORATION, Er. al."

1883. In the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. 62 New

Hampshire Reports 537-551, 13 Am. St. Rep. 590.

[Bill in equity by certain stockholders to set aside certain contracts

of the directors of one railroad company whereby they purchased for

Note.

it a controlling interest in the stock of a connecting road for the pur-

See note at end of next case.

pose of controlling the latter in the interests of the former.]

Smith, J. * * * The case finds that the Northern railroad is

Sec. 305. Same.

the owner of 1,290 shares of Concord railroad stock, purchased in

1873, upon which it has since voted at the meetings of the Concord

3. Exceptions to general rule.

railroad. A corporation can not become a stockholder in another

corporation, unless such power is given it by its charter or is neces-

PEARSON v. CONCORD RAILROAD CORPORATION, ET. ..u..1

sarily implied in it (Franklin Co. v. Bank, 68 Maine 43; Bank v.

Agency Co., 24 Conn. 159; Green Bri. Ult. V. 91, and cases cited;

1883.

Mor. Corp., section 229 and cases cited); especially if the purchase

1 Only so much of the opinion as relates to the single point is here given.

IN THE SuPREMR CouRT OF NEw HAMPSHIRE. 62 New
Hampshire Reports 537-551, 13 Am. St. Rep. 590.

[Bill in equity by certain stockholders to set aside certain contracts
of the directors of one railroad company whereby they purchased for
it a controlling interest in the stock of a connecting road for the purpose of controlling the latter in the interests of the former.]
SMITH, J. • • • The case finds that the Northern railroad is
the owner of I , 290 shares of Concord railroad stock, purchased in
1873, upon which it has since voted at the meetings of the Concord
railroad. A corporation can not become a stockholder in another
corporation, unless such power is given it by its charter or is necessarily implied in it (Franklin Co. v. Bank, 68 Maine 43; Bank v.
Agency Co., 24 Conn. r 59; Green Bri. Ult. V. 9 I, and cases cited;
Mor. Corp., section 229 and cases cited); especially if the purchase
1
,
Only eo much of the opinion as relates to the single point ie here given.
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be for the purpose of controlling or affecting the management of

the other corporation. Sumner v. Marcy, 3 W. & M. 105; Central

POWER TO ACQUIRE PERSONAL PROPERTY.
R. R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582; Hazlehurst v. Savannah, etc.,
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R. R. Co., 43 Ga. 13; G. N. Ry. Co. v. Eastern, etc., Ry. Co.,

21 L. J. Ch. 837; Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419, 439. Dealing in

stocks is not expressly prohibited in the act of congress providing for

the organization of national banks (U. S. Rev. St., section 5136, par.

7), but such prohibition is implied from the failure to grant the power.

Bank v. Bank, 92 U. S. 122, 128. Corporations are creatures of the

legislature, having no other powers than such as are given to them by

their charters, or such as are incidental or necessary to carry into ef-

fect the purposes for which they were established. Downing v. Mt.

W. Road Co., 40 N. H. 230, 232; Trustees v. Peaslee, 15 N. H.

317, 330; Beaty v. Knovvler's Lessee, 4 Pet. 152; Perrine v. Com-

pany, 9 How. 172; Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Trustees Dart-

mouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636.

Certain classes of corporations, such as religious and charitable

corporations, and corporations for literary purposes, may rightfully in-

vest their moneys in the stock of other corporations. The power, if

not expressly mentioned in their charters, is necessarily implied, for
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the preservation of the funds with which such institutions are en-

dowed, and to render their funds productive. So an insurance com-

pany or savings bank may rightfully invest its capital or deposits in

the stocks of railroad companies, banks, manufacturing companies,

and similar corporations. The power is necessary to enable them to

engage in the business for which they are organized, and hence is im-

plied, if not expressly granted, in their charters. Such investments

are in the line of their business. On the other hand, a manufacturing

or railroad corporation is incorporated to do the business of manu-

facturing or transporting passengers and merchandise. Investing

their funds in that of other corporations is not in the line of their busi-

ness. Under extraordinary circumstances it may become necessary

for a national bank, or a manufacturing corporation, or a railroad cor-

poration, to acquire stock in another corporation, as in satisfaction of

a valid debt, or by way of security, but with a view to its subsequent

sale or conversion into money so as to make good or redeem an an-

ticipated loss. Bank v. Bank, 92 U. S. 128; Fleckner v. Bank, 8

Wheat. 338.

In Hodges v. N. E. Screw Co., 1 R. I. 312, the court said there

was no doubt the defendant company might have taken the stock in

the iron company in payment for its rolling-mill, if it had been taken

with a view to sell again, and not permanently to hold it.

The Northern Railroad by its charter was vested with all the pow-

ers necessary to carry into effect the purposes and objects of its incor-

poration, subject to the laws in relation to corporations and railroads

contained in the Revised Statutes. The objects of its incorporation are

declared to be the accommodation of the public travel and the trans-

portation of goods and merchandise. Laws 1844, ch. 190. It was

not contemplated that more funds would be raised by the issue of

stock than was necessary to construct and equip its road. The pro-

be for the purpose of controlling or affecting the management of
the other corporation. Sumner v. Marcy, 3 W. & M. 105 ; Central
R. R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582; Hazlehurst v. Savannah, etc.,
R. R. Co., 43 Ga. 13; G. N. Ry. ·Co. v. Eastern, etc., Ry. Co.,
21 L. J. Ch. 837; Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419, 439. Dealing in
stocks is not expressly prohibited in the act of congress providing for
the organization of national banks (U.S. Rev. St., section 5136, par.
7), but such prohibition is implied from the failure to grant the power.
Bank v. Bank, 92 U. S. 122, 128. Corporations are creatures of the
legislature, having no other powers than such as are given to them by
their charters, or such as are incidental or necessary to carry into effect the purposes for which they were established. Downing v. Mt.
W. Road Co., 40 N. H. 230, 232; Trustees v. Peaslee, 15 N. H.
317, 330; Beaty v. Knowler's Lessee, 4 Pet. 152; Perrine v. Company, 9 How. 172; Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Trustees Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 5 18, 636.
Certain classes of corporations, such as religious and charitable
corporations, and corporations for literary purposes, may rightfully invest their moneys in the stock of other corporations. The power, if
not expressly mentioned in their charters, is necessarily implied, for
the preservation of the funds with which such institutions are endowed, and to render their funds productive. So an insurance. company or savings bank may rightfully invest its capital or deposits in
the stocks of railroad companies, banks, manufacturing companies,
and similar corporations. The power is necessary to enable them to
engage in the business for which they are organized, and hence is implied, if not expressly granted, in their charters. Such investments
are in the line of their business. On the other hand, a manufacturing
or railroad corporation is incorporated to do the business of manufacturing or transporting· passengers and merchandise. Investing
their funds in that of other corporations is not in the line of their business. Under extraordinary circumstances it may become necessary
for a national bank, or a manufacturing corporation, or a railroad corporation, to acquire stock in another corporation, as in satisfaction of
a valid debt, or by way of security, but with a view to its subsequent
sale or conversion into money so as to make good or redeem an anticipated loss. Bank v. Bank, 92 U. S. 128; Fleckner v. Bank, 8
Wheat. 338.
In Hodges v. N. E. Screw Co., 1 R. I. 312, the court said there
was no doubt the defendant company might have taken the stock in
the iron company in payment for its rolling-mill, if it had been taken
with a view to sell again, and not permanently to hold it.
The Northern Railroad by its charter was vested with all the powers necessary to carry into effect the purposes and objects of its incorporation, subject to the laws in relation to corporations and railroads
contained in the Revised Statutes. The objects of its incorporation are
declared to be the accommodation of the public travel and the transportation of goods and merchandise. Laws 1844, ch. 190. It was
not contemplated that more funds would be raised by the issue of
stock than was necessary to construct and equip its road. The pro-
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vision that when the net receipts shall amount to a sum making, with
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the prior net receipts of the corporation, more than an average of 10
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per cent, per annum from the commencement of its operations, the

excess shall be paid into the treasury of the state, is evidence that the

vision that when the net receipt s shall amount to a sum making, with
the prior net receipts of the corporation, more than an average of 10
per cent. per annum from the commencement of its operations. the
excess shall be paid into the treasury of the state, is evidence that the
legislature never contemplated the accumulation of a fund from its
earnings, or from loans, or from the issue of stock, to be invested in
the stock of another railroad corporation. It can no more make a
permanent investment of funds in the stock of another road than it
can engage in a general banking, manufacturing or steamboat business. It is neither incidental to the purposes of its incorporation, nor
necessary in the exerci se of the powers conferred by its charter. If it
can purchase any portion of the capital stock of the Concord company it may buy up the whole, and thus engage in a business for
which its charter gives it no authority. And what would hinder a
banking corporation from becoming a manufacturing company, or a
manufacturing company from becoming a railroad common carrier?
But the facts in this case go further. 'Fhe stock was bought at
$105 or $106 per share (par value, $so), a price largely in excess of
its market value, and for the purpose of obtaining control of the Concord and securing more favorable contracts to itself. In Sumner v.
Marcy, 3 \V. & M. 105, the corporation was chartered to deal in
lumber, with a capital of $1_so,ooo, of which only $15,000 could be
invested in personal property, and took stock in a bank to the value
of $168,000, for the purpose of getting control of the bank-a clear violation of its charter, but no more so than in this case. The purchase by a corporation of stock in another corporation ·will be enjoined at the instance of stockholders, when it involves a misapplication of corporate funds, or is a mere speculation, or is induced by a
vicious purpose. Pierce R. R., 505. If the investment by one r;tilroad corporation of more than $135,000 in stock of another at prices
exceeding its market value, for the purpose of controlling such corporation for its own benefit, is not a misapplication of corporate funds,
it would be difficult to find a case where such investment would be.
[Contracts set aside and a trustee appointed to manage the affairs
of the Concord company. J

legislature never contemplated the accumulation of a fund from its

earnings, or from loans, or from the issue of stock, to be invested in

the stock of another railroad corporation. It can no more make a

permanent investment of funds in the stock of another road than it

can engage in a general banking, manufacturing or steamboat busi-

ness. It is neither incidental to the purposes of its incorporation, nor

necessary in the exercise of the powers conferred by its charter. If it

can purchase any portion of the capital stock of the Concord com-

pany it may buy up the whole, and thus engage in a business for

which its charter gives it no authority. And what would hinder a

banking corporation from becoming a manufacturing company, or a

manufacturing company from becoming a railroad common carrier?

But the facts in this case go further. The stock was bought at

$105 or $106 per share (par value, $50), a price largely in excess of

its market value, and for the purpose of obtaining control of the Con-

cord and securing more favorable contracts to itself. In Sumner v.

Marcy, 3 W. & M. 105, the corporation was chartered to deal in
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lumber, with a capital of $150,000, of which only $75,000 could be

invested in personal property, and took stock in a bank to the value

of $168,000, for the purpose of getting control of the bank—a clear

violation of its charter, but no more so than in this case. The pur-

chase by a corporation of stock in another corporation will be en-

joined at the instance of stockholders, when it involves a misapplica-

tion of corporate funds, or is a mere speculation, or is induced by a

vicious purpose. Pierce R. R., 505. If the investment by one rail-

road corporation of more than $135,000 in stock of another at prices

exceeding its market value, for the purpose of controlling such corpo-

ration for its own benefit, is not a misapplication of corporate funds,

it would be difficult to find a case where such investment would be.

[Contracts set aside and a trustee appointed to manage the affairs

of the Concord company.]

Note. Acquiring stock in other corporations.

1. General rule: In the absence of particular charter or statutory provisions,

or circumstances (indicated below), one business corporation has no general

implied authority to acquire or hold stock in another such corporation (or-

ganized either for a similar or for a different purpose), as an investment for

speculation, or for purpose of controlling or managing such corporation. This

rule is applied in cases of:

fa) Banks: 1852, Talmage v. Pell, 7 N. Y. 328; 1877, Franklin Co. v. Lewis-

Note. Acquiring stock in other corporations.

ton Snv. Inst., 08 Maine 43 (in manufacturing); 1884, Franklin Bank v. Com-

1. General rule: ln the absence of particular charter or statutory provisions,

mercial Bank, 36 Ohio St. 350 (in banks); 1884, Nassau Bank v. Jones, 95 N. Y.

or circumstances (indicated below), one business corporation has no ~enentl
implied authority to acquire or bold stock iu another such corporation (organized either for a similar or for a different purpose ), M an investment for
speculation, or for purpose of controlling or managing such corporation. This
rule is applied in cases of:
(a) Ba11ks: 18.52, Talmage v. Pell, 7 N. Y. 328; 1877, Franklin Co. v. Lewiston 8nv. Inst., 68 Mai11e 43 <in manufacturing\ ; 1884, Franklin Bank v. Commercial Bank, 36 Ohio St. 350 (in banks \; 1884, Nassau Bank v. Jonei;;, 95 N. Y.
115, infra, p. 1205 (in railroad); 1893, Bank of Commerce v. Hart, 37 Neb. l\11
(in insurance); 1897, California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. 8. 362 (in banks);
1899, First National Bank v. Hawkins, 174 U.S. :l64 (in banks). But compare,
18$!7, Latimer v. Citizens' S. B., 102 Iowa 162. See infra (i).
(b) FurniturP. companie.~ : 1893, Denny H otel Co . v. Schram, 6 \\'ash. 134,
supra , p . .'i.53 (in hotel); 1895, Knowles v. Sandercock, 107 Cal. 629 (same);
18\:18, Newland Hotel Co. v. Furniture Co., 73 Mo. App. 135 (same).

115, infra, p. 1205 (in railroad); 1893, Bank of Commerce v. Hart,37 Neb. Wi

(in insurance); 1897, California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362(in banks);

1899, First National Bank v. Hawkins, 174 U. S. 364 (in banks). But compare,

1897, Latimer v. Citizens' S. B., 102 Iowa 162. See infra (i).

(b) Furniture companies: 1893, Denny Hotel Co. v. Schram, 6 Wash. 134,

supra, p. 553 (in hotel); 1895, Knowles v. Sandercock, 107 Cal. 629 (same);

1898, Newland Hotel Co. v. Furniture Co., 73 Mo. App. 135 (same).
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(c) Insurance companies: 1855, Mechanics' and W. M. Sav. B., etc., v.

Meriden Agency, 24 Conn. 159 (in bank); 1857, Berry v. Yates, 24 Barb. (N.

Y.) 199 1 in insurance); 1878, Ex parte Liquidators L. R., 8 Ch. D. 679 (same);

1884, Pierson v. McCurdy, 33 Hun (N. Y.) 520 (same); 1891, Commw. Fire

Ins. Co. v. Board of Rev., 99 Ala. 1, supra, p. 773 (in bank). See infra (i).

(d) Land company: 1893, Pauly v. Coronado Beach Co., 56 Fed. Rep. 428 (in

manufacturing);

(e) Lumber company: 1893, Lanier Lumber Co. v. Rees, 103 Ala. 622 (in

lumber company);

(f) Manufacturing company: 1847, Sumner v. Marcy, 3 Woodb. & M. 105,

Fed. Cas. 13609 (in bank); 1888, Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Iron Co., 46 Ohio

St. 44 (in railway);

In other manufacturing: 1892, Easun v. Buckeye B. Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 156;

1892, Buckeye Marble Co. v. Harvey, 92 Tenn. 115; 1895, Merz Capsule Co.

v. U. S. Capsule Co., 67 Fed. Rep. 414; 1897, People v. Chicago Gas Co., 130

111. 268; 1898, Martin v. Stove Co., 78 111. App. 105; 1898, People v. Pull-

man's P. C. Co., 175 111. 125; 1899, De La Vergne R. M. Go. v. German Sav.

Inst., 175 TJ. S. 40. But compare, 1897, White v. Marquardt, 105 Iowa 145.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

See infra (i).

(g) Railway companies: In other rail way companies: 1851, East Anglican

R. Co. v. Eastern Counties R., 7 Eng. L. & Eq. 505; 1863, Maunsell v.

Midland R., 1 Hem. & M. 130; 1869, Central R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582;

1871, Hazelhurst v. Savannah, etc., R. Co., 43 Ga. 13; 1875, Central R. Co.

v. Pennsvlvania R. Co., 31 N. J. Eq. 475; 1882, Milbank v. N. Y., L.

E. & W.,64 How. Pr. 20; 1882, Elkins v. Camden & A. R. 36 N. J. Eq. 5;

1883, Pearson v. Concord Rv. Co., 62 N. H. 537; 1888. Mackintosh v. Flint,

etc., R., 34 Fed. Rep. 582; 1888, Langdon v. Branch,37 Fed. Rep. 449; 1892,

Hamilton v. Savannah, etc., R., 49 Fed. Rep. 412; 1896, Farmers L. & T.

Co. v. Railroad Co., 150 N. Y. 410; 1898, Military Interstate Assoc. v. Rail-

See infra (i) and,

(h) The general rule is applied with vigor where the object is to obtain con-

trol in order to prevent competition: 1869, Central R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga.

582; 1879, Central R. v. Penn. R., 31 N. J. Eq. 475; 1882, Elkins v. C. & A.

R., 36 N. J. Eq. 5; 1889, People v. Chicago G. T. Co., 130111. 268, 17 Am. St.

R. 319, 8 L. R. A. 497, supra, p. 1054; 1892, Clarke v. R. Co., 50 Fed. Rep. 338;

1895, Louisville, etc., R. v. Ky., 161 U. S. 677; 1898, Martin v. Stove Co., 78

111. App. 105; 1899. De La Vergne R. M. Co. v. German Sav. Inst., 175 U. S. 40.

(i) But the following cases hold contra the general rule above given: 1849,

Elvsville Mfg. Co. v. Okisko Co., 1 Md. Ch. 392; 1850, Hodges v. Screw Com-

pany, 1 R. I. 312, 53 Am. Dec. 624; 1853, Elvsville Mfg. Co. v. Okisko Co., 5

Md. 152; 1879, Terry v. Eagle Lock Co., 47 Conn. 141; 1880, Booth v. Robin-

son, 55 Md. 419; 1883, Pearson v. Railroad Co., 62 N. H. 537 (as to some cor-

porations); 1894, Smith v. Newark, etc., R., 8 Ohio C. C. 583; 1895, Calumet

Paper Co. v. S. I. Co., 96 Iowa 147; 1897, White v. Marquardt, 105 Iowa 145,

74 N. W. Rep. 930.

See, also, English rule, supra, p. 1051, and exceptions noted below.

2. Exceptions to the general rule.

(a) Express or implied authority; special authority. 1869, Miners'Ditch

Co. v. Zellerbuch, 37 Cal. 543; 1884, Evans v. Bailey, 66 Cal. 112; 1899, Tien-

tun Potteries Co. v. Oliphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507 , 43 Atl. Rep. 723.

Authority to consolidate implies power to purchase' stock: 1863, Mayor of

Baltimore v. B. & O. R., 21 Md. 50; 1879, Ryan v. Leavenworth, 21 Kan.

365; 188-5, Terhune v. Potts, 47 N. J. L. 218; 1885, Hill v. Nisbet, 100 Ind.

341; 1892. Dewey v. Toledo R., 91 Mich. 351; 1893, Tod v. Kv. Union Land

Co., 57 Fed. Rep. 47, supra, p. 952; 1894, Marburv v. Land Co., 62 Fed. Rep.

335: 1896, Louisville T. Co. v. Louisville, etc., R., 75 Fed. Rep. 433; 1898,

Rogers v. Nashville, etc., Co., 91 Fed. Rep. 299; 1900, Trust Co. v. State, 109

(c) Insurance companies: 1855, Mechanica' and W. M. Sav. B., etc., v.
Meriden Agency, 24 Conn . 159 (in bank ) ; 1857, Berry v. Yates, 24 Barb. (N.
Y.) 199 t in insurance); 1878, Ex pa·rte Liquidators L . ~., 8 Ch. D. 679 (same) ;
1884, Pierson v. McCurdy, 33 Hun (N. Y. ) 520 (same) ; 1891, Commw. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Board of Rev., 99 Ala. 1, supra, p. 773 (in bank). See infra (i) .
(d ) Land company: 1893, Pauly v. Coronado Beach Co., 56 Fed. Rep. 428 (in
manufacturing) ;
(e) Lmnbe1· company: 1893, Lanier Lumber Co. v. Rees, 103 Ala. 622 (in
lumber company);
(f) Mam1facturing company: 1847, Sumner v. Ma.rcy, 3 Woodb. & M. 105,
Fed. Cas. 13609 (iu bank); 1888, Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Iron Co., 46 Ohio
St. 44 (in railway) ;
In other manufacturing: 1892, Easun v. Buckeye B. Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 156;
1892, Buckeye Marble Co. v. Harvey, 92 Tenn. 115; 1895, Merz Capsule Co.
v. U.S. Capsule Co., 67 Fed. Rep. 414; 189i, People v. Chicago Gas Co., 130
Ill. 268; 1898, Martin v. Stove Co., 78 Ill. App. 105; 1898, People v. Pullman's P. C. Co., 175 Ill. 125; 1899, De La Vergne R. M. Go. v. German Sav.
Inst., 175 U. S. 40. But compare, 1897, White v . .Marquardt, 105 Iowa 145.
See infra ( i).
(g) Railtoay companies: _In other railway com£_anies: 1851, East Anglican
R. Co. v. Eastern Counties R ., 7 Eng. L . & ~- 505; 1863, Maunsell v.
Midland R., 1 Hem. & M. 130; 1869, Central R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582;
1871, Hazelhurst v. Savannah, etc., R. Co., 43 Ga. 13; 1875, Central R. Co.
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 31 N. J. Eq. 475; 1882, Milbank v. N. Y., L.
E. & W., 64 How. Pr. 20; 1882, Elkius v. Camden & A. R. 36 N. J. Eq. 5;
1883, Pearson v. Concord Ry. Co., 62 N. H. 537; 1888, Mackintosh v. Flint,
etc., R., 34 Fed. Rep. 582; 1888, Langdon v. Brancb,37.Fed. Rep. 449; 1892,
Hamilton v. Savannah, etc., R., 49 Fed. Rep. 412; 1896, Farmers L. & T.
Co. v. Railroad Co., 150 N. Y . 410; 1898, Military Interstate Assoc. v. Railway Co., 105 Ga. 420 (in an advertising company).
See infra (i) and,
·
(h) The generar rule is applied with vigor where the object is to obtain control in order to prevent competition: 1869, Central R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga.
582; 1879, Central R. v. Penn. R., 31 N. J. Eq. 475; 1882, Elkins v. C. & A.
R., 36 N. J. Eq . 5; 1889, People v. Chicago G. T. Co., 130 Ill. 268, 17 Am. St.
R. 319, 8 L. R. A. 497, ll'upra, p . 1054; 1892, Clarke v. R. Co., 50 Fed. Rep. 338;
1895, Louisville, etc., R. v. Ky., 161 U. S. 677; 1898, Martin v. Stove Co., 78
Ill. App.105; 1899, De La Vergne R. l\L Co. v. German Sav. Inst., 175 U.S. 40.
(i) . Butt.he following cases hold contra the general rule above given: 1849,
Elysville Mfg. Co. v. Okisko Co., 1 Md. Ch. 392; 1850, Hodges v . Screw Company, 1 R. I. 312, 53 Am. Dec. 624; 1853, Elysville Mfg. Co. v. Okisko Co., 5
Md. 152; 1879, Terry v. Eagle Lock Co., 47 Conn . 141; 1880, Booth v. Robinson. 55 Md. 419; 1883, Pearson v. Railroad Co., 62 N. H. 537 (as to some corporations); 1894, Smith v. Newark, etc., R., 8 Ohio C. C. 583; 1895, Calumet
Paper Co. v. S. I. Co., 96 Iowa 147; 1897, White v. Marquardt, 105 Iowa 145,
74 N. W. Rel?. 930.
See, also, English rule, supra, p . 1051, and exceptions noted below .
2. Exr.eptions to the general rule.
(a l Express or implied authority; special authority. 1869, Miners' Ditch
Co. v. Zellerbach, 37 Ca l. .'")43; 1884, Evans v. Bailey, 66 Cal. 112; 1899, Tren ton Potteries Co. v. Oliphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507, 43 Atl. Rep. 723.
Anthority to consolidate implies power to purchase· stock: 1863, Mayor of
Baltimore v. B. & 0. R., 21 Md . 50; 1879, Ryan v. Leavenworth, 21 Kan.
365; 188-5, Terhune v. Pott.a, 47 N. J . L. 218; 18fl5, Hill v. Nisbet, 100 Ind.
341; 1892, Dewey v. Toledo R., 91 Mich. 351; 1893, Tod v. Ky. Union Land
Co., 57 Fed. Rep. 47, sttpra, p. 952; 1894, Marbury v. Land Co., 6~ Fed. Rep.
33.5; 1896, Louisville T. Co. v. Louisville, etc., R., 75 Fed. Rep. 433; 1898,
Rogers v. Nashville, etc., Co., 91 Fed. Rep. 299; 1900, Trust Co. v. State, 109
Gn. 736, 35 S. E . Rep. 323.
In 1895, Calumet Paper Co . v. South Invest. Co., 96 Iowa 147, power to acquire stock in other companies is implied from a grant "to contract, acquire
and transfer property as a private person"; so too, in 1897, White v. Mar-

Ga. 736, 35 S. E. Rep. 323.

In 1895, Calumet Paper Co. v. South Invest. Co., 96 Iowa 147, power to ac-

quire stock in other companies is implied from a grant "to contract, acquire

and transfer property as a private person"; so too, in 1897, White v. Mar-

Digitized by

Go gl

Origi11al from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

IO64 PEARSON V. CONCORD RAILROAD CORPORATION. § 305

quardt, 105 Iowa 145, 74 N. W. Rep. 930, it was held that a corporation might
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In many states the subject is regulated by statutory or other provision—*.

quardt, 105 Iowa 145, 74 N. W. Rep. 930, it 1waa held that a corporation might
exchange its goods for stock in other corporations.
In man1 states the subject is regulated by statutory or other provieion-t.
g ., Georgia forbids her legislature authoriizing one corporation purchasing
the shares of another corporation. Cons,t. 1877, art. 1v, § 2, par. 4. See,
1900, Trust Co. v. State, 109 Ga. 736, 35 S. E. Rep. 323. On the other hand,
several states authorize corporations to purchase and deal in such stocks, as
Minn . G. S. 1891, § 2680; New Jersey, Acts 1896, § 51; New York, G. L. C.
36, art. iii, § 40.
.
(b) When necessary to prevent loss, or se~cure the payment of a debt, stock
may be taken in other corporations : 1847, 8umner v. Marcy, 3 Woodb. & M.
105, Fed. Oas. 13609; 1852, Talmage v. Pell,. 7 N. Y. 328; 1860, Howe v. Boston Carpet Co., 82 Maas. (16 Gray ) 493; 1875,, First National Bank v. National
Ex. Bk., 92 U. 8. 122; 1888, Railway Co. v. Iron Co., 46 Ohio St. 44; 1889, National Bank v. Case, 99 U. 8. 628; 1891, Holmes & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. H . &
W . M. Co., 127 N. Y. 252; 1893, Bank of Commerce v. Hart, 37 Neb. 197 ;
1891S, Byrne v. Schuyler Elec. Mfg. Co., 65 Conn. 336; 1895, Cah1met Paper
Co. v. Invest. Co., 96 Iowa 147; 1897, Calilfornia Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.

g., Georgia forbids her legislature authorizing one corporation purchasing

the shares of another corporation. Const. 1877, art. iv, § 2, par. 4. See,

1900, Trust Co. v. State, 109 Ga. 736, 35 S. E. Rep. 323. On the other hand,

several states authorize corporations to purchase and deal in such stocks, as

Minn. G. S. 1891, § 2680; New Jersey, Acta 1896, § 51; New York, G. L. C.

36, art. iii, § 40.

(b) When necessary to prevent loss, or secure the payment of a debt, stock

may be taken in other corporations: 1847, Sumner v. Marcy, 3 Woodb. & M.

105, Fed. Cas. 13609; 1852, Talmage v. Pell, 7 N. Y. 328; 1860, Howe v. Bos-

ton Carpet Co., 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 493; 1875, First National Bank v. National

Ex. Bk., 92 U. S. 122; 1888, Railway Co. v. Iron Co., 46 Ohio St. 44; 1889, Na-

tional Bank v. Case. 99 U. 8. 628; 1891, Holmes & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. H. &

W. M. Co., 127 N. Y. 252; 1893, Bank of Commerce v. Hart, 37 Neb. 197;

1895, Byrne v. Schuyler Elec. Mfg. Co., 65 Conn. 336; 1895, Calumet Paper

Co. v. Invest. Co., 96 Iowa 147; 1897, California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.

S. 362.

s. 362.

(c) But it seems a failing corporation may dispose of ita property in ex-

(c) But it seems a failing corporation may dispose of its property in exchange for the stock of another corporation,, for the purpose of winding up itB
affairs, but not for holding permanently, and if creditors are protected: 1856,
Treadwell v. Salisbury M. Co., 7 Gray 1M01ss.) 393; 1876, Buford v. Keokuk
N . P. Co., 3 Mo. App. 159; 1895, Holmes & G. Mfg. Co. v. H. & W. M. Co.,
127 N. Y. 252; 1895, Byrne v. Elec. Co., 65 Conn. 336; 1896, Pinkus v. Minn.
L. M. Co., 65 Minn. 40.
But not if solvent, against the protest of shareholders : 1892, People v. Ballard, 134 N. Y. 269, infra, p.1066; 1895, Byme v. Elec. Co., 65 Conn. 336; 1896,
Elyton Land Co. v. Dowdell, 113 Ala. 177, 5'9 Am. St. Rep. 105.
(d) A parent company may acquire the st;ock of a branch company: 1889,
People v. Bell Tel. Co ., 117 N. Y. 241.
3. Where stock of a corporation is held without authority by another corporation, the latter may collect dividends rnpon, or sell it, but can not vot.e
upon it: 1872, State v. McDaniel, 22 Ohio St. 31?4, 368; 1882, Milbank v. N.
Y., etc., R., 64 How. Pr. 20, 30; 1889, Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Woods, 88
Ala. 630; 1899, Bigbee & W. R. Co. v. Moore, 121 Ala. 379, 25 So. Rep. 60"2;
1899, State v. Newman, M La. Ann. 833.
But if the holding is authorized, the stock so held may be voted : 1890,
State v. Rohlffs, - N. J. - , 19 At!. Rep. 1099; 1894, Oelbermann v. N. Y.,
etc., R., 77 Hun (N. Y.) 332.
As to liabilitv of a corporation upon an ultra '7ires holding of stock in anot.h.er co,rporation, see, 1894,,Kennedy v. C:11.I. Sav. Bk ., 101<?al.4.95; 1896,
C1tizens, etc., Bk. v. Hawkms, 71 Fed. Re1p. 369; 1897, Califorrua Bk. v.
Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362.
The ultra -vires exclusive holding, however, does not merge the companies,
and the one owning the stock of the other does not make the former liable
for the debts of the latter: 1895, Einstein v. Rochester Gas, etc., Co., 146 N.
Y . 46; 1898, National Bank of Commerce v. Allen, 90 Fed. R~p. 545; 1898,
Louisville Gas Co. v. Kaufman,20 Ky. L. R1ep. 1069, 48 S. W. Rep. 434.
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change for the stock of another corporation, for the purpose of winding up its

affairs, but not for holding permanently, and if creditors are protected: 1856,

Treadwell v. Salisbury M. Co., 7 Gray (Mass.) 393; 1876, Buford v. Keokuk

N. P. Co., 3 Mo. App. 159; 1895, Holmes & G. Mfg. Co. v. H. & W. M. Co.,

127 N. Y. 252; 1895, Byrne v. Elec. Co., 65 Conn. 336; 1896, Pinkus v. Minn.

L. M. Co., 65 Minn. 40.

But not if solvent, against the protest of shareholders: 1892. People v. Bal-

lard, 134 N. Y. 269, infra, p. 1066; 1895, Byrne v. Elec. Co., 65 Conn. 336; 1896,

Elyton Land Co. v. Dowdell, 113 Ala. 177, 59 Am. St. Rep. 105.

(d) A parent company may acquire the stock of a branch company: 1889,

People v. Bell Tel. Co., 117 N. Y. 241.

3. Where stock of a corporation is held without authority by another cor-

poration, the latter may collect dividends upon, or sell it, but can not vote

upon it: 1872, State v. McDaniel, 22 Ohio St. 354, 368; 1882, Milbank v. N.

Y., etc., R., 64 How. Pr. 20, 30; 1889, Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Woods, 88

Ala. 630; 1899, Bigbee & W. R. Co. v. Moore, 121 Ala. 379, 25 So. Rep. 602;

1899, State v. Newman, 51 La. Ann. 833.

But if the holding is authorized, the stock so held mav be voted: 1890,

State v. Rohlffs, — N. J. -—, 19 Atl. Rep. 1099; 1894, Oel'bermann v. N. Y,

etc., R., 77 Hun (N. Y.) 332.

As to liability of a corporation upon an ultra vires holding of stock in an-

other corporation, see, 1894, Kennedy v. Cal. Sav. Bk., 101 Cal. 495; 1896,

Citizens', etc., Bk. v. Hawkins, 71 Fed. Rep. 369; 1897, California Bk. v.

Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362.

The ultra vires exclusive holding, however, does not merge the companies,

and the one owning the stock of the other does not make the former liable

for the debts of the latter: 1895, Einstein v. Rochester Gas, etc., Co., 146 N.

4. JV/io may object.

Y. 46; 1898, National Bank of Commerce v. Allen, 90 Fed. Rep. 545; 1898,

(a) A l'lluu·eholder ~n, if the contract is eixecutory, or if he act.s promptly:
1849, Salomone v. La~ng, 12 Beav. 339; 18.53, Kean v. Johnson , 9 N. J . Eq.
401; 1885, Holt v. Wmfield Bank, 25 Fed. R:ep.812; 1895, Byrnev. Elec. Co.,
65 Conn. 336; 189!), Harding v. Am. Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551, 74 Am. St. Rep.
190. See note, BUpra, § 291; infra, §§ 583-58:5.
But not if completely executed or if ~uiltv of laches: 1882, Wright v. Pipe
Line, 101 Pa. St. 204; 1885, Holt v. Wmfield Bank, 25 Fed. Rep. 812; 1892,
Willoughby v. Chicago Jct. , 50 N. J. Eq. 65fi. See note, supra , § 291.
lb) The state can complain: 1889, Peopl,e v. Chicago Gas Trost, 130 rn.
268; 1892, People v. Ballard, 134 N. Y. 269; 1892, State v. Standard Oil Co.,
49 Ohio St. 137. See note, supra, § 291, infr·a, §§ 583-585.

Louisville Gas Co. v. Kaufman, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1069, 48 S. W. Rep. 434.

4. Who may object.

(a) A shareholder can, if the contract is executory, or if he acts promptlv:

1849, Salomons v. Laing, 12 Beav. 339; 1853, Kean v. Johnson, 9 N. J. Eq.

401; 1885, Holt v. Winfleld Bank, 25 Fed. Rep. 812; 1895, Byrne v. Elec. Co.,

65 Conn. 336; 1899, Harding v. Am. Glucose Co., 182 111. 551, 74 Am. St. Rep.

190. See note, supra, § 291; infra, §§ 583^585.

But not if completely executed or if guiltv of laches: 1882, Wright v. Pipe

Line, 101 Pa. St. 204; "1885, Holt v. Winfleld Bank, 25 Fed. Rep. 812; 1892,

Willoughby v. Chicago Jet., 50 N. J. Eq. 656. See note, supra, § 291.

(b) The state can complain: 1889, People v. Chicago Gas Trust, 130 111.

268; 1892, People v. Ballard, 134 N. Y. 269; 1892, State v. Standard Oil Co.,

49 Ohio St. 137. See note, supra, § 291, infra, §§ 583-585.
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Sec. 306. 3. Power to alienate property,

(a) General doctrine.

POWER TO AqENATE PROPERTY.

THE AURORA AGRICULTURAL AND HORTICULTURAL SOCIETY

1065

OF AURORA v. PADDOCK Et al.

1875. In the Supreme Court of Illinois. 80 111. 263-274.

Sec. 306.

Craig, J. This was a bill in equity, brought by appellees, to fore-

3 . Power to alienate property.
(a) General doctrine.

close a mortgage executed by the Aurora Agricultural and Horti-

cultural Society of Aurora, on the 28th day of December, 1870, to

secure the payment of $6,000 loaned by John R. Coulter to the

society. The court, on a hearing of the cause, rendered a decree

THE AURORA AGRICULTURAL AND HORTICULTURAL SOCIETY
OF AURORA v. PADDOCK ET AL.

directing a sale of the mortgaged premises in satisfaction of the mort-

gage debt.

1875.

IN

THE

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

8o Ill. 263-274.

The society has prosecuted this appeal, and, in order to obtain a

reversal of the decree, it is insisted by the counsel for appellant:

First. That the society had no power whatever to mortgage.

Second. That the mortgage in question was wholly unauthorized.

The appellant was organized on the 6th day of March, 1869, under

an act approved February 15, 1855, which authorized the incorpora-

tion of agricultural societies. (Gross' Statutes, 1869, page 119.)

By the third section of the act the society was made a body corporate,
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with power to sue and be sued, to acquire and hold real estate not

exceeding five hundred acres, to construct the necessary improvements

and buildings for its purpose, to have and employ capital, machinery,

live stock, etc., not exceeding in value $10,000.

While it is true no section of the act confers direct authority upon

the society to sell or mortgage its property, except upon a dissolution

of the corporation, yet the act does not prohibit or restrict the society

from selling or giving a mortgage upon its real estate. The power

to mortgage, when not expressly given or denied, must be regarded

as an incident to the power to acquire and hold real estate and make

contracts.

We understand it to be the common law rule that corporations have

an incidental right to alien or dispose of their lands and personal prop-

erty unless specially restrained by the act under which they are organ-

ized or by statute.

It is said in Angell & Ames on Corporations, p. 153: "Independ-

ent of positive law, all corporations have the absolute jus disponendi,

neither limited as to objects nor circumscribed as to quantity." The

same doctrine is clearly laid down by Kent, vol. 2, page 280.

We are, therefore, of opinion, as the society was not prohibited

from mortgaging its lands, it possessed the power to do so as an in-

cident to the power to purchase and hold real estate and make con-

tracts.

In regard to the second point relied on by appellant that the direc-

tors of the society had no power to authorize its president and secre-

tary to mortgage, the premises, such power, if it existed at all, being

CRAIG, J. This was a bill in equity, brought by appellees, to foreclose a mortgage executed by the Aurora Agricultural and Horticultural Society of Aurora, on the 28th day of December, 1870, to
secure the payment of $6,ooo loaned by John R. Coulter to the
society. The court, on a hearing of the cause, rendered a decree
directing a sale of the mortgaged premises in satisfaction of the mortgage debt.
The society has prosecuted this appeal, and, in order to obtain a
reversal of the decree, it is insisted by the counsel for appellant:
First. That the society had no power whatever to mortpage.
Second. That the mortgage in question was wholly unauthorized.
The appellant was organized on the 6th day of March, 1869, under
an act approved February 15, 1855 1 which authorized the incorporation of agricultural societies. (Gross' Statutes, 1869, page 119.)
By the third section of the act the society was made a body corporate,
with power to sue and be sued, to acquire and hold real estate not
exceeding five hundred acres, ·t o construct the n~cessary improvements
and buildings for its purpose, to have and employ capital, machinery,
live stock, etc., not exceeding in value $10 1 000 . .
While it is true no section of the act confers direct authority upon
the society to sell or mortgage its property, except upon a dissolution
of the corporation, yet the act does not prohibit or restrict the society
from selling or giving a mortgage upo11 its real estate. The power
to mortgage, when not expressly given or denied, must be regarded
as an incident to the power to acquire and hold real estate and make
contracts.
We understand it to be the common law mle that corporations have
an incidental right to alien or dispose of their lands and personal property unless specially restrained by the act under which they are organized or by statute.
It is said in Angell & Ames on Corporations, p. 153: "Independent of positive law, all corporations have the absolute jus disponendi,
neither limited as to objects nor circumscribed as to quantity." The
same doctrine is clearly laid down by Kent, vol. 2, page 280.
vVe are, therefore, of opinion, as the society was not prohibited
from mortgaging its lands, it possessed the power to do so as an incident to the power to purchase and hold real estate and make contracts .
In reg ard to the second point relied on by appellant that the directors of the society had no power to authorize its president aod secretary to mortgage. the premises, such power, if it existed at all, being
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in the stockholders—a complete answer to this position is that the

action of the directors was ratified by the stockholders.

in the stockholders-a complete answer to this positioh is that the
action of the directors was ratified by the stockholders.
D ecree ajfirmed.

Decree affirmed.

Note. Corporations have the power to alienate property, generally without

special authority, and to any extent, if creditors, or dissenting shareholders, are

not injuriously affected: 1838, Ref. Prot. Dutch Church v. Mott, 7 Paige Ch.

Note. Corporations have the power to alienate property, generally without
special authority, and to any exte nt, if creditors, or dissenting shareholders, are
n ot injuriously affected: 1838, Ref. Prot. Dutch Church v. Mott, 7 Paige Cb.
(N. Y ) 77, 32 Am. Dec. 613; 1840, Burrill v. Nahant Bauk, 21\Ietc. (Mass.) 163,
35 Am. Dec. 395; 1856, Old Colony R. Co. v. Evans, 6 Gray rMass.J 25, 66 Am.
Dec. 39.J.; 1856, Treadwell v. Salisbury Mf~. Co ., 7 Gray (Mass.) 393, 66 Am.
Dec. 4\JO, infra, p. 1787; 186\J, M.iners Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach, 37Cal. 543, 99 Am
Dec. 300; 1888, Statev. Western, etc., Co.,40Kan. 96, 10 Am. St. R. H:i6; 1891,
Finch v. Ullman, 105 Mo. 2.55, 24 Am. St. R. 383; 1891, Holmes Mfg. Co . v.
Holmer; Metal, etc., Co., 127 N. Y. 252, 24 Am. St. R. 448; 1892.l Uniou Pacific
H.. Co. v. C., R. I. & P.R., 51 Fed. Rep. 309; 1894, Benbow v. t;ook, Jl5 N. C.
324, 44 Am. St. R. 4.'54; 1897, Bartholomew v. Derby Rubber Co., 69 Conn.
521, 61 Am. St. R. 57; 181J8, Central Trust Co. v. W. N. C. R. Co., 89 Fed.
Rep. 24; 1898, Risdon Iron & L. W . v. Citizens' Traction C'o., 122 Cal. 94, 54 Pac.
Rtip. 529 (rolling stock); 1899, Stockton v. Am. Tobacco Co., 55 N. J. Eq. 352;
1899, Michigan Tel. Co. v. City of St.Joseph, 121Mich.502, 80 N. W . Rep. 383;
1900, City of Spokane v. Amsterdamsch, etc., - Wash.-, 60 Pac. Rep. 141;
1900, Hamilton v. MenominE>e Falls Quarry Co., - Wis.-, 81 N. W. Rep.
876; 1900, Advance Benev. Order v. Penn. Safe D. & T. Co., - Pa. - , 46
. ~ti. Rep. 102. But see, infra, § 619, as to power of majority to sell withouL
•·unse nt of minority of shareholders. Also infra, § 639, as creditors' rights to
1·omplain.

(N.Y)77,32 Am. Dec.613; 1840, Burrillv. Nahant Bank,2 Mete. (Mass.) 163,

35 Am. Dec. 395; 1856, Old Colony R. Co. v. Evans, 6 Gray 1 Mass.) 25, 66 Am.

Dec. 394; 1856, Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 7 Gray (Mass.) 393, 66 Am.

Dec. 490, infra, p. 1787; 1869, Miners Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach, 37Cal. 543,99 Am

Dec. 300; 1888, State v. Western, etc., Co. ,40 Kan. 96,10 Am. St. R. 166; 1891,

Finch v. Ullman, 105 Mo. 255, 24 Am. St. R. 383; 1891, Holmes Mfg. Co. v.

Holmes Metal, etc., Co., 127 N. Y. 252, 24 Am. St. R. 448; 1892. Union Pacific

R. Co. v. C, R. I. & P. R., 51 Fed. Rep. 309; 1894, Benbow v. Cook, 115 N. C.

324, 44 Am. St. R. 454; 1897, Bartholomew v. Derby Rubber Co., 69 Conn.

521, 61 Am. St. R. 57; 1898, Central Trust Co. v. W. N. C. R. Co., 89 Fed.

Rep. 24; 1898, Risdon Iron & L. W. v. Citizens' Traction Co., 122 Cal. 94,54 Pac.

Rep. 529 (rolling stock); 1899, Stockton v. Am. Tobacco Co., 55 N.J. Eq. 352;
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1899, Michigan Tel. Co. v. City of St. Joseph, 121 Mich. 502, 80 N. W. Rep. 383;

1900, City of Spokane v. Amsterdamsch, etc., — Wash. —, 60 Pac. Rep. 141;

1900, Hamilton v. Menominee Falls Quarry Co., - Wis. —, 81 N. W. Rep.

876; 1900, Advance Benev. Order v. Penn." Safe D. & T. Co., — Pa. —, 46

.\tl. Rep. 102. But see, infra, § 619, as to power of majority to sell without

consent of minority of shareholders. Also infra, § 639, as creditors' rights to

complain.

Sec. 307. (b) Limits.

PEOPLE v. BALLARD Et al."

Sec. 307. (b) Limits.

1892. In the Court of Appeals of New York. 134 N. Y.

Rep. 269-305.

Vann, J. In 1880 the Spring Valley Hydraulic Gold Company

PEbPLE v. BALLARD ET

AL. 1

was organized as a corporation under the general manufacturing act

of this state, and shortly thereafter it invested substantially all its cap-

1892.

ital in certain mines in the state of California, and until the year 1886

IN THE CouRT

OF APPEALS OF

NEW

YoRK.

134 N . Y.

Rep. 269-305.

operated the same as its sole business. The object for which it was

formed, as stated in the certificate of incorporation, was to carry on

VANN , J. In 1880 the Spring V alley Hydraulic Gold Compa ny
was organized as a corporation under the general manufacturing act
of this state, and shortly thereafter it invested substantially all its capital in ce rtain mines in the state of California, and until the year 1886
operated the same as its sole business. The object for which it was
formed, as stated in the certificate of incorporation, was to carry on
the business of mining various precious ores, and to smelt, refine and
sell the product.
In July, 1886, the defendant trustees transferred all its property,
both real and personal, including said mines, to a corp_oration organized at the time under the laws of the state of California, for the
purpose of carry ing on the business theretofore conducted by the defendant company and of taking title to its assets. This was done with
the approval of stockholders holding a majority of the stock, in good
faith, to save the property from sacrifice, but without the consent of
the holders of a large number of shares and against the protest of
some of the stockholders. The sole considerntion for such transfer
1 Part of opi nion of Vann, J ., and all of dissenting opinion of Landon , J.

the business of mining various precious ores, and to smelt, refine and

sell the product.

In July, 1886, the defendant trustees transferred all its property,

both real and personal, including said mines, to a corporation organ-

ized at the time under the laws of the state of California, for the

purpose of carrying on the business theretofore conducted by the de-

fendant company and of taking title to its assets. This was done with

the approval of stockholders holding a majority of the stock, in good

faith, to save the property from sacrifice, but without the consent of

the holders of a large number of shares and against the protest of

some of the stockholders. The sole consideration for such transfer

1 Part of opinion of Vann, J., and all of dissenting opinion of Landon, J.

(with whom Brown, J., concurred), omitted.

(with whom Brown, J., concurred), omitted.
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was an agreement by the California company to pay the debts of the

POWER TO ALIENATE.

New York company and to issue to it certain shares of its capital

stock. A majority of the directors of the former company were, and

still are, residents of California, and the only object of the transaction

was, without a dissolution, to reorganize the defendant company un-

der the laws of another state in order to obtain some real or supposed

advantage afforded thereby. The attorney-general commenced this

action to remove the trustees and to compel them to account for the

property thus transferred, but the special term dismissed the complaint

because no one was joined as a relator and the general term affirmed

the judgment, one of its learned justices dissenting.

This appeal presents two questions of grave importance:

1. Whether an action for the judicial supervision of a business cor-

poration, its officers and members can be maintained by the attorney-

general in the name of the people without a relator? (People v.

Lowe, 47 Hun 577; People v. Bruff, 9 Abb. [N. C] 153.)

2. Whether a corporation created by the laws of this state can be

reorganized under the laws of another state without the process of law-

ful dissolution. • * »
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(After holding that the New York statutes allowed the proceeding

by the attorney-general alone, proceeds:)

A corporation is purely artificial, having no natural or inherent

power, but only such as its charter confers. The charter of the cor-

poration in question was the statute under which it was organized.

Upon filing the certificate of incorporation it came into existence with

power to do only that which is expressly or impliedly authorized by

the statute. It had no power to act, except through its trustees, who

were authorized to manage its "stock, property and concerns," and

a majority of whom were required to be citizens of this state. (Laws

of 1848, ch. 40, as amended by Laws of 1869, ch. 269.) While they

were authorized to conduct its affairs, they were not authorized to

terminate its existence, although, under special circumstances, the

courts could dissolve it upon their application. (Code of Civ. Pro.,

§ 2419.) A corporation can not cease to exist of its own will. Its

life continues until either the charter period has expired or the court

has decreed a dissolution. The law made it, and the law only can

put an end to it. As it can not take its own life directly, it can not

do so indirectly, for that would be a fraud upon the law and against

public policy. By the transaction complained of the defendant com-

pany was stripped of all its property, and thus prevented from going

on in business and deprived of all means of carrying into effect the

object of its existence. While a corporation may sell its property to

pay debts, or to carry on its business, it can not sell its property in

order to deprive itself of existence. It can not sell all its property to

a foreign corporation organized through its procurement, with a ma-

jority of non-resident trustees, for the express purpose of stepping into

its shoes, taking all its assets and carrying on its business. That

would be the practical destruction of the corporation by its own act,

which the law will not tolerate. Whether the process by which it

was an agreement by the California company to pay the debts of the
New York company and to issue to it certain shares of its capital
stock. A majority of the directors of the former company were, and
still are, residents of California, and the only object of the transaction
was, without a dissolution, to reorganize the defendant company un- der the laws of another state in order to obtain some real or supposed
advantage afforded thereby. The attorney-general commenced this
action to remove the trustees and to compel them to account for the
property thus transferred, but the special term dismissed the complaint
because no one was joined as a relator and the general term affirmed
the judgment, one of its learned justices dissenting.
This appeal presents two questions of grave importance :
1. Whether an action for the judicial supervision of a business corporation, its officers and members can be maintained by the attorneygeneral in the name of the people without a relator? (P(:ople v.
Lowe, 47 Hun 577; People v. Bruff, 9 Abb. [N. C.J 153.)
2. vVhether a corporation created by the laws of this state can be
reorganized under the laws of another state without the process of lawful dissolution. • • •
(After holding that the New Y ork statutes allo\'.red the proceeding
by the attorney-general alone, proceeds:)
A corporation is purely artificial, having no natural or inherent
power, but only such as its charter confers. The charter of the corporation in question was the statute under which it was organized.
Upon filing the certificate of incorporation it came into existence with
power to do only that }Vhich is expressly or impliedly authorized by
the statute. It had no power to act, except through its trustees, who
were authorized to manage its "stock, property aud concerns," and
a majority of whom were required to be citizens of this state. (Laws
of 1848, ch. 40, as amended by Laws of 1869, ch. 269.) \Vhile they
were authorized to conduct its affairs, they were not authorized to
terminate its existence, although, under special circum stances, the
courts could dissolve it upon their application. (Code of Civ. Pro.,
§ 2+ r9.) A corporation can not cease to exist of its own will. Its
life continues until either the charter period has expired or the court
has decreed a dissolution. The law made it, and the law only can
put an end to it. As it can not take its own life directly, it can not
do so indirectly, for that would be a fraud upon the law and against
public policy. By the transaction complained of the defendant company was stripped of all its property, and thus prevented from going
on in business and deprived of all means of carry ing into effect the
object of its existence. While a corporation m:iy sell its property to
pay debts , or to carry on its business, it can not sell its property in
order to deprive itself of existence. It can not sell all its property to
a foreign corporation org~nized through its procurement, with a majority of non-resident trustees, for the express purpose of stepping into
its shoes, taking all its assets and carrying on its business. That
would be the practical destruction · of the corporation by its own act,
which the law will not tolerate. Whether the process by which it
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corporation is called reorganization, consolidation or amalgamation,

it was the exercise of a power not delegated, and was void. It was

was sought to convert the New York corporation into a California
corporation is called reorganization, consolidation or amalgamation,
it was the exercise of a power not delegated, and was void. It was
corporate burial in New York for resurrection in California. While
the stockholders who consented may be estopped by their acts, those
who did not consent can take advantage of this violation of their
rights, and in the state of New York can demand that those who did
the wrong shall make restitution.
The case of Abbott v. American Hard Rubber Company (33 Barb.
578) 1 is the lead ing authority upon the subject in this state, and it is
also recognized as the leading authority in most of the states. In
that case a majority of the trustees of a business corporation, without
the consent of some of the stockhold~rs, transferred all its personal
property, which was especially adapted to its business, to two persons,
who forthwith caused another corporation to be formed, and transferred such property to it. It was held that, as such transfer practically
terminated the corporation by taking from it the power to fulfill the
object of its organizatio11, it was a violation of that object, was not
within the power of the trustees, and was hence void as ulta vires.
Tht! case was elaborately considered both at general and special term,
and we regard it as a sound and valuable authority.
A somewhat similar question was under consideration in Frothingham v. Barney (6 Hun 366), where the court said: "This, as a business
arrangement, was wise, discreet and sagacious. As such it should be
sustained if it legally is possible. The interests of one or two small
stockholders should not enable them to work .the destruction of the
interests of co-owners, or compel the purchase of their stock at fictitious or unreal prices, if it can be avoided. • • • Upon the dissolution of the association, it became the duty of the trustees to convert the assets into money and distribute the proceeds among the
stockholders. To a certain extent this has been done. A portion of
such assets has not been distributed, and another portion, including
the good will of the old association, has been exchanged by the trustees for the corporate stock of a new Wells, Fargo & Co. This, as I
understand, the trustees had no right to do. They had no right to
exchange the assets of the old association for the corporate stock of
any corporation without the consent of all the stockholders. (Mann
v. Butler, 2 Barb. Ch. 362.) Equally were they without authority
in making this partial exchange without such consent. Stockholders
of the old association could not thus, against their will, be forced into
relations with the new company. (Blatchford v. Ross, 54 Barb. 42 i
H. & N. H. R. Co. v. Croswell, 5 Hill 383, 386.)"
In Taylor v. Earle (8 Hun 1) , a New York corporation, by the
vote of a large majority of its stockholders, sold all its property, except cash on hand, mills and franchises, to a Vermont corporation
and took in payment shares of stock in the latter company. The
court said: "The whole scheme of the transfer and its execution was
illegal. There is no power given 'by the acts under which the Burlington cotton mills (the New York corporation) was incorporated

corporate burial in New York for resurrection in California. While

the stockholders who consented may be estopped by their acts, those

who did not consent can take advantage of this violation of their

rights, and in the state of New York can demand that those who did

the wrong shall make restitution.

The case of Abbott v. American Hard Rubber Company (33 Barb.

578), is the leading authority upon the subject in this state, and it is

also recognized as the leading authority in most of the states. In

that case a majority of the trustees of a business corporation, without

the consent of some of the stockholders, transferred all its personal

property, which was especially adapted to its business, to two persons,

who forthwith caused another corporation to be formed, and trans-

ferred such property to it. It was held that, as such transfer practically

terminated the corporation by taking from it the power to fulfill the

object of its organization, it was a violation of that object, was not

within the power of the trustees, and was hence void as ulta vires.
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The case was elaborately considered both at general and special term,

and we regard it as a sound and valuable authority.

A somewhat similar question was under consideration in Frothing-

ham v. Barney (6 Hun 366), where the court said: "This, as a business

arrangement, was wise, discreet and sagacious. As such it should be

sustained if it legally is possible. The interests of one or two small

stockholders should not enable them to work .the destruction of the

interests of co-owners, or compel the purchase of their stock at ficti-

tious or unreal prices, if it can be avoided. * * * Upon the dis-

solution of the association, it became the duty of the trustees to con-

vert the assets into money and distribute the proceeds among the

stockholders. To a certain extent this has been done. A portion of

such assets has not been distributed, and another portion, including

the good will of the old association, has been exchanged by the trus-

tees for the corporate stock of a new Wells, Fargo & Co. This, as I

understand, the trustees had no right to do. They had no right to

exchange the assets of the old association for the corporate stock of

any corporation without the consent of all the stockholders. (Mann

v. Butler, 2 Barb. Ch. 362.) Equally were they without authority

in making this partial exchange without such consent. Stockholders

of the old association could not thus, against their will, be forced into

relations with the new company. (Blatchford v. Ross, 54 Barb. 42;

H. & N. H. R. Co. v. Croswell, 5 Hill 383, 386.)*'

In Taylor v. Earle (8 Hun 1), a New York corporation, by the

vote of a large majority of its stockholders, sold all its property, ex-

cept cash on hand, mills and franchises, to a Vermont corporation

and took in payment shares of stock in the latter company. The

court said: "The whole scheme of the transfer and its execution was

illegal. There is no power given by the acts under which the Bur-

lington cotton mills (the New York corporation) was incorporated
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to transfer all its property and thus terminate its existence, and take

in payment stock in a company carrying on the same business with a

different name, charter and stockholders, and being a foreign corpo-

ration. The corporation, by the New York law, could increase or

diminsh its stock, or extend its business to other objects, but that falls

far short, I think, of the sweeping power exercised on this occasion.

The sale was not real. It was a mere form to turn a New York cor-

poration into a Vermont one, and thus escape the scrutiny into the

affairs of the company permitted by the New York law to the stock-

holders."

All the authorities in this state are uniform in holding that the trus-

tees of a corporation can not so dispose of its property as to virtually

end its existence and prevent it from carrying on the business for

which it was incorporated. (Blatchford v. Ross, 54 Barb. 42; Cope-'

land v. Citizens' Gas Light Co., 61 Barb. 60; Smith v. New York

Consolidated Stage Co., 18 Abb. Pr. 419; Metropolitan El. Ry. Co.

v. Manhattan El. Ry. Co., 14 Abb. [N. C] 303; Hartford, etc.,

R. R. Co. v. Croswell, 5 Hill 383.)
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Other courts of the highest standing have laid down the same rule.

(Railway Co. v. Allerton, 85 U. S. 233; Stevens v. Rutland, etc.,

R. R. Co., 29 Vt. 545; New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co. v. Harris, 27

Miss. 517; see, also, Morawetz on Corporations, § 413; Spelling on

Corporations, § 1012; Cook on Stock and Corporation Law, § 667;

Beach on Corporations, §§ 358, 430).

The fact that the trustees acted in good faith did not empower

them to do an illegal act; and the fact that there may be some diffi-

culty in the final adjustment of rights, because some of the stock-

holders consented, while others did not, constitutes no defense to the

action. We see no greater difficulty, however, than would exist if

the action were brought by a trustee who had not consented to the act

complained of, and no reason why "the liability of the trustees to ac-

count" should not be "limited to those stockholders who have not

assented to the transfer."

We think that the transfer was unauthorized and void as to the

non-assenting stockholders, and as to the state, and that the people

can maintain the action in the name of sovereignty.

The judgment should, therefore, be reversed and a new trial

granted, with costs to abide event.

Note. Compare, 1889, People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 111. 268, 17 Am.

St. R. 319, 8 L. R. A. 497, supra, p. 1054; 1895, Coleman v. Howe, 154 111. 458,

45 Am. St. R. 133; 1896, Buck v. Ross, 68 Conn. 29, 57 Am. St. R. 61, infra, p.

1977; 1898, Sprague v. National Bank, 172 111. 149, 64 Am. St. R. 17; 1899, Hard-

ing v. Am. Glucose Co., 182 111. 551, 74 Am. St. R. 190; 1899, De La Vergna

Refrigerating Match Co. v. German Sav. Inst., 175 U. S. 40, 20Sup. Ct. Rep. 20.

to transfer all its property and thus terminate its existence, and take
in payment stock in a company carrying on the same business with a
different name, charter and stockholders, and being a foreign corporation. The corporation, by the New York law, could increase or
diminsh its stock, or extend its business to other objects, but that falls
far short, I think, of the sweeping power exercised on this occasion.
The sale was not real. It was a mere form to turn a New York corporation into a Vermont one, and thus escape the scrutiny into the
affairs of the company permitted by the New York law to the stockholders."
All the authorities in this state are uniform in holding that the trustees of a corporation can not so dispose of its property as to virtually
end its existence and prevent it from carrying 6n the business for
which it was incorporated. (Blatchford v. Ross, 54 Barb. 42; Cope-·
land v. Citizens' Gas Light Co., 61 Barb. 6o; Smith v. New York
Consolidated Stage Co., 18 Abb. Pr. 419; Metropolitan El. Ry. Co.
v. Manhattan El. Ry. Co., 14 Abb. [N. C.] 303; Hartford, etc.,
R. R. Co. v. Croswell, S Hill 383.)
Other courts of the highest standing have laid down the same rule.
(Railway Co. v. Allerton, 85 U. S. 233; Stevens v. Rutland, etc.,
R. R. Co., 29 Vt. 545; New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co. v. Harris, 27
Miss. 517; see, also, Morawetz on Corporations, § 413; Spelling on
Corporations, § 1012; Cook on Stock and Corporation Law, § 667;
Beach on Corporations, §§ 358, 430).
The fact that the trustees acted in good faith did not empower
them to do an illegal act; and the fact that there may be some difficulty in the final adjustment of rights, because some of the stockholders consented, while others did not, constitutes no defense to the
action. We see no greater difficulty, however, than would exist if
the action were brought by a trustee who had not consented to the act
complained of, and no reason why "the liability of the trustees to account" should not be "limited to those stockholders who have not
assented to the transfer."
We think that the transfer was unauthorized and void as to the
non-assenting stockholders, and as to the state, and that the people
can maintain the action in the name of sovereignty.
The judgment should, therefore, be reversed and a new trial
granted, with costs to abide event.
Note. Compare, 1889, People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 17 Am.
St. R. 319, 8 L. R. A. 497, supra, p. 1054; 1895, Coleman v. Howe, 154 lll. 458,
45 Am. St. R. 133; 1896, Buck v. Ross, 68 Conn. 29, 57 Am. St. R. 61, infra, p.
1977; 1898, Sprague v. National Bank, 17i Ill. 149, 64 Am. St. R. 17; 1899, Hard·
ing v. Am. Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551, 74 Am. St. R. 190; 1899 De La Vergne
Refrigerating Mat.ch Co. v. German Sav. Inst., 175 U ..S. 40, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 20.
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Sec. 308. (c) Same. Property charged with public trust can

not be sold without special authority.

Sec. 308.

( c) Same. Property charged with public trust can
not be sold without special authority.

HOAR, J., in COMMONWEALTH v. SMITH.

1865. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 10

Allen (Mass.) 448, on 455-6, 87 Am. Dec. 672, on 674-5.

[Bill in equity by the state as the owner of prior mortgage on the

HOAR, J.,

property of the Troy and Greenfield Railroad Company, to impeach

IN

COMMONWEALTH v. SMITH.

the validity of a mortgage executed by that company to Smith as

trustee, covering the franchise and property of the railroad company

1865.

then owned, or afterward acquired, to secure bonds to the amount of

IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

IO

Allen (Mass.) 448, on 455-6, 87 Am. Dec. 672, on 674-5.

$900,000 to be issued to the contractor as part compensation for the

construction of the road.]

There seems to be no reason why a railroad corporation should not

[Bill in equity by the state as the owner of prior mortgage on the
property of the Troy and Greenfield Railroad Company, to impeach
the validity of a mortgage executed by that company to Smith a
trustee, covering the franchise and property of the railroad company
' then owned , or afterward acquired, to secure bonds to the amount of
$900,000 to be issued to the contractor as part compensation for the
construction of the road. J
There seems to be no reason why a railroad corporation should not
be considered as having power to make a bond for any purpose for
which it may lawfully contract a debt, without any special authority
to that effect, unless restrained by some restriction, express or implied, in its charter, or in some other legislative act. A bond is
merely an obligation under seal. A corporation having the capacity
to sue and be sued, the right to make contracts, under which it may
incur debts, an<l the right to make and use a common seal, a contract
under seal is not only within the scope of its powers, but was originally the usual and peculiarly appropriate form of corporate agreement. The general power to di1;pose of and alienate its property i
also incidental to every corporation not restricted in this respect hy
express legislation, or by ''the purposes for which it is created, and
the nature of the duties and liabilities imposed by its charter." Treadwell v. Salisbury Manufacturing Co., 7 Gray 404.
But in the case of a railroad company, created for the express and
sole purpose of constructing, owning and managing a railroad; authorized to take land for this public purpose un<ler the right of eminent domain ; whose powers are to be exercised by officers ex pre, sly
designated by statute; having public duties, the discharge of which
i the leading object of its creation; required to make returns to the
legislature; there are certainly great, and, in our opinion, insuperable
objections to the doctrine that its franchise can be alienated, and its
powers and privileges conferred by its own act upon another.person
or body, without authority other than that derived from the fact
of its own incorporation. The franchise to be a corporation clearly
can not be transferred by any corporate body, of its own will. Such
a franchise is not, in its own nature, transmissible. The power to
mortgage can only be coextensive with the power to alienate absolutely, because every mortgage may become an absolute conveyance
by foreclosure. And although the franchise to exist as a corporation

be considered as having power to make a bond for any purpose for

which it may lawfully contract a debt, without any special authority

to that effect, unless restrained by some restriction, express or im-

plied, in its charter, or in some other legislative act. A bond is

merely an obligation under seal. A corporation having the capacity
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to sue and be sued, the right to make contracts, under which it may

incur debts, and the right to make and use a common seal, a contract

tinder seal is not only within the scope of its powers, but was orig-

inally the usual and peculiarly appropriate form of corporate agree-

ment. The general power to dispose of and alienate its property is

also incidental to every corporation not restricted in this respect by

express legislation, or by ''the purposes for which it is created, and

the nature of the duties and liabilities imposed by its charter." Tread-

well v. Salisbury Manufacturing Co., 7 Gray 404.

But in the case of a railroad company, created for the express and

sole purpose of constructing, owning and managing a railroad; au-

thorized to take land for this public purpose under the right of emi-

nent domain; whose powers are to be exercised by officers expressly

designated by statute; having public duties, the discharge of which

is the leading object of its creation; required to make returns to the

legislature; there are certainly great, and, in our opinion, insuperable

objections to the doctrine that its franchise can be alienated, and its

powers and privileges conferred by its own act upon another-person

or body, without authority other than that derived from the fact

of its own incorporation. The franchise to be a corporation clearly

can not be transferred by any corporate body, of its own will. Such

a franchise is not, in its own nature, transmissible. The power to

mortgage can only be coextensive with the power to alienate abso-

lutely, because every mortgage may become an absolute conveyance

by foreclosure. And although the franchise to exist as a corporation
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is distinguishable from the franchises to be enjoyed and used by the

•

corporation after its creation, yet the transfer of the latter differs es-

POWER TO ALIENATE.

sentially from the mere alienation of ordinary corporate property.

The right of a railroad company to continue in being depends upon

the performance of its public duties. Having once established its

road, if that and its franchise of managing, using and taking tolls or

fares upon the same are alienated, its whole power to perform its most

important functions is at an end.- A manufacturing company may

sell its mill and buy another; but a railroad company can not make a

new railroad at its pleasure.

See note at end of next case.

Sec. 309. Mame.

BRUNSWICK GAS LIGHT COMPANY v. UNITED GAS, FUEL AND

LIGHT COMPANY."

1893. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 85 Maine

is distinguishable from the franchises to be enjoyed and used by the
corporation after its creation, yet the transfer of the latter differs essentially from the mere alienation of ordinary corporate property.
The right of a railroad company to continue in being depends upon
the performance of its public duties. Having once established its
road, if that and its franchise of managing, using and taking tolls or
fares upon the same are alienated, its whole power to perform its most
important functions is at an end: A manufacturing company may
sell it. mill and buy another; but a railroad company can not make a
new railroad at its pleasure.
See note at end of next case.

ReP- 532-54!. 35 Am- St- ReP- 385-

[Action to recover damages for breach of the covenants in a lease.

The defense was that the plaintiff, being a corporation that owed a

duty to the public, had no legal right to lease such property as dis-

Sec. 309.

~a.me.
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abled it from performing this duty.]

Walton, J. The question is whether a gas company, which pos-

sesses and exercises the right to lay its pipes in the public streets, can

BRUNSWICK GAS LIGHT COMPA1'TY v. UNITED GAS, FUEL AND
LIGHT COMPANY.I

sell, lease or assign its corporate rights and privileges to another gas

company without the consent of the legislature.

We think the question must be answered in the negative. Cor-

1893.

porations possessing and exercising the right of eminent domain, owe

IN THE SUPREME JuDICIAL CouRT OF MAINE.
Rep. 532-54 r, 35 Am. St. Rep. 385.

85 Maine

duties to the public from the performance of which they are not al-

lowed to escape by a sale or lease of their franchises, without first

obtaining the consent of the legislature. The franchise of a corpora-

tion having the right to receive tolls may be levied on to satisfy an

execution against the corporation, and in this way it may be deprived

of its corporate powers and privileges. And they may be lost by the

foreclosure of a legally executed mortgage. And they may also be

lost by laches in reclaiming them when they have been illegally sold,

leased or assigned. But subject to these well-defined exceptions, it is

now settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that public or

quasi-public corporations, which possess and exercise the right of

eminent domain, or its equivalent, owe duties to the public, as well

as to their stockholders; and that they can not sell or lease their cor-

porate powers and privileges, and thereby disable themselves from

performing their public duties, without legislative authority. It is the

duty of gas companies, water companies, electric light companies,

1 Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.

[Action to recover damages for breach of the covenants in a lease.
The defense was that the plaintiff, being a corporation that owed a
duty to the public, had no legal right to lease such property as disabled it from performing this duty.]
WALTON, J. The question is whether a gas company, which possesses and exercises the right to lay its pipes in the public streets, can
sell, lease or assign its corporate rights and privileges to another gas
company without the consent of the legislature.
We think the question must be answered in the negative. Corporations possessing and exercising the right of eminent domain, owe
duties to the public from the performance of which they are not allowed to escape by a sale or lease of their franchises, without first
obtaining the consent of the legislature. The franchise of a corporation having the right to receive tolls may be levied on to satisfy an
execution against the corporation, and in this way it may be deprived
of its corporate powers and privileges. And they may be lost by the
foreclosure of a legally executed mortgage. And they may also be
lost by !aches in reclaiming them when they have been illegally sold,
leased or assigned. But subject to these well-de fined exceptions, it is
now settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that public or
quasi-public corporations, which possess and exercise the right of
eminent domain, or its equivalent, owe duties to the public, as well
as to their stockholders; and that they can not sell or lease their corporate powers and privileges, and thereby disable themselves from
performing their public duties, without legislative authority. It is the
duty of gas companies, water companies, electric light companies,
1

Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.
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telegraph and telephone companies, street railway companies, and all

similar corporations, which have obtained the right to use the public

1072

streets for the erection or extension of their works, to serve the public

BRUNSWICK G. L. CO. V. UNITED G., F. AND L. CO.

§ 309

faithfully and impartially, and at reasonable rates. And this is a duty

telegraph and telephone companies, street railway companies, and all
similar corporations, which have obtained the right to use the public
streets for the erection or extension of their works, to serve the public
faithfully and impartially, and at reasonable rates. And this is a duty
the performance of which may be enforced by the courts. And one
reason why these corporations are not allowed to sell or lease their
corporate powers and franchises, without legislative authority, is that
if they were able to do so, they might thereby disable themselves
from the performance of their public duties, and thus escape from the
power of the courts and of the legi slature to enforce their performance.
But a still more serious objection to the traffic in corporate franchises is the ease with which such a power could be used to create
monopolies. By its exercise, a single corporation could easily become possessed of the corporate powers and privileges of all its rivals,
and thereby annihilate competition and obtain a complete control of
the markets. Such combinations are usually hurtful, and sound public policy requires that they be kept under legislative supervision and
restraint.
To the argument that similar combinations may be made by individuals, it has been aptly replied that men are mortal, and their combinati9ns short-lived, but corporations are immortal, and their combinations and acquisitions may go on forever; that they may add field
to field, wealth to wealth, and power to power, till they become too
strong for the government itself; that all experience shows that such
accumulations of wealth and power are dangerous to the public welfare; and that while society can endure the accumulations and combinations of mortals, which must end at the grave, it can not endure
similar accumulations and combinations of power by corporations,
which may continue fore ver. • • •
( Citine: and commenting upon as supporting this view Stockton '"'
Central Railroad, 50 N. J. Eq. 52; Feitsam v. Hay, 122 Ill. 293; 1
People v. Chicago Gas Tmst, 130 Ill. 268; s People v. Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582".)
The law does not assume that all combinations of corporate powers and franchises are necessarily hurtful. It recognizes the fact that
they are sometimes beneficial, and provides a way by which they may
be lawfully made. But as such combinations are liable to be made
for improper purposes and with conditions annexed to them which
are inadmissible, sound public policy requires that they be made under legislative supervision and restraint.
In the present case the Brunswick Gas Light Company undertook
to lease all its property, and all its corporate rights and privileges, to
the United Gas, Fuel and Light Company for twenty-five years. The
latter company took possession of the works and held them for seventeen and a half months, making improvements upon them and pay-

the performance of which may be enforced by the courts. And one

reason why these corporations are not allowed to sell or lease their

corporate powers and franchises, without legislative authority, is that

if they were able to do so, they might thereby disable themselves

from the performance of their public duties, and thus escape from the

power of the courts and of the legislature to enforce their perform-

ance.

But a still more serious objection to the traffic in corporate fran-

chises is the ease with which such a power could be used to create

monopolies. By its exercise, a single corporation could easily be-

come possessed of the corporate powers and privileges of all its rivals,

and thereby annihilate competition and obtain a complete control of

the markets. Such combinations are usually hurtful, and sound pub-

lic policy requires that they be kept under legislative supervision and

restraint.

To the argument that similar combinations may be made by indi-
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viduals, it has been aptly replied that men are mortal, and their com-

binations short-lived, but corporations are immortal, and their com-

binations and acquisitions may go on forever; that they may add field

to field, wealth to wealth, and power to power, till they become too

strong for the government itself; that all experience shows that such

accumulations of wealth and power are dangerous to the public wel-

fare; and that while society can endure the accumulations and com-

binations of mortals, which must end at the grave, it can not endure

similar accumulations and combinations of power by corporations,

which may continue forever. * * *

(Citing and commenting upon as supporting this view Stockton v.

Central Railroad, 50 N. J. Eq. 52; Feitsam v. Hay, 122 111. 293;*

People v. Chicago Gas Trust, 130 HI. 268 ;3 People v. Sugar Re-

fining Co., 121 N. Y. 5SV.)

The law does not assume that all combinations of corporate pow-

ers and franchises are necessarily hurtful. It recognizes the fact that

they are sometimes beneficial, and provides a way by which they may

be lawfully made. But as such combinations are liable to be made

for improper purposes and with conditions annexed to them which

are inadmissible, sound public policy requires that they be made un-

der legislative supervision and restraint.

In the present case the Brunswick Gas Light Company undertook

to lease all its property, and all its corporate rights and privileges, to

the United Gas, Fuel and Light Company for twenty-five years. The

latter company took possession of the works and held them for sev-

enteen and a half months, making improvements upon them and pay-

■ Supra, p. 141. • Supra, p. 1054. • Supra, p. 100.

• Supra, p. 141.
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ing a portion of the agreed rent. It then abandoned the works, and
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possession was resumed by the lessors.

This is a suit by the lessors against the lessees for a breach of the

covenants contained in the lease. It was contended in defense that

the lease was illegal and void, and that no recovery could be had

upon it. The presiding justice ruled, as a matter of law, that the

plaintiff company and the defendant company had power to execute

the lease, and that a recovery could be had for a breach of the cove-

nants contained in it. We think the ruling was erroneous. No legis-

lative authority for making the lease was shown, and, without such

authority, we think the lease must be regarded as ultra vires and

void. The authorities bearing upon the question are not in entire har-

mony; but the weight of authority seems to us to be overwhelm-

ingly in favor of this conclusion. See 2 Beach on Corporations,

sections 831 to 856, inclusive, and the six pages of authorities, -pro

and con, cited under the section last cited. The cases are too numer-

ous for citation here, and the few cases to which we have referred

will furnish a key to all of them.
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But it is claimed that, inasmuch as the defendant company took

and held possession of the plaintiff company's works by virtue of the

lease, ultra vires is no defense to an action to recover the agreed

rent. We do not doubt that the plaintiff company is entitled to re-

cover a reasonable rent for the time the defendant company actually

occupied the works; but do not think the amount can be measured

by the ultra vires agreement. We think that in such cases the recov-

ery must be had upon an implied agreement to pay a reasonable rent;

and that while the ultra vires agreement may be used as evidence, in

the nature of an admission, of what is a reasonable rent, it can not

be allowed to govern or control the amount. It seems to us that it

would be absurd to hold that the ulta vires lease is void and at the

same time hold that it governs the rights of the parties with respect

to the amount of rent to be recovered. A void instrument governs

nothing. We think the correct rule is the one stated by Mr. Justice

Gray, in a recent case in the United States Supreme Court. He said

that a contract made by a corporation which is unlawful and void, be-

cause beyond the scope of its corporate powers, does not by being

carried into execution become lawful and valid; and that the proper

remedy of the aggrieved party is to disaffirm the contract and sue to

recover as on a quantum meruit the value of what the defendant has

actually received the benefit of. Pittsburgh, etc,, v. Keokuk, etc.,

131 U. S. 371. We think this is the correct rule. 2 Beach on Corp.,

§ 423, and cases there cited.

Exceptions sustained.

Note. See, also, 1826, Ammant v. New Alex. Tp. R., 13 Serg. & R. (Pa.)

210, 15 Am. Dec. 593; 1845, 8usquehanna Canal Co. v. Bonham, 9 Watts &

8. 27, 42 Am. Dec. 315; 1859, Coe v. C. P. & I. R., 10 Ohio St. 372, 75 Am.

Dec. 518; 1880, Gooch v. McGee, 83 N. C. 59, 35 Am. Rep. 558; 1887, Chicago

Gaa L. Co. v. People G. L. Co., 121 111. 530, 19 Am. St. R. 663; 1892, Overton

Bridge Co. v. Means, 33 Neb. 857, 29 Am. St. R. 514; 1892, Union Pacific R.

68—Wil. Cas.

ing a portion of the agreed rent. It then abandoned the works, and
possession was resumed by the lessors.
This is a suit by the lessors against the lessees for a breach of the
covenants contained in the lease. It was contended in defense that
tht: lease was illegal and void, and that no recovery could be had
upon it. The presiding justice ruled, as a matter of law, that the
plaintiff company and the defendant company had power to execute
the lease, and that a recovery could be had for a breach of the covenants contained in it. We think the ruling was erroneous. No legisl~tive authority for making the lease was shown, and, without such
authority, we think the lease must be regarded as ultra vires and
void. The authorities oearing upon the question are not i~ entire harmony; but the weight of authority seems to us to be overwhelmingly in favor of this conclusion. See 2 Beach on Corporations,
sections 831 to 856, inclusive, and the six pages of authorities, pro
and con, cited under the section last cited. The cases are too numerous for citation here, and the few cases to which we have referred
will furnish a key to all of them.
But it is claimed thati inasmuch as the defendant company took
and held possession of the plaintiff company's works by virtue of the
lease, ultra vires is no defense to an action to recover the agreed
rent. We do not doubt that the plaintiff company is entitled to recover a reasonable rent for the time the defendant company actually
occupied the works; but do not think the amount can be measured
by the ultra vires agreement. We think that in such cases the recovery must be had upon an implied agreement to pay a reasonable rent;
and that while the ultra vires agreement may be used as evidence, in
the nature of an admission, of what is a reasonable rent, it can not
be allowed to govern or control the amount. It seems to us that it
would be absurd to hold that the ulta vires lease is void and at the
same time hold that it governs the rights of the parties with respect
to the amount of rent to be recovered. A void instrument governs
nothing. We think the correct rule is the one stated by Mr. Justice
Gray, in a recent case in the United States Supreme Court. He said
that a contract made by a corporation which is unlawful and void, because beyond the scope of its corporate powers, does not by being
carried into execution become lawful and valid ; and that the proper
remedy of the aggrieved party is to disaffirm the contract and sue to
recover as on a quantum merut"t the value of what the defendant has
actually received the benefit of. Pittsburgh, etc,, v. Keokuk, etc.,
131 U. S. 371. We think this is the correct rule. 2 Beach on Corp.,
§ 423, and cases there cited.
Exceptions sustained.
Note. See, also, 1825, Ammant v. New Alex. Tp. R., 13 Berg. & R. (Pa.)
210, 15 Am. Dec. 593; 1845, Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Bonham, 9 Watts &
S. Zl, 42 Am. Dec. 315; 1859, Coe v. C. P. & I. R., 10 Ohio St. 372, 75 Am.
Dec. 518; 1880, Gooch v. McGee, 83 N. C. 59, 35 Am. Rep. 558; 1887, Chicago
Gas L. Co. v. People G . L. Co., 121 Ill. 530, 19 Am . St. R. 663; 1892, Overton
Bridge Co. v. Means, 33 Neb. 857, 29 Am. St. R. 514; 1892, Union Pacific R.
68-W IL. CAB.
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Co. v. C, R. I. & P. R., 51 Fed. Rep. 309; 1893, Gardner v. Mobile, etc., R.

Co., 102 Ala. 635, 48 Am. St. R. 84; 1895, Reynolds v. Reynolds Lumber Co.,

Co. v. C., R. I. & P. R., 51 Fed. Rep. 309; 1893, Gardner v. Mobile, etc., R.
Co., 102 Ala.. 635, 48 Am. St. R. 84; 1895, Reynolds v. Reynolds Lumber Co.,
169 Pa. St. 626, 47 Am. St. R. 935; 1895, Bank v. Tanning Co., 170 Pa. St. 1;
1896, Johnson Co. v. Miller, 174 Pa. St. 605, 52 Am. St. R. 833; 1897, Smith
v. R. Co., 182 Pa.. St. 139; 1898, Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Citizens' Traction Co., 122 Cal. 94, 54 Pac. Rep. 529; 1899, Harding v. Am. Glucose
Co., 182 Ill . 551, 74 Am. St. R. 189.

169 Pa. St. 626, 47 Am. St. R. 935; 1895, Bank v. Tanning Co., 170 Pa. St. 1;

1896, Johnson Co. v. Miller, 174 Pa. St. 605, 52 Am. St. R. 833; 1897, Smith

v. R. Co., 182 Pa. St. 139; 1898, Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Citi-

zens' Traction Co., 122 Cal. 94,54 Pac. Rep. 629; 1899, Harding v. Am. Glucose

Co., 182 111. 551, 74 Am. St. R. 189.

Sec. 310. Same, (d) Contra.

BULLITT, J., in BARDSTOWN and LOUISVILLE RAILROAD COM-

PANY v. METCALFE. •

1862. In the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. 4 Metcalfe (Ky.)

Sec. 310. Same. ( d)

Rep. 199, on pp. 206-210, 81 Am. Dec. 541, on 546-550.

Contra.

[The charter of the railroad company authorized its directors to

BULLITT, J.,

borrow money not exceeding $50.000; the board of directors author-

ized the president to borrow $30,000 from Metcalfe, and execute a

IN

BARDSTOWN AND LOUISVILLE RAILROAD COMP ANY v. METCALFE. •

mortgage upon the road and its property. This was done, default in

1862. IN THE CounT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY. 4 Metcalfe (Ky.)
Rep. 199, on pp. 206-210, 81 Am. Dec. 541, on 546-550.

payment made, foreclosure suit brought, and judgment that the road

be leased for eight years to the highest bidder, the rent to go to pay
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the debt, and if no one would lease, that the road be sold to the

f The charter of the railroad company authorized its directors to
borrow money not exceeding $50,000; the board of directors authorized the president to borrow $30,000 from Metcalfe, and execute a
mortgage upon the road and its property. This was done, default in
payment made , foreclosure suit brought, and judgment that the road
be leased for eight years to the highest bidder, the rent to go to pay
the debt, and if no one would lease, that the road be sold to the
highest bidder. Appeal was taken from this judgment.]
4. It is contended that the appellant had no power to mortgage its
road or franchises. This question, and the next one that we shall
consider, were raised by a general demurrer to the petition. Generally, a private corporation has an implied power. to do whatever may
be necessary to execute its express powers, and to accomplish the
purposes for which it was formed. The appellant was expressly authorized to borrow this money, but was not expressly authorize d to
n:iake a mortgage. Had it not an implied power to do so? It can
not be doubted that a manufacturing corporation having power, express or implied, to borrow money, might, unless expressly prohibited,
mortgage its property to secure the debt. But it is contended that a
railroad corporation stands upon a different footing, because its road
is built for public use as well as for the profit of its stockholders; that
it is under a duty to the public to keep its road in repair, and carry on
its business for the transportation of freight and passengers ; and that
it can not relieve itself from those duties by conveying its road away.
These views seem to be sustained by several English decisions. At
any rate, it seems to be settled in England that a railway company
can not, without express authority from parliament, assign or mortgage or lease its road, upon the ground that it is against public policy.
An examination of several of those cases does not enable us to state
the precise views of public policy out of which that doctrine sprung.
It probably arose in part of a general statute which is not in force
here. Judge Redfield, however, says: "The ground upon which
the decisions in England and America, which hold the franchises of

highest bidder. Appeal was taken from this judgment.]
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road or franchises. This question, and the next one that we shall
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These views seem to be sustained by several English decisions. At

any rate, it seems to be settled in England that a railway company

can not, without express authority from parliament, assign or mort-

gage or lease its road, upon the ground that it is against public policy.

An examination of several of those cases does not enable us to state

the precise views of public policy out of which that doctrine sprung.

It probably arose in part of a general statute which is not in force

here. Judge Redfield, however, says: "The ground upon which
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country, that such franchises are beyond the legislative control; namely,

that the charter constitutes a contract between the sovereignty and the

corporation, on the one part, for the grant of certain privileges and im-

munities, and upon the other, for the performance of certain duties

and functions which are deemed an equivalent or consideration. * * *

The state confers upon railways some of its most essential powers

of sovereignty, that of eminent domain, and of a virtual monopoly,

in the transportation of freight and passengers, and in return therefor

stipulates for the performance of those duties by the corporation.

The corporation have no more right in equity and justice to transfer

their obligations to other companies, or to natural persons, than the

state has to withdraw them altogether." Redfield on Railways, 422,

note 14.

The doctrine, according to Judge Redfield, rests upon the ground

that the corporation is under an obligation to the state to build and

operate its road. Such was formerly the rule in England, even as to

a railway corporation that had not made any express undertaking to
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that effect, and to which no exclusive privileges had been granted.

Redfield on Railways, section 192. But concerning that class of

cases, the doctrine seems to have been overruled in England, and has

never prevailed in America. Redfield on Railways, section 192, and

notes. The appellant did not expressly undertake to build the road

authorized by its charter; nor did its charter expressly declare that it

should do so; nor was any exclusive right to do so conferred upon it.

In our opinion, the appellant was not bound to commence the road,

nor to complete it after commencing, nor to put it in operation after

completion, nor to continue it in operation. It might have forfeited

its charter by non-user, but was not bound to use it. So long as it

shall avail itself of the privileges conferred by its charter, it will be

liable to the burdens thereby imposed. But, in our opinion, neither

the public nor any individual not connected with it can compel it to

exercise its corporate franchises, or make it pay damages for failing

to do so. The doctrine under consideration has, therefore, no founda-

tion in this case, if the ground on which it rests is earnestly stated by

Judge Redfield. Nor do we perceive any other solid ground on

which to place it.

We do not suppose that the appellant could mortgage its corporate

existence, or any prerogative franchise conferred upon it. But the

right to build and use a railroad is not a prerogative franchise. It

has, indeed, been said that "both currency and internal communica-

tion between different portions of the state are exclusively the pre-

rogatives of sovereignty"; Redfield on Railways, 23; and that "the

right to build and use a railroad, and take tolls or fares, is a franchise

of the prerogative character, which no person can legally exercise

without some special grant of the legislature"; Redfield on Rail-

ways, 23, note 1. Possibly these passages were not designed to

mean more than this: A road can not be made over the lands of un-

corporations not to be assignable, except by consent of the legislature,
rest is mainly the same as that upon which it has been held in this
country, that such franchises are beyond the legislative control; namely,
that the charter constitutes a contract between the sovereignty and the
corporation, on the one part, for the grant of certain privileges and immunities, and upon the other, for the performance of certain duties
and functions which are deemed an equivalent or consideration. • • •
The state confers upon railways some of its most essential powers
of sovereignty, that of eminent domain, and of a virtual monopoly,
in the transportation of freight and passengers, and in return therefor
stipulates for the performance of those duties by the corporation.
The corporation have no more right in equity and justice to transfer
their obligations to other companies, or to natural persons, than the
state has to withdraw them altogether." Redfield on Railways, 422,
note 14.
The doctrine, according to Judge Redfield, rests upon the ground
that the corporation is under an obligation to the state to build and
operate its road. Such was formerly the rule in England, even as to
a railway corporation that had not made any express undertaking to
that effect, and to which no exclusive privileges had been granted.
Redfield on Railways, section 192. But concerning that class of
cases, the doctrine seems to have been overruled in England, and has
never prevailed in America. Redfield on Railways, section 192, and
notes. The appellant did not expressly undertake to build the road
authorized by its charter; nor did its charter expressly declare that it
should do so; nor was any exclusive right to do so conferred upon it.
In our opinion, the appellant was not bound to commence the road,
nor to complete it after commencing, nor to put it in operation after
completion, nor to continue it in operation. It might have forfeited
its charter by non-user, but was not bound to use it. So long as it
shall avail itself of the privileges conferred by its charter, it will be
liable to the burdens thereby imposed. But, in our opinion, neither
the public nor any individual not connected with it can compel it to
exercise its corporate franchises, or make it pay damages for failing
to do so. The doctrine under consideration has, therefore, no foundation in this case, if the ground on which it rests is earnestly stated by
Judge Redfield. Nor do we perceive any other solid ground on
which to place it.
We do not suppose that the appellant could mortgage its· corporate
existence, or any prerogative franchise conferred upon it. But the
right to build and use a railroad is not a prerogative franchise. It
has, indeed, been said that "both currency and internal communication between different portions of the state are exclusively the prerogatives of sovereignty"; Redfield on Railways, 23; and that "the
right to build and use a railroad, and take tolls or fares, is a franchise
of the prerogative character, whic;:h no person can legally exercise
without some special grant of the legislature"; Redfield on Railways, 23, note I. Possibly these passages were not designed to
mean more than this: A road can not be made over the lands of un-
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state, in order to encourage internal improvements, may grant to a
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corporation or individual the exclusive right to build a road between

willing proprietors except under authority from the state; and the
state, in order to encourage internal improvements, may grant to a
corporation or individual the exclusive right to build a road between
two points. In the absence of any positive law upon the subject, our
opinion is that an individual has as much right to build a railroad
over his own land, or the land of others with their consent, as he has
to build a stage or a wagon; and as much right to use the former as the
latter in carrying freight and passengers for pay.
The denial of the right of a railroad corporation to transfer its
road has sometimes been based upon considerations of general convenience and public interest, and upon the ground that the corporation, having been chosen by the legislature as the fit depositary of the
right to construct and operate the road, should not be permitted to
transfer it to irresponsible parties. To this argument several objections present themselves. The appellant's directors, in authorizing
this mortgage to Metcalfe, declared themselves "satisfied that to
furnish and complete the road they will require the sum of thirty
thousand dollars in addition to the means at their command." Assuming, as we must do, that the loan was necessary to complete the
road, and assuming it to be probable, as we may do, that the loan
could not have been effected without a mortgage, considerations of
general convenience seem to be on the side of the power to make the
mortgage rather than against it.
The public had an interest in seeing the road constructed and operated according to the terms of the charter. But whether it shall be
thus operated by A or B, by an individual or corporation, does not
seem to be a matter of any interest whatever to the public. Under
the charter of the appellant, its road, while held by it, is under the
control of its stockholders. A single person, by purchasing all the
stock, can control the road as completely as if he owned it individually. A purchaser, under its mortgage, would take the road subject
to the terms of the charter designed to protect the public, and would
be bound thereby as fully as the corporation is.
We perceive no reason to suppose that a purchaser of all the property of appellant would be less responsible in a pecuniary point of
view than the appellant. Nor do we perceive any other reason to
suppose that the individual responsibility of the purchaser would not
be quite as beneficial to the public as the corporate responsibility of
the appellant. General convenience requires that the appellant shall
in some manner be compelled to pay the money it borrowed. But it is
contended that this should be done by merely subjecting the accruing
profits. To do that effectually it might be necessary to appoint a receiver to take charge of the road, because under the management of
the directors it is possible that no profits might accrue, while under a
different management the road might be profitable. Yet every argument against allowing the appellant to mortgage its road applies with
equal force against the appointment of a receiver to control it, with
perhaps the additional argument that a receiver would not be person•
ally liable, like a purchaser, ..as a common carrier.
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road, and assuming it to be probable, as we may do, that the loan
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That a mortgage by a railway company to secure money borrowed

for the construction of its road is not opposed to the public policy of
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this state is indicated by the general course of legislation upon the

subject. We believe that all the railroads in the state, except that of

the appellant, were constructed under charters authorizing such mort-

gages; and mortgages made by the Covington and Lexington Com-

pany and by the Lexington and Big Sandy Company, without express

authority either to make a mortgage or to borrow money, were after-

ward ratified by the legislature. And we are not aware of an instance

in which the legislature, when applied to, has refused to confer such

power or to ratify the exercise of it.

The facts that the appellant voluntarily mortgaged its property to

secure the money which it was expressly authorized to borrow, and

that the bondholders invested their money upon the faith of the mort-

gage, furnish, in our opinion, a sufficient distinction to relieve this

case from the operation of the distinction in the case of Winchester

and Lexington Turnpike Co. v. Vimont, 5 B. Monroe 1, in which it

was held that a turnpike road could not be sold for a general debt of

the corporation. If the decision in that case could be regarded as
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denying that property or franchises, in the use of which the public

have an interest, can be assigned, we might perhaps hesitate to follow

it, in view of several other decisions of this court. In Jouitt v. Lewis,

4 Litt. 160, the vendee of a turnpike road was held liable upon his

covenant to keep it in repair without any question being made as to

the validity of the sale. In Trustees of Maysville v. Boon, 2 J. J.

Marsh. 227, a ferry franchise was held to be alienable. And in Mc-

Cauley v. Givens, 1 Dana 261, a lease of a ferry under an order of

court was held to be valid. Our decision rests upon the ground that

the appellant, having been authorized to borrow this money, had im-

plied power to execute a mortgage to secure its payment. The Amer-

ican decisions cited in Pierce on Railroad Law, chapter 20, and Redfield

on Railways, section 235, note 19, present such a conflict of opinion

that we have felt free to consider the question as an open one, and

have not deemed it advisable to attempt to sustain our opinion by re-

ferring to cases which are perhaps counterbalanced by opposing au-

thorities. • • *

Reversed on another ground.

Compare, 1869, Miners' Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 643, 99 Am. Dec.

300; 1888, State v. Western, etc., Co., 40 Kan. 96, 10 Am. St. Rep. 166; 1899,

Michigan Telephone Co. v. St. Joseph, 121 Mich. 502, 80 Am. St. Rep. 520,

80 N. W. 383.

That a mortgage by a railway company to secure money borrowed
for the construction of its road is not opposed to the public policy of
this state is indicated by the general course of legislation upon the
subject. We believe that all the railroads in the state, except that of
the appellant, were constructed under charters authorizing such mortgages; and mortgages made by the Covington and Lexington Company and by the Lexington and Big Sandy Company, without express
authority either to make a mortgage or to borrow money, were after~
ward ratified by the legislature. And we are not aware of an instance
in which the legislature, when applied to, has refused to confer such
power or to ratify the exercise of it.
The facts that the appellant voluntarily mortgaged its property to
secure the money which it was expressly authorized to borrow, and
that the bondholders invested their money upon the faith of the mortgage, furnish, in our opinion, a sufficient distinction to relieve this
case from the operation of the distinction in the case of Winchester
and Lexington Turnpike Co. v. Vimont, 5 B. Monroe r, in which it
was held that a turnpike road could not be sold for a general debt of
the corporation. If the decision in that case could be regarded as
denying that property or franchises, in the use of which the public
have an interest, can be assigned, we might perhaps hesitate to follow
it, in view of several other decisions of this court. In Jouitt v. Lewis,
4 Litt. 16o, the vendee of a turnpike road was held liable upon his
covenant to keep it in repair without any question being made as to
the validity of the sale. In Trustees of Maysville v. Boon, 2 J. J.
Marsh. 227, a ferry franchise was held to be alienable. And in McCauley v. Givens, 1 Dana 261, a lease of a ferry under an order of
court was held to be valid. Our decision rests upon the ground that
the appellant, having been authorized to borrow this money, had implied power to execute a mortgage to secure its payment. The American decisions cited in Pierce on Railroad Law, chapter 20, and Redfield
on Railways, section 235, note 19 1 present such a conflict of opinion
that we have felt free to consider the question as an open one, and
have not deemed it advisable to attempt to sustain our opinion by referring to cases which are perhaps counterbalanced by opposing authorities. • • •
Reversed on another ground.
Compare, 1869, Miners' Ditch Co. v. ZeJJerbach, 37 Cal. 543, 99 Am. Dec.
800; 1888, State v. Western, etc., Co., 40 Kan. 96, 10 Am. St. Rep. 166; 1899,
Michigan Telephone Co. v. St. Joseph, 121 Mich. 502, 80 Am. St. Rep. 520,
80 N. W. 383.
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JONES V. GUARANTY AND INDEMNITY COMPANY.

§ Jll

1879. In the Supreme Court of the United States, ioi

U. S. Rep. 622-633.

Sec. 311. (e) Power to mortgage.

[Appeal from United States Circuit Court, E. D. New York. The

New York Kerosene Oil Co., and the New York Guaranty and In-

JONES v. GUARANTY AND INDEMNITY COMPANY.1

demnity Company were both New York corporations. In 1867, Coz-

zens, president of the oil company, applied to the guaranty company

for a loan for $100,000; this was agreed to, and $50,000 advanced;

1879.

and to secure the same, by agreement with Cozzens, a bond and mort-

IN

THE SUPREME

COURT OF

THE

UNITED

STATES.

IOI

U. S. Rep. 622-633.

gage were directed to be executed, after the written consent of the

holders of more than two-thirds of the stock of the oil company had

[Appeal from United States Circuit Court, E. D. New York. The
New York Kerosene Oil Co., and the New York Guaranty and Indemnity Company were both New York corporations. In 1867, Cozzens, president of the oil company, applied to the guaranty company
for a loan for $100 1000; this was agreed to, and .$50 1 000 advanced;
and to secure the same, by agreement with Cozzens, a bond and mortgage were directed to be executed, after the written consent of the
holders of more than two-thirds of the stock of the oil company had
been obtained. The mortgage was duly executed to secure a loan of
$100,000, and w as stated to be given to cover any advances then
made, or thereafter to be made by the guaranty company, to Cozzens
to the amount of $100 1000, on condition that whenever any sum '''a!;
so advanced the amount and date should be indorsed and signed by
Cozzens on the bond-and whenever he made any payment such sum
should also be indorsed on the bond. No dishonesty was alleged or
shown in the transactions, and the company had express authority to
secure its debts "contracted by it in the business for which it was incorporated, by mortgaging any or all of its real estate." The unsecured creditors, after the corporation became insolvent, attacked the
validity .of the mortgage. The circuit court sustained it, and this decision is brought here for review.]
MR. JusncE SWAYNE.
•
•
•
The central and controlling
questions to be determined are:
Whether the oil company had the power to give a mortgage for
future advances; and,
Whether the mortgage here in question is, in the view of a court of
equity, for the debt of the oil company or for the debt of Abraham
M. Cozzens.
The oral arguments of the eminent counsel who appeared before us
were addressed principally to these subjects. Numerous other points
are made by the counsel for the appellant in his brief, and have been
fully discussed in the printed arguments upon both sides. They are
minor in their character, and we think involve no proposition that admits of doubt as to its proper solution. We are satisfied with the
disposition made of them by the circuit court, and shall pass them by
without further remark.
At the common law, every corporation had, as incident to its existence, the power to acquire, hold and convey real estate, except so
far as it was restrained by its charter or by act of parliament. This
comprehensive capacity included also p ersonal effects of every kind.
1 Statement abridged.
Part of opinion omitted.

been obtained. The mortgage was duly executed to secure a loan of

$100,000, and was stated to be given to cover any advances then

made, or thereafter to be made by the guaranty company, to Cozzens

to the amount of $100,000, on condition that whenever any sum was

so advanced the amount and date should be indorsed and signed by

Cozzens on the bond—and whenever he made any payment such sum

should also be indorsed on the bond. No dishonesty was alleged or

shown in the transactions, and the company had express authority to
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secure its debts "contracted by it in the business for which it was in-

corporated, by mortgaging any or all of its real estate." The unse-

cured creditors, after the corporation became insolvent, attacked the

validity of the mortgage. The circuit court sustained it, and this de-

cision is brought here for review.]

Mr. Justice Swayne. * * * The central and controlling

questions to be determined are:

Whether the oil company had the power to give a mortgage for

future advances; and,

Whether the mortgage here in question is, in the view of a court of

equity, for the debt of the oil company or for the debt of Abraham

M. Cozzens.

The oral arguments of the eminent counsel who appeared before us

were addressed principally to these subjects. Numerous other points

are made by the counsel for the appellant in his brief, and have been

fully discussed in the printed arguments upon both sides. They are

minor in their character, and we think involve no proposition that ad-

mits of doubt as to its proper solution. We are satisfied with the

disposition made of them by the circuit court, and shall pass them by

without further remark.

At the common law, every corporation had, as incident to its ex-

istence, the power to acquire, hold and convey real estate, except so

far as it was restrained by its charter or by act of parliament. This

comprehensive capacity included also personal effects of every kind.

1 Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.
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The jus disponendi was without limit or qualification. It extended

1079

to mortgages given to secure the payment of debts. I Kyd Corp.,

69, 76, 7S, 108; Angell & Ames, § 145; 2 Kent Com., 283; Rey-

nolds v. Commissioners of Stark County, 5 Ohio 204; White-

water Valley Canal Co. v. Valette, 21 How. 414.

A mortgage for future advances was recognized as valid by the

common law. Gardner v. Graham, 7 Vin. Abr. 22, pi. 3. See

also, Brinkerhoff v. Marvin, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 320; Lawrence v.

Tucker, 23 How. 14.

It is believed that they are held valid throughout the United States,

except where forbidden by the local law.

The statute under which the oil company came into existence made

it "capable in law of purchasing, holding and conveying any real and

personal estate, whenever necessary to enable" it to carry on its busi-

ness: but it was forbidden to "mortgage the same, or give any lien

thereon." This disability was removed by the later act of 1864,

which expressly conferred the power before withheld. This change

was remedial, and the clause which gave it is, therefore, to be construed
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liberally with reference to the ends in view.

The learned counsel for the appellant insisted that a mortgage could

be competently given by the oil company only to secure a debt in-

curred in its business and already subsisting. This, we think, is too

narrow a construction of the language of the law. A thing may be

within a statute but not within its letter, or within the letter and yet

not within the statute. The intent of the lawmaker is the law. The

People v. Utica Insurance Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 358; United States

v. Babbit, 1 Black 55.

The view of the court in Thompson v. New York and Hudson

River Railroad Co., 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) Ch. 625, was sounder and

better law. There the charter authorized the corporation to build a

bridge. It found one already built that answered every purpose, and

bought it. The purchase was held to be intra vires and valid. Here

the object of the authorization is to enable the company to procure

the means to carry on its business. Why should it be required to go

into debt, and then borrow, if it could, instead of borrowing in ad-

vance and shaping its affairs accordingly? No sensible reason to the

contrary can be given. If it may borrow and give a mortgage for a

debt antecedently or contemporaneously created, why may it not thus

provide for future advances as it may need them? This may be more

economical and more beneficial than any other arrangement involving

the security authorized to be given. In both these latter cases the

ultimate result with respect to the security would be just the same as

if the mortgage were given for a pre-existing debt in literal compli-

ance with the statute. No one could be wronged or injured, while

the corporation, whom it was the purpose of the law to aid, might be

materially benefited. Is not such a departure within the meaning, if

not the letter, of the statute? There would be no more danger of

the abuse of the power conferred than if it were exercised in the man-

ner insisted upon. The safeguard provided in the required assent of

The jus disponendt' was without limit or qualification. It extended
to mortgages given to secure the payment of debts. 1 Kyd Corp.,
69, 76, 78, 108; Angell & Ames, § 145; 2 Kent Com., 282; Reynolds v. Commissioners of Stark County, 5 Ohio 204; Whitewater Valley Canal Co. v. Valette, 21 How. 414.
A mortgage for future advances was recognized as valid by the
common law. Gardner v. Graham, 7 Vin. Ahr. 22, pl. 3. See
also, Brinkerhoff v. Marvin, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 320; Lawrence v.
Tucker, 23 How. 14.
It is believed that they are held valid throughout the United States,
except where forbidden by the local law.
The statute under which the oil company came into existence made
it "capable in law of purchasing, holding and conveying any real and
personal estate, whenever necessary to enable" it to carry on its business: but it was forbidden to "mortgage the same, or give any lien
thereon." This disability was removed by the later act of 1864,
which expressly conferred the power before withheld. This change
was remedial, and the clause which gave it is, therefore, to be construed
liberally with reference to the ends in view.
The learned counsel for the appellant insisted that a mortgage could
be competently given by the oil company only to secure a debt incurred in its business and already subsisting. This, we think, is too
narrow a construction of the language of the law. A thing may be
within a statute but not within its letter, or within the letter and yet
not within the statute. The intent of the lawmaker is the law. The
People v. Utica Insurance Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 358; United States
v. Babbit, I Black 55.
The view of the court in Thompson v. New York and Hudson
River Railroad Co., 3 Sand£. (N. Y.) Ch. 625 , was sounder and
better law. There the charter authorized the corporation to build a
bridge. It found one already built that answered every purpose, and
bought it. The purchase was held to be t'ntra vt'res and valid. Here
the object of the authorization is to enable the company to procure
the means to carry on its business. Why should it be required to go
into debt, and then borrow, if it could, instead of borrowing in advance and shaping its affairs accordingly? No sensible reason to the
contrary can be given. If it may borrow and give a mortgage for a
debt antecedently or contemporaneously created, why may it not thus
provide for future advances as it may need them? This may be more
economical and more beneficial than any other arrangement involving
the security authorized to be given. In both these latter cases the
ultimate result with respect to the security would be just the same as
if the mortgage were given for a pre-existing debt in literal compliance with the statute. No one could be wronged or injured, while
the corporation, whom it was the purpose of the law to aid, might be
m aterially benefited. Is not such a departure within the meaning, if
not the letter, of the statute? There would be no more danger of
the abuse of the power conferred than if it were exercised in the manner insisted upon. The safeguard provided in the required assent of
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stockholders would apply with the same efficacy in all the cases. The

1080

object of the loan, the application of the money, and the restraints

JONES V. GUARANTY AND INDEMNITY COMPANY.

§JI I

imposed by the charter in those particulars, would be the same

whether the transaction took one form or the other. According to

stockholders would apply with the same efficacy in all the cases. The
object of the loan, the application of the money, and the restraints
imposed by the charter in those particulars, would be the same
whether the transaction took one form or the other. According to
our con truction the company could give no mortgage but one growing out of their business, and intended to aid them in carrying it on.
In legal effect the difference between the two constructions is one
merely of mode and manner, and not of substance.
Such securities are not contrary to the law or public policy of the
state. Many cases are found in her reported adjudications where
both judgments and mortgages for future advances have been sustained.
Our view is not without support from the language of the statute,
that "every mortgage so made shall be as valid to all intents and purposes as if executed by an individual owning such real estate." If
this mortgage had been given by individuals, the question we are examining doubtless would not have been brought before us for consideration.
When a deed is fatally defective for the want of a sufficient consider·
ation to support it, such a consideration subsequently arising may cure
the defect and give the instrument validity. Sumner v. Hicks, 2
Black 532. It is not necessary to go through the form of executing a
second deed to take the place of the first one. This principle applies
to the mortgage after all the advances had been made, conceding that
it had before been invalid for the reason insisted upon.
The statute of 1864 neither expressly forbids nor declares void mort·
gages for future advances.
If the one here in question be ultra vires, no one can take advan·
tage of the defect of power involved but the state. As to all other
parties it must be held valid, and may be enforced accordingly. Silver Lake Bank v. North, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 370; National Bank
v. Mathews, 98 U. S. 621. In the latter case this subject was fully
examined.
A corporation can act only by its agents If there were any such
technical defect as is claimed touching the execution of this mort·
gage, it has been cured by acquiescence and ratification by the mort·
gagor.
No one else can raise the question. All other parties are concluded.
Gordon v. Preston, 1 Watts (Pa.) 385.
Where money had been obtained by a corporation upon its securities, which were irregular and u.ltra vires, but the money was applied
for the benefit of the company, with Lhe knowledge and acquiescence
of the shareholders, the company and the shareholders were estopped
from denying the liability of the company to repay it. And the same
result follows where such securities are issued with the knowledge of
the shareholders, so far as the money thus raised is applied for the
benefit of the company. In re Cork & Youghal Railway Co., Law
Rep. 4 Ch. 748.
A court of equity abhors forfeitures, and will not lend its aid to

our construction the company could give no mortgage but one grow-

ing out of their business, and intended to aid them in carrying it on.

In legal effect the difference between the two constructions is one

merely of mode and manner, and not of substance.

Such securities are not contrary to the law or public policy of the

state. Many cases are found in her reported adjudications where

both judgments and mortgages for future advances have been sus-

tained.

Our view is not without support from the language of the statute,

that "every mortgage so made shall be as valid to all intents and pur-

poses as if executed by an individual owning such real estate." If

this mortgage had been given by individuals, the question we are ex-

amining doubtless would not have been brought before us for consid-

eration.

When a deed is fatally defective for the want of a sufficient consider-

ation to support it, such a consideration subsequently arising may cure
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the defect and give the instrument validity. Sumner v. Hicks, 3

Black 532. It is not necessary to go through the form of executing a

second deed to take the place of the first one. This principle applies

to the mortgage after all the advances had been made, conceding that

it had before been invalid for the reason insisted upon.

The statute of 1864 neither expressly forbids nor declares void mort-

gages for future advances.

If the one here in question be ultra vires, no one can take advan-

tage of the defect of power involved but the state. As to all othei

parties it must be held valid, and may be enforced accordingly. Sil-

ver Lake Bank v. North, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 370; National Bank

v. Mathews, 98 U. S. 621. In the latter case this subject was fully

examined.

A corporation can act only by its agents If there were any such

technical defect as is claimed touching the execution of this mort-

gage, it has been cured by acquiescence and ratification by the mort-

gagor.

No one else can raise the question. All other parties are concluded.

Gordon v. Preston, 1 Watts (Pa.) 385.

Where money had been obtained by a corporation upon its securi-

ties, which were irregular and ultra vires, but the money was applied

for the benefit of the company, with the knowledge and acquiescence

of the shareholders, the company and the shareholders were estopped

from denying the liability of the company to repay it. And the same

result follows where such securities are issued with the knowledge of

the shareholders, so far as the money thus raised is applied for the

benefit of the company. In re Cork & Youghal Railway Co., Law

Rep. 4 Ch. 748.

A court of equity abhors forfeitures, and will not lend its aid to

Digitized by

Go gl

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 312

POWER TO ALIENATE.

enforce them. Marshall v. Vicksburg, 15 Wall. 146. Nor will it

give its aid in the assertion of a mere legal right contrary to the clear
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equity and justice of the case. Lewis v. Lyons, 13 111. 117.

The second point to be considered is whether the mortgage was for

the debt of Cozzens or for the debt of the oil company. * * *

We are satisfied beyond a doubt that it was the debt of the oil

company and not his debt that was intended to be secured and was

secured by the mortgage. * * *

Decree affirmed.

Note. As to power to mortgage property: 1830, Jackson v. Brown, 5 Wend.

590; 1832, Leggett v. N. J. M. & B. Co., 1 Saxt. Ch. (N. J.) 541,23 Am. Dec. 728;

1833, Gordon v. Preston, 1 Watts (Pa.) 385, 26 Am. Dec. 75; 1852, Susque-

hanna, etc., Go. v. Gen'l Ins. Co., 3 Md. 305, 56 Am. Dec. 740; 1867, Hendee

~nforce

them. Marshall v. Vicksburg, 15 Wall. 146. Nor will it
give its aid in the assertion of a mere legal right contrary to the cl~ar
equity and justice of the case. Lewis v. Lyons, 13 Ill. 117.
The second point to be considered is whether the mortgage was for
the debt of Cozzens or for the debt of the oil company. • • •
We are satisfied beyond a doubt that it was the debt of the oil
0>mpany and not his debt that was intended to be secured and was
secured by the mortgage. • • •
Decree affirmed.

v. Pinkerton, 14 Allen (Mass.) 381; 1887, Warfield v. Marshall Co., 72 Iowa

666, 20 Am. St. Rep. 263; 1892, Evans v. Boston Heating Co., 157 Mass. 37;

1894, Benbow v. Cook, 115 N. C. 324, 44 Am. St. Rep. 454; 1896, Ashley Wire

Co. v. Illinois Steel Co., 164 111. 149, 56 Am. St. Rep. 187; 1898, First Nat'l

Bank v. Winchester, 119 Ala. 168, 72 Am. St. Rep. 904; 1899, New Britain

Nat'l Bank v. Cleveland Co., 158 N. Y. 722, 53 N. E. Rep. 1128; 1899, G. V. B.
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Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 96 Fed. Rep. (C. C. A.) 23; 1899, Rutherford,

etc., Elec. Co. v. Franklin Trust Co., 58 N. J. Eq. 584, 43 Atl. Rep. 1098; 1900,

Citizens' State Bank v. McGraft Lumber Co., 122 Mich. 573, 81 N. W. Rep.

567.

Sec. 312. (f) Franchise.

1. Not without special authority.

1302. "Royal franchises never pass by assignment, without special

Note. As to power to mort,gage property: 1830, Jackson v. Brown, 5 Wend.
-090; 1832, Leggettv. N.J. M. & B. Co., I Saxt. Ch. (N. J.) 541,23Am. Dec. 728;
1833, Gordon v. Preston 1 Watts (Pa.) 385, 26 Am. Dec. 75; 1852, Susquehanna, et.c., Co. v. Gen•! Ins. Co., 3 Md. 305, 56 Am. Dec. 740; 1867, Hendee
v. Pinkerton, 14 Allen (M8B8.) 381; 1887, Warfield v. Marshall Co., 72 Iowa
-666, 20 Am. St. Rep. 263; 1892, Evans v. Boston Heating Co., 157 MR88. 37;
1894, Benbow v. Cook, 115 N. C. 324, 44 Am. St. Rep. 454; 1896, Ashley Wire
Co. v. Illinois Steel Co., 164 Ill. 149, 56 Am. St. Rep. 187; 1898, First Nat'l
Bank v. Winchester 119 Ala. 168, 72 Am. St. Rep . 904; 1899, New Britain
Nat'l Bank v. Cleveland Co., 158 N . Y. 72'2, 53 N. E. Rep. 1128; 1899, G. V. B.
Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 9i Fed. Rep. (C. C. A.) 23; 1899, Rutherford,
etc., Elec. Co. v. Franklin Trust Co., 58 N. J. Eq. 584, 43 Atl. Rep. 1098; 1900,
Citizens' State Bank v. McGraft Lumber Co., 122 Mich. 573, 81 N. W. Rep.
-067.

•words in the Kings' grant"—Quo warranto against John Arundel, and

asked him by what warrant he held a market once a week and a fair

twice a year in his manor of C. Answer—held by descent from our

Sec. 312.

( f) Franchise.

father who was enfeoffed by Walter de Ralegh of the manor of C.

with appurtenances, to whom King John granted the franchises:

I.

Not without special authority.

Held as above.—Y. B. 30 Ed. I, 220, Cornish Iter.

See Fietsam v. Hay, 122 III. 293, 3 Am. St. Rep. 492, supra,

p. 141, § 25, and note; Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. R. Commrs., 112

U. S. 609, supra, p. 143, § 26.

Note. See note, supra, p. 157; also, 1895, Bank v. Fanning, 170 Pa. St. 1;

1897, State v. Anderson, 97 Wis. 114; 1898, Central Trust Co. v. W. N. C. R.

Co., 89 Fed. Rep. 24; 1899, Michigan Telephone Co. v. St. Joseph, 121 Mich.

502, 80 N. W. 383, 80 Am. St. Rep. 520, contra.

1302. "Royal franchises never pass by assignment, without special
words in the Kings' grant"-~uowarranto against John Arundel, and
asked him by what warrant he held a market once a week and a fair
twice a year in his manor of C. Answer-held by descent from our
father who was enfeoffed by Walter de Ralegh of the manor of C.
with appurtenances, to whom King John granted the franchises:
Held as above.-Y. B. 30 Ed. I , 220, Cornish Iter.
See Fietsam v. Hay, 122 Ill. 293, 3 Am. St. Rep. 492, supra,
p. 141, § 25, and note; Memphis & L. R.R. Co. v. R. Commrs., 112
U. S. ~'supra, p. 143, § 26.
Note. See note, supra, p. 157; also, 189.5, Bank v. Fa~ing, 170 Pa. St. 1;
1897, State v. Anderson, 97 ~is .. 114; 1898, Central Trust Co. v. W. N. C.R.
Co., 89 Fed. Rep. 24; 1899, M1ch1gan Telephone Co. v. St. Joseph, 121 Mich.
502, 80 N. W. 383, 80 Am. St. Rep. 520, contra.
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chise is given.

•

- . ._
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•
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THE STATE OF OHIO, Ex rkl. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, v. JOHN

Sec. 313.

SHERMAN Et al.1

1872. In the Supreme Court of Ohio. 22 Ohio St. Rep.

2.

Theory of a sale, when authority to convey franchise is given.

4"-435-

[Quo warranto against defendants, as claiming to be the P., F. W.

THE STATE OF OHIO, Ex REL. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, v. JOHN
SHERMAN ET AL.1

& C. Railway Co. in Ohio, without authority. The O. & P. Co.,

by proper authority from Pennsylvania and Ohio, had built a railroad

from Pittsburg to Crestline, Ohio; the O. & L, by authority of Ohio

1872.

and Indiana, from Crestline, Ohio, to Ft. Wayne, Ind.; and the F.

W. & C, by authority of Indiana and Illinois, from Ft. Wayne to

IN THR SUPREME CouRT OF Omo.
4 11 -435•

22 Ohio St. Rep.

Chicago. These three roads, by proper authority from each of the

[ ~uo warranto against defendants, as claiming to be the P., F. W.
& C. Ra£lway Co. in Ohio, without authority. The 0. & P. Co.,
by proper authority from Pennsylvania and Ohio, had built a railroad
from Pittsburg to Crestline, Ohio; the 0. & I., by authority of Ohio
and Indiana, from Crestline, Ohio, to Ft. Wayne, Ind.; and the F.
W. & C., by authority of Indiana and Illinois, from Ft. Wayne to
Chicago. These three roads, by proper authority from each of the
states, were duly consolidated into the P., F. W. & C. Ra£lroad Co.,
and a certificate of its organization, according to the laws of Ohio
filed with secretary of state of Ohio, as required. This company
issued its bonds as authorized, but made default in payment of interest
thereon, whereupon proceedings to foreclose the mortgages securing
the bonds were had in the proper courts, and a sale made in 186r to
Lanier et al., as trustees for the creditors, "of said railroad and the
property and franchises connected therewith.'' Lanier and his associates became duly incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania. Indiana and Illinois, as the P., F. W. & C. Railway Co., and Lanier
et al. conveyed by deed all the property and franchises pertaining to
the P., F. W. & C. Ra£lroad Co. Afterward, in 1863, this P. , F.
W. & C. Ra£lroad Co. conveyed by deed properly executed its " franchise to be a corporation," in conformity with the law of Ohio, to
the P., F. W. & C. Ra£lway Co., and, under this conveyance, the
latter company claimed to have become a legal and valid corporation
in Ohio.]
WELCH, C. J. • • • The questions to be decided, therefore, are:
I. Is the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railway Company
a corporation of Ohio? 2. If not such corporation, has it the right
and power, as a foreign corporation, to own, operate and maintain its
road in Ohio, and for that purpose to use and enjoy the privileges
and franchises specified in the information? We will consider these
two questions in their order.
1. Are the defendants an Ohio corporation?
Their claim is, that the consolidated company, the Pittsburg, Fort
Wayne and Chicago Ra£lroad Company, was an Ohio corporation,
and th at its charter, "its franchise to be," or right of existence, has
passed to, or become vested in the defendants, by virtue of the deed
made under the act of April 4, 1863. Unless this act, and the deed

states, were duly consolidated into the P., F. W. & C. Railroad Co.,

and a certificate of its organization, according to the laws of Ohio

filed with secretary of state of Ohio, as required. This company

issued its bonds as authorized, but made default in payment of interest

thereon, whereupon proceedings to foreclose the mortgages securing

the bonds were had in the proper courts, and a sale made in 1861 to
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Lanier et al., as trustees for the creditors, "of said railroad and the

property and franchises connected therewith." Lanier and his asso-

ciates became duly incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania, In-

diana and Illinois, as the P., F. W. & C. Railway Co., and Lanier

et al. conveyed by deed all the property and franchises pertaining to

the P., F. W. & C. Railroad Co. Afterward, in 1863, this P., F.

W. & C. Railroad Co. conveyed by deed properly executed its "fran-

chise to be a corporation," in conformity with the law of Ohio, to

the P., F. W. & C. Railway Co., and, under this conveyance, the

latter company claimed to have become a legal and valid corporation

in Ohio.]

Welch, C. J. * * * The questions to be decided, therefore, are:

1. Is the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railway Company

a corporation of Ohio? 2. If not such corporation, has it the right

and power, as a foreign corporation, to own, operate and maintain its

road in Ohio, and for that purpose to use and enjoy the privileges

and franchises specified in the information? We will consider these

two questions in their order.

1. Are the defendants an Ohio corporation?

Their claim is, that the consolidated company, the Pittsburg, Fort

Wayne and Chicago Railroad Company, was an Ohio corporation,

and that its charter, "its franchise to be," or right of existence, has

passed to, or become vested in the defendants, by virtue of the deed

made under the act of April 4, 1863. Unless this act, and the deed

1 Statement of facts abridged. Arguments omitted. Only part of opinion

given.

1 Statement of facts abridged.
Arguments omitted. Only part of opinion
given.
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made under it, are sufficient and effectual so to transfer or vest the

charter of the consolidated company, it is quite unnecessary to in-

quire whether that company was, or is, a legal corporation of Ohio,

§ 313
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and we are saved the necessity of considering the various questions

made and argued by counsel, touching the legality of the consolida-

tion, and of the proceedings preliminary and antecedent thereto.

Assuming, then, for the present, what I believe to be the fact, that

the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railroad Company was an

Ohio corporation, did its charter pass to or vest in the defendants, by

virtue of the deed and act of 1863, and thus constitute the defend-

ants, or rather thus constitute the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago

Railway Company, an Ohio corporation?

That a corporation can, when authorized by law so to do, transfer,

sell, or convey its charter or franchise to be a corporation, and thus

vest it in others, seems to be quite well settled by judicial decisions.

And we have no objections to make to this proposition of law, except

it may be to the form of stating it. The real transaction in all such

cases of transfer, sale, or conveyance, in legal effect, is nothing more

or less, and nothing other, than a surrender or abandonment of the

old charter by the corporators, and a grant de novo of a similar char-
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ter to the so-called transferees or purchasers. To look upon it in

any other light, and to regard the transaction as a literal transfer or

sale of the charter, is to be deceived, we think, by a mere figure or

form of speech. The vital part of the transaction, and that without

which it would be a nullity, is the law under which the transfer is

made. The statute authorizing the transfer and declaring its effect,

is the grant of a new charter, couched in few words, and to take ef-

fect upon condition of the surrender or abandonment of the old char-

ter; and the deed of transfer is to be regarded as mere evidence of

the surrender or abandonment. According to our understanding of

the cases cited by counsel for the defendants in support of the doc-

trine of the transferability of such charters, this is the view enter-

tained wherever the courts have spoken directly of the legal effect

of such conveyances. And such seems to be the view taken by coun-

sel themselves. For they say, among other things: "If the corpora-

tors ('of the old company') saw fit, nobody would question their

right to dissolve the old corporation and surrender their franchise to

the state, and no question could be made of the right of the state, by

a general law, to provide for conferring it upon the purchasers of their

property." And the counsel add: "That is what, in effect, is done

by this act," the act of 1863. We agree to this proposition of coun-

"sel. with a single proviso. We think, with them, that "that is what,

in effect, is done," provided anything is constitutionally and effectu-

ally done.

In other words, the legislature of Ohio, by the act of 1863, have

granted to the defendants a charter of incorporation similar to that

held by the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railroad Company,

provided the legislature, at the date of the act, had constitutional

power to grant such a charter, and provided the requirements of the

made under it, are sufficient and effectual so to transfer or vest the
charter of the consolidated company, it is quite unnecessary to inquire whether that company was, or is, a legal corporation of Ohio,
and we are saved the necessity of considering the various questions
made and argued by counsel, touching the legality of the consolidation, and of the proceedings preliminary and antecedent thereto.
Assuming, then, for the present, what I believe to be the fact, that
the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railroad Company was an
Ohio corporation, did its charter pass to or vest in the defendants, by
virtue of the deed and act of 1863, and thus constitute the defendants, or rather thus constitute the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago
Ra£lway Company, an Ohio corporation?
That a corporation can, when authorized by law so to do, transfer,
sell, or convey its charter or franchise to be a corporation, and thus
vest it in others, seems to be quite well settled by judicial decisions.
And we have no objections to make to this proposition of law, except
it may be to the form of stating it. The real transaction in all such
cases of transfer, sale, or conveyance, in legal effect, is nothing more
or less, and nothing other, than a surrender or abandonment of the
old charter by the corporators, and a grant de novo of a similar charter to the so-called transferees or purchasers. To look upon it in
any other light, and to regard the transaction as a literal transfer or
sale of the charter, is to be deceived, we think, by a mere figure or
form of speech. The vital part of the transaction, and that without
which it would be a nullity, is the law under which the transfer is
made. The statute authorizing the transfer and declaring its effect,
is the grant of a new charte1·, couched in few words, and to take effect upon condition of the surrender or abandonment of the old charter; and the deed of transfer is to be regarded as mere evi.)ence of
the surrender or abandonment. According to our understanding of
the cases cited by counsel for the defendants in support of the doctrine of the transferability of such charters, this is the view entertained wherever the courts have spoken directly of the legal effect
of such conveyances. And such seems to be the view taken by counsel themselves. For they say, among other things: "1£ the corporators ('of the old company') saw fit, nobody would question their
right to dissolve the old corporation and surrender their franchise to
the stat~, and no question could be made of the right of the state, by
a general Jaw, to provide for conferring it upon the purchasers of their
property." And the counsel add: "That £s what, in effect, is done
by this act," the act of 1863. 'Ve agree to this proposition of coun- sel , with a single proviso. We think, with them, that "that is what,
in effect, is done," provided anything is constitutionally and effectually done.
In other words, the legislature of Ohio , by the act of 1863 1 have
granted to the defendants a charter of incorporation similar to that
held by the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railroad Company,
provided the legislature, at the date of the act, had constitutional
power to grant such a charter, and provided the requirements of the
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act have been complied with by the parties. It matters not if we re-

gard the charter granted as identical with the one surrendered—a

something which really passes from the old or defunct corporation

act have been complied with by the parties. It matters not if we regard the charter granted as identical with the one surrendered-a
sometlting which really passes from the old or defunct corporation
into the hands of the legislature, and thence to the new organization.
There must be at the time constitutional power in the legislature, not
only to receive but also to reissue the charter. It must pass through
legislative hands before it can take life in a new organization. It
comes into their hands the work and offspring of the old constitution,
but it goes out again, if at all, as the work and offspring of the new
one, and subject to all its requirements and limitations.
By the present constitution of Ohio, the power of the legislature
to grant charters of incorporation is subjected to important limitations,
which did not exist under the constitution of 18o2. One of these is,
that the grant must be made by a general law; another is that the
charter must be subject to alteration and revocation by the legislatnre;
and a third is, that the grant must be made in some such form as will
subject the stockholders to individual liability, to at least a certain
extent, for the debts of the corporation. The claim upon the part
of the state is that the act of April 4 1 1863, is in violation of these
several provisions of the constitution; or, if the act will admit of a
construction consistent with these provisions, then the claim is that
the provisions and requirements of the act, taken in their proper and
constitutional sense, have not been conformed to by the parties.
We have no hesitation in holding that the act of 1863 is not liable
to the objection that it is a "special act." It is a "general law," in
out judgment, within the meaning of article 1, section 2, of the constitution. In so holding we merely repeat, in substance, what has
been heretofore decided by this court in Cricket v. The State, 18
Ohio St. 9; Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio St. 87.
The objection, that if the defendants did thus acquire a charter under the act of 1863, that charter would not be subject to alteration or
repeal, has, in effect, been answered in what is said above. If the
charter thus acquired is to be regarded in law as identical with the
charter of the reorganized company, and not as a new charter issuing
directly from the legislature; and if, in like manner, the charter of
the reorganized company is to be regarded not as a legislative grant
made to it, but as a grant directly from the original companies so consolidated, then it may be true that the charter would be unalterable
and irrevocable, and the act of 1863 be unconstitutional on that
ground. But, as we have already said, such is not the law of the
case, and the charter, if so vested, would remain, as other charters
granted under the present constitution, liable to amendment and repeal by the legislature.
But the trouble in defendants' case arises when we attempt to reconcile their claim that they are an Ohio corporation under the act of
1863, with the third-named limitation in the constitution-the limitation in regard to individual liability. Under the present constitution
the legislature are powerless to grant a charter to any such corporation, un1ess the grant is made in a form that will secure the individual

into the hands of the legislature, and thence to the new organization.

There must be at the time constitutional power in the legislature, not

only to receive but also to reissue the charter. It must pass through

legislative hands before it can take life in a new organization. It

comes into their hands the work and offspring of the old constitution,

but it goes out again, if at all, as the work and offspring of the new

one, and subject to all its requirements and limitations.

By the present constitution of Ohio, the power of the legislature

to grant charters of incorporation is subjected to important limitations,

which did not exist under the constitution of 1802. One of these is,

that the grant must be made by a general law; another is that the

charter must be subject to alteration and revocation by the legislature;

and a third is, that the grant must be made in some such form as will

subject the stockholders to individual liability, to at least a certain

extent, for the debts of the corporation. The claim upon the part

of the state is that the act of April 4, 1863, is in violation of these
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several provisions of the constitution; or, if the act will admit of a

construction consistent with these provisions, then the claim is that

the provisions and requirements of the act, taken in their proper and

constitutional sense, have not been conformed to by the parties.

We have no hesitation in holding that the act of 1863 is not liable

to the objection that it is a "special act." It is a "general law," in

our judgment, within the meaning of article 1, section 2, of the con-

stitution. In so holding we merely repeat, in substance, what has

been heretofore decided by this court in Cricket v. The State, 18

Ohio St. 9; Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio St. 87.

The objection, that if the defendants did thus acquire a charter un-

der the act of 1863, that charter would not be subject to alteration or

repeal, has, in effect, been answered in what is said above. If the

charter thus acquired is to be regarded in law as identical with the

charter of the reorganized company, and not as a new charter issuing

directly from the legislature; and if, in like manner, the charter of

the reorganized company is to be regarded not as a legislative grant

made to it, but as a grant directly from the original companies so con-

solidated, then it may be true that the charter would be unalterable

and irrevocable, and the act of 1863 be unconstitutional on that

ground. But, as we have already said, such is not the law of the

case, and the charter, if so vested, would remain, as other charters

granted under the present constitution, liable to amendment and re-

peal by the legislature.

But the trouble in defendants' case arises when we attempt to rec-

oncile their claim that they are an Ohio corporation under the act of

1863, with the third-named limitation in the constitution—the limita-

tion in regard to individual liability. Under the present constitution

the legislature are powerless to grant a charter to any such corpora-

tion, unless the grant is made in a form that will secure the individual
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liability of its stockholders for the debts of the corporation, at least

to the amount of their stock over and above their subscription. This

POWER TO ALIENATE.

liability may be secured by an express provision in the act of incor-

1085

poration. Where it is to exceed the amount of the stock, it must be

secured in that form. In the absence of any such provision in the

act of incorporation, I presume this provision of the constitution would

enter into and form part of the act of incorporation, and to that ex-

tent execute itself. In either case, however, the act of incorporation,

the grant of the charter, must be in some such form as will secure

this liability. It must require of the individuals availing themselves

of its provisions some acts as such, under and in pursuance of it, as

will subject them individually to its provisions, or to this provision of

the constitution in regard to liability. If it fails to do this, it is simply

unconstitutional and void.

The act of 1863, under which the defendants claim title, contains

no provision imposing liability upon individuals who may become

stockholders under it. Whether the act, properly interpreted, does or

does not require of the persons becoming incorporated under its pro-

visions, acts or proceedings which will secure their individual liability

as stockholders, is totally immaterial to the present case. Because, if
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it is to be interpreted as requiring such acts—namely, an organization

of individuals under the act, such as is required by the act of April

11, 1861 ; a deed to be made to, and accepted by them, or a taking of

stock by them in the company thus organized—then the defendants

have put a wrong interpretation upon the act, and have failed to com-

ply with its provisions. On the other hand, if they have rightly in-

terpreted the act, then the act itself is unconstitutional and void, for the

want of adequate provisions to secure the individual liability of stock-

holders becoming incorporated under its provisions. I presume it is

not claimed on behalf of defendants that they have done any act, by

way of organization, the taking of stock, or the acceptance of the deed

made under the act of 1863, which subjects them, as individuals, to

any liability whatever beyond that incurred by becoming members of

the foreign company. They never organized under the Ohio act;

their organization was complete before it was passed. They took no

stock under the Ohio act; their stock had already been taken under

the Pennsylvania act. Nor was the deed made to, or accepted by

them; it was made to, and accepted by the corporation, of which they

were members. As such corporation it had no power, by any act

whatever, to pledge the individual liability of its stockholders. The

powers of a corporation are limited to the common property and com-

mon interests of the organization. Over these, and within the scope

and purpose of its organization, a majority of its members, acting

through and by its officers and agents, can exercise dominion and con-

trol, and bind its individual members. Beyond this common fund

and outside this scope, the corporation, as such, is powerless to bind

its individual members. In some cases it has been found very diffi-

cult to determine the exact line between what may be done by a ma-

jority of the corporators, thus acting by and through common agents,

liability of its stockholders for the debts of the corporation, at least
to the amount of their stock over and above their subscription. This
liability may be secured by an express provision in the act of incorporation. Where it is to exceed the amount of the stock, it mu st he
secured in that form. In the absence of any such provision in the
act of incorporation, I presume this provision of the constitution would
enter into and form part of the act of incorporation, and to that extent execute itself. In either case, however, the act of incorporation ,
the grant of the charter, must be in some such form as will secure
this liability. It must require of the indivt'duals availing themselves
of its provisions some acts as such, under and in pursuance of it, as
will subject them individually to its provisions, or to this provision of
the constitution in regard to liability. If it fails to do this, it is simply
unconstitutional and void.
The act of 1863 1 under which the defendants claim title, contains
no provision imposing liability upon individuals who may become
stockholders under it. Whether the act, properly interpreted, does or
does not require of the persons becoming incorporated under its provisions, acts or proceedings which will secure their individual liability
as stockholders, is totally immaterial to the present case. Because, if
it is to be interpreted as requiring such acts-namely, an organization
of individuals under the act, such as is required by the act of Apri.I
1 1, r 86 I ; a deed to be made to, and accepted by them, or a taking of
stock by them in the company thus organized-then the defendants
have put a wrong interpretation upon the act, and have failed to comply with its provisions. On the other hand, if they have rightly interpreted the act, then the act itself is unconstitutional and void, for the
want of adequate provisions to secure the individual liability of stockholders becoming incorporated under its provisions. I presume it is
not claimed on behalf of defendants that they have done any act, by
way of organization, the taking of stock, or the acceptance of the deed
made under the act of 1863 1 which subjects them, as indivi'duals, to
any liability whatever beyond that incurred by becoming members of
the foreign company. They never organized under the Ohio act;
their organization was complete before it was passed. They took no
stock under the Ohio act; their stock had already been taken under
the Pennsylvania act. Nor was the deed made to, or accepted by
them; it was made to, and accepted by the corporation, of which they
were members. As such corporation it had no power, by any act
whatever, to pledge the individual liability of its stockholders. The
powers of a corporation are limited to the common property and common interests of the organization. Over these, and within the scope
and purpose of its organization, a majority of its members, acting
through and by its officers and agents, can exercise dominion and control, and bind its individual members. Beyond this common fund
and outside this scope, the corporation, as such, is powerless to bind
its individual members. In some cases it has been found verv difficult to determine the exact line between what may be done by- a majority of the corporators, thus acting by and through common agents,
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and what can only be effected by the individual consent of each and
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all; but no difficulty of the kind can occur in solving questions of in-

§ 313

dividual liability. There the line is distinctly drawn and marked.

and what can only be effected by the individual consent of each and
all; but no difficulty of the kind can occur in solving questions of individual liability. There the line is distinctly drawn and marked.
The contract by which he becomes such member fixes the boundary
between the interests of the stockholder and those which are embarked
in the common enterprise, and thus subjected to the common control.
And this contract, be it express or implied, must be interpreted in the
light of the law as it existed at the time, and under which the organization is had. The private interests and rights of the stockholder,
not by this contrsct, or some subsequent individual act of his, placed
in the common fund, or subjected to the corporate control, are as
completely outside the reach and power of the corporation as are the
property and rights of strangers.
The element of individual liability must be ingrafted upon the
stock by the law under which the organization is had, or the stock is
taken, and by virtue of that organization or taking, or else by some
subsequent individual assent of the stockholder; otherwise he stands
liable for no more than the amount which, by his contract with the
company, he has agreed to contribute to the common fund.
In this view of the case, it plainly follows, that the defendants have
not become members of an Ohio corporation, created under the present constitution of the state, for the reason that they have never subjected themselves to the individual liability which it imposes on stockholders, and which it makes an indispensable element in the creation
of all such corporations. Either the defendants have misinterpreted
the act of 1863, and wholly failed to conform to its provis ions, or, if
they have rightly interpreted it, as authorizing the bestowment of a
charter upon a foreign corporation, without securing any individual
liability of its stockholders, then the act itself is unconstitutional and
void. In either alternative the defendants are no legal corporation of
Ohio. It is unnecessary, therefore, to inquire whether their charter
as a corporation of Pennsylvania, gives them authority, as such corp oration, to accept an additional charter from another state ; or
whether, if they have such authority, it is competent for another
state , not having a constitution like ours, thus to grant them a second
charter-that is, to make the grant directly to the corporation. eo
nomt'ne, and not to the individuals composing it. If we concede both
the authority to accept a second and foreign charter, and the genera.J
power of another state in this manner to make the grant, it is enough
for the present case to say, that the power in question has been denied to the legislature of Ohio by her present constitution.
[On the second question the court held that the company, as a foreign corporation , had a right under the Ohio laws to maintain and
operate its road in Ohio.]
Judgment of ouster as to being an Ohio corporation.

The contract by which he becomes such member fixes the boundary

between the interests of the stockholder and those which are embarked

in the common enterprise, and thus subjected to the common control.

And this contract, be it express or implied, must be interpreted in the

light of the law as it existed at the time, and under which the organ-

ization is had. The private interests and rights of the stockholder,

not by this contract, or some subsequent individual act of his, placed

in the common fund, or subjected to the corporate control, are as

completely outside the reach and power of the corporation as are the

property and rights of strangers.

The element of individual liability must be ingrafted upon the

stock by the law under which the organization is had, or the stock is

taken, and by virtue of that organization or taking, or else by some

subsequent individual assent of the stockholder; otherwise he stands

liable for no more than the amount which, by his contract with the

company, he has agreed to contribute to the common fund.
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In this view of the case, it plainly follows, that the defendants have

not become members of an Ohio corporation, created under the pres-

ent constitution of the state, for the reason that they have never sub-

jected themselves to the individual liability which it imposes on stock-

holders, and which it makes an indispensable element in the creation

of all such corporations. Either the defendants have misinterpreted

the act of 1863, and wholly failed to conform to its provisions, or, if

they have rightly interpreted it, as authorizing the bestowment of a

charter upon a foreign corporation, without securing any individual

liability of its stockholders, then the act itself is unconstitutional and

void. In either alternative the defendants are no legal corporation of

Ohio. It is unnecessary, therefore, to inquire whether their charter

as a corporation of Pennsylvania, gives them authority, as such cor-

poration, to accept an additional charter from another state; or

whether, if they have such authority, it is competent for another

state, not having a constitution like ours, thus to grant them a second

charter—that is, to make the grant directly to the corporation, eo

nomine, and not to the individuals composing it. If we concede both

the authority to accept a second and foreign charter, and the genera4

power of another state in this manner to make the grant, it is enough

for the present case to say, that the power in question has been de-

nied to the legislature of Ohio by her present constitution.

[On the second question the court held that the company, as a for-

eign corporation, had a right under the Ohio laws to maintain and

operate its road in Ohio.]

Judgment of ouster as to being an Ohio corporation.

Note. See, 1845, Babeock v. Western R! Corp., 9 Mete. (Mass.) 553, 43

Am. Dec. 411; 1857. Phillips v. Winslow, etc., Co., 18 B. Mon. (Kv.) 431, 68

Am. Dec. 729; 1864, Shamokin Valley R. Co. v. Lawrence, 47 Pa. St. 465, 86

Am. Dec. 552; 1874, Metz v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 58 N. Y. 61,17 Am. R. 201;

Note . See, 1845, Babcock v. Western R: Corp., 9 Mete. (Mass.) 053, 43
Am. Dec. 411; 1857, Phillips v. Winslow, etc., Co. , 18 B. Mon. (Ky . ) 431, 68
Am. Dec. 729; 1864, Shamokin Valley R. Co. v. Lawrence, 47 Pa. St. 465, 86
Am. Dec. 552; 1874, Metz v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 58 N. Y. 61, 17 Am. R. 201;
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1870, Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 TJ. S. 217; 1884, Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. R.

Commrs., 112 U. S. 609, supra, p. 143; 1885, Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Miller.

§ 314

POWER TO ACT IN A PERSONAL RELATION.

114 U. S/176; 1887, Lawrence v. Morgans' L. & T. R., etc., Co., 39 La. Ann.

427,4 Am. St. R. 265; 1889, Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Newell, 73 Texas 334, 15 Am.

St. 788.

ARTICLE V. POWER TO ACT IN A PERSONAL RELATION.

Sec. 314. I. Power to take as trustee.

MR. JUSTICE STORY in VIDAL Et al. v. GIRARD'S EXECUTORS.1

1876, Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. 8. 217; 1884, Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. R.
Comm re., 112 U. 8. 609, supra, p.143; 1885, Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Miller.
114 U . S.-176; 1887, Lawrence v. MorgRns' L. & T. R., etc., -Co., 39 La. Ann:
427, 4 Am. St. R. 265; 1889, Gulf, etc., R . Co. v. Newell, 73 Texas 334, 15 Am.
St. 788.

1844. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 2 How-

ard (43 U. S.) 126-201, on pp. 187, 188.

[Stephen Girard, in his will, bequeathed to the city of Philadelphia

ARTICLE V.

POWER TO ACT IN A PERSONAL RELATION.

certain real and personal estate for the erection and support of a

college, upon the trusts, and for the uses designated in the will. The

city, by its charter, was capable in law to have, purchase, take, re-

See. 314.

I.

Power to take as trustee.

ceive, possess and enjoy lands, tenements and hereditaments, liberties,

franchises and jurisdictions, goods, chattels and effects to them and

MR. JUSTICE STORY

IN

VIDAL ET

AL.

v. GIRARD'S EXECUTORS.1

their successors forever, or for any other or less estate, without any

limitation as to value, amount or purpose. The heirs objected to the

1844. l'.ll

THE SUPREME CouRT OF THE UNITED STATES.

2

How-

ard (43 U. S.) 126-20I, on pp. I87, I88.

will, and claimed, among other things, that the corporation could not

take as trustee.]
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Part of Mr. Binney's argument, p. 148.

The old doctrine was that a corporation could not be seized to a

use. Sugden on Uses, 10.

But it has been since settled that a corporation may be a trustee. If

it receives a deed, the legal estate will pass, provided the statutes of

mortmain do not prohibit it. If the trust is void, equity will decree

a reconveyance; but this can not be necessary, unless the legal estate

had passed. And if a corporation is incapable of executing the trust,

equity will appoint some person who is not. 1 Saunders on Uses,

346, 349; Willes on Trustees, 31; Levin on Trusts, 10, 11; 2

Thomas's Co. Litt., 706, note; 1 Cruise Dig., 403, tit. 12, Trust.,

ch. 1, § 89.

Also, that a corporation may be a trustee. 2 Vern., 411; 2 Bro.

P. C, 370; 7 Bro. P. C, 235.

Where a corporation abused a trust and was dismissed, see 3 Bro.

Ch. Cas., 171, 371; 4 Ves., 453; 2 Bro. Ch. Cas., 46; 1 Bro. Ch.

Cas., 467; 14 Bro. Ch. Cas., 253; 12 Mass. 547; 17 Serg. & R.

(Pa.) 89; 3 Rawle (Pa.) 170.

The cases in 12 Mass. 547 and 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 89 may not

appear at first to sustain the doctrine, but the cases are right. That

of 3 Rawle (Pa.) 170 is very much like the present, and establishes

the doctrine, that if the trust is for the welfare of the corporation, it

may take it.

1 Only that part of the opinion relating to a corporation's power to take as

trustee is given.

[Stephen Girard, in his will, bequeathed to the city of Philadelphia
certain real and personal estate for the erection and suppott of a
college, upon the trusts, and for the uses designated in the will. The
city, by its charter, was ~apable in law to have, purchase, take, receive, possess and enjoy lands, tenements and hereditaments, liberties,
franchises and jurisdictions, goods, chattels and effects to them and
their successors forever, or for any other or less estate, without any
limitation as to value, amount or purpose. The heirs objected to the
will, and claimed, among other things, that the corporation could not
take as trustee. J

Part of Mr. Binney' s argument, p. 148.
The old doctrine was that a corporation could not be seized to a
use. Sugden on Uses, 10.
But it has been since settled that a corporation may be a trustee. If
it receives a deed, the legal estate will pass, provided the statutes of
mortmain do not prohibit it. If the trust is void, equity will decree
a reconveyance; but this can not be necessary, unless the legal estate
had passed. And if a corporation is incapable of executing the tmst,
equity will appoint some person who is not. 1 Saunders on Uses,
346, 349; Willes on Trustees, 3I; Levin on Trusts, 10, 11; 2
Thomas's Co. Litt., 706, note; I Cruise Dig., 403, tit. I2, Trust.,
ch. I, § 89.
Also, that a corporation may be a trustee. 2 Vern., 411; 2 Bro.
P. C., 370; 7 Bro. P. C., 235.
Where a corporation abused a trust and was dismissed, see 3 Bro.
Ch. Cas., 171, 371; 4 Ves., 4_c;3; 2 Bro. Ch. Cas., 46; 1 Bro. Ch.
Cas., 467; 14 Bro. Ch. Cas., 253; 12 Mass. 547; I7 Serg. & R.
(Pa.) 89; 3 Rawle (Pa.) 170.
The cases in 12 Mass. 547 and I7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 89 may not
appear at first to sustain the doctrine, but the cases are right. That
of 3 Rawle (Pa.) 170 is very much like the present, and establishes
the doctrine, that if the trust is for the welfare of the corporation, it
may take it.
1 Only that part of the opinion relating to a corporation's power to take as
trustee is given.
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Story, Justice. Now, although it was in early times held that a

FEDELITY INS. & T. CO. V. NIVEN.

corporation could not take and hold real or personal estate in trust

upon the ground that there was a defect of one of the requisites to

STORY, JusTICE. Now, although it was in early times held that a
corporation could not take and hold real or personal estate in trust
upon the ground that there was a defect of one of the requisite to
create a good trustee, viz., the want of confidence in the person;
yet that doctrine has been long since exploded as unsound, and too
artificial ; and it is now held, that where the corporation has a legal
capacity to take real or personal estate, there it may take and hold it
upon trust, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
person may do. It is true that if the trust be repugnant to, or inconsistent with the proper purposes for which the corporation was created,
that may furnish a ground why it may not be compellable to execute
it. But that will furnish no ground to declare the trust itself void, if
otherwise unexceptionable; but it will simply require a new trnstee
to be substituted by the proper court, possessing equity jurisdiction to
enforce and perfect the objects of the trust.

create a good trustee, viz., the want of confidence in the person;

yet that doctrine has been long since exploded as unsound, and too

artificial; and it is now held, that where the corporation has a legal

capacity to take real or personal estate, there it may take and hold it

upon trust, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private

person may do. It is true that if the trust be repugnant to, or incon-

sistent with the proper purposes for which the corporation was created,

that may furnish a ground why it may not be compellable to execute

it. But that will furnish no ground to declare the trust itself void, if

otherwise unexceptionable; but it will simply require a new trustee

to be substituted by the proper court, possessing equity jurisdiction to

enforce and perfect the objects of the trust.

Note. See, 1826, Greene v. Dennis, 6 Conn. 293, 16 Am. Dec. 58 (requires

special charter authority to be trustee); 1842, Commissioners v. Walker, 6

Howard (Miss.) 143, 38 Am. Dec. 433; 1858, Bell County v. Alexander, 22

Texas 351, 73 Am. Dec. 268; 1889, Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Beebe, 40
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Minn. 7; 1897, White v. Rice, 112 Mich. 403.

Sec. 315. 2. Power to act as administrator or executor.

Note. See, 1826, Greene v. Dennis, 6 Conn. 293,-16 Am. Dec. 58 (requires
special charter autbority to be trustee ) ; 1842, Commissioners v. Walker, 6
Howard (Miss.) 143, 38 Am. Dec. 433; 1858, Bell County v. Alexander, 22
Texas 351, 73 Am. Dec. 268; 1889, Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Beebe, 4().
Minn. 7; 1897, White v. Rice, 112 Mich. 403.

FIDELITY INSURANCE, TRUST, Etc., CO. v. D. G. NIVEN.1

1878. In the Court of Errors and Appeals of Delaware.

5 Houston's (Delaware) Reports, 416-432, 1 Am. St. 150.

The ruling of the court below in the case and now assigned for

error in this court was that by the laws of this state no corporation

aggregate, whether incorporated by the legislature of this state or of

any other state, can be appointed an administrator in this state or can

Sec. 315.

sue as an administrator in the courts of this state.

2.

Power to act as administrator or executor.

Wales, J. * * * Secondly, it is objected that by the common

FIDELITY INSURANCE, TRUST, ETc., CO. v. D. G. NIVEN.1

law the plaintiff is not capable of being an administrator. Blackstone,

among the disabilities of a corporation, includes its inability to be an

1878.

executor or administrator, "for it can not take an oath for the due execu-

IN

THE

COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF DELAWARE~
1 Am. St. 150.

5 Houston's (Delaware) Reports, 416-432,

tion of the office." 1 Bl. Com., 477. In Bacon's Ab., Tit. Executors

and Administrators, 2, the same doctrine is laid down on the same

ground, but under a semble, and with these additional reasons: First,

The ruling of the court below in the case and now assigned for
error in this court was that by the laws of this state no corporation
aggregate, whether incorporated by the legislature of this state or of
any other state, can be appointed an administrator in this state or can
sue as an admini strator in the courts of this state.
WALES, J. • • • Secondly, it is objected that by the common
law the 'p laintiff is not capable of being an administrator. Blackstone,
among the disabilities of a corporation, includes its inability fo be an
executor or administrator, "for it can not take an oath for the due execution of the office." 1 Bl. Com., 477. In Bacon's Ab., Tit. Executors
and Administrators, 2 1 the same doctrine is laid down on the same
ground , but under a semble, and with these additional reasons: First,
because corporations can not be feoffees in trust for the u se of others;
and, second, because they are a body framed for a special purpose.
When the reason of a rule ceases, so does the rule itself. The plaintiff is not required to take an oath. It has been incorporated or
"framed for the special purpose" of acting in the character and

because corporations can not be feoffees in trust for the use of others;

and, second, because they are a body framed for a special purpose.

When the reason of a rule ceases, so does the rule itself. The plaint-

iff is not required to take an oath. It has heen incorporated or

"framed for the special purpose" of acting in the character and

'Arguments omitted. Only part of opinion relating to capacity of corpora-

tion is given.

1
Arguments omitted.
Lion is given.
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capacity in which it has come into court; and it is now well and long

established that a corporation may be a trustee in the same manner as

POWER TO ACT IN A PERSONAL RELATION.

an individual, not only of real estate, but of personal property, to the

1089

same extent as private persons. Hill on Trustees, 48 (and cases cited

in the note). Says Toller: "It now seems settled that corporations

can be executors, and that on their being so named they may appoint

persons styled syndics to receive administration with the will an-

nexed, who are sworn like all other administrators. Such corpora-

tions as can take the oath of an executor are clearly competent," as,

for instance, a corporation sole. Toller on Exes., 30. There is, then,

no inherent disability or disqualification belonging to a corporation as

such which excludes it from acting as an administrator, and it may

accept the office if not prohibited by its charter, or forbidden by

statute, whenever from the objects of its incorporation and the nature

of its business it may become necessary and proper, and it is able to

comply with the conditions prescribed by law as to giving bond, etc.

Practically, the position of the plaintiff is meritorious and unob-

jectionable. With the express power contained in its charter to re-

ceive the appointment of administrator, and with its capital stock

pledged as the security required for the faithful performance of its
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duties, it brings an action in its representative capacity for the recovl

ery of a debt due to its intestate, and is met at the outset by technica-

rules, which, whatever may have been the reason of their origin and

adoption, have either become obsolete or have been so modified and

relaxed as to be no longer of general application. The execution of

the bond would, at the best, amount to little more than a form, and

be without substantial benefit or necessity; but still the defendant is

entitled to it, if it is insisted upon, and the plaintiff has a full and

lawful power to execute it as it would have to make or indorse a

promissory note, or accept a bill of exchange, or to execute any other

description of bond which may be fairly and legitimately considered

as necessary and proper in the usual course of its business. It has

not been made to appear in what manner the interests of this state or

of its citizens would be impaired, or in what way its policy would be

invaded or subverted, by sustaining the plaintiff's action. Admitting

that a corporation may be unable to act as an original administrator

under the provisions of the general statute, it does not follow that it

may not be recognized as a foreign administrator on the production of

letters duly authenticated and giving bond. The word "persons"

may extend to and include bodies corporate and politic as well as in-

dividuals. Amend. Code, ch. 5. If the plaintiff can give the bond,

it does all that the law requires. The rights of our citizens will not

be endangered, their property rendered less secure, or the dignity of

the state be diminished. If the policy of the state is to be inferred

from the history of its legislation, the act of the general assembly of

Delaware of April 9, 1873, incorporating a company for the special

purpose, among others, of acting as administrator would be conclusive

of that question. 14 Del. Laws, 714. * * *

Reversed.

69—Wil. Cas.

capacity in which it has- come into court; and it is now well and long
established that a corporation may be a trustee in the same manner as
an individual, not only of real estate, but of personal property, to the
same extent as private persons. Hill on Trustees, 48 (and cases cited
in the note). Says Toller: "It now seems settled that corporations
can be executors, and that on their being so named they may appoint
persons styled syndics to receive administration with the will annexed, who are sworn like all other administrators. Such corporations as can take the oath of an executor are clearly competent," as,
for instance, a corporation sole. Toller on Exes., 30. There is, then,
no inherent disability or disqualification belonging to a corporation as
such which excludes it from acting as an administrator, and it may
accept the office if not prohibited by its charter, or forbidden by
statute, whenever from the objects of its incorporation and the nature
of its business it may become necessary and proper, and it is able to
comply with the conditions prescribed by law as to giving bond, etc.
Practically, the position of the plaintiff is meritorious and unobjectionable. With the express power contained in its charter to receive the appointment of admini! trator, and with its capital stock
pledged as the security required for the faithful performance of its
duties, it brings an action in its representative capacity for the recovl
ery of a debt due to its intestate, and is met at the outset by technicarules, which, whatever may have been the reason of their origin and
adoption, have either become obsolete or have been so modified and
relaxed as to be no longer of general application. The execution of
the bond would, at the best, amount to little more th an a form, and
be without substantial benefit or necessity; but still the defendant is
entitled to it, if it is insisted upon, and the plaintiff has a full and
lawful power to execute it as it would have to make or indorse a
promissory note, or accept a bill of exchange, or to execute any other
description of bond which may be fairly and legitimately considered
as necessary and proper in the usual course of its business. It has
not been made to appear in what m anner the i~terests of this state or
of its citizens would be impaired, or in what way its policy would be
invaded or subve1ted, by sustaining the plaintiff's action. Admitting
that a corporation may be unable to act as an original fldministrator
under the provisions of the general statute, it does not follow that it
may not be recognized as a foreign administrator on the production of
letters duly authenticated and giving bond. The word "persons "
may extend to and include bodies corporate and politic as well as individuals. Amend. Code, ch. 5. If the plaintiff can give the bond,
it does all that the law requires. The rights of our citizens will not
be endangered, their property rendered less secure, or the dignity of
-the state be diminished. If the policy of the state is to be inferred
from the history of its legislation, the act of the general assembly of
Delaware of April 9 1 1873 1 incorporating a company for the special
purpose , among others, of acting as administrator would be conclusive
of that question. 14 Del. Laws, 714. • • •
Reversed.
69-W IL. CAB.
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See, to same effect, 1885, Camden 8. D. & T. Co. v. Ingham, 40 N. J. Eq. 3;

1889, Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Beebe et al., 40 Minn. 7, holding that a

KILLINGSWORTH V. PORTLAND TRUST CO.

law authorizing corporations to be guardians, was valid and they could so act;

1890, Coleman's Adinr. v. Parrott, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 814, 37 A. & E. C. C. 1.

See, to same effect, 1885, Camden S. D. & T. Co. v. Ingham, 40 N. J. Eq. 3;
1889, Minnesota. Loan & Trust Co. v. Beebe et al., 40 Minn. 7, holding that a
law authorizing corporations to be guardiam, was valid and they could eo ad;
1890, Coleman's Admr. v. Parrott, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 814, 37 A. & E. C. C. 1.
See note, 32 A. & E. C. C., p. 2.

See note, 32 A. & E. C. C, p. 2.

Sec. 316. 3. Power to act as agent, or attorney in fact.

W. M. KILLINGSWORTH, Appellant, v. THE PORTLAND TRUST CO.,

OF OREGON, Respondent.1

1890. In the Supreme Court of Oregon. 18 Oregon Reports

SS^S6' r7 Am- St- ReP- 737- 32 A- & E- c- C. 33.

Lord, J. This is an action to recover damages for failure of the

Sec. 316.

defendant to execute and deliver to the plaintiff a conveyance of cer-

3. Power to act as agent, or attorney in fact.

tain premises, pursuant to an agreement to that effect. The defendant

denies this, and alleges as the attopiey in fact of one Deborah H. In-

W. M. KILLINGSWORTH, APPELLANT, v. THE PORTLAND TRUST CO.,
OF OREGON, REBPONDENT. 1

gersoll, in compliance with said agreement, that it did execute and

tender to the plaintiff a conveyance of said premises, etc., and now

1890.

brings it into court and deposits it for the plaintiff, and that plaintiff

refuses to accept the same. To this the plaintiff demurred on the

ground that the same does not state facts sufficient to constitute a

18 Oregon Reports

LORD, J. This is an action to recover damages for failure of the
defendant to execute and deliver to the plaintiff a conveyance of certain premises, pursuant to an agreement to that effect. The defendant
denies this, and alleges as the atto~ey in fact of one Deborah H. Ingersoll, in compliance with said agreement, that it did execute and
tender to the plaintiff a conveyance of said premises, etc., and now
brings it into court and deposits it for the plaintiff, and that plaintiff
refuses to accept the same. To this the plaintiff demurred on the
ground that the same does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of defense to the cause of action alleged. The point raised by
the demurrer is: Can the defendant, a corporation, execute a deed of
conveyance of real property as the attorney in fact of another? • • •
It is provided by our statute that a corporation may engage in any
lawful enterprise, business pursuit or occupation (Code, section 3217),
so that, unless corporations are affected with some disability, when
the articles of incorporation are' sufficient for the purpose, there is no
lawful occupation or business in which it may not engage in this state
exactly as individuals. By its articles of incorporation the defendant
corporation is expressly authorized and empowered "to act as the
general or special agent, or attorney in fact. for any public or private
corporation or person in the management and control of real estate or
other property, its purchase, sale or conveyance, etc." No question
is made but what the defendant, by its articles of incorporation, has
conferred upon it the power to do the act for which there is claimed
to be an alleged failure; but the contention is that a corporation, from
the nature of the organization as an artificial body, necessitated to act
through agents, is incapable of executing a deed as an attorney in
fact. This argument is based on the assumption that there are some
things, from the inherent nature of the case, that a corporation is incapable of doing, and seeks its illustrations in the common law, as
that a corporation can not be an administrator or executor, because its
duties are of a personal nature and can not be delegated, or to take
an oath, when so required by law, before proceeding to execute some

cause of defense to the cause of action alleged. The point raised by

the demurrer is: Can the defendant, a corporation, execute a deed of
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351-356, 17 Am. St. Rep. 737, 32 A. & E. C. C. 33.

conveyance of real property as the attorney in fact of another? * * *

It is provided by our statute that a corporation may engage in any

lawful enterprise, business pursuit or occupation (Code, section 3217),

so that, unless corporations are affected with some disability, when

the articles of incorporation are sufficient for the purpose, there is no

lawful occupation or business in which it may not engage in this state

exactly as individuals. By its articles of incorporation the defendant

corporation is expressly authorized and empowered "to act as the

general or special agent, or attorney in fact, for any public or private

corporation or person in the management and control of real estate or

other property, its purchase, sale or conveyance, etc." No question

is made but what the defendant, by its articles of incorporation, has

conferred upon it the power to do the act for which there is claimed

to be an alleged failure ; but the contention is that a corporation, from

the nature of the organization as an artificial body, necessitated to act

through agents, is incapable of executing a deed as an attorney in

fact. This argument is based on the assumption that there are some

things, from the inherent nature of the case, that a corporation is in-

capable of doing, and seeks its illustrations in the common law, as

that a corporation can not be an administrator or executor, because its

duties are of a personal nature and can not be delegated, or to take

an oath, when so required by law, before proceeding to execute some

1 Only so much of the opinion as relates to the single point is given.

1 Only
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duty or trust. But this argument overlooks the fact that a corporation

may be empowered to do by statute what it was incapable of doing

POWER '.fO ACT IN A PERSONAL RELATION.

under its common law powers, and when thus created, its powers,

1091

capacities and modes of exercising them depend upon the statute.

Having the power conferred upon it to act as an attorney in fact,

is it not endowed with all the faculties or capacities essential to exe-

cute it and carry out the business projects of its creation? Why may

not a corporation act as an agent for an individual or another corpo-

ration? As the owner of real property, it can, by its authorized

agents, execute a conveyance, or it may authorize another, by power

of attorney in writing, to convey such property for it. Why, then,

may it not act as the agent or attorney in fact of another for a like

purpose, when it is so authorized, and to thus act is one of the chief

powers conferred to effect the object of its creation and to carry on

the business in which it is engaged?

"Within the scope of its corporate powers," says Mr. Mechem,

"unless there are express provisions in its charter, or constating in-

struments to the contrary, a corporation may act as agent, either for

an individual, a partnership or another corporation. Many of the

grea^ corporations of the country are organized for this express pur-
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pose under statute or charters conferring and defining their powers

and the methods of executing them; but even in other cases, the au-

thority so to act might be implied as auxiliary to their main purpose."

Mechem on Agency, § 64. It is clear, then, that a corporation may

act as the agent of another, and if so, it must be endued with the

faculties or instrumentalities to perform the office it is authorized to

undertake, and carry out the purposes of its creation.

When a corporation engages in a legitimate business and is author-

ized by its incorporation to do the things necessary to carry on such

business, it is an express grant of power to enable it to effect that ob-

ject. If it is to be excluded from doing such things because, from

the nature of its organization, it can not act personally, but only

through agents, there would be little left in the domain of business it

could do. As was said by the court in Hopkins v. Gallaton Turn-

pike Co., 4 Humph. 412, "the common law rule with regard to

natural persons, that an agent, to bind his principal by deed, can not

in the nature of things be applied to corporations aggregate, these be-

ing of mere legal existence, and their board, as such, literally speak-

ing, are incapable of a personal act. They direct or assent by vote,

but their most immediate mode of action must be by agent." Being

a creation of the law—an artificial person—it can only act by agents

who are its limbs or instrumentalities to effect the purpose for which

it was organized and to act for it, their act being the act of the cor-

poration, exactly as the act of an individual is his act. As such,

upon the principle of the objection raised, it could not make an ac-

knowledgment in person, but it may by its officers, and in such cases,

its officer affixing the seal is the party executing the deed within the

meaning of the statute requiring deeds to be acknowledged by the

grantor. Kelly v. Calhoun, 95 U. S. 711; Frostberg M. B. Ass.

duty or trust. But this argument overlooks the fact that a corporation
may be empowered to do by statute what it was incapable of doing
under its common law powers, and when thus created, its powers,
capacities and modes of exercising them depend upon the statute.
Having the power conferred upon it to act as an attorney in fact,
is it not endowed with all the faculties or capacities essential to execute it and carry out the business projects of its creation? Why may
not a corporation act as an agent for an individual or another corporation? As the owner of real property, it can, by its authorized
agents, execute a conveyance, or it may authorize another, by power
of attorney in writing, to convey such property for it. Why, then,
may it not act as the agent or attorney in fact of another for a like
purpose, when it is so authorized, and to thus act is one of the chief
powers conferred to effect the object of its creation and to carry on
the business in which it is engaged?
"Within the scope of its corporate powers," says Mr. Mechem,
"unless there are express provisions in its charter, or constating instruments to the contrary, a corporation may act as agent, either for
an individual, a partnership or another corporation. Many of the
grea~ corporations of the country are organized for this express purpose under statute or charters conferring and defining their powers
and the methods of executing them; but even in other cases, the authority so to act might be implied as auxiliary to their main purpose."
Mechem on Agency, § 64. It is clear, then, that a corporation may
act as the agent of another, and if so, it must be endued with the
faculties or instrumentalities to perform the office it is authorized to
undertake, and carry out the purposes of its creation.
When a corporation engages in a legitimate business and is authorized by its incorporation to do the things necessary to carry on such
business, it is an express grant of power to enable it to effect that object. If it is to be excluded from doing such things because, from
the nature of its organization, it can not act personally, but only
through agents, there would be little left in the domain of business it
could do. As was said by the court in Hopkins v. Gallaton Turnpike Co., 4 Humph. 412, "the common law rule with regard to
natural persons, that an agent, to bind his principal by deed, can not
in the nature of things be applied to corporations aggregate, these being of mere legal existence, and their board, as such, literally speaking, are incapable of a personal act. They direct or assent by vote,
but their most immediate mode of action must be by agent." Being
a creation of the law-an artificial person-it can only act by agents
who are its limbs or instrumentalities to effect the purpose for which
it was organized and to act for it, their act being the act of the corporation, exactly as the act of an individual is his act. As such,
upon the principle of the objection raised, it could not make an acknowledgment in person, but it may by its officers, and in such cases,
its officer affixing the seal is the party executing the deed within the
meaning of the statute requiring deeds to be acknowledged by the
grantor. Kelly v. Calhoun, 95 U. S. 711; Frostberg M. B. Ass.
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SILVER LAKE BANK V. NORTH.

v. Brace et al., 51 Md. 508; Am. & Eng. Enc, "Acknowledg-

SILVER LAKE BANK V. NORTH.

ments," "Corporations."

In fact, within the same principle of reasoning, it may be said that

v. Brace et al., 51 Md. 508; Am. & Eng. Enc., "Acknowledgments," "Corporations."
In fact, within the same principle of reasoning, it may be said that
a corporation can not make a deed of its own property; but we know
it can, and that the act of its officers in so doing is the act of the corporation. When a corporation is made the agent of another fo sell
and convey property, it acts through the same instrumentalities as
when acting for itself, and the relation between it and its instrumentalities is as one being, or artificial person, in the performance of its
engagement, and involves no delegation of powers. So that when a
corporation is invested with a power of attorney to sell and convey
real property, the person conferring the power knows that the corporation can not act personally in the matter, but that in performing the
engagement it will act through its agents, who for that purpose are its
faculties, and whose acts in the discharge of that duty are the acts of
the corporation, and as such must be considered to be included in the
artificial person as instrumentalities authorized by him to do the act
conferred upon it by his power of attorney. In this view, the argument that the corporation can not do such act under the power of attorney without a delegation of authority to its agents, and that the
grantor of the power has given no such power of substitution, can not
be sustained.
There was no error, and the judgment must be affirmed.

a corporation can not make a deed of its own property; but we know

it can, and that the act of its officers in so doing is the act of the cor-

poration. When a corporation is made the agent of another to sell

and convey property, it acts through the same instrumentalities as

when acting for itself, and the relation between it and its instrumentali-

ties is as one being, or artificial person, in the performance of its

engagement, and involves no delegation of powers. So that when a

corporation is invested with a power of attorney to sell and convey

real property, the person conferring the power knows that the corpo-

ration can not act personally in the matter, but that in performing the

engagement it will act through its agents, who for that purpose are its

faculties, and whose acts in the discharge of that duty are the acts of

the corporation, and as such must be considered to be included in the

artificial person as instrumentalities authorized by him to do the act

conferred upon it by his power of attorney. In this view, the argu-

ment that the corporation can not do such act under the power of at-
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torney without a delegation of authority to its agents, and that the

grantor of the power has given no such power of substitution, can not

be sustained.

There was no error, and the judgment must be affirmed.

Not*. See, 1875, McWilliams v. Detroit Co., 31 Mich. 275; 1890, Jemison

v. Bank, 122 N. Y. 135; 1891, Van Dresser v. Ore. R. Co., 48 Fed. Rep. 202;

1896, Anderson v. Bank, 5 N. D. 451; 1897, Snow-Church Co. v. Hall, 19

Miscl. (N. Y.) 655.

Compare, 1885, Westinghouse, etc., Co. v. Wilkinson, 79 Ala. 312.

ARTICLE VI. POWER TO SUE AND BE SUED.

Sec. 317. Right to sue, at common law, anywhere.

Note. See, 1875, McWilliams v. Detroit Co., 31 Mich. 275; 1890, Jemison
v. Bank, 122 N. Y. 135; 1891, Van Dresser v. Ore. R. Co., 48 Fed. Rep. 202;
1896, AndeJ'Bon v. Bank, 5 N. D. 4.51; 1897, Snow-Church Co. v. Hall, 19
Mi.Bel. (N. Y. ) 655.
Compare, 1885, Westinghouse, etc., Co. v. Wilkinson, 79 Ala. 312.

THE SILVER LAKE BANK (in Pennsylvania) v. Q. NORTH.1

1820. In the Court of Chancery of New York. 4 Johns.

Ch. (N. Y.) Rep. 370-374.

[Bill to foreclose a mortgage, given upon land in New York, to

secure a claim of the bank against the defendant for money loaned.]

The Chancellor (Kent). There are several objections raised

ARTICLE

by the answer, and by the counsel, at the hearing, to the right of the

Vl.

POWER TO

SUR AND BR SURD,

plaintiffs to a foreclosure or sale of the mortgaged premises.

Sec. 317. Right to sue, at common law, anywhere.

1. It is objected, that a foreign corporation can not be recognized

as such and entitled to sue in our courts.

It appears by the pleadings and proofs that the plaintiffs are a bank-

THE SILVER LAKE BANK

(IN PENNSYLVANIA)

v. G. NORTH.1

ing corporation, created by an act of the legislature of Pennsylvania,

1820.

and that they took the mortgage in question to secure a loan of money

1 Arguments and opinion on other points omitted.

IN THE CouRT OF CHANCERY OF NEw YoR.K.
Ch. (N. Y.) Rep. 370-374.

4 Johns.

[Bill to foreclose a mortgage, given upon land in New York, tosecure a claim of the bank against the defendant for money loaned. J
THE CHANCELLOR (Kent). There are several objections raised
by the answer, and by the counsel, at the hearing, to the right of the
plaintiffs to a foreclosure or sale of the mortgaged premises.
I. It is objected, that a foreign corporation can not be recognized
as such and entitled to sue in our courts.
It appears by the pleadings and proofs that the plaintiffs are a banking corporation, created by an act of the legislature of Pennsylvan£a,
and that they took the mortgage in question to secure a loan of money
1
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made at their banking house in that state. There is perfect justice

and equity in their demand, and I can not see that the objection is

POWER TO . SUE AND BE SUED.

even plausible. It is well settled that foreign corporations may sue

1093

here in their corporate name, and may prove, as a matter of fact, if

the same were denied, that they were lawfully incorporated. The

Bank of the United States has sued in our courts. (1 Johns. Cas.

132.) In Henriques v. Dutch West India Company (2 Ld. Raym.

1532, 1 Str. 612), a suit was brought by a Dutch corporation and

sustained, both in the K. B. and in the House of Lords, though it was

objected in that case that a foreign corporation could not maintain a

suit. This court ought to be as freely open to such suitors as a court

of law, and it would be most unreasonable and unjust to deny them

that privilege. They might well exclaim:

Quod genus hoc hominiim? « * *

* * * hospitio prohibemur arena.

See, 1806, National Tel. Mfg. Co. v. Dubois, 165 Mass. 117, 52 Am. St. Rep.

503, infra, p. 1490; 1899, Alliance Trust Co. v. Wilson, 9 Kan. App. 891, 51)

Pac. Rep. 177; 1899, Ware Cattle Co. v. Anderson, 107 Iowa 231, 77 N. W.

Rep. 1026; 1900, Texas & P. R. Co. v. Davis, 93 Texas 378, 55 S. W. Rep. 562;

1900, Sclimi.lt & Bro. v. Mahoney, 60 Neb. 20, 82 N. W. Rep. 99.
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Sec. 318. Under statutes, conditions imposed do not generally

prevent suing.

GARRATT FORD CO. v. VERMONT MANUFACTURING CO. Et al.

1897. In the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. 20 R. I.

Rep. 187-90, 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. (N. S.) 171-174.

Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered by a foreign corporation

made at their banking house in that state. There is perfect justice
and equity in their demand, and l can not see that the objection is
even plausible. It is well settled that foreign corporations may sue
here in their corporate name, and may prove, as a matter of fad, if
the same were denied, that they were lawfully incorporated. The
Bank of the United States has sued in our courts. (I Johns. Cas.
132.) In Henriques v. Dutch West India Company (2 Ld. Raym.
1532, I Str. 612), a suit was brought by a Dutch corporation and
sustained, both in the K. B. and in the House of Lords, though it was
objected in that case that a foreign corporation could not maintain a
suit. This court ought to be as freely open to such suitors as a court
of law, and it would be most unreasonable and unjust to deny them
that privilege. They might well exclaim:
~uod genus ltoc homi'num.~ •
• •
• • • hospi'ti'o proldbemur arena.
_ See, 1896, National Tel. Mfg. Co. v. Dubois, 165 Mass. 117, 52 Am. St. Rep.
503, infra, p. 1490; 1899, Alliance Trust Co. v. Wilson, 9 Kan. App. 891, 5\:1
Pac. Rep. 177; 1899, Ware Cattle Co. v. Anderson, lOi lowa 231, 77_N. W.
Rep. 1026; 1900, Texas & P. R. Co. v. Davis, 93 Texas 378, 55 S. W. Rep. 562;
1900, ~chmidt & Bro. v. Mahoney, 60 Neb. 20, 82 N. W . Rep. 99.

which had not appointed an attorney in this state on whom process

against it might be served. Heard on defendant's petition for a new

trial.

Stiness, J. The plaintiff, a corporation located in Boston, Mass.,

Sec. 318. Under statutes, conditions imposed do not . generally
prevent suing.

sold to the defendant a tank, through a salesman who took the order

in Providence, and it now seeks to recover the price in this suit. The

defendant asked the judge presiding at the trial to charge that the

GARRATT FORD CO. v. VERMONT MANUFACTURING CO. ET AL.

plaintiff, being a foreign corporation, which had not complied with

the law of this state in appointing a resident of this state as its attor-

ney (Gen. Laws, cap. 253. §§ 36 to 41), was not entitled to main-

1897.

tain this action. To the refusal of the judge so to charge, the de-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND. 20 R. I.
Rep. 187-90, 7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. (N. S.) 171-174.

fendant asks for a new trial on the ground of erroneous ruling.

The question, whether a corporation of one state can do business in

another state without complying with the laws of such state, is one which

has frequently arisen, and upon which decisions are conflicting, al-

though many decisions turn upon the language of a statute. Thus it

is held that a statute prohibiting a foreign corporation from doing

Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered by a foreign corporation
which had not appointed an attorney in this state on whom process
against it might be served. Heard on defendant's petition for a new
trial.
STINESS, J. The plaintiff, a corporation located in Boston, Mass.,
sold to the defendant a tank, through a salesman who took the order
in Providence, and it now seeks to recover the price in this suit. The
defendant asked the judge presiding at the trial to charge that the
plaintiff, being a foreign corporation, which had not complied with
the law of this state in appointing a resident of this state as its attorney (Gen. Laws, cap. 253. §§ 36 to 41), was not entitled to maintain this action. To the refm;al of the judge so to charge, the defendant asks for a new trial on the ground of erroneous ruling.
The question, whether a corporation of one state can do business in
another state without complying with the laws of such state, is one which
has frequently arisen, and upon which decisions are conflicting, although many decisions tum upon the language of a statute. Thus it
is held that a statute prohibiting- a foreign corporation from doing
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business in a state without complying with its terms makes such busi-

FORD CO. V. VERMONT MFG. CO.

ness illegal and void, and that no such corporation can maintain an

action to enforce its illegal contracts. And where the statute does

not provide for the consequences of non-compliance, the argument is

business in a state without complying with its terms makes such business illegal and void, and that no such corporation can maintain an
action to enforce its illegal contracts. And where the statute does
not provide for the consequences of non-compliance, the argument is
that the acts of the corporation must be void, or else the statute would
be nugatory. In Massachusetts a penalty is imposed upon the agent
doing business, but the statute (Laws of 1884, cap. 330, § 3) says
that a failure to comply with the conditions shall not affect the validity
of an act of the corporation. Rogers v. Simmons, 155 Mass. 259.
Some statutes declare the acts to be void. In such cases there can be
no question of validity. Some cases hold that where the statute imposes a penalty upon the agent but is silent as to the validity of the
act, it is to be presumed that the legislature intended the penalty as a
sufficient safeguard for compliance, and that to declare the acts of the
corporation void would go further than the statute and impose an additional penalty, by construction, which should not be done. A
notable case of this kind is Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U.S. 282, in which
the court says: "The fair implication is that, in the judgment of the
legislature of Colorado, this penalty was ample to effect the object of
the statutes prescribing the terms upon which foreign corporations
might do business in that state. It is not for the judiciary, at the instance or for the benefit of private parties claiming under deeds executed by the person who had previously conveyed to the corporation,
according to the forms prescribed for passing title to real estate. to
inflict the additional and harsh penalty of forfeiting, for the benefit of
such parties, the estate thus conveyed to the corporation and by it
conveyed to others. * • • If the legislature had intended to declare that no title should pass under conveyance to a foreign corporation
purchasing real estate before it acquires the right to engage in business
in the state, and that such a conveyance should be an absolute nullity
as between the grantor and grantee, leaving the grantor to deal with
the property as if he had never sold it, that intention would have been
clearly manifested." To the same effect are Dearborn F. Co. v. Augustine, 31 Pac. Rep. (Wash.) 327; Edison, etc., Co. v. Canadian
Co., 8 Wash. 370, 24 L. R. A. 315, with a note which holds the
contrary view. See, also, an instructive article by Mr. Gunn in Am.
Law Reg., January, 1897, p. 19. Without multiplying authorities,
we think that the reasoning which we have quoted is conclusive,
although we concede that the greater number of authorities are probably the other way. We think, moreover, that we find support for
this view in similar legislation in this state.
In Gen. Laws R. I., cap. 182, § 17, it is declared, in the case of a
foreign insurance company, that the contract shall be valid, and the
same declaration is made as to resident insurance companies which
fail to comply with the law. The argument is pressed that because
this declaration of validity is made in these cases, its omission in the
statute before us leads to the inference of the invalidity of other contracts. We do not think that the legislature intended to make one
class of contracts valid and other contracts, under similar conditions,
invalid. If the legislature intends to make such contracts as the one

that the acts of the corporation must be void, or else the statute would

be nugatory. In Massachusetts a penalty is imposed upon the agent

doing business, but the statute (Laws of 1884, cap. 330, § 3) says

that a failure to comply with the conditions shall not affect the validity

of an act of the corporation. Rogers v. Simmons, 155 Mass. 259.

Some statutes declare the acts to be void. In such cases there can be

no question of validity. Some cases hold that where the statute im-

poses a penalty upon the agent but is silent as to the validity of the

act, it is to be presumed that the legislature intended the penalty as a

sufficient safeguard for compliance, and that to declare the acts of the

corporation void would go further than the statute and impose an ad-

ditional penalty, by construction, which should not be done. A

notable case of this kind is Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U. S. 282, in which

the court says: "The fair implication is that, in the judgment of the

legislature of Colorado, this penalty was ample to effect the object of

the statutes prescribing the terms upon which foreign corporations
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might do business in that state. It is not for the judiciary, at the in-

stance or for the benefit of private parties claiming under deeds ex-

ecuted by the person who had previously conveyed to the corporation,

according to the forms prescribed for passing title to real estate, to

inflict the additional and harsh penalty of forfeiting, for the benefit of

such parties, the estate thus conveyed to the corporation and by it

conveyed to others. * * * If the legislature had intended to de-

clare that no title should pass under conveyance to a foreign corporation

purchasing real estate before it acquires the right to engage in business

in the state, and that such a conveyance should be an absolute nullity

as between the grantor and grantee, leaving the grantor to deal with

the property as if he had never sold it, that intention would have been

clearly manifested." To the same effect are Dearborn F. Co. v. Au-

gustine, 31 Pac. Rep. (Wash.) 327; Edison, etc., Co. v. Canadian

Co., 8 Wash. 370, 24 L. R. A. 315, with a note which holds the

contrary view. See, also, an instructive article by Mr. Gunn in Am.

Law Reg., January, 1897, p. 19. Without multiplying authorities,

we think that the reasoning which we have quoted is conclusive,

although we concede that the greater number of authorities are prob-

ably the other way. We think, moreover, that we find support for

this view in similar legislation in this state.

In Gen. Laws R. I., cap. 182, § 17, it is declared, in the case of a

foreign insurance company, that the contract shall be valid, and the

same declaration is made as to resident insurance companies which

fail to comply with the law. The argument is pressed that because

this declaration of validity is made in these cases, its omission in the

statute before us leads to the inference of the invalidity of other con-

tracts. We do not think that the legislature intended to make one

class of contracts valid and other contracts, under similar conditions,

invalid. If the legislature intends to make such contracts as the one
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in suit invalid, it is easy to say so; but, in the absence of such a pro-
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vision, it is a wide stretch of judicial construction for the court to hold

that such a result was intended. The purpose of the statute'is not to

invalidate contracts, but to require foreign corporations to appoint an

attorney in this state upon whom service of process may be made.

This purpose seems to be adequately served by imposing a penalty

upon the agent who ventures to do business for the company without

complying with the law. While we do not question the right of the

state to impose such conditions and penalties upon foreign companies

doing business here as it may deem proper, subject to the provisions

of the federal constitution as to the regulation of commerce among

the states, yet, in view of the vast amount of business now done by

such corporations, we think it is a conservative position to hold that

the legislature did not intend to exempt our citizens from paying just

debts, upon grounds of non-compliance with our statutes, which may

have been fully known to the debtors, when the general assembly has

not clearly expressed that intention, and the inference of it is not

necessary to the object of the statute.

We are referred to Electric News Co. v. Perry, 75 Fed. Rep. 898,
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in which it is claimed that our statute was construed to preclude a

foreign corporation, which had not complied with it, from maintain-

ing a suit. That case, however, was a bill in equity for an injunc-

tion to restrain police officers of Pawtucket, who had seized the prop-

erty of the complainant for a violation of our statute against pool

selling, from interfering with their business. Judge Colt, in the

opinion, very properly said that a foreign corporation, which has not

complied with statutory provisions, "can not invoke the aid of this

court to prohibit the defendants from interfering with a business

which it has no legal right to carry on." That is a very different

thing from holding that a contract is void, which, in its nature, is not

contrary to public policy.

Our decision is that the court did not err in refusing the instruction

asked for, and that the petition for a new trial must be dismissed.

See, 1899, Alliance Trust Co. v. Wilson (Kan. App.), 59 Pac. Rep. 177; 1899,

Morse v. Holland Trust Co.,84 111. App. 84, 56 N. E. Rep. 369; 1899, National

Cash Register v. Wilson, 9 N. D. 112, 81 N. W. Rep. 285.

Sec. 319. But statutes may exclude from suing, except as to in-

terstate or foreign commerce.

TABER v. INTERSTATE BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION.1

1897. In the Supreme Court of Texas. 91 Texas Rep. 92-95,

7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. (N. S.) 168.

[Action brought by the loan association, a Georgia corporation, to

foreclose a mortgage upon a lot in Austin, Texas, given by Kate

in suit invalid, it is easy to say so; but, in the absence of such a provision, 'it is a wide stretch of judicial construction for the court to hold
that such a result was intended. The purpose of the statute· is not to
invalidate contracts, but to require foreign corporations to appoint an
attorney in this state upon whom service of process may be made.
This purpose seems to be adequately served by imposing a penalty
upon the agent who ventures to do business for the company without
complying with the law. While we do not question the right of the
state to impose such conditions and penalties upon foreign companies
doing business here as it may deem proper, subject to the provisions
of the federal constitution as to the regulation of commerce among
the states, yet, in view of the vast amount of business now done by
such corporations, we think it is a conservative position to hold that
the legislature did not intend to exempt our citizens from paying just
debts, upon grounds of non-compliance with our statutes, which may
have been fully known to the debtors, when the general assembly has
not clearly expressed that intention, and the inference of it is not
necessary to the object of the statute .
. We are referred to Electric News Co. v. Perry, 75 Fed. Rep. 898,
in which it is claimed that our statute was construed to preclude a
foreign corporation, which had not complied with it, from maintaining a suit. That case, however, was a bill in equity for an injunction to restrain police officers of Pawtucket, who had seized the property of the complainant for a violation of our statute against pool
selling, from interfering with their business. Judge Colt, in the
opinion, very properly said that a foreign corporation, which has not
complied with statutory provisions, "can not invoke the aid of this
court to prohibit the defendants from interfering with a business
which it has no legal right to carry on." That is a very different
thing from holding that a contract is void, which, in its nature, is not
contrary to public policy.
Our decision is that the court did not err in refusing the instruction
asked for, and that the petition for a new trial must be dismissed.
See, 1899, Alliance Trust Co. v. Wilson (Kan. App.),59Pac. Rep. 177; 1899,
Morse v. Holland Trust Co., 84 Ill. App. 84, 56 N. E .. Rep. 369; 1899, National
Cash Register v. Wilson, 9 N. D. 112, 81 N. W. Rep. 285.

1 Statement abridged. Arguments omitted.

Sec. 319. But st{ltutes may exclude from suing, except as to interstate or _foreign commerce.
TABER v. INTERSTATE BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION.I

1897.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT

OF

TEXAS.

91 Texas Rep. 92-95,

7 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. (N. S.) 168.
[Action brought by the loan association, a Georgia corporation, to
foreclose a mortgage upon a lot in Austin, Texas, given by Kate
1 Statement abridged.
Arguments omitted.
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Taber to secure a loan from the company to her. The petition al-
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leged that it had a branch office in Texas, and had a permit, under

TABER V. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION.

the Texas law, to do business in the state. This was met by a gen-

eral denial; the question was raised as to whether, under these

Taber to secure a loan from the company to her. The petition alleged that it had a branch office in Texas, and had a permit, under
the Texas law, to do business in the state. This was met by a general denial; the question was raised as to whether, under these
circumstances, the corporation must prove it had such a permit.
Judgment was rendered for the corporation, but this question was
certified for answer by the supreme court.]
BROWN, Associate Justice. •
• • To the question propounded
we answer that it was necessary for the corporation (plaintiff below)
to prove that it had a permit to do business in Texas at the time that
the contract sued upon was made in order that the court might enter
judgment in its favor. Article 745 1 Rev. Civ. St. 1895, provides, in
substance, that every corporation for pecuniary profit organized or
created under the laws of another state which desires to transact business in this state, or to solicit business in this state, or which desires
to establ ish a general or special office in this state, shall be required
to file with the secretary of state a duly-certified copy of its articles
of incorporation. Article 746, Rev. Civ. St. 1895, reads as follows:
'•No such corporation can maintain any suit or action, either legal or
equitable, in any of the courts of this state upon any demand, whether
arising out of contract or tort, unless at the time such contract was
made or tort committed the corporation had filed its articles of incorporation under the provisions of this chapter in the office of the secretary of state for the purpose of procuring its permit." Every state
h as the right to prescribe the terms upon which any corporation created in another state or foreign country may do business within its
limits, and may exclude such corporations entirely, with the exception
of corporations engaged in interstate commerce, or such as are employed by the United States in the transaction of its business. Under
this rule of law, about which there is no controversy, this state had
the right to adopt such measures as it thought fit to enforce the provisions of its law, which required foreign corporations to deposit the
articles of their incorporation with the secretary of state; and, the
legislature having seen fit to prescribe as a condition to the maintenance of ~uits in its courts that such compliance should precede the
transaction of business in the state, it follows that the filing of its articles
of incorporation with the secretary of state is a condition precedent to
the maintenance of suit upon any contract or right of action accruing
to such foreign corporation; and, it being a condition precedent, the
fact must be both alleged and proved to entitle the corporation to
judgment in such case. Cumberland Land Co. v. Canter Lumber
Co. (Tenn. Ch. App.), 35 S. W. Rep. 886; Mullens v. Mortgage
Co., 88 Ala. 28o, 7 So. Rep. 201; Thorne v. Insurance Co., 8o Pa.
St. 15; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Holloway v . Railway Co.,
23 Texas 465. • • •

circumstances, the corporation must prove it had such a permit.

Judgment was rendered for the corporation, but this question was

certified for answer by the supreme court.]

Brown, Associate Justice. * * * To the question propounded

we answer that it was necessary for the corporation (plaintiff below)

to prove that it had a permit to do business in Texas at the time that

the contract sued upon was made in order that the court might enter

judgment in its favor. Article 745, Rev. Civ. St. 1895, provides, in

substance, that every corporation for pecuniary profit organized or

created under the laws of another state which desires to transact busi-

ness in this state, or to solicit business in this state, or which desires

to establish a general or special office in this state, shall be required

to file with the secretary of state a duly-certified copy of its articles

of incorporation. Article 746, Rev. Civ. St. 1895, reads as follows:

"No such corporation can maintain any suit or action, either legal or

equitable, in any of the courts of this state upon any demand, whether
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arising out of contract or tort, unless at the time such contract was

made or tort committed the corporation had filed its articles of incor-

poration under the provisions of this chapter in the office of the secre-

tary of state for the purpose of procuring its permit." Every state

has the right to prescribe the terms upon which any corporation cre-

ated in another state or foreign country may do business within its

limits, and may exclude such corporations entirely, with the exception

of corporations engaged in interstate commerce, or such as are em-

ployed by the United States in the transaction of its business. Under

this rule of law, about which there is no controversy, this state had

the right to adopt such measures as it thought fit to enforce the pro-

visions of its law, which required foreign corporations to deposit the

articles of their incorporation with the secretary of state; and, the

legislature having seen fit to prescribe as a condition to the main-

tenance of suits in its courts that such compliance should precede the

transaction of business in the state, it follows that the filing of its articles

of incorporation with the secretary of state is a condition precedent to

the maintenance of suit upon any contract or right of action accruing

to such foreign corporation; and, it being a condition precedent, the

fact must be both alleged and proved to entitle the corporation to

judgment in such case. Cumberland Land Co. v. Canter Lumber

Co. (Tenn. Ch. App.), 35 S. W. Rep. 886; Mullens v. Mortgage

Co., 88 Ala. 280, 7 So. Rep. 201; Thorne v. Insurance Co., 80 Pa.

St. 15; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Holloway v. Railway Co.,

23 Texas 465. • * *

Note.. See, 1899, Texas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 55 8. W. Rep. 562; 1900,

Thompson Company v. Whitehall, 18;"> 111. 454, 7G Am. St. Rep. 51; 1901,

Helman Brewing Co. v. Reuneise, — .Minn. — , 88 N. W. 441.

NotR-. See, 1899, Texas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 55 S. W . Rep. 562; 1900,
Thom pson Company v. White bed, 18.'J Ill. .JM, 76 Am. f::t. Rep. 51; 1901,
H e lm a n Brewing Co . v. Re meise, - l\linn. - , 88 N. W. 441.
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United States courts.

MR. JUSTICE HUNT in INSURANCE COMPANY v. MORSE.1

Sec. 320.

But such statutes can not exclude from suing in the
United States courts.

1874. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 87 U. S.

(20 Wall.) 445, on 454-5-6.

[The Wisconsin statutes of 1870 provided that it shall not be law-

MR. JUSTICE HUNT

ful for any fire insurance company, incorporated in any other state,

IN

INSURANCE COMPANY v. MORSE. 1

directly or indirectly to take risks or transact any business in this state,

without first appointing an attorney upon whom process may be

1874.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF THE UNITED STATES.

served, and containing an agreement that such company will not re-

(20

87

U. S.

Wall.) 445, on 454-5-6.

move the suit for trial into the United States courts. The Home

Insurance Company, a New York corporation, began business in Wis-

consin, and appointed such an agent, the power of attorney containing

a provision not to remove suits to the United States courts. It insured

Morse, and a loss occurred, for which he sued in the state court, and

the company petitioned for removal. This was denied, error assigned

and taken to the supreme court of Wisconsin; this court affirmed the

decision, and the company brought the case here. After quoting the
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provision of the constitution of the United States as to the jurisdiction

of the United States courts, and saying that jurisdiction depends on

the laws of the United States, that the states can not limit it, and that

for purposes of such jurisdiction corporations are citizens of the state

creating them, proceeds:]

The Home Insurance Company is a citizen of New York, within

this provision of the constitution. As such citizen of another state,

it sought to exercise this right to remove to a federal tribunal a suit

commenced against itself in the state court of Wisconsin, where the

amount involved exceeded the sum of $500. This right was denied

to it by the state court on the ground that it had made the agreement

referred to, and that the statute of the state authorized and required

the making of the agreement.

We are not able to distinguish this agreement and this requisition,

in principle, from a similar one made in the case of an individual

citizen of New York. A corporation has the same right to the pro-

tection of the laws as a natural citizen, and the same right to appeal

to all the courts of the country. The rights of an individual are not

superior in this respect to that of a corporation.

The state of Wisconsin can regulate its own corporations and the

affairs of its own citizens, in subordination, however, to the constitu-

tion of the United States. The requirement of an agreement like

this from their own corporations would be brutum fulmen, because

they possess no such right under the constitution of the United States.

A foreign citizen, whether natural or corporate, in this respect pos-

1 Much of opinion containing citations from cases as to the general power

of a state to exclude foreign corporations is omitted.

[The Wisconsin statutes of 1870 provided that it shall not be law·
fol for any fire insuranc~ company, incorporated in any other state,
directly or indirectly to take risks or transact any business in this state,
without first appointing an attorney upon whom process may be
served, and containing an agreement that such company will not remove the suit for trial into the United States courts. The Home
Insurance Company, a New York corporation, began business in Wisconsin, and appointed such an agent, the power of attorney containing
a provision not to remove suits to the United States courts. It insured
Morse, and a loss occurred, for which he sued in the state court, and
the company petitioned for removal. This was denied, e1Tor assigned
and taken to the supreme court of Wisconsin; this court affirmed the
decision, and the company brought the case here. After quoting the
prO\·ision of the constitution of the United States as to the jurisdiction
of the United States courts, and saying that jurisdiction depends on
t'he laws of the United States, that the states can not limit it, and that
for purposes of such jurisdiction corporations are citizens of the state
creating them, proceeds:]
The Home Insurance Company is a citizen of N cw York, within
this provision of the constitution. As such citizen of another state,
it sought to exercise this right to remove to a federal tribunal a suit
commenced against itself in the state court of Wisconsin, where the
amount involved exceeded the sum of $500· This right was denied
to it by the state court on the ground that it had made the agreement
referred to, and that the statute of the state authorized and required
the making of the agreement.
We are not able to distinguish this agreement and this requisition,
in principle, from a similar one made in the case of an individual
citizen of New York. A corporation has the same right to the protection of the laws as a natural citizen, and the same right to appeal
to all the courts of foe country. The rights of an individual are not
superior in this respect to that of a corporation.
The state of Wisconsin can regulate its own corporations and the
affairs of its own citizens, in subordination, however, to the constitution of the United States. The requirement of an agreement like
this from their own corporations would be brutum fulmen, because
they possess no such right under the constitution of the United States.
A foreign citizen, whether natural or corporate, in this respect pos1 Much of opinion containing citations from cases as to the general power
of a state to exclude foreign corporations is omitted.
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sesses a right not pertaining to one of her own citizens. There must

necessarily be a difference between the status of the two in this re-
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We do not consider the question whether the state of Wisconsin

sesses a right not pertaining to one of her own citizens. There must
necessarily be a difference between the status of the two in this respect.
We do not consider the question whether the state of Wisconsin
can entirely exclude such corporations from its limits, nor what reasonable terms they may impose as a condition of their transacting
business within the state. These questions have been before the
court in other cases, but they do not arise here. • • •
(Citing and quoting Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How.
407; Ducat v. City of Chicago, 10 Wall. 410; Bank of Columbia v.
Okely, 4 Wheat. 235.)
On this branch of the case the conclusion is this:
1. The constitution of the United States secures to citizens of another state than that in which suit is brought an absolute right to remove their cases into the federal court, upon compliance with the
terms of the act of I 789.
2. The statute of Wisconsin is an obstruction to this right, is repugnant to the constitution of the United States and the laws in pursuance
thereof, and is illegal and void.
3. The agreement of the insurance company derives no support
from an unconstitutional statute and is void, as it would be had no
such statute been passed.
We are of opinion, for the reasons given, that the Winnebago
County Court erred in proceeding in the case after the filing the petition and the giving the security required by the act of 1789 1 and that
all subsequent proceedings in the state court are illegal and should be
vacated. The judgment in that court, and the judgment in the supreme court of Wisconsin , should be reversed, and the prayer of the
petition for removal should be granted.
Mr. CHIEF JusTICK W AITK and Mr. JUSTICE DAVIS dissenting.

can entirely exclude such corporations from its limits, nor what rea-

sonable terms they may impose as a condition of their transacting

business within the state. These questions have been before the

court in other cases, but they do not arise here. • » •

(Citing and quoting Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Bank of Au-

gusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How.

407; Ducat v. City of Chicago, 10 Wall. 410; Bank of Columbia v.

Okely, 4 Wheat. 235.)

On this branch of the case the conclusion is this:

1. The constitution of the United States secures to citizens of an-

other state than that in which suit is brought an absolute right to re-

move their cases into the federal court, upon compliance with the

terms of the act of 17S9.

2. The statute of Wisconsin is an obstruction to this right, is repug-

nant to the constitution of the United States and the laws in pursuance

thereof, and is illegal and void.
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3. The agreement of the insurance company derives no support

from an unconstitutional statute and is void, as it would be had no

such statute been passed.

We are of opinion, for the reasons given, that the Winnebago

County Court erred in proceeding in the case after the filing the peti-

tion and the giving the security required by the act of 1789, and that

all subsequent proceedings in the state court are illegal and should be

vacated. The judgment in that court, and the judgment in the su-

preme court of Wisconsin, should be reversed, and the prayer of the

petition for removal should be granted.

Mr. Chief Justice Waite and Mr. Justice Davis dissenting.

Note. See, 1857, Shelby v. Hoffman, 7 Ohio St. 450; 1872, Morse v. Home

Ins. Co., 30 Wis. 496,11 Am. Rep. 580; 1875, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 6

Bias. 461; 1876, State, errel. Drake, v. Doyle, 40Wis. 175,22 Am. Rep. 692; 1876,

Doyle v. Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535, infra; 1887, Barron v. Burnside. 121 U.

S. 186; 1889, Rece v. N. N. & M. V. Co., 32 W. Va. 164, 3 L. R. A. 572; 1890,

Texas v. Worsham, 76 Texas 556; 1892, Southern Pac. Rv. Co. v. Denton, 146

TJ. S. 202; 1894, Martin v. Bait. & Ohio R. Co., 151 Ui S. 673, 684; 1895,

Note. See, 1857, Shelby v. Hoffman, 7 Ohio St. 450 ; 1872, Morse v. Home
Ins. Co .. 30 Wis. 496, 11 Am. Rep. 580; 1875, Hartford .F ire Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 6
Biss. 461; 1876, State, ex rel. Drake, v. Doyle, 40Wis.175, 22Am. Rep. 692; 1876,
Doyle v. Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535, infra: 1887, Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.
S. 186; 1889, Rece v. N. N. & M. V. Co., 32 W. Va. 164, 3 L. R. A. 572; 1890,
Texas v. Worsham, 76 Texas 556; 1892, Southern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Denton, 146
U. S. 202; 1894, Martin v. Bait. & Ohio R. Co., 151 U. 8. 673, 684; 1895,
Commw. v. East Tenn. C. Co., 97 Ky. 238.

Commw. v. East Tenn. C. Co., 97 Ky. 238.

Sec. 321. Federal corporations can sue in the federal courts.

SUPREME LODGE OF KNIGHTS OF PYTHIAS OF THE WORLD v.

HILL.1

1896. In the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. (W.

Va.) 76 Fed. Rep. 468-472.

[Action on the case in assumpsit, brought in courts of West Vir-

ginia by Ellen Hill, against the lodge, to enforce the payment of a

1 Statement abridged; only the part of the opinion relating to the one point

is given.

Sec. 321. Federal corporations can sue in the federal courts.
SUPREME LODGE OF KNIGHTS OF PYTHIAS OF THE WORLD v.
HILL. 1

IN

THE

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF
Va.) 76 Fed. Rep. 468-472.

APPEALS.

(W.

[Action on the case in assumpsit, brought in courts of West Virginia by Ellen Hill, against the lodge, to enforce the payment of a
1 Statement abridged; only the pa.rt of the opinion relating to the one point
is given .
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By petition of the lodge, a corporation created under the laws of the

United States, the suit was removed to the United States Circuit Court,

district of West Virginia. From a judgment in favor of Ellen Hill the

lodge appealed.]

Goff, Circuit Judge. * * * The first error assigned is to the action

of the court in overruling the demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration.

The grounds of the demurrer were that the circuit court of the United

States had no jurisdiction of this case, that it did not properly present

a federal question, and that the same was shown by the declaration

itself, and also that there was no cause of action set forth in either

count thereof. It should be remembered, in this connection, that this

cause was removed from the state court on the petition of the defend-

ant, in which it was alleged that said defendant was a corporation

duly formed, organized and created by and under the laws of the

United States, and also that the declaration as filed in the state court

recited that the defendant was duly incorporated under an act of con-

gress. This assignment of error is without merit, as it is plain that
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the demurrer was properly overruled by the court below. The su-

preme court of the United States has decided that corporations of

the United States, created by and organized under acts of congress,

are entitled to remove into the circuit court of the United States suits

brought against them in the state courts, on the ground that such suits

are suits "arising under the laws of the United States." Pacific Rail-

road Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1113; Butler v.

National Home, 144 U. S. 64, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581. That court

also entertained and decided a writ of error in the case of Knights of

Pythias v. Kalinski, 163 U. S. 289, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047, which

had been removed from a state court, in the eastern district of Lou-

isiana, to the circuit court of the United States for that district, upon

the petition of the said Knights of Pythias, in which it was alleged

that it was a corporation created by and organized under an act of

congress. * * *

Affirmed. .

Note. See, 1899, Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. England, 94 Fed. Rep. 369.

See. 322. Liability to be sued.

In the United States courts, citizenship.

ST. LOUIS AND SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY CO. v. JAMES.1

1896. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 161 U. S.

ReP- 545-572-

[In 1892 Etta James brought this action in the United States Cir-

policy of insurance on the life of Arthur Hill, in favor of the plaintiff.
By· petition of the lodge, a corporation created under the laws of the
United States, the suit was removed to the United States Circuit Court,
district of West Virginia. From a judgment in favor of Ellen Hill the
lodge appealed.]
GOFF, Circuit Judge. • • • The first error assigned is to the action
of the court in overruling the demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration.
The grounds of the demurrer were that the circuit court of the United
States had no jurisdiction of this case, that it did not properly present
a federal q\testion, and that the same was shown by the declaration
itself, and also that there was no cause of action set forth in either
count thereof. It should be remembered, in this connection, that this
cause was removed from the state court on the petition of the defendant, in which it was alleged that said defendant was a corporation
duly formed, organized and created by and under the laws of the
United States, and also that the declaration as filed in the state court
recited that the defendant was duly incorporated under an act of congress. This assignment of error is without merit, as it is plain that
the demurrer was properly overruled by the court below. The supreme court of the United States has decided that corporations of
the United States, created by and organized under acts of congress,
are entitled to remove into the circuit court of the United States suits
brought against them in the state courts, on the ground that such suits
are suits "arising under the laws of the United States." Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 11 S U. S. 1, S Sup. Ct. Rep. 1113; Butler v.
National Home, 144 U. S. 64, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581. That court
also entertained and decided a writ of error in the case of Knights of
Pythias v. Kalinski, 163 U. S. 289, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047, which
had been removed from a state court, in the eastern district of Louisiana, to the circuit court of the United States for that district, upon
the petition of the said Knights of Pythias, in which it was alleged
that it was a corporation created by and organized under an act of
congress. • • •
Affirmed.
Nou. See, 1899, Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. England, 94 Fed. Rep. 369.

cuit Court, western district of Arkansas, against the railway company,

1 Statement much abridged; arguments, part of opinion and dissenting

opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan omitted.

Sec. 322. Liability to be sued.
In the United States courts, citizenship.
ST. LOUIS AND SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY CO. v. JAMES. 1

1896.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

161

u. s.

Rep. 545-57 2 •

[In 1892 Etta James brought this action in the United States Circuit Court, western district of Arkansas, against the railway company,
1 Statement much abridged; arguments, part of opinion and diseenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan omitted.
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for negligence in maintaining a switch target so near its tracks, in the

state of Missouri, that her husband, a fireman on the company's en-
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gine, was killed. Mrs. James resided in Monett, Mo., where the

accident took place. The railway company was incorporated in Mis-

:l:or negligence in maintaining a switch target so near its tracks, in the
state of Missouri, that her husband, a fireman on the company's engine, was killed. Mrs. James resided in Monett, Mo., where the
accident took place. The railway company was incorporated in Missouri in 1876, and soon thereafter became the owner of a road extending southerly from Monett, to the state line, and on to Fort
Smith in Arkansas; the latter part of this line had been purchased in
1882 by the St. L. & S. F. Co.; in 1889 Arkansas chftflged her
former law relating to foreign railway companies owning or operating
railways in that state by enacting that such company before having
the benefit of such act shall within sixty days file with the secreta ry
of state a certified copy of its a1ticles of incorporation or charter,
" and shall thereupon become a corporation of this state, anything in
its articles of incorporation or charter to the contrary notwithstanding,
and in all suits and proceedings instituted against such corporation
process may be served" as in case of "corporations in this state org anized and existing under the laws of this state." The railway
company filed its copy of its articles of incorporation as required by
the act of 1889, but was never otherwise incorporated in Arkansas.
The railway company duly objected to the jurisdiction of the court,
on the ground that the plaintiff and defendant were both citizens of
Mi ssouri, and that the requisite diversity of citizenship did not exist
so as to give jurisdiction to the United States courts; the question was
so raised, by exceptions · to the ruling of the trial court, and assignments of error, as to be presented to the circuit court of appeals, by
which four questions were certified to this court: 1. Under the act of
1889, by filing its articles of incorporation, and continuing to operate
its road, did the railway company "become a corporation and citizen
of Arkansas ?" 2. Did it thus become a citizen of Arkansas so as to
give to the United States Circuit Court, western district of Arkansas, jurisdiction of th,is action, in which complainant was a citizen of Missouri ?
3. Did it so become a citizen of Arkansas as to give such court jurisdiction of such action, when complainant was a citizen of Missouri,
and when· the cause of action accrued there? 4. Under all the circumstances, did the said court have jurisdiction of the action?]
MR. JUSTICE SHmAs. Etta James, as a citizen of the state of :Missouri, and having a cause of action against the St. Louis and San
Francisco Railway Company, a corporation of the state of Missouri,
could , of course, sue the latter in the courts of that state, but equally,
of course, could not sue such state corporation in the circuit court of
the United States for the district of Missouri. Can she, as such citize n
of the state of Missouri, lawfully assert her cause of action in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Arkansas against the
St. Louis and San Francisc.."'O Railway Company by showing that the
latter had availed itself of the rights and privileges conferred by the
state of Arkansas on railroad corporations of other states coming
within her borders and complying with the terms and conditions of
her statutes?
Before addressing ourselves directly to this question, it must be con-

souri in 1876, and soon thereafter became the owner of a road ex-

tending southerly from Monett, to the state line, and on to Fort

Smith in Arkansas; the latter part of this line had been purchased in

1882 by the St. L. & S. F. Co.; in 1889 Arkansas changed her

former law relating to foreign railway companies owning or operating

railways in that state by enacting that such company before having

the benefit of such act shall within sixty days file with the secretary

of state a certified copy of its articles of incorporation or charter,

"and shall thereupon become a corporation of this state, anything in

its articles of incorporation or charter to the contrary notwithstanding,

and in all suits and proceedings instituted against such corporation

process may be served" as in case of "corporations in this state or-

ganized and existing under the laws of this state." The railway

company filed its copy of its articles of incorporation as required by

the act of 18S9, but was never otherwise incorporated in Arkansas.

The railway company duly objected to the jurisdiction of the court,
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on the ground that the plaintiff and defendant were both citizens of

Missouri, and that the requisite diversity of citizenship did not exist

so as to give jurisdiction to the United States courts; the question was

so raised, by exceptions' to the ruling of the trial court, and assign-

ments of error, as to be presented to the circuit court of appeals, by

which four questions were certified to this court: 1. Under the act of

1889, by filing its articles of incorporation, and continuing to operate

its road, did the railway company "become a corporation and citizen

of Arkansas?" 2. Did it thus become a citizen of Arkansas so as to

give to the United States Circuit Court, western district of Arkansas, ju-

risdiction of this action, in which complainant was a citizen of Missouri?

3. Did it so become a citizen of Arkansas as to give such court juris-

diction of such action, when complainant was a citizen of Missouri,

and when*the cause of action accrued there? 4. Under all the cir-

cumstances, did the said court have jurisdiction of the action ?]

Mr. Justice Shiras. Etta James, as a citizen of the state of Mis-

souri, and having a cause of action against the St. Louis and San

Francisco Railway Company, a corporation of the state of Missouri,

could, of course, sue the latter in the courts of that state, but equally,

of course, could not sue such state corporation in the circuit court of

the United States for the district of Missouri. Can she, as such citizen

of the state of Missouri, lawfully assert her cause of action in the cir-

cuit court of the United States for the district of Arkansas against the

St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Company by showing that the

latter had availed itself of the rights and privileges conferred by the

state of Arkansas on railroad corporations of other states coming

within her borders and complying with the terms and conditions of

her statutes?

Before addressing ourselves directly to this question, it must be con-
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is transitory in its nature, and that the St. Louis and San Francisco

Railway Company, though denying the plaintiff's right to sue it in

the circuit court of Arkansas, waives its statutory privilege of being

sued only in the district in which it has its habitat.

It must be regarded, to begin with, as finally settled, by repeated

decisions of this court, that, for the purpose of jurisdiction in the fed-

eral courts, a state corporation is deemed to be indisputably composed

of citizens of such state. It is equally true that, without objection so

far from the federal authority, whether legislative or judicial, it has

become customary for a state, adjacent to the state creating a railroad

corporation, to legislatively grant authority to such foreign corpora-

tion to enter its territory with its road—to make running arrangements

with its own railroads—to buy or lease them, or to consolidate with

the companies owning them. Sometimes, as in the present case, such

foreign corporation is declared, upon its acceptance of prescribed

terms and conditions, to become a domestic corporation of such ad-

jacent state, and to be endowed with all the rights and privileges en-
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joyed by similar corporations created by such state.

We have already said that the rule that state corporations are in-

disputably composed of citizens of the states creating them is finally

settled. But, in view of the question now before us, it may be well

to briefly review some of the cases.

In the case of Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61,

87, 88, where an action had been brought against citizens of the state

of Georgia in the circuit court of the United States for the district of

Georgia, by a petition of '-the president, directors and company of

the Bank of the United States," wherein it was alleged that the peti-

tioners were citizens of the state of Pennsylvania, it was held that a

corporation aggregate, composed of citizens of one state, may sue a

citizen of another state in the circuit court of the United States, and

Chief Justice Marshall, in giving the opinion of the court, said: "Sub-

stantially and essentially, the parties in such a case, where the mem-

bers of the corporation are aliens or citizens of a different state from

the opposite party, come within the spirit and terms of the jurisdiction

conferred by the constitution on the national tribunals."

Before leaving this case it should be noted that the United States

Bank was not a corporation of the state of Pennsylvania, but of the

United States. The decision, therefore, was to the effect that where

it appeared that a corporation plaintiff, regardless of its origin, was

composed of aliens or of citizens of a different state from the defend-

ant, the plaintiff, through suing in its corporate name, could make the

averment that the individuals who composed the corporation were

such aliens or citizens of a different state, and such averment, if not

traversed, would sustain the jurisdiction. The principle of the case

makes the individual corporators the real parties to the suit.

In Louisville, Cincinnati, etc., Railroad v. Letson, 2 How. 497,

555, an action was brought, in the circuit court of the United States

for the district of South Carolina, by a citizen of the state of New

ceded that the plaintiff's cause of action, though arising in Missouri,
is transitory in its nature, and that the St. Louis and San Francisco
Railway Company, though denying the plaintiff's right to sue it in
the circuit court of Arkansas, waives its statutory privilege of being
sued only in the district in which it has its habitat.
' It must be regarded, to begin with, as finally settled, by repeated
decisions of this court, that, for the purpose of jurisdiction in the federal courts, a state corporation is deemed to be indisputably composed
of citizens of such state. It is equally true that, without objection so
far from the federal authority, whether legislative or judicial, it has
become customary for a state, adjacent to the state creating a railroad
corporation, to legislatively grant authority to such foreign corporation to enter its territory with its road-to make running arrangements
with its own railroads--to buy or lease them, or to consolidate with
the companies owning them. Sometimes, as in the present case, such
foreign corporation is declared, upon its acceptance of prescribed
terms and conditions, to become a domestic corporation of such adjacent state, and to be endowed with all the ri'ghts and privileges enjoyed by similar corporations created by such state.
We have already said that the rule that state corporations are indisputably composed of citizens of the states creating them is finally
settled. But, in view of the question now before us, it may be well
to briefly review some of the cases.
In the case of Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61,
87, 88, where an action had been brought against citizens of the state
of Georgia in the circuit court of the United States for the district of
Georgia, by a petition of "the president, directors and company of
the Bank of the United States," wherein it was alleged that the petitioners were citizens of the state of Pennsylvania, it was held that a
corporation aggregate, composed of citizens of one state, may sue a
citizen of another state in the circuit court of the United States, and
Chief Justice Marshall, in giving the opinion of the court, said: ''Substantially and essentially, the parties in such a case, where the members of the corporation are aliens or citizens of a different state from
the opposite party, come within the spirit and terms of the jurisdiction
conferred by the constitution on the national tribunals."
Before leaving this case it should be noted that the United States
Bank was not a corporation of the state df Pennsylvania, but of the
United States. The decision, therefore, was to the effect that where
it appeared that a corporation plaintiff, regardless of its origin, was
composed of aliens or of citizens of a different state from the defendant, the plaintiff, through suing in its corporate name, could make the
averment that the individuals who composed the corporation were
such aliens or citizens of a different state, and such averment, if not
traversed, would sustain the jurisdiction. The principle of the case
makes the individual corporators the real parties to the suit.
In Louisville, Cincinnati, etc., Railroad v. Letson, 2 How. 497,
555, an action was brought, in the circuit court of the United States
for the district of South Carolina, by a citizen of the state of New
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York against a corporation whose members were alleged to be citi-

zens of South Carolina. A plea to the jurisdiction was set up that
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there were members of the defendant company who were not citizens

ST. LOUIS AND SAN FRANCISCO RY. CO. V. JAMES.

§ 322

of the state of South Carolina, but of another state than New York

York against a corporation whose members were alleged to be citizens of South Carolina. A plea to the jurisdiction was set up that
there were members of the defendant company who were not citizens
of the state of South Carolina, but of another state than New York
or South Carolina. In the opinion in this case, Bank of the United
States v. Deveaux was said to have gone too far, and that consequences
and inferences had been argumentatively drawn from it which ought
not to be followed, and it was said that "a corporation created by a
state to perform its functions under the authority of that state and
only suable there, though it may have members out of the state, seems
to us to be a person, though an artificial one, inhabiting and belonging to that state, and, therefore, entitled, for the purpose of suing and
being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that state," and accordingly the
judgment of the circuit court, overruling the plea to its jurisdiction,
was sustained. • • •
(Citing, and quoting from, as following the Let~on case, Marshall
v. B. & 0. R.R., 16 How. 314, 329; Covington Drawbridge Co. Y.
Shepherd, 20 How. 227, 233.)
The previous cases were reviewed in Ohio and Mississippi Railroad
v. Wheeler, I Black 286, 297. That was the case of an action
brought in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Indiana against Wheeler, a citizen of that state, to recover the amount
due on his subscription to stock of the Ohio and Mississippi Railro:id
Company. The declaration described the plaintiffs as the "president
and directors of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company, a corporation created by the laws of the states of Indiana and Ohio, and
having its principal place of business in Cincinnati , in the state o f
Ohio, a citizen of the state of Ohio." The defendant pleaded to the
jurisdiction by alleging that the plaintiff company, although a corporation of the state of Ohio in the first instance, had been incorporated
by an act of assembly of the state of Indiana, and thus had become
a body corporate of the same state whereof he was a citizen.
The question thus raised was on a certificate of a division of opinion
between the judges of the circuit court, brought to this court, and was
answered as follows: "This suit in the corporate name is, in contemplation of law, t:l?e suit of the individual persons who compose it,
and must. therelore. be regarded and treated as a suit in which citizens of Ohio and Indiana are joined as plaintiffs in an action again t
a citizen of the last mentioned state. Such an action can not be m a intained in a court of the United States, where jurisdiction of the case
depends altogether on the citizenship of the parties. And , in such a
suit, .it can make no difference whether the plaintiffs sue in their own
proper names or by the corporate name and style by which they are
described. The averments in the declaration would seem to imply
that the plaintiffs claim to have been created a corporate body, and to
have been endued with the capacities and faculties it possesses by the
co-operating legislation of the two states, and to be one and the same
legal being in both states. If this were the case it would not affect
the question of jurisdiction in this suit. But such a corporation can

or South Carolina. In the opinion in this case, Bank of the United

States v. Deveaux was said to have gone too far, and that consequences

and inferences had been argumentatively drawn from it which ought
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state to perform its functions under the authority of that state and

only suable there, though it may have members out of the state, seems

to us to be a person, though an artificial one, inhabiting and belong-

ing to that state, and, therefore, entitled, for the purpose of suing and

being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that state," and accordingly the

judgment of the circuit court, overruling the plea to its jurisdiction,

was sustained. • • •

(Citing, and quoting from, as following the Letson case, Marshall

v. B. & O. R. R., 16 How. 314, 329; Covington Drawbridge Co. v.
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brought in the circuit court of the United States for the district of In-

diana against Wheeler, a citizen of that state, to recover the amount

due on his subscription to stock of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad

Company. The declaration described the plaintiffs as the "president

and directors of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company, a cor-

poration created by the laws of the states of Indiana and Ohio, and

having its principal place of business in Cincinnati, in the state of

Ohio, a citizen of the state of Ohio." The defendant pleaded to the

jurisdiction by alleging that the plaintiff company, although a corpo-

ration of the state of Ohio in the first instance, had been incorporated

by an act of assembly of the state of Indiana, and thus had become

a body corporate of the same state whereof he was a citizen.

The question thus raised was on a certificate of a division of opinion

between the judges of the circuit court, brought to this court, and was

answered as follows: "This suit in the corporate name is, in con-

templation of law, the suit of the individual persons who compose it,

and must, therefore, be regarded and treated as a suit in which citi-

zens of Ohio and Indiana are joined as plaintiffs in an action against

a citizen of the last mentioned state. Such an action can not be main-

tained in a court of the United States, where jurisdiction of the case

depends altogether on the citizenship of the parties. And, in such a

suit, .it can make no difference whether the plaintiffs sue in their own

proper names or by the corporate name and style by which they are

described. The averments in the declaration would seem to imply

that the plaintiffs claim to have been created a corporate body, and to

have been endued with the capacities and faculties it possesses by the

co-operating legislation of the two states, and to be one and the same

legal being in both states. If this were the case it would not affect

the question of jurisdiction in this suit. But such a corporation can
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under the decision of this court in the case of the Bank of Augusta v.

Earle.1 It is true that a corporation by the name and style of the

plaintiffs appears to have been chartered by the states of Indiana and

Ohio, clothed with the same capacities and powers, and intended to

accomplish the same objects, and it is spoken of in the laws of those

states as one corporate body, exercising the same powers and fulfilling

the same duties in both states. Yet it has no legal existence in either

state, except by the law of the state. And neither state could confer

on it a corporate existence in the other, nor add to or diminish the

powers to be there exercised. It may, indeed, be composed of and

represent, under the corporate name, the same natural persons. But

the legal entity or person, which exists by force of law, can have no

existence beyond the limits of the state or sovereignty which brings it

into life and endues it with its faculties and powers. The president

and directors of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company are,

therefore, a distinct and separate corporate body in Indiana from the

corporate body of the same name in Ohio, and they can not be joined
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in a suit as one and the same plaintiff, nor maintain a suit in that

character against a citizen of Ohio or Indiana in a circuit court of the

United States. * * * And we shall certify to the circuit court

that it has no jurisdiction of the case on the facts presented by the

pleadings." * * *

(Citing and quoting from Memphis & Charleston R. R. v. Ala-

bama, 107 U. S. 581, 585, and Railway Company v. Whitton, 13

Wall. 270.)

One phase of the subject was before the court in the case of the

Pennsylvania Co. v. St. Louis, etc., Railroad, 118 U. S. 290, 295.

A suit had been brought in the circuit court of the United States for

the district of Indiana by the St. Louis, Alton and Terre Haute Rail-

road Company, alleging that it was a corporation organized under the

laws of the state of Illinois, and a citizen of that state, against the In-

dianapolis and St. Louis Company, a corporation organized under

the laws of the state of Indiana, and a citizen of that state, and against

other corporations mentioned in the bill as citizens of Indiana, or of

other states than Illinois. An objection to the jurisdiction was made

on the ground that the St. Louis, Alton and Terre Haute Railroad

Company was organized under laws of both Illinois and Indiana,

and was, therefore, a citizen of the latter state. In treating this ques-

tion this court said, by Mr. Justice Miller: "It does not seem to ad-

mit of question that a corporation of one state, owning property and

business in another state by permission of the latter, does not be-

come a citizen of this state also. And so a corporation of Illinois,

authorized by its laws to build a railroad across the state from the

Mississippi River to its eastern boundary, may by permission of the

state of Indiana extend its road a few miles within the limits of the

latter, or, indeed, through the entire state, * * * without thereby

becoming a corporation or a citizen of the state of Indiana. Nor

does it seem to us that an act of the legislature conferring upon this

113 Pet. 519.

have no legal existence upon the principles of the common law or
under the decision of this court in the case of the Bank of Augusta v.
Earle. 1 It is true that a corporation by the name and style of the
plaintiffs appears to have been chartered by the states· of Indiana and
Ohio, clothed with the same capacities and powers, and intended to
accomplish the same objects, and it is spoken of in the laws of those
states as one corporate body, exercising the same powers and fulfilling
the same duties in both states. Yet it has no legal existence in either
state, except by the law of the state. And neither state could confer
on it a corporate existence in the other, nor add to or diminish the
powers to be there exercised. It may, indeed, be composed of and
represent, under the corporate name, the same natural persons. But
the legal entity or person, which exists by force of law, can have no
existence beyond the limits of the state or sovereignty which brings it
into life and endues it with its faculties and powers. The president
and directors of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company are,
therefore, a distinct and separate corporate body in Indiana from the ·
corporate body of the same name in Ohio, and they can not be joined
in a suit as one and the same plaintiff, nor maintain a suit in that
character against a citizen of Ohio or Indi ana in a circuit court of the
United States. •
•
•
And we sh all certify to the circuit court
that it has no jurisdiction of the case on the facts presented by the
pleadings." • • •
(Citing and quoting from Memphis & Charleston R. R. v. Alabama, 107 U. S. 581, 585, and Railway Company v. Whitton, 13
Wall. 270.)
One phase of the subject was before the court in the case of the
Pennsylvania Co. v. St. Louis, etc., Railroad, 118 U. S. 290, 295.
A suit had been brought in the circuit court of the United States for
the district of Indiana by the St. Louis, Alton and Terre Haute Railroad Company, alleging that it was a corporation organized under the
laws of the state of Illinois, and a citizen of that state, against the Indianapolis and St. Louis Company, a corporation organized under
the laws of the state of Indiana, and a citizen of that state, and against
other corporations mentioned in the bill as citizens of Indiana, or of
other states than Illinois. An objection to the jurisdiction was made
on the ground that the St. Louis, Alton and T erre Haute Railroad
Company was organized under laws of both Illinois and Indiana,
and was, therefore, a citizen of the latter state. In treating this question this court said , by Mr. Justice Miller: "lt does not seem to admit of question that a corporation of one state, owning property and
business ih another state by permission of the latter, does not become a citizen of this state also. And so a corporation of Illinois,
authorized by its laws to build a railroad across the state from the
Mississippi River to its eastern boundary, may by permission of the
state of Indiana extend its road a few miles within the limits of the
latter, or, indeed, through the entire state, • • • without thereby
becoming a corporation or a citizen of the state of Indiana. Nor
does it seem to us that an act of the legislature conferring upon this
1

13 Pet. 519.
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corporation of Illinois, by its Illinois corporate name, such powers to

enable it to use and control that part of the road within the state of
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Indiana as have been conferred on it by the state which created it,
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constitutes it a corporation of the state of Indiana. It may not be

corporation of Illinois, by its Illinois corporate name, such powers to
enable it to use and control that part of the road within the state of
Indiana as have been conferred on it by the state which created it,
constitutes it a corporation of the state of Indiana. It may not be
easy in all such cases to distinguish between the purpose to create a
new corporation which shall owe its existence to the law or statute
under consideration, and the intent to enable the corporation already
in existence under laws of another state to exercise its functions in the
state where it is so received. The latter class of laws are common in
authorizing insurance companies, banking companies and others to do
business in other states than those which have chartered them. To
make such a company a corporation of another state, the language
must imply creation or adoption in such form as to confer the power
usually exercised over corporations by the state, or by the legislature,
and such allegiance as a state corporation owes to its creator. Tbe
mere grant of privileges or, powers to it as an existing corporation,
without more, does not do this, and does not make it a citizen of the
state conferring such powers.''
So in Nashua Railroad v. Lowell Railroad, 136 U. S. 356, it was
held that railroad corporations, created by two or more states, though
joined in their interests, in the operation of their roads, in the issue
of their stock and in the division of their profits, so as practically to
be a single corporation, do not lose their identity; but each has its
existence and its standing in the courts of the country only by virtue
of the legislation of the state by which it was created, and the union
of name, of officers, of business and property, does not change their
distinctive character as separate corporations.
To fully reconcile all the expressions used in these cases would be
no easy task, but we think the following propositions may be fairly
deduced from them: There is an indisputable legal presumption that
a state corporation, when sued or suing in a circuit court of the United
States, is composed of citizens of the state which created it, and hence
such a corporation is itself deemed to come within that provision of
the constitution of the United States which confers jurisdiction upon
the federal courts in "controversies between citizens of different
states.."
It is competent for a railroad corporation organized under the laws
of one state, when authorized so to do by the consent of the state
which created it, to accept authority from another state to extend its
railroad into such state, and to receive a grant of powers to own and
control, by lease or purchase, railroads therein, and to subject itself
to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the second state.
Such legislation on the part of two or more states is not, in the absence of inhibitory legislation by congress, regarded as within the
constitutional prohibition of agreements or compacts between states.
Such corporations may be treated by each of the states whose legislative grants they accept as domestic corporations.
The presumption that a corporation is composed of citizens of the
state which created it accompanies such corporation when it does busi-

easy in all such cases to distinguish between the purpose to create a

new corporation which shall owe its existence to the law or statute

under consideration, and the intent to enable the corporation already

in existence under laws of another state to exercise its functions in the

state where it is so received. The latter class of laws are common in

authorizing insurance companies, banking companies and others to do

business in other states than those which have chartered them. To

make such a company a corporation of another state, the language

must imply creation or adoption in such form as to confer the power

usually exercised over corporations by the state, or by the legislature,

and such allegiance as a state corporation owes to its creator. The

mere grant of privileges or, powers to it as an existing corporation,

without more, does not do this, and does not make it a citizen of the

state conferring such powers."

So in Nashua Railroad v. Lowell Railroad, 136 U. S. 356, it was

held that railroad corporations, created by two or more states, though

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101065404392
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

joined in their interests, in the operation of their roads, in the issue

of their stock and in the division of their profits, so as practically to

be a single corporation, do not lose their identity; but each has its

existence and its standing in the courts of the country only by virtue

of the legislation of the state by which it was created, and the union

of name, of officers, of business and property, does not change their

distinctive character as separate corporations.

To fully reconcile all the expressions used in these cases would be

no easy task, but we think the following propositions may be fairly

deduced from them: There is an indisputable legal presumption that

a state corporation, when sued or suing in a circuit court of the United

States, is composed of citizens of the state which created it, and hence

such a corporation is itself deemed to come within that provision of

the constitution of the United States which confers jurisdiction upon

the federal courts in "controversies between citizens of different

states."

It is competent for a railroad corporation organized under the laws

of one state, when authorized so to do by the consent of the state

which created it, to accept authority from another state to extend its

railroad into such state, and to receive a grant of powers to own and

control, by lease or purchase, railroads therein, and to subject itself

to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the second state.

Such legislation on the part of two or more states is not, in the ab-

sence of inhibitory legislation by congress, regarded as within the

constitutional prohibition of agreements or compacts between states.

Such corporations may be treated by each of the states whose legis-

lative grants they accept as domestic corporations.

The presumption that a corporation is composed of citizens of the

state which created it accompanies such corporation when it does busi-
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in such other state as a citizen of the state of its original creation.

We are now asked to extend the doctrine of indisputable citizen-

ship, so that if a corporation of one state, indisputably taken, for the

purpose of federal jurisdiction, to be composed of citizens of such

state, is authorized by the law of another state to do business therein,

and to be endowed, for local purposes, with all the powers and privi-

leges of a domestic corporation, such adopted corporation shall be

deemed to be composed of citizens of the second state in such a sense

as to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts at the suit of a citizen of

the state of its original creation.

We are unwilling to sanction such an extension of a doctrine which,

as heretofore established, went to the very verge of judicial power.

That doctrine began, as we have seen, in the assumption that state

corporations were composed of citizens of the state which created

them; but such assumption was one of fact, and was the subject of

allegation and traverse, and thus the jurisdiction of the federal courts

might be defeated. Then, after a long contest in this court, it was
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settled that the presumption of citizenship is one of law, not to be

defeated by allegation or evidence to the contrary. There we are

content to leave it. * * *

(After reviewing the former Arkansas legislation relative to foreign

corporations- acquiring and operating railroads in the state, under

which the road in question was acquired, and showing such former,

legislation did not attempt to make the foreign corporation an Ar-

kansas corporation.)

It is true that by the subsequent act of 1SS9, by the proviso to the sec-

ond section, it was provided that every railroad corporation of any

other state, which had theretofore leased or purchased any railroad in

Arkansas, should, within sixty days of the passage of the act, file a

certified copy of its articles of incorporation or charter with the secre-

tary of state, and shall thereupon become a corporation of Arkansas,

anything in its articles of incorporation or charter to the contraiy not-

withstanding; and it appears that the defendant company did accord-

ingly file a copy of its articles of incorporation with the secretary of

the state. But whatever may be the effect of such legislation, in the

way of subjecting foreign railroad companies to control and regula-

tion by the local laws of Arkansas, we can not concede that it availed

to create an Arkansas corporation out of a foreign corporation in such

a sense as to make it a citizen of Arkansas within the meaning of the

federal constitution so as to subject it as such to a suit by a citizen of

the state of its origin. In order to bring such an artificial body as a

corporation within the spirit and letter of that constitution, as con-

strued by the decisions of this court, it would be necessary to create

it out of natural persons, whose citizenship of the state creating it

could be imputed to the corporation itself. But it is not pretended in

the present case that natural persons, resident in and citizens of Ar-

kansas, were by the legislation in question created a corporation, and
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ness in another state, and it may sue , or be sued in the federal courts
in such other state as a citizen of the state of its original creation.
We are now asked to extend the doctrine of indisputable citizenship, so that if a corporation of on_e state, indisputably taken, for the
purpose of federal jurisdiction, to be composed of citizens of such
state, is authorized by the law of another state to do business therein,
and to be endowed, for local purposes, with all the powers and privileges of a domestic corporation, such adopted corporation shall be
deemed to be composed of citizens of the second state in such a sense
as to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts at the suit of a citizen of
the state of its original creation.
We are unwilling to sanction such an extension of a doctrine which,
as heretofore established, went to the ,·ery verge of judicial power.
That doctrine began, as we have seen, in the assumption that state
corporations were composed of citizens of the state which created
them; but such assumption was one of fact, and was the subject of
allegation and traverse, and thus the jurisdiction of the federal courts
might be defeated. Then, after a long contest in this court, it was
settled that the presumption of citizenship is one of law, not to be
defeated by allegation or evidence to the contrary. There we are
content to leave it. • • •
(After reviewing the former Arkansas legislation relative to foreign
corporations · acquiring and operating railroads in the state, under
which the road in question was acquired, and showing such formet:
legislation did not attempt to make the foreign corporation an Arkan sas corporation.)
It is true that by the subsequent act of 1889, by the proviso to the second section, it was provided that every railroad corporation of any
other state, which had theretofore leased or purchased any railroad in
Arkansas, should, within sixty days of the passage of the act, file a
certified copy of its articles of incorporation or charter with 'the secretary of state, and shall thereupon become a corporation of Arkansas,
anything in its articles of incorporation or charter to the contrary notwithstanding; and it appears that the defendant company did accordingly file a copy of its articles of incorporation with the secretary of
the state. But whatever may be the effect of such legislation, in the
way of subjecting foreign railroad companies to control and regulation by the local laws of Arkansas, we can not concede that it availed
to create an Arkansas corporation out of a foreign corporation in such
a sense as to make it a citizen of Arkan sas within the meaning of the
federal constitution so as to subject it as such to a suit by a citizen of
the state of its origin. In order to bring such an artificial body as a
corporation within the spirit and letter of that constitution, as construed by the decisions of thi s court, it would be necessary to create
it out of natural persons, whose citizenship of the state creating it
could be imputed to the corporation itself. But it is not pretended in
the present case that natural persons, resident in and citizens of Ark an sas, w ere by the legislation in question created a corporation, and
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that, therefore, the citizenship of the individual corporators is im-
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putable to the corporation. * * *
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The result of these views is that we answer the second question put

to us by the circuit court of appeals in the negative, and this renders

that, therefore, the citizenship of the individual corporators is imputable to the corporation. • • •
The result of these v£ews is that we answer the second question put
to us by the c£rcuit court of appeals in the negat£ve, and this renders
it unnecessary to answer the other questions.
Mr. Justice HARLAN dissents.

it unnecessary to answer the other questions.

Mr. Justice Harlan dissents.

Note. See note at end of next case.

Sec. 323* Same. In what district.

SHAW v. QUINCY MIN. CO.1

1892. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 145 U. S.

444, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935.

Note . See note. at end of next case.

[This was a petition for a writ of mandamus to the judges of the

circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York

to command them to take jurisdiction against the Quincy Mining

Company upon a bill in equity filed in that court on September 3,

Sec. 323, Same.

1891, by the petitioner, described in the bill as a citizen of Massa-

In what district.

chusetts, in behalf of himself and other stockholders of the Quincy

SHAW v. QUINCY MIN. C0.1

Mining Company, against "the Quincy Mining Company, a corpora-

tion duly organized under the laws of the state of Michigan, and hav-

1892.

ing a usual place of business in the city, county and state of New

IN THE
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

444,

York." Upon that bill a subpena was issued, directed to the Quincy

12

145 u.

s.

Sup. Ct. Rep. 935.

Mining Company, and was served upon it within the southern district

[This was a petition for a writ of mandamus to the judges of the
circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York
to command them to take jurisdiction against the Quincy Mining
Company upon a bill in equity filed in that court on September 3,
1891, by the petitioner, described in the bill as a citizen of Massachusetts, in behalf of himself and other stockholders of the Quincy
Mining Company, against "the Quincy Mining Company, a corporation duly organized under the laws of the state of Michigan, and having a usual place of business in the city, county and state of New
York." Upon that bill a subpena was issued, directed to the Quincy
Mining Company, and was served upon it within the southern district
of New York. The Quir:icy Mining Company appeared specially,
and moved for an order to set aside the service.
At the .hearing of the motion it appeared that the law of Michigan
allowed, and its articles of association provided: "The business office
of the company shall be in the city, county and state of New York,
and another business office at the Quincy mine, in the county of
Houghton and state of Michigan."
The order to et aside the service was granted by the court, upon
the ground "that said Quincy Mining Company is a corporation created and existing under the laws of the state of Michigan, and is :in
inhahitant of the western district of Michigan, and not an inhabitant
of the southern district of N cw York."]
MR. JUSTICE GRAY. The single question in this case i whether
under the act o f March 3, 1887, ch . 373 , § 1, as corrected by the act
of August 13, 1888, ch. 866 (the material parts of which are copied
in the margin 3 ) , a corporation incorporated in one state of the union
1 Statement abridged and part of opinion omitted.
1 "The circuit courts of the United Eltates shall hnve originnl copiiznnce,
('011rurre nt with the courts of the severnl states, of all snits of a civil nature.
:ti <·omrnon law or in equity, where tlie matter in dispute ex<.'ceds. exclut'ivt"
of intert-Ht and cost.a, the sum or value of two thousand dollars, and arising

of New York. The Quincy Mining Company appeared specially,

and moved for an order to set aside the service.

At the .hearing of the motion it appeared that the law of Michigan

allowed, and its articles of association provided: "The business office

of the company shall be in the city, county and state of New York,

and another business office at the Quincy mine, in the county of

Houghton and state of Michigan."

The order to set aside the service was granted by the court, upon

the ground "that said Quincy Mining Company is a corporation cre-

ated and existing under the laws of the state of Michigan, and is an

inhabitant of the western district of Michigan, and not an inhabitant

of the southern district of New York."]

Mr. Justice Gray. The single question in this case is whether

under the act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, as corrected by the act

of August 13, 188S, ch. S66 (the material parts of which are copied

in the margin2), a corporation incorporated in one state of the union.

'Statement abridged and part of opinion omitted.

1 "The circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance,

concurrent witli the courts of the several states, of all suits of a civil nature,

ut common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive

of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars, and arising

under the constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which

under the constitution or laws of the l ' nited States, or treaties made, or which
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not been incorporated, may be sued, in a circuit court of the United

States held in the latter state, by a citizen of a different state.

This question, upon which there has been a diversity of opinion in

the circuit courts, can be best determined by a review of the acts of

congress, and of the decisions of this court, regarding the original

jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States over suits be-

tween citizens of different states.

In carrying out the provision of the constitution which declares that

the judicial power of the United States shall extend to controversies

"between citizens of different states," congress, by the judiciary act

of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, conferred jurisdiction on the

circuit court of suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity,

"between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought and a citizen

of another state," and provided that "no civil suit shall be brought"

"against an inhabitant of the United States," "in any other district

than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found

at the time of serving the writ." 1 St., pp. 78, 79.
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The word "inhabitant," in that act, was apparently used, not in

any larger meaning than "citizen," but to avoid the incongruity of

speaking of a citizen of anything less than a state, when the intention

was to cover not only a district which included a whole state, but also

two districts in one state, like the districts of Maine and Massachusetts

in the state of Massachusetts, and the districts of Virginia and Ken-

tucky in the state of Virginia, established by section 2 of the same

act. 1 St., p. 73. It was held by this court from the beginning that

an averment that a party resided within the state or the district in

which the suit was brought was not sufficient to support the jurisdic-

tion, because in the common use of words a resident might not be a

citizen, and, therefore, it was not stated expressly and beyond am-

biguity that he was a citizen of-the state, which was the fact on which

the jurisdiction depended under the provisions of the constitution and

of the judiciary act. Bingham v.. Cabot, 3 Dall. 382; Turner v.

Bank, 4 Dall. 8; Abercrombie v. Dupuis, 1 Cranch 343; Hodgson

v. Bowerbank,. 5 Cranch 303; Brown v. Keene, 8 Pet. 112, 115.

The same rule has been maintained to the present day, and has been

shall be made, under their authority, or in which controversy the United

States are plaintiffs or petitioners, or in which there shall be a controversy be-

tween citizens of different states, in which the matter in dispute exceeds, ex-

clusive of interest and costs, the sum or value aforesaid, or a controversy

between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different

states, or a controversy between citizens of a state and foreign states, citizens

and having a usual place of business in another state in which it has
not been incorporated, may be sued, in a circuit court of the United
States held in the latter state, by a citizen of a different state.
This question, upon which there has been a diversity of opinion in
the circuit courts, can be best determined by a review of the acts of
congress, and of the decisions of this court, regarding the original
jurisdiction of the circuit coU1ts of the United States over suits between citizens of different states.
In carrying out the provision of the constitution \'v hich declares that
the judicial power of the United States shall extend to controversies
"between citizens of different states," congress, by the judiciary act
of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § II, conferred jurisdiction on the
circuit court of suits of a civil nature, at common Jaw or in equity,
"between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought and a citizen
of another state," and provided that "no civil suit shall be brought"
"against an inhabitant of the United States," "in any other district
than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found
at the time of serving the writ." 1 St., pp. 78, 79.
.
The word "inhabitant," in that act, was apparently used, not in
any larger meaning than "citizen," but to avoid the incongruity of
speaking of a citizen of anything less than a state, when the intention
was to cover not only a district which included a whole state, but also
two districts in one state, like the districts of Maine and Massachusetts
in the state of Massachusetts, and the districts of Virginia and Kentucky in the state of Virginia, established by section 2 of the same
act. I St., p. 73. It was held by this court from the beginning that
an averment that a party resided within the state or the di strict in
which the suit wa~ brought was not sufficient to support the jurisdiction, because in the common use of words a resident might not be a
citizen, and, therefore, it was not stated expressly and beyond ambiguity that he was a citizen of ·the state, which was the fact on which
the jurisdiction depended under the provisions of the constitution and
of the judiciary act. Bingham v.. Cabot, 3 Dall. 382; Turner v.
Bank, 4 Dall. 8; Abercrombie v. Dupuis, 1 Cranch 343; Hodgson
v. Bowerbank,. 5 Cranch 303; Brown v. Keene, 8 Pet. 112, 115.
The same rule has been maintained to the present day, and has been

or subjects, in which the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and

costs, the sum or value aforesaid." "But no person shall he arrested in one

district for trial in another in any civil action before a circuit or district court;

and no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts against any per-

son by any original process or proceeding in anv other district than that

whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on

the fact that the action is between citizens of different states, suit shall be

brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the de-

fendant." 25 St., p. 434.

shall be made, nnder their authority, or in which controversy th e United
States are plaintiffs or petitioners, or in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of differe nt states, in which the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value aforesaid, or a controversy
betwee n citizens of the same state claiming lands under grant~ of different
states, or a controversy between citizens of a state and foreign states, citizens
or subjects, in which the matte r in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interrst and
costs, the sum or valtH• aforesaid." "But no person shall be arrestt>d in one
difit.rict for trial in another in any civil nction before a circuit or distrid court;
and no civil suit shall be brought before either of Maid courts againsl any person by any original process or proceeding in anv other di;;trict than that
whe reo f he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is foundP<I only on
the fact that the action is between citizens of differPnt states, anit s hnll be
brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant." 2.5 St., p. 434.
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States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the

held to be unaffected by the fourteenth amendment of the constih1tion, declaring that "all persons born or naturalized in the united
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they 1·eside." Robertson v.
Cease, 97 U. S. 646; Grace v. American Ins. Co., 109 U. S. 278, 3
Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; Timmons v. Land Co., 139 U. S. 378, I I Sup.
Ct. Rep. 585; Denny v. Pironi, 141 U.S. 121, I 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 966.
By the act of May 4, 1858, ch. 27, § l, it was enacted that, in a
state containing more than one district, actions not local ~hou Id "be
brought in the district in which the defendant resides," or, "if there
be two or more defendants residing in different districts in the same
state," then in either district. l 1 St., p. 272. The whole purport
and effect of that act was not to enlarge, but to restrict and distribute,
jurisdiction. It applied only to a state containing two or more districts, and directed suits against citizens of such a state to be brought
in that district the11eof in which they or either of them resided. It
did not subject defendants to any new liability to be sued out of the
state of which they were citizens, but simply prescribed in which district of that state they might be sued.
These provisions of the acts of 1789 and I 858 were substantially
re-enacted in sections 739 and 740 of the Revised Statutes.
The act of March 3 1 1875, ch. 137 1 § 1, after giving the circuit
courts jurisdiction of suits "in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different states," and enlarging their jurisdiction in
other respects, substantially re-enacted the corresponding provi ion of
th~ act of 1789 1 by providing that no civil suit should be brought
"against any person" "in any other district than that whereof he i
an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found" at the time of service,
with certain exceptions, not affecting the matter now under con iderntion. 18 St., p. 476.
The act of 1887 1 both in its original form and as corrected in 1888,
re-enacts the rule that no civil suit shall be brought against any person
in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, hut omits
the clau e allowing a defendant to be sued in the district where he i
found, and adds this clause: "But where the jurisdiction is founded
only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different states,
suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the
plaintiff or the defendant." 24 St., p. 552; 25 St. , p. 434. As ha
been adjudged by this court, the last clause is by way of proviso to
the next preceding clause, which forbids any suit to be brought in
any other district than that whereof the defendant is an inhabitant:
and th e effect is that, "where the jurisdiction is founded upon any of
the causes mentioned in this section, except the citizenship of the parties, it must be brought in the district of which the defendant is an
inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded solely upon the
fact that the parties are citizens of different states, the suit may be
brought in the district in which either the p!:lintiff o r the defendant
resides." ~1cCormick Co. v. Walthers, 134 U. S. 41, 43, IO Sup.
Ct. Rep. 485. And the general object of this act, as appears upon its

United States and of the state wherein they reside." Robertson v.

Cease, 97 U. S. 646; Grace v. American Ins. Co., 109 U. S. 278, 3

Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; Timmons v. Land Co., 139 U. S. 378, 11 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 585; Denny v. Pironi, 141 U. S. 121, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 966.

By the act of May 4, 1858, ch. 27, § 1, it was enacted that, in a

state containing more than one district, actions not local should "be

brought in the district in which the defendant resides," or, "if there

be two or more defendants residing in different districts in the same

state," then in either district. 11 St., p. 272. The whole purport

and effect of that act was not to enlarge, but to restrict and distribute,

jurisdiction. It applied only to a state containing two or more dis-

tricts, and directed suits against citizens of such a state to be brought

in that district thereof in which they or either of them resided. It

did not subject defendants to anv new liability to be sued out of the

state of which they were citizens, but simply prescribed in which dis-

trict of that state they might be sued.
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These provisions of the acts of 1789 and 1S5S were substantially

re-enacted in sections 739 and 740 of the Revised Statutes.

The act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, after giving the circuit

courts jurisdiction of suits "in which there shall be a controversy be-

tween citizens of different states," and enlarging their jurisdiction in

other respects, substantially re-enacted the corresponding provision of

the act of 1789, by providing that no civil suit should be brought

"against any person" "in any other district than that whereof he is

an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found" at the time of service,

with certain exceptions, not affecting the matter now under consid-

eration. 18 St., p. 476.

The act of 1887, both in its original form and as corrected in 1S88,

re-enacts the rule that no civil suit shall be brought against any person

in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, but omits

the clause allowing a defendant to be sued in the district where he is

found, and adds this clause: "But where the jurisdiction is founded

only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different states,

suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the

plaintiff or the defendant." 24 St., p. 552; 25 St., p. 434. As has

been adjudged by this court, the last clause is by way of proviso to

the next preceding clause, which forbids any suit to be brought in

any other district than that whereof the defendant is an inhabitant:

and the effect is that, "where the jurisdiction is founded upon any of

the causes mentioned in this section, except the citizenship of the par-

ties, it must be brought in the district of which the defendant is an

inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded solely upon the

fact that the parties are citizens of different states, the suit may be

brought in the district in which either the plaintiff or the defendant

resides." McCormick Co. v. Walthers, 134 U. S. 41, 43, 10 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 485. And the general object of this act, as appears upon its
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to enlarge, the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States.

Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315, 320, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 303; In re

Pennsylvania Co., 137 U. S. 451,454, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; Fisk

v. Henarie, 142 U. S. 459, 467, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207.

As to natural persons, therefore, it can not be doubted that the

effect of this act, read in the light of earlier acts upon the same sub-

ject and of the judicial construction thereof, is that the phrase "dis-

trict of the residence of" a person is equivalent to "district whereof

he is an inhabitant," and can not be construed as giving jurisdiction,

by reason of citizenship, to a circuit court held in a state of which

neither party is a citizen, but, on the contrary, restricts the jurisdic-

tion to the district in which one of the parties resides within the state

of which he is a citizen; and that this act, therefore, having taken

away the alternative, permitted in the earlier acts, of suing a person

in the district "in which he shall be found," requires any suit, the

jurisdiction of which is founded only on its being between citizens of

different states, to be brought in the state of which one is a citizen,

and in the district therein of which he is an inhabitant and resident.
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In the case of a corporation, the reasons are, to say the least, quite

as strong for holding that it can sue and be sued only in the state and

district in which it has been incorporated, or in the state of which the

other party is a citizen.

In Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 588, Chief Justice Taney said: "It

is very true that a corporation can have no legal existence out of the

boundaries of the ^sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only

in contemplation of law, and by force of the law; and where that law

ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can

have no existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation, and can

not migrate to another sovereignty. But, although it must live and

have its being in that state only, yet it does not by any means follow

that its existence there will not be recognized in other places; and its

residence in one state creates no insuperable objection to its power of

contracting in another."

This statement has been often reaffirmed by this court, with some

change of phrase, but always retaining the idea that the legal exist-

ence, the home, the domicile, the habitat, the residence, the citizen-

ship of the corporation can only be in the state by which it was

created, although it may do business in other states whose laws per-

mit it. • * *

(Citing and quoting Insurance Co. v. French, iS How. 404; Rail-

road Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5, 11, 12. See, also, Paul v. Virginia,

8 Wall. 168, 1S1; Railroad Company v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65, 81 ; St.

Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 354, 356; Railway Co. v. Gebhard. 109

U. S. 527, 537; Bank v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61; Insurance Co. v.

Boardman, 5 Cranch 57; Sullivan v. Steamboat Co.. 6 Wheat. 4^0;

Breithaupt v. Bank, 1 Pet. 23S; Bank v. Slocomb, 14 Pet. 60; Rail-

road Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 558; Marshall v. Railroad Co., 16

How. 314, 328; Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 20 How. 227, 233;

face, and as has been often declared by this court, is to contract, not
to enlarge, the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States.
Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315, 320, IO Sup. Ct. Rep. 303; In re
Pennsyh•ania Co., 137 U.S. 451, 454, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; Fisk
, .. Henarie , 142 U. S. 459, 467, I 2 Sup. Ct. R ep. 207.
As to natural persons, therefore, it can not be doubted that the
e ffect of this act, read in tbe light of earlier acts upon the sa me subj ect and of the judicial construction thereof, is that the phrase "district of the residence of" a person is equivalent to " district whereof
he is an inhabitant," and can not be construed as giving jurisdiction,
by reason of citizenship, to a circuit court held in a state of which
neither party is a citizen, but, on the contrary, restricts the jurisdiction to the district in which one of the parties resides within the state
of which he is a citizen; and that this act, the re fore, having taken
away the alternative, permitted in the earlier acts, of suing a person
in the district "in which he shall be found," requires any suit, the
jurisdiction of which· is founded only on its being between citizens of
different states, to be brought in the state of which one is a citizen,
:md in the district therein of which he is an inhabitant and resident.
In the case of a corporation, the reasons are, to say the least, quite
as strong for holding that it can sue and be sued only in the state and
district in which it has been incorporated, or in the state of which the
other party is a citizen.
In Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 588, Chief Ju stice Taney said: ''It
is very true that a corporation can have no legal existence out of the
boundaries of the .. sovereignty by which it is created. It exists on! y
in contemplation of law, and by force of the law; and where that law
ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can
have no existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation, and can
not migrate to another sovereignty. But, although it must live and
have its being in that state only. yet it does not by any means follow
that its existence there will not be recogn ized in other places; and its
residence in one state creates no insuperable objection to its p ov..·er of
contracting in another."
This statement has been often reaffirmed by this court, with som e
change of phrase. but always retaining the idea that the lega l existence, the home, the domicile, the habitat, the residence, the c itizenship of the corporation can only be in the state by which it was
created, although .i t may do business in other states whose laws permit it. • • •
(Citing and quoting Insurance Co. v. French , 18 How. 404; Railroacl C o . v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5, I 1, 12. See, also, Paul v. Virginia,
8 Wall. 168, 181; Railroad Company v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65 , 8 1: St.
Clnir v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 354, 356; Railway Co. v. Geuhard. 109
U. S. 527, 537; Bank v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61: In suran ce Co. v.
Boardman, 5 Crnnch 57; Sullivan v. Steamboat Co., 6 \Vh eat. 4::;0;
Breithaupt v. Bank, r Pet. 238; Bank v. Slocomb, 14 Pet. 60: Railroad Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 558; Marshall v. Railroad Co., 16
How. 314, 328; Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 10 How. 227, 233;
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S. 444; Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 118, 121; Railroad

R:lilroad Co. v. Wheeler, I Black 286, 296; Muller v. Dows, 94 U .
.S. 444; Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 118, 121 ; Railroad

Co. v. Alabama, 107 U. S. 581, 585; Insurance Co. v. Francis, 11

Wall. 210, 216.)

Co. v. Alabama, 107 U.S. 581 1 585; Insurance Co. v. Francis, 11
Wall. 210, 216.)
In Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369, 377, Chief Ju tice
Waite said: "A corporation can not change its residence or its citizenship. It can have its legal home only at the place where it is
located by or under the authority of its chaiter; but it may by its
agents transact business anywhere, unless prohibited by its charter, or
excluded by local laws." The jurisdiction of the circuit court in that
case, as well as in Insurance Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U. S. 138, 146,
4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 364, was maintained upon the ground that the defendant corporation, though incorporated in another state, yet, by reason of doing business in the state in which the suit was brought, and
having appointed an agent there as required by its laws, upon wh om
process against the company might be served, was found in that state,
within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, then in
force, and hereinbefore cited.
The statute now in question, as already observed, has repealed the
permission to sue a defendant in a district in which he is found , and
has peremptorily enacted that, "where the jurisdiction is found ed
only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different states,
suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the
plaintiff or the defendant." In a case between natural persons, as
has been seen, this clause does not allow the suit to be brought in a
state of which neither is a citizen. If congress, in framing this clause,
did not have corporations in mind, there is no reason for giYing the
clause a looser and broader construction as to artificial persons who
were not contemplated than as to natural persons who were. If, as
it is more reasonable to suppose, congress did have corporations in
mind, it must be presumed also to have had in mind the law, as long
and uniformly declared by this court, that, within the meaning of the
previous acts of congress giving jurisdiction of suits between citizen
of different states, a corporation could not be con~idered a citizen or
a resident of a state in which it had not been incorporated. • • •
Under the existing act of congress a corporation incorporated in one
state only, can not be compelled to answer, in a circuit court of the
United States held in another state in which it has a usual place of
business, to a civil suit, at law or in equity, brought by a citizen of a
different state.
'
vV rit of mandamus denied.
Mr. Justice HARLAN dissented.

In Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369, 377, Chief Justice

Waite said: "A corporation can not change its residence or its citi-

zenship. It can have its legal home only at the place where it is

located by or under the authority of its charter; but it may by its

agents transact business anywhere, unless prohibited by its charter, or

excluded by local laws." The jurisdiction of the circuit court in that

case, as well as in Insurance Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U. S. 138, 146,

4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 364, was maintained upon the ground that the de-

fendant corporation, though incorporated in another state, yet, by rea-

son of doing business in the state in which the suit was brought, and

having appointed an agent there as required by its laws, upon whom

process against the company might be served, was found in that state,

within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, then in

force, and hereinbefore cited.
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The statute now in question, as already observed, has repealed the

permission to sue a defendant in a district in which he is found, and

has peremptorily enacted that, "where the jurisdiction is founded

only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different states,

suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the

plaintiff or the defendant." In a case between natural persons, as

has been seen, this clause does not allow the suit to be brought in a

state of which neither is a citizen. If congress, in framing this clause,

did not have corporations in mind, there is no reason for giving the

clause a looser and broader construction as to artificial persons who

were not contemplated than as to natural persons who were. If, as

it is more reasonable to suppose, congress did have corporations in

mind, it must be presumed also to have had in mind the law, as long

and uniformly declared by this court, that, within the meaning of the

previous acts of congress giving jurisdiction of suits between citizens

of different states, a corporation could not be considered a citizen or

a resident of a state in which it had not been incorporated. * * *

Under the existing act of congress a corporation incorporated in one

state only, can not be compelled to answer, in a circuit court of the

United States held in another state in which it has a usual place of

business, to a civil suit, at law or in equity, brought by a citizen of a

different state.

Writ of mandamus denied.

Mr. Justice Harlan dissented.

Note. Residence of corporations for purposes of suits against them. The-

ories:

(a) In the state, county or district where the principal office is: 1850, Clarke

v. Bank of Misssisippi, lOArk. 516, 52 Am. Dec. 248; 1852. Central Bank v.

Gibson, 11 Ga. 453; 1855, Conroe v. National Protec. Ins. Co., 10 How. Pr. 403;

1856, Thorn v. Centra] R., 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 121; 1858, Connecticut & P. R. Co.

v. Cooper, 30 Vt.476, 73 Am. Dec. 319; 1859, Crowlev v. Panama R., 30 Barb.

Note. Residence of corporations for purposes of suits against them. Theories:
(a) In the state, county or district where the principal office is: 1850, Clarke
v. B:1nk of Misssisippi , lOArk. 516, 52 Am. Dec. 248; 1852, Central Bank'·
Gibson, 11 Ga. 453; 181i5, Conroe v. National Protec. Ins. Co., lOHow . Pr. 403;
1856, Thorn v. Central R., 2 Dutch. ( N. ,J.) 121; 1858, Connecticut. & P . R . Co.
v. Cooper, 30 Vt.476, 73 Am. Dec. 319; 1859, Crowley v. Pnnama R., ::m 13arb.
99; 1861, Adams v. Great West. R . Co., 6 Hurls. & N. 404, 30 L. J. (~ . .... )

99; 1861, Adams v. Great West. R. Co., 6 Hurls. & N. 404, 30 L. J. (N. S.)
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v. Oregon Pac. R. Co ,116 Ore. 12M, 20 A. & E. Corp. Cas. 527; 1894, Galveston,

H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U. S 496; 1895, Ireland v. Globe Milling

Co., 19 R. I. 180, 61 Am. St. Rep. 756; 1895, In reKeasbey, etc., 160 U. S. 221;

1896, Duke v. Taylor, 37 Fla. 64, 53 Am. St. Rep. 232; 1896, Crookston v. Cen-

tennial En M. Co., 13 Utah 117, 4 A. & E. Corp. Cas. N. S. 30; 1898, liergner,

etc., Brewing Co. v. Drevfus, 172 Mass. 154, 70 Am. St. Rep. 251; 1898, Tnr-

eott v. R., 101 Tenn. 102*, 70 Am. St. Rep. 661; 1899, Louisville, N. A. & C.

R. v. La. T. Co., 174 U. S. 552, 19 S. C. 819. See, also, note, p. 56, svpra.

(b) Railroad and other companies, having improvements located in various

counties, may be sued in any county in which their lines are, and where they

do business: 1&54, Bristol v. Chicago & Aurora R.Co., 15 111. 436; 1857, Bald-

win v. Mississippi R. Co., 5 Clarke (Iowa) 518; 1857, Belden v. N. Y. & Har-

lem R. Co., 15 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 17; 1858, Connecticut & P. R. Co. v. Cooper.

30 Vt. 476, 73 Am. Dec. 319, contra; 1859, Richardson v. Burlington, etc., R.

Co., 8 Clarke (Iowa) 260.

(c) Some cases hold that jurisdiction is not confined to locality of principal

office, but extends throughout the territory of the state granting the charter:
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1815, Cromwell v. Insurance, 2 Rich. Law (S. C.) 512; 1846, Glaize v. South

Car. R. Co., 1 Strobh. Law (S. C.) 70; 1855, B. & O. R. Co. v. Gallahue's

Admr., 12 Gratt. (Va.) 655,65 Am. Dec. 254.

(d) A few cases held that corporations had no residence, but must be sued

where one or more corporators reside: 1839, Wood v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,

13 Conn. 202, 33 Am. Dec. 395; Bank of U. S. v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch (U. S.)

61; Cooper's Lessee v. Galbraith, 3 Wash. (C. C.) 546; 1867, City of St, Louis

v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 40 Mo. 580, contra, and the many recent cases given in

Eq. 124; 1863, Jenkins v. California Stage Co., 22 Cal. 537; 1888, Holgate
v. Oregon Pac. R. Co., 116 Ore. 12a, 20 A. & E. Corp. C11s. 527; 1894, Galveston,
H. & 8. A. R. Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U. S 496; 1895, Irelan<l v. Globe Mil ling
Co., I\J R . I. 180, 61 A 111. Rt. Rep. 756; 1895, Jn re Keasbey, etc., HiO U. H. 221 ;
J896, Ouke v. Taylor, 37 Fin. 64, 53 Am. St. Rep. 2:12; 1896, Crookston v. Crntennial En M. Co., 13 Utah lli, 4 A. & E. Co rp. Cns. N. S. 30 ; 1898, Hngn cr,
etc., Bre win~ Co. v. Dreyfu s, 172 l\lass. 154, 70 .Am. St. Rep. 2fil; 1898, Tnrr.ott v. R ., 101 Tenn . 102, iO Am . St. Re p. 661; 1899, Louisvill e, N. A. & C.
R. v. La . T. Co., 17-l U.S. 552, 19 S. C. SW. See, also, note, p. 56, :rnpra.
(b) Railroad and other companil'S, having improvements locatccl in rnrious
counties, may be sue<l in any county in whi ch their lines are, nnJ where they
do business : 18.54, Bristol v. Chir.ago & Aurora R. Co., 15 Ill. 436; 18-57, Bal<lwin v. )fississippi R. Co., 5 Clarke tlowa) fil8; 1857, Belden v. N. Y. & Harlem R. Co., 15 How . Pr.(~. Y.) 17; 18:"i8, Connectil'ut& P.R. Co.v .Cooper,
30 Vt. 476, 73 Am. DPr.. 319, contm; 185\J, Richardson v. Burlington, etc., R.
Co., 8 Clarke (Iowa) 260.
(c) Some C'ases hold t.hnt jurisdiction is not confined to locality of principal
office, but extends throughout the t<'rritory of the state granting the charter:
184:5, Cromwell v. Insurance, 2 Rich. Law (S. C.) 512; 1846, Glaize v. South
Car. R. Co., l Strobh. Lnw (S. C. ) 70; 1855, B. & 0. R. Co. v. Gallahue's
Admr., 12 Gratt. (Va.) 655, 65 Am. Dec. 254.
( d) A few cases held that corporations had no residence, bnt must be sued
where one or more corporators reside: 1839, Wood v. Hartford Fire Ins. Uo.,
13 Conn. 202, 33 Am. Dec. 395; Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch (U.S.)
61; Cooper's Lessee v. Galbraith, 3 Wash. {C. C.) 546; 1867, City of St.. Louis
v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 40 Mo. 580, contra, and the many recent cases given in
(a) above.

(a) above.
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1898. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 170

BARROW STEAMSHIP COMPANY v. KANE.•

U. S. Rep. 100-113.

Mr. Justice Gray. This action was brought in the circuit court

of the United States for the southern district of New York against

1898.

IN

THE SUPREME COURT

U. S. Rep.

the Barrow Steamship Company, by a passenger on one of its steam-

OF THE UNITED
100-113.

STATES.

170

ships on a voyage from Londonderry, in Ireland, to the city of New

York, for an assault upon him by its agents in the port of London-

derry. The certificate of the circuit court of appeals shows that the

plaintiff is a citizen and resident of the state of New Jersey; that the

defendant is a corporation, organized and incorporated under the laws

of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and a common

carrier running a line of steamships from ports in that kingdom to the

port of New York, and does business in the state of New York,

through a mercantile firm, its regularly appointed agents, and upon

whom the summons in this action was served.

It was contended, in behalf of the steamship company, that, being

a foreign corporation, no suit could be maintained against it in per-

sonam in this country without its consent, express or implied; that

by doing business in the state of New York it consented to be sued

only as authorized by the statutes of the state; that the jurisdiction

1 Statement except as given in the opinion omitted.

Mn. JUSTICE GRAY. This action was brought in the circuit court
of the United States for the southern district of New York against
the Barrow Steamship Company, by a passenger on one of its steamships on a voyage from Londonderry, in Ireland, to the city of New
York, for an assault upon him by its agents in the port of Londonderry. The certificate of the circuit court of appeals shows that the
plaintiff is a citizen an<l resident of the state of New Jersey; that the
<lefendant is a corporation, organ ized and incorporated un<ler the laws
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland , and a common
carrier running a line of steamships from potts in that kingdom to the
port of New York, and does business in the state of New York,
through a mercantile firm, its regularly appointed agents, and upon
whom the summons in this action was served.
It was contended, in behalf of the steamship company, thnt, hcing
a foreig n corporation, no suit could be maintained against it in p ersonam in this country without its consent, express or implied; that
by doing business in the state of New York it consen ted to he sued
only as authorized by the statutes of the state; that the jurisdiction
1

Statement e xcept as given in the opinion omitted.
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ot the courts of the United States held within the state depended on

I I I2

the authority given by those statutes; that the statutes of New York

BARROW STEAMSHIP COMPANY V. KANE .

conferred no authority upon any court to issue process against a for-

ot the courts of the United States held within the state depended on
the authority given by those statutes; that the statutes of New York
conferred no authority upon any court to issue process against a foreign corporation in an action by a non-resident, and for a cause not
arising within the state, and, therefore, that the circuit court acquired
no jurisdiction of this action brought against a British corporation by
a citizen and resident of New Jersey.
The constant tendency of judicial decisions in modem times has
been _in the direction of putting corporations upon the same footing
as natural persons in regard to the jurisdiction of suits by or against
them.
By the constitution of the United States the judicial power, so far
as depe nding upon citizenship of parties, was declared to extend to
controversies "between citizens of different states," and to those between "citizens" of a stnte and foreign "citizens or subjects." And
congress, by the judiciary act of 1789, in defining the original jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States, described each party
to such a controversy, either as "a citizen" of a state, or as ''an
alien." Act of September 24, 1789, § 1 l ; l Stat., 78; Rev. Stat.,
§ 629. Yet the words "citizens" and "aliens," in these provisions
of the constitution and of the judiciary act, have always been held by
this court to include corporations.
The jurisdiction of the circuit com:ts over suits between a citizen
of one state and a corporation of another state was at first maintained
upon the theory that the persons composing the corporation were
suing or b eing sued in its name, and upon the presumption of fact
that all those persons were citizens of the state by which the corporation had been created, but that this pre~umption might be rebutted,
by plea and proo f, and the jurisdiction thereby defeated. Bank of
United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 87, 88; Hope In s . Co. v.
Boardman , 5 Cranch 57; Comm ercial Bank v. Slocomb, 14 Pet. 6o.
But the earl icr cases were afterwards overruled, and it has bec9me
the settled law of this cou!'t that, for the purposes of suing and being
sued in the courts of the United States, a corporation created by and
doing business in a state is, although an artificial person, to be considered as a citizen of the state as much as a natural person , and there
is a conclusive presumption of law that the persons compo!'ing the
corporation are citizens of the same state with the corporation. Loui ville, etc., Railroad v. Letson, z How. 497, 558; Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R:iilroad, 16 How. 314, ~29; Muller v. Dows, 94 C.
S. 444; Steamship Co. v. Tugman, ro6 U. S. l 18; St. Louis & San
Francisco Railway v. James, 161 U. S. 545, 555-559. • • •
(Quoting from B:ink of Augusta Y. Earle, r 3 Pet. 519.)
The manifest injustice \•v hich would ensue, if a foreign corporation.
permitted by a state to do business therein, and to bring suits in it,..
courts, could not be sued in those courts, and thus, while allowed the
benefits , be exempt from the burdens of the laws of the s tate , bas
induced many states to provide by statute that a foreign corporation
making contracts within the state shall appoint an agent residing

eign corporation in an action by a non-resident, and for a cause not

arising within the state, and, therefore, that the circuit court acquired

no jurisdiction of this action brought against a British corporation by

a citizen and resident of New Jersey.

The constant tendency of judicial decisions in modern times has

been in the direction of putting corporations upon the same footing

as natural persons in regard to the jurisdiction of suits by or against

them.

By the constitution of the United States the judicial power, so far

as depending upon citizenship of parties, was declared to extend to

controversies "between citizens of different states," and to those be-

tween "citizens" of a state and foreign "citizens or subjects." And

congress, by the judiciary act of 1789, in defining the original juris-

diction of the circuit courts of the United States, described each party

to such a controversy, either as "a citizen" of a state, or as "an

alien." Act of September 24, 1789, § 11; 1 Stat., 7S; Rev. Stat.,

§ 629. Yet the words "citizens" and "aliens," in these provisions
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of the constitution and of the judiciary act, have always been held by

this court to include corporations.

The jurisdiction of the circuit courts over suits between a citizen

of one state and a corporation of another state was at first maintained

upon the theory that the persons composing the corporation were

suing or being sued in its name, and upon the presumption of fact

that all those persons were citizens of the state by which the corpora-

tion had been created, but that this presumption might be rebutted,

by plea and proof, and the jurisdiction thereby defeated. Bank of

United States v. Dcveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 87, 88; Hope Ins. Co. v.

Bonrdman, 5 Cranch 57; Commercial Bank v. Slocomb, 14 Pet. 60.

But the earlier cases were afterwards overruled, and it has become

the settled law of this court that, for the purposes of suing and being

sued in the courts of the United States, a corporation created by and

doing business in a state is, although an artificial person, to be con-

sidered as a citizen of the state as much as a natural person, and there

is a conclusive presumption of law that the persons composing the

corporation are citizens of the same state with the corporation. Louis-

ville, etc., Railroad v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 558; Marshall v. Balti-

more & Ohio Railroad, 16 How. 314, 329; Muller v. Dows, 94 U.

S. 444; Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 118; St. Louis & San

Francisco Railway v. James, 161 U. S. 545, 555—559- * * *

(Quoting from Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519.)

The manifest injustice which would ensue, if a foreign corporation,

permitted by a state to do business therein, and to bring suits in its

courts, could not be sued in those courts, and thus, while allowed the

benefits, be exempt from the burdens of the laws of the state, has

induced many states to provide by statute that a foreign corporation

making contracts within the state shall appoint an agent residing
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therein, upon whom process may be served in actions upon such con-
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tracts. This court has often held that wherever such a statute exists

service upon an agent so appointed is sufficient to support jurisdiction

of an action against the foreign corporation, either in the courts of

the state, or, when consistent with the acts of congress, in the courts

of the United States held within the state, but it has never held the

existence of such a statute to be essential to the jurisdiction of the

circuit courts of the United States. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18

How. 404; Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369; New England

Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, m U. S. 138, 146; Shaw v. Quincv Mining

Co., 145 U. S. 444, 452. • * *

(Citing and quoting from Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How.

408, 409; Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65, 83, 84.)

In England the right of a foreign corporation doing business in

England to sue in the English courts was long ago recognized, and

its liability to be subjected to suit in those courts, by service made

upon one of its principal officers residing and representing it within

the realm, has been fully established by recent decisions. Newby v.
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Von Oppen, L. R. 7 Q. B. 293; Haggin v. Comptojr d'Escompte

de Paris, 23 Q. 13. D. 519.

In the courts of several states of the union the like view has pre-

vailed. Libbey v. Hodgdon, 9 N. H. 394; March v. Eastern Rail-

road Co.,4oN. H. 548, 579; Day v. Essex County Bank, 13 Vt.

97; Moulin v. Trenton Ins. Co., 1 Dutcher (25 N. J. Law) 57;

Bushel v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 15 S. & R. 173; North Mis-

souri Railroad v. Akcrs, 4 Kan. 453, 469; Council Bluffs Co. v.

Omaha Co., 49 Neb. 537. The courts of New York and Massachu-

setts, indeed, have declined to take jurisdiction of suits against for-

eign corporations, except so far as it has been expressly conferred by

statutes of the state. McQueen v. Middletown Manuf. Co.. 16 Johns.

5; Robinson v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 112 N. Y. 315;

Desper v. Continental Water Meter Co., 137 Mass. 252. But the

jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States is not created by,

and does not depend upon, the statutes of the several states.

In the circuit courts of the United States there have been conflicting

opinions, but the most satisfactory ones are those of Judge Drum-

mond and Judge Lowell in favor of the liability of foreign corpora-

tions to be sued. Wilson Packing Co. v. Hunter, S Bissell 429;

Haytlen v. Androscoggin Mills, 1 Fed. Rep. 93. * • »

(Citing and quoting from Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How.

407.)

The object of the provisions of the constitution and statutes of the

United States, in conferring upon the circuit courts of the United

States jurisdiction of controversies between citizens of different states

of the union, or between citizens of one of the states and aliens, was

to secure a tribunal presumed to be more impartial than a court of the

state in which one of the litigants resides.

The jurisdiction so conferred upon the national courts can not be

abridged or impaired by any statute of a state. Hyde v. Stone, 20

therein, upon whom process may be served in actions upon such contracts. This court has often held that wherever such a statute exists
service upon an agent so appointed is sufficient to support jurisdiction
of an action against the foreign corporation, either in the comts of
the state, or, when consistent with the acts of congress, in the courts
of the United States held within the state, but it has never held the
exi tence of sur.h a statute to be essential to the jurisdiction of the
.circuit courts of the United States. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18
How. 404; Ex parte Schollenhcrger, 96 U. S. 369; New England
Ins. Co.v. vVoodworth, I l l
138, 146; Shaw v. Quincy Mining
Co., 145 U. S. 444, 452. • • •
(Citing and quoting from Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How.
408, 409; Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65, 83, 84.)
In England the right of a foreign corporation doing business in
England to sue in the English courts was long ago r ecognized, and
its liability to be subj ected to suit in those courts, by service made
upon one of its principal officers residing and representing it \vithin
the realm, has been fully establishf!d by recent decisions. Newby v.
Von Oppen, L. R. 7 Q. B. 293; Haggin v. Comptoir d'Escompte
de Paris, 23 Q. B. D. 5 r9.
In the courts of several states of the union the !ike view has prevailed. Libbey v. Hodgdon, 9 N. H. 394; March v. Eastern Railroad Co., 40 N. H. 548, 579; Day v. Essex County Bank, 13 Vt.
97; Moulin v.Trenton Ins. Co., I Dutcher (25 N. J. Law)57;
Bushel v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 15 S. & R. 173; North Missouri Railroad "· Akers, 4 Kan. 453, 469; Council Bluffs Co. v.
Omaha Co., 49 Neb. 537. The courts of New York and Massachusetts, indeed, have declined to take jurisdiction of suits against foreign corporations, except so far as it has been expressly conferred by
statutes of the state. McQueen v. Middletown Manuf. Co. , 16 J o hns.
5; Robinson v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 11 2 N. Y. 315;
Desper v. Continental Water Meter Co., 137 Mass. 252. B11t the
jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States is not created by,
and does not depend upon, the statutes of the severa l states.
In the circuit courts of the United States there have been conflicting
opinions, but the most safo;factory ones are those of Judge Drummond and Judge L owell in favor of the liability of foreign corporation to be sued . \iVilson Packing Co. v. Hunter, 8 Bissell 429;
Hayden v. Anclroscoggin Mills, 1 Fed. R ep. 93. • • •
(Citing and quoting from Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How.
4o7.)
The object of the provisions of the constitution and statute of the
United States, in conferring upon the circuit courts of the United
States jurisd iction of controver ·ies between citizens of different states
of the union, or between citizens of one of the ~tatts and a liens, was
to secure a tribunal presumed to be more imparti al than a court of the
state in which one of the litigants resides.
The jurisd iction so conferred upon the national courts can not bt:
abridged or impaired by any statute of a state. Hyde v. Stone, 20

u. s.
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How. 170, 175: Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 516. It has. there-
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fore, been decided that a statute, which requires all actions against a

H ow . 170, 175 : Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 1 516. It has , then:fore, been decided th at a statute, 'v\'hich requires all actions again t a
county to be hrought in the county court, does not prevent the circuit
court of the united States from taking jurisdiction of such an action,
Chief Justice Chase ~ay ing that "no statute limitation of suability
can defeat a jurisdiction given by the constitution." Cowie v.
Mercer County, 7 WalJ. 118, 122; Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S . 529; Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 529. So statutes
r equiring foreign corporations, as a condition of being permitted to
do business within the tate, to stipulate not to remove into the courts
of the United States suits brought against them in the courts of the
state, have been adjudged to be unconstitutional and void. Home
Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 \Vall. 445; Barron v. Burnside , 121 U.S. 186;
Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202.
On the other hand, upon the fundamental principle that no one
shall be condemned unheard, _it is well settled that in a suit against ~\
corporation of one state, brought in a court of the United States held
within another state, in which the corporation neither does business,
nor has authorfaecl any person to represent it, service upon one of its
offtcers or employes found within the state will not support the jurisdiction, notwithstanding that such service is recognized a sufficient
by the statutes or the judicial decisions of the state. St. Clair v. Cox,
106 U.S. 350; Fitzgerald Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U.S. 98, 106;
Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518. See, also, Mexican Central Railway v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194.
By the existing act of congress defining the general jurisdiction of
the circuit courts of the United States, those courts "shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all
su its of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, when the matter
in dis pute exceeds, exclu ive of interest and costs, the sum or value of
two thousand dollars," "in which there shalJ be a controversy between citizens of different states,'' ''or a controversy between citizens
of a tate and foreign states, citizens or subjects," and, as has been
adjudged by this court, the ubsequent provisions of the act, a to the
district in which suits must be brought, have no application to a uit
again st an alien or a foreign corporation, but such a person or corporation may be sued hy a citizen of a state of the union in ;my district
in which valid service can be m:ide upon the defendant. Act of
~1 n rch 3, r887, ch. 373, § 1, as corrected hy the act of August 13 1
1888, ch. 866, § l; 24 Stat., 552; 25 Stat., 434; Shaw v. Quincy
Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444, 453; In re Hohorst , r50 U. S. 653;
Galveston, etc., Railway v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 496, 503; In re
Keasbey & Mattison Co. , 16o U. S. 22 1. 229, 230.
The prc!-ent action was brought by a citizen and resident of the
state of New J ersey, in a circuit court of the United States h eld
within the state of New York, against a foreign corporation do ing
business in the latter state. It was for a personal tort committed
abroad, such as would have been actionable if committed in the state
of ~ ew York or elsewhere in this country, and an action for which

county to be brought in the county court, does not prevent the circuit

court of the United States from taking jurisdiction of such an action,

Chief Justice Chase saying that "no statute limitation of suability

can defeat a jurisdiction given by the constitution." Cowles v.

Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118, 122; Lincoln County v. Liming, 133

U. S. 529; Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 529. So statutes

requiring foreign corporations, as a condition of being permitted to

do business within the state, to stipulate not to remove into the courts

of the United States suits brought against them in the courts of the

state, have been adjudged to be unconstitutional and void. Home

Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186;

Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202.

On the other hand, upon the fundamental principle that no one

shall he condemned unheard, it is well settled that in a suit against a

corporation of one state, brought in a court of the United States held

within another state, in which the corporation neither does business,
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nor has authorized any person to represent it, service upon one of its

officers or employes found within the state will not support the juris-

diction, notwithstanding that such service is recognized as sufficient

by the statutes or the judicial decisions of the state. St. Clair v. Cox,

106 U. S. 350; Fitzgerald Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98, 106;

Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518. See, also, Mexican Cen-

tral Railway v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194.

By the existing act of congress defining the general jurisdiction of

the circuit courts of the United States, those courts "shall have orig-

inal cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all

suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, when the matter

in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of

two thousand dollars," "in which there shall be a controversy be-

tween citizens of different states," "or a controversy between citizens

of a state and foreign states, citizens or subjects," and, as has been

adjudged by this court, the subsequent provisions of the act, as to the

district in which suits must be brought, have no application to a suit

against an alien or a foreign corporation, but such a person or corpo-

ration may be sued by a citizen of a state of the union in any district

in which valid service can be made upon the defendant. Act of

March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, as corrected by the act of August 13,

1888, ch. 866, §1; 24 Stat., 552; 25 Stat., 434; Shaw v. Quincy

Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444, 453; In re Ilohorst, 150 U. S. 653;

Galveston, etc., Railway v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 496, 503; In re

Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221. 229, 230.

The present action was brought by a citizen and resident of the

state of New Jersey, in a circuit court of the United States held

within the state of New York, against a foreign corporation doing

business in the latter state. It was for a personal tort committed

abroad, such as would have been actionable if committed in the state

of New York or elsewhere in this country, and an action for which.
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might be maintained in any circuit court of the United States which

acquired jurisdiction of the defendant. Railroad Co. v. Harris,
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above cited; Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 11; Huntington

v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 670,675; Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio

Railroad, 168 U. S. 445. The summons was duly served upon the

regularly appointed agents of the corporation in New York. In re

Hohorst, above cited. The action was within the general jurisdiction

conferred by congress upon the circuit courts of the United States.

The fact that the legislature of the state of New York has not seen fit

to authorize like suits to be brought in its own courts by citizens and

residents of other states can not deprive such citizens of their right to

invoke the jurisdiction of the national courts under the constitution

and laws of the United States.

The necessary conclusion is that the circuit court had jurisdiction

to try the action and to render judgment therein against the defend-

ant, and that the

Question certified must be answered in the affirmative.

Note. See, 1893, In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 663; 1899, In re La Bourgoyne,

79 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 331.
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1882. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 106 U. S.

might he maintained in any circuit court of the United States which
acquired jurisdiction of the defendant.
Railroad Co. v. Harris,
above cited; Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 11; Huntington
v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 670, 675; Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad, 168 U. S. 445. The summon \Vas duly served upon the
regularly appointed agents of the corporation in New York. In re
Hohor5t, above cited. The action was within the general jurisdiction
conferred by congress upon the circuit courts of the United States.
The fact that the legislature of the state of New York has not seen fit
to authorize like suits to be brought in its own courts by citizens and
residents of other states can not deprive such citizens of their right to
invoke the jurisdiction of the national courts under the constitution
and laws of the United States.
The necessary conclusion is that the circuit court had jurisdiction
to try the action and to render judgment therein against the defendant, and that the
~uesti'on

certified must be answered t'n the affirmative.

Rep. 350-360.

[Error to United States Circuit Court, eastern district of Michigan.

Action by Cox v. St. Clair to recover $5,000 on two notes made by

Note. See, 1893, In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653; 1899, In re La Bourgoyne,
79 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 331.

St. Clair to the Winthrop Mining Company, an Illinois corporation,

payable in Chicago, for ore and property sold by the mining company

to the defendant. The defense was that plaintiff purchased the note

after maturity, and after notice that defendant had obtained a judg-

Sec. 325.

In the state courts,-where found doing business.

ment in the Michigan courts against the mining company to the amount

ST. CLAIR v. COX.1

of $10,000, which should properly be offset against the note. At

the trial a certified copy of the judgment was offered in evidence, but

on objection it was excluded, because it was not shown the state court

had obtained jurisdiction of the parties. Exception was taken, but

1882.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Rep. 35~36o.

judgment was rendered for plaintiff for full amount. The exclusion

106

u. s.

of the judgment is assigned as error.]

Mr. Justice Field. * * * The judgment of the circuit court

in Michigan was rendered in an action commenced by attachment. If

the plaintiffs in that action were, at its commencement, residents of

the state, of which some doubt is expressed by counsel., the jurisdic-

tion of the court, under the writ, to dispose of the property attached,

1 Statement abridged; part of opinion omitted.

[Error to United States Circuit Court, eastern district of Michigan.
Action by Cox v. St. Clair to recover $5,000 on two notes made by
St. Clair to the Winthrop Mining Company, an Illinois corporation,
payable in Chicago, for ore and property sold by the mining company
to the defendant. The defense was that plaintiff purchased the note
after maturity, and after notice that defendant had obtained a judgment in the Michigan courts again t the mining company to the amount
of $10,000, which should properly be offset against the note. At
the trial a certified copy of the judgment was offered in evidence, but
on objection it was excluded, because it wa s not shown the state court
had obtained jurisdiction of the parties. Exception was taken, but
judgment was rendere d for plaintiff for full amount. The exclusion
of the judgment is a igne d as error. J
MR. J uSTICE FIELD.
•
•
•
The judgment of the circuit court
in Michigan was rendered in an action commenced by attachment. If
the plaintiffs in that action were, at its commencement, residents of
the state, of which some doubt is expressed by counsel., the jurisdiction of the court, under the writ, to dispose of the property attached,
1

Statement abridged; part of opinion omitted.
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can not be doubted, so far as was necessary to satisfy their demand.

No question was raised as to the validity of the judgment to that ex-

can Flot be doubted, so far as was necessary to satisfy their demand.
No question was ra ised as to the validity of the judgment to that extent. The objection to it was as evidence that the amount rendered
was an existing obligation or debt against the company. If the court
had not acquired jurisdiction over the company, the judgment established nothing as to its liability, beyond the amount which the proceeds of the property di charged. There was no appearance of the
company in the action, and judgment against it was rendered for
$6,450 by default. The officer, to whom the writ of attachment was
issued, returned that, by virtue of it, he had seized and attached certain specified persona l property of the defendant, and had also served
a cop y of the writ, v•ith a copy of the inventory of the property attached, on the dcfen<lant, "by delivering the same to H enry J. Colwell, E sq., agent of the said Winthrop Mining Company, personally,
in said county.''
The laws of Michigan provide for attaching property of absconding, fraudulent and non-resident debtors and of foreign corporations.
They require that the "vrit issued to the sheriff, or other officer by
whom it is to be served, shall direct him to attach the property of the
defendant, and to summon him if he be found within the county, and
also to serve on him a copy of the attachment and of the inventory of
th e property attached. They also declare that where a copy of the
writ of attachment has been personally served on the defendant, the
same proceedings may be had thereon in the suit in all respects as
upon the return of an original writ of summons personally served
where suit is commenced by such summons. 2 Comp. Laws, 1871,
sections 6397 and 641 3.
They also provide, in the chapter regulating proceedings by and
again st corporations, that ''suits against corporations may be comm enced by original writ of summons, or by declarntion, in the sa me
manner that pe rsonal actions may be commenced against indiYicluals,
and such writ, or a copy of uch declaration , in any suit against a corp oration, may be served on the presiding officer, the cashier, the secretary or the treasurer thereof; or, if there be no such officer, or none
can be found, uch serv ice m ay be made on such other officer or m ember
of ~uch corporntion, or in such other manner as the court in which
such sui t ii; brought may direct;" and that "in suits com m enced by
attachment in fa\'or of a resident of this state agninst any corporation
created by or under the laws of any other state, gove rnment or country, if a copy of such attachment and of the inventory of property
attached hall have hecn personally served on any officer, member,
clerk or agent of such corporation within this state, the same proceedings shall be thereupon had, and with like effect, as in case of an attachment against a natural person, which sha ll have been returned
served in like manner upon the defendant." 2 Comp. Laws, 1871,
sections 65H and 6550.
The courts of the United States only regard judgments of the state
co lllts esta blish ing personal demands as having validity or as importing verity where they have been rendered upon personal citation

tent. The objection to it was as evidence that the amount rendered

was an existing' obligation or debt against the company. If the court

had not acquired jurisdiction over the company, the judgment estab-

lished nothing as to its liability, beyond the amount which the pro-

ceeds of the property discharged. There was no appearance of the

company in the action, and judgment against it was rendered for

$6,450 by default. The officer, to whom the writ of attachment was

issued, returned that, by virtue of it, he had seized and attached cer-

tain specified personal property of the defendant, and had also served

a copy of the writ, with a copy of the inventory of the property at-

tached, on the defendant, "by delivering the same to Henry J. Col-

well, Esq., agent of the said Winthrop Mining Company, personally,

in said county."

The laws of Michigan provide for attaching property of abscond-

ing, fraudulent and non-resident debtors and of foreign corporations.

They require that the writ issued to the sheriff, or other officer by
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whom it is to be served, shall direct him to attach the property of the

defendant, and to summon him if he be found within the county, and

also to serve on him a copy of the attachment and of the inventory of

the property attached. They also declare that where a copy of the

writ of attachment has been personally served on the defendant, the

same proceedings may be had thereon in the suit in all respects as

upon the return of an original writ of summons personally served

where suit is commenced by such summons. 2 Comp. Laws, 1871,

sections 6397 and 6413.

They also provide, in the chapter regulating proceedings by and

against corporations, that "suits against corporations may be com-

menced by original writ of summons, or by declaration, in the same

manner that personal actions may be commenced against individuals,

and such writ, or a copy of such declaration, in any suit against a cor-

poration, may be served on the presiding officer, the cashier, the sec-

retary or the treasurer thereof; or, if there be no such officer, or none

can be found, such service may be made on such other officer or member

of such corporation, or in such other manner as the court in which

such suit is brought may direct;" anil that "in suits commenced by

attachment in favor of a resident of this state against any corporation

created by or under the laws of any other state, government or coun-

try, if a copy of such attachment and of the inventory of property

attached shall have been personally served on any officer, member,

clerk or agent of such corporation within this state, the same proceed-

ings shall be thereupon had, and with like effect, as in case of an at-

tachment against a natural person, which shall have been returned

served in like manner upon the defendant." 2 Comp. Laws, 1871,

sections 6544 and 6550.

The courts of the United States only regard judgments of the state

courts establishing personal demands as having validity or as im-

porting verity where they have been rendered upon personal citation
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ceive process for him, or upon his voluntary appearance.

In Pennoyer v. Neff we had occasion to consider at length the man-

ner in which state courts can acquire jurisdiction to render a personal

judgment against non-residents which would be received as evidence

in the federal courts; and we held that personal service of citation on

the party or his voluntary appearance was, with some exceptions,

essential to the jurisdiction of the court. The exceptions related to

those cases where proceedings are taken in a state to determine the

status of one of its citizens toward a non-resident, or where a party

has agreed to accept'a notification to others or service on them as

citation to himself. 95 U. S. 714.

The doctrine of that case applies, in all its force, to personal judg-

ments of state courts against foreign corporations. The courts render-

ing them must have acquired jurisdiction over the party by personal

service or voluntary appearance, whether the party be a corporation

or a natural person. There is only this difference: A corporation,

being an artificial being, can act only through agents, and only through
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them can be reached, and process must, therefore, be served upon

them. In the state where a corporation is formed it is not difficult to

ascertain who are authorized to represent and act for it. Its charter

or the statutes of the state will indicate in whose hands the control

and management of its affairs are placed. Directors are readily found,

as also the officers appointed by them to manage its business. But

the moment the boundary of the state is passed difficulties arise; it is

not so easy to determine who represent the corporation there, and un-

der what circumstances service on them will bind it.

Formerly it was held that a foreign corporation could not be sued

in an action for the recovery of a personal demand outside of the state

by which it was chartered. * * *

(Quoting and citing McQueen v. Middleton Mfg. Co., 16 Johns.

(N. Y.) 5; Peckham v. North Parish, 16 Pick. 274; Libbey v.

Hodgdon, 9 N. H. 394; Moulin v. Trenton Ins. Co., 24 N. J. Law

222.)

This doctrine of the exemption of a corporation from suit in a state

other than that of its creation was the cause of much inconvenience,

and often of manifest injustice. The great increase in the number of

corporations of late years, and the immense extent of their business,

only made this inconvenience and injustice more frequent and marked.

Corporations now enter into all the industries of the country. The

business of banking, mining, manufacturing, transportation and in-

surance is almost entirely carried on by them, and a large portion of

the wealth of the country is in their hands. Incorporated under the

laws of one state, they carrry on the most extensive operations in

other states. To meet and obviate this inconvenience and injustice,

the legislatures of several states interposed, and provided for service

of process on officers and agents of foreign corporations doing busi-

ness therein. Whilst the theoretical and legal view, that the domicile

of a corporation is only in the state where it is created, was admitted,

of the party, or, what is the same thing, of those empowered to receive process for him, or upon his voluntary appearance.
In Pennoyer v. Neff we had occasion to consider at length the manner in which state courts can acquire jurisdiction to render a personal
judgment against non-residents which would be received as evidence
in the federal courts; and we held that personal service of citation on
the party or his voluntary appearance ·was, with some exception ·,
essential to the jurisdiction of the court. The exceptions related to
those cases where proceedings are taken in a state to determin e the
status of one of its citizens toward a non-resident, or where a party
has agreed to accept· a notification to others or service on them as
citation to htmself. 95 U. S. 714.
The doctrine of that case applies, in all its force, to personal judgments of state courts against foreign corporations. The courts rendering them must have acquired jurisdiction over the· party by personal
service or voluntary appearance, whether the party b e a corporation
or a natural person. There is only this difference: A corporation,
being an artificial being, can act only through agents, and only through
them can be reached, and process must, therefore, be served upon
them. In the state where a corporation is formed it is not difficult to
ascertain who are authorized to represent and act for it. Its charter
or the statutes of the state will indicate in whose hands the control
and management of its affairs are placed. Directors are readily found,
as also the officers appointed by them to manage its business. But
the moment the boundary of the state is passed difficulties arise ; it is
not so easy to determine who represent the corporation there, and under what circumstances service on them will bind it.
Formerly it was held that a foreign corporat.ion could not be sued
in an action for the recovery of a personal demand outside of the state
by which it was chartered. • • •
(Quoting and citing McQueen v. Middleton Mfg. Co., r6 Johns.
(N. Y.) 5; Peckham v. No1th Parish, 16 Pick. 274; Libbey v.
Hodgdon, 9 N. H. 394; Moulin v. Trenton Ins. Co., 24 N. J. Law
222.)
This doctrine of the exemption of a corporation from suit in a state
other than that of its creation was the cause of much inconvenience,
and often of manifest injustice. The great increase in the number of
corporations of late years, and the immense extent of their business,
only made this inconvenience and injustice more frequent and marked.
Corporations now enter into all the industries of the country. The
business of banking, mining, manufacturing, transportation and insurance is almost entirely carried on by them, and a larg e portion of
the wealth of the country is in their hands. In corporated under th e
laws of one state, they carrry on the most extensive operations in
other ~ tates. To meet and obviate this incon venience and inju tice,
the legislatures of several states interposed, and provided for serv ice
of process on officers and agents of foreign corporations doing business therein. Whilst the theoretical and lega l view, that the d omicile
of a corporation is only in the state where it is created, was admitted,
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it was perceived that when a foreign corporation sent its officers and

it was perceived that when a foreign corporation sent its officers and
agents into other states and opened offices, and carried on its business
there, it was, in effect, as much represented by them there as in the state
of its creation. As it was protected by the laws of those states, a!lo ..ved
to carry on its business witl'iin their borders, and to sue in their courts,
it seemed only right that it should be held responsible in those courts
to obligations and liabilities there incurred.
All that there is in the legal residence of a corporation in the state
of its creation consists in the fact that by its laws the corporators are
associated together and allowed to exercise as a body certain functions, with a right of succession in its memoers. Its officers and
agents constitute all that is visible of its existence; and they may be
authorized to act for it without as well as within the state. There
would seem, therefore, to be no sound reason why, to the extent of
their agency, they should not be equally deemed to represent it in the
states for which they are respectively appointed when it is called to
legal responsibility for their transactions.
The case is unlike that of suits against individuals. They can act
by themselves, and upon them process can be directly sen•ed, but a
corporation can only act and be reached through agents. Serving
process on its agents in other states, for matters within the sphere of
their agency, is, in effect, serving process on it as much so as if such
agents resided in the state where it was created.
A corporation of one state can not do business in another state
without the latter's consent, express or implied, and that consent may
be accompanied with such conditions as it may think proper to impose. As said by this court in Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French:
"These conditions must be deemed valid and effectual by other
states and by this court, provided they are not repugnant to the constitution or laws of the United States, or inconsistent with those
rules of public law which secure the jurisdiction and authori.ty of each
state from encroachment by all others, or that principle of natural justice which forbids condemnation without opportunity for defense.''
18 How. 404, 407; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168.
The state may, therefore, impose as a condition upon which a foreign corporation shall be permitted to do business within her limits,
that it shall stipulate that in any litigation arising out of its transactions in the state, it will accept as sufficient the sen1ice of process on
its agents or persons especially designated; and the condition would
be eminently fit and just. And such condition and stipulation may
be impli ed as well as expressed. If a state permits a foreign corporation to do business within her limits, and at the same time provides
that in suits against it for business there done, process shall be served
upon its agents, the prov ision is to be d eemed a condition of the permi ·sion, and the corporations that subsequently do business in the
state are to be deemed to assent to such condition as fully as though
th ey had specially authorized their agents to receive service of the
process. Such condition must not, however, encroach upon that principle of natural justice which requires notice of a suit to a pa1ty before

agents into other states and opened offices, and carried on its business

there, it was, in effect, as much represented by them there as in the state

of its creation. As it was protected by the laws of those states, allowed

to carry on its business within their borders, and to sue in their courts,

it seemed only right that it should be held responsible in those courts

to obligations and liabilities there incurred.

All that there is in the legal residence of a corporation in the state

of its creation consists in the fact that by its laws the corporators are

associated together and allowed to exercise as a body certain func-

tions, with a right of succession in its members. Its officers and

agents constitute all that is visible of its existence; and they may be

authorized to act for it without as well as within the state. There

would seem, therefore, to be no sound reason why, to the extent of

their agency, they should not be equally deemed to represent it in the

states for which they are respectively appointed when it is called to

legal responsibility for their transactions.

The case is unlike that of suits against individuals. They can act
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by themselves, and upon them process can be directly served, but a

corporation can only act and be reached through agents. Serving

process on its agents in other states, for matters within the sphere of

their agency, is, in effect, serving process on it as much so as if such

agents resided in the state where it was created.

A corporation of one state can not do business in another state

without the latter's consent, express or implied, and that consent may-

be accompanied with such conditions as it may think proper to im-

pose. As said by this court in Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French:

"These conditions must be deemed valid and effectual by other

states and by this court, provided they are not repugnant to the con-

stitution or laws of the United States, or inconsistent with those

rules of public law which secure the jurisdiction and authority of each

state from encroachment by all others, or that principle of natural jus-

tice which forbids condemnation without opportunity for defense."

18 How. 404, 407; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168.

The state may, therefore, impose as a condition upon which a for-

eign corporation shall be permitted to do business within her limits,

that it shall stipulate that in any litigation arising out of its transac-

tions in the state, it will accept as sufficient the serv ice of process on

its agents or persons especially designated; and the condition would

be eminently tit and just. And such condition and stipulation may

be implied as well as expressed. If a state permits a foreign corpo-

ration to do business within her limits, and at the same time provides

that in suits against it for business there done, process shall be served

upon its agents, the provision is to be deemed a condition of the per-

mission, and the corporations that subsequently do business in the

state are to be deemed to assent to such condition as fully as though

they had specially authorized their agents to receive service of the

process. Such condition must not, however, encroach upon that prin-

ciple of natural justice which requires notice of a suit to a party before
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vided for should be only upon such agents as may be properly deemed

representatives of the foreign corporation. The decision of this court

in Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, to which we have already re-

ferred, sustains these views. * * *

We do not, however, understand the laws of Michigan as authoriz-

ing the service of a copy of the writ, as a summons, upon an agent of

a foreign corporation, unless the corporation be engaged in business

in the state, and the agent be appointed to act there. We so construe

the words "agent of such corporation within this state." They do

not sanction service upon an officer or agent of the corporation who

resides in another state, and is only casually in the state, and not

charged with any business of the corporation there. * * *

(Citing and quoting to this effect Newell v. Great Western Ry.

Co., 19 Mich. 344; Moulin v. Trenton Ins. Co., 24 N. J. Law 222,

234-)

Without considering whether authorizing service of a copy of a writ

of attachment as a summons on some of the persons named in the

statute—a member, for instance, of the foreign corporation, that is, a
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mere stockholder—is not a departure from the principle of natural

justice mentioned in Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, which forbids

condemnation without citation, it is sufficient to observe that we are

of opinion that when service is made within tire state upon an agent

of a foreign corporation, it is essential, in order to support the juris-

diction of the court to render a personal judgment, that it should ap-

pear somewhere in the record—either in the application for the writ,

or accompanying its service, or in the pleadings or the finding of the

court—that the corporation was engaged in business in the state. The

transaction of business by the corporation in the state, general or

special, appearing, a certificate of service by the proper officer on a

person who is its agent there would, in our opinion, be sufficient

prima facie evidence that the agent represented the company in the

business. It would then be open, when the record is offered as evi-

dence in another state, to show that the agent stood in no representa-

tive character to the company, that his duties were limited to those of

a subordinate employe, or to a particular transaction, or that his agency

had ceased when the matter in suit arose.

In the record, a copy of which was offered in evidence in this case,

there was nothing to show, so far as we can see, that the Winthrop

Mining Company was engaged in business in the state when service

was made on Colvvell. The return of the officer, on which alone re-

liance was placed to sustain the jurisdiction of the state court, gave no

information on the subject. It did not. therefore, appear even -prima

facie that Colwcll stood in any such representative character to the

company as would justify the service of a copy of the writ on him.

The certificate of the sheriff, in the absence of this fact in the record,

was insufficient to give the court jurisdiction to render a personal judg-

ment against the foreign corporation. The record was, therefore,

properly excluded.

Judgment affirmed.

he can be bound by it. It must be reasonabl;e, and the service provided for should be only upon such agents as may be properly deemed
representatives of the foreign corporation. The decision of this court
in Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, to which we have already referred, sustains these views. • • •
We do not, however, understand· the laws of Michigan as authorizing the service of a copy of the writ, as a summons, upon an agent of
a foreign corporation, unless the corporation be engaged in business
in the state, and the agent be appointed to act there. We so construe
the words " agent of such corporation within this state." They do
not sanction service upon an officer or agent of the corporation who
resides in another state, and is only casually in the state, and not
charged with any business of the corporation there. • • •
(Citing and quoting to this effect Newell v. Great Western Ry.
Co., 19 Mich. 344; Moulin v. Trenton Ins. Co., 24 N. J. Law 222,
2 34·)

Without considering whether authorizing service of a copy of a writ
of attachment as a summons on some of the persons named in the
statute-a member, for instance, of the foreign corporation, that is, a
mere stockholder-is not a departure from the principle of natural
justice mentioned in Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, which forbids
condemnation without citation, it is sufficient to observe that we are
of opinion that when service is made within tire state upon an agent
of a foreign corporation, it is essential, in order to support the jurisdiction of the court to render a personal judgment, that it should appear somewhere in the record-either in the application for the writ,
or accompanying its service, or in the pleadings or the finding of the
court-that the corporation was engaged in bu siness in the state. The
transaction of business by the corporation in the state, general or
special, appearing, a certificate of service by the proper officer on a
person who is its agent there would, in our opinion, be sufficient
prima fact'e evidence that the agent represented the company in the
business. It would then be open, when the record is offered as evidence in another state, to show that the agent stood in no representative character to the company, that his duties were limited to those of
a subordinate employe, or to a particular transaction, or that his agency
had ceased when the matter in suit arose.
In the record, a copy of which was offered in evidence in this case,
there was nothing to show, so far as we can see, that the Winthrop
Mining Company was engaged in business in the state when service
was made on Colwell. The return of the officer, on which alone reliance was placed to sustain the jurisdiction of tile state court, gave no
information on the subject. It did not, therefore , appear even prima
fact'e that Colwell stood in any such representative character to the
company as would justify the service of a copy of the writ on him.
The certificate of the sheriff, in the absence of this fact in the record,
was insufficient to give the court jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against the foreign corporation. The record was, therefore,
properly exciudcd.
Judgment affirmed.
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1. Domestic corporations:

(a) At common law, on officers, was sufficient: 1819, McQueen v. Middle-

Note.

ton Mfg. Co., Hi Johns. 5; 1837, Meriwether v. Bank of Hamburg, Dud.

(a) At common law, on officers, was sufficient: 1819, McQueen v. Middleton ~Ifg. Co., 16 J ohns. 5; 1837, Meriwether v. Bank of Hamburg, Dud.
(S. C.) 36; 18-16. Glaize '"South Car. R. Co., 1 Strobh. L. (S. C. ) 70; 1889,
Newell v. Great W ei;tern R. Co., 19 Mich . 336; 1871, Hartford City Fire Ina.
Co. v. Carrugi, 41 Ga. 660; 1875, Barnett v. Chicago & L. H. R. Co., 4
Hun 114.
(b) By statutes, sen·i1:e may be made on general officers, such as president,
secretary, casl.Jier, general superinte ndent, managing officers, etc.: 1854,
Chamberlin v. ~Iammot.h Mining Co., 20 Mo. 96 (president); 1854, Willamette
Falls Co. v. Williams, 1Ore.1 12 ; 1854, Commerce Bank v. Rutland & W.R.,
JO How. Pr. 1 (genernl manager); 1865, Carr v. Commercial Bank of R acine,
19 Wis. 272; 186.5, Gillig v. Independent G. & S. !\1. Co ., 1 Nev. 247 1secretary); 1887, Arlamfl Express Co. v. St. John, 17 Ohio St. 6-11 (general superintendent); 1872, Newby & Colts Pat. Fa. Co., L. R. 7 Ct. Q. B. 293; 1882,
?lk:'IIurtry v. Tnttle, 1il Neb. 232 (tr easurer); 1893, Taylor v. Grnnite Rtate,
etc., Assn., 136 ~- Y . 343, 32 Am. St. Rep. 749 (an attorney is not such ofJicer).
But a ticket seller (lS.59, Doty v. Mich. C. R. Co., 8 Abh. I'r. 427; 1900,
Denver, etc., R . Co. v. Holle r, 100 Fed. Rep. 738 ' ; bNggnge mnst~r (18-51,
Flynn v. Hudson Riv. R. Co., 6 How. Pr. 308); ship cnptain (1862, Upper
Mi sEZ. Trans. Co. v. Whittak er , 16 Wis. 220); or an attorney ( 1893, Taylor'°·
<iranito State Assn., 136 N. Y. 343, 32 Am. St. Rep. 749), are not such officers
;ii:i justify service unless specially provided for.
Yet generally it is now he ld that any agent authorized to contract the debt,
or reprcf!e nt the corporation in the particular transaction, sufficiently repref!<'ll la the corporation in n1·(.·epting se rvice of summons .in a ruattter arisinJor
from such trnnsartion: l 8\J2, Klopf v. Creston City W. W . Co., 34 Neb. 808,
3:3 ,\m . St. Re p. 661); 1\rn. Bell Te . Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 17, 34; 1892, R eyer v.
Odd Fellows', etc., Assn., 1!>7 :\lass. 3<i7, 34 Am. St. Rep. 288; 1894, Foster v.
Betcher Lumber Co., 5 R. D. 57, -19 Am. St. Rep. 859, 23 L. R . A. 490; 1895,
Hude v. Dakota F. & ;\I. Ins. Co., 7 S. D. 644, 58 Am. St. Rep. 880; 1896, P olloek v. Building & L . Assn., 48 8. C. 65, 59 Am. St. Rep. 695: 1898, Turcott
v. Railroad Co., 101 Te nn . 102, 70 Am. St. Rep. 661; 1898, Conn. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602.
2. Foreign corporations.
(a) At common lnw, not on an officer outside of th e state creating the corporation: 18Hl, McQueen v. Middleton Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. 5; 1834, Peckham
v. North Parish, 16 Pick. (:'IIass.) 274; 1875, Barnett v. Chicago & L. H. R.
Co., 4 Hun 114.
But see, contra, 1871, Hartford Ins. Co. v. Ca.rrugi. 41 Ga. 660; 1875, Ba.wknight v. Liverpool L. & G. Ins. Co., 55 Ga. 195.
(b) Under statutes, only when the statute allows, i.e., by express statutory
authority, and then generally only such as are doing business and hnve agents
in the state: 18Hl, 0. & M. R. Co. v. Wheeler,] Black CU. S.) 286, on 297; 1866,
Camden Rolling M. Co. v. Swede Irou Co., 32 N. J. Law 15 : 1868, Howell''·
Chicago & N. W .R. Co., 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 378; 1873, Lathrop v. V nion Pac.
R. Co., l McAr. (D. C.) 234; 18i5, Dallas v. Atlantic & M . R . Co.,'.? )IcAr.
( D. C.) 146; 1893, Aldrich v. Anchor Coal Co., 24 Ore. 32. 4J Am. St. Rep.
83 1: 1894, Fm1ter v. Betcher Lniuber Co., 5 S. D. 5i, 49 Am. ~t. Rep. S.59, 23
L. R. A. 490, note; 1898, Crook v. Girard Iron Co., 87 l\fd. 138. 67 Am. St.
Rep. :~2:); 1898, Carstens v. Leidigh & L. Co., 18 Wash . 450, 63 Arn. St. Rep.
90H, 3\l L. R. A. 548; 1898, Conn. Mot. Jns. Co. v. Spmtley, 172 U .S. 602;
1899, ~lerke v. Valleytown J\f. Co., 93 Fed. Rep. 697; 1900, Denver & R. G. R .
Co. v. Roller, 100 l•eil. Rep. 738; 1900, J. W. Thompson v. Whitehead, l &'>
Ill. 4f>4.
\VhilP. it i8 hel<l that only an officer named in the st atute cnn ncceptservice.
189ii, Firnt Nnt'l Rk. v. Hnntington Dis. Co., 41 W. Yn. 530, 56 Am . • t. Rep.
878. ~·pt it would seem that any agent that is authorized to do the busine8!.' il'
suffil'i<'nt if he regnlarly represents the company in such business. See supra,
Domestic corpnmtions ( b ).

Newell v. Great Western R. Co., 19 Mich. 336; 1871, Hartford City Fire Ins.

Co. v. Carrugi, 41 Ga. 660; 1875, Barnett v. Chicago & L. H. R. Co., 4

Hun 114.

(b) By statutes, service may be made on general officers, such as president,

secretary, cashier, general superintendent, managing officers, etc.: 1854,

Chamberlin v. Mammoth Mining Co.,20 Mo. 96 (president); 1854, Willamette

Falls Co. v. Williams, 1 Ore. 112; 1854, Commerce Bank v. Rutland & W. R.,

10 How. Pr. 1 (general manager); 1865, Carr v. Commercial Bank of Racine.

19 Wis. 272; 1865, Gillig v. Independent G. & S. M. Co., 1 Nev. 247 (secre-

tary); 1867, Adams Express Co. v. St. John, 17 Ohio St. 641 (general super-

intendent); 1872, Newby & Colts Pat. Fa. Co., L. R. 7 Ct. Q. B. 293; 1882,

McMurtry v. Tuttle, 13 Neb. 232 (treasurer); 1893, Taylor v. Granite State,

etc., Assn., 136 N. Y. 343, 32 Am. St. Rep. 749 (an attorney is not such of-

ficer).

But a ticket seller (iai9, Dotv v. Mich. C. R. Co., 8 Abb. Pr. 427; 1900.
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Service of process.

l. Domestic corporations:

(S. C.) 36; 1846. Glaize v. South Car. R. Co., 1 Strobh. L. (S. C.) 70; 1869,

Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Holler, 100 Fed. Rep. 738'; baggaue master (1851,

Flvnn v. Hudson Riv. R. Co., 6 How. Pr. 308); ship captain (1862, Upper

Miss. Trans. Co. v. Whittaker, 16 Wis. 220); or an attorney (1893, Taylor v.

Granite State Assn., 136 N. Y. 343, 32 Am. St. Rep. 749), are not such officers

as justify service unless specially provided for.

Yet generally it is now held that any agent authorized to contract the debt,

or represent the corporation in the particular transaction, sufficiently repre-

sents the corporation in accepting service of summons in a mattter arising

from such transaction: 1892, Klopp v. Creston City W. W. Co., 34 Neb. 808,

33 Am. St. Rep. 666; Am. Bell Tel. Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 17, 34; 1892, Rever v.

Odd Fellows', etc., Assn., 157 Mass. 367, 34 Am. St. Rep. 288; 1894, Foster v.

Betcher Lumber Co., 5 S. D. 57, 49 Am. St. Rep. 859, 23 L. R. A. 490; 1895,

Gude v. Dakota F. & M. Ins. Co., 7 S. D. 644, 58 Am. St. Rep. 860; 1896, Pol-

lock v. Building & L. Assn.. 48 S. C. 65, 59 Am. St. Rep. 695; 1898, Turcott

v. Railroad Co., 101 Tenn. 102, 70 Am. St. Rep. 661; 1898, Conn. Mut. InB.

Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602.

2. Foreign corporations.

(a) At common law, not on an officer outside of the state creating the cor-

poration: 1819, McQueen v. Middleton Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. 5; 1834, Peckham

v. North Parish, 16 Pick. (Masp.) 274; 1875, Barnett v. Chicago & L. H. R.

Co., 4 Hun 114.

But see, contra, 1871, Hartford Ins. Co. v. Carrugi. 41 Ga. 660; 1875, Bawk-

night v. Liverpool L. & G. Ins. Co., 55 Ga. 195.

(b) Under statutes, only when the statute allows, i. p., by express statutory

authority, and then generally only such as are doing business and have agents

in the state: 1861,0. & M. R.Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black (U.S.) 286, on 297; 1866,

Camden Rolline M. Co. v. Swede Iron Co., 32 N. J. Law 15; 1868, Howell v.

Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 378; 1873, Luthrop v. Union Pac.

R. Co., 1 McAr. (D. 0.) 234; 1875, Dallas v. Atlantic & M. R. Co., 2 McAr.

(D. C.) 146; 1893, Aldrich v. Anchor Coal Co., 24 Ore. 32, 4J Am. St. Rep.

831; 1894, Foster v. Betcher Lumber Co., 5 S. D. 57, 49 Am. St. Rep. 859, 23

L. R. A. 490, note; 1898, Crook v. Girard Iron Co., 87 Md. 138, 67 Am. St.

Rep. 325; 1898, Carstens v. Leidigh & h. Co., 18 Wash. 450. 63 Am. St. Rep.

906, 39 L. R. A. 54S; 1898. Conn. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Spratlev, 172 U. S. 602;

1899, Mecke v. Vallevtown M. Co.,93 Fed. Rep. 697; 1900, Denver & R. G. R.

Co. v. Roller, 100 Fed. Rep. 738; 1900, J. W. Thompson v. Whitehead. 185

111. 454.

While it is held that onlv an officer named in the statute can accept service.

1895, First Nat'l Bk. v. Huntington Dis. Co., 41 W. Va. 530, 56 Am. St. Rep.

878, yet it would seem that any agent that is authorized to do the business is

sufficient if he regularly represents the company in such business. See supra,

Domestic corporations (b).
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i aee cases above), though there are a few cases to the contrary: 1877, Hiller

v. B. & M. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 223; 1887, Childs v. Harris Mfg. Co., 104 N.

Y. 477.

Sec. 326. What is doing business so as to authorize service.

But service on agent temporarily in the state, is not generally sufficient
cases above), though there are a few cases to the contrary: 1877, Hiller
v. B. & M. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 223; 1887, Childs v. Harris Mfg. Co., 104 N.

1 see

Y. 477.

RYERSON v. WAYNE CIRCUIT JUDGE.1

1897. In the Supreme Court of Michigan. 114 Mich. Rep.

352-354-

[Mandamus by Ryerson to compel the circuit judge of Wayne

Sec. 326.

What is doing business so as to authorize service.

county to vacate an order setting aside the service of summons against

RYERSON v. WAYNE CIRCUIT JUDGE. 1

a foreign corporation.]

Moore, J. March n, 1S97, relator, a resident of Detroit, com-

menced a suit by summons in the Wayne Circuit Court against the

Beach & Clarridge Company, a Massachusetts corporation, for a

cause of action accruing in Wayne count}'. The service was made

upon H. L. Baker, who is said by relator to be the traveling agent of

said corporation. Motion was made to set aside the service, because

unauthorized. The service was set aside and the proceedings dis-
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missed. It is sought to review that action here.

It is claimed the service was authorized by Act No. 61 of the Pub-

lic Acts of 1895, which reads:

"Suits may be commenced at law or in equity in the circuit court

for any county of this state where the plaintiff resides * * *

against any corporation not organized under the laws of this state, in

all cases where the cause of action accrues within the state of Michi-

gan, by service * * * upon any officer or agent of the corpora-

tion," etc.

The record shows that Mr. Baker was a traveling salesman of the

Massachusetts corporation. His business was the taking of orders

for goods in this and a number of other states. He had no office in

this state. He did not have charge of any men under him. His

duties were those of the ordinary traveling agent, selling goods to

retail dealers. * * *

It is the claim of the respondent that Mr. Baker was not such an

agent as is meant by the statute, where it authorizes service upon an

agent; citing Newell v. Railway Co., 19 Mich. 336; 'Watson v.

Wayne Circuit Judge, 24 Mich. 38; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v.

Hunt, 39 Mich. 469; Pettit v. Booming Co., 74 Mich. 214; Kirby

Carpenter Co. v. Trombley, 101 Mich. 447. These cases do not

throw much light upon the discussion, as the statute construed by

them is quite different from the one to be construed here. In the last

three cases the statute reads that service might be made on certain of-

ficers, and the "general or special agent, superintendent or other prin-

cipal officer."

1 Part of opinion omitted.

71—Wil. Cas.

1897.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF M1cHIGAN. 114 Mich. Rep.
35z-354.
[Mandamus by Ryerson to compel the circuit judge of Wayne
county to vacate an order setting aside the service of summons against
a foreign corporation. J
MOORE, J. l\tlarch 11, 1897, relator, a resident of Detroit, commenced a suit b y summons in the Wayne Circuit Comt against the
Beach & Clarridge Company, a Massachusetts corporation, for a
cause of action accruing in vVayne county. The service was made
upon H. L. Baker, who is said by relator to be the traveling agent of
said corporation. Motion was made to set aside the servi ce, because
unauthorized. The service was set aside and the proceedings dismissed. It is sought to review that action here.
It is claimed the service was authorized by Act No. 61 of the Public Acts of 1895, which reads:
" Suits may be commenced at law or in equity in the circuit court
for any county of this state where the plaintiff resides
•
•
•
against any corporation not organized under the laws of this state, in
all cases where the cause of action accrues within the state of Michigan, by service • • •
upon any officer or agent of the corporation," etc.
•
The record shows that Mr. Baker was a traveling salesman of the
Massachusetts corporation. His business was the taking of orders
for goods in this and a number of other states. He had no office in
this state. He did not have charge of any men under him. His
duties were those of the ordinary traveling agent, selling goods to
retail dealers. • • •
It is the clairp of the respondent that Mr. Baker was not such an
agent as is meant by the statute. where it authorizes service upon an
agent; citing Newell v. Railway Co., 19 Mich. 336; •Watson v.
\Vayne Circuit Judge , 24 Mich. 38; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v.
Hunt, 39 Mich. 469; Pettit v. Booming Co., 74 Mich. 214; Kirby
Carpenter Co. v. Trombley, 101 Mich. 447. These cases do not
throw much light upon the discussion, as the statute con. tmed by
t.hem is quite different from the one to be construed here. In the last
three cases the statute reads that service mig ht be made on certain oflicers, and th e ' 'general or special agent, s uperintendent or other principal officer."
1 Part of opinion omitted.
71-WIL. CAS.
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Counsel also cites Maxwell v. Railroad Co., 34 Fed Rep. 286. In

§ 327

this case Justice Brown held: "It does not appear to me that the law

Counsel also cites Maxwell v. Railroad Co., 34 Fed Rep. 286. In
this case Justice Brown held: "lt does not appear to me that the law
of this state with resp ect to suits agninst foreign corporations ( 2 How.
Stat., § 8145) cuts any figure in the case, since it provides for ser.v ice
of process upon the agent of a foreign corporation only where the
cause of action arises within this sta te," and he held that the cause of
action did not arise in this state, and for that reason the court did not
get jurisdi ction. In the case of Fairbank & Co. v. Cincinnati, etc.,
R. Co., 4 C. C. A. 403, 54 F ed. Rep. 420, th ere was a dissenting
·opinion, which w e think is m o re in harmony v.•ith the later decisions
of tliis court, which w e shall hereafter cite, than the prevailing opinion.
In Gottschalk Co. ' " Distilling, etc., Co., c;o F e d. R ep. 681, it was
h e ld that the person called a "distributing agent" was not an agent,
but ·was a purchaser of the goods of defenda nt.
\Ve think the reconl fairly discloses that the Massachusetts corporation was doing business in thi s state, and that it was done through the
agency of Mr. B a ker, its traveling agent, and that the case comes
within th e provisio ns of the statute. There c a n be no doubt of the
right of this corporatio n to do bu siness in this state, and of its right to
sue its debtors in the courts of this state. When it unde rtakes to do
bu siness here, it must do so in compliance with our laws, which provide for the bringing of suits and the method of service. Vorheis v.
P eo ple's Mut. Ben. Soc. , 86 Mich. 3 r; Shafer Iron Co. \'. Iron Circuit Judge , 88 Mich. 464; Turner v. Tunnel Co., 102 Mich. 574.
We think the service of process was good. The writ will issue as
prayed.
The other justices concurred.

of tliis state with respect to suits against foreign corporations (2 How.

Stat., § 8145) cu*s any fig1"-6 m t°e case, since it provides for service

of process upon the agent of a foreign corporation only where the

cause of action arises within this state," and he held that the cause of

action did not arise in this state, and for that reason the court did not

get jurisdiction. In the case of Fairbank & Co. v. Cincinnati, etc.,

R. Co., 4 C. C. A. 403, 54 Fed. Rep. 420, there was a dissenting

opinion, which we think is more in harmony w ith the later decisions

of this court, which we shall hereafter cite, than the prevailing opinion.

In Gottschalk Co. v. Distilling, etc., Co., 50 Fed. Rep. 6S1, it was

held that the person called a "distributing agent" was not an agent,

but was a purchaser of the goods of defendant.

We think the record fairly discloses that the Massachusetts corpora-

tion was doing business in this state, and that it was done through the

agency of Mr. Baker, its traveling agent, and that the case comes

w ithin the provisions of the statute. There can be no doubt of the
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right of this corporation to do business in this state, and of its right to

sue its debtors in the courts of this state. When it undertakes to do

business here, it must do so in compliance with our laws, which pro-

vide for the bringing of suits and the method of service. Vorheis v.

People's Mut. Ben. Soc, 86 Mich. 31; Shafer Iron Co. v. Iron Cir-

cuit Judge, 88 Mich. 464; Turner v. Tunnel Co., 102 Mich. 574.

We think the service of process was good. The writ will issue as

prayed.

The other justices concurred.

Note. See, 1894, Foster v. Betcher Lumber Co., 6 8. D. 57, 23 L. R. A.

490, note; 1895, Florsheim, etc., Dry Goods Co. v. Lester, 60 Ark. 120, 46 St.

Rep. 162; 1896, Comm. Bank v. Sherman, 28 Ore. 573, 52 Am. St. Rep. 811;

1898, Crook v. Girard Iron Co., 87 Md. 138, 67 Am. St. Rep 325; 1898, Conn.

Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602; 1898, Mearslion v. Pottsville L.

Note. See, 1894, Foste r v. Be tcher Lumber Co., 5 S. D. 57, 23 L. R . A.
490, note; 1895, Florsheim, etc., Dry Goods Co. v. Lester, 60 Ark. 120, 46 St.
Rep. 162; 1896, Comm. Bank v. 8h erman, 28 Ore. 573, 52 Am. St. Rep. 811;
1898. Crook v. G irard Iron Co., 87 Md. 138, 67 Am. St. Rep 325; 1898, Cona.
Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U . 8. 602; 1898, Mears hon v. P ottsville L.
Co., 187 Pn. St. 12, 67 Am. St. Rep. 560; 1899, Wall v. Chee. & 0. R . Co., 95
Fed . Rep. 398; 1899, In re La Bourgogue, 79 L. T . (N. S. I 331.
But see, 1895, State v. Bristol Sav. Bk., 108 Ala. 3, 54 Am. St. Rep. 141.

Co., 187 Pa. St. 12, 67 Am. St. Rep. 560; 1899, Wall v. dies. & O. R. Co.. 95

Fed. Rep. 398; 1899, In re La Bourgogne, 79 L. T. (N. S. 1 331.

But see, 1895, State v. Bristol Sav. Bk., 108 Ala. 3, 54 Am. St. Rep. 141.

Sec. 327. Pleading.

Corporation plaintiff—need not allege corporate existence.

EXCHANGE NATIONAL BANK v. L. J. CAPPS Et al.1

1891. In the Supreme Court of Nebraska. 32 Nebraska Rep.

242-245, 29 Am. St. Rep. 433.

[Suit by the bank upon a promissory note made payable to the order

of the Exchange National Bank. The petition read simply that

Sec. 327.

"Plaintiff complains," etc., without alleging it was a corporation, or

Pleading.

stating under what law it was organized. A demurrer to the petition

Corppration plaintiff-need not allege corporate existence.

was sustained, and this is the error assigned.]

1 Statement abridged.

EXCHANGE NATIONAL BANK v. L. J . CAPPS ET .AL. 1

1891.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF N EBRASKA. 32 Nebra ka Rep.
242-245, 29 Am. St. R ep. 433.

[Suit by th e bank upon a promissory note made payable to the order
of the Exchnnge :'.'J ational Bank. The petition read simply that
"Plaintiff compl ain s," etc., without alleging it was a corporation. or
stating under what law it was organized . A demurrer to the petition
was sustai ned . an<l this is the e rror assigned.]
1
Statement abridged.
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Maxwell, J. * * * In Platte Valley Bank v. Harding, 1

§ 327

POWER TO SUE AND BE SUED.

I I

23

Neb. 461, it was held that the maker of a note payable to a bank, in

an action on the note, can not raise the question of the bank's incor-

poration. In Angell & Ames on Corporations, section 632, it is

said: "It is, however, generally admitted that a corporation may de-

clare in its corporate name, without setting forth in the declaration

the act of incorporation or averring that it is a corporation if the act

be private."

At common law it is not necessary to set forth in the declaration

the act of incorporation when an action is brought in the corporate

name. The code was designed to simplify procedure. There is no

requirement of the statute that the act of incorporation shall be

averred, and it seems to be sufficient to bring the action in the cor-

porate name.

In Stanley v. R. & D. R. Co., 89 N. C. 331, it is said: "It is dif-

ficult to assign any sufficient reason why a corporation suing or sued

should be designated by any further description than its corporate

name, which does not apply with equal force to a natural person, the
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only purpose in either case being to point out the party to the action.

The appearance and plea to the merits or answer is a concession of

the sufficiency of the designation of the person, natural or artificial,

and, if intended to be disputed, it should be under the present prac-

tice by answer."

So under the section of the Iowa code in regard to actions on writ- .

ten instruments, when "suit may be brought by or against any of the

parties thereto, by the same name and description as those by which

they are designated in such instrument." (Harris Mfg. Co. v. Marsh,

49 Iowa 11, 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 285.) There is no require-

ment of the code that authorizes a court to insist upon setting out the

act of incorporation in an action brought in the corporate name. The

common law prevails in this state in all matters where there is no

statute to the contrary. The code has not changed the common law

in this respect. It was, therefore, unnecessary to aver the act of in-

corporation.

The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the cause re-

manded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

The other judges concur.

Note. See. also, I860, Central Bank v. Knowlton, 12 Wis. 624, 78 Am. Dec.

769; 1867, Stein v. Ind. Bldg. & L. Assn., 18 Ind. 237, 81 Am. Dec. 353; 1894,

Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Hoover, 79 Md. 253, 47 Am. St. Rep. 392; 1896, Shirk

v. Citizens' Enterprize Co., 15 Ind. App. 329,57 Am. St. Rep. 230; 1897,

Holden v. Great W. El. Co., 69 Minn. 527, 65 Am. St. Rep. 585; 1898, Emer-

son v. Nimocks, 88 Fed. Rep. 280; 1898, Parker v. Carolina Sav Bk., 53 S. C.

MAXWELL, J.
• • • In Platte Valley Bank v. Hardin g, 1
Neb. 461, it was held that the maker of a note payable to a bank, in
an action on the note, can not raise the question of the bank's incorporation. In Angell & Ames on Corporations, section 632, it is
said: "It is, however, generally admitted that a corporation may d eclare in its corporate name, without setting forth in the declaration
the act of incorporation or averring that it is a corporation if the act
be private."
At common law it is not necessary to set forth in the declaration
the act of incorporation when an action is brought in the corporate
name. The code was designed to simplify procedure. There is no
requirement of the statute that the act of incorporation shall be
averred, and it seems to be sufficient to bring the action in the corporate name.
In Stanley v. R. & D.R. Co., 89 N. C. 331, it is said: "It is difficult to assign any sufficient reason why a corporation suing or sued
should be designated by any further description than its corporate
name, which does not apply with equal force to a natural person, the
only purpose in either case being to point out the party to the action.
The appearance and pica to the merits or answer is a concession of
the s ufficiency of the designation of the person, natural or artificial,
and, if intended to be disputed, it should be under the present practice by answer."
So under the section of the Iowa code in regard to actions on writ- .
ten instruments, when "suit may be brought by or against any of the
parties thereto, by the same name and description as those by which
they are designated in such instrument." (Harris Mfg. Co. v. Marsh,
49 Iowa 11, 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 285.) There is no requirement of the code that authorizes a court to insist upon sett!ng out the
act of incorporation in an action brought in the corporate name. The
common law prevails in this state in all matters where there is no
statute to the contrary. The code has not changed the common law
in this respect. It was, therefore, unnecessary to aver the act of incorporation.
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
The other judges concur.

583, 69 Am. St. Rep. 888; 1899, Wood v. Friendship Lodge, 20 Ky. L. Rep.

2002, 50 S. W. Rep. 836; 1899, Moynihan v. Drobaz, 124 Cal. 212, 71 Am. St.

Rep. 46; 1901, Brady v. National Supply Co., 64 O. S. 267, 83 Am. St. Rer,.

753. 60 N. E. 218.

See following case, contra.

Note. Flee. also, 1860, Central Bank v. Knowlton, 12 Wis. 624, 78 Am. Dec.
769 ; 1867, Stein v. Ind. Bldg. & L. Assn., 18 Ind . 237, 81 Am. Dec. 353; 1894,
Norfolk, ere., R. Co. v. Hoover, 79 Md. 253, 47 Am. St. Rep. 392; 1896, f;;hirk
v. Citizens' Enterprize Co., 15 lnd. App. 329, 57 Am. St. Rep. 230: 18!17,
Holden v. Great W. El. Co., 69 Minn. 527, 65 Am. St. Rep. 585; 1898, Emerson v. Nimocks, 88 Fed. Rep. ~80; 1898, Parker v. Carolina 811.v Bk., 53 S. C.
583, 69 Am. St. Rep. 888; 1899, Wood v. Friendship Lodge, 20 Ky. L. J{ep.
2002, 50 S. W. Rep. 836; 181:1~1, Moynihan v. Drobaz, 124 Gal. 212, 7.1 Arn. 8t.
Rep. 46; 1001, Brady v. N ational Supply Co., 64 0. 8 . 267, 83 Am. St. Rer,.
Iii~. 60 N. E . 218.
St>e follnwi11g <'ase, contra.
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Sec. 328. Same. Contra,—must allege corporate existence.

R. W. HOLLOWAY v. THE MEMPHIS, EL PASO AND PACIFIC R.

I 124

R. CO.1

HOLLOWAY V. THE :\fD1PHlS PACIFIC R. R. CO.

§ 328

1859. In the Supreme Court of Texas. 23 Texas Rep. 465-468,

Sec. 328. Same.

76 Am. Dec. 68.

[Suit by the corporation (without alleging its corporate existence)

Contra,-must allege corporate existence.

against Holloway upon a written contract of subscription to the stock

R. W. HOLLOWAY v. THE MEMPHIS, EL PASO .AND PACIFIC R.

of the railroad company. The defendant demurred, the court over-

R.

ruled the demurrer, and this is the error assigned.]

co.

1

Wheeler, C. J. It is the settled rale of the English law, and it

IN

is the rule in New York, Virginia and some of the other states, that

THE

where a body politic institutes legal proceedings, either on a contract

SUPREME CouRT OF TEXAS. 23 Texas Rep. 465-<f-68,
76 Am. Dec. 68.

or to recover property, it must, at the trial, under the general issue,

[Suit by the corporation (without alleging its corporate existence)
against Holloway upon a written contract of subscription to the stock
of the railroad company . The defendant demurred , the court overruled the demurrer, and this is the error assigned. ]
WHEELER, C. ]. It is the &ettled rule of the English law, and it
is the rule in New York, Virginia and some of the other states, that
where a body politic institutes legal proceedings , either on a contract
or to recover property, it must, at the trial, under the general issue,
prove the . fact of incorporation. (Angell & Ames on Corp., § 632,
4th edit., and cases cited.) In the case of The Bank v. Simonton,
2 Texas Rep. 531 , this court held that the plaintiffs must aver and
prove that they were a body co rporate, duly constituted by competent
authority, to enable them to maintain this action. That was the case
of a foreign corporation. But the principle of the decision applies
equal ly to a domestic corporation, created by private act, of which the
court can not judicially take noti ce.
In some of the states a diffe rent rde obtains, and it is held that, if
in a suit by a corporation the defenda nt plead the general issue, it is
an ad mis ·io n of the corporate existence of the plaintiffs, on the principle, it seems, that by pleading to the merits, the defendant admits
the capacity of the plaintiffs to sue. (Angell & Ames on Corp ..
§ 633.) . Those courts, however, make an exception in the case of
fore ign corporations. ( Angell & Ames on Corp. , § 633.) But the
reason for a distinction in this respect is not very clearly discoverable.
A foreign corporation is required to prove its corporate legal existence, because the court can not judicially know the legal being of
·uch a corporation. The court can not take notice , ex officio, of the
foreign law, by which it is created a body corporate. The same reason applies to a d o m estic corporation, created by a private act. The
court can not judicially take notice of a private statute, and there
would seem to be the same reason for requiring the proof to be made
in the one case as in the other.
The English rule seems m ost in consonance with principle. The
m erely n :i ming themselvc:-s a company shows the foct of an association act ing under a particular name, but not that they have the lega l
capacity to act, and prosecute suits by that name ; nor can the court
kn ow that they h ave such capacity, unless they are constituted a body
corporate by public law, or are recognized as uch by a law, of which
the cou1t can judicially take notice . It would seem, therefore, on

prove the fact of incorporation. (Angell & Ames on Corp., § 632,

4th edit., and cases cited.) In the case of The Bank v. Simonton,

2 Texas Rep. 531, this court held that the plaintiffs must aver and

prove that they were a body corporate, duly constituted by competent

authority, to enable them to maintain this action. That was the case

of a foreign corporation. But the principle of the decision applies

equally to a domestic corporation, created by private act, of which the
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court can not judicially take notice.

In some of the states a different ruie obtains, and it is held that, if

in a suit by a corporation the defendant plead the general issue, it is

an admission of the corporate existence of the plaintiffs, on the prin-

ciple, it seems, that by pleading to the merits, the defendant admits

the capacity of the plaintiffs to sue. (Angell & Ames on Corp.,

§ 633.) Those courts, however, make an exception in the case of

foreign corporations. (Angell & Ames on Corp., § 633.) But the

reason for a distinction in this respect is not very clearly discoverable.

A foreign corporation is required to prove its corporate legal exist-

ence, because the court can not judicially know the legal being of

such a corporation. The court can not take notice, ex officio, of the

foreign law, by which it is created a body corporate. The same rea-

son applies to a domestic corporation, created by a private act. The

court can not judicially take notice of a private statute, and there

would seem to be the same reason for requiring the proof to be made

in the one case as in the other.

The English rule seems most in consonance with principle. The

merely naming themselves a company shows the fact of an associa-

tion acting under a particular name, but not that they have the legal

capacity to act, and prosecute suits by that name; nor can the court

know that they have such capacity, unless they are constituted a body

corporate by public law, or are recognized as such by a law. of which

the court can judicially take notice. It would seem, therefore, on

1 Statement abridged; arguments omitted.

1
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principle, that a private domestic corporation, equally with a foreign

§ 329

POWER TO SUE AND BE SUED.

II25

corporation, must aver and prove the fact of incorporation.

The question raised by the demurrer is, whether it was necessary

for the plaintiffs to aver that they are a corporation. In The Bank v.

Simonton, it was held to be a necessary averment to enable the plaintiffs

to maintain the action. We are of opinion that the present is not dis-

tinguishable from that case in principle, and that the petition want-

ing the averment is insufficient.

It is insisted that the defendant, by contracting with the plaintiffs

in their corporate name, has admitted that they are duly constituted

a body corporate under that name. This question was also consid-

ered in the case of The Bank v. Simonton, in reference to the authori-

ties now cited by the plaintiffs' counsel, and the contrary was decided.

The mere fact that in a contract with the company the defendant has

designated it by a name which is appropriate to a corporate body,

does not admit its corporate legal existence, unless it be distinctly

stated in the contract that the company is an incorporated company.

(7 Wend. 540; 8 Wend. 480; 15 Wend. 316.) It admits only the

existence of an association acting under that name.
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If it be an inconvenience and hardship to require a private corpora-

tion to prove its corporate existence in actions brought by it, it can

easily be obviated by an act of the legislature declaring the act of

incorporation a public law, or dispensing with the necessity of plead-

ing the act in suits by the corporation.

We are of opinion that the court erred in overruling the exceptions

to the petition, and that the judgment be reversed and the cause re-

manded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

Note. See, 1897, Citizens' Bank v. Corkings, 9 S. D. 614, 62 Am. St. Rep.

891; 1899, Pryse v. Three Forks, etc., Bank, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1057, 48 S. W.

Rep. 415.

See preceding case, contra.

Sec. '329. Pleading,—plaintiff need not allege that defendant is a

corporation, if name implies it is not a natural person.

WOOLF v. THE CITY STEAMBOAT COMPANY.

1849. In the English Court of Common Pleas. 7 Man., Gr.

& S. (62 Eng. C. L.) »io3, *io4.

principle, that a private domestic corporation, equally with a foreign
.corporation, must aver and prove the fact of incorporation.
The question raised by the demurrer is, whether it was necessary
for the plaintiffs to aver that they are a- corpora6on. In The Bank v.
Simonton, it was held to be a necessary averment to enable the plaintiffs
to maintain the action. We are of opinion that the present is not distinguishable from that case in principle, and that the petition ·wanting the averment .is insufficient.
It is insisted that the defendant, by contracting with the plaintiffs
in their corporate name, has admitted that they are duly constituted
a body corporate under that name. This question \.vas also considered in the case of The Bank v. Simonton, in reference to the authorities now cited by the plaintiffs' counsel, and the contrary was decided.
The mere fact that in a contract with the company the defendant has
designated it by a name which is appropriate to a corporate body,
does not admit its corporate legal existence, unless it be distinctly
stated in the contract that the company is an incorporated company.
(7 Wend. 540; 8 ·wend. 48o; 15 Wend. 316.) It admits only the
existence of an association acting under that name.
If it be an inconvenience and hardship to require a private corporation to prove its corporate existence in actions brought by it, it can
easily be obviated by an act of the legislature declaring the act of
incorporation a public law, or dispensing with the necessity of pleading the act in suits by the corporation.
\Ve are of opinion that the cou1t erred in ovemiling the exceptiov..s
to the petition, and that the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. ·
Reversed and remanded.
Note. See, 1897, Citizens' Bank v. Corkings, 9 S. D. 614, 62 Am. St. Rep.
891; 1899, Pryse v. Three Forks, etc., Bank, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1057, 48 S. W.
Rep. 415.
See preceding case, contra.

Assumpsit. The declaration commenced thus: "The plaintiff

complains of The City Steamboat Company, who have been sum-

moned to answer the plaintiff," etc.

Special demurrer—assigning for causes, that the names of the de-

Sec. ' 329.

Pleading ,-plaintiff need not allege that defendant is a
corporation, if name implies it is not a natural person.

fendants were not stated, that it did not appear whether they were

sued as a corporation or a company completely registered, or by virtue

of what act of Parliament they were entitled to be sued by the name

WOOLF v. THE CITY STEAMBOAT COMPANY.

of a company.

1849.

IN THE ENGLISH CouRT OF CoMJ\fON PLEAS.

7 Man., Gr.

& S. (62 Eng. C. L.) •103, •104.

Assumpsz't. The declaration commenced thus: "The plaintiff
complains of The City Steamboat Company, who have been summoned to answer the plaintiff," etc.
Special demurrer-assigning for causes, that the names of the defendants were not stated, that it did not appear whether they were
sued as a corporation or a company completely registered, or by virtue
of what act of Parliament they were entitled to be sued by the name
of a company.
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Hugh Hill, in support of the demurrer. The question in this case

1126

is, whether the plaintiff may, in his declaration, describe the defend-

STATE V. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL R. CO.

§ 330

ants as a company, without showing whether or not they are a corpo-

ration or a registered company. In the doubtful state of the allegation

1-fuglz Hill, in support of the demurrer. The question in this case
is, whether the plaintiff may, in his declaration, describe the defendants as a company, without showing whether or not they are a corporation or a registered company. In the doubtful l'tate of the allegation
the defendants could not safely plead nu/ t£el corporation. (Cresswell, ]. Is not this the u sual form of declaring against a corporation? It may be that the defendants are a chartered compnnJ ; how
does it appear that they are not?) In Thompson v. The Universal
Salvage Company, 1 Exch. 694-which was an action again ta registered company upon a promissory note-the declaration stated that
the company had been duly registered under the s~atute 7 & 8 Viet.,
c. 110. (Maule, ]. If the defendants in fact are a corporation, the
declaration is correct; if they are not, they may traverse it.) In The
Quee n v. \Vest, I Q. B. 826, a coroner's inquisition stating that certain goods and chattels were the goods and chattels of the proprietors
of the Hull and Selby Railway, was held bad, because it did not show
that there was any corporation so intituled. (Cresswell , J. Th at
case would have been more to the purpose if the defendants here.had
been described as "the proprietors of the City Steam boats.") Since
the statutes creating these registered corporations, it is essential th at
they should in all proceedings be described according to the truth.
(Cresswell, J. How can the mode of describing them in pleading
be affected by the statutes?) It is important that the true character
in which a party sues or is sued should appear upon the record.
Hawkins, contra, was not called upon.
MAULE, J.
The mode of pleading is governed either by positi,·e
mies or by a known course of precedents. There is no positive rule
that I am aware of which requires such a mode of description as the
defendant's counsel insists upon in this case, nor is the description
which is given nt all out of the usual form ; it impliedly amounts to
an allegation that the defendants are a corporate body. I think the
plaintiff is entitled to judgment.
The rest of the court concurring. Judgment for the plaintiff.
Note. See to same effect, notes 29 Am. Dec. 375; 76 Arn. Dec. 68; 35 Am.
St. Hep. 291; 1893, Lake Erie & W.R. Co. v. Griffin, 8 lnd. App. 47, 52 Am.
Rt. Rep. 463; 1897, Holden v. Gre11t W. El. Co., 61) Minn. 527, 65 Am. St. Rep.
585; 1899, Moynihan v. Drobaz, 124 Cal. 212, 71 Am. St. Rep. 46.
See following case, contt·a.

the defendants could not safely plead nul tiel corporation. (Cress-

well, J. Is not this the usual form of declaring against a corpora-

tion? It may be that the defendants are a chartered companj; how

does it appear that they are not?) In Thompson v. The Universal

Salvage Company, 1 Exch. 694—which was an action against a regis-

tered company upon a promissory note—the declaration stated that

the company had been duly registered under the statute 7 & 8 Vict.,

c. 110. (Maule, J. If the defendants in fact are a corporation, the

declaration is correct; if they are not, they may traverse it.) In The

Queen v. West, 1 Q. B. 826, a coroner's inquisition stating that cer-

tain goods and chattels were the goods and chattels of the proprietors

of the Hull and Selbv Railway, was held bad, because it did not show

that there was any corporation so intituled. (Cresswell, J. That

case would have been more to the purpose if the defendants here.had

been described as "the proprietors of the City Steamboats.") Since

the statutes creating these registered corporations, it is essential that
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they should in all proceedings be described according to the truth.

(Cresswell, J. How can the mode of describing them in pleading

be affected by the statutes?) It is important that the true character

in which a party sues or is sued should appear upon the record.

Haivkins, contra, was not called upon.

Maule, J. The mode of pleading is governed either by positive

rules or by a known course of precedents. There is no positive rule

that I am aware of which requires such a mode of description as the

defendant's counsel insists upon in this case, nor is the description

which is given at all out of the usual form; it impliedly amounts to

an allegation that the defendants are a corporate body. I think the

plaintiff is entitled to judgment.

The rest of the court concurring. Judgment for the plaintiff.

Note.. See to same effect, notes 29 Am. Dec. 375; 76 Am. Pec. 68; 35 Am.

St. Rep. 291; 1893, Lake Erie & AV. R. Co. v. Griffin, 8 Ind. App. 47, 52 Am.

St. Rep. 463; 1897, Holden v. Great W. El. Co., 69 Minn. 527, 66 Am. St. Rep.

585; 1899, Moynihan v. Drobaz, 124 Cal. 212, 71 Am. St. Rep. 46.

See following case, contra.

Sec. 330. Same. Plaintiff suing a corporation should allege it is

such.

STATE v. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY CO.1

1893. In the Supreme Court of South Dakota. 4 S. D.

Rep. 261-264, 46 Am. St. Rep. 783.

Corson, J. This was an action by the state to enjoin the defend-

ant from continuing an alleged nuisance. The defendant demurred

1 Statement, except as in the opinion of the court, and part of the opinion

omitted.

Sec. 330. Same.

Plaintiff suing a corporation should allege it is

such.
STATE v. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY 00.1
1893.

IN

THE

SUPREME CounT OF

SouTH

DAKOTA.

4 S.

D.

R ep. 261-264, 46 Am. St. Rep. 783.
ConsoN, J. This was an action by the state to enjoin the defendant from continuing an alleged nuisance. The defendant demurred
1 Statement, except as in the opinion of the court, and part of the opinion
omitted.
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to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to

§ 330

POWER TO SUE AND

BE

SUED.

1127

constitute a cause of action, and the same was sustained by the court.

From the order sustaining • ttie demurrer the plaintiff appeals. The

defendant specifies as the particular ground of objection, in the brief

filed in this court, that there is no allegation in the complaint that the

defendant is a corporation. The only indication of the character in

which the defendant is sued is in the title. The learned counsel for

the respondent contend that the defendant is sued by a name indicat-

ing that it is not a natural person, but a company of some kind, and

that no facts are stated to show that it is an artificial being, capable

of being sued.

It is true that by section 390s, Comp. Laws, it is provided that "in

all civil actions brought by or against a corporation it shall not be

necessary to prove on the trial of the cause the existence of such cor-

poration, unless the defendant shall, in the answer, expressly aver that

the plaintiff or defendant is not a corporation." But an allegation

that the defendant is a corporation is, we think, still necessary, and

the language of the section presupposes that the defendant is sued as
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a corporation. In what manner can a court be advised that the de-

fendant is sued as a corporation, unless it is so alleged in the com-

plaint? In the recent case of People v. Cent. Pac. R. Co., 83 Cal.

393, 23 Pac. Rep. 303 (decided in 1890), the supreme court of that

state, in passing upon this question, says: "The defendant is sued by

a name indicating that it is not a natural person, but a company of

some kind; but there is no averment of the fact of incorporation, or

of any fact to show that it is an artificial being, capable of being sued.

Nor, if incorporated, is there any averment to show where, or under

what law, so that the court may determine where the jurisdiction of

its person lies. An averment of defendant's corporate existence is

necessary in every count of a complaint against a corporation. Loup

v. Railroad Co., 63 Cal. 97." Mechanics' Banking Association v.

Spring Valley Shot and Lead Co., 13 How. Pr. 227. Judge Bliss,

in his work on Code Pleading (section 258), savs: "But a corporation

is an artificial personalitv, not presumed to exist even, and the phrase

may stand for such personality, or for a joint stock company, or for a

partnership, or for a private person, or for nothing at all. The allega-

tion, then, that the plaintiff is a corporation, even if permitted to be

made in general terms, would seem to be essential to show its right to

bring the suit." And in section 260 he says: "In regard to actions

against corporations, the same general rule should prevail." We are

of the opinion that the rule laid down by Judge Bliss and the supreme

court of California is the safer and better rule, though there are courts

holding a contrary rule. In the case of Express Co. v. Harris, 120

Ind. 73, 16 Am St. Rep. 315, 21 N. E. Rep. 340, decided by the su-

preme court of Indiana in 1889, that court says: 'The name of the

defendant (Adams Express Company) imports that it is a corporation,

and it was. therefore, not necessary to specifically aver that it was a

corporation." But, with great respect for that court, we can not

agree with its conclusions. As was said in the California case, the

to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of f\Ction, and the same was sustained hy the court.
From the order sustaining· the demurrer the pl aintiff appeals. The
defendant specifies as the particular ground of objection, in the brief
filed in this court, that there is no allegation in the complaint that the
defendant is a corporation. The only. indication of the character in
which the defendant is suc<l is in the title. The learned counsel for
the respondent contend that the defendant is sued by a name indicating that it is not a natural person, but a company of some kind, and
that no facts are stated to show that it is an artificial being, capable
of being sued.
It is true that by section 2908, Comp. Laws, it is provided that "in
all ciYil actions brought by or against a corporation it shall not be
necessary to prove on the trial of the cause the existence of such corporation, unless the defendant shall, in the answer, expressly aver that
the plaintiff or defendant is not a corporation." But an allegation
that the defendant is a corporation is, we think, still necessary, and
the language of the section presupposes that the defendant is sued as
a corporation. In what manner can a court be advised that the defendant is sued as a corporation, unle s it is so alleged in the complaint? In the recent case of P eople v. Cent. Pac. R. Co., 83 Cal.
393, 23 Pac. R ep. 303 (decided in r890), the supre me court of that
state, in passing upon this questio n, says: "The defendant is sued by
a name ind icating that it is not a natural p erson, but a company of
some kind; but there is no avcrment of the fact of incorpo i·ation, or
of any fact to show that it is an artificial being, capahle of being sued .
Nor, if incorporated, is there any averment to show where, or under
what law, so that the court may determine where the jurisdiction of
its p erson lies. An averment of defendant's corporate existe nce is
necessary in every count of a complaint against a corporation. Loup
v. Railroad Co., 63 Cal. 97." Mechanics' Banking Association v.
Spring V a lley Shot and L ead Co., 13 How. Pr. 227. Jud ge Bli~ s ,
in his work on Code Pleading ( section 258), says : "But a corporation
is an artificial personality, not presumed to exist even , and the phrase
may stand for such personality, or for a joint stock company, or for a
p artnership, or for a private p erson, or for nothing at all. The allegation. then, that the plaintiff is a corporation, even if permitted to be
made in general terms, would seem to be essential to show its right to
bring the suit." And in section 260 he says : "fn regard to actions
against corporations. the same general rule should prevail." \Ve are
of the opinion that the rule lai d down by Judge Bliss and the supreme
court of California is the safer and better rule, though there are courts
holding a contrary rule. In the case of Express Co. v. Harris, 120
Ind. 73, 16 Am St. R ep. 315, 21 N. E. R ep. 340. d ecided by the supreme court of Jndian a in 1889 1 that court says : 'The name of the
defendant (Adams Express Company) imports that it is a corporation,
and it was, the refore, not necessary to specifica lly aver that it wa s a
corporation. '' But, with f:,>Tea t respect for that court , we can not
agree with its conclusions. As was said in the California case, the
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name indicates "that it is not a natural person, but a company of

II28

some kind," but whether a corporation or an unincorporated associ-

BA:'.'l'K OF

JA~AICA

§ 33 I

V. JEFFERSON.

ation does not appear. We are not aware of any principle of law

that will authorize a court to presume that it is a corporation any more

name indicates "that it is not a natiiral person, but a company of
some kind," but whether a corporation or an tuiincorporated association does not appear. We are not aw~re of any principle of law
that will authorize a court to presume that it is a corporation any more
than it would presume that it was an unincorporated association. A
similar view as to the necessity of alleging in the complaint that the
defen?ant is a corporation was taken by the supreme court of North
Carolrna in Stanley v. Railroad Co., 89 N. C. 33r. • • •
Affirmed.

than it would presume that it was an unincorporated association. A

similar view as to the necessity of alleging in the complaint that the

defendant is a corporation was taken by the supreme court of North

Carolina in Stanley v. Railroad Co., 89 N. C. 331. * * *

Affirmed.

Note. See, 1892, Miller v. Pine M. Co., 2 Idaho 1206, 35 Am. St. Rep. 289 n.

291, 41 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., p. 1, and note p. 3.

See preceding case, contra.

Sec. 331. Pleading—general issue at law does not raise question

of corporate existence; the rule is otherwise in equity.

Note. See, 1892, Miller v. Pine M. Co., 2 Idaho 1206, 35 Am. St. Rep. 289 n.
291, 41 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., p. 1, and note p. 3.
See preceding case, cont1·a.

BANK OF JAMAICA v. JEFFERSON.1

1893. In the Supreme Court of Tennessee. 92 Tenn. Rep.

537-542, 36 Am. St. Rep. 100.

[Suit in equity by the bank, alleging itself to be a corporation un-

der the laws of New York, to recover upon a note.]

Sec. 331.

Pleading-general issue at law does not raise question
of corporate existence; the rule is otherwise in equity.

Wilkes, J. * * * Again it is assigned as error that complain-
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ant sues as a foreign corporation, and it is insisted that no recovery

can be had unless that allegation is sustained by proof, and that no

proof was offered on this point in the court below.

BANK OF JAMAICA v. JEFFERSON.1

On the other band, it is insisted that this allegation of the bill is not

denied in the answer, that the character in which plaintiff sues is not

1893.

put in issue by the answer, and that, under a general denial, or the

general issue, proof of the character in which the suit is brought is

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF TENNESSEE.
537-542, 36 Am. St. Rep. 100.

92 Tenn. Rep.

not necessary to be made.

[Suit in equity by the bank, alleging itself to be a corporation under the laws of New York, to recover upon a note.]
WILKES, J. • • • Again it is assigned as error that complainant sues as a foreign corporation, and it is insisted that no recovery
can be had unless that allegation is sustained by proof, and that no
proof was offered on this point in the court below.
On the other hand, it is insisted that this allegation of the bill is not
denied in the answer, that the character in which plaintiff sues is not
put in issue by the answer, and that, under a general denial, or the
general issue, proof of the character in which the snit is brought is
not necessary to be made.
This latter contention is unquestionably CotTect in actions at law. in
which actions, if the plaintiff alleges that it is a corporation, even
though it be a foreign corporation, that fact need not be proven unless
it is put in issue by a specific denial, and the general issue would not
be sufficient, and pleading to the merits would be an admission of the
character in which the plaintiff sues. z Beach on Private Corporations, 867-869; 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 285-6, and notes;
• Union Cement Co. v. Noble, 15 Fed. Rep. 502: Harrison , .. Martinsville Railroad Co., 16 Ind. 505 , 79 Am. Dec. 447; Orono v.
Wedgewood, 44 Me. 49, 69 Am. Dec. 81; \Vest Winstead Asso. v.
Fonl, 27 Conn. 282, 71 Am. Dec. 66; Marble Co. v. Black. 89

This latter contention is unquestionably correct in actions at law. in

which actions, if the plaintiff alleges that it is a corporation, even

though it be a foreign corporation, that fact need not be proven unless

it is put in issue by a specific denial, and the general issue would not

be sufficient, and pleading to the merits would be an admission of the

character in which the plaintiff sues. 2 Beach on Private Corpora-

tions, 867-869; 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 285-6, and notes;

» Union Cement Co. v. Noble, 15 Fed. Rep. 502; Harrison v. Mar-

tinsville Railroad Co., 16 Ind. 505, 79 Am. Dec. 447: Orono v.

Wedgewood, 44 Me. 49, 69 Am. Dec. 81; West Winstead Asso. v.

Ford, 27 Conn. 282, 71 Am. Dec. 66; Marble Co. v. Black. 89

Tenn. 118, 120. 121.

We do not think the cases of Jones v. State, 5 Sneed 346. 348;

Owen v. State, 5 Sneed 493, 495, and Augusta Mfg. Co. v. Vertrees.

4 Lea 75, 78, are in conflict with this ruling. The cases of Jones v.

1 Statement abridged, and part of opinion and other points omitted.

Tenn. n8, 120.

12r.

We do not think the cases of Jones v. State, 5 Sneed 346. 348 :
Owen v. State, 5 Sneed 493, 495, and Augusta Mfg. Co. v. Vertrees.
4 Lea 75, 78, are in conflict with this ruling. The cases of Jones v.
1 Statement

Digitized by

Go gl

abridged, and part of opinion and other points omitted.

Original from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 332

1129

POWER TO SUE AND BE SUED.

The State and Owen v. The State are criminal prosecutions, in which

§ 332

POWER TO SUE AND BE SUED.

1129

greater strictness of proof is required, and the case of Augusta Mfg.

Co. v. Vertrees, was an action of ejectment, in which by statute (M.

& V. Comp., 3963) it is provided that under the general plea of not

guilty the defendant may avail himself of all legal defenses.

The rule is different in chancery cases. At law every fact alleged

in the declaration, and not denied in the plea, is taken as true. Code,

§ 2910; M. & V., § 3620. But in chancery every allegation of fact

not admitted, whether denied or not, must be proved, the failure to ,

admit or deny being equivalent to a denial. Hill v. Walker, 6 Cold.

429, 98 Am. Dec. 465; Hardeman v. Burge, 10 Yer. 202; Smith v.

St. Louis Ins. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch. 602; Gibson's Suits in Chancery,

section 457.

The fact that complainant is a foreign corporation is alleged in the

bill, and it is a fact material to the right to recover. It is not ad-

mitted in the answer, and there is a general denial of all matters not

admitted. It should, therefore, have been proven, and, for the fail-

ure to prove this, we are constrained to reverse the decree of the court
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below, and remand the cause for proof of the corporation and for

further proceedings under the statute. Code, § 3170.

Note. See note, 41 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas., p. 3; 1861, Harrison v. Rail-

road Co., 16 Ind. 505, 79 Am. Dec. 447, note 449; 1899, Wood v. Friendship

Lodge, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 2002, 50 S. W. Rep. 836; 1899, Ludington v. Luding-

ton, 119 Mich. 480, 78 N. W. Rep. 558; 1899, Moynihan v. Drobaz, 124 Cal.

212, 71 Am. St. Rep. 46.

Sec. 332. Same. Contra,—under general issue corporate exist-

ence must be proved.

SUTHERLAND, J., in BANK OF UTICA v. SMALLEY.

1824. In the Supreme Court of New York. 2 Cowen (N.

The State and Owen v. The State are criminal prosecutions, in which
greater strictness of proof is required, and the case of Augusta Mfg.
Co. v. Vertrees, was an action of ej ectment, in which by statute ·(M .
& V. Comp. , 3963) it is provided tha t under the general plea of not
guilty the defendant may avail himself of all legal defenses.
The rule is different in chancery cases. At law every fact alleged
in the declaration, and not denied in the plea, is ta ken as true. Code,
§ 2910; M. & V. , § 3620. But in chancery every allegation of fact
not admitted, -:vlleth er denied or not, must be proved, the failure to
admit or deny being equivalent to a d e nial. Hill v . Walker, 6 Cold .
.p9, 98 Am. Dec. 465; Hardeman v. Burge, IO Yer. 202; Smith v.
St. Louis Ins . .Co., 2 Tenn. Ch. 602; Gibson's Suits in Chancery,
section 45 7.
The fact that complainant is a foreign corporation is alleged in the
bill, and it is a fact material to the right to recover. It is not admitted in the answer, and there is a general denia l of all matters not
admitted. It should, therefore, have been proven, and, for the failure to prove this, we are constrained to reverse the decree of the court
below, and remand the cause for proof of the corporation and for
further proceedings under the statute. Code, § 3170.
Note. See note, 41 Am. & Eng. Corp. Ca1;1., p. 3; 1861, Harrison v. Railr oad Co .. 16 Ind. 505, 79 An1. Dec. 447, note 449; l8U9, Wood v. Friendship
Lodge, 20 Ky. L . Rep. 2002, 50 S. W. Rep. 836; 1899, Ludington v. Ludington, 119 Mich. 48.0, 78 N. W . Rep. 558; 1899, Moynihan y. Drobaz, 124 Cal.
212, 71 Am. St. Rep. 46.

1

Y.) Rep. 770, on 778, 14 Am. Dec. 526.

[Suit by the bank in its corporate name to recover of defendants as

Sec. 332. Same.

Contra,-under general issue corporate existence must be proved.

indorsers upon a note payable at the bank.]

It is contended that the judge erred in deciding that the plaintiffs

were not bound to prove themselves a corporation upon the general

SUTHERLAND, J .,

IN

BANK OF UTICA v. SMALLEY.

issue pleaded.

This objection is well taken. When a corporation sues they need

not set forth, by averment, in the declaration, how they were incor-

1824.

porated, but upon the general issue pleaded they must prove that they *

are a corporation. (Kyd on Corp., 292; Norris v. Staps, Hob. 211,

Jackson, ex dem. Trustees of Union Academy, v. Plumbe, 8 Johns.

378; Dutchess Cotton Manufacturing Company v. Davis, 14 Johns.

238 on 245, opinion of Thompson, Ch. J.; Bank of Auburn v. Weed,

19 Johns. 300.)

Note. 1832, Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480, 24 Am. Dec. 51,

note 58; 1836, Harris v. Muskingum Mfg. Co.", 4 Blackf. 267, 29 Am. Dec. 372

and note.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEw YORK. 2 Cowen (N.
Y.) Rep. 770, on 778, 14 Am. Dec. 526.

[Suit by the bank in its corporate name to recover of defendants as
indorsers upon a note payable at the bank. J
lt is contended that the judge erred in deciding that the plaintiffs
were not bound to prove themselves a corporation upon the general
issue pleaded.
This objection is well taken. vVhen a corporation sues they need
n ot se~ forth, by averment, in the declaration, h ow they were incorporated , but upon the general issue pleaded they must prove that they '
are a corporation. (Kyd on Corp., 292; Norris v. Stap s, H ob . 211,
Jackson, ex d cm. Tru stees of Union Academy, v. Plumbe, 8 Johns.
378; Dutchess Cotton Manufacturing Compa ny v. Davis, 14 J ohns.
238 on 245, opinion of Thompson , Ch. J.; B an k of Auburn v. \ i\Teed,
19 J o hns. 300. )
Note. 1832, Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480, 24 Am . Dec. 51,
note 58; 1836, Harrie v. Muskingum Mfg. Co.~ 4 Blackf. 267, 29 Am. Dec. 372
and note.
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$ 333

VA VIS V. NEBRASKA NAT' L BA~K.

DAVIS V. NEBRASKA NAT'L BANK.

1130
Sec. 833. Pleading—general denial under the code.

§ 333

8. K. DAVIS et al. v. NEBRASKA NATIONAL BANK OF OMAHA.

Sec. 333.

1897. In the Supreme Court of Nebraska. 51 N. E. Rep.

Pleading-general denial under the code.

401-402, 6 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. (N. S.) 593.

S. K. DAVIS

Irvine, C. The Nebraska National Bank of Omaha sued the

ET AL.

v. NEBRASKA NATIONAL BANK OF OMAHA.

plaintiffs in error on a promissory note alleged by the petition to have

1897.

been made by the defendants below to the order of the Nebraska Na-

tional Bank of Beatrice, and by the latter bank indorsed and trans-

IN° THE SUPREME CounT OF NEBRASKA. 51 N. E. R ep.
401:-402, 6 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. (N. S.) 593.

ferred to the plaintiff. The plaintiff recovered judgment for the

InvtNE, C. The Nebraska National Bank of Omaha sued the
plaintiffs in error on a promissory note alleged by the petition to have
been made by the defendants below to the order of the Nebraska National Bank of Beatrice, and bv the latter bank indorsed and transferred to the plaintiff. The plaintiff recovered judgment for the
amount of the note. The pc6tion alleged that the plaintiff was a
corporation organized under the laws of the United States. The
answer specifically denied plaintiff's corporate existence. No evidence ·was introduced on the subject. The instructions of the court
entirely ignored the issue, and the court refused a peremptory instruction to find for the defendants, as well as a special instruction . ubmitting to the jury for determination the corporate existence of the
plaintiff.
It will be observed that there existed no privity of contract beh.,,·een
the defendants and the plaintiff bank whereby the defendants were estopped to deny the corporate capacity of the plaintiff, nor are any other
grounds of estoppel pleaded. The defense interposed was, therefore,
a valid defense in this action. It has been several t;mes held that a
general denial does not present the issue, but that it must be raised by
a specific denial in the nature of a plea in abatement. Insurance Co.
v. Robinson, 8 Neb. 452; Dietrichs v. Railroad Co., 13 Neb. 43,, i3
N. W. Rep. 3; Herron v. Cole Bros., 25 Neb. 692, 41 N. W. Rep.
765; Swift & Co. v. Crawford, 34 Neb. 450, 51 N. W. Rep. 1034.
But a special denial of the character indicated is sufficient to present
the defense (Sunapee v. Eastman, 32 N. H. 470: Greenwood v. Railroad Co., IO Gray 375), and such a plea casts the burden of proof of
corporate existence upon the plaintiff ( see cases cited in 5 Enc. Pl. &
Prac. 82 ). At the common law there existed some controyersy as to
whether nu! tie! corporation ~hould be pleaded in abatement or
whether it might be pleaded in bar. The Nebraska cases cited intimate that this court has considered it to be in the nature of a plea in
abatement. But this is immaterial , because under our code defen es
of both characters may be presented in one answer. Hurlburt v.
Palmer, 39 Neb. 158, 57 N. W. Rep. 1019; Association v. Peterson, 41 Neb. 897, 60 N. W. Rep. 373; Herbert v. vVorten<lyke
(Neb.), 68 N. \V. Rep. 350. It is probable, as l'> uggested in the
hank's brief, that this and other defenses were purely technical and
devoid of merit. The plea was, however, one of which the defendants might legally avail themselves. The bank was notified by the
special plea that it would be called upon to establish its corporate existence. It entirdy failed to do so, and the judgment must for that
reason be reversed.
Reversed and remanded.

amount of the note. The petition alleged that the plaintiff was a

corporation organized under the laws of the United States. The

answer specifically denied plaintiff's corporate existence. No evi-

dence was introduced on the subject. The instructions of the court

entirely ignored the issue, and the court refused a peremptory instruc-

tion to find for the defendants, as well as a special instruction sub-

mitting to the jury for determination the corporate existence of the

plaintiff.

It will be observed that there existed no privity of contract between
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the defendants and the plaintiff bank whereby the defendants were es-

topped to deny the corporate capacity of the plaintiff, nor are any other

grounds of estoppel pleaded. The defense interposed was, therefore,

a valid defense in this action. It has been several times held that a

general denial does not present the issue, but that it must be raised by

a specific denial in the nature of a plea in abatement. Insurance Co.

v. Robinson, 8 Neb. 452; Dietrichs v. Railroad Co., 13 Neb. 43, 13

N. W. Rep. 3; Herron v. Cole Bros., 25 Neb. 692, 41 N. W. Rep.

765; Swift & Co. v. Crawford, 34 Neb. 450, 51 N. W. Rep. 1034.

But a special denial of the character indicated is sufficient to present

the defense (Sunapee v. Eastman, 32 N. H. 470: Greenwood v. Rail-

road Co., 10 Gray 375), and such a plea casts the burden of proof of

corporate existence upon the plaintiff (see cases cited in 5 Enc. PI. &

Prac. 82). At the common law there existed some controversy as to

whether nul tiel corporation should be pleaded in abatement or

whether it might be pleaded in bar. The Nebraska cases cited in-

timate that this court has considered it to be in the nature of a plea in

abatement. But this is immaterial, because under our code defenses

of both characters may be presented in one answer. Hurlburt v.

Palmer, 39 Neb. 158, 57 N. W. Rep. 1019: Association v. Peter-

son, 41 Neb. S97, 60 N. W. Rep. 373; Herbert v. Wortendyke

(Neb.), 68 N. W. Rep. 350. It is probable, as suggested in the

bank's brief, that this and other defenses were purely technical and

devoid of merit. The plea was, however, one of which the defend-

ants might legally avail themselves. The bank was notified by the

special plea that it would be called upon to establish its corporate ex-

istence. It entirely failed to do so, and the judgment must for that

reason be reversed.

Reversed and remanded.
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§ 334

113 I

POWER TO SUE AND BE SUED.

Sec. 334. Proof of corporate existence—special charter.

§ 334

POWER TO SUE AND BE SUED.

I I

3I

UNITED STATES BANK v. STEARNS.1

1836. In the Supreme Court ok New York. 15 Wend. (N.

Sec. 334.

Proof of corporate existence-special charter.

Y.) ZH-W-

[Assumpsit by the bank to recover overpaid money.]

UNITED STATES BANK v. STEARNS.1

The cashier of the Buffalo Branch Bank testified that the plaintiffs

had a banking house in Philadelphia, where they had carried on bank-

ing business for many years, under their charter. The defendant in-

1836.

sisted that the plaintiffs were bound to prove themselves a corporation

IN THE SuPREJ\fE COURT OF NEW YORK.
y •) 3 I 4-3 I 7•

is

vVend. (N.

by the production of their charter. The judge decided that the char-

ter need not be produced, because the act of incorporation of the

Bank of the United States was a public act, which, for certain pur-

poses, constituted the bank the financial agent of the general govern-

ment, and gave the United States an interest in the stock, and because

the presentation of the checks and the receipt of the money was an

implied admission of the existence of the corporation. The jury

found for the plaintiffs. The defendant asks for a new trial.

Savage, C. J. * * * The least proof which has been held
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sufficient is the production of an exemplification of the act incorpo-

rating the plaintiffs, and evidence of user, under their charter. 1

Wendell 555. In one case it was held that the act of incorporation

might be read from the statute book, printed by the printer to the

state. 9 Cowen 205-6. The evidence of user in this case was

enough, but there was no evidence at all of the act of incorporation.

No exemplification was produced, nor even the act read or produced

in the statute book. One or the other is indispensable when the suit

is brought by corporations created by our own statutes But when a

suit is brought by a foreign corporation, as the plaintiffs must be con-

sidered in this court, I apprehend an exemplification should be pro-

duced, if required. The courts of the state of New York have no

judicial knowledge of acts of congress creating corporations. When

they are necessary, as evidence, they must be proved as the acts of

our sister states must be proved. In my opinion the proof of the ex-

istence of the corporation was insufficient. The transaction of busi-

ness by the defendant with the plaintiffs was probably an admission

that they had capacity to transact business as a company, but not that

they were an incorporated company. Many commercial companies

not incorporated do business by officers and agents, and are capable

of suing, but not otherwise than in their individual capacities. * * •

New trial granted.

N~te. See next case, and Packard v. Old Colony R. Co., 168 Mass. 92;

supra, § 142; also, President, Directors, etc., of Bank of U. S. v. Dandridge,

12 Wheat (U. S.), 64; supra, § 237.

1 Statement abridged; only part of opinion given.

[Assumpsit by the bank to recover overpaid money.]
The cashier of the Buffalo Branch Bank testified that the plaintiffs
had a banking house in Philadelphia, where they had carried on banking business for many years, under their charter. The defendant insisted that the plaintiffs were bound to prove themselves a corporation
by the production of their charter. The judge decided that the charter need not be produced, because the act of incorporation of the
Bank of the United States was a public act, which, for certain purposes, constituted the bank the finnncial agent of the general government, and gave the United States an interest in the stock, and because
the presentation of the checks and the receipt of the money was an
implied admission of the existence of the corporation.
The jury
found for the plaintiffs. The defendant asks for a new trial.
SAVAGE, C. J.
• • • The least proof which has been held
sufficient is the production of an exemplification of the act incorporating the plaintiffs, and evidence of user, under their charter. I
Wendell SSS· In one case it wns held that the act of incorporation
might be read from the statute book, printed by the printer to the
state. 9 Cowen 2os-6. The ·evidence of user in this case was
enough, but there was no evidence at all of the act of incorporation.
No exemplification was produced, nor even the act read or produced
in the statute book. One or the other is indispensable when the suit
is brought by corporations created by our own statutes But when a
suit is brought by a foreign corporation, as the plaintiffs must be considered in this co111t, I apprehend an 'e xemplification should be produced, if required. The courts of the state of New York have no
judicial knowledge of acts of congress creating corporations. When
they are necessary, as evidence, they must be proved as the acts of
our sister states must be proved. In my opinion the proof of the existence of the corporation wa.s insufficient. The transaction of busine.;s by the defendant with the plaintiffs was probably an admission
that they had capacity to transact business as a company, but not that
they were an t"ncorporated companv. Man.v commercial companies
not incorporated <lo business by officers and agents. and arc capable
of suing, but not otherwise than in their individual capacities. • • •
New tr£a/ granted.
N ·te. See next rnse, nnd Pnckard v. Old Colony R . Co., 168 l\fass. 92;
supra, § 142; also, President, Directors, etc., of Hank of U.S. v. Dandridge,
12 Wheat (U. 8.), 64; 1111pra, § 237 .
1 Statement abridged; only part of opinion given.
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I 132 BALTIMORE, ETC., R. R. CO. V. BAPTIST CHURCH. § 335

Sec. 335. Proof of corporate existence under general incorporation

I 132

laws.

BALTI:\IORE, ETC., R . R . CO. V. BAPTIST CHURCH.

§ 335

BALTIMORE AND POTOMAC R. R. CO. v. FIFTH BAPTIST CHURCH.'

1891. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 137 U.

Sec. 335. Proof of corporate existence under general incorporation

S. Rep. 568-576.

laws.

[Action on the case by the church against the railroad company for

damages for maintaining a continuous nuisance by noise and smoke to

BALTIMORE AND POTOMAC R.R. CO. v . FIFTH BAPTIST CHURCH. 1

plaintiff's enjoyment of its property. Judgment below for the church. ]

Mr. Justice Gray. * * * The declaration was headed "The

i89r.

Fifth Baptist Church of Washington, D. C, by its Trustees, v, The

I)i'

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

137

u.

S. Rep. 568-576.

Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Company," and alleged that the

plaintiff was a body corporate in the District of Columbia, under

[Action on the ca e by the church against the railroad company for
damages for m:tintaining a continuous nuisance by noise and smoke to
plaintiff's enjoyment of its property. Judgment below for the church. J
MR. JusTICE GnAv. • • • The declaration was headed "The
Fifth Baptist Church of Washington, D. C., by its Trustees, , ... The
Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Company, " and all eged that the
plaintiff was a body corporate in the District of Columbia, under
and by virtue of the general corporation act of May 5, 18701 ch. 80,
§ 2; 16 Stat. 99, lOO; Rev. Stat. D. C., §§ 533-M4·
The defendant pleaded in bar: I. "That the said plaintiff was not
at the time of commencement of this suit, and n ever was, a body corporate or politic, as set forth and alleged in and by said declaration."
2. Not guilty.
The plaintiff joined issue on these pleas.
The plaintiff, upon the issue presented by the first plea, and to
prove its user of corporate rights, offered the following evidence,
which was admitted against the defendant's objection and exception:
1. The original of the following ce1tificate of incorporation, signed
and sealed by the six persons named therein:
"We, C. C. Meador, George M. Kendall, John N. Henderson,
Samuel M. Yeatman, James C. Deatley and Samuel S. Taylor, of
Washington City, in the District of Columbia, do hereby certify
that we have been duly elected 'Trustees of the Fifth Baptist Church
of \Vashington City, D. C.' (commonly called 'the Island Baptist
Church'), and that this certificate is made, signed and sealed for the
purpose of obtaining corporate rights and privileges for the said 'Fifth
Baptist Church,' a religious society worshipping at present in their
church edifice on D street, south , between Four-and-a-half and Sixth
streets, in said City of Washington, under the provisions of an act of
congress approved May 5, 1870, entitled •An act to proYide fo r the
creation of corporations in the District of Columbia hy general law.'
" ln testimony whereof, we hereunto set our hands and affix our seals
this twenty-fourth day of Augu st , in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-one."
Annexed to this paper were a notary public's certificate of its
acknowledgment on the same day by these six persons, an affidavit of
one of them, dated May T, 1885, that the statements in the certificate
of incorporation were true , a memorandum of the recorder that the
paper was recorded Scptemher 5, 1871, and another memorandum
that it was recorded M ay 1, 1885.
1 tatement abridge11.
Only the part of the opinion relating to proof of cor-

and by virtue of the general corporation act of May 5, 1870, ch. 80,

§ 2; 16 Stat. 99, 100; Rev. Stat. D. C, §§ 533-544-

The defendant pleaded in bar: 1. "That the said plaintiff was not

at the time of commencement of this suit, and never was, a body cor-

porate or politic, as set forth and alleged in and by said declaration."

2. Not guilty. The plaintiff joined issue on these pleas.

The plaintiff, upon the issue presented by the first plea, and to

prove its user of corporate rights, offered the following evidence,
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which was admitted against the defendant's objection and exception:

1. The original of the following certificate of incorporation, signed

and sealed by the six persons named therein:

"We, C. C. Meador, George M. Kendall, John N. Henderson,

Samuel M. Yeatman, James C. Deatley and Samuel S. Taylor, of

Washington City, in the District of Columbia, do hereby certify

that we have been duly elected 'Trustees of the Fifth Baptist Church

of Washington City, D. C.' (commonly called 'the Island Baptist

Church'), and that this certificate is made, signed and sealed for the

purpose of obtaining corporate rights and privileges for the said 'Fifth

Baptist Church,' a religious society worshipping at present in their

church edifice on D street, south, between Four-and-a-half and Sixth

streets, in said City of Washington, under the provisions of an act of

congress approved May 5, 1870, entitled 'An act to provide for the

creation of corporations in the District of Columbia by general law.'

"In testimony whereof, we hereunto set our hands and affix our seals

this twenty-fourth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thou-

sand eight hundred and seventy-one."

Annexed to this paper were a notary public's certificate of its

acknowledgment on the same day by these six persons, an affidavit of

one of them, dated May 1, 1S85, that the statements in the certificate

of incorporation were true, a memorandum of the recorder that the

paper was recorded September 5, 1871, and another memorandum

that it was recorded May 1, 1885.

1 Statement abridged. Only the part of the opinion relating to proof of cor-

porate existence is given.

porate existence is given.
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2. A recorder's copy of the certificate of incorporation, acknowl-

edgment and affidavit, as recorded May I, 1SS5.
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3. That in the year 1871 it became necessary for the plaintiff, in

order to complete its church edifice, to borrow money upon a mort-

gage of its land, and that to promote this object, and upon the recom-

mendation of its finance committee, a special meeting was called, and

was held on July 2, 1871, at which the church (which had been known

as the Island Baptist Church) resolved to become incorporated under

the name stated in the above certificate of incorporation, and elected

as its trustees the six persons named therein, and fixed their term of

office at three years, and thereupon that certificate was prepared and

signed by the trustees and recorded.

4. Three deeds, respectively dated September 26, 1871, Septem-

ber 18, 1872, and November 10, 1S74, from the six persons named

in the above certificate of incorporation, describing themselves as

"trustees of the Fifth Baptist Church of Washington City, D. C,"

reciting its incorporation under the general corporation act, and its

resolution authorizing them to execute the deeds, and conveying the

church building and land, in trust and by way of mortgage, to secure
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the payment of various sums of money.

5. Two deeds of release of the same building and land, dated No-

vember 9, 1874, from the grantees to the grantors in the first two of

the trust deeds aforesaid.

6. The record of the judgment in the former action between these

parties.

The plaintiff also introduced, without objection, evidence tending

to show "that its present church edifice was begun about the year

1866, and was completed at a cost of about $22,000, exclusive of the

ground; that the property is worth about $30,000, and has been occu-

pied and used by the plaintiff's society or congregation since the year

1867 as its place of religious worship, and that during the period cov-

ered by this suit its actual church membership, consisting, as in all

Baptist churches, of persons who have been baptized after a pro-

fession of faith, numbered about four hundred persons, exclusive of

the persons attending services there as members of the congrega-

tion who were not members of the church."

It may be that, as held by the court below in 4 Mackey 43, at a

former stage of one of these cases, the original certificate of incor-

poration, not stating the date of election or the term of office of the

trustees, nor supported by affidavit, as required by statute, was not

sufficient of itself to prove the plaintiff's existence as a corporation,

either de jure or de facto; and that the adding of an affidavit to the

certificate, and recording it anew, since the commencement of these

actions, could not avail the plaintiff.

But the certificate of incorporation, as originally drawn up, taken

in connection with the other evidence now introduced, and especially

the record of the former action in which this plaintiff as a corporation

recovered judgment against this defendant without any objection being'

taken to the plaintiff's capacity to sue, is clearly competent and suf-

2. A recorder's copy of the certificate of incorporation, acknowledgment and affidavit, as recorded May l, 1885.
3. That in the year 1871 it became necessary for the plaintiff, in
order to complete its church edifice, to borrow money upon a mortgage of its land, and that to promote this object, and upon the recommendation of its finance committee, a special meeting was called, and
was held on July 2, 1871, at which th~ church (which had been known
as the Island Baptist Church) resolved to become incorporated under
the name stated in the above certificate of incorporation, and elected
as its trustees the six persons named therein, and fixed their term of
office at three years, and thereupon that certificate was prepared and
signed by the trustees and recorded.
4. Three deeds, respectively dated September 26, 1871, September 18 1 1872, and November 10, 1874 1 from the six persons named
in the above certificate of incorporation, describing themselves as
"trustees of the Fifth Baptist Church of Washington City, D. C.,"
reciting its incorporation under the general corporation act, and its
resolution authorizing them to execute the deeds, and conveying the
church building and land, in trust and by way of mortgage, to secure
the payment of various sums of money.
5. Two deeds of release of the same building and land, dated November 9, 1874, from the grantees to the grantors in the first two of
the trust deeds aforesaid.
6. The record of the judgment in the former action between these
parties.
The plaintiff also introduced, ,,..·ithout objection, evidence tending
to show ''that its pre$ent church edifice was begun about the year
1866, and was completed at a cost of about $22,000, exclusive of the
ground; that the property is worth about $30,000, and has been occupied and used by 1he plaintiff's society or congregation since the year
1867 as its place of religious worship, and that during the period covered by this suit its actual church membership, consisting, as in all
Baptist churches, of persons who have been baptized after a profession of faith, numbered about four hundred persons, exclusive of
the persons attending services there as members of the congregation who were not members of the church."
It ~ay be that, as held by the court below in 4 Mackey 43, at a
former stage of one of these cases, the original certificate of incorporation, not stating the date of election or the term of office of the
trustees, nor suppo1ted by affidavit, as required by statute, was not
sufficient of itself to prove the plaintiff's existence as a corporation,
either de Jure or de jacto; and that the adding of an affidavit to the
certificate, and recording it anew, since the commencement of these
actions, could not avail the plaintiff.
But the certificate of incorporation, as originally drawn up, taken
in connection with the other evidence now introlluced, and especially
the record of the former action in which this plaintiff as a corporation
recovered judgment against this defendant without any objection being ·
taken to the plaintiff's capacity to sue, is clearly competent and suf-
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ficient, as between these parties, to prove that the plaintiff had in good

faith attempted to legally organize as a corporation, and had long acted

ficient, as between these parties, to prove that the plaintiff had in good
faith attempted to legally organize as a corporation, and had long acted
as such, and was at least a corporation de facto, which is all that is
necessary to enable it to maintain an action aga inst any one, other than
the state, who has contracted with the corporation, or who h as <lone
it a wrong. Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, 72;
Con a rd v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pct. 386, 450; Chubb v. Upton. 95
U. S. 665; Williamsburg Ins. Co. v. Frothingham, 122 Mass. 391:
Scarsburgh Turnpike Co. v. Cutler, 6 Vt. 315; Cincinnati, etc.,
Railroad v. Danville & Vincennes Railroad, 75 Ill. 113; Stockton &
Linden Co. v. Stockton & Copperopolis Railroad. 45 Cal. 68o.
It is objected that the evidence admitted, if sufllcient to prove that
the plaintiff was a corporation, did n ot prove that it was the corporation which brought this action, because the evidence was that the corporate name was "The Fifth Baptist Church of Washing ton, D. C. ,"
whereas the action, as stated in the declaration, was brought by "The
Fifth Baptist Church of Washington, D C., by its Trustees."
It may well be doubted whether the words "by its trustees," as
here used, are part of the name of the plaintiff. They may have been
inse1ted, like "by attorney" or "by next friend," to indicate by whose
agency, and not in whose be half, the action is brought. By the general corporation act, both the title in real estate, and the right to sue,
arc vested in the trustees "by the T)aine and style assumed as aforesaid," that is to say, in the name and behalf of the corporation. Act
of May 5, 1870, ch. 80, § 2; 16 Stat., 99, 100; Rev. Stat. D. C.,
§§ 534, 539, 540.
But if these words in the declaration can be taken as part of the
plaintiff's name, the most th a t is shown is a mistake in that name .
While nul ti'el corporation, or that the plaintiff is not and never was
a corporation, is a good plea in bar, because it goes to show that the
plaintiff can never maintain any action whatever; yet misnomer, or
mere mistake in the name of a corporation plaintiff, which does not
affect its capacity to sue in the right ·name is pleadable in abatement
only, and is waived by pleading to the merits. ' Bro. Ab. Misnomer,
7.3; Society for Propagating the Gospel v. Pawlet, 4 Pet. 480, 501;
Christian Society v. Macomber, 3 Met. 235, 237; Gould Pl., .ch. 5,

as such, and was at least a corporation de facto, which is all that is

necessary to enable it to maintain an action against any one, other than

the state, who has contracted with the corporation, or who has done

it a wrong. Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, 72;

Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. 386, 450; Chubb v. Upton. 95

U. S. 665; Williamsburg Ins. Co. v. Frothingham, 122 Mass. 391:

Searsburgh Turnpike Co. v. Cutler, 6 Vt. 315; Cincinnati, etc.,

Railroad v. Danville & Vincennes Railroad, 75 111. 113; Stockton &

Linden Co. v. Stockton & Copperopolis Railroad, 45 Cal. 680.

It is objected that the evidence admitted, if sufficient to prove that

the plaintiff was a corporation, did not prove that it was the corpora-

tion which brought this action, because the evidence was that the cor-

porate name was ''The Fifth Baptist Church of Washington, D. C,"

whereas the action, as stated in the declaration, was brought by '"The

Fifth Baptist Church of Washington, D C, by its Trustees."

It may well be doubted whether the words "by its trustees," as
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here used, are part of the name of the plaintiff. They may have been

inserted, like "by attornev" or "by next friend," to indicate by whose

agency, and not in whose behalf, the action is brought. By the gen-

eral corporation act, both the title in real estate, and the right to sue,

are vested in the trustees "by the name and style assumed as afore-

said," that is to say, in the name and behalf of the corporation. Act

of May 5, 1870, ch. 80, § 2; 16 Stat., 99, 100; Rev. Stat. D. C,

§§ 534i 539. 54°-

But if these words in the declaration can be taken as part of the

plaintiff's name, the most that is shown is a mistake in that name.

While nul tiel corporation, or that the plaintiff is not and never was

a corporation, is a good plea in bar, because it goes to show that the

plaintiff can never maintain any action whatever; yet misnomer, or

mere mistake in the name of a corporation plaintiff, which does not

affect its capacity to sue in the right name is pleadable in abatement

only, and is waived by pleading to the merits. ' Bro. Ab. Misnomer,

73; Society for Propagating the Gospel v. Pawlet, 4 Pet. 480, 501;

Christian Society v. Macomber, 3 Met. 235, 237; Gould PI., ,ch. 5,

§ 79. * * *

Affirmed.

Note.. See note preceding case.

Sec. 336. Power to confess judgment.

SHUTE v. KEYSER.

1892. In the Arizona Supreme Court. 37 Am. & Eng. Corp.

§ 79·

Cas. 61-63.

•

•

•

Affirmed.
Note. See note preceding case.

Kibbey, J. * * * Appellants very earnestly contend that a corpora-

tion has no power to confess a valid judgment; that, therefore, the pre-

tended judgment against the Old Dominion Copper Mining Company

Sec. 336.

Power to confess judgment.
SHUTE v. KEYSER.

1892.

IN

THE

AmzoNA SuPREME CounT.
Cas. 61-63.

37 Am. & Eng. Corp.

KIBBEY, J. • • • Appellants very earnestly contend that a corporation has no power to confess a valid judgment; that, therefore. the pretended judgment against the Old Dominion Copper Mining Company
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is void, and plaintiff's title thereunder, and, consequently, his cause of

action in this case must fail. Counsel do not cite us a case wherein the

power of the corporation to confess a judgment is denied. We do not

know, and are not informed by the record what were the powers of

the Old Dominion Copper Mining Company. It was a corporation

organized under the laws of the state of New York, whether by special

charter or under general incorporation laws does not appear. That

it is a private corporation fairly appears, for it is hardly conceivable

that a public corporation, organized under the laws of New York,

should be engaged in business in Arizona. It is admitted by the de-

murrer that it was engaged in transacting business in Arizona, neces-

sarily, then, entering into contracts.

A domestic private corporation has the power to sue, is liable to be

sued, and may appear in court and defend when it is sued; may, we

suppose, of course, suffer default and judgment hereby; and we see

no reason, in absence of proof to the contrary, to presume that the

same attributes do not attach to a foreign private corporation. There

are attributes so universally incident to private corporations in modern
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times that it would be totally at variance with the probabilities to pre-

sume otherwise. Indeed, it is said by the text writers that it is neces-

sarily implied that a corporation, from the mere fact of its incorpora-

tion, may sue and be sued. Field Corp., § 360; Mor. Priv. Corp., § 356.

Incident to the right to sue, and the liability to be sued, we think is

unquestionably the right to confess judgment. In no case to which

our attention has been called has the power of a corporation to con-

fess judgment been doubted or called in question. In 12 How. Pr. , a case cited by appellant, a doubt of such power was not sug-

gested. Black, in his recent work on Judgments, discusses the power

of agents of a corporation to confess a judgment, but does not even

intimate that to confess a judgment is ultra vires of a corporation.

Indeed, while he does not in terms assert that power to exist, yet the

inference is necessary from his statement that the corporation is bound

by a confession of a judgment by its officer upon whom summons

might have been served in a contested action. 1 Black Judgm., § 59;

and see Freem. Judgm., § 545. Morawetz lays down the broad rule

that the managing agents of a corporation have authority to confess

judgment whenever they deem it to be to the interest of the corpora-

tion. Mor. Priv. Corp., § 430. In Miller v. Bank of British Colum-

bia, 2 Ore. 291, wherein a judgment by confession against a corpora-

tion was under discussion, the question was whether the president had

virtute officii the power to confess for his principal: that the confes-

sion was ultra vires the corporation was not even suggested. In

McMurray v. St. Louis Oil Manufacturing Co., 33 Mo. 377. the ques-

tions were as to the power, virtute officii, of the president of a

corporation to confess judgment, the sufficiency of the statutory state-

ment required to accompany such confession, and the power of the

corporation to create a lien by such a judgment, the statute prohibit-

ing it from mortgaging their property or giving any lien thereon. In

Joliet, etc., Co. v. Ingalls, 23 III. App. 45, a judgment against a cor-

HORNE V. IVV.
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poration by confession was under consideration. The question whether

HORNE V. IVY.

§ 337

the corporation had the power to confess a judgment was not sug-

poration by confession was unde r consideration. The question whether
the corporation had the p ower to confess a judgment was not su g gested . The matter considered was the authority of the paiticular
officer who did confess the judgment to do so. And so in Stokes '".
New J ersey Pottery Co., 46 N. J. Law 237, 6 Am. & Eng. C orp .
Cas. 240; Thew v . Porcelain Manufacturing Co., 5 S. C. 415; White·
v. Crow, I 7 F eel . Rep. 98. And in all these cases there was a direct
attack upon the judg ment , and not a collateral one, as in this case.
W c do not entertain a doubt of the general right of a private corporation to confess a judgment.
• • •

gested. The matter considered was the authority of the particular

officer who did confess the judgment to do so. And so in Stokes v.

New Jersey Pottery Co., 46 N. J. Law 237, 6 Am. & Eng. Corp.

Cas. 240; Thew v. Porcelain Manufacturing Co., 5 S. C. 415; White

v. Crow, 17 Fed. Rep. 98. And in all these cases there was a direct

attack upon the judgment, and not a collateral one, as in this case.

We do not entertain a doubt of the general right of a private corpo-

ration to confess a judgment. * * *

Affirmed.

Note. See Stokes v. New Jersey Potterv Co., 46 N. J. Law 237, 6 A. & E.

Corp. Cas. 240, note 246; 1898 Solomon v. C. M. Schneider & Co., 56 Neb. 680.

Affirmed.

77 N. W. Rep. 65; 1898, Chicago Tp. & T. Co. v. Chicago Nat'l Bank, 176

111. 224.

infra, p. 1842.

N ote. See Stokes v. New J e rsey Pottery Co., 46 N. J . Law 237, 6 A. & E.
Corp. Cas. 240, note 246; 1898 Solomon v. C. l\1. Schneider & Co., 56 Neb. 680.
77 N. W. Rep. 65; 1898, Chicago Tp. & T. Co. v. Chicago Nat'! Bank, 176

ARTICLE VII. RIGHT TO HAVE AND USE A SEAL.

111. 224.

Sec. 337. What may be taken on execution.

See The Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Boney, 117 Ind. 501.
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Sec. 338. 1. Necessity of a seal.

(a) At common law.

Sec. 337.

HORNE v. IVY.1

What may be taken on execution.

In the King's Bench. 20 Car. 2 (1668), 1 Mod. 18.

See The Louisville,
t'nfra, p. 1842.

7respass for taking away a ship. The defendant justifies as serv-

ant under the patent whereby The Canary Company is incorporated,

and whereby it is granted, "That none but such and such should trade

~.

A. & C. Ry. Co. v . Boney, 117 Ind. 501,

thither, on pain of forfeiting their ships and goods," etc., and says,

ARTICLE Vll.

that the defendant did trade thither, etc. The plaintiff demurs.

RIGHT TO HAVE AND USE A SEAL.

Pollcxfen, for the plaintiff, contended that the defendant ought to

Sec. 338.

have shown the deed whereby he was authorized by the company to

seize the goods; though he agreed, that for ordinary employments

1.

Necessity of a seal.
(a) At common law.

and services a corporation may appoint a servant without deed, as a

HORNE v. IVY. 1

cook, a butler, etc. A corporation can not license a stranger to fell

trees without deed. Nor can they make a disseisor without deed,

nor deliver a letter of attorney without deed.

IN THE KING' S BENC H.

Twisdkn, Justice. For the first point, I think, they can not seize

without deed, no more than they can enter for a condition broken

20

Car.

2 (

1668), r Mod. 18.

7'.,-espass for t<fking away a ship. The d efendant justifies as servant under the p atent whereby Tile Canary Company is incorporated.
and whereby it is granted, " That none but such and such should trade
thither, on pain of forfeiting their ships and goods," etc., and says,
that the defendant did trade thither , etc. The plaintiff d emurs.
Pollexfen, for the plai'ntijf, contended that the defendant ought to
have sh own the deed whereby he was authorized by the company to
seize the goods : though he agreed, that for ordinary employment
a11<l services a corporation may appoint a servant without deed, as a
cook, a butler, etc. A corporation can not license a stranger to fell
trees without deed. Nor can they m ake a disi;e isor without deed ,
nor deliver a letter of attorney without deed.
Tw1 soEN, Justice. For the first point, I think, they can not seize
without d eed, no more than they can enter for a condition broken
without deed.

without deed.

See note, 50 Am. St. R., p. 150.

'Part of argument and opinion of Kelynge, C. J., omitted.

See note, 50 Am. St. R., p. 150.
of argument and opinion of Kelynge, C. J. , omitted.

1 Part
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Sec. 339. Same.

§ 339
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1137

See President, etc., of Bank of the United States v. Dandridge,

12 Wheat. (25 U. S.) 64, supra, p. 854.

Sec. 339. Same.

See notes to following cases.

Sec* .340. Same.

(b) Now generally unnecessary, except where required

See President, etc., of Bank of the United States v. Dandridge,

12 Wheat. (25 U. S.) 64, supra, p. 854.

of a natural person also.

MUSCATINE WATER COMPANY, Appellee, v. MUSCATINE LUMBER

See notes to following cases.

COMPANY.1

1892. In the Supreme Court of Iowa. 85 Iowa Rep. 112-119,

Sec. ,340. Same.

39 Am. St. Rep. 284.

(b) Now generally unnecessary, except where required

[Action to recover damages for loss of a mill by fire alleged to be

of a natural person also.

due to the failure of the water company to extend its water system to

place where water could be had, in accordance with a contract entered

into between the lumber and the water company, whereby the latter

agreed to so extend its water system. Judgment for plaintiff, and de-

MUSCATINE WATER COMPANY, APPEUEE, v. MUSCATINE LUMBER
COMPANY. 1

fendant appeals.]

RoniNSON, C. J. * * * The appellant contends that the con-
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tract in suit is invalid for the reason that no seal of either corporation

is attached to it. Section 2112 of the code contains the following:

"The use of private seals in written contracts, except the seals of

corporations, is abolished." It is argued from this that the use of

private seals by corporations is governed by the rules of the common

law, and that such seals must be affixed to all contracts not covering

the scope of the ordinary, every-day functions of the corporations.

That is not the law of this state. On the contrary, it was said in

Merrick v. Plank Road Co., 11 Iowa 76, that "the doctrine is now

well settled that corporations of all kinds may be bound by contracts

not under their seal. They may make a binding contract in writing

Without using the seal, and so they may be held liable on verbal con-

tracts; and as they may make, so they may ratify and adopt as their

own, without the use of the seal, that which has been done by an-

other or an officer out of the usual line of his duties." In 1 Mora-

wetz on Private Corporations, section 33S, this language is used: "It

is now a rule well settled throughout the United States that a corpo-

ration may make a contract without the use of a seal in all cases in

which this may be done by an individual." A corporation organized

under the laws of this state may have a common seal, but it is not

required to have one; and it is a matter of common knowledge that

corporations in large numbers organize and do business in the state,

making contracts and conveying property, without using or having a

seal. There is nothing in this case to show any requirement on the

1 Only the part of opinion relating to seal is given.

72—Wil. Cas.

1892. IN THE SUPREME CoURT OF low A. 85 Iowa Rep. 112-119,
39 Am. St. Rep. 284.
[Action to recover damages for loss of a mill by fire alleged to be
due to the failure of the water company to extend its water system to
place where water could be had, in accordance with a contract entered
into between the lumber and the water company, whereby the latter
agreed to so extend its water system. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.]
RomNsoN, C. J. • • • The appellant contends that the contract in suit is invalid for the reason that no seal of either corporation
is attached to it. Section 2 c 12 of the code contains the following:
"The use of private seals in written contracts, except the seals of
corporations, is abolished." It is argued from this that the use of
private seals by corporations is governed by the rules of the common
law, and that such seals must be affixed to all contracts not covering
the scope of the ordinary, every-day functions of the corporations.
That is not the law of this state. On the contrary, it was said in
Merrick v. Plank Road Co., 11 Iowa 76, that "the doctrine is now
well settled that corporations of all kinds may be bound by contracts
not under their seal. They may make a binding contract in writing
without u sing the seal, and so they may be held liable on verbal contracts; and as they may make, so they may ratify and adopt as their
own, without the use of the seal, that which has been done by another or an officer out of the usual line of his duties.'' In 1 Morawetz on Private Corporations, section 338, this language is used : "It
i<; now a rule well settled throughout the United States that a corporation may make a contract without the use of a seal in all cases in
.which this m ay be done by an individual." A corporation organized
ll nder the laws of this state may have a common sea l, but it is not
requ ired to have one; and it is a matter of common knowledge that
corporations in large numbers organize a nd do business in the state,
making- contracts and conveying property, \-Vithout using <;>r having a
seal. There is nothing in this case to show any requirement on the
1 Only the part of opinion relating to seal is given.
72-WIL. CAS.
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§ 341

part of either party to the agreement in question that its contracts

GARRETT V. BELMONT LAND COMPANY.

should be under seal, nor that either had a seal. There is no pre-

§ 34r

sumption, in the absence of evidence to that effect, that the agreement

part of either party to the agreement in question that its contracts
sbouJd be unde r seal , nor that either hncl a sea l. There is no presumption, in the absence of evidence to that effect, that the agreement
·w as invalid for wnnt of a sea l; and no presumption of that kiP.d is
raised by anything contained in the record. • • •
Affirmed.

was invalid for want of a seal; and no presumption of that kind is

raised by anything contained in the record. » * •

Affirmed.

Note. Real is unnecessary, where not necessary in ease of a natural person:

1813, Bank of Col. v. Patterson's Admr., 7 Cr. 299; 1823, Mott v. Hicks. 1

Cow. (N.Y.i 513, 13 Am. Dec. 5.50; 1825, The Banks v. Poitiaux,3 Rand (Va.i

136, 15 Am. Dec. 706; 182.5, Fitzhugh v. Bank of Shepherdsville, 3 T. B. Mon.

Note. Seal is unn ecessary, where not necessary in case of a natural person:
1813, Bank of Col. v. Patterson's Admr., 7 Cr. 2W; 1823, Mott v. Hicks , I
Cow. (N. Y. 151H, 13 Am. Dec. 550; 1825, The Banks v. P oitiaux,3 Rand (\'a .1
ms, 15 Am. Dec. 706: 182.">, Fitzhugh v. Bank o f bepherdsville,3 T. B. )J on.
( Ky.) 1~6, 16 Am. Der. 90; 18W. Barker v. Mechanirs, etc .. Co., 3 Wend. • N.
Y .l 94, 20 Am . Dec . 664; 1831, Garrison v. Combs, 7 J. J . Marshall (Ky. ) 84,
22 Am. Dec:. 120 ; 18R7, Eve rett v. United Stute~. () P orte r (Ala.) 166, 30 Am .
Dec. 584; 18a9, Lathrop '' · Commercial Bank , 8 Dana ( Ky. ) JH, 33 Aru. Dec.
481; 1840, Commercial B ank v . Newport Co ., 1 B. !1lon. (Ky. ) J3 , 35 Am.
Dec. 171; 1848, RoAs v. City of Madison, 1 Ind . 281, -18 Am. Dec. ~61; 185;'.
Goodwin v. Union Screw Co. , 34 N. H. 378; 1862, Toppingv. Birkford, 4 A llen 120: 1867, Pixley v. R . Co., 33 Cnl. 183 ; 1867, She rman v. Fitch. 98 :Ma~s .
5H; 1868, Rarine, elc., R . Co. v. Farmers' L ., etc., C-0., 49 111. 331. 95 Am.
Dec. 595; 1890, Duke v. l\111rkha m, JOfi N. C. 131, l R Am. Rt. R 88\l; l 92,
Roberts v. Dl'm ing Woorl Working Co., 111 N. C. 432 : 18!"lll. 8:1r111iento v.
Davis Boat, etr .. Co., 105 l\fich. 300, 55 Am . 8t. R. 446; 189ii, B. S. Green C'-0.
v . Blodgett, 159 111. 169, 50 Am. St . R. 146; 1896, Ford v. Hill, 92 Wis. 188, 53
Am. St. R. 902; 1899, 8peirs v. Drop-Forge<Jo., 174 Mass. 17.1, fi-l N. E . Rep.
497; 1899. State, PX ri' f . G rimm, v. Manhattan Rubber Co., 149 Mo. 181; 1900,
Pullis v. Pullis Bros. Iron Co., lfi7 :\Jo. 56!i, 57 S. W . Rep. 1095. If seal is
not presf>nt officer's 1mtbority must be shown: 1900, Fontana v. Pacific Can .
Co., 129 Cal. bl, 61 Pac. Rep. 580.
Bee note next case. Also, notes 50 Am. St. R. 150, and 64 Am. St. R . 260;
1900, Garland Mfg. Co. v. Northumb. Paper Co., 31 Ont. 40.

(Kv.) 126, 16 Am. Dee. 90; 1829. Barker v. Mechanics, etc.. Co., 3 Wend. 1 N.

Y.) 94, 20 Am. Dec. 664; 1831, Garrison v. Combs, 7 J. J. Marshall (Kv.) 84,

22 Am. Dec. 120; 1837, Everett v. United States, (i Porter (Ala.) 166, 30 Am.

Dec. 584; 1839, Lathrop v. Commercial Bank, 8 Dana (Ky.) 114, 33 Am. Dec.

481; 1840, Commercial Bank v. Newport Co., 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 13, 35 Am.

Dec. 171; 1848, Ross v. City of Madison, 1 Ind. 281, 48 Am. Dec. 361; 1857,

Goodwin v. Union Screw Co., 34 N. H. 378; 1862, Topping v. Bickford, 4 Al-

len 120: 1867, Pixlev v. R. Co., 33 Cal. 183; 1867, Sherman v. Fitch, 98 Mass.

59; 1868, Racine, etc., R. Co. v. Farmers' L., etc., Co., 49 111. 331, 95 Am.
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Dec. 595; 1890, Duke v. Markham, 105 N. C. 131, 18 Am. St. R 889; 1892,

Roberts v. Deming Wood Working Co., Ill N. C. 432: 18*5, Sarmiento v.

Davis Boat, etc., Co., 105 Mich. 300. 55 Am. St. R. 446; 189.5, B. S. Green Co.

v. Blodgett, 159 111. 169, 50 Am. St. R. 146; 1896, Ford v. Hill, 92 Wis. 188, 53

Am. St. R. 902; 1899, Speirs v. Drop-Forge Co., 174 Mass. 175, 54 N. E. Rep.

497; 1899. State, me rel. Grimm, v. Manhattan Rubber Co.. 149 Mo. 181; 1900,

Pullis v. Pullis Bros. Iron Co., 157 Mo. 565, .57 S. W. Rep. 1095. If seal is

not present officer's authority must be shown: 1900, Fontana v. Pacific Can.

Co., 129 Cal. 61, 61 Pac. Rep. 580.

See note next case. Also, notes 50 Am. St. R. 150, and 64 Am. St. R. 260;

1900, Garland Mfg. Co. v. Northumb. Paper Co., 31 Ont. 40.

Sec. 341. Same.

(c) In deeds conveying land, the corporate seal is re-

quired in some states.

GARRETT v. BELMONT LAND COMPANY.1

See. 341. Same.

1895. In the Supreme Court of Tennessee. 94 Tenn. Rep.

459-485-

( c) In deeds conveying land, the corporate seal is required in some stiltes.

[Action of ejectment by Garrett against the land company. Both

parties trace title to a common source, but the complainant's title was

through a deed in which the''Second National Rank conveys, remises,

and releases" and concludes "In testimony whereof, the Second Na-

GARREIT v. BELMONT LAND COMPANY.1

tional Bank hath hereunto set its hand, by its president. James Mc-

Laughlin, this 13th day," etc. "(Signed) James McLaughlin, pres-

1895.

ident Second National Bank."

No seal, or any impression of one, though the bank had one, was

IN THE SuPREJ\fE Cou nT OF TENNESSEE.
459-485.

94 Tenn. Rep.

1 Statement abridged ; only that part of the opinion relating to the necessity

[Action of ejectrnent by Garrett against the land company . Both
parties trace titl e to a common source, hut the complainant's title w a~
through a deed in which the "Second National Bank convevs, remi_e ...
and relca!'e!->" and concludes " Tn testimony whereof. the Second ;\ :itional Rank hath hereunto set its h and, by its president, James M cLaug hlin , this 13th d ay," etc. " (Sig ned) James McLaughlin, pre~
idcnt Second Na tional B ank. "
No seal, or any impression of one, though the bank had one, wa!-

of the seal to make a valid conveyance is given.

1 8tatement abridged ; only that part of the opinion relating to the necessity
of the seal to make a valid conveyance is given.
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affixed to the instrument. It was shown that it was not the custom of

the bank to seal deeds, or other instruments, except stock certificates.

The defendant contends that this deed was insufficient to pass title to

§ 341

RIGHT TO HAVE ANU USE A SEAL.

1139

complainants. The court below held the deed sufficient, and this is

one of the errors assigned.]

Wilkes, J. * * * (After stating the facts, and holding with

Combe's Case, 9 Co. 75, after an excellent review of the cases, that

"When any one has authority as attorney to do any act, he ought to

do it in his name who gives the authority; for he appoints the attorney

to be in his place and to represent his person; and, therefore, the

attorney can not do it in his own name, nor as his proper act, but in

the name and as the act of him who gives the authority,"—and

hence this was not the deed of the bank, proceeds as to the want of

seal as follows:)

Prior to the adoption of the code of 185S, the seal of the grantor

was necessary to the validity of any deed made by an individual or a

corporation. The use of seals by individuals arose out of necessity,

as, in former days, many persons of extensive estates were too illiter-

ate to make their manual signatures. Its adoption and use by cor-
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porations, however, arose out of their nature and constitution, being

invisible, intangible bodies, composed of an aggregation of individ-

uals, who must speak, at least in weighty matters, through a common

seal. It was accordingly held that the affixing of the seal, and that

alone, united the several assents of the individuals who composed the

corporation, and gave expression to the act as the assent of the whole,

and that a corporation could enter into no contract of importance ex-

cept under seal. The tendency of modern legislation and the trend of

more recent decisions is toward the abolition of the strict rules for-

merly prevailing as to sealed instruments, and in many states statutes

have been passed doing away, in whole or in part, with the distinction

between sealed and unsealed instruments, and in most of the states

the use of the seal is now regulated by statute. There is a difference

kept up, however, in many of the states between the use of seals by

corporations and by individuals. While it is laid down broadly that

corporations may enter into contracts to the same extent as individuals

without using a seal, this clearly has reference to other contracts than

the conveyance of lands, and none of the cases to which we have

been cited hold that the use of a seal is not required in conveyances

of land. See Taylor on Corporations, section 248; Morawetz on

Corporations (2d ed.), section 338; Waterman on Corporations,

sections 89, 90; Mus. W. Co. v. Mus. L. Co., 37 Am. & Eng. Corp.

Cases 119; Gottfield v. Miller, 104 U. S. 527; Merrick v. Burling-

ton Plank-Road Co., 11 Iowa 74-76; Cary Holliday Lumber Co. v.

Cain et al., 13 So. Rep. 239.

These conveyances did not involve conveyances of real estate, and

none of the citations are authority for the proposition that a corpora-

tion can execute a deed without usine a seal. But we think the con-

trary is held, more or less directly, in the following, as well as other

authorities: Spelling on Private Corporations, section 195; Beach on

affixed to the instrument. It was shown that it was not the custom of
the bank to seal deeds, or other instruments, except stock certificates.
The ddendant contends that this deed was insufficient to pass title to
complainants. The court below held the deed sufficient, an<l this is
one of the errors assigned.]
\¥1LKES, J.
• • • (After stating the facts, and hokling with
Combe's Case, 9 Co. 75, after an excellent review of the cases, that
"When any one has authority as attorney to do any act, he ought to
do it in his name who gives the authority; for he appoints the attorney
to be in his place and to represent his person; and, therefore, the
attorney can not do it in his own name, nor as his proper act, but in
the name and as the act of him who gives the authority,"-and
hence this was not the deed of the bank, proceeds as to the want of
seal as follows:)
Prior to the adoption of the code of 1858, the seal of the grantor
was necessary to the validity of any deed made by an individual or a
corporation. The use of seals by individuals arose out of necessity,
as, in former days, many persons of extensive estates were too illiterate to make their manual signatures. Its adoption and use by corporations, however, arose out of their nature and constitution, being
invisible, intangible bodies, composed of an aggregation of individuals, who must speak, at least in \veighty matters, through a common
seal. It was accordingly held that the affixing of the seal, and that
alone, united the several assents of the individuals who composed the
corporation, and gave expression to the act as the assent of the whole,
and that a corporation could enter into no contract of importance except under seal. The tendency of modern legislation and the trend of
more recent decisions is toward the abolition of the strict rules formerly prevailing as to sealed instruments. and in many states statutes
have been passed doing away, in whole or in part, with the distinction
between sealed and unsealed instruments, and in most of the states
the use of the seal is now regulated by statute. There is a difference
kept up, however, in many of the states behveen the use of seals by
corporations and by individuals. While it is laid down broadly th at
corporations may enter into contracts to the same extent as individuals
without using a seal, this clearly has reference to other contracts than
the conveyance of lands, and none of the cases to which we have
been cited hold that the use of a seal is not required in conveyances
of land. See Taylor on Corporations, section 248; Morawetz on
Corporations (2d ed.), section 338; Waterman on Corporations,
sections 89, 90; Mus. vV. Co. v. Mus. L. Co., 37 Am. & Eng. C orp.
Cases 119; Gottfield v. Miller, 104 U. S . 527: Me1Tick v. Burlington Plank-Road Co., I I Iowa 74-76; Cary Holliday Lumber Co. ''·
Cain et al., 13 So. Rep. 239.
These conveyances did not im·olve conveyances of real estate, and
none of the citations are authority for the proposition th:it a corporation can execute a deed without usine- a seal. But we think the contrary is held, more or less directly, in the following, as well as other
authorities: Spelling on Private Corporations, section 195; Beach on
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Private Corporations, 376, and section 742 as to mortgages; Jones on

GARRETT V. BEUi ONT LAND COMPANY.

§ 341

Mortgages, section 128; 1 Waterman on Corporations, section 95.

Private Corporations, 376, and section 742 as to mortgages; Jones on
Mortgages, section 128; 1 Waterman on Corporations, section 95T
p. 303; Boone on Corporations, section 54; 3 Wash burn on Real
Estate, p. 288, section 7; Leggett v. N. J. M. & B. Co., 2 3
Am. Dec. 746, note; 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 240; 2
Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 910; Osbome v. Temis, 23 N.
J. Law 633, 658; Duke v. Markam, 18 Am. St. Rep. 889, note;
Miner's Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 543; Hutchins v. Byrnes, 9
Gray 367; Flint v. Clinton Co., 12 N. H. 430; Tenney v. East Warren Lumber Co., 43 N. H. 343; Hatch v. Barr, 1 Ohio 390; Savings
Bank v. Davis, 8 Conn. 191; Isham v. Bennington Iron Co., 19 Vt.
230; Zoller v. Ide, 1 Neb. 439; Brinley v. Mann, 2 Cush. 337; Kochler v. Iron Co., 2 Black 715, 721.
By the code of Tennessee of 1858, it is provided (M. & V., § 2478)
that "the use of private seals in written contracts, except the seals of
corporations is abolished, and the addition of a private seal to an instrument of writing hereafter made shall not affect its character in any
respect whatever."
Did the act change the rule as to conveyances by corporation in
Tennessee so as to dispense with the necessity of a seal? There is
certainly nothing in the act to so indicate, but the fact that seals of
corporations are excepted by its provisions is an indication that the
seal was to be used by corporations after the act was pas ed, as had
been done before its passage, at least in some cases. Statutes similar
to this have been passed in Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Kentucky, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska,
North Carolina, Ohio, Indiana, Texas, Pennsylvania and \\est Virginia. Nevertheless, in most of these States corporations are still required to use their seals in making conveyances, as in Ohio, Indiana.
Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, Kansas and Texas. See 3 Wash. on Real Prop. , p. 288.
And not only must the deed be sealed, but the seal must be affixed by
some one authorized to affix it. 3 Wash. on Real Prop., p. 289.
The conveyance of real estate is one of the most solemn and important acts a corporation is called upon to perform, and if the seal
is required for any purpose, it is difficult to conceive of any other act
for which its u se is more necessary. If it was intended to abolish the
u<;e of sea ls hy corporations altogether, why was the saving or exceptin g clause inserted in the act? And if the seal is to be required in
any case, in what case is it more important than in a conveyance of
real estate, either absolutely or under mortgage?
Prior to the code, the use of an individual or private seal workt>d
nuious effects, as for example; If not under seal , it wa necessary to
aver and prove a consideration in all contracts, oral or written , except
in cases of bills and notes . .Roper v. Stone; Cooke 499: ~helton '".
Bruce, 9 Yer. 26; R ead v. Wheeler, z Yer. 50: Brown v. Park. , "
Hum. 297. The consideration of a sealed instrument cou ld not be
inquire<l into in an action of law. Nivens v. MeITick, I Tenn. 314:
Coleman Y. Sanderlin, 5 Hum. 563. And the statute of limitations

p. 303; Boone on Corporations, section 54; 3 Washburn on Real

Estate, p. 288, section 7; Leggett v. N. J. M. & B. Co., 23

Am. Dec. 746, note; 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 240; 2

Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 910; Osborne v. Temis, 23 N.

J. Law 633, 658; Duke v. Markam, 18 Am. St. Rep. 889, note;

Miner's Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 543; Hutchins v. Byrnes, 9

Gray 367; Flint v. Clinton Co., 12 N. H. 430; Tenney v. East War-

ren Lumber Co., 43 N. H. 343; Hatch v. Barr, 1 Ohio 390; Savings.

Bank v. Davis, 8 Conn. 191; Isham v. Bennington Iron Co., 19 Vt.

230; Zollerv. Ide, 1 Neb. 439; Brinley v. Mann, 2 Cush. 337; Koch-

ler v. Iron Co., 2 Black 715, 721.

By the code of Tennessee of 1858, it is provided (M. & V., § 2478)

that "the use of private seals in written contracts, except the seals of

corporations is abolished, and the addition of a private seal to an in-

strument of writing hereafter made shall not affect its character in any

respect whatever."
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Did the act change the rule as to conveyances by corporations in

Tennessee so as to dispense with the necessity of a seal? There is

certainly nothing in the act to so indicate, but the fact that seals of

corporations are excepted by its provisions is an indication that the

seal was to be used by corporations after the act was passed, as had

been done before its passage, at least in some cases. Statutes similar

to this have been passed in Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,

Kentucky, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska,

North Carolina, Ohio, Indiana, Texas, Pennsylvania and West Vir-

ginia. Nevertheless, in most of these States corporations are still re-

quired to use their seals in making conveyances, as in Ohio. Indiana.

Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Ne-

braska, Kansas and Texas. See 3 Wash, on Real Prop., p. 2SS.

And not only must the deed be sealed, but the seal must be affixed by

some one authorized to affix it. 3 Wash, on Real Prop., p. 289.

The conveyance of real estate is one of the most solemn and im-

portant acts a corporation is called upon to perform, and if the seal

is required for any purpose, it is difficult to conceive of any other act

for which its use is more necessary. If it was intended to abolish the

use of seals bv corporations altogether, why was the saving or except-

ing clause inserted in the act? And if the seal is to be required in

any case, in what case is it more important than in a conveyance of

real estate, either absolutely or under mortgage?

Prior to the code, the use of an individual or private seal worked

various effects, as for example; If not under seal, it was necessary to

aver and prove a consideration in all contracts, oral or written, except

in cases of bills and notes. Roper v. Stone,' Cooke 499: Shelton v.

Bruce, 9 Yer. 26; Read v. Wheeler, 2 Yer. 50; Brown v. Parks, S

Hum. 297. The consideration of a sealed instrument could not be

inquired into in an action of law. Nivens v. Merrick, 1 Tenn. 314;

Coleman v. Sanderlin, 5 Hum. 563. And the statute of limitations
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was different in cases of sealed and unsealed instruments. Anderson

§ 34 I
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I I 41

v. Settle, 5 Sneed 203; Thompson v. Thompson, 2 Head 407, and

other cases. A release was required' to be under seal. Evans v.

3 Cold. 397, 398; Simpson v. Moore, 6 Bax. 373. A sealed

contract merged one not under seal. Nunnelly v. Dunn, 1 Yer. 31;

Bishop on Contracts, section 31. A person could not bind another by

seal unless authorized by seal. Nunnelly v. Dougherty, 1 Yer. 27;

Turbeville v. Ryan, 1 Hum. 113. Creditors under sealed instru-

ments had certain preferences at common law in estates of deceased

persons. Anson on Contracts, p. 48.

The application of this section of the code, No. 2478, finds ample

scope in altering these rules derived from the common law in regard

to contracts and conveyances by individuals, without extending it to

the deeds and other solemn instruments to be executed by corpora-

tions, and, in view of the saving clause excepting corporation seals,

we can not infer that the legislature intended to abolish the use and

necessity for corporate seals altogether.

We are of opinion that this act, 2478 M. & V. Code, does not

change the rule of the common law requiring corporations to use their
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seals in all conveyances of real estate, and a conveyance not under

seal, made by a corporation, does not vest a legal title in the grantee,

except, it may be, cases of corporations created'under the act of 1875,

and which have 110 common seal, in which case that act provides that,

in such corporations, having no common seal, the signing of the name

of the corporation, by any duly authorized agent, shall be legal and

binding. See act 1875, ch. 142, section 5; M. & V., § 1704.

The corporation now in question was not created under the act of

1875, but under the acts of congress providing for national banks,

and we are not called upon to say whether, under this act of 1875, a

corporation may convey without seal in any case. That question is

in no way involved in this case. We are of opinion that the deed in

question in this case was not properly signed nor sealed, and hence

did not vest the legal title to the lots in controversy in complainants,

but only operated to create in them an equitable interest and title.

Pomerov's Eq. Juris., section 418; Devlin on Deeds, section 246;

Beardsley v. Knight, 33 Am. Dec. 193; Frost v. Wolf, 19 Am. State

Rep. 761, 764; Allis v. Jones, 45 Fed. Rep. 148; Brinkley v. Bethel,

9 Heis. 786. * » *

• Reversed.

Note. See Accord: 1839, Kinzie v. Chicago, 2 Scammon fill.) 187, 33 Am.

Dec. 443; 1855, Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Gallahue, 12 Gratt. (Va.1 655, 65

Am. Dec. 2o4; 1867, Gashwiler v. Willis, 33 Cal. 11, 91 Am. Dec. 607; 1885,

City of Tiffin v. Shawhan, 43 Ohio St. 178, 184; 1890. Shropshire v. Behrens

& Castles et al., 77 Texas 275; 1891, Danville Seminary v. Mott et ah, 136 111.

289; 1893, Brown v. Supply Co., 23 Ore. 541; 1897, Allen v. Brown, 6 Kan.

App. 704, 50 Pac. Rep. 505.

But see, contra, 1808, Sandford v. Tremlett, 42 Mo. 384; 1900, Pullis v. Pullis

Bros. Iron Co., 157 Mo 565, 57 P. W. Rep. 1095.

An equitable title will pass if the corporate seal is not present: 1899,

Precious Blood Society v. Elsythe, 102 Tenn. 40, 50 S. W. Rep. 759.

was different in cases of sealed and unsealed instmments. Anderson
v. Settle, 5 Sneed 203; Thompson v. Thompson, 2 Head 407 1 and
other cases. A release was required · to be under seal. Evans v.
Pigg, 3 Cold. 397 1 398; Simpson v. Moore, 6 Bax. 373. A sealed
contract merged one not under seal. Nunnelly v. Dunn, 1 Yer. 31;
Bishop on Contracts, section 31. A person could not bind another by
seal unless authorized by seal. Nunnelly v. Dougherty, 1 Yer. 27;
Turbeville v. Ryan, 1 Hum. 113. Creditors under sealed instruments had certain preferences at common law in estates of deceased
persons. Anson on Contracts, p. 48.
The application of this section of the code, No. 2478, finds ample
scope in altering these rules derived from the common law in regard
to contracts and conveyances by individuals, withqut extending it to
the deeds and other solemn instruments to be executed by corporations, and, in view of the sa\"ing clause excepting corporation seals,
we can not infer that the legislature intended to abolish the use and
necessity for corporate seals altogether.
We are of opinion that this act, 2478 M. & V. Code, does not
change the rule of the common law requiring corporations to use their
seals in all conveyances of real estate, and a conveyance not under
seal, made by a corporation, Joes not vest a legal title in the grantee,
except, it may be, cases of corporations created"under the act of 1875,
and which have no common seal, in which case that act provides that,
in such corporations, having no common seal, the signing of the name
of the corporation, by any duly authorized agent, shall be legal and
binding. See act 1875, ch. 142, section 5; M. & V., § 1704.
The corporation now in question was not created under the act of
1875 1 but under the acts of congress providing for national banks,
and we are not called upon to say whether, under this act of 1875, a
corporation 1riay convey without seal in any case. That question is
in no way involved in this case. We are of opinion that the deed in
question in this case was not properly signed nor sealed, and hence
did not vest the legal title to the lots in controversy in complainants,
but only operated to create in them an equitable interest and title.
Pomeroy's Eq. Juris., section 418; De:vlin on Deeds, section 246;
Beardsley v. Knight, 33 Am. Dec. 193; Frost v. WOY, 19 Am. State
Rep . . 761, 764; Allis v. Jones, 45 Fed. Rep. 148; Brinkley v. Bethel,
9 Heis. 786. • • •
· Reversed.
Note. See Accord: 1839, Kinzie v. Chicago, 2 Scammon (Ill.) 187, 33 Am.
Dec. 443; 1855, Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Gallahue, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 655. 65
Am. Dec. 2.'i-1; 1867, Gashwiler v. Willis, 33 Cal. 11, 91 Am. Dec. 607; 188.5,
City of Tiffin v. Shawhan, 43 Ohio St. 178, 184; 1890. Shropshire v. BehrPns
& Castles l't al., 77 Texas 275; 1891, Danville Seminary v. Mott et al., 13() Ill.
289; 1893, Brown v. Supply Co., 23 Ore. 541; 1897, Allen v . .Brown , o Kan.
App. 704, 50 Pac. Rep. 505.
But see, contra, 1868, Sandford v. Tremlett, 42 Mo. 384; 1900, Pullis v. Pullis
Bros. Iron Co., li'i7 Mo 56.5, 57 P.. W. Her. 1095.
An equitable title will pass if the corporate seal is not present: 1899,
Precious Blood Society v. Elsythe, 102 Tenn. 40, 50 S. W. Rep. 75U.
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(d) Signing in some way is now generally of more im-

portance than sealing.

Sec. 342. Same.

GLOBE ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY v. REID.1

1898. In the Appellate Court of Indiana. 19 Ind. App. Rep.

(d) Signing in some way is now generally of more importance than sealing.

203-222.

f Action by the widow of John Reid to recover on a policy of insur-

ance on his life. There was a judgment by default; defendant

claimed there was error by the court, upon application, in not setting

GLOBE ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY v. REID. 1

aside service of summons, and also that the complaint was insufficient

on its face, for the reason that it showed the policy was not signed by

1898.

the insurance company.]

IN THE APPELLATE CouRT OF INDIANA.

19 Ind.

App.

Rep.

203-222.

Black, J. * * * The objection urged against the complaint

is, that the policy, as shown by the copy thereof made an exhibit, is

(Action by the widow of John Reid to recover on a poiicy of insurance on his life. There was a judgment by default; defendant
claimed there ''v as error by the court, upon application, in not setting
aside service of summons, and also that the complaint was insufficient
on its face, for the reason that it showed the policy was not sig11ed by
the insurance company. J
BLACK, J.
• • • The objection urged against the complaint
is, that the policy, as shown by the copy thereof made an exhibit, is
not signed by the insurance company or by any person.
The policy so set forth commences as follows: "Globe Accident
Insurance Company, Indianapolis, Indiana. • • • in sures John
A. Reid," etc. And the ·exhibit concludes as follows:
"In witness the Globe Accident Insurance Company affixes its corporate seal and signature of its president and secretary, 23 January,
1894."

not signed by the insurance company or by any person.

The policy so set forth commences as follows: "Globe Accident

Insurance Company, Indianapolis, Indiana. * * * insures John

A. Reid," etc. And the exhibit concludes as follows:

"In witness the Globe Accident Insurance Company affixes its cor-

porate seal and signature of its president and secretary, 23 January,
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1894."

[L. S.]

Thus the policy appears to have been sealed, the lettering or de-

vice of the seal not being indicated except as above, but the policy,

as shown by the complaint, was not signed. The exhibit must be

regarded as controlling the averments of the pleading. Something

has been said in argument to the effect that parol contracts of insur-

ance may be made when not prohibited by the charter of the insurance

company, and that no special form of words is necessary; but the

complaint before us is so plainly founded upon the written instrument,

not embodied in the pleading, but filed with it as an exhibit, that no

[L. S.)

pretense to the contrary coidd have any plausible support. It is only

Thus the policy appears to have been scaled, the lettering or device of the seal not being indicated except as above, but the policy,
as shown by the complaint, was not signed. The exhibit must be
regarded as controlling the avcrments of the pleading. Something
has been said in argument to the effect that parol contrncts of insu rance may be made when not prohibited by the cha1ter of the in sprance
company, and that no special form of words is necessary; but the
complaint b efore us is so plainly founded upon the written instrument,
not e mbodied in the pleading, but filed with it as an exhibit. that no
pretense to the contrary couTd have any plausible support. It is only
as the foundation of the action that the court can take notice of the
exhibit. Un less the policy has been executed in some valid manner,
it can not be regarded as a written contract. By its language , in prescribing the form in which it is to be executed, it provides not only
for the affixing of the corporate seal, but also for the signature of the
president and secretary of the corporation . It can not be said to ha,·e
been completely executed according to its own provis ions . At common law , as is well known, a corporation spoke only hy its common
seal. Its contracts were valid only when its seal was affixed by a duly
aut l ~ orizcd :igent, and a sealing was a sufficie nt execution of its deed
without sig ning. " ' here a statute expressly provides that a corpora-

as the foundation of the action that the court can take notice of the

exhibit. Unless the policy has been executed in some valid manner,

it can not be regarded as a written contract. By its language, in pre-

scribing the form in which it is to be executed, it provides not only

for the affixing of the corporate seal, but also for the signature of the

president anil secretaiy of the corporation. It can not be said to have

been completely executed according to its own provisions. At com-

mon law, as is well known, a corporation spoke only by its common

seal. Its contracts were valid only when its seal was affixed by a duly

aut! orized agent, and a sealing was a sufficient execution of its deed

without signing. Where a statute expressly provides that a corpora-

1 Only that part of opinion relating to signing the policy is given.

1 Only
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tion may have and use a common seal, it is but declaratory of an in-

cidental power which a duly organized corporation possessed formerly

at common law and still possesses. But the old common law require-

ment of the use of a seal by a corporation has been discarded, and

where a corporation is merely authorized by statute to have and use a

common seal, it need not use it in the execution of its ordinary con-

tracts. Unless its charter or some statute requires it, a corporation

need not use a seal except where a natural person would be required

to use one; and no particular efficacy attaches now to a seal affixed

to a contract merely because it is the seal of a corporation. Where

it is used it must be affixed by an authorized officer or agent, but it

has no greater effect or higher virtue upon the contract of the corpo-

ration than has the seal of a natural person affixed to his contract.

Our statute, section 454, Burns' R. S. 1894 (450, Horner's R. S.

1897), provides that "there shall be no difference in evidence between

sealed and unsealed writings; and every writing not sealed shall have

the same force and effect that it would have if sealed."

The next section provides: "The execution of an instrument is the
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subscribing and delivering it, with or without affixing a seal."

In this state it is not required by any statute that a policy of insur-

ance issued by a domestic corporation shall be sealed. The provis-

ions of sections 454, 455. Burns' R. S. 1894, above quoted, are ap-

plicable to such a written instrument.

In Peoria, etc., Ins. Co. v. Walser, 22 Ind. 73, the action was

founded on a policy of insurance which was exhibited with the com-

plaint. The policy commenced thus: "The Peoria Marine and Fire

Insurance Company do insure," etc.; and it concluded thus: "In

witness whereof, the president of said insurance company has hereunto

subscribed his name and caused the same to be attested by their secre-

tary, at," etc. "But the same shall not be valid until countersigned

by A. Andrews, agent at," etc. It was countersigned by said agent,

but it was not signed by the president or attested by the secretary.

The complaint was held insufficient on demurrer, because the policy

was but partially executed, and was therefore invalid. In McMillen

v. Terrell, 23 Ind. 163, it was said: "Ordinarily, written obligations

are executed by signing the names of the parties to be hound thereby

at the bottom or close of the instruments. But this mode of execu-

tion is not essential to the validity of the instrument. The law does

not prescribe the particular place where the obligor's name must be

placed; it may be at the beginning or in the body, at the close or

perhaps on the margin of the instrument: but wherever placed, it

must be done with the intention of thereby executing it as the obliga-

tion of the party so signing it. If the signature is placed at the close,

;it the ordinary place of signature, the inference is that it was so placed

as the final execution of the instrument. This inference, however,

does not necessarily arise when the name is found at the commence-

ment or in the body. In such case there should be some evidence,

either in the form of the instrument or the circumstances attending

tion may have and use a common seal, it is but declaratory of an incidental power which a duly organized corporation possessed formerly
at common law and still possesses. But the old common law requirement of the use of a seal by a corporation has been discarded, and
where a corporation is merely authorized by statute to have and use a
common seal, it need not use it in the execution of its ordinary contracts. Unless its charter or some statute requires it, a corporation
need not use a seal except where a natural person would be recp1ircd
to use one; and no particular efficacy attaches now to a seal affixed
to a contract merely because it is the seal of a corporation. Where
it is used it must be affixed by an authorized officer or agent, but it
has no greater effect or higher virtue upon the contract of the corporation than has the seal of a natural person affixed to his contract.
Our statute, section 454, Burns' R. S. 1894 (450, Homer's R. S.
1897), provides that "there shall be no difference in evidence between
sealed· and unsealed writings; and every writing not sealed shall have
the same force and effect that it would have if sealed."
The next section provides: "The execution of an instrument is the
subscribing and delivering it, with or without affixing a seal."
In this state it is not required by any statute that a policy of insurance issued by a domestic corporation shall be sealed. The provisions of sections 454, 455, Burns' R. S. 1894, above quoted, are applicable to such a written instrument.
In Peoria, etc., Ins. Co. v. Walser, 22 Ind. 73, the action was
founded on a policy of insurance \-v hich was exhibited with the complaint. The policy commenced thu s : "The Peoria Marine and Fire
Insurance Company do insure," etc. ; and it concluded thus: "In
witness whereof, the president of said insurance company has hereunto
subscribed his name and caused the same to be attested by their secretary, at," etc. "But the same shall not be valid until counte rsigned
by A. Andrews, agent at," etc. It was countersigned hy said agent,
but it was not signed by the president or attested by the secretary.
The complaint ·was held insufficient on demurrer, hecau ~e the policy
was but partially executed, and was therefore invalid. In l\tlcMillen
v. Terrell, 23 Ind. 163, it was said: "Ordinarily, written obligations
are executed by signing the names of the parties to he hound therehy
at the bottom or close of the instruments. But this mode of execution is note sential to the validity of the ipstrurnent. Th~ law doe
not prescribe the particular place where the obligor' s name must be
placed; it may be at the beginning or in the body, at the close or
perhaps on the margin of the instrument: but wherever placed, it
must he done with the intention of thereby executing it as the obligation of the party so signing it. If the signature is placed at the close,
at the or<linary place of signature, the inference is that it was so placed
as the final execution of the instrument. This inference , however,
does not necessarily arise when the name is found at the commencement or in the body. Tn such case there should be some evidence.
either in the form of the instrument or the circumstances attending

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

1144 GLOBE ACCIDENT INSURANCE CO. V. REID. §342

the signature, showing that it was the intention of the party thereby
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to execute it."

GLOBE ACCIDENT INSURANCE CO. V. REID .

In the Wild Cat Branch v. Ball, 45 Ind. 213, the action was upon

the signature, showing that it was the intention of the party thereby
to execute it."
In the \i\Tild Cat Branch v. Ball, 45 Ind. 2 I 3, the action was upon
a bond exhibited with the complaint, not sealed, containing the name
of the principal in the body, and signed by the sureties, but not signed
by the principal. It was held that the complaint was insufficient as
against the principal on demurrer. The court held that under our
statute a seal was not necessary to the execution or validity of the
bond; and referring to the section of the statute quoted above as section SSS [4SS], Burns' R. S. 1894, said that this section answered the
question as to what was necessary to the valid execution of the instrument,-that it is the subscribing and delivering it. The court was of
the opinion that in construing the statute (which does not prescribe a
signing, but requires a subscribing) it should be regarded as intending
a writing under, at the bottom or at the end of the instrument, and
that though the name o{ the principal in the beginning of the bond
were written there by himself, this could not be regarded as a subscribing, and that he could not be held liable upon any supposition
that he adopted the name at the beginning; that whatever may have
been the rule previously, he was not, according to the statute, bound
by the bond, because he did not subscribe it.
Without regard to this strict constmction nf the statute, we could
not consider the name of the appellant in the beginning of the policy
as the signature of the insurer. Aside from the fact that a c01poration can not sign its own name, which can only be signed by an authorized agent, and aside from all other considerations pertinent to
the subject, the policy at its conclusion indicates that its contemplated
execution was to include signing by the president and secretary at the
end of the instrument, and therefore the name at the beginning was
not intended as the subscribing of the policy.
The statl!te prescribing what constitutes execution of an instrument
can not be ignored. The seal, if not required by some other statute,
is wholly immaterial. It does not constitute a subscribing, and without subscribing as well as delivery, the instrument is not fully executed.
Prather v. Ross, I 7 Ind. 49S ; Nicholson v. Combs, 90 Ind. 5 1 5;
Crumrine v. Estate of Crnmrine, 14 Ind. App. 64x. • • •
R eversed.

a bond exhibited with the complaint, not sealed, containing the name

of the principal in the body, and signed by the sureties, but not signed

by the principal. It was held that the complaint was insufficient as

against the principal on demurrer. The court held that under our

statute a seal was not necessary to the execution or validity of the

bond; and referring to the section of the statute quoted above as sec-

tion 555 [455], Burns' R. S. 1894, said that this section answered the

question as to what was necessaiy to the valid execution of the instru-

ment,—that it is the subscribing and delivering it. The court was of

the opinion that in construing the statute (which does not prescribe a

signing, but requires a subscribing) it should be regarded as intending

a writing under, at the bottom or at the end of the instrument, and

that though the name of the principal in the beginning of the bond

were written there by himself, this could not be regarded as a sub-

scribing, and that he could not be held liable upon any supposition

that he adopted the name at the beginning; that whatever may have

been the rule previously, he was not, according to the statute, bound
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by the bond, because he did not subscribe it.

Without regard to this strict construction ^f the statute, we could

not consider the name of the appellant in the beginning of the policy

as the signature of the insurer. Aside from the fact that a corpora-

tion can not sign its own name, which can only be signed by an au-

thorized agent, and aside from all other considerations pertinent to

the subject, the policy at its conclusion indicates that its contemplated

execution was to include signing by the president and secretary at the

end of the instrument, and therefore the name at the beginning was

not intended as the subscribing of the policy.

The statute prescribing what constitutes execution of an instrument

can not be ignored. The seal, if not required by some other statute,

is wholly immaterial. It does not constitute a subscribing, and with-

out subscribing as well as delivery, the instrument is not fully executed.

Prather v. Ross, 17 Ind. 495; Nicholson v. Combs, 90 Ind. 515;

Crumrine v. Estate of Crumrine, 14 Ind. App. 641. « * •

Reversed.

Note.. See, 1808, Jackson v. "Walsh, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 226; 1825, Decker v.

Freeman, 3 Maine 338; 1830, Lovett v. Steam Saw Mill Ass'n, 6 Paige (N. Y.)

54; 1847, Isham v. Bennington Iron Co., 10 Vt. 230; 1857, Hutcliins v. Bvrnes,

9 Grav (Mass.) 367; 1862, Haven v. Adams, 4 Allen (Mass.) 80; 1873, N. W.

Distilling Co. v. Brant, 69 111. 658, 18 Am. Rep. 631.

But if seal is not present officer's authority must be shown: 1900, Fontana

v. Pacific Can. Co., 129 Cal. 51, 61 Pac. Rep. 580; and at common law sealing

alone was sufficient without signing; 1858, Johnston v. Crawley, 25 Ga. 316,

Note. See, 1808, Jackson v.·Walsb, 3 Johns. (N. Y. ) 226; 18251 Deckerv.
Freema n, 3 Maine 338; 1836, Lovett v. Steam Saw Mill Ass'n, 6 Paige (N. Y.)
54; 1847, Isham v. Bennington Tron Co., 19 Vt. 230; 1857, Hutchins v. Byrnes,
9 Gray ( Mass.) 367; 1862, Haven v. Adams, 4 Allen (Mass.) 80; 1873, N. W.
Distilling Co. v. Brant, 69 Ill. 658, 18 Am. Rep. 631.
Bnt if seal is not present officer's authority roust be shown: 1900, Fontana
v . Pacific Can. Co ., 129 Cal. 51, 61 Pac. Rep. 580; und at common law 11ealing
alon e was sufficie nt without s igning ; 1858, Johnston v. Crawley, 25 Gu. 3 16,
7L Am. Dec. 17::!; and Cook, Corp.,§ 722, Rays the Equitable Life Insurance
Co. now disr.hnrges mortgages by attaching its seal to the discharge without
other signature.
As to til e proper ruethod of signing, see 8Upra, p. 862, !I.OU n· Tho111p .

71 Am. Dec. 173; and Cook, Corp., § 722, says the Equitable Life Insurance

Co. now discharges mortgages by attaching its seal to the discharge without

other signature.

As to the proper method of signing, see supra, p. 802, and IV Thomp.

Corp., § 5090.

Corp., § 50UO.
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RIGHT TO HAVE AND USE A SEAL.

§ 343

(a) Presumptions.

JACKSONVILLE, MAYPORT, PABLO RY. & NAV. CO. v. HOOPER."

Sec. 343.

2.

Sufficiency and effect of a seal.

1896. In the Supreme Court of the United States. 160 U.

(a) Presumptions.

S. Rep. 514-53°-

[Action by Hooper to enforce covenants under a lease of a hotel

to the railway company by plaintiffs. The declaration was in cove-

JACKSONVILLE, MAYPORT, PABLO RY. & NAV. CO. v. HOOPER.1

nant, and an exhibit was attached purporting to be the lease sued

upon, to which the signature of the company was as follows:

"Jacksonville, Mayport, Pablo Railway and Navigation

"Company. [Seal]

18¢. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
S. Rep. 514-530.

IOO

u.

"By Alex. Wallace, President."

The defendant denied it had executed the lease, or that Wallace

had authority to execute it. Decision below for the plaintiff, overrul-

ing defendant's demurrer. Error brought.]

Mr. Justice Shiras. * * * The defendant demurred on sev-

eral grounds, one of which was as follows:

"That attached to the said declaration is a paper purporting to be
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the contract which is the basis of this suit, which paper is alleged to

be a lease between the defendant company and the plaintiffs, and

which paper is referred to in each and every count of said declaration,

and asked and prayed and made a part of said declaration; that each

and every count of same declares in covenant, and yet the same con-

tains on the face thereof and the face of the paper made part thereof

that the said cause of action will not lie because the said paper is not

under seal; that there is no seal of the defendant company to said

paper."

The theory of this demurrer appears to be that there should have

been an averment on the face of the instrument that the seal attached,

on behalf of the company, was its common or corporate seal. How-

ever, there was an averment that the parties had set their hands and

seals to the paper, and the attesting clause alleged that the railroad

company had signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of two

witnesses, who signed their names thereto. On demurrer this was

plainly sufficient.

But it is urged in the third and fourth assignments that it was error

to permit to be put in evidence the certified copy of the lease, as like-

wise the duplicate lease, because they were not shown to be under the

seal of the company, but appeared to be under the private seal of Al-

exander Wallace, the president of the company. But, in the absence

of evidence to the contrary, the scroll or rectangle containing the word

"seal" will be deemed to be the proper and common seal of the

company. A seal is not necessarily of any particular form or figure.

1 Only that part of opinion relating to seal is given.

[Action by Hooper to enforce covenants under a lease of a hotel
to the railway company by pla intiffs. The declaration was in covenant, and an exhibit was attached purporting to be the lease sued
upon, to which th e signature of the company was as follows:
"Jacksonville, M ayp ort, Pablo Railway and Navigation
"Company.
[Seal]
" By Alex. Wallace, President."
The defendant denied it had executed the lease, or that Wall ace
had authority to execute it. Decision below for the plaintiff, overruling defendant's demurrer. Error brought.]
MR. JusTICE SHIRAS. • • • The defendant demurred on several grounds, one of which was as follows:
"That attached to the said d eclaration is a paper purporting to be
the contract which is the basis of this suit, which paper is alleged to
be a lease between the defendant company and the plaintiffs, and
which paper is referred to in each and every count of said declaration,
and asked and prayed and made a p art of s aid declaration; tha t each
and every count of same declares in covenant, and yet the same contains on the face thereof a nd the face of the p aper made part thereof
that the said cause of action will not lie because the said paper is not
under seal; that there is no seal of th e defendant company to said
paper."
The theory of this demurre r appears to be that there should have
been an averment on the face of the instrument that the seal attached,
on behalf of the company, was its common or corporate seal. However, there was an averme nt that the parties had set their h a nds and
seals to thf! paper , and the attesting clause alleged that the ra ilroad
company had s igned , sealed and delivered in the presence of two
witnesses, who signed their na mes thereto . On demurrer this was
pla inly sufficien t.
But it is urged in the third and fourth assignments that it was e rro r
to p ermit to be put in evidence the certified copy of the lease, as likewise the duplicate lease, because they were not shown to b e und e r the
seal of th e company, but appeared to be under the private seal of Alexander Wallace, the preside nt of the company . But, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, the scroll o r rectangle containing the word
"seal" will be d eem ed to be the prope r a nd common seal of the
compa ny. A seal is not n ecessarily of any particular form or figure.
1
Only that part of opinion relating to seal is given.
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In Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How. 472, 474, this court said, through
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Mr. Justice Grier, when discussing an objection that an instrument

JACKSONVILLE, MAYPORT, ETC., CO. V. HOOPER. §

343

read was improperly admitted in evidence because the seal of the cir-

cuit court authenticating the acknowledgment was an impression

In Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How. 472, 474, this court said, through
Mr. Ju tice Gri er, when discussing an objection that an instrnment
read was imprope rly admitted in evidence because the seal of the circuit court authenticating the acknowledgment was an impression
stamped on paper and not "on wax, wafer, or any other adhesive or
tenacious substance," said: "It is the seal which authenticates, and
not the substance on which it is impressed; and where the court can
recognize its identity , they should not be called upon to analyze the
material which exhibits it. Jn Arkansas the presence of wax is not
necessary to give validity to a seal; and the fact that the public officer
in \iVisconsin had not thought proper to use it, was sufficient to raise
the pres umption that such "ms the law or custom in Wisconsin, till
the contrary was proved . It is time that such objections to the validity of seals should cease. The court did not err in overruling the
objections to the deed offered by the plaintiff." Price v. Indsetb,
106 U. S. 546, is to the same effect.
Whether an instrument is under seal or not is a question for the
court upon inspection; whether a mark or character shall be held to
be a seal depends upon the intention of the execut:mt, as shown by
th(· paper. Hacker's Appeal, 121 Pa. St. 192; Pillow v. Roberts,
ub. supra.
The defendant did not produce the original in order that it might
be compared in the particular objected to with the copy and duplicate
offered . The defendant's attorney, Mr. Buckman, was called. and
testified that he was one of the attesting witnesses to the instrument
offered, and that he, as a notary public, took the acknowledgment
thereto of Alexander Wallace, that he executed the same for and in
behalf of the company, and that the said lease was the act and deed
of the defendant company for the uses and purposes therein expressed.
\Vhether, therefore, the in strument put in evidence was merely a
copy, in which event it would not be expected that a wax or stamped
seal of the company would appear upon it, but merely a scroll, representing the original seal, or whether the so-called copy was really the
original paper, as certified by one of defendant' s witnesses, would
not, in our opinion, be material. The pres umption would be, if the
paper were a copy, that the original was duly sca led , or, if it were
the original, that the scroll was adopted and u sed by the company as
its sea l, for the purpose of executing the contract in question. • • •
Atfirmcd.

stamped on paper and not "on wax, wafer, or any other adhesive or

tenacious substance," said: "It is the seal which authenticates, and

not the substance on which it is impressed; and where the court can

recognize its identity, they should not be called upon to analyze the

material which exhibits it. In Arkansas the presence of wax is not

necessary to give validity to a seal; and the fact that the public officer

in Wisconsin had not thought proper to use it, was sufficient to raise

the presumption that such was the law or custom in Wisconsin, till

the contrary was proved. It is time that such objections to the valid-

ity of seals should cease. The court did not err in overruling the

objections to the deed offered by the plaintiff." Price v. Indseth,

106 U. S. 546, is to the same effect.

Whether an instrument is under seal or not is a question for the

court upon inspection; whether a mark or character shall be held to

be a seal depends upon the intention of the executant, as shown by

the paper. Hacker's Appeal, 121 Pa. St. 193; Pillow v. Roberts,
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ub. supra.

The defendant did not produce the original in order that it might

be compared in the particular objected to with the copy and duplicate

offered. The defendant's attorney, Mr. Buckman, was called, and

testified that he was one of the attesting witnesses to the instrument

offered, and that he, as a notaiy public, took the acknowledgment

thereto of Alexander Wallace, that he executed the same for and in

behalf of the company, and that the said lease was the act and deed

of the defendant company for the uses and purposes therein expressed.

Whether, therefore, the instrument put in evidence was merely a

copy, in which event it would not be expected that a wax or stamped

seal of the company would appear upon it, but merely a scroll, repre-

senting the original seal, or whether the so-called copy was really the

original paper, as certified by one of defendant's witnesses, would

not, in our opinion, be material. The presumption would be, if the

paper were a copy, that the original was duly sealed, or, if it were

the original, that the scroll was adopted and used by the company as

its seal, for the purpose of executing the contract in question. * * *

Affirmed.

Note. As to the sufficiency of the seal, it seems that any device adopted

by tlie corporation for the purpose will be sufficient: 1826, Perrv v. Price, 1

Mo. 604, 14 Am. Dec. 316; 1839, Kinzie v. Chicago, 2 Pcam. fill.) 187,33 Am.

Dec. 443; 1848, Brinlev v. Maun, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 337,48 Am. Dec. 669;

1858, Johnson v. Crawley. 25 Ga. 316, 71 Am. Dee. 173; 1868. Royal Bank v.

Grand .Tunc, etc., Co., 100 Mass. 444, 97 Am. Dec. 115; 1889, Penn. Nat. Gaa

Co. v. Cook, 123 Pa. St. 170; 1895, Sanniento v. Davis Boat, Co.. 105 Mich.

300, 55 Am. St. Rep. 446; 1897, Thaver v. Nehalem Mill Co., 31 Ore. 437, 51

Pac Kep. 202; 1899, Ellison v. Branstrator, 153 Ind. 146, 54 N. E. Rep. 433.

Note. As to the .•tt.tflciency of th e seal, it seems that a ny device adopted
by the corporation for the pmpose will he s ufficient: 1826, Perry v. Price, 1
Mo. 664, H Am. Dl'c·. ~JG; l8.1H, Kinzie v . Chieago, 2 Sram . <Ill.) 187, a3 Am.
De~. 4-!3; 18-18, Brin l e ~· v. ?\faun, 2 Cush . (~tnss.) ~::>7, ·18 Am. Dec. 669;
1858, John son v. Crnwley. 25 Ga. 3 1ti, 71 Am. D ec . 173 ; 18fi8, Royal Bank v.
G rand .Tune., etc., Co., 100 )lass. 444, 97 Am. Dec. 115; 1889, Penn. Nat. Gila
Co. v. Cook, 123 Pa. St. 170; 189.'), Rarmiento v. Davis Bont Co .. 10..'i Mich.
300, 5!) Am. St. Rli'p. -146 ; 1897, Thayer v. Nehalem Mill Co., ~1 Ore. 437 ..n
Pac. l{e p. 202; 1899. E llisou v. Brunstrntor, 153 lnll. 146, 54 N. E. Rep. 433.
If the seal alone is pre!!e n t, it must be proved to be the corporate senli t does not prove i tself: 1800, Den v. Vreeland, 2 Haist. ( N. J.) 352, 11 Am .

If the seal alone is present, it must be proved to be the corporate seal-

it does not prove itself: 1800, Den v. Vreeland, 2 Halst. (N. J.) 352, 11 Am.
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Dee. 551; 1820, Berks Turnpike Road v. Myers, 6 S. & R. 12, 9 Am. Dec.
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402; 1826, Perry v. Price, 1 Mo. 604, 14 Am. Dec. 316.

But if the contract is shown to have been executed by the proper officers

with authority, any seal present will be presumed to be the corporate seal:

1852, Susquehanna, etc., Co. v. General Co., 3 Md. 305, 56 Am. Dec. 740;

1855, Phillips v. Coffee, 17 111. 154, 63 Am. Dec. 357; 1867, Musser v. John-

son, 42 Mo. 74, 97 Am. Dec. 316; 1894, Benbow v. Cook, 115 N. C. 324, 44 Am.

St. Rep. 454.

See next case and note.

Sec. 344. (b) As evidence of agents' or officers' authority.

LITTLE SAW MILL VALLEY TURNPIKE or PLANK ROAD COM-

Dec. 5.51; 1820, Berks Turnpike Road v. Myers, 6 S . & R. 12, 9 Am. Dec.
402; 182ti, Perry v. Price, 1 Mo. 66-t , 14 Am. Dec. 3 16.
But if the contract is shown to have been exec-uted by lbe proper officers
with a,uthority, any seal present .will be Rresumect to b_e Lbe corporate seal:
1&52, Susquehanna, etc., Co. v. Genernl C11., 3 ~Id. 30a, 56 Am. Dec. 740;
1855, Phillips v. Coffee, 17 Ill . 154, 63 Am. Dec. 357; 1867, Musser v. Johnson, 42 Mo. 74, 97 Am. Dec. 316; 1894, Benbow v. Cook, 115 N. C. 324, 44 Am.
St. Rep. 454.
See next case and note.

PANY v. FEDERAL STREET and PLEASANT VALLEY PASSEN-

GER RAILWAY CO.1

1899. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 194 Pa. St.

Rep. 144, 75 Am. St. R. 690.

[Action by road company upon a contract made with it by the

president of the railway company, whereby the latter guaranteed to

See. 344.

(b) As evidence of agents' or officers' authority.

LITTLE SAW MILL VALLEY TURNPIKE oa PLANK ROAD COMP ANY v. FEDERAL STREET AND PLEASANT VALLEY PASSENGER RAILWAY C0. 1

pay annually to the road company any deficiency in its tolls, due to

the change of the motive power of the railway company using the

1899.
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road, from horse power to electricity.]

Brown, J. * * * It is insisted, however, that the railroad

company was not bound by the contract, because it was made by the

president without authority from the corporation or its board of di-

rectors. It is signed by the president. The corporate name attached

was apparently in the handwriting of the secretary, and the common

seal was affixed. Neither officer was called to deny authority to act,

and the presumption was that it had been given. The maxim, Omnia

fraesumuntur rite esse acta, applies to acts done on behalf of cor-

porations, and it can never be presumed that a corporate agent is act-

ing wrongfully; or that an act which might have been a proper act to

do on behalf of the corporation was done under circumstances render-

ing it improper: Taylor on Private Corporations, section 204.

"Where a party deals with a corporation in good faith—the transac-

tion is not ultra vires—and he is unaware of any defect of authority

or other irregularity on the part of those acting for the corporation,

and there is nothing to excite suspicion of such defect or irregularity,

the corporation is bound by the contract, althaugh such defect or

irregularity in fact exists. If the contract can be valid under any cir-

cumstances, an innocent party in such a case has a right to presume

their existence, and the corporation is estopped to deny them." Mer-

chants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 644. "When the common

seal of a corporation appears to be affixed to an instrument, and the

signatures of the proper officers are proved, the courts are to presume

that the officers did not exceed their authoritv, and the seal itself is

prima facie evidence that it was affixed by proper authority." Angell

and Ames on Corporations, section 224. The second point submitted

1 Statement abridged. Only the part relating to the effect of the corporate

seal is given.

IN THE SuPRF.ME CouRT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Rep. 144, 75 Am. St. R. 690.

194 Pa. St.

[Action by road company upon a contract made with it by the
president of the railway company, whereby the latter guaranteed to
pay annually to the road company any deficiency in its tolls, due to
the change of the motive power of the railway company using the
road, from horse power to electricity.]
BROWN, J. • • • It is insisted, however, that the railroad
company was not bound by the contract, because it was ma<le by the
president without autnority from the corporation or its board of directors. It is signed by the pres ident. The corporate name attached
was apparently in the handwriting of the secretary, and the common
seal was affixed. Neither officer was called to deny authority to act,
and the presumption was that it h ad been given. The m axim, Omn£a
praesumuntur ri'te esse acta, applies to acts done on behalf of corporations, and it can never be presumed that a corporate agent is acting wrongfully; or that an act which might have been a proper act to
d o on b ehalf of the corporation was done under ci:rcumstances rendering it improper: T aylor o n Private Corporations, section 204.
"Where a p a rty deals with a corporation in good faith-the transaction is not ultra vfres-and he is unaware of any defect of authority
or other irregul a rity on the p art of those acting for the corporation,
and there is nothing to excite su ·picion of such d efect or irregu la rity,
the corporation is bound by the contract, a Ith nigh such defect or
irregu larity in fact exists. If the contract can be valid under any circumstances, an innocent party in such a case has a right to presume
their existence, and the corporatio n is estopped to d eny them." M erch ants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 \Vall. 644. " 1When the common
seal of a corporation appears to be nffixed to an instrume nt, and the
signatures of the proper officers are proved, the courts are to presume
that the officers did not exceed the ir authoritv, and the seal itself is
prima fade evidence that it was affixed by proper authority ." Angell
and Ames o n Corporations, section 224 . The second point submitted
1 StatemPnt abridged.
Only the part relating to tl.Je effect of tl.Je corporate
s~al is given.
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by defendant was properly refused. The second and third assign-

MAYOR V. THE NORFOLK RAILWAY COMPANY.

ments of error are overruled and the judgment affirmed.

§ 345

Note. The presence of the corporate seal is prima facie evidence of the

agent's authority to act for the corporation, and to affix the seal, and also

by defendant was properly refused. The second and third assignments of error are overruled and the judgment affirmed.

that the corporation has taken the necessary steps to authorize the contract

to be entered into: 1820, Berk's Turnpike Road v. Myers, (i Serg. & R. 12, 9

Note. The presence of the corporate seal is prima facit' evidence of the
agP,nt's authority to act for tbe corporation, and to affix the seal, and also
that the corporation has taken the necessary steps to authorize the contract
to be e ntered into: 1820, Berk's Turnpike Road v. Myers, 6 8erg. & R. 12, 9
Am. Dec, 402; 1832, Leggett v. 'ew Jersey, etc., Co., 1 Saxton Cb. <N. J.)
541, 23 Am. Dec. 728; 1833, Gordon v. Preston, 1 Watts (Pa.) 385. 26 Am.
Dec. 75; 1839, Kinzie v. Chicago, etc., 2 Scam. {Ill.) 187, 33 Am. Dec. 443;
1840, Burrill v . Nahant Bank, 2 Met. 163, 35 Am. Dec. 395; 1&59, St. Louis
Pub. Schools v. Risley, 28 Mo. 415. 75 Am. Dec. 131; 1863, Koehler v. Black
River Falls, etc .. Co., 2 Black 715; 1867. M11sser v. Johnson, 42 Mo. 74, 97
Am. Dec. H16; 1867, Sheehan v. Davis, Ii Ohio St. 571; 1869, Mine r's Ditch
Co. v. Ze ll erbach, 37 Cal. 543, 99 Am. Dec. 300; 1874, Central Nat'l Bank v.
Charlotte, etc., R ., 5 8. C. 156, 22 Am. R e p. 12; 1890, Sherman. etc., Co. v.
Swigart, 43 Kan. 2\J2, 19 Am. St. R ep. 137; 1891, Mullanphy Sav. Bank v.
Schott, 13-5 Ill . 6,')!), 25 Am. St. R ep. 401; 1804, Benbow v. Cook, 115 N. C. 324,
44 Am. St. Rep. 454; 1895, B. S. Green Co. v. Blodgett, 159 Ill. 169, 50 Am.
St. Rep. 146, 11ote 150; 189H. Ellison v. Branstrator, 153 Ind. 146; 1900, In re
West .Jersey Trnct. Co., 59 N. J. Eq. 63, 45 At!. Rep. 282; Contra, 1898, Morrison v. Wilder Gas Co., 9L ~aine 492, 64 Am. St. Rep. 257-but see note
here, p. 260.
The corporation can be shown to have no authority to make the contract:
1832, Leggett v. New Jersey, etc., Co., 1 Saxton Ch. (N. J.) 541, 23 Am. Dee.
728; 1866, Conine v. Junction R. Co., 3 Roust. 288, 89 Am. Dec. 230.
So, too, the agent's authority may be questioned: 1845, Gibson v. Goldthwaite, 7 Ala. 281, 42 Am. Dec. 592; 1876, Luse v. Isthmas, etc., Co., 6 Ore.
25 Am. Rep. 506.

Am. Dec, 402; 1832, Leggett v. New Jersey, etc., Co., 1 Saxton Ch. (N. J.)

541, 23 Am. Dec. 728; 1833, Gordon v. Preston, 1 Watts (Pa.) 385, 26 Am.

Dec. 75; 1839, Kinzie v. Chicago, etc., 2 Seam. (.111.) 187 , 33 Am. Dec. 443;

1840, Burrill v. Nahant Bank, 2 Met. 163, 35 Am. Dec. 395; 1859, St. Louis

Pub. Schools v. Risley, 28 Mo. 415, 75 Am. Dec. 131; 1863, Koehler v. Black

River Falls, etc., Co., 2 Black 715; 1867. Musser v. Johnson, 42 Mo. 74, 97

Am. Dec. 316; 1867, Sheehan v. Davis. 17 Ohio St. 571; 1869, Miner's Ditch

Co. v. Zellerbach,37 Cal. 543, 99 Am. Deo. 300; 1874, Central Nat'l Bank v.

Charlotte, etc., R., 5 S. C. 156, 22 Am. Rep. 12; 1890, Sherman, etc., Co. v.

Swigart, 43 Kan. 292. 19 Am. St. Rep. 137; 1891, Mullanphv Sav. Bank v.

Schott, 135 111. 655, 25 Am. St. Rep. 401 ; 1894, Benbow v. Cook, 115 N. C. 324,

44 Am. St. Rep. 454; 1895, B. S. Green Co. v. Blodgett, 159 111. 169, 50 Am.

St. Rep. 146, note 150; 1899, Ellison v. Branstrator, 153 Ind. 146; 1900, In re

West Jersey Tract. Co., 59 N. J. Eq. 63, 45 Atl. Rep. 282; Contra, 1898, Mor-
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rison v. Wilder Gas Co., 91 Maine 492, 64 Am. St. Rep. 257—but see note

here, p. 260.

The corporation can be shown to have no authority to make the contract:

1832, Leggett v. New Jersey, etc., Co., 1 Saxton Ch. (N. J.) 541, 23 Am. Dec.

728; 1866, Conine v. Junction R. Co., 3 Houst. 288, 89 Am. Dec. 230.

So, too, the agent's authority mav be questioned: 1845, Gibson v. Gold-

thwaite, 7 Ala. 281, 42 Am. Dec. 592; 1876, Luse v. Isthmus, etc., Co., 6 Ore.

25 Am. Rep. 506.

Sec. 345. (c) As evidence of a consideration.

LORD CAMPBELL, C. J., IN THE MAYOR, Etc., OF NORWICH v. THE

NORFOLK RAILWAY COMPANY.

1855. In the Queen's Bench. 83 Eng. C. L. (4 El. & Bl.)

Sec. 345.

Rep. "367, on *443-6.

( c) As evidence of a consideration.

[Action against the railway company on a covenant under their

LORD CAMPBELL, C. J., IN THE MAYOR, ETC., OF NORWICH v. THE
NORFOLK RAILWAY COMPANY.

seal to pay ^1,000 in case certain works were not completed, whether

a certain act of parliament should be obtained or not, as agreed under

seal. It was averred that the works were not completed, though

IN

plaintiff had performed all conditions precedent.]

Although the agreement be under seal, we may examine to see

82 Eng. C. L. (4 El. & Bl.)
Rep. *367, on •443-6.

THE QUEEN'S BENCH.

whether there was any, and what consideration for the contract to pav

[Action aiainst the railway company on a covenant under their
seal to pay£, I ,ooo in case certain works were not completed, whether
a certain act of parliament should be obtained or not, as agreed under
senl. It was averred that the works were not completed, though
plaintiff had performed all conditions precedent. J
Although the agreement be under seal, we may examine to ee
whether there was any, and what consideration for the contnct to pay
money, when we are to determine whether the contract was or was
not u.ltra vt'res. The m ere circum . tance of a covenant by directors
in the name of the company being ultra vires, as between them and
the shareholders, does not necessarily disentitle the covenantce to ue
upon it. For example, if the directors o f a railway company were
to enter into a contract und er the seal of the company for the purchase
of a large quantity of iron rails and to pay for them at a fixed price,
as the vendor had reasonnble ground for uppo~ ing that the rails were
wanted for the purpose of the railroad, it would be no defense to an

money, when we are to determine whether the contract was or was

not ultra vires. The mere circumstance of a covenant by directors

in the name of the company being ultra vires, as between them and

the shareholders, does not necessarily disentitle the covenantee to sue

upon it. For example, if the directors of a railway company were

to enter into a contract under the seal of the company for the purchase

of a large quantity of iron rails and to pay for them at a fixed price,

;is the vendor had reasonable ground for supposing that the rails were

wanted for the purpose of the railroad, it would be no defense to an
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notion for the price, or for not accepting them, that the rails were
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illegally purchased on speculation, to be resold by the directors for

their own profit. But suppose that the directors of a railway com-

pany should purchase a thousand gross of green spectacles, as a specu-

lation, and should put the seal of the company to a deed covenanting

to pay for these goods, here would be a clear excess of authority on

the part of the directors; this excess of authority would necessarily

be known to the covenantee; and, he being in pari delicto, I conceive

that the maxim would apply potior est conditio possidentis. This

would be an illegal contract to misapply the funds of the company;

and the illegality might be set up as a defense. So, if, without any

consideration whatever, the directors of a railway company were to

put the company's seal to a deed covenanting to pay a mere stranger

^1,000, this would be ultra vires, to the knowledge of the covenan-

tee, and he could not maintain an action to recover the ^1,000 from

the funds of the company in fraud of the shareholders. When the

excess of authority, with the knowledge of both parties, is shown

by plea, this joint violation of the law, I apprehend, is a bar to the
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action.

It has been contended, I am aware, that the deeds of such com-

panies are to be treated like the deeds of individuals or of common

partnerships. But there seems to be an essential distinction between

them. The individual may do what he likes with his own, and he

mav bind himself by a deed disposing of his property, however

capriciously, and without any consideration, so that no fraud has been

practiced upon him. In such a case, want of consideration is imma-

terial; no one is injured, and there is no illegality to be pleaded. "To

look upon a railway company," says Lord Langdale, in Coleman v.

Eastern Counties Railway Company, 10 Beav. 1, 14, "in the light of

a common partnership, and as subject to no greater vigilance than

common partnerships are, would, I think, be greatly to mistake the

functions which they perform, and the powers which they exercise of

interference, not only with the public, but with the private rights of

all individuals in this realm. We are to look to these powers as given

to them, in consideration of a benefit which, notwithstanding all other

sacrifices, it is to be presumed and hoped, on the whole, will be ob-

tained by the public;" "and I am clearly of opinion, that the powers

which are given by an act of parliament like that now in question,

extend no farther than is expressly stated in the act, or is necessarily

and properly required for carrying into effect the undertaking and

works which the act has expressly sanctioned." The same learned

judge, in answer to an argument that the directors may apply the

funds of the company as they please, so that their object is to increase

the traffic upon the railway, and thereby to increase the profits of the

shareholders, exclaims, "surely that has nowhere been stated; there

is no authority for saying anything of that kind." "Unless acts so

done can be proved to be in conformity with the powers giyen by the

statutes under which those acts are done, they furnish no authority

whatever."

action for the price, or for not accepting them, that the rails were
illegally purchased on speculation, to be resold by the directors for
their own profit. But suppose that the directors of a railway comyany should purchase a thousand gross of green spectacles, as a speculation, and should put the seal of the company to a deed covenanting
to pay for these go:><ls, here would be a clear excess of authority on
the part of the directors; this excess of authority would necessarily
be known to the covenantee; and, he being in pari dclt'cto, I conceive
that the maxim would apply pott'or est conditt'o possidentt's. This
would be an illegal contract to misapply the funds of the company;
and the illegality might be set up as a defense. So, if, without any
consideration whatever, the directors of a railway company were to
put the company's seal to a deed covenanting to pay a mere stranger
£1 ,000, this would be ultra vfres, to the knowledge of the covenantee, and he could not maintain an action to recover the £1,000 from
the funds of the company in fraud of the shareholders. \Vhen the
excess of authority, with the knowledge of both parties, is shown
by plea, this joint violation of the law, I apprehend, is a bar to the
action.
It has been contended, I am aware, that the deeds of such companies are to be treated like the deeds of individuals or of common
partnerships. But there seems to be an essential distinction between
them. The individual may do what he likes with his own, and he
may bind himself by a deed disposing of his property, however
capriciously, and without any consideration, so that no fraud has been
practiced ·upon him. In such a case, want of consideration is immaterial; no one is injured, and there is no illegality to be pleaded. "To
look upon a railway company," says Lord Langdale, in Coleman v.
Eastern Counties Railway Company, 10 Beav. 1, 14, "in the light of '
a common partnership, and as subject to no greater vigilance than
common partnerships are, would, I think, be greatly to mistake the
functions which they perform, and the powers which they exercise of
interference, not only with the public, but with the private rights of
all individuals in this realm. We are to look to these powers as given
to them, in consideration of a benefit which, notwithstanding all other
sacrifices, it is to be presumed and hoped, on the whole, will be obtained by the public;" "and I am clearly of opinion, that the powers
which are given by an act of parliament like that now in question,
extend no farther than is expressly stated in the act, or is necessarily
and properly required for carrying into effect the undertaking and
works which the act has expressly sanctioned." The same learned
judge, in answer to an argument that the directors may apply the
funds of the company as they please, so that their object is to increase
the traffic upon the railway, and thereby to increase the profits of the
shareholders, exclaims, "surely that has nowhere been stated; there
is no authority for saying anything of that kind." "Unless acts so
done can be proved to be in conformity with the powers given by the
statutes under which those acts are done, they furni sh no au thority
whatever."
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The equity reports abound with cases in which injunctions have

been granted against the application of the funds of such companies

1150

to purposes not authorized by the acts of parliament creating them,

CHASE NATIONAL BANK V. B . C. FAUROT.

although professedly for the benefit of the shareholders: and I appre-

The equity reports abound with cases in which injunctions have
been granted against the application of the funds of such companies
to purposes not authorized by the acts of parliament creating them,
although professedly for the benefit of the shareholders: and I apprehend that a contract, against the performance of which an injunction
would be granted in equity, must he considererl illegal and void at
law, on proof that, to the knowledge of both pa1ties, it is beyond the
power of the directors, and leads to a misapplication of the funds
of the company. On this principle proceeded the solemn deci sion of
the court of common pleas in The East Anglian Railways Company
v. The Eastern Counties Railway Company, 11 Com. B. 775 (E. C.
L. R., vol. 73), where a railway company having, by a deed under
their seal, covenanted with another railway company to take a lease
of their railway, and to pay the expenses incuned py them in oliciting certain bills in parliament, which were then pending, whether
these bills should pass into law or not, and the bills not having
been obtained, the covenantees sought to recover the amount of these
costs. It was decided that the covenantors had a limited authority,
and were a corporation only for making and maintaining the railwiiy
sanctioned by their act, and that the funds of the company could only
be applied to these purposes; so that, as the contract sued upon was
not justified by the act of parliament, it was consequently void, and
could not be made the foundation of an action.

hend that a contract, against the performance of which an injunction

would be granted in equity, must be considered illegal and void at

law, on proof that, to the knowledge of both parties, it is beyond the

power of the directors, and leads to a misapplication of the funds

of the company. On this principle proceeded the solemn decision of

the court of common pleas in The East Anglian Railways Company

v. The Eastern Counties Railway Company, 11 Com. B. 775 (E. C.

L. R., vol. 73), where a railway company having, by a deed under

their seal, covenanted with another railway company to take a lease

of their railway, and to pay the expenses incurred by them in solicit-

ing certain bills in parliament, which were then pending, whether

these bills should pass into law or not, and the bills not having

been obtained, the covenantees sought to recover the amount of these

costs. It was decided that the covenantors had a limited authority,

and were a corporation only for making and maintaining the railway

sanctioned by their act, and that the funds of the company could only
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be applied to these purposes; so that, as the contract sued upon was

not justified by the act of parliament, it was consequently void, and

could not be made the foundation of an action.

Note. See contra, 1868, Royal Bank of Liverpool v. Grand June., etc., Co.,

100 Mass. 444,97 Am. Dec. 115; and compare, 1879, Best v.Thiel, 79 N. Y. 15;

1895, Taft v. Church, 162 Mass. 527.

Sec. 346. (d) Upon a negotiable instrument.

CHASE NATIONAL BANK, Respondent, v. B. C. FAUROT, Appellant.1

1896. In the Court of Appeals of New York. 149 N. Y.

Rep. 532-539, 35 L. R. A. 605.

Note. See contra, 1868, Royal Bank of Liverpool v. Grand June., etc., Co.,
100 M11ss. 444,97 Am. Dec.115; and compare, 1879, Bestv.Thiel, 79 N. Y.15;
1895, Taft v. Church, 162 Mass. 527.

Bartlett, J. The plaintiff seeks to recover of defendant as in-

dorser of a promissory note for $16,787.02, signed "New York Con-

struction Company, by T. P. Graf, secretary."

Impressed upon the face of the note were the words "New York

Construction Company, seal." The note did not recite a seal and no

effort was made at the trial to prove the seal, or that it was affixed by

Sec. 346. ( d) Upon a negotiable instrument.

authority of the "New York Construction Company," save reading

the note in evidence. The note was executed and payable in the

state of Ohio and the contract of indorsement was made in the state

CHASE NATIONAL BANK,

RESPONl>KNT,

v. B.

c.

FAUROT, APPELLANT.

l

of New York. The facts upon this appeal are undisputed, and the

plaintiff's counsel insists that the seal on the note in suit was not

1896.

proved within the rule laid down by this court in Weeks v. Esler

IN

THR COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.

149

N. Y.

Rep. 532-539, 35 L. R. A. 6o5.

1 Part of opinion on another point omitted.

BARTLETT, J.
The plaintiff seeks to recover of defendant as indorser of a promissory note for $16,787.02, signed "New York Construction Company, by T. P. Graf, secretary."
Impregsed upon the face of the note were the words "New York
Construction Company, seal.'' The note did not recite a sea l and no
effo1t was made at the trial to prove the seal, or that it was affixed by
authority of the "New York Construction Company," save reading
the note in evidence. The note wns executed and payable in the
state of Ohio and the contract of indorsement was made in the state
of New York. The facts upon this appeal are undisputed , and the
plaintiff's counsel insists that the sea l on the note in suit was not
proved within the rule laid down by this court in Weeks v. Esler
1
Part of opinion on another point omitted.
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(143 N. Y. 374): that a note is negotiable, and having been pur-
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chased in good faith and before maturity, as found by the jury, the
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recovery below must be sustained.

The defendant's counsel, while admitting that the rule in Weeks v.

Esler is opposed to certain of his contentions on this appeal, urges

with much earnestness and ability that this court should reconsider

the doctrines of that case; he also argues that even assuming the note

to be negotiable in form, it never had a legal inception, and defend-

ant is not liable as indorser.

We held in Weeks v. Esler that the presumption attaching ordi-

narily to seals of corporations when affixed to deeds or other instru-

ments did not exist as to the promissory notes of a corporation, and that

in the absence of any recital that the seal of the corporation was af-

fixed and of any evidence to show the fact of sealing, or that the

corporate seal was impressed, or that it was the corporate seal, the

notes could not be regarded as sealed instruments.

We think this rule a reasonable one in view of the vast business

transactions of corporations, and see no occasion to reconsider it.

In the case at bar we shall assume for the purposes of this appeal
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that the note in suit was a sealed instrument, and will place our de-

cision on broader grounds than those laid down in Weeks v. Esler.

In view of the law as settled by this court and the courts of other

jurisdictions as to what instruments are negotiable, we hold that the

commercial paper of a corporation negotiable in form does not lose

the quality of negotiability by having attached thereto the corporate

seal.

The following are a few of the cases showing the evolution of the

modern doctrine that a seal does not deprive corporate obligations of

negotiability:

Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome (19 N. Y. 20). The village

had issued bonds under its corporate seal in aid of a railroad com-

pany, and the latter sold certain of them to a bona Jide holder, and

the question was whether the purchaser was subject to a defense avail-

able against the railroad company.

Comstock, J., said: "The bonds were payable to bearer, and

although under the corporate seal of the village, they were negotiable

instruments in such a sense as would exempt them, in the hands of a

bona Jide holder, from a defense which might be available against

the railroad company." (Citing State of Illinois v. Delafield. 8

Paige 527; State of Illinois v. Delafield on appeal, 2 Hill 159, 177;

Mechanics' Bank v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 13 N. Y. 625, 627;

Morris Canal & B. Co. v. Fisher, 3 Am. L. Reg. 423.)

Brainerd v. New York & Harlem Railroad Company (25 N. Y.

496). It was held that the bond of a railroad corporation, payable

to an individual or his assigns, is in the nature of commercial paper,

negotiable by delivery under an assignment in blank, and not a

specialty subject to equities between the corporation and the person

named in the bond as the primary payee.

Denio, Ch. J., said: "The questions of law which the appeal

( 143 N. Y. 374): that a note is negotiable, and having been purchased in good faith and before maturity, as found by the jury, the
recovery below must be sustaine<l.
The defendant's counsel, while admitting that the rule in Weeks v.
Esler is opposed to certain of his contentions on this appeal, urges
with much earnestness and ability th at this court should reconsider
the doctrines of that case; he also argues that even assuming the nol'e
to be negotiable in form, it never had a legal inception, and defendant is not liable as indorser.
We held in Weeks v. Esler that the presumption attaching ordinarily to seals of corporations when affixed to deeds or other instruments did not exist as to the promissory notes of a corporation, and that
in the absence of any recital that the seal of the corporation was affixed and of any evidence to show the fact of sealing, or that the
corporate seal was impressed, or that it was the corporate seal, the
notes could not be regarded as sealed instruments.
We think this rule a reasonable one in view of the vast business
transactions of corporations, and see no occasion to reconsider it.
In the case at bar we shall assume for the purposes of this appeal
that the note in suit was a sealed instrument, and will place our decision on broader grounds than those laid <lown in Weeks v. Esler.
In view of the law as settled by this court and the courts of other
jurisdictions as to what instruments are negotiable, we hold that the
commercial paper of a corporation negotiable in form does not lose
the quality of negotiability by having attached thereto the corporate
seal.
The following are a few of the cases showing the evolution of the
modern doctrine that a seal does not deprive corporate obligations of
negotiability:
Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome ( 19 N. Y. 20). The village
had issued bonds under its corporate seal in aid of a railroad company, and the .latter sold certain of them to a bona fide holder, and
the question was whether the purchaser was subject to a defense available against the railroad company.
Comstock, J., said: "The bonds were payable to bearer, and
although under the corporate seal of the village, they were negotiable
instruments in such a sense as would exempt them, in the hands of a
bona fide holder, from a defense which might be available against
the railroad company." (Citing State of Illinois v. Delafidd, 8
Paige 527; State of Illinois v. Delafield on appeal, 2 Hill I 59, 177;
Mechanics' Bank v. N. Y. & N. H. R.R. Co., 13 N. Y. 625, 627;
Morris Canal & B. Co. v. Fisher, 3 Am. L. R eg. 423. )
Brainerd v. New York & Harlem Railroad Company (25 N. Y.
496). It was held that the bond of a railroad corporation. payable
to an individual or his assigns, is in the nature of commercial paper,
negotiable by delivery under an assignment in blank, and not a
specialty subject to equities between the corporation and the person
named in the bond as the primary payee.
Denio, Ch. J., said: "The questions of law which the appeal
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presents are, whether these instruments are commercial paper, so as
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to be negotiable, and whether they were legally negotiated by deliv-
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ery under the blank assignment. These might have been very grave

questions in this state a few years ago. But they have been

presents are, whether these instruments are commercial paper, so as
to be negotiable, and whether they were legally negotiated by delivery under the blank assignment. These might have been very grave
questions in this state a few years ago.
But they have been
settled against the defendant in this state by a series of decisions
which it is impossible at this day to depart from. • • • The
point of objection, when it is sought to bring such securities within
the law of commercial paper, is that, being under seal, they are dee<l •
and commercial instruments are simple contracts. But when such
obligations are issued to secure the payment of money upon time, and
contain on their face an expression showing that they are expected to
pass from one person to another, and thu s to perform the office of h iils
and notes or of money, as the word · 'bearer,' or 'as~ ig-ns.' or •holder.'
or the like, the courts of this country, with a single cxcq>liun, a nd th o,,·
of this state, without any exception. have concurred in ;1ttaching to them
the attributes of commercial paper." (See cases cited in this opinion.)
This case also laid down the rule that no distinction could be mad e
between private corporations and those which are created for governmental or municipal purposes.
.
Dinsmore v. Duncan (57 N. Y. 573). It was held that the negotiability of a United States treasury note is not strained or affected hy
the fact that it is under the treasury seal.
Dwight, C. , said: "There are se\·eral olijections urged to th e
negotiability of this instrument. One is, that it is under the seal 11f
the United States trea sury. There are, no doubt, decisions that an
instrument under seal is not negotiable. These cases refer to private
obligations between inJivi<luals . (Clark,.. Farmers' \Voolen Manufacturing Co., 15 \iVend. 256: Steele'" Oswego Co~ton Manufacturing Company, 15 Wend. 265.) They are not to be extended to the
case of public securities like those issued by the government, and intended to seek for a market throughout the civilized world. The
seal was not placed there to restrain their negotiability, but rather to
stamp them as genuine, wherever they might be in circulation."
Evertson v. National Bank of Newport (66 N. Y. 14) holds interest coupons of railroad bonds payable to bearer at a specified time
and place are negotiable promisesfor the payment of money. (See
cases there cited.)
Marine, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Bradley ( 105 U.S. 175) was the case of
an instrument issued by a South Carolina corporation under seal agreeing to pay a ce1tain sum of money, and by an indorsement under seal
the company agreed, in consideration of forbearance, to pay a higher
rate of interest on the money to bearer.
Mr. Justice Matthews, passing upon the validity of the indorsement,
said: "It is a negotiable note within the meaning of the law merchant, according to the law of the place of the contract, notwithstanding it is an instrument under seal" (p. 180).
In Mercer County v. H acket ( 1 Wall. 83), the United States
supreme court held county bonds under seal to be negotiable instru-

settled against the defendant in this state by a series of decisions

which it is impossible at this day to depart from. * * * The

point of objection, when it is sought to bring such securities within

the law of commercial paper, is that, being under seal, they are deeds,

and commercial instruments are simple contracts. But when such

obligations are issued to secure the payment of money upon time, and

contain on their face an expression showing that they are expected to

pass from one person to another, and thus to perform the office of hiils

and notes or of money, asthe words 'bearer,' or 'assigns,' or 'holder.*

or the like, the courts of this country, with a single exception, and thoxo

of this state, without any exception, have concurred in attaching to them

the attributes of commercial paper." (See cases cited in this opinion.)

This case also laid down the rule that no distinction could be made

between private corporations and those which are created for govern-

mental or municipal purposes.

Dinsmore v. Duncan (57 N. Y. 573). It was held that the nego-
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tiability of a United States treasury note is not strained or affected by

the f:ict that it is under the treasury seal.

Dwight, C, said: "There are several objections urged to the

negotiability of this instrument. One is, that it is under the seal <>f

the United States treasury. There are, no doubt, decisions that an

instrument under seal is not negotiable. These cases refer to private

obligations between individuals. (Clark v. Farmers' Woolen Manu-

facturing Co., 15 Wend. 256; Steele v. Oswego Cotton Manufactur-

ing Company, 15 Wend. 265.) They are not to be extended to the

case of public securities like those issued by the government, and in-

tended to seek for a market throughout the civilized world. The

seal was not placed thereto restrain their negotiability, but rather to

stamp them as genuine, wherever they might be in circulation."

Evertson v. National Bank of Newport (66 N. Y. 14) holds in-

terest coupons of railroad bonds payable to bearer at a specified time

and place are negotiable promises for the payment of money. (See

cases there cited.)

Marine, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Bradley (105 U. S. 175) was the case of

an instrument issued by a South Carolina corporation under seal agree-

ing to pay a certain sum of money, and by an indorsement under seal

the company agreed, in consideration of forbearance, to pay a higher

rate of interest on the money to bearer.

Mr. Justice Matthews, passing upon the validity of the indorsement,

said: "It is a negotiable note within the meaning of the law mer-

chant, according to the law of the place of the contract, notwithstand-

ing it is an instrument under seal" (p. 180).

In Mercer County v. Racket (1 Wall. 83), the United States

supreme court held county bonds under seal to be negotiable instru-
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ments. Mr. Justice Grier said, in speaking of the bonds issued un-

der seal: ''But there is nothing immoral or contrary to good policy
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in making them negotiable if the necessities of commerce require

that they should be so. A mere technical dogma of the courts or the

common law can not prohibit the commercial world from inventing or

issuing any species of security not known in the last century."

The following authorities further illustrate the point under discus-

sion: Mason v. Frick (105 Pa. St. 162 and cases cited); Barrett v.

Schuyler Co. (44 Mo. 197); Morris Canal, etc., Co. v. Fisher (9 N.

J. Eq. 699); Haven v. Grand June. R. R. & D. Co. ( 109 Mass. S8);

Murray v. Lardner (2 Wall. 110); National Exchange Bank v.

Hartford, P. & F. R. R. Co. (8 R. I. 375); Daniel on Ncg. Inst.,

§§ 1500 and 1501 and cases cited; Morawetz on Corp., § 341;

Tiedman on Com. Pap., § 117.

In Blewitt v. Boorum (142 N. Y. 357) Judge Peckham, in a

learned and interesting opinion, reviews the history of seals upon in-

struments and points out their immateriality on contracts which do

not require them in order to be valid.

The note in suit being negotiable under the law of this state, and
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the contract of indorsement having been made here, it is unnecessary

to consider many of the points argued by appellant under the as-

sumption that the defendant had indorsed a non-negotiable instru-

ment. * » *

Affirmed.

Note. See cases cited in note to § 238, supra, p. 864; and 1895, Am. Nat'l

Bank v. Am. Wood Paper Co., 19 R. I. 149.

ARTICLE VIII. POWER TO MAKE BY-LAWS.

Sec. 347. 1- Definition and purpose, differs from regulation.

STATE v. ISAAC S. OVERTON.1

1854. In the Supreme Court of Judicature of New Jersey.

ments. Mr. Justice Grier said, in speaking of the bonds issued under seal: '•But there is nothing immoral or contrary to good policy
in making them negotiable if the necessities of commerce require
that they should be so. A mere technical dogma of the courts or the
co~mon law can not prohibit the commercial world from inventing or
issuing any species of security not known in the last century."
The following authorities further illustrate the point under discussion: Mason v. Frick ( 105 Pa. St. 162 and cases cited); Ba1Tett v.
Schuyler Co. (44 Mo. 197); Morris Canal, etc., Co. v. Fisher (9 N.
J. Eq. 699); Haven v. Grand June. R.R. & D. Co. ( 109 Mass. 88);
Murray v. Lardner (2 Wall. 110); NationaJ Exchange Bank v.
Hartford, P. & F. R. R. Co. (8 R. I. 375); Daniel on Neg. Inst.,
§§ 1500 and 1501 and cases cited; Morawetz on Corp., § 341 ;
Tiedman on Com. Pap., § I 17.
In Blewitt v. Boorum ( 142 N . Y. 357) Judge Peckham, in a
learned and interesting opinion, reviews the history of seals upon instruments and points out their immateriality on contracts which do
not require them in order to be valid.
The note in suit being negotiable under the law of this state, and
the contract of indorsement hav ing been made here, it is unnecessary
to consider many of the points argued by appellant under the assumption that the defendant had indorsed a non-negotiable instrument. • • •

Affirmed.

24 N. J. Law (4 Zabriskie) Rep. 435-443, 61 Am. Dec. 671.

Overton, a conductor on the Morris & Essex R. R., forcibly ejected

Note. See cases cited in note to § 238, supra, p. 864; and 1895, Am. Nat'l
Bank v. Am . Wood Paper Co., 19 R. I. 149.

a passenger from one of the trains, and was convicted of an assaul)

and battery therefor. A motion for new trial on account of misdirec-

tion of the court was overruled. This was assigned as error. The

passenger had purchased a ticket from N. to M. At a way station

ARTICLE VIll.

POWER TO MAKE BY-LAWS.

between these stations he left the train, having first obtained a con-

ductor's check printed "Conductor's check to M." About an hour

afterward he took the train of Overton, to complete his journey to M.

See. 347.

1.

Definition and purpose, differs from regulation.

1 Statement abridged. Only that part of opinion relating to one point is

given.

STATE v. ISAAC S. OVERTON. 1

73—Wil. Cas.

1854. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF NEW JERSEY.
24 N. J. Law (4 Zabriskie) Rep. 435-443, 61 Am. D ec. 671.
Overton, a conductor on the Morris & Essex R.R., forcibly ejected
a passenger from one of the trains, and was convicted of an assauq
and battery therefor. A motion for new trial on account of misdirection of the court was overruled. This was assigned as e n-or. The
passenger had purchased a ticket from N. to M. At a way station
between these stations he left the train , having first obtained a conductor's check printed "Conductor's check to M." About an hour
afterward he took the train of Q,·erton. to complete his journey to M.
1 Statement abridged.
given.

Only that part of opinion relating to one point is

73-WIL. C..\B.
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Overton refused to recognize the conductor's check, demanded the

STATE \'. ISAAC S. OVERTON.

§ 347

fare, and upon refusal to pay, put the passenger off without unneces-

sary violence. Some years before the company had adopted a rule,

Overton refused to recognize the conductor's check, demanded the
fore, and upon refusal to pay, put the passenger off without unnecessary violence. Some years before the company had adopted a rnle,
and g iven public notice of it that conductor's checks were not transferrahle from one train to another. This action of the company was
submitted to the jury as if it were a by-law or regulation of the company affecting the rights of passengers, upon the reasonableness and
val£dity of which the jury were to decide. This was assigned as
error.
GREEN, C. J. • • • In this the court erred. Here was no evidence
of any by-law, or of any regulation made by the company affecting the
rights of passengers upon the reasonableness, or validity of which
either court or jury were called upon to decide. The right of the
passenger rested upon his contract. The notice given by the company was in strict conformity with his rights under the contract. Upon
the evidence in the cause, if no proof had been offered of the notice
given by the company, that conductors' checks were not transferable,
the defendant would have been entitled to a verdict. Proof of that
notice certainly placed him in no worse position. The company have
an unquestionable right, under their cha1'ter, independent of any bylaw or regulation, to charge different rates by different trains, or a
higher price for traveling o\·er the road as a way-passenger, by different journeys, than for a through passenger. This was in reality
all that was involved -in the evidence of the action by the company,
as proved upon the trial. The case does not faJI within the operation of the principle, by which it ·was held to be controlled.
Assuming at the bar, as was done upon the trial, that the guilt or
innocence of the defendant depended upon the validity of a regulation
made hy the company, affecting the rights of passengers, the question
was elaborately argued whether the validity of such regulation can in
any case be submitted as a question of fact to be decided by a jury.
and the broad principle was assumed that the val idity of every regulation made by a railroad company, regulating the concerns and affecting the rights of the road, is a question of law, to be decided by
the cou1t, and never can be submitted to a jury; that the compnny is
bound to make regulations for the comfort and convenience of pa senger. ; that the power is regulated by their charter; that what is
lawful is reasonable, and that, therefore, every regulation is rea. onab le which is not unlawful.
The va lidity of the by-lav\' of a corporation is purely a que tion of
law. Whether the by-l aw be in conflict with the law or with the charter of the company, or be in a legal sense unreasonable, and therefore
unlawful, is a question for the court and not for the jury. Commonwealth v. \ Vorce!.ter, ~ P ickeri11g462; Paxon v. Sweet, I Green r96 :
.Ang. and Ames on Corp ., 357. But the by-la:-.vs of a private corporation bind the 111emb<'r s only hy virtue of their assent, and do not
affect third persons. All regulations of a company affecting it business, which do not operate upon third persons. nor in any way affect
tbeir rights, are properly denominated by-lav.-s of the company, and

and given public notice of it that conductor's checks were not trans-

ferrable from one train to another. This action of the company was

submitted to the jury as if it were a by-law or regulation of the com-

pany affecting the rights of passengers, upon the reasonableness and

validity of which the jury were to decide. This was assigned as

error.

Green, C.J. * * * In this the court erred. Here was no evidence

of any by-law, or of any regulation made by the company affecting the

rights of passengers upon the reasonableness, or validity of which

either court or jury were called upon to decide. The right of the

passenger rested upon his contract. The notice given by the com-

pany was in strict conformity with his rights under the contract. Upon

the evidence in the cause, if no proof had been offered of the notice

given by the company, that conductors' checks were not transferable,

the defendant would have been entitled to a verdict. Proof of that
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notice certainly placed him in no worse position. The company have

an unquestionable right, under their charter, independent of any by-

law or regulation, to charge different rates by different trains, or a

higher price for traveling over the road as a way-passenger, by dif-

ferent journeys, than for a through passenger. This was in reality

all that was involved in the evidence of the action by the company,

as proved upon the trial. The case does not fall within the opera-

tion of the principle, by which it was held to be controlled.

Assuming at the bar, as was done upon the trial, that the guilt or

innocence of the defendant depended upon the validity of a regulation

made by the company, affecting the rights of passengers, the question

was elaborately argued whether the validity of such regulation can in

any case be submitted as a question of fact to be decided by a jury,

and the broad principle was assumed that the validity of every regu-

lation made by a railroad company, regulating the concerns and af-

fecting the rights of the road, is a question of law, to be decided by

the court, and never can be submitted to a jury; that the company is

bound to make regulations for the comfort and convenience of pas-

sengers; that the power is regulated by their charter; that what is

lawful is reasonable, and that, therefore, every regulation is reason-

able which is not unlawful.

The validity of the by-law of a corporation is purely a question of

law. Whether the by-law be in conflict with the law or with the char-

ter of the company, or be in a legal sense unreasonable, and therefore

unlawful, is a question for the court and not for the jury. Common-

wealth v. Worcester, 3 Pickering 462; Paxon v. Sweet, 1 Green 196:

Aug. and Ames on Corps., 357. But the by-laws of a private corpo-

ration bind the members only by virtue of their assent, and do not

affect third persons. All regulations of a company affecting its busi-

ness, which do not operate upon third persons, nor in any way affect

their rights, are properly denominated by-laws of the company, and
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may come within the operation of the principle. Within this limit it is

the peculiar and exclusive office of the court to decide upon the validity

of the regulation.
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But there is another class of regulations, made by corporations, as

well as by individuals, who are common carriers of passengers, which

operate upon, and affect the rights of others which are not, properly

speaking, by-laws of the corporation, and which do not fall within

the operation of the principle. Of this character are all regulations

touching the comfort and convenience of travelers, or prescribing

rules for their conduct to secure the just rights of the company. It is

not perceivable of this class of regulations, that they are never un-

reasonable unless they are unlawful. On the contrary, they are un-

lawful because they are unreasonable, or an unnecessary infringement

of the rights and liberty of the passengers. The reasonableness and

validity of a regulation, that passengers by railroad or steamboat

should exhibit their tickets when reasonably requested; that they

should not smoke or indulge in other filthy, or offensive practices;

that male passengers should not enter a car or a saloon, especially ap-

propriated to females, might be conceded, and the right of the com-

pany to enforce them, even by excluding, in case of necessity, the of-
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fending passenger from the train. But it would scarcely be contended

that a regulation requiring passengers continually, or as often as

the caprice or malice of a conductor might require it, to exhibit

their tickets; forbidding them to speak, or change their seats from

one part of a car or saloon to another, when the right of no other

passenger was affected, was a regulation lawful in itself or which

might safely be enforced. This latter class of regulations are no

more in violation of the charter of the company, or of any particular

statute, than the former. But they would be held unlawful, because

they are unreasonable, and an unnecessary infringement of the rights

and liberty of travelers. The distinction between such regulations as

are necessary, and conducive to the comfort and convenience of trav-

elers, or to protect the rights of the company, must from its very

nature be a question of fact rather than of law. The reasonableness

and unreasonableness of the regulation is properly for the considera-

tion, not of the court, but of the jury. * * *

But there was in reality no such question involved in the present

case. The right to transfer conductors' checks, resulted upon a con-

tract which the company had a clear and unquestionable legal right to

enforce. The question was improperly submitted to the jury, and

the verdict is against law, and contrary to the evidence. « * *

New trial granted.

Note. See note 85 Am. Dec. 617, et seq; 1886, L. S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Rosen-

zoweig, 113 Pa. St. 519; 1892, Am. Liv. St. Co. v. Chicago L. S. Ex., 143 111.

210, 36 Am. St. Rep. 385; 1899, Northport, etc., Ass'n v. Perkins, 93 Maine

235, 74 Am. St. Rep. 342.

may come within the operation of the principle. Within this limit it is
the peculiar and exclusive office of the court to decide upon the validity
of the regulation.
But there is another class of regulations, made by corporations, as
well as by individuals, who are common carriers of passengers, which
operate upon, and affect the rights of others which are not, properly
speaking, by-laws of the corporation, and which do not fall within
the operation of the principle. Of this character are all regulations
touching the comfort and convenience of travelers, or prescribing
rules for their conduct to secure the just rights of the company. It is
not perceivable of this class of regulations, that they are never unreasonable unless they are unlawful. On the contrary, they are unlawful because they are unreasonable, or an unnecessary infringement
of the rights and liberty of the passengers. The reasonablen ess and
validity of a regulation, that passengers by railroad or steam hoat
should exhibit their tickets when reason~bly requested; that they
should not smoke or indulge in other filthy, or offensive practices ;
that male passengers should not enter a car or a saloon, especially appropriated to females, might be conceded, and the right of the company to enforce them, even by excluding, in case of necessity, the offending passenger from the train. But it would scarcely be contended
that a regulation requiring pas::;engers continually, or as often as
the caprice or malice of a conductor might require it, to exhibit
their tickets; forbidding them to speak, or change their seats from
one part of a car or saloon to another, when the right of no other
passenger was affected, was a regulation lawful in itself or which
might safely be enforced. This latter class of regulations are no
more in violation of the charter of the company, or of any particular
statute, than the former. But they would be held unlawful, because
they are unreasonable, and an unnecessary infringement of the rights
and liberty of travelers. The distinction between such regulations as
ar~ necessary, and conducive to the comfort and convenience of travelers, or to protect the rights of the company, must from its very
nature be a question of fact rather than of law. The reasonableness
and unreasonableness of the regulation is properly for the consideration , not of the court, but of the jury. • • •
But there was in reality no such question involved in the prese nt
case. The right to transfer conductors' checks, resulted upon a contract which the company had a clear and unquestionable legal right to
enforce. The question was improperly submitted to the jury, and
the verdict is aga inst law, and contrary to the evidence. • • •
JVew trt"al granted.
Note. See note 85 Am . Dec. 617, et seq; 1886, L. S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Rose.nzoweig, 113 Pa. St. 5 19; 1892, Am. Liv. St. Co. v. Chicago L. S. Ex., 14:J 111.
210, 3o Am. St. Rep. 385; 1899, Northport, etc., Ass'n v. Perkins, 93 Maine
235, 74 Am. St. Rep. 342.
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NORRIS V. STAPS.

§ 348

Sec. 348. 2. Power to make.

NORRIS V. STAPS.

(a) Incidental.

HOBART, J., in NORRIS v. STAPS.

Sec. 34:8.

c. 1625, Hobart's Rep. 211 a.

2.

Power to make.

"I am of the opinion that though power to make laws is given by

(a) Incidental.

special clause in all incorporations, yet it is needless; for I hold it to

be included, by law, in the very act of incorporating, as is also the

power to sue, to purchase, and the like. For as reason is given to

HOBART, J.,

the natural body for the governing of it, so the body corporate must

IN

NORRIS v. STAPS.

c. 1625, Hobart's Rep. 211 a.

have laws, as a politic reason to govern it; but those laws must ever

be subject to the general law of the realm, as subordinate to it. And

"I am of the opinion that though power to make laws is given by
special clause in all incorporations, yet it is needless; for I hold it to
be included, by law, in the very act of incorporating, as is also the
power to sue, to purchase, and the like. For as reason is given to
the natural body for the governing of it, so the body corporate mu st
have laws, as a politic reason to govern it; but those laws must ever
be subject to the general law of the realm, as subordinate to it. And
therefore, though there be no proviso for that purpose the law supplies it."
'

therefore, though there be no proviso for that purpose the law sup-

plies it."

Note. See 1613, Sutton's Hospital, 10 Co. 23a., supra, 264, on 266; 1815, St.

Luke's Churdi v. Mathews, 4 Dessaus. (S. C.) 678, 6 Am. Dec. 619; 1819,

Commw.v. Woelper, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 29, 8 Am. Dec. 628; 1832, Leggett v.

N. J. M. & B. Co., 1 Saxton Ch. (N. J.) 541, 23 Am. Dec. 728; 1834, Tavlor v.

Griswold, 2 Green Law (N. J.) 222,27 Am. Dec. 33; 1895, Engelhardt v. Fifth

Ward, etc., Ass'n, 148 N. Y. 281, 35 L. R. A. 289; 1899, Bailey v. Association
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of Master Plumbers, 103 Tenn. 99, 46 L. R. A. 561.

Note, 85 Am. Dec. 618.

Sec. 349. Same.

Note. See 1613, Sutton's Hospital, 10 Co. 23a., supra, 264, on 266; 1815, St.
Luke's Church v. Mathews, 4 Dessaus. (S. C.) 578, 6 Am. Dec. 619; 1819,
Cornrow. v. Woelper, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa. ) W, 8 Am. Dec. 628; 1832, Leggett v.
N. J.M. & B. Co., 1 Saxton Ch. (N. J .) 541, 23 Am. Dec. 728; 1834, Taylor v.
Griswold, 2 Green La.w (N. J.) 222, 27 Am. Dec. 33; 1895, Engelhardt v. Fifth
Ward, etc., Ass'n, 148 N. Y. 281, 35 L. R. A. 289; 1899, Bailey v. Association
of Master Plumbers, 103 Tenn . 99, 46 L. R. A. 561.
Note, 85 Am. Dec. 618.

(b) This power resides in the shareholders or members,

unless otherwise provided.

THE MORTON GRAVEL ROAD CO. v. WYSONG.1

1875. In the Supreme Court of Indiana. 51 Ind. Rep. 4.

[Action to recover a penalty for violating a by-law regulating tolls.

Judgment below for plaintiff. The by-law was adopted by the direct-

ors, and not by the corporation at large. The statute provided: "Such

company may * * * make, enact, and publish any and all ordi-

Sec. 34:9. Same.

nances and by-laws," etc.]

Downey, J. This is in conformity to the statute on the subject, en-

entitled "An act establishing general provisions respecting corpora-

(b) This power resides in the shareholders or members.
unless otherwise provided.

tions," 1 G. & H. 267, section 2 of which provides that "corporations

shall, where no other provision is specially made, be capable, in their

corporate name, * * * to make necessary by-laws," etc.

THE MORTON GRAVEL ROAD CO. v. WYSONG. 1

The power to make by-laws resides in the members of the corpora-

tion at large, where there is no law or valid usage to the contrary.

1875.

1 Statement abridged. Only that part of opinion relating to the one point

IN THE SUPREME CounT OF INDIANA.

5 I Ind. Rep. 4.

is given.

■

[Action to recover a penalty for violating a by-law regulating tolls.
Judgment below for plaintiff. The by-law was adopted by the directors, and not by the corporation at large . The statute provided: "Such
company may • •
• make, enact, and publish any and all ordin ances and by-laws," etc.]
DowNEY, J. This is in conformity to the statute on the subject, enentitlerl "An act establishing general provisions respecting corporations,'' 1 G. & H. 267, section 2 of which provides that "corporations
shall , where no other provision is specially made, be capable, in their
corporate name , • • • to make necessary by-laws," etc.
The power to make by-laws resides in the members of the corporation at large, where there is no law or valid usage to the contrary.
1 Statement abridged.
Only that part of opinion relating to the one point
is given.

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 35o

"57

RIGHT TO MAKE BY-LAWS.

In Angell & Ames on Corp., section 327, it is said: "Unless by

§ 350

1157

RIGHT TO l\fAKE BY-LAWS.

the charter, or some general statute to which the charter is made sub-

ject, or by immemorial usage, this power is delegated to particular

officers or members of the corporation, like every other incidental

power, it resides in the members of the corporation at large, to be

exercised by them in the same manner in which the charter may direct

them to exercise other powers or transact their general business, and

if the charter contain no such direction, to be exercised according

to the rules of the common law," etc. We must, therefore, treat the

by-law in question as invalid, and as having nothing to do with the

question to be decided. * * *

Judgment reversed.

Note. See, also, 1827, Union Bank v. Ridgley, 1 Har. & G. (Md.) 324; 1868,

Stevens v. Davison, 18 Gratt. (Va.) 819, 98 Am. Dec. 692; 1873, People v.

Crossley, 69 111. 195; 1880, Carroll v. Mullanphy Sav. Bank, 8 Mo. App. 249;

In Angell & Ames on Corp., section 327, it is said: "Unless by
the charter, or some general statute to which the charter is made subject, or by immemorial usage, this power is delegated to particular
officers or members of the corporation, like every other incidental
power, it resides in the members of the corporation at large , to be
exercised by them in the same manner in which the charter may direct
them to exercise other powers or transact their general business, and
if the charter contain no such direction, to be exercised a ccording
to the rules of the common law," etc . \Ve must, therefore, treat the
by-law in question as invalid, and as having nothing to do with the
question to be decided. • • •

Judgment reversed.

1887, State Savings Assn. v. N. J. P. Co., 25 Mo. App. 642; 1893, Brinker-

hoff-Farris, etc., Co. v. Lumber Co., 118 Mo. 447, infra, p. 1162; 1899, North

Milwaukee T. S. Co. v. Bishop, 103 Wis. 492, 45 L. R. A. 174; note 85 Am.
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Dec. 618.

But the shareholders may delegate authority to make by-laws to the direct-

ors, or the statute or charter may authorize them to do so: 1845, Cabill v. K.

M. I. Co., 2 Douglass (Miss.) 124, 43 Am. Dee. 457; 1875, Spurlock v. Pacific

R., 61 Mo. 326.

See. 350. (c) Limits on power to make.

1. Forfeitures.

In the Matter op the Election op DIRECTORS OF THE LONG ISLAND

Note. See, also, 1827, Union Bank v. Ridgley, 1 Har. & G. (Md.) 324; 1868,
Stevens v. Davison, 18 Gratt. (Va.) 819, 98 Am. Dec. 692; 1873, People v.
Crossley, 69 Ill. 195; 1880, Carroll v . Mullanphy Sav. Bank, 8 Mo. App. 249;
1887, State Savings Assn. v. N. J.P. Co., 25 Mo . .App. 642; 1893, Brinkerbo.ff-yarris, etc., Co. v. Ln!Ilber Co., 11~ Mo. 447, illfra, p. 11~2; 1899,.,r.:No rth
M1hrnukee T. S. Co. v. Bishop, 103 Wis. 492, 45 L. lL A. 174, note iso Am.
Dec. 618.
But the shareholders may delegate authority to make by-laws to the directors, or the statute or charter may authorize them to do so: 1845, Cahill v. K .
M. T. Co., 2 Douglass (Miss.) 124, 43 Am. Der.. 457; 1875, Spurlock v. Pacific
R., 61 Mo. 326.

R. R. CO.1

1837. In the Supreme Court of New York. 19 Wendell's

(N. Y.) Rep. 37-45, 32 Am. D. 429.

Sec. 350.

(c)

Limits on power to make.

I .

Forfeitures.

[Motion to set aside an election, for refusing to permit Edwin Lord

vote 1200 shares of stock, for the reason "that the stock had already

been declared forfeited for default in payment of the calls." If these

shares had been voted the result of the' election might have been

IN THE MATrER OF THE

ELEC'TION

changed. The forfeiture was declared under a by-law enacted for that

OF

DIRECTORS OF THE LONG ISLAND

R.R.

co.1

purpo.se.]

Nelson, C. J. * * * The corporation possess the power to make

1837.

by-laws not inconsistent with any existing law, for the management of

its property, the regulation of its affairs, and for the transfer of stock.

IN THE SUPREME CouRT OF NEw YoRK.
(N. Y.) Rep. 37-45, 32 Am. D. 429.

19 Wendell's

(2 R. S. 602, § 1, sub. 6. This is the broadest general power con-

ferred upon it; but it is not new, and would have existed as inci-

dental. When taken as incidental it must be exercised in conformity

to the general law of the land, that being the rule to regulate the pro-

ceedings of artificial bodies, as well as the conduct of natural per-

sons, independently of express provisions of the charters of those

'Only so much of opinion as relates to the one point is given.

[Motion to set aside an election, for refusing to permit Edwin Lord
vote 1200 shares of stock, for the reason "that the stock had already
been declared forfeited for default in payment of the calls." If these
shares had been voted the result of the' election might have been
changed. The forfeiture was declared under a by-law enacted for that
p11rpose.]
N ELSO~, C. J. • • • The corporation possess the power to make
by-laws not £ncons£stent w£th any exisHng law, for the manage m e nt of
its property, the reg ulation of its affairs, and for the transfer of stock.
(2 R. S. 6o2, § 1, sub. 6. This is the broadest genera l power conferred upon it; but it is not new, anci would have existed a s incidental. '¥hen taken as incidental it must be exercised in conformity
to the general law of the land , that being the rule to regulate the proceedings of art~jic£al bodies, as well as the conduct of natural pe1·sons, indepe ndently of express pro,·i ions of the ch a rte rs of those
1 0nly
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I 158 DIRECTORS OF THE LONG ISLAND R. R. CO. § 350

companies to the contrary. This general law has ascertained the

rights of person and of property of the citizen, and established modes

DIRECTORS OF THE· LONG ISLAND R. R. CO.

of proceeding in case of a violation of them; and corporate bodies

§ 350

must conform to them, in seeking redress, the same as individuals.

companies to the contrary. This general law has ascertained the
rights of person and of property of the citizen, and established modes
of proceeding in case of a violation of them ; and corporate bodies
mu ·t conform to them, in seelcing redress, the same as individuals.
The former can no more take the remedy into their own hands than
can the latter. So strict has this salutary principle of subjection been
held in England, that even a by-law in pursuance of an express power
in a charter granted by the king, is void, if contrary to the common
law or act of parliament. ( 1 Kyd on Corp., 109; Willcock on Corp.,
95; Angel & Ames, 186; 8 Co. 125, a, 127, b; 2 Inst. 47; 1 T. R.
118.) Thus a by-law imposing a forfeiture of goods is void, though
the letters patent authorized it; and a power granted to a corporation
of dyers to search, and if they found cloth dyed with logwood, to
seize it as forfeited, was adjudged void as contrary to magna charta.
On the same principle, by-laws in restraint of trade are adjudged
void. (11 Co. 53; 1 Burr. 12; 4 Burr. 1951; 7 Dowl. & Ryl. 601;
1 Bacon's Abr. 547; Angel & Ames, 184; Will cock. 142.) So a
by-law that may be lawful can not be enforced by an extraordinary
penalty, such as imprisonment or forfeiture of goods, or by distress
and sale of goods, for, by the general law of the kingdom, no man is
to be imprisoned, or dispossessed of his goods and chattels nisi per
legate judt'cium parium suorum, vel per legem terra:: and if such
penalties were allowed, corporations would be enabled to set up private patticular laws in contradiction to the laws of the land, which is
against the nature and essence of a by-law. (Clark's Case, 5 Co.
64; 3 Salk. 76; Willcock, 98; 1 Bacon's Abr. 551.) Even an act
of parliament does not by i'mplicatt'on invest the corporation with any
extraordinary authority; and if it is intended to be given, it must be
by express words to that effect. In Kirk v. Nowill ( 1 T. R. 118),
which was an action of trespass for seizing and tnking a quantity of
forks, the defendant justified under an act of parliament incorporating
the inhabitants of the Liberty of H. into a company of cutlers, and
under a by-law of the company. The act authorized the adoption of
such by-laws as appert~incd to good regulation and workmanship in
the manufacturing of cntlery wares, with power to impose reasonable
pain s, penalties and punishm ent, by fine or amercement, in case of
violation, and which ·was to be levied to the use of the corporation
for the benefit of the poor. The company ordained that the searchers (officers recognized in the act) should search for unworkmanlike
wares, and seize , carry away and destroy the same. The property
was seized tt nder and by vi1tue of this by-law.
Lord Mansfield observed that a corporation in the definition of it,
is a creature of the crown, created by letters patent; that such a corporation. with the power of making by-laws, can not make any such
law to incur a forfeiture; that those corporations which are created
by act of parliament have no other additional powers incident to them
than those have which are created by charters, zmless they be expressly
gi'ven, and that no such extraordinary power of making by-lnwr. to incur a forfeiture, appearing upon the plea to have been conferred it

The former can no more take the remedy into their own hands than

can the latter. So strict has this salutary principle of subjection been

held in England, that even a by-law in pursuance of an express power

in a charter granted by the king, is void, if contrary to the common

law or act of parliament. (1 KydonCorp., 109; Willcock on Corp.,

95; Angel & Ames, 186; 8 Co. 125,0;, 127, b; 2 Inst. 47; 1 T. R.

118.) Thus a by-law imposing a forfeiture of goods is void, though

the letters patent authorized it; and a power granted to a corporation

of dyers to search, and if they found cloth dyed with logwood, to

seize it as forfeited, was adjudged void as contrary to magna charta.

On the same principle, by-laws in restraint of trade are adjudged

void. (11 Co. 53; 1 Burr. 12; 4 Burr. 1951 ; 7 Dowl. & Ryl. 601;

1 Bacon's Abr. 547; Angel & Ames, 184; Willcock, 142.) So a

by-law that may be lawful can not be enforced by an extraordinary

penalty, such as imprisonment or forfeiture of goods, or by distress

and sale of goods, for, by the general law of the kingdom, no man is
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to be imprisoned, or dispossessed of his goods and chattels nisi -per

legale judicium parium suorum, vcl per legem terra: and if such

penalties were allowed, corporations would be enabled to set up pri-

vate particular laws in contradiction to the laws of the land, which is

against the nature and essence of a by-law. (Clark's Case, 5 Co.

64; 3 Salk. 76; Willcock, 98; 1 Bacon's Abr. 551.) Even an act

of parliament does not by implication invest the corporation with any

extraordinary authority; and if it is intended to be given, it must be

by express -words to that effect. In Kirk v. Nowill (1 T. R. 118),

which was an action of trespass for seizing and taking a quantity of

forks, the defendant justified under an act of parliament incorporating

the inhabitants of the Liberty of H. into a company of cutlers, and

under a by-law of the company. The act authorized the adoption of

such by-laws as appertained to good regulation and workmanship in

the manufacturing of cutlery wares, with power to impose reasonable

pains, penalties and punishment, by fine or amercement, in case of

violation, and which was to be levied to the use of the corporation

for the benefit of the poor. The company ordained that the search-

ers (officers recognized in the act) should search for unworkmanlike

wares, and seize, carry away and destroy the same. The property

was seized under and by virtue of this by-law.

Lord Mansfield observed that a corporation in the definition of it,

is a creature of the crown, created by letters patent; that such a cor-

poration, with the power of making by-laws, can not make any such

law to incur a forfeiture; that those corporations which are created

by act of parliament have no other additional powers incident to them

than those have which are created by charters, unless they be expressly

given, and that no such extraordinary power of making by-laws to in-

cur a forfeiture, appearing upon the plea to have been conferred, it
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was impossible for the court to say that the by-law in that case could

§ 351

1159

RIGHT TO MAKE BY-LAWS.

be supported by the act. Buller, J., remarked, that taking it gen-

erally as a by-law creating a forfeiture, the act of parliament not hav-

ing given the corporation the power to make such a by-law, it was

bad on that ground. In all the cases where his power to declare a

forfeiture of stock as expressly given by the charter has been inci-

dentally noticed by the courts, it has been regarded as a new and

cumulative remedy to the one existing at common law. (i Caines'

Cas. in Error, 85; 1 Caines, 389, Radcliff, J.; 9 Johns. R. 218; 6

Mass. R. 40; 2 Bibb, 576.) This has also been the understanding

of the legislature, for, on examination, it will be found that the power

has been usually conferred by an express provision in the charters,

from the earliest period down to the present time. Upon the whole,

I am entirely satisfied the directors possessed no authority under the

charter to declare a forfeiture of the stock; that their acts in this re-

spect were wholly void, and left the rights of the stockholders in full

force, and that the sales which were made, and attempted transfers of

the supposed forfeited shares, passed no title to or interest in them to

the purchasers. * * *
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Election set aside.

Note. 1887, Budd v. Multnomah St. R. Co., 15 Ore. 413, 3 Am. St. Rep.

169, infra, p. 1669; 1892, Gemmel v. Davis, 75 Md. 546, 32 Am. St. Rep. 412;

1891, Morris v. Mettalline L. Co., 164 Pa. St. 326, 44 Am. St. Rep. 614; 1897,

Elizabeth City Cotton Mills v. Dunstan, 121 N. C. 12, 61 Am. St. Rep. 654,

holding that "a corporation may be empowered to provide bv its by-laws for

forfeiture of shares for non-pavment, and if reasonable, it will be enforced."

See notes, 68 Am. Dec. 88; 43 Am. St. Rep. 156; 61 Am. St. Rep. 656.

On the general subject of forfeiture, and sale of stock for non-payment,

see, 1821, Franklin Glass Co. v. Alexander, 2 N. H. 380, 9 Am. Dec. 92, note

97; 1843, Selma & Tenn. R. Co. v. Tipton, 5 Ala. 787, 39 Am. Dec. 344; 1850,

Hightower v. Thornton, 8 Ga. 486, 52 Am. Dec. 412; 1855, New Hampshire

R. v. Johnson, 30 N. H. 390, 64 Am. Dec. 300, n. 308; I860, Leevey's Island

R. Co. v. Bolton, 48 Maine 451, 77 Am. Dec. 236; 1869, Germantown, etc., R.

Co. v. Fitler, 60 Pa. St. Rep. 124, 100 Am. Dec. 546, and note; 1893, Carpen-

ter v. Am. Bldg. Ass'n, 54 Minn. 403, 40 Am. St. Rep. 345, note 348.

See. 351. Same.

2. Transfers.

THE VICTOR G. BLOEDE CO v. VICTOR G. BLOEDE.1

was impossible for the court to say that the by-law in that case could.
be supported by the act. Buller, J., remarked, that taking it generally as a by-law creating a forfeiture, the act of parliament not having given the corporation th<; power to make such a by-law, it was
bad on that ground. In all the cases where his power to declare a
forfeiture of stock as expressly given by the charter has been incidentally noticed by the courts, it has been regarded as a new and
cumulative remedy to the one existing at common law. ( r Caines'
Cas. in Error, 85; 1 Caines, 389, Radcliff, J.; 9 J ohns. R. 218; 6
Mass. R. 40; 2 Bibb, 576.) This has also been the understanding
of the legislature, for, on examination, it will be found that the power
has been usually conferred by an express provision in the charters,
from the earliest period down to the present time. Upon the whole,
I am entirely satisfied the directors possessed no authority under the
charter to declare a forfeiture of the stock; that their acts in this respect were wholly void, and left the rights of the stockholders in full
force, and that the sales which were made, and attempted transfers of
the supposed forfeited shares, passed no title to or interest in them to
the purchasers. • • •
Election set aside.
Note. 1887, Budd v. Multnomah St. R. Co., 15 Ore. 413, 3 Am. St. Rep.
169, infra, p. 1569; 1892, Gemmel v. Davis, 75 Md. 546, 32 Am. St. Rep. 412;
1894, Morris v. Mettalline L. Co., 164 Pa. St. 326, 44 Am. St. Rep. 614; 1897,
Elizabeth City Cotton Mills v. Dunstan, 121 N. C. 12, 61 Am. St. Rep. 654,
holding that "a corporation may be empowered to provide b,}'. its by-l aws for
forfeiture of shares for non-payment, and if reasonable, it will be enforced."
See notes, 61:! Am. Dec. 88; 43 Am. St. Rep. 1.56; 61 Am. St. Rep. 656.
On the general subject of forfeiture, and sale of stock for non-payment,
see, 1821, Franklin Glass Co. v. Alexander, 2 N. H . 380, 9 Am. Dec. 92. note
97; 1843, Selma & Tenn. R. Co. v. Tipton, 5 Ala. 787, 39 Am. Dec. 344; 1850,
Hightower v. Thornton, 8 Ga. 486, 52 Am. Dec. 412; 1855, New Hampshire
R. v. Johnson, 30 N. H. 390, 64 Am. Dec. 300, n. 308; 1860, Leevey's Island
R. Co. v. Bolton, 48 Maine 451, 77 Am. Dec. 236; 1869, Germantown, etc., R.
Co. v. Fitler, 60 Pa. St. Rep. 124, 100 Am. Dec. 546, and note ; 1893, Carpenter v. Am. Bldg. Ass'n, 54 Minn. 403, 40 Am. St. Rep. 345, note 348.

1896. In the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 84 Md. Rep.

129-142, 57 Am. St. R. 373.

Appeal by the company from a decree ordering it to transfer nine

shares of stock to appellee, plaintiff below, standing in name of Y.

Sec. 351. Same.

A by-law of the defendant corporation provided that if any stock-

2.

holder should desire to dispose of his stock, he shall, before a trans-

Transfers.

1 Statement of facts taken from syllabus. Only that part of opinion given

THE VICTOR G. BLOEDE CO v. VICTOR G. BLOEDE.1

relating to validity of by-law.

1896.

IN

THE

CouRT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
129-142, 57 Am. St. R. 373.

84

Md.

Rep.

Appeal by the company from a decree ordering it to transfer nine
shares of stock to appellee, plaintiff below, standing in name of Y.
A by-law of the d efendant corporation provided that if anv stockholder should des ire to dispose of his stock. he sh all , before ·a trans1 Statement of facts taken from syllabus.
Only that part of opinion given
relating to validity of by-law.
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fer, notify the president of his intention to sell and of the price he can

I 160

obtain, which notice shall be communicated to the other stockholders,

VICTOR G. BLOEDE CO. V. VICTOR G . BLOEDE.

§ 35r

who shall have the option to purchase the stock at the price named,

fer, notify the president of his intention to sell and of the price he can
obtain, which notice shall be communicated to the other stockholders,
who shall have the option to purchase the stock at the price named
in pro 1·ata amounts, and the corporation shall have the right to take
any such stock not taken by the shareholders. A large number of
shares were originally issued to plaintiff for value. He afterwards
caused some of the shares to be transferred to other parties , including
a cc1tificate for nine shares made out in the name of Y. Plaintiff alleged that the certificate was so made out in order to gh·e Y. an opportunity to purchase them if he wished, while defendant alleged that it
was done in pursuance of an agreement between plaintiff and the
other chief owner of the stock that neither of them should own a majority of the shares. This allegation of the defendant was held not to
be established by proof. Y. refused to accept or pay for the shares
made out in his name, and assigned the certificate to the plaintiff, ·who
demanded a transfer of the same back to himself. The defendant refused to make the transfer.
McSHERRY, C. J. • • • But the by-law itself can, when invoked by
the company, interpose no obstacle to the transfer of these shares for
the reason that it is invalid. It is an unrensonable and a palpable restraint upon the alienation of property. As a general rule stockholders indisputably have the right to sell their shares at pleasure. Trisconi v. Winship, 43 La. Ann. 45. That the power to regulate
transfers of stock does not include authority to control its transferability by prescribing to whom the owner may sell and to whom not,
or upon what terms; and that the mere power to regulate transfers
does not authorize a refusal to a llow a transfer of shares to even an
insolvent is decided in Chouteau Spring Co. v. Harris, 20 Mo. 383.
And so a by-law prohibiting the alienation of shares of stock or imposing any restrictions on its exercise is declared to be in restraint of
trade and against public policy and void in Moore v. Bank of Commerce, 52 Mo. 377; Re Klaus, 67 Wis. 401; Brinkerhoff Farris
Trust & Sav. Co. v. Home Lumber Co., n8 Mo. 447; Feckheimer
v. Nat. Ex. Bk. of Norfolk, 79 Va. 80. And in Am. Nat. Bk.
v. Oriental Mills, 17 R. I. 551, in considering a similar by-law it was
held, without passing on its validity, that no one but the stockholders
could take advantage of the non-compliance with the by-ln·w, and
that they had the power to waive it. And in Irelnnd v. Globe Milling
and Reducing Co., 19 R. I. roo, 29 L. R. A. 429, it was decided
that a by-law giving the corponition the first right to purchase stock
which is for sale by any of its members, is not valid under a statute
specifying se\·cral subjects upon whi ch by-laws may be enacted, but
making no reference to the question of stock-transfers. See , also,
Farmers' Bk. ,., Wasson, 48 Iowa 339; Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co.,
8 Pic k. 90.
The cases in 36 Md. 491, and 48 1'vld. 473, and others cited are
distinguishable. for there the invalidity relied on by the stockholders
was invoked to defeat the claim of a creditor.

in pro rata amounts, and the corporation shall have the right to take

any such stock not taken by the shareholders. A large number of

shares were originally issued to plaintiff for value. He afterwards

caused some of the shares to be transferred to other parties, including

a certificate for nine shares made out in the name of Y. Plaintiff al-

leged that the certificate was so made out in order to give Y. an op-

portunity to purchase them if he wished, while defendant alleged that it

was done in pursuance of an agreement between plaintiff and the

other chief owner of the stock that neither of them should own a ma-

jority of the shares. This allegation of the defendant was held not to

be established by proof. Y. refused to accept or pay for the shares

made out in his name, and assigned the certificate to trie plaintiff, who

demanded a transfer of the same back to himself. The defendant re-

fused to make the transfer.

McSiierry, C. J. * * * But the by-law itself can, when invoked by

the company, interpose no obstacle to the transfer of these shares for

the reason that it is invalid. It is an unreasonable and a palpable re-
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straint upon the alienation of property. As a general rule stockhold-

ers indisputably have the right to sell their shares at pleasure. Tris-

coni v. Winship, 43 La. Ann. 45. That the power to regulate

transfers of stock does not include authority to control its transfera-

bility by prescribing to whom the owner may sell and to whom not,

or upon what terms; and that the mere power to regulate transfers

does not authorize a refusal to allow a transfer of shares to even an

insolvent is decided in Chouteau Spring Co. v. Harris, 20 Mo. 383.

And so a by-law prohibiting the alienation of shares of stock or im-

posing any restrictions on its exercise is declared to be in restraint of

trade and against public policy and void in Moore v. Bank of Com-

merce, 53 Mo. 377; Re Klaus, 67 Wis. 401; Brinkerhoff Farris

Trust & Sav. Co. v. Home Lumber Co., 118 Mo. 447; Fcckheimer

v. Nat. Ex. Bk. of Norfolk, 79 Va. 80. And in Am. Nat. Bk.

v. Oriental Mills, 17 R. I. 551, in considering a similar by-law it was

held, without passing on its validity, that no one but the stockholders

could take advantage of the non-compliance with the by-law, and

that they had the power to waive it. And in Ireland v. Globe Milling

and Reducing Co., 19 R. I. 100, 29 L. R. A. 429, it was decided

that a by-law giving the corporation the first right to purchase stock

which is for sale by any of its members, is not valid under a statute

specifying several subjects upon which by-laws may be enacted, but

making no reference to the question of stock-transfers. See. also,

Farmers' Bk. v. Wasson, 48 Iowa 339; Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co.,

8 Pick. 90.

The cases in 36 Md. 491, and 48 Md. 473, and others cited are

distinguishable, for there the invalidity relied on by the stockholders

was invoked to defeat the claim of a creditor.
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§ 352 RIGHT TO MAKE BY-LAWS. Il6l

As we shall affirm the decree appealed from, we have not thought

it worth while to consider the motion made to dismiss the appeal.

Decree affirmed with costs above and beloiv.

' § 352

RIGHT TO MAKE BY-LAWS.

1161

Note. See, 1829, Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co., 8 Pick. 90, 19 Am. Pec. 306;

1878, Farmers', etc., Bank v. Wasson, 48 Iowa 336, 30 Am. Rep. 398; 1893,

Bank of Atchison v. Durfee, 118 Mo. 431, 40 Am. St. Rep. 396; 1893, Trust

and Savings Co. v. Home Lumber Co., 118 Mo. 447; 1894, New England Trust

Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 27 L. R. A. 271, and note; 1895. Ireland v. Globe

Milling, etc., Co., 19 R. I. 180, 61 Am. St. Rep. 756, 29 L. R. A. 429; 1897,

McNulta v. Corn Belt Bank, 164 111. 427, 56 Am. St. Rep. 203; 1898, Ireland

v. Globe Milling Co., 20 R. I. 192, 38 L. R. A. 299, 8 A. & E. C. C. N. S. 136,

n. p. 141.

See note to Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust, etc., Co. v. Lumber Co., 118 Mo. 447,

infra, p. 1162, and note, 57 Am. St. Rep. 379, 384.

Sec. 352. Same.

3. Liens.

CHILD versus HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY.1

As we shall affirm the decree appealed from, we have not thought
it worth while to consider the motion made to dismiss the appeal.
Decree affirmed with costs above and below.
Note. See, 1829, Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co., 8 Pick . SlO, Hl ..\m. Dec. 3(){);
1878, Farmers', etc., Bank v. Wasson, 48 Iowa 336, 30 Am. Rep. 398; 1893,
Bank of Atchison v. Durfee, 118 Mo. 431, -W Am . St. Rep. 396; 18981 Trui<t
and Savings Co. ,•. Home Lumber Co., 118 :\fo. 447; 1894, ~ew Englanu Trust
Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass.148, 27L. R.A.27J,nnd note; 1895, Irelan<l v. Globe
Milling, etc., Co., 19 R. I. 180, 61 Am. St. Rep. 756, 29 L. R. A. -129; 18H7,
Mc~ulta v. Corn Belt Bank, 164 Ill. 427, 56 Am. Rt. Rep. 203; 1898, lrelaud
v. Globe Milling Co., 20 R. I. 192, 38 L. R. A. 2U9, 8 A. & E. C. C. N. S. 136,
n. p. 141.
See note to Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust, etc., Co. v. Lumber Co., 118 Mo. 447,
ill.fra, p. 1162, and note, 57 Am. St. Rep. 379, 384.

1733. In the High Court of Chancery. 2 Pecre Williams Re-

ports 207-209.

Sir Stephen Evans was one of the proprietors of the stock of the
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Hudson's Bay Company, which company are made a corporation by

Sec. 352. Same.

charter, and are thereby empowered to make by-laws for the better

3. Liens.

government of the company, and for the management and direction

of their trade to Hudson's Bay.

CHILD

Accordingly they made a by-law, that if any of their members

V.&BSus

HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY. 1

should be indebted to the company, his stock in the company should

be in the first place liable to the debts which such member should owe

1723.

IN

THE

HIGH

COURT OF CHANCERY.

2

Peere Williams Re-

potts 207-209.

the company, and that the company might seize and detain the said

stock for the debts due to them.

[Evans became bankrupt, and his assignees brought a bill against

the company asking for an accounting of the profits and dividends on

Evans's stock; the company insisted that Evans was indebted to them,

and that his stock ought to be liable to pay the debt. It was argued

for the plaintiffs that the stock or its proceeds should not be made

specially liable to pay any one debt, but should be applied to all, and

that no by-law could be made in this way to the prejudice of any third

person. The debt of Evans was not direct to the company, but to

/. 5. in trust for the company, upon an insurance project of that com-

pany.]

Macclesfield, L. C. This is a good by-law. for the legal interest

of all the stock is in the company, who are trustees for the several

members, and may order that the dividends to be made shall be under

particular restrictions, or terms; and by the same reason that .this by-

law is objected to. the common by-laws of companies, to deduct the

1 Statement of facts abridged.

Sir Step!ten Evans was one of the proprietors of the stock of the
Ht,dson's Bay Company, which company are made a corporation by
charter, and are thereby empowered to make by-laws for the better
government of the company, and for the management and direction
of their trade to Hudson's Bay.
Accordingly they made a by-law, that if any of their members
should be indebted to the company, his stock in the company should
be in the first place liable to the debts which such member should owe
the company, and that the company might seize and detain the said
stock for the debts due to them.
[Evans became bankrupt, and his assignees brought a bill against
the company asking for an accounting of the profits and dividends on
Evans's stock: the company insisted that Evans was indebted to them,
and that his stnck ought to be liable to pay the debt. It ,.,·as argued
for the plaintiffs that the stock or its proceeds should not be made
specially liable to pay any one debt, but should be applied to all, and
that no by-law could be made in this way to the prejudice of any third
person. The debt of Evans was not direct to the company, but to
J. S. in trust for the company, upon an insurance project of that company.]
MACCLESFIELD, L. C.
This is a goocl by-l aw , for the legal interest
of all the stock is in the ·company, who are trustees for thl' seycral
members, and may order that the dividends to be 'nacle shall be under
particular restrictions, or terms; and by the same reason that .this bylaw i objected to, the common by-laws of companies, to deduct the
1 Statement of facts abridged.
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calls out of the stocks of the members refusing to pay their calls, may-

be said to be void.

As to the other part of the by-law, empowering the company to de-

tain and seize the stock of such member, that is also good; but then

there ought to be some acts done by the company, to order or declare,

that the stock of such member is seized for the debt due to the said

company; but this being a by-law, to the prejudice of other creditors,

it shall be taken strictly, and not to extend to such debt as the mem-

ber does not owe in law, but only in equity, and in the present case

this is in law a debt due to J. S.

A corporation has an implied power to make by-laws; but where

the charter gives the company a power to make by-laws, they can only

make them in such cases as they are enabled to do by the charter, for

such power given by the charter implies a negative, that they shall

not make by-laws in any other cases.

Thus, where the company, in the principal case, have a power given

them by the charter to make by-laws for the management of their

trade to Hudson''s Bay, this power implies a negative, that they can

not make any other by-laws; a fortiori they can not make by-laws

in relation to projects and insurances, which by act of parliament are
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declared to be illegal.

Note. See note next case.

Sec. 353. Same.

BRINKERHOFF-FARRIS TRUST and SAVINGS CO. v. HOME LUMBER

COMPANY, Appellant.1

1893. In the Supreme Court of Missouri. 118 Missouri Rep.

447-463-

[In 1888 the Trust Company loaned Cleland $13,000, and accepted

as collateral security two certificates of stock of par value of $5,000

each in the lumber company, transferable only on the books of the com-

pany upon surrender of the certificates. Cleland having made default,

the trust company sold the stock, and through its president became

purchaser, and afterward presented the certificates for transfer on the

books of the lumber company; this was refused because Cleland was

indebted to the lumber company and it, by virtue of its by-laws, claimed

a lien on the stock. The tnist company claimed it had no notice of

such by-law, and it was therefore void as to it. The by-law pro-

vided "any transfer of stock shall be subject to the lien of the com-

pany thereon for any indebtedness due the company from theholder."]

Gantt, P. J- * * * The court found the issue in favor of the

plaintiff and assessed the damages at the par value of the stock and

interest from date of demand. Motions for a new trial and in arrest

were duly made and overruled and exceptions were duly taken to the

admission and exclusion of evidence and giving and refusing instruc-

tions, and the case is brought to this court by appeal.

1 Statement abridged. Arguments omitted. Only part of opinion given.

§ 353 RIGHT TO MAKE BY-LAWS. 1163

1. The defendant is a business corporation organized and existing

under the provisions of article 8, chapter 21, of Revised Statutes of

1879, and the general provision of article 1, of said chapter 21, so

§ 353

RIGHT TO MAKE BY-LAWS.

far as applicable.

By section 709, Revised Statutes 1879, the directors of a corpora-

tion like this are only empowered to make "by-laws to direct the

manner of taking the votes of stockholders on the question of increas-

ing or diminishing the number of directors or trustees, or of changing

the corporate name." The power to make all other needful or neces-

sary by-laws is conferred upon the corporation itself, and can only be

exercised by the stockholders. Rex v. Westwood, 7 Bing. 1; Bank

v. Bank, 17 Mass. 33; Carroll v. Bank, 8 Mo. App. 249; State

Savings Association v. Printing Co., 25 Mo. App. 642; Albers v.

Merchants' Exchange, 39 Mo. App. 583.

It was very clearly pointed out by Judge Hayden in Carroll v. Bank,

supra, that in the cases of Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 45

Mo. 513, and Ins. Co. v. Goodfellow, 9 Mo. 149, and Spurlock v.

Railroad, 61 Mo. 326, the directors in each case received their au-

thority to make the by-laws in question in those cases directly from

the legislature.
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It is very clear that the attempt of the directors of the defendant

company to adopt the by-laws, restricting the rights of its stockhold-

ers to convey their stock to any one until the said directors had re-

fused to purchase it or while indebted to the corporation, was without

warrant or authority of law, and as such is not binding, either on the

stockholders or those purchasing from them. The company itself

had no right to pass such a by-law. Moore v. Bank, 52 Mo. 377.

But it is claimed by appellant that the so-called by-law and the

resolution, although not valid as a by-law, is nevertheless binding as

a valid agreement on all who were parties to it, and that, as Mr. Cle-

land was then the president of defendant and a director, he was bound

by it, and that plaintiff, as a purchaser from Cleland, took only an

equity, and was chargeable with notice of this lien, asserted by de-

fendant, and that all [as] the certificates of stock are not negotiable

papers, plaintiff can not occupy the position of an innocent purchaser

for value and without notice. * * *

The spirit of all modern legislation is opposed to secret liens. At

common law a corporation has no lien on the stock of its stockholders

for any indebtedness to it. Accordingly, when such a lien is asserted,

it should clearly appear to be authorized by public law, or by a duly

adopted by-law, or valid agreement, of which the purchasers of the

stock have notice. None of these conditions existed as to the stock

in suit when it was transferred as security for plaintiff's loan, and

consequently plaintiff took it without being bound by so-called by-law

and resolution.

By section 739, Revised Statutes 1879, this stock was expressly de-

clared to be personal estate and transferable in the manner pre-

scribed by the by-laws, and no shares should be transfered until all

previous calls thereon should be fully paid. The only restriction on

1. The defendant is a b'usiness corporation organized and existing
under the provisions of article 8, chapter 2 l, of Revised Statutes of
1879, llnd the general provision of article l, of said chapter 21, so
far as applicable.
By section 709, Revised Statutes 1879, the directors of a corporation like this are only empowered to make "by-laws to direct the
manner of taking the votes of stockholders on the question of increasing or diminishing the number of dire ctors or trustees, or of changing
the corporate name." The power to make all other needful or necessary b y-laws is conferred upon the corporation itself, and can only be
exercised by the stockholclers. Rex v. Westwood, 7 Bing. l; Bank
v. Bank, 17 Mass. 33; Carroll v. Bank, 8 Mo. App. 249; State
S avings Association v. Printing Co., 25 Mo. App. 642; Albers v.
M erchants' Exchange, 39 Mo. App. 583.
It was very clearly pointed out by Judge Hayden in Carroll v. Bank,
supra, that in the cases of Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 45
Mo. 513, and Ins . Co. v. Goodfellow, 9 Mo. 149, and Spurlock v.
Railroad, 61 Mo. 326, the directors in each case received their authority to make the by-laws in question in those cases directly from
the legislature.
It is very clear that the attempt of the directors of the defendant
company to adopt the by-laws, restricting the rights of its stockholders to convey their stock to any one until the said directors had refused to purchase it or while indebted to the corporation, was without
warrant or authority of law, and as such is not binding, either on the
stockholders or those purchasing from them. The company itself
had no right to pass such a by-law. Moore v. Bank, 52 Mo. 377.
But it is claimed by appellant that the so-called by-law and the
re<;olution, although not valid as a by-law, is nevertheless binding as
a valid agreement on all who were parties to it, and that , as Mr. Cleland was then the president of defendant and a director, he '<vas bound
by it, and that plaintiff, as a purchaser from Cleland, took only an
equity, and was chargeable with notice of this lien, asserted by defendant, and that all [as] the certificates of stock are not negotiable
p apers, plaintiff can not occupy the position of an innocent purchaser
for value and without notice. • • •
The spirit of all modern legislation is opposed to secret liens. At
common law a corporation has n0 lien on the stock of its stockholders
for any indebtedness to it. Accordingly, when such a lien is asserted,
it should clearly appear to be authorized by public law, or by a duly
adopted by-law, or valid agreement , of which the purchasers of the
stock have notice. None of these conditions exi ted as to the stock
in suit when it was transferred as security for plaintiff's loan, and
consequently plaintiff took it without being bound by so-called by-law
and resolution.
·
By section 739, R evised Statutes 1879, this stock vvas expressly declnred to be personal estate and transferable in the manner prescribed by the by-laws, and no shares should be transfered until all
previous calls thereon should be fully paid. The only restriction on
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the transfer bv this section is upon the stock which was not fully paid

BRINKERHOFF-FARRIS CO. V. HOME, ETC., CO.

up; a restriction not applicable here, because this stock was fully

§ 353

paid up in the beginning. The purpose of permitting the company

the transfer by this section is upon the sto~k which was not fully paid
up; a re triction not applicable here, because this stock was fully
paid up in the beginning. The purpose of permitting the company
to require a transfer on the books was clearly to advise the company
of the change of ovrnership in order that only the owners of the stock
should participate in the corporate election, and to enable the corporation to pay dividends without risk, or make assessments upon the
holdl'rs of its stock, but certainly it was not intended that under this
power to regulate transfers, the company should create or reserve a
secret 1icn upon the stock. Without reference to its quasi-negotiable
character, the pledge or sale of this stock was simply a pledge or sale
of personal property, and the pledgee or vendee, without notice of
the lien, took it discharged therefrom. He did not purchase a mere
equity in paper, but he purchased personal property. If that property
was bound by a lien of which he had lawful notice, he took subject
to it, and if he had no such notice he took it discharged therefrom.
The mere recital that "it was only transferable on the books of the
company" was not notice, either of a restriction on sale, or of a lien
thereon.
• • •
(Upon the question of value, the court held the measure of damages
for com·ersion is its actual value, which, if it has no market value, is
presumptively its face value, but may be established by proof of its
dividend;earning capacity (though an expert's opinion on this point
is not competent), or by value of corporate assets, or by individual
sales not under compulsion.]

to require a transfer on the books was clearly to advise the company

of the change of ownership in order that only the owners of the stock

should participate in the corporate election, and to enable the corpo-

ration to pay dividends without risk, or make assessments upon the

holders of its stock, but certainly it was not intended that under this

power to regulate transfers, the company should create or reserve a

secret lien upon the stock. Without reference to its ywcri'-negotiable

character, the pledge or sale of this stock was simply a pledge or sale

of personal property, and the pledgee or vendee, without notice of

the lien, took it discharged therefrom. He did not purchase a mere

equity in paper, but he purchased personal property. If that property

was bound by a lien of which he had lawful notice, he took subject

to it, and if he had no such notice he took it discharged therefrom.

The mere recital that "it was only transferable on the books of the

company" was not notice, either of a restriction on sale, or of a lien

thereon. « • •

[Upon the question of value, the court held the measure of damages
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for conversion is its actual value, which, if it has no market value, is

presumptively its face value, but may be established by proof of its

dividend-earning capacity (though an expert's opinion on this point

is not competent), or by value of corporate assets, or by individual

sales not under compulsion.]

Affirmed.

Note. By the weight of authority valid liens upon shares can not be created

by by-law alone, bo as to prevent the transfer of the shares, divested of the lien,

to persons having; no notice of such lien: 1825, Fitzhiigh v. Bank, 3 T. B. Mon.

(Kv.) 126, 16 Am. Dec. 90, note; 1829, Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co., 8 Pick.

90, 19 Am. Dec. 306; 1878, Fanners', etc., Bank v. Wasson, 48 Iowa 336, 30

Am. R. 398; 1880, Bank of Hollv Springs v. Pinson, 58 Miss. 421, 3ft Am. R.

Affirmed.

330; 1892, Gemmel v. Davis, 75 Md. 546, 32 Am. St. R. 412, note; 1893, Bank

Note. By the weight of authority valid liens upon shares can not be created
by by-law alone, so as to prevent the transfer of the shares, divested of the lien,
to persons having no noti ce of such lien: 1825, Fitzhugh v. Bank, 3 T. B. Mon.
(Ky .) 126, 16 Am. Dec. 90, note; 1829, Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co., 8 Pick.
90, 19 Am. Dl'c. 306; 1878, Farmers', etc., Bank v. Wassou, 48 Iowa 336, 30
Am. R . 398; 1880, Bank of Holly 8prings v. Pinson, 58 Miss. 421, 38 Am. R.
330; 1892, Uemmel v. Davis, 15 Md. 546, 32 Am. St. R. 412, note ; I 93, Bank
of Atchison Co. v. Durfee, 118 .Mo. 431, 40 Am. St. R. 396; 189ft, Bloede Co.
v. Bloede, 84 Mu. 129, 57 Am. 8t. R. 373, .note 379, supra, P: 1159; 1897, Boyd
v. Redd , 120 N. C. 3::15, 58 Am. St. R. 792; 1898, Dorr v. Life, 71Minn.38, 70
Am. St. R. 309. See also notes 11 Am. Dec .•581, &5 Am. Dec. 619, 57 Am.
St. R. :-{79.
Cn11 tm, 1822, l\Iorgan v. Bank, 8 Serg. & R. 73, 11 Am. Dec. 575 ; 1870,
Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 4.5 Mo. 513, 100 Am. Dec. 388. See
al110 caf'es given in note.~ 11 Am. Dec. 581, and &5 Am. Dec. 619.
:-:luclt valid lie n, however , mny he created by expres11 statutory or charter
provision or authority. 185\l, Reese v. Bank, 14 Md. 271, 74 Am. Dec. 536;
18!l6, Bloe<le Co. v. Bloerle, 84 .:\fd. 129. fl7 Am. St. R. 373, note 379; 1898.
Dorr v. Life, 71 ~Jinn . 38, 70 Am. St. R. 309.
Or by contract contained in the certificate of stock: 1899, Stafford v. Produce Exchange Banking Co., 61 0. S. 160, 76 Am. St. Rep. 371.

of Atchison Co. v. Din-fee, 118 Mo. 431, 40 Am. St. R. 3%; 1896, Bloede Co.

v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129. 57 Am. St. R. 373, note 379, supra, p. 1159; 1897, Boyd

v. Redd, 120 N. C. 335, 58 Am. St. R. 792; 1898, Dorr v. Life, 71 Minn. 38, 70

Am. St. R. 309. See also notes 11 Am. Dec. 581, 85 Am. Dec. 619, 57 Am.

St. R. 379.

Contra, 1822, Morgan v. Bank, 8 Serg. & R. 73, 11 Am. Dec. 575; 1870,

Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 45 Mo. 513, 100 Am. Dec. 388. See

also eases given in notes 11 Am. Dec. 581, and 85 Am. Dec. 619.

Such valid lien, however, may be created by express statutory or charter

provision or authority. 1859, Reese v. Bank, 14 Md. 271, 74 Am. Dec. 536;

1896, Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 57 Am. St. R. 373, note 379; 1898.

Dorr v. Life, 71 Minn. 38, 70 Am. St. R. 309.

Or by contract contained in the certificate of stock: 1899, Stafford v. Pro-

duce Exchange Banking Co., 61 O. S. 160, 76 Am. St. Rep. 371.
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EVANS v. THE PHILADELPHIA CLUB.'

1865. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 50 Pa. St.

Sec. 354. Same.

Rep. 107-127.

4. Expulsion of members.

Certificate from the court at Wist. Prius. Evans petitioned for

mandamus to be restored to membership in the club, claiming to, have

EVANS v. THE PHILADELPHIA CLUB. 1

been expelled for an insufficient cause. The decision of the court at

Nisi Prius was delivered by Woodward, C. J., as follows:

"This case touches the power of a private corporation to disfran-

1865.

IN

THE

SUPREME CouRT o F

chise one of its members, and it will be necessary and proper to ex-

amine, somewhat minutely, the authorities of the law bearing upon

the point.

"The leading case upon this branch of law is that of James Bagg,

decided in the reign of James I (A. D. 1616), and reported in Coke's

Reports, part xi, p. 93. Bagg was one of twelve chief burgesses

of the borough of Plymouth, in England, and having been guilty of

the most scandalous and disorderly speeches to the mayor and his fel-

low burgesses, was expelled, but the King's Bench restored him by
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mandamus. Among other things it was resolved, 'That no freeman

of any corporation can be disfranchised by the corporation, unless they

have authority to do it, either by the express words of the charter or

by prescription; but if they have not authority, neither by charter nor

prescription, then he ought to be convicted by course of law before he

can be removed.' And in support of this, Lord Coke quotes that

famous clause of Magna Charta, beginning '■Nullus liber Ziomo,' etc.

"Though much was said about disfranchisement in Bagg's case, it

was really a case of amotion, and not of disfranchisement. Bagg

was removed from the office of burgess, and not expelled from the

borough by the action of the corporation. Mr. Willcock, in his ex-

cellent treatise on Corporations, page 270, defines amotion as applica-

ble only to officers, and says it causes a cessation of the particular of-

fices from which they are amoved, but in no manner affects their

right to the freedom of the municipality; whilst disfranchisement is

applicable only to the freedom, and cuts off the corporator from all

rights and privileges of the corporation. It appears, he says, that

there is not an incidental right in corporations to disfranchise their

members, but it must be claimed by prescription or express grant of

the charter. For this he refers himself to Bagg's case, which, he says,

has never been expressly overruled; the cases in which it has been

questioned having been cases of amotion. Me then goes on to make

some general observations on the subject, all of which arc so excel-

lent, and some of which are so pertinent to the case in hand, that I

am tempted to transcribe them. He says: 'At the time when James

1 Statement of facts abridged. Arguments and part of opinion omitted.

PENNSYLVANIA.

50

Pa . St.

Rep. 107-127.
Certificate from the court at Nz'sz'. Prt'us. Evans petitioned for
mandamus to be restored to membership in the club, claiming to, have
been expelled for an insufficient cause.

The decision of the comt at

Nz'sz' Pr£us was delivered by WoonwARD, C. J., as follows:
"This case touches the power of a private corporation to disfranchise one of its members, and it ·will be necessary and proper t o examine, somewhat minutely, the authorities of the law bearing upon
the point.
"The leading case upon thi s branch of law is that of James Bagg,
decided in the reign of James I (A. D. 1616), and reported in Coke's
Reports, part xi, p. 93. B agg was one of twelve chief burgesses
of the borough of Plymouth , in England, and h·aving been guilty of
the most scandalous and disorderly speeches to the mayor and hi s fellow burgesses, was expelled, but the King's Bench r estored him by
mandamus. Among other things it was resolved, •That no freeman
of any corporation can be disfranchised by the corporation, unless they
have authority to do it, either by the express words of the charter o r
by prescription; but if they have not authority, neither by charter n or
prescription, then he ought to b e convicted by course of l aw before he
can be removed.' And in support of this, L ord Coke quotes th at
famous clause of Magna Charta , beginning •Nul!us !t'ber homo,' etc.
"Though much was said about disfranchisemen t in Bagg's case, it
was really a case of a motion, and not of disfranchisement. Bagg
was re moved from the office of burgess, and not expelled from the
b oro ug h by the action of the corporation. Mr. Willcock, in hi s excellent treatise on Corporations, page 270, defines amotion as applicable only to officers, and says it causes a cessation of the particular offices from which they are amoved, out in no manner affects the ir
right to the freedom of the municipality; whilst disfranchisement is
applicable only to the freedom, and cuts off the corporator from all
rights and privileges of the corporation. It appears, he says, that
there is not an incidental right in corporations to disfranchise their
members, but it must be claimed by prescription or express grant of
th e charter. For this he refers himself to Bagg's case, which, he says,
has never been expressly overruled; the cases in which it has been
questioned h aving been cases of amotion. He then goes on t o make
some general observat ion!' on the subject, all of which are so excellent, and some of which arc so p ertine nt to the case in hand , that I
am tempted to transcribe them. H e says : 'At the time when James
1
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Bagg's case was before the court, their attention had been rarely at-

§ 354

tracted to the consideration of corporate causes, and the distinction

Bagg's case was before the court, their attention had been rarely attracted to the cunsi<leration of corporate causes, and the distinction
between the right to the offices and the right to the freedom of a
municipality had been little considered. The particular case was of
amotion from offi.:e; the arguments were in general more applicable
to disfranchisement. But there is a material difference in principle.
The enjoyment of office is not for the private benefit of the corporator, but an honorable distinction which he holds for the welfare of
the corporation, and therefore, though it be an office of a freehold
nature, it is entirely conditional. • • • But the franchise of a
freeman is wholly for his own benefit, and a private right; a right in
the municipality similar to that of a natural subject in the state, of
which he ought not to be deprived for any minor offen1'e against bis
corporate fealty, any more than that for which, as a subject, he ought
to be deprived of his franchise as a liegeman. For this reason, all
minor corporate offenses, suclz as improper beliavior to Ids fellowcorporators, where not punishable by the general law of the land, as
well as violations of his corporate duties, ought to be punished by
penalties imposed by the ordinances of the municipality, and not by
disfranchisement. But such offenses against the general law as occasion a forfeiture of all civil rights, import in themselves a forfeiture
of the corporate franchise; and offenses against the corporation which
tend to its destruction, such as defacing the charters, altering the corporate records so as to destroy the evidence of their title to privileges,
or that of the title of his fellow-corporators to their franchises, are of
course causes of di sfranchisement.'
"These observations relate to municipal corporations; but why are
they not equally applicable to private corporations? The interest or
•freedom' which a member has in a private corporation is as truly a
'franchise' as that which any of the burgesses mentioned in Bagg's
case had in the borough of Plymouth, and may often be a much more
valuable franchise. Where it has b een obtained by the payment of a
pecuniary consideration, and property is held in connection with it, it
is a vested estate, and certainly ought not to be sacrificed on account
of minor offenses, which would not be p ermitted to forfeit individu a l
interests in a municipal corporation. And if a power to disfranchise
in a municipal corporation does not exist unless expressly granted, it
is very safe to conclude that it is not inherent in a private corporation,
and must have an express grant to support it.
"The extent to which Bagg's case has been overruled is clearly indicated in Lord Bruce's Case, 2 Strange 819, which was a ca se of
amotion, not disfran chisement, and where it was said 'the modern
opinion has been that a power of amotion is incident to the corporation, though Bagg's case seems contrary.' Richardson's Case, r Burr.
517, was amotion from a municipal office-that of portman of the
borough of Ipswich . Lord Mansfield went very fully into the law of
corporations, and whilst the amotion was not sustained, he sanctioned.
very distinctly, the 'modem opinion' referred to in Lord Bruce's case,

between the right to the offices and the right to the freedom of a

municipality had been little considered. The particular case was of

amotion from office; the arguments were in general more applicable

to disfranchisement. But there is a material difference in principle.

The enjoyment of office is not for the private benefit of the corpora-

tor, but an honorable distinction which he holds for the welfare of

the corporation, and therefore, though it be an office of a freehold

nature, it is entirely conditional. * * * But the franchise of a

freeman is wholly for his own benefit, and a private right; a right in

the municipality similar to that of a natural subject in the state, of

which he ought not to be deprived for any minor offense against his

corporate fealty, any more than that for which, as a subject, he ought

to be deprived of his franchise as a liegeman. For this reason, all

minor corporate offenses, such as improper behavior to his fellow-

corporators, where not punishable by the general law of the land, as

well as violations of his corporate duties, ought to be punished by
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penalties imposed by the ordinances of the municipality, and not by

disfranchisement. But such offenses against the general law as occa-

sion a forfeiture of all civil rights, import in themselves a forfeiture

of the corporate franchise; and offenses against the corporation which

tend to its destruction, such as defacing the charters, altering the cor-

porate records so as to destroy the evidence of their title to privileges,

or that of the title of his fellow-corporators to their franchises, are of

course causes of disfranchisement.'

"These observations relate to municipal corporations; but why are

they not equally applicable to private corporations? The interest or

'freedom' which a member has in a private corporation is as truly a

'franchise' as that which any of the burgesses mentioned in Bagg's

case had in the borough of Plymouth, and may often be a much more

valuable franchise. Where it has been obtained by the payment of a

pecuniary consideration, and property is held in connection with it, it

is a vested estate, and certainly ought not to be sacrificed on account

of minor offenses, which would not be permitted to forfeit individual

interests in a municipal corporation. And if a power to disfranchise

in a municipal corporation does not exist unless expressly granted, it

is very safe to conclude that it is not inherent in a private corporation,

and must have an express grant to support it.

"The extent to which Bagg's ca.se has been overruled is clearly in-

dicated in Lord Bruce's Case, 2 Strange 819, which was a case of

amotion, not disfranchisement, and where it was said 'the modern

opinion has been that a poiver of amotion is incident to the corpora-

tion, though Bagg's case seems contrary.' Richardson's Case, 1 Burr.

517, was amotion from a municipal office—that of portman of the

borough of Ipswich. Lord Mansfield went very fully into the law of

corporations, and whilst the amotion was not sustained, he sanctioned,

very distinctly, the 'modern opinion' referred to in Lord Bruce's case,
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and stated three sorts of offenses for which an officer or a corporator

may be discharged:

"'1. Such as have no immediate relation to his office; but are in

§ 354

RlGHT TO MAKE BY-LAWS.

themselves of so infamous a nature as to render the offender unfit to

execute any public franchise.

"'2. Such as are only against his oath and the duty of his office as

a corporator, and amount to breaches of the tacit condition annexed to

his franchise or office.

"'3. Such as are of a mixed nature, as being an offense not only

against the duty of his office, but also a matter indictable at common

law.'

"Of these distinctions, limited originally to municipal corporations,

I shall have something to say hereafter, when I come to speak of them

in connection with private corporations.

"In Earle's Case, Carthew 173, it was held that a member of a

corporation can not be disfranchised except for that v/hich works to

the destruction of the body corporate, or of the liberties and privileges

thereof, and not for any personal offense of one member to another.

"Tidderly's Case, 1 Siderfin 14, was a question of restoring a mu-

nicipal officer who had voluntarily resigned, and Chief Justice Hale
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held that every corporation had power to receive a resignation, and

might, for good cause, amove.

"These cases are sufficient to reflect the opinion of the English

courts on Bagg's case. A more full reference to the authorities will

be found in the notes to Willcock's chapter on disfranchisement, in

his work on Corporations. The result seems to be that the resolu-

tion I quoted from Bagg's case has been so far modified that the

power of amotion is inherent in the nature of corporations and not

dependent upon prescription or charter, but the authorities do not

establish the point that corporations have inherent power to disfran-

chise a private member. But Bagg's case is an authority against the

power of disfranchisement no farther than the reasonings therein are

entitled to respect, for the point of the case had not reference either

to private corporations or the power of disfranchisement. Whilst,

therefore, the very point of the case may be regarded as overruled,

the reasonings, as expounded by Mr. Willcock, are such as to com-

mend them to universal acceptance. Where corporations are founded

upon private capital, the modern English cases are very unanimous

in holding that no stockholder can be disfranchised, and thereby de-

prived of his interest in the property of the corporation, without an

express authority for the purpose in the charter.

"In Pennsylvania, The Commonwealth, ex rel. John Binns, v.

The St. Patrick Benevolent Society, 2 Binn. 441, is the leading case.

The society, under a power conferred by its charter, made a by-law

that vilifying a member by another member should be punished as a

crime against the society, by removal from office, fine, or expulsion.

Binns having been convicted of grossly vilifying a fellow-member,

was expelled therefor under this by-law. The supreme court restored

him upon mandamus, mainly on the ground that the by-law was not

and stated three sorts of offenses for which an officer or a corporator
may be discharged:
" '1. Such as have no immediate relation to his office ; but are in
themselves of so infamous a nature as to render the offender unfit to
execute any public franchise.
" '2. Such as are only against his oath and the duty of his office as
a corporator, and amount to breaches of the tacit condition annexed to
his franchi se or office.
" ' 3· Such as are of a mixed nature, as being an offense not only
against the duty of his office, but also a matter indictable at common
law.'
"Of these disti.nctions, limited originally to municipal corporations,
I shall have someth ing to say hereafter, when I come to speak of them
in connection with private corporations.
"ln Earle's Case, Carthew 173, it was held that a member of a
co'r poration can not be dis franchised except for that which works to
the <lestmction of the body corporate, or of the liberties and privileges
thereof, and not for any personal offense of one member to anotlter.
"Tidderly's Case, 1 Siderfin 14, was a question of restoring a municipal officer who had voluntarily resigned, and Chief Justice Hale
held that every corporation had power to receive a resignation, and
might, for good cause, amove.
"These cases are sufficient to reflect the opinion of the English
courts on Bagg's case. A more full reference to the authorities will
be found in the notes to Willcock's chapter on disfranchisement, in
his work on Corporations. The result seems to be that the resolution I quoted from Bagg's case has been so far modified that the
power of amotion is inherent in the nature of corporations and not
dependent upon prescription or charter, but the authorities do not
establish the point that corporations have inherent power to disfranchise a private member. But Bagg's case is an authority against the
power of disfranchisement no farther than the reasonings therein are
entitled to respect, for the point of the case had not reference either
to private corporations or the power of disfranchisement. vVhilst,
therefore, the very point of the case may be regarded as overruled,
the reasonings, as expounded by Mr. Willcock, are such as to commend them to universal acceptance. \Vhere corporntions are founded
upon private capital, the modern Engli sh cases are very unanimous
in holding th:it no stockholder can be disfranchised, and thereby deprived of his interest in the property of the corporation, without an
express authority for the purpose in the charter.
" ln P e nnsylvania, The Commonwealth, ex rel. John Binns, v.
The St. Patrick Benevolent Society, 2 Binn. 441, is the leading case.
The society, under a power confGrred by its charter, made a by-law
that vilifying a m·ember by another member should be punishe<l as a
crime against the society, by removal from office, fine, or expulsion.
Binns having been convicted of grossly vilifying a fellow-member,
was expelled therefor under this by-law. The supreme court restored
him upon mandamus, mainly on the ground that the by-law was not
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corporation—that it subjected the rights of membership to the uncer-

tain will of a majority—that 'the offense of vilifying a member, on a

necessary for the good government and support of the affairs of the
corporation-that it subjected the rights of membership to the uncertain will of a majority-that 'the offense of vilifying a member, on a
private quarrel, is totally unconnected with the affairs of the society,
and therefore its punishment can not be necessary for the good government of the corporation.' Chief Justice Tilghman, delivering the
opinion of the court, quoted Lord Mansfield's three sorts of offenses
as laid down in Richardson ' s case , and said Binn's offense did not
come within either of them, and he concluded by declaring that
'without an express power in the charter, no man can be disfranchised
unless he has been guilty of some offense which either affects the interest or good government of the corporation, or is- indictable by the
law of the land.'
"In Fuller v. The Trustees of the Plainfield Academy, 6 Conn.
532, Judge Dagg et alluded to the doctrine that a power of amotion
is incidental to corporations, but seemed to doubt whether it was applicable to any but municipal corporations, and quoted Judge Story
as saying in the Dartmouth C ollege case that there could be no arnotion of. the trustees of that institution, and he restored the trustee of
the Plainfield Academy , who had been expelled for disrespectful and
contemptuou s language tow ards his associates, and for neglect of duty
as a trustee . 'The court, ' he said, 'can not justify expulsion from
office o n such charg es. What the trustee might have done to one of
their number who had committed a crime which would banish him
from society, it is not necessary to decide.' Another prin ci1;le was
asserted in thi s case, that the pl ace of a trustee in a n eleemosynary
corporation, though no emoluments are attached to it, is a franchi se
of such a nature that a person improperly dispossessed of it is entitled to redress by mandamus. S ee also Dartmouth College v . Woodward , 4 Wheat. 676.
" In the case of Gray v. The Medical Society of Erie, 24 Barb.
570, a physician was asking to be restored to a society from which he
had b een expelled for violating a by-law that prescribed a tariff of
fees for medical services. The supreme court of New York went
very fully into the autho rities upo n corporate powers , and held that
the power given to m edical societies by statute to make by-laws and
r egulations relative to the admi ssion and. expulsion of members, was
not an arbitrary or unlimited power, and th at a by-law must be reasonable, and adapted to the purposes of th e corporation.
" In th e case o f The C ommonwealth v. Philanthrop ic Society, 5
B inn. 486, we have in our own courts wha t is very rare in the authoriti es. an instance of expulsion that was sustained. A m ember made
a d em and u pon the society fo r relief agreeably to th e rules of the in!'titntion , and presente<l a physician' s bill which he bad altered fro m
$+ to $40, and which he cl aimed to ha ve paid. Upon the ground
that thi s w as a scandalous crim e , amounting almost, if not quite , to
techn ical forgery, and that it w as directly injurious to the society , his
e xpul sion w as supported .
" In Th e C ommonwealth v . The Franklin B eneficial Association ,

private quarrel, is totally unconnected with the affairs of the society,

and therefore its punishment can not be necessary for the good gov-

ernment of the corporation.' Chief Justice Tilghman, delivering the

opinion of the court, quoted Lord Mansfield's three sorts of offenses

as laid down in Richardson's case, and said Binn's offense did not

come within either of them, and he concluded by declaring that

'without an express power in the charter, no man can be disfranchised

unless he has been guilty of some offense which either affects the in-

terest or good government of the corporation, or is indictable by the

law of the land.'

"In Fuller v. The Trustees of the Plainfield Acadercry, 6 Conn.

532, Judge Dagget alluded to the doctrine that a power of amotion

is incidental to corporations, but seemed to doubt whether it was ap-

plicable to any but municipal corporations, and quoted Judge Story

as saying in the Dartmouth College case that there could be no amo-

tion of the trustees of that institution, and he restored the trustee of
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the Plainfield Academy, who had been expelled for disrespectful and

contemptuous language towards his associates, and for neglect of duty

as a trustee. 'The court,' he said, 'can not justify expulsion from

office on such charges. What the trustee might have done to one of

their number who had committed a crime which would banish him

from society, it is not necessary to decide.' Another principle was

asserted in this case, that the place of a trustee in an eleemosynary

corporation, though no emoluments are attached to it, is a franchise

of such a nature that a person improperly dispossessed of it is enti-

tled to redress by mandamus. See also Dartmouth College v. Wood-

ward, 4 Wheat. 676.

"In the case of Gray v. The Medical Society of Erie, 24 Barb.

570, a physician was asking to be restored to a society from which he

had been expelled for violating a by-law that prescribed a tariff of

fees for medical services. The supreme court of New York went

very fully into the authorities upon corporate powers, and held that

the power given to medical societies by statute to make by-laws and

regulations relative to the admission and expulsion of members, was

not an arbitrary or unlimited power, and that a by-law must be reason-

able, and adapted to the purposes of the corporation.

"In the case of The Commonwealth v. Philanthropic Society, 5

Binn. 486, we have in our own courts what is very rare in the author-

ities, an instance of expulsion that was sustained. A member made

a demand upon the society for relief agreeably to the rules of the in-

stitution, and presented a physician's bill which he had altered from

$4 to $40, and which he claimed to have paid. Upon the ground

that this was a scandalous crime, amounting almost, if not quite, to

technical forgery, and that it was directly injurious to the society, his

expulsion was supported.

"In The Commonwealth v. The Franklin Beneficial Association,
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"In The Commonwealth v. The German Society, 3 Harris 251, a

society for 'mutual support and assistance,' the cause of disfranchise-

ment was that the member had assisted, as president of the society,

in defrauding it out of fifty cents, and had defamed and injured the

society in public taverns. It was held not to be a sufficient cause,

and he was .restored.

"When the charter of the Butchers' Beneficial Association was

presented to our supreme court, it was rejected on the ground, among

others, that it allowed the association to expel members who should

be 'guilty of actions which may injure the association.' This, said

the chief justice, we can not approve; for it gives the association an

entirely indefinite power over its members. For any action which

may injure them they may expel, and therefore they may expel a

member for becoming insolvent. It is totally incompatible with the

whole spirit of our institutions, to clothe anybody with such indefinite

power over its members; for it is equivalent to socialism, and is a re-

jection of all individual rights within the association. It is common
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in such charters to found the right of expulsion on the fact that the

member has been found guilty of some crime on a trial in court, and

this is quite proper, n Harris 151.

"In the case of The Beneficial Association of Brotherly Unity, 2

Wright 299, a charter was rejected because it gave a majority the

power to expel any member 'guilty of an offense against the law'—

the court holding that a constitution that puts all power over rights in

the hands of a majority is no constitution at all.

"Gathering now, into one group, the principles of decision that lie

scattered through the authorities, they may be stated thus:

"1. That the power of amotion for adequate cause, is an inherent

incident of all corporations, whether municipal or'private, except,

perhaps, such as are literary or eleemosynary, but the exercise of this

power does not affect the private rights of the corporator in the fran-

chise.

"2. That the power of disfranchisement which does destroy the

member's franchise, must, in general, be conferred by statute, and is

never sustained as an incidental power, without statute grant, except

in two cases—first, on conviction of the member in a court of justice

of an infamous offense; and second, where he has committed some

act against the society which tends to its destruction or injury.

"3. That the power to make by-laws is incidental to corporations,

and generally expressly conferred by statute; but by-laws which vest

in a majority the power of expulsion for minor offenses, are, in so far,

void, and courts of justice will not sustain expulsion made under

them.

"4. In joint stock companies, 'or, indeed, in any corporation own-

ing property' (Angell & Ames on Corporations, § 410), no power

74—WIL. CAS.

ro Barr 35 7, a member was rest9red who had been expelled for enlisting in a violation of a by-law of the society.
"In The Commonwealth v. The German Society, 3 Harris 251, a
society for 'mutual support and assistance,' the cause of disfranchisement was that the member had assisted, as president of the society,
in defrauding it out of fifty cents, and had defamed and injured the
society in public taverns. It was held not to be a sufficient cause,
and he was .restored.
"When the charter of the Butchers' Beneficial Association was
presented to our supreme court, it was rejected on the ground, among
others, that it allowed the association to e~el members who should
be 'guilty of actions which may injure the association.' This, said
the chief justice, we can not approve; for it gives the association an
entirely indefinite power over its members. For any action which
may injure them they may expel, and therefore they may expel a
member for becoming insolvent. It is totally incompatible with the
whole spirit of our institutions, to clothe anybody with such indefinite
power over its members; for it is equivalent to socialism, and is a r:ejection of all individual rights within the association. It is common
in such charters to found the right of expulsion on the fact that the
member has been found guilty of some crime on a trial in court, and
this is quite proper. r 1 Harris 15 r •
. "In the case of The Beneficial Association of Brotherly Unity, 2
Wright 299, a charter was rejected because it gave a majority the
power to expel any member 'guilty of an offense against the law'the court holding that a constitution that puts all power over rights in
the hands of a majority is no constitution at all.
"Gathering now, into one group, the principles of decision that lie
scattered through the authorities, they may be stated thus:
"r. That the power of amotion for adequate cause, is an inherent
incident of all corporations, whether municipal or· private, except,
perhaps, such as are literary or eleemosynary, but the exercise of this
power does not affect the private rights of the corporator in the franchise.
"2. That the power of disfranchisement which does destroy the
member's franchise, must, in general, be conferred by statute, and is
never sustained as an incidental power, without statute grant, except
in two cases-first, on conviction of the member in a court of justice
of an infamous offense; and second, where he has committed some
act against the society which tends to its destruction or injury.
"3· That the power to make by-laws is incidental to corporations,
and generally expressly conferred by statute; but by-laws which vest
in a majority the power of expulsion for minor offenses, are, in so far,
void, and courts of justice will not sustain expulsion made under
them.
"4· In joint stock companies, 'or, indeed, in any corporation owning property' (Angell & Ames on Corporations, § 410), no power
74-WIL. OAS.
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of expulsion can be exercised unless expressly conferred by the char-

ter. • • •
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"The 65th, 66th and 67th by-laws enact that 'if the conduct of a

EVANS V. THE PHILADELPHIA CLUB.
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member be disorderly, or injurious to the interest of the club, or con-

of expulsion can be exercised unless expressly conferred by the charter. • • •
"The 65th, 66th and 67th by-laws enact that 'if the conduct of a
membe r be disorderly, or injurious to the interest of the club, or contrary to its by-laws, he shall be requested to resign, and if the request
be disregarded, the board shall refer the matter to the next stated
meeting of the club, and at such meeting the circumstances of the
case shall be considered, and the member may be expelled.'
"The relator became a member of the club in 1848, and it is not
alleged that he has failed to pay any of bis dues, or perform any of
his <luties to the club, but. the return alleges that on 'the evening of
the 24th of February, 1863 1 the defendant was guilty of breaking the
65th by-law by having an altercation within the walls of the clubhouse with Samuel B. Thomas, an<l by striking him a blow.' For
this he was expelled. • • •
"It is not alleged that the rclator is a quarrelsome person or habitually disorderly. On the contrary, it was admitted in argument that
he is a respectable gentleman, and it is shown that when the offen e
occurred he was sitting in the bar-room of the club-house in quiet and
friendly conversation with another person, when Thomas entered and
uttered defamatory words which the relator understood to be applied
to himself. It wa s therefore an assault upon Thomas, provoked by
himself. It was not an interruption of any deliberations or proceedings of the club in a state of organization-it occurred not in a readingroom, or an eating-room, nor at a card or billiard table, but in what
is called the office or bar-room of the house.
"l look upon the occurrence as disorderly and injurious to the interest of the club, within the meaning of the 65th by-law, but as one
of those •minor offenses,' of which Mr. Willcock speaks, and for
which a maj ority have no power, even under the by-laws, to disfranchise a member. · And upon the doctrine of the cases I have referred
to, I hold the by-law void so far as it inflicts this extreme penalty for
such an offense. I would be very sorry to say that anything short of
a statute could confer on a majority of the members of any corporation power to expel a fellow-member for merely disorderly conduct. " • •
"But what is conclusiYe of this case is, that the corporation posses es property, real and personal, and is at liberty to accumul::tte
more, until an annual revenue of $3 ,ooo comes to be enjoyed; and
the re lator has purchased and paid for the right to participate in that
franchise. It is not a joint stock company at present, for under its
by-Ia,"'·s no pecuniary profits are divisible among the members, but it
may become so, and whether it does or not, the relator has a \'ested
interest in its estate, and can not be deprived of it by the procet>ding-~
that were had against him. On thi s point the authorities are clear.
and \'Vithout confl ict. Nothing but an express power in the charter
can authorize a money co1voration to throw overboard one of its
members . I h:n·e shown that the act of incorporation contained no
such power. On the contrary, it excluded it , for the proviso reads
' that nothing he: rein contained shall be so con, trued as to authorize

trary to its by-laws, he shall be requested to resign, and if the request

be disregarded, the board shall refer the matter to the next stated

meeting of the club, and at such meeting the circumstances of the

case shall be considered, and the member may be expelled.'

"The relator became a member of the club in 1S48, and it is not

alleged that he has failed to pay an}' of his dues, or perform any of

his duties to the club, but. the return alleges that on 'the evening of

the 24th of February, 1863, the defendant was guilty of breaking the

65th by-law by having an altercation within the walls of the club-

house with Samuel B. Thomas, and by striking him a blow.' For

this he was expelled. * * *

"It is not alleged that the relator is a quarrelsome person or habitu-

ally disorderly. On the contrary, it was admitted in argument that

he is a respectable gentleman, and it is shown that when the offense

occurred he was sitting in the bar-room of the club-house in quiet and

friendly conversation with another person, when Thomas entered and
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uttered defamatory words which the relator understood to be applied

to himself. It was therefore an assault upon Thomas, provoked by

himself. It was not an interruption of any deliberations or proceed-

ings of the club in a state of organization—it occurred not in a reading-

room, or an eating-room, nor at a card or billiard table, but in what

is called the office or bar-room of the house.

"I look upon the occurrence as disorderly and injurious to the in-

terest of the club, within the meaning of the 65th by-law, but as one

of those 'minor offenses,' of which Mr. Willcock speaks, and for

which a majority have no power, even under the by-laws, to disfran-

chise a member.' And upon the doctrine of the cases I have referred

to, I hold the by-law void so far as it inflicts this extreme penalty for

such an offense. I would be very sorry to say that anything short of

a statute could confer on a majority of the members of any corpora-

tion power to expel a fellow-member for merelv disorderly con-

duct. * • *

"But what is conclusive of this case is, that the corporation pos-

sesses property, real and personal, and is at liberty to accumulate

more, until an annual revenue of $3,000 comes to be enjoyed; and

the relator has purchased and paid for the right to participate in that

franchise. It is not a joint stock company at present, for under its

by-laws no pecuniary profits are divisible among the members, but it

may become so, and whether it does or not, the relator has a vested

interest in its estate, and can not be deprived of it by the proceedings

that were had against him. On this point the authorities are clear,

and without conflict. Nothing but an express power in the charter

can authorize a money corporation to throw overboard one of its

members. I have shown that the act of incorporation contained no

such power. On the contrary, it excluded it. for the proviso reads

'that nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to authorize

Digitized by

Go gle

Origillal frcm

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

§ 355

II7I

RIGHT TO MAKE BY-LAWS.

said Philadelphia Association and Reading-Room to do any other act
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or acts in their corporate capacity than are herein expressed.'

"For these reasons a peremptory mandamus must be awarded."

Affirmed by an equal division of the court in banc.

Note. As to right to provide by bv-laws for expulsion of members, see,

1810, Commonwealth v. St. Patrick's Soc, 2 Binuey (Pa.) 441,4 Am. Dec. 453;

1821, Delacy v. Neuse River Nav. Co., 1 Hawks (N. C.) 274, 9 Am. Dec. 636;

1836, In re Phil. Sav. Inst., 1 Whart. (Pa.i 461, 30 Am. Dec. 226; 1836. Black,

etc., Soc. v. Vandvke, 2 Whart. 312,30 Am. Dec. 263; 1857, Austin v. Searing,

16N.Y. 112,69Am Dec. 665, note$l\; 1866, Society, etc., v. Commonwealth, 52

Pa. St. 125, 91 Am. Dec. 139; 1869, State v. Georgia Med. Soc, 38 Ga. 608, 95

Am. Dec. 408, supra, p. 136, note 140; 1871, Dickenson v. Chamber of Com.,

29 Wis. 45, 9 Am. Rep. 544; 1872, Gregg v. Massachusetts M. Soc, 111 Mass.

185, 15 .Am. Rep. 24, note 27; 1888, Otto v. Journeyman, etc., Union, 75 Cal.

308, 7 Am. St. Rep. 156, note 160; 1890, Connelly v. Masonic, etc., Ben. Ass'n,

68 Conn. 552, 18 Am. St. Rep. 296; 1890, Common wealth v. Union League, 135

Pa. St. 301, 20 Am. St. Rep. 870; 1891, Huston v. Reutlinger, 91 Kv. 333, 34

Am. St. Rep. 225; 1892, Am. Live Stock Co. v. Chicago L. S. Ex., 143111.210,
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36 Am. St. Rep. 385, supra, p. 682; 1895, Ryan v. Cudahy, 157 111. 108, 48 Am.

St. Rep. 305; 1896, Jacltsori v. South Omaha L. S. Ex.,'49 Neb. 687; 1896,

Board of Trade of Chicago v. Nelson, 162 111. 431, 53 Am. St. Rep. 312; 1897,

Robinson v. Templar Lodge, 117 Cal. 370, 59 Am. St. Rep. 193, note 201; 1899,

Weiss v. Musical, etc, Union, 189 Pa. St. 446, 69 Am. St. Rep. 820.

Mandamus is the proper remedy to reinstate: 1821, Delacy v. Neuse Riv.

Nav. Co., 1 Hawks (N. C.) 274, 9 Am. Dec. 636; 1836, Black, etc., Soc. v. Van-

dyke, 2 Whart. (Pa.) 312, 30 Am. Dec. 263; 1869, State v. Georgia Med. Soc,

38 Ga. 608, 95 Am. Dec. 408, supra, 136; 1888, Otto v. Journeyman Tailors',

etc., Union, 75 Cal. 308,7 Am. St. Rep. 156; 1897, Robinson v. Templar Lodge,

117 Cal. 370, 59 Am. St. Rep. 193, note 201; 1899, Weiss v. Musical, etc., Union,

189 Pa. St. 446, 69 Am. St. Rep. 820.

The courts, however, will not generally interfere, unless there are property

rights involved, or for the purpose, and to the extent only, of ascertaining

that the proceedings were according to the rules and regulations, carried on

in good faith, and not in violation of the law of the land: 1857, Austin v.

Searing, 16 N. Y. 112, 69 Am. Dec. 665, note 671; 1877, Illinois, etc., Soc. v.

Baldwin, 86 111. 479; 1888, Otto v. Journeyman Tailors' Union, 75 Cal. 308, 7

Am. St. Rep. 156, note 160; 1890, Lewis v. Wilson, 121 N. Y. 284; 1890, Con-

nelly v. Masonic M. B. Ass'n, 58 Conn. 552, 18 Am. St. Rep. 296, note 201;

1895, Ryan v. Cudahy, 157 111. 108, 48 Am. St. Rep. 305; 1896, People v. N.

said Philadelphia Association and Reading-Room to do atry other aat
or acts in their corporate capacity than are herein expressed.'
"For these reasons a peremptory mandamus must be awarded.''
Affirmed by an equal division of the court in bane.
N ote. As to right to provide br, by-laws for ex:pulsion of members, see,
1810, Commouwealth v. St. Patrick s Soc., 2 Binney (Pa.) 441, 4 Am. Dec. 453;
1821, Delacy v. Neuse River Nav. Co., 1 Hawks (N. C.) 274, 9 Am. Dec. 636;
1836, Jn re Phil. Sav. Inst., 1 Whart. (Pa. 1 461, 30 Am. Dec. 226; 1836, Black,
etc., Soc. v. Vaud.v ke, 2 Whart. 312, 30 Am. Dec. 26::1; 1857, Austin v. Searing,
16 N. Y. 112,69 Am Dec. 66.5, note671: 1866, Society, etc., v. Commonwealth, 52
Pa. St. 125, 91 Am. Dec. 139; 1869, State v. Georgia Med. Soc., 38 Ga. 608, 95
Am. Dec. 408, supra, p. 136, note 140; 1871, Dickem1on v. Chamber of Com.,
29 Wis. 45, 9 Am. Rep. 544; 1872, Gregg v. Massachusetts M. Soc., 1 LI Mase.
185, 15 Am. Rep. 24, note 27; 1888, Otto v. Journeyman, etc., Union, 75 Cal.
308, 7 Am. St. Rep. 156, note 160; 1890, Connell y v. Masonic, etc., Ben. Ass'n,
58 Conn. 552, 18 Am. St. Rep. 296; 1890, Commonwealto v. Union League, 135
Pa. St. 301, 20 Am. St. Rep. 870; 1891, Huston -v. Reutlinge r, 91 Ky. 333, 34
Am. St. Rep. 225; 1892, Am. Live Stock Co. v. Chicago L. S. Ex:., 143 Ill . 210,
36 Am. St. Rep. 385, supra1 P· 682; 1891:), R_yan v. Cudahy'. 157 Ill. 108, 48 Am.
St. Rep. 305; 1896, Jackson v . South Omaha L. S. Ex. , 49 Neb. 687; 1896,
Board of Trade of Chicago v. Nelson, 162 Ill. 431, 58 Am . St. Rep. 312; 1897,
Robinson v . Templar Lod~e, 117 Cal. 3i0, 59 .Am. St. Re p. 193, note201; 1899,
Weiss v. Musical, etc., Umon, 189 Pa.. St. 446, 69 Am. St. Rep. 820.
Mandamus is the P.roper r~rnedy to reinstate: 1821, Delacy v. Neuse Riv.
Nav. Co., 1 Hawks (N. C.) 214, 9 Am. Dec. 636; 1836, Black, etc., Soc. v. Vandyke, 2 Whart. (Pa.) 312, 30 Am. Dec. 263; 1869, State v. Georgia Med. Soc.,
38 Ga. 608, 95 Am. Dec. 408, supra, 136; 1888, Otto v. Journeyman Tailors',
etc., Union, 75 Cal. 308, 7 Am. St. Rep. 156; 1897, Robinson v. Templar Lodge,
117 Cal. 370, 59 Am. St. Rep.193, note 201; 1899, Weif!B v. Musical, etc., Union ,
189 Pa. St. 446, 69 Am. St. Rep. 820.
The courts, however, will not generally interfere, unless there are property
rights involved, or for the purpose, and to the ext1ent only, of ascertaining
that the proceedings were according to the ntles and regulations, carried on
in good faith, and not in violation of the law of the land: 1857, Austin v.
Searin~, 16 N. Y. 112, 69 Am. Dec. 665, note 671; 1877, Illinois, etc., Soc. v.
Baldwm, 86 Ill. 479; 1888, Otto v. Journeyman Tailors' Union, 75 Cal. 30R, 7
Arn. St. Rep. 156, note 160; 1890, Lewis v. Wilson, 121 N. Y. 284; 1890, Connelly v. Masonic M. B. Ass'n, 58 Conn. 552, 18 Am. St. Rep. 296, note 201;
1895, Ryan v. Cudahy, 157 Ill. 108, 48 Am. St. Rep. a05; 1896, People v. N.
Y., etc., Exch., 149 N. Y. 401.

Y., etc., Exch., 149 N. Y. 401.

Sec. 355. 3. Validity of by-laws in general.

THE PEOPLE v. THE CHICAGO LIVE STOCK EXCHANGE.1

1897. In the Supreme Court of Illinois. 170 111. 556-571, 62

Sec. 355.

3. Validity of by-laws in general..

Am. St. Rep. 404.

[Petition for leave to file information in nature of quo warranto

THE PEOPLE v. THE CHICAGO LIVE STOCK EXCHANGE. 1

against the Live Stock Exchange, for assuming to enact and attempt-

ing to enforce without authority, a by-law prohibiting members from

employing trade solicitors not members of the association, limiting

1897.

IN

170 II~. 556-571, 62

THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

Am. St. Rep. 404.

1 Statement of facts abridged. Arguments and part of opinion omitted.

[Petition for leave to file information in nature of quo warranto
against the Live Stock Exchange, for assuming to enact and attempting to enforce without authority, a by-law prohibiting members from
employing trade solicitors not m e mbers of th e association, limiting
1
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the number of solicitors which may be employed by members in cer-

tain states, and providing that such solicitors must be paid a fixed
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salary, and not allowed to work on commission. It was claimed the

THE PEOPLE V. THE LIVE STOCK EXCHANGE.

§ 35 5

by-law was in restraint of trade, and interfered with the legal rights

the number of solicitors which may be employed by members in certain states , and providing that such solicitors must · be paid a fixed
salary, and not allowed to work on commission. It was claimed the
by-law was in restraint of trade, and interfered with the legal rights
of the members. The lower court held it valid, and denied the application. Appeal was taken from this judgment.]
PmLLJPS, C. J. • • • The common law refused to recognize restrictions upon trade and business among the citizens of a common country.
Under this rule of the common law the right of the laborer to dispose
of his skill and industry, and to contract in reference to the same with
whom he pleased and at such contract rates as might be agreed on,
was recognized and not allowed to be trammeled with restriction
which interfered with individual action and liberty. Combinations
and associations of men have no right to place restrictions upon the
right of an individual to contract and engage in business, employing
such means and agencies as are not prohibited by law. The natural flow
of trade and commerce must be unrestricted, and men engaged therein
may accelerate its current by all means not unlawful. To this end
men engaged in trade and commerce may advertise, employ men to
solicit business and offer rewards and inducements to secure trade
without violating the law of the land, and in so doing are exercising
a right which is in the interest of the public, because competition can
not be hostila to public interests. Efforts to prevent competition and
to restrict individual efforts and freedom of action in trade and commerce are restrictions hostile to the public welfare, not consonant with
the spirit of our institutions and in violation of law. • • •
In Rex v. Wardens of the Coopers' Co., 7 T. R. 543, it was held
that a by-law limiting the number of apprentices which any member
of the company might take was void. In the case of Tailors of
Ipswich, r I Coke 53 1 a corporation known as the Tailors of Ipswich
enacted a by-law to prohibit any tailor from exercising his trade until
he had presented himself before the corporation and proved that he
had served seven years as an apprentice. This by-law was held Yoid,
as being in restraint of trade. See, also, Gunmakers' Society v. Fell,
Willes 384. Sustaining the same propositions are Stanton v. Allen,
5 Denio 434; People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9; Morris Run Coal Co.
v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173; People, ex rel., v. Medical
Society of Erie, 24 Barb. 570.
A case similar to that now under consideration was before the court
of appeals of Kentucky in Huston v. Reutlinger, 15 S. W. Rep.
857. There the Louisville Board of Underwriters passed a by-law
which, among other things, prohibited local companies from employing more than one solicitor, and regulated the manner in which the
salary of such solicitor was to be paid. For a violation of thi s bylaw the offending member of the board would forfeit all rights as a
member of the association. A local company which had employed
more than one solicitor sought to enjoin the enforcement of the forfeiture on the ground that the association had no authority to control
the members in the employment of solicitors, etc. A decree was en-

of the members. The lower court held it valid, and denied the ap-

plication. Appeal was taken from this judgment.]

Phillips, C. J. * * * The common law refused to recognize restric-

tions upon trade and business among the citizens of a common country.

Under this rule of the common law the right of the laborer to dispose

of his skill and industry, and to contract in reference to the same with

whom he pleased and at such contract rates as might be agreed on,

was recognized and not allowed to be trammeled with restrictions

which interfered with individual action and liberty. Combinations

and associations of men have no right to place restrictions upon the

right of an individual to contract and engage in business, employing

such means and agencies as are not prohibited by law. The natural flow

of trade and commerce must be unrestricted, and men engaged therein

may accelerate its current by all means not unlawful. To this end

men engaged in trade and commerce may advertise, employ men to

solicit business and offer rewards and inducements to secure trade
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without violating the law of the land, and in so doing are exercising

a right which is in the interest of the public, because competition can

not be hostile to public interests. Efforts to prevent competition and

to restrict individual efforts and freedom of action in trade and com-

merce are restrictions hostile to the public welfare, not consonant with

the spirit of our institutions and in violation of law. » • •

In Rex v. Wardens of the Coopers' Co., 7 T. R. 543, it was held

that a by-law limiting the number of apprentices which any member

of the company might take was void. In the case of Tailors of

Ipswich, 11 Coke 53, a corporation known as the Tailors of Ipswich

enacted a by-law to prohibit any tailor from exercising his trade until

he had presented himself before the corporation and proved that he

had served seven years as an apprentice. This by-law was held void,

as being in restraint of trade. See, also, Gunmakers' Society v. Fell,

Willes 384. Sustaining the same propositions are Stanton v. Allen,

5 Denio 434; People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9; Morris Run Coal Co.

v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173; People, ex re/., v. Medical

Society of Erie, 24 Barb. 570.

A case similar to that now under consideration was before the court

of appeals of Kentucky in Huston v. Reutlinger, 15 S. W. Rep.

857. There the Louisville Board of Underwriters passed a by-law

which, among other things, prohibited local companies from employ-

ing more than one solicitor, and regulated the manner in which the

salary of such solicitor was to be paid. For a violation of this by-

law the offending member of the board would forfeit all rights as a

member of the association. A local company which had employed

more than one solicitor sought to enjoin the enforcement of the for-

feiture on the ground that the association had no authority to control

the members in the employment of solicitors, etc. A decree was en-
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tered in accordance with the prayer of the bill, which, on appeal, was

affirmed, the court saying: "The majority of the members, under the

guise of producing harmony in this business association, have taken
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from their individual members the right to determine how many men

they shall employ in their private business, and then only such as the

association may think fit for the position. Nor can they employ a

solicitor for a less period than six months, or offer a solicitor employ-

ment within twelve months after the solicitor has severed his connec-

tion with any member; are compelled to discharge those in their em-

ploy if they have more than one; and, if these by-laws are enforced,

have placed their business under the control of the majority vote of

the association—a power the exercise of which was not given by the

fundamental law of the order, and doubtless not contemplated when

the association was formed. * * * The common law rule, recog-

nized and adopted when business relations were not so multiplied and

extensive as now and when less necessity existed for enforcing it, con-

demned all such restrictions upon trade and business intercourse with

men as is found to exist in this case. The right of one to control his

own property as he pleases, and to employ those necessary to aid him

in his business upon such terms as may be agreed upon, when not in
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violation of the law of the land, is the rule of the common law, and

the right of the laborer to dispose of his skill and industry to whom

he pleases and for the price agreed on is embraced within the same

rule. In all classes of business the employer and employee should be

allowed to contract with each other unrestrained by others who may

demand that the one shall give more or the other receive less, and, as

a general rule, when restrictions are placed upon their rights by com-

binations or associations of men, they will be regarded as in violation

of law, and void."

When a corporation is created there goes with it the power to enact

by-laws for its government and guidance as well as for the guidance

and government of its members. This power is necessary to enable

a corporation to accomplish the purpose of its creation. But by-laws

must be reasonable and for a corporate purpose, and always within

charter limits. They must always be strictly subordinate to the con-

stitution and the general law of the land. They must not infringe

the policy of the state nor be hostile to public welfare. The by-law

in this case is a restriction on freedom of trade and business. It

trammels competition and prohibits an i?idividual from contracting

and engaging in business, and from using such agencies and means

he may desire not hostile to general law. It is not required for cor-

porate purposes, nor is it included within the purposes declared in the

certificate of incorporation. It is, therefore, unlawful, as this cor-

poration had no right to exercise this power of enacting it under its

franchise. * * *

Petition should have been granted.

Reversed and remanded.

Note. Validity of by-laics in general: They must be reasonable, not violate

charter, statute or common law rules, operate uniformly and not be in re-

tered in accordance with the prayer of the bill, which, on appeal, was
affirmed, the court saying: "The majority of the members, under the
guise of producing harmony in this business association, have taken
from their individual members the right to determine how -many men
they shall employ in their private business, and then only such as the
association may think fit for the position. Nor can they employ a
solicitor for a less period than six months, or offer a solicitor employment within twelve months after the solicitor has severed his connection with any member; are compelled to discharge those in their employ if they have more than one; and, if these by-laws are enforced,
have placed their business under the control of the majority vote of
the association-a power the exercise of which was not given by the
fundamental law of the order, and doubtless not contemplated when
the association was formed. • • • The common law rule, recognized and adopted when business relations were not so multiplied and
extensive as now and when less necessity existed for enforcing it, condemned all such restrictions upon trade and business intercourse with
m en as is found to exist in this case. The right of one to control his
own property as he pleases, and to employ those necessary to aid him
in his business upon such terms as may be agreed upon, when not in
violation of the law of the land, is the rule of the common law , and
the right of the laborer to dispose of his skill and indu stry to whom
he pleases and for the price agreed on is embraced within the same
rule. In all classes of business the employer and employee should be
allowed to contract with each other unrestrained by others who m ay
demand that the one shall give more or the other receive less, and, as
a general rule, when restrictions are placed upon their rights by combinations or associations of men, they will be regarded as in violation
of law, and void."
When a corporation is created there goes with it the power to enact
by-laws for its government and guidance as well as for the guidance
and government of its members. This power is necessary to enable
a corporation to accomplish the purpose of its creation. B ut by-laws
must be reasonable and f or a corporate purpose, and always witltt"n
charter limt'ts. Th ey must always be strictly subordinate to the constitut£on and tlte general law of the land. They must not infringe
the pol£cy of the state nor be hostile to publt'c welfare. Tlie by-law
t'n this case t's a restriction on freedom of trade and bust'ness. It
trammels competitt'on and prolit'bits an individual from contracting
and engagt'ng t'n business, and from ust'ng such agendes and means
he may desfre not lwstt'lc to general law. It is not required for corporate purposes, nor is it included within the purposes declared in the
certificate of incorporation. It is , therefore , unlawful , as this corporation had no rig ht to exercise this power of enacting it under its
franchi se. • • •
Petition should have been g ranted.
Reversed and remanded.
Note. Validity of by-laws in ge11eml : They must be reasonable, not violate
charter, statute or common law rules, operate uniformly and not be in re-
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straint of trade: 1837, Matter of L. I. R., 19 Wend. 37, 32 Am. Dec. 429; 1848,

strnint of trade: 1837, Matter of L. I. R., 19 Wend . 37, 32 Am. Dec. -429; 1848,
Palmetto Lodge v. Hubbell, 2 Strob. (S. C.i 457, 49 Am. Dec. 604; 1854, State
v. Overton, 4 Zabr. (N. J.) 435, 61 Am. Dec. 671; 1863, Sayre v. Louis\·ille
Benev. Assn., 1 Duvall (Ky.) 143, 85 Am. Dec. 613, 1wte617; 1887, Buddv.
Mn ltnomah St. R. Co., 15 Ore. 413, 3 Am. St. Rep. 169, infra, p . . JotiU; l!S\I:.:!
Am. Live 8tock Co. v. Chicago L. S. Ex., 14.'l Ill. 210, 36 Am. St. Rep. 385;
189·5, Durkee v. People, 155 Ill. 354, 46 Am. St. Rep. 340; 1897, McNulta v.
Corn Eelt Bank, 164 HI. 427, 56 Am. St. Rep. 203; 1897, People v. Chicago,
etc., Exchange, 170 Ill. 556, 62 Am. St. Rep. 404, suvra, p. 1171; 1897, Wells v.
Black, 117 Cal. 157, 59 Am. St. Rep. 162; 1897, King v. Internat'l Bldg.
Union, 170 Ill. 135, 7 Am. & E. C. C. <N. S. l 526; 1899, Northport, etc., Assn.
v. Perkins, 93 Maine :.!35, 74 Am. St. Rep. 342; 1899, Herring v: Ru skin Co-op.
Assn., --Tenn. Ch. App.--, 52 S. W. Rep. 327; 1899, Bailey v. Assn . of
Master P!3rnbers, IOa Tenn. U9, 46 L. R. A. 561.
But if they are authorized by the charter, the courts can not set them as.i de
as unreasonable: 1899, Burden v. Burden , 159 N. Y. 287.
By-laws can not modify vested rights arising under contracts, change terms
as to dividends, increase or decrease liability of shareholders, or enlarge corporate powers: 11168, Flint v. Pierce, 99 Mass. 68, 96 Am. Dec. 691, infra,
p. 1174; 1887, Hazeltine v. Belfast R. Co., 79 Maine 411, l Am. St. Rep. 330;
1897, W ells v. Hlack, 117 Cal. 157, 69 Am. St. Rep. 162; 1899, Steinerv.
Steiner L. & L. Co., 120 Ala. 128, 26 So. Rep. 494; 1899, State v. Citizens' Bank,
51 La. Ann. 426, 25 So. Rep. 318.

Palmetto Lodge v. Hubbell, 2 Strob. (S. C.i 457, 49 Am. Dec. 604; 1854, State

v. Overton, 4 Zabr. (N. J.) 435, 61 Am. Dec. 671; 1863, Sayre v. Louisville

Benev. Assn., 1 Duvall (Kv.) 143, 85 Am. Dec. 613, note 617; 1887, Budd v.

Multnomah St. R. Co., 15 Ore. 413, 3 Am. St. Rep. 169, infra, p. 1569; l»y2

Am. Live Stock Co. v. Chicago L. S. Ex., 143 111. 210, 36 Am. St. Rep. 385;

1895, Durkee v. People, 155 111. 354, 46 Am. St. Rep. 340; 1897, McNulta v.

Corn Belt Bank, 164 111. 427 , 56 Am. St. Rep. 203; 1897, People v. Chicago,

etc., Exchange, 170 111.556,62 Am. St. Rep.404, supra, p. 1171; 1897, Wells v.

Black, 117 Cal. 157,59 Am. St. Rep. 162; 1897, King v. Internat'l Bldg.

Union, 170 111. 135, 7 Am. & E.C. C. <N. S.I 526; 1899, Northport, etc., Assn.

v. Perkins, 93 Maine 235, 74 Am. St. Rep. 342; 1899, Herring v. Ruskin Co-op.

Assn., — Tenn. Ch. App. ,52 S. W. Rep. 327; 1899, Bailey v. Assn. of

Master Plumbers, 103 Tenn. 99, 46 L. R. A. 561.

But if thev are authorized by the charter, the courts can not set them aside

as unreasonable: 1899, Burden v. Burden, 159 N. Y. 287.

By-laws can not modify vested rights arising under contracts, change terms

as to dividends, increase or decrease liability of shareholders, or enlarge cor-
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porate powers: 1H68, Flint v. Pierce, 99 Mass. 68, 96 Am. Dec. 691, infra,

p. 1174; 1887, Hazeltine v. Belfast R. Co., 79 Maine 411, 1 Am. St. Rep. 330;

1897, Wells v. Black, 117 Cal. 157,59 Am. St. Rep. 162; 1899, Steiner v.

Steiner L. & L. Co., 120 Ala. 128, 26 So. Rep. 494; 1899, State v. Citizens' Bank,

51 La. Ann. 426, 25 So. Rep. 318.
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1868. In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 99

4. Effect of by-laws.

Mass. Rep. 68-71, 96 Am. Dec. 691.

[Suit by Flint against Pierce for balance of a loan due on a note

SAMUEL FLINT v. JAMES PIERCE.1

given in 1862 by a corporation of which Pierce was a member, and had

signed a by-law providing that "The members of this association

1868. IN

pledge themselves, in their individual as well as collective capacity, to

THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

99

Mass. Rep. 68-71, 96 Am. Dec. 691.

be responsible for all moneys loaned to this association."]

Wells, J. The note upon which this action is based is the con-

tract of the corporation. The defendant is not a party to that con-

(Suit by Flint against Pierce for balance of a loan due on a note
given in 1862 by a corporation of which Pierce was a member, and had
signed a by-law providing that "The members of this association
pledge themselves, in their individual as well as collective capacity, to
be responsible for all moneys loaned to this association."]
vVELLS, J.
The note upon which this action is based is the contract of the corporation. The defendant is not a party to that contract; and the plaintiff does not seek, by this suit, to charge him upon
any statute liability as a stockholder. Responsibility for the amount
of the note is sought to be established through a by-law of the corporation , to which the defendant had attached his signature. This bylaw, with others, wa s adopted in i831. To become a member of the
association it was requisite to subscribe the by-laws. It does not app ear that the defendant's signature was attached for any other purpose
than to constitute him a member of the corporation. It does not appear, and is not alleged, that the plaintiff lent his money upon the
faith or credit of the individual pledge contained in the by-law; nor
that the by-law was in :my manner made known to him, or to the
public, as the· basis of such credit.

tract; and the plaintiff does not seek, by this suit, to charge him upon

any statute liability as a stockholder. Responsibility for the amount

of the note is sought to be established through a by-law of the corpo-

ration, to which the defendant had attached his signature. This by-

law, with others, was adopted in 1831. To become a member of the

association it was requisite to subscribe the by-laws. It does not ap-

pear that the defendant's signature was attached for any other purpose

than to constitute him a member of the corporation. It does not ap-

pear, and is not alleged, that the plaintiff lent his money upon the

faith or credit of the individual pledge contained in the by-law; nor

that the by-law was in any manner made known to him, or to the

public, as the basis of such credit.

1 Statement abridged. Arguments and part of opinion omitted.
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The office of a by-law is to regulate the conduct and define the

UGHT TO MAKE BY-LAWS.

duties of the members towards the corporation and between them-

I 17 5

selves. So far as its provisions are in the nature of contract, the

parties thereto are the members of the association, as between them-

selves; or the corporation upon the one side and its individual mem-

bers upon the other. The right of any third party, stranger to the

association, to establish a legal claim through such a by-law, must

depend upon the general principles applicable to express contracts, as

laid down in Mellen v. Whipple, i Gray 317, and the subsequent

decisions in Field v. Crawford, 6 Gray 116, and Dow v. Clark, 7

Gray 198. No action can be maintained by such third party unless

he can bring his case within some of the recognized exceptions to

that general rule. A pledge like the one in question, if made for the

purpose of enabling the corporation to obtain a loan upon the faith of

it, and used for that purpose, may perhaps give a right of action

against the subscribers in favor of a party who has been induced to

advance money upon its credit. This seems to be implied strongly

by the decision in the case of Trustees of Free Schools in Andover

v. Flint, 13 Met. 543, inasmuch as the plaintiff in that case appears
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to have failed to recover upon a similar claim merely for the reason

that the defendant had not signed the by-law. But no such facts are

shown to exist in the present case. The plaintiff not only is no party

to the contract contained in the by-law, but he fails to show any priv-

ity between himself and the defendant in relation to the subject-matter,

or to the consideration, of his demand. Judgment must be rendered

accordingly for the defendant.

Note. Effect of by-laws.

(a) As to members, they are generally held to be charged with notice

of the provisions of the by-laws, and be bound by them, if valid: 1854,

Came v. Brigham, 39 Maine 35; 1859, Anacosta Tribe v. Murbach, 13 Md.

91, 71 Am. Dec. 625; 1884, Wetherly v. Med. & Sur. Soc, 76 Ala. 567;

1887, Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McSherry, 68 Md. 41; 1888, Supreme Lodge

K. of P. v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489, 3 L. R. A. 409; 1888, Miller v. Hillsboro

Mut. F. Assn., 44 N. J. Eq. 224; 1889, Pfister v. Gerwig, 122 Ind. 567;

1893, Matthews v. Assoc. Press, 136 N. Y. 333; 1894, Mandel v. Swan, L. &

C. Co., 51 111. App. 204.

But see, 1891, Pearsall v. W. U. Tel. Co., 124 N. Y. 256, 21 Am. St. Rep. 662;

1891, Ruddv. Robinson, 126 N. Y. 113,22 Am. St. Rep. 816; 1894, People's

Home Sav. Bk. v. Sup. Ct., 104 Cal. 649, 43 Am. St. Rep. 147, note 152.

(b) As to third parties, those having no notice of by-laws are not affected by

their provisions: 1856, Worcester v. Essex Merrimac B. Co., 7 Gray (Mass.)

457; 1869, Samuel v. Holladay, Fed. Cas. 12288; 1892, Am. Liv. St. Co. v.

Chicago L. S. Ex., 143 111. 210, 36 Am. St. Rep. 385; 1893, Metropole B. & T. B.

Co. v. Garden Citv, etc., 50 111. App. 681; 1898, Barnes v. Black D. Coal Co.,

101 Tenn. 354, 47 8. W. Rep. 498; 1898, Ireland v. Globe Milling Co., 21 R.

1.9,41 AO. Rep. 258; 1899, Northport, etc., Assn. v. Perkins, 93 Maine 235,

Rep. 74 Am. St. Rep. 342.

But see, contra, 1857, Cummings v. Webster, 43 Maine 192; 1885, Haden v.

Farmers' & M. F. Assn., 80 Va. 683.

«

The office of a by-law is to regulate the conduct and define the
duties of the members towards the corporation and between themselves. So far as its provisions are in the nature of contract, the
parties thereto are the members of the association, as between themselves; or the corporation upon the one side and its individual members upon the other. The right of any third party, stranger to the
association, to establish a legal claim through such a by-law, must
depend upon the general principles applicable to express contracts, as
laid down in Mellen v. Whipple, 1 Gray 317, and the subsequent
decisions in Field v. Crawford, 6 Gray 1161 and Dow v. Clark, 7
Gray 198. No action can be maintained by such third party unless
he can bring his case within some of the recognized exceptions to
that general rule. A pledge like the one in question, if made for the
purpose of enabling the corporation to obtain a loan upon the faith of
it, and used for that purpose, may perhaps give a right of action
against the subscribers in favor of a party who has been induced to
advance money upon its credit. This seems to be implied strongly
by the decision in the case of Trustees of Free Schools in Andover
v. Flint, 13 Met. 543, inasmuch as the plaintiff in that case appears
to have failed to recover upon a similar claim merely for the reason
that the defendant had not signed the by-law. But no such facts are
shown to exist in the present case. The plaintiff not only is no party
to the contract contained in the by-law, but he fails to show any privity between himself and the defendant in relation to the subject-matter,
or to the consideration, of his demand. Judgment must be rendered
accordingly for the defendant.
Note. Effeci of by-laws.
(a) As to members, they are generally held to be charged with notice
of the provisions of the by-laws, and be bound by them, if valid: 1854,
Came v. Brigham, 39 Maine 35; 18.59, Anacosta Tribe v. Murbach, 13 Md.
91, 71 Am. Dec. 625; 1884, Wetherly v. Med. & Sur. Soc., 76 Ala. 567;
1887, Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McSherry, 68 Md. 41; 1888, Supreme Lodge
K. of P. v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489, 3 L. R. ~. 409; 1888, Miller v. Hillsboro
Mut. F. Assn. , 44 N. J. Eq. 224; 1889, Pfister v. Gerwig, 122 Ind. 567;
1893, Matthews v. Assoc. Press, 136 N. Y. 333; 1894, Mandel v. Swan, L. &
C. Co., 51 Ill . App. 204.
But see, 1891, Pearsall v. W. U. Tel. Co., 124 N. Y . 256, 21 ..\m. St. Rep. 662;
1891, Rudd v. Robinson, 126 N. Y. 113, 22 Am. St. Rep. 816; 1894, People's
Home Sav. Bk. v. Sup. Ct., 104Cal. 649, 43 Am. St. Rep. 147, note 152.
(b) A.~ to third parties, those having no notice of by-Jaws are not affectfld by
their provisiomi: 1856, Worcester v. Essex Merrimnc B. Co., 7 Gray (l\fass.)
45i; 1869, Samuel v. Holladay, Fed. Cas. 12288; 1892, Am. Liv. St. Co. v.
Chicag0 L. S. Ex., 143 Ill. 210, 36 Am. St. Rep. :~8·5; 1893, Metropole B. & T. B.
Co. v. Garden Cit~·. etc., 50 Ill . App. 681; 1898, Barnes v. Black D. Coal Co.,
101 Tenn. 354, 47 8 . W. Rep. 498; 1898, Ireland v. Globe Milling Co., 21 R .
1.9,41. Atl. Rep. 258; 1899, Northport, etc., Assn. v. Perkins,93 Maine 235,
Rep. 74 Am. St. Rep. 342.
But see, contra, 1857, Cummings v. Webster,43 Maine 192; 1885, Haden v.
Farmers' & M. F. Asen., 80 Va. 683.
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OF MEMBERS.

See State v. Georgia Med. Soc, 38 Ga. 608, 95 Am. Dec. 408,

supra, p. 136, note 140; White v. Brownell, 2 Daly 329, supra,

ARTJCL£ 1.X.

p. 187; Belton v. Hatch, 109 N. Y. 593, 4 Am. St. Rep. 495. supra,

DISFRANCIDSBVENT OF MEMBERS.

p. 178; American Live Stock Co. v. Chicago L. S. Ex., 143 111. 210.

See State v. Georgia Med. Soc., 38 Ga. 6o8, 95 Am. Dec. 4o8,
supra, p. 136 note 140; White v. Brownell, 2 Daly 329 supra,
p. 187; Belton v . Hatch, 109 N . Y. 593 1 4 Am. St. Rep. 495. supra,
p. 178; American Live Stock Co. v. Chicago L. S. Ex., 143 Ill. :u o,
36 Am. St. Rep. 241 1 supra, p. 682; Evans v. The Philadelphia
Club, 50 Pa. St. t07 1 supra, p. u65, and note, p. 1171.

36 Am. St. Rep. 241, supra, p. 682; Evans v. The Philadelphia

Club, 50 Pa. St. 107, supra, p. 1165, and note, p. 1171.
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